Transnational Media and Migrants in Europe:
The Case of the mediated Turkish-Kurdish Ethno-National Conflict

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Transnational Media Audiences and Conflict: Turks and Kurds in Europe
Abstract

This PhD examines the role of the transnational media in articulating and mobilizing different political and identity positions for migrants. It explores the complex linkages between Kurdish and Turkish transnational ethnic media and migrant communities. It is based on 74 in-depth interviews and 6 focus groups with Kurdish and Turkish migrants of diverse age, gender, political affiliation, occupation and length of migration in London, Berlin and Stockholm. Drawing upon the concepts of “imagined community” (Anderson 1991) and “banal nationalism” (Billig 1995), it seeks to understand how migrants make sense of the media representations of the ethno-national conflict between the Turkish state and the Kurds and how they position themselves in relation to these media texts. The thesis explores how the media impact differentially on migrants’ views and ethnic identities in the three countries.

This study argues that transnational media speak on behalf of the nation to the nation, even if the members of these imagined national communities live in different places, connecting people across different geographical spaces and thus building transnational imagined communities. They create a sense of belonging to a meaningful imagined community defined as “our” nation. The mediated Turkish-Kurdish ethno-national conflict has contributed to this transnational imagined community. The analysis of interviews found that the mediated conflict has hardened ethnic-based divisions and differentiation between Kurdish and Turkish migrants in Europe. Transnational media have contributed to deterritorialization, differentiation and division among migrants. Kurds and Turks have developed distinct identities in Europe and cannot be viewed any longer as a homogeneous group. The thesis concludes by suggesting a three-way framework for the analysis of ethno-national identities of migrants, taking into account firstly the country of settlement, secondly Turkish and thirdly Kurdish media as significant in constructing imagined national communities.
# Transnational Media and Migrants in Europe: The Case of the Mediated Turkish-Kurdish Ethno-National Conflict

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Acronyms

AKP  Justice and Welfare Party (Turkish: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)
BDP  Peace and Democracy Party (Turkish: Baris ve Demokrasi Partisi)
CHP  Republican People Party (Turkish: Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası)
CoE  Council of Europe
DDKD Association of Revolutionary Democratic Culture (Turkish: Devrimci Demokratik Kültür Derneğî)
DDKO Revolutionary Cultural Hearths of the East (Kurdish: Cîvîngehên Çandî yêng Şoresgevê Rojhilat)
DEHAP Democratic People Party (Turkish: Demokratik Halk Partisi 2005-2009)
DEHAP Democratic People's Party (Turkish: Demokratik Halk Partisi)
DEP  Democracy Party (Turkish: Demokrasi Partisi 1993-1994)
DKP  Democratic Mass Party (Turkish: Demokratik Kitle Partisi 1997-1999)
DP  Democratic Party (Turkish: Demokrat Parti)
DTP  Democratic Society Party (Turkish: Demokratik Toplum Partisi, 2005-2009)
DYP  True Path Party (Turkish: Dogru Yol Partisi)
ECHR European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights
EP  European Parliament
EU  European Union
Hak-Par Rights and Freedom Party (Turkish: Hak ve Özgürlükler Partisi)
HAK-PAR Rights and Freedoms Party (Turkish: Hak ve Özgürlükler Partisi)
HEP People's Labour Party (Turkish: Halkın Emek Partisi)
HEP The People's Labour Party (Turkish: Halkın Emek Partisi, 1990-1993)
ITC Committee of Union and Progress (Turkish: İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti)
KADEP Participatory Democracy Party (Turkish: Katılımcı Demokrasi Partisi)
KDP Democratic Participation Party (Turkish: Katılımcı Demokrasi Partisi).
KDP Kurdistan Democratic Party (Kurdish: Partîya Demokrata Kurdistan)
KOMKAR.eu Federation of Associations from Kurdistan (Kurdish: Konfederasyona Komeleyên Kurdistan li Ewrûpa)
KON-KURD  Confederation of Kurdish Associations in Europe (Kurdish: Konfederasyon Komelên Kurd Li Ewropa)
KPE  The Kurdish Parliament in Exile (Kurdish: Parlamentoya Kurdistan Derveyi Welat)
MG  The National View (Turkish: Millî Görüş)
MHP  Nationalist Movement Party (also translated as “Nationalist Action Party”) (Turkish: Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi)
ÖZDEP  Freedom and Democracy Party (Turkish: Özgürlük ve Demokrasi Partisi)
PKK  Workers’ Party of Kurdistan (Kurdish: Partîya Karkerên Kurdistan)
PSK/TKSP  Party of Socialist Kurdistan (Kurdish: Partîya Sosyalîst a Kurdistan)
RTÜK  Radio and Television Supreme Council (Turkish: Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu)
SHP  Social Democratic People’s Party (Turkish: Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Partı)
TDK  Turkish Language Institution (Turkish: Türk Dil Kurumu)
TIP  Worker’s Party of Turkey (Turkish: Türkiye Isçi Partisi)
T-KDP  Democratic Party of Kurdistan in Turkey (Kurdish: Partiya Demokrata Kurdistane Turkiye)
TKP  Communist Party of Turkey (Turkish: Türkiye Komünist Partisi)
TRT  Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (Turkish: Türkiye Radyo ve Televizyon Kurumu)
TRT 6  Turkish Radio and Television Corporation’s channel 6 (Turkey’s first national Kurdish language television station)
TTK  Turkish Historical Society (Turkish: Türk Tarih Kurumu)
**Introduction: Transnational Media and Migrants in Europe: The Case of the Turkish-Kurdish Ethno-National Conflict**

**1. Introduction**
In the 1980s and more rapidly in the 1990s communications technology has interconnected different individuals, networks, communities in several countries (Vertovec 2001). This has lead to the transnationalization of different identities and political positions. Owing to the patterns of migration and the rapid development of communications and transport technologies in the age of globalization, ethnic, political, cultural, religious identities have become more diverse in Europe. In this process transnational communities have emerged in many European countries at an unprecedented scale (Becker and Behnisch 2001, Hafez 2000, King et al. 2008a, Vertovec 2007). One of the contradictory consequences of this new development has been a revival of national and religious identities of migrants in European countries of settlement. Transnational media have played a key part in this by enabling a re-connection of diasporic populations with a mediated homeland (Aksoy and Robins 2000, Faist 2000c, Georgiou 2005, Hesmondhalgh 2001, Karim 1998, Pries 2002, Robins and Aksoy 2001, Tsagarousianou 2004, van Bruinessen 2000a).

One example where this has occurred is in relation to Turkish and Kurdish communities in Europe. Turkish print media have been distributed in Europe since the end of the 1960s. However, the Turkish and Kurdish transnationalized media including print, audiovisual and internet have only entered strongly and visibly in the political, cultural and social life of Europe’s Turkish and Kurdish audiences since the 1990s. They have become the key provider of “information” and maker of opinion for 2.5 million Turkish and 1.5 million Kurdish migrants in Europe. The media have carried the cultural, political and religious debates from the homeland to the diaspora.
The media have also carried news to Europe about the ethno-national armed conflict between the Turkish state and the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) that has lasted for 30 years. The role of transnational media reporting on the conflict has become more important since Turkey began television broadcasts to its “gurbetçi” (expatriate) population in the 1990s. From 1994, Kurdish television channels have been broadcast from Europe and “Southern Kurdistan” (McDowall 2004 135) that is Northern Iraq, addressing audiences both in Kurdistan and “Penabera Kurdan” (Kurdish refugees and diasporas) in Europe. The audiences of these transnational ethnic media follow political developments in the homeland closely, especially the tragic ethno-national conflict. The Turkish and Kurdish transnational media disseminate the sense of belonging to an imagined Turkish or Kurdish community in the diaspora. Kurds are an important, ethnically distinct part of Turkey’s population, making up 25% of the country’s population. What I will argue in this thesis is that transnational Turkish and Kurdish political communication plays an important role in linking and mobilizing migrant populations in Europe either in the Turkish state’s interests or on behalf of the Kurdish national movement. This has led to a strengthening of transnational political, ethnic and religious identities in the settlement countries. A media war between nationalist Turkish and Kurdish media is taking place in Europe, creating imagined transnational ethnic communities.

Transnationalization of the Kurdish and Turkish media is seen as a development that poses a challenge to the nation states in Europe. The European nation-states aim of cultural and linguistic, as well political, “integration” of migrants into the ethnically dominant society. When migrants consume media from their home countries, this is often seen in contradiction to state policies of integration, so that “The rows of satellite dishes in multiethnic neighborhoods have become the ultimate symbol of ethnic segregation in the eyes of some local authorities” (Georgiou 2005
The settlement countries - especially Germany - see the ethnicisation of migrant communities through disseminated symbols, language and sense of ethnic identity by the Turkish and Kurdish media as a creation of a parallel society within their cities. The Social Democrat Party (SPD)’s politician, Hans-Ulrich Klose summarizes the debate in Germany as follows:

“In the meantime, we have in Germany, at least in the ‘large cities’, so hardened parallel societies that I do not believe that there can be still a real integration success. This is a very bitter statement because it applies according to my appraisal to about 85 percent of the Turks living here... the linguistic proficiency of the youngsters of the third and fourth generation is worse more clearly than in the second ones; they read predominantly Turkish newspapers, watch Turkish television... we must turn this trend absolutely, even if there are considerable conflicts” (SPD politician, Hans-Ulrich Klose, quoted in Becker 2000: 10).

It appears that “An ideological consciousness of nationhood can be seen to be at work”, (Billig 1995:4) which “embraces a complex set of themes about ‘us’, ‘our homeland’, ‘nations’ (‘ours’ and ‘theirs’),’ [our cities, our language], the ‘world’, [the conflict] as well as the morality of national duty and honour” (Billig 1995:5). While migration is often seen as part of globalization, Klose’s invocation of the clear boundaries between “us” and the migrants emphasizes that society is still most often imagined as a nation, an idea which “is already very much taken for granted” (Gellner 1983:4). Some social scientists share the concern of the SPD politician and problematize the ethnicisation, pluralism and diversity in “their” large cities through the ethnic-based media. These media are seen as creating “parallel and mutually exclusive media communities” (Robins 1998:11). This is seen as cultural, economic and linguistic hindrance of “integration” of Kurdish and Turkish migrants in the countries of settlement (Piorr et al. 1996). Indeed, the mobilization of Kurdish and Turkish national identities
in the European countries of residence challenges these countries’ own national imagined communities. The conflicting Turkish and Kurdish national identities are seen as a potential challenge to the sovereignty of the European countries of residence. In particular the Turkish and Kurdish media’s reporting on the Turkish-Kurdish ethno-national struggle has been criticized for heightening the conflict between Turkish and Kurdish migrants (Heitmeyer 1996, Özdemir 1997). The debate around the migrant media cultures perceives the transnational media as “potential threats …for European democracy and values, in popular media and mainstream political discourses” (Georgiou, 2005:482).

2. The Research
We are witnessing a new process of ethnic identification amongst Turkish and Kurdish migrants in Europe. There is a shift from being seen as “Turkish migrants” to becoming “Kurdish and Turkish migrants’ and establishing diasporic Turkish and Kurdish imagined communities in the settlement countries. I call this “the dissolution of the ‘homogeneous’ Turkish nation” in the diaspora. The mediation of the Turkish and Kurdish ethno-national conflict has played a crucial role in the division, differentiation and de-territorialization of political, ethnic and social identities amongst migrants from Turkey/Kurdistan region in Turkey that is variously called “Northern Kurdistan”, (McDowall, 2004:135,van Bruinessen 1998) “Turkish Kurdistan” or “East and Southeast of Turkey’. However, this diversity has only become strongly visible in recent years because of the spread of information about ethno-national conflict through the media. The research will present how the media impact differentially on migrants’ views and ethnic identities in the different countries. This thesis will show that processes of ethnic identification are strongly related to media consumption.

The research is based on 6 focus groups and in-depth interviews with 74 Kurdish and Turkish migrants of diverse age, gender, occupation, length of
migration in the three cities of London, Berlin and Stockholm. The research tries to understand how migrants make sense of the media representations of the ethno-national conflict in their homeland and how they position themselves vis-à-vis the media print and visual texts. To this end, the project applies Anderson's concept of "imagined community", Billig's of "banal nationalism" and Gramsci's of "hegemony" as well as that of "transnationalism" to the case of Turkish and Kurdish migrants in Europe. It is important to understand the role of transnational media in the lives of Turkish and Kurdish migrants in Europe as this forms part of their "everyday ethnicity". In some cases, this "everyday ethnicity" (Brubaker 2004) leads to conflicts between Turkish and Kurdish migrants in particular transnational spaces e.g. Berlin boroughs of Kreuzberg and Wedding and London boroughs of Hackney and Haringey, as well as Stockholm borough of Rinkeby-Kista. There is a need to understand how nation-ness and nationalism as "cultural artifacts of a particular kind have come into historical being, in what ways their meanings have changed over time, and why, today, they command such emotional legitimacy" (Anderson 1991:3-4). This should be understood as being within a certain sovereign territory and also beyond it, as is the case of Turkish and Kurdish migrants' relationship and emotional attachment to their "nation".

This research highlights the relationship of media texts to migrants' identity formation. In this process, the Turkish media contributes to a polarization between Turkish and Kurdish migrants in their views of Turkish policy towards the Kurds. The media also unintentionally contributed to creating a sense of opposition among Kurds who feel that Turkish media portray them mainly negatively or reduce their ethnic identity to "separatism". This alienation from the Turkish media has led many Kurds to embrace Kurdishness and Kurdish media. The Kurdish media has politically and culturally empowered Kurdish migrants to create a sense of belonging. Yet it has also alienated some Kurds with its highly politicized programmes.
However the politics of identity takes place in the everyday life of migrants on different levels. The complex and dynamic picture that has emerged from my interviews shows that both migrant groups make different sense of the texts and images of media. There are differences of ethnic identification, political and social values both between Kurds and Turks but also within these groups.

3. Research questions
This research aims to explore the intersection of local, national and transnational local relationships and identities through media production and consumption and the role of the media in the tension between Diasporic and transnational discourses (Cohen 1997, Faist 2000a), national (and nationalist) institutions and social movements. It examines processes of media reception in three European countries of the Kurdish and Turkish diaspora - Sweden, the UK and Germany.

The key research questions are:
1. What is the impact of transnational Turkish and Kurdish media on migrants from Turkey?
2. What part do the media play in the construction of transnational community identities among Kurdish and Turkish migrants in Europe?
3. What role has the ethno-national conflict played in division, differentiation and re-construction of Turkish and Kurdish migrant communities?
4. How do Turkish/Kurdish media produce/reproduce banal nationalism?

4. the Study of Kurdish and Turkish migrants in Germany, the UK and Sweden
Three different European countries – Germany, the UK and Sweden - have been chosen because:
1. They represent a range of European realities of immigration, as they have diverse demographic and institutional factors and politics of migration and migrant incorporation.
2. The nature of migration from Turkey differs in the three countries. Kurdish and Turkish migrants are mainly political refugees in the UK and Sweden (mainly Kurdish); however the migration to Germany has been characterized more by labour migration and the guest worker recruitment (mainly Turkish).

3. “Turkish and Kurdish homeland politically-oriented organizations” (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003:261) including ethnic, religious, economic and cultural networks and organizations in the three countries are “in co-operation (…) with their counterparts elsewhere in Western Europe and in Turkey” (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003:261).

4. The transnational Turkish and Kurdish media are consumed and partly produced in these countries especially in Germany. Daily Turkish and Kurdish newspapers are printed in Germany and distributed to other European countries.

Therefore, the rationale for choosing these three countries is that they show a different relationship of migrants to the media: the UK Kurdish and Turkish community consists mainly of refugees. Kurds are in the majority in the UK and tend to support the Kurdish national movement. As Kurds are in the majority in the UK, there is little direct confrontation between nationalist Turks and Kurds.

In Germany, Turks are in the majority and there are some intense, and at times violent, confrontations between some Turks and Kurds about the Kurdish-Turkish ethno-national conflict. Migrants from Turkey are the largest ethnic minority group in Germany, and Germany represents the largest European settlement country for migrants from Turkey. Therefore, Germany represents a key context for both Kurdish and Turkish transnational communities’ media production and consumption.

The power relations between Turks and Kurds differ in the three countries
and the degree of political integration into the host countries also differs. In the UK, Kurds are well connected with British political parties, whereas in Germany Kurds are, by and large, marginalized from lobbying the big political parties, while Turkish community groups play an important role in lobbying German political parties on behalf of pro-Turkish nationalism. In Sweden, Kurds are politically well connected, but Turks are less visible as a lobby group in Swedish politics. The majority of migrants from Turkey are Kurdish refugees except for a small group of Turkish refugees and labour migrants. Sweden has played a key role in the creation of Kurdish culture by supporting the development of Kurdish language and cultural production. Therefore, the Kurdish community in Sweden differs from that in the UK, as they are well educated, speak and write Kurdish very well and for these reasons, until recently Kurds in Sweden were overrepresented as professionals in Kurdish media production. However, Kurds in Sweden tend to be politically more critical of the hegemonic PKK position within the Kurdish national movement. Therefore, the rationale for including Sweden in the study was to show a differentiated and critical position of Kurdish migrants towards the Kurdish media. These issues are discussed in more depth in chapters IV and VII.

5. The Originality of the Research
There is some important critical research on different Turkish and Kurdish migrants (King et al. 2008a). These studies focus on their transnational political and cultural mobilization in Europe (Faist 2000c, Østergaard-Nielsen 2000, Wahlbeck 1998a, Wahlbeck 1998b), transforming citizenship (Erel 2009), Kurdish refugees (Bloch et al. 2009b, Griffiths 2001, Wahlbeck 1998e), the Kurdish community and employment (Holgate et al. 2009a) However these works have not explored the role of media in migrants’ identity formation. Some research has examined the media contexts of banal nationalism in Turkey (Yumul and Özkirimli 2000). Other research has explored the construction of Kurdish identity in the Turkish media (Bulut 1992, Sezgin and Wall 2005). Hirschler has examined the
construction of Kurdish history in the Kurdish media in Turkey (Hirschler 2001). However, this research has not looked at the media in a transnational migration context. Furthermore, this previous research has focused on discourse or content analysis of media texts without engaging with how audiences, in particular audiences in Europe, make sense of these texts. While there is a body of work that explores the role of the Turkish and Kurdish media in the formation of migrants’ identities in Europe, this does not look at how migrants make sense of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict.

Instead, these studies have looked at the role of Turkish media in creating “parallel societies” and causing intolerance or violence among Turkish migrants in Germany (Heitmeyer 1998, Oberndörfer 2001). Other work has looked at the ethnicisation of Turkish media culture and its relationship to globalization (Hafez 2002). There are some studies on the Turkish media in Germany, the media consumption habits of Turkish migrants and the portrayal of Turkey and Turks in the German mass media (Zentrum für Türkeistudien 1995, Zentrum für Türkeistudien 1997). All of this research is from Germany, where the impact of Turkish media on migrants’ integration is widely discussed as an issue of public concern. Aksoy and Robins (2003) emphasize the theoretical aspect of transnationalism rather than the role of media on the integration of migrants into national cultures of the countries of residence.

However, the Kurdish-Turkish ethno-national conflict is mostly hidden behind Turkish Studies (in Europe). This misses the complex realities of Kurdish and Turkish migrants from Turkey. However, I argue here that research that includes Kurds in research on “Turks”, the “Turkish diaspora”, and the “Turkish-speaking community” etc. is problematic as it intentionally, or unintentionally, ignores the political differentiation between
Turkish and Kurdish migrants. Holgate highlights the importance of examining the Kurdish migrants and their political, cultural aspects:

We argue that it is therefore necessary for contemporary research to understand and explain the specific economic, cultural and political nature of the Kurdish migrant population in Europe and their relationship to the host country’s state and non-state institutions. It is also important in order to understand the new emergent political and social realities in Kurdish societies in Europe that have created new collective Kurdish identities and collective action in places of recent settlement in European countries. In particular, there is a paradigm shift from having an imposed identity from Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria, to a dreamed, imagined and constructed Kurdish identity formed in Kurdistan, which is strongly felt in displaced migrant communities (Holgate et al. 2008:19).

There is a need for a direct and explicit account of the Kurdish migrant population in Europe and their relationship to Turkish migrant communities and Europeans. Even the Turkish ultra-nationalists complain of the lack of academic research on “separatist broadcasting” as there is currently of journalistic writing on Kurdish publishing and broadcasting (Laçiner 2000). I address this gap in the research literature with particular focus on Kurdish and Turkish transnational media and migrants.

In this context, the thesis is original as it differentiates Kurdish and Turkish migrant identities in the three European countries. It contributes to debates in three distinct bodies of literature: 1) debates on migration and transnational media in Europe 2) debates on the Kurdish-Turkish ethno-national conflict and its media representation 3) audience research among Turkish and Kurdish migrants on their identities. Therefore, this thesis helps us develop a more complex understanding of the relationship between migration, transnational media and ethno-national conflicts.
The thesis employs the notions of imagined communities, banal nationalism, transnational community and hegemony in its theoretical framework. It explores the relationship between imagined communities, banal nationalism and the competing and conflicting notions of Kurdish and Turkish transnational community. The thesis argues that it is important to differentiate between Kurdish and Turkish migrants in Europe. It argues that the countries of residence matter in positioning Turkish and Kurdish migrants differently and in how they make sense of the transnational media reporting of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict. The most important original contribution of the thesis is its empirical investigation of the role of the media in migrants’ ethno-national identities. We cannot read these identities off from media texts as migrants navigate the complex tension between an ethnically differentiated migrant identity (Kurdish or Turkish), the homeland (which is also ethnically differentiated) and the country of residence.

5. Outline of Chapters
Chapter I focuses on the theoretical debate around the emergence of nationalism (Anderson 1991), banal nationalism (Billig 1995), and the concept of hegemony (Gramsci 1971) and the discourse of transnationalism. I have chosen these theoretical concepts to understand how Kurdish and Turkish transmigrants make sense of the mediated ethno-national conflict for hegemonic power. Anderson’s imagined community and Billig’s concept of banal nationalism explain the role of media in disseminating the idea of nationhood, its language, and meaning and also creating national consciousness within and beyond the nation-state territory. I am using Gramsci’s concept of hegemony to conceptualize the struggle for hegemony between the Turkish state and its ideological allies including transnationalized Turkish media and subordinated Kurds and their transnationalized media within and beyond the current territory of Turkey. These theoretical debates inform the analysis throughout the
thesis, though Gramsci’s notion of hegemony is given less weight than debates on nationalism and national discourse-oriented media.

Chapter II describes the methods used in this thesis and outlines the reasons for choosing them in order to explore the role of the Turkish and Kurdish media in national and ethnic identity construction among migrant audiences. It illustrates the direction in which I took my research, the problems I encountered and the original insights I gained from this work. Chapter III focuses on the origin of the Turkish and Kurdish ethno-national conflict and the role of the media in the conflict. Chapter IV presents an overview of the transnational conflict within Turkish and Kurdish communities in Germany, Sweden and the UK and their media consumption habits. Chapters V to VII focus on my empirical findings. Chapter V looks at the politicization, differentiation, deterritorialization and ethnicisation of Turkish and Kurdish migrants through mediatized political communication. Chapter VI focuses on an important media event that contributed to the polarization of Turkish and Kurdish migrants’ views of the conflict. This discusses representations of the capture of the PKK leader, Öcalan, in the Kurdish and Turkish media and the impact of these representations on Turkish and Kurdish migrants’ relationships in Europe. Chapter VII examines the mediated banal nationalism in the Turkish and Kurdish media. It looks at Turkish and Kurdish migrants’ interpretation of the political and social meanings of banal nationalist news. Chapter VIII is the conclusion, summarizing the thesis. It highlights the contribution of my research to academic debates, in particular about transnational media and nationalism.
Chapter I: “Nationalism has gone mobile”

Theoretical framework

1. Introduction

How can we make sense of the mobilization of Turkish and Kurdish migrants around homeland politics? What is the role of Turkish and Kurdish media in politically, culturally and ethnically re-constructing the migrants' identities in different nation states? The thesis will explore the politicization, differentiation, deterritorialization and ethnicisation of Turkish and Kurdish migrant identities in Europe. I begin by discussing theories of nationalism, following modernist approaches, in particular I critically use Benedict Anderson’s work on “imagined community” (Anderson 1991) and Michael Billig’s work on “banal nationalism” (1995). Both theories are helpful as they focus on the role of media dissemination for constructing and maintaining nationalism. The primary focus of the study is on the way these two ideas both complement and counteract each other in the construction of the Turkish and Kurdish identities of migrants in Europe.

The reason for applying Anderson’s concept of an imagined community to my thesis is that, as many scholars (Georgiou 2005, Karim 1998, Kosnick 2007, Tsagarousianou 2004) in the field of transnationalized media and migration have highlighted, many nation states try to project imagined communities through print language as well as via satellite television. The aims of Turkish state TRT also makes clear that they intend to build a Turkish imagined community of the homeland in different settlement countries (TRT 2006) (see chapter IV). Secondly, the media play an important role in creating a specific culture amongst migrants who consume different media from the “native” residents in the settlement countries. One of the striking elements of Turkish and Kurdish media products is their repeated deployment of national symbols and nationalist language which can be usefully theorized by Billig’s notion of “banal nationalism”. Through this media culture, migrants create their social,
cultural and political attachments. The media play an important role in shaping migrants’ ways of thinking. The media deployment of banal nationalism also shapes their feelings of belonging to their “homeland”, in particular where they are politically, economically and culturally excluded by settlement countries.

The third section explains the reasons for drawing on some useful insights from Gramsci about the nature of power and hegemony, and how this manifests itself through the media and in the relations between these communities. The fourth section discusses the relationship between nationalism and transnational communication, identities and politics. I argue that membership of an imagined community cannot be limited to a sovereign nation-state territory. Instead I suggest that communication technologies help to disseminate print in national languages and symbols, contributing to a new form of deterritorialized nationalism in the age of globalization. This is supported by Anderson’s recent acknowledgement that “Nationalism has gone mobile” (Anderson 2005).

2. Theoretical Debates about Nations and Nationalism

2.1. Primordialist and Modernist Approaches to the Study of Nationalism

The concepts of “nation” and “nationalism” have initiated a series of theoretical debates amongst scholars which are summarized in two distinct types of nationalism. The first type of nationalism is based on culture and tradition. In this view, the nation is an inclusive, taken-for-granted and natural community as well as “something sacred, eternal, organic, carrying a deeper justification than the works of men” (Kohn 1951:249). This view of nationalism was conceptualized by German romantic writers such as Herder, Fichte, Schlegel and Schleiermacher and influenced most of the primordialists including key writers like Smith (2001) and Hutchinson (2006). The second approach to nationalism foregrounds the role of the bureaucracy, the intelligentsia and communication technology in
constructing the political entity of a nation-state. This approach is taken by modernists and is “by and large rational rather than emotional” (Horace 1978:29).

2.1.1. Primordialists
The primordialists’ approach (Hutchinson 2000, Smith 2001) sees nation as “a named human population occupying an historic territory and sharing common myths and memories, a public culture, and common laws and customs for all members” (Smith 2003:37). Primordialists argue that nations emerged from pre-modern ethnic communities which shared a collective history, culture, language, religion, territory, myths and memories. The nation is primarily characterized as an anthropological phenomenon based on shared kinship and tradition (Geertz 1963). According to this perspective, nations occur naturally, and nationalism is not an ideology, but a “universal, natural” condition (Smith 1994:707) and instinctive social disposition of humankind. Thus nations are timeless.

The primordialist approach takes for granted the naturalness of feelings of national allegiance and therefore does not explore the role of states, media and other institutional actors in actively constructing such feelings of the nation (Anderson 1991). Moreover, the primordialist approach cannot explain that two or three different ethnic groups may use the same standardized language and share some of the same memories or myths. For example Scots, English and Irish use the same language, yet many members of these groups view themselves as forming distinct nations. Likewise Arab countries share a majority religion and use the same language. Nonetheless, they have created 22 states which see themselves as individual nation-states. Therefore it is useful to look for factors other than shared culture or language to understand nationalism.

The primordialists accept that culture and ethnic identities are changeable. But they suggest that these changeable cultural identities are distinctive of
the same ethnic group over time. This does not adequately explain why the boundaries of ethnic or cultural groups change (Puri 2004) and even sometimes overlap (Cohen 1978, Horowitz 1985). For example, after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, many Muslim Balkan populations migrated to Turkey without knowledge of the Turkish language or culture (Hirschon 2003). They were Muslims from the newly independent Balkan countries where they were not tolerated because of their religion. Yet, the newly created Turkish Republic treated them as ethnic Turks and integrated them. The Turkish state has resettled many of these immigrants in Kurdistan, as it was resettling parts of the Kurdish population in other parts of the Turkish Republic. By settling “Turkish” immigrants from the Balkans in Kurdish regions, the state intended to strengthen the Turkish identity of the populations in this region to achieve hegemony over other ethnic groups. But in some cases, the contrary happened and some of these immigrants were assimilated into the larger Kurdish population, eventually identifying as Kurds. Some of them even play an important role in developing Kurdish nationalism. These examples show the flexibility of boundaries of ethnic groups and the multiplicity of ethnic identity. Primordialist approaches which emphasize the stability of an ethnic group over long periods of time as the basis for nationalism do not adequately address this aspect of Kurdish and Turkish nationalism.

2.1.2. The Modernists
Modernist approaches to the study of nationalism are more useful for exploring the changing politicization of migrants’ ethnic identities through their engagement with media. The modernists consider the nation a political and ideological phenomenon, rather than a natural expression of human feelings of belonging (Anderson 1991, Billig 1995, Gellner 1983, Hobsbawm 1996, Hopkins and Reicher 1996, McCrone 1998). They emphasize that feelings of national identity or allegiance are not a given. They argue that the organization of political entities according to national boundaries cannot be taken for granted. Instead, they show how particular
actors, such as bureaucracies (Gellner 1983) or intellectuals (Hobsbawm 1992) made an effort to create a homogenized culture and anchor it in the idea of a shared national identity. They argue that industrial society, enlightenment and rationalization were important factors that contributed to the construction of the nation state.

Within the modernist approach to nationalism different theorists have emphasized different aspects as central to how the nation is socially constructed. Modernist approaches encompass functionalist views, such as Gellner's (1983) who consider the emergence of the nation and nation-state as a fulfillment of the economic and political demands of industrialization. Hobsbawm's (1992) more Marxist approach sees nations as “dual phenomena”, constructed from above and from below. Within the modernist approach, I have found Anderson’s and Billig’s work, which emphasize the role of media in nationalism particularly useful for my thesis.

2.2. Anderson's framework of “imagined communities”
Many scholars (Georgiou 2005, Karim 1998, Kosnick 2007, Tsagarousianou 2004) in the field of transnationalized media and migration have highlighted the role of sending states in attempting to build imagined communities through print media and satellite televisions. Migrants’ media culture is an important aspect contributing to the politicization of their ethnic identities.

Anderson agrees with other modernist theorists like Gellner, that nationalism is not a given but socially constructed: “[N]ationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist but it does need some pre-existing differentiating marks to work on” (Gellner 1983:169). However he refines this argument by pointing out that this does not mean that the nation is a “fabrication”. Instead he suggests that nationalism is a way of “imagining” the nation: “In fact, all
communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined” (Anderson 1991:6). Anderson argues that the key invention that facilitated large groups of people to imagine themselves as a nation was the newspaper.

Anderson was influenced by a Benjaminian perspective which is based on the notion of the role of mechanical reproduction and dissemination of commodified print language which he terms “print-capitalism”. Print-capitalism has an impact in creating and shaping the attitudes and worldview of people as it made it possible to spread literacy beyond the religious elites, and widely accessible in the languages spoken by the people, rather than in Latin. Anderson sees this as “revolutionary vernacularizing” (Anderson 1991:39) because print languages “created unified fields of exchanges and communication”, and “standardized national languages” above the spoken vernaculars.

As a result of linguistic standardization, people “became capable of comprehending one another via print and paper” and “gradually...hundreds of thousands, millions...” started to imagine themselves as part of a community (Anderson 1991:44). Secondly, print-capitalism “gave a new fixity to language, which, in the long run, helped to build that image of antiquity so central to the subjective idea of the nation” (Anderson 1991:44). Thirdly, “print-capitalism created languages of power of a kind different from older administrative vernaculars. Certain dialects [language] inevitably were 'closer' to each print language and dominated their final forms” (Anderson 1991:44). Such dialect was “correspondingly elevated to a new politico-cultural eminence” (Anderson 1991:45) and turned language into a tool to dominate and subsume the others which “were unsuccessful (or only relatively successful) in insisting on their own print-form” (Anderson 1991:45). The nations which were successful in creating their own print-languages actively discouraged attempts of failed nations to
develop publications in their own languages (Anderson 1991:45). In the meantime, other languages spoken in the territories claimed as belonging to the nation were targeted and banned from public use. This was intended to create unified fields of communication which were crucial to the imagining and establishing of nation-states (Anderson 1991:44). When discussing the historically later development of radio and television, he considers these to be even more influential than print media, owing to their easy access and large reach. This makes clear, how central media and language are in Anderson’s framework for understanding the nation and nationalism.

Beyond this, he outlines four key elements of his view of the nation:
1. Firstly, nations are imagined: “because members…will never know most of their fellow members…yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (Anderson 1991:6).
2. Secondly, the nation is limited “because even the largest of them . . . has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations”. Therefore, in the minds of nationalists, there must be others who do not belong to their nation and are, therefore, outsiders.
3. Thirdly, the nation is sovereign “because the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm…nations dream of being free…The gauge and emblem of this freedom is the sovereign state”.
4. Finally nation is a community “because…the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship…Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings” (Anderson 1991: 7).

I have adopted Anderson’s framework for the central role he gives to the media in forming nationalism. This guides my analysis of the ways in which
Kurdish and Turkish migrants’ ethnic identities have been politicized in the diaspora.

2.2.1. Refining Anderson’s framework
While Anderson’s framework has been highly influential, it was originally published in 1983 and other authors have built on this framework by criticizing some of its elements. In the following I review some main points of these critiques, as qualifying or further developing the concept of imagined communities rather than as invalidating it.

2.2.1.1 Ethnic Cores
The primordialist Smith (1983) criticizes Anderson for ignoring that nations have a history of “ethnic cores' consisting of a pre-existing kinship. He argues that nationalism is a product of a specific history, culture, traditions, ethnicity and every nationalist movement has its own specific historical circumstances. Therefore a general framework of nationalism can only be a “simplistic ascription” (Smith 1983:15). He argues that the “expressions of fervent attachment to the concept of the nation as a territorial-cultural and political community” go back as far as the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries 'in France, England ... as well as in Poland and Russia” (Smith 1998:137, also see Pittock 1999). While specific ethnic cores do not preclude developing a general framework for understanding nationalism, I think it is important to attend to the specific development of nationalism in each historical and geographic context. While feelings of allegiance cannot fully explain the rise of nationalism, in my analysis I pay attention to the emotions and feelings of belonging (See below, chapters III and VIII). These emotions are treated as important elements in producing and reproducing the nationalism of migrants through their engagement with the media, which in turn, produce or stoke such emotions.

2.2.1.2 Third World Nationalism: Model or Original
Anderson argues that one important way in which the model of nationalism spread was through colonialism. The colonial powers when exporting their
languages, education and capitalist system into the colonized world also brought nationalist ideas, literacy and modernity. This gave the colonies access to “the models of nationalism, nation-ness, and nation-state produced elsewhere in the course of the nineteenth century” (Anderson 1991:107). Chatterjee criticizes Anderson’s concept as oversimplifying the export of Western nationalism to post-colonial societies(1993, Chatterjee 1999). He argues that Anderson’s framework universalizes the development of European experiences and reduces the anti-colonial and post-colonial nationalist movements to a copy of the model of European nationalism. This ignores the role of nationalism as a tool against the colonial powers (cf. also Harootunian 1999, Itzigsohn and vom Hau 2006, Sommer 1999) He criticizes Anderson's framework as Eurocentric, encompassing all experiences as a “product of the political history of Europe”, (Chatterjee 1993:215) while the societies of the colonized world are cast as “perpetual consumers of modernity” (Chatterjee 1986: 38).

While arguing the nation is historical constructed and imagined by the intelligentsia and by popular mass nationalist movements as a homogenized society and culture in a single political entity, he emphasizes the different historical circumstances between colonial powers and the colonized world (Chatterjee 1999). Anderson acknowledged these criticisms in the 1991 edition of his book, revising as “hasty and superficial” his earlier view that “that the immediate genealogy should be traced to the imaginings of the colonial state” (Anderson 1991:163). Responding to postcolonial critics, he highlights the practice of cosmopolitanism in contemporary nationalism, however also states that he does not believe “that there is a distinctively Asian form of nationalism… One should also add that what people have considered to be East and West has varied substantially over time” (Anderson 2001: 31-32).

The postcolonial critique of Anderson’s framework is useful for my context,
as Chaterjee’s finding makes me mindful to consider the different circumstances of Turkish nationalism, which has been considered by some authors (McDowall 2004, Fernandes 2010) as a colonial enterprise, and Kurdish nationalism, which has been developed in resistance to national oppression.

2.2.1.3. Nationalism and Multilingualism

Anderson views the creation of a standardized language through print media as a key element for development of national consciousness. However, in much nationalism, in particular in the postcolonial world, a majority of people are multilingual. Segal and Handler (1992) challenge Anderson’s assumption that “a common language is a functional prerequisite for ‘communities’, whether imagined as sacred or national. This is, in effect, to treat (linguistic) homogeneity as a human norm and not as a contingent principle of the nationalist world view” Segal (Segal and Handler 1992:7, for a similar criticism cf. Hollinger 1999). This criticism applies to many national contexts, thus Switzerland has four official national languages while India recognizes forty-eight (Chatterjee 1986).

