

**Family Centredness and Democratisation  
across Cultures & Generations:  
Investigation of the Impacts of Macro- &  
Individual-Level Factors**

**Miriam Sang-Ah Park  
School of Social Sciences  
Brunel University**

**Thesis Submitted for the Award of  
PhD Degree in Psychology**

**2010**

## DECLARATION

I, *Miriam Sang-Ah Park* originally carried out the research reported in this thesis under the supervision of *Professor Robin Goodwin* at the School of Social Sciences, Brunel University. This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or qualification at any other University. Any assertions or research represented that are not my own are duly acknowledged and referenced. Any errors found therein must be solely ascribed to me.

**Some of the ideas and results presented in this thesis (Study I, parts of Study III) have been accepted for publication in the following:**

[Forthcoming] Park, M.S., Goodwin, R., Harsanyi, S.G. & Kim, J. (2011). Macro-Level Factors & Their Influences on Family Perceptions in Two Cultures. *Psychological Research Records (PRR)*.

[Forthcoming] Park, M.S. & Ohtaka, M. Values, Political Beliefs & Family Perceptions. (2011). In Klicperova-Baker, M. (Ed.). *Publication title to be confirmed*.

## **DEDICATION**

To my wonderful family,  
the source of my inspiration, motivation, and joy in life

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My deepest gratitude goes to all those who have shone me a light in the dark on this long but meaningful journey

Professor Robin Goodwin, my supervisor, the 'watchman/lighthouse'- for his guidance and insight enabled me to complete this journey

Dr. Tara Marshall, Dr. Christopher Lo (University of Toronto), Dr. Stanley O. Gaines, Professor Marta Fulop (Hungarian Academy of Sciences, ELTE), and Professor Jae Hwi Kim (Choong-Ang University) - for their invaluable comments and advice

Collaborators- Szabolcs Gergő Harsányi, Jung-Ae Kim, Ohtaka Mizuka, Greg Bonn, and the staff from Choong-Ang and Kyung-Sang Universities, who allowed me so much of their time, energy, and patience

For all those who are dear to me- Kevin, for his constant care and support, Ayla, Mary, Hugh, Soo-Am, Yoo-Seung, Sr. Danielle, Father Kim Woo-Sung and many more, for their warm friendship and encouragements

My mother, whose insight and wisdom has nurtured and strengthened me

And God, for giving me all the love and wonderful gifts in life

# CONTENTS

<i>Declaration</i> .....	<i>ii</i>
<i>Dedication</i> .....	<i>iii</i>
<i>Acknowledgements</i> .....	<i>iv</i>
<b>Abstract</b> .....	<b>x</b>

## CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS

Chapter 1 .....	1
Introduction to the thesis .....	1
1.0 <i>Introduction</i> .....	1
1.1 <i>Family views and attitudes: Family centredness and democratisation</i> 1	
1.2 <i>Key Theoretical Issues to be addressed</i> .....	2
1.3 <i>Variables and their influences on family views and attitudes</i> .....	4
1.3.1 <i>Cultural impact</i> .....	4
1.3.2 <i>Individual-level factors and their influence on family views and attitudes</i> .....	6
1.3.3 <i>Gender &amp; age effects</i> .....	7
1.3.4 <i>Social change</i> .....	8
1.4 <i>Summary</i> .....	10
1.5 <i>Outlines of the following chapters</i> .....	11
Chapter 2 .....	12
Review of the literature.....	12
Part I: Discussion of the Macro-Level Factors .....	12
& Their Influences .....	12
2.1.0 <i>Macro-level variables</i> .....	12
2.1.1 <i>Culture</i> .....	13
2.1.1.1 <i>Definition &amp; significance</i> .....	13
2.1.1.2 <i>Dimensions of Individualism-Collectivism</i> .....	15
2.1.1.3 <i>Culture &amp; the family</i> .....	17
2.1.2 <i>Social change</i> .....	19
2.1.3 <i>Economic development &amp; childhood experiences</i> .....	22
2.1.4 <i>Gender</i> .....	25
PART II: Cultures under.....	28
Consideration .....	28
2.2.0 <i>Cultures under consideration</i> .....	28
2.2.1 <i>Cross-Cultural Comparisons</i> .....	30
2.2.1.1 <i>Socioeconomic Change</i> .....	30
2.2.1.2 <i>Cultural background</i> .....	31
2.2.2 <i>South Korea</i> .....	32
2.2.3 <i>Japan</i> .....	35
2.2.4 <i>Canada</i> .....	37

2.2.5	<i>Hungary: An ex-Communist country</i> .....	38
Part III:	Discussion of the Individual-Level Factors,.....	40
Family Centredness	.....	40
& Democratisation	.....	40
2.3.0	<i>Introduction</i> .....	40
2.3.1	<i>Values</i> .....	40
2.3.2	<i>Postmodernist Values</i> .....	44
2.3.3	<i>Intergenerational Value Changes</i> .....	49
2.3.4	<i>Self beliefs</i> .....	53
2.3.5	<i>Political Beliefs</i> .....	57
Part IV:	.....	61
Family Views and Attitudes:	.....	61
Family Centredness and Democratisation	.....	61
2.4.0	<i>Introduction</i> .....	61
2.4.1	<i>Aspects of family views and attitudes</i> .....	62
2.4.1.1	History of family.....	62
2.4.1.2	Family centredness.....	63
2.4.1.3	Family importance, commitment & dependence.....	65
2.4.1.4	Family democratisation.....	66
2.4.2	<i>Family changes</i> .....	67
2.5	<i>Conceptual model</i> .....	72
Chapter 3	.....	74
Study I	.....	74
3.1	<i>Research aim</i> .....	74
3.2	<i>Variables</i> .....	75
3.2.1	<i>Culture</i> .....	75
3.2.2	<i>Social change/ Economic development</i> .....	76
3.2.3	<i>Gender</i> .....	76
3.2.4	<i>Postmodernist Values</i> .....	77
3.2.5	<i>Political beliefs</i> .....	79
3.2.6	<i>Family centredness &amp; democratisation</i> .....	82
3.2.6.1	Family centredness.....	82
3.2.6.2	Family democratisation.....	83
3.3	<i>Hypotheses</i> .....	84
3.4	<i>Methodology</i> .....	86
3.4.1	<i>Participants</i> .....	86
3.4.2	<i>Questionnaire</i> .....	87
3.4.2.1	Individualism (IDV):.....	88
3.4.2.2	Demographic Information:.....	88
3.4.2.3	Family Centredness and Democratisation.....	88
3.4.2.4	Postmodernist Values:.....	89
3.4.2.5	Political Beliefs:.....	90
3.5	<i>Analysis</i> .....	91
3.6	<i>Results</i> .....	92

3.6.1	<i>Correlations between the variables</i> .....	92
3.6.2	<i>MANOVA- Culture &amp; gender effects- group differences</i> .....	93
3.6.2.1	Values and Beliefs .....	93
3.6.2.2.	Family centredness and democratisation .....	97
3.6.3	<i>Model fitting</i> .....	100
3.6.4	<i>SEM results</i> .....	105
3.7	<i>Discussion</i> .....	106
3.8	<i>Concluding Remarks &amp; Plans for the Following Studies</i> .....	112
CHAPTER 4 .....		116
STUDY II .....		116
4.1	<i>Research aim</i> .....	116
4.2	<i>New variables</i> .....	119
4.2.1	<i>Schwartz' Values</i> .....	119
4.2.2	<i>Self-beliefs</i> .....	119
4.3	<i>Discussion of intergenerational change: Values &amp; beliefs</i> .....	120
4.4	<i>Family centredness expanded &amp; family democratisation</i> .....	123
4.4.1	<i>Roles within the family, gender attitudes &amp; roles, &amp; family democratisation</i> .....	123
4.4.2	<i>Family centredness: Importance, commitment &amp; dependence</i> .....	124
4.4.3	<i>Generations and families</i> .....	125
4.5	<i>Hypotheses</i> .....	126
4.6	<i>Methodology</i> .....	130
4.6.1	<i>Participants</i> .....	130
4.6.2	<i>Questionnaire &amp; measurement</i> .....	131
4.6.2.1	Country-Level Economic Growth: .....	132
4.6.2.2	Culture (Individualism versus Collectivism): .....	133
4.6.2.3	Demographic information: .....	133
4.6.2.4	Schwartz' Values: .....	133
4.6.2.5	Postmodernist Values:.....	134
4.6.2.6	Political interest/Democratic beliefs: .....	134
4.6.2.7	Self-beliefs/ Relatedness, autonomy & Autonomous-Related Self: .....	135
4.6.2.8	Family centredness: perceived importance, dependence, and com mitment, & family democratisation:.....	135
4.7.0	<i>Analyses &amp; results</i> .....	137
4.7.1	<i>MANOVA: Analyses by culture and gender</i> .....	137
4.7.1.1	Values and beliefs .....	137
4.7.1.2	Family centredness and democratisation .....	144
4.7.2	<i>Family views and attitudes: Factor analysis</i> .....	147
4.7.3	<i>SEM: Final structural equation model</i> .....	149
4.7.3.1	SEM & the models.....	149
4.7.3.2	Model fitting.....	149

4.8	<i>Discussion &amp; further remarks</i> .....	151
	Chapter 5 .....	158
	Study III .....	158
5.1	<i>Research Aim</i> .....	158
5.2	<i>Hypotheses</i> .....	161
5.3	<i>Methodology</i> .....	164
5.3.1	<i>Participants</i> .....	164
5.3.2	<i>Questionnaire</i> .....	165
5.3.2.1	<i>Country-level economic growth:</i> .....	165
5.4	<i>Analysis</i> .....	166
5.5	<i>Results</i> .....	167
5.5.1	<i>Values and Beliefs</i> .....	167
5.5.2	<i>Family Centredness and Democratisation</i> .....	172
5.5.3	<i>Factor analysis: Family variables</i> .....	175
5.5.4	<i>Testing of the model: Structural equation modelling (SEM)</i> .....	176
5.5.5	<i>Multi-group analysis</i> .....	181
5.6	<i>Discussion</i> .....	182
5.6.1	<i>Discussion of the findings</i> .....	182
5.6.2	<i>Cross-cultural differences</i> .....	183
5.6.3	<i>Links between culture, social change, and family views and attitudes</i> .....	184
5.6.4	<i>Conclusion</i> .....	185
	Chapter 6 .....	191
	Conclusion, Implications,.....	191
	& Caveats.....	191
6.1	<i>Summary of major findings and issues arising from the findings</i> .....	191
Study I	.....	192
Study II	.....	194
Study III	.....	196
6.2	<i>Implications of the present research &amp; its findings</i> .....	197
6.3	<i>Major Contributions of the Current Work</i> .....	202
6.4	<i>Methodological issues &amp; suggestions for future studies</i> .....	207
	Appendix 1 a) .....	235
	Appendix 1 b) .....	239



## List of Tables & Figures

Figure 2.1 Cultural Impact .....	18
Figure 2.2 Impacts of Social Change .....	22
Figure 2.3 Impacts of Family Affluence .....	25
Figure 2.4 Gender and Its Influence on Family .....	27
Figure 2.5 Schwartz' Value Dimensions & Interrelated Variables .....	43
Figure 2.6 Postmodernist Values & Interrelated Variables.....	49
Figure 2.7 Age/Generation Effects .....	53
Figure 2.8 Autonomous-Related Self & Interrelated Variables .....	56
Figure 2.9 Political Beliefs and Interconnected Variables.....	60
Figure 2.10: Conceptual Model (Overall Hypothesis) .....	73
Table 3.1: Means and Standard Deviations of All Variables .....	96
Table 3.2: Correlations between All Variables.....	96
.....	97
Figure 3.1: Values and Beliefs by Culture .....	97
Figure 3.2: Family Democratisation & Centredness by Gender .....	99
Figure 3.3: Family Democratisation by Culture .....	99
Table 3.3: Model Fit of the Measurement Model I & Full SEM Models I and II	101
Figure 3.4: Measurement Model I.....	102
Figure 3.5: SEM Model I.....	103
Figure 3.6: SEM Model II.....	104
Table 4.1: Means and Standard Deviations (in parentheses) of All Variables in Study II .....	138
Table 4.2: Correlations between All Variables.....	138
Figure 4.1: Values and Beliefs by Generation .....	141
Figure 4.2: Values and Beliefs by Gender X Generation .....	143
Figure 4.3: Values and Beliefs by Culture X Generation .....	143
Figure 4.4: Family Views by Culture.....	146
Figure 4.5: Measurement Model (Variables consisting of Family Items) ....	148
Table 4.3: Fit Indices for the Measurement Model.....	152
Figure 4.6: SEM I .....	153
Figure 5.1: Conceptual Model .....	164
Table 5.1: Means and Standard Deviations (in parentheses) of All Variables in Study III .....	170
Table 5.2: Correlation Table for All Variables in Study III .....	170
Figure 5.2: Values and Beliefs by Gender .....	171
Figure 5.3: Values and Beliefs by Culture .....	171
Figure 5.4: Family Views by Culture X Gender.....	172
Figure 5.5: Family Views by Culture.....	174
Table 5.3: Factor Items and Loadings .....	177
Table 5.4: Model Fit of the Measurement Model & the Structural Model ....	179
Figure 5.6: Structural Equation Model .....	180
Figure 5.7: Multi-group Analysis (British).....	187
Figure 5.8: Multi-group Analysis (Koreans) .....	188
Figure 5.9: Multi-group Analysis (Japanese) .....	189
Figure 5.10: Multi-group Analysis (Canadians).....	190

## ABSTRACT

What are the factors that shape views and attitudes toward the family, and how are these views and attitudes influenced in changing cultures? Do culture, social change/economic development, childhood experiences, and gender influence family centredness and democratisation? Are there different levels of factors that impact on family centredness and democratisation? If so, how are these factors interlinked? The studies discussed in detail in this thesis investigated family perceptions across cultures and generations, looking closely into specific aspects of family views and attitudes and various factors that impact on them.

This thesis attempts to answer these questions by conducting three experiments. Study I (described in Chapter 3), which was conducted in Hungary, South Korea, and Canada (total N=403), tested a hypothesised model based on the literature review (Chapter 2). The study looked at cultural differences in family centredness and democratisation, and the impact of cultural orientation, gender, economic growth (national-level), Postmodernist Values, and political beliefs on perceptions of family centredness and democratisation. Study II (described in Chapter 4), conducted in the US and South Korea amongst young individuals in their late teens or early twenties, and their parents' generations, mostly in their forties and fifties (total N= 230). It expanded on the model by adding Schwartz' value dimensions, self-beliefs, and broader aspects of family perceptions. Furthermore, Study II investigated the intergenerational differences and the impact of childhood experiences by comparing data from two generational groups. Study III (Chapter 5) was conducted in four cultures, Canada, Britain, South Korea, and Japan on 539 university students, in order to ascertain cultural influences on values, beliefs, and family centredness and democratisation. Study III also investigated the interlinks between the factors in each culture more specifically using multi-group analysis method in SEM (Structural Equation Modelling). The final chapter summarises and discusses the implications of the major findings from these studies, and makes note of possible methodological issues.

Overall, cross-cultural differences in value priorities, self-beliefs, political beliefs, and perceptions of family centredness and democratisation were found. Generation/age, country-level economic growth and gender were significant predictors for values, beliefs and family views and attitudes discussed in this work. Women and younger generations were more likely to endorse the Autonomous-Related Self-belief, believe in the importance of family democratisation. Stronger belief in the Autonomous-Related self led to higher emphases on family centredness and democratisation. Significant relationship was also found between family centredness and democratisation and individual-level values and beliefs, where stronger democratic beliefs led to stronger belief in the importance of family democratisation, higher endorsement of Self-Transcendence values predicted higher levels of family centredness and democratisation, and stronger Conservation Values predicted higher level of family centredness. By investigating factors influencing family centredness and democratisation, the current work probed into the family in the contemporary world. In line with Kagitcibasi's new model of family change, this thesis demonstrates that certain features of family views and relationship, including perceptions of family centredness, are likely to persist, and contends the individualisation theorists' (e.g., Beck, 1997; Giddens, 1992) negative predictions for the future of the family.

# Chapter 1

## Introduction to the thesis

### 1.0 Introduction

### 1.1 Family views and attitudes: Family centredness and democratisation

Different levels of factors including culture, socioeconomic conditions, and social change have influence on perceptions of family centredness and democratisation, for they shape expectations and organisation of the family, including relationships between the members of the family (e.g. Bengston & Roberts, 1991; Kagitcibasi, 2007). This thesis explores various areas of influence on how individuals view family relationships. The types of views and beliefs investigated here include the perceptions of the importance of the family, level of commitment to the family, degree of dependence on the family for emotional support and decision-making, and relationship equality within the family. For example, the concept of 'familism' or family cohesion, which comprises of individuals' feelings of loyalty, reciprocity, and solidarity

with the members of the family (e.g., Keller et al., 2006) can be likened to family centredness and democratisation investigated in this work. Family values and attitudes relating to individuals' sense of relatedness to the family (e.g., Kagitcibasi, 2007) and the dimensions of Individualism-Collectivism in the family context are also considered in the current investigation.

Although there are works on family views and attitudes, little cross-cultural work has been done, particularly in changing cultures. Studies have noted, for example, the impact of modernisation and economic development on the family in the late nineteenth and the earlier part of the twentieth centuries (e.g., Smith, 1995; Thornton & Fricke, 1987), cultural differences in the role and meaning of the family (e.g., Siemienska, 2002), changes in the meaning and value of the children (e.g., Aycicegi-Dinn & Kagitcibasi, 2010), and intergenerational differences in attitudes and ideals toward family relationships (e.g., Delsing et al, 2003). However, an elaborative work that investigates the families of the early twenty first century by canvassing exact impacts of macro-level and individual-level factors on family views and attitudes is rare to find. This thesis thus sets out to construct and tests a model of influences on family views and attitudes- centredness and democratisation in the contemporary world, which will aid the understanding of families and perceptions of family centredness and democratisation in cultures that are undergoing social, political, and economic changes.

## 1.2 Key Theoretical Issues to be addressed

This work began by considering some of the theories that relate to family views and

attitudes, and important omissions in the literature. This work has taken a social constructionist approach, which stresses the significance of the socially constructed reality within which individuals come to understand the world, including themselves (Berger & Luckmann, 1971; Gergen, 1985). Seeking to explain the processes by which these views and attitudes are shaped, special focus was given to the social context and socialisation experiences that are unique to the individuals with different cultural background, gender and generation.

One of the important tasks that this thesis set out to do was to test Kagitcibasi's (2007) new model of family change, and to determine the direction of the change—whether the family in the modern times across cultures is losing its importance due to individualisation and heightened emphasis on the autonomy of the self (e.g., Beck, 1997), or converging toward the model of emotional interdependence with continued family importance (e.g., Kagitcibasi, 2007). This work also planned to extend Postmodernisation theory (Inglehart, 1997), which discusses the influences of social change and childhood experiences on value priorities, specifically Postmodernist Values, which place strong emphases on self-expression and quality of life. Extending this theory to family views and attitudes, this work linked these influences between societal factors and value priorities with political beliefs, self-construals and family views and attitudes. This work proposes a new comprehensive model that combine these (social constructionist, new model of family change, Postmodernisation theory) and other (e.g., Allan, 2001; Schwartz, 2004; 2006) theories together, demonstrating factors at multiple levels and their interrelations. These factors included the variables of Schwartz' (2004, 2006) Self-Transcendence versus Self-Efficacy and Openness to Change versus Conservation Values, political

conservatism, political interest, democratic beliefs, and Kagitcibasi's (2007) self-construals. By comparing responses across cultures and generations, this work made the attempt to test and integrate different theories of family change (Beck, 1997; Delsing et al., 2003; Kagitcibasi) and establish a clear understanding of what factors impact on the perceptions of family centredness and democratisation, and what the views and attitudes toward the family are in the modern world.

### 1.3 Variables and their influences on family views and attitudes

#### 1.3.1 Cultural impact

Social, cultural, and historical contexts are important in understanding the family, for they often influence family norms and views (Smith, 1995; Thornton & Fricke, 1987). Significant differences in the family and adopted family values across cultures can be attributed to macro-level factors such as the historical background, traditions, level of economic development, and political and democratic stability unique to each country (Garzon, 2000). Gallup research on family values reported in 1997 demonstrated that individuals in the East Asian countries such as Japan and South Korea held more traditional views than their counterparts in the Western European and North American countries such as Britain, Canada, and the United States. The research also found that the individuals in the more industrialised nations in the West such as Britain exhibited less traditional views on aspects such as importance of children in the sense of personal fulfilment than those in less industrialised parts of the world

(Gallup, 1997). Inglehart and Baker (2000) claim that cultural heritage, along with economic development of the society has profound influence on the life experiences, and thus on the values and beliefs of the individuals. These findings highlight the importance of considering macro-level factors in understanding family views and attitudes.

The dimension of Individualism-Collectivism (Hofstede, 1980) is often discussed in interpreting cross-cultural differences found in the meaning, perception, and interactional patterns in social relationships. Whereas the focus lies on the individual himself/herself and his/her personal independence, uniqueness, and internal attributes in individualistic cultures, the focus is on social interactions, and sense of belonging and relatedness is characteristic of collectivistic cultures (Basabe & Ros, 2005). Culture also influences family centredness, adherence to in-group norms, and value priorities. Lay and his associates (1998) found that the Eastern and the Western groups scored differently on the Family Scale, observing fundamental differences in how closely the individuals thought themselves to be connected to their families within a given culture. Their findings showed that individuals in the Eastern group had higher level of family allocentrism, and adhered more to in-group norms than their counterparts in the Western group. Basabe and Ros (2005) argued that the cultural differences can manifest themselves in the emphases placed on different value types. They found that Hofstede's dimension was significantly correlated with cross-cultural value dimensions such as those proposed by Schwartz (1994) and Inglehart (1997). Therefore, these links of influence between the levels of factors, from cultural and social influences, individual values and beliefs, and family centredness and democratisation are re-investigated here.



### 1.3.2 Individual-level factors and their influence on family views and attitudes

Individual-level factors of values and beliefs can also have an impact on family views and attitudes. For example, Yabiku, Axinn, and Thornton (1999) claim that values and beliefs toward the 'self' and the society, and the conception of the self in relation to close others have close relationship with how the family is perceived. The value and meaning of the family would reflect the characteristics and goals of the society (Kagitcibasi, 1996; 2007). The concept of the self is sensitive to the cultural context in which the individuals grow up, and the level of autonomy and relatedness perceived and emphasised in the self influence individuals to socialise and interact with close others in their society (Kagitcibasi, 1996). Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002) and Giddens (1992) have pointed to the changes in self-concepts and close relationships in the current times. They noted specifically two characteristics that are most prominent: a breakaway from the traditional and social norms and more emphasis on the individual for making important decisions concerning his/her own life. Values, which reflect what individuals feel as core to their lives, including desired goals for themselves and the society (Hitlin, 2003), can have influence on aspects of family relationships including democratisation of the family (Inglehart, 1997). The impact of these and other individual-level factors on family views and attitudes, especially family centredness and democratisation, is examined further in this thesis.

### 1.3.3 Gender & age effects

Often, changes in family attitudes are more pronounced in the younger generation and in the female population (e.g., Inglehart, 1997; Siemienska, 2002; Trent & South, 1992). Thornton and Young-DeMarco (2001) note the general trend of rising acceptance of egalitarian decision-making and less gender-specific roles in the last decades. It is believed that improvements in economic conditions enhances individuals' chances of obtaining better and higher education, which in turn have liberalising effects on the perceptions of family and gender roles (Trent & South, 1992). Increase in women's level of education and participation in the workforce, and ensuing liberalisation from the traditional roles at home are facilitating these changes (Allan, 2001). Schwartz (2006) argues that cultural and social norms determine, to some extent, what a family needs to do in order to function smoothly by specifically setting an expectation for how it should be organised, how children should be raised and educated, and how the members should interact. Differences in attitudes and values between generations are found similarly across different nations, and these differences seem to be related to the changes in the level of education, changes in the social structure, and economic and political situations of the society (Siemienska, 2002). Therefore, family studies that trace the paths and characteristics of these impacts and the interrelations between these macro-level factors, values and beliefs, and family views and attitudes can be useful. This thesis investigates the impact of gender (Study I & II) and age/generation (Study II) on individuals' values and beliefs as well as family centredness and democratisation.

#### 1.3.4 Social change

Allan (2001) argues that views and attitudes toward the family should be studied within the context of recent economic and social transformations. It is suggested that new ways of conceiving the family are emerging in different parts of the world in the twenty-first century, and that these are due at least in part to the social changes that took place in the latter half of the earlier century (e.g., Beck, 1997; Kagitcibasi, 2007; Thornton & Young-DeMarco, 2001). Social change, or significant change to the economic, political, or cultural aspects of the society often impacts on the individuals and the families, re-shaping views and attitudes toward the self and the family (e.g., Giddens, 1992; Inglehart, 1997; Kagitcibasi, 1996; 2007). Social change also has an impact on family organisation and structure, which often also leads to changes in views and attitudes toward the family (Kagitcibasi, 2007). More specifically, research and ideas revolving around Postmodernisation theory (Inglehart, 1997) and models of family and family change (Kagitcibasi, 2007) have discussed the impact of cultural change on individuals' values, beliefs, and family relationships. The traditional meanings of the family might be disappearing due to changing societal climate, socioeconomic conditions, increasing level of education, emphasis on the autonomy or autonomous-relatedness of the self and democratic beliefs (e.g., Inglehart, 1990; 1997). Therefore, social change can have influence on how individuals conceptualise the self (sense of relatedness-autonomy) and close relationships (hierarchy-equality), which in turn can have impact on their family views and attitudes. Possible influences of these factors are discussed in detail in following chapters.

The impacts of recent social change on the individuals, interpersonal relationships, and the society are common topics of discussion in 'individualisation' literature (e.g.

Allan, 2001; Beck, 2002; Giddens, 1992). Beck (1997) discussed that with social change and loosening of the traditional commitments in areas of life including personal relationships and increasing level of education, younger generations are faced with greater freedom and independence to choose their own course of life and independence. The modern trends of increasing emphasis on individuation, tolerance to diverse ideas, freedom, and reduced commitment to the collective have influence on one's relations to his/her own family (Thornton & Young-DeMarco, 2001). Increasing importance of individualisation can suggest that individuals nowadays are faced with more freedom in choices and decisions regarding the family, and that family relationships are more egalitarian since each of its members, including the children, are expected to voice his or her own opinions on family matters (e.g. Beck, 1997). The process of individualisation does not embody only the growing sense of independence and individual choice but also re-shaping of identities and self-beliefs, as well as re-defining of gender roles in the family. Relationships within the family have become more egalitarian over the last few decades due to democratising societies (Delsing et al., 2003).

However, there is an alternative theory and explanation to those that suggest unidirectional individualisation as a model of family change. This theory of recent family change claims for convergence of the cultural impacts. Kagitcibasi (2007) presents a new family model that embraces both the senses of dependence and independence. Kagitcibasi's (1996) family models demonstrate the interconnectedness between culture, family systems, and values. Her theory of family change proposes a new model of family, where both autonomy and relatedness of the individual are emphasised, which she termed 'Autonomous-

Related Self (-in-Family). She argues that the recent social change has resulted in reduced physical and material dependence on the family but same or higher level of emotional dependence and relatedness to the family. This thesis will pay a particular attention on this new type of self-construal. The significance of this self-construal on predicting family centredness in the modern families is discussed in this work.

#### **1.4 Summary**

Although various findings suggest that family views and attitudes can be highly related to socioeconomic factors and childhood experiences that shape beliefs and values individuals hold (e.g., Dalton & Shin, 2003; Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart & Abramson, 1999; Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Inglehart, 2000; Inglehart, 2008), a detailed account that explains and combines various pathways linking the societal influences, individual-level variables, and family views and attitudes that will contribute to understanding how current families and beliefs about family centredness and democratisation are changing has been rare to find. In this thesis, thus, the relationship between culture, gender, age/generation, economic factors that shape life experience of the individuals, and family centredness and democratisation are examined. Also discussed are the possible effects of individuals' beliefs about the self and autonomy, values, and political beliefs on family centredness and democratisation. Questions I raise in this work tackle include whether these interrelations are robust and whether cultural groups and generations demonstrate differences in values, beliefs, and family centredness and democratisation. Individuals' perceptions of family centredness, including family importance, the level

of commitment to the family, and dependence to the family, and democratisation within the family are investigated using various family belief and attitude measures and are elaborated in this thesis. These factors will be measured by a set of questionnaire items borrowed from a number of family studies.

## **1.5 Outlines of the following chapters**

Chapter 2 will include literature review for this work. In Part I, the macro-level factors and their impact on the values, beliefs, and family centredness and democratisation are discussed. Part II of Chapter 2 will introduce the countries investigated in this work. Part III discusses the individual-level factors and family centredness and democratisation in detail. The meaning and significance of each of the variables will be discussed in relation to the macro-level factors discussed in Part I of Chapter 2, and to the aspects of family views and attitudes (family centredness and democratisation) (Part IV). Chapter 3 consists of Study I, which investigates interrelationships between the variables, including cultural-level individualism, gender, and economic growth, Postmodernist values, political beliefs, and family views and attitudes in three countries, South Korea, Hungary, and Canada. Chapter 4 consists of Study II, which investigates intergenerational as well as cross-cultural differences in two countries (US and South Korea). Chapter 5 consists of Study III, which included more countries (Japan, South Korea, Canada & UK) representing different cultural orientations and multi-group (country) analyses of the interrelations between the variables. In Chapter 6, final comments and concluding remarks that summarise findings from all the studies will be presented.

# **Chapter 2**

## **Review of the literature**

### **Part I: Discussion of the Macro- Level Factors & Their Influences**

#### 2.1.0 Macro-level variables

This chapter delineates the macro-level variables that can influence views on family

centredness and democratisation. Conditions experienced during childhood and adolescence years including societal atmosphere and educational attainment lead to less autocratic ideology in different spheres of life, including views toward political system and family (Elder, 1965). It is important, thus, to consider individuals' experiences of growing up in certain cultural background and economic/political/social climates, for family attitudes and views mould early in life and tend to be stable over the course of life (Bunting, 2004; Trent & South, 1992). The relevance and significance of each of the macro-level factors that shape individuals' childhood experiences will be the topic of discussion in detail in this chapter.

## 2.1.1 Culture

### *2.1.1.1 Definition & significance*

Culture can be defined as 'a way of life where a group of [individuals] share and transmit from one generation to another' (Murry et al., 2001, p.911), and as shared values, attitudes, ideas, and norms that are specific to a socio-cultural group (Inglehart, 1997; Kagitcibasi, 1996). Moreover, it can be conceptualised as an outcome of specific groups and individuals interacting with and shaping their physical, psychological, and social environments (Kim et al., 2002). Culture can influence how individuals view life and themselves, for their life experiences in the given circumstances are likely to shape their perceptions and understandings, and thus, culture and its relative effect become important issues in contemporary research



(Lyons & Chrysoschoou, 2000). With increasing globalization and migrations of people, culture became an increasingly important topic of study in psychology. Interests in culture has grown significantly in the field (Miller, 2002), and psychologists have begun to pay more attention to, and to propagate the importance of studying psychological phenomena in their own cultural context (Kagitcibasi, 2007). The importance of sociocultural and historical context in understanding psychological processes has been highlighted (e.g., Miller, 2002). For example, Georgas and his colleagues' (2001) cross-cultural study found that the effects of culture accounted for emotional distance in the family (explaining 15% of the total variance), which provides a reason for believing that family centredness, or the extent to which the family remains central for the individual, is related to cultural traditions and thus differs across cultures.

Cross-cultural psychology, which can be defined as “the systematic study of behaviour and experience as it occurs in different cultures, is influenced by culture, or results in changes in existing cultures” (Triandis, 1980, p.1), has proved its importance in the understanding of the ‘context’ in which individuals’ values and beliefs are formed and maintained . Culture serves as an important variable in psychological research in the sense that it affects behaviour by both ‘influencing self-image and by defining situations’ (Singelis, 1994, p. 582), and can serve as an organiser of meaning (Kagitcibasi, 2007). Culture’s unique impact on various dimensions of individuals’ social and psychological dimensions has been found. For example, Inglehart and Baker (2000) have noted that the cultural heritage of a given society has great impact on the values and behaviours of its people, even when factors such as economic level are controlled for. In this sense, it is useful to

consider culture as an independent variable that affects individuals' psychological processes and developments which can then be considered as dependent variables (Miller, 2002).

#### *2.1.1.2 Dimensions of Individualism-Collectivism*

Cousins (1989) suggests that “the units of interaction both in person and situation are constituted in different ways by different cultures” (p. 129). The use of the cultural dimensions of Individualism-Collectivism has been common and popular in explaining for and predicting cultural differences (e.g., Fischer et al., 2009; Hofstede, 1980; Kagitcibasi, 1997). It is believed that individuals in the Western countries emphasised independence, self-direction, and autonomy (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Contrarily, individuals in what Kagitcibasi (1996) calls ‘Majority World’, the non-Western and less wealthy nations, considered ‘togetherness’, harmony, and collective goals to be more important. It is speculated that the Protestant background of North America have led to the high level of Individualism in the United States, whereas long history of predominant Confucianism in South Korea is believed to have shaped the country along with her neighbours such as China and Japan to be collectivistic (Basabe & Ros, 2005). At the psychological level, differences in how individuals value allocentrism or togetherness, versus idiocentrism or independence from others, depend on how aspects of cooperation, competition, or individualism are differentially stressed in different cultures (Triandis et al., 1988).

Culture influences individuals' conception of the self and the world (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Tafarodi et al, 2004), child-rearing practices and encouraged/valued traits in children (Triandis, 1989), conceptualisation of the family and the formation of certain type of family system (Georgas, 2003), and actual interpersonal and social behaviours (Adamopoulos, 2002). The view of the self in relation to others, whether the individuals see themselves as part of the big picture or as separate from others, depends heavily on the cultural background (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). The dimensions of Individualistic (Independent) versus Collectivistic (Interdependent) cultures have been crucial in explaining for some of the differences in these aspects. These cultural orientations can be seen as being analogous to Schwartz' (2006) bipolar value dimensions of Embeddedness versus Autonomy at the culture-level. There have been studies that illustrate the more specific cultural influences on the family. Georgas and his colleagues (1997), for example, found that for the members of the extended family, the strength of emotional closeness was higher in the more collectivistic countries of Cyprus and Greece than in the more individualistic countries of Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands.

Triandis (1989) noted that social behaviours, including those perpetuated by the family, are heavily influenced by ingroup norms and found that they differ in collectivistic and individualistic cultures. It was also found that the fluidity of individuals' 'self-construals', how willingly they would adjust their self-images to suit their social contexts and how important they thought this adaptability is, differ across cultures (Tafarodi et al., 2004). In this sense, causal link can be drawn between culture and the individual, where culture influences the individual's beliefs about the self in relation to close others. While the individuals in individualistic cultures

emphasise the non-changing, unique self, those in collectivistic cultures view the self as embedded within the larger context, more fluid and adaptable depending on the situations and particular relationships (English & Chen, 2007; Kanagawa et al., 2001; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). These cultural differences in conceptualisations of the self can be important in how individuals view themselves in relation to others, and how they think about and evaluate their close relationships.

#### *2.1.1.3 Culture & the family*

Culture plays an important role in shaping individuals' perceptions of and behaviours within the family. Georgas and his colleagues (2001) outline the significance of the impact of culture on various family outcomes; Impact of the culture on various functional and structural aspects of family relationship such as geographic and emotional proximity, psychological interaction, and family roles has been noted to exist. In their study, culture accounted for 20% of the total variance on the perceived emotional distance in the family. Kagitcibasi (2007) also holds the belief that cultural views and traditions lead to differences in the meaning and structure of the family across societies. She found that traditionally the Western families had the tendency to emphasise autonomy, whereas in the Eastern families the emphasis was placed on relatedness. Therefore, the dimensions of Individualism and Collectivism may be one way of examining the manner in which opposing cultural views shape individuals' relationships with close others.

Hofstede (2009) provides a series of cultural-level Individualism (IDV) scores which can be used to inform cross-cultural comparisons. This score, although is based on slightly outdated data, has been found to have significant statistical relations with other important variables and is employed in this study. Its correlations with social, economic, and historical aspects of a nation were found; a country's Individualism score was highly correlated with its Gross National Product (GNP), Human Development Index (HDI), international transparency, and religious and philosophical background (Basabe & Ros, 2005). This suggests that this cultural dimension has close ties with the social and cultural factors and economic state. Culture is known to shape self-beliefs and values (e.g., Kagitcibasi, 1996; Schwartz, 2006), and these beliefs and values individuals hold, in turn, can have close relations with family views and attitudes, sometimes influencing them in important ways. In this sense, it is also possible to postulate that culture influences family views and attitudes through shaping self-beliefs and values, as is depicted in Figure 2.1.




