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COMMENTARY

Germany’s Ocean Greyhounds and the Royal Navy’s First Battle Cruisers: An Historiographical Problem

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ABSTRACT

Recently some revisionist historians have contested the evidential basis for the argument put forward by their post-revisionist colleagues that the growth of the German mercantile marine, most particularly ships capable of being transformed into armed commerce raiders, was viewed with alarm in the British Admiralty and played a significant part in shaping British naval policy before 1914. Looking in detail at their reasoning, this assessment demonstrates that the rejection of this argument is based upon a faulty and incomplete understanding of the documentary record. Moreover, it is driven by a desire to defend the thesis that they have previously articulated that the expansion of German maritime power played a limited role in British defence policy before 1914. However, their objections do not withstand detailed scrutiny. Whatever might have been the British view of the long-term threat posed by Russia and France, Germany’s growing strength, including in merchant shipping, loomed large as a security problem in the decade and a half before 1914. The wartime activities of German commerce raiders, notably the Kronprinz Wilhelm, suggest that fears of a German commerce war were entirely rational.

On 30 March 1901 at the Vulcan Shipyard in Stettin, an elaborate ceremony took place to mark the launch of the new high-speed luxury Atlantic liner, Kronprinz Wilhelm. In the presence of representatives of the Norddeutsche Lloyd [NDL] shipping company, the firm that ordered the vessel and which would operate it, Crown Prince Wilhelm, the heir apparent to the German throne and the personage after whom the new liner was named, listened to a christening poem read out by Martha Achelis. He then severed the cables that held the vessel on the slip and so allowed the new leviathan to enter the water for the first time. Following the successful launch, the emperor, Wilhelm II, received a telegram informing him of the latest addition to his merchant navy and, with equal despatch, he acknowledged this message and forwarded his proud hopes for the great vessel named after his beloved son.
The pomp and carefully choreographed spectacle surrounding the launch of the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* was no accident, but a piece of theatre designed to underscore an important message. Displacing nearly 15,000 tons and measuring over 664 feet in length, the new liner was a magnificent example of German engineering prowess. It was also a very visible symbol of the new Empire’s growing success as a global commercial Power. Although only three decades old, the German Reich was now one of the world’s industrial powerhouses with a merchant marine to match. Behind only Britain in numbers and tonnage, the German merchant navy boasted two of the world’s great shipping companies, the NDL and its great domestic competitor, the Hamburg-Amerika line [HAPAG]. That was not its only mark of distinction. If, by some margin, the British merchant navy had the advantage in terms of numbers and tonnage, its German rival had recently overtaken it in one of the great prestige indictors, namely speed.

Since the mid-1850s, the Blue Riband, the accolade accorded to the merchant vessel that recorded the highest average speed for a trans-Atlantic crossing, had always been held by a British registered ship, frequently one owned by the Cunard Steamship Company. This situation changed in 1897. That year saw the coming into service of the NDL’s first express steamer—and for a few years the world’s largest ship—the SS *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*. That November this floating advertisement for German maritime prowess completed the journey from Sandy Hook, New Jersey to the Needles, off the Isle of Wight, at an average speed of 22.3 knots. In 1898, it broke the westbound record as well. Not to be outdone, HAPAG ordered a fast liner of its own. The *Deutschland* came into service in 1900 and promptly usurped *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*’s crown, claiming the eastbound and westbound records in July that year. The *Kronprinz Wilhelm* was NDL’s first reply. In September 1902, it re-claimed the Blue Riband for the eastbound voyage and, although never re-claiming the westbound title, NDL re-acquired this award when its next new liner, *Kaiser Wilhelm II*, made the journey in June 1904 at an average speed of 23.58 knots.

The impact of these German triumphs was not to be under-estimated. The North Atlantic shipping industry was highly competitive, one in which Britain had long dominated; and holding the Blue Riband was an important indicator of commercial success. The fact that only German vessels had held it since 1897–1898 and only German companies were building vessels that were likely to claim it in the future was a powerful statement that whatever the German merchant marine may have lacked in terms of overall tonnage, it intended to make up for in respect of speed and luxury. These four ocean greyhounds—*Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*, *Deutschland*, *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, and *Kaiser Wilhelm II*—thus, amounted to floating metaphors of the German challenge to British pre-eminence on the North Atlantic.

Unsurprisingly, given what these vessels symbolised about the nation’s vigour, the launch of the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* was widely reported in...
Germany. Germans were proud to read about the latest addition to their burgeoning merchant navy. Equally, but more relevant as a source of anxiety, the news also attained considerable coverage across the British Empire. Major metropolitan newspapers noted the arrival of the new German leviathan, but so, too, did the print media of countries as far from Germany as Australia. *The Sydney Morning Herald* was but one of many Australian dailies to comment on the latest German vessel, discussing its launch in an article on 11 May, but pre-dating it with a discussion of the implications of the spate of fast German transatlantic liners in a feature from 7 March. The inescapable conclusion, that Britain would need to do something or fall behind, underlay the piece.

If there was a widespread public recognition of the growing German domination when it came to the fastest transatlantic vessels and an awareness of what this signified in commercial terms, less comment, at least in public, occurred about another aspect of this transformation, namely, what it might mean in military terms. Yet, the growing number of German express steamers did have important naval implications. Each one of these German vessels was designed and built to mount guns if needed. Of course, theoretically any ship could be equipped with weapons. However, because of the stresses produced in firing heavy ordnance, it was unwise to bolt large calibre artillery onto the decks of ships not designed to take them. Hence, converting merchant ships to carry guns often required special structural strengthening directly under the point on the deck where the intended guns should be placed. Depending on the size of gun, it could necessitate major alterations requiring a lengthy period in dock. The *Kronprinz Wilhelm* or any of the fastest German liners did not need such costly and time-consuming measures. The necessary structural features were already in place. All that was required was to have the guns in a fixed position.