This criticism of Anderson’s framework is particularly apt in the context of Kurdish nationalism: Kurds have four different dialects Sorani, Kurmanji, Zazaki, Gorani. In addition, these dialects are not fully standardized and use different scripts: Latin, Cyrillic and Arabic. Despite this difficulty of developing a standardized print language, Kurds who speak different dialects and live in different nation states have developed a unified national consciousness. This was largely in response to the repression and racism that they experienced. In this sense, Chatterjee’s argument that collective resistance to dominant powers can fuel nationalism is an important qualifier to the central role Anderson’s framework assigns to a common standardized print language (1993).
However, I do not reject Anderson’s concept that the media connected people from different geographical spaces through feeling part of a nation because of their shared experiences (see chapter VI). However I qualify his argument by suggesting these do not need to be told in a single standardized print-language. Kurdish newspapers and satellite TV channels report similar news on the Kurds in their dialect. This shared news content created imagined shared experiences and awareness of Kurds in other parts of Kurdistan. The recent rapid development of satellite and internet media creating a Kurdish imagined community underlines the topical relevance of Anderson's emphasis on the role of media in creating nationalism. However, the case of the Kurds puts a question mark over the centrality of a single common language, and indeed Anderson acknowledges that “In a world in which the national state is the overwhelming norm, all of this means that nations can now be imagined without linguistic communality” (Anderson 1991:135). Indeed, in Turkey, the state’s policy of prohibiting the use of Kurdish in public (see Chapter III) has meant that Kurds are forced to use the Turkish language. Yet, even though they may share some mediated experiences with Turks, the Kurds have re-interpreted the meaning of belonging to the nation in an oppositional Kurdish nationalist way.

**2.2.1.4. Contestations of the imagined community**

One of the key elements of Anderson’s view of the nation is that it constitutes a *community* “conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship” (Anderson 1991:7). This perceived fraternity, according to Anderson is why people are prepared to die for the sake of the nation. But this comradeship is always conceived as problematic by excluded and subordinated social groups. Therefore, the nation is in “permanent crisis” (Chernilo 2006:15). In order to address this crisis, some nation states impose values, politics and cultural references to maintain or create a coherent internally homogeneous community. This is then legitimized through media and rituals of everyday life (Billig 1995). In particular in “ethno-centric nation-
building projects, which tend to marginalize or exclude the minorities,” (Yiftachel 1999:287) the nation-state uses coercive and consensual ways to maintain their imagined community. This process could be seen as a hegemonic struggle between dominant and subordinated groups.

These “horizontal ties” (McNeill 2001:342) are actively cultivated by states, for example through sports activities (King-White 2008). While this might be successful in some cases, Itzigsohn and vom Hau (2006:193) criticize Anderson for remaining “rather silent on explaining how national discourses are contested and how national inclusion - the question of who is a member and who can claim rights - evolves over time”. Their study on Mexico, Peru and Argentina’s subordinate people, indigenous ethnic groups, and excluded elites shows that official national ideologies “cause conflicts between states and movements of subordinate actors and alternative elites (…). Internal cleavages differentiate between strong and weak citizens; the latter being those groups that are marked as not fully belonging to the national community” (Itzigsohn and vom Hau 2006:194-195, also see Lomnitz 2001).

The weak citizens’ linguistic and ethnic differences are seen as potential danger to the imagined community. This leads to hegemonic struggles over the internal and external boundaries of ethno-national political projects, so that subaltern and dominant political projects are in “contestation and negotiation” (Itzigsohn and vom Hau 2006:194 – 195, cf. Lomnitz 2001). The subordinated or “[e]xcluded groups, such as ethnic or racial minorities or immigrants, often put forward alternative visions of the nation that aim to reshape established national imageries and to expand its internal boundaries” (Itzigsohn – and vom Hau 2006:196). Indeed, subordinated ethnic groups can mobilize to resist the dominant group’s hegemonic construction of the imagined community. While Anderson acknowledges “old nations”, once thought of as fully fledged, find
themselves challenged by sub-nationalisms within their borders, (Anderson 1991:6) he merely uses this to emphasise the ubiquity of the nation as a form of social organization, rather than seeing it as systemically liable to contestation from its internally subordinated “other(s)”. In this thesis I draw on critiques of Anderson which explore nationalism in a “dynamic, multi-ethnic setting” (Elmhirst 1999:814).

2.2.1.5. Postmodern critics
Modernists have approached the nation as linear, internally homogeneous, stable, bounded and inclusive. However economic and cultural globalization has challenged “the era of the pure national” (Rantanen 2002:139). The mobility of millions of people, the rapid development of communication and transport technologies have impacted on nations and nationalism. Some researchers, taking a postmodern approach, question the very concept of the nation-state: “the nation-state has always been historically opaque, sociologically uncertain and normatively ambivalent” (Chernilo 2006:15). They argue that with the process of globalization, and the deterritorializing impulse of socio-cultural, economic and human mobility, the concept of nation-state has been challenged by an increasing cosmopolitanism (Papastergiadis 2000, Rantanen 2002, Woodward 1997). Instead of focusing on the construction of nations, post-modernist approaches highlight the hybridity of identities and cultures’ interaction, (Chambers 2009, Papastergiadis 2000), mobilities of people (Chambers 2009, Papastergiadis 2000), practices of cross-cultural engagement (Lamont 2000), recognizing multiple identities (Held 2002), rhizomes (Appadurai 2003). Others, suggest that globalization and nationalism should be seen as “co-original and in co-evolution rather than two opposing forces” (Chernilo 2006:16).

Yet, while globalization, and especially migration and transnational communication are important phenomena, this has not made nations less important. Instead, this thesis is concerned with how nationalism is being reconstructed through transnational media in the lives of migrants. Even in
today’s globalizing world, nations remain the main democratically legitimated source of political authority in everyday life domestically and in international relations.

2.3. Billig’s Framework of Banal Nationalism

Billig’s influential work examines the everyday forms through which nationhood is re-produced, disseminated and negotiated in routine written and visual texts. He looks in particular at media, national symbols, signs and speeches of politicians. The media play a crucial role in designing the style in which the nation is imagined. The media are an authorized national reminder creating national consciousness and belonging in everyday life. They “operate directly, through their messages, stereotypes and deictics” (Billig 1995:124). In contrast most studies of nationalism focus on the origin and rise of the nation-state and nationalist ideology, (Smith, 2004, Gellner, 1983, Anderson 1991) but not on how these are reproduced and disseminated in everyday life.

While extending Anderson’s concept of the imagined community, Billig explains how the imagined community and people’s attachment to the nation are sustained. Contrary to the view that nationalism takes place during periods of “extraordinary emotional mood, striking at extraordinary times” or is a phenomenon of “blood and soil”, “dangerously irrational, surplus and alien,” (1995:55) he shows how banal and unworthy of comment it is:

“The ideological habits, by which our nations are reproduced as nations, are unnamed and therefore unnoticed. The national flag hanging outside a public building in the United States attracts no special attention. It belongs to no special, sociological genus. Having no name, it cannot be identified as a problem. Nor, by implication, is the daily reproduction of the United States a problem” (Billig 1995:6).

Standard definitions tend to locate nationalism as “something beyond the
established nation-state” (Billig 995:43), while the label of “patriotism” is attached to the nationalisms of established Western nation-states. In so far as nationalism is acknowledged in Western democratic nation-states, it is often seen as the province only of the far right. In contrast Billig argues that nationalism is an “endemic condition” (Billig 1995:6), “the surface of contemporary life”, (Billig 1995:93) and an ideology which has become common sense (in Gramsci’s sense see Billig 1991:7). Nationalism, Billig argues, is reproduced in different “hot” or “banal” form in different political geographies. It is a taken-for-granted part of a collective group and personal identity. National identity is a “form of life which is daily lived in a world of nation states” (1995:68) that has to be reproduced as well as “emotionally driven” (Billig 1995:44). While Billig acknowledges the existence of “hot” nationalism that is explicit and erupts in times of crisis, he is most concerned with exploring the workings of the “banal” form.

“Banal nationalism”, refers to the repetition and routine diffusion of symbols of nationalism through the media, consumer culture and other areas of social life. Members of the imagined community are faced with “often unnoticed” nationalist symbols and expressions in everyday life, disseminated by the media and politicians in established, democratic nations (Billig 1995:93). The media and politicians adopt a distancing rhetoric in using personal collective pronouns such as “we” vs. “them”, “our” vs. “their”. By drawing these boundaries of “us” and “them”, banal nationalism discursively produces belonging to the nation and exclusion from it. Billig shows that the idea of nationhood is reproduced in everyday media discourse through 'unmemorable clichés' that are taken seriously 'because of, not despite, their rhetorical dullness” (Billig 1995:93). Media routinely reproduce and disseminate a distancing rhetoric in the design of reporting on “home” and “foreign” news. News items are flagged up in terms of their relevance to “us”. In addition, a wide range of media texts address a national audience by using this deictic language of “we”, “our”,

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“us” and “here” to signify the nation (Billig 1995:105). It is the very unobtrusive and taken-for-granted repetition of these nationalist symbols that makes them so effective in producing and reproducing a national consciousness “that embraces a complex set of themes about ‘us’, ‘our homeland’, ‘nation’ (‘ours and ‘theirs’), the ‘world’, as well as the morality of national duty and honour” (1995:4).

The ubiquity of nationalist symbols and language suggests that the nation is already established and simply reproduces itself through the repetition of national symbols. Instead, banal nationalism should be seen as a way of constructing and establishing the nation in an ongoing struggle. The process of creating a nation “is a struggle for the monopoly of the means of violence. What is being created – a nation-state - is itself a means of violence. The triumph of a particular nationalism is seldom achieved without the defeat of an alternative nationalism and other ways of imagining peoplehood” (Billig 1995:28).

2.3.1. Refining Billig’s framework of Banal Nationalism

While critically applying the concept of banal nationalism to examine the media’s role in reproducing Turkish and Kurdish nationalism critically, I address some criticisms of Billig’s theory as they have emerged in the literature and my own work.

2.3.1.1. Internal diversity

Billig does not pay enough attention to the differences within the national community. People identify with the nation and its symbols to different degrees, reflecting differences in their social position according to class, gender, age, education, sexual orientation, ethnicity and faith. Moreover, the political views of newspapers and the ways in which they reproduce the nation differ from one another. For example, the empirical application of his theory to the British media ignores its complexity and internal diversity: (Conboy 2006, Gripsrud 2002, Harries and Wahl-
the distinctive features of Englishness, Scottishness (Schlesinger 1998) and Welshness (Jones and Desforges 2003), fragmented Northern Irishness, working class and middle class cultures (Conboy 2006, Tunstall 1996, Gripsrud 2002, Harries and Wahl-Jorgensen 2007) and the way different media target particular audiences through specific use of deixis and symbols. The issue of internal diversity is not specific to the British media, but also applies to Spain (Crameri 2000), Switzerland (van den Bulck and van Poecke 1996), Belgium (Van den Bulck 2001, Dhoest 2004) and Canada (Raboy 1986).

2.3.1.2. Oppositional Readings
All written and visual texts have many possible meanings (Prosser 1998). Symbols and meanings of the nation are not interpreted and experienced in the same way by all members of a nation. While, to some people, the nation is commonsense, others are critical of it and its symbols on a daily basis (Whitehead 2005). Condor’s research on Englishness shows that her interview partners use banal nationalist terms such as “this country” in their everyday conversation (1996). While this confirms Billig’s theory that “in both lay and social scientific discourse – the construct of nation is often accepted and reproduced mindlessly and uncritically” (Condor 2000:177) the interviewees were reluctant to use patriotic pride explicitly. They were critical of some nationalistic terms. This shows that audiences engage in complex ways with banal nationalism in media texts. My empirical data also shows that there is not one standard response, that Kurdish and Turkish audiences have complex and multiple understandings of banal nationalist signifiers.

National media do not reproduce banal nationalism evenly among their audiences. The media’s distancing rhetoric can create oppositional identifications amongst audiences which have been ethnicized or racialized. Ethnic minorities and migrants can have an “oppositional
reading” (Hall 1973) of the written and audio-visual texts that is different from those of the ethnic majority, in particular if the mainstream media targets them (Fenton 2007). My empirical data from three countries shows that many Kurds complain about the discriminatory language used by the Turkish media which depicts them in various negative, stereotypical ways. This racist portrayal aims to make them feel ashamed of their identity and accept the dominant ethnic identity. However my research also shows that these negative depictions of Kurds in the Turkish media create an oppositional reading amongst Kurdish audiences and contribute to them embracing a Kurdish national consciousness.

2.3.1.3. Transnational media and globalization

Billig’s theory does not engage with the construction of the nation in the diaspora via satellite TV and the internet which has led to the emergence of “[d]eterritorialised, virtual nationalism” (Eriksen 2007:15) among diasporas (See chapter VII).

As Erikson argues:

“It can no longer be taken for granted that the people who identify with a given nation inhabit the same space, nor can it be assumed that cultural homogenization takes place at the level of the nation through mass media” (Erikson 2007:1).

As Saunders’ (2008) work on Russian minorities in the newly independent countries shows, rather than engaging with Russian media, they engage with Western countries’ English language media because they think that they can build their future in Europe through their English skills.

Billig pays little attention to the transnational media, simply perceiving globalization as “the global transmission of American culture” (1995:149). He views transnational flows of information and culture as extending “what is essentially an American conception of the world” (Billig 1995). However research by Hafiz (2002), Kosnick (2007) and Madianou (2005) shows
that many migrants in Europe turn their satellite dishes towards cultural programming outside of America or the West. These media consumption practices, albeit highly contested, serve “as markers of difference, reminders of the other within the “mythically homogeneous nation-state” (Madianou 2005:534).

Drawing on research about media use of Palestinians in Israel, Edensor suggests that

“Globalization and national identity should not be conceived of in binary terms but as two inextricably linked processes. . . . As global cultural flows become more extensive, they facilitate the expansion of national identities and also provide cultural resources which can be domesticated, enfolded within popular and everyday national cultures . . . global processes may diminish a sense of national identity or reinforce it” (2002:29).

This means that transnational media add a new dimension to the construction of national identities.

2.3.1.4. The blurred boundary between “hot” and “banal” nationalism
The development of communication and transport technologies made possible the mobility of people and culture and has deterritorialized identities, cultures and media consumption. This has led scholars to debate the role of modernity in the constitution of nationalism. Some show that the nation does not develop in a linear way (Papastergiadis 2000). Instead, they propose that the nation-state is in “permanent crisis” (Chernilo 2006:15). In response to these crises, states propagate a national identity in order to stabilize and naturalize the nation. Different agencies and institutions try to create an “essentialist conception of both society and social agency” (Laclau 1990:89) by reminding citizens of their belonging and responsibilities towards the nation. Billig sees “established, democratic nations” (1995:93) as characterized by banal nationalism and a relative absence of hot nationalism. However he ignores the nationalist and
racist tendencies within “established, democratic nations” which indeed can be seen as “hot” nationalism.

Contrary to this net distinction, banal forms of nationalism are an important aspect of maintaining national identity in non-Western nation-states such as Turkey. Billig rightly states that

“as a nation-state becomes established in its sovereignty, and if it faces little internal challenge, then the symbols of nationhood, which might once have been consciously displayed, do not disappear from sight, but instead become absorbed into the environment of the established homeland. There is, then, a movement from symbolic mindfulness to mindlessness” (1995:41).

This same development holds true for non-established and undemocratic states like Turkey or for stateless nations such as Quebec or Catalan (Gade 2003), Basque lands (Raento 1997), and Kurdish nationalism (Keles et al. 2010). My research shows that Kurds make use of both banal and hot forms of nationalism to construct national unity and solidarity. They mobilize tens of thousands of protesters for marches and activities through nationalist symbols, songs, flags, maps and speeches.

3. Gramsci’s concept of hegemony
The Gramscian concept of hegemony has been widely regarded as a critical evolution from the “economic determinism” associated with Marxist theory. Marxist historical materialism posits a social structure of base and superstructure. The notion of base covers forces of production (means of production and relations of production). These material relations are seen as determining all aspects of life in a society including ways of thinking and acting, political and ideological relations. These latter form the superstructure. Marx and Engels made clear this: … relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real base, on which rise legal and political superstructures and to which correspond definite forms
of social consciousness” (Marx 1993).

This approach has been criticized as simplistic, as it “tends to see all other dimensions of the social formation as simply mirroring 'the economic'” (Hall 1986:8). Gramsci’s analysis was prompted by the experience of fascism in the 1930s and “the failure of the Western European working-class movements” (Gitlin 1979:516) to resist it. Gramsci focused on the role of superstructure and developed a social and cultural approach, in contrast to the Marxist understanding of the primary role of economic crises in subverting capitalism. As opposed to this, Gramsci explored the role of the superstructural institutions (norms, ideas and ideologies) in the fight against existing structures alongside the economic relations. While other Marxists had considered culture as 'ancillary' to the political struggle, Gramsci considered culture as politically significant as economic domination in the ruling class’s quest for intellectual and moral leadership.

He drew on Marxist ideas but paid attention to the much neglected role of the superstructure as the arena where

“dominant groups in society, including fundamentally but not exclusively the ruling class, maintain their dominance by securing the 'spontaneous consent' of subordinate groups, including the working class, through the negotiated construction of a political and ideological consensus which incorporates both dominant and dominated groups” (Strinati 1995:165).

While Lenin had previously used the term hegemony to refer to the political and ideological leadership of the proletariat in socialist revolution (Joseph 2000). Gramsci’s concept of hegemony differed from this. He considered hegemony the struggle of the dominant group for a position of ideological domination which would enable it to succeed in enacting its power over subaltern social groups. Gramsci was concerned with power relations between social groups, rather than just social classes, in capitalist society.
(Hall 1986:16). He suggested that a social group “becomes dominant when it exercises power, but even if it holds it firmly in its grasp, it must continue to “lead” as well” (Gramsci 1971:57–58).

According to Gramsci, dominating a social group requires two types of control. The first, coercion manifests itself through direct, physical force and a “set of social institutions and practices” (Litowitz 2000:530) that authorize and legitimate the dominant social group through the army, police and courts. Secondly, consent which embraces a complex set of civil society institutions. It relates to the dissemination of the dominant group’s belief system and values through education, the media and popular culture which produces a structure “in which a certain way of life and thought is dominant” (Williams 1960:587). In particular, it “involves subduing and co-opting dissenting voices through the subtle dissemination of the dominant group’s perspective as universal and natural, to the point where the dominant beliefs and practices become an intractable component of common sense” (Litowitz 2000:515).

Gramsci (1971:419) characterized common sense as a

“conception which, even in the brain of one individual, is fragmentary, incoherent and inconsequential, in conformity with the social and cultural position of those masses whose philosophy it is……..not something rigid and immobile, but is continually transforming itself, enriching itself with scientific ideas and with philosophical opinions which have entered ordinary life” (Gramsci 1971:326).

Common sense is a key means to form consent and achieve hegemony. Therefore, “Common sense is negotiated by unequal forces in a complex process through which the subordination and resistance of the workers are created and recreated” (Exoo 1987:6). Hall (1983) suggests that this argument can be applied to other social groups of unequal power, not only to classes. Thus, the Gramscian notion of common sense is useful in
conceptualizing Turkish nationalism: how it is constructed as common sense, disseminated by the state, widely reproduced in Turkish civil society, and accepted and taken for granted, even by subordinated ethnic groups like the Kurds. The media play a key role as the “key terrain where ‘consent’ is won or lost”, (Hall et al. 1978:220) in rendering Turkish nationalism as common sense.

The common sense of the ruling class is accepted by subordinated groups, too, who believe that the values, ideology and the economic and political system of the ruling group is also to their benefit. This means that hegemony relies on a shared common sense. This leads to a politically and culturally unified society which gives consent to be governed.

The moment of “hegemony” transcends “the corporate limits of purely economic class and can and must become the interest of other subordinate groups too”. In this moment, hegemony begins to “propagate itself throughout society ….. bringing about not only a unison of economic and political aims but also intellectual and moral unity” (Gramsci 1971:181-182). It is this process of the co-ordination of the interests of a dominant group with the general interests of the subordinate groups, that constitutes hegemony of a particular historical bloc (Gramsci 1971:181-182). It is only in such moments of “national popular” unity that the formation of what Gramsci calls a” collective will” becomes possible(Ives 2004).

3.1. Civil society and state
Gramsci reinterpreted the Hegelian conception of the “ethical state” from a Marxist perspective. He developed the notion of “political society”, which is a realm of coercion and the notion of “civil society”, which he saw as the sphere where the struggle for hegemony takes place. These two spheres are understood as interrelated as the state protects “hegemony (…) by the armour of coercion” (Gramsci 1971:263).

“The apparatus of state coercive power legally enforces discipline on those groups who do not consent either actively or passively. This apparatus
is, however, constituted for the whole of society in anticipation of moments of crisis of command and direction when spontaneous consent has failed” (Gramsci 1988:307).

He formulated the interlocked relationship between state and civil society as follows “one might say that State = political society + civil society” Gramsci associated physical force with the public sphere denoted as “political society” (Gramsci 1971:160) and hegemony with the “civil society”, but he cautions that the separation of public (state) and private (civil society) is “purely methodological” rather than “organic” (Gramsci 1971:159-160) since both spheres “form part of a totality” (Litowitz 2000:526) and most states combine elements of both (Gramsci 1977:1590). So the state plays an important role in establishing a historical bloc through institutions and alliances of social groups through consent, or force to maintain its domination. He made clear that the state cannot achieve hegemony only through controlling the economic system but also needs to control political and cultural belief systems and reproduce this order within all elements of society “through so-called private organizations, such as the Church, trade unions, schools” (Gramsci 1971:137).

3.2. Gramscian ideas beyond Gramsci
A few key issues in the reception of Gramsci’s ideas provide a context for my thesis. The New Left movement of the 1960s and increasingly the 1970s employed Gramsci’s work to examine the increase of ideological, political and cultural domination of ruling class over all elements of society and the role of the state and its institutions in creating consent through civil society. British intellectuals of the Left developed Gramsci’s thoughts in applying his concepts to analyzing the social formation in British history (1980, Anderson 1976, Nairn 2003 [1977]) social movements (Thompson 1991) and the role of culture as a determining force in its own right (Williams 1977). In particular, during the Thatcher era, scholars such as
Hall applied the concept of hegemony to analyze the success of a new radical conservatism. More generally Williams (1977) Hobsbawm (1982), Hall (1983), and Thompson (1991) used Gramscian ideas for a productive debate about the relations between economic base and cultural superstructure and the dichotomy between agency and structure. Hall’s work employed Gramsci’s concept of hegemony to analyze the ways in which the British media established a common sense about ethnicity and race (Hall 1983:1). He pointed out the significance of articulation, negotiation and cultural struggles over meaning for understanding the ideological role of the news. This made an important contribution to expanding the use of Gramsci’s thought from an engagement with class relations to wider relations of domination.

An important point of debate among scholars of Gramsci has been whether he overemphasized the superstructure. Indeed he has been considered by some as a theoretician of the “superstructure” (Bobbio 1987). However Hall (1986) makes a critique of the reduction of Gramsci’s notion of hegemony to its ideological dimensions, recalling his insistence that: “though hegemony is ethical-political, it must also be economic, must necessarily be based on the decisive function exercised by the leading group in the decisive nucleus of economic activity” (Gramsci1971:161).

It has often been noted that Gramsci’s work is not always coherent and can be read in multiple interpretations. Thus, Hall states that “not only are the writings scattered; they are often fragmentary in form rather than sustained pieces of writing” (Hall 1986:6). One reason for this is likely to be the conditions of censorship under which he wrote in prison. This can account for the way the term hegemony in the Prison Notebooks has various, and sometimes conflicting meanings. It refers to the relationship between state and civil society where exactly hegemony operates (Anderson 1976:12–13), it is used as the opposite of domination (Gramsci
1971:12), sometimes to explain the creation, reproduction and maintenance of moral and intellectual leadership (Hoare and Smith 1971:xiv), or to refer to the practices of the ruling class with the purpose of constructing and establishing a “collective will” and consent (Ives 2004). Another issue raised by scholars of the Foucault school is aspects of the relationship of the state and civil society which are highly relevant today that Gramsci did not address. By privileging civil society as the site where hegemony is produced, he does not offer concepts for theorizing either “the process of penetration of civil society by agencies of government’ or non-governmental form of control” (Alonso 1994:381).

Gramsci’s concept of hegemony allows us to develop a “critical engagement” (Zompetti 1997:74) with power relations between differently positioned social, cultural and economic groups. This can go beyond an analysis of class relations and explore the domination in the context of “race”, ethnicity and gender as scholars such as Hall (1986), Laclau and Mouffe have shown. Laclau and Mouffe (1985) use the concept of hegemony “to explore forms of social and political domination arising from culture, gender and other sources that are allegedly non-, or only tangentially, economic or class based in origin, if not in effect”(Bellamy 2001:209). They suggest that the notion of hegemony is useful to explore and actively advance struggles for democratic participation and recognition of subordinated ethnicized and gendered groups. Their revised concept of hegemony is meant as a “useful instrument in the struggle for a radical, libertarian and plural democracy” (Laclau and Mouffe 1985:4). Ferguson (2006:109) suggests that Gramsci’s concept of hegemony is relevant to “forms of resistance—along lines not only of race and class . . . but also of gender, sexuality, and so on. Gramsci’s brilliant topographic imagination may be a guide to this new political world, but only if we are willing to update our maps".
In the field of International Relations there have been controversial debates about the extent to which the concept of hegemony can help to understand the tensions between structure and agency. Some argue that the concept of hegemony draws attention to agency while neglecting structure (Joseph 2009). Yet, Joseph stresses that hegemony is a more complex concept than these debates imply (2009). Hegemony “is more than just material capabilities or intersubjective agreement, although these ideas capture a part of what hegemony is about” (Joseph 2008:110). He elaborates the concept of hegemony in the context of realist approaches “to stress that hegemony (whether in IR theory or more generally) has to be considered in relation to underlying social structure” (Joseph 2008:109). In his take, hegemony is there “to represent the political (or we might also say agential) moment in the reproduction of social structures. It is crucial to the political mediation between structure and agency” (Joseph 2008:110).

The neo-Gramscian Robert Cox (1983) takes the concept beyond hegemonic struggle within a nation state to a global stage. He uses the concept of hegemony to conceptualize the role of transnational organizations in constructing hegemony over less powerful states e.g. IMF or WTO in the “world order”. In International Relations a neo-Gramscian approach has employed the notion of hegemony to examine the dominance of super powers over other states, using political, economic and military power to create consent for this domination (Cox 1981, also see Gill 1993, Gilpin 1981, Kindleberger 1981, Modelski 1990, Murphy 1994, van der Pijl 1984). While my thesis does not focus on these international power relations, it is important to note that other research has used the concept of hegemony for research in a transnational frame.

3.3. The relevance of Gramscian concepts to the thesis
Hall (1986:8) argues that Gramsci’s theorizing is relevant for the study of race and ethnicity, even though Gramsci did not specifically write about
“race, ethnicity or racism in their contemporary meanings or manifestations”. However Gramsci’s work offers a non-reductive approach to region, religion, culture, class and ethnicity (Hall 1983). According to Hall, the notion of hegemony is particularly useful for understanding issues of ethnicity, “race” and racism, because of its “multi-dimensional, multi-arena character”. The notion of hegemony encompasses not only the “economic and administrative fields alone, but encompasses the critical domains of cultural, moral, ethical and intellectual leadership”. The notion of hegemony pays attention to the positioning of subordinated social groups beyond “limits of purely economic solidarity”. In this sense, Hall argues that Gramsci’s concept can be fruitfully employed to examine the hegemonic struggle between ethno-national groups.

As Joseph argues imagining a national community has been a way the nation-state has achieved hegemony:

“Since early modernity, hegemony has been connected to the national project. And while the nation is connected to the state ..., it is also connected to a wider forging of identity around social, political, historical, cultural and economic factors. Nationalist ideologies must therefore be seen as attempts to mobilize support around a national project... By constructing a social project around the nation-state, nationalism can act in passing off the interests of a certain group as the national interest, in constructing belief in a shared community that cuts across notions of class and other forms of social stratification. The ideology of nationalism therefore acts to legitimate the political practice of a leading group, and its struggle either to maintain power or to achieve it. It may, however, take on contradictory forms according to its social base and the dynamics of struggle. We have seen recently in former-Yugoslavia how in some cases nationalist movements would seem to create their own basis or even their own nation” (2002:136).

However, he also shows that challenges to this nationalist common sense
from other groups who create their own nationalist imagination can be seen as struggles for hegemony. It is in this sense that I employ the term to explore how Kurdish and Turkish transnational media create a nationalist common sense and try to mobilize support among migrants in Europe.

A Gramscian conception of the interrelationship between state and civil society is very relevant to understanding the situation in Turkey, where there is a strong interplay of the media and state coercive bodies – the military and judicial system around nationalism (see chapter III). In Turkey large parts of the media and civil society concur with the state’s official ideology to legitimize and disseminate a nationalist common sense that only accepts Turkishness as a legitimate national identity within the state. Alonso argues that “the equation of the dominant ethnic identity with the core of the nation, and the location of subordinated ethnic identities at its peripheries, is secured partly through differential power over private and public spaces” (1994:382)

So according to Gramsci, the dominant group creates an alliance and forms compromises with different social groups to establish hegemony. The alliance of these social forces can be defined as a “historical bloc” (Gramsci 1971:366). A historical bloc reproduces and disseminates a national social order. It makes it possible to create and reproduce a nationalist common sense and establish moral and intellectual dominance over subordinated people by force or consent. Joseph (2002:32) would argue that “the state provides the institutional framework for the implementation of hegemonic projects” and secures “the unity of the ruling bloc”. This conceptualization helps in understanding the Turkish nationalist common sense, and the ways in which Kurdish nationalist projects challenge it through hegemonic struggles for the recognition of Kurdishness.
However Gramsci also theorized how subordinated groups (workers) can develop their resistance or counter hegemony in a “war of position” within civil society against the existing hegemony (Pratt 2004). This approach is relevant to analyzing the challenges of Kurdish nationalism. Counter hegemony can be understood as resistance through the juxtaposition of a subordinated group’s common sense to that of the dominant historical bloc. Gramsci differentiates two types of struggles: war of manoeuvre (“frontal attack” (Gramsci 1971:238) or “sudden incursion” (Gramsci 1971:234) “where everything is condensed into one front and one moment of struggle and there is a single, strategic breach in the “enemy’s defences” which, once made, enables the new forces “to rush in and obtain a definitive (strategic) victory” (Gramsci 1971:233, Hall 1983:5). This is related to “more of a tactical than a strategic function” (Gramsci 1971:235). The second type of struggle is “war of position” “which has to be conducted in a protracted way, across many different and varying fronts of struggle; where there is rarely a single break-through (Hall 1983:5) and “this strategy requires steady penetration and subversion of the complex and multiple mechanisms of ideological diffusion” (Femia 1981:52). The war of position consists of “a concrete programme which engenders widespread consent and a system of alliances under its hegemony” (Showstack Sassoon 1987:214). However this process requires a long time to “to occupy or create new spaces for alternative identities, moralities, and ways of life within the limits of existing social, economic, and state structures” (Carroll and Ratner 1999:4). In the case of Kurdish nationalism, the research focuses on the “war of position” rather than the “war of manoeuvre”.

Anderson and Billig’s work focuses on the establishment and maintenance of nationalism but fails to consider how subordinated nationalist projects might challenge the dominant nationalist project. Anderson excludes the potential threats of “others” juxtaposing their imagined community or how the dominant group oppresses, subjects or excludes social groups to
create a unified national print language and reproduce the dominant 
language and culture. These assimilative and eliminationist policies cause 
an “inevitable site of ideological struggle” (Fiske 1992:291). between 
“ethno-centric nation-building projects” and subordinated or excluded 
minorities (Yiftachel 1999:287).

Different studies on Indonesia (Elmhirst 1999, Fachry 1997, Hefner 1989), 
Latin America (Escolar 2001, Gutierrez 1999, Itzigsohn and vom Hau 
Yegen 2007) show that “sub-nationalisms” (Anderson 1991:6) also 
challenge the hegemonic discourse in several ways which lead to 
permanent crises (Chernilo 2006:15) for the “fully consolidated” imagined 
communities (Anderson 1991:6). One response that states can take to 
achieve national cohesion is to create a civil nationalism or a federative 
system. However another possible response to subnationalism by the 
state is the use of coercive control and consent for the hegemonic project 
of an internally homogeneous national community. However such coercive 
policies can contribute to a collective rejection of the dominant national 
project by subordinated groups. This can take place within the state 
territory but also, and perhaps more easily, in the diaspora where 
contested and alternative media discourses can flourish outside the control 
of the dominant nation state. In particular satellite TV has created a civil 
society in the sky, simultaneously contributing to the permanent crises of 
fully consolidated nation states.

In summary, in my research I apply Gramsci’s theory to conceptualize 
(a) the exercise of ideological power through coercion and consent in the 
context of the Turkish state and Turkish media. While the Turkish media is 
diverse, Kurdish issues are represented uniformly so a strong common 
sense prevails across otherwise differentiated media.
(b) the relationship between state and civil society including Turkish and Kurdish political parties, NGOs, media in Turkey and in Europe.
(c) the Kurdish challenge to the “supremacy of a social group”, which “manifests itself in two ways, as ‘domination’ ” and as “intellectual and moral leadership” (Gramsci 1971:57).
(d) the political and ideological impact of the negotiated power struggle in changing both nationalist groups: their concepts, tactics, values, symbols and dreams.
(e) the role of “intellectual and moral leadership” in the cultural and political reproduction of the hegemonic form of “Turkishness” and counter hegemonic “Kurdishness” through the politicized process of producing meanings by the media in Turkey and Europe.

4. Diaspora, Transnational Discourse and the role of the Media
In recent times, many academics (Basch et al. 1994, Baumann 2000, Erel 2009, Pries 2002, Safran 1991, Soysal 2000, Wahlbeck 1998c) have discussed new theories of the formation of migrant political, economic and cultural movements, the decline of citizenship and challenges to the nation-state posed by diasporas and “transnational communities”. The thesis explores this theoretical debate and the relationship of transnationalism theory to the phenomenon of the media promoting and reproducing a particular concept of the “nation” and “nationhood” outside of their national borders in the states of settlement among the migrant communities in the diaspora.

4.1. Concepts of the diaspora and transnationalism

4.1.1. Diaspora
Diaspora is a Greek word meaning to scatter abroad. It commonly referred to the scattering of people away from an established or ancestral homeland (Jews, Armenians, Greeks, and Africans) (Cohen 1997, Chaliand and Rageau 1995, Green 1998 ). However the concept has been revised since the 1980s to define the dynamics of dispersal of a range of
ethnic minorities living in countries of settlement and thus has also been applied to Kurds (Clifford 1994, Esman 2009, Esman 1986, McDowall 2004, Safran 1991). The contemporary meaning is applied to research on immigrants’ everyday life and their social, ethno-political and cultural position in the “host” countries as well as their relationship with their homeland (Sheffer 1986b, Bruneau 1995). This has represented a shift away from earlier studies on immigrants mainly concerned with integration into the host country, echoing the general expectation that immigrant groups would “shed their ethnic identity and assimilate to local norms” (Shuval 2002:44).

However, there has been much debate about the concept of diaspora. Key arguments that scholars have put forward to explain diasporic identifications have been the role of collective memory, shared loyalties and attachments to particularity (ies) (Safran 1991, Bruneau 1995, Cohen 1997). Therefore, a key aspect of diasporas has been identified as a strong ethnic group consciousness. Yet, scholars differentiate different types of diasporas according to the key reasons for forming them. Research has distinguished between political, entrepreneurial and religious diasporas (Bruneau 1995). Labour migration, the formation of empires (e.g. British), trade, and victim diasporas (Chaliand and Rageau 1995, Cohen 1997, Cohen 1997, Safran 1991, Van Hear 1998) also characterize the formation of diasporic groups.

The classic definition of the diaspora connoted “forced expulsion and dispersal, persecution, a sense of loss, and a vision of return,” (Vertovec 2005:1) in particular the Jews, Armenians, Greeks and also Kurds and Palestinians. Certainly these issues might describe to some extent the situation of these groups, in particular with respect to displacement, pain and trauma. The term diaspora often evokes a sense of loss and related struggles for justice and recognition. Therefore the notion of diaspora has
“acquired a more sinister and brutal meaning. Diaspora meant a collective trauma, banishment into exile, and a heart-aching longing to return home” (Cohen 1997: ix).

Yet, in recent debates, diaspora has been used to describe migrants’ maintenance of strong links with a real or imagined home country more generally. For example Safran (1991) describes the diaspora as “a metaphoric designation’. It could be applied to expatriate minority communities and “wider categories which reflect processes of politically motivated uprooting and moving of populations, voluntary migration, global communications and transport… The term… encompasses a motley array of groups such as political refugees, alien residents, guest workers, immigrants, expellees, ethnic and racial minorities, overseas communities” (Shuval 2000). Esman restricts the definition of diaspora to:

“a minority ethnic group of migrant origin which maintains sentimental or material links [with their homeland], either because of social exclusion, internal cohesion or other geo-political factors. It is never assimilated into the whole society but in time, develops a diasporic consciousness which carries out a collective sharing of space with others” (Esman 1986:316).

While the notion of diasporas had previously been applied mainly to particular ethnic and national groups, recent scholarship refers to a wider range of “self-defined diasporas” (Vertovec 2005:2, Butler 2001:2) or “modern diasporas”, (Sheffer 1986a) “communities that scholars had once labeled as immigrants, “(Butler 2001:3) who recreate new ethnic and religious spaces in settlement countries while simultaneously reconnecting emotionally, politically and culturally through travel and media to “their” real, or imagined, home country. In comparison to previous generations, the “proliferation of global communications has also reduced the ‘emotional distance’ for potential migrants by enabling them to keep in touch with this home country while away” (Stalker 1994:32), making it possible to
exchange ideas, political thought, cultural dynamics as well economic links (Appadurai 1996).

Some scholars criticize what they perceive as a primordialist or “ethnicist” approach in research (Vali 2003) for seeing diaspora migrants as oppressed ethnic minorities, passive victims of trauma who have a historically fixed ethnic identity. Instead they emphasize the ways in which diasporic groups contribute to processes of cultural hybridization (Brah 1996, Clifford 1994, Gilroy 1993, Hall 1999, Vertovec 2005). They consider the diaspora as an ongoing, dynamic, changeable condition (Hall 1990) arising “from the experience of being from one place and of another” (Anthias 1998:565). For them the key characteristic of diasporas is “the idea of particular sentiments towards the homeland, whilst being formed by those of the place of settlement. This place is one where one is constructed in and through difference, and yet is one that produces differential forms of cultural accommodation: in some versions, hybridity” (Clifford 1994:16 quoted in Alcid 2007:36).