Figure 2.1 Cultural Impact

### 2.1.2 Social change

Social or cultural change encompasses fluctuations and transformations in the economic, social, and political aspects of life. It often influences, and in some cases, even transforms the patterns of close personal relationships, and is thus important to be taken into account in psychological investigations (e.g. Goodwin, 1998; Moghaddam & Crystal, 1997). Research has found shifts of opinions and preferences toward many aspects of life, such as individuals' beliefs about the self and identity, relationships, family, and the larger society in places that have undergone considerable amount of social/economic change (Beck, 1997; Giddens, 1992; Inglehart, 1997). Therefore, relating the nature and the extent to which these changes occur and their effects on the psychological aspects of the people can be helpful in allowing researchers to corroborate the link between culture and the individual. These relationships as well as areas of possible influence including family views and attitudes are depicted in Figure 2.2.

Various aspects of human lives have undergone considerable changes in many parts of the world with the globalisation, modernisation, and economic developments of the past century or so (Beck, 1997; Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002; Inglehart, 1997; Kagitcibasi, 1996). In the West, changes occurred in many aspects of family life and relationships, where the traditional meaning of family and the role it played in deciding individuals' life course transitions and individual identities are modified (Thornton & Young-DeMarco, 2001). Global changes result in changes in industry structures, types, and demands, and the impact these changes have on defined roles and duties of both men and women has been noted by authors such as Giddens (1992) and Mac an Ghail and Haywood (2007). It can thus be postulated

that individuals' beliefs, values, and behaviours are likely to be influenced by both the rapidly-changing world and the unique patterns of change in their own societies.

Inglehart (1997)'s theoretical model and data on studies of the importance of values around the world indicate that the economic, societal, and political changes are very often accompanied by changes in people's values. As will be explained further in the latter part of this chapter, it is suggested that individuals in countries that are becoming wealthier and more stable increasingly endorse Postmodernist values, emphasising quality of life and freedom of expression rather than self achievement and material wealth. Inglehart (2008)'s study found direct relationship between value priorities and the level of economic development (Inglehart, 2008), where the prevalence of value types endorsed by the majority of citizens matched the society's level of wealth and security.

While it is noted that self-beliefs are culture-specific, where in one part of the world the sense of 'belongingness' and its importance become increasingly more important, whereas in other parts of the world emphasis would fall on the sense of 'autonomy' (e.g. Inglehart, 1982; Kagitcibasi, 1996), research suggests that changes to the self-beliefs can also be linked to rising needs in different cultures. For example, Inglehart (1982) notes that value change in the West reflected new emphasis on belongingness whereas in Japan the opposite pattern reflecting a gradual decline in the traditional sense of group obligation and emphasis on individual freedom was observed. Therefore, it is difficult to conjecture the direction and nature of change in self and family beliefs, and investigation that traces these changes across cultures becomes necessary in order to find out how the family is perceived, and how family relationships might be changing.

If the links and interconnectivity between the society, the individual and the family are to be acknowledged, it would be important to take note of how they influence one another at varying times and levels across individuals' lives, and across generations. The 'contextual-developmental-functional approach' (Kagitcibasi, 2007, p. 2) to studying the family accounts for the close relationship between all these factors. It regards the family as a 'context' and focuses on individuals' developments of identity, including their social self, and the social and psychological adaptive mechanisms they might adopt in the given society or culture. Thus, this approach demonstrates how individuals' perceptions of the importance, necessary level and type of commitment, the function and appropriate organization of the family, and relationship dynamics within the family might take significant amount of influence from the community and the broader society in which they belong. The norms, values, and customs of a society are continued and maintained through the process of socialisation within the intimate family setting (Rindfuss, Liao, & Tsuya, 1992, p. 812), and in this sense, recent social changes must be bringing changes not only to the norms and values of the society but also to the individuals' values and beliefs including their family values and attitudes.






Figure 2.2 Impacts of Social Change

### 2.1.3 Economic development & childhood experiences

As mentioned above, sociocultural influences act as the context in which children/adolescents' views, attitudes, and orientations are shaped (Vollebergh, Iedema, & Raaijmakers, 2001). The variable 'childhood experiences' encompasses individuals' experiences as children growing up in the specific environment in which they belong. Children and adolescents construct and internalise cultural influences and develop stable attitudes as the result of the process, and thus these years are identified as crucial in the development of cultural and political orientations (Vollebergh, Iedema, & Raaijmakers, 2001). Moreover, attitudes and values that are shaped in childhood (including adolescence years) are relatively stable and long-lasting (Axinn & Yabiku, 2001), which adds to the significance of this period in individuals' development. In this sense, it can be suggested that the economic conditions experienced during childhood impact on types of values and beliefs endorsed, and economic stability of the society and the family environment- including family socioeconomic status- will influence the traits and values encouraged in the children. Triandis (1989) notes that a general trend toward individualism in societies

that are becoming more complex and affluent can be found. Individuals from wealthier, middle class families and those who are from more individualistic cultures are also more likely to grow up in an environment where 'Postmodernist' values are fostered (Inglehart, 2008). In the professional social classes, for example, traits such as self-actualisation are highly emphasised in child-rearing, and in individualistic cultures, the importance of autonomy will be highlighted (Triandis, 1989).

Both the importance and the lack of research that examines the patterns of direct effect of economic change on family outcomes have been addressed (White & Rogers, 2000), and thus, this study investigates closely the link between economic development and views on the importance of family centredness and family democratisation. For instance, in Study III (Chapter 5), the GDP (Gross Domestic Product) data for the four nations included in the study from the years in between 1990 and 2006 were included in order to compare the amount and pattern of economic growth in each of the nations and to investigate its influence. The formative periods of 8 to 12 years were found to be the most significant in shaping individuals' value priorities (Inglehart, 1982), and thus, the GDP per capita data for the years equivalent for this period for the average participant in each cultural/generational group were used. Since this dimension taps on the change in economic conditions in each country, the growth rate or percentage change in these countries in the years were employed as the point of comparison rather than the actual GDP level.

Factors that shape childhood experiences are not limited to those at the societal level only. Family-level affluence and socio-economic status, education, and parents'

socialisation are also identified as factors that have influence on individuals' experiences and values in the formative years (e.g. Inglehart, 2008; Marks, 1997). The level of material wealth of the family is likely to have an impact on the childhood experiences of the individuals. Marks (1997) argues for parental influences, especially, the degree of economic security in the family in which the individual grew up, on the shaping of values. Link between values at the societal level and economic affluence has been noted; individualism was found to have close association with affluence (Hofstede, 1980). Moreover, one can also speculate that those who grow up in relatively well-off families also come to think more positively about life, and the amount of control and autonomy they possess. For example, individuals that grew up in relatively prosperous families also endorsed higher levels of Post-Materialist values (Inglehart, 1982). The impact of family affluence and childhood experiences on self-beliefs, values, political beliefs, and family views and attitudes can thus be speculated, as shown below (Figure 2.3).




Figure 2.3 Impacts of Family Affluence

#### 2.1.4 Gender

Views and attitudes towards the self, family, gender relations, and equality are believed to be shaped in the early stages of their lives depending on their socialisation experiences (e.g. Beck, 1997; Inglehart, 1997; Hill, 2005). Gender as an entity belongs to social institutions and cultural practices and not to the individual (Mac an Ghail & Haywood, 2007), and many of gender differences are rigidified by social norms and customs (Euler et al., 2001). In this sense, it can be discussed that gender influences individuals' values and beliefs by shaping their childhood experiences, and can be considered a macro-level variable (e.g. Kashima et al., 1995; Prince-Gibson & Schwartz, 1998).

Gender has particular influences on individuals' sense of relatedness, which can have implications for self-beliefs, values, and family views and attitudes. In discussing the impact of gender, Hill (2005) argues that identity formation and

establishment of boundaries between the self and others are influenced strongly by the children's gender. Studies have often found gender differences in self-beliefs; women were more likely than men to have relational or interdependent self-construals (e.g., Cross et al., 2000). Moreover, women were found to also be able to integrate individuality and relatedness better than men (Roberts & Helson, 1997), which were seen as desirable by the authors. Kashima and his associates (1995) have found that gender had an effect on how emotionally related individuals felt to their close others, and invariability of this difference across cultures. These gender differences relate to value priorities as well. Prince-Gibson and Schwartz (1998) mention the possibility of women being more 'relational, expressive, and communal' than men, as thus being more inclined to prioritise community-based values rather than individualistic goals. From these findings, it can be speculated that women in general would perceive value of the family more than men do, and show stronger dependence and commitment to the family. These researched and speculated impacts of gender are illustrated in Figure 2.4.

A study of gender attitudes across Europe identified gender, age, education, and Postmodernist values as factors that impact on gender attitudes (Bergh, 2007). Social and cultural norms about gender relations often manifest themselves in family relationships, and the degree to which specific gender roles and defined differences exist in the society often reflected unequal relations in the family (Gittins, 1993). Gender is closely related to family attitudes, where women are often found to hold more non-traditional attitudes toward family issues than did men (Trent & South, 1992). Gender differences in beliefs such as importance of egalitarianism in work and family have been found to be significant and relatively invariant across cultural,

demographic, and situational factors (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001). Distinctive gender roles can also be culturally and socially determined, and male-female roles defined in a society are likely to be reinforced and maintained by these cultural traditions (Prince-Gibson & Schwartz, 1998). Whereas more egalitarian views and attitudes about gender roles within families are found in some Western countries such as the U.S., more strict and traditional gender roles persist in collectivistic culture such as Japan, where the intergenerational influences are greater (Rindfuss et al., 1992). However, recent social and cultural changes are transforming individuals' views rapidly, and whether these cultural differences still hold truth in the midst of these changes will be investigated in this work.




Figure 2.4 Gender and Its Influence on Family

# **PART II: Cultures under Consideration**

## 2.2.0 Cultures under consideration

Countries often differ in the cultural orientations and norms, traditions, history, and the types of socio-cultural-political changes they have undergone. Cultural changes can influence and in some cases even transform patterns of close personal relationships including those within the family (Goodwin, 1998). Research on the relations between social change and personal relationships in ‘transient’ cultures, or cultures that are going through large scale changes, can be helpful in understanding the roles of cultures and changing values on relationships. In this part of the thesis, countries under investigation in the current studies are described, with special focus on social, cultural, economic, and political aspects of life in the countries that have undergone rapid social changes in the recent decades. Social/economic change and family dynamics in South Korea will be discussed in great detail, with comparisons to Japan, another East Asian country, which underwent changes much earlier. Only

some or little references will be made to Britain, US, and Canada, for they are considered to be countries with stable socioeconomic conditions in relative terms. Political change and its implications are discussed with reference to Hungary, an ex-Communist country.

It is important to trace both the influences of the traditional culture and history of the country and the social change it went through and the experiences people have had in that country on family views and attitudes. Theories suggest that family change does not occur in uniform ways across cultures, that the link between modernisation and individualistic tendencies is rather weak (e.g., Kagitcibasi, 2007). For example, it is argued that the Western individualism was not an outcome of industrialisation, for the typical individualistic tendencies and nuclear families have existed for centuries preceding Industrial Revolutions in those countries (Kagitcibasi, 2007, p. 129). Kagitcibasi (2007)'s Value of Children (VOC) Study also found that the value of independence and self-reliance was higher in South Korea, a fast-industrialising country, than in the U.S., which seems counter-intuitive given that South Koreans are often thought to be collectivistic. Therefore, it cannot be presumed that the developing countries in other parts of the world today are becoming individualistic in the same manner as the ones in the West. It can be suggested that each country has a unique trajectory of change that depends on the specific pattern of development and specific needs that take priority in the given society. Therefore, investigating the trajectories of changes happening that takes into account both cultural history and the types of social change that are culture-specific might be important in providing insight and confirmation of this view.



## 2.2.1 Cross-Cultural Comparisons

### 2.2.1.1 *Socioeconomic Change*

The countries included in the investigation are Japan (Study III), South Korea (Study I, II, III), US (Study II), Canada (Study I & III), Hungary (Study I), and Britain (Study III). These cultures were chosen on the basis that they differ significantly from one another on historical, cultural, political and economical grounds. Some of these countries have undergone major economic, political, and social change, while the others remained relatively stable. Considering the rate and magnitude of change in the recent decades, South Korea stands out among these six countries as a country that has experienced a recent phenomenon of social change, the most rapid economic and social developments, and dramatic political changes (e.g. Dalton & Shin, 2003). Even among the wealthy West European countries, Britain's economic position can be said to have been relatively strong for the last few decades or so after the depression years following the World Wars, and its society, relatively stable. In comparison to some other countries, Britain did not experience cases of extreme economic hardships or major political failures for the latter half of the twentieth century, which has placed her above other countries in development and allowed early settlement of stable government and society. In comparison to countries like South Korea or Hungary, Britain, Canada, and the U.S. in the late twentieth century did not suffer much from extreme economic hardships or major political failures for the latter half of the twentieth century, which places them above other countries in development and early settlement of stable government and society.

Therefore, among the countries under consideration, South Korea is where there

have been greatest social and economic changes, both in terms of their magnitude and types. Quite differently, in Japan and Britain changes occurred more gradually since these countries had already risen to major powers and stayed in stable conditions for the past few decades. HDI (Human Development Index) scores can serve as useful indicators for signifying where a nation stands in terms of its economic, political, and social situations, and the quality and the standard of living for its citizens. Annual growth rate of GDP per capita places South Korea above all the others at 6% from the year 1975 to 2005, while in other countries under investigation, it grew only 1-2 percents (Hungary is an exception to this, but Hungary's GDP growth was still lower/slower than compared to that of South Korea). In comparing four countries (Britain, Canada, South Korea and Japan), ratio of estimated female to male income between the two Western nations and the East Asian ones showed significant difference, for the ratios for Canada and Britain are 0.64 and 0.66 (higher for females) and the ratios for Japan and Korea much lower at 0.45 and 0.40 (higher for males).

### *2.2.1.2 Cultural background*

In terms of the cultural dimension of individualistic-collectivistic societies, South Korea and Japan are often believed to be 'collectivistic' cultures, where one's relationship with others that are close to them has been of great importance to the people, whereas Britain, Hungary, Canada, and the U.S are 'individualistic' cultures, where one's autonomy and independence are more strongly emphasised. Triandis and his colleagues (1988) suggest 'cultural complexity' brought by factors such as a high number of immigrants, rapid social and geographical mobility to be the

precondition for individualistic culture. On the other hand, Confucian ideals are often identified as the foundation for the strongly collectivistic East Asian countries. Therefore, it may be the case that the perceptions of and the importance placed on family may be more similar between South Korea and Japan than with Britain or other Western countries. Given these differences, looking at family views and attitudes such as views regarding family centredness and democratisation in these cultures would provide insight into how culture and its trajectory can have impact on the lives of the people.

### 2.2.2 South Korea

On Hofstede's (2009) Individualism dimension (IDV), South Korea scores 18, which places her on the highly collectivistic end of the continuum. Political changes in South Korea have been dramatic throughout the second half of the twentieth century. Despite establishment of the first democratic government in the history with the first president in 1948, the war with North Korea, heavy influence from the United States, rapid economic and social development, and the ruling military dictators, have left the country under authoritarian leadership. Strong protests against authoritarian rule in the 1970s and 1980s have led onto democratisation and restoration of free elections in 1987 in South Korea (US Department of State, 2009). The desire for better democracy, along with growing distrust for the political situations, politicians, and the government and more active voicing of opinions and participation has been observed in South Korea (Dalton & Shin, 2003). Moreover, Dalton and Shin (2003) argue that these changes in political views and opinions are coupled with more

democratic values, positive views toward democracy, and belief in democratic government by the Koreans.

In discussing the family culture in Korea, strong influence of Confucianism and the virtue of Filial Piety are one of the most important themes (Cumings, 2005). Confucius emphasised importance of virtue which serves as the source of strength and insight that 'rule peacefully and harmoniously within oneself, one's family, one's nation, and the world', that can be realised through 'self-cultivation' (Kim, Hegelsen, & Ahn, 2002, p. 330). Hierarchical relations among family members determined by age, gender, and place in the family, and strict adherence to the defined roles have been characteristic features of a Korean family. Moreover, Cumings (2005) notes of the collectivistic nature of the Korean family, where each person is regarded as a 'building block' of the family as well as the society, and his/her attachment and relatedness to the family very strong (p.16).

In the years 1980-2006, it was observed that GDP per capita increased twelve times in South Korea whereas it only tripled or quadrupled in the other countries included in this research (EconStats, 2007). South Korean government and the Economic Planning Board organized four Five-Year Economic Development Plans that ranged in the years of 1961 to 1981, which enabled them the ground for the following decades' further modernisation and economic and social developments (Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, 2009). On the other hand, Japan, although geographically close to South Korea and shares a similar ancient historical background with South Korea, underwent economic and social transformations earlier (from the 1950s to the 70s), achieving the status of a major economic power

and enjoying the stability much earlier than all the other Asian countries (Feldman, 1997; Inglehart, 1981; Moghaddam & Crystal, 1997). In this sense, it can be hypothesised that the life experiences of the young generation in these two countries would have differed, which could have resulted in differences in the beliefs and values they hold.

Democratic form of government was implemented only in the 1980s in South Korea, after years of foreign influence- US watching over its affairs- and a series of military dictatorships until the 1990s (Armstrong, 2002; Cumings, 2005; Lipset, 1994). However, there has been steady progress in developing its democratic system and efforts have been made to ensure the rights of the citizens, and as a result, democratic ideals have more firmly been rooted in the country since the 1990s (Dalton & Shin, 2003). Both political rights and civil liberties in South Korea have grown significantly, with its democracy level almost matching the democratic nations in the West and Japan at the beginning of the twenty-first century (Freedom House, 2008). Individuals' democratic beliefs, or beliefs about the importance or goodness of a democratic system, can be influenced by the political situations their country has faced, or their cultural traditions. The results from the World Value Survey (2009) demonstrate that the percentages of individuals rating the importance of democracy as high ('absolutely important') were higher in Britain and Canada (56% and 57% respectively) than in Japan and South Korea (40% and 38% respectively). Data from the World Values Survey (2009) demonstrates this difference, for it finds that the changes in the opinions regarding sense of control and individual choice of the South Koreans are more noticeable than in other countries in the recent years. Comparing democratic beliefs across cultures, this thesis explores the possible impact of recent

political change and democratisation on individuals' beliefs.

Some changes in the family relationships in South Korea have been observed. For example, the traditional extended family structure, which were prevalent in the early twentieth century, are almost non-existent in Korea in the present days, replaced by nuclear families with small household size and decreasing number of children per family (Kim et al., 2005). The number of people consisting a family has decreased to be only a half of what it was only twenty years ago, and fertility rate, at 1.28 in the year 2007, is one of the lowest in the world, with couples bearing only a quarter of the number of children born forty five years ago (Kim et al., 2005). The contemporary nuclear family is increasingly perceived as a 'conscious' personal choice made by those that want certain level of privacy and independence, as opposed to the traditional extended families where there existed multiple responsibilities and duties as well as defined role relations (Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 2009). Role relations and democratisation of the family in the country are changing quickly, with laws that used to rigidly define the family relations and the traditional sense of kinship system disappearing quickly.

### 2.2.3 Japan

Often seen as an example of a collectivistic society, the culture of Japan has been described to embrace 'social relativism', where the concern for human relationships and social interactions are heightened (Cousins, 1989). Japan, as well as South Korea and other East Asian countries, is also a homogeneous culture, where

deviance from in-group norms is not tolerated (Triandis, 1989). Emphases on maintaining harmony in interpersonal relations, attentiveness to expectations of the others, and interdependence of the selves have been observed in many studies conducted in Japan (e.g., Kanagawa et al., 2001). However, aside from its sharing general collective tendencies with other East Asian neighbouring countries, the history and pattern of social change in Japan do differ from the others in some ways. Most importantly, as mentioned earlier, major developments happened much earlier in Japan than in any other East Asian countries. After World War II, although it destroyed much of the economic and industrial accomplishments, rebuilding happened both quickly and efficiently in Japan, when intense investment in its production and great effort into building a well-disciplined and effective work force were made (CIA, 2007). By the mid 1950s the economy was already back to its pre-war levels, and between 1953 and 1965, the national GDP increased by more than 9 percent per year. Even with various challenges it faced in 1970s through 1990s and slowing down of the growth, it still managed to keep a relatively stable growth rate and remain as one of the strongest economic powers in the world. Moreover, it can be speculated that these historical circumstances might have allowed the Japanese in the post-war years to adopt more to the Western ideals and abandon their traditional values such as those of interpersonal intimacy or obligations that were still held tightly by those in contemporary Korea.

After the war, the traditional family ideology and authority in Japan were weakened, with more rights and freedom of choice given to women and children, and since the 1970s, decline in the perceived importance and the desire to maintain multigenerational households and the increase in couple-only households have often

been observed. Kashima and his associates' (1995) self-report study on self-beliefs found that Koreans scored higher in relatedness and placed higher importance on the close relationships than Japanese. Therefore, some differences in family beliefs as well as values and other types of beliefs in Japan and Korea can be expected despite the similarity in the cultural teachings and orientation. The more recent social and political changes could have affected these two neighbouring countries in significantly different ways, and more attention should be paid in investigating and accounting for these differences.

#### 2.2.4 Canada

Over the last few decades, Canada's position in the world has been relatively firm and stable. Economically, its GDP per capita has had steady increase without suffering from major crisis, and in the last ten years its average percentage growth stayed above the OECD average (average of 3.34% a year, in contrast to the OECD average of 2.73%) (Hurtig, 2008). More importantly, Canada scores highly on the United Nation's Human Development Index (HDI). Out of the 182 countries investigated, Canada ranked first in the years 1994-2000 and maintains a high rank throughout for the years afterwards, which highlights the country's high quality of life overall (UNDP, 2010). Autonomy and independence are emphasised in the country's politics as well. The theme of decentralised government characterises the country's politics (Hurtig, 2008); less power is concentrated in the federal government, and provincial and local governments are expected to have a relatively autonomous control over their jurisdiction.



In discussing Canadian families, diversity of culture is a prominent feature that deserves much consideration. For instance, one out of five Canadians were born outside of the country, which suggests that many of Canadian families have cultural backgrounds and family beliefs that differ from one another (Lee, 2010). In this sense, it is difficult to define normative relationship or structure of family in Canada. Moreover, intergenerational conflicts or disparity in family beliefs and values can be expected, as the new generation of individuals that are born within the country can have different childhood experiences and hold different views than their parents' generation who adhere to their own cultural norms and traditions. The impact of social change on the family in Canada is also noted (Lee, 2010). Since the 1970s, changes in beliefs towards responsibilities and expectations in the family have been observed. Investigating the impact of cultural background, social change and age/generation on family views and attitudes in this thesis can be useful in understanding societies like Canada where individuals and generations with different cultural background and socialisation experiences live together.

#### 2.2.5 Hungary: An ex-Communist country

Political, economic and social changes in Central/Eastern Europe have been dramatic in the past decades. Inglehart (1997; 2008) claims that the shift to Postmodernist values occur as individuals place stronger emphases on autonomy, self-expression, and quality of life. Postmodernist values were considered less important in the Eastern European countries compared to the Western European

ones (Schwartz & Bardi, 1997). Less importance was placed on autonomy and egalitarianism values in the Eastern European countries, possibly because of the economic hardships and political conditions the citizens faced. In particular, Schwartz and Bardi (1997) suggest that the constraints and instabilities that were brought to the citizens pushed them to adhere strongly to conservatism and hierarchy values, favouring social order and self-discipline.

The political unrest of the recent decades and the aftermath of the fall of communism in East European countries including Hungary are often discussed (e.g., Saxonberg, 2001). It could have brought change of values and beliefs, high level of mistrust toward the government and lose of interest in politics, as well as low level of Postmodernist value endorsement in these ex-Communist countries. Flanagan (2003) points to the rising importance of active involvement in politics among the young generations through learning of new principles of social contract, where participation in most community, family, and social affairs is becoming highly encouraged. Thus, he claims that changing social norms had impact on values and attitudes desired in children at school and in the family in Hungary and other Eastern European countries, and that these changes had implications for political stability as well. Hungary is unique among these countries, however, for its high Individualism; it scores 82 on Hofstede's Individualism, which is higher than most other ex-Communist countries.

# **Part III: Discussion of the Individual-Level Factors, Family Centredness & Democratisation**

## **2.3.0 Introduction**

Aspects of the individual including the values and beliefs are often influenced by macro-level factors, and can be related to the views and attitudes toward the family. In this section of the chapter, I look at how endorsement of value types and beliefs toward the self and politics might influence family views and attitudes.

## **2.3.1 Values**

Values are motivational constructs that are universal, but relative importance placed

on each of these constructs can differ across nations (Schwartz, 1990). In the context of culture, values include beliefs about what is considered to be good, right, and desirable that are shared among the members of the same cultural group (Schwartz & Bardi, 1997, p. 386). Therefore, some cultures would prioritise certain types of values while other cultures would prioritise others. For instance, whilst some cultures, especially ones that are undergoing developmental stages, would prioritise achievement and self-direction, other cultures, such as those with Confucian ideals, would emphasise embeddedness and group harmony. Hofstede (1980) makes the claim that economic development leads individuals to have stronger individualism, and less of the power and hierarchy values. Allen and his colleagues (2007) also found that richer countries tended to endorse hedonistic/individualistic and egalitarian values, whereas poorer countries tended toward submission and hierarchy values. The interrelations between cultural influence, economic development, and values are depicted in Figure 2.5.

Research has found that the values are closely related to individuals' daily goals and strivings, cultural background and socialisation experiences, societal norms, and their beliefs and attitudes (e.g., Oishi et al., 1998; Schwartz, 2006). Thus, value orientations transcend specific situations, and can tap on different aspects of individuals' lives in a given society such as the family. Although relatively stable, values are also sensitive to societal influences, and can thus be influenced by general social trends as well as unique historical and cultural background (Bardi & Goodwin, in press; Feather, 1979). Roberts and Helson (1997) claim that individuals are turning away from traditional roles, social norms and values and are paying more attention to the aspects of self including thoughts, feelings, and traits. Therefore,

while culture has influence on values, social change often leads to changes in the existing value priorities and goals. Schwartz and Bardi (1997) discuss the adaptive nature of values; economic or political climate, such as communism, can impact on the formation and change of values. For example, endorsement of Conservation values is highly connected to the need to achieve and maintain a state of stability and security (Schwartz & Bardi, 1997), and is thus found to be high in regions and countries where insecurities or uncertainties abound.

In this work, I look at individual-level values. Schwartz (2001; 2006) distinguishes between different levels of values and value priorities, and proposes 10 motivational types of values at the individual level. These 10 value types reflect individuals' own conceptions of value priorities, which can be placed under two orthogonal dimensions, Openness-to-Change versus Conservation, and Self-Efficacy versus Self-Transcendence. Research has shown reliability of the items measuring these value types, validity of the value construct, and universality and measurement equivalence of the value structures across cultures (see Schwartz, 1994; Schwartz & Sagiv, 2005; Spini, 2003). While the dimension of Openness to Change includes value types of self-direction, stimulation, and hedonism, and emphasises willingness and acceptance towards new ideas and experiences. Openness to Change values also emphasise independent action, and in this sense, will adhere less to the social norms and show more inclination toward autonomy and individual decision-making (Roccas & Schwartz, 2010). The dimension of Conservation, which stands opposite to Openness to Change, includes security, tradition, and conformity values, and reflects resistance to change. The dimensions of Self-efficacy and Self-transcendence differ in whether the focus is on the self; Self-efficacy dimension

emphasises achievement and power values, which reflect self-interest, whereas Self-transcendence dimension encompasses universalism and benevolence values, which place stronger emphasis on the welfare of others. Spini's(2003) study found little cross-cultural equivalence for the items measuring hedonism value, and thus this value was omitted from this research. These value types are emphasised depending on the self-construal that reflects the beliefs and goals embedded in that culture, where individuals in the Individualistic cultures are likely to place greater importance on values such as self-direction, hedonism, and stimulation, while collectivists prioritise benevolence, tradition, and conformity (Oishi et al., 1998). Especially in relation to types of values like tradition and conformity, value priorities can influence family attitudes, where individuals emphasising tradition and conformity are more likely to emphasise family centredness and believe less in the importance of family democratisation. Figure 2.5 suggests this interrelationship between values and family attitudes.




Figure 2.5 Schwartz' Value Dimensions & Interrelated Variables

### 2.3.2 Postmodernist Values

Inglehart and Baker (2000) noted that economic development, along with other types of global, social, and political changes, can have profound impact on individuals' values in a given culture. Emphases on what is important, valuable, or desirable in life could be placed differently depending on the circumstances, which include the level of stability, prosperity and security of the society. Inglehart (1997) argues that culture constitutes a 'survival strategy', in the sense that people's values, beliefs, and skills in a given society are likely to reflect the situation they face and are likely to be tailored to the kinds of needs and challenges in their daily lives. He found that remarkable economic developments have led to high levels of prosperity in various countries in Western and Northern Europe, as well as in North America and some parts of Asia, which also resulted in lasting changes to the meaning and importance of life for many. Studies of values often have found that value changes occur alongside the broader social, cultural, and economic change (e.g. Allen et al., 2007; Inglehart, 1997; 2008).

The theory of Postmodernisation proposed by Inglehart (1997) paints a clear picture of interrelations between the society and the individual through times of change. Inglehart's (1981; 1997) study of values demonstrates clearly that the economic, societal, and political changes are very often accompanied by the changes in people's value priorities. He claims in the 'Postmodernist' societies where both economic and societal stabilities have already been settled and guaranteed for their people, value changes are bound to occur. 'Post' here in 'Postmodernism' can be understood as denoting a long process of 'ongoing cultural and social transformations' (Mac an Ghail & Haywood, 2007, p. 27), and it is plausible to think

that this process of change would result in fundamental differences in the ideas and beliefs about life that the new generations hold. 'Postmodernist', or 'Postmaterialist' values emerge as increasing emphasis is placed on autonomy, self-expression, and the quality of life, as existential conditions allow people, and survival can be taken for granted (Inglehart, 2008, p. 131). This shift in values reflect changes away from emphasis on economic and physical security, toward growing emphasis on freedom of expression, more voluntary and active participation in politics, and individual autonomy (Inglehart, 2008). Individuals in 'Postmodernist' societies also hold less traditional or 'materialistic' values of emphasising achievement and economic success, show less interest or support for institutionalized forms and of religion and politics and their authority than those from the less well-off nations, and place more emphasis on individuation, quality of life, self-expression, and romantic love (Inglehart, 1997). Endorsement of Postmodernist Values has been found to be highly related to certain views and attitudes regarding family and gender relations, as can be seen in Figure 2.6. A study conducted in the US found that Americans were becoming more open to less traditional family forms and ideas; in comparison to their older counterparts, young Americans showed much less support for traditional social values less old fashioned values about family and marriage, and higher acceptance for homosexuality, gender equality, and diversity in comparison to their counterparts in the past decades to the past (The Pew Research Center, 2010).

Inglehart (1997, 2008) makes the distinction between different priorities in individuals' values using two orthogonal dimensions: traditional versus secular-rational and; survival versus self-expression values. Whereas traditional values include emphases on religion, authority, and national pride, rational-secular values would include the



opposites. Survival values include emphases on the survival and improvement of the individual and the society, whereas self-expression values encompass the goals that are aimed to enhance freedom of choice and overall well-being of the individuals. Inglehart (1997) claims that individuals in the 'Postmodernist' societies are more likely to score high on secular-rational and self-expression values, and those in the 'Modernist' societies the opposite would be the case, where the scores on the traditional survival values would be high. This pattern reflects the interaction between the environmental conditions and individuals' values, for certain conditions of a society are likely to motivate the individuals to endorse the types of values and goals that will be useful/beneficial to them. In comparing his data from 1970 through to 2006, Inglehart found that the number of Postmodernists/Postmaterialists grew significantly in many parts of the world. In his 2006 data, Postmodernists/Postmaterialists outnumbered Modernists/Materialists in West Europe and the US, which suggests value shifts in the parts of the world where high levels of stability and prosperity are ensured for its citizens (Inglehart, 2008).

In line with this view, other researchers have also taken interest in further investigating the link between changes to individuals' values and economic development. It appears that greater change in one variable is often accompanied by greater change in the other. Allen and colleagues (2007), for example, have found that there exists strong linkage between these two variables, although they were not able to determine the exact magnitude of the relationship or the direction of influence, which were thus presumed. They found that people's values changed more drastically in societies that had gone through major economic developments, and that societies in which people had decided to endorse different cultural values - more

egalitarian, autonomy, and mastery - experienced greater economic growth. It is noted that the increasing emphasis on self-expression is also linked to rising gender equality (Inglehart, 2008). Inglehart (2008)'s data suggests that there is a correlation between the economic status of the nation (represented by GNP per capita) and the level of materialist/postmaterialist values. The fluctuations in economy such as inflation rate change in different years are closely resembled by the pattern of value priority changes (Lesthaegae & Meekers, 1986). In 1995, South Korea scored lower in both GNP per capita and on materialist/post-materialist value scale than the other nations investigated here. However, with the remarkable rate at which the country developed economically and socially within the last decade, it is imaginable that the values of the people in this country changed by a greater extent as well. Allen and colleagues (2007) found that people's values changed more drastically in societies that had gone through major economic developments, which suggests a close relationship between rapid economic change and value change.

In this sense, it can be supposed that intergenerational differences in value endorsement would be found. Correlates of Postmodernist Values include various macro-level factors such as culture, economic conditions, age, and education, as can be seen on Figure 2.6. The impact of economic development and cultural background of the country on endorsement of Postmodernist values was confirmed in Basabe & Ros (2005) as well. Age and the level of education are often found to be highly correlated with the level of Postmodernist values (Hellevik, 1993), with younger and better educated individuals often showing higher levels of Postmodernist value endorsement. With the recent economic development and social change, economic stability and security in the nation provide individuals with

opportunities to focus less on individual achievement and financial security and more on aspects such as individual freedom and quality of life. Inglehart (1997; 2008) highlights the importance of societal conditions experienced in childhood in shaping these values; the more security the individual experiences growing up, the more he or she will endorse Postmodernist Values, with more concern for freedom, equality, individual choice, and quality of life. It can thus be speculated that the younger generations are more likely to hold Postmodernist values than their older counterparts in most developed countries. The results from Inglehart (2008)'s study as well as various findings from the World Value Survey conducted over last few decades across the world demonstrated this to be true; younger generations almost always held more Postmodernist values than their older counterparts across cultures. Moreover, the findings also demonstrated that these intergenerational value differences resulted from differences in childhood experiences of the younger and older generations. Due to the relative societal and economic stability they were able to enjoy, younger generations in the industrialised, developed countries held more Postmodernist values than did older generations. This relationship between differences in childhood experiences (accounted by level of change to the socioeconomic conditions) across generations and Postmodernist values as well as family views and attitudes (see Figure 2.6) are examined in Study II.




Figure 2.6 Postmodernist Values & Interrelated Variables

### 2.3.3 Intergenerational Value Changes

However, even if changes are occurring in a society that is developing and economically growing, it does not always mean that these changes would influence everyone that belongs to the society in an equal and uniform way. In other words, it is likely that there will be individual differences in how fast the values and perceptions will change depending on several factors. Inglehart (2008) argues that the basic values individuals hold reflect the conditions that were prevalent during their pre-adult, formative years. In this sense, value priorities of a society change in a gradual manner through what Inglehart (2008) terms ‘intergenerational replacement’ (p.132). The values and beliefs of the older generations that grew up with the concern for survival often differ from those held by the younger generations that grew up taking basic survival for granted. Economic security provides individuals with better educational opportunities, and this allows for successive generations to adopt more Postmodernist values (MacIntosh, 1998).

The meaning of generation encompasses a 'shared socio-historical experience', which determines the way the subjects perceive the world around them (Scabini & Marta, 2006, p. 82). For example, it can be found that there are intergenerational differences in the extent and the degree to which the changes occur, for individuals in older and younger generations may have qualitatively different life experiences in fast-developing societies (Rindfuss et al., 1992). Therefore, the central role of generation in shaping the particular way in which individuals understand the history and the workings of the society, as is suggested by researchers (e.g., Scabini & Marta, 2006) seems to be quite clear. Indeed, findings suggest that the perception of the world, interests, values, and attitudes of the younger generation, which includes individuals born in the late twentieth century, are perceivably different from the older ones born in the earlier decades (Inglehart, 1997). Research that looked at cohort differences in the Netherlands revealed that younger cohorts always demonstrated more culturally progressive attitudes, and that there was a trend toward less cultural conservatism (Vollebergh, Iedema, & Raaijmakers, 2001).

The effects of age/generation on values and beliefs are often found (e.g., Inglehart, 1997; 2008; Siemienka, 2002; Trent & South, 1992). Comparing data from the Value Surveys from 1980s to 2000s, shifts toward gender equality and openness toward homosexuality- attitudes closely related to self-expression and secular-rational values- were observed, which Inglehart (2008) claims is largely due to intergenerational population replacement. In any given society, it can be expected that younger generations would hold more open views toward new ideas and new models relating to social roles and human rights (Siemienka, 2002, p. 377).

Comparison of gender-role ideology held by individuals in early twenties in 1983 and

1994 also found large differences, which demonstrates this intergenerational shift (Scott, 1999). Siemienka (2002) argues that changes in social structure and people's level of satisfaction with their standard of living would have a great impact in shaping the attitudes and behaviours of the new generations in the globalising world. Therefore, one can suspect that different conditions under which different generations grew up in can lead to changes in value priorities between the generations. Furthermore, this may be even more so for there would be less resistance of inconsistency in the early learning and the present for the younger generation (Inglehart, 1997). A study conducted in Japan found generational differences and age effects in individuals' views on topics relating to family, for they found that younger individuals seemed to hold less traditional opinions (Rindfuss et al., 1992). In another study, age was also found to have an effect on attitudes about marriage, family, and gender roles, with older members holding more traditional ideas and beliefs (Trent & South, 1992).