The reason that these vessels were pre-fitted with this capability was that in the event of war, these fast liners could convert into auxiliary cruisers. By mounting guns in the pre-prepared positions, activating sealed orders that would give the ship official status as a man-of-war, and placing those members of the crew who held reserve commissions in the German navy in command positions, everything necessary for undertaking such a transformation could occur quickly and easily. With their great speed and high freeboards, which endowed them with the ability to cut through rough seaways in the stormy North Atlantic, the assumption was they would make powerful commerce raiders in wartime.

Such certainly proved to be the case with regard to the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*. When the First World War began in August 1914, the ship was in New York harbour. Putting to sea on the evening of 3 August, the liner rendezvoused with the light cruiser *Karlsruhe* on the morning of 6 August. The meeting allowed the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* to take on board two 8.8 cm guns as well as a
quantity of small arms, ammunition, and additional naval personnel and, thereby, fit out as an auxiliary cruiser. The liner’s design for a quick conversion turned out to be of considerable importance. Just over three hours later, the two German vessels spotted a British warship, the cruiser Suffolk, on the horizon. By that time, however, the Kronprinz Wilhelm had already become the newest addition to the Imperial German navy and, the presence of the Suffolk notwithstanding, the Kronprinz Wilhelm was able to head away ready to embark upon her new career as a warship.²

Armed and ready, the Kronprinz Wilhelm would immediately proceed to demonstrate just what such a vessel could achieve. Over the course of the next eight months, the German raider travelled a distance of 37,666 miles and captured 15 Allied ships with a total displacement of 60,522 tons. The loss of these vessels was not the sum total of the damage that the Kronprinz Wilhelm caused. News of her deprivations caused panic on the sea-lanes and meant deploying considerable Allied naval resources in the futile effort to track her down and protect merchant vessels in the areas in which she was believed to be operating. The fact that the liner was able to evade capture and remain at sea without anchoring for a remarkable 250 days—an achievement enabled by taking supplies from captured vessels and rendezvousing with German supply ships operating out of neutral ports—meant that the effort to run her down was, of necessity, a sustained one. Moreover, it seemed to have no end in sight. The ability of its captain in avoiding Allied efforts to cut him off from supplies and put a stop to his activities was considerable. Fortunately for the Allies, sickness amongst the crew and increasing mechanical problems eventually forced the liner to seek a safe haven. Arriving in Hampton Roads on 11 April 1915, the Kronprinz Wilhelm was interned, a fate that finally put an end to its remarkable career as a raider.³

The Kronprinz Wilhelm was the most high profile of Germany’s First World War auxiliary cruisers, but it was not the only one. In total, Germany commissioned ten merchant vessels for this purpose and, collectively, they destroyed over 427,000 tons of Allied shipping. Like the Kronprinz Wilhelm, they also made a considerable nuisance of themselves, forcing the Allied navies to take active counter-measures. Whilst these were often more successful than those enacted against the Kronprinz Wilhelm, leading in some cases to the sinking of the German vessels in question, they were still a diversion of resources that the Allies could have done without. As such, the German raiders fulfilled a useful war role.

The wartime record of these vessels and of the Kronprinz Wilhelm in particular poses some obvious questions. In particular, if the commercial challenge of the fast German liners was clear to commentators in the British Empire, was the military challenge equally well known and, if so, what did policy-makers propose to do about it? Answering these questions should be relatively straightforward. Policy papers on these matters survive in large numbers and the message they
contain is surprisingly clear. Unfortunately, the answers they produce have significant historiographical implications that have led to considerable debate. This analysis illustrates and then untangles that debate.

In a book published in 2012, I argued that the Royal Navy well understood the military implications of Germany’s fleet of fast transatlantic liners.⁴ Utilising the surviving papers of the Naval Intelligence Department [NID], supplemented by private papers, miscellaneous intelligence reports that had survived in other collections, and entries in the Admiralty digest, I showed that German dominance in high speed vessels first attracted NID notice in 1901, more or less at the moment when the Kronprinz Wilhelm was coming into service. From that moment, it never ceased to be an issue for Britain’s naval strategists. Initially at least, the reason was very specific. The high speed of the German vessels not only gave them a commercial advantage, it also endowed them with an important military one. Put simply, they could out-run all existing British trade protection cruisers, including the latest British armoured cruisers, which were the fastest high seas vessels that the Royal Navy then possessed. The relative excess of speed of the German vessels compared to Royal Navy cruisers was in some cases a small one expressed numerically, but in reality was greater than it looked for two reasons. First, the size of the German liners meant that they could maintain a high speed even in poor weather, as their high freeboards allowed them to cut through the kind of rough seaways that would slow, if not actually batter, the smaller British cruisers. Second, the armoured decks of British cruisers limited the space available for the rise and fall of the pistons that powered their reciprocating engines, forcing them to develop their motive power through rapid movement rather than length of movement. Whilst this worked, it also produced considerable wear and tear. Thus, whilst they could reach high speeds, it was well known that they could not maintain them for any length of time without significant risk of mechanical breakdown. By contrast, having no armoured decks about which to worry, liners avoided such mechanical difficulties. As proved on their Blue Riband winning voyages, they could maintain high speeds over extended periods. The result of this dual speed advantage was well expressed by the financial and parliamentary secretary to the Admiralty, H.O. Arnold-Forster, in early 1902: “There is no vessel carrying the White, Blue or Red Ensign which can come near [them].” He drew the obvious conclusion that, if armed, a fast German liner would be able to “destroy everything weaker than herself, i.e., the whole of the British Mercantile Marine . . . .”⁵

Arnold-Forster’s conclusion was no individual aberration, but reflected an important strand of naval thinking that argued that Germany was in a powerful position to assault British seaborne trade. Moreover, it was a conclusion backed by regular testing. Several war games conducted at the Naval War College modelled the effects of a German attack on British trade
with fast auxiliary cruisers. Whilst all their results no longer exist, two examples from 1906 and 1913 survive. They made sober reading for British naval strategists. Charles Ottley, the director of Naval Intelligence, described the November 1906 war game in January 1907:

Under hypothetical circumstances, such as may easily recur in a real war, three fast German Atlantic liners converted into armed cruisers have escaped from the Elbe, and have been playing havoc with British trade in the open Atlantic. Thanks to their empty cargo spaces, these ships have an almost inexhaustible capacity for coal. They have a sea-speed of 23 knots. Although frequently sighted by British warships, they have only been lost again over the sea horizon, simply because the British warships hitherto employed to hunt them down cannot overhaul them or maintain for more than a few hours the necessary high speed, without dangerously depleting their bunkers.  