Furthermore, increasing globalisation encourages stronger links between political parties and movements in the states of origin and of settlement, where immigrant groups are likely to build a lobby for the economic, political interests of their homeland (Rigoni 2002, also see Chapter VIII). These diasporas sustain ‘a sense of community, across and beyond localities, through various forms of communication and contact’ which does not ‘necessarily depend on returning to a distant homeland” (Peters 1999).

Some scholars have proposed the notion of “global-deterritorialized diasporas” (Cohen 1997) to theorize the contemporary form of diaspora. Other scholars have described this new condition as “transnational communities” and transnational networks which span borders and have multiple relationships with more than two countries, because “The
membership in a diaspora now implies potential empowerment based on the ability to mobilize international support and influence in both the homeland and hostland” (Butler 2001:3, also see Clifford 1994). Yet, it is not easy to neatly distinguish between notions of transnational communities and diaspora as some scholars argue that “[d]iasporas are the exemplary communities of the transnational moment” (Tölölyan 1991:5). They view the concept of diaspora as reflecting “a sense of being part of an ongoing transnational network that includes dispersed people who retain a sense of their uniqueness and an interest in their homeland” (Shuval 2000:43, also see Hall 1990). Globalization and transnationalism have become important aspects of the concept of diaspora, enriching the diaspora discourse (Castles and Miller 1998, Kennedy and Roudometof 2001, Laguerre 1998, Mahler 2000, Papastergiadis 1998). According to van Hear, the transnational community becomes “a more inclusive notion, which embraces diasporas, but also populations that are contiguous rather than scattered and may straddle just one border (Van Hear 1998:6). The terms diaspora and transnationalism make it possible to examine issues related to belonging, identity and communication between mover and stayer. Thus, the notions of transnational communities and diasporas are often used interchangeably. This has both advantages in the sense of enabling dialogues between scholars, but can also sometimes lead to a loose application of concepts. In this thesis I will generally refer to transnational communities and only where the aspect of migrants’ relationship with the homeland is in the foreground will I refer to the diaspora.

4.1.2. Transnationalism
“the processes by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement. We call these processes transnationalism to emphasize that many immigrants today build social fields that cross geographic, cultural, and political borders. An essential element is the multiplicity of involvements that transmigrants sustain in both home and host societies. We are still groping for a language to describe these social locations” (Basch et al. 1994:6).

The debate on transnationalism has raised many contradictory claims. In some writings, the phenomenon is portrayed as novel and emergent, whereas in others, as old as labour immigration itself... For purposes of this investigation, it is preferable to delimit the concept of transnationalism to activities that require regular and sustained social contacts across national borders for their implementation (Portes et al. 1999:218).

While some scholars of transnationalism focus on the economic (Flandreau 2003, Glover et al. 2000), others have focused on transnational political activism (Al-Ali et al. 2001b:616, Al-Ali and Koser 2002b, Richman 1992) emphasizing the distinction between refugees and labour migrants. They have found different typologies of transnationalism among refugees studied (Bosnian refugees in the UK and the Netherlands and Eritrean refugees in the UK and Germany), where some refugees repatriated to their country of origin play a crucial role in post-conflict reconstruction and "consolidate the process to which they have contributed from abroad" (Al-Ali et al. 2001b:617, also see Koser and Black 1999a). The refugees unable to return move “from a situation of temporary exile,...to permanent exile, where transnationalism has been extended to active involvement in contributing to reconstruction in their home country” (Al-Ali et al 2001:633). This does not mean that they focus on their integration in host countries and their transition into ethnic minorities (Portes and Rumbaut 1990). Rather they maintain their links with the homeland through cultural, social, political, economic ties (Al-Ali et al 2001:617) and promote their particular
social, cultural and political activities in the settlement countries. Portes describes these as networks

"across political borders, created by immigrants in their quest for economic advancement and social recognition. Through these networks, an increasing number of people are able to live dual lives. Participants are often bilingual, move easily between different cultures, frequently maintain homes in two countries, and pursue economic, political and cultural interests that require their presence in both" (1997:812).

One of my Kurdish participants’, a second-generation Kurdish refugee in the UK, illustrates how far he lives transnationally in Europe:

"Yes, I use internet to take contact to relatives…They live all over. They live in Aegean Sea region, Mediterranean Sea region of Turkey, Istanbul, in Cyprus and in Europe including Hungary, Finland, Germany, Sweden, France, Denmark, Belgium, Switzerland here, [England] Scotland. I sometimes visit them. I feel very lucky because it’s economically quite useful [laughs], so that I have seen many European cities….For the Kurdish youth events, festivals, concert, demonstrations visiting my relatives, travels…. you feel like …one whole countries you go and you have relatives living in all parts of Europe and they have very good connection with native people in these countries. Through my young relatives, I became friendship with two German, one Swedish who have visited me in London. What I told you is not an exceptional case. I know many Kurds who visit their relatives in European countries and became friendship with native Europeans and visited many European countries due to attend political events or visit their relatives. I think the diaspora Kurds are more European than the Europeans themselves because there is already a set up bases in getting touch with native Europeans through their relatives in European countries" (Interview with Rojhan, London, 5 April 2008).

This sense of belonging and solidarity across borders is not related to the
small-scale of propinquity relations, but in a broader sense it is as Faist argues:

“a link through reciprocity and solidarity to achieve a high degree of social cohesion, and a common repertoire of symbolic and collective representations... Transnational communities can also consist of larger aggregates, primarily held together by symbolic ties of common ethnicity or even nationhood. For example, refugees such as Kurds from Turkey who have pursued nation building or political opposition projects in their home countries typically try to develop and entertain dense transnational ties” (Faist 2000b:196).

From these transnational communities, a transnational social space and networks have emerged, “grounded upon the perception that they share some form of common identity, often based upon a place of origin and the cultural and linguistic traits associated with it” (Vertovec 2001:574).

In these spaces and networks, a transnational dialogue has developed between differently located people who reproduce “social practices, symbolic systems and artifacts” (Westwood and Phizacklea 2000, Pries 2002:3). The emerging transnational social space which has resulted from these processes has partly overcome the nation-state and extended to several other nation-states, societies and continents. The relation of this new reality of “transnational social spaces” in different countries has expanded blurred the boundaries of nation-states. It has created deterritorialized identities that are not contained within the nationally-orientated majority culture of either the country of settlement or country of origin (the Kurdish case is a good example). The effects of the new social interaction through transnational networks can be seen in both the country of origin and the countries of settlement, as well as between them (Al-Ali 2001, Erel 2009) However it is debatable whether transnationalism has replaced interest in immigration and integration as some theorists argue, (Lie 1995 quoted in Wahlbeck 1998a:2) because the social fields
constructed through transnationalism exist on the territory of liberal nation-states. This late modernity or liquid modernity (Bauman 2000) is influenced by national social spaces with their own regulations. Therefore, Al-Ali and Koser suggest that debates on transnational communities refer rather to the fact that “new labels are being applied to old processes” (Al-Ali and Koser 2002:1).

As Westwood and Phizacklea (2000:2) state, there are “the two processes simultaneously at work. On the one hand the continuing importance of the nation and the emotional attachments invested in it, and on the other hand, those processes such as cross-border migration which are transnational in form” (also see Al-Ali 2001).

On the other hand “the rulers of the country of emigration” sometimes see the transnational communities and their transnational social spaces as “an external homeland” (Faist 2000:192). In the case of the Turkish and Kurdish migrants, the Turkish state sees the Kurdish transnational communities as separatist and terrorist groups promoted by Western countries. Some theorists in the field of nationalism have highlighted that these transnational communities and their everyday cultural and political practices are “an extension of origin of their society” (Pries 2002:2-3) Indeed, many Turkish and Kurdish actors in the homeland support the transnational communities, trying to strengthen these networks in their national interests, for example by helping to set up community centres in different countries, inviting MPs of Turkish and Kurdish ethnic background in European countries’ parliaments to lobby for their country or protest pro/contra Turkey or the Kurdish national struggle.

The Turkish and Kurdish migrants’ political and cultural activities and ties in Europe show that the notions of “homeland”, “nation” and solidarity play a central role in their everyday practices, political engagement and media consumption. These everyday practices of migrants have reproduced a
sence of belonging to a particular entity, namely to Turkishness and Kurdishness. Van Bruinessen states that for Kurdish migrants and refugees “Due to a combination of political factors and technological developments, these diasporas have increasingly become (re-)oriented towards the part of Kurdistan and the state of origin.....It was exile that transformed Kurdistan from a vaguely defined geographical entity into a political ideal” (van Bruinessen 2000a:1-2).

Critically engaging with the notion of transnationalism, Van Bruinessen points out that it is too general a concept to apply to Kurds as they are internally divided by the boundaries of nation-states. So if they connected with Kurds in other nation-states (e.g. a Kurd from Turkey with a Kurd from Iraq), this would constitute a transborder but not a transnational encounter. He argues, however, that Kurds cross-border political and social relationships are not confined to contact within Kurdish communities but also relate to other ethnic groups in the settlement countries, and different agencies, institutions and parties. For example, Kurds in London recently established K4 L (Kurds for Labour) or a Kurdish support group for Tamils during the heavy war between Tamil Tigers and the Singhalese government in 2009. Al-Ali et al (2001) observe a similar tendency amongst Bosnian refugees in the UK and the Netherlands and Eritrean refugees in the UK and Germany. These “multi-connected, multi-referential” relationships amongst and between trans-ethnic groups and settlement societies should not be oversimplified when using the term transnationalism (Soysal 2000 :13) Transnationalism is not only related to the social relations that link together transmigrant societies of origin and settlement but should be expanded to encompass relationships and interactions with networks and organizations as well as interventions “across the borders of multiple nation-states” (Faist 2000:189).

Transnational media play an important role in connecting people from the
same ethnic, religious and political background in different geo-political spaces. These transnational media disseminate and contest cultural, political and nationalistic ideas and images (Aksoy 2001, Georgiou 2005, Karim 1998a, Robins 2001, Tsagarousianou 2004). The audiences of these transnational media are immigrant populations who “are often deliberately targeted by cross-border media as members of de-territorized national or religious imagined communities” (Kosnick 2007:2). However these transnational media practices of migrants are seen as obstacles to the integration policies of the settlement countries. The role of transnational media in creating multicultural or integrated societies is widely discussed amongst scholars (Becker and Behnisch 2001, Georgiou 2005b, Hafez 2000, Heitmeyer 1998, Kosnick 2007, Robins 2001, Tsagarousianou 2004) and in some countries, such as Germany, the impact of Kurdish and Turkish language media on migrants is seen by some politicians and sociologists negatively, as impeding integration. However, some researchers - like Kosnick (2007) argue that transnational media are not a hindrance to integration but important in supporting migrants’ multiple identities and linking migrants to their homeland. In this linking process, transnational media disseminate and reproduce “our” nationhood and its symbols, meaning and language to geo-political spaces (see Chapters V and VII).

5. Conclusion

I have highlighted the theoretical debate between primordialist and modernist perspectives. The primordialist approach sees nationalism and nationhood as rooted in pre-modern ethnic communities while I apply a modernist approach which takes the nation and nationalism as a product of modernity: print capitalism, industrial society and democracy. Therefore, the modernists consider nationalism not as natural and instinctive but as constructed with particular political and ideological means. I have focused on Anderson’s concept of the “imagined community and Billig’s of “banal
nationalism” to explain the role of the media as one of the key modern means for disseminating a national consciousness. The creation of nationalism went hand in hand with the creation of a uniform language, symbols and meanings to create a common sense of belonging to an imagined national community.

I have applied Gramsci’s concept of hegemony to explain the long-lasting ideological struggle for hegemony between the two ethnic groups, namely the Turkish and Kurdish, which are unequally endowed with power. This hegemonic struggle is not limited to a territorial space because nationalism “has gone mobile” (Khazaleh 2005, Culcom conference) Anderson considers this deterritorialized nationalism as “long-distance nationalism, email/internet nationalism” (Khazaleh 2005, Culcom conference) but I prefer refine the term as “imagined and transnationalized communities” because the Turkish and Kurdish migrant politics have strong real and imaginary connections with the ethno-nationalist conflict in the homeland. Kurdish and Turkish so-called “long-distance” nationalists are not isolated from the homeland but a part of the conflict in the homeland and play an important role in its construction and maintenance.

The transnationalized media play a central role in disseminating information about the nation and the ethno-national conflict. At the same time, they produce and reproduce the national and nationalist symbols of “us” versus “them”. This creates a transnationalized conversation amongst people, networks and organizations in different countries, who are not only linked with their countries of origin and of settlement but also have relationships “across the borders of multiple nation-states” (Faist 2000:189).
Chapter II: Research Design and Methodology

1. Introduction
In this chapter I describe the methods used for this thesis and outline the reasons for choosing them to explore the role of the Turkish and Kurdish media in national and ethnic identity construction among migrant audiences in particular. In the following, I evaluate the chosen methods and report on the experience of fieldwork.

In deciding on the most appropriate research approach for this thesis, it was important to consider both qualitative and quantitative research methodology. Quantitative research deals with “the what of audience-media relationships - but is much less suited for telling us about the why or how of such relationships” (Rayner et al. 2002:273). As Rayner et al (2002:273) states, “quantitative research is used to measure how many people feel, think or act in a particular way”. This is usually based on numbers, statistics or tables and attempts to “measure” some kind of phenomenon and produce “hard data” (Rayner et al. 2002:273).

In contrast, qualitative research has been described by Benoliel as “modes of systematic inquiry concerned with understanding human beings and the nature of their transactions with themselves and with their surroundings” (Benoliel 1984:3). Hansen argues that it is necessary to turn to more qualitative methods:

“For examining the dynamics of what experiential knowledge and frames of interpretation audiences bring to bear in their use of media content, what role media use has in the everyday life of audiences, or how audiences use the media as a resource in their everyday lives” (Hansen et al. 1998:257).

As this thesis is concerned with how migrants make sense of Kurdish and Turkish language media, two qualitative research methods have been used: focus groups with Kurdish and Turkish migrants (ethnically,
educationally and politically diverse audiences) who regularly consume transnational Turkish and Kurdish TV and newspapers. Complementary in-depth interviews with some focus group participants and other respondents in order to compare the responses of interviewees in and outside the group.

2. Doing qualitative research with migrants
There are 8 main reasons for choosing this qualitative research approach:

2.1. The lack of data in doing quantitative research with Kurdish and Turkish audiences in Europe
The first reason for choosing this qualitative research approach is the lack of adequate quantitative data. It is recognized that data on migrants in the EU do not adequately cover all aspects, “even the most general statistical tables used to analyze patterns and trends of migration in Europe present an unclear picture of the reality of human mobility across borders” (Singleton 1999:151). There is a lack of data in some countries and no agreed understanding of certain key terms from country to country. While Singleton (1999:157) overcomes this limitation by using existing data “as indicators of emerging trends, rather than as accurate quantitative measurements of the actual size of flows”, Zulauf (1999) finds qualitative research useful for addressing the paucity of quantitative statistical data.

There is also a paucity of statistical data on Kurdish and Turkish migrants in the EU. I decided against conducting a quantitative study as it would have been difficult to collect quantitative data for research about the Kurdish and Turkish migrants in three countries over three years. Problems of representative sampling arise when collecting quantitative data on Kurds and Turks in the UK and Germany as there is no reliable data on the number of Kurds and Turks resident, nor the age, sex, class, education or household composition that could be used for my analysis. Although all the major surveys carried out in the UK ask about the ethnicity of respondents, they do not have a separate category for Kurds and Turks.
Kurds and Turks appear mainly in the “Other” category.

Germany, on the other hand, collects data on the nationality of its residents, and it is possible to analyze that data by country of origin, as the Turkish nationals constitute the largest number of immigrants in Germany. However, questions on nationality ignore the ethnicity of the respondents and Kurds are therefore not separately listed. Hence, the number and demography of Kurds living in Germany (Ammann 2000) and in the UK can only be estimated (Holgate et al. 2009b, King et al. 2008). Sweden collects also data on the nationality of its residents, however, Sweden is different from both Germany and the UK, because a lot of research about the Kurds has been undertaken, and Kurds are represented in Swedish society both politically and culturally (Bozarslan 2006).

For these reasons, it became apparent that a qualitative methodology was the most appropriate for this research. In order to collect rich, in-depth data and understand meaning-making processes in relation to migrants’ use of media, qualitative research methods are crucial for a comprehensive understanding of the debates in different settlement countries.

1.2. Understanding meaning-making processes
This research also examines how migrants use and consume media in their everyday lives. What are the reasons that they consume particular media? How do these media contribute to the migrants’ social and political world? What role do the media play in these two migrant groups’ social relationships with each other and with the settlement countries’ institutions as well as with cultural, social and political issues in the places where they live?

This research also examines how transnationalised ethnic media have contributed to the processes of identity formation amongst Turkish and Kurdish migrants. Do these media products contribute to the construction
of “Turkishness” and “Kurdishness” as two opposed nationalisms and created Turkish and Kurdish extended imagined communities?

1.3. Interrelation of personal and political narratives

In a qualitative interview where both interviewer and interviewee have knowledge about the past and present of the research topic, these themes can unfold in the interviewees’ personal narratives. The in-depth interview can provide space for many voices and subjectivities and can build trust between interviewer and interviewee. It enables interviewers and interviewees to interact in order to understand the complex meanings and political, social and cultural implications of different personal narratives (Waterston 2005a) and how their meanings change in different contexts.

Here it is important to problematize both the personal and wider political aspects of narratives, since. “[e]ven the most individualised and emotionally charged narratives belong to specific communities with specific scripts” (Bamberg and Andrews 2004:2). The research explores how personal political narratives of people are transmitted and transformed in both Kurdish and Turkish communities and how they illuminate “individual and collective action and meanings, as well as the social processes by which social life and human relationships are made and changed” (Laslett 1999:392).

Personal narratives are key to understanding how migrants identify with the larger political narratives about the homeland, the diaspora, and the Kurdish-Turkish conflict. Personal stories “gather people around them” (Plummer 1995:174), connecting people and social movements. The personal narrative “promotes empathy across different social locations” (Gamson 1999 quoted in Riessman 2001:4), as well as across communities. Different political and ethnic groups articulate distinct personal narratives. These distinct narratives also create communities:
“For narratives to flourish there must be a community to hear...for communities to hear, there must be stories which weave together their history, their identity, their politics” (Plummer 1995:87).

Turkish and Kurdish migrants have different experiences of ethnic discrimination in the homelands and societies of residence. They also relate in complex ways to national identities. These personal narratives have multiple meanings (Eastmond 2007), which are focused on in different chapters. The way in which personal narratives are taken up in public representations and collective memory highlights legitimizing strategies within the Turkish/Kurdish conflict.

People’s media consumption and their political activities in the settlement countries are also shaped by personal narratives. One strand is characterized by the Turkish and Kurdish migrants who came to Europe as so-called “guest workers” experiencing racial and economic discrimination. They were seen only as “labour” rather than as people with their own desires, histories and hopes. We can also look to the political exiles who fled from the two military coups (1971 and 1981) and the ethnic conflict, because they brought their personal-political narratives with them and this contributed to creating different identities and communities in the diaspora.

Some political activists use their personal narratives explicitly for political projects, thereby influencing the structure of the ethnic minority community (Hantrais 1999). Thus, some speak for a collective identity and community, which is why some interviewees begin every sentence not with “I” but with “we”. These politicized migrants are what Said terms “exiles”:
“Most people are principally aware of one culture, one setting, one home; exiles are aware of at least two, and this plurality of vision gives rise to an awareness of simultaneous dimensions, an awareness that -- to borrow a phrase from music -- is contrapuntal” (Said 2001:186).
Some migrant audiences live in two different places, firstly where they work and settle in Europe and secondly in their homeland... In this sense they live “in-between” (Said, 2001:186) two different places and cultures but do not feel part of one. The personal narratives of the interviews help us to understand this in-betweenness, both of those who write their personal narratives and publish them on the websites, in the newspapers and in audio-visual media and of those who watch these media and relate them back to their own personal narratives.

Lastly, the personal political narratives contribute to creating ethnic, ideological, religious and political identities that are interrelated and present in migrants’ everyday life. Through the personal narratives, people not only remember political and historical narratives but they also bring the past to bear on present agendas (Rylko-Bauer 2005). In other words, the past comes alive and is turned into a political agenda in the diaspora, where different identities find opportunities to express themselves. The migrants’ personal stories and memories about their political, cultural and social attachments or about losing loved ones in the conflict play an important role in how they use and consume the Turkish and Kurdish media.

Personal narratives can offer different perspectives in terms of orality, temporality, sociality and mediation for this research. Amongst Kurdish and Turkish communities, where oral culture is very strong, personal narratives play an important role in transmitting and transforming the political and social conflicts and changes over time (Waterston 2005a). Personal political narratives create chains of meaning between people who left the country in the 70s, 80s and 90s. There are also breaks in the chains, where meaning cannot be transmitted: e.g. a Turkish socialist participant states that through her exile she lost her friends, her parents and her
dreams. The political narratives produce solidarity among ethnic communities. They also produce status for those seen to be activists or leaders who influence community. Therefore it is important to look at how they structure social realities (Lamnek 1993, Silverman 1993), Silverman, and how they organize the community “internally” (Hantrais 1999:96). To sum up individuals’ narratives become an important aspect in qualitative research to explain the relationship between personal experience and cultural, historical and social structures of the society in which they live (Waterston 2005b, Eastmond 2007).

1.4. Addressing Politically Taboo Subjects
Conducting research on the Turkish and Kurdish ethno-nationalist struggle means talking about a highly politicized, polarized and taboo subject. Dündar (2008, 2009) suggests that Turkey is a “republic of fear” that punishes people who talk about “the integrity of Turkey” or the “Kurdish Question”. People who dare to talk about taboo subjects are called “separatist” or “traitor of country”. One prominent example is the sociologist Ismail Besikci, who carried out research on the Kurds, for which he consequently spent 17 years in Turkish prisons (Beşikçi 1974:1). Many people from both communities avoid talking directly about the Kurdish/Turkish conflict. Even when people do talk about the conflict, they may not speak openly.

In Turkey, people often use abstract terms to signal their political views, for example Kurdish supporters of the PKK would refer to themselves as “yurtsever” while Turkish nationalists call themselves “vatansever”. Both words can be translated as “patriot”; however all those who know about the Kurdish-Turkish conflict recognize that one term denotes Kurdish and the other Turkish political affiliation. This indirect way of expressing allegiances is one way to avoid laying oneself open to legal prosecution which is being reproduced in the diaspora, too.
As Necirwan, a Kurdish participant in Berlin said: “The Kurdish issue is a hot potato. Who touches it will be burned. S/he is branded or stigmatized as a terrorist”. Similarly, Hale, a Turkish exile in Stockholm explained that, in their struggle for a socialist revolution in 1970s Turkey, they did not talk about ethnic issues. “We were all Turks and fought for a classless world. The ethnic differentiation among the Turkish migrants was created here” (Interview with Hale, Sweden, 19.06.2007). This change refers to the changing “metaphoric designation” (Safran 1991) of migrants’ self-identifications.

Vertovec (2005) argues that tensions or serious conflicts within the diaspora can arise when new waves of migrants meet people of previous waves who might have differing political views depending on the time and circumstances in which they left the home country. At the same time, newer waves may be highly critical of a tendency within the well-established diaspora communities in the destination country to promote “long-distance nationalism” or support the most right-wing and reactionary forms of nationalism.

This type of complex and nuanced data on political ideas and identifications can only be collected via face-to-face communication if the interviewer can build a rapport and reassure participants of confidentiality. These sensitive issues cannot be explored in quantitative research, only in qualitative research, where trust and anonymity allow taboo subjects to be raised.

1.5. Issue of language
Language plays an important role in cross-national research with ethnically and linguistically diverse populations (Bloch 2007). The reason for this is that the “linguistic dimension interacts with cultural, as well as associated intellectual and professional specificities to form the problematic of comparative analysis” (Mangen 1999:111). It is not only an issue of making
the research question understandable in the language used by the specific community being researched, but also language is used “to mark ethnic/nationalist boundaries” and “to mark gender and other identity issues” (Temple 2002:846). For example if we look at the term “region”, we might assume that the term has only one meaning. However, in the course of my research, I discovered that the term was used to convey several meanings, depending on who was using it. For example, since 1985 the term “region” is used to reference the Kurdish area by Turkish newspapers, radio and television. Many politicians, even human rights activists and pro-Kurdish parties, use the term “region” in this way. Indeed, the Turkish Prime Minister told journalists in March 2008 during a visit to Sirnak (a city in the Kurdish region) that the “people from the region” support his policy and his party.

In probing the use of the term with the participants in this research, I found that when I asked Turkish participants what they mean by “region” they answered that this refers to “East or South-East Anatolia”. But Kurdish participants explained that they mean “Northern Kurdistan”. That is, the two groups give a different symbolic reference to the term “region”: while for the Turkish participants, it is a “region” of Turkey, for the Kurdish participants it is a “region” of Kurdistan. In this way the Kurdish participants subvert the prohibition of using the term “Kurdistan” which is banned in Turkey.

Moreover, paying close attention to differences is crucial when the topic guides for focus groups and in-depth interviews are designed and translated into other languages, for example, the different levels of literacy amongst Kurdish and Turkish communities in the three countries. Differentiated research on Turkish and Kurdish communities highlights that many women have not had the opportunity to participate in formal education in their homeland (Uguris 2004, Erel 2009) and have insufficient
knowledge of the settlement county’s language (Bloch 2007, Uguris 2000, Erel 2009). Bloch highlights that it is necessary to translate the topic guides into the relevant languages to ensure that all research participants of different linguistic ability or people with low levels of literacy can be included in research (Bloch 2007). In this project, some first generation male and female participants could not understand the language of their country of settlement and some so-called second generation migrants could not fully understand formal Kurdish or Turkish. Therefore the topic guides were translated from English into Kurdish, Turkish, and German and Swedish. Many migrants use a mixture of languages with different idioms, expressions, abstractions and proverbs in everyday life, which are a part of their culture in their homeland and create linguistic hybridity in their communities (Uguris 2000). This means that it is essential to do face-to-face qualitative research with migrant groups, so that the interviewer can explain some terms if necessary in two or even three languages during the in-depth interview as some second generation participants might otherwise not understand the questions fully. Qualitative research is flexible enough to take account of this (Uguris 2000), whereas quantitative instruments such as questionnaires are unable to accommodate this linguistic hybridity.

Edward (1998), Temple (2002), Bloch (2007) focus on doing cross-language research and how to “carry out research with people who either do not speak English or do not use it as their preferred language” (Temple 2002:844). They address how to use interpreters or researchers with relevant language skills. They develop innovative, alternative methods to deal with this problem. Bloch used “the dual processes of the translation decentralizing procedure and back translation “ because “translation decentralizing procedure requires a critical examination of the original question to check the appropriateness of different concepts across languages and cultures because this is more important than the literal
wording of questions” (Bloch 2007:239).

As I am fluent in Kurdish, Turkish, German and English I translated my topic guides, paying attention not only to literal meanings but the different nuances of the languages. As I have basic Swedish language skills, I needed help to translate my research questions into Swedish. My topic guides were translated by a student of political science in Sweden who speaks Swedish, Kurdish, Turkish and English. This translation was checked by two people, one who speaks Swedish and Kurdish and one who speaks Swedish and Turkish. This “translation decentralizing procedure” (Bloch 2007:239) ensures the accuracy of translation. It makes sure the questions are meaningful for research participants with different backgrounds and that the Swedish language is used in a way to fit the idioms, expressions, abstractions and proverbs used by second and third generation migrants in Sweden. However the research participants preferred to talk to me either in Turkish or in Kurdish and only three research participants in Sweden preferred to speak in English. But I printed my topic guides in Swedish and provided them to research participants in case they had a difficulty to understand my questions in Kurdish or Turkish and English.

During the interview I had the opportunity to clarify my questions in accordance with the research participants’ education, ethnicity, religion, gender etc. However sometimes participants, particularly migrants who left Turkey in the 1960s or 1970s, used some metaphors or idioms which are not current any more in Turkish or Kurdish, so I asked them for further explanation.

The translation of interview material is another challenge in social sciences. The “culturally-loaded meanings of interview material” (Manges 1999:112) could be difficult to translate. Manges (1999:112) states that
“There can be no doubt that the use of one language in multilingual environments imposes serious limits”. I translated the interview material and tried to match appropriate proverbs, abstracts, and idioms.

1.6. Comparative, cross-national social research
This thesis compares media consumption of two different migrant groups in three different localities (Berlin, London and Stockholm) with different political, labour market and migration policies. In the three countries, the public perception of migrants also varies. Therefore it is useful to look at diversity, the differences, similarities and “variance” (Mills et al. 2006:621) between the three countries’ policies in the context of migrant “integration” and how they see the migrant media culture. It is also important to consider the “diversity of the characteristics” (Bloch 2007:238) of both communities within each country and differences between the three different countries to “ensure a more representative sample” (Bloch 2007:238). This helps to explain why and how migrants follow the transnational media and how they make meaning of transnational media in different political, cultural, geographical spaces, (Hantrais 1999) as well as the fieldwork experiences in my chosen localities.

Cross-national research applies different methods, ranging from case studies, surveys, combined qualitative and quantitative methods, longitudinal studies, biographies, secondary analysis to interviews with focus group. Recently scholars have critically assessed recent developments, current debates and key issues in cross national research (Mills 2006 et al:620). This is relevant for “drawing lessons about best practice or, more straightforwardly, gaining a better understanding of how social processes operate” (Hantrais 1999:93).

There is a long-standing debate on cross-national social quantitative research’s “competing objectives" and about what constitutes “a legitimated set of methods” (Hantrais and Mangen 1999:91). Some
scholars claim that cross-national research is best done by quantitative – rather than qualitative - methods (for further discussion see (Mangen 1999, Silverman 1993). Moreover there is no clear consensus among academics “as to whether cross-national research has features different from research in general” (Zulauf 1999:159). But Zulauf suggests “that cross-national projects may require compromises beyond those of single-country studies” (Zulauf 1999:159 also see, Hantrais and Mangen 1996).

Cross-national quantitative research has been done in social sciences, in particular political sciences and sociology to analyze “the differences and/or similarities between nation states” (Quilgars et al. 2009:19). Qualitative methods have been more widely used in recent years in cross-national research. The status of qualitative methods has changed from “last resort techniques” to methods used to “formulate new hypotheses, drive conceptual development, evaluate hypotheses, test the validity of theories” (Mahoney 2007:221). Qualitative research in comparative politics “facilitates the study of over-time data and a concern with temporal processes” (Mahoney 2007:125-127).

However a number of methodological challenges and questions may arise during cross-national research. Drawing on a UK national survey and “a multi-sited comparative survey in the UK and South Africa”, Bloch (2007) discusses methodological challenges in carrying out research with forced migrants in sub-national units (within one country (UK)) from different communities and in cross-national contexts. These challenges include “sampling, access and representativeness, the appropriateness of different modes of data collection between and within countries and communities including the use of interviewers, the impact of politics and exile on data collection and research instruments, language and literacy, gender and immigration status” (Bloch 2007:231-231).
As Bloch mentions the issue of sampling has created a wider discussion among researchers. It is argued that the issues of the “scale of the analysis” (countries) could create “the risk of having too many variables and too few cases to effectively test causal models” (Mills at al 2006:622). The issue of how to “construct equivalence” (Mills at al 2006:622) across groups, nations and cultures has been widely debated. All of these have different references and their understanding and interpretation of certain definition such as migrants (Singleton 1999) “race”, class, and gender also plays a central role in assessing the validity of the research.

Apart from Bloch’s research on migrants, there is some other cross-national research on asylum seekers, labour migrants and migrants in professional occupations (Zulauf 1999, Singleton 1999) and the impact of migration on the citizenship status and experiences of children (Ackers 1999). These highlight the lack of reliable data and of common definitions and relevance of policies on international migration in the EU (Singleton 1999, Zulauf 1999). Another factor to be taken into account is the “culture-boundedness” (Ackers 1999:172) - different understandings of values and different experiences of migration, discrimination and citizenship. In term of media and migration, existing research on transnational media and migration is mostly within a single national context (Robins and Aksoy 2001, Georgiou 2005, Hafez 2000, Tsagarousianou 2004, Kosnick 2007). There is little cross-national research on the relationship of transnational media and migrants.

In order to address the difficulties of varying concepts across countries, I particularly chose the focus group and in-depth interview methods to talk in detail to research participants. This allowed me to find out similarities and differences within the sub-national units and cross-national units because the in-depth interviews make it possible to collect rich data (Zulauf 1999) and allow for clarification of meanings. However it is time consuming.
(Zulauf 1999, Mangen 1999). In particular, in-depth interviews sometimes need to be conducted in the format of everyday conversation to gain their trust of the interviewee. This is particularly important to create an appropriate atmosphere for talking about sensitive issues.

Cross-national qualitative research is “typically small scale” (Mangen1999:113). A small sample was chosen from two contested migrant groups in conflict. Overall, I conducted interviews with 117 individuals: 37 in Stockholm, 46 in Berlin and 34 in London. The samples in each country needed to “exhibit sufficient similarity to be meaningfully compared to one other” (Mahoney 2007:129) within the sub-national units and cross-national units to allow “scope for generalizable inference” (Mangen1999:113). These individuals participated in focus groups and/or individual in-depth interviews (see below). The participants are from Kurdish and Turkish background with diverse age, gender, income, political affiliation, citizenship, occupation, religious background and length of residency. They included first, second, even third generation migrants who regularly follow Turkish and Kurdish media to be informed about their country of origin but also to be entertained through football, soap operas, films and talk show. So the social, cultural, economic and political variables were selected so suitable similarities and differences between both groups could be drawn. This helped me to apply my theories.

The countries were selected because they represent a range of immigration and integration policies in Europe and different positions in migrant consumption of transnational media. Furthermore, there is variation in the nature of migration from Turkey/Kurdistan, the size and length of immigration of both ethnic groups and their social and political status in these countries. Another variation is in their political and cultural engagement with their homelands and their homeland-oriented organizations (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2002, Faist 2000c).
The locations have been chosen as large cities where most of both migrant groups are located. The migrants practise their transnational media consumption in certain spaces where they have access to Turkish and Kurdish transnational audiovisual and print media and reproduce their ethnic, religious, cultural and political identities. The cities also are spaces where migrants may be involved in homeland politics in different ways including in demonstrations and lobbying.

The research focuses on how both migrant groups in the three localities consume the media and make sense of its messages regarding the ethno-national conflict in their homeland. Therefore my research has “an acceptable level of equivalence of meaning in concept, context and function” (Mangen1999:116). It is suitable for cross-national comparative research and provides empirical data to bring to bear on theoretical debates on nationalism and transnationalism.

**Gaining access to participants**

Access to participants has been widely discussed in social sciences, in particular when doing sensitive research which poses potential methodological challenges over ethical issues (Benoliel 1984, Bloch 2007, Bloch et al. 2009a, Dickson-Swift et al. 2007, Düvell et al. 2010, Higgins et al. 2001, Renzetti and Lee 1993) (see doing sensitive research, Chapter II). Researchers have highlighted the difficulty of physical access to spaces used by the group under study (Gummesson 2000), the difficulty of being an outsider/insider (Okumus et al. 2007). Many researchers attempt to gain access through gatekeepers, signposting and phone calls (Zulauf 1999).

Through working as social pedagogue in Berlin and project manager and adviser for a Kurdish community centre in London, I made contact with Turkish and Kurdish migrants as well as their socio-cultural organizations.
Therefore I had ready access to research participants within the commonly used spaces such as community centres, mosques, the Elewî cultural centre and women’s organisations. But I also had contact with people beyond the reach of these collective organisations and spaces, who avoid them for reasons of sexism, or their political or religious nature. My knowledge of locality and contacts with groups and individuals in London and Berlin helped give me access to a range of different individuals without having to go through gatekeepers. I went to legal advice, cultural, social, political and religious community centres, women’s organizations, student societies at universities, youth centres, parent and pensioner organizations, communal spaces used by people from the same city, town or village, cafes, restaurants, minicab offices, or off-licences to find participants for the research. Access through gatekeepers can be helpful to reach invisible groups, undocumented migrants in particular (Bloch et al 2009) and to get an overview of the situation of the people under study (Gummesson 2000). However access through gatekeepers can also be problematic because they represent certain political, ideological or religious groups who have power to build a community around their agenda, and so serve their interests but not those of the research project (Feldman et al. 2003, Lee 1993).

In contrast, in Sweden I had only briefly stayed in Stockholm in 2000. Before beginning the fieldwork, I renewed my contacts there and conducted desktop research to identify the neighbourhoods where both communities were mostly settled. I also sent out information about my research to community centres, the Elewî Cemhouse, student networks, mosques and also contacted people through Facebook. I also obtained access through some Turkish and Kurdish gatekeepers including the Kurdish Federation and the Turkish Federation. Then I went to Turkish and Kurdish areas and distributed my research information sheet in cafes and restaurants. However, only two participants contacted me in response.
However, on my return visit, when I talked to people directly and invited them to participate in my research, the response was better (See Appendix F).

3. Design of field research
The fieldwork consists of two sections: Focus group and in-depth interview. During my focus group sessions I showed short clips from the Turkish commercial television (Star TV) and newspaper (Hürriyet and Milliyet) photographs of the Turkish flag, as well as of Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK leader when the Turkish army captured him in 1999. I also gave the participants two short news items (one is from the Turkish newspaper Hürriyet, another from the pro Kurdish Ozgurpolitika), one regarding the teaching of Turkish in a German town, the other regarding the use of ethnic minority languages in a local authority in Turkish Kurdistan. The focus groups were complemented with in-depth interviews with some individual focus group participants.