Manneim's (1940, 1970) theory of generational change points to the direct relationship between the extent and size of social change and the magnitude of generational differences (Siemienka, 2002). Inglehart (1997) found that intergenerational differences in values are larger in societies with greater level of economic development or societal change. Comparing South Korea and Japan can thus be useful in illustrating this point, for the trajectory and recency of socioeconomic change in these two countries in the last few decades differ significantly. For instance, Global Economic Data for South Korea shows that the GDP of the country in the last twenty-five years has jumped twelve times, whereas in Japan it only quadrupled within the same period (Econstats, 2007). Data from the

Inglehart (1997)'s study showed that the strength of the linkage between age, values, and the rates of economic growth were the highest in South Korea in the latter half of the twentieth century. The experiences the younger and the older generations have had in the society were more radically different in South Korea than in Japan, and this is likely to have caused the young and the old to have different outlooks of life and values in the former society than the latter. These results suggest that the rate and extent of economic development lead to intergenerational value changes. It is noted that the qualitatively different life experience of the younger generation in rapidly changing cultures gives rise to 'new perceptions of reality', and this can lead to fundamental cultural change (Inglehart, 1997, p.27). Hahn and his colleagues (2006)'s study also produced similar findings. They found that generational differences in relative importance of specific needs differed more in the country with rapid social change; while both young and old Americans emphasised self-esteem, Korean adolescents found needs for autonomy to be most important and the older Koreans self-actualisation needs. These findings demonstrate the need for comparing value endorsements in different generations, and for relating these differences to change/stability of the society in which these generations were raised. Interrelationships and effects discussed in this section are depicted in Figure 2.7.




Figure 2.7 Age/Generation Effects

#### 2.3.4 Self beliefs

Cultural influences on self-beliefs are often noted (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Tafarodi et al., 2004). Triandis (1989) defines the self as an “active agent that promotes differential sampling, processing, and evaluation of information from the environment” (p. 506), and notes that differences in social behaviours can originate from the self-concept. Many cross-cultural psychologists placed emphasis on the impact of culture on the self, and have demonstrated that certain aspects of the self are specific to particular cultures, such as self-construals (e.g. Kagitcibasi, 1996; 2007; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Cousins (1989) remarked that the self-perception is influenced by idioms of personhood that are specific to the culture (p. 129). As the immediate and lasting place of influence on individuals, different types of cultural backgrounds and the likely types of early socialisation experiences foster different senses of self, for all aspects of social motivations are closely related to the self (Triandis, 1989). Individuals from Collectivistic cultures may hold very different ideas



about the self (embedded and interdependent self) than those in the more Individualistic cultures (independent, autonomous self), in that culture can have strong impact on the conception of the self as related or separate from close others (e.g. Cross et al., 2000; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Singelis, 1994). Individuals' sense of self as separate or related to close others, the degree to which individuals will attend to and think relevant of information of close others and consider opinions of close others in decision making might depend on the type of self-construal (independent or interdependent) held by the individual (Cross et al., 2000). The fluidity and adaptability of the self also differ depending on the cultural orientation of the given society. Individuals from Collectivistic cultures think of the self as more fluid, adaptable, and malleable, whereas those in Individualistic cultures think of the self as fixed. For example, Singelis (1994)' study of different cultural groups in the US found that the Caucasian Americans were more autonomous/independent than Asian Americans, and that the Asian Americans were more related/ interdependent than the Caucasian Americans.

Social change and its impact on self-beliefs and close relationships are often discussed (e.g. Beck, 1997; Giddens, 1992; Goodwin, 1998; Kagitcibasi, 2007). Some theories point to the increasing emphasis on the self and autonomy. Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002) contended that 'the ethic of individual self-fulfilment and achievement is the most powerful current in modern society' (p.22). They described what happens in most parts of the present world as 'individualisation', where one faces the needs for conceptualising one's self, relationships, and lives on his or her own. The boundaries and rules the society and its traditions impose on the individual are not as powerful as before, and now the individual can make conscious choices

about everything in their lives. Results from the World Values Surveys (2007) from the 1980s to the 2000s demonstrate parts of this trend; it was found that individuals' sense of freedom and control have grown in many of the developed countries. Giddens (1992) relates the modern sense of intimacy in interpersonal sphere to democracy in the larger context. He claims that relationship partners now enter relationships expecting greater equality, satisfactory emotional communication, and rewarding experiences (Giddens, 1992). Trent & White claim that education has played a role in 'liberalising' individuals', and especially women's, attitudes toward family and gender role behaviour (1992, p. 429). Interpersonal relations in the domain of family are also changing due to these factors. Individuals now have—either in reality, in their opinion, or both—more liberty and personal choice in choosing what the 'proper thing to do' would be (Giddens, 1992). Moreover, Triandis (1989) suggested the possibility of individuals becoming more individualistic as societies become more complex and wealthy (p. 509). Therefore, older ideals and prescriptions about the family may have less influence on how individuals perceive family in the modern society, for their self-concept and need for autonomy are mediating their views on their interpersonal relationships. In summary, these views suggest that the present economic conditions and cultural values are increasingly encouraging and necessitating individualisation, where individuals turn away from social norms and formal values and place more emphasis on their own feelings and traits for defining the self (Bumpass, 1990; Roberts & Helson, 1997).

These changes, however, does not signify decline of the family and close relationships. Alternative theories suggest that importance of maintaining good social ties with close others continues to be strong (e.g., Kagitcibasi, 2007). Some

believe that while individuals living in the present are faced with the dual task of maintaining old ties and also seeking their individual identities and appropriate levels of autonomy, integration of both of these elements is most desired (Roberts & Helson, 1997). Gavazzi and Sabatelli (1990), along with many other researchers, propose that individual development should include both achieving appropriate level of autonomy and maintaining appropriate level of interconnectedness, especially with the family. Kagitcibasi (2007) presents a new conception of self that incorporates the need for both autonomy and relatedness, which she termed Autonomous-Related Self. Figure 2.8 outlines this theory and its implications for the modern family, which are further discussed in the family change section.




Figure 2.8 Autonomous-Related Self & Interrelated Variables

### 2.3.5 Political Beliefs

Socioeconomic factors have been noted to be linked to political outcomes (Lipset, 1994), and in this respect, changes in the former can often be conducive to the change in the latter. For instance, Ross (1997) discusses the significant relevance of culture in politics, noting that it frames the political context, and shapes and links individual and cultural identities. Interest in politics could arise as a direct result of an economic or political situation in a society (Siemienska, 2002).

How the ideas of democracy are shared and cultivated depends on the cultural context (Kim et al., 2002). Cultural background, as well as political and economic conditions, often influences individuals' beliefs and attitudes towards democracy and democratic relations (Inglehart, 1997). The impact of recent social change on the individuals' democratic beliefs, political interest, and types of political participation has been discussed (e.g. Inglehart, 1997; Kim, Helgesen, & Ahn, 2002).

Globalisation has had influence on the conceptions of the power and the role of the government, and many of the modern states, affected by the economic changes and the historical and cultural surroundings, are adopting their own government and governance strategies and forms (Held, 2000). Granato and his colleagues (1996) have found that the shift toward Postmaterialist goals, which are promoted by stable economic conditions, was strongly related to emergence of democracy, suggesting that the endorsement of Postmaterialist/ Postmodernist values and positive attitude toward democracy among the public occur jointly. These examples demonstrate that the particular experiences in individuals' childhood can have impact on their political beliefs. Major changes in the economic and political systems are likely to bring new ideas and values, which will be more readily accepted by younger generations (e.g.

Flanagan, 2003; Inglehart, 1997). Inglehart (1997) argues that political views may change at two different levels, where the smaller level changes might bring changes to preference for one political party over the other and general beliefs about how societies should be run, and on a higher level, individuals decide to take more active and direct participation in political matters. This may be so, for individuals may not perceive the necessity of having to rely on, trust, and stay loyal to existing political parties as their previous generations did, they may believe in having better conception and power over the political matters themselves, and may choose to participate in more active and direct ways. Individuals' choices about how much interest they show in politics, whether or not to participate in elections, and other political activities show how much they believe in the state (Siemienska, 2002), and may differ between generations as a result of how much trust in the state they have come to form over the formative years. Therefore, differences in political beliefs across generations can be found, with the differences most pronounced in the societies where there have been larger changes.

Some researchers postulate that there is a strong link between democratic ideals and Postmodernisation (e.g., Inglehart, 1981; Lesthaeghe & Meekers, 1986). Growing emphasis on self-expression value, for example, was found to be correlated with rising demands for participation in decision making in political life, which is an important attribute of democracy (Inglehart, 2008). Endorsement of Postmodernist Values is linked to anti-establishment orientation, participation in protest activities, less nationalism, and less conservatism (Inglehart, 1981; Lesthaeghe & Meekers, 1986). Research has also found high correlation between existing level of Postmodernist values and the prevalence and/or support for

democratic form of government across the world (e.g., Dalton & Shin, 2003; Inglehart, 1997). This relationship is more easily observed in the cultures with the more recent political and economic changes such as the East Asian countries. Democracy can be defined as a political system in which groups with different social and ideological ideas can compete for power, and those who hold power are elected by and represent the people (Vanhanen, 2000). Dalton & Shin (2003) believe that democratisation has transformed many parts of the world in the latter half of the twentieth century. Within the period of fifty years from 1950 to 2000, the percentage of nations that are democracies increased from 14.3 percent to 62.5 percent (Freedom House, 2008). Moreover, these findings tend to support the view that these changes are indicating overall patterns of movement toward Postmodernist societies. It can thus be suggested that this shift happens alongside changes in people's attitudes toward other aspects of life, such as self and the family.

Researchers have argued that the changes in the political system such as those following the German unification or the collapse of the communist government in East Europe brought changes to many aspects of people's lives, including work, marriage, ascribed and perceived gender roles, and the family (e.g., Goodwin & Emelyanova, 1995; Goodwin, 1999). Goodwin (1999) found clear changes in people's values, attitudes, and relationships in Russia, where the political system collapsed and was replaced by another. Therefore, it can be suggested that the politics of the society has implications for the family, including relationship dynamics, views, and attitudes. Correlations were found between individuals' decisions regarding political and civic engagements and emotional connections and social identity built through experiences and learning in the family (Flanagan, 2003). The

ideals of democracy and egalitarianism in the present world can have impact on family relationships (Thornton & Fricke, 1987). Countries like South Korea and Taiwan have adopted more democratic ideals in the recent decades (Dalton & Shin, 2003), and these views in turn may influence beliefs about the power relations, role division, and decision-making in the family. According to Elder (1965), autocratic family ideology is associated with societal factors in that it declines with increasing industrialisation, elevation in median education level, and decline of cultural and institutional support. It can thus be postulated that culture and social change, as well as individuals' childhood experiences and values in life, can have impact on their political beliefs, for social change often bring on changes in both individuals' values and political attitudes and behaviours (Inglehart & Abramson, 1999). Political beliefs and other major factors that are believed to be interrelated with these beliefs are illustrated in Figure 2.9.




Figure 2.9 Political Beliefs and Interconnected Variables

# **Part IV:**

## **Family Views and Attitudes:**

### **Family Centredness and**

### **Democratisation**

#### 2.4.0 Introduction

This chapter will discuss specific aspects of family views and attitudes investigated in this thesis. The family can be conceptualised as the most basic and crucial social unit (Study Commission on the Family, 1983; Thornton & Fricke, 1987) for it serves as a vital link between the individuals and the society (Kagitcibasi, 2007). The norms, values, and customs of a society are maintained by the process of socialisation within the intimate family setting (Rindfuss, Liao & Tsuya, 1992), where individuals from an early stage begin to form ideas about their world receive knowledge from their parents and other senior family members, and learn how to maintain social interactions. Thornton & Young-DeMarco (2001, p.1010) discuss the central role the institution of family has played in organising individuals' lives and their social relationships. Societal and economic factors such as modernisation or economic



development could, and have been noted to, bring changes to the meaning, functions, and structure of the family in many parts of the world (Smith, 1995; Thornton & Fricke, 1987). Family centredness and democratisation across cultures (Study I, II & III) and generations (Study II) will be discussed in more detail and investigated in this work.

#### 2.4.1 Aspects of family views and attitudes

##### 2.4.1.1 *History of family*

For as long as history can trace back, families have existed and have served individuals with not only the biological needs to survive and reproduce, but also with their psychological and social needs to belong and to care and be cared by close others (Smith, 1995). As mentioned earlier in the thesis, the concept of the family includes complex sets of components, with its functions, meanings, and structures closely related to both the workings and needs of the individuals and the society. Various types and levels of factors influence family relationships, including their cultural background, societal norms, individual needs and wants, and the expectations and the needs of the community. Georgas and his colleagues (1997) argue that a combination of factors including sense of longing for emotional closeness, need for interdependency, and various obligations imposed by the society and the culture upon family members contribute to the way individuals are bound to their families. Therefore, cultural norms determine, to some extent, the functioning

and organisation of the family, expectations within the family, education and socialisation of the children, and interactional patterns (Schwartz, 2006).

At the level of the individual, the perceptions of the family views and attitudes include their ideas, beliefs, and personal views on the function, importance, and closeness in family, as well as the roles within the family. Over the course of their lives, especially in the childhood and adolescence years, individuals develop stable attitudes and perceptions as results of 'active structuring and internationalisation of cultural influences' (Vollerbergh, Iedema, & Raaikmakers, 2001, p. 1187). Although these individual views are highly influenced by the societal ideals and cultural transmissions, they can still differ according to the specific types of experience or learning under certain societal conditions and family setting. With social change and as a result higher living standard, different type of family democratisation, and education, family perceptions that the younger generation hold could change and differ from those of their older family members. In other words, individuals within the same culture are likely to share similar perceptions, but their unique family settings or the specific events in the society can have impact on them as well. For instance, Kagitcibasi (2007) suggests that close emotional ties can continue to exist while hierarchy in family may decrease in families in countries undergoing rapid economic development.

#### *2.4.1.2 Family centredness*

Schwarz and his colleagues (2005) found that the norms of 'familism', or how

committed the family member is to his or her roles and obligations in the family, predicted greater exchange of support between adult children and their parents. Similarly, Bengston and Roberts' (1991) model of intergenerational family solidarity, for instance, emphasises the roles of factors such as both the parent's and child's norms of familism, opportunity structure for family interaction, perception of exchange reciprocity, and affection for determining the level and the depth of parent-adult child association (p. 859). The level of familism is different across cultures, and stronger commitment, adherence to the societal norms, and belief in the importance of family in individuals are likely to induce behaviours and decisions that are pro-family. For example, Hispanic groups in the U.S. are found to be high on familism, and the individuals belonging to this ethnic background had more favourable attitude toward marriage and starting a family (Trent & South, 1992). Therefore, measures that tap onto specific aspects of family views and attitudes could provide insights into the present families.

Furthermore, even the concept of 'centredness' or 'closeness' in family can mean different things in different cultures. It can highlight the relationship between different members of the family over the others depending on where the emphasis tends to fall on in a given culture, and the desired level and type of closeness in each culture can vary as well. The extent to which individuals view themselves as autonomous or related to their family can be an important factor in family relationships (Kagitcibasi, 1996, 2007). Rothbaum and his colleagues (2000) found that parents' conception of family relatedness and closeness differed between a more collectivistic group and an individualistic group. Their study found that Asian immigrant families' ideas of closeness often consisted of unity, harmony, mutual understanding, and compromise

between all members of the family. On the other hand, European American families placed more emphasis on the 'sacredness' of the couple, involving the notion of romance rather than the parent-child association when discussing closeness. As can be seen in these examples, the types and nature of relationships and views within the family reflect the type of cultural values and societal goals. For these reasons thus, families can be useful in studying the role of culture in personal relationships, for the findings of these studies clearly demonstrate that much of cultural influence takes place at the level of family (Lalonde, 2006).

#### *2.4.1.3 Family importance, commitment & dependence*

Family importance includes general ideas and views about family, and encompasses aspects such as perceived importance of having and maintaining family, perceived benefits and costs of family, and level of satisfaction individuals feel about their own families. Family commitment is defined as a psychological construct that directly influences everyday behaviours in relationships, including decisions to persist (Rusbult, Martz, & Agnew, 1998, p. 360). It can also encompass aspects such as individuals' feelings of psychological attachment to their significant others accommodative behaviours, and cognitive interdependence (Wieselquist et al., 1999). Commitment to the family in the context of this research includes both the actual commitment level of the individuals, and how important individuals perceive commitment to be in families. Autonomy/relatedness regarding the family is found to be nurtured differently according to the cultural dimensions of individualism-collectivism (Kagitcibasi, 2005). Testing the differences in dependence-

independence from the family, or 'allocentrism-idiocentrism' concerning the family across nations that are believed to differ in the level of collectivism-individualism will add to our understanding of these cultural differences (Lay et al., 1998, p.435). Kagitcibasi (2007)'s model of family change includes the family independence/dependence as one of the facets of family interactions, and claims that it is influenced by culture and socialisation values. The modern trends of increasing emphasis on individuation, tolerance to diverse ideas, and freedom, and reduced commitment to the collective have influence on one's relations to his/her own family (Thornton & Young-DeMarco, 2001).

#### *2.4.1.4 Family democratisation*

The dimension of family democratisation closely resembles Larson's (1974) concept of 'family power', defined as dynamic processes involving 'exchanges among all family members relative to norms, behaviours connected with decision-making or conflict management situations' (p. 127). It also includes hierarchies and distribution on power within the family, and how much authority falls on each member of the family- whether the father has the most say or each family member can voice their opinions in the family- and can be influenced by societal norms and individuals' values and attitudes. For example, Larson's (1974) study of American families in 1960s found that the majority of perceptual disagreement in family power was between male head-of-the-family dominance and equality, which demonstrates that power in the family can gravitate towards specific member of the family, which can

also reflect the norms and expectations of the time and the society. Growing acceptance of egalitarian decision making and less prescribed and defined gender roles were witnessed in the 1980s and early 1990s (Thornton & Young-DeMarco, 2001). It is thus possible that the individuals who are born in this social atmosphere endorse more egalitarian family views. Research shows that the relative power and influence in each family can be highly related to the social and educational status of the parents. Lueptow (1980) demonstrated that mothers who work have considerably higher influence in the family compared to those who do not work, which shows the connection between women's social position and power in the family. Furthermore, mothers with higher educational status had more influence in the family, especially on their daughters (Lueptow, 1980). Therefore, this thesis further investigates the impact of gender, age/generation, values, and beliefs on family democratisation.

#### 2.4.2 Family changes

Many researchers have investigated changes in the modern family, including transformations in the structure and meaning of the family members, and individuals' family views and attitudes (e.g., Allan, 2001; Georgas, 2003; Kagitcibasi, 1996; Kagitcibasi, 2007; and Scott, 1999). Since the family is an 'integral part of society', and is related closely to the structure, values, and norms of the society (Kagitcibasi, 1996), the meaning, perception, and functioning of the family are changing in relation to, and at times as the results of other changes that are shaping the modern world.

For example Kagitcibasi (2007) claims that the impact of social change and societal development on the family structure and the family system is significant on socialisation values and interactions within the family. White & Rogers (2000)'s study of American families can be presented as a specific example of this. Their results demonstrated that the economic development in 1990s that brought changes in family structure and increase in women's economic role affected the role relations between couples, meaning of marriage and family, and relationship satisfaction. Therefore, as Allan (2001) notes, rapid economic and social changes of the present times are having continuous influence on the interdependencies between individuals, including families as well as the wider social networks (p.325). For instance, the new generation of young adults, with higher education and access to new ideas, gain the ability and power to challenge authority of their parents, and it becomes more difficult for the parents to enforce their old beliefs and wishes on their children (Thornton & Fricke, 1987, p.757). Modern individuals perceive more freedom in deciding what type of relationships they want to have, how they want to interact with the others in the relationship, and in choosing how committed they will be to the relationship. It is argued that individuation is an 'independent causal force' in family change, and that traditional concepts of family about aspects such as marriage, parenthood, women's employment, adult intergenerational relationships will wane with the increase in opportunities (Bumpass, 1990). Moreover, increase in individuation, freedom, and the acceptance of diverse ideas and behaviours and living arrangements, as well as less commitment to the collective, have been observed and well noted by numerous researchers of social and family change (Thornton & Young-DeMarco, 2001)).

'Postmodernisation', since it promotes higher level of autonomy and control in the

individual, tends to democratise personal relationships and to bring changes to the decision-making and power relations, and to affect other aspects of families and other intimate interpersonal relationships (Beck, 1997; Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002; Giddens, 1992; Inglehart, 1997; Kagitcibasi, 1996). For instance, material affluence and the new economic conditions enjoyed by many of the societies today have changed the meaning and function of the family, and individuals are no longer constrained to the traditional gender and family roles (Allan, 2001). Increasing levels of freedom in individual decisions, which characterise the modern societies, lead individuals to adhere less to prescribed behaviours and attitudes toward the family (Thornton & Young-DeMarco, 2001). Growing emphasis on self-expression value leads to rise of gender equality, with more freedom and independence of choice of work and family for the women and resulting in the traditional prescribed gender roles in the family (Inglehart, 2008). Research has found this kind of links between macro-level social/economic changes and micro-level outcomes in family-building and family-bonding behaviours as well (e.g., Axinn & Yabiku, 2001). 'Postmodernisation' does not necessarily suggest unidirectional movement to individualistic values, or considers the types of collectivistic values which prize connectedness as insignificant or losing their importance. Quite contrarily, researchers are beginning to note that values that emphasise togetherness and relatedness actually continue to exist and influence the perceptions and decisions made by individuals.

Whereas former theories of families made simplistic classification between family models of independence and interdependence, Kagitcibasi (1996, 2002) suggests a new model of family that accounts for this type of family change better. In her third



family model – family model of emotional interdependence- there is material/economic independence, which in turn fosters autonomy of the children, but at the same time, continued interdependence in psychological dimension because of continued importance of connectedness in the given culture. Adams (2004) also notes of the continuation of emotional links between family members in modern societies. Therefore, these newer theories present a family environment that encourages and fosters emotional maturity and autonomy in the individual while also providing appropriate level of emotional support as ideal. Identity formation and the maintenance of intimacy becomes a major issue for many living in the present society. In conclusion, it is not always easy to predict the direction or the characteristics of change in family formation and relationships in different cultures, for the economic development and other societal factors cannot tell the whole story; the cultural background and study the types and strengths of values that continue to be of significance in the given society are also needed.

Rising status and independence of women and the young also bring changes to family democratisation and commitment. Women today have higher education and better jobs, and with their increased economic power and social status, they fight against ‘the old ties of dependence’ and can ask for more rights and demands for themselves (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002, p.63 ). Georgas (2003) discusses the change in the ‘power’ of the father in the family; he notes that the traditional authority and control of the father are disappearing quickly, especially in the richest societies. These changes have become visible in many places across the globe, and they are often concurrent with the changes in the size and democratisation of the family, fertility rates, and patterns of family arrangements (Adams, 2004). With

increased level of education, young people are going through a kind of cultural revolution, where traditional commitments become loosened and their own choice and initiative becomes more significant (Beck, 1997; Scott, 1999). Relationships between family members and their views and attitudes might be changing just as well, and these changes might be visible across generations. For example, in a study of perceptions of family relationship, Delsing and his colleagues (2003) found that compared to children in the previous generation, current-family children perceived more justice, affection, and trust from their parents.

Various factors can have influence on the family. Giddens (1992)' concept of 'negotiated commitment' also discusses the way individuals in the modern society may be organising their kinship connections. Giddens also claims that individuals in a modern society are now forced to work out what the 'proper thing to do' in the family context is, in how much intimacy to have with their family members and relatives, who to consider as family, and how much commitment they want to give to and expect back from their family members (1992). Therefore, the family in the present have really become 'families of choice'; the central motivation of the individuals may no longer necessarily be to continue with the traditions or to conform to the older values, but rather, to search for satisfactory relationships that will aid them with personal affirmation (Weeks et al., 1999, p.298). Axinn and Yabiku (2001) claim that marriage and childbearing, or in other words starting a family, can be seen as a costly choice for it restricts the freedom and independence of the individual, and these factors can have significant influence on the views toward the family, and especially the level of commitment to the family.

The experience one has with his or her family as a child has lasting impact on the personality, family views and attitudes, and future behaviours in regards to the family. The social organisation of families in childhood has great influence on the individuals (Axinn & Yabiku, 2001), and in that sense, the ideals and values relating to family may persist for longer time than expected despite of the rapid social change the society may be undergoing. Moreover, in some cultures, where there exist strong beliefs about the importance of traditional family, the type of family relationship that is highly valued might persist regardless of the other changes in individual beliefs and values. Therefore, this thesis will examine the impact of culture on the family views and attitudes, specifically tracing interlinks between values, beliefs, and family centredness and democratisation in each of the country included in this work.

## **2.5 Conceptual model**

Chapter 2 described the variables and their interrelations. Based on the projected influences explained, a conceptual model is drawn (*Figure 2.10*). Each of these impacts will be investigated in Studies I, II, and III.




Figure 2.10: Conceptual Model (Overall Hypothesis)

# Chapter 3

## Study I

### 3.1 Research aim

Study I presents a multi-level model that delineates the links between family centredness and democratisation and factors at societal and individual levels. Interrelations between macro-level factors, and values and beliefs measured at the individual level, and perceptions of family relatedness and democratisation were examined. For example, Goodwin and Gaines (2004) found that at the individual level, the correlation between fatalistic beliefs and relationship quality was moderated by country, suggesting a possible influence of the level of Individualism on the extent to which negative beliefs about the relationship actually affected the

quality of the relationship. At the group/family level, Kagitcibasi (1996) notes that, as family is an integral part of the society, beliefs, expectations, and values regarding the family are sensitive to both cultural history and social change. Rindfuss and his colleagues (1992) claimed that individuals' socialisation experiences in the family are important in connecting the individuals to the norms, values, and customs of a society which are continued and maintained in the intimate social setting of the family. Trent and South (1992) also outline the influence of experiences that are typical to individuals' social or ethnic group on family views and attitudes, suggesting links between individuals' cultural and social background and their attitudes towards the family. Although the directions and nature of these interrelations can be viewed in different ways, this study maintained focus only on one-directional influences, from the macro-level factors to individual-level factors, which then exert influence on family views and attitudes.

## **3.2 Variables**

### **3.2.1 Culture**

In this study, I focused on three cultures- Hungary, SouthKorea, and Canada- of which the first two have undergone significant but different economic/social/political transformations in the last few decades. Such changes are liable to have important implications for individual' values and political beliefs (e.g. Inglehart, 1997; Schwartz & Bardi, 1997), and in this study, cross-cultural differences in the political beliefs,

Postmodernist values and their role in influencing family views and attitudes were investigated.

### 3.2.2 Social change/ Economic development

Economic conditions, and especially the level of economic development can be an indicator of national differences in the level of social change experienced, and is closely related to shifts in individuals' value priorities and beliefs (e.g. Inglehart, 1990). Therefore, economic growth represented by GDP per capita change for each culture in the years 1980 to 2006 was used in this study to test whether this was held true. Economic growth is associated with level of Individualism at the cultural level (Hofstede, 1980), and as there can be other factors involved in this relationship that might mediate or moderate the strength of the relationship (Kashima & Kashima, 2003), these factors were considered as well. Along with culture and age/generation, it is represented as a macro-level variable here, for it influences the individuals by way of shaping their experiences.

### 3.2.3 Gender

Markus and Kitayama (1991) discuss gender differences in construals of the self, where women are more likely than men to construct interdependent self and are naturally more inclined to form close ties and deep-rooted relatedness with those around them. Roberts and Helson (1997) found that women find it easier to combine individuality or autonomy with relatedness successfully, which can be seen as

desirable. These findings provide ample reasons to believe that gender differences exist in self-beliefs in relation to close others, and that these can lead towards differences in various family processes and meanings. The processes and the benefits of family integration might also be dependent on the individual's gender, their experiences of gender relations, interactions, and roles (Yabiku, Axinn, & Thornton, 1999). In particular, gender differences in the perceived importance of gender equality in the family seem to exist in many cultures, where women view it as more important than do men. These findings demonstrate that women and men may differ in the way they view relationship dynamics and roles, and interact with close others. In this study, I hypothesise that gender impacts perceived importance of family centredness and democratisation, which will be explained further in the following paragraphs.

#### 3.2.4 Postmodernist Values

The current study focused on the Postmodernist values. Inglehart (1997, 2008) distinguishes between different priorities in individuals' values using two dimensions of opposing emphases: traditional versus secular-rational values and survival versus self-expression values. Whereas traditional values place emphases on religion, authority, and national pride, rational-secular values would include the opposites. Survival values stress both the survival of the individual and the society, self-expression values stress enhancement of the individuals' freedom of choice, control, and overall well-being. Inglehart (1997) proposes that individuals in the 'Postmodernist' societies are likely to be high on secular-rational and self-expression values and those in the 'Modernist' societies the opposite. This pattern reflects the



interaction between sociocultural conditions and values priorities, for certain conditions of a society are likely to encourage individuals to endorse certain types of views and values that will be useful or beneficial to them. Both the level of economic development and cultural history and background that is unique to the country accounted for most of the cross-national differences found (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). The observed changes included shifts of opinions and preferences toward many aspects of life, such as individuals' beliefs about the self and identity, relationships, the family, and the larger society (Beck, 1997; Giddens, 1992; Inglehart, 1997).

De Graaf and De Graaf (1988) have suggested the role of Postmodernist values as a predictor variable for aspects of the individual including political attitudes and beliefs. They suggested that Postmodernist attitudes influence the individuals' political interest, party identification, political dissatisfaction, and voting behaviour (p. 51). The rising importance of individual freedom and quality of life, and decreasing importance of material success and maintenance of status quo, result in more democratic ideals for the society. Postmodernist values are also correlated with anti-establishment orientation, less nationalism, enthusiasm and support for the 'third force' movements in countries with long histories of dominant two-party systems, and peace movements (Lesthaeghe & Meekers, 1986, p. 229). Moreover, Inglehart (1981) claims that those holding postmodernist values are only about one third as likely to hold conservative views compared to those holding materialist values, and that they are likely to favour new ideas and social change. Therefore, the impact of gender and the cultural dimensions of Individualism and Collectivism on Postmodernist values, and its relations to political beliefs and family views and attitudes will be one focus of this study.

### 3.2.5 Political beliefs

Political ideologies are often discussed in conjunction with factors such as values, various other aspects of political beliefs that the individual hold, and individual and societal factors that are at work. Barnea and Schwartz (1998) discuss the importance of value priorities in predicting support for political parties. They found that those who attribute importance to conservation values, which emphasise the importance of protecting social order, certainty, and the status quo, were predisposed to vote for conservative parties. Inglehart (1990) claims that political culture is closely tied to and embedded in values, which are shaped by years of historical experience shared, transmitted, and altered by generations. Michauld and her colleagues (2009) also discuss both the effect of cultural values, which include the social norms and rules for behaviour and individual's interactional patterns, and the role of political knowledge on political ideologies. These findings point to the importance of investigating the links between societal factors that shape individuals' values and political beliefs.

The possible impact of these values and beliefs also impact on family views and attitudes should be discussed. For example, conservatism is linked to societal, individual, and family level factors. For example, Van Hiel and his colleagues (2004) argue that cultural conservatism is highly related to authoritarian parent-child relationships, traditional work ethics, and conventional female roles. Feather (1979) found significant positive relations between total conservatism and national security and family security, and a negative relation with equality. Other researchers also

claimed that resistance to change and opposition to equality are the main components of political conservatism (e.g., Jost et al., 2003). Therefore, it can be hypothesised that higher political conservatism will predict weaker support for family democratisation, that there will be gender differences in level of political conservatism, although the direction of this relation is unclear, and that women will demonstrate higher support for family democratisation. Societal atmosphere impacts on political opinions and beliefs, where changes and instabilities in a country may lead individuals to hold more conservative political opinions in association with the psychological needs to reduce uncertainty and threat (Jost et al., 2007). It is possible, thus, to posit that the security and stability of the country influence the individuals' general and political conservatism, and that these conservative views in turn can have impact on family views and attitudes, especially in regards to democratisation within the family. Inglehart (1997) demonstrated the link between societal change and increasing tolerance for non-traditional family forms and women's freedom of decision concerning the family. For the purpose of the study, political conservatism is measured as political orientation, as there is a significant correlation between level of political conservatism and left-right political orientation (Collani & Grumm, 2009).

Democratic beliefs are likely to be related to cultural beliefs, values, and norms (Kim et al., 2002). How democracy is understood, how strong the belief that democracy is good/desirable for a society is, and how these beliefs form and spread across different aspects of life can be dependent on the factors that shape or influence both cultural and political atmosphere surrounding the individuals. Greater affluence, a higher emphasis on emotional as well as physical well-being, and social equality. For example, were identified as factors that lead to beliefs in democracy at the societal

level and democratic beliefs at the individual level (Lipset, 1994). A growing importance of individual rights and freedom, which arise from increasing stability in the society, leads individuals to hold more democratic beliefs, and this in turn can allow for more democratic institutions (Inglehart, 2000). These patterns of change have been observed in the parts of the world where rapid economic and social development took place, such as in East Asian countries of South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore (Lipset, 1994). The relationship between cultural-level individualism, individual-level democratic beliefs, and family centredness and family democratisation will be closely investigated in this study.

Differences in the endorsement of Postmodernist values or political beliefs in South Koreans and Hungarians can also be traced to the recent political histories of these nations. Although both have gone through significant political changes, expansion of democracy spread to East Asian countries earlier than to ex-Communist Eastern European countries (Lipset, 1994). Moreover, it can be said that these changes were less abrupt in Asia than in Eastern Europe, where the former ideology and system of government was replaced with new democracy. In this sense, comparing the beliefs and values of South Koreans, Hungarians and Canadians can be useful in understanding the possible effects of historical events, in this case the nature, magnitude, and recency of political change. The possible influence of these recent political changes in South Korea and Hungary will be considered in this study.

### 3.2.6 Family centredness & democratisation

#### 3.2.6.1 *Family centredness*

This study discusses the impact of culture and gender on 'family centredness'.

Family centredness combines the concepts of family bond, cohesion, intimacy, and closeness. North and her colleagues (2008) found a particularly strong link between family cohesion, defined by the strength of the family bond and relatedness in the family, and personal happiness. In discussing 'centredness', or 'relatedness' alternatively, Markus and Kitayama (1991) argue that although the appreciation and need for maintaining relatedness with others is universal, its significance can differ depending on the emphasis placed on either the independent or the interdependent self (p. 229). The dimensions of Individualism-Collectivism, and the emphasis on the independent versus interdependent selves, can thus influence perception of the importance of family centredness and the degree of independence from the family. Cross-cultural differences in the level of family allocentrism, or norm-oriented family relationship, were found in Eastern cultures (Chinese and East Indian samples), and Western culture, White Canadian samples (Lay et al., 1998). This finding demonstrates that cultural background and teachings, which promote the sense of either independent or interdependent self, affect the level of family centredness and its importance in that culture. The importance of the concept of familism, which includes aspects of family centredness, on the individuals' social, personal, and psychological developments has been emphasised in various literature (e.g., Yabiku, Axinn, & Thornton, 1999). This study compares the perceptions of family centredness in the more individualistic countries of Hungary and Canada (English-speaking) and the more collectivistic country of South Korea to confirm the cultural

influence on views regarding self in relation to family. It can be hypothesised that South Koreans, due to the collectivistic influences, would perceive this dimension to be more important than Hungarians or Canadians, and score higher.

### 3.2.6.2 *Family democratisation*

Family democratisation incorporates views about decision making, gender roles, and equalities in the family. It includes what Larson (1974) termed as 'family power', views, norms and attitudes concerning family decisions and conflict managements. Family members can view relations in the family as equal or hierarchical, attribute certain roles to the members, and have differing expectations about each members of the family (for example, deciding that the father has the most say in the decisions or that the mother is in charge of child-caring). Socio-cultural context often shapes the expectations and opinions about gender roles and gender equality in the family. Normative gender expectations reflect culturally shared norms of the society about men and women's roles in the family (Kwon et al., 2003). In South Korea, for example, strong influence of Confucianism, with heavy emphases on social hierarchy and clearly defined roles for the different genders and ages, has led to clearly divided gender roles and hierarchical relations in the family (Kwon et al., 2003). Therefore, stronger beliefs in family democratisation might be found among the Western countries of Canada and Hungary than in the country with strong Confucian influences like South Korea.

### 3.3 Hypotheses

In this study, culture, gender, and economic growth are considered as macro-level factors, for they can act as contextual factors that shape the experiences of the individuals. This conceptualisation of culture, where it is seen as an independent variable that influences factors such as level of development and psychological processes at the individual level, is commonly found in cross-cultural psychology (Miller, 2002). Individuals actively construct, and co-construct with others, explanations and stories that enable themselves to understand and make sense of the world around them, as well as self-concepts and identities, in their particular social context (Haste, 2004). In this sense, variables such as culture and gender provide individuals with a context in which they formulate and stabilise a view of the self, close others, and the world. Therefore, it is possible to conjecture that family views and attitudes are influenced by these macro-level factors via individual values and beliefs.