The June 1913 “strategical exercise” was no more encouraging. Despite vigorous counter-measures by the Royal Navy, German auxiliary cruisers were able to sink or capture 26 British merchant vessels in the first 32 days of a war. Although 15 German raiders were also apprehended, as the subsequent analysis admitted, “the captures made were for the most part pure luck.” Thus, even with good fortune, the British could expect carnage on the trade routes; what would happen without such fortune did not bear contemplation, except, of course, it was the job of the Admiralty to do so. In May 1914, Captain Richard Webb, the officer designated to head the new Trade Division of the War Staff, gave thought to what a concerted German guerre de course with auxiliary cruisers might mean. His conclusions were even more worrying than the June 1913 exercise, of which he was aware. He believed

in the Atlantic alone 8 ships would be captured every day or 56 during the week. This 56 per week represents 1.5% of the Foreign-going vessels belonging to the British Isles, or 3% of those in Home and Atlantic ports and waters.

To this must be added German Commerce Raiders on other Trade Routes. In China Seas and adjoining waters, therefore, a further loss of British shipping may not unnaturally be expected, and putting this loss at only 3 ships daily or 21 per week, this brings the total loss of shipping per week up to 77 or approximately 2.1% of the Foreign-going British vessels.

Thus we see that a 10% loss might reasonably be incurred during the first five weeks of the war, assuming the German vessels were not hunted down before that time. 

In short, from 1901 through to 1914, the Admiralty knew of the possibility of having to face German auxiliary cruisers and certainly did not underestimate the dangers they posed. This situation, naturally, begs the question: what did they propose to do about it?

The Royal Navy did not have a single solution to this problem; rather the preferred counter-measure strategy changed over time. By 1914, the Admiralty was working on a multi-track approach involving both arming
British merchant vessels in self-defence to allow them to fight back against the raiders and building up a global intelligence network that would collate information about the whereabouts of German raiders to route British shipping away from them and vector British warships towards them. Advanced in *The Royal Navy and the German Threat*, this argument is novel and so far uncontroversial. However, the same is not true for the rest of the interpretation advanced in the book, which also examined earlier incarnations of Britain’s strategy, including the policy developed between 1901 and 1906. The documentary evidence for this period shows clearly that the Admiralty’s initial response to the problem of fast German raiders was a like-for-like policy: if the Germans could build transatlantic liners of high speed, so, too, could Britain. If faster than their German counterparts, the British liners would be able to run down their German rivals in wartime. The result of such thinking found its most forceful expression in a memorandum written by Lord Selborne, first lord of the Admiralty, in July 1902. Noting that if “we did find ourselves at war with Germany, we have no ships existing or projected … which could catch these four German steamers,” he went on to argue that it remained easily handled:

> The most effective and economical method of making provision against this danger would be by subsidizing merchant cruisers to be specially built to match these German boats, and slightly improve upon their speed.\(^9\)

The Cabinet agreed: the Cunard Company received a large subsidy to enable the construction of two very large liners, *Lusitania* and *Mauretania*. The problem was that whilst Selborne felt that this addressed the problem, not everyone in the navy concurred. In particular, several senior officers, including Prince Louis of Battenberg, John Fisher, and John Jellicoe, were highly critical of the idea of considering unarmoured civilian vessels for missions inevitably involving armed combat. Their preferred solution was the building of large, fast cruisers that could overtake the German liners in all weather and any seas and, without any doubt, defeat them in combat. The officer who expressed this view most forcefully was Fisher, the first sea lord. As he stated on 2 December 1905:

> Originally the two great Cunard ships now completing were subsidised by the Government with the object of enabling the armed merchant ships of this country to be a match for the Great German vessels which were then the fastest on the sea. But such vessels when armed will only be equal to the German vessels, and in war equality only would not suffice—as Nelson said, “You ought to be 100 per cent stronger than the enemy if you can!” If two ships of that type met, the result of the fight would be a “toss up,” and the British Navy must not be placed in such a position… Therefore foreign vessels of that description must be sought out and dealt with by fast big armoured cruisers of the *Invincible* class, when there can be no doubt of the result. A cruiser like the *Invincible* would “mop” up such vessels
one after the other with the greatest ease, and therefore, if necessary, more Invincibles must be built for that purpose.\textsuperscript{10}

What makes this statement so interesting is that it is one of the very few from Fisher about the role and function of the ships that he called “Invincibles”—but which would later be known as battle cruisers—to come from the period before they were actually laid down. Moreover, in this statement, delivered to all the sea lords and senior figures at the Admiralty, Fisher made clear that there was a direct link between battle cruisers and the German auxiliary cruiser threat. The former had to run down the latter. More were required if the three then contemplated were not enough for that purpose. The suggestion that battle cruisers might have been intended to run down Germany’s fast auxiliary cruisers has proved highly controversial, despite the fact that Fisher in 1905, Jellicoe in 1906, and Admiral Reginald Bacon after the war all maintained that this was their intended role.\textsuperscript{11} Unsurprisingly, the greatest criticism of the idea has come from those who have invested heavily in other interpretations. Foremost amongst these are Keith Neilson, Jon Sumida, and Nicholas Lambert.