3.1. Doing sensitive research
Undertaking sensitive community-based research poses several methodological, ethical, and political challenges. It can lead to unpleasant experiences or even potential threats. It may be difficult for researchers and participants to cope with sensitive research topics in conducting fieldwork. Therefore, it is essential to be aware and prepared, as the problems for many contingencies (Lee 1993). Any research topic poses implicit or direct difficulties of political, cultural, social and economic complexity. But the level of sensitivity differs from topic to topic. Lee provides a useful working definition of sensitive research as that “which potentially poses a substantial threat to those who are or have been involved in it” (1993:4). For instance one Kurdish participant in Berlin made a statement about just such a threat:

“There’s a ‘good Kurd - bad Kurd’ issue depending on where the Kurd’s from. If you were politically active within a Kurdish organization in Europe, which
is actually banned because of closer relationship between Turkey and some European countries, could you get sanctuary and safety in Europe? The Kurdish individual has to be extremely careful what s/he says because s/he has been automatically criminalized and is associated with, or linguistically the attempt to associate Kurds with negative points, strengthened by the legal position of their political organizations especially in Germany very heavy-handed, very authoritarian response to Kurdish individuals or community organizations have had a serious effect on expressing their opinion” (Interview with Dilsad, Berlin, 18 July 2007).

It is possible to do fieldwork in such sensitive situations, as Jenkins et al (1984) did in their anthropological study of a Belfast housing estate during the conflict. Yet, Knox highlights “the importance of the identity of the researcher in the eyes of his/her research subjects and its impact, positively or negatively, on access”(2001 :206). Since suspicion of outsiders is intense in this type of research, the perceived religion, ethnicity or political views of the researcher is likely to be a key factor for interviewees. They will look for “clues” to such relevant aspects of the researcher’s affiliation. “Coming from the ‘other’ community may condition the response of interviewees or put the researcher at some risk given the sensitive topic under review and the nature of the questions posed” (Burton 1978:218). During my research, almost all participants were curious about what I was doing and why I was interviewing them. They asked me about my views on the Turkish state and the PKK. They want to be sure of my views before giving an interview.

Significantly, many of them asked me which city I was from, rather than my ethnic background. I told them I was born and raised in Istanbul but my family came from Gumushane 40 years ago, a Turkish city in the Black Sea region. This explanation was enough for Turkish participants. But I had to field some additional questions for Kurdish participants. For
instance: “If your family came from Gumushane, how come you speak Kurdish? And why do you speak Kurdish so well? Where did you learn to write Kurdish?” But during the interviews, when I asked the questions about the language issue (e.g. what are the differences between both situations? Or “do you think Kurds in Turkey should have the right to use their language? And why?”). Many Turkish participants suddenly asked me whether I was Laz or Kurdish.

Turkish and Kurdish migrants are suspicious of “outsiders” for political and cultural reasons. In particular, Kurds are more sensitive about these issues because asking questions and collecting data reminds them of their home countries where they were questioned by the authorities. Moreover the Turkish State, “still sits over society like an incubus” (Belge quoted in Robins and Aksoy 2003:23) in Europe too. Rigoni (2002:2) argues that the state creates “a space of control in the settlement countries of the immigrants”. Migrants are intimidated or forced to spy by threats of arrest or not to extend their passports in Turkey. Even those who are no longer Turkish citizens can be intimidated because they have families in Turkey who can be threatened. If they go to Turkey to visit their friends or relatives they may be confronted with state violence. There are several institutionalized social and political groups which exercise (legal, illegal, symbolic) control over the migrants. They can silence an individual’s criticism of the Turkish state, the PKK, Islamic or left groups and settlement countries.

An example of how far-reaching the fear of openly admitting one’s political views can be happened as I began looking for interview partners among the Turkish migrants in Stockholm. I interviewed a man whose body language and demeanor indicated that he felt very uncomfortable. He answered my questions regarding the Turkish and Kurdish conflict with very far-right Turkish views. When all of a sudden he asked me where I
was from, I told him that my family was from Gumushane, a city in the Black Sea region. He asked me “Are you Laz?” (a small ethnic group in the Black Sea region). I told him “No I am Kurdish”. Then he started to talk to me in Kurdish. I was a bit upset because I thought I had finished my fieldwork with the Kurds and I had wanted to do interviews with Turkish migrants. I asked him why he presented himself as Turkish. He told me “you don’t know who is who here. I have to be careful in answering such a question”. Then he started telling me that the answers which he had given me earlier were not true. He showed me the photograph of the Turkish flag on the table saying “this is not my flag. When I see it I remember Turkish soldiers and Turkey’s injustice against the Kurds” (Interview with PhD student, Karzan, Stockholm, 10th June 2007).

The PKK is not an official power but it has control over Kurdish migrants through an active group which physically attacks or politically isolates Kurds who criticize the PKK, though this has lessened since 2000, when the PKK entered a period of internal crisis. Significantly, during the focus group sessions some people were silent about the PKK, but in the in-depth interviews criticized it for “occupying Kurdish public sphere with different means” (Interview with Alan, Berlin, 28 August 2007). On the other hand a Turkish participant, a shopkeeper, stated that “Milli Gorus uses religion and moral pressure to collect “donations”. Although I don’t go to the mosque and sell alcohol, they come here every Friday to collect donations from us for this and that. If you refuse to give them a donation, they will force people not to buy from me” (Interview with Serdar, Berlin, 17 July 2007).

Furthermore interviewing people who are affected by the conflict at home or stigmatized in settlement countries has other implications. Many of these people are both politicized and vulnerable. One participant confided: “If I had not gotten involved, I would not be in exile or in this situation”
(referring to his health problem – a recent heart transplant). As this participant began to feel unwell during the interview I stopped the interview and discussed other topics with him which helped him calm down. Considering his strong emotional response and his heart condition, I did not want to take the risk of continuing the interview. So interviews may arouse difficult feelings in the research participants, yet how these are handled also determines whether the relationship between researcher and participant is based on the trust necessary for sensitive research. Yet, this also raises some ethical problems. Johnson and Clarke Macleod (2003:422) state that “the concern here is that however “sensitive” researchers might be during the negotiation period, participants might still feel obliged to consent to being interviewed” because “there is the argument that by ‘being friendly’ in order to obtain data, researchers risk being exploitative in the field” (Johnson and Clarke Macleod 2003:422).

However, I would argue that researchers should be friendly in interviews with vulnerable people. Otherwise they risk reminding vulnerable Turkish and Kurdish people of their terrible past experiences with the police or other state authorities (particularly for Kurds or Turkish leftists). In addition “being friendly” makes it possible to create a non-hierarchical structure between researchers and participants. It was very important for me to counter this because the Kemalist elite undermine the “sokaktaki adam-common people” by establishing symbolic power over them. Kurdish politicians and activists display similarly patronizing behaviour towards the Kemalist elites. I gave interviewees space to ask me questions about the Turkish and Kurdish communities in different countries and I used this reciprocity to collect more in-depth information about their life.

Studying life experiences or “entering the lives” (Dickson-Swift et al. 2007:336) of marginalized people in settlement countries and people displaced from their homeland can emotionally affect the researchers. As
Ely et al. (1991:49) suggests “if we undertake to study human lives, we have to be ready to face human feelings”. My previous job as a documentary film maker and social pedagogue, as well as interpreter made it possible to manage “emotional labour” (Hochschild 1983:7), in other words “dealing with other people’s emotions” (James 1989:16). Some participants had intensely difficult life experiences, especially people who had been tortured in their homeland and my previous experiences of working with vulnerable people helped to protect me from their sadness without “becoming desensitized” (Dickson-Swift et al. 2007:340).

Sometimes I let the strong emotional responses of participants flow and stopped focusing on my interview. I removed the tape recorder and just listened to participants, so they were not left alone with their intensely emotional life experiences. Sometimes it was not possible to go on. But sometimes, these situations turned out to be “opening Pandora’s box”, (Ramos 1989:59) or the “tin-opener effect” (Etherington 1996:341) the participants calmed down and were able to continue the interviews.

Not only participants confront risk in research on sensitive topics. The researchers also face physical and psychological risk. Dickson-Swift et al. contribute an excellent body of work to this neglected research area: “Traditionally, risk assessments in research have been limited to examining the risks to the research participants. Although doing so is appropriate and important, there is growing recognition that undertaking research can pose risks to researchers as well”(2008:133). It is clear that nowadays risk is part of our everyday life (Giddens 1991, Beck 1992, Tulloch and Lupton 2003). The crucial issue is how we can cope with and minimize it “with knowledge”. The researchers have to know the historical and current background to the research topic and which terms or words are used and accepted as indicators of the political or ideological viewpoint of each of the different groups. Each wrongly used term or word can lead to a
While “outsider” researchers need to familiarize themselves with these issues, those researchers deemed to be “insiders” have other problems to tackle. Posing critical questions can have negative implications for researchers. It can be interpreted as “undermining our struggle against terrorists”. It is very easy to be labeled as either a “separatist” or as “undermining Kurdish struggle”. Being aware of the complexity and difficulties of my research topic helped me to design my questions carefully and I was largely able to avoid causing an unpleasant atmosphere during the interviews.

**Focus groups and in-depth interviews as the basis for this research**

At first I intended to include participant observation as part of my research methodology. But it is difficult to do participant observation in politicized communities (where the Kurdish communities are pro PKK and Turkish communities are pro Islamic, far right or far left) because of the potential suspicion of the researchers as “outsiders” (Knox 2001:218). Feldmann, who conducted research on violence in Northern Ireland, states that “in a culture of political surveillance, participant observation is at best an absurdity and at the least, a form of complicity with those outsiders who surveil” (1991:12).

**3.2. Focus Groups**

Focus groups are a standard methodology in the social sciences in order to find out how people react to and feel about different issues in an interactive group setting. They are used in media research to find out how and why audiences make sense of media content and messages and “how audiences use the media as a resource in their everyday lives” (Hansen et al. 1998:257). Using focus groups, I aimed to find out how participants’ opinions varied across ethnicity, age and gender in the three different
settlement countries.

3.2.1. Focus group questions
The research aim was to find out how people used and interpreted media messages, created new meanings from them and shared them with their family and friends. I was interested in “how interpretations were collectively constructed through talk and the interchange between respondents in the group situation” (Morley 1980:31). The questions included: Do you reject or accept the messages regarding the Kurdish-Turkish conflict? How do you interact with the influences of these messages? Do you identify with the coverage of these media? The use of focus groups also meant that I could get information from some Turkish and Kurdish participants who had a stronger oral and visual culture rather than textual one.

The decision to set up different focus groups for Turks and Kurds (3 Kurdish, 3 Turkish) in the three target countries (two in the UK, two in Germany and two in Sweden) was taken as my pilot interviews in London had shown a strong polarization and politicization and decrease of commonalities between Kurds and Turks in Europe. This is due to increased politicization of Kurds and militarist and Islamist influences on Turks, growing resistance to Turkish-style “democracy” and “secularism” among both migrant groups and the retention of the Kurdish language as a source of comfort and marker of identity against its criminalization in Turkey.

The focus groups were mixed in terms of age, gender, education, political viewpoints, citizenship, occupation, length of residency and immigration status, religious background, and generation of settlement. This diversity was aimed at facilitating discussion from the different perspectives within the focus group. In total, 28 Kurdish and 15 Turkish participants attended focus groups. The focus groups took place with 11 Kurds (3 women and 8 men) in Berlin, 6
Kurds (2 women and 3 men) in Stockholm and 11 Kurds (6 women and 4 men) in London. The distribution of Turkish participants was: 7 participants (3 women and 4 men) in Berlin, 5 participants (2 women and 3 men) in London and 3 participants (2 women and 1 man) in Stockholm.

### 3.1.2. Using visual material in focus groups
Visual material was used in the focus groups to find out the similarities and differences in making sense of media-produced images (cf. Mangen 1999:121). Researchers collect their visual material according to their research topic and approach. Prosser defines this as follows: “Images can be ‘researcher found’ (generated by others) or ‘researcher generated’ (created by the researcher)” (1996:2).

Different “researcher found” visual materials were used as prompts for each group (See Chapter III as well as two short news items). In contemporary societies, everyday visual culture has an important influence on our behaviour, identity formation, as well as political and social position. Visual materials are used to explore social and cultural life as methodologically photography, film and video: “have all come to be regarded as ‘text’ and worth analyzing as a cultural artefact that can be ‘read’ ” (Ali 2005:266, also see Banks 2001, Emmison 2000, Knowles and Sweetman 2004, Pink 2006, Prosser 1998a, Rose 2006, Stanczak 2007, Van Leewen and Jewitt 2001).

### 3.3. Justifications for selected visual and print material

#### 3.3.1. The Turkish Flag
The flag has acquired cult status in Turkey as a symbol of political and cultural hegemony. The military hangs “the biggest and the most beautiful holy flag” in public places in Kurdish cities. The Hürriyet newspaper organized and advertised a contest for “the most beautiful flag” in the country, and gave flags as a present to readers in their European edition. In 2005, when two Kurdish teenagers threw a Turkish flag on the street,
the military published a condemnation of this act, and tens of thousands attended demonstrations. The BBC reported that “Turkey is in the grip of something close to flag frenzy - with demonstrations across the country to show support for the Turkish flag” (Dymond 2005). In Europe, the Turkish flag can be seen in Turkish community centres, homes, as an emblem on clothes, chains and earrings. In recent years several thousand demonstrators have formed a Turkish flag chain across Europe. The research was designed to find out how Turkish and Kurdish migrants perceive media images of the Turkish flag, because of its ubiquity and role in banal nationalism.

3.3.2. The Picture of Öcalan
Since the seizure of Abdullah Öcalan, leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Italy in November 1998 and his ensuing capture by the Turkish state in February 1999, the relationship between Kurds and Turks have deteriorated dramatically. Demonstrations in protest by Kurds at his capture or in support by Turks at times turned violent and wreaked havoc throughout Europe and Turkey as well as all over Kurdistan. At this point, it became apparent that the ethnic conflict between Kurds and Turks had become a transnational issue (see chapter VI). Hence his picture was used to elicit the opinion of people marginalized by the pro PKK media, and to assess the strength of his symbolic presence and its influence on the Turkish-Kurdish relationship.

3.3.3. The Language Question
Two news items were shown: one on the restrictions on teaching Turkish in a German town by denying the use of a school building as premises; the second on the prosecution of a local authority in the Kurdish area of Turkey for using minority languages in its official publications. The research aim was to find out what they thought about the intervention in minority languages in Turkey and in Germany and whether there were differences or similarities in the reactions to the two situations.
3.3.4. The Speech of the Chief of the Turkish General Staff
A television recording (Star TV, 15.02.2007) was shown of the chief of the Turkish General Staff's speech on internal and external “enemies”, calling on Turkish migrants to lobby for Turkey during a visit to Washington. The coverage depicted him as the sole saviour of the country, implying a threat to the sovereignty of the republic akin to the invasion of Iraq. This item was deployed to find out how Turks and Kurds identified with the military, and reacted to references to “dynamic forces (dinamik gucler)” who will “fight against enemy”.

See Appendix A for documentation, pictures and link to audio-visual material.

4.3. Combining focus groups and in-depth interviews
In Turkish or Kurdish community organizations there is usually a room where people sit and drink tea, watch television or read a newspaper. Some people (male and female) spend many hours there, sometimes several days a week. They discuss the news and develop a culture (of that particular community group, which is often linked to a political movement) interpreting the news. I designed and set up my focus groups as a natural social activity (Liebes and Katz 1990) and focus group discussions followed a similar format to discussions people have at home, in a cafe or community organization of media representations in their everyday life.

I began with some simple questions like “Which programme do you watch?” or “Which columnist do you follow and why?” in order to create social interaction between all participants from the start, and to get an overview of the participants. It was very interesting to observe that all the participants complained about the media’s ideological or political positions. Then I showed or gave the selected media items to the focus groups and followed on with discussion.

At first, the discussions with Turkish participants in Berlin were “like a
social activity” but when I showed the selected media items they started to take up political, social and cultural positions. For example, some participants were for teaching Kurdish in Turkey, and some were strongly against teaching it in school and one argued: “If they want to learn Kurdish they can move to North Iraq”. Yet, there was also unexpectedly vehement discussion between first- and second-generation Turkish migrants about the legitimacy of teaching Kurdish in Turkey. While participants who defined themselves as Kemalist agreed with the speech of the former Chief of the General Staff, Turkish migrants supporting Islamic-oriented political movements and Kurds criticized his speech as “separatist” and “anti-democratic”. Kurds also expressed fierce differences in political views, for example over the flag. One female participant stated that “if we expect Turks to respect our flag we should respect their flag too”. The other participants stated that they “never respect the Turkish flag because if they see it they remember the injustice in Turkey towards Kurds” (Focus group with Kurdish participants in London, 13 April 2008).

In the Kurdish focus groups there was a consensus about the “double standard” of the Hürriyet coverage or the Chief of the General Staff’s speech where he called Kurds the “internal enemy” (Focus group with Kurdish participants in Stockholm, 09th June 2008), but there was a controversial discussion about the PKK-dominated media and the lack of freedom of opinion in the media run by the Kurdish parties. Two participants in Berlin criticized “the party-dominated media” but added that they did not read or watch them. But when I went to their home for in-depth interviews, I noticed that they did nonetheless follow these media (Focus group with Kurdish participants in Berlin, 22 August 2007).

However, there is a high probability that fear of the Turkish state’s or the PKK’s repression hindered Kurdish participants from talking freely in the group. Hansen et al state that “Some individuals inevitably exert more
influence than others in a group situation, to the extent that they may begin to dominate the discussion” (1998:263). This problem emerged during my focus group interviews with Kurds in London and focus groups with Turks in Berlin. Some participants were left marginalized in the discussion.

For example, in the focus group with Turks in Berlin, when given the two texts to read and asked their opinion as to whether Kurds in Turkey should have the right to use their language, one female participant replied “If we want to have the right to be taught Turkish here in Germany, the Kurds should have the same right in Turkey to learn Kurdish at school”. On the other hand, some participants insisted that Kurds can have the same rights as Turks to learn their language in Germany, but not in Turkey because “allowing Kurds to learn their language at school will destroy the unity of the Turkish nation” (Focus group with Turkish participants in Berlin, 26 August 2007). After this statement, the person who was pro-Kurdish teaching in school in Turkey was reduced to silence.

It was interesting to observe the use of language. The Turkish participants did not use the term “Kurdish question”. Mainly they referred to “South-east Anatolia’s problem” or “separatist terror problem” in the focus groups (Focus group with Turkish participants in Berlin, 26 August 2007). However, in the in-depth interviews, some Turkish participants used the term “Kurdish question”. In addition, some participants used the term “Türkiyeli” - people from Turkey - which was not accepted by other participants because they argued that everybody who lives in or comes from Turkey is a “Turk”. This showed the resistance to recognizing ethnic diversity among the population of and from Turkey, (Focus group with Turkish participants in Stockholm, 27 June 2008) and a discrepancy in language indicating political ambivalence or anxiety that only came out through probing further in the in-depth interviews.
Wimmer and Dominick state, the focus group shall take place “in a relatively free discussion about the topic under consideration” (1983:100). However, as my topic is a highly political tensions arose. This shows that there are also some disadvantages to using focus groups for this particular research, as it makes it difficult “to find out what each member of the group thinks about the topic under discussion”(Berger 2002:89). Therefore, combining focus groups and in-depth interviews (with respondents from the focus groups) made it possible to consider the voices of those participants, reduced to silence in the focus group session. The in-depth interviews allowed me to explore individual opinions and attitudes on a whole range of topics that were not expressed in the focus groups.

4.3.1. Problems with the focus groups
Doing cross-national research “may require compromises beyond those of single-country studies” (Zulauf 1999:159 and also see Hantrais and Mangen 1996). While setting up focus groups in different cities, this became apparent as various obstacles arose. It was difficult to find a suitable time and place to bring together all the participants, especially in Stockholm. I had to make some compromise. Despite all my efforts, I was unable to bring 7 people together for the focus group as I had initially planned. Only 3 people came to the meeting and I accepted this and carried on with this smaller number of participants.

Not only ethnic, but also class and cultural references play an important role (Singleton 1999) in providing material for participants to interpret. For example, with regard to the second text on the prosecution of the local council of Sur (Diyarbakir) governed by the DTP (Democratic Society Party) in the Kurdish area of Turkey for using minority languages in official publications, most of the participants said they had read this article or seen it on Kurdish or Turkish television. The difficulty arose with regard to the lack of knowledge about the pro-Kurdish DTP (Democratic Society Party which was banned in 2009 by the Turkish Constitutional Court) and the
small Assyrian minority. Many Turkish participants knew of a pro-Kurdish party in Turkey but they did not know its name. When I told them that the DTP is a party which predominantly won the local election in Southeast Turkey, they responded, “Oh I know, the legal arm of the terrorist organization in Parliament” (Focus group with Turkish participants in London, 13 March 2008 and also with Turkish participants in Berlin, 26 August 2007). However Turkish participants with higher levels of education did not need any explanation regarding the DTP, they knew the party and its political positions.

It is argued that cross-national research should consider cultural differences (Coffey and Atkinson 1996) in different locations under study, because they may make it difficult to ascertain that participants are indeed talking about the same thing in different locations in cross-national research. Therefore, it is important to acknowledge culture-boundedness and where possible to minimize cultural differences in cross-national research (Ackers 1999). This is one of the strengths of qualitative methods (Zulauf 1999, Mangen 1999). Indeed, “Qualitative research is not simply non-numerical. Its central defence lies in its ability to penetrate the experiential social worlds of intentional, self-directing actors, whether through the spoken or written word” (Mangen 1999:110). I encountered such cultural differences in the different research locations, regarding research participants’ knowledge of the Syrianic minority. While the participants in Sweden did not ask any questions about the Syrianic minority in Turkey, many Turkish participants in Berlin and London asked me, “What is Syrianic?” (Focus group with Turkish participants in London, 13 March 2008 and in Berlin, 26 August 2007). The Syrianic minority lives in the Kurdistan region of Turkey and today there is a significant number of Syrianic migrants in Sweden but not in Berlin or London. This shows clearly the importance of taking local specificities into account (Hantrais, 1999).
4.3.2. **In-depth interviews**
Focus group interviews were followed by 74 in-depth interviews including with 10 respondents from the focus groups because I also wanted to know what individuals thought outside of a group context, “to elicit from each person his or her opinions” (Hansen et al 1998:263). The reason for choosing the in-depth interview technique with some focus group participants was the sensitive and controversial nature of the research topic. Some participants could not fully express their feelings or opinion in a group, whereas, in private, during a one-to-one interview sessions, they felt more able to do so. The advantage of the in-depth interview is that the researchers can ask questions which fit the individual and can explore their “own opinions” (Bryman 2004:110). It is possible to clarify questions and dispose of misunderstandings in the context of language. Moreover, it is possible to collect firsthand information from participants without family members or friends influencing their responses.

In the course of my research, I not only interviewed people from Kurdish and Turkish community centres, which share links and goals with the Turkish state or political parties, but also people from outside of these influences. I interviewed a wide range of people, including politicians in local parliaments with Kurdish and Turkish ethnic backgrounds, journalists in local and national Turkish and Kurdish media and community leaders. In-depth interviews were mixed in term of age, gender, education, and political viewpoint, citizenship, occupation, and immigration status and length of residency, religious background, first and second, even third generation and place of residence (Berlin, London and Stockholm).

4.3.3. **Preparation of the interview questions**
Although questions for the in-depth interview were prepared, I let participants talk freely about the issues which they found important regarding their media use. This structure was chosen following pilot interviews in London.
In-depth interview questions were divided into five sections:

1. Interviewees’ background in the country of origin and in the settlement country and their attachments, allegiances and roots. This helped me to pitch the other questions to make them intelligible to the interviewee. At the same time I wanted to create a friendly confidence which was essential in order to move onto the more sensitive questions (Lee 1993, Düvell et al. 2010).

2. Use and consumption of different print and visual media. My focus was on finding similarities and differences between both ethnic groups’ use of media in three different locations (Zulauf 1999, Arber 1993, Quilgars at el 2009, Hantrais 1999).

3. The Turkish and Kurdish ethnic conflict and their positions: The third section focused on conflict in the homeland and their position with regard to the conflict. Here I focused on the worries and concerns amongst both groups in the context of conflict. How did they view it? How did the conflict affect their lives and livelihoods? What was the relationship like between both groups and with their settlement countries? This section helped me to explore and develop key themes (Mangen1999) around their political involvement in the community and links and obligations to their homeland and their future aspirations for it. This could help me to compare the similarities and differences and the perception of key themes by both ethnic groups in the different locations.

4. Knowledge about the settlement country and its media: The fourth section referred to the integration issue and use of settlement country media, the relationship between minority and majority and everyday life in the settlement country.
5. The use of new media: Finally I asked questions regarding new media (internet) in order to know which web newspapers they read. These web newspapers play a crucial role in the life of politically engaged people, potentially mobilizing many people in a short space of time. In addition, as many migrants cannot obtain newspapers in small towns in their settlement countries, they can access them via the internet. Therefore they can follow what is going on in the homeland and in the settlement country. Those second-generation individuals interviewed in the three countries indicated a similar tendency, that they read the news on the internet. I asked questions regarding their connection with the homeland and other countries via the internet in order to conceptualize my understanding of the transnational community which could be theorized in terms of transmigration, transnationalism and transmobilization through the use of media.

4.3.4. Problems with In-depth Interviews
I will discuss here the different implications of the in-depth interview:
During the first interviews I tried to find an appropriate way to ask the sensitive questions about the conflict in the homeland as a common definition of the conflict does not exist for either group. For example, if I had started to ask a Turkish participant about “the Kurdish and Turkish ethnic conflict” or “the Kurdish question”, the interviewee would have felt uncomfortable. Maybe s/he would have withdrawn. For many Turkish participants there is not an “ethnic conflict” or a “Kurdish question” but a “separatist terror problem” (Interview with Fatih, London, 02 April 2008). Therefore I posed the question indirectly to elicit their personal interpretations in the form of: “Do you have any concerns regarding Turkey?” or “What disturbs you when you read/watch news regarding Turkey?” When they started to talk about the conflict, I would then develop some of my questioning following up their comments.

The same difficulty emerged with Kurdish participants when I started
asking questions about the strict control of the Kurdish public sphere by Kurdish parties and its ideologically biased media. After the questions, which caused some controversy, I asked, “How do you feel in London?” or similar questions which eased the situation and made it possible to continue the interview in a more relaxed atmosphere.

Finally following the questions about the internet, I talked with the interviewees about their communication with their family and friends which enabled them to relax after all the difficult questions. Although I mentioned at the beginning of the interview that the results would be anonymous, it was still hard to win the confidence of participants. The best way that I found of solving this problem was to create a friendly atmosphere, talking about everyday life – such as their family and children. Moreover it helped to be referred participants by their acquaintances, as this inspired trust.

My language skills and knowledge of everyday life in Sweden, Germany and the UK helped me to win the confidence of participants. Speaking Kurdish with the Kurdish participants created a greater atmosphere of trust with some. However, some Kurdish participants were not able to understand Kurdish because of the linguistic genocide in Turkey. Therefore I asked my questions either in German, English or Turkish. Furthermore many second-generation participants and even first generation ones used mixed or different languages in the same sentence. In contrast to Germany, in Sweden where the Kurdish language is taught in school, most of the participants, even third-generation migrants, were keen to give interviews in Kurdish. In the UK, the second generation tended to speak English and the first generation tended to speak Kurdish or Turkish.

Another important issue was carrying out the interviews at participants’ homes. Traditionally if Kurds or Turks invite you to their home, it means you have won their confidence. It is time-consuming, but good way to do
an in-depth interview because people open their private sphere to you.

5. **Ethical issues in this research process**

ESRC Framework for Research Ethics (2010:40) describes research ethics as “the moral principles guiding research, from its inception through to completion and publication of results and beyond”. They emphasise that it is crucial to avoid or minimize “harm to participants… in all instances” (ESRC 2010:3).

As this research topic is controversial and sensitive because it examines the representations of conflict in highly politicized media to diverse individuals and communities in relationship to each other. Therefore the data too is “ethics sensitive” (ESRC 2010:26).

The ESRC considers as sensitive topics: “participants’ sexual behaviour, their illegal or political behaviour, their experience of violence, their abuse or exploitation, their mental health, or their gender or ethnic status (2010:8). Ethical issues are raised at the start of a project in the formulation of questions, access to research participants, transcribing and translation, analyzing data and disseminating the research findings at different conferences to minimize the risk (ESRC 2010:3). “Risk is often defined by reference to the potential physical or psychological harm, discomfort or stress to human participants that a research project might generate…These include risk to a subject’s personal social standing, privacy, personal values and beliefs, their links to family and the wider community, and their position within occupational settings” (ESRC 2010:26).

To address these issues, information about the project was prepared in 5 languages to explain what my research was about. Transparency is very important in collecting sensitive research. Some of the participants wanted to see my University ID card, some of them wanted to know who was
financing my research and what I will do with the interviews. Some participants wanted to see the topic guide before being interviewed. I provided my ID and topic guides to the participants. After scanning them, some participants refused to be interviewed owing to the content of the questions. However it was important for me to inform potential participants about the aims and objectives of the research and how I would disseminate the results, as this is a crucial component of gaining informed consent. In some cases, people wanted to be interviewed but refused to sign the consent form which was understandable for me because they did not want to be identified (see Düvell 2010).

Issues surrounding privacy and confidentiality have been widely discussed in the literature (Bloch 2007, Düvell 2010). It has been suggested that researchers with a similar ethnic, linguistic and cultural background as research participants “might find it easier to carry out sensitive research due to shared language and culture” (Bloch 2997:242). However this raises some ethical questions of confidentiality, as participants might fear that the researcher would disclose information to co-ethnics.

I carefully considered issues of privacy, confidentiality and informed consent in order not to harm people who took time to participate in this research. The consent forms made clear what the research was about, that the information they provided me with would be treated confidentially. It also informed them that that they could withdraw from the study at any time. My mobile number and email address were printed on the bottom in case they wanted to contact me if they had any questions about the research or concerns about what they had told me and how I would use it. Two participants from Berlin have contacted me to withdraw from the study and I deleted the interviews I had conducted with them. Some participants preferred to give me a fictional name but some participants used their real names. It was important to assure participants that their names would be
anonymized. Some participants were keen to know when I would publish my research so that they could see their name in print. After telling them that I would anonymize their names, one participant stated that “then why did you interview me when you do not intend to publish my name?”

Many people who have participated in my research live in large cities but in a “small world” because as a migrant groups from the same geographical areas they know each other directly or indirectly, owing to cultural, political, community activities or just sharing spaces such as cafes, restaurants, entertainment spaces (Keles et al. 2010). Therefore researching such communities requires greater awareness of the ethics involved.

Moreover the issue of anonymising data is often complex and hard work because people mentioned their neighbourhood, their relatives who live in Britain, their political parties which are outlawed in Turkey, their names and where they work, their relations with their partners and relatives. As Ali (2005:119) state “[t]he harm that may result from unwitting disclosure of personal information are both foreseeable and unforeseeable harms and the researcher has a duty to protect people from both”. All the information has been anonymised during the writing-up of this thesis because as researcher, I have an obligation towards research participants (Düvell 2010:236).

I am aware of the power relationship in terms of gender and education and tried to reduce this by starting the interviews with informal chat about everyday life.

In terms of storing the data, I avoided storing them on my desktop but I put them on two memory sticks which were removed from my computer after use and locked in a safe place. During the translation of the interview material I tried to stay as true as possible to participants’ words (Temple
All data was recorded on audio-tape with the permission of the group or the individual. As this was a controversial topic, it was particularly important to assure participants of their anonymity. Gaining the trust of the participants through establishing a friendly relationship was vital as it allowed them to “speak openly” to the researcher (Düvell 2010:231). This was particularly important for the Kurdish participants as they may be in fear of state repression. One way of reassuring them was by speaking to them in Kurdish. Through working as a social worker and interpreter with Kurdish and Turkish communities, I got to know some gatekeepers who helped me to gain access to research participants and win their trust. For the Turkish participants, the issues of the study were equally contentious but they may not have felt under the same pressure. I gained their trust by assuring them of the confidentiality of the research.

6. Reflexivity

Any researcher needs to reflexively position themselves within the research process. My own position as a former journalist for Turkish newspapers and a former human rights activist has given me a particular perspective and experience. My professional experience helps me to understand critically how news is made. My background as a human rights activist reflects the values I still hold, which inform the research project. Thus, freedom of the press and freedom of information are key values. I am in favour of Turks and Kurds living together in peace and equality and free from racism. During my activism I have defended the rights of the Kurds to self-expression on political and social issues and to use their own language and reproduce their culture. My Kurdish background means that I speak Kurdish as well as Turkish. I support minority rights, be it in Turkey or Europe. Therefore, I welcome Turkish and Kurdish migrants’ access to transnational media and see this as one way of integrating into a hybrid
European identity. I am also aware that “[t]he researcher’s own cultural and linguistic knowledge, disciplinary affiliations …. logistic resources also serve as important determinants of the choice of topic, the country mix, the contextual variables and the approach adopted” (Hantrais 1999:102). By being open about my own position, I hope to achieve greater transparency in the research process. I hope that this openness means that my findings and interpretations can contribute to academic knowledge about migrants and their use of Turkish and Kurdish media, rather than being seen as me following a “hidden agenda” as is so often the case in debates about this very sensitive issue.
Chapter III: Mediating the Turkish and Kurdish Ethno-National Conflict

1. Introduction
In the theoretical framework chapter, I briefly focused on the construction of the Turkish imagined community. This was created through the force of the Turkish state and its policies to construct Turkish history, language, myths and symbols (McDowall 2004, Hirschler 2001, Besikci 1977) on the denial of the existence of other ethnic groups, forcing them to adopt Turkishness in order to create a Turk Ulusu - Turkish nation - after the collapse of Ottoman Empire (Vali 1998, Hirschon 2003). These policies have caused a hegemonic struggle between the Turkish state and the second largest ethnic group, the Kurds in Turkey (Kutlay 2000). I will highlight the central role that the Turkish and Kurdish media have played in Turkey and Europe in disseminating and legitimizing the respective Turkish and Kurdish positions in the conflict.

In the attempt to keep a homogenous and unified nation, the hegemonic struggle spread to Europe through the migration of people and media from Turkey to Europe. Therefore, it is important to focus on the attempt to create an imagined Turkish community, putting the hegemonic struggle between the state and the PKK in historical perspective, and explaining the role of the media in transnationalizing the Turkish and Kurdish ethno-national conflict.

Consequently, this chapter focuses on the construction of a “political imagined community” (Anderson 1991:6) in a multi-ethnic and multi-faith region of Anatolia and the problems caused by conceptualizing “Turkishness” by denying others’ culture and history, forcing them to adopt “Turkishness”. The chapter explores how Kurdish identity and nationalism have challenged the Turkish nationalization project since 1920. In a historical perspective, it examines how the suppressed Kurdish ethno-
national movement has developed different strategies and concepts to oppose the Turkish state’s turkifying policies (Hirschler 2001, Bozarslan 1992).

In the process of constructing an “imagined community”, Turkish institutions and mainstream media have played a crucial role in creating commonalities amongst ethnic Turks and imposing an identity on non-Turkish ethnic groups. The Turkish media have promoted Turkishness (Bulut 1992, Sezgin and Wall 2005) openly or “unnoticed” (Billig 1995:4). The Kurdish media has contributed to challenging Turkish state policies of Turkification of Kurds, and have also given a voice to other ethnic and religious groups like Laz, Assyrian and Elewî believers (Hirschler 2001) to create an alliance against the organized dominance of Turkish official state nationalism and its “patterns of common sense” (Billig 1995:20). The Kurdish media has also normalised a Kurdish ethno-nationalist outlook and symbols (Hassanpour 1998) in order to counteract Turkish nationalism. Its representations of time and place have created an “alternative nationalism and other ways of imagining peoplehood” (Billig 1991:28) amongst some Kurds in Turkey/ Kurdistan and Europe. These representations are part of a struggle between two contested nationalistic projects, an expression of a permanent crisis of the hegemonic project of Turkification in Turkey.

The Turkish media, including European editions and the main Kurdish newspaper and TV stations published or broadcast and consumed in Europe, have a significant effect on the 2.5 million Turkish and 1.5 million Kurdish migrants who came to Europe, first as guest-workers, and later as family migrants or political refugees. Therefore, it is important to look at the role of the Turkish media in disseminating Turkishness and delegitimizing Kurdishness historically over time in order to understand the ongoing struggle for hegemony between these two ideologies and movements in the European diaspora (Rigoni 2002).
2. Constructing an Imagined Turkish National Identity: the Origin of Turkey’s “Kurdish Question”

Nationalism as a political and ideological project has caused bitter struggles between different ethnic groups\(^5\) in Anatolia since the nineteenth century. Turkish nationalism was the ideological basis for the massacre of the Armenians (Akçam 2004) and the deportation of Greek Ottomans to Greece (Hirschon 2003). The minority population who remained in the territory of the Turkish Republic was ideologically relegated to the status of second class citizens, who had only the right to be “servants and slaves” according to Justice Minister, Mahmut Esad Bozkurd, in a statement in 1930 (Milliyet Newspaper 1930 in Bulut 1992).

During the establishment of the Turkish Republic, nationalists aimed to create a hegemonic order, constructing common values, language, and identity. Ethnic groups other than Turks were excluded and marginalised by coercion and consent, subjecting them to the dominant ethno-centric nationalism. Thus, rather than creating a “deep, horizontal comradeship” (Anderson 1991:7) among all people in Anatolia, those who did not identify as Turks were ostracized as the “other” within the previously multi-ethnic Turkish Republic. However, this was not simply accepted, but led to a series of struggles which caused a “permanent crisis” (Chernilo 2006:15) in the ethno-centric nation state. This “permanent crisis” led to the enactment of the anti-democratic state of emergency law.

Theories of the state have been an important subject of debate within political theory. The state as both an ideological construction (Billig 1995, Anderson 1991) and a coercive organization has been the subject of different thinkers. The debate around Hegel’s conception of the state as an “ethical idea”, where the state embodies a unified will with civil society as the invisible hand, has influenced many thinkers including Gramsci.
Gramsci reconceptualised Hegel considering the state as “political society + civil society, in other words hegemony, protected by the armour of coercion (Gramsci 1971:160). Thus, he associated physical force with the public sphere denoted by “political society”.

