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http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/30007
Title: | Competition for publication-based rewards |
Authors: | Felgenhauer, M |
Keywords: | experimentation;persuasion;manipulation;information acquisition |
Issue Date: | 5-Oct-2024 |
Publisher: | Elsevier |
Citation: | Felgenhauer, M. (2024) 'Competition for publication-based rewards', Economics Letters, 244, 112017, pp. 1 - 4. doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.112017. |
Abstract: | This paper studies how more competition among researchers for publication-based rewards affects the quality of the publication process. Publishable results can be generated via costly informative sequential private experimentation or costly uninformative manipulation. By reducing expected rewards, competition may discourage manipulation in favor of experimentation, but not vice versa. It also reduces excessive experimentation. Both effects improve the quality of the publication process. |
Description: | JEL classification: D82; D83. Data availability: No data was used for the research described in the article. |
URI: | https://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/30007 |
DOI: | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2024.112017 |
ISSN: | 0165-1765 |
Other Identifiers: | ORCiD: Mike Felgenhauer https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9882-403X 112017 |
Appears in Collections: | Dept of Economics and Finance Research Papers |
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FullText.pdf | Copyright © 2024 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license ( https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ). | 565.52 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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