Before discussing their particular objections to this explanation of the origins of the battle cruiser, it is worth considering why their broader analytical outlook might pre-dispose them to reject it come what may. Neilson, Sumida, and Lambert are all adherents to the “revisionist” school of British foreign and defence policy. In Neilson’s case, this means that his work advocates the view that the German threat as a factor in and driver of pre-war British diplomacy has been greatly over-stated. Russia, in his view, was the greatest long-term menace to British Imperial security. Accordingly, finding ways to prevent Russian ambitions from challenging the British position in Asia was more important to British diplomatic thinking than the problem of Germany.\textsuperscript{12} On this basis, he labels those who regard Germany’s naval expansion as a core factor in British pre-war strategy as failing to understand Britain’s global outlook and being unduly influenced by the “teleology of 1914” into looking for the antecedents of that conflict even where they do not exist.\textsuperscript{13} For this reason, an explanation of the battle cruiser based on meeting a danger from Germany is exactly the kind of interpretation that would fall foul of his belief that too much of pre-1914 history is unnecessarily “German-centred.” Instead, he would be much happier with one that privileged the idea that the Royal Navy in general and battle cruisers in particular buttressed global issues that lay at the heart of British policy. Sumida provides just such an analysis.

Sumida’s revisionism is of a different type to Neilson’s. His focus is not on British diplomacy, but on the Royal Navy and Britain’s quest for maritime security before 1914. However, like Neilson, he also believes that Anglo-German antagonism has received too much emphasis at the expense of
understanding Britain’s Imperial and global commitments. As a result, in much the same way that Neilson complains about teleology in interpretations of British diplomacy, he argues that the knowledge that Britain and Germany would be on opposing sides in the First World War has skewed interpretations of British naval policy. In his view, with that end in mind, this leads to all naval developments being analysed wrongly. Instead, he proposes that the Royal Navy under Fisher was not fixated on containing the German threat in the North Sea, but sought to support British interests against all challengers on a worldwide basis. For Sumida the battle cruiser is central to this analysis. He regards it as a multi-role vessel principally designed to fight a global cruiser war against French and Russian enemies deploying armoured cruisers to attack British trade, but also capable of fighting in the line of battle if need be. As such, it epitomises the priorities of a navy not worried unduly about Germany. Consequently, the idea that the battle cruiser intended to meet a specific German challenge would be inherently problematic. Indeed, it would be incompatible with the broader thrust of his analysis.

The same is true for Lambert, whose work explicitly builds upon Sumida’s scholarship. Thus, the foundation for his argument that the Royal Navy planned to defend the British Isles with destroyers and submarines rather than with battleships—a strategy he terms “flotilla defence” is Sumida’s theory that Fisher wanted to abolish battleships and replace them with battle cruisers. Capable of lying in the line of battle if need be, their main role would be to interdict French or Russian armoured cruisers and project British naval power into distant waters, a plan Lambert terms the “battle cruiser concept.” Given this emphasis, he, too, needs to downgrade the place of Germany in British naval thinking and seeks to do so in his work. Indeed, he extends the argument to its extreme form, even contending in one article that as late as 1912 “the Admiralty kept a wary eye on its Russian and French allies.”

Given the manner in which questions about the origins and role of the battle cruiser intersect with wider debates about British policy, it is not altogether surprising if a new interpretation that challenges some entrenched views should provoke controversy. Notwithstanding, the validity of the criticisms need assessment on their own individual merits. After all, the partiality that underscores them does not necessarily make them invalid. Therefore, what are they and do they stand scrutiny?

Neilson offers three objections. First, Germany had too few auxiliary cruisers for it to be worth Britain’s while to develop specific countermeasures against them; second, such raiders as Germany possessed would not be able to operate effectively because they could not re-provision themselves at sea; and, finally, building battle cruisers to hunt armed merchantmen would have been far too expensive to justify. At initial glance, these seem like reasonable observations—until one looks at the
archival records of the Royal Navy.\textsuperscript{16} The question of numbers illustrates this well. Whilst it is certainly true that Germany deployed only ten merchant raiders in the whole of the First World War, producing an average of 2.5 per year—hardly a figure, one might think, to justify much anxiety—the problem with such an observation, ironically enough, is that it is fundamentally teleological. It assumes that what the Germans did when war came is what the British had expected them to do when thinking about a future war in peacetime. Yet, this is not the case. Several pre-war British intelligence assessments of the German merchant navy’s capacity to supply auxiliary cruisers are available. Without exception, they all assumed that the world’s second largest merchant marine, that is, Germany’s, would provide numerous ships capable of conversion into raiders. Two examples illustrate the point. In early 1912, the Admiralty established a committee under Captain Alexander Duff, the director of the mobilisation division of the War Staff, to examine the possibility of arming British merchant vessels for self-defence. As part of their deliberations, it received a list of 38 German civilian vessels most likely to be armed if war broke out.\textsuperscript{17} Webb produced a similar list in 1914. By this time, the number had risen to 46 merchant steamers.\textsuperscript{18} The fact that both figures turned out to be wrong is unimportant. The people who shaped policy believed them to be true.