In this paper, these links and the mediating effects of the political beliefs and Postmodernist values on family views and attitudes (family centredness and democratisation) will be investigated. The following can be proposed as hypotheses:

- 1) Variables considered in this study - macro-level variables of culture, gender, economic growth, individual-level values and beliefs, and family centredness and democratisation- should be correlated with one another across different levels. For instance, significant correlations should be found between individual values and beliefs (e.g., Postmodernist values, political beliefs, conservatism).

2) Macro-level variables of culture and gender should impact on individual values and beliefs.

- Economic development, as measured by the change in the GDP per capita from the year 1981 to 2005, should be positively related to Postmodernist Values and democratic beliefs, and negatively to political conservatism.

- With the relatively more stable social, economic, and political conditions in the recent years, Canadians and Koreans should score higher on Postmodernist values, demonstrate less support for conservative parties, hold stronger democratic beliefs, and show higher political interest than Hungarians

- Males and females in each culture, depending on their cultural teachings and differential socialisation experiences, should have different value priorities or hold different views. Therefore, there should be interactional effects of culture X gender on political beliefs, conservatism and Postmodernist values, where cultural or gender effects are minimised or mediated by each other.

3) Culture and gender should also impact on family centredness and democratisation.

- With the relatively more stable social, economic, and political conditions in the recent years, Canadians and Koreans should score higher on family democratisation than Hungarians.

- With South Korea being a collectivistic society, Koreans should perceive family centredness as more important than their Western counterparts.

- Males and females in each culture should hold different priorities and should view the family in different ways. Females, often taught to value family cohesion and relatedness, should perceive family centredness as more important than males do.



- Often known to hold more egalitarian views, females should perceive family democratisation as more important than men do.
- 4) The suggested interrelationships between the variables as predicted in the hypothesised model should be found significant.
- Family democratisation as well as political beliefs and conservatism should differ by gender and culture, where women and those from the wealthier and more stable countries hold stronger democratic beliefs and perceive family democratisation as important.
- Higher democratic beliefs should be conducive to support for more democratic family relations, represented as family democratisation in this study.
- Higher level of Postmodernist Values and lower level of political conservatism should predict higher support for family democratisation, and possibly lower support and belief for family centredness.

### **3.4 Methodology**

#### **3.4.1 Participants**

The participants for this study consisted of university students from South Korea, Hungary, and Canada. The South Korean and the Hungarian samples were relatively homogenous: Most of the participants were from the culture of origin; all of the participants included in the final analysis were born inside the country, spent majority of their lives (15 or more years) in the country, and were fluent in their national

language. Canadian sample was less homogenous, and only the data from those who were either born or have spent most of their lives in the country (15 or more years) were included in the analysis. In order to ensure relatively equal and matching socioeconomic status of the participants across groups, participants from universities in medium-sized cities were recruited for the study. All sessions began with the researcher's introduction to the study and brief explanation of the participants' duties and responsibilities. All participants included in the study gave informed consent prior to their participation, and were debriefed at the end of the session. After deleting cases with large amount of data missing, the final selected data included, 148 Koreans (M age= 22.01, SD=2.04; 97 men (65.5%) and 51 women (34.5%)), 140 Hungarians (M age= 22.49, SD=4.16; 49 men (35%) and 91 women (65%)), and 115 Canadians (M age= 19.84, SD= 3.38; 61 men (53%) and 54 women (47%)).

### 3.4.2 Questionnaire

The questionnaire for this study can be found in Appendix 1 a), p.235. With the original items in English, Korean and Hungarian versions of the questionnaire were created and back-translated (e.g., Van de Vijver & Hambleton, 1996). Translators were fluent in both the language to be translated (English) and the language into which the questionnaire was to be translated (Korean or Hungarian). For most parts of the questionnaire except for demographic questions and the political orientation scale, 6-point Likert scale with forced choice method was employed. Items 2.1- 2.29 (pp.235-236) measured Need for Closure (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994), but were not included in the analysis for this study. The other items and what they were

supposed to measure are explained more specifically in the following sub-sections.

#### 3.4.2.1 *Individualism (IDV):*

According to Hofstede (2009), country-level Individualism score measures the relative importance of autonomy and independence in each country. Instead of measuring Individualism directly in the study, the country-level score provided in Hofstede (2009) was applied.

#### 3.4.2.2 *Demographic Information:*

Participants were asked to give information on their age, nationality, and gender.

#### 3.4.2.3 *Family Centredness and Democratisation*

This part included 8 questions (p.236) regarding views toward the family relationship, and participants were asked to rate how much they agree to each of the statements ranging from 1 (very strongly disagree) to 6 (very strongly agree). Four selected questions (Items 4.1 to 4.22), taken from Kagitcibasi (2007)'s *Autonomous-Related*

*Self-in Family Scale*, were included to test the participants' sense of family centredness. The questions included statements such as 'A person may be attached to his/her family, and at the same time' on a 6-point Likert scale with forced choice method was used; participants were asked to choose from 1 (*very strongly disagree*) to 6 (*very strongly agree*), based on their level of agreement or the opinion regarding the statement. High score (except for Item 4.1, which is a reverse item) indicated higher family centredness. Data with missing values for items were deleted listwise in order to avoid the problem of invariance. It was believed that the missing or incomplete cases in the study were completely at random and the number of missing cases in each of the variables was quite small, which validated the choice to employ the method as discussed in Acock (2005). Four items (Items 9.1 to 9.4) from Spence & Helmreich (1978)'s *Attitudes toward Women Scale (AWS)* that are relevant to areas related to gender equality and women's role in the family, such as 'Under modern economic conditions with women being active outside the home, men should share in household tasks such as washing dishes and doing laundry' were included to test the participants' views on family democratisation. Items 9.2 and 9.4 were reverse items. With the scores from these items appropriately reversed, higher total score indicated higher importance placed on family democratisation.

#### 3.4.2.4 *Postmodernist Values:*

The next items (Items 11.1 to 11.12, p.237) borrow from Inglehart's (1997) 12-item *Index of Materialism & Postmaterialism*, and measured the participants' endorsement of Postmodernist values. Instead of the ranking method of the items originally proposed by the author, a rating method employing 6-point Likert scale was used in

order for this scale to be congruent to the rest of the scales used in the questionnaire. For all 12 items, participants were asked to rate the extent to which they think each goal is important. Modernist value items included statements such as '*Maintaining a high rate of economic growth*', and Postmodernist value items included statements such as '*Progress towards a less impersonal, more humane society*'. Placing the two types of values on each end of the continuum (Modernist versus Postmodernist), the final composite score for the Postmodernist value was computed by subtracting the mean of all the statements advocating Modernist value from the mean of those advocating Postmodernist value.

#### 3.4.2.5 *Political Beliefs:*

Six questions (Items 12.1 to 12.6, p.238) regarding participants' level of interest in politics and beliefs in democracy were included. Questions included: *how important do you think politics is?*; *how interested are you in politics?*; *how important it is for you to live in a country governed democratically?*; *how much do you believe in the goodness of democracy?*; *do you believe in democracy?*; *did you vote in the last national election?*. For the first four items, higher scores indicated less interest or perceived importance. The last two items were yes/no questions. These six items were categorised into two aspects of political beliefs: political interest (first three items) and democratic beliefs (the latter three items). Confirmatory factor analysis was performed to test the relevance of the items tapping on these dimensions (refer to Figure 2). Items 12.7 and 12.8 (p.238) measured party loyalty, but were excluded from the analysis for they were not relevant to the aim of this study. For the item measuring the level of political conservatism (item 12.9), participants were asked to

rate their beliefs on the political dimensions of conservatism, socialism, and liberalism was added. Participants were asked to rate their position on each of these dimensions on a scale of 1 to 10. A final score for political conservatism was calculated by subtracting the mean value on socialism and liberalism from the conservatism score. Higher score for this item, thus, indicated higher level of political conservatism.

### **3.5 Analysis**

Descriptive statistics of the measured variables in the study are presented in *Table 3.1*. Correlations between all of the variables included in the model were tested as well, in order to look at the significance of the relationships between the variables. The impact of culture and gender, the independent variables on other variables were tested. The significance of the independent variables and their interaction on 1) political beliefs, Postmodernist Values and political conservatism; 2) family centredness and family democratisation were tested were tested using two-way MANOVA tests. Structural equation modelling (SEM) technique was used for confirmatory factor analyses of the sets of variables in the model, the family perceptions and the political beliefs, and for testing of the full hypothesised model. Advantages of SEM analysis, including that of obtaining detailed information on the interlinks between the variables and the items that compose them are mentioned in Spini (2003). In the analyses, both the goodness of the fit of each of the models and

the regression weights of the pathways in the model were considered, and these results are reported in the following section.

## **3.6 Results**

### **3.6.1 Correlations between the variables**

The hypothesised correlations were tested, and the results, correlations between all the variables, are demonstrated in Table 3.2. It was hypothesised that the variables in the study are correlated with one another across levels. It was hypothesised, for example, that Postmodernist values and political beliefs would show significant correlations. As hypothesised, some significant correlations were found among the variables, as can be found in Table 3.2. Among the individual-level variables, it was found that Postmodernist values were correlated with political conservatism [ $r(403) = -.15, p < .01$ ], and democratic beliefs were correlated with political interest [ $r(403) = .31, p < .01$ ]. In the following sections, the hypothesised interrelationships between variables at different levels are tested again using MANOVA and structural equation modelling analyses.

### 3.6.2 MANOVA- Culture & gender effects- group differences

For the purpose of this part of the analysis and testing the culture and gender influences, the significance of the impacts of culture and gender on the individual-level political beliefs and Postmodernist values, and family centredness and democratisation were investigated. Culture and gender, considered as the independent variables in the study, were found to have significant influence on aspects of political beliefs and Postmodernist values, and the two family-level variables. The results from the two-way MANOVA tests comparing scores from the three countries (South Korea, Hungary and Canada) and the male-female gender groups demonstrated that the cultural and gender groups differed significantly on political beliefs, value priorities, and family centredness and democratisation. In this section, specific results from the MANOVA tests are explained along with the statistics,

#### 3.6.2.1 *Values and Beliefs*

Macro-level variables of culture and gender were hypothesised to influence individuals' values and beliefs, and thus a 2 (gender) X 3 (culture) MANOVA was conducted with Postmodernist Values, political interest, democratic beliefs and political conservatism as dependent variables. It was hypothesised that culture and



gender, since they play a key role in shaping individuals' socialisation experiences, should interactively affect values and beliefs of the individuals. In multivariate tests, using the Wilks's criterion, the Gender X Culture interaction was not significant, Wilks's Lambda = .99,  $F(4, 403) = .67$ ,  $p > .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .01$ . Gender differences in value priorities and political beliefs were also hypothesised to be found. However, the main effect of gender was not significant, Wilks's Lambda = .99,  $F(1, 403) = .70$ ,  $p > .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .01$ . In univariate tests, the main effect for gender was not significant in Postmodernist values,  $F(1, 403) = .15$ ,  $p > .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .00$ , political interest,  $F(1, 403) = .69$ ,  $p > .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .01$ , democratic beliefs,  $F(1, 403) = .75$ ,  $p > .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .01$ , and political conservatism,  $F(1, 403) = 1.46$ ,  $p > .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .00$ . The main effect of culture was significant, Wilks's Lambda = .86,  $F(2, 403) = 7.47$ ,  $p < .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .07$ . Cross-cultural differences in values and political beliefs were hypothesised. With the relatively more stable social, economic, and political conditions in the recent years, Canadians and Koreans should score higher on Postmodernist values, demonstrate less support for conservative parties, hold stronger democratic beliefs, and show higher political interest than Hungarians. In univariate tests, the main effect for culture was significant in 1) Postmodernist values,  $F(2, 403) = 7.94$ ,  $p < .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .04$ , with the Korean ( $M = .73$ ,  $SD = .60$ ) and the Canadian ( $M = .72$ ,  $SD = .96$ ) respondents showing higher scores than the Hungarians ( $M = -.31$ ,  $SD = 1.10$ ), 2) in political interest,  $F(2, 403) = 4.27$ ,  $p < .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .02$ , with the Canadian respondents scoring the highest ( $M = 4.08$ ,  $SD = 1.27$ ) and the Korean ( $M = 3.78$ ,  $SD = 1.01$ ) and the Hungarian ( $M = 3.71$ ,  $SD = 1.14$ ) respondents scoring lower, 3) in democratic beliefs,  $F(2, 403) = 10.67$ ,  $p < .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .05$ , with the Koreans scoring the highest ( $M = 2.05$ ,  $SD = .71$ ), the Hungarian respondents in the middle ( $M = 1.97$ ,  $SD = .68$ ), and the Canadians the

lowest ( $M = 1.67$ ,  $SD=.76$ ), and 4) in political conservatism,  $F(2, 403) = 2.08$ ,  $p < .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .01$ , with the Canadians ( $M = -5.56$ ,  $SD=4.59$ ) and the Koreans ( $M = -5.45$ ,  $SD=3.40$ ) showing less conservatism than the Hungarian respondents ( $M = -4.42$ ,  $SD=4.85$ ). Following up the significant outcomes above with Scheffe post-hoc tests, it was demonstrated that: 1) mean scores for Postmodernist values were significantly different between the Hungarians and the Koreans ( $p < .01$ ) and between the Hungarians and the Canadians ( $p < .01$ ); 2) mean scores for political interest were significantly different between the Hungarians and the Canadians ( $p < .05$ ); 3) mean scores for democratic beliefs were significant between the Hungarians and the Canadians ( $p < .005$ ) and between the Koreans and the Canadians ( $p < .001$ ) and; 4) mean scores for political conservatism were not significantly different between the three groups. These significant results, with the mean scores for each group, are presented in *Figure 3.1*.

Table 3.1: Means and Standard Deviations of All Variables

Means and Standard Deviations (in parentheses) of Family Democratisation, Family Centredness, Postmodernist Values,  
Political Interest, Democratic Beliefs & Political Conservatism in Hungary, Korea and Canada

	Hungary		Korea (South)		Canada (English-speaking)	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Family Democratisation	4.43 (0.99)	4.75 (0.83)	4.24 (0.59)	4.57 (0.71)	4.49 (0.99)	5.13 (0.87)
Family Centredness	4.26 (0.74)	4.55 (0.77)	4.22 (0.55)	4.47 (0.57)	4.31 (0.78)	4.42 (0.67)
Postmodernist Values	-0.31 (0.80)	-0.32 (1.23)	0.13 (0.67)	0.07 (0.60)	0.06 (0.88)	0.07 (0.96)
Political Interest	3.50 (1.21)	3.82 (1.10)	3.85 (1.02)	3.78 (1.00)	4.15 (1.31)	4.01 (1.23)
Democratic Belief	1.89 (0.75)	2.02 (0.64)	2.00 (0.74)	2.16 (0.66)	1.71 (0.74)	1.62 (0.80)
Conservatism (Political)	-4.66 (5.29)	-4.30 (4.62)	-5.88 (3.42)	-4.62 (3.23)	-5.55 (4.93)	-5.56 (4.23)

Table 3.2: Correlations between All Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. Individualism (IDV)	-								
2. GDP Growth Rate	.15**								
3. Gender	.22**	.11*							
4. Family Democratisation	.20**	-.10	.26**						
5. Family Centredness	.07	.04	.17**	.14**					
6. Postmodernist Values	-.11*	-.15**	-.03	.05	-.06				
7. Political Interest	.04	-.14**	.03	-.03	.01	-.02			
8. Democratic Beliefs	.14**	.19**	.04	.17**	.11*	.05	.31**		
9. Conservatism (Political)	.06	.09	.09	-.18**	.04	-.15**	.00	.04	

\*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

N=403




Figure 3.1: Values and Beliefs by Culture

### 3.6.2.2. Family centredness and democratisation

Macro-level variables of culture and gender were hypothesised to impact on family centredness and democratisation. A country's socioeconomic conditions and cultural orientation, factors which shape individuals' experiences, were hypothesised to play an important role in determining family views and attitudes. Therefore, a 2 (gender) X 3 (culture) MANOVA was conducted with family democratisation and family centredness as dependent variables. In multivariate tests, using the Wilks's criterion, the Gender X Culture interaction was not significant, Wilks's Lambda = .99,  $F(4, 403) = 1.14$ ,  $p > .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .01$ . Women were hypothesised to place more emphasis on the importance of the family centredness and democratisation. The main effect of

gender was significant, Wilks's Lambda = .93,  $F(1, 403) = 16.07$ ,  $p < .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .08$ . In univariate tests, the main effect for gender was significant in both family democratisation,  $F(1, 403) = 17.08$ ,  $p < .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .06$ , with the women respondents ( $M=4.81$ ,  $SD=.77$ ) scoring higher than the men ( $M= 4.36$ ,  $SD=.86$ ), and family centredness,  $F(1, 403) = 4.49$ ,  $p < .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .02$ , again with women ( $M= 4.49$ ,  $SD=.69$ ) scoring higher than men ( $M= 4.25$ ,  $SD=.67$ ) (See *Figure 3.2*). The macro-level variable of culture was also hypothesised to impact on family centredness and democratisation, where individuals from countries with different cultural and socioeconomic backgrounds would differ in their perceptions of family centredness and democratisation. In this study, it was found that the main effect of culture was indeed significant, Wilks's Lambda = .96,  $F(2, 403) = 3.85$ ,  $p < .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .02$ . In univariate tests, the main effect for culture was significant in family democratisation,  $F(2, 403) = 7.53$ ,  $p < .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .04$ , with the Canadian respondents showing the highest scores ( $M= 4.79$ ,  $SD=.99$ ), then the Hungarian respondents ( $M=4.64$ ,  $SD=.90$ ) and the Korean respondents ( $M=4.36$ ,  $SD=.65$ ) scoring the lowest (See *Figure 3.3*). The follow-up Scheffe post-hoc test found that mean scores for family democratisation were significantly different between the Hungarians and the Koreans ( $p<.01$ ) and the Canadians and the Koreans ( $p<.001$ ). The effect for culture was not significant in family centredness,  $F(2, 403) = .61$ ,  $p > .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .00$ .




Figure 3.2: Family Democratisation & Centredness by Gender




Figure 3.3: Family Democratisation by Culture

### 3.6.3 Model fitting

In the following section, the results from the structural equation modelling testing the significance of the individual pathways between the three levels of variables, the independent, mediating, and dependent variables, and the fit between the implied and the observed covariance matrices will be discussed in greater detail.

Models, including two measurement models for different levels of variables and structural models including all latent variables, were tested independently for their abilities to account for the hypothesised model. Full diagrams of the measurement and structural models for the study including parameter estimates and regression weights of the estimates can be found in *Figures 3.4 to 3.6*. Two separate testing of measurement models, one for the family centredness, family democratisation and their indicators (Measurement Model I), and the second one for political belief variables (Measurement Model II) were performed, to check the validity of the groups of items testing each of the variables. Confirmatory factor analysis performed showed adequate fit of the models, and items that did not successfully load onto the factors (factor loadings of less than .30) were dropped and are not shown in the diagrams. After checking for these variables, full structural models were drawn and their goodness of fit with the hypothesised model was tested.

The first and the second SEM models included three cultures (South Korea, Hungary, and Canada), and two (gender and individualism) and three (gender, individualism, and economic growth) independent variables respectively. Canada and Hungary both score high, 80, on Hofstede's country-level Individualism (IDV), whereas South Korea scores low, 18. These scores (high versus low) were used to represent the

cultural differences in the endorsement of Individualism. Economic growth for each of the countries was calculated by tracing the rate of economic growth from the years 1986 to 2006. Fit indices of chi-square (CMIN= minimum discrepancy) divided by degree of freedom (CMIN/df), comparative fit index (CFI), Tucker-Lewis index (TLI), and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) are reported for the analysis of the final model in the study. We can assume a good fit if the CFI is greater than .9, RMSEA is below .08, and relative chi-square (CMIN /df) below 3 (Hu & Bentler, 1999; Maxwell et al., 2005). As can be found in *Table 3.3*, fit indices of the measurement model and the full structural equation models demonstrated adequacy of the models. Reporting of the specific results of the full SEM models, which includes each of the parameters and their regression weights follows in the next section.

Table 3.3: Model Fit of the Measurement Model I & Full SEM Models I and II

	CMIN/df	p	CFI	RMSEA
Measurement Model I	.281	.890	1.000	.000
SEM Model I	1.352	.082	.981	.029
SEM Model II	1.291	.111	.985	.028



Figure 3.4: Measurement Model I  
(Dependent Variables: Family Centredness and Family Democratisation)




Figure 3.5: SEM Model I  
(3 Cultures, 2 Independent Variables)





Figure 3.6: SEM Model II  
(3 Cultures, 3 Independent Variables)



#### 3.6.4 SEM results

SEM Model I: Although gender-specific socialisation experiences and cultural teachings were hypothesised to predict value priorities and political beliefs, gender was not found to have direct impact on political beliefs, conservatism or Postmodernist Values. However, gender was a strong predictor of the perceived importance of family democratisation ( $\beta=.83$ ,  $p<.001$ ), as was hypothesised. Country-level Individualism predicted democratic beliefs ( $\beta=.13$ ,  $p<.05$ ). However, it did not have significant effect on either the endorsement of Postmodernist Values or political conservatism, which suggests the possibility of social change and economic/political conditions having larger impact on these dimensions than cultural-level Individualism. As was hypothesised, positive relations between democratic beliefs and family views and attitudes were found, with stronger democratic beliefs predicting higher importance placed on family centredness ( $\beta=.33$ ,  $p<.01$ ) and democratisation ( $\beta=.29$ ,  $p<.01$ ) (see *Figure 3.5*).

SEM Model II: This second model also tested the impacts of the macro-level and individual-level variables on family centredness and democratisation. Higher level of economic development (GDP per capita change) was hypothesised to predict stronger endorsement of Postmodernist Values, stronger democratic beliefs, and lower political conservatism. As can be seen in *Figure 3.6*, the newly added independent variable of economic development was a significant predictor for the level of political conservatism, where higher economic growth predicted lower level of political conservatism ( $\beta=-.21$ ,  $p<.05$ ). In this three-independent-variable model, gender had highly significant impact on both family centredness ( $\beta=.41$ ,  $p<.001$ ) and

family democratisation ( $\beta=.79$ ,  $p<.001$ ). Country-level Individualism predicted the level of democratic belief ( $\beta=.13$ ,  $p<.05$ ). Democratic beliefs also had impact on both of these family variables ( $\beta=.30$  and  $\beta=.25$  respectively, both significant at  $p<.01$  level). In both SEM Model I and II, political conservatism had impact on family democratisation ( $\beta=-.16$ ,  $p<.001$ ).

### **3.7 Discussion**

This study investigated the impact of culture and gender on values, political beliefs, and family views and attitudes. The results are in line with the findings from other studies; the links between culture and value priorities (Schwartz, 1994), sociocultural background and values (Inglehart, 1900; 2000), political instability and societal conditions and value priorities (Schwartz & Bardi, 1997), culture and political views and participation (Ross, 1997), culture and the family (Kagitcibasi, 2007) have been demonstrated. This study demonstrated that that macro-level factors of culture and gender, affect individuals' values and beliefs, and furthermore, their family views toward family centredness and democratisation, and the interrelations between these variables were found to be significant in the SEM analysis.

Firstly, let us consider cross-cultural differences in the political dimensions, Postmodernist values were found to be significantly different amongst the respondents from the three countries. In accordance to Inglehart (1997; 2000), these

cross-cultural differences can most likely be accounted by the differences in the historical and cultural backgrounds, as well as recent developments in the social and political spheres of these countries. In particular, Inglehart (1997; 2008) noted that the shift to Postmodernist values reflect the broader societal change which is reshaping different dimensions of life, including political outlook, gender roles, and religious/spiritual beliefs. This study clearly demonstrated cross-cultural differences in the endorsement of Postmodernist values, level of political interest, and political conservatism in the two countries.

Cultural influences on the dimensions under investigation were also examined by a modelling the culture and gender effects. This study found that the Hungarian respondents showed lower levels of Postmodernism than the students in South Korea and Canada did. Inglehart (1997) argues that stable conditions of a country lead its citizens to adopt more Postmodernist values, and in this sense, the lower endorsement of Postmodernist values in the Hungarian sample may reflect the current changes and instabilities in political and other arenas of life in Hungary. Consistent with previous work, societal conditions of the country, and the ensuing Postmodernist values were closely related to political beliefs and attitudes, such as political interest (De Graaf & De Graaf, 1988). Inglehart (1997) suggested that Postmodernist values can extend to family values as well, where emphasis on women's self-realisation grows, and women's place and role outside the house are recognised and encouraged. However, an examination of the link between Postmodernist values and family democratisation did not find a significant relationship in this study. This may be due to the method of calculating Postmodernist values here, considering Postmodernist values and Modernist values

on each end of the spectrum and deducting one score from the other, rather than following the standard ranking method suggested by Inglehart (1997), where individuals are categorised as 'Postmodernist', 'Modernist', or 'Mixed' depending on which two most important goals they have selected.

Cross-cultural differences found in political beliefs and Postmodernist Values in this study point to the importance of considering macro-level societal and cultural factors. Macro-level factors such as cultural-level Individualism, which reflects the cultural background, and economic development and gender, which shape individuals' experiences, were found to influence beliefs about politics, self, and the family. For example, Basabe and Ros (2005) have noted the link between strong Confucianism and low Individualism, where the centuries-long beliefs held by the Asians lead them to believe less in challenging the existing order, and thus may be less inclined to make political participation or believe in their own political influence. On the other hand, the importance of considering recent economic development and current societal condition is also often highlighted. The claim made by Inglehart and other proponents of social change and Postmodernist values is that economic development and stability leads individuals to have more participation in politics, declining beliefs in institutional forms of government, and increasing support for third parties, peace movements, and equality. For example, Kim and his colleagues (2002) argued that rapid social change and economic development in East Asian countries such as South Korea and Taiwan brought democratic ideals and beliefs to these countries. Therefore, in investigating political beliefs in countries like the ex-Communist states of Hungary, or the new democratic states of South Korea, and have undergone rapid and significant changes, and feature different cultural

backgrounds, it becomes difficult to predict whether the more traditional cultural influences prevail, or if social change brings significant changes to these beliefs. Future studies should thus attempt to separate out these two lines of influences, and examine them more closely.

Gender did not have a significant influence on the political factors (political interest, democratic beliefs, or conservatism). However, gender had a direct positive relationship with the family centredness and family democratisation. The findings from this study that demonstrate women place higher importance on close relationship to their family, and on democratic family values, is in line with Duncan and Smith's (2002) claim that individuals' own gendered expectations impact women's roles in the family. Moreover, these findings are also in line with Sidanius and Pena's (2003) claim that gender differences in egalitarian views are caused by the behavioural predispositions and learning and experiences in the early years, and are thus relatively invariant across culture. Re-negotiation of gendered roles in the family, as is suggested by Duncan and Smith (2002), seems to be influenced by gender directly, and by culture indirectly through shaping of other types of views. Along with gender, both political conservatism and democratic beliefs were significant predictors of family democratisation, where lower level of conservatism and stronger democratic ideals were conducive to more democratic family relations. This link between conservatism and family democratisation is in agreement with earlier work (e.g. Feather, 1979) which found significant negative relations between conservatism and the importance placed on equality values.

Beck (1997) discusses the importance of socialisation experiences in the family as a



way of making 'the spirit of democracy the spirit of a society' (p.156). How individuals are brought up by their parents in the family influences their democratic views, and it is also likely that their socialisation experiences reflect the societal norms and atmosphere. In advocating democratic views and relations, individuals' attitudes can carry over from the broader level of society to the more intimate setting of family and vice versa. Delsing and his colleagues (2003) argued that in recent decades, more equal relations in the family have become the norm alongside an overall democratisation in the social spheres. This study demonstrated a significant link between individuals' level of democratic beliefs in politics and in the family, which suggests that democratic views usually extend over different arenas of life. Those who held more democratic political views also perceived equality in family as important. This result clearly suggests a link between individuals' perceptions of equality and democracy both in the politics and the family, and universality of these beliefs across different spheres of life/settings.

Many researchers have looked into political conservatism and other aspects of individual beliefs and values that are believed to be interlinked. Previous research has demonstrated the close link between political conservatism and individuals' resistance to change, reluctance to accept new ideas, uncertainty avoidance, authoritarianism, and opposition to equality (Kossowosk & Van Hiel, 2003; Jost et al., 2007; Van Hiel et al., 2004). Those who were high in political conservatism were also found to exhibit tendencies to resist change and new ideas, avoid uncertainty, believe in authoritarianism and hierarchy, and oppose equality. The results of this study indicate that political conservatism influenced the perception of family democratisation, whereas those who are high in political conservatism also believed

less in the importance of equality in family roles and relations, and less in equal gender relations and decision making at home. This finding confirms previous work by Jost and his colleagues (2003), that resistance to change and opposition to equality are the main components of political conservatism.

Postmodernist values did not have a significant influence on either of the family variables, which leads us to speculate that the issues relating to Postmodernist-Modernist values might not have such a direct connection to the issues and views regarding the family covered in this study. According to Inglehart (1997), individuals whose basic survival needs are guaranteed will become more Postmodernist, which means they will value goals such as ensuring autonomy and freedom of individuals and ensuring high quality of life more than they value material wealth or strength of the nation. He also suggested that those who hold Postmodernist views, are more likely to advocate more equal relations in the family, be more accepting toward the non-traditional family forms, and be more open toward women's choice in the family and the work. However, the results of this study did not find this link, which suggests that individuals' position on this value orientation might not always predict their views and attitudes toward the family, or the sense of closeness/centredness and equal relations in the family. However, this study found very little correlations between Postmodernist values and other variables. Alternatively, it may be possible that views regarding the family stand independent of individual values, for value priorities concern individuals' views on the larger society and are broader in spectrum than their views on the family in specific. Including other value priorities such as those theorised by Schwartz might be useful in investigating the link between individual values and family centredness and democratisation further.

### **3.8 Concluding Remarks & Plans for the Following Studies**

This study has a few methodological and theoretical limitations. Two possible problems can be raised in regards to the choice of measurement in this study. Firstly, the questionnaire used in the study was rather short, and included only a small number of items for measuring family perceptions; the length of the questionnaire was cut short in order to reduce the time it takes participants to complete it. Future studies should employ lengthened questionnaire, which includes full scales rather than only individual items for enhanced reliability of the scales, is advisable. Secondly, the issue with measuring Postmodernist values as raised in the discussion should be recognised. In the future studies, different methods of calculating the level of Postmodernist values will be employed in the hopes of more precise measurement of this important variable. Lastly, it should be noted that neither the MANOVA results of group differences nor the SEM regression paths can prove causality, although causal relations are often implied in this work based on the hypotheses and the results.

The model needs further development, and it is advisable that the following studies include more macro-level variables. Economic indicators can be helpful in explaining the recent cultural and social trajectories of different countries, as well as accounting for the differences in childhood experiences of the individuals, and should be considered in all model testing. The relation between the level of economic development and the level of Postmodernist values endorsed, as well as the link between the more individual-level economic variables of education, employment, wealth, and income, and the types of family attitudes are often found (e.g., White &

Rogers, 2000). Therefore, inclusion of economic indicators such as GDP per capita can be helpful in explaining for recent cultural and social trajectories of different countries, as well as accounting for the differences in childhood experiences. Bergh (2007) demonstrated in his study that social or cultural change, and especially economic development, led individuals of both sexes to views these relations in a more egalitarian way. Thus, impact of economic development on views regarding gender roles and decision making in the family should be investigated.

The impact of social change on other aspects of family relationship and perceptions should also be examined further. Roseneil and Budgeon (2004) argue that even the concept of 'family' is changing in the current times, with the breakdown of the traditional family forms, increasing levels of divorce, and rising importance of individuation and gender equalities. They argue for a rise of non-normative cultures of intimacy and care, the existing ideas about families and family relationships becoming less important. In this sense, social change is influencing family relationships in ways that are difficult to predict. In a study of families across culture, cross-cultural differences in the strength of emotional closeness were not significant among those in the nuclear family, although they were significant among the members of the extended families (Georgas, 1997). This finding calls for a more comprehensive study of the impact of contextual factors and social change on family perceptions across cultures.

Moreover, it could be useful for future studies to expand on the mediating effects of the variables discussed and consider other possible individual-level variables that can be related to the ones investigated in this study, for studying more diverse

influences including self-beliefs and other value dimensions can add to broadening the understanding of the macro-level and individual-level factors and their impact on family centredness and democratisation. In addition to the political beliefs and orientation and Postmodernist values studied here, Schwartz' more extensive value dimensions, and autonomy-relatedness beliefs of the self will be added. For instance, Van Hiel and his colleagues (2004) and other researchers point to the importance of considering cultural impact on values relating to Openness to Change versus Conservation, gender differences, and their relations to political beliefs. Expanding the scope of the research by including these value dimensions will also be useful in the following studies.

Gender attitudes are known to have changed over the last half-century, where the advanced industrial societies have seen the attitudes toward equal gender relations growing (Bergh, 2006; Delsing et al., 2003; Trent & South, 1992). Bergh's study showed that social or cultural change, and especially economic development, led individuals of both sexes to views these relations in a more egalitarian way; gender attitudes and societal development were correlated. Thornton and Young-DeMarco (2001) also note of this change, where they talk about the increasing importance of equal rights and freedom in private and social spheres affecting gender roles and relationships in the family. In particular, the increase in women's education level and participation in the work force predicted these changes. In the following studies, these links, including those between economic and social development, women's work, and perception of gender roles in the family will be investigated further.

Value change reflects lasting changes in life conditions; Individuals adapt to the

circumstances they face in the society, and come to place more emphases on certain value types than the others (Schwartz & Bardi, 1997). A cross-generational study will be useful in tracing these changes in countries that have undergone transformations, and in determining whether different generations, due to the life experiences they have had, prioritise different values. Indeed, intergenerational value shift has been demonstrated in Inglehart's (2000) study. Lesthaeghe and Meekers (1986) found cohort differences in the perceived importance of equality and freedom in relation to family and politics. Therefore, Study II will make cross-generational comparison of family perceptions and individual values and beliefs, as well as cross-cultural and cross-gender comparisons, in order to investigate further into the impact of social change on these dimensions.

# CHAPTER 4

## STUDY II

### 4.1 Research aim

Study II looks deeper at the values, beliefs, and family centredness and democratisation across generations and cultures. The variable of 'Age/generation' is added to the model from the previous study, and its impact on individual-level and family variables is investigated. This study also concentrates on expanding the model, broadening the concept and investigation of family views and attitudes, especially family centredness.

As in the previous study, impacts of various macro-social and other external factors

on family views and attitudes are investigated. Macro-level factors include variables that are external to the individual, that act to influence or shape individuals' experiences, beliefs, and values. This study identifies country-level Individualism, gender, economic growth, and age as macro-level factors and tests their impact on other levels of variables. In particular, it focuses light on the impact of social change and childhood experiences. The differing childhood experiences in the younger and the older generations in the two cultures, South Korea (collectivistic) and the US (individualistic) are likely to have caused differences in their views and beliefs.

More individual-level factors are added to the model and are investigated in this study. These include Schwartz (1994)'s opposing value dimensions of Openness to Change versus Conservation and Self-Transcendence versus Self-Efficacy, and Kagitcibasi (2007)'s types of self-beliefs (Autonomous, Relational, Autonomous-Related). These individual-level variables, along with Postmodernist Values and political beliefs, are added to the hypothesised model and their interrelations with other variables are tested in order to gain better insight into the predictive value of individual values and beliefs on family centredness and democratisation.

This study widens on the concept of family centredness, including a larger number of items to the questionnaire that tap on more specific aspects of views and beliefs. The concept of family centredness is expanded and divided into three separate dimensions: family dependence; family commitment and; family importance. The importance of correctly recognising different levels of variables, and to test relationships between variables at appropriate levels of analysis is emphasised in Smith (2004), and this study distinguishes between different levels of factors and



investigates unidirectional influences between these variables. As in the previous study, the theoretical model suggests a three-level structure of influences, macro-level, individual-level, and family-level (consisting of the four family variables), and their interrelations are tested using SEM analysis.

South Korea and the United States were selected for this study, for they form an interesting comparison for their differences in two macro-level factors: 1) their economic conditions and the rate of development over the last few decades; and 2) their standing on the cultural dimension of Individualism-Collectivism. From the late 1960s to the mid 1980s, South Korea was one of the three fastest growing economies in the world (Inglehart, 1990). Therefore, South Koreans born in the 1960s grew up under very different societal conditions than those that were born more recently (in the 1980s onwards) who were brought up in greater prosperity. This significant difference in the living conditions experienced in the childhood should have caused the two generations in Korea to adopt different values and beliefs. Inglehart (1997)'s research found steep increase in Postmodernist values in South Koreans, demonstrating very rapid intergenerational change in the country in the recent decades. On the other hand, rapid economic growth in the US took place much earlier, in the period following the WW I and into the early 1970s, which then slowed down and stabilised (White & Rogers, 2000). Differences in the two generations' values and beliefs should be observed in this study thus, for it can be expected that their childhood experiences would have shaped their views differently. This study makes intergenerational comparisons of the individual-level factors and family centredness and democratisation in the samples from the two countries.