Civil society in countries torn by ethno-national conflict is split with people having to take positions either on the side of the dominant power and ideology and or in resistance to it. Since its inception, civil society in Turkey has been structured to support a homogenous, Turkish imagined community. A weakness of Anderson’s work is that he tended to underplay the responses of subordinated, marginalized groups to the dominant imagined community (Chernilo 2006, Escolar 2001, Gutierrez 1999, Itzigsohn and vom Hau 2006, Lomnitz 2001, Mattiace 1997, Yiftachel 1999). Here subordinated groups refer to “a variety of non-dominant social groups, including not only the working class, peasants and slaves but also religious groups, women, and various racial groups. One of the central aspects that makes all these social groups subaltern is that they lack a coherent philosophy or world-view from which to understand and interpret the world” (Ives 2004:79). Many Gramscian scholars (Hall 1986, Ives 2004, Laclau and Mouffe 1985) have criticized Gramsci for ignoring the unequal power relations between ethnic groups and men and women, considering them also as the object of hegemonic struggles (Cox 1992:35). While Ives argues the working class’s “world-view (and interests) will be the core that is expanded to include other groups in an alliance, but never compromised” (Ives 2004:113), feminists and antiracists have raised objections to the idea of being subsumed by working class interests (Ives 2004:113). Gramsci also idealized the political party as the “modern prince”. As the history of the colonized world shows, armed movements or parties which fought against colonial powers can subsequently create their own power structure which continues repressive policies.
Since 1923, the motto of the Turkish state has been “one state, one language and one flag”. However, the construction of Turkish nationhood in Anatolia was a difficult process due to the multi-ethnic and multi-faith composition of the region and as a consequence of policies of denial, a bitter power struggle began between the dominant Turkish state and the subordinated Kurds. Yegen (1999:555) states that

“the Turkish state has, for a long time, consistently avoided recognizing the Kurdishness of the Kurdish question.....From the mid-1920s until end of the 1980s, the Turkish state ‘assumed’ that there was no Kurdish element on Turkish territory”.

Yet, during the Ottoman Empire, ethnicity was not an important marker of identity. Religion defined the core element dividing peoples in the Ottoman political system. Therefore, Kurds were not alienated and were not seen as a “minority”. The Sunni Kurds were “equal” with Turks and Arabs within a multi-national empire and had independent principalities, autonomous from the central government. The duties of the Kurdish tribes vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire were to defend the border, provide soldiers and pay taxes. However in the nineteenth century, Kurds started to stand up for their national interests as witnessed in the Rewanduz (1830-1833) and Bedirxan Bey (1843–1847) uprisings. At the end of the nineteenth century when the nationalist idea reached the border regions of the Ottoman Empire, the Kurdish national movement organized insurrections. As part of this movement, the first Kurdish language newspaper called “Kurdistan” was published in exile in 1898 (Vali 1998).

After the WWI, the defeated Ottoman Empire signed the Treaty of Sèvres which “envisioned interim autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas of Turkey with a view to full independence if the inhabitants of these areas wanted this” (McDowall 1996:17). This Treaty was later replaced by the Lausanne Treaty which recognized a new state: the Turkish Republic and left Kurds without any statutory protection. They became the largest
stateless ethnic group in the Middle East. The division of Kurdistan had first taken place between the Ottoman Empire and the Persian Empire following the battle of Chaldiran in 1514. After World War I, Kurdistan was divided by the Allies (mainly by the British Empire and French colonial forces) into five different states. Turkey occupied 43% of Kurdistan under the Lausanne agreement, Iran 31%, Iraq 18%, Syria 6% and the former Soviet Russia 2% respectively (Izady 1992). The Kurds, with an estimated 30 million population, form the largest ethnic group after the Turks, Arabs and Persians in the Middle East. They constitute the largest ethnic group in the world without a state. (Vali 1998:26)

The founder of Turkey, Kemal Mustafa, was supported by some Kurds during the Turkish War of Independence. He promised the Kurds a Turkish and Kurdish multi-ethnic state. This historical promise is kept alive in contemporary politics by the demands of the PKK and the pro-Kurdish party DTP (shut down in 2010) (Milliyet Newspaper, 11.06. 2009). Moreover he offered the Kurds autonomy in the territory where they constituted a majority. After the war and the establishment of the Republic, the new regime turned against the Kurds (Barkey and Fuller 1998). The Prime Minister, Inonu explained the direction of the newly established republic in 1924: “We are frankly nationalists . . . and [n]ationalism is our only factor of cohesion. In the face of a Turkish majority, other elements have no kind of influence. We must turkify the inhabitants of our land at any price, and we will annihilate those who oppose the Turks or “le turquisme” (Simsir 1991:58 quoted in Barkey and Fuller 1998:10).

However, the Kurds opposed this nationalistic approach and have attempted to challenge the Turkish nationalistic discourse and fought for the recognition of their existence in Turkey. The insurrections of Shaykh Said in 1924, Agri in 1930 and Dersim in 1937-1938 followed each other unsuccessfully and the Turkish nationalists suppressed the Kurdish
demands for recognition with the Law for the Maintenance of Order⁷ and İstiklal Mahkemeleri - (special courts established for the express purpose of suppressing opposition groups in the country) (Adak 2004).

In such cases where the contested ideologies are struggling for dominance for their economic, political and cultural interests, “[a] social group dominates antagonistic groups which it tends to “liquidate”, or to subjugate, perhaps even by armed force” (Gramsci 1971:57–58). The state used all means available to ensure it was ethnically homogenized in Anatolia. This included the state of emergency laws in Kurdish regions which were in force from 1925 – 2002. Furthermore, Kurds were displaced from where they lived and moved to other regions of Turkey (Olson 1989), in order to “create a country speaking with one language, thinking in the same way and sharing the same sentiment…” (Law of Settlement 1934, TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Devre:IV, Cilt:23, İçtima:3, 14/06/1934, p. 141, quoted in Ülker 2008).

After the use of authorized and legitimised violence, gradually the state started to change the names of Kurdish people and Kurdish cities into Turkish names and the Kurdish language was banned from public places. Education was used to assimilate Kurdish children “into the dominant culture” (Sezgin and Wall 2005:788). All these repressive, ideological measures aimed to create an “imagined community” and through it, the Turkish state defined the Kurds, who form 25% of Turkey’s total population, as its eternal, “imagined enemy”. This Turkish national project precipitated a continuous struggle between the Turkish state and the Kurds, who constitute the major challenge to the nationalistic practice of the Turkish state.

Gramsci highlighted that “[a] social group…. subsequently becomes dominant when it exercises power, but even if it holds it firmly in its grasp,
it must continue to “lead” as well” (Gramsci, 1971:57–58). This close intertwining of control and consent means that “to the extent the consensual aspect of power is in the forefront, hegemony prevails. Coercion is always latent but is only applied in marginal, deviant cases. Hegemony is enough to ensure conformity of behaviour in most people most of the time” (Cox 1983:127).

The dominant group will attempt to “attain or retain… ideological power” (Aronowitz 2009:13) in its intellectual and moral leadership within civil society, generating consent amongst allied and subordinated groups (Degiuli and Kollmeyer 2007). This ideological power, articulated by intellectuals justifies the dominant group’s “privileged socio-economic position … by exerting daily influence over the ideas, values, and norms promoted across civil society – for example, by influencing the ideological messages espoused by churches, community groups, political parties, the media, schools and universities, and trade unions” (Degiuli and Kollmeyer 2007:500).

The ideological power of the dominant Turkish group has succeeded to some degree in subordinating the different ethnic groups (the Kurds, the Lazs, the Caucasians) by using its monopoly of state power to impose a standardized Turkish language, education and invented history of the “Turks” during the construction of Turkey’s national unity. This established a “unified”, “homogenous” Turkish nation without regard for the non-Turkish, multi-ethnic groups.

The Kemalist regime with its official ideology known as Altı Ok - the Six Arrows⁸ - equated citizenship with Turkishness in the 1924 constitution which aimed to turkify all the ethnic groups through force and a consensus of silence. Therefore, other ethnic groups’ linguistic, cultural and social existence was diluted through repression, massacre and assimilation.
Some ethnic groups and refugees from the Balkans “accepted” the nationalist Turkification policy. “In the new state structure, still in place, any identity conflicting with the national state identity – based solely on Turkish culture, language and identity – is not accepted and faces punishment under criminal law” (Sezgin and Wall 2005:788). But this brutal process created an opponent – the Kurdish national movement with its imagined Kurdish nation – in opposition to the Turkish nationalist conception of the nation-state.

After the Dersim massacre in 1938 the Kurds and Kurdish identity disappeared from political view and for a decade fell silent. (Olson 1989, McDowall 1996) Yet, as Gramsci argues gaining political and economic power is not enough to gain hegemony. To achieve hegemony requires that a specific conception of the world be disseminated which acquires the consent of subordinated groups. In this sense the dominant power needs “to win intellectual power” (Gramsci 1985:41) and cultural dominance to neutralise others and gain their consent. Therefore to achieve hegemony, it is necessary for dominant and aspiring groups to organize themselves culturally and ideologically – developing their own intellectuals and world outlook.

The Turkish nation-building process aimed to remove all barriers to their imagined community by using force and building consent. Therefore the state started assimilation policies through ideological institutions such as the education system, and in every city and town cultural centres, the Halkevi, were established to disseminate Turkish culture and language. Moreover, theories legitimating Turkish supremacy such as the “Turkish Historical Thesis” and the “Sun Language Theory” were disseminated in through state institutions and the media. This shows that the nationalist project did not simply rely on the media as Anderson suggests, but was created by active intervention of both political and civil society. Critical to
this was the role of intellectuals in the broadest sense educationalists, journalists, academics in formulating and articulating leading ideas in civil society: in schools, in history texts, in the media. The aim was to imply that all other ethnic groups had given up their autonomous, social, political and linguistic existence and accepted the “common sense” that all citizens in Turkey were included in the homogenous Turkish nation.

However the concept of common sense, sets “a certain limit to the effectiveness of ideology …and also implied is a re-evaluation of the significance of culture [politics, ideology] as a strategic battlefield in the struggle to define the terms of conflict” (Texier 1979 in Mouffe 1979:74). The subordinated group can only challenge the dominant common sense by proposing practical alternative understandings of the world and possibilities of change (Elmhirst 1999; Escolar 2001; Fachry 1997; Gutierrez 1999; Hefner 1989; Itzigsohn and vom Hau 2006; Lomnitz 2001; Mattiace 1997).

Crucial in this role was the development of a group of Kurdish intellectuals and activists capable of independent thought. After the introduction of the multi-party system in 1946, the Kurds returned to the political arena and in the elections, the opposition party DP wiped out the Kemalist CHP party in Kurdistan. However this freedom was short-lived, as following the 1960 coup d’etat, the first democratically elected Prime Minister, along with two other cabinet members, were sentenced to death and executed by the military junta in 1961 and 49 prominent Kurdish intellectuals were arrested. They were later to become the motor force of the Kurdish movement in the 1980s up to 2009. One of them was Yasar Kaya, the owner of the Ulke newspaper which was bombed with the permission of the Ciller government in 1994 (Duran 1998).
In the 60s and 70s Kurdish intellectuals found new opportunities to express their ethnic identity, by highlighting their poverty and oppression and the class struggle in the left-wing Turkish parties and organisations, in particular the Turkish Worker Party (TIP). Although it was under the influence of a centralist Kemalist ideology, it tolerated the expression of Kurdish identity to a certain degree. Yet they were criticised within the party for being too Kurdish nationalist, and subsequently Kurds established their own cultural and political organisations and “outlaw” parties⁹. Indeed the PKK’s roots go back to those times when the Kurdish social and national movement was founded.

Many legal and illegal newspapers and magazines were published, for example, Riya Azadî – Path to Freedom - (in Turkish: Özgürlük Yolu). Mehdi Zana, one of the first pro-Kurdish mayors of the unofficial capital city of Turkish Kurdistan, (which many of the people interviewed referred to as Northern Kurdistan) Amed (Turkish: Diyarbakır) spoke openly: “about the need to defend Kurdish culture and community, forcefully advocating the right to use one’s mother tongue and to identify oneself as Kurdish. He gave many of his election speeches in Kurdish, arguing that Kurds in Turkey had been subject to ‘colonialist’ and ‘fascist’ aggression and that he was a candidate who would forcefully resist this. He thus clearly posited a Kurdish ‘we’ against an official and nationalist Turkish ‘they’” (Dorronsoro and Watts 2009:471-472).

The Kurdish national movement can be understood as resistance against the Turkish imagined political community. Kurdish intellectuals, producing an imagined Kurdish community could be defined as “organic” intellectuals (Gramsci, 1971:9) of the Kurdish national movement, who have contributed to the transformation of consciousness of a subordinated people. Gramsci stated
"the mode of being of the new intellectual can no longer consist in eloquence … but in active participation in practical life, as constructor, organizer, "permanent persuader" and not just a simple orator…” (1971:10). Indeed Kurdish intellectuals, who were influenced by the social movements of the 60s and 70s, were indeed active organizers. As Mehdi Zana indicates, the Kurdish left-nationalist oriented politicians and groups saw the Turkish state in Kurdistan as a “colonialist power”, a theory developed by the well-established sociologist of the Kurds, Ismail Besikci. The 1980 military coup and the unimaginable abuse of Kurds’ human rights brought Kurdish nationalism to its peak.

Today many Kurdish politicians, who were arrested and tortured as a consequence of the 1980 coup d’etat, are the main protagonists of the Kurdish national movement in Turkey/Kurdistan. They are also the main group who created Kurdish communities in the diaspora. I interviewed 9 of them in Berlin and Stockholm, including the president of the Kurdistan Socialist Party, Kemal Burkay in Sweden and Recep Marasli who spent 15 years in Diyarbakir prison and now lives in exile in Germany. From there he runs his own internet newspaper which receives 10,000 hits per day and publishes articles from Kurdish intellectuals who were tortured and humiliated in the junta prisons in the 1980s.

Since the foundation of the Turkish Republic, the Kurds have been denounced as the “state enemy”. Turkey’s “Kurdish question” has been defined by the Turkish authorities and the media which for decades, has demonstrated its loyalty to the state. After the Kurdish uprising in 1924, the Kurds were represented in the media as instruments of the imperialists, threatening national unity; from the 1950s to the 1980s, they were identified with feudal backwardness (Bulut 1992); from 1980-85 they were defined as “mountain Turks” (see below).
However, it was not just the demonisation of Kurds that was contentious. The Turkish state also suppressed the Kurdish language. This policy was crucial to create an imagined Turkish political community and to exert moral and intellectual dominance over potential revivals of Kurdish nationalism. While the Turkish state has created, institutionalized and propagated Oz Turkce - pure Turkish - the Kurdish language was “subjected to state violence” (Hassanpour 2000:33). In 1924, Kurdish was banned from being published and spoken in schools or public places. The Kurds were displaced from Kurdistan to different parts of Turkey and many Balkan migrants were resettled in the Kurdish region in 1934. Kurdish names and the names of Kurdish cities were replaced by Turkish ones. The ideological apparatus of the Turkish state invented a new theory that the Kurds were Dagli Türkler, “mountain Turks”, to put them under psychological and symbolic pressure, to shame them from mentioning their ethnic background or speaking Kurdish (Hassanpour, 2000).

While the primordialists consider language as one of the crucial roots of the nation (Smith, 1998), the modernists (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1988, Gellner 1983) consider language as a means to shape national consciousness and identity. The use of a common language creates and reproduces a shared feeling of belonging to a particularity (Brubaker 2004). Anderson argues that the standardization of language and privileging of certain dialects and vernaculars at the expense of others created “unified fields of exchange and communication”, a crucial step in the historical formation of the modern nation state (Anderson 1991:67–82). This can account for the language policy of the Turkish state of prescribed monolingualism, imposed on the Kurdish population. As Billig argues that “nationalism creates languages...as markers of boundaries between “our” nation and others” (Billig 1995:30-31). In this sense a shared language is a key element for an imagined community and national identity (Edwards 2009, Joseph 2004, Sheyholislami 2010) because “the creation of a
national hegemony often involves a hegemony of language” of the dominant ethnic group (Billig 1995:29).

Gramsci focused on the role of language in achieving hegemony through dissemination of the culture and world-view of the dominant group, while studying the standardization of Italian and how a middle class Tuscan dialect was imposed on Sicily and Sardinia (Gramsci’s homeland) during the unification of the Italian state in 1861. Although Gramsci favoured the creation of a common national language he was against imposing a reconstructed Florentine dialect onto people as the official language of Italy (Gramsci 1985:182). He considered the creation of a national language by forcible imposition as alien to people’s life, history and experience, advocating instead that the dialects and subaltern languages in daily use be combined to construct a “normative grammar” (Gramsci1985:181) which would reflect the common life and experience of people in Italy. Thus, he favoured keeping regional dialects and languages:

“Language is transformed with the transformation of the whole of civilisation, through the acquisition of culture by new classes and through the hegemony exercised by one national language over others., ..., and what it does is precisely to absorb, in metaphorical form, the words of previous civilisations and cultures “ (Gramsci 1971:452).

Language, to Gramsci, is a part of the process of establishing hegemony because “in language, there is contained a specific conception of the world” (Ives 2004:85). This had a political, as well as cultural import:

“Every time that the question of language surfaces, in one way or another, it means that a series of other problems are coming to the fore: the formation and enlargement of the governing class, the need to establish more intimate and secure relationships between the governing groups and the national–popular mass, in other words to recognize the cultural hegemony” (Gramsci 1985 183–4).
The cultural nature of language produces meaning and sets up boundaries which also exclude other groups of people (Fairclough 1989:3). This exclusion can lead to conflict, in which linguistic struggles play an important role in winning hegemony. Dominant ethnic groups can ban or suppress the language of subordinated ethnic groups in order to create a fixed national identity (Kymlicka and Patten 2003, Kymlicka and Straehle 1999). In the case of Turkey, the government officially denied that its Kurdish citizens are Kurds and that there is a Kurdish language: the Kurds are deemed “mountain Turks” who have forgotten their native, Turkish tongue (Billig 1995:34) or are dubbed “Turks Who Don’t Speak Turkish” (Murat 2005:602) Ostensibly, they speak differently because of their lack of education while being essentially Turkish (Kutlay 2000). From 1985-2000 the Kurdish question was defined as a “terror problem” in Turkish political discourse and in the media.

However, the politicians and media also started to acknowledge Kurdish existence, as former Prime Minister, Ecevit did, without using the word “Kurds” (Murat 2005). At the same time, the extreme nationalists continue to deny Kurdish existence and reduce the Kurdish question to one of “terror”. The former Turkish Prime Minister and State President, Suleyman Demirel, made clear the hegemonic power struggle between the Kurds and the Turkish state when he stated that the Kurds had resisted “29 times” in Turkey, adding that each time “we put down the separatists” (Candar 2005) promising the PKK, to put down this “last separatist terror”. The Kurds as a subordinated group are seen as a threat - “separatist terror” - for opposing the imagined Turkish political community. However as Gramsci pointed out, even if the dominant group dominates others through coercion, “it must continue to “lead” as well (1971:57–58 ). The use of the Turkish state’s monopoly of force caused a huge reaction amongst the subordinated Kurds and gave rise to political, military and cultural
contestation of the imagined Turkish community that resulted in the rise of the Kurdistan Workers Party.

2.1. The Turkish state, PKK and power struggle for the “nation”

The PKK was established as a Marxist-Leninist student movement in the Turkish capital city, Ankara, in 1978 and its initial aim was to establish a unified, independent socialist Kurdish state. The organizational structure of the early period was characterised by “Leninist democratic centralism”. While many Kurdish left-wing, “outlawed” organisations and parties (PSK, DDKO, KUK, KAWA and Rizgari)\(^\text{10}\) in Turkey fought politically for the rights of the Kurds, the PKK started an armed struggle against the Turkish state in 1984. Within a short time its guerrilla war developed. By the 1990s it could control Kurdish cities after dark and was judged to “have gained strong support since the inception of the armed struggle in 1984” from both the Kurds in Turkey and in Europe (Hirschler 2001:146).

For a long time, the Turkish state and media have claimed that the nation is unified in its war against the “separatists”. In so doing, they have created the political slogan “All together from Hakkari to Edirne” - an imagined community stretching from the Kurdish populated city on the borders with Iran and Iraq in eastern Anatolia, to a Turkish populated city on the border with Greece, in western Turkey. Thus, this slogan is both a geographic and political, symbolic image of the forcible assimilation of ethnic “others” by the Turkish state.

The Turkish state’s response to the PKK was characterised by indiscriminate violence against all Kurds who lived in the Kurdish regions of Turkey and even Istanbul where Kurdish young people had been radicalized to participate in the PKK. The Turkish military destroyed and burned three thousand Kurdish villages\(^\text{11}\), leading to the internal displacement of the Kurds in Turkey. This caused more problems rather
than providing a solution for the Turkish state. The war spread from Kurdistan to Turkey. Kurds became internally displaced, causing ethnic tension and hostility between Turks and Kurds. Many of these displaced people were forced to move to large cities like Amed (in Turkish Diyarbakır), Istanbul, Izmir, and Mersin and also to Western Europe. The internally displaced Kurds suffer from massive unemployment, housing and health problems. Moreover, internally displaced Kurds face daily attacks from the police and nationalist groups, and multiple forms of discrimination. According to the official estimate, 40,000 people were killed during the conflict. The human rights organisations’ estimates exceed 40,000, blaming the government for the killing and “disappearances” of human rights activists, journalists, Kurdish politicians and other civilians (Beşikçi 2009).

At the end of the 1980s, the state and the media began to use the term “Kurdish”, but did not accept the claim for a separate national identity. They saw Kurdishness as just one folkloric variation among many within the mosaic of Turkey’s people. Nevertheless, accepting the “separatists” as Kurds, created a dilemma for the state and media because state ideology had denied Kurdish existence up till then. If the state accepted that the so-called “separatists” were Kurds and citizens of Turkey, then this meant firstly, the recognition of Kurdish identity, and secondly, according to the state’s own ideology, the existence of an ethnic group other than the Turks within the borders of the state which could endanger the integrity of Turkey. For this reason, the state and media reinforced a hegemonic construction of the Turkish nation-state as a homogenous, unified, inclusive imagined community, using the geographic term “the people of East and Southeast Anatolia” to denote the Kurdish people.

However, “[a] movement of national independence will not only claim that ‘we are a nation’, but, in so doing, it will be demanding the political
entitlements which are presumed to follow from being a nation” (Billig 1995:63). Therefore, the Kurds established their own legal pro-Kurdish political parties\textsuperscript{12} which have been banned by the Turkish Constitutional Court on the grounds of separatism and/or supporting the Kurdistan Workers Party. After all the Kurdish political parties were closed down, other pro-Kurdish parties replaced them. These parties play a crucial role in legitimizing Kurdishness and running local government in Kurdish populated regions, highlighting Kurdish issues in the Turkish Parliament.

Öcalan’s capture and handover to the Turkish state by the CIA in 1998, (see chapter VI) brought a shift in the political strategy of the PKK. The PKK’s initial aim of establishing a unified, independent socialist Kurdish state shifted to establishing a democratic confederation of Kurds in Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Syria without changing the respective states’ national borders\textsuperscript{13} and a democratized “nation” in Turkey. This has caused anger amongst Kurds in Turkey and also in the diaspora.

The PKK was not able to reach the large and diverse Kurdish population through armed struggle alone and has attempted to transform itself from a military power to a legal political movement in Turkey. It decreased the intensity of armed struggle and changed its political demands so they were more acceptable to the Turkish public. Moreover, the PKK as a political organization aimed to create a movement of diverse identities and broader appeal, going beyond the “corporate” interests of the Kurdish population, through legal political, cultural and economic struggles to create a “national–popular collective will” (Dalmaz 2011) for a “war of position” – the long haul contesting within the institutions of civil society. This could be described as “building up a broad bloc of varied social forces, unified by a common conception of the world,” (Simon 1991:25) capable of challenging the hegemony of the dominant social group and state policies.
This transformation has caused PKK sympathisers deep disappointment and the organisation has lost a significant number of members and financial support from diaspora Kurds. However the PKK’ support extends to thousands of communities in Europe, North America, and the Middle East. Over the years, it has been transformed into a contemporary transnational party which also addresses ecological issues and multicultural society in the fight for the democratisation of Turkey and the rights of all the Kurds in Kurdistan and in the diaspora. While the other Kurdish parties’ influence remained confined to the social circles, region, dialect and tribe of their leaders, the PKK’s origins in left-wing movements ensured it mobilized against regionalism and tribalism. While PKK left-wing ideology clearly diverges from a primordialist argument, it has constructed an imagined political community, based on secularism, the rejection of regionalism and tribalism, and the dissemination of Kurdish language and culture. It has promoted the linguistic and cultural aspects of its political discourse in Turkey and internationally to force Turkey to change its exclusivist nation-building project.

Moreover as Anderson (1983), Gellner (1983) and Billig (1995) argue the creation of national consciousness is “accompanied by the creation of national histories” (Billig 1991:71). The nation is not only a political concept. National movements and nation-states “create their own histories or interpretations” (Billig 1991:71). The construction of contemporary Kurdishness needed to invent a historical root. The new imagined Kurdish political community invented different myths to explain Kurdish roots, in a similar vein to the Turkish Historical Thesis (Turk Tarih Tezi) and The Sun Language Theory (Gunes Dil Theorisi), published in 1936, which claimed that “the Turkish language is the source for all existing languages in the world” (Hirschler 2001:147, Beşikçi 1974, Hassanpour 1992)
Kurdish nationalists reinterpret these myths to legitimate their resistance to the Turkish state. A key example is the celebration of the New Year, Newroz. The celebration welcomes the spring and New Year according to Zoroastrian tradition. Since the 1980s, the PKK has reinterpreted this celebration in a politicised vein, turning it into a day of opposition to the “Turkish occupation”, demanding recognition of a distinctive Kurdish identity. It is claimed that New Year commemorates the liberation of the ancient Kurds from the tyrant Dehak who used to eat the sons of his Kurdish subjects. The smith, Kawa successfully rebelled and killed the tyrant, thereby freeing the Kurds. The PKK identify themselves with the “hero Kawa” and the Turkish state with the tyrant Dehak, thus re-interpreting this ancient myth in a nationalist manner. The Turkish state had banned the Newroz celebrations until the 1990s. However, in 1995 the state introduced for the first time on TV and through other media its own interpretation of Newroz: “In 1995, Newroz was declared to be a Turkish holiday commemorating the day the Turks left their Central Asian homeland, Ergenekon. Newroz was now referred to in its Turkified version as Nevruz” (Hirschler 2001:154).

But despite the use of ancient myths and historical figures, the Kurdish national movement has a modernising function in Kurdish society while the Turkish state has relied on traditional Kurdish leaders, the religious and feudal tribal chiefs who have co-operated with it. The Turkish state has ruled in Kurdistan through a state of emergency, military force, the use of Islam and by exerting influence over the Kurdish feudal chiefs in Kurdistan. But the Kurdish national movement, including the PKK as an alternative nation-building movement, has focused on secularisation of the society, dissolving the feudal system amongst Kurds and establishing their own political parties, newspapers and other civil society institutions. Kurdish nationalists use elements of what they claim is ancient Kurdish culture to construct a new, imagined Kurdish community. Their view of history and
historical rituals and practices reconstructs an ancient Kurdish community for the purpose of creating a viable modern Kurdish identity with a view to reinforcing the project of Kurdish nationalism.

In August 2005, the current Prime Minister, Erdogan spoke of the Kurdish question in the Kurdish area, acknowledging “there is a Kurdish question and the Kurdish question is my problem. The state made some mistakes and we will solve this problem in a democratic process” (Yeni Safak 2005). But such statements of responsibility and commitment to broadcasting in Kurdish have not been anchored in the constitution. It is still possible that this recognition could change into a denial of Kurdish existence. Recently Erdogan stated that “there is not a Kurdish question in this country anymore. I reject this claim… There are the problems of my Kurdish brothers but there is not a Kurdish question anymore” (Erdem 2011).

However when the armed struggle between the Turkish military and the PKK started again, destabilizing the flow of petrol and gas from Asia and the Middle East through the Kurdish region of Turkey, international pressure on the Turks and the PKK increased. The hopes of the Turkish government of winning the local election in Kurdistan proved hollow because the former pro-Kurdish DTP party won a majority. Therefore, the Turkish government talked publicly about a “Kurdish Opening” or “Kurdish Initiative”, later renamed the “Democratic Initiative”. But this Turkish government initiative lasted only a short time and mass arrests of elected Kurdish politicians followed in 2009 and 2010. Constitutional jurist Prof. Mustafa Erdoğan states in an interview with journalist Nese Düzel of the Taraf newspaper that “indeed the ruling AKP government aims to get the Kurds on its side and integrate them in the system”(Düzel 2010) demonstrating the continuing hegemonic power struggle between the Turkish state and the Kurds.
As this brief history has shown, the ethno-national struggle continues through the struggle for hegemony. The Turkish-dominated state has attempted to impose “a national identity that is based on a conceptualization of a Turkish nation whose cornerstones are cultural unity and homogeneity, “ (Kirisci 2009:8) political, as well as ideological hegemony over other identity groups. In doing this, the Turkish state has sought to create a common sense of Turkish nationalism. The Turkish state has sought to build a “historic bloc” in the Gramscian sense of the term, against the potential threat to their “imagined community”. This constitutes more than simply a political alliance between social forces represented by classes or social groups. It indicates the integration of a variety of different class interests expressed within the society (Morton 2010:6) to bring “about not only a unison of economic and political aims, but also intellectual and moral unity . . . on a ‘universal’ plane” (Gramsci 1971:181–2). However this attempt to create a nationalistic common sense has been rejected for decades by the second largest ethnic group in Turkey, the Kurds. So Kurdish nationalism has, over a long period, created its own imagined community and constructed an alternative common sense. This can be interpreted in political and cultural terms as a counter-hegemonic “historic bloc”.

2.2. Hegemonic Struggle over the “Imagined Community”
According to Gavrilos, identities are “relationally constructed and negotiated between differently empowered groups” and therefore can only be understood by historicizing their struggles (2002:427). Therefore a historical overview is required to see how identity has been articulated in the struggle for hegemony.

The Turkish republic gradually established its ideological base through institutionalization and standardization of an invented Turkish history and language. As Colak has argued:
“With the first attempts to build the institutions of a nation-state during the early years of the Republic of Turkey, a common national language was seen to be essential to the development of a mass consciousness of being a part of a cultural whole” (Colak 2004:67).

Therefore, the Turkish nationalists invested in the construction of a new Turkish language. The Turkish Language Society (Türk Dil Kurumu) was established to create a pure Turkish (“öz Türkce”). In order to distinguish the Republic from the Ottoman Empire, the new, pure Turkish used Latin, rather than Arab, script. Mustafa Kemal introduced “new Turkish letters” on 9 August 1928, purging the Turkish language of Arabic and Farsi in order “to spread culture among the people. It should be a language through which the flow of thought and idea from above is possible in order to publicize and inculcate culture” (“Gazi Türkcesi”, original publication 1932:114 quoted in Colak 2004:68). The official “scientification of language” (Colak 2004:81) was associated with stress on its political role in the formation of a new culture from above.

In order to establish and consolidate the imagined Turkish political imagined community, the Turkish state punished Kurdish intellectuals who published articles, books on or in Kurdish and imprisoned them on charges of separatism. As a result of the Turkish military coup in 1981, an article was added to the Turkish constitution stating that “Freedom of expression and dissemination of thought is not allowed in languages (Kurdish Y.K) prohibited by law” (1982 Constitution Article 26, par. 3 and also Article 28, par. 2), and in 1985 another article (No. 2987) was passed proscribing the use of written and spoken languages other than the “mother tongue of Turkish citizens”. Billig argues that:

“the achievement of national hegemony is well illustrated by the triumph of official national languages and the suppression of rivals...to
consolidate their hold on state power. The 1982 Constitution of Turkey specially forbids any party from concerning itself “with the defence, development or diffusion of any non-Turkish language or culture” (in Entessar 1989 quoted in Billig 1995:27-28).

However the suppressed Kurdishness has been reconstructed in Turkish prisons, in the diaspora and in the mountains. This subordinated Kurdishness caused “an organic crisis” which the Turkish state faced a challenge. Therefore, during Turgut Ozal’s period as Prime Minister in 1991, the Turkish government repealed the bill forbidding the use of non-Turkish languages in the hope of defusing the ethnic armed struggle. Billig argues that “sometimes when hegemony is assured, or when it is later threatened, this legal suppression of language is relaxed, either in the interest of recapturing a harmless heritage, or to ward off demands from separatist irredentist group” (1995:37). Yet, while after 1991 speaking Kurdish was allowed, writing and learning Kurdish remained criminalized.

The contradictions of Turkey’s language policy with regard to Kurdish can be shown by two examples. The co-chairperson of the Democratic Society Party (DTP), which was banned in 2009, Ahmet Turk stated that the government “are spreading the propaganda that Kurdish is freely spoken. We wanted to see whether this was true”. He announced that he would talk in Kurdish in the parliamentary meeting of the DTP on February 24 2009, during UNESCO’s World Languages Week. When he started to talk in Kurdish, the state television channel TRT 3 cut the broadcast and a TV announcer read a statement: “Since no language other than Turkish can be used in the parliamentary meetings according to the Constitution of the Turkish Republic and the Political Parties Law, we had to cut our broadcast”.

Another example is the prosecution of Kurds for using letters not found in the Turkish alphabet e.g. q, w, and x, so-called “non-Turkish letters” which
are used in Kurdish. Many families who gave their children Kurdish names containing “Kurdish letters”, and Kurdish politicians like Diyarbakir Mayor, Baydemir faced criminal prosecution for using “illegal letters”. The constitution and laws are designed to maintain Turkish ethnic and cultural dominance: “The Turkish state, with its territory and nation, is an indivisible entity. Its language is Turkish” (Turkish Constitution Article 3, 1982). Act 1353 of November 1, 1928 on Adoption and Application of Turkish Letters forbids the use of any “non-Turkish letters”, though this law is not enforced with respect to the use of English in schools or universities. These articles are only used to criminalize Kurdish.

In 2001, the Turkish government commissioned the Radio and Television Higher Board (RTUK) to prepare regulation of “Radio and TV Broadcasts in Languages and Dialects Traditionally used by Turkish Citizens in Their Daily Lives”. Following this regulation, the state started its first Turkish-subtitled television broadcast in Kurdish for 30 minutes a day, 2 hours a week. In 2009, before the local elections, the Turkish Prime Minister, Erdogan became the first Turkish politician to greet Kurdish audiences in Kurdish on the newly established Turkish state, 24-hour broadcasting channel, TRT6 (in Kurdish TRT Şeş) which “aims at the unity of the country and to protect interests of states and individuals in line with the Constitution and provide broadcasts contributing to the democratic awareness of the country’s people” (TRT6 2009). This “structural change” (Gill 1990) can be analysed from a Gramscian perspective that hegemony is not static, but a struggle to “lead”. Providing news and other programmes for Kurds in Kurdish language is the state’s attempt to maintain popular consent in a society in which the national project is contested by an alternative imagining of peoplehood. This has forced the Turkish state to adapt its language policy in the face of Kurdish oppositional positions.
The journalist Akyol (2009) states:

“TRT 6's real aim, it appears, is to undercut the appeal of Roj TV, a Kurdish satellite network broadcasting out of Europe that is extremely popular among Turkey's Kurds. Ankara has accused Roj of being a mouthpiece for the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and of spreading anti-Turkish propaganda. But the channel, which shows a mix of news, music videos and other programs, has been able to become as popular as it is, because there has been no other alternative out there” (in byegm.gov.tr, 15.01.2009) (See Turkish state attempts to close down the Europe-based Kurdish transnational MED TV and its successors Medya TV and Roj TV in chapter IV).

The state broadcasts now in Kurdish but that does not mean that the Turkish state and its ideological institutions is willing to share political power with the Kurds. Kurds are still not allowed to broadcast in Kurdish. This policy is a good example of how hegemony in civil society is:

“only possible through public protection by the state. For example, government agencies will grant television licenses to stations that run approved programming, and the governmental authorities reserve the right to approve textbooks for use in public schools. These relations are maintained by force in the last instance (the police will shut down a ‘pirate’ television station or remove a book from the shelves of a school library” (Litowitz 2000:526).

This brief survey of the historical struggles around Turkish and Kurdish language shows how means of coercion (legal prohibitions, imprisonment of writers and speakers of Kurdish) and consent (educating children in Turkish), as well as mixtures of both, characterize the struggle for hegemony. Relaxing the prohibition of Kurdish and most Kurdish language broadcasting by Turkish state television can be seen as an attempt to recapture hegemony against an increasingly strong Kurdish counter-hegemonic public. Language is a key issue negotiated within changing
political and social contexts by the state and the Kurdish nationalist movement (Kaplan 2006).

2.3. The Kurdish nationalist movement
The Kurdish nationalist movement has employed changing notions of common sense to disseminate its nationalism to Kurds within Turkey. It had to change its concepts and dreams of a nation state. At the beginning of the 70s and increasingly in 80s, the discursive politics of the Kurdish nationalists was to fight against “colonization of Kurdistan” through armed struggle. The following statement of PKK’s first manifesto makes clear that “Kurdistan is an inter-state colony. A national liberation struggle is unavoidable duty in order to gain the freedom and independence of the Kurdish people” (Ozcan 2005:93).

However later they came to understand that they could win consent in the Kurdish population whose internal and external world were being “colonized” by the language policy and education system into accepting Turkish ethnic domination as common sense. Moreover the Kurdish nationalists understood that they would not be able to challenge the coercive control of the state through its police and military power, so they set about building alliances with the Turkish people. Therefore in the 90s, the Kurdish national movement started to establish legal parties within the framework of Turkish law, a strategy called “becoming part of Turkey” (Turkiyelilesmek) and later named “democratic confederation” and now “democratic autonomy”.

The question of political agency has been a subject of some controversy in recent years within the Kurdish political establishment. This new strategy rejected the idea of an independent Kurdistan and advocated solving the Kurdish issue through the democratization of Turkey. It aimed for the democratization of the Turkish nation-state, and within this framework sought autonomy for the Kurds without touching the national border of
Turkey. The PKK and its imprisoned leader Öcalan wanted to achieve a federation between Turkish and Kurdish people. This new political strategy turned the struggle for domination from a coercive moment into a struggle for consent in civil society. This means that “the war of position”, rather than a frontal war of attrition, became the crucial way to change the system.