Neilson’s next argument is that German auxiliary cruisers would not be able to operate effectively because they could not re-provision at sea. As he explains it, they could not return to Germany for supplies and they could not get materials from neutral ports. Whilst this contains an element of truth, it is seriously misleading. To begin with, the 250-day cruise of the \textit{Kronprinz Wilhelm} demonstrates that these factors were not the obstacle that Neilson claims. This ship was able to survive by taking coal from its captures—including no less than 5,000 tons from the British collier, \textit{Hemisphere}\textsuperscript{19}—and, whilst it is true that it could not put in at neutral ports, that situation did not prevent German vessels in neutral harbours from meeting it in secret. By such means, \textit{Kronprinz Wilhelm} remained supplied. Were such means anticipated? The short answer is yes. What the \textit{Kronprinz Wilhelm} did to remain at sea is exactly what the pre-war Admiralty had expected German vessels to do. Several examples illustrate this line of thinking. In January 1904, Sir Henry Hozier, the secretary of Lloyd’s insurance market and an important advisor to the Admiralty on commercial matters, gave a lecture to the Naval War Course about commerce protection in wartime. Amongst the threats he identified were German auxiliary cruisers. The threat, he argued, was a serious one, not least because these vessels could remain at sea for long periods partly from seizing coal from those British vessels—especially colliers!—captured as prizes. As he put it:
It has been argued that fast commerce destroyers . . . could not keep the seas long, because they would be driven in by want of coal; but it must be remembered that these vessels would be able to draw coal in many directions, even if they were only lightly armed. . . . [I]n the first place, they would find, at the outbreak of war, a large number of our colliers on the seas, outward bound with coal, and from these they could help themselves as they chose.\(^{20}\)

The pickings from captured vessels were not the only possible sources of fuel. Another option for German raiders was to rendezvous with German colliers in neutral waters and take coal on board there. Whilst it was technically a breach of international law for a commissioned warship to use neutral waters in such a manner, it was nevertheless the Admiralty’s expectation, as Admiral Henry H. Campbell explained in 1913, that this abuse was bound to take place. Coal transfers would occur by such means, if not in the waters of powerful states that could defend their neutrality then, certainly, “in the territorial waters of those [weaker Powers] they can afford to ignore.”\(^{21}\)

Webb agreed:

"Many of the vessels presumably earmarked for this duty have very large hold capacity which can be utilized for coal. With a little previous organization the vessel can be met and coaled from a collier in some out of the way anchorage, say the Azores, little or no regard being paid to Spanish or Portuguese neutrality in such a struggle for existence. The ship will probably be away and on the Trade Routes before the news of her presence brings a British cruiser after her."\(^{22}\)

The voyage of the Kronprinz Wilhelm would validate all of these judgements.

Neilson’s final argument is that building British battle cruisers to hunt armed merchantmen would have been far too expensive to justify, especially as doing so would have involved “difficult political steps” such as “increasing tax revenue.” This is frankly bizarre for the simple reason that the three Invincible class battle cruisers were built without raising taxes. Neilson is thus presenting a counter-factual in which funding was available for these vessels if they were ordered for one purpose—the purpose of which he approves—but mysteriously would not have existed if they had been ordered for reasons he deprecates. The factual situation is, however, straightforward: the money was there in the naval estimates for these ships and they were built. To say otherwise is simple misdirection. It also misses the point. To begin with, saying that a policy might be too expensive to justify requires some basis for quantification. Yes, battle cruisers did not come cheap—over £1 million each—but if that was the insurance premium for keeping a German guerre de course within reasonable limits that was hardly a great expense, particularly if the assessments from the various pre-war war games about what such raiders might achieve were taken into account. However, at one level this is beside the point, because the irony of Neilson’s argument is that the advocates of building battle cruisers to hunt merchant raiders justified this measure
because it would save money compared to the policy it would replace. The existing policy was to subsidise British shipping companies to provide merchant cruisers to match the German ones. Who would triumph in such an engagement was anyone’s guess, but if the British were defeated and a British armed merchantman sunk in action, the Admiralty would be liable for the cost of the ship. As Battenberg, one of the policy’s critics, duly noted: “our liabilities would amount to little short of a million [pounds] for the single ship.” As he went on to note, it was not far off the price of a modern cruiser, which would in combat “be equal to any number of Deutschlands [i.e. fast German liners].” Fisher felt likewise. As he explained on 2 December 1905, Britain had adopted a policy

of enabling the armed merchant ships of this country to be a match for the Great German vessels which were then the fastest on the sea. But such vessels when armed will only be equal to the German vessels, and in war equality only would not suffice—as Nelson said, “You ought to be 100 per cent stronger than the enemy if you can!” If two ships of that type met, the result of the fight would be a “toss up,” and the British Navy must not be placed in such a position.

Far better and, in the long run, cheaper to create a situation where “there can be no doubt of the result.”

If Neilson’s objections do not stand up to sustained scrutiny, what of Sumida’s? Sumida advances two main objections. The first is that the battle cruiser could not have been built with a German challenge in mind because it was designed to meet a different enemy, namely the armoured cruisers of Russia and France, a problem that Sumida describes as “more important.” The second is that the Germans had far too few auxiliary cruisers to justify a policy of building battle cruisers. If battle cruisers had been built to address this threat, it would mean, “a largely fictitious danger moulded British planning for many years, a proposition that, if demonstrable, would raise large and troubling questions about British intelligence and the judgment of senior Admiralty officials.”

Taking these points seriatim, we first come to the idea of the battle cruiser conceived as an antidote to Franco–Russian plans to wage a guerre de course against British shipping with a fleet of commerce-raiding armoured cruisers. This argument assumes two things: first that there was a Franco–Russian armoured cruiser threat at the time of building the battle cruiser; and, second, that the Admiralty was worried about this problem. Neither proposition is justified by the evidence.