## 4.2 New variables

### 4.2.1 Schwartz' Values

Study II included Schwartz's individual-level values, broadening on the investigation of value priorities, value change, and their influences on family centredness and democratisation. As mentioned in the earlier chapter, Schwartz' (2001; 2006) theory of values proposes 10 motivational types of values at the individual level, which reflect individuals' own conceptions of value priorities, which can be placed under two orthogonal dimensions, Openness-to-Change versus Conservation, and Self-Efficacy versus Self-Transcendence.

### 4.2.2 Self-beliefs

This study includes self-beliefs as an additional individual-level variable that influences family perceptions. Hinde and his colleagues (2001) discuss the role of self-concept in defining, perceiving, and interacting in different relationship contexts and situations. The culture in which the individuals are socialised affect the way relationships are perceived, formed, and maintained (Peplau, 2002), and self-concepts often act to mediate this relationship in particular ways (Hinde et al., 2001). The difference in focus in the individualistic versus collectivistic cultures, where either individuality and autonomy (individualistic culture) or harmonious relations with others (collectivistic culture) is emphasised, can result in individuals' thinking about close relationships differently.

### 4.3 Discussion of intergenerational change: Values & beliefs

A generation of individuals shares particular historical event that shape social and cultural experiences (Scabini & Marta, 2006), and generally, older generations tend to hold more traditional views than the younger generations, especially toward the family and gender roles (Trent & South, 1992). Therefore, less intergenerational similarities may be found in their values and beliefs in times of rapid social change, since each generation's life experiences would be qualitatively different due to the changes at the macro, or socio-cultural level. For example, Inglehart (1997)'s theory of intergenerational value change claims that rapid economic development and expansion of the welfare state result in differences in the types of values emphasised by older and younger generations. Perceptions of national development are positively correlated with sense of agency ( $r=.94$ ), which suggests that emphases on the individual's separateness and competence are often associated with the more wealthy, technologically advanced, and industrialised countries (Kashima et al., 2009). Hahn and Oishi (2006) found no generational differences between the most salient psychological need in the Americans, but significant differences in the younger and older Koreans, whose childhood experiences differed more so than those of the younger and older Americans. This cross-generational difference can be due to the fact that social and economic circumstances have changed significantly in South Korea in the last few decades, leaving younger and older generations to value different needs. As Hareven (1991) notes, it is important thus to understand age and cohort differences in the family in relation to historical events and the experiences and beliefs they render individuals and families at given periods of time.

Various family changes and intergenerational differences in family values and beliefs are found. Changes in family ideals, such as from familism to individualism, and authority to autonomy are discussed (Thornton, 2001). One of the leading theories of family change discusses the link between socioeconomic development and family relations, where increasing affluence leads to less material dependence but increased psychological/emotional connectedness in the family (Kagitcibasi, 2007). This study looks at cross-cultural and intergenerational differences in family dependence, examining the relationship between societal wealth and the level of family dependence. Kagitcibasi's work on Value of Children (VOC) studies find age and cohort differences in the importance and meaning of family (especially children) (Kagitcibasi, 2007; Aycicegi-Dinn & Kagitcibasi, 2010). The more modern families placed less value on the economic gains from having children, while the emotional benefits that can be gained from tight parent-child relationships continued to be valued. Younger individuals emphasised psychological value of children more than their parents, and changes in child-rearing values as well as emphasis on autonomy and independence in the children were also found (Aycicegi-Dinn & Kagitcibasi, 2010), where more emphasis on independence is often found among younger generations. Payne and his colleagues (1973) found differences in moral judgments across generations, where in regards to violations of 'conventional morality', the youth generation expressed less negative affect than their parents generation, and the parents generation less so than the grandparents generation.

Many theories of modern family are suggesting convergence; families from different cultures are changing due to socioeconomic development, where they adopt new values while maintaining some of their old family ideals and are beginning to share

similar values. The impact of social and economic change on family relationship seems significant, for changes even in cultures that have maintained strong family norms and traditions are noted. Martin (1990) notes of intergenerational changes in attitudes and expectations about family relations even in the East Asian countries, where there have been long traditions of tight family bond and filial piety. She argues that with the demographic changes that influence families in these countries, the meaning and relationships in the family might change in ways that are new for these countries with strong Confucian beliefs. Kagitcibasi (2007) notes changes in the modern families in both the Eastern and the Western countries, where family relationships and emphases are changing in unique ways. She claims that both the individualistic countries of the West and the collectivistic countries like the East Asian ones are converging toward a model where both autonomy and relatedness are valued.

Altogether, these findings suggest the possibility that the younger generations adopt different sets of values compared to their older counterparts as the result of the differences in their life experiences. It is also known that young generations tend to adopt new values and opinions more readily than their older counterpart, and hold less traditional opinions regarding family relations (Rindfuss et al., 1992). Therefore, intergenerational differences can be found in individuals' value priorities and beliefs for the generational experiences and the societal conditions in which they grow up might differ, and the younger generations are often more open to new ideas and changes than the older generations. Younger individuals are likely to hold views that are less culturally conservative; they support more egalitarian gender relations, believe in individual autonomy in decision-making, and are less influenced by

traditional norms (Vollebergh et al., 2001). In line with these views, this study examines generational differences in the individual-level variables of values and beliefs and perceptions of the family, and traces the impact of social change through cross-cultural comparisons. The impact of cultural and economic factors on values and beliefs are considered separately.

#### **4.4 Family centredness expanded & family democratisation**

##### **4.4.1 Roles within the family, gender attitudes & roles, & family democratisation**

Individuals in the family often have predetermined expectations and role patterns placed on them depending on their age, gender, and family position (McKie et al., 2005). Individuals' own gendered expectations and demands about what a man or a woman should do often influence their conceptions of gender roles and relations in the family (Duncan & Smith, 2002). Moreover, Peplau (2002) claims the impact of cultural stereotypes and cultural values on role patterns, which might remain unchanging for the members of that culture who adhere to them. The impact of Confucius ideals in the East Asian country of South Korea is often mentioned as the cause of the long-lasting hierarchical and gendered relations in the country (e.g. Kim et al., 2002). Therefore, traditionally, patriarchy and filial piety have been emphasised in South Korea and other East Asian countries, with female and young family members stand lower in the family hierarchy and having less say in decision making in the family. On the contrary, with more emphasis on autonomy and independence of the individual, American and many other Western families have had relatively

more egalitarian family relations (Kagitibasi, 2007).

#### 4.4.2 Family centredness: Importance, commitment & dependence

Perception of family importance and commitment to the family may be especially sensitive to the individual's conception of the self, and values and beliefs, as well as cultural traditions and norms. Martin (1990), for example, notes that the importance of family has been emphasised in East Asian countries with strong Confucian traditions. Commitment encompasses individuals' feelings of psychological attachment to their significant others and cognitive interdependence (Wieselquist et al., 1999), and in this sense, commitment to the family is interlinked with the individual's self-concept; it arises from the sense of belonging to a community, which he/she sees as a part of or supporting his/her concept of self. The more the individuals saw themselves as closely related to the family, the higher their level of family commitment was (Kelley, 2002). Kagitibasi (1996; 2007) suggests that the value and meaning of the family reflect the characteristics and goals of the society. Commitment to family in the context of this research includes both the actual commitment level of the individuals, and how important individuals perceive commitment to be in families. Individuals may differ in how much effort and time they are willing to put into initiating and maintaining families, how much commitment they think they will want to put into their families in the future, and how much value they place upon them. Family dependence includes individuals' views on the appropriate level of dependence to family/ independence from family, and in this study, encompasses emotional dependence and family influences in decision-making and

general beliefs. In her model of family change, Kagitcibasi (2007) includes family independence/ dependence in one of the facets of family interactions, and claims that it is influenced by culture and socialisation values.

#### 4.4.3 Generations and families

In adolescence and young adulthood years, individuals develop stable attitudes through active structuring and internalising of the models and expectations in the society (Vollebergh et al., 2001). Bengston and Roberts (1991) demonstrated a link of influences between both the child and parent's sense of obligation to familism norm and affection for each other as factors for intergenerational solidarity. Boehnke and his colleagues (2007) claim that intra-familial value transmission occurs in the specific socio-cultural context in which the family is based, where societal, economic, political, and any other macro-level factors can have influence on how and which types of values are to be transmitted.

However, with social change, generations come to differ in family values and attitudes towards the family due to differences in their life experiences. Family change of recent decades encompass factors such as increase in women's participation in the work force, sexual freedom, break-up of what is supposedly 'traditional' in husband-wife relationships (Berscheid & Peplau, 2002; Roseniel & Budgeon, 2004). Elder (1965) pointed out factors such as increasing urbanisation, elevation in median educational attainment, and increasing exposure to democratising child-rearing literature in the nation as predictors of more democratic



family. 'Postmodernisation' also applies to the family, in the sense that the social change is transforming the contemporary family form, functions and organisation, and relationships (Study Commission on the Family, 1983). For example, Delsing and his colleagues (2003) found that the younger and the older generations differed in perceiving trust, justice, and affection from their parents.

Furthermore, rapid social and economic change was also found to have significant impact on the interdependencies between individuals. Changes in self-concept may account for the differences in the behaviours and attitudes towards close relationships such as the family in the younger and the older generations (Hinde et al., 2001; Martin, 1990). In particular, changes in the perceived meaning, relative importance, and commitment to the family have been observed in times of social change (Allan, 2001). While the family continues to be the primary and important social institution, views regarding the roles and equality in the family, appropriate level of commitment, emotional dependence, and the family's centrality in life seem to be changing (e.g. Kagitcibasi, 2007).

#### **4.5 Hypotheses**

As discussed in earlier chapters, factors that shape individuals' childhood experiences can have impact on various areas of their views and attitudes. Therefore, it can be conjectured that if childhood experiences have great impact on shaping of the values, beliefs, and family centredness and democratisation, then intergenerational differences in these aspects should be observed. Moreover, culture

and gender should influence or at least has close relations to the individual's values, beliefs, and family views and attitudes, as was found in the previous study. These effects, as well as the interrelationships between various variables under investigation here, will be re-examined. Therefore, following hypotheses can be made:

1. Age, culture and gender effects on values priorities and beliefs should be found and are tested using three-way MANOVA tests. More specifically:
  - 1) Value priorities should differ in the different generational groups, where the relative importance of value dimensions Self-Enhancement versus Self-Transcendence, Openness to Change versus Conservatism, and Postmodernism/Postmaterialism versus Modernism/Materialism should be different in the two generations due to the differences in the socioeconomic conditions they faced as children. Thus, those that grew up in relative wealth and stability (Younger Americans and Younger Koreans) should favour Self-Transcendence, Openness to Change and Postmodernist values and score higher on these types of values than their older counterparts (Inglehart, 1997).
  - 2) The perceived importance of and interest in politics and democratic beliefs in the two generational groups should differ. Younger individuals will believe less in politics, have stronger democratic beliefs, and hold less conservative views than their older counterparts. Stronger beliefs in democracy should predict stronger support for family democratisation ideals, or equality of family relations and decision-making.

- 3) Self-beliefs of the two generational groups will should, with the emphases on the different types of self-beliefs and the level of relatedness to/autonomy from close others being different in the younger and the older generations. The younger generation will see themselves as more autonomous-related in comparison to the older generation.
- 4) Cross-cultural differences in the endorsement of self-beliefs, and family views and attitudes should be found in the Korean and American samples, which can be explained by the differences in economic and social circumstances and cultural backgrounds in which they were brought up. In this sense, it can be hypothesised that Americans will view family centredness to be less important than the Koreans.
- 5) Since the magnitude of societal change has been much greater in South Korea than in the United States, it can be hypothesised that intergenerational differences in values and beliefs will be greater in South Korea than in the United States.
- 6) Gender differences in values and family centredness and democratisation should be found. As noted in Hill (2005), due to differences in their socialisation experiences, women are likely to develop more relational self than men, and place more importance in considering others and interpersonal relationships. In that sense, it can be hypothesised that women will score higher on belief in strong family dependence, commitment, importance, and democratisation, and hold more Self-Transcendence value than men will.

## 2. Age, culture and gender effects on family centredness and democratisation

should also be found and are tested using three-way MANOVA tests. More specifically:

- 7) With differences in these dimensions in effect, the two generational groups should perceive family relationship in different ways, and the differences will be observed in the perception of family importance, commitment, dependence, and democratisation. The rising importance of autonomy can be hypothesised to cause the younger generation to perceive the family as less important, and become less dependent and committed to the family. However, if the younger generation endorses the ideal of autonomous-related self and view themselves as both autonomous and related, they can continue to perceive the family in a similar way as their older counterparts or view it as more important than did the older generations.
  - 8) The younger generation, with increasing acceptance of individual freedom and equality, should view family democratisation as more important. Moreover, family democratisation should be viewed as more important among those who hold stronger democratic beliefs.
3. Values and Beliefs should also be significant predictors for family centredness and democratisation. These effects as well as other hypothesised interrelationships are tested using structural equation modelling.
- 9) The impact of values and beliefs on family views and attitudes should be found, as in Study I. High levels of Postmodernist Values and Openness to Change values will predict stronger belief in family democratisation and weaker family dependence. Self-Transcendence values should impact

family commitment and family importance. In the three-level model, thus, the values and beliefs will have relations both to the macro-level variables and family variables, where interrelations will be found between age, gender, individualism and perceptions of family centredness and democratisation.

- 10) Stronger democratic beliefs should predict higher belief in family democratisation.
- 11) Autonomous-Related Self-belief should predict family centredness, where belief in both the autonomous and relational nature of the self should be positively related to perceptions of family importance, commitment and especially, dependence to the family.

The variables and their hypothesised relationships can be found on the theoretical model, which expands on the findings from Study I (*Figure 3.4*).

## **4.6 Methodology**

### **4.6.1 Participants**

Participants for this study included two generational groups, the younger group consisting of those in late teens to mid twenties, and the older group consisting of those above the age forty. Data was collected in South Korea and the United States,

representing collectivistic and individualistic cultures, respectively. After abandoning data from participants who have migrated from another country, or have diverse cultural backgrounds, a total of 230 questionnaires (111 for the Korean sample; 119 for the American sample) were subjected to data analysis. In South Korea, data was collected off-line, at a university for the younger group and from senior meetings for the older group. American data was collected online through a web version of the questionnaire for both of the groups. The mean age for Young-Korean group (N=61) was 21.62 (SD=1.71), and had 43 males (70.4%) and 18 females (29.6%), and the mean age for Young-American group (N=58) was 17.88 (SD=1.03), 13 males (22.4%) and 45 females (77.6%). The mean age for Older-Korean group (N=50) was 53.20 (SD=6.34), and consisted of 17 males (34%) and 33 females (66%), and the mean age for Older-American group (N=61) was 49.97 (SD=7.77), 18 males (29.6%) and 43 females (70.4%). Age range for the older groups was bigger than that for the younger groups in both countries.

#### 4.6.2 Questionnaire & measurement

Participants in the US and South Korea received the questionnaire consisting items written in their native language. The questionnaire originally consisted of items in English, and Korean version was created using the method of back-translation ((e.g., Van de Vjiver & Hambleton, 1996). The original English version of the questionnaire used in this study and Study III is in Appendix 1 b) (p.239)). Same as in Study I, the questionnaire included questions such as '*How long have you been living in the country?*', and '*Is Korean/English your native language?*', so that responses from those who have not lived in the country of residence for majority of their lives or

whose native language is not Korean/English will not be included in the final data. Participants were also asked to confirm their and their parents' culture of origin, so that those not originally from the country in which the data was collected, and those from multi-cultural backgrounds can be screened out. Same as in the first study, the questionnaire for this study employed 6-point Likert scale with forced choice method; participants were asked to choose from 1 (*very strongly disagree*) to 6 (*very strongly agree*), based on their level of agreement or the opinion regarding the statement. The demographic questions and Index of Materialism & Postmaterialism were the only exceptions to this, Data with missing values for items were deleted listwise in order to avoid the problem of invariance. It was believed that the missing or incomplete cases in the study were completely at random and the number of missing cases in each of the variables was quite small, which then validated the choice to employ the method, as discussed in Acock (2005). The questionnaire consisted of 144 items measuring the variables below:

#### 4.6.2.1 *Country-Level Economic Growth:*

For investigating intergenerational value differences, Inglehart (2008) suggests use of time lag of about fifteen to twenty years in order to investigate societal influences on the younger birth cohorts. Therefore, as a way of comparing different cohort groups based on the economic circumstances, economic data (GDP per capita) for the years were selected based on the mean age of the participants in the different generational groups. GDP per capita data for the single year at which each of the generational groups was age 10 were chosen, and the differences between the two years at which each group was average age 10 were calculated. Thus, the data from

the two countries for the year 1970 (for the older generation, mean age for both countries=51.58) and 2000 (for the younger generation, mean age for both countries=19.75) were chosen, considering that most participants would have been around age 10 in these years respectively.

#### 4.6.2.2 *Culture (Individualism versus Collectivism):*

Hofstede's country-level Individualism (IDV) scores for South Korea and the US were employed to account for this dimension. South Korea scored 18, while the US scored 91, the highest among 51 countries and regions, which supports the belief that the former is a collectivistic culture whereas the latter is an individualistic one.

#### 4.6.2.3 *Demographic information:*

Participants' age, gender, native country, and culture of origin (parents' native country(s)) were asked. Participants were also asked whether they had lived in the country of residence for majority of their lives.

#### 4.6.2.4 *Schwartz' Values:*

Items 2.1 to 2.21 (p.240) measured Schwartz' Values. 21-item questionnaire developed by Schwartz for the European Social Survey (ESS) was used, and individual scores for 10 value facets as well as mean scores for each of the four



value dimensions ( $\alpha = .74$  to  $.81$  for each of the dimensions) were calculated.

#### 4.6.2.5 *Postmodernist Values:*

Same as in Study I, Postmodernist value was measured by 12-item Index of Materialism and Postmaterialism, which asks participants to rank the importance of different goals a society faces. Section 11 (p.245) of the questionnaire on Appendix 1 b) consisted of the items for assessing Postmodernist values. Materialist/ Modernist value items included statements such as '*Maintaining a high rate of economic growth*', and Postmaterialist/ Postmodernist value items included statements such as '*Progress towards a less impersonal, more humane society*'. Placing the two types of values on each end of the continuum (Modernist versus Postmodernist), the final composite score for the Postmodernist value was computed by subtracting the mean of all the statements advocating Modernist value from the mean of those advocating Postmodernist value. Measurement for Postmodernist value in Study II and III employed ranking method, where participants had to order the items on perceived importance, and differed from the Likert-scale rating method in the method from Study I. This rating method follows Inglehart's (1997) original method of measurement.

#### 4.6.2.6 *Political interest/Democratic beliefs:*

Items 12.1 to 12.6 (p.246) measured individuals' political beliefs and are same as the

first six questions from the questionnaire used in Study I. Reliability of the items that form these dimensions were tested following Hair and his colleagues' (1998) advice.

#### *4.6.2.7 Self-beliefs/ Relatedness, autonomy & Autonomous-Related Self:*

27-item *Autonomous-Relatedness Scale* developed by Kagitcibasi was used in this study (see Items 3.1 to 3.27 on p.241). This scale measures three types of self-beliefs as discussed above: Autonomous Self; Relational Self and; Autonomous-Related Self. Statements were given that describe each of the self-construals, and participants were asked to rate how much they agree with them. Statements for Autonomous-Self included 'I feel independent of the people who are close to me', Relational-Self statements included 'Those who are close to me are my top priority', and Autonomous-Related Self 'A person can feel both independent and connected to those who are close to him/her'. The three types of self-beliefs were calculated separately, and mean scores for each were compared across generational and cultural groups.

#### *4.6.2.8 Family centredness: perceived importance, dependence, and commitment, & family democratisation:*

In comparison to the previous study, this study expanded this part of the questionnaire, to include more items for improving construct validity, and to measure more broad range of family views, especially more facets of family centredness.

Items from various questionnaires and scales measuring family beliefs, relationship styles, and attitudes were included. The total number of items pooled together for family perception was 72. The full *Self-in-Family Scale* (Kagitcibasi, 2007), including 22 items (Items 4.1 to 4.22, p. 242) and three sets of scales measuring different types of self-construals in relation to the family were used. Statements on this scale tapped on the aspects such as emotional independence/dependence to the family, level of autonomy from/ reliance on the family in decision-making, acceptance of /refusal to agree to the wishes of the family. All the items from *Family Allocentrism Scale* (Lay et al., 1998), and selected items from *Investment Model Scale* (Rusbult et al., 1998), and *Individualism: Family Dimension in the Cultural orientation Style* (COS) ( $\alpha = .82/.56/.70$  in different samples) (Bierbrauer et al., 1994), and Shortened *Individualism-Collectivism Scale* ( $\alpha = .91$ ) (Hui, 1988) were included in the questionnaire. All items were answered on 6-point Likert scale. For example, participants were asked to rate how much they agree with statements such as 'It is important to feel independent of one's family', 'I have certain duties and obligations in my family', 'My family relationship is close to ideal', and these items considered to measure levels of family dependence, commitment, and importance. Factor analysis of the items was performed in order to select items that exhibited strong correlations with these family perception variables and with other items. Selected items from *Attitudes toward Women Scale (AWS)* ( $\alpha = .89$  for the whole 15-item scale) (Spence & Helmreich, 1978) was used to measure level of agreement to family democratisation. Statements on this scale included 'In general, the father should have greater authority than the mother in the bringing up of the children', and 'Under modern economic conditions with women being active outside the home, men should share in household tasks such as washing dishes and doing laundry'.

#### 4.7.0 Analyses & results

The first part of the analyses included testing of the validity of the scales tapping on the variables, and cross-cultural and cross-generational comparisons of the scores on each of the variables. Descriptive statistics with means and standard deviations of the variables in this study are presented on *Table 4.1*. Correlations between all variables can be found on *Table 4.2*.

Comparisons of mean scores for the various constructs used in the study by culture, gender, and generation using three-way MANOVA tests was performed, in order to gain insights into differences between groups of different nationalities, gender, and generations. The correlations between the family scale items and the family factors/clusters they formed were tested using factor analysis method. Items that measured various aspects of political beliefs were also tested using exploratory factor analysis method. These basic analyses will provide the ground for the testing of the hypothesised model using structural equation modelling (SEM) technique.

#### 4.7.1 MANOVA: Analyses by culture and gender

##### 4.7.1.1 *Values and beliefs*

Age/generation, culture, and gender were hypothesised to have effect on individual's values and beliefs, and thus a 2 (gender) X 2 (culture) X 2 (generation) MANOVA was conducted with the variables representing individual-level values and beliefs.

Table 4.1: Means and Standard Deviations (in parentheses) of All Variables in Study II

	Korean		American	
	Younger	Older	Younger	Older
Autonomous-Related Self-belief	4.61 (.54)	4.42 (.64)	4.63 (.77)	4.69 (1.08)
Postmodernist Values	3.72 (1.98)	3.54 (2.19)	3.05 (2.26)	3.39 (2.30)
Self-Transcendence minus Self-Efficacy	-0.48 (1.67)	1.27 (1.71)	1.26 (1.99)	1.59 (2.63)
Openness to Change minus Conservation	1.39 (2.47)	-1.68 (2.00)	1.44 (3.08)	.49 (3.74)
Political Interest	3.64 (.97)	3.12 (1.00)	3.70 (1.18)	3.60 (1.47)
Democratic Belief	1.56 (.34)	1.28 (.28)	1.98 (.43)	1.75 (1.19)
Family Democratisation	4.24 (.71)	3.84 (.53)	4.73 (.96)	4.88 (1.25)
Family Importance	4.42 (.88)	4.47 (.80)	4.25 (1.07)	4.02 (1.30)
Family Commitment	5.09 (.67)	4.93 (.81)	3.98 (.73)	3.41 (1.03)
Family Dependence	4.79 (.93)	4.80 (.75)	4.53 (1.01)	4.00 (1.38)

Table 4.2: Correlations between All Variables

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Autonomous-Related Self-belief	-									
2. Postmodernist Values	.10									
3. Self-Transcendence minus Self-Efficacy	.32**	.17*								
4. Openness to Change minus Conservation	.15*	.15*	-.17*							
5. Political Interest	.54**	.22**	-.00	.22**						
6. Democratic Belief	.10	-.01	-.22**	-.20**	-.07					
7. Family Democratisation	.03	-.01	-.22**	-.26**	-.24**	.59**				
8. Family Importance	.36**	-.01	.03	-.18*	.15*	.68**	.61**			
9. Family Commitment	-.18*	-.27**	-.10	-.08	-.14*	.01	.03	-.03		
10. Family Dependence	-.46**	-.29**	-.16*	-.06	-.25**	-.06	-.12	-.32**	.14*	-

\*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

N= 230

The results of the multivariate tests for Postmodernist Value, Self-Transcendence versus Self-Efficacy (calculated Self-Transcendence minus Self-Efficacy) and Openness to Change versus Conservation (calculated Openness to Change minus Conservation) values, political beliefs (Political Interest and Democratic Belief) and Autonomous-Related Self-Belief were produced. Value priorities and political beliefs were hypothesised to differ across the cultural and age groups. With the more stable socioeconomic conditions in the latter half of the twentieth century, Americans were hypothesised to prioritise Self-Transcendence, Openness to Change and Postmodernist values, and hold stronger democratic beliefs than Koreans. Growing up in wealthier and socioeconomically more secure conditions, younger generations were hypothesised to prioritise Self-Transcendence, Openness to Change and Postmodernist Values, and also hold stronger democratic beliefs than older generations. With different socialisation experience, women and men were hypothesised to have different self-beliefs, with women more likely to emphasise and value the relational nature of the self than men do.

The main effects of culture (Wilks's Lambda = .82,  $F(6, 204) = 6.27$ ,  $p < .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .18$ ) and generation (Wilks's Lambda = .82,  $F(6, 204) = 6.26$ ,  $p < .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .18$ ) were significant. The main effect of gender (Wilks's Lambda = .92,  $F(6, 204) = 2.58$ ,  $p > .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .08$ ), however, was not significant. The effects of the Generation X Culture interaction (Wilks's Lambda = .93,  $F(6, 204) = 2.33$ ,  $p < .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .08$ ) was significant, but the effects of other interactions, the Gender X Generation, Gender X Nationality, and the Gender X Generation X Culture, were not. In univariate tests, the main effect for gender was significant only in Autonomous-Related Self beliefs,  $F(1, 204) = 6.30$ ,  $p < .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .03$ , with the female

respondents scoring higher ( $M = 4.79$ ,  $SD=.79$ ) than the male respondents ( $M= 4.47$ ,  $SD=.80$ ). The main effect for culture was significant in 1) Self-Transcendence versus/minus Self-Efficacy Values ,  $F (1, 204) = 4.66$ ,  $p < .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .03$ , with the American respondents scoring higher ( $M=1.46$ ,  $SD=2.40$ ) than the Korean respondents ( $M=.36$ ,  $SD=1.84$ ), and in 2) democratic beliefs,  $F (1, 204) = 14.29$ ,  $p < .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .08$ , with the American respondents scoring higher ( $M=1.87$ ,  $SD=.98$ ) than the Korean respondents ( $M=1.45$ ,  $SD=.34$ ). The main effect for age/generation was significant in 1) Self-Transcendence versus/minus Self-Efficacy Values ,  $F (1, 204) = 10.20$ ,  $p < .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .05$ , with the younger respondents scoring lower ( $M=.39$ ,  $SD=1.97$ ) than the older respondents ( $M=1.47$ ,  $SD=2.32$ ), 2) in Openness to Change versus/minus Conservation Values,  $F (1,204) = 9.86$ ,  $p < .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .05$ , with the younger respondents scoring higher ( $M=1.27$ ,  $SD=2.75$ ) than their older counterparts ( $M=-.31$ ,  $SD=3.43$ ), and 3) in democratic beliefs,  $F (1,204) = 4.98$ ,  $p < .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .03$ , with the younger respondents scoring higher ( $M=1.73$ ,  $SD=.44$ ) than the older respondents ( $M=1.59$ ,  $SD=.99$ ) (See *Figure 4.1*).




Figure 4.1: Values and Beliefs by Generation

As can be seen on *Figure 4.2*, Gender X Generation interaction's main effect was significant in 1) Postmodernist Values,  $F(1, 204) = 6.57, p < .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .04$ , with the older male respondents scoring the highest ( $M=4.57, SD=2.66$ ), the older female respondents scoring the lowest ( $M=3.11, SD=1.82$ ), and the scores of the male and the female respondents in the younger groups being in the middle and close to each other (Younger Male  $M=3.58, SD=1.95$ ; Younger Female  $M=3.67, SD=1.91$ ), and in 2) Openness to Change versus/minus Conservation Values,  $F(1, 204) = 4.29, p < .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .02$ , with the younger female respondents scoring the highest ( $M=1.58, SD=3.14$ ), the older female respondents the lowest ( $M=-.67, SD=3.26$ ), and the two male group respondents (Younger Male  $M=.93, SD=2.21$ ; Older Male  $M=.42, SD=3.70$ ) scoring in the middle. The Scheffe post-hoc tests found that the mean score differences for Postmodernist Values were significant between the older



females and the older males ( $p < .01$ ). The mean scores for Openness to Change versus/minus Conservation values were significantly different between the older female respondents and the younger male respondents ( $p < .001$ ) and the younger female respondents ( $p < .001$ ). The Culture X Generation interaction's main effect was significant in 1) Self-Transcendence versus/minus Self-Efficacy Values,  $F(1, 204) = 3.92$ ,  $p < .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .02$ , with the older American respondents scoring the highest ( $M = 1.52$ ,  $SD = 2.72$ ), the younger Korean respondents scoring the lowest ( $M = -.38$ ,  $SD = 1.62$ ), and the older Koreans ( $M = 1.39$ ,  $SD = 1.64$ ) and the younger Americans ( $M = 1.38$ ,  $SD = 1.94$ ) in the middle, and in 2) Openness to Change versus/minus Conservation Values,  $F(1, 204) = 8.43$ ,  $p < .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .05$ , with the younger Korean respondents scoring the highest ( $M = 1.34$ ,  $SD = 2.43$ ), the older Koreans scoring the lowest ( $M = -1.68$ ,  $SD = 2.00$ ), and the younger Americans ( $M = 1.18$ ,  $SD = 3.14$ ) and the older Americans ( $M = .67$ ,  $SD = 3.89$ ) scoring in the middle (See *Figure 4.3*). Scheffe post-hoc tests found significant mean score differences for Self-Transcendence versus/minus Self-Enhancement Values between the younger Koreans and the older Koreans ( $p < .005$ ), the younger Americans ( $p < .001$ ) and the older Americans ( $p < .001$ ), and for Openness to Change versus/minus Conservation Values between the older Koreans and the younger Koreans ( $p < .001$ ), the younger Americans ( $p < .001$ ), and the older Americans ( $p < .005$ ).




Figure 4.2: Values and Beliefs by Gender X Generation




Figure 4.3: Values and Beliefs by Culture X Generation

#### 4.7.1.2 Family centredness and democratisation

With the macro-level variables of age/generation, culture and gender hypothesised to influence family views and attitudes, a 2 (gender) X 2 (culture) X 2 (generation) MANOVA was conducted with family importance, commitment, dependence and democratisation as dependent variables. Several hypotheses were made about the differences across gender groups, cultures, and generations. Individuals from South Korea, a highly Collectivistic country, were hypothesised to rate family centredness as more important than those from the United States. It was hypothesised that the differences in the perceptions of family centredness and democratisation should be larger between the two generations in South Korea than between the generations in the United States, for the childhood experiences between the older and the younger generations in South Korea differ more than in the United States, with the recent social change in South Korea. It was also hypothesised that if the younger generations are becoming more individualistic or independent, they should perceive the family to be less important, be less committed, and less dependent on the family. Gender differences were also hypothesised, where different socialisation experiences should lead women to perceive family centredness and democratisation to be more important than men do. Women and younger generations were also hypothesised to view family democratisation as more important than men and older generations.

The effects of all three of the independent variables, gender (Wilks's Lambda = .91,  $F(4, 204) = 5.09$ ,  $p < .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .10$ ), generation (Wilks's Lambda = .93,  $F(4, 204) = 3.53$ ,  $p < .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .07$ ), and culture (Wilks's Lambda = .55,  $F(4, 204)$

= 40.13,  $p < .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .45$ ), were significant. The Generation X Culture interaction was also significant (Wilks's Lambda = .91,  $F(4, 204) = 5.04$ ,  $p < .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .10$ ), but the effects of Gender X Generation (Wilks's Lambda = .98,  $F(4, 204) = .77$ ,  $p > .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .02$ ), the Gender X Culture (Wilks's Lambda = .99,  $F(4, 204) = .35$ ,  $p > .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .0$ ), and the three-way Generation X Gender X Culture (Wilks's Lambda = .97,  $F(4, 204) = 1.41$ ,  $p > .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .03$ ) interactions were not significant. In univariate tests, the main effect for gender was significant only in Family Democratisation,  $F(1, 204) = 19.39$ ,  $p < .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .09$ , with the female respondents showing higher score ( $M = 4.66$ ,  $SD = .98$ ) than the male respondents ( $M = 4.04$ ,  $SD = .86$ ). The main effect for culture was significant in 1) Family Commitment,  $F(1, 204) = 96.26$ ,  $p < .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .33$ , with the Korean respondents scoring higher ( $M = 5.02$ ,  $SD = .74$ ) than the American respondents ( $M = 3.72$ ,  $SD = .92$ ), 2) in Family Dependence,  $F(1, 204) = 15.10$ ,  $p < .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .07$ , with the Korean respondents scoring higher ( $M = 4.80$ ,  $SD = .85$ ) than the American respondents ( $M = 4.24$ ,  $SD = 1.19$ ), and 3) in Family Democratisation,  $F(1, 204) = 15.08$ ,  $p < .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .07$ , with the American respondents ( $M = 4.78$ ,  $SD = 1.13$ ) scoring higher than the Korean respondents ( $M = 4.07$ ,  $SD = .67$ ) (See *Figure 4.4*). The main effect for age/generation was significant in Family Commitment,  $F(1, 204) = 7.19$ ,  $p < .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .04$ , with the younger respondents scoring higher ( $M = 4.53$ ,  $SD = .70$ ) than the older respondents ( $M = 4.17$ ,  $SD = .91$ ).

Gender X Generation interaction's main effect was significant in Family Dependence,  $F(1, 204) = .83$ ,  $p < .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .16$ , with the young male respondents scoring the highest ( $M = 4.68$ ,  $SD = .97$ ) and the older male respondents scoring the lowest

( $M = 4.22$ ,  $SD = 1.04$ ), with both female groups scoring in the middle. Significant mean score differences between the younger male respondents and the younger female respondents ( $p < .01$ ), older male respondents ( $p < .01$ ) and the older female respondents ( $p < .01$ ) were found in the Scheffe post-hoc tests. Culture X Generation interaction's main effect was significant in Family Democratisation,  $F(1, 204) = 9.83$ ,  $p < .05$ ,  $\text{partial } \eta^2 = .05$ , with the younger ( $M = 4.76$ ,  $SD = .93$ ) and the older ( $M = 4.80$ ,  $SD = 1.30$ ) American respondents scoring similarly high, the younger Korean respondents scoring 4.24 ( $SD = .71$ ), and the older Korean respondents scoring the lowest ( $M = 3.85$ ,  $SD = .54$ ). In Scheffe post-hoc tests, significant mean score differences for Family Democratisation were found between the younger Koreans and the younger Americans ( $p < .05$ ) and the older Americans ( $p < .01$ ), and the older Koreans and the younger Americans ( $p < .001$ ) and the older Americans ( $p < .001$ ).





Figure 4.4: Family Views by Culture

#### 4.7.2 Family views and attitudes: Factor analysis

Exploratory factor analysis of all the items from the family scales was performed in order to reduce the number of the items and select only those that load highly for further analysis. Principal components factor analysis with Varimax rotation was conducted to examine the structure of 72 items from various family scales. Factors with eigenvalues of higher than 1.0, and items that have loadings higher than .55 on the factors only, were selected for further analysis. Criterion for factor loadings was set higher than is normally accepted, in order to select only the items that are highly correlated with the others and to weed out many of the items that do not seem to suitably tap on the variables. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy (KMO) was .924, which is high (recommended value is  $>.50$ ). Four factors retained for both of the samples combined explained for 66.53% of the total variance.

As mentioned above, family view and attitudes were hypothesised to have four categories or factors. In the following analysis, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) of the chosen factors and items was performed using AMOS 16.0. This second factor analysis was necessary, for considering the sample size and degree of freedom, item scores for factors with higher numbers of items were aggregated to have less than 4 items loading onto each factor. The analysis demonstrated that the aggregate items still represented and measured the factors appropriately; regression weights for all the items were higher than .57 (in SEM, relations between indicator variables and latent variables are described in regression terms). These results were very similar to what was previously found in the exploratory factor analysis performed on SPSS. The measurement model that includes the factors, items, and regression weights for each of the items is demonstrated in *Figure 4.5*.

