The practice and theory of British counter-insurgency: The histories of the atrocities at the Palestinian villages of al-Bassa and Halhul, 1938-39

Abstract

This article details two largely unreported atrocities by British forces operating against Arab rebels during the Arab revolt, 1936-39, at the Palestinian villages of al-Bassa and Halhul. It then examines the military-legal system that underpinned and authorized British military forces operating in aid of the civil power, suggesting that the law in place at the time allowed for a level of reprisals and punitive actions, such as happened at al-Bassa and Halhul. The article does not conclude that the law allowed for atrocities but it does argue that it gave a basic form and understanding to an operational method that was brutal and could lead to atrocities. It thus tests the idea in much of the literature on counter-insurgency that the British were restrained and used minimum force when compared to other colonial and neo-colonial powers fighting insurgents.