The first battle cruiser laid down was HMS Inflexible, the keel plate of which placed in position on the slipway on 5 February 1906. This occurred nine months after the bulk of the Russian navy had been annihilated in the Russo–Japanese War and a year after the first Moroccan crisis had transformed the Anglo–French Entente Cordiale of 1904 from a mere settlement
of colonial differences into the beginnings of a fully-fledged *de facto* diplomatic partnership. As a result, construction of the first battle cruiser commenced at a time when France’s navy was friendly and Russia’s virtually non-existent. Of course, the argument might be put forth that a ship begun in 1906 would have been conceived a year earlier when circumstances were different. It is certainly true that the Committee on Designs, the body that drew up the plans for these vessels, first met at the end of 1904, at a moment when the bulk of the Russian navy had yet to meet its destiny at the hands of the Japanese. However, even at that time, it is more than doubtful if the Royal Navy believed that French and Russian armoured cruisers posed any kind of menace. For one thing, it was obvious by 1903, if not earlier, that the arms race in armoured cruisers was one that the Royal Navy had comprehensively won. So great was the British preponderance in these vessels that the NID believed any danger was already well and truly neutralised. As it explained in October 1903:

> During recent years France has built a number of armoured cruisers for use as commerce-destroyers…. Great Britain has replied by building a larger number of still more powerful cruisers…. [O]ur present superiority in point of numbers … will be even greater in the future, as we are building 22 more armoured cruisers against 10 building by France and none by Russia.25

This numerical superiority further underscored a qualitative one. Careful monitoring of French and Russian naval construction revealed that the armoured cruisers of these Powers took a long time to build and under-performed when completed. The Jeanne D’Arc is a case in point, laid down in 1896 but not commissioned until 1902. Despite this extensive building time, the ship performed poorly in its speed trials, managing only 21.8 rather than the anticipated 23 knots.26 All of this was well known to the NID and added substantially to the British belief that if French and Russian armoured cruisers posed a problem, it was one Britain had well in hand. In this context, building battle cruisers to fight French and Russian armoured cruisers would have been a way to spend large amounts of money on a problem already solved and for which no additional solution was required. It is not surprising, therefore, that no contemporary statements exist directly linking the two.27 Yet, as shown above, there is a clear, explicit, and unambiguous statement from Fisher that “Invincibles” were needed to “mop up” German armed merchantmen.

Sumida’s second point is that given how few German auxiliary cruiser there actually were, building battle cruisers to hunt them down would have meant that “a largely fictitious danger moulded British planning for many years, a proposition that, if demonstrable, would raise large and troubling questions about British intelligence and the judgment of senior Admiralty officials.” He is open to the same criticism applied to Neilson, namely that the actual number
of German raiders mattered less than the number that the Admiralty believed existed. However, Sumida’s formulation is open to some even more serious objections. As mentioned already, German raiders destroyed over 427,000 tons of Allied shipping. Whilst this total is less than some had feared in their worst-case projections from before the war, it still constituted a considerable total. It certainly does not merit the label “a largely fictitious danger.” Whether such a loss justified building the three Invincible class battle cruisers is, of course, a matter of judgement. But one would be remiss not to point out that if the judgement of British officials was open to question for anticipating a threat that in reality did destroy a mere 427,000 tons of shipping, how much more open to question would it be if they had built battle cruisers to deal with French and Russian armoured cruisers. After all, in the course of the service life of Britain’s battle cruisers, French and Russian armoured cruisers sank a grand total of zero tons of British shipping. A more “fictitious danger” than that is hard to imagine. Yet, for Sumida, building expensive vessels to deal with this non-existent threat does not “raise [the] large and troubling questions about British intelligence and the judgment of senior Admiralty officials” that building them for a threat that did cause real damage apparently does. This inconsistency is to say the least remarkable.

Lambert’s arguments are the most confused of all. His core proposition is that the very idea of German auxiliary cruisers causing the Admiralty serious anxiety is “implausible even on its face.” This is quite a surprising argument from someone who has made his career as a naval historian out of advocating hypotheses that contest received wisdom in counter-intuitive ways. The contention that Fisher, who presided over the construction of Dreadnought, really wanted to abolish battleships altogether and was against the building of Dreadnought itself is a case in point. Not just Dreadnought, but 14 dreadnought battleships were ordered whilst Fisher was first sea lord, making the theory that he was against their construction “implausible even on its face.” It has not stopped Lambert from making such an argument. Nor does implausibility seem to be a barrier to him advancing new and outlandish theories about the battle cruiser. His latest claim is these ships made old age pensions possible, a proposition that stretches the significance of contemporary naval policy beyond the bounds of credulity. Again, that has proven no barrier to its advancement.

As for the likelihood of German commerce raiders causing anxiety amongst senior naval officers, it need only be pointed out that no matter how unlikely it might seem to Lambert, many contemporaries found this threat quite believable and put their views on record. This is what Rear-Admiral Edmond Slade had to say on the matter in 1909:

… Germany intends on the outbreak of war to strike a blow at our trade… The blow that she has in contemplation is nothing less than the simultaneous destruction in all parts of the world of as many of our merchant vessels as she can lay
hands upon. To affect this she has arranged, immediately upon the outbreak of war, to transform as many of her merchant vessels into men of war as she thinks will be necessary. They will then proceed to sink and destroy as many British vessels as they can find.

Personally, I look on this as being a far more dangerous state of affairs than the relative sizes of our respective battle fleets. I do not think that we are in any danger as regards the latter, and we can easily keep such strength as will prevent Germany from doing us any serious harm in Home waters.  