Figure 4.5: Measurement Model (Variables consisting of Family Items)



### 4.7.3 SEM: Final structural equation model

#### 4.7.3.1 SEM & the models

The second part of the analyses included testing of the links between the variables and of the overall hypothesised model relating the variables together, using the method of Structural Equation Modelling (SEM). For SEM analysis, 10 to 15 cases per latent variable and a sample size of greater than 200 are accepted as sufficient (e.g. Garson, 2009). This study met these conditions (N=230), and all the final SEM models showed adequate fit. One measurement model including only the family latent variables and their indicators, and three full structural equation models are presented in this study, each containing different numbers of macro-level factors, or, independent variables. SEM I contains two macro-level factors, generation and country-level Individualism, SEM II contains three macro-level factors, generation, country-level Individualism, and gender, and SEM III presents four macro-level factors, including the above and economic change. The diagrams for the final SEM model can be found in *Figure 4.6-4.8*, each including all the latent variables, pathways, regression weights, and fit indices.

#### 4.7.3.2 Model fitting

The models, both the measurement model for the four family variables, family importance, dependence, commitment and democratisation, and the structural equation models including all latent variables were tested separately for their abilities to account for the hypothesised model. Firstly, the measurement model for family



perception variables was tested in order to check the validity of the groups of items testing each of the variables. After checking for these variables, full structural model was drawn and its goodness of fit with the hypothesised model was tested. Fit indices of chi-square (CMIN= minimum discrepancy) divided by degree of freedom (CMIN/df), comparative fit index (CFI), Tucker-Lewis index (TLI), and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) are reported for the analysis of the final model in the study. We can assume a good fit if the CFI is greater than .9, RMSEA is below .08, and relative chi-square (CMIN /df) below 3 (Hu & Bentler, 1999; Maxwell et al., 2005). As can be found in *Table 4.3*, analyses of the measurement model demonstrated adequacy. Furthermore, fit indices for the full structural equation model including all latent and manifest variables for the study, indicated goodness of fit, CMIN/df<3, CFI>.900; RMSEA below .065 for all three models.

*Figure 4.6* features the full structural model including three macro-level variables of 'gender', 'generation (age)' and 'cultural-level Individualism', and shows a good fit (CMIN/df=1.790, CFI=.953, RMSEA=.048), indicating that the interrelations between the variables as shown are likely to exist as hypothesised. As can be seen in *Figure 4.6*, the independent variable of gender was a significant predictor for Autonomous-Related-Self belief, where women were more likely to see the self as both autonomous and related ( $\beta=.21$ ,  $p<.01$ ). Age/generation had highly significant impact on Autonomous-Related-Self belief as well, where younger individuals were more likely to believe the self to be both autonomous and related ( $\beta= -.21$ ,  $p<.01$ ), and country-level individualism also predicted the self-belief, with individuals in the less individualism (thus more collectivistic- in this case, South Koreans) perceive the self to be both autonomous and related ( $\beta= -.26$ ,  $p<.01$ ). It was hypothesised that

endorsement of Openness to Change and Postmodernist Values should predict stronger belief in family democratisation and weaker family centredness. Self-Transcendence Values were hypothesised to predict higher family centredness. Stronger Autonomous-Related Self-belief was hypothesised to predict stronger belief in family centredness, and stronger democratic beliefs was hypothesised to predict stronger belief in family democratisation, The value dimensions of Openness to Change versus Conservation predicted family importance ( $\beta=-.72$ ,  $p<.001$ ) and family commitment ( $\beta=-.70$ ,  $p<.001$ ), where higher endorsement of Openness to Change Value predicted lower levels of family importance and commitment. Same as in the previous study, democratic beliefs predicted family democratisation ( $\beta=.43$ ,  $p<.001$ ). Postmodernist Values did not predict family views, as was the case in Study I. Autonomous-Related-Self belief predicted family importance ( $\beta= .22$ ,  $p<.001$ ), family democratisation ( $\beta=.27$ ,  $p<.001$ ) and family dependence ( $\beta=.96$ ,  $p<.001$ ), with stronger Autonomous-Related-Self belief predicting higher levels of all of the three family views.

#### **4.8 Discussion & further remarks**


This study investigated the impact of generation and other macro-level factors on family centredness and democratisation. As a way of investigating the impact of social and economic change, intergenerational differences in values and beliefs were used, in conjunction with the belief that these differences are caused by the disparity in wealth and stability of the nation experienced as youth (e.g. Inglehart, 1997; 2008).

Significant differences between older and younger individuals in both countries were found, which suggests that childhood experiences play a role in shaping family views and attitudes differently in the two age groups. The results were in agreement with Inglehart (1997)'s claim; Younger individuals had higher levels of acceptance for Openness to Change and Postmodernist values. Younger individuals are placing more emphases on accepting new ideas, self-expression and quality of life than their parents, which will have implications for their lifestyle, close relationships, and choices. Intergenerational differences in self-beliefs and perceptions of close relationships seem to be changing as well. The findings from this study also support Kagitcibasi's (2007) theory of family change and the new model of Autonomous-Related Self-in-the-Family. It was demonstrated that younger individuals are more likely to view themselves as Autonomous-Related than their older counterparts, and stronger sense of Autonomous-Relatedness predicted perception of higher importance placed on the family, stronger family commitment, and higher emotional dependence to the family, which demonstrate that the strength of family bond is not diminishing, and the young generations continue to value family relationship. Therefore, the results of the study are against the views that the modern emphasis on the self and individuation might undermine the family (e.g. Beck, 1997).

Table 4.3: Fit Indices for the Measurement Model

	CMIN/df	p	CFI	RMSEA
Measurement Model	1.219	.184	.995	.031

Figure 4.6: SEM I  
 (Three Macro-Level Variables)



Contrarily, this study found that the younger individuals incorporate the view of the self that combines both the independence and dependence and as the result continued to maintain strong emotional ties with the family and view family relationship as important. Therefore, this demonstrates that although the traditional beliefs regarding the family including the relationship dynamics, and roles within the family, might be undergoing change, unchanging are the strength and importance of the family as the basic social institution and source of emotional support. The results of the present study are in line with those of Thornton and Young-DeMarco's (2001) study, which found evidence for increase in perceived family importance and commitment to the family in the younger generations in the United States.

The perceived importance of democratic relations within the family was influenced by factors such as age and democratic beliefs, with younger individuals and those that hold stronger democratic beliefs more likely to perceive democratisation in the family as important. Several explanations for this relationship can be suggested. Previous research suggested that spread of ideals for democracy and egalitarianism can modify family relationships (Thornton & Fricke, 1987). More importantly, the impact of economic conditions and cultural background on family democratisation were significant; Older Koreans, who were high in the endorsement of Conservation values, perceived least importance for family democratisation. These results can probably be best explained by the strong Confucian influences (e.g. Kim et al., 2002), and the economic and social conditions (e.g. Inglehart, 1997; 2008) they experienced while growing up. Beliefs in democracy and goodness of a democratic system predicted family democratisation; stronger beliefs in democracy predicted higher perceived importance of equal family relations. The previous study found

direct significant impact of gender on family democratisation. However, the impact was somewhat weaker in this study, which can be due to an increasing number of latent and observed variables included and thus the added complexity of the SEM model. Analysis of the effects of gender did find significant difference between the sexes on Autonomous-Related Self-beliefs and family democratisation, which supports this belief.

The observed intergenerational differences in value priorities and family views and attitudes can lead to mismatch in expectations in family relationships, and this can be especially the case in cultures undergoing rapid social change like South Korea. This can cause family conflicts and diminished satisfaction and cohesion in the families of fast changing societies, and calls for careful investigation. In discussing 'exchange' aspect of close relationships, Cramer (1998) explains the concepts of interdependence and equity, where matched expectations about interdependence and commitment lead to healthy and satisfactory relationships. If expectations and choices toward the family differ among generations, perceived fairness and satisfaction in the relationship can diminish, and the bond between the family members of different generations can weaken. For example, Euler and his colleagues (2001) found that the more the children accepted the parents as their cultural models, and shared the same values and norms, the more positive was the perceived quality of the parent-child relationship. This study demonstrated that generations can differ in the perceptions of family centredness and democratisation, especially when the socialisation experiences as children for the older and younger generations differ. Future studies should further examine the influence of rapid social change on intergenerational family relationships, and family members' perceived

quality and satisfaction.

The interrelationships between levels of factors were corroborated, and thus, the importance of societal and cultural level factors and individuals' values and beliefs should be highlighted when considering family views and attitudes in different cultures. Hareven (1991) and Chafetz and Hagan (1996) discuss the importance of considering economic and cultural factors in investigation of family change, noting significance of factors such as economic expansion, increased female labour participation, and education. As is noted by Thornton and Fricke (1987), in most of cultures, increasing number of women and young individuals are receiving higher levels of education due to the improvements in societal and economic conditions, and the impact of these factors on family dynamics should be investigated. The results of this study demonstrated that values, self-beliefs, and political beliefs impacted on perceptions of family centredness and democratisation. Schwartz' (1994) value dimensions of Openness to Change versus Conservation, Kagitcibasi (2007)'s Autonomous-Related Self belief, and democratic beliefs predicted perceptions of Family importance, dependence and commitment. Higher Conservation values and lower beliefs in democracy predicted high Family Commitment, higher Conservation values and stronger sense of Autonomous-Related Self predicted high Family Importance, and lower endorsement of Postmodernist values, stronger sense of Autonomous-Related Self, and higher democratic beliefs predicted high family dependence. Country-level Individualism had indirect influence on self-belief and democratic beliefs through gender as a mediator. Therefore, this study demonstrated the interrelations between the varying levels of factors, relating macro-level/societal influences, the individual, and the family views, and highlighted the importance of the

contextual-development-functional approach to studying the family (see Kagitcibasi, 2007), which takes into account the interrelations between the self, family, and the society which are all embedded in culture. Although the directionality of these interrelations can only be inferred, the current findings suggest that there are significant relationships between these factors and that further investigation can be thus desired.

The model from this study is re-examined in Study III, which extends on the findings by adding more cultures/countries and thus strengthening investigation of cultural influences, studying the impact of societal level economic conditions and family-level affluence using parents' occupation and income data, and testing the interlinks separately in each of the country samples. Whereas Study I investigated countries that are fast-changing (Hungary and South Korea) versus relatively stable (Canada), and Study II two countries with opposing cultural orientations (US= Individualistic versus South Korea=Collectivistic), the following study (Study III) makes cultural comparisons of four countries in order to allow for more precise examination of the impact of cultural orientation on family centredness and democratisation. Cultural influences will be investigated by studying them by country and by groups of cultural orientations (Canada & UK= Individualistic versus South Korea & Japan= Collectivistic). Study III will place more emphasis on investigating cultural impacts more carefully, and understanding the interrelations between the variables in each country by using multi-group analysis.



# Chapter 5

## Study III

### 5.1 Research Aim

Previous research had looked at particular links among different levels of factors, such as those in between culture and the self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991), culture and individual values (Schwartz, 2006; 2007), Postmodernist values and political beliefs (Lesthaeghe & Meekers, 1986), economic change and Postmodernist values (Inglehart, 1997). Study III re-investigated these links across countries with different cultural orientations (Individualistic versus Collectivistic) and history of economic development.

In the last few decades, social and economic phenomena such as modernisation

and rapid economic growth have brought changes to the meaning, functions, and structure of the family in many parts of the world (Smith 1995; Thornton & Fricke, 1987). This study looked more closely at the impact of economic growth on individual level variables. Both the importance and the lack of research that examines the patterns of direct effect of economic change on family outcomes have been addressed (White & Rogers, 2000), and thus, this study investigated closely the link between economic development and family views and attitudes. GDP (Gross Domestic Product) data for the four nations investigated in the study from the years in between 1990 and 2006 were used in the study to compare the amount and pattern of economic growth in each of the nations. Since this dimension taps on the change in economic conditions in each country, the growth rate or percentage change in each of these countries in the years were employed as the point of comparison rather than the actual GDP level. Therefore, average GDP per capita growth rate for the four countries were included in the study, represented as a macro-level variable.

The effects of culture and social change on individuals' perception of the roles and interactional patterns in the family, the importance of the family, and their commitment to the family continue to be the focus of investigation. Study III was conducted in four different countries, Japan, South Korea, UK, and Canada. Inclusion of these four countries in the investigation improved the validity of Individualistic versus Collectivistic culture comparison, for the cultural orientations were represented by more than one country each. South Korea and Japan are often believed to be 'interdependent' or 'collectivistic' cultures, where one's relationship with others that are close to them has been of great importance to the people, and

were chosen as the collectivistic cultures. The U.K. and Canada are seen as 'independent' or 'individualistic' cultures, where one's autonomy and independence are more emphasised and chosen here as to represent individualistic cultures. Hofstede (2001)'s data showed that the four countries differ in his measure of Individualism (IDV): 80 for Canada and 89 for Britain, whereas Japan scored 46 and South Korea the lowest out of the four at 18. The Confucian ideals prevalent in Asian countries like South Korea and Japan for centuries have shaped social relations and family values in a specific way, where group harmony and order in the family have been prioritised (Moghaddam & Crystal, 1997). Therefore, it may be the case that the perceptions of and the importance placed on family may be more similar between individuals in South Korea and Japan than with those in Britain and Canada.

The indirect effect of culture on family centredness and democratisation as well as individual values and beliefs were investigated in this study. Specifically, the variable of culture was distinguished and examined at two levels, at the level of nations separately, and at the level of individualistic versus collectivistic cultures. In addition, the impact of affluence at family level on value priorities (measured by parents' occupations) was studied. Family socioeconomic status can have an influence on which traits and values are encouraged in the child, and these childhood experiences that shape the individuals' values and beliefs are found to have long-term impact (Axinn & Yabiku, 2001). In this study, this variable is represented as family affluence.

## 5.2 Hypotheses

As can be seen in *Figure 5.1*, the interrelationships between these factors are organized in three levels, where the contextual factors such as culture and childhood experiences exert influence on the types of beliefs and values individuals hold, and have influence on family views and attitudes.

This study investigated the effect of culture and social change on the perception of the family through the indirect ways of influencing the self. It is postulated that the beliefs and values of the individuals, which might arise from their childhood experiences and the culture and society in which they grew up, influence the way they perceive their families. In that sense:

1. As in the previous studies, macro-level variables of culture and gender are hypothesised to have effect on individual values, beliefs and family centredness and democratisation. Following the results found in the previous study, it is hypothesised that individual-level values and beliefs should relate to family views and attitudes as well. More specifically:
  - (1.1) Individual values, level of Postmodernist values, self-construals, and political beliefs should differ across countries. In particular, countries with relatively stable socioeconomic conditions should be conducive to Self-Transcendence, Openness to Change, and Postmodernist Values as well as stronger democratic beliefs. Culture-level Individualism should be negatively related to Autonomous-Related Self-belief.
  - (1.2) These dimensions should have significant influence on family centredness

and democratisation.

- (1.3) Individual values of Self-Efficacy should be positively related to family commitment, but negatively to family democratisation for those that prioritise Self-Efficacy values will take more conservative outlook toward the family than those who prioritise Self-Transcendence Values
- (1.4) Postmodernist values should be positively related to family democratisation
- (1.5) Autonomous-related self views should be positively related to aspects of family centredness, for individuals who emphasise relatedness should value the quality and continuity of their family relationships
- (1.6) Democratic beliefs should lead individuals to believe in democratic family system as well
- (1.7) Self-Transcendence, Openness to Change and Self-Transcendence Values should negatively predict family centredness

2. Moreover, culture and level of economic development should predict the type of values endorsed, self-belief, political beliefs, and the perceived importance of family centredness and democratisation. For instance:

- (2.1) The unique trajectory of social and economic development, as well as cultural traditions and the history of a nation, should be reflected in the individuals' family centredness and democratisation, along with other non-familial ideals and beliefs held by those individuals. In other words, culture, as representing both the historical background and the individualism dimension, should influence values and beliefs, which in turn should influence family centredness and democratisation

- (2.2) Countries that share similar cultural orientation in terms of emphasising independence (Britain and Canada) should exhibit closer scores in self-beliefs compared to countries that emphasise interdependence (South Korea and Japan)
- (2.3) In family views and attitudes, countries with similar cultural orientation (Collectivistic- South Korea and Japan), should share more similarities in family importance, commitment, dependence and democratisation ideals, and should differ from cultures believed to be more individualistic and egalitarian (Canada and Britain).
3. The level of societal and economic developments should also produce changes in how the individuals think about themselves and their families.
- (3.1) Family views and attitudes in South Korea, a country with a fast-changing society and high rates of rapid economic growth should differ from the relatively stable societies of Britain, Japan, and Canada where there have been slower and steadier developments over the last half-century.
- (3.2) Economic developments at the societal level and affluence at the level of family determine the type of childhood experience, and should thus have effects on beliefs about family centredness and democratisation by shaping and influencing individuals' self & autonomy beliefs and values.

The hypothesised relationships and the variables can be found on the conceptual model (*Figure 5.1*).




Figure 5.1: Conceptual Model

## 5.3 Methodology

### 5.3.1 Participants

Data were collected in four countries, South Korea, Japan, UK, and Canada. This study consisted of 539 students (154 Korean students (M age= 22.5, SD= 2.00) and 159 Japanese students (M age= 19.1, SD= 1.32). 106 British students (M age= 21.4, SD= 4.98) and 118 Canadian students (M age=19.4, SD= 3.95)), recruited from universities in large cities in their respective countries. All were from the majority ethnic/cultural group in their nation, and data from those that did not reside in the country for majority of years or spend childhood years elsewhere were excluded. In all cases, participants volunteered to take part without any monetary compensation,

mostly in exchange for a course credit. All sessions began with the researcher's introduction to the study and brief explanation of the duties and responsibilities of the participants, and all participants included in the study gave informed consent prior to participation.

### 5.3.2 Questionnaire

The questionnaire employed in this study was identical to the one used in Study II (See Appendix 1 b) on pp. 239-246). With the original items in English, Korean and Japanese versions of the questionnaire were also created for the Korean and the Japanese samples respectively, using the method of translation and back-translation (e.g. Van de Vijver & Hambleton, 1996). Translators were fluent in both the language to be translated (English) and the translated language (Korean or Japanese). The English version was administered to the Canadian and the British samples, and Korean and Japanese language versions for the Koreans and Japanese respectively.

#### 5.3.2.1 *Country-level economic growth:*

For investigating intergenerational value differences, Inglehart (2008) suggests use of time lag of about fifteen to twenty years in order to investigate societal influences on the younger birth cohorts. Therefore, as a way of comparing different cohort groups based on the economic circumstances, economic data (GDP per capita) for the years was selected based on the mean age of the participants in the different



generational groups. GDP per capita data for the single year at which each of the generational groups was age 10 were chosen, and the differences between the two years at which each group was average age 10 were calculated. Thus, the data from the two countries for the year 1970 (for the older generation, mean age for both countries=51.58) and 2000 (for the younger generation, mean age for both countries=19.75) were chosen, considering that most participants would have been around age 10 in these years respectively.

#### **5.4 Analysis**

Comparisons of mean scores for the various constructs used in the study by culture and gender using two-way MANOVA tests were performed, in order to gain insights into differences between groups of different nationalities and gender. The correlations between the family scale items and the family factors/clusters they formed were tested using factor analysis method. Items that measured various aspects of political beliefs were also tested using exploratory factor analysis method. These basic analyses provided the ground for the testing of the hypothesised model, using structural equation modelling (SEM) technique. In addition, validity of the model in each of the cultures was tested using multi-group analysis method in SEM.

## 5.5 Results

*Table 5.1* presents mean scores on the variables of Postmodernist Values, Schwartz' Values, Autonomous-Related Self-beliefs, democratic beliefs, and family democratisation and centredness organised by culture and gender. . Correlations between the variables are shown in *Table 5.2*. Results of the two-way MANOVA tests are explained in the following section.

### 5.5.1 Values and Beliefs

A 2 (gender) X 4 (culture) MANOVA was conducted with the variables representing individual values and beliefs. The results of the multivariate tests for Postmodernist Value, Self-Transcendence versus Self-Efficacy (calculated Self-Transcendence minus Self-Efficacy) and Openness to Change versus Conservation (calculated Openness to Change minus Conservation) values, political beliefs (Democratic Belief) and Autonomous-Related Self-Belief were produced. As in Study I and II, country-level Individualism was hypothesised to be negatively related to Autonomous-Related Self-beliefs. The scores for South Koreans and Japanese should be more similar on this dimension, and those for Canadians and British more similar. Differences in the cultural and socioeconomic conditions in the recent decades were hypothesised to influence value priorities and political beliefs. Higher wealth or economic/political security at the societal-level should influence those that live in that society and lead them to endorse Self-Transcendence, Openness to Change and Postmodernist Values, and to hold stronger democratic beliefs. In this sense, scores

for these dimensions for South Koreans should differ more significantly from those of the other groups. As in the previous studies, women were hypothesised to view the self as both autonomous and related, or in other words score higher on Autonomous-Related Self-belief than men do. The main effects of culture (Wilks's Lambda = .76,  $F(15, 485) = 8.94$ ,  $p < .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .09$ ) and gender (Wilks's Lambda = .95,  $F(5, 485) = 4.68$ ,  $p < .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .05$ ) were significant. The effects of the Culture X Gender interaction (Wilks's Lambda = .93,  $F(15, 485) = 2.27$ ,  $p < .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .02$ ) was significant as well.

In univariate tests, the main effects for gender were significant in 1) Autonomous-Related Self beliefs,  $F(1, 485) = 11.50$ ,  $p < .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .02$ , with the female respondents scoring higher ( $M = 5.01$ ,  $SD = .60$ ) than the male respondents ( $M = 4.85$ ,  $SD = .65$ ), in 2) Postmodernist Values,  $F(1, 485) = 10.60$ ,  $p < .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .02$ , with the female respondents scoring higher ( $M = 4.60$ ,  $SD = 2.19$ ) than the male respondents ( $M = 3.84$ ,  $SD = 2.08$ ), and in 3) Self-Transcendence versus/minus Self-Efficacy Values,  $F(1, 485) = 9.16$ ,  $p < .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .02$ , with the female respondents scoring higher ( $M = .87$ ,  $SD = 1.10$ ) than the male respondents ( $M = .37$ ,  $SD = 1.11$ ) (See *Figure 5.2*).

The effects for culture were significant in 1) Postmodernist Values,  $F(3, 485) = 5.44$ ,  $p < .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .03$ , with the scores from the British ( $M = 4.84$ ,  $SD = 2.29$ ), the Canadian ( $M = 4.38$ ,  $SD = 2.31$ ), the Korean ( $M = 4.06$ ,  $SD = 1.99$ ), and the Japanese ( $M = 3.69$ ,  $SD = 1.77$ ) respondents, in the order of high to low, in 2) Self-Transcendence versus/minus Self-Efficacy,  $F(3, 485) = 14.51$ ,  $p < .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .08$ , with the scores from the British ( $M = .92$ ,  $SD = 1.14$ ), the Japanese ( $M = .91$ ,

SD=.98), the Canadian (M=.66, SD=1.20), and the Korean (M=.01, SD=.97) respondents, in the order of high to low, and in 3) democratic beliefs,  $F(3, 485) = 20.72, p < .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .12$ , with the Japanese (M=2.99, SD=1.02), the British (M=2.18, SD=1.09), the Canadian (M=2.15, SD=1.00), and the Korean (M=2.13, SD=.89) respondents scoring from the highest to the lowest in order. The effect of the Culture X Gender interaction was significant in Autonomous-Related Self-belief,  $F(15, 485) = 5.62, p < .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .03$  (See *Figure 5.3*). The Scheffe post-hoc tests showed that the mean scores for Postmodernist Values were significant between the British and the Korean respondents ( $p < .01$ ), and the British and the Japanese respondents ( $p < .001$ ). Mean score differences for Self-Transcendence versus/minus Self-Efficacy Values were significant between the Korean and the Japanese ( $p < .001$ ), the Korean and the British ( $p < .001$ ) and the Korean and the Canadian ( $p < .001$ ) respondents. Mean score differences for democratic beliefs were significant between the Japanese and the Canadian respondents ( $p < .01$ ).

Table 5.1: Means and Standard Deviations (in parentheses) of All Variables in Study III

	Korean		American		British		Canadian	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Autonomous-Related Self-belief	4.78 (.52)	4.65 (.66)	4.72 (.78)	4.85 (.65)	4.57 (.72)	5.15 (.56)	4.74 (.82)	5.11 (.58)
Postmodernist Values	3.98 (1.98)	4.30 (1.86)	3.60 (2.04)	3.67 (1.75)	3.98 (2.31)	5.37 (2.14)	3.50 (2.08)	4.59 (2.35)
Self-Transcendence minus Self-Efficacy	-.04 (.95)	.14 (1.06)	.69 (1.14)	1.20 (.88)	.73 (1.17)	1.07 (1.08)	.59 (1.38)	.65 (1.14)
Openness to Change minus Conservation	1.61 (2.49)	1.78 (2.20)	2.86 (1.08)	3.03 (1.01)	1.34 (2.29)	1.88 (2.85)	1.41 (3.58)	1.19 (2.74)
Democratic Belief	2.14 (.92)	1.98 (.62)	2.86 (1.08)	3.03 (1.01)	2.20 (1.09)	2.23 (1.12)	2.11 (.90)	2.18 (1.01)
Family Democratisation	4.46 (.56)	4.16 (.51)	4.01 (.74)	4.39 (.60)	4.06 (.59)	4.12 (.69)	3.95 (.75)	4.10 (.76)
Family Importance	5.22 (.54)	5.00 (.66)	4.22 (.84)	4.69 (.69)	3.95 (.71)	4.10 (.82)	4.38 (.88)	4.48 (.79)
Family Commitment	4.33 (.52)	4.33 (.42)	4.34 (.61)	4.44 (.56)	4.50 (.55)	4.67 (.47)	4.46 (.46)	4.68 (.43)
Family Dependence	3.82 (.55)	3.93 (.58)	2.89 (.63)	3.01 (.53)	3.52 (.53)	3.43 (.62)	3.81 (.76)	3.81 (.76)

Table 5.2: Correlation Table for All Variables in Study III

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Autonomous-Related Self-belief	-									
2. Postmodernist Values	.13									
3. Self-Transcendence minus Self-Efficacy	.18*	.26**								
4. Openness to Change minus Conservation	.31**	.20**	-.05							
5. Political Interest	.49**	.21**	.25**	.25**						
6. Democratic Belief	.07	-.01	-.05	-.18*	-.08					
7. Family Democratisation	-.02	.02	-.30**	-.26**	-.23**	.56**				
8. Family Importance	.28**	.02	-.11	-.07	.13	.68**	.29*			
9. Family Commitment	-.16*	-.30**	-.13	-.09	-.20*	-.02	-.01	-.05		
10. Family Dependence	-.12	-.33**	-.18*	-.08	-.28**	-.09	-.16*	-.36**	.14	

\*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

\*\* . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

N= 539




Figure 5.2: Values and Beliefs by Gender




Figure 5.3: Values and Beliefs by Culture

### 5.5.2 Family Centredness and Democratisation

A 2 (gender) X 4 (culture) MANOVA was conducted with family importance, commitment, dependence and democratisation as dependent variables. In multivariate tests, using the Wilks's criterion, the Gender X Culture interaction was significant, Wilks's Lambda = .95,  $F(12, 517) = 2.34$ ,  $p < .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .02$ . In univariate tests, the main effect for the Gender X Culture interaction was significant in 1) family importance,  $F(3, 517) = 4.91$ ,  $p < .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .03$ , with the Korean male respondents showing the highest scores ( $M = 4.47$ ,  $SD = .54$ ) and the Canadian male respondents scoring the lowest ( $M = 3.96$ ,  $SD = .68$ ), and in 2) family commitment,  $F(3, 517) = 4.09$ ,  $p < .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .02$ , with the Korean male respondents again scoring the highest ( $M = 5.22$ ,  $SD = .54$ ) and the British male respondents scoring the lowest ( $M = 3.91$ ,  $SD = .73$ ) (See *Figure 5.4*).




Figure 5.4: Family Views by Culture X Gender

Differences in socialisation experiences should lead to gender differences in the family views, with women perceiving both family centredness and democratisation to be more important than men do. Individuals from the countries with high culture-level Individualism should score lower on family centredness than those from the more Collectivistic countries. The main effect of culture was significant, Wilks's Lambda = .54,  $F(12, 517) = 28.86$ ,  $p < .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .18$ . As can be found on *Figure 5.5*, in univariate tests, the main effect for culture was significant in all four variables: 1) family importance,  $F(3, 517) = 3.43$ ,  $p < .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .02$ , with the Korean respondents scoring the highest ( $M=4.41$ ,  $SD=.55$ ), followed by the Japanese ( $M=4.14$ ,  $SD=.71$ ), the Canadians ( $M=4.08$ ,  $SD=.74$ ), and the British ( $M=4.07$ ,  $SD=.64$ ); 2) family commitment,  $F(3, 517) = 35.57$ ,  $p < .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .17$ , with the Korean respondents scoring the highest ( $M=5.18$ ,  $SD=.57$ ), followed by the Canadians ( $M=4.47$ ,  $SD=.80$ ), the Japanese ( $M=4.38$ ,  $SD=.82$ ), and the British respondents ( $M=4.01$ ,  $SD=.78$ ); 3) family democratisation,  $F(3, 517) = 5.32$ ,  $p < .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .03$ , with the Canadian respondents showing the highest scores ( $M=4.64$ ,  $SD=.43$ ), followed by the British ( $M=4.59$ ,  $SD=.52$ ), the Japanese ( $M=4.38$ ,  $SD=.60$ ) and the Korean respondents ( $M=4.33$ ,  $SD=.50$ ); and 4) family dependence,  $F(3, 517) = 49.41$ ,  $p < .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .23$ , with the Korean respondents showing the highest scores ( $M=3.84$ ,  $SD=.56$ ), followed by the Canadian ( $M=3.70$ ,  $SD=.72$ ), the British ( $M=3.47$ ,  $SD=.59$ ), and the Japanese respondents ( $M=2.94$ ,  $SD=.60$ ). In the Scheffe post-hoc tests, mean score differences for Family Importance were significant between the Japanese and the Korean ( $p < .005$ ) and the Japanese and the Canadian ( $p < .01$ ) respondents, and between the Korean respondents and all the other groups, the Japanese ( $p < .001$ ), the British ( $p < .001$ ) and the Canadian ( $p < .001$ ) respondents, and between the British and the Canadian respondents



( $p < .005$ ). Mean score differences for Family Democratisation were significant between the Korean and the British ( $p < .001$ ), the Korean and the Canadian ( $p < .001$ ), the Japanese and the British ( $p < .005$ ) and the Japanese and the Canadian ( $p < .001$ ) respondents, and for Family Dependence, between the Korean and the Japanese ( $p < .001$ ), the Korean and the British ( $p < .001$ ), the Japanese and the British ( $p < .001$ ) and the Japanese and the Canadian ( $p < .001$ ) respondents. The main effect of gender was not significant, Wilks's Lambda = .98,  $F(4, 517) = 2.05$ ,  $p > .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .02$ . In univariate tests, the main effect for gender was significant only in family democratisation,  $F(1, 517) = 5.76$ ,  $p < .05$ , partial  $\eta^2 = .01$ , with the women respondents ( $M = 4.58$ ,  $SD = .69$ ) scoring higher than the men ( $M = 4.37$ ,  $SD = .67$ ).




Figure 5.5: Family Views by Culture

### 5.5.3 Factor analysis: Family variables

Factor analysis of the family constructs (democratisation, dependence, importance, and commitment) was performed in order to provide the ground for establishing adequate factor structure for the further model testing. Correlations among the items included in the study were mostly high, some as high as .78. The responses from all four nationality groups were rotated to four-factor Varimax orthogonal solutions using principal component factoring and a loading criterion of 0.30. The assumption of independent sampling was met. Items with very low correlations or hampered the normality were excluded for further analysis. After dropping the items that did not load onto factors adequately, four factor solution (Eigenvalues >1) was found. *Table 5.2* displays the items and factor loadings for the rotated factors, with loadings less than 0.30 omitted to improve clarity (See *Table 5.3*). The four-factor solution fitted the hypothesised model of the dependent variables, the four constructs representing family democratisation, family importance, family commitment, and independence from family. Cross-national analysis proved that the factor structures were quite similar across the four groups, and thus the results presented here consist only of combined group analysis. All of the items retained exhibited loading in the range of .60 to .90, which is considered as high. The first factor accounted for 21.77% of the variance, the second factor accounted for 18.61%, the third factor 17.96%, and the fourth factor 10.89%. Together, the four factors chosen accounted for 69.23% of the total variance. With KMO (Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy) value of 0.808 and Bartlett value being significant (approx. chi-square value of 3216.04, with 91 degrees of freedom and p of .000), the analysis proved successful.

#### 5.5.4 Testing of the model: Structural equation modelling (SEM)

Confirmatory factor analysis was performed in order to test the goodness-of-the-fit of the measurement models for family views and attitudes tested above. Measurement model of the factors and the family items tested above in the exploratory factor analysis demonstrated adequacy in this analysis. Since the chi-square goodness of fit test is oversensitive and penalising for large sample size (Bentler, 2007; Byrne, 2001; Cheung & Rensvold, 2000; Hagger et al., 2003), other absolute fit indices recommended by other authors were taken into consideration to judge the goodness of the model fit.

Table 5.3: Factor Items and Loadings

	Factor/ Component		
	Family Importance	Family Commitment	Family Democr
ARSF1			
ARSF2			
ARSF3			
ARSF4			
FA7		.785	
FA8		.794	
FA10		.777	
FA12		.685	
INDFD2			
INDFD4			
INV3	.834		
INV4	.853		
INV6	.841		
INV7	.833		

As in the previous studies, fit indices of chi-square (CMIN= minimum discrepancy) divided by degree of freedom (CMIN/df), comparative fit index (CFI), Tucker-Lewis index (TLI), and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) are reported for the analysis of the models in the study. We can assume a good fit if the CFI is greater than .9, RMSEA is below .08, and relative chi-square (CMIN /df) below 3 (Maxwell et al., 2005). Results of this analysis demonstrated that Measurement model I fits the pooled data that combines all four cultural groups of Koreans, Japanese, British, and Canadians satisfactorily. Fit indices for this model are presented in *Table 5.4*. The structural equation model that was fitted to the all-samples data (samples from all four countries combined) is presented in *Figure 5.6*.

It was hypothesised that lower culture-level Individualism should predict higher Autonomous-Related Self-belief. The results showed that Individualism successfully predicted Autonomous-Related Self-belief ( $\beta = -.20$ ,  $p < .01$ ) and Postmodernist Values ( $\beta = .45$ ,  $p < .05$ ). Individuals in the countries with lower Individualism scores held higher level of Autonomous-Related Self-belief, higher level of Postmodernist Values, and higher level of Self-Transcendence versus Self-Efficacy Values. Economic development was hypothesised to be positively related to Self-Transcendence, Openness to Change and Postmodernist Values. Country's level of Economic growth were found to predict the endorsement of Self-Transcendence versus Self-Efficacy Values ( $\beta = .23$ ,  $p < .05$ ) and democratic beliefs. ( $\beta = .56$ ,  $p < .001$ ). The results suggest that the higher levels of economic growth predicted higher level of endorsement for Self-Transcendence Values, and higher democratic beliefs. Family-level affluence did not predict the endorsement of values as was hypothesised, and was dropped from the model.


In both Study II and Study III, Autonomous-Related Self-belief was hypothesised to have positive influence on the perception of family centredness, where individuals who view the self to be both autonomous and related should view the family to be central to their lives. Autonomous-Related Self-belief predicted perceptions of family importance ( $\beta = .19$ ,  $p < .01$ ), family commitment ( $\beta = .22$ ,  $p < .001$ ), and family democratisation ( $\beta = .41$ ,  $p < .001$ ). Individuals that viewed themselves as autonomous-related were also likely to perceive family importance, commitment, and democratisation as important. Self-Transcendence and Openness to Change Values were hypothesised to negatively predict family centredness and positively predict family democratisation. As in the previous studies, stronger democratic belief was

hypothesised to lead to stronger family democratisation. Endorsement of Postmodernist Values did not predict any of the family-level outcomes. Schwartz' value dimension of Self-Transcendence predicted perceptions of family importance ( $\beta=.15$ ,  $p<.001$ ), family commitment ( $\beta=.33$ ,  $p<.001$ ), and family democratisation ( $\beta=.19$ ,  $p<.001$ ). These results suggest that individuals with high endorsement of Self-Transcendence Values were likely to emphasise family importance, commitment less and democratisation. Strong beliefs in democracy predicted high importance of family democratisation ( $\beta=.40$ ,  $p<.001$ ), and family dependence ( $\beta=.56$ ,  $p<.001$ ).

Table 5.4: Model Fit of the Measurement Model & the Structural Model

	CMIN/df	p	CFI	RMSEA
Measurement Model	.605	.84	1	0
Structural Model	1.738	.000	.976	.038

Figure 5.6: Structural Equation Model



### 5.5.5 Multi-group analysis

A separate analysis and testing of the model was performed in order to examine the usefulness of the model in explaining these interrelations in all the cultures. The analysis was performed in order to test whether the model and its various interrelations hold true across the countries investigated. Multi-group analysis in SEM is used for testing multigroup invariance, where the invariance of the measurement structure, paths of the structural model, and latent structures across populations is evaluated (Byrne, 2001). The model's latent structures and the paths were tested for each of the four countries. The model demonstrated a good fit; however, it more suitably explained for the interrelations between values and beliefs and family views and attitudes in the Canadian and British samples better than in the Korean and Japanese samples. In other words, while the fit indices showed goodness of the model's latent structures for all four countries (CMIN/df=1.064,  $p=.203$ , CFI=.990, RMSEA=.013), not all of the paths showed statistically significant relations, especially in the Korean and the Japanese samples. Diagrams with the paths and regressions weights that showed statistical significance ( $p<.05$ ) for each of the country samples can be found in *Figures 5.7-5.10*, presented at the end of chapter.