In the meantime, the Kurdish national movement discovered the power of the diaspora, which is distant from the direct experience of coercion by the dominant group in Turkey. In the diaspora, Kurdish nationalists can more freely disseminate their messages, symbols and language through different agencies, including transnational media. Therefore, they started to publish newspapers and established a transnational TV station in Europe which created an interconnected popular Kurdish imagined community within Turkey and in the diaspora.

In Europe, Kurdish and Turkish migrants live in civil societies free of the direct control of the Turkish state and continue simultaneous and multi-level struggles on an international level, creating, disseminating and legitimizing its “Weltanschauung” (Gramsci 1971:381). Turkish and Kurdish migrants lead their hegemonic struggle through demonstrations, media and lobbying for the homeland. The hegemonic struggle to create imagined communities has spread to Turkish and Kurdish migrants living in Europe to whom contesting nationalist symbols, language and meanings are disseminated through the media and the migrants interpret and create meaning out of these media texts and images.

2.4. Nationalism and Media “Beyond Geography”
Agnew claims that nationalism is never “beyond geography” (1989:167, quoted in Billig 1995:75) “the nation place has to be imagined, just as much as the national community does” (Billig 1995:75). The Kurdish cause came to be internationalised through key events: Saddam Hussein’s use of
chemical weapons against Kurds in Halabja in 1988, the Gulf War in 1991, the collapse of Saddam’s regime in 2003 and the progress of Turkey’s application for membership of the EU, begun in 1987. Kurdish migrant mobilisation and lobbying have given more power to the PKK in the region than that Federal President of Iraq, Jalal Talabani’s PUK or KRG or President of Iraqi Kurdistan, Masud Barzani’s KDP. Today the PKK has “developed broad organizational structures and displayed an enormous capacity to mobilize Kurds both within and without Turkey especially in Europe” (Hirschler 2001:146). If we understand hegemony primarily as “a strategy for the gaining of the active consent of the masses through their self-organization” (Buci-Glucksmann 1982:119), the Kurdish national movement’s creation of its own media and cultural centres from the Middle East to Europe can be seen as a successful attempt at creating hegemony.

The Turkish and Kurdish migrants moved to Europe at different times for different reasons and have reproduced “their nationhood” in Europe. The first large-scale migration was the guest-worker wave that started in the 1960s to Germany, and later to Sweden and other European countries. The settlement countries acted generously in allowing Turkish embassies to control their citizens in terms of education (Sirkeci 2006). Thus, the guest-worker children attended “Turkish schools” run by embassies because the guest workers were supposed to return to their homeland. Turkey gave permission for the Turkish media to be distributed in Europe in order to propagate Turkishness and keep the loyalty to the imagined nation alive amongst so-called guest workers.

However after the military coup in 1971, followed by the coup in 1981, a significant group of mostly left-oriented Turks and Kurds fled to Europe. Here they continued their political opposition to the Turkish military regime. This made the Turkish state aware of a possible threat to its system. Subsequently the Turkish media in Europe started to portray left-wing
individuals and groups as the “enemy of state” and “traitor of the country”. *Hürriyet* and *Milliyet* led a campaign of slander against some intellectuals and artists (Abakay 1988:60). In the late 1970s, the Turkish State created “a space of control in the host countries of the immigrants (pressure for the ban on illegal organizations, campaigns of Turkish politicians by the migrants, exportation of the Turk-Islamic synthesis) (Rigoni 2002:2).

When the Kurds started to establish their communities and focused on reproducing Kurdish language and culture in the diaspora, they met with resistance from the Turkish state. (Hassanpour 1992:135) For example, the Turkish Embassy in Copenhagen tried to stop the Nordic Cultural Foundation in Denmark programme of teacher training for Kurdish language education of migrants, “by pointing out that participants were still Turkish citizens and were, thus, not entitled to break Turkish law, whatever country they were in, and in Turkish law Kurdish is a forbidden language” (Skutnabb-Kengas 1981:279-80, quote in Hasanpour 1992:135). Such state invention increased at the end of the 1980s and at the beginning of the 90s, when politicized Kurdish migrants consolidated their separate Kurdish communities, publishing magazines and newspapers and finally broadcasting on *MED TV* and later its successors Medya TV and *Roj TV*.

Today a 100 Turkish and 17 Kurdish TV Channels broadcast in Europe and several Turkish and 2 Kurdish daily newspapers are available to migrants in Europe, in addition to 24-hour access to the Internet. This has created different identities and political positions amongst Turkish and Kurdish migrants. Each of these channels and newspapers tries to create their own imagined community in accordance with the projects of these diverse political movements in Europe, in Turkey and the Kurdish territories. This highlights the deficiency in Billig’s theoretical framework which does not take account of the diversity of political views of different newspapers. My empirical research shows that people do not automatically
agree with these media, even if they use political and geographical terms and definitions disseminated by them. Migrants talk about the news in cafés, community centres and at home. This awakes an “alternative nationalism and other ways of imagining peoplehood” (Billig 1995:28). Therefore, the Turkish state sees the Kurdish channels and newspaper as a threat to its own imagined community in Turkey and Europe.

Turkey’s battle with the Kurdish media and institutions can be defined as the defence and reproduction of Turkey’s imagined community both internally and internationally. For example, a crisis arose with Denmark over Kurdish broadcasting from Denmark on Roj TV - formerly Medya TV - and the people who gave an interview to Kurdish Roj TV or who watched this channel were punished. The satellite antennae in Kurdish territory (so called Eastern and South-eastern Anatolia of Turkey) were also destroyed. The invisible negotiated struggle between Kurdish nationalists and the Turkish state over their attempts to create their imagined community has been transnationalized and deterritorialized and continues in socio-political ways. The media is the key tool in this process.

3. Media and Conflict
Anderson and Billig have focused on the role of the media in disseminating and legitimizing the ideological discourse of the nation, its symbols and meanings for the imagined community. Anderson states that “Nationalism has to be understood by aligning it, not with self-consciously held political ideologies, but with the large cultural system that preceded it, out of which, as well as against which, it came into being (1991:13). In this sense, the role of the Turkish and Kurdish media in disseminating the imagined Turkish and Kurdish communities in Europe will be examined. The media are linked with the dominant Turkish or Kurdish power structures and their key actors, through their financial and legal dependence on the state, socialisation with the politicians, bureaucrats, military and business elites and shared ideology. As neo-Gramscians have argued, power structures
are “supported and promoted by forms of elite interaction that have forged common perspectives among business, state officials, and representatives of international organizations favouring the logic of capitalist market relations” (Morton 2010:163, see also Gill and Law 1989).

In the framework of these power structures, the “official Turkish and Kurdish media” are juxtaposed in their reporting of the conflict, but both sides’ reporting shows things “in black and white” without shades of grey (Duran 1998:36).

3.1. The Turkish media and their position in the conflict

The Turkish media were established by the state in 1929 which reduced its function to propagating the nationalistic and hegemonic ideology of the Turkish nation-state. Adak states that: “in 1929, the nationalistic discourse that was already a dominant part of the new regime turned into a hegemonic ideology in Turkey….. [and] found [its] place in its publishing organ as well” (2004b:87). The newspapers “Hakimiyeti Milliye” and “Cumhuriyet” – “which was published in a printing house that the state had confiscated from its Armenian owner” (Cemal 2005:456) – acted as the ideological apparatuses of the new state to create “attachment” and “meaning” (Anderson 1991:53) to the nation and effect a nationalist transformation.

With the introduction of the multi-party system in 1946, many new newspapers joined the Turkish media landscape. The state established its own Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) in 1964 to “broadcast on behalf of the state” (TRT 2008). While the state kept its monopoly on broadcasting with TRT, the print media did not significantly develop until the 1980s and confronted state restriction. The 1960s spring was an exception, when the 1961 Constitution allowed press freedom and the establishment of civil society, including unions and the first legal left-wing
Turkish Workers Party (TIP). However the 1960s movement broke up with the military coup in 1971.

The influence of global liberalisation reached Turkey in the mid 1980s when Turgut Ozal’s government restructured the economy. The liberalisation, privatization policies and spread of communication technologies forced Turkey to give up the state monopoly on broadcasting. The Law on the Establishment of Radio and Television Enterprises and Their Broadcasts, Law No.3984 was passed on 20 April 1994 (RTÜK 1994). These policies have changed media ownership in Turkey and created new media tycoons very much like Berlusconi or Murdoch. The new media proprietors not only own newspapers and TV channels, but are also operating in financial services, including mortgages and insurance, in energy, industry, construction, trade and tourism. Media functions have been reduced to reproducing Turkish “common sense”, promoting tycoons’ products and their economic interests. “This metamorphosis led to sensationalism, manipulation, disinformation and misinformation in the news media, in the very best interest of the media conglomerates instead of [in] citizens’ interest” (İnceoğlu and Çınarlı 2007:2)14.

Today the conservative, Islamic government has used its power to create its own “henchman” media and closed down Cem Uzan’s multi-sectoral and multi-media group. They use state power to control mainstream media including through customs’ officers, arrests, harassment, intimidation and imprisonment of journalists. The monopolized media split into different groups with the support of the AKP ruling government like Feza, Albayrak Medya Group, Samanyolu Yayın group, Star Medya Yayınıcılık A.Ş and Çukurova Holding, while the Dogan Group, Ciner Medya Group, DK Gazetecilik Yayınıcılık A.Ş support Kemalist ideology, the state propagated Turkish nationalism, military as well as the liberal ideas and policies. These media groups also support Turkey's candidacy to the European Union. But
even with this differentiation of the media, the core principles of the broadcasting and publishing based on the Turkish nationalist ideology. Turkish media with its different nationalist, Islamic, liberal, pro-European perspectives report on Kurdish issues in the perspective of hegemonic and ethnocentric Turkish nationalism. Kurdish identity is still associated with “terrorist organisation” and individuals with “separatist terror” (Islamic Zaman Newspaper 2009). Duran explains this with reference to the media’s dependence on the state (1998:34) but the dependence of the Turkish media on the state is not only economic and financial but above all ideological in nature because the publishing policies of the mainstream Turkish media is based on the Ethnocentric nationalist ideology of the Turkish state. Therefore the function of journalistic occupation is reduced to reproduce and legitimize the ethno-centric state’s ideology, values, symbols, meanings.

3.2. Representations of the “Kurdish” question in the Turkish media

Until the 1990s, the main discursive strand in the newspapers close to the Turkish state was the denial of the existence of Kurdish ethnicity, culture and language. Cultural and linguistic differences were represented as signs of regional backwardness, tribal culture or feudality. This policy of psychological humiliation by the state and its media alienated and marginalized the Kurds in Turkey (Bulut 1992). Psychological humiliation refers here to ideological dominance over subordinated people used to shame them about being Kurdish, to prevent them expressing their identity and make them internalize the Turkish nationalism. The Kurdish identity was depicted in various negative, stereotypical ways such as separatist and terrorist. This has had a huge negative psychological impact on the Kurdish population and made them feel culturally and socially unvalued. This approach was reproduced in newspaper headlines and articles until the 2000 (Bulut 1992, Duran 2006).
When the war between the Turkish state and the PKK intensified, the media discourse on the Kurds changed from “mountain Turks” to “rioters”, “Ermeni Dölü - Armenian seed - and “terrorists”. The media discourse used here can be understood as “a recontextualizing principle for appropriating other discourses [nationalistic, cultural, social, militarist] and bringing them into a special relation with each other for the purposes of their dissemination and mass consumption” (Chouliaraki 1999:39, also see Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999) in order to maintain hegemonic domination (see chapter VI for further discussion on media discourse).

Turkey’s strongly militarist policies are reflected in the media: During the most intense phase of the war between the Turkish state and the PKK at the end of the 1980s and in the early ‘90s, Turkish journalists joined the military operations and relied mainly on military sources, when reporting the war, instead of doing independent, investigative journalism. The Turkish media published the statements of the military and government while columnists wrote docile commentaries, acceptable to the generals. The ideological and financial dependency of the Turkish media on the state has prevented it from developing an independent and critical distance from the state and its military policies (Sezgin and Wall, 2005).

Media proprietors have maintained strong financial links with the military and government. In particular Ozal’s government in 1980, Demirel’s and Ciller’s governments in the 1990s have used this financial link to silence the media and make it tow the military line during the conflict they defined as “low intensity war”. In 1995, the then Prime Minister, Tansu Ciller, met with representatives of the giant media companies and their editors and journalists. She spoke of winning the war through the media (Hürriyet, 22.03.1995). The Hürriyet columnist, Mr. Eksi wrote that the media had to support the government in the battle against the separatist terror organization, i.e. the PKK, and Defence Minister, Sezgin called upon
journalists to co-operate with the police (Çalışlar 2006). Journalists Duran (2006), Mahcupyan (2006) and Calislar (2006) blame their colleagues for acting as military officers. Mahçupyan (2006) points out that the media is “a strong actor in the political equation. Therefore, the selection of news carries a direct political meaning and indeed we don’t learn about reality” (Mahcupyan 2006). Mahçupyan blames the Turkish media for ignoring the Kurdish issue and reducing it to a question of terror. Furthermore, he accuses them of manipulating the readers, by deliberately distorting events.

Issues related to Kurdish identity, discrimination against Kurds and the indiscriminate use of violence against them by the military have not been a topic in the best-selling, mainstream Turkish media. Instead the notion of national security is a value beyond debate. A recent example of manipulation from the Hürriyet newspaper illustrates the position of the Turkish media in this conflict. The Umut Bookstore, owned by Seferi Yilmaz, in the Semdinli (district of Hakkari) was bombed in November 2005. One person died during this attack. When bystanders caught the perpetrators of the attack and delivered them to police officers, it emerged that they were two junior military officers, Ali Kaya and Ozcan Ildeniz and a PKK informant of the Gendarmerie Intelligence and Anti-Terror Unit JITEM. The investigations found evidence that the attack was likely backed by the Gendarmerie Forces. Yet, Yaşar Büyükanit, then Commander of the Army, backed these two junior officers. When the Prosecutor, Ferhat Sankaya, began investigating the gang’s possible connections with high-ranking officials including Yaşar Büyükanit, he was disbarred by the Supreme Board of Prosecutors and Judges. The two junior officers were sentenced to 39 years, but the Supreme Court of Appeal decided that a military court should be in charge of the investigation. Both officers were released after their first trial in the military court.
During this case, Hürriyet published a report on the alleged connections of the bookseller Seferi Yilmaz to a Chairman of the Kurdistan Democratic Confederation (KCK), Murat Karayilan. The report suggested that “the organisation [i.e. KCK] used this incident to blame the Turkish military. [General Fevzi Turkeri] stresses the military did not participate in this game” (Gurel and Özturk 2005). Hurried supported this report with a manipulated photo-montage showing KCK Chairman Karayilan and bookshop owner Mr. Seferi Yilmaz next to each other at the bookshop.

3.1. The original photo

3.2. The photo-montage

While the pro-Kurdish Ongar Political and Kurdistan Post denounced this media fabrication, other newspapers did not report it.

3.3. Kurdish media: challenging imagined “Turkishness”
The first Kurdish newspaper Kurdistan was published in Cairo in 1898 and moved from Cairo to the UK and Switzerland owing to financial problems and persecution in the Ottoman Empire. Other newspapers like Ark (1908), Amid-I Sedan vet Penman (1909), Yuban (1913), Jin (1918) and Iran
(1923), Hagar (in Syria, 1923), Galatea (in Mahanadi, Iranian Kurdistan, 1936), Intiman (1943) which promoted Kurdish nationalism in different parts of Kurdistan have been able to publish.

While the restriction on the use of Kurdish language and publishing in Kurdish began in Turkey in the 1920s, Kurds founded other communications media to maintain their language. So they first broadcast on radio in 1924 from Red Kurdistan in the Soviet Union. Other radio stations followed: - in 1939 Baghdad Kurdish radio began; during World War II, an anti-Nazi radio broadcast from Haifa in Palestine; in 1955, Erivan radio from Radon Rewind broadcast a programme in Kurdish and in 1957 Egyptian Kurdish radio started up. Iran reacted to Egyptian Kurdish radio broadcasting with the establishment of the first Kurdish radio in Kermanshah in 1958. Then the first Kurdish television was established in Kirkuk in 1968 by the Iraqi government in order to control the Kurdish uprising and curb Iranian influence. In 1963, Kurdistan radio was established by Kurdish nationalists in Iraqi Kurdistan. Turkey reacted to the setting up of Kurdish radio in Egypt with a fierce statement, the first documented reaction of Turkey to Kurdish broadcasting, culminating in intensified denunciations in the 90s.

Some of these radio stations lasted a decade and disappeared because most of them were operated by certain external powers and ideologies to control Kurdish nationalism. But these radios were listened to in different parts of Kurdistan and had a huge impact on the development of Kurdish culture and language, creating a collective consciousness amongst Kurds of being one people - “we “. The most influential radio was Erivan Radio (1955) which broadcast in the Kurdish Kumauni dialect and had large hidden audiences in Kurdistan region in Turkey where broadcasting and publishing in Kurdish was strictly prohibited.
According to the chronology set out by Kemal Burkay, the former leader of the Socialist party of Kurdistan, whom I interviewed in Stockholm (07 June 2007), the Kurdish media was set up in Turkish in the 60s and 70s in Turkey but met with state harassment and confiscation and was finally shut down in 1979. However, the main shift in government strategy, took place under the liberal policies of the Turgut Ozal government in 1991, when the ban on Kurdish was officially lifted. “Several Kurdish journals moved their offices from Europe to Turkey. New Kurdish journals were also established, and there was a veritable boom in Kurdish publishing” (van Bruinessen 1998:2)

However Turkey has continued its censorship. Turkish and Kurdish media were and still are not allowed to investigate issues surrounding the Kurdish-Turkish ethno-national conflict or and criticize state policies and military. In a democracy, the function of the media is conceptualized as watchdog to hold government and state institutions accountable. However the democratic character of a regime plays a vital role in upholding or maintaining press freedom and freedom of speech, opinion (Whitten (Whitten-Woodring 2009, Popescuy 2001). Without press freedom, media cannot act as a Fourth Estate and hold decision makers in accountable.

Current academic debate about censorship in Europe thematises invasions of privacy, distinction between private and public, self-censorship and the ownership of media (Belsey 1995). Yet, in Turkey, the official power applies coercive control of media because there is no transparent, open and democratic system for the citizens (Popescu 2001). Military, politicians and dominant social groups attempt to win public support, credibility or legitimate their political and economic position. For this purpose they control the media (Poe et al. 1999). Most censorship takes place in the name of “national interest” and “public interest’ (Gibert 1995:141) therefore
the nature of the regime plays a vital role in censorship policies (Choi and James 2006).

Where the democratic system works, there control of the media is not coercive but where the regime, law, institutions are highly doctrinated, the authorities apply the coercive control of media (Popescu 2001). In addition, official and non-official restrictions on freedom of speech become an important issue.

In such situations, the pro-government media are sponsored through “lucrative government advertising” (Popescu 2001:6), the critical media is confronted with constitutional restrictions, financial pressure, confiscation of newspapers issues and censorship.

Journalists are subjected to denial of access to official and unofficial information, resources intimidation, physical attacks and threats, imprisonment and even murders (Popescu 2001). The voice of subordinated social groups and individuals either disappear or are represented negatively. In such circumstances, professionalism of journalistic occupation and ethics are ignored and journalist self-censorship becomes an ordinary practice. Journalists become part of the political establishment, rather than acting as a Fourth Estate. These censorship policies “exclude certain groups from participation in political debate that characterizes the political life of the communities” and “dissentient voices” are suppressed (Gilbert 1995:148 -149). Moreover the aim of censorship in Turkey is to prevent the Kurds to establish and disseminate their “common sense” which challenges Turkishness.

Freedom of speech and belief and press freedom is guaranteed by UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Turkey is one of the signatories. However the implementation remains on paper. Civil society is
understood in Turkish state context as a part of process of constructing and dissemination Turkishness (Dikici-Bilgin 2009).

Many Kurdish newspapers were attacked through the judicial system and the armed forces. The correspondents and distributors of these newspapers were arrested. Between 1990 and 1995, 26 correspondents and distributors were killed by state forces. In 1994, Turkish Generals and Prime Minister, Tansu Ciller openly declared that the “separatist media” should be silenced. Two weeks later the pro-Kurdish daily Özgür Ülke’s headquarters and another two offices were bombed. But the government could not prevent Kurds from publishing their newspapers again the following day. Moreover the state judicial system monitored the newspapers before allowing them to be published or distributed. The Kurdish media chose to highlight censorship by the state by publishing their newspapers with several pages of empty spaces, with only the news headline minus the story. Above the empty space there was only one word in bold: “Sansurludur” – censored (See the pictures below). The state understood that this policy was embarrassing and closed down Yeni Politika in 1995.
3.3. Censored Yeni Politika Newspaper

In particular, in the 1990s, the state made great efforts to ban pro-Kurdish newspapers in Kurdish areas and violated the right to free communication.
to get the news when the state of emergency (OHAL) was operative in every corner of Kurdistan. All the aforementioned newspapers were subject to heavy fines, forcing them to close and re-establish themselves under new names, disrupting distribution\textsuperscript{15} and criminalising readers. In response to European pressures, the use of Kurdish language in publications and broadcasts has been allowed since 2002, but this policy has not been put into practice. Even though nowadays the state broadcasts in Kurdish, if pro-Kurdish parties or individuals use the Kurdish language, they face prosecution and accusations of “helping and harbouring terrorist organisations”. With the broadcasting of MED TV from London in 1995, and its successors, Medya TV and Roj TV, as well as many other transnational Kurdish TV stations from South Kurdistan (“Iraqi Kurdistan”), the state has lost its monopoly control of broadcasting which violated the right of people in Kurdish populated regions to get information in the Kurdish language.

The aforementioned Kurdish newspapers published articles focusing on Kurdish history, identity, state terror in Kurdistan and disappearances of people who were arrested by the state, the destruction and burning of Kurdish villages by the Turkish military, the progress of the war, and most importantly, the PKK who were presented to the Kurdish and Turkish public in a positive light. Interviews with the PKK leader, Öcalan, news about the guerrilla’s life, news of South Kurdistan and other parts of Kurdistan entered, for the first time, into the everyday life of Kurds and Turks who read the Kurdish media.

Kurdish newspapers bring to mind in the Kurdish people the “Yeni Ulke” - New Country – which signified Kurdistan. The name Özgür Ulke - Free Country, Azadiya Welat -Freedom of Country challenges the idea of Turkey as a unified, homogenous nation. It promotes the Kurdish nationalist project of an independent and free Kurdistan: Kurdistana Azadi.
Even the names of the magazines and newspapers constitute a challenge to a unified Turkish nation and divide it in two: the Turkish state and the Kurds. As Anderson pointed out newspapers and radio are consumed in private. Yet each reader is well aware that this ritual is simultaneously shared by millions of others (1991:35) and the “fellow readers, to whom they were connected through print, formed . . . the embryo of the nationally imagined community” (1991:44).

These papers introduce new concepts through terms like the “Kurdish National War of Independence”, “the Kurdish freedom struggle”, “the Kurdish revolt” or “Kurdish uprising”, people “of Kurdish descent”. Mention of the PKK, the ceasefire, the “call for peace”, the Kurdish flag, the Kurdish parliament in exile, the war and “crimes against humanity”, South Kurdistan, Kurdish leaders, Kurdish generals signify the presence of another nation within Turkey, whereas the state has, for decades, declared “one flag, one nation and one language” in Turkey. This can be seen as Kurdish resistance to the Turkish “ideological state apparatus” and its media representations of the Kurdish struggle in its “war of position” with the Turkish state (see chapter I and chapter IV).

In response to this war of words, in 1999, the Interim Minister decided to prepare a “list of forbidden, ‘objectionable’ words” which was sent to the state news agency Anadolu Ajansi (Anatolia Agenda), TRT (state television), other private and commercial media and state institutions (Alkan T, Radikal, 15 June 1999). According to the new rule, the TRT and Anadolu Ajansi, university and commercial media had to replace certain terms like “evacuated villages”, with “villages which had been abandoned”, “the Kurdish state” with “the entity in Northern Iraq” and “the fight against terrorism” with “low intensity war”.
Moreover, the Kurdish media has broken the silence of the Turkish media over Kurdish identity and given voice to the Kurds. It has even represented the PKK as an alternative to Turkey’s political and military power in the Turkish media landscape. The current head of the Turkish General Staffs, Basbug stated during the military’s regular “media briefing” on 19 July 2005, that “the spread of support for the separatist terror must be prevented”, Justice Minister, Cemil Cicek (currently spokesperson of the AKP government) attacked the Ülke de Özgür Gündem newspaper at the AGM of the Journalists Association of Turkey on 11 June 2006, denouncing it as a “mob that should be stopped” (DIHA 2007).

In response to European pressures, the Turkish government has made “some improvements with respect to press freedom and human rights, [but] problems still remain” (International Press Institute 2004) (this reference predates the examples given above). The use of Kurdish language in publications and broadcasts has been formally allowed since 2002; however this policy is not put into practice. The transnational Kurdish Roj TV (formerly MED TV- 1995) - broadcasting from Europe - can be received through satellite dishes. However those who are found to watch it or phone into their programmes are prosecuted. Despite these difficulties, these media play an important role in articulating resistance to the Turkish nationalist common sense, as well as providing information that is otherwise not available.

After pressure from the EU, in 2004, the government passed a law to allow one hour’s broadcasting on state TV in the Kurdish language and “other non-Turkish local languages and dialects”. The Turkish Parliament passed a bill in June 2008 allowing the state-owned television Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) to “broadcast programmes in languages other than Turkish”. While “Kurdish TRT” led by a “very special bureaucrat” (Ergan 2008) who worked abroad for the Turkish state in the Intelligence
Service - has started to broadcast 24 hours in Kurdish, the commercial television stations are not allowed to broadcast in Kurdish, except for Can TV. This will mean that the state can broadcast in Kurdish but Kurds will not be allowed to broadcast in their language.

The meaning and purposes of the nation are redefined and reconceptualised over time in order to keep the national movement alive (Anderson 1991). These aims and aspirations are disseminated in various ways including in print, contributing to the creation of a “popular vernacular-based nationalism” (Anderson 1991:139). In this sense, the Kurdish media have played an important role in reconstructing Kurdishness territorially, through linguistic and cultural means.

Some columnists who have written widely on history, language and culture have debated openly for the first time, and created some discussion at a popular level among the Kurds. Some of these authors and journalists describe the Kurds “as the oldest people in the region”. This is contrasted to “outside” people, who arrived later. “These ‘outside’ people...are depicted as invaders or occupiers of the Kurdish regions. “History is seen as the eternal struggle between the defending, civilized insider and the aggressive, barbaric outsider” (Hirschler 2001:155). The uncivilized Other refers to “the Turks” who built their society, “merely on military bases...The cruelty of the present–day Turkish army is a heritage of the “plunder ideology”” (Hirschler 2001:156).

The Kurdish national movement responded to the Turkish nationalist view of Kurds as “mountain Turks” by challenging the official view of Turkish history that “Turks” came from Middle Asia to Anatolia and Mesopotamia centuries ago and built all the existing civilisations there. “The Kurdish national historiography in Turkey has mainly been directed towards, but also influenced by Turkish national historiography at a popular level. This
is visible in the focus on geographical area, the redefinition of the central
myths of Turkish national historiography and the centrality of this discourse
to contested issues (Hirschler 2001:161). However some Marxist and
modernist columnists criticized the Kurdish nationalist alternative for
constructing a “romantic nationalistic view of history” (Hirschler 2001:152)
in a multi-ethnic region.

Duran’s view of the Turkish media underlined “its strong political,
ideological and financial dependence on the state” (Duran 2006:33-5). The
same could also be said of the Kurdish media. Its journalists like to
describe their Kurdish media as based on an “ozgur basin gelenegi” –
independent media tradition. However it has not been independent and
remains like an old-style left-wing party journal which has opened its pages
to political movements and organisations close to it, as well as to the
Turkish left. But it has not managed to become a media for all Kurds and it
has alienated many Kurdish intellectuals as well as ordinary people. If the
Turkish media has some restrictions on freedom of thought about what
constitutes the national interest - security, national borders, national
culture, the untouchable status of the military, some Kurdish media have
similar restrictions in terms of the immunity of the PKK, its current
leadership and captured leader, Öcalan from criticism. Many Kurdish
intellectuals criticize these media for being “party-dominated/led media
where you are not allowed to criticize some people or party policy” (Banaz
2008, conference on Kurdish Journalism). Simsek has also argued that
journalists in party-dominated media use self-censorship as they are there
primarily to “praise functionaries” (Simsek 2002, online article). But
communication technology offers an important opportunity to make other
voices heard. The internet has contributed to the Kurdish public discussion
of different taboos and limitations of the Kurdish parties as well as of the
Turkish state.
4. Conclusion
This chapter has presented a brief overview of the construction of an imagined Turkish nation-state in its struggle against Kurdish nationalism. The Turkish state has used different legal and illegal means to dominate the multi-ethnic populations and Turkify them. This nation-building project has denied the cultural, political and linguistic diversity of Anatolia since 1923 and attempted to create a collective consciousness of Turkishness through force, imposing a common language, politics and education system. However Kurdish nationalism has challenged this ethnically exclusive nationalist project. Therefore, Turkey has been destabilised since its establishment and passed different laws to suppress “other” ethnic voices. Displacement and Resettlement Law, Emergency Law, prohibition of Kurdish identity in public were common practices of Turkish nationalism over decades (Olson 1989). Kurdish ethnic identity has been stigmatized as a threat to the integrity of the Turkish nation. The Kurds have reacted to Turkish ethno-nationalist policies in different ways including political, cultural and armed resistance. This long-lasting struggle for hegemony has created a sense of Kurdishness which is opposed to official Turkishness. In this way the Kurdish movement and its media has created resistance by building an alternative “historic bloc” against that of the Turkish state, and its national cultural and political dominance, manifested in the media, education system and political parties.

In this process, the Turkish press and its official discourse has been an important instrument in legitimating state policies of cultural and linguistic subordination of other peoples. It has served Turkish nationalist discourse and justified state violence in defence of “Turkishness”, ignoring its function to inform its audience in a truthful, reliable and credible way (Duran 2006) about the ethno-national conflict. The Turkish press has positioned itself as a significant player in legitimising Turkishness and delegitimizing Kurdishness in both Turkey and Europe, where the Turkish media have
been distributed among Turkish and Kurdish “guest-workers” since the 1960s.

The Kurdish media has contributed through its news reporting and features to countering the Turkish nationalist discourse and making Kurdish voices heard within Turkey and beyond. It has redefined Kurdish identity to create an imagined Kurdish political community. The Kurdish media is also ideologically and financially dependent on the Kurdish political parties which make it difficult for it to include all Kurds in their audience and truly inform them.
Chapter IV: Mapping Kurdish and Turkish Communities and Media in Europe

1. Introduction
This chapter presents a brief historical overview of the Kurdish and Turkish migrant communities in Germany, Sweden and the UK, their arrival, settlement, establishment of their communities, ethnic divisions and engagement in homeland politics in a transnational setting. Then the functions of the Turkish and Kurdish transnational networks linking organizations and communities are traced and their engagement in their homeland politics through transnational practices (Vertovec 2005). Understanding these transnational networks is important because transnational networks, organisations and their activities form part of the ongoing hegemonic struggle between dominant Turkish notions of imagined community and the Kurdish national movement. This has been described as an ‘exported war’ by some German politicians and commentators, but it can best be interpreted as a hegemonic struggle in the countries of settlement to create a sense of belonging to the imagined Turkish or Kurdish political community.

The Turkish and Kurdish media have played an important role, over a long period of time, in disseminating news and interpretive frameworks, interconnecting these transnational networks in different geopolitical spaces through information about the homeland and its politics (Rigoni 2002, Kosnick 2007). A historical overview of the Turkish and Kurdish media in Europe and their development from print media to satellite broadcasting demonstrates how they have contributed to deterritorialising the ethno-national conflict, spreading it to other geo-political spaces (Karim 1998; Kosnick 2007; Ostergaard-Nielsen 2002a; Rigoni 2002). Then I present my empirical work on consumption of these media in the three European countries and the debate on their effects in creating a sense of belonging to a particular, narrowly defined ethnic group (Georgiou 2005).
Finally I focus on the debate on reception and consumption in the countries of settlement of transmigrant media and transnational political practices.

My empirical work in the three countries shows that the mediated ethno-national conflict and imaginary of the homeland has become part of everyday life of both migrant groups. It shapes the nature of their ethnic identity. They expressed a strong emphasis on their ethnic identity, including the second generation who were born and educated in West European countries. A large group of both communities in the three locations were familiar with political developments in Turkey. They stated that they follow the news and political discussion on TV and in the newspapers and highlighted their concerns about the ongoing ethno-national conflict. As a Turkish respondent in Sweden stated:

What is happening in Turkey affects our life here because the Kurds are demonstrating against Turkey in Stockholm and that causes a negative image of Turkey which reflects on us. So we try to respond to their negative representation of Turkey. We try to understand what is going in Turkey... therefore at home we do not miss the TRT news. I read different newspapers on the internet. (Interview with Osman, Stockholm, 28th June 2007)

A Kurdish respondent in Sweden makes a similar point:

Yes I follow the news on Kurdish and Turkish channels and also read newspapers on internet...of course the ongoing war causes concerns amongst the Kurdish community in Sweden. How can we close our eyes, when the Turkish state bombs our hometown, people who we know? We are here in safety and should do something to make it publicly known in Europe what is going on there. People in Kurdistan do not have this opportunity but here we live in a democratic country. (Interview with Zana, Stockholm, 08th June 2007).
Both statements highlight the concern, frustration and anger about the Kurdish-Turkish ethno-national conflict in Turkey as affecting migrants’ lives in the Diaspora. The Kurdish and Turkish transnational media disseminate the information which causes migrants concern about the homeland. In addition, the transnational political activity for the homeland by both groups of migrants causes confrontation between them. Beyond the immediate concerns about the ethno-national conflict, the marginalized position of migrants in the countries of settlement may also contribute to them prioritising the homeland struggle over engagement with social and political issues in the countries of settlement. Migrants continually face being categorised as a separate group, as opposed to the nationally defined ‘us’ in the countries of settlement (Räthzel 2006). Research has shown that migrant experiences of discrimination and exclusion from the labour market and political participation have contributed to strengthening their transnational communities (Portes et al. 1999; Schiller 2009; Smith 2003). In response to these experiences of exclusion, migrants seek out alternative media, where they find themselves, their culture and community better represented (Becker and Behnisch 2001).

My interviews show a strong sense of belonging and attachment to the homeland which is manifested in Turkish and Kurdish migrants’ transnational political activities as two groups in conflict over their “homeland”. Anderson (1992) considers such attachment and activities as ‘long-distance nationalism’ lived out through e-mail: “His political participation is directed towards an imagined Heimat in which he does not intend to live” (1992:11). Unable to integrate into the country of settlement, the long-distance nationalist migrant can play the role of ‘national hero’ in the homeland, “all of which can have incalculable consequences in zones of their ultimate destinations” (Anderson 1992:12) Yet, scholars of transnationalism have criticised this view that migrants engage in homeland politics as they are not fully part of the polity of either the
settlement - or the homeland - country. Instead, scholars of transnationalism argue that transnational activities and integration are not incommensurable. In addition, they suggest viewing transnational migrants as part of an interconnected transnational field, rather than as actors influencing the homeland from the outside. Schiller elaborates, that long-distance nationalism constitutes:

“a set of identity claims and practices that link together people who claim descent from an ancestral land. These people see themselves as acting together to constitute, strengthen, overthrow, or liberate a homeland. Long-distance nationalism brings together transnational social fields and identity claims. It unites people settled in various locations abroad and those in the homeland in political processes organized within a transnational social field” (2009:33).

In place of “long distance nationalism”, I prefer the term transnational communities, as there is a lively, incisive field of transnational scholarship on which to build (Portes 1999; Schiller and Georges 1999; Vertovec 2001). Transnational media, in particular satellite TVs and the Internet, have compressed time and space. Homeland is not only imagined, but deterritorialized (Appadurai (1995). Therefore ethno-national conflicts cannot anymore be viewed as limited to the territories where the conflict takes place. Migrants in settlement countries have become part of the ongoing conflict and can play an important role in the nation-building project at the international level through demonstrations and lobbying for the homeland (Curtis 2005, Basch et al. 1994, Danforth 1995). Transnational communities’ ‘invention’ of the homeland (Appadurai 1990:11) is a product of the imagination of deterritorialised groups(Demmer 2002:95). Therefore transnational networks, communities and organisations become part of the nationalist struggle. Researchers have explored these issues with reference to Tamils (Eriksen 2007, Wayland 2004), Kurds (Curtis 2005; Eriksen 2007; Faist 2000b; Vertovec
and Cohen 1999), Palestinians (Bamyeh 2007) and members of the former Yugoslavia (Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina) (Al-Ali et al. 2001a).

Before the transnational media became widely available, migrant participation in homeland politics was limited. In contrast today the media, in particular TV and the internet, play a crucial role in connecting people with the same ethnic, religious, political backgrounds in different localities to homeland politics (Appadurai 1995; Danforth 1995; Eriksen 2007; Hassanpour 1997; Portes et al. 1999; Rigoni 2002; Romano 2002; Schiller and Georges 1999; Sheyholislami 2010) Appadurai calls such connections "virtual communities" (1995:219) where the nation, kinship, ideas of nationalism are produced, retold and disseminated. But among these transnational networks, the media has also contributed to heightening an awareness of the conflict between the groups, as we have witnessed between some Turkish and Kurdish migrants in Germany. The elites of these transnational groups play a crucial role in producing transnational media and are active in politics in the settlement countries as well as the homeland. This is illustrated by the fact that many ministers in the Kurdish regional government are former exiles in Sweden or in the UK. This does not mean that transnational migrants have the same ideas or coherent ethnic identities. Such groups are "internally heterogeneous. Different parts of the same diaspora can and do have different interests, defined among other things by class, gender, generation, occupation or religion" (Smith 2007:5).