What are we to make of Slade’s suggestion? The first thing is that it was clearly not “implausible” to him. Second, his was the view of an informed contemporary with inside information—the former Director of Naval Intelligence, no less. Third, the First World War would prove him right: the Royal Navy could keep command in home waters; the sea-lanes proved Britain’s weak link. Fourth, this was no off the cuff remark. In 1909, the British government held an inquiry into Admiralty policy because of charges levelled against the naval authorities by the recently superseded and disgruntled admiral, Lord Charles Beresford. The inquiry was a high profile one, with considerable political importance and public visibility. As part of this inquiry, the prime minister, Herbert Asquith, wrote to Slade asking him to submit written evidence about Admiralty policy and procedures during his recent stint there as DNI. It was in reply to this letter and in the full knowledge of where it was going and what it was for that Slade articulated his pronounced views about the German threat to British commerce. As a seasoned naval bureaucrat, Slade would have been well aware that this was not the context deliberately to present outlandish views invalidating one’s credibility. He must have therefore anticipated a positive reception for his position. There is, sadly, no record of how this particular letter was received—although it was printed and circulated—but Slade’s career provides a reasonable clue to his standing. The then Captain Slade had been appointed DNI in November 1907. He received accelerated promotion to flag rank in November 1908 and, after serving as a delegate to the London naval conference, received his own independent command as commander-in-chief East Indies in March 1909. He served a full term on this “lucrative” foreign station. On his return, after being both knighted and commended by the Government of India, he was promptly appointed to a series of important Admiralty policy-making committees. These bodies explored such subjects as the provision of overseas cruisers, the transport of a British Expeditionary Force to France, and the work of the Royal Naval War College and its relationship with the new Naval Staff. In addition, he also led the expedition to Persia in connection with the Anglo–Persian Oil Company and provided input to the planning for the Third Hague Conference. All of these were important areas, with staff work and the Expeditionary Force being particularly important to the new first lord, Winston Churchill. Thereafter, Slade won promotion to vice-admiral in
April 1914 and, on the outbreak of war, was appointed to the War Trade Department to help run the campaign of economic warfare against Germany. None of this would have occurred had Slade held views noticeably out of line either with Admiralty thinking in general or specifically about trade defence, in which instance his appointment to the Hopwood committee on overseas cruisers would have been an astonishing one. Yet, appointed he was. If Slade’s forcefully expressed concern about the German auxiliary cruiser threat was “implausible even on its face,” then this was evidently not held against him. If others held it or similar views, the reason for his appointment to this and other committees becomes clear.

Having attempted to discredit the broader concept by the ahistorical means of privileging his own views over those of contemporaries, Lambert next attacks the evidence advanced to support the proposition that battle cruisers were originally intended to hunt down German commerce raiders. His arguments on this point are many, but they are entirely unfounded, as two specimen examples will illustrate.

The first concerns the testimony of Sir Reginald Bacon. In 1904 the then Captain Bacon, one of Fisher’s assistants, was appointed to serve on the Committee on Designs, the body that drew up the blueprint for HMS Invincible, the name ship for the first class of battle cruisers. In later years, Bacon provided a record of the work of this committee, most notably in a biography of Fisher. The standing of this work has always been high. One might note that a list of the “leading biographies of Fisher” produced by none other than Lambert in 2004 assigned first place to Bacon’s, which was described as “the most tantalizing.” In making this judgement, Lambert also stressed Bacon’s role as “the former assistant to Admiral Fisher,” presumably in recognition of the authority that this proximity to Fisher bestowed upon the work. Given that neither the quality of the biography nor Bacon’s participation in the events described is in dispute, Lambert can hardly complain about Bacon’s eyewitness testimony to the birth of the battle cruiser being cited as evidence for what occurred. Bacon wrote that the battle cruiser was designed in order to meet a want that had long been felt but never supplied, namely, a ship fast enough to hunt down any armed merchant ship afloat, and at the same time to be able to fight any cruiser afloat. . . . The speed . . . was definitely fixed at 25 knots. This gave her some margin over the German Transatlantic liners. Hitherto we had subsidized, for a huge annual sum, some of our own liners to fight those of Germany, in spite of the fact that they had never been designed to fight and were totally unfitted to so.

This seems quite clear and supports the notion that in the decision-making process of 1904–1905, Germany was a central issue. Lambert objects to this. It is hardly surprising, because if one accepts Bacon’s testimony at face value, one of the main pillars supporting Lambert’s argument collapses. Having
previously praised Bacon’s biography of Fisher, Lambert does not attack Bacon directly but, instead, focuses on the manner in which I present it. Seligmann, he asserts, “conveys to his readers the impression that his primary witness was reporting Fisher’s opinions. In fact, Bacon was not. The passages taken from his Fisher biography are written in the passive voice, and are thus not directly attributable.”33 This is frankly inexplicable and not just because of the extraordinary weight that it attributes to Bacon’s grammatical preferences. The passage in which I introduce the above quotation runs as follows:

In this book, Bacon provided a clear, detailed and precise account of the reasoning behind the construction of the first battle cruisers. As he explained, the need for such vessels stemmed from the German strategy of arming their fast liners…34

As can be seen, at every stage, Bacon’s views are explicitly presented as heralding from Bacon. This is re-enforced in the footnotes that likewise attribute the quotation to Bacon. No attempt is made to suggest that Bacon was quoting Fisher. This does not mean that Bacon, who was close to Fisher—even according to Lambert—is inadmissible as a witness on Fisher’s opinions. Quite the contrary, he could be expected to have unique insights into such matters, and it is not unreasonable to suppose that he might have chosen to share some of these when writing what was after all a biography of Fisher; but no specific claim is made that Bacon is speaking for Fisher. What The Royal Navy and the German Threat claims is that Bacon was in a unique position to offer eyewitness testimony about the origins of the battle cruiser and that he believed that their original conception involved a response to armed German liners. Lambert does not dispute that this is what Bacon believed. If Bacon is wrong about what took place, despite having been there, Lambert will have to prove it with something more substantive than trivialities like Bacon’s preference for the passive over the active voice.

Another of Lambert’s targets is a war game played at the Naval War College in late 1906 and early 1907. The game modelled in real time an Anglo–German conflict and was of interest because of what it revealed about British expectations regarding a likely German assault on British shipping. Under the heading “Commerce Destruction,” the printed précis of the war game stated:

Germany had prepared crews for three of the largest Norddeutscher Lloyd line and Hamburg-American Line ships that happened to be in German ports at the time, and immediately they decided to proceed to war these were filled with coal—5,000 to 8,000 tons—and sent off round the north of Scotland to prey on British trade in the Atlantic.