## 5.6 Discussion

### 5.6.1 Discussion of the findings

Overall, the results are mostly in line with my propositions. It was demonstrated that there are clear cross-cultural differences in individual values of Self-Efficacy versus Self-Transcendence, level of Postmodernist values, autonomous-related self-beliefs, and democratic beliefs, with Koreans and Japanese scoring generally lower than British and Canadians in Postmodernist Values, Autonomous-Related Self-beliefs, Self-Efficacy values, and political beliefs. (Hypothesis 1.1 confirmed). British scored the highest in the endorsement of Postmodernist Values and Self-Transcendence values, and Canadians scored the highest in Autonomous-Related Self-belief. The differences in mean scores for all of these mediating variables and the sub-factors of family centredness and democratisation were significant across the selected four countries, and comparisons by cultural dimension of Individualism versus Collectivism also showed that there are differences in the scores depending on the Individualism-Collectivism orientation of the country (Hypotheses 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 confirmed). Moreover, all of these variables except for Postmodernist values had influence on different aspects of family centredness and democratisation (Hypotheses 2.1 and 2.2 partly confirmed). Regression weights, including the size of the effects and significances, for these pathways are presented in *Table 5.4 and Figure 5.6*, and the specificities of these effects are discussed in greater detail in the following sections of the discussion. The results and the analysis did not fit Hypothesis 1.6. The results showed that the culture and childhood experiences represented by father's income level influenced Postmodernist values, individual

values, and political beliefs, but the actual impact of economic conditions of the nation on these aspects is unclear from the present study (Hypothesis 3.2 partly confirmed).

#### 5.6.2 Cross-cultural differences

Cross-cultural differences in self-conceptions, individual values, Postmodernist values, and political beliefs were demonstrated clearly. Cultural environment, which is represented by the participants' nationality and encompassing the cultural background, history, and the societal ideals, had a significant influence on beliefs in democracy and the level of Postmodernist values. Belief in the importance of democratic government differed significantly by nation and by the cultural orientations of Individualism versus Collectivism. The results showed that the level of economic development in the country represented by GDP growth over the last decade had a direct relationship with the level of Postmodernist values held in the four countries. It can be suggested that the lowest mean level of Postmodernist values held in Japan is explained by the negative overall growth and fluctuations in the country's GDP since the year 2000. As is the true for the case of GDP growth and Postmodernist values, the types of experience individuals have growing up in their country are quite important in predicting these beliefs and values individuals in each country hold, for aspects such as socialisation experience, cultural traditions, and education attainment encourage them to adopt certain viewpoints.

This study demonstrated cultural influences on family centredness and democratisation in an indirect way, with multi-group analysis finding less significance for the impacts of individual-level values and beliefs in the Collectivistic cultures of South Korea and Japan. Individuals' values and beliefs had more power in predicting family centredness and democratisation in the individualistic cultures of Canada and Britain. This finding suggests the possibility that family views and attitudes are more strongly influenced by individuals' own views and values in the individualistic cultures than in the collectivistic cultures. It can be speculated that these views and attitudes toward the family in the collectivistic cultures of South Korea and Japan are more sensitive to cultural norms and traditions (e.g. Kim et al.,2002; Moghaddam & Crystal, 1997). However, this explanation for the cultural differences need to be investigated more specifically, where the design of the research allows for fitting the relative importance of cultural norms and traditions against the impact of individual values and beliefs in these cultures and comparing the effects of each.

### 5.6.3 Links between culture, social change, and family views and attitudes

Perception of the importance of the family and family commitment were predicted by self and autonomy beliefs and individual values. Thus, perceived benefit of the family and the intended level of effort and investment to the family can be thought to be guided by individuals' values and beliefs about themselves, the others, and the world around them. However, the effect of Postmodernist values on these constructs was not as significant as was originally thought. There can be two explanations for this non-significance: 1) the disparity in methods could have resulted in incompatibility,

for the Index of Materialism and Postmaterialism, which measures endorsement of these values uses ranking method whereas the rest of the questionnaire employed Likert scale, a rating method; 2) The Index of Materialism and Postmaterialism taps on individuals' broader aspects of ideal society whereas the constructs of family views and attitudes in this study entailed views specific to the family only. Family democratisation, involving the politics within the family such as decision making, hierarchy, level of autonomy, and defined roles, was influenced by democratic beliefs, autonomous beliefs, and individual values. Individuals' self and autonomy beliefs influenced how much individuals rely on their family in making decisions (dependence to family). Individuals who scored high on Autonomous-Related Self-belief believed democratic government to be important and desirable, scored higher on Self-Transcendence values and perceived democratic family system to be more important. Democratic beliefs had an inverse relationship with family dependence; those who thought democracy important depended less on the family. As predicted, individuals that valued autonomous-related selves showed higher family commitment.

#### 5.6.4 Conclusion

This study verified the cultural orientations and their impacts on values, beliefs, and family centredness and democratisation by examining country differences. As hypothesised, values and beliefs were more similar among countries that were presumed to have similar cultural orientation (Japan and South Korea as Collectivistic cultures and Britain and Canada as Individualistic cultures).

Autonomous-Related Self-belief had influence on family perceptions, which suggest that individuals that see themselves as both autonomous and related will perceive the family as important, have higher level of commitment to the family, and be more emotionally dependent on the family. This influence was also found to be consistent across culture, which demonstrates that the endorsement of this self-belief is not specific to culture. These findings are in line with Kagitcibasi (2007)'s model of family change, which suggests the convergence of cultural traditions and emphases on both autonomy and emotional relatedness. The extent of economic growth had impact on the types of values and beliefs held by the individuals, where rapid economic growth had positive relation with endorsement of Postmodernist Values, Openness to Change Values, and more democratic beliefs. Thus, the findings of this study call forth the importance of taking societal conditions and socioeconomic change into account in investigating aspects of the individual and the family.

Figure 5.7: Multi-group Analysis (British)




Figure 5.8: Multi-group Analysis (Koreans)




Figure 5.9: Multi-group Analysis (Japanese)







Figure 5.10: Multi-group Analysis (Canadians)



# **Chapter 6**

## **Conclusion, Implications, & Caveats**

### **6.1 Summary of major findings and issues arising from the findings**

This thesis explored the hypothesised interrelations between macro-level, individual-level factors and their impact on family centredness and democratisation across cultures. The three quantitative studies and their results confirmed the hypotheses outlined in Chapters 3 to 5 on the relationships between the variables. This chapter presents a summary of the major findings from the studies.

## Study I

1. Cultural/National differences were significant in the level of endorsement of Postmodernist Values and political beliefs. In general, the more stable socioeconomic conditions led to stronger democratic beliefs, higher endorsement of Postmodernist Values and less political conservatism.
2. Cultural-level Individualism was a significant predictor for democratic beliefs, where the Individualism score was positively related to beliefs in the importance of democracy.

As was hypothesised, differences in the endorsement of Postmodernist Values and political beliefs across culture were significant, which suggests the influence of the recent socioeconomic and political conditions on the citizens. Higher levels of Postmodernist values, democratic beliefs, and lower political conservatism were found in the countries with relatively stable conditions. The impact of cultural-level Individualism on democratic beliefs can be interpreted in different ways. Cultural and socioeconomic background can be one explanation, where some of the influences can be explained by the disparity in cultural background and recent political history of the countries rather than by Individualism per se. As Lipset (1994) suggested, it is possible that the recent economic growth and achievement of stable government and societal conditions in East Asia have been conducive to democratic ideals in countries like South Korea. Other cross-cultural differences could have been responsible for the finding. For example, this result could also have been due to cross-cultural differences in the response style. East Asians are more likely to

answer using midpoints on the scales as opposed to North Americans who use more extreme scales (Chen et al., 1995).

3. Political conservatism predicted the level of perceived importance of family democratisation. Lower political conservatism was related to stronger belief in the importance of family democratisation.
4. Democratic beliefs had direct and positive impact on perceived importance of family democratisation.

This thesis suggested a relationship between political beliefs and perceived importance of egalitarian family relationships. The current findings were in line with those found in previous works that found negative correlations between political conservatism and egalitarian relationship in the family (e.g. Feather, 1979; Van Hiel et al., 2004). This suggests that changes in socio-political atmosphere can cause changes in family ideals as well. Family relationships in countries experiencing turmoil can remain more hierarchical or authoritarian, whereas in countries where stable conditions are leading individuals to increasingly believe in democracy, the importance of democratic family relations are heightened.

5. Gender had direct impact on family centredness and democratisation. Women scored higher on perceived importance of family centredness and democratisation .

This finding that women perceived higher levels of importance of family relatedness

and democratisation than men reflects the gap in women and men's views toward egalitarian relations in the family and the meaning of the family. This has implications for marriage satisfaction, especially for women who have higher expectations for egalitarian relations and a strong family bond.

## Study II

6. Cultural-level Individualism impacted on democratic beliefs and Autonomous-Related Self-belief. Higher Individualism score predicted stronger democratic beliefs and lower Autonomous-Related Self-belief.

This implies that the cultural background plays an important role in shaping individuals' values and beliefs, and confirms Hypothesis 6 of Study II and Hypothesis 1 of Study III which predicted the cultural influences on these variables.

7. Schwartz' value dimensions of Openness to Change minus Conservation had an inverse impact on the perceptions of family importance, commitment, and dependence; Individuals who prioritised Openness to Change values perceived less importance of these aspects of the family.

Schwartz' value dimensions of Openness to Change versus Conservation predicted perceptions of the family significantly (regression weights high for the family centredness, ranging from  $-.35$  to  $-.88$  depending on structure of the model) , and proved to be better predictors of attitudes towards the family than Postmodernist Values.

8. Generation/Age had an impact on Openness to Change versus Conservation values, Postmodernist Values, perceived importance of family democratisation and Autonomous-Related Self-belief. Age had negative correlation with Openness to Change and Postmodernist Values, stronger support for family democratisation, and Autonomous-Related Self-belief, and younger generations demonstrated higher levels of endorsement for Openness to Change and Postmodernist Values, stronger support for family democratisation, and stronger belief in the Autonomous-Related Self.

The importance of social change in shaping generations' childhood experiences differently was demonstrated, with differences found in the generations' values and beliefs. This also means that the impact of social change, especially rapid economic development should be considered in studies of individual values and beliefs, for cultural and historical background alone cannot determine which values and beliefs the individuals are likely to endorse (Inglehart, 1997; 2000). Socioeconomic conditions in which a particular generation grows up should also be taken into account in studying values and family views and attitudes.

9. Gender differences in the Autonomous-Related Self-belief were significant. Women were more likely than men to believe in both the autonomous and relational nature of the self.
10. Autonomous-Related Self-belief predicted the levels of importance of family views and attitudes. Stronger belief in the Autonomous-Related Self predicted

high levels of perceived family importance, dependence and democratisation.

In line with Kagitcibasi (2007)'s claim that the family is not in decline in the present society, links between generation, Autonomous-Related Self-belief, and family perceptions were found. The younger generation, who held more autonomous-related self-construal than their parent's generation, also rated perceptions of family importance, commitment, dependence, and democratisation as important. This implies that even with the increasing emphasis placed on the autonomy of the individual, the younger generations of today continue to see themselves as related to their close others, and are willing to emotionally depend on and commit to their families, and maintain close family relationships. These findings present positive outlook for future families, contrary to the worries of many (e.g. Beck, 1997, Giddens,1992), who see modernity as hampering family relationships.

### Study III

11. Culture, gender and the Culture X Gender interaction were all significant in accounting for group differences in the values and beliefs

With values (Schwartz', Postmodernist) and beliefs (democratic, Autonomous-Related) as dependent variables, groups analysed by culture, gender, and culture X gender interactions demonstrated significant differences. This finding is in line with many of the cross-cultural studies including Schwartz' value studies across cultures. In particular, cross-cultural differences in these variables were

significant across all three studies included in this work. Although causal relationship can only be inferred from this finding, it highlights the importance of considering the possible impact of contextual factors in understanding how individuals' value priorities and beliefs are formulated.

12. Individual-level variables of values and beliefs had a greater impact on predicting family centredness and democratisation in the individualistic cultures than in the collectivistic cultures.

This finding calls for different interpretations. Firstly, this can result from individualistic cultures placing stronger emphasis on the individual's own views and opinions. It can also suggest that the cultural norms and traditions that influence family ideals and relationships in East Asia remain strong. Kim and his colleagues (2002), for example, noted the lasting impact of Confucian ideals on family relationship in East Asia. Future studies, that include more countries, should investigate the extent of cultural influences, and whether the strength of relationship between values, beliefs and family centredness and democratisation can be found in other cultures.

## **6.2 Implications of the present research & its findings**

With data collected in three countries (total N= 403), Study I demonstrated cross-cultural differences in endorsement of Postmodernist Values, political beliefs, and



self-in-family beliefs. The data also showed the relationship between political beliefs and family democratisation, where low level of political conservatism and strong democratic belief predicted strong beliefs in family democratisation. Collecting data from two cultures/countries and two generational groups from each culture, Study II (total N=230) demonstrated intergenerational differences in values, self-beliefs, and family centredness and democratisation, suggesting that age/generation and childhood experiences play a role in determining the types of values and beliefs about the self and the family that are endorsed by the individual. The multi-group analysis in Study III (total N= 539, data collected in 4 countries) demonstrated that individual-level values and beliefs had stronger impact on family centredness and democratisation in the Individualistic cultures than in the Collectivistic cultures. One interpretation of this is the enduring influence of cultural traditions on family views and attitudes in Collectivistic cultures.

Overall, the findings from Study II support Inglehart's theory of Postmodernisation. An age/generation effect on Postmodernist Values was found, where younger generations across culture endorsed higher level of Postmodernist Values than their older counterparts. These findings agree with Inglehart (1997)'s beliefs about the overall shift to Postmodernism, and changes in the goals and motivations of the individuals as well as societies in the present times. From these findings, it can be speculated that as long as social and economic conditions of the societies continue to be stable, concerns about individual autonomy, quality of life, freedom of expression will become increasingly important. More studies from 'transient' cultures (see Goodwin, 1998) should be conducted in order to corroborate these beliefs.

Interpreting the findings from the studies, several conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, with intergenerational value change, important aspects of the family are changing as well. Schwartz' individual value dimensions were found to be useful in predicting family views and attitudes, especially the dimension of Openness to Change versus Conservation. The findings suggest that the more the individuals adhere to Conservation values the higher they rated the importance of the family, and their perception of appropriate levels of commitment and dependence. Considering that younger generations scored lower in Conservation values in general, it seems that the younger generations perceive less importance of, lower level of commitment to and less dependence on the family.

In line with Kagitcibasi (2007)'s theory of family change, however, it can be suggested that this might only be a part of the whole picture. While mentioning the decline in the traditional form of family, where the family serves more of the instrumental needs such as monetary support or care-taking, Kagitcibasi claims that emotional and psychological ties with the family continues to be strong in the modern families. The findings in this thesis support Kagitcibasi's claims, for I found younger generations to be higher in Autonomous-Related Self-belief, which show that the young individuals are more likely than the older generations to view themselves as both autonomous and relational. Higher endorsement of Autonomous-Related self construal predicted higher perceived importance of the family, which again advocate Kagitcibasi's views.

Therefore, the overall findings of the current studies point to family change. With social change leading to changes in values and beliefs, different aspects of family

views and attitudes seem to be undergoing changes as well. Higher endorsement of Autonomous-Related Self construals in younger generations suggest that, unlike theories predicting heightened sense of autonomy, personal control and negotiated relations (e.g., Beck & Beck-Gersheim, 2002; Giddens, 1992), need for strong emotional ties with the family continues to be strong. Social change, which in this thesis has been represented by changes in economic conditions, seems to lead to stronger belief in family democratisation, which suggests that the modern families are becoming more egalitarian in the relationship dynamics, role divisions and decision making. Gender and age effects on family democratisation ideals were significant, however, which suggest that the younger generations and women are more in favour of family democratisation than the older generations and men. As societies become more democratic and individuals' political views become less conservative and more democratic, the perception of the importance of family democratisation also seem to grow. In this sense, more democratic family relationships can be expected in societies that are democratic or democratising, as was found in South Korea in this thesis.

The significance of the cultural orientation was found not in its direct influence on the family centredness and democratisation but in disparity in the impact of values and beliefs on these family views and attitudes. As mentioned earlier, individual-level values and beliefs had less predictive power on family views and attitudes in collectivistic cultures. This finding suggests that the cultural traditions in the collectivistic cultures that emphasise cohesion, harmony, and dependence are long-lasting, and less likely to change even with changes in individuals' values and beliefs.

The current work contributes to the understanding of the modern families in several ways. While there has been a lack of research on how exactly family views and attitudes are shaped, this work identified the factors that directly influence perceptions of family centredness and democratisation and tested for the significance of these effects. In line with Kagitcibasi (2007)'s model of family that discusses the impact of sociocultural factors on family outcomes, the results of the current work demonstrated that the macro-level/ contextual factors- culture, gender and socioeconomic conditions- continued to be important in shaping views about the centrality of the family in one's life and the role/gender equality in the family.

The findings of the current work suggest that the growing apprehension over family breakdown as the result of individualisation might have been premature. In contrast to previous work that emphasised the rising importance of the self as the independent and autonomous agent and the worries that this would have negative impact on the integrity of the family (e.g., Giddens, 1992), this work found evidences that the family continued to remain central to individuals' lives. For example, cultural traditions continued to have strong impact on family views, where in collectivistic cultures the family continued to be viewed as central and commitment and dependence to the family were high. Younger generations, who are often considered to be less committed to the family or to believe less in the traditional family norms, were found to construe the self to be both autonomous and related, which led to stronger belief in the importance, dependence and commitment to the family.

Investigating family democratisation across different cultural, gender and age groups, the current work found that this particular attitude toward family relationship is

changing and is likely to change further in the future. Having received better education and gaining more rights and freedom of choice for themselves, women and younger individuals increasingly perceived role and gender equality in the family to be important. Support for less conservative political parties and strong beliefs in democracy, which is a common trend found in the developed countries, also led to stronger emphasis on family democratisation. Current findings thus imply that the modern families are changing at least in this regard: families are becoming more egalitarian, with members becoming more equal in their position and decision-making power.

### 6.3 Major Contributions of the Current Work

This thesis tested theories on social and family change in an integrated empirical attempt to explain how family views and attitudes are influenced and shaped in the contemporary world. Adopting the social constructionist approach (e.g., Berger & Luckmann, 1971; Gergen, 1985), this thesis concentrated on elucidating the processes by which individuals come to perceive the family, and in particular, how they form opinions about the centrality of the family and democratisation within the family. With the intention of highlighting the impact of the 'context' and the 'social location', this work established cultural background and socioeconomic conditions as significant contextual factors that influence individuals' views toward the family as well as value priorities and beliefs. The findings of the current research gave weight to the social constructionist claim by demonstrating differences in value priorities and

beliefs about the self, politics and the family among groups of individuals with different cultural and socioeconomic backgrounds. Most importantly, this work found that cultural orientations of Individualism was found to be negatively related to individuals' Autonomous-Related Self-Beliefs, and Autonomous-Related Self-beliefs positively to family centredness, and that with these interrelations higher level of Collectivism is likely to lead to higher importance placed on connectedness both in the self-construal and in the family. These and other findings of the current work attested to the value of the contextualistic thinking often taken in cross-cultural psychology (e.g., Allan, 2001), and show that the views and attitudes held by individuals including toward the family are best understood within the socio-cultural context in which they grew up.

This work began by considering some important omissions in the literature. In particular, while there have been a number of individual theories linking, for example, sociocultural norms to family outcomes (Allan, 2001), cultural influences to self-construals (Markus and Kitayama, 1991), individual values and political ideals (Schwartz and Bardi, 1997), social change and family attitudes (Goodwin & Emelyanova, 1995), there have not been integrated empirical attempts to model these complicated relationships together across cultures. This is important because the exact relationships and overlap between these concepts have not been spelt out in previous work. In particular, despite recognition of the need to include 'multiple levels' of analyses (Kagitcibasi, 2007) when predicting family outcomes, few attempts have previously been made that integrate individual values with subgroup and cultural variables within a comprehensive model. This thesis thus makes an important contribution in investigating these interrelationships between the macro-

level factors, individual-level values and beliefs and family views and attitudes across six cultures and demonstrating how these factors influence or predict the family outcomes.

This work also added significantly to the Postmodernisation literature by applying the theory to the understanding of the family views and attitudes. Although Inglehart's (1997) Postmodernisation theory provided an elaborate understanding of the link between the socioeconomic conditions of the society and individuals' value priorities, works that extended this understanding to the family views and attitudes were rare. While direct and significant relations between Postmodernist Values and family views and attitudes were not found, this work demonstrated the importance of considering socioeconomic conditions experienced in the childhood in accounting for the values and attitudes and the interrelations between the variables of values, beliefs, and family views. This work corroborated Inglehart's (1997) claim that childhood experiences play an important role in shaping values and beliefs, demonstrating that culture, gender, economic conditions and generation, variables which are highly likely to influence childhood experiences, predicted the types of values and beliefs that the individuals held.

This work tested Kagitcibasi's (2007) new theoretical model which has suggested that families across cultures are increasingly adopting a model of family where there is a high and deepening level of emotional interdependence between members of the family. This model has not been tested widely in contexts where families from different continents- European, Asian, and North American- are directly compared against one another, or considered alongside value priorities and political beliefs

which were introduced in this thesis. This allows for an analysis of the trajectory of change in families across cultures and whether they are moving toward Kagitcibasi's model of family change or toward the traditional Western model of family with strong weight on autonomy and independence of the individual. It also allows for a unique evaluation of the relative weight of the role of each factor- self-belief, political beliefs, value priorities on family views and attitudes. The current findings offer sound grounds for her theory. Firstly, this work demonstrated that the cultural influences, including the norms and beliefs regarding the self and family relationships, continued to impact on the views and attitudes toward the family, which is in line with Kagitcibasi's (1996) claim that there are causal relations between cultural contexts and the socialisation experience where specific self and family views are encouraged. Moreover, the intricate relations between the levels of factors, the macro-level contextual factors, values and beliefs at the individual-level, and perceptions of family centredness and democratisation, show that changes in the modern families are not unidirectional or that there is a global trend toward the Western family model where the primary emphasis is placed on the autonomous nature of the individual. Rather, the current work found that families across cultures were converging toward the new model suggested by Kagitcibasi (1996, 2007), the 'emotional interdependence' model, with the emphases on both autonomy and relatedness of the self in the family, and the family continuing to be perceived as a significant and central part of life.

This work set out to subject individualisation theory to a test. The result is a mixed one, however, with the findings partially supporting and partially disagreeing with the claims made in the individualisation literature (e.g., Beck, 1997; Giddens, 1992;



Thornton & Young-DeMarco, 2001). The findings of this work contradicted the negative outcomes of individualisation on family relationships as predicted by these theorists. Traditional commitments to the family as well as emotional dependence to the family did not diminish in the younger generation, which are against the belief that the increasing emphasis on individualisation led to reduced commitment to the collective and loosening of the family ties. However, current findings demonstrate that individualisation has led to stronger democratisation ideals in the family, especially in women and the younger generation, as was anticipated by individualisation theorists (e.g., Beck, 1997; Delsing et al., 2003). This thesis thus negates the idea that individualisation brings about decline of the family in the modern world, and proposes instead a new conceptualisation of the modern family that can be characterised by continuing importance, dependence and commitment to the family and the more egalitarian views toward family relationships. How the recent social change has impacted the family and whether the outcomes of the change are positive or negative have been discussed by many including individualisation theorists. Investigating views and attitudes toward the family across different cultural, gender and generational groups, this work affirms that with various levels of factors that influence family views and attitudes in complex ways, they are resistant to change than were previously predicted, and that the family continues to have significant meaning in life across all cultures and generations.

#### 6.4 Methodological issues & suggestions for future studies

Lastly, some of the methodological issues and comments regarding the studies should be mentioned. For instance, the issue of etic-emic distinction should be considered (Brislin, 1976). All of the questionnaire items used in the studies were developed and tested in English, and although careful back-translation method was used to ensure the validity of the items in different languages, there are still important issues about cultural interpretation and word choice. As a way of improving accuracy of the cross-cultural investigation, a mixture of methods can be suggested. Although there is a general acceptance for paper-and-pencil test as a form of collecting data, especially from a large sample, its limitations, especially in cross-cultural investigations, are also often raised (e.g., King et al., 2003). As a way of improving content validity, thus, inclusion of interview study or other qualitative method of data collection can be advised, for they can provide more in-depth information on the investigated constructs (e.g., Matveev, 2002).

Problems regarding the use of student samples should also be mentioned. Many argue that university students hardly comprise representative sample of their whole countries; criticisms include the larger effect size and greater homogeneity that are often found in the student sample compared to the general population (e.g., Peterson, 2001). In particular, this could have been a problem for measuring levels of Postmodernist and Modernist values, for students tend to be significantly less Modernist (Marks, 1997). In this sense, it is difficult to claim validity for the national average scores of Postmodernist value endorsements obtained in the current studies. Although some support can be found for validity of using student samples in cross-

cultural comparisons (Flere & Lavric, 2008), ensuring generalisability of the result by employing at least two different samples can be recommended (e.g., Schwartz, 1999).

Questions can be raised regarding the research design chosen in the studies and the results drawn. The internal validity of the current cross-sectional studies can be questioned, for it is difficult to distinguish age and generation (cohort) effects using only one type of research design (Baltes, 1968). Therefore, longitudinal studies that trace the lasting impact of the culture on these variables will be helpful in explaining these relationships more emphatically, and should be used alongside current studies in order to distinguish between the effects more clearly.

As was mentioned earlier, the choice of cultural-level indicator (Hofstede's Individualism (IDV) score for countries) for measuring the level of individualism might have been problematic, considering the scores used in the study were based on outdated data. A use of more recent cultural-level indicators should be considered in future studies.

This thesis investigated perceptions of family centredness and democratisation across cultures and generations, and explained the impacts on these family perceptions using complex models. Further investigations of family change and value shifts should be carried out in order to corroborate the relationships and impacts found in this work, particularly in cultures that are undergoing rapid social change.

# References

- Acock, A.C. (2005). Working with missing values. *Journal of Marriage & Family*, 67, 1012-1028.
- Adamopoulos, J. (2002). The perception of interpersonal behaviours across cultures. In W. J. Lonner, D. L. Dinnel, S. A. Hayes, & D. N. Sattler (Eds.), *Online Readings in Psychology and Culture* (Unit 15, Chapter 2), (<http://www.wvu.edu/~culture>), Centre for Cross-Cultural Research, Western Washington University, Bellingham, Washington USA.
- Adams, B.N. (2004). Families and family study in international perspective. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 66(5), 1076-1088.
- Allan, G. (2001). Personal relationships in late modernity. *Personal Relationships*, 8, 325-339.
- Allen, M.W., Ng, S.H., Ikeda, K., Jawan, J.A., Sufi, A.H., Wilson, M., & Yang, K. (2007). Two decades of change in cultural values & economic development in eight East Asian & Pacific Island Nations. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 38 (3), 247-269.
- Armstrong, C.K. (2002). Civil society in contemporary Korea. In *Korean Society, Democracy, & the State*. (Ed. C.K. Armstrong). London: Routledge (pp. 1-10).

- Axinn, W.G., & Yabiku, S.T. (2001). Social change, the social organization of families, & fertility limitation. *American Journal of Sociology*, 106(5), 1219-1261.
- Aycicegi-Dinn, A. & Kagitcibasi, C. (2010). The value of children for parents in the minds of emerging adults. *Cross-Cultural Research*, 44(2), 174-205.
- Baltes, P.B. (1968). Longitudinal & cross-sectional sequence in the study of age & generation effect. *Human Development*, 11(3), 145-171.
- Bardi, A., Goodwin, R. (In press). The dual route to value change: Individual processes and cultural moderators. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*.
- Barnea, M.F & Schwartz, S.H. (1998). Values and voting. *Political Psychology*, 19(1), 17-40.
- Basabe, N. & Ros, M. (2005) Cultural dimensions and social Behaviour correlates: Individualism-Collectivism and Power Distance. *International Review of Social Psychology*, 18(1), 189-225.
- Beck, U. (1997). Democratization of the family. *Childhood*, 4, 151-168.
- Beck, U. & Beck-Gernsheim, E. (2002). *Individualization*. London: Sage Publications.
- Bengston, V.L. & Roberts, R.E.L. (1991). Intergenerational solidarity in aging families: An example of formal theory construction. *Journal of Marriage & the Family*,

53, 856-870.

Bentler, P.M. (2007). On tests & indices for evaluating structural models. *Personality & Individual Differences, 42*, 825-829.

Berger, P.L. & Luckmann, T. (1971). *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Bergh, J. (2007). Gender attitudes and modernization processes. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 19*(1). 5-23.

Berscheid, E. & Peplau, L. (2002). The emerging science of relationships. In H.H.Kelley, E.Berscheid, A.Christensen, J.H.Harvey, T.L.Huston, G.Levinger, E.McClintock, L.A.Peplau, & D.R.Peterson (Eds.). *Close Relationships* (pp. 1-19). New York: Percheron Press.

Bierbrauer, G., Meyer, H., & Wolfradt, U. (1994). Measurement of normative and evaluative aspects in Individualistic and Collectivistic orientations: The Cultural Orientation Scale (COS). In U. Kim, H. C. Triandis, Ç. Kağıtçıbaşı, S. C. Choi, & G. Yoon (Eds.), *Individualism and collectivism: Theory, method, and applications* (pp. 189 – 200). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Boehnke, K., Hadjar, A. & Baier, D. (2007). Parent-child value similarity: The role of Zeitgeist. *Journal of Marriage & Family, 69*, 778-792.

- Brislin, R.W. (1976). Comparative research methodology: Cross-cultural studies. *International Journal of Psychology, 11*(3), 215-229.
- Bumpass, L.L. (1990). What's happening to the family? Interactions between demographic & institutional change: Population association of America, 1990 presidential address. *Demography, 27*(4), 483-498.
- Bunting, M. (2004). *Willing Slaves: How the Overwork Culture is Ruining our Lives*. London: Harper Collins.
- Byrne, B.M. (2001). *Structural Equation Modelling with AMOS: Basic Concepts, Applications, & Programming*. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers.
- Central Intelligence Agency (2007). *The World Factbook: Japan*. Retrieved from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/print/ja.html>.
- Chafetz, J. & Hagan, J. (1996). The gender division of labour & family change in industrial societies: A theoretical accounting. *Journal of Comparative Family Studies, 27*(2), 187-219.
- Chen, C., Lee, S. & Stevenson, H.W. (1995). Response style & cross-cultural comparisons of rating scales among East Asians & North American students. *Psychological Science, 6*(3), 170-176.

- Cheung, G.W. & Rensvold, R.B. (2000). Assessing extreme & acquiescence response sets in cross-cultural research using structural equation modelling. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 31*(2), 187-212.
- Collani, G. & Grumm, N. (2009). On the dimensional structure of personality, ideological beliefs, social attitudes, & personal values. *Journal of Individual Differences, 30*(2), 107-119.
- Cousins, S.D. (1989). Culture and self-perception in Japan and the United States. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56*(1), 124-131.
- Cramer, D. (1998). *Close Relationships: The Study of Love & Friendship*. London: Arnold.
- Cross, S.E., Bacon, P.L. & Morris, M.L. (2000). The relational-interdependent self-construal and relationships. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78*(4), 791-808.
- Cumings, B. (2005). *Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.
- Dalton, R.J. & Shin, D. (2003). Democratic aspirations & democratic ideals: Citizen orientations toward democracy in East Asia. *Proceedings of the Hawaii International Conference on the Social Sciences, Honolulu, Hawaii, June, 2002*, 1-25.



- De Graaf, N.D. & P. De Graaf (1988). Family background, Postmaterialism and life style. *The Netherlands Journal of Sociology*, 24, 50-64.
- Delsing, M.J.M.H, Oud, J.H.L, De Bruyn, E.E.J., & Van Aken, M.A.G. (2003). Current & recollected perceptions of family relationships: The social relations model approach applied to members of three generations. *Journal of Family Psychology*, 17(4), 445-459.
- Duncan, S. & Smith, D. (2002). Geographies of family formations: Spatial differences & gender cultures in Britain. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series*, 27(4), 471-493.
- Econstats (2007). *GDP Growth Rate*. Retrieved from <http://www.econstats.com/>
- Elder, G. H. (1965). Role relations, sociocultural environments, & autocratic family ideology. *Sociometry*, 28(2), 173-196.
- English, T. & Chen, S. (2007). Culture and self-concept stability: Consistency across and within contexts among Asian Americans and European Americans. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 93(3), 478-490.
- Euler, H.A., Hoier, S. & Rohde, P.A. (2001). Relationship-specific closeness of intergenerational family ties: Findings from evolutionary psychology & implications for models of cultural transmission. *Journal of Cross-Cultural*

*Psychology*, 32(2), 142-158.

Feather, N.T. (1979) Value correlates of conservatism. *Journal of Personality & Social Psychology*, 37(9), 1617-1630.

Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress (2009). *Country Studies*.

Retrieved from <http://countrystudies.us>.

Feldman, O. (1997). Culture, society, & the individual: Cross-cultural political psychology in Japan. *Political Psychology*, 18(2), 327-353.

Finch, J. (1989). *Family Obligations & Social Change*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Fischer, R.F., Ferreira, M.C., Assmar, E., Redford, P., Harb, C., Glazer, S., Cheng, B., Jiang, D., Wong, C., Kumar, N., Kartner, J., Hofer, J. & Achoui, M. (2009). Individualism-Collectivism as descriptive norms: Development of a subjective norm approach to culture measurement. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 40(2), 187-213.

Flanagan, C.A. (2003). Developmental roots of political engagement. *Political Science & Politics*, 36(2), 257-261.

Flere, S. & Lavric, M. (2008). On the validity of cross-cultural social studies using student samples. *Field Methods*, 20(4), 399-412.

- Fontaine, J.R.J., Poortinga, Y.H., Delbeke, L. & Schwartz, S.H. (2008). Structural equivalence of the values domain across cultures. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 39(4), 345-365.
- Freedom House (2008). *Freedom in the Word 2008 Survey Release*. Retrieved from <http://www.freedomhouse.org>.
- Gallup. (1997). 1997 Global Study of Family Values: GPNS Special Report. Retrieved from <http://www.gallup.com/poll/9871/1997-Global-Study-Family-Values.aspx#2>
- Garson, G.D. (2009). Structural equation modelling. *Statnotes*. Retrieved May 10<sup>th</sup>, 2010, from <http://faculty.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/PA765/structur.htm>
- Garzon, A. (2000). Cultural change & familism. *Psicothema*, 12, 45-54.
- Gavazzi, S.M. & Sabatelli, R.M. (1990). Family systems dynamics, the individuation process, & psychosocial development. *Journal of Adolescent Research*, 5(4), 500-519.
- Georgas, J., Christakopoulou, S., Poortinga, Y.H., Angleitner, A., Goodwin, R., & Charalambous, N. (1997). The relationship of family bonds to family structure & function across cultures. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 28 (3), 303-320.

- Georgas, J., Mylonas, K., Bafiti, T., Poortinga, Y.H., Christakopoulou, S., Kagitcibasi, C., Kwak, K., Ataca, B., Berry, J., Orung, S., Sunar, D., Charalambous, N., Goodwin, R., Wang, W., Angleitner, A., Stepanikova, I., Pick, S., Givaudan, M., Zhuravliova-Gionis, I., Konatambigi, R., Gelfand, M.J., Marinova, V., McBride-Chang, C., & Kodic, Y. (2001). Functional relationships in the nuclear & extended family: A 16-culture study. *International Journal of Psychology*, 36(5), 289-300.
- Georgas, J. (2003). Family: Variations and changes across cultures. In W. J. Lonner, D. L. Dinnel, S. A. Hayes, & D. N. Sattler (Eds.), *Online Readings in Psychology and Culture* (Unit 13, Chapter 3), (<http://www.wvu.edu/~culture>), Center for Cross-Cultural Research, Western Washington University, Bellingham, Washington USA
- Gergen, K.J. (1985). The social constructionist movement in modern psychology. *American Psychologist*, 40(3), 266-275.
- Giddens, A. (1992). *The Transformation of Intimacy: Sexuality, Love, & Eroticism in Modern Societies*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Gittins, D. (1993). *The Family in Question: Changing Households & Family Ideologies* (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition). London: MacMillan Press.
- Goodwin, R. & Emelyanova, T. (1995). The Perestroika of the family? Gender occupational differences in family values in modern day Russia. *Sex Roles*,

32, 337-351.

Goodwin, R. (1998). Personal relationships & social change: The 'Realpolitik' of cross-cultural research in transient culture. *Journal of Social & Personal Relationships*, 15 (2), 227-247.