Yet, the ethno-national conflict brings these heterogeneous groups together to engage with homeland politics and create an imagined national community of the homeland through transnational political activity. (Basch et al. 1994; Curtis 2005; Danforth 1995; Portes 1999; Schiller 2009). Nationalism and political transnationalism have become important identifications in migrants’ everyday lives. This helps them also to find
social orientation, stabilising their ethnic and individual identities and sense of belonging in the settlement countries. Over time they create and reproduce the homeland on a local scale and a more global scale, such as through contributing to “conflict resolution” (Al-Ali et al. 2001a:617, Koser and Black 1999b). Therefore the attachment and sense of belonging to the homeland is neither nostalgia towards the past nor simply ‘long distance nationalism’. In the light of new scholarship on transnationalism, Anderson’s view of the long-distance nationalist as a passive and marginalized actor in the settlement country who nurtures heroic daydreams of virtual activism in the homeland without being accountable for his political actions needs to be revised. Transnational imagined communities are complex and hybrid. They do “double duty”, integrating and activating migrants with regard to both the homeland and the settlement countries (Radhakrishnan 1996:12).

Like the nation, transnational communities are not a given but need to be actively imagined through homeland political projects. They establish a particular political project to maintain the established imagined community or establish a new imagined homeland. As Joseph highlights,

“hegemony has been connected to the national project....... nationalism can act in passing off the interests of a certain group as the national interest, in constructing belief in a shared community that cuts across notions of class, and other forms of social stratification. The ideology of nationalism therefore acts to legitimate the political practice of a leading group, and its struggle either to maintain power or to achieve it... to create their own ... nation” (Joseph 2002:136).

From this perspective, Kurdish and Turkish transnational activities can be seen as part of a hegemonic ethno-national struggle in the homeland.

The debate on the impact of transnational communities has sharpened since the transnational media have begun to shape and politicise migrant
communities’ attachments in the countries of settlement (Georgiou 2005; Kosnick 2007; Tsagarousianou 2004; Vertovec 2001). Information and cultural resources do not anymore flow only from West to East, but also in the other direction (Becker and Behnisch 2001, Sheyholislami 2010). Migrant groups have turned their satellite dishes to different political and cultural spaces (Georgiou 2005). This has been considered a challenge to the imagined community of the countries of settlement which have tried to integrate migrants (Georgiou 2005, Faist 1998, Solomos 2003).

**Ethnic incorporation in the settlement countries**

Migration has changed and challenged the imagined community, notions of citizenship and national identity in Western countries since WWII and the economic boom in the 1950s and ‘60s (Kofman 2005). While some countries like the USA, Canada, and Australia, consider migrants as new citizens, other countries like Germany incorporated migrants into the labour market but excluded them from political participation, trying to regulate and control rights of family reunion and settlement and preventing citizenship since the 1960s. Over time, migration and incorporation policies have changed. During the 1970s, Sweden, Britain, Canada, USA, Netherlands gradually recognized cultural, linguistic, ethnic and religious diversity and supported equal opportunities and the social and cultural participation of migrants (Parekh 1997). However in Britain, Germany and Sweden, as elsewhere, “immigration, the position of minorities and growing numbers of refugees have become key issues on the political agenda, shaping the ideologies” (Solomos 2003:3).

Each European Union country has a historically distinct pattern of migration, racial and ethnic diversity and integration regime. Therefore it is still difficult to compare these countries in terms of ethnic incorporation (Solomos 2003:5, Ackers 1999). The situation is often ambiguous and growing racism and the popularity of right-wing parties occurs at the same
time as policies are introduced to address migrants’ social and economic problems. Despite these differences it is clear that mass migration since WW II has contributed to “uncertainty and confusion about economic and political orientation of the ‘new Europe’, the new ‘European identity’ and the dissolving of established national and ethnic boundaries…” (Solomos 2003:7). The globalisation of economic, political and cultural life, increasing human mobility, the internet and “the emergence of ethnic identity politics” (Solomon 2003:xii) have changed the imagined political communities and national identities in Western countries (Itzigsohn et al. 1999, Castles and Davidson 2000). Therefore nation-states with large migrant populations try to deal with issues of national cohesion within their national political imaginary to create a national consensus (Glazer 1997; Scannell 1992; Staeheli et al. 2002). This challenges the nation states to address transnational migrant mobility, the globalization of communication technologies and culture (Georgiou 2005; Holston and Appadurai 1999; Kosnich 2007; Sassen 1999). These issues have been widely discussed in Germany (Cyrus 2005), Sweden (Ålund 1999) and the UK (Castles 2000; Castles and Davidson 2000; Favell and Geddes 1999; Isin and Wood 1999; Modood 1997; Schuster and Solomos 2002; Solomos 2003).

In the light of substantial transformation of societies through mass migration, one can question the saliency of concepts of imagined community and banal nationalism applied to Western countries. The nascent multiple narratives and ethnic identities (Solomos 2003, Hall 2000, Bauman 2000) have changed the nature of the imagined community. In addition to this, global forces such as supra-national organisations such as the EU, IMF, World Trade Organisation (Cox 1993) and global media conglomerates (Barwise and Gordon 1998, Thussu 2007, Doyle 2002, Downey 2006) have led to a decline of the power of the nation states and media to construct their own national identity. With an increasingly globalised consumer culture, some scholars argue
that national cultures become increasingly similar. This argument underlines that media conglomerates are attempting to standardise audience tastes and cultures of consumption globally to sell their products to a mass market of people in different spaces. This may be seen as an erosion of the nation-state’s power to maintain itself as an imagined community (Murdock 1982, Nordenstreng and Schiller 1993, Barwise and Gordon 1998, Chadha and Kavoori 2005, Herman and McChesney 1997, Thussu 2007). Other researchers point out that with increasing ethnic diversity within a nation state, concepts such as banal nationalism and a unified imagined national community come into question. (Jones and Desforges 2003; Jones 2003; Rosie et al. 2006; Schlesinger 1998).

However the national imagined community has spread to every contemporary society (Anderson 1991:157). This is evident in current European debates on national identity, social cohesion and ‘the death of multiculturalism’ (Back 2009:204). These debates continue to utilise rhetoric which “distances ‘us’ from ‘them’ [foreigners], ‘our’ world from ‘theirs’ “(Billig 1995:49). This rhetoric “is embedded in habits of thought and life” (Billig 1995:63) in every national society which constructs ‘outsiders,‘ foreigners’ and ‘enemies’ (Solomos 2003:7). Contrary to these trends Billig argues that “the sense of the importance of a bounded homeland, together with the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘foreigners’, have not disappeared” (Billig 1995:39) Immigration is again a central topic in Western countries where the distinction between European nation-states and “non-Christian, non-European and non-civilized worlds” (Billig 1995:142) is constructed: “concern about immigration is today almost invariably expressed within nationalist ways of talking, as speakers wonder what is happening to ‘our’ country, ‘our’ homeland” (Billig 1995:142). These distinctions are produced through media rhetoric. Chadha and Kavoori concur with Billig that “the nation state still plays a crucial role in determining the structure, nature and organization of media industries"
Moreover the dominant ideas and representations in a given social order in particular nationalist ideologies reproduce relations of domination in terms of race, ethnicity, gender, migration. The institutions of nation states are constantly at work to legitimate ‘our’ cultural norms. This contributes to the subordination of groups of people who have been racialized or ethnicized in different ways, and is reflected in the dominant uses of ‘we’ and ‘they’ in the media. However, the issues of imagined community and banal nationalism have become more complex within a transnational frame even though they remain valid as analytical tools.

2. Turkish and Kurdish Migrants in Western Europe

The significant history of Kurdish and Turkish immigration in Europe started in the 1960s as work migration, family re-union and refugee migration and settlement. Today the estimated number of Turkish and Kurdish migrants from current day Turkey is around 3.5 million. The majority of the Turkish and Kurdish migrants (2.5 million) live in Germany. Germany is the centre of the Turkish and Kurdish print media where most of the discussion about these media takes place. In contrast to the UK and Sweden, Germany has different integration policies for migrants (Kosnick 2007, Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, Erel 2007). But the debate about the integration of migrants and multiculturalism remains a topical subject in all European countries.

For example in Britain: “in the wake of the London bombings of 7th July, 2005, public commentators routinely pronounce the death of multiculturalism in Britain….., summed up in the idea that multiculturalism failed and that the advocates of a multicultural future were deluding themselves” (Back 2009 :205) Many European countries, on the one hand, passed legislation to govern the new ethnic and religious diversity in their territories, while, on the other hand, talking about “the moral/political controversies about national
belonging” (Back 2009:204) and national cohesion.

2.1. Sweden
Swedish immigration and asylum policy is usually characterized as ‘liberal’ (Cederberg 2006:14). Sweden has introduced different social and cultural equality policies to integrate migrants into the wider society (Ålund, 2002, Ålund & Schierup, 1991). While the ‘Swedish model’ in the 1960s was based on inclusion of migrants in the labour market and health system, in the 70s, the government introduced multicultural policies to include migrants socially, politically and culturally in the wider society (Cederberg 2006). The Swedish model guaranteed “equal access and equal rights to the different spheres of society… including the right to retain their culture” (Cederberg and Anthias 2006:19, also see Castles and Miller 1998).

Swedish governments, in particular Social Democrat governments, enabled migrants to express their ethnic and cultural identities from 1975 to the mid 80s through Swedish corporatist political structures. “Corporatism implies that people are perceived of as collectives, whereby social identities are created largely through expressions of collective experiences” (Cederberg 2006:19). Therefore these were central to how multiculturalism took shape in the Swedish context. (Cederberg 2006:19, also see Ålund and Schierup 1991, 1993; Geddes 2003, Soysal 1994). Social and political movements, especially trade union movements have been “the traditional vehicle(s) of political socialization and moral supervision in Sweden … (and) form the cornerstone(s) of Social Democratic strategies of popular mobilization and national integration”” (Ålund and Schierup 1993:111 quoted in Cederberg 2006:19). The ‘Swedish corporate model’ is significant also in terms of political decision-making because “citizens can exercise political influence, namely through the organizations in which they are members. Multiculturalism in the Swedish case then implied collective and representative rights for migrants, through their national/ethnic groups” (Cederberg 2006:19 also
see Schierup et al 2006). The Swedish government incorporated state-funded migrant associations as part of the decision-making process and considered them as social agencies with rights and obligations. They are expected to reproduce their ethnic culture and provide help, advice to migrants to integrate them into majority society (Cederberg and Anthias 2006). The associations were thus charged with retaining their cultural heritage and acting as a “channel for political influence” (Borevi 2004:31, quoted in Cederberg 2006). In addition to this, the Swedish government provides mother-tongue teaching. This aimed to create ‘freedom of choice’ for migrants (Cederberge 2006, see also Borevi 2004:42). However this 'Swedish model' has increasingly been blamed for creating ‘cultural differences’, ‘segregation’, ‘isolation’ and hindering migrants’ integration into Swedish majority society (Cederberg 2006, also see Borevi 2004, Pred 2000). Therefore, Swedish government policies moved from seeing migrants as part of a collective corporate identity to treating them as individuals, focusing instead on anti-discrimination legislation and integration e.g. the 2003 Act to deal with discrimination at work, education and in society (Cederbergsg 2006, also see Geddes 2003, Schierup et al. 2006). However Sweden retains some progressive policies in comparison with other European countries. For example migrants have had the right to vote in local elections since 1976 and the naturalization process is easier than in other European countries.

While the Swedish government believes in promoting cultural diversity, multiculturalism has failed to integrate migrants into Swedish majority society. Researchers such as Geddes (2003) and Kamali (2005) point out that discrimination and exclusion of migrants has led to segregation. This move away from multiculturalism is also a consequence of the growth of a far-right Swedish movement which took its anti immigrant arguments into the wider society and political system (Cederberg 2006, Floya Anthias 2006). Multicultural policies have been gradually abandoned in Sweden.
since the 1990s (Kamali, 2005, Schierup, et al., 2006, Ålund & Schierup, 1991). The keywords of the 1970s and 1980s were jamlikhet, valfrihet, samverkan - equality, freedom of choice, and co-operation, emphasizing support for maintaining minority cultural identities. This has been replaced by an emphasis on national identity and cohesion, summed up in the keywords Sverige, framtiden och mångfalden - Sweden, the future and diversity.

There is a strong political and public pressure on migrants to adapt linguistically and culturally to the majority society. The integration classes and language tests for migrant have become important topics for public debate on asylum seekers and migrants. The 1989 Aliens Act, 1997 Aliens Act, the 2005 Aliens Act have been changed to promote “integration” of migrants into Swedishness. This integration is racialized, as skin colour, culture and religion become key markers of Otherness, for example the term migrants is not applied to a significant new group of German migrants to Sweden who are seen as easily integrated. Migrants from Africa and Muslim are however often seen as hard to integrate in public discussion. The division of “us” as Sweden or “us” as European and “other” as “migrants” is part of everyday discourses and speeches of politicians and media (Kamali, 2005, Ålund, 1991b, Alina 2005). This has become particularly acute after 11 September, when migrants from Muslim countries were seen as a potential danger to Swedish values, democracy and gender equality (Räthzel 2006). My interviews with Kurdish and Turkish males show that they complain of being stereotyped by media and public in Sweden. While many interviewees stated that Sweden is their home where they enjoy their rights as citizens, they mentioned discrimination, unequal opportunity at schools and in the labour market (Räthzel 2006).

The history of Turkish and Kurdish migrants in Sweden goes back to the
mid 1960s when Swedish industry needed labour power. Kurdish and
Turkish migrants emigrated primarily from the Konya district of Kulu to
Sweden (Alakom 2006). In the meantime, ethnically and religiously diverse
migrant groups from the Kurdish and Syriac populated region came to
Sweden: the Syriac minority who faced ethnic and religious discrimination
and persecution in Turkey. Later, in the ‘70s and ‘80s, Kurdish left-wing
groups escaped “persecution and repression” of the military regime by
going to Sweden (Westin 2003:992). The political refugee influx from the
Kurdistan region began in the 1980s, similarly to Germany. The Swedish
government registers migrants according to their nationals and country of
birth. Therefore there are no statistics on the number of Assyrian/Syriac,
Kurdish and Turkish migrants (Westin 2003). The estimated number of
migrants from Anatolia now amounts to 60,026 (54% born in Turkey, 46%
in Sweden) (Westin 2003:990). Bozarslan (2006) estimates the number of
Kurds in Sweden as around 50,000 – 60,000 including all the Kurds from
different countries.

The Turkish migrants in Sweden are an invisible community in public due
to their small number but also due to the dominance of Kurdish and
Assyrian/Syriac communities. The Turkish government attempted to
organise this small group, however it did not work (Interview with Osman
Özkanat, Stockholm 24th June 2007). When the Turkish migrants from
communities in different localities set up the first umbrella organization, the
ITIDF in 1973, it was based on Social-democratic values under the
influence of the Swedish Social Democrat system. This contrasts with the
Turkish migrant organizations in Germany and the UK which are more
religious and nationalistic and often sponsored by the Turkish embassies.
However in recent years, there has been a significant change in the
political nature of Turkish networks and communities. This was in reaction
to the political activities of the Kurdish and Assyrian/Syriac communities.
Since 2010, the consulate attempted to organise Turkish communities
including the nationalist Kemalist Thought Association in Sweden and mobilized against the recognition of the Armenian Genocide Resolution.

Since the 1970s, Kurdish intellectuals have established themselves. Through Swedish government funding, Kurdish literature and arts have flourished and spread to other parts of the Kurdish Diaspora “because of a generous immigration policy initiated by Prime Minister Olof Palme and the material incentives for publication and artistic creation was able to attract a major part of the Kurdish intelligentsia while Germany mainly took in immigrant workers” (Institut-Kurde de Paris 2002). Furthermore, Kurdish is taught in Swedish schools which has led to the creation of a Kurdish linguistic elite in Sweden, constituting the majority of staff in transnational media production. Thus, Swedish multiculturalism has been instrumental in a renaissance of Kurdish cultural production and identity transnationally. Many Kurdish migrants testify to the Swedish government’s ‘generosity’ in helping ‘stateless Kurds’ to develop their culture.

Thus ten years ago, Sweden became the centre of modern Kurdish culture, language and publishing. (Izady 1992). Many Kurdish novelists including Mehmet Uzun and Mahmut Baksi have written modern Kurdish literary works in Sweden as well as books for children, because of the promotion of formal education in Kurdish. Today still Swedish Kurds play an important role in Kurdish media production. Roj TV or Kurd1 have journalists and program makers from Sweden and there are even some Kurdish satellite TV broadcasts from Sweden e.g. Komala TV broadcasts via satellite to the Kurds in Iran.

Furthermore Kurds have become part of the Swedish political system, occupying key roles (such as Member of Parliament: Gülen Avcı and former Member of Parliament and now head of a women's organization and a member of the Swedish Democratic Social Party, Nalin Baksi), which
contrasts with both Germany and the UK.

2.2. Germany
When large-scale labour migration in the 1960s began, migrants were considered as temporary workers. Political participation of migrants from outside Europe is still not allowed even in local elections. Therefore migrant political participation is low in Germany (Assimenos and Shajanian 2001) and in comparison to Sweden and the UK, the establishment of migrant associations are restricted by specific rules (see § 14 Association Law and § 47 Residence Act). Simultaneously the migrant organisations are financially supported by local authorities and the federal government to advise migrants and integrate them into the German system (Cyrus 2005).

Until 2000, the German government emphasized its self-understanding as an ethnic nation, so citizenship could mainly be acquired through birth to German parents. In 2000, the Social Democrat and Green coalition government changed the citizenship law. The new Nationality Act, in combining the principle of the *ius sanguinis* (right by blood) and *ius soli* (right by territory i.e. residence), makes it easier for migrants to acquire German citizenship. While many children born to migrant parents can now acquire German citizenship as a rule, adult naturalization still depends on several complexities and conditions including attending an integration course, taking a language test, swearing allegiance to the democratic order, having sufficient income to support themselves and their family and having resided in Germany for at least 7 years. The same coalition has passed the Anti-Discrimination Law in 2005 which was designed to prevent discrimination on the grounds of race, gender, age, disability and sexual orientation. The CDU and SPD coalition government subsequently passed the ‘Act for
the Control and Limitation of Immigration and for Regulation of the Residency and Integration of Citizens of the European Union and Foreigners’ (Zuwanderungsgesetz) after a long and fierce debate in 2004 to incorporate migrants in the wider German society (Cyrus 2005).

After 11 September 2001, migrant communities from ‘Muslim’ countries were stigmatized as potential terrorists and a potential danger to ‘our’ democratic values. In addition, the discourse of segregation, ghettoization, and parallel societies became an important element in public debates on social cohesion. Migrants are expected to integrate culturally, linguistically and economically into the ‘host’ society. Therefore integration courses have been started for migrants to learn German language, history, culture and the legal system. While public debate revolves around the German state’s demands of migrants, it does not take migrants’ perspectives into account. As a policy-maker of Kurdish parentage emphasized during my fieldwork in Berlin: “Integration is not only from one side. Every society has to find the way to live together” (Interview with Sunbul, Berlin, 11th August 2007).

The history of Kurdish and Turkish immigration into Germany could be divided into four distinct periods. Labour migration, family reunion, refugee migration and settlement of the second and third generation. The German government desperately sought to import labour power to fuel its economic boom and overcome labour shortages in the 1960s. Therefore, it signed several Anwerbe Abkommen – bilateral labour recruitment treaties in 1960 and 1961 with different southern Mediterranean countries - Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Yugosavia (Goldberg et al. 2004).

Germany sought a temporary solution to its labour shortages as it wanted to prevent long-term stays of workers of Muslim background. (from Turkey, Morocco and Tunisia). There was no intention for
migrant workers to stay and settle. The Turkish and German authorities, as well as the migrants, expected that their stay would be short-term as the term “guest-workers” implies (Hunn 2005).

In 1973, the German government imposed a stop on recruitment owing to the oil crisis. By then, some migrants had already brought their families and the tendency of family reunion and marriage grew in the ‘70s and ‘80s. After the Anwerbestopp, most migrants came to Germany through family reunion, marriage or as refugees, particularly after the military coup in the 1980s which preceded the Turkish and Kurdish ethno-national conflict. The political and economic crises in Turkey forced migrants to change their plans to return to their respective ‘homelands’. But the dream of returning home remained a psychological myth until the 90s amongst the first generation. So migration turned willy-nilly into permanent settlement. During the late 1980s to the mid-1990s, the intensive war between the Turkish state and Kurdish guerrillas cost thousands of lives, the burning of 3,000 Kurdish villages and deportation of millions of people from Kurdistan to Turkey or refugee flight to West European countries, especially Germany, according to one human rights organization (Skubsch 2000, Feigl 1995). This was the largest and most significant Kurdish influx into Europe (Amman 1997) especially into Germany because it was no longer unknown territory for many Kurdish and Turkish people.

In 1985, as the war between the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) and the Turkish state became more severe, the conflict spread to Europe especially to Germany, through Turkish and Kurdish organizations and media. The conflict created a strongly politicized Kurdish ‘diaspora community’ or ‘transnational political and cultural spaces’ and a nationalist Turkish movement which already existed in Europe, especially in Germany
(Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, Rigoni 2002, Aslan and Bozay 1999). In the meantime this ethno-nationalist conflict mobilized Kurdish and Turkish migrants for and against the Turkish state and the Kurdish national movement. This gave rise to several political and cultural problems, not only between Kurds and Turks but also between Kurdish and Turkish groups and the German authorities. Some Kurdish organizations and media were banned, among them the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) in 1993, and the Kurdish newspaper Ozgur Politika. The Turkish media tycoon, Aydin Dogan was warned not to polarize the Turkish and Kurdish communities and target individuals who voiced criticism of Turkey’s Kurdish policies. (Rasche 2005, German newspaper F.A.Z 05.04.2005)

In 2008 about 6.75 million people with a migration background were living in Germany. (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2007) Of these, 2.6 million people were from Turkey/Kurdistan. It is estimated that this includes 1.6 million Turks and 1000,000 Kurds who form the largest ethnic minorities in Germany. Due to the history of guest-worker migration, the Kurdish and Turkish communities, though ethnically diverse are relatively homogeneous in terms of class and education. Both communities are settled and visible in German political, economic and cultural life including in the media. Whilst the first generation worked in manual jobs in factories, many second generation of Turkish and Kurdish descent who have become German citizens, have moved into professional occupations. However both communities suffer from high unemployment since the Deutsche Wiedervereinigung - German reunification - in 1990 and the transformation of the economy from heavy industry to services.

While the German media mainly offers TV programmes and news to their national audiences, migrant audiences have been ignored or portrayed through negative images (Hafez 2000, Becker and Behnisch 2001). In particular Kurdish and Turkish media have been blamed for creating parallel societies which are viewed as obstacles for the integration of the
migrant population. (Hafez 2000). Compared to Kurdish migrants, Turkish communities and organizations have more visibility and are represented in different mainstream parties in the German parliament (Bundestag). This contrasts with both Sweden and the UK where the Kurds are politically and culturally more visible.

2.3. The UK
The UK has been a country of immigration and emigration for decades (Castles 2000; Castles and Davidson 2000; Favell and Geddes 1999; Isin and Wood 1999; Modood 1997; Schuster and Solomos 2002; Solomos 2003; King 2008, Keles al et 2010). It brought in workers on a large scale from the Caribbean and other Commonwealth countries in the 1960s and 70s because of the post-war economic boom and labour shortages (Holgate et al 2009a). This has also intensified the debate on ‘race and nation’ which “have become a central component of British political culture” (Solomos 2003:33) as well as academic scholarship. This has meant that debates took place on institutional racism and black people and other ethnic minorities began to mobilise (Solomos 2003). Key themes in public debates on ethnic incorporation were the representation of these minorities in the media and their challenge to the set definitions of Britishness (Modood et al 1994). The dominant ideology has described and categorised people in accordance with their skin colour (Holgate et al 2009a) and groups became racialized as “Black” and “Asian” (Modood et al 1994). Migration policy was racialized and British governments used legislation to prevent ‘black’ migrants from settling in Britain. The 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act was formulated in a way to exclude mostly Black British colonial subjects from settling in Britain.

Yet, parallel legislation to prevent discrimination was also passed, such as the 1976 Race Relations Act, later amended by the Race Relations Amendment Act 2000. Additional legislation to cover religious
discrimination - the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 – was later introduced. State institutions, and in particular Labour governments have developed policies to promote ‘race equality’. Government policies, in particular of the Labour Party have changed the understanding of national identity (Solomon 2003, Modood 1992, Parekh1991) and created a broader definition of multiculturalism to incorporate minorities within the broader British society.

Among the post-war migrants were Turkish-speaking Cypriots who had arrived in the 1940s and 50s to escape from poverty and find a better life, before the mainland Turkish and Kurdish migrants left. (King, 2007). A large proportion came during the ethno-nationalist conflict between Greece and Turkey during the 1960s and 70s. Cyprus was a UK colony so Cypriots held British citizenship (For the background on this see (King et al. 2008b, Enneli et al. 2005). While the Kurdish and Turkish migrants in continental Europe were invited as so-called “guest workers”, the UK received a small number of Kurds and Turks in 1960s and 70s as students or workers who were employed mainly in Turkish Cypriot small businesses (Ali 2001, King et al. 2008b).

However, the nature of migration from Anatolia changed from labour to political migration when the Turkish military seized power in 1980 and dissolved the Parliament, banning political parties and suspending the constitution. Many Kurdish and Turkish intellectuals, union officers and left-wing sympathizers fled from the repression to the UK where they were not obliged to have a visa until 1989. The second wave of migration to the UK in the late 1980s consisted in the overwhelming majority of Kurdish political refugees who fled the ethnic discrimination and war (Wahlbeck 1998b, Griffiths 2002). Therefore the nature of immigration is different from the guest worker migration to Germany. Østergaard-Nielsen (2003) makes this difference clear: “Kurds in London, who spend their day illegally working
long hours under harsh conditions in the sweatshops of northern London, use their sparse free time to mobilize around homeland political agendas which are untenable in even the most optimistic analysis of Turkish and Middle Eastern regional politics” (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003:776). The British multiculturalist system encourages ethnic self-organization in marked contrast to the German migration and integration regime. As a result, the Kurdish and Turkish migrants became well organized and politically mobilized.

Turkish and Kurdish media consumption is high amongst both migrant groups and there are even several local newspapers in Turkish and Kurdish produced by migrants. However compared to the large ethnic groups such as the Indians, Pakistanis and African Caribbeans, the 150,000 Kurdish and 80,000 Turkish population\(^{16}\) (King et al. 2008b) are insignificant minorities and some researchers describe them as ‘invisible’. (Enneli et al. 2005, King et al. 2008b, Holgate et al. 2009b, Erel 2009, Holgate et al. 2009a). Therefore, the media consumption of Kurdish and Turkish migrants has received less attention than that of their counterparts in Germany (for exceptions, see Aksoy and Robins 2000, Laçiner 2000)

3. The Transnational Impact of Kurdish and Turkish Migrant Networks on Homeland Politics

When the nation-state is undergoing crisis (Chernilo 2006) its imagined community is destabilised. In these circumstances, the dominant nation through its ‘national identity’ seeks to control all elements of society and their social relations, including economic, cultural and political activities in order to establish a unified and subtle hegemony with the help of ‘so-called private organizations, such as the Church, trade unions, schools.’ (Gramsci 1971:137).
Hegemony does not only occur “within a nation, between the various forces of which the nation is composed, but in the international and worldwide field between complexes of national and continental civilisations” (Gramsci 1971:350). In this sense civil society is the transnational location where the ideology of the dominant group amongst migrants is reproduced (Portes 1999).

When the Turkish and Kurdish migrants came to Germany in the 1960s, the Turkish state took control of migrants through its consulate, giving permission for them to stay or leave the ‘host country’ and schooling migrant children in Turkish, inculcating the national anthem. This was very important in disseminating the dominant nationalist ‘conception of the world’ (Gramsci 1971:462, 386–8) based on the Turkish ethnic imagined community to guest workers and their children. Turkish state institutions also created religious structures for its ‘citizens’, operating through the Turkish General Directorate for Religious Affairs (TGFRA) (Rigoni 2002) and supported selected migrant organisations. The consulate, religious directorate and some of the Turkish migrant organisations actively promoted Turkishness amongst migrants.

This nationalist culture constitutes a form of hegemony and domination (Gramsci 1971:246). The dominant group’s belief system and values were disseminated and reproduced in a transnational ‘civil society’ (Sirkeci, 2006). The aim was “the construction of consent and the exercise of leadership by the dominant group over subordinate groups” (Joseph 2002) to disseminate the ruling ideology to sustain the dominant nationalist order. Every attempt by Kurds to establish their community organisations has been strongly opposed by the Turkish consulates as the state has sought to maintain control over Kurds abroad. It has exerted its political and diplomatic power to hinder the development of Kurdish civil society which
could counterpose the Turkish imagined community (Rigoni 2002, Hasanpoor 1994, Sirkeci 2006).

While in Germany the social order was reproduced through the involvement of Turkish consulates, media and some migrant communities, the state’s attempt to establish such mechanism in Sweden and in the UK failed because the majority of Kurds were political refugees and had no intention of returning to their homeland. In addition they arrived in these countries at the time when the Kurdish national movement had started in 1970s and ‘80s.

The hegemony of the Turkish state and its ideology were attained for decades through the Turkish consulates, Turkish migrant organisations and predominantly Turkish media over the Kurds. The first Kurdish generation did not have a political consciousness of being Kurds or of the struggle for “their” identity or homeland in the diaspora. The lack of coherence and intellectual leadership amongst the Kurdish diaspora prevented them from constructing their own ethnic consciousness and “conception of the world” (Gramsci 1971:462, 386–8). Consequently, the Turkish state managed to achieve hegemony amongst Turkish and Kurdish migrants until the 1980s (Rigoni 2002).

After the military coup in 1980, the flow of refugees from Turkey/Kurdistan challenged the hegemonic domination of Turkish institutions, creating new transnational communities.

The Kurds have gradually developed their civil society and media through their political forces. In particular “the PKK began to organize within Germany in the early 1980s, bringing a Kurdish separatist movement to Germany” (Curtis 2005:8). Since 1985, the PKK has operated ‘across the borders of multiple nation-states.’ (Faist, 2000:189) mobilising Kurdish refugees and second-generation Kurdish young people for homeland politics (van Bruinessen 1999). This shows us that ‘ordinary’ people are
not passive recipients of dominant ideology. The war between the Turkish state and Kurdish national movement was no longer confined within the territory of Turkey. Scholars have highlighted that “Intra-state violent conflicts are no longer fought solely in the actual war territories.... Increasingly, conflicts seem to become dispersed and delocalised,” (Demmers 2002:88) therefore the relationship between identity groups and nation-states is no longer confined within an established imagined community. This is the case of the Turkish-Kurdish ethno-national conflict as it has become deterritorialized, “now with diaspora communities and international organisations playing important roles in nationalist struggles throughout the world” (Demmers 2002:88).

In the ethno-national conflict, transnational networks play a crucial role in highlighting the homeland politics through lobbying, demonstration, and fundraising (Portes 1999), struggling to acquire intellectual, moral and political leadership within their given transnational communities but also externally to legitimize their ethno-national struggle. These networks are ‘multi-connected, multi-referential’ (Soysal 2000:13) relationships, and political practices between trans-ethnic, religious groups and settlement societies and country of origin. (Basch, Glick Schiller, & Blanc, 1994) so their ‘incorporation’ is not limited to a single nation state. In this sense the ‘delocalised’ and deterritorialized nature of the ethno-national conflict has caused a hegemonic struggle between the Turkish state and Kurdish national movement for dominant influence over the migrant communities. According to Demmers: “Contemporary nationalist struggles are largely counter-nationalistic: identity groups resist assimilation into the nation-state”, (Demmers 2002:92) hence in “civil wars and intra-state conflict ‘ethnic marking’ is very important”. As these conflicts are transnationalized “National communities are being “imagined” in a new (delocalised) way. We are witnessing the construction of transnational national communities. People remain loyal to a national homeland they no longer inhabit”
The Kurdish and Turkish guest-workers and refugees have gradually developed effective political structures and influence through their local and transnational organizations and media in the European countries\(^\text{18}\). These highlight ‘immigrant politics’ - rights for migrants- and ‘homeland politics.’ Homeland politics “denote migrants’ and refugees’ political activities pertaining to the domestic or foreign policy of the homeland. That is, it means opposition to or support for the current homeland political regime and its foreign policy goals” (Østergaard-Nielsen 2001:262).

The homeland dispute around Turkey's Kurdish question, religious, class and other political issues are reflected in the local and transnational migrant organizations and play an important role in their structures, policies and relationships to each other. These may revolve around differences of an ethnic - Turkish-Kurdish - religious -Sunni-Elewî- or political - left-right - kind, as well as the institutions in the country of settlement. All these differences, even within the Islamic groups (Süleymancı, Milli Gorus, Nurcu) are reproduced in the countries of settlement in the organizations and consumption of media (Steinbach 1997, 1998). Some of these organizations have their own media including satellite TV stations e.g. the extremist Islamic group Kaplancilar, which in Germany mainly go under the name of the “Association of Islamic Society and Community” and its HAKK TV station.

Indeed the Kurdish and Turkish homeland-oriented organizations are an extension of the various political and religious tendencies in Turkey and in the Kurdistan region. The nationalistic Ataturk Thought Associations (ATA) abroad are linked to the ATA in Turkey and to the Republican People's Party – (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP) in Turkish). The Federation of Idealistic Democratic Turkish Communities in Europe (the Grey Wolves) is
connected to the Turkish Nationalist Action Party and even its leader is approved in Ankara, (Hafez 2002, Hafez 2000), while the Union of Turk-Islam in Europe has links to the Great Union Party (Zentrum für Türkeistudien 1995, Zentrum für Türkeistudien 1997). *Milli Görüş-National*, one of the huge transnational religious and nationalist Turkish organizations in Europe, is an extension of the religious *Fazilet* party in Turkey. The Federation of the Union of Elewîs in Europe (a heterodox religious and philosophical belief consisting of a mix of Zoroastrian, Mazdeic, Christian and Islamic elements) represents the Elewî faith in Europe, and is connected to other Elewî organizations in Turkey. The PKK has operated transnationally since 1985, in particular in Germany (Curtis 2005) where, as we have seen, the hegemony of the Turkish state and its ideology over Kurds was previously unchallenged. The change in the ethno-national conflict in the diaspora came through the transnationalization of the Kurdish political movement, with increasing negative representation of Kurdish ethnic identity in the Turkish media (Keles 2008) countered by the development of autonomous Kurdish media.

The Kurdish Parliament in Exile (KPE) was established with the participation of almost 400 delegates from different Kurdish organizations and with some DEP MPs who fled Turkey due to the banning of the pro Kurdish DEP from the Turkish Parliament and the arrest of DEP MPs including Leyla Zana, a prominent Kurdish woman politician. The KPE was one of the most important transnational organizations in mediating diplomatically with different European politicians and EU states. This caused great tension between Turkey and those European countries which had contacts with the Kurdish Parliament in Exile. For instance, the announcement of the meeting of the Kurdish Parliament in Exile with the Basque Parliament and the Turkish uproar and diplomatic efforts to hinder the meeting, created a political crisis between the central Spanish and regional Basque governments (Azbarez, February 1999). Moreover, the
KPE organized an election campaign in the Kurdish diaspora to vote for the Kurdish Parliament in Exile which was, as Garzan, the PKK representative in Europe put it: “a first step towards the creation of a National Parliament… that will represent all Kurds and form a government” (Kutschera 1995, online article).

The Federation of Kurdish Associations in Europe (KON-KURD) and the Federation of Associations from Kurdistan (KOMKAR) are the main Kurdish transnational organizations which have member organizations in all European countries and strong political connections with pro-Kurdish parties in Turkey (Faist 2000, Østergaard-Nielsen 2001). While these organisations try to create a sense of Kurdish imagined community in the Diaspora and in Kurdistan, the hegemonic struggle translates into struggles against other organizations in Europe. Many migrants and their communities participate in this hegemonic struggle by creating public awareness, lobbying for the homeland and sometimes through street battle between rival migrant groups.

Different claims are made about the rise of transnational communities. Some argue that these networks emerged because of the exclusion of the migrant population in the countries of settlement, while others claim that the transnational organizations operate successfully because of their inclusion in the society of settlement which helps to integrate the marginalized migrant population into mainstream society (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). The ongoing debate over transnational organizations and their practices revolves around whether and how they reconnect migrants to their religion, homeland and nation in real and symbolic ways and export the homeland conflict to the countries of settlement (Vertovec and Cohen 1999, Faist 2000b, Østergaard-Nielsen 2000). On the other hand, some settlement countries view these organizations as a significant obstacle to their integration policies (Heitmeyer et al. 1997).
Kurdish and Turkish homeland political organizations are deterritorialized in their transnational practices but reterritorialized through their local, everyday practices in the countries of settlement. The function of the local organizations consists of organising politically for the rights of migrants in the individual countries of settlement and getting involved in homeland politics in the broadest sense. The relationship between being deterritorialised and reterritorialised or, as Østergaard-Nielsen puts it, ‘unboundedness and groundedness’ (2000:262) is fluid. Taking the example of Kurdish nationalist organizations, we find that they are connected to each other in several ways: through the establishment of the Kurdish communities in London which support Kurdish councillors, to get a representative Kurdish voice in the area, but these communities also lobby for the homeland in the UK Parliaments. They also maintain close relations with transnational Kurdish organizations in Europe and in Turkey/Kurdistan and mobilise for, or organise certain demonstrations and festivals, together with European-based Kurdish organizations in Germany, such as Turkish Day in July.

Moreover the country of origin – Turkey as defined by the Turkish state - is involved directly and indirectly in encouraging Turkish migrants to become citizens of the countries of settlement in order to be active in pro-Turkey politics in the country of settlement. Consequently, “there are at least two political systems and socio-economic contexts to consider in the analysis of transnational political practices” (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2001:263).

Gramsci considered civil society as ‘private society’ and ‘political society’ or ‘state’ (Gramsci 1971:12) a part of a totality and ‘one and same’. (Gramsci 1971:160). However, civil organisations in a country can oppose the ‘common sense’ of a dominant social group or state-disseminated values (Kaldor et al 2003, Dikici-Bilgin 2009) for example, in a human rights
Such transnational organisations cannot be reduced to the Turkish state or Kurdish national movement, but are heterogeneous and not “one and same” as the state. However, these transnational networks, communities, organisations can be contested within each group. Nevertheless, my interviews with the community networks, leaders of migrant associations, workers and visitors to migrant centres confirm that the majority of Turkish and Kurdish organisations in my sample, are struggling with the two competing nationalistic projects of ‘Turkishness’ and ‘Kurdishness’. This causes an ongoing struggle between them to disseminate and reproduce their respective nationalist concepts and to exercise political and cultural leadership over the Turkish and Kurdish communities, but also beyond these communities, to the wider public in the settlement countries. Therefore the transnational Kurdish and Turkish network organizations exert huge influence over the local organizations, mobilizing different campaigns around homeland issues. The disputed homeland politics has spread through this transnational political organization from the country of origin and its media to the localities of Berlin, London or Stockholm.