They got clear away without being seen by any British cruisers until they were on the trade route west of Ireland. One of them was then sighted by some small British cruisers that had been sent out to watch the trade, but, although she was between three pairs of British cruisers, she easily avoided them on account of her superior speed.
The war game thus provides evidence of the fact that the Royal Navy anticipated a German *guerre de course* with auxiliary cruisers and that it knew such vessels could escape existing British cruisers. It is of further interest because in the margins of the document located next to the statement about German raiders escaping British cruisers owing to their superior speed is the sentence: “N.B.—*Raison d’être* of the new type of fast unarmoured cruiser (*Boadicea* type) and of the high speed of the *Invincible* type.” I have described this as a minute by Fisher that shows the origins and purpose of the battle cruiser. Lambert avers that “the rubric in question was not penned, not a minute and not by Fisher.” It is, he says, a printed sub-heading integral to the report and “indisputably” written by Slade, the author of the *précis*.35

There is an obvious distinction between a sub-heading and a minute. Whilst the former provides a brief description of what is in the text it accompanies, the latter amplifies or adds commentary on the text. Were this sentence a sub-heading, the neighbouring text would be about the purpose of the *Boadicea* and *Invincible* type. Instead, it covers the escape of German auxiliary cruisers from British warships. In short, it is a minute rather than a sub-heading. What about its authorship? Lambert goes on to say that there “is nothing anywhere on this page or elsewhere in this document that could be remotely construed as attributing these words to Fisher.” In fact, we have known for over half a century that Fisher wrote it. In 1960 and 1964, Lieutenant-Commander Peter Kemp, then head of the Historical Section and Librarian at the Admiralty, published two volumes of Fisher Papers for the Navy Records Society.36 The second volume included the very document—the *précis* of the 1906–1907 war game. In the late 1950s and early 1960s when Kemp would have been doing his research for these volumes, a great many more war planning documents of this era existed than is the case today and, on account of his position, Kemp would have had access to all of them. In Kemp’s edition, the sentence under discussion is not a sub-heading—although he has sub-headings elsewhere in the text—but a minute. It is rendered thus: “N.B.—*Raison d’être* of the new type of fast unarmoured cruiser (*Boadicea* type) and of the high speed of the *Invincible* type—J.F.”37

The salient point, which I am sure all readers will have noticed, is that in the version Kemp used for making his transcription, the minute was initalled and the initials are Fisher’s. Lambert, it might be noted, frequently cites Kemp’s volume. Perhaps he overlooked this page.

Taken collectively, the objections put forward to the idea that Germany played a major role in Britain’s pre-First World War trade defence policy do not withstand scrutiny. The broader implications are clear. Without in any way denying that Britain was an Imperial Power with global obligations, the attempt to downplay the place of Germany in British strategic thinking—of which these criticisms are a part—is misplaced. There is no teleology involved in pointing out that officials and politicians in London recognised
that Germany could use its power against British interests and that some of the ways in which Germany was choosing to formulate its increasing power made it look as if it actively contemplated such actions, if not prioritised them. And if German industrial prowess meant that Germany was capable of posing a threat that other Powers could not equal—as with fast liners—it was hardly surprising if note was taken of this fact and counter-measures prepared. This is not a German-centric analysis; rather it is a reality-centric one.

Returning then to the launching ceremony of the *Kronprinz Wilhelm*, it is clear that the efforts made to bring solemnity and grandeur to the occasion were not misplaced. The vessel was a real accretion of power to the German Empire reflected in various ways. The vessel underscored German commercial success by adding yet another high profile dimension to Germany’s growing fleet of luxury transatlantic liners. It also further underlined that in the world of international competition symbolised by the quest for the Blue Riband, the days of natural British pre-eminence were over. Germany was a contender when it came to the race for the highest speeds with all that this implied about industrial vitality and national vigour. Finally, in building a civilian vessel with serious and intended military potential, Germany was adding to the sum of its naval power in ways that other Powers could not fail to notice. Amongst those Powers showing the greatest awareness was Britain. The high speed of Germany’s fastest liners posed problems for those in charge of Britain’s trade defence strategy, problems that they could not simply ignore. Whilst it might not suit those who wish to privilege the Imperial dimensions to British foreign and defence policy to admit it, this presented more of a challenge than the frankly illusory threat of French and Russian armoured cruisers, which, if it ever existed, had disappeared before a single British battle cruiser had even been laid down. The German raider threat, by contrast, existed not just in theory, but also in practice. If the wartime record of Germany’s raiders was less dramatic than had been feared, it was not so inconsiderable as to give the Admiralty no pause for thought either during the war itself or thereafter. Indeed, the possibilities exposed in the conflict of 1914–1918 were such as to make British planners in the inter-war years assume that a future conflict with Germany would see such techniques used on a larger scale. In preparation, a study of German cruiser warfare in the First World War appeared in 1940, the better to guide counter-measures for the expected campaign. Whilst, once again, the reality did not prove as dangerous as expected, it was anything but irrational to prepare for the possibility. The same was true before 1914.

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Notes

13. For his most recent exposition on this theme, see Keith Neilson, “1914: The German War?,” *European History Quarterly*, 44/3 (2014), 395–418.
16. It might be pointed out that despite criticising others for the alleged narrowness of their archival research, Neilson does not make much, if any, use of the Admiralty records.
17. Appendix to the report of the Duff Committee, ADM 116/1203.
18. ADM 1/8380/150.
19. ADM 137/3852.
22. Webb minute, 25 November 1913, Convoy papers [Naval Historical Branch, Portsmouth].
27. The assertion that British armoured cruisers needed to be faster than foreign ones, which Lambert highlights, is merely the application of Fisher’s general principle that “the first desideratum in every type of fighting vessel is a greater speed than that possessed by a similar class of the enemy’s ships.” It tells us about an attribute that battle cruisers—like all British vessels—needed; it does not indicate for what the ships were designed to do.
29. Slade to Asquith, 8 May 1909, CAB 16/9B.
34. Seligmann, Royal Navy and the German Threat, 69 [emphasis added].
37. Ibid., II, 447–8.
38. Extracts from Admiralty Record Office Case 00244 quoted in ADM 199/2365.

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