Goodwin, R. (1999). *Personal Relationships across Cultures*. London: Routledge.

Goodwin, R. & Gaines, S.O. (2004). Relationships beliefs & relationship quality across cultures: Country as a moderator of dysfunctional beliefs & relationship quality in three former Communist societies. *Personal Relationships*, 11, 267-279.

Granato, J., Inglehart, R. & Leblang, D. (1996). The effect of cultural values on economic development: Theory, hypotheses, and some empirical tests. *American Journal of Political Science*, 40(3), 607-631.

Hagger, M.S., Biddle, S.J., Chow, E.W., Stambulova, N., Kavussanu, M. (2003). Physical self-perceptions in adolescence: Generalizability of a hierarchical multidimensional model across three cultures. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 34(6), 611-628.

Hair, J.F., Anderson, R.E., Tatham, R.L. & Black, W.C. (1998) *Multivariate Data Analysis*, 5<sup>th</sup> ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

- Hahn, J. & Oishi, S. (2006). Psychological needs & emotional well-being in older & younger Koreans & Americans. *Personality & Individual Differences*, 40, 689-698.
- Hareven, T.K. (1991). The history of the family & the complexity of social change. *The American Historical Review*, 96(1), 95-124.
- Harvey, D.M., Curry, C.J., & Bray, J.H. (1991). Individuation & intimacy in intergenerational relationships & health: Patterns across two generations. *Journal of Family Psychology*, 5(2), 204-236.
- Haste, H. (2004). Constructing the citizen. *Political Psychology*, 25(3), 413-439.
- Held, D. (2000). Regulating globalization? The reinvention of politics. *International Sociology*, 15(2), 394-408.
- Hellevik, O. (1993). Postmaterialism as a dimension of cultural change. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, 5(3), 211-233.
- Hill, M. (2005). Children's boundaries: Within & beyond families. In L.Mckie & S. Cunningham-Burley, S. (Eds.). *Families in Society: Boundaries & Relationships* (p. 77-94). Bristol: Policy Press
- Hinde, R.A., Finkenauer, C. & Augahen, A.E. (2001). Relationships and the self-concept. *Personal Relationships*, 8, 187-204.

- Hitlin, S. (2003). Values as the core of personal identity: Drawing links between two theories of self. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 66(2), 118-137.
- Hofstede, G. (1980). *Culture's Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Hofstede, G. (2001). *Culture's Consequences*. Second Edition. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
- Hofstede, G. (2009). *Cultural Dimensions*. Retrieved from the Web. March 27, 2010. [http://www.geert-hofstede.com/hofstede\\_dimensions](http://www.geert-hofstede.com/hofstede_dimensions).
- Hu & Bentler (1999). Cutoff criteria for fit indexes in covariance structure analysis: criteria versus new alternatives, *Structural Equation Modeling*, 6(1), 1-55.
- Hui, C.H. (1988). Measurement of individualism-collectivism. *Journal of Research in Personality*, 22(1), 17-36.
- Hurtig, M. (2008). *The Truth about Canada*. London: Random House.
- Inglehart, R. (1981). Post-materialism in an environment of insecurity. *American Political Science Review*, 75(4), 880-900.
- Inglehart, R. (1982). Changing values in Japan and the West. *Comparative Political Studies*, 14(4), 445-479.

Inglehart, R. (1990). *Culture Shift: In Advanced Industrial Society*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Inglehart, R. (1997). *Modernization & Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, & Political Change in 43 Societies*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Inglehart, R. & Abramson, P. R. (1999). Measuring Postmaterialism. *American Political Science Review*, 93(3), 665-677.

Inglehart, R. (2000). Globalization & Postmodern values. *The Washington Quarterly*, 23(1), 215-228.

Inglehart, R. & Baker, W.E. (2000). Modernization, cultural change, & the persistence of traditional values. *American Sociological Review*, 65, 19-51.

Inglehart, R. (2008). Changing Values among Western publics from 1970 to 2006. *West European Politics*, 31, 130-146.

Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. (2003). Political conservatism as motivated social cognition. *Psychological Bulletin*, 129, 339-375.

Jost, J.T., Napier, J.L., Thorisdottir, H., Gosling, S.D., Palfai, T.P., & Ostafin, B. (2007). Are needs to manage uncertainty and threat associated with political



conservatism or ideological extremity? *Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin*, 33(7), 989-1007.

Kagitcibasi, C. (1996). *Family & Human Development across Cultures: A View from the Other Side*. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., Publishers.

Kagitcibasi, C. (2005). Autonomy & relatedness in cultural context: Implications for self & family. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 36(4), 403-422.

Kagitcibasi, C. (2007). *Family, Self, & Human Development across Cultures: Theory & Applications*. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., Publishers.

Kanagawa, C., Cross, S.E. & Markus, H.R. (2001). "Who am I?" The cultural psychology of the conceptual self. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 27(1), 90-103.

Kashima, Y., Yamaguchi, S., Kim, U., Choi, S., Gelfand, M.J. & Yuki, M. (1995). Culture, gender, & self: A perspective from Individualism-Collectivism research. *Journal of Personality & Social Psychology*, 69(5), 925-937.

Kashima, Y., Bain, P., Haslam, N., Peters, K., Laham, S., Whelan, J., Bastian, B., Loughnan, S., Kaufmann, L. & Fernando, J.. (2009). Folk theory of social change. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, 12, 227-246.

Keller, H., Lamm, B., Abels, M., Yovsi, R., Borke, J., Jensen, H., Papaligoura, Z.,

- Holub, C., Lo, W., Tomiyama, A.J., Su, Y., Wang, Y. & Chaudhary, N. (2006). Cultural models, socialization goals, and parenting ethnotheories: A multicultural analysis. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 37*(2), 155-172.
- Kelley, H. H. (2002). Love & commitment. In H.H.Kelley, E.Bersheid, A.Christensen, J.H.Harvey, T.L.Huston, G.Levinger, E.McClintock, L.A.Peplau & D.R.Peterson (Eds.). *Close Relationships* (pp. 265-314). Percheron Press: New York.
- Kim, U., Helgesen, G. & Ahn, B.M. (2002). Democracy, trust, & political efficacy: Comparative analysis of Danish & Korean political culture. *Applied Psychology: An International Review, 51*(2), 318-353.
- Kim, U., Park, Y., Kwon, Y., & Koo, J. (2005). Values of children, parent-child relationship, and social change in Korea: Indigenous, cultural, and psychological analysis. *Applied Psychology: An International Review, 54*(3), 338-354.
- King, G., Murray, C.J.L, Salomon, J.A., & Tandon, A. (2003). Enhancing the validity & cross-cultural comparability of measurement in survey research. *American Political Science Review, 97*(4), 567-583.
- Kossowsk, M. & Van Hiel, A. (2003). The relationship between Need for Closure & conservative beliefs in Western and Eastern Europe. *Political Psychology, 24*(3), 501- 518.

- Kwon, H., Rueter, M.A., Lee, M., Koh, S., & Ok, S. (2003). Marital relationships following the Korean economic crisis: Applying the family stress model. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 65, 316-325.
- Lalonde, C.E. (2006). Identity formation and cultural resilience in Aboriginal communities. In R.J. Flynn, P. Dudding & J. Barber (Eds.), *Promoting Resilience in Child Welfare: International Perspectives on Theory, Research, Practice & Policy*. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press.
- Larson, L.E. (1974). System and subsystem perception of family roles. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 36(1), 128-138.
- Lay, C., Fairlie, P., Jackson, S., Ricci, T., Eisenberg, J., Sato, T., Teeaar, A., & Melamud, A. (1998). Domain-specific Allocentrism-Idiocentrism: A measure of family connectedness. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 29(3), 434-460.
- Lee, K. (2010). Families matter: Psychology of the family and the family psychology. *Canadian Psychology*, 51(1), 1-8.
- Lesthaeghe, R. & Meekers, D. (1986). Value changes & the dimensions of familism in the European community. *European Journal of Population*, 2, 225-268.
- Lipset, S. M. (1994). The Social requisites of democracy revisited: 1993 presidential address. *American Sociological Review*, 59(1), 1-22.

- Lueptow, L.B. (1980). Social structure, social change and parental influence in adolescent sex-role socialization: 1964-1975. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 42(1), 93-103.
- Lyons, E. & Chryssochoous, X. (2000). Cross-cultural research methods. In Breakwell, G.M., Hammond, S., & Fife-Schaw, C (Eds.). *Research Methods in Psychology* (pp.134-146). London: Sage.
- Mac an Ghail, M. & Haywood, C. (2007). *Gender, Culture, & Society: Contemporary Femininities & Masculinities*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
- MacIntosh, R. (1998). Global attitude measurement: An assessment of the World Value Survey Postmaterialism Scale. *American Sociological Review*, 63, 452-464.
- Mannheim, K. (1940). *Man & Society in an Age of Reconstruction: Studies in Modern Social Structure*. Oxford: Harcourt.
- Mannheim, K. (1970). The problem of generations. *Psychoanalytic Review*, 57, 378-404.
- Marks, G.N. (1997). The formation of Materialist & Postmaterialist Values. *Social Sciences Research*, 26, 52-68.
- Markus, H. & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the self: Implications for cognition,

emotion, and motivation. *Psychological Review*, 98(2), 224-253.

Martin, L.G. (1990). Changing intergenerational family relations in East Asia. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political & Social Science*, 510, 102-114.

Matveev, A.V (2002). The Advantages of employing quantitative & qualitative methods in intercultural research: Practical implications from the study of the perceptions of intercultural communication competence by American & Russian managers. *Bulletin of Russian Communication Association "Theory of Communication & Applied Communication"*, 1, 59-67.

Maxwell, J. P., Sukhodolsky, D.G., Chow, C.C.F. & Wong, C.F.C. (2005). Anger rumination in Hong Kong & Great Britain: Validation of the scale & a cross-cultural comparison. *Personality & Individual Differences*, 39(6), 1147-1157.

Mckie, L., Cunningham-Burley, S. & Mckendrick, J.H. (2005). Families and relationships: Boundaries & bridges. In L. Mckie & S. Cunningham-Burley (Eds.). *Families in Society: Boundaries & Relationships* (pp. 3-18). Bristol: Policy Press.

Michaud, K.E.H., Carlisle, J.E., & Smith, E.R.A.N. (2009). The relationship between cultural values and political ideology, and the role of political knowledge. *Political Psychology*, 30(1), 27-42.

- Miller, J.G. (2002). Bringing culture to basic psychological theory- beyond Individualism & Collectivism: Comments on Oyserman et al. (2002). *Psychological Bulletin*, 128(1), 97-109.
- Moghaddam, F.M. & Crystal, D.S. (1997). Revolutions, Samurai, & reductions: The paradoxes of change & continuity in Iran & Japan. *Political Psychology*, 18(2), 355-383.
- Murry, V. M., Smith, E.P., & Hill, N.E. (2001). Race, ethnicity, & culture in studies of families in context. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 63, 911-914.
- Nationmaster (2010). GDP (per capita) by Country. *Economic Statistics*. Retrieved from <http://www.nationmaster.com/cat/economy>.
- North, R.J., Holahan, C.J., Moos, R.H., & Cronkite, R.C. (2008). Family support, family income, and happiness: A 10-year perspective. *Journal of Family Psychology*, 22(3), 475-483.
- Oishi, S., Schimmack, U., Diener, E., & Suh, E.M. (1998). The measurement of values & Individualism-Collectivism. *Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin*, 24(11), 1177-1189.
- Payne, S., Summers, P.A. & Stewart, T.R. (1973). Value differences across three generations. *Sociometry*, 36(1), 20-30.

- Peplau, L.A. (2002). Roles and gender. In H.H.Kelley, E.Bersheid, A.Christensen, J.H.Harvey, T.L.Huston, G.Levinger, E.McClintock, L.A.Peplau, & D.R.Peterson (Eds.). *Close Relationships* (pp. 220-264). New York: Percheron Press.
- Peterson, R. A. (2001). On the use of college students in social science research: Insight from second-order meta-analysis. *Journal of Consumer Research* 28 (3), 450–61.
- Pew Research Center (2010). *The Decline of Marriage and Rise of New Families*. Retrieved from <http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1802/decline-marriage-rise-new-families>.
- Prince-Gibson, E & Schwartz, S.H. (1998). Value priorities and gender. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 61(1), 49-67.
- Rindfuss, R.R., Liao, T.F., & Tsuya, N.O. (1992). Contact with parents in Japan: Effects on opinions toward gender & intergenerational roles. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 54, 812-822.
- Roberts, B.W. & Helson, R. (1997). Changes in culture, changes in personality: The influence of Individualism in a longitudinal study of women. *Journal of Personality & Social Psychology*, 72(3), 641-651.
- Roccas, S. & Schwartz, S.H. (2010). Personal value priorities & national

- identification. *Political Psychology*, 31(3), 393-419.
- Roseneil, S. & Budgeon, S. (2004). Cultures of intimacy and care beyond 'the family': Personal life and social change in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century. *Current Sociology*, 52(2), 135-159.
- Ross, M.H. (1997). The relevance of culture for the study of political psychology & ethnic conflict. *Political Psychology*, 18(2), 299-326.
- Rothbaum, F., Weisz, J., Pott, M., Miyake, K. & Morelli, G. (2000). Attachment and culture: Security in the United States and Japan. *American Psychologist*, 55(10), 1093-1104.
- Rusbult, C.E., Martz, J.M., & Agnew, C.R. (1998). The Investment Model Scale: Measuring commitment level, satisfaction level, quality of alternatives, and investment size. *Personal Relationships*, 5, 357-391.
- Saxonberg, S. (2001). *The Fall: A Comparative Study of the End of Communism in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary & Poland*. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers.
- Scabini, E. & Marta, E. (2006). Changing intergenerational relationship. *European Review*, 14(1), 81-98.
- Schwartz, S. H. *A proposal for measuring value orientations across nations in ESS*



- Schwartz, S.H. (1992). Universals in the content and structure of values: Theory and empirical tests in 20 countries, *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, 25, 1-65.
- Schwartz, S.H. (1994). Are there universal aspects in the structure and contents of human values? *Journal of Social Issues*, 50, 19-46.
- Schwartz, S. H. (1994). Are there universal aspects in the content and structure of values? *Journal of Social Issues*, 50, 19-45.
- Schwartz, S.H. & Bardi, A. (1997). Influences of adaptation to Communist rule on value priorities in Eastern Europe. *Political Psychology*, 18(2), 385- 410.
- Schwartz, S. H. (1999). A theory of cultural values and some implications for work. *Applied Psychology: An International Review* 48 (1), 23–47.
- Schwartz, S. & Bardi, A. (2001) Value hierarchies across cultures: Taking a similarities perspective. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 32 (3), 268-290.
- Schwartz, S.H. (2004). Mapping and interpreting cultural differences around the world. In H.Vinken, J. Soeters, & P. Ester (Eds.), *Comparing Cultures* (pp.43-73). Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers.
- Schwartz, S. H. & Sagiv, L. (2005). Identifying culture-specifics in the content and

- structure of values. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 26(1), 92-116.
- Schwartz, S. H. (2006). A theory of cultural value orientations: Explication and application. *Comparative Sociology*, 5, 136-182.
- Sidanius, J. and Pena, Y. (2003). The gendered nature of family structure and group-based anti-egalitarianism: A cross-national analysis. *Journal of Social Psychology*, 143(2), 243-251.
- Sidanius, J. and Pratto, F. (2001). *Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy & Oppression*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Siemienska, R. (2002). Intergenerational differences in political values and attitudes in stable and new democracies. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, 43(3), 368-390.
- Singelis, T.M. (1994). The measurement of Independent & Interdependent Self-Construals. *Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin*, 20(5), 580-591.
- Smith, S. (1995). Family theory & multicultural family studies. In Ingoldsby, B.B., & Smith, S. (Eds.), *Families in Multicultural Perspective*. New York: The Guilford Press.
- Spence, J. T., & Helmreich, R. L. (1978). *Masculinity and Femininity: Their Psychological Dimensions, Correlates and Antecedents*. Austin: University

of Texas Press.

Spini, D. (2003). Measurement equivalence of 10 value types from the Schwartz Value Survey across 21 countries. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 34(1)*, 3-23.

Study Commission on the Family (1983). *Families in the Future*. London: Witley Press.

Tafarodi, R., Lo, C., Yamaguchi, S., Lee, W.W. & Katsura, H. (2004). The inner self in three countries. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 35(1)*, 97-117.

Thornton, A. & Fricke, T.E. (1987). Social change and the family: Comparative perspectives from the West, China, & South Asia. *Sociological Forum, 2(4)*, 746-779.

Thornton, A. & Young-DeMarco, L. (2001). Four decades of trends in attitudes toward family issues in the United States: The 1960s through the 1990s. *Journal of Marriage and the Family, 63*, 1009-1037.

Trent, K. & South, S.J. (1992). Sociodemographic status, parental background, childhood family structure, and attitudes toward family formation. *Journal of Marriage and the Family, 54*, 427-439.

Triandis, H.C. (1980). Introduction to handbook of cross-cultural psychology. In H. C.

Triandis & W.W. Lambert (Eds.), *Handbook of Cross-Cultural Psychology Vol. 1* (pp.1-14). Boston: Allyn & Bacon.

Triandis, H.C. (1989). The self and social behaviour in different cultural contexts. *Psychological Review*, 96(3), 506-520.

Triandis, H.C., Bontempo, R., Villareal, M.J., Asai, M. & Lucca, N. (1988). Individualism and collectivism: Cross-cultural perspectives on self-ingroup relationships. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 54(2), 328-338.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2010). *Human Development Reports*. Retrieved from <http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/>

US Department of State (2009). *Background Notes*. Retrieved from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/index.htm>

Van de Vijver, F. & Hambleton, R.K. (1996). Translating tests: Some practical guidelines. *European Psychologist*, 1(2), 89-99.

Vanhanen, T. (2000). A new dataset for measuring democracy, 1810-1998. *Journal of Peace Research*, 37(2), 251-265.

Van Hiel, A., Pandelaere, M., & Duriez, B. (2004) The impact of Need for Closure on conservative beliefs & racism: Differential mediation by authoritarian submission & authoritarian dominance. *Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin*, 30(7), 824-837.

- Vollebergh, W. A. M. , Iedema, J., & Raaijmakers, Q. A. W. (2001). Intergenerational transmission and the formation of cultural orientations in adolescence & young adulthood. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 63, 1185-1198.
- Webster, D. M., & Kruglanski, A. W. (1994). Individual differences in need for cognitive closure. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 67, 1049–1062.
- White, L. & Rogers, S.J. (2000). Economic circumstances and family outcomes: A review of the 1990s. *Journal of Marriage & the Family*, 62, 1035-1051.
- Wieselquist, J., Rusbult, C.E., Foster, C.A., & Agnew, C.R. (1999). Commitment, pro-relationship behaviour, and trust in close relationships. *Journal of Personality & Social Psychology*, 77(5), 942-966.
- World Values Survey (2007). *The Value Surveys 1981-2004*. Retrieved from <http://www.jdsurvey.net/bdasepids>.
- World Values Survey (2009). *World Values Survey*. Retrieved <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org>.
- Yabiku, S.T., Axinn, W.G., & Thornton, A. (1999). Family integration and children's self-esteem. *American Journal of Sociology*, 104(5), 1494-152

# Appendix 1 a)

## Questionnaire for Study I (English Version)

### Questionnaire

This questionnaire is constructed for the purpose of investigating family relationships and perceptions across cultures. The results of this study will be included in a PhD thesis in cross-cultural psychology for Miriam Sang-Ah Park, a PhD Candidate at Brunel University, UK. Your effort and time for taking part in this will be greatly appreciated, and in some cases, will result in the form of a course credit as a reward for participation. For further information regarding the questionnaire or the study, please contact the researcher whose contact details are provided below.

Miriam Sang-Ah Park: [Miriam.Park@brunel.ac.uk](mailto:Miriam.Park@brunel.ac.uk)

**Please answer the following questions about yourself in the format indicated.**

- 1 What is your age? (write in numbers)
- 2 What is your gender? (MALE/ FEMALE)
- 3 What is your nationality? (Specify your citizenship(s))

**For each of the descriptions below, please indicate how much you agree with the statement by placing an O or V mark on the appropriate box on the right.**

**(1= I disagree very strongly, 2= I disagree strongly, 3= I disagree somewhat, 4= I agree somewhat, 5= I agree strongly, 6= I agree very strongly)**

	Strongly			Very Strongly		
	1	2	3	4	5	6
2.1 I think that having clear rules and order at work is essential for success.						
2.2 Even after I've made up my mind about something, I am always eager to consider a different opinion.						
2.3 I don't like situations that are uncertain.						
2.4 I dislike questions which could be answered in many different ways.						
2.5 I find that a well ordered life with regular hours suits my temperament.						
2.6 I enjoy the uncertainty of going into a new situation without knowing what might happen.						
2.7 When dining out, I like to go to places where I have been before so that I know what to expect.						
2.8 I feel uncomfortable when I don't understand the reason why an event occurred in my life.						
2.9 I feel irritated when one person disagrees with what everyone else in a group believes.						
2.10 I would describe myself as indecisive.						
2.11 When I go shopping, I have difficulty deciding exactly what it is I want.						
2.12 I usually make important decisions quickly and confidently.						

	Disagree		Agree	
	Very Strongly		Very Strongly	
2.13 I think it is fun to change my plans at the last moment.				
2.14 My personal space is usually messy and disorganized.				
2.15 I tend to struggle with most decisions.				
2.16 I believe orderliness and organization are among the most important characteristics of a good student.				
2.17 When considering most conflict situations, I can usually see how both sides could be right.				
2.18 I prefer to socialize with familiar friends because I know what to expect from them.				
2.19 When thinking about a problem, I consider as many different opinions on the issue as possible.				
2.20 I like to know what people are thinking all the time.				
2.21 I dislike it when a person's statement could mean many different things.				
2.22 It's annoying to listen to someone who cannot seem to make up his or her mind.				
2.23 I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life.				
2.24 I like to have a plan for everything and a place for everything.				
2.25 I feel uncomfortable when someone's meaning or intention is unclear to me.				
2.26 When trying to solve a problem I often see so many possible options that it's confusing.				
2.27 I always see many possible solutions to problems I face.				
2.28 I do not usually consult many different options before forming my own view.				
2.29 I <u>dislike</u> the routine aspects of my work (studies).				
4.1 I feel independent of my family.				
4.2 I usually try to agree with the wishes of my family.				
4.21 A person can feel both independent and emotionally connected to his/her family.				
4.22 A person may be attached to his/her family, and at the same time, expect respect for any differences of opinion.				
9.1 Under modern economic conditions with women being active outside the home, men should share in household tasks such as washing dishes and doing laundry.				
9.2 Women should worry less about their rights and more about becoming good wives and mothers.				
9.3 Women should assume their rightful place in business and all the professions along with men.				
9.4 In general, the father should have greater authority than the mother in the bringing up of the children.				





Please tick the box that indicates your opinion.

<b>12.1 How important is politics in your life?</b>										
Very Important		Quite Important		Important		A Little Important		Not Very Important		Not Important
<b>12.2 How interested would you say you are in politics?</b>										
Very Interested		Quite Interested		Interested		A Little Interested		Not Very Interested		Not Interested
<b>12.3 As a way of governing (a) country, how good is having a democratic political system?</b>										
Very Good		Quite Good		Good		Not Bad		Not Very Good		Bad
<b>12.4 How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically?</b>										
Very Important		Quite Important		Important		A Little Important		Not Very Important		Not Important
<b>12.5 Do you believe in democracy?</b>										
YES								NO		
<b>12.6 Did you vote in your country's recent elections to the national parliament?</b>										
YES				NO				Couldn't Vote (Underage)		
<b>12.7 Which Party did you vote for in the last national election?</b>										
Labour Party				Conservative Party				Liberal Democrats		
Green Party				Democratic Unionist Party				Other		
<b>12.8 Which party would you vote for if there would be an election on next Sunday?</b>										
Labour Party				Conservative Party				Liberal Democrats		
Green Party				Democratic Unionist Party				Other		
<b>12.9 How would you place your beliefs in the next political dimensions? (1= Not at all; 10= My belief is very strongly of this kind)</b>										
a) Conservative										
b) Liberal										
c) Socialist/ Left Wing										

# Appendix 1 b)

## Extended Questionnaire for Study II & III (English Version)

### Questionnaire

This questionnaire is constructed for the purpose of investigating family relationships and perceptions across cultures. The results of this study will be included in a PhD thesis in cross-cultural psychology for Miriam Sang-Ah Park, a PhD Candidate at Brunel University, UK. Your effort and time for taking part in this will be greatly appreciated, and in some cases, will result in the form of a course credit as a reward for participation. For further information regarding the questionnaire or the study, please contact the researcher whose contact details are provided below.

Miriam Sang-Ah Park: [Miriam.Park@brunel.ac.uk](mailto:Miriam.Park@brunel.ac.uk) 44- (0)7807-152-850

#### 1 Please answer the following questions about yourself in the format indicated.

- 4 What is your age? (write in numbers)
- 5 What is your gender? (MALE/ FEMALE)
- 6 What is your nationality? (Specify your citizenship(s))
- 7 A) Were you born in the country of current residence/residency? (YES/ NO)  
B) If not, how many years have you lived in this country? \_\_\_\_\_ Years
- 8 If you were not born in the country of current residence, what is your place of origin?  
\_\_\_\_\_ (country name)
- 9 If your parents are not originally from the country of current residence, please specify their countries/cultures of origin.
- 10 How many people live in your household?
- 11 A) What is the occupation of your father?  
B) Does he work full-time or part-time? (FULL TIME/ PART TIME)
- 12 A) What is the occupation of your mother?  
B) Does she work full-time or part-time? (FULL TIME/ PART TIME)

**2 Here we briefly describe some people. Please read each description and think about how much each person is or is not like you. Tick the box to the right that shows how much the person in the description is like you.**

**(1= Not like me at all, 2= Not like me, 3= A little bit like me,**

**4= Somewhat like me, 5= Like me, 6= Very much like me)**

	1	2	3	4	5	6
2.1 Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to him/her. He/She likes to do things in his/her own original way.						
2.2 It is important to him/her to be rich. He/She wants to have a lot of money and expensive things.						
2.3 He/She thinks it is important that every person in the world should be treated equally. He/She believes everyone should have equal opportunity in life.						
2.4 It is important to him/her to show his/her abilities. He/She wants people to admire what he/she does.						
2.5 It is important to him/her to live in secure surroundings. He/She avoids anything that might endanger his/her safety.						
2.6 He/She likes surprises and is always looking for new things to do. He/She thinks it is important to do lots of different things in life.						
2.7 He/She believes that people should do what they are told. He/She thinks people should follow rules at all times, even when no-one is watching.						
2.8 It is important to him/her to listen to people who are different from him/her. Even when he/she disagrees with them, he/she still wants to understand them.						
2.9 It is important to him/her to be humble and modest. He/She tries not to draw attention to himself/herself.						
2.10 Having a good time is important to him/her. He/She likes to "spoil" himself/herself.						
2.11 It is important to him/her to make his/her own decisions about what he/she does. He/She likes to be free and not depend on others.						
2.12 It's very important to him/her to help the people around him/her. He/She wants to care for their well-being.						
2.13 Being very successful is important to him/her. He/She hopes people will recognize his/her achievements.						
2.14 It is important to him/her that the government ensures his/her safety against all threats. He/She wants the state to be strong so it can defend its citizens.						
2.15 He/She looks for adventures and likes to take risks. He/She wants to have an exciting life.						
2.16 It is important to him/her always to behave properly. He/She wants to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong.						
2.17 It is important to him/her to get respect from others. He/She wants people to do what he/she says.						
2.18 It is important to him/her to be loyal to his/her friends. He/She wants people to devote himself/herself to people close to him/her.						
2.19 He/She strongly believes that people should care for nature. Looking after the environment is important to him/her.						
2.20 Tradition is important to him/her. He/She tries to follow the customs handed down by his/her religion or his/her family.						
2.21 He/She seeks every chance he can to have fun. It is very important to him/her to do things that give him/her pleasure.						

**3 Please answer the following questions on a 6-point scale, by ticking in the box that reflects your opinion.**

**(1= I disagree very strongly, 2= I disagree strongly, 3= I disagree somewhat, 4= I agree somewhat, 5= I agree strongly, 6= I agree very strongly)**

	Disagree			Agree		
	Very Strongly			Very Strongly		
	1	2	3	4	5	6
3.1 People who are close to me have little influence on my decisions.						
3.2 I do not like a person to interfere with my life even if he/she is very close to me.						
3.3 I feel independent of the people who are close to me.						
3.4 I lead my life according to the opinions of people to whom I feel close to.						
3.5 The opinions of those who are close to me influence on my personal issues.						
3.6 While making decision, I consult with those who are close to me.						
3.7 On personal issues, I accept the decisions of people to whom I feel close to.						
3.8 I usually try to conform to the wishes of those to whom I feel very close to.						
3.9 I can easily change my decisions according to the wishes of those who are close to me.						
3.10 I need the support of persons to whom I feel very close to.						
3.11 I prefer to keep a certain distance in my close relationships.						
3.12 Generally, I keep personal issues to myself.						
3.13 The people who are close to me strongly influence my personality.						
3.14 I think often of those to whom I feel very close to.						
3.15 I do not worry about what people think of me, even if they are close to me.						
3.16 Those who are close to me are my top priority.						
3.17 My relationships to those who are close to me make me feel peaceful and secure.						
3.18 I do not share personal matters with anyone, even if very close to me.						
3.19 It is important to have both close relationships and also to be autonomous.						
3.20 Even if the suggestions of those who are close are considered, the last decision should be one's own.						
3.21 A person who has very close relationship cannot make his/her own decision.						
3.22 A person should be able to oppose the ideas of those who are close.						
3.23 Giving importance to the opinions of those who are close to me means ignoring my own opinions.						
3.24 Being very close to someone prevents being independent.						
3.25 A person can feel both independent and connected to those who are close to him/her.						
3.26 In order to be autonomous, one should not form close relationships.						
3.27 A person may be attached to those who are close, and at the same time, expect respect for any differences of opinion.						

**4-5 Please answer the following questions on a 6-point scale, by ticking in the box that reflects your opinion.**

**(1= I disagree very strongly, 2= I disagree strongly, 3= I disagree somewhat,**

**4= I agree somewhat, 5= I agree strongly, 6= I agree very strongly)**

	Disagree			Agree		
	Very Strongly	Strongly	Somewhat	Somewhat	Strongly	Very Strongly
	1	2	3	4	5	6
4.1 I feel independent of my family.						
4.2 I usually try to agree with the wishes of my family.						
4.3 I do not have to think the way my family does.						
4.4 People should receive approval from their families for their future plans.						
4.5 I avoid making decisions with which my family would not agree.						
4.6 On personal issues, I accept the decisions of my family.						
4.7 I would not be close to someone whom my family does not agree.						
4.8 Independent of my family, I cannot make my decisions easily.						
4.9 I can easily change my decisions according to the wishes of my family.						
4.10 I prefer to keep a certain distance in my relationship with my family.						
4.11 During hard times, I would like to know that my family will be with me.						
4.12 The time that I spend with my family is not important t for me.						
4.13 Feeling very close to the family is a good thing.						
4.14 My family is my top priority.						
4.15 I feel myself closely attached to my family.						
4.16 My relationship with my family makes me feel peaceful and secure.						
4.17 I am very close with my family.						
4.18 I don't enjoy spending much time with my family.						
4.19 One should not hesitate to express his/her own ideas, even if he/she values his/her family.						
4.20 A person may be very close to his/her family and at the same time can make his/her decisions.						
4.21 A person can feel both independent and emotionally connected to his/her family.						
4.22 A person may be attached to his/her family, and at the same time, expect respect for any differences of opinion.						
5.1 I am very similar to my parents.						
5.2 I follow my feelings even if it makes my parents unhappy.						
5.3 My ability to relate to my family is a sign of my competence as a mature person.						
5.4 Once you get married your parents should no longer be involved in major life choices.						
5.5 The opinions of my family are important to me.						
5.6 Knowing that I need to rely on my family makes me happy.						
5.7 I will be responsible for taking care of my aging parents.						

5.8 Even when away from home, I should consider my parents' values.						
5.9 My happiness depends on the happiness of my family.						
5.10 I have certain duties and obligations in my family.						
5.11 There are a lot of differences between me and other members of the family.						
5.12 I think it is important to get along with my family at all costs.						
5.13 My needs are not the same as my family's.						
5.14 After I leave my parents' house, I am not accountable to them.						
5.15 I respect my parents' wishes even if they are not my own.						
5.16 It is important to feel independent of one's family.						

**6 Please answer the following by ticking in one of the six boxes. Read each question and think about how often it is the case in your country.**

**(1= Never, 2= Seldom, 3= Not very often, 4= Often, 5= Quite often, 6= Almost Always)**

	Never			Almost Always		
	1	2	3	4	5	6
6.1 How often do people in your native country share their ideas and newly acquired knowledge with their parents?						
6.2 How often do people in your native country listen to the advice of their parents or close relatives when choosing a career?						
6.3 How often do children in your native country live at home with their parents until they get married?						
6.4 How often do people in your native country consult their family before making an important decision?						
6.5 How often do people in your native country discuss job or study related problems with their parents?						
6.6 Do people in your native country often feel lonely when not with their brothers, sisters, or close relatives?						
6.7 Would someone in your native country feel insulted, if his or her brother had been insulted?						

**7-10 Please answer the following questions on a 6-point scale, by ticking in the box that reflects your opinion about families, and your family relationship.**  
**(1= I disagree very strongly, 2= I disagree strongly, 3= I disagree somewhat,**  
**4= I agree somewhat, 5= I agree strongly, 6= I agree very strongly)**

	Disagree			Agree		
	Very Strongly	Strongly	Somewhat	Very Strongly	Strongly	Somewhat
	1	2	3	4	5	6
7.1 Teenagers should listen to their parents' advice on dating.						
7.2 I would not share my ideas and newly acquired knowledge with my parents.						
7.3 Success and failure in my academic work and career are closely tied to the nurture provided by my parents.						
7.4 Young people should take into consideration their parents' advice when making education/career plans.						
7.5 The bigger a family, the more family problems there are.						
8.1 I am committed to maintaining my relationship with my family.						
8.2 I feel very attached to my family.						
8.3 I feel satisfied with my family.						
8.4 My family relationship is close to ideal.						
8.5 My family relationship makes me very happy.						
8.6 My family relationship does a good job of fulfilling my intimacy needs (sharing personal thoughts, secrets, etc).						
8.7 My family relationship does a good job of fulfilling my needs for companionship (doing things together, enjoying each other's company, etc).						
8.8 I have invested a great deal of time in my family relationship.						
9.1 Under modern economic conditions with women being active outside the home, men should share in household tasks such as washing dishes and doing laundry.						
9.2 Women should worry less about their rights and more about becoming good wives and mothers.						
9.3 Women should assume their rightful place in business and all the professions along with men.						
9.4 In general, the father should have greater authority than the mother in the bringing up of the children.						
10.1 I tend to vote for conservative political candidates.						
10.2 I believe in one true religion.						
10.3 I believe laws should be strictly enforced.						
10.4 I believe that we should be tough for crime.						
10.5 I like to stand during the national anthem.						
10.6 I tend to vote for liberal political candidates.						
10.7 I don't consider myself religious.						
10.8 I believe that criminals should receive help rather than punishment.						
10.9 I believe in the importance of art.						
10.10 I believe that there is no absolute right and wrong.						

**11 There is a lot of talk these days about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. Below are four goals which different people would give top priority. For each of these lists which do you, yourself, consider most important.**

List A

1. Maintaining a high rate of economic growth
2. Making sure that this country has strong defence forces
3. Seeing that the people have more say in how things get decided at work and in their communities
4. Trying to make our cities and country side more beautiful.

Which of the above (1, 2, 3, or 4) is the most desirable?

Which would be the next most important?

List B

5. Maintaining order in the nation
6. Giving the people more say in important government decisions
7. Fighting rising prices
8. Protecting freedom of speech

Which of the above (5, 6, 7, or 8) is the most desirable?

Which would be the next most important?

List C

9. Maintaining a stable economy
10. Progress towards a less impersonal, more humane society
11. The fight against crime
12. Progress toward a society where ideas are more important than money

Which of the above (9, 10, 11, or 12) is the most desirable?

Which would be the next most important?

**Now please check through all 12 priorities.**

**Which is most desirable overall?**

**Which is the next most desirable?**

**Which is the least important from your point of view?**



**12 Please tick the box that indicates your opinion.**

<b>12.1 How important is politics in your life?</b>										
Very Important		Quite Important		Important		A Little Important		Not Very Important		Not Important
<b>12.2 How interested would you say you are in politics?</b>										
Very Interested		Quite Interested		Interested		A Little Interested		Not Very Interested		Not Interested
<b>12.3 As a way of governing (a) country, how good is having a democratic political system?</b>										
Very Good		Quite Good		Good		Not Bad		Not Very Good		Bad
<b>12.4 How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically?</b>										
Very Important		Quite Important		Important		A Little Important		Not Very Important		Not Important
<b>12.5 Do you believe in democracy?</b>										
YES					NO					
<b>12.6 Did you vote in your country's recent elections to the national parliament?</b>										
YES					NO					