For example, when the Turkish military started to prepare the Turkish people to support its cross-border operation against the PKK in 2008, during the operation, the conflict spread to Europe and affected Turkish and Kurdish communities in Berlin worse than elsewhere. The German media declared the “Turks hunt the Kurds” and identified “a kind of pogrom mood” (Peters 2007b, Die Welt Newspaper 2007). The conflict between nationalist and religious-oriented Turkish and Kurdish European organizations and their members became visible in different European cities.

4. The Transnational Media
Since the 1960s, the migrant population consumed only homeland print media and the TV programmes of the respective country of settlement. Video from the homeland entered into migrants’ lives in the 1980s. But the turning point came in the late ‘80s and ‘90s, when transnational satellite TV, the internet and digital technologies inter-connected people from different geo-political spaces and took them virtually ‘home’. This ended the dependency of migrant audiences on the media of the settlement countries and has lead to different identities and political positions in the world as the more sensitive new communications technology has demonstrated ‘a liberating potential’ (Romano 2002:128) for those whose identity is denied as in the case of the Kurds. The new communications technology has enabled the Kurds to “redefine themselves and challenge dominant states” (Romano 2002:128).

Transnational broadcasts have become frequent and the audiences for them have grown remarkably large, such as Fairchild TV for Chinese speaking communities, Al-Jazeera, Al Hurra and ART for Arabic speaking communities, Antenna for Greek-speaking communities, the Russian WMNB, the Italian Teletatino, Spanish Telemundo, Kurdish Roj TV, the Turkish TRT INT (1990) the Indian Network Asia and the Star, Zee TV, MBC, Phoenix and many more. Some of these channels broadcast in a number of languages. Arabic Orbit TV, for example, broadcasts in Arabic, English and French and programmes are also exported to the West, such as CNN and the BBC. The Islamic Ahmadiyye International broadcasts from London around the world and has offices in Germany, Pakistan, Canada and the United States. The common features of these media are that they broadcast across national borders, in different languages, to different commercial, linguistic, ethnic and religious communities.

The broadcasts from several geographic areas have begun to send television signals about an “imagined geography” in order to make ideological, nationalist, religious or commercial gains. Among the
developing, as well as the developed, countries, this trend has raised among nation-states the “fear that digital broadcasting satellites (DBS) would erode their sovereignty by transmitting foreign programming to their populations in unregulated manners” (Karim 1998: 9). Karim draws a parallel between the increasingly ideological nature of movements of “nationalism, ethnicity, religious fundamentalism, racism, sexism and other forms of exclusion” and sustained communications technologies (Karim 1998, Aksoy 2001, Georgiou 2005, Becker and Behnisch 2001, Robins and Aksoy 2001, Aksoy and Robins 2000). Another important conclusion in an increasingly interconnected world, is that “people who live in close physical proximity, may share less on a cultural level than they do with dispersed people elsewhere” (Shuval 2002:43). However, at the same time this condition has been enhanced by “merging into the mainstream of the host society” (Karim 1998:9) and spreading information from other regions to the West. Appadurai concludes that

We need to look closely at the variety of what has emerged as diasporic public spheres. [...] As mass mediation becomes increasingly dominated by electronic media (and thus de-linked from the capacity to read and write), and as such media increasingly link producers and audiences across national boundaries, and as these audiences themselves start new conversations between those who move and those who stay, we find a growing number of diasporic public spheres. (Appadurai 1997:21-22).

The term “transnational communities’ public sphere” is closely connected to the term “diasporic public spheres” as Shuval indicates: “Diaspora theory is also linked to the theoretical discourse on transnationalism and globalization” (Shuval, 2000:3) and “Diasporas are the exemplary communities of the transnational moment” (Tölöyan 1991:3), for further discussion, see chapter I). So the terms are used interchangeably. However, I prefer to use the term the public sphere of transnational
communities since it directly relates to the positioning of migrants in-between two points of reference the country of settlement and the country of origin: “In the contemporary world, group identities are no longer spatially or territorially bounded. People support, produce or cling to territorially based identities even though they do not actually live in the territory” (Demmers 2002:89). Migrant consumption of different transnational ethnic media in different languages has created a new transnational public, social and cultural space where migrants reproduce, negotiate and create meanings out of their ethnic and religious identities. Their lives are now shaped by more than one source of media and culture.

4.1. Turkish and Kurdish media in Europe
The Turkish and Kurdish media present in Europe play an important role in transmitting political information, knowledge, ideologies which influence migrants' mental models and outlooks. These media mobilize migrants around homeland politics, and the media content is invoked by migrants in dialogue around homeland issues, in particular about the ethno-national conflict and ‘our martyrdom’ in everyday life, in workplaces, cafés, community centres and homes. During the Turkish and Kurdish so-called “guest worker” migration in the late 1960s, the nationalist Turkish Ter cuman and Aksam were the first newspapers to be distributed in Germany. They were followed by the nationalist Hürriyet, Milliyet, Sabah, the nationalist-religious Zaman, Milli Gazete, Turkiye newspapers, the weekly Cumhuriyet (Kemalist) and the left-wing Evrensel (1995). In the 1970s and ‘80s newspapers were produced for Turks in Turkey (Istanbul) but distributed in Germany too. But since the 1990s, the media added European editions to the national papers for distribution in Europe. Today some of the newspapers have their editorial offices and even printing facilities in Germany.

The most powerful newspaper is Hürriyet which has been published since
1971 in Germany and has claimed that “For the past 40 years, *Hürriyet* has been fulfilling the need for news and commentary of Turkish people living in Europe” (*Hürriyet kurumsal*, 2008). *Hürriyet* and *Milliye* belong to media tycoon Aydin Dogan\(^20\) whose other 7 newspapers are also present in Europe. The second best-selling newspaper *Zaman* is owned by the Feza group which is a mouthpiece for the Islamic cleric and Turkish intellectual” Fethullah Gülen. (Balci 2008, *Zaman Newspaper* 24.06.08). *Zaman* uses the resources of religious community organizations like *Fethullah Gülen* community and *Milli Gorus* to expand its distribution. *Evrensel* is the only left-wing Turkish newspaper which has much coverage of working-class issues, both German and migrant. The newspaper is close to *Emek* - the Labour Party - (a small party without any representatives in the Turkish Parliament). The weekly, *Cumhuriyet* is the mouthpiece of the Kemalist regime in Turkey. The readers of this newspaper are older-generation Kemalists. But in comparison to other newspapers, *Cumhuriyet* has no significant readership in Europe.

In the 1970s and ’80s, these newspapers informed their audiences about the socio-political situation in Turkey acting as ‘a bridge to the homeland’. In the 1980s, video took an important place in the life of Turkish and Kurdish migrants and an ethnic Turkish video industry was born in Germany. Since the 1990s European editions of the Turkish print media have focused on news from the countries of settlement (mainly Germany) which primarily relate to Turkey and Turkish migrants, presenting them culturally, linguistically in a positive light while stereotyping the subordinated Kurds negatively.

The imagined political Turkish community was reflected in media texts produced in Turkey and disseminated and consumed in Europe. At that time there was no significant Kurdish daily media and Kurds followed mainly Turkish media to inform themselves about their homeland. However
as hegemony is not static but contested, the Kurdish media came to play an important role in challenging the dominant Turkish nationalistic discourse which had been accepted for decades as ‘normal’, disseminating its own Kurdish nationalist world view.

The Kurdish media emerged in the 1970s, again printed in Turkey and distributed in Europe. But when the military coup took place, “the Kurdish media were prohibited therefore, the period of silence of Kurdish media had begun” (Interview with Kurdish politician and Journalist, Kemal Burkay, Stockholm, 17th June 2007) in Europe. It lasted until the 1980s with the publication of the Kurdistan Socialist party newsletter and monthly magazine, the PKK Serxwebun and, at the end of 80s, the Kurdish Roja Nû. These monthly magazines contained ideological and propaganda material. Also different parties and groups published some magazines dealing with political, cultural and gender issues.

The first Kurdish dailies were Özgür Gündem and Özgür Ülke, produced in Turkey and distributed with a European edition in Europe. But when Özgür Ülke newspaper headquarters and other two offices in Istanbul were bombed in 1994, the newspaper began publishing in Germany with the name of Özgür Politika - Free Politics. Two weeks before the German general election in 2005, the German Interior Minister, Otto Schily closed down Özgür Politika because of an allegation of links with the PKK. The Kurdish sources talked about a deal between the Turkish and German governments that the German SPD would close down the newspaper and the Turkish government and media would encourage Turkish German citizens to vote for the SPD. The same press company began publishing Yeni Özgür Politika in 2006 which is still being published today. In 2004, Peyame, an independent Kurdish weekly began publishing but closed down because of financial problems in 2006. The new Rudaw and Le Monde Diplomatique are other important media printed in Kurdish which
disseminate a Kurdish ‘conception of the world.’ (Gramsci 1971:462, 386–8).

4.2. Transnational Turkish and Kurdish satellite TV stations
Since the early 1990s, the transnational Turkish and Kurdish media have changed Turkish and Kurdish society in Turkey and in the diaspora, deterritorialising nationalism and remapping its imagined borders. The ethnic and religious conflicts in the homeland enter through the media into migrants' lives, recasting migrant political and religious orientations. (Hafez 2002)

A broader classification of these transnational satellite TV stations is:

4.2 i) State-controlled nation-building television TRT
The mouthpiece of the state nationalist discourse has broadcast since 1964 in Turkey, and since 1990, has been broadcasting TRT INT (renamed TRT Türk since 2008) to reach “the population of Turkish migrants in Europe ….drawing them back into the Turkish national imaginary,” (Aksoy 2000:6) in order to “create an expanded imaginary space of Turkishness” (Aksoy and Robins 2000:6).

TRT TÜRK (Formerly known as TRT INT), the main Turkish state TV channel for migrants in Europe presents the ‘aims of programs for citizens living outside’ on its website as:

“[to] become conscious against separatist, destructive and reactionary terror organization, in favour of the Turkish Republic, helping in organising with their leadership and initiative for lobbying activities” (TRT general broadcasting plan 2006, aims of programs for citizen living outside, article 6:28).
These aims should cover broadcasts of drama, religious, news and documentary programmes. Moreover programmes have to be opposed to the “smear campaigns” of the so-called Armenian genocide, the PKK and others. The 140 page document vividly exposes the fears of the Turkish state. The state channel TRT broadcasts programmes like Arayis on ‘the Armenian question and Terror’ (2005 and 2006) on TRT INT for migrants in Europe and discusses the ‘so-called Armenian genocide’ when some European parliaments in Germany, Sweden, France, Belgium and Switzerland discuss these issues. The same TV channel also reports on ‘North Iraq and Terror’. The Turkish media use different terms to define certain hot issues – such as ‘separatist terror’, ‘the entity in Northern Iraq (Kurdish federal region)’, the ‘so-called Kurds’, ‘people, who believe that they are Kurdish’, the ‘so-called PKK’, and ‘so-called Kurdish question’. This coverage is intended to build a front against the ‘enemies’ of Turkey within the Turkish community in Europe. The media and Turkish military (former Turkish general of staff, Buyukanit) call on migrants to lobby in favour of Turkey. (Star TV, 15.02.2007).

The interviews show that the Turkish media has influenced some migrants in terms of creating a ‘front’ against ‘...separatist, destructive and reactionary terror’ (TRT general broadcasting plan 2006, aims of programs for citizen living outside, article 6:28). But this cost the Turkish media credibility amongst Kurdish, and some Turkish, migrants. Nationalistic media messages contribute to creating a sense of alienation among Kurdish audiences. The Kurdish migrants I interviewed felt that these Turkish media messages singled them out so they became aware of their Kurdishness as an object of hostility. Kosnick’s research (1994) on migrant media in Berlin points out that the use of a range of different media to make sense of events is an important part of Kurdish migrants’ media habits:
“… Deniz and Zerdi, both in their early 30s, were firmly placed in front of the television, channel-zapping as they tried to catch news on the Kurdish rally that had taken place earlier that day in Frankfurt. They had wanted to go, but could not leave their newspaper store… Deniz got lucky with the German public service channel ARD, which briefly covered the rally in its evening news program. The report stated that 15,000 people had attended the rally from all over Germany. Deniz exclaimed, ‘Not true- there were twice as many!’ Zerdi told me that they had heard about the numbers who attended the rally from relatives who had participated. ‘But television always lies,’ Deniz said, adding that ‘the Turkish channels are fascist anyway, and the only place where you can get the truth is the Kurdish programs on the Open Channel’(Kosnick 2007:1).

At the time of Kosnick’s research there were no transnational Kurdish channels broadcasting. But now the number of transnational Kurdish channels has reached fifteen and the potential sources of information which Kurdish migrants can access has increased manifold. Kurdish migrants are keen to zap from Roj TV to Kurdistan TV or from Turkish TRT to German ARD to get ‘true’ information. This means they are more likely to be confronted with a range of terms denoting Kurdish issues and interpret these terms in a variety of ways.

4.2 ii) Private, commercial TV stations
Private TV stations (Show, Kanal D, ATV, Star 1 etc) were a part of the globalization and liberalisation of the national market and growth of consumer society. The first Turkish private broadcasting, Magic Box, started in Germany in 1991 and sent TV signals from Germany to Turkey, thus ending the state TRT monopoly over broadcasting. Turkey was forced to change its legislation on broadcasting in 1994. The private and commercial TV stations broke the standard linguistic and cultural state
broadcasting format and brought a range of topics into migrants’ lives: political discussion on issues like homosexuality, the breakdown of the traditional, conservative Islamic code for women, and even Kurdish issues which were new for Turkey, but also for the more conservative diaspora.

Aksoy argues that “These companies [Turkish media tycoons] invested in media channels for the Turks in Europe for business reasons (rather than out of a political concern with the Turkish nation in imagined Diaspora)” (2000b:7). This uncritical approach ignores the fact that many Turkish intellectuals criticized the ideological and financial dependency of the media on the state (Duran 1998). Further they also anticipated the consequences of the competition for advertising revenues and audience ratings with private TV channels which have pushed them to broadcast sensational news and to toy with the nationalist feelings of viewers in Turkey and in Europe following official guidelines in order to avoid getting into trouble with state institutions. (Interview with former media tycoon. (Düzel 2010, Taraf Newspaper 15.03.2010) This dependency on the state and official ideology poses obstacles to informing audiences about all aspects of the news. These TV channels belong to media tycoons who own newspapers, banks, insurance companies and distribution outlets. There are now over 100 Turkish-language private transnational TV channels. (See appendix Table 1 – The Transnational Turkish satellite TV and its establishment in Europe).

**iii) Islamic-nationalist TV**

Different tendencies - *Milliyetci-maneviyatci* (nationalist-moralist), *Milliyetci-mukaddesatci* (nationalist followers-of-the-Holy), *muhafazakar-müslüman* (conservative-Muslim) (Öncü 2000) - come to the public through the Islamic –nationalist TGRT (1993) via satellite from the UK, the *Nur* religious order’s STV (1994), the *Fazilet* party’s *Kanal 7*, Kadiri order’s *Mesaj* TV. According to Öncü:
“Despite differences in their sectarian affiliations, these channels share a number of broad commonalities. They are ‘private’ but not ‘commercial’ because they are sponsored by religious orders, and hence are not dependent upon advertising revenues (audience ratings) for survival. They define themselves as ‘civil initiatives’ against the ‘moral degeneracy’ of infotainment channels, on the one hand, and the official ‘secularism’ of the state broadcasting agency on the other. Yet for Turkish-speaking viewers, ‘watching’ Muslim channels means entering a very different discursive ideological realm from that of state television, because of the distinctive language which controls the gaze” (Öncü 2000:309).

Islamic TV stations disseminate an ‘Islamic, huzur life-style’ which is “referring to a mental state which makes it possible to be in the presence of God”(Öncü 2000:312). In their programme and advertising, the Koran becomes the main symbolic power in promoting Islamic dress code, a traditional Islamic family structure, the Islamic bank and Shopping Centre.

iv) Elewî-oriented TV
*Su, Cem, Dem, Yol* and *Düzgün* are based in Germany, the Netherlands and Turkey but broadcast via satellite to different countries including the UK. These TV stations have significant audiences in Germany and the UK and have created a fierce debate about Elewî beliefs and identity. The owners and audiences of these TV Channels are mainly Kurdish Elewîs. Therefore the music programmes and the discussion are mostly focused on Turkey’s Kurdish question and Elewî identity which goes recognized.

v) Left oriented TV
There is only one ‘left-wing’ TV, *Hayat* – life- which broadcasts from Turkey to Europe. However it does not have significant audiences.
vi) Kurdish transnational satellite TV and Turkish government: 
hegemonic struggle in the sky

With the broadcasting in 1994 of MED TV from London and Brussels, the Kurds, transcended
“the international borders which since 1918 have divided the land in which Kurds live. The channel allowed the Kurds, for the first time in their history, to establish a powerful mode of communication among themselves, and undermine the state-centred geopolitical order that has reduced them to the status of helpless minorities” (Hassanpour 1998:53)

MED TV, Medya TV, Roj TV, Kurd1 and other new Kurdish TV channels have created juxtaposition to the Turkish nationalistic discourse by broadcasting in Kurdish, providing news from a Kurdish perspective and discussion, far removed from Turkish coercive power, about self-determination, Kurdish culture and language. The reconstruction of Kurdish identity, history and language (“Kurdiya MED TV- MED TV Kurdi” referring to high Kurdish) has challenged the “state discourses that deny or suppress Kurdish identity …..now pursued through the use of technologies such as satellite broadcasting, Internet and desktop publishing” (Romano 2002:148) and has made Turkish law on Kurdish identity and language meaningless.

Hassanpour argues that
“... it is clear that every second of MED TV’s broadcasting seriously undermines Turkish sovereign rule. The logo “MED TV,” which is always present in the upper left corner of the screen, is an assertion of Kurdishness (the Kurds are Medes not Turks). It also asserts Kurdish rights to statehood. The logo’s colours of red, yellow and green are the colours of the Kurdish flag; moreover, the flag itself appears frequently in the programming, ranging from news and information to entertainment and culture. The daily menu begins with a grand orchestra performing the Kurdish national anthem, Ey Requib (O Enemy!).
The ever presence of the Kurdish national flag and anthem means that MED TV has the power to treat the Kurds not as an audience, but as citizens of a Kurdish state” (1998b:59)

Turkey uses “its coercive forces to prevent the reception of the airwaves within Turkey” (Hassanpour 1998:54) including destroying or banning satellite dishes, arresting and jailing audiences for watching Kurdish TV, banning people from giving interviews to these TV stations (Hassanpour 1998). MED TV’s license was revoked by Tony Blair’s government in 1999 on the grounds that it was not “in the public interest to have any broadcaster use the UK as a platform for broadcasts which incite people to violence” and which are “likely to encourage or incite crime or lead to disorder”. However the Kurds established Medya TV and started to transmit via a satellite link from France from 1999 to 2004. The French authorities took away Medya TV’s license in 2004 because of its links with the PKK. But this time the TV moved to Denmark under the new name of Roj TV and began transmitting from there in 2004. Turkish efforts to close down the Kurdish TV stations have made the Kurdish broadcasting situation more public and “a British cultural television station (CTV) has also begun allowing several hours a day of Kurdish cultural programming on its satellite waves” (Romano 2002:143). MED TV, Medya TV and Roj TV face “resistance not only from the various states straddling Kurdistan, but also from anti-terrorist police forces in the UK, Belgium and Germany” (Karim 1998:10) Recently the Roj TV studio in Brussels was raided again by Belgium police. According to Hürriyet newspaper “the operation was planned by the Turkish secret agency (MIT)” (04.03. 2010). The Kurds blamed the Belgian government for accepting the Turkish order to close down their studio.

The use by the Kurds of new communications technology has forced Turkey to change its policy on broadcasting in Kurdish to tackle Kurdish
nationalism and so it has created its own TV TRT 6 to propagate the national unity of Turkey in Kurdish. As the Turkish political establishment see Kurdistan as part of their imagined territory due to its regional and international importance, strategic political and economic importance for energy, transportation and water resources. Yet Kurdistan is seen as a ‘backyard’ in juxtaposition to the strength of Turkishness.

6. Conclusion
The Turkish and Kurdish migrants came to Europe as “guest workers” in the 1960s and later for family reunion or as political refugees. The suppressed identities of different ethnic and religious communities in Turkey found opportunities to develop as Kurds and Elewîs in the liberal-democratic Western countries (Griffiths 2002, Faist 2000b, Østergaard-Nielsen 2000, van Bruinessen 1999b, Alakom 2006, van Bruinessen 1998). However the Turkish state has tried to intimidate the political dissidents in several ways including through the Turkish embassies, some nationalistic migrant organisations and the state financed, the Turkish General Directorate for Religious Affairs. Since the end of 1960s, the Turkish media has taken the place of the nation-state in Europe, targeting those voices critical of its policies (Rigoni, 2002). The development of global flows and communications technologies and the intensification of the ethno-national conflict in the homeland strengthened the suppressed identities of Kurds in hegemonic struggle with the Turkish state in Turkey and in Europe in the 1990s. Turkey established its TRT INT and the Kurds their MED TV and their own newspaper in Europe in order to develop their counter-hegemonic imagined community through both banal and hot nationalism (see chapter VII and see Kosnick 2007, Becker and Behnisch 2001).
The Turkish and Kurdish actors have used these new communications technologies including transnational satellite TV channels, print media, the internet and other digital technologies to create ‘new conversations’ between homeland politics and the Turkish and Kurdish diaspora through banal nationalist symbols, reminding the audience of ‘our’ nation, talking on its behalf. Thus Kurds have been engaged in highlighting the abuse of Turkish state power, which is turned against them and against Kurdish culture. This has created a hegemonic struggle in the sky between the Turkish state and the Kurds. Moreover, the Kurdish media has created Kurdishness within the Turkish imagined community in Turkey as well as in Europe (Hassanpour 1998).
Chapter V: Media Consumption, Identity Formation and Conflict of Terms

1. Introduction

In chapter IV, I have argued that the Turkish and Kurdish actors deploy various means in their hegemonic struggle to maintain the Turkish state or build the Kurdish imagined community. One of these means is using the media to disseminate their “common sense”, symbols of “their” imagined nation, its meaning and necessity for the people. Especially since communications technology has advanced so rapidly, the hegemonic struggle for an imagined community has become very effective at reaching Turkish and Kurdish migrants in the different countries of settlement (Curtis 2005b; Hafez 2000; Kosnick 2007).

The media is used to legitimate their position amongst the Turkish and Kurdish people in Europe, mobilising them around homeland issues, in particular in the ethno-national conflict. The Turkish state has, through the state-owned or -affiliated private media, aimed to make Turkish migrants “consciously opposed to the separatist, destructive and reactionary terror organisation” (TRT 2006, Article 6:28) and speak out for “their” nation in the countries of settlement. This militarist recruitment programmes for the Turkish nation in the Turkish media are produced and sent to the Turkish and Kurdish migrants’ households.

The Kurdish media has challenged the official state discourse and common sense which is based on the denial of diverse ethnic, and even religious groups, and the propagation of the idea of a homogeneous Turkish nation. Both migrant groups have been confronted with banal nationalist terminology in the media, within the framework of “the nation”, and “nationhood”: such as “enemies of our nation”, “separatists” and “terrorists”, and other expressions of hatred and racism towards “othered” peoples. On the other hand, the Kurdish media has created its own
terminology again within the framework of nation and nationhood, for example renaming the “East and South East” of Turkey “Northern Kurdistan”, referring to the Turkish state as the “occupier”. The attempts to legitimate their position amongst migrants and also define migrant identities and the position of migrants in the Turkish-Kurdish ethno-national conflict in their homeland. The struggle around these conflicting terminologies is an attempt to align individual ethnic identities – the “attachments, allegiances, loyalties, and bonds…” of people politically. (Robins and Aksoy 2001:254). These bonds are also reproduced through transnational vernacular media amongst Turkish and Kurdish migrants in a transnational social and cultural space where people have social, political and economic relations in two or more countries (the country of settlement, the country of origin and third places).

The chapter highlights the different banal nationalist terminologies deployed in the process of shaping migrant identifications, analysing mediated identity categories and the ways Kurdish and Turkish migrants themselves deploy these terms. The imagined community draws on banal nationalism within the two communities, in which the Turkish and Kurdish sides in the homeland and diaspora carry on a struggle between each other. I see this struggle as a Gramscian struggle of hegemony and counter hegemony. Most importantly this is now played out through the transnational media and Turkish and Kurdish “civil society” in Europe.

I start by presenting the research findings of different studies, including my own, on the media consumption of Turkish and Kurdish migrants in Germany, Sweden and the UK. Then the relationship between ethnic identity formation and media consumption amongst the Turkish and Kurdish migrants will be examined. This will focus on: how migrants make sense of the mediated hegemonic struggle between the Turkish state and the Kurdish national movement; how this hegemonic struggle shapes the
migrants’ own ethnic identity in particular through their media consumption in the three countries of settlement. It is important to see whether the hegemonic struggle for an imagined community, through the banal nationalistic terminology deployed by the media, has real effects which impact on the Kurdish and Turkish in defining their ethnic identities, their attachments and sense of belonging.

2. The Migrants’ Media Consumption
The research conducted in Turkish and Kurdish migrants’ media consumption (Zentrum für Türkeistudien 1997; Aksoy and Robins 2000; Simon 2007; Bayram, Nyquist et al. 2009) shows that it has changed since satellite TV stations have appeared on the scene. Before they mainly watched TV broadcasts in the country of settlement, but by the new possibilities of the print, digital and satellite media have reconnected migrants to their homeland. This kind of media consumption plays a crucial role in reconstructing cultural, national and religious identities and legitimising cultural, ethnic and religious affiliations and attachments.

It is complicated to explore the media consumption habits of Kurdish and Turkish transnational audiences because of the diversity of their identities and profiles – length of residency, age, gender, education and psychology - and the diversity of socio-political spaces in which the media are consumed, in an age of globalization. Their ethnic, religious and political belief systems play an important role in the consumption of print and satellite TV (Hafez 2002). However, they are not limited to these particular media and follow a range of media which are not directly related to their ethnic or religious affiliations. For example, Kurdish audiences follow the Kurdish media, but also the Turkish media and media of the country of settlement. A person affiliated to Islamic Milli Görus watches Islamic Kanal 7 and reads Milli Gazete (National View newspaper) and mainstream Turkish TV, as well as following the media in the country of settlement. Although they follow different media in different languages, some
audiences have a strong sense of belonging to “Turkishness” or “Kurdishness “ due to the ethno-national conflict in the homeland, as a Kurdish participant in London makes clear:

“I mean if I wasn’t a Kurd, if I was English or a European, I would be more interested in global warming, I would be in Greenpeace something like that, something else. But I, as an individual, and the Kurdish people are facing the Turkish racist ethnic discrimination policies and registrations because of our cultural, linguistic or ethnic identity background and there is an ongoing brutal war against my people in Kurdistan. Therefore I consume more Kurdish and Turkish media than the British media, to inform myself about what we can do from here to get equal rights like the Turks in Turkey” (Interview with Peri, London, 2nd April 2008).

Numerous studies have been conducted on the media consumption of Turkish audiences in Germany including the Zentrum für Türkeistudien’s research (1997), Weiβ and Trebbe’s (2001) and (Schulte 2002). According to the Zentrum für Türkeistudien (1997), the migrants used the German and Turkish media in complementary ways. Weiβ and Trebbe’s (2001) research found that migrants were more interested in Germany than Turkey. But the young people were not interested in German politics. While the young people used German TV, the elderly used the Turkish media. However the Data4U research on 60,000 people found that Turkish migrants watch Turkish television, the German channels do not play an important role in their lives (Schulte 2002). Study of the German public broadcasters ARD/ZDF among Turkish, Italian and Greek, Bosnian, Montenegrin, Croatian, Serbian and ethnic German migrants from Russia (russische Spätaussiedler) found out that only 14% watch solely in their homeland language. The Turkish audiences more than other migrant groups, used the media in their homeland language (Simon 2007).
Robins and Aksoy’s research on Turkish migrants (again encompassing Kurds with “Turkish migrants”) provides rich empirical material on Turkish transnational audiences. They found out that migrants from “Turkey” follow both British and Turkish media (Aksoy and Robins 2000, Robins and Aksoy 2000).

These studies encompassed Kurds in the term “Turkish migrant” in Germany and in the UK, a term which “is obviously disputed by the Kurdish diaspora in Europe, and is seen as a deliberate attempt to import a Turkish hegemonic and nationalistic ideology into the European context” (Thomson et al. 2006:9). This approach ignores the ethnic and cultural differences and diverse media consumption habits between Turkish and Kurdish audiences. Therefore it is impossible to understand how the both conflicted migrants group create meaning of their ethnic identities, imagined homeland and ongoing ethno-national conflict through consuming Turkish, Kurdish media which remind them homeland and flag certain banal nationalist symbols. Again, the research on Turkish audiences in Sweden (Bayram et al. 2009) suggests that the consumption of Turkish-originated media amongst Turkish audience is higher than the consumption of Swedish media.

The Zentrum für Türkeistudien (1997) and GöfaK-Studie (2001) claimed that only a small number of migrants used the Turkish media. However my research shows that the media consumption in Turkish and Kurdish languages has increased amongst Turkish and Kurdish audiences owing to the dispute between the Turkish state and the Kurds, as well as between the Islamic- oriented AKP government and the military in recent years. Therefore I see parallelity between media consumption and the ethno-national conflict between Turkish and Kurdish migrants and their mobilisation, engagement for homeland. Both media connect them to “homeland” and reproduce the constructed and conflicted ethno-national identities, imagined “our “nation. The sensations, dynamic of societal
change towards nationalistic directions, the brutal attack of Turkish police on Kurdish children, the tortured bodies of death guerrillas, the killed or “martyrized” Turkish soldiers’ partners or mothers’ tears at well designed and mediated funeral ceremonies, the out of shouted soldiers at mediated funeral ceremonies for revenge on “terrorists” are transmitted into everyday life of migrants. This creates mediated experiences through print, visual and digital media amongst migrants and a routine habit to news from “homeland” and new form of nationalism which has been described by “virtual nationalism” (Appadurai 1996) “because of the speed of communications and high mobility of people diaspora are increasingly capable of forging and sustaining social relations that link their societies of origin and settlement. Practically, this means that diaspora communities can easily participate in conflicts in their homelands and live their politics long-distance” (Demmers 2002:88). Demmers states that although migrants are living in different geographical and political spaces and “are physically separated from ‘the core conflict’ however “they are likely to experience different emotions and develop different behaviour during the course of the conflict. Whereas the ‘homeland’ groups that are physically engaged in the conflict will experience fear, hunger, pain, and stress, diaspora groups will probably feel anger, frustration or alienation. Consequently, these differences in attitudes will effect their behaviour and perception of the contradiction, and so forth” (Demmer 2002 95).

Most of the participants I interviewed stated that they watch “too much news”. A Kurdish immigration advisor in Berlin affirmed that:

The Turkish and Kurdish audiences consume the news with an excitement of a football match which makes them a bit aggressive to each other. But I can understand them because the media presents the news in the style of a game of football. The Turkish media approves of the killing of “separatist terrorists” and the Kurdish media approves of the killing of
“soldiers” and “occupiers” (Interview with Dara, Berlin 14 August 2007).

As a Turkish participant who has been living in Berlin for 21 years, explained:

“Efkan: I watch the same news several times over. I am addicted to the news on Turkey. I am sad to see what has happened to the country of Ataturk. If he could see the situation of his country now he would definitely have a heart attack. On one hand, the separatist Kurds, on the other hand, the hypocritical, religious government. But I hope the Ataturk military will do something. We are at the end of our tether.

Yilmaz: I think recently the general staff; Buyukanit has said that they are at the end of their tether. Do you agree with him?

Efkan: Yes, yes” (Interview with Efkan, Berlin, 25 July 2007).

While Robins describes such audiences as “passive and vulnerable to the influence of ‘Turkish television’” (2000:293). Hafez describes such audiences in Europe as loyal individuals, who see themselves as an “integral component of the Turkish state” who “identify themselves with the Turkish state and its interests, through groups like the Grey Wolves and Islamic-nationalist Milli Gorus” (Hafez 2002:23).

“In Germany, nearly a million televisions are tuned into Turkish [Kurdish, Elewî] television by satellite during prime time every night” (Brochure of the Turkish EuroD channel in Aksoy 2000:1). Certainly this media consumption habit has created opportunities for some ethnic, religious groups whose identity was denied by the Turkish state. In particular the Kurdish, Assyrian, Chaldian and Syriancic ethnic groups and those of Elewî belief have for the first time seen traditions, history and political struggle for recognition in public life in Turkey but also in Europe, represented on screen. These TV stations give voice to the different identities and perspectives of people but also re-conceptualize them in political, ideological, religious and ethnic terms and draw out commonalities. Despite the Turkish state having
suppressed the different identities, they have now found their voice through these satellite TV channels where they can communicate and discuss their identities. A Kurdish Elewî stated in Berlin, that she had not learned anything about Elewî identity in school in Turkey, so she watches Elewî Dem and Düzgün TV regularly to learn about Elewîsm. Similarly other Kurds stated that they see Kurdish TV as “our window to the world “(Interview with Arinas, Berlin, 18.08.2007).

It have been pointed out already that Turkish and Kurdish migrants in Germany watch more than 3 hours of German and Turkish TV (Simon 2007). Some other research has indicated this reaches 5 hours (Schulte 2002). The German audience watches on average 3 hours daily. My research shows that the Turkish and Kurdish audiences in Germany watch on average 4 hours daily, while the figures are 2.45 hours in Sweden, 3.15 hours in the UK:

“Yilmaz: How many hours do you spend watching TV or reading newspaper every day? How many hours do you watch Kurdish channels/ read Kurdish newspaper?
Rebeen: Quite a lot of ..... Yilmaz: How many hours?
Rebeen: to be honest I will say 3-4 hours daily.[Laugh]
Yilmaz: OK
Rebeen: it is probably about 20-25 hour per week. [Laugh] it is quite a lot”

The outcome of my research shows that the Turkish audiences in all three countries usually watch the Turkish originated state TRT INT, followed by Kanal D, and ATV for their news, “good entertainment, football programmes“. The religious TV station e.g. TGRT, STV, Kanal 7 are watched mostly by conservative Turkish audiences in Germany but not in the UK and Sweden. Hürriyet newspaper is read widely by migrants in all three countries, followed by Zaman of Fettullah Gûlen group, Milliyet,
Sabah. The ultra nationalist Yeni Cag and Ortadogu gazetesi are followed mainly on the internet.

The Kurds watch Kurdish originated Roj TV and the MMC music channel in the UK and Germany, while many Swedish Kurds preferred Kurdi1, MMC, Roj TV, Kurdistan TV and Zagros TV (from the Kurdistan region of Iraq). This is a quite an interesting finding because it shows that they have turned away from Turkey to Kurdistan in terms of consuming media in Kurdish and media from different parts of Kurdistan. The main daily newspaper is Ozgur Politika in Kurdish and Turkish which has significant readers in all three countries, in particular in Germany. Azadiya Welat Kurdis language newspaper is another paper which has mostly a Swedish Kurd readership.

The Turkish media consumption amongst Kurds in Sweden is lower than that of Kurds in Germany and the UK. Some participants stated that they watch or read Turkish media “only if there is some discussion of Kurdish issues “. The Kurds in Germany and the UK follow the Turkish media daily in order to “know how the Turkish fascist media deal with Kurdish issues “. It is quite interesting that Kosnick (2007) and Hafez (2002) both found in their research that the Kurds refer to the Turkish media as “fascist media “(Hafez 2002:53 ). The “fascist media” terminology was used mainly by the Turkish and Kurdish left-wing media in the ‘80s. Although they called the Turkish media, “fascist”, they still consume it, both for news of the ongoing debate about the Kurds and also for entertainment because “the Kurdish media offers mostly political discussion and “does not have many programmes for relaxing” as one participant in London put it (Interview with Arjin, London, 4th March 2008). The most watched Turkish TV stations amongst the Kurds are the liberal NTV, CNN Turk, followed by ATV and Kanal D. Again the Hürriyet is the only Turkish newspaper they read if they see at a café or restaurant but many of the participants stated that
they never buy it because “it is the official newspaper of the racist state” (Interview with Peri, London, 2nd April 2008). The second newspaper is the liberal Radikal which has been replaced by the Taraf newspaper in regular media consumption of Kurds. Taraf is the only newspaper which criticises the Turkish military and its function in shaping Turkish political life and openly advocates a peaceful solution to Turkey’s urgent Kurdish question.

70% of Kurdish audiences have stated that they regularly watch the Roj TV Türkê Derwêş documentary which is based on interesting stories about people from the arts, sciences, music and politics accompanied by images of Kurdish populated cities in Anatolia. Many migrants complain about the Turkish and Kurdish newspapers that they are primarily concerned with Germany and ignore the Swedish and British migrants.

In terms of the media in the countries of settlement, Turkish and Kurdish audiences prefer to watch the German RTL, Pro 7 and SAT 1 for their light entertainment value. This finding is similar to the GöfaK-Studie (2001) research. The educated participants tend to watch ARD. Some Kurds in Berlin state that they regularly watch the ARTE, a Franco-German TV network, because “they have some documentary and news on Kurdistan” (Interview with Dilsad, Berlin, 18 July 2007). Neither group has much interest in the German print media but occasionally read the Berlin-based Berliner Zeitung, Taz, and Tagesspiegel. In Sweden, the Turkish and Kurdish migrants follow Swedish 1, 2 and 4 and mainly read the free newspaper Metro in Stockholm. Aftonbladet and Svenska Dagenblatt are mostly read by the second generation. In the UK, the BBC is the most watched TV station because

“British media is more objective (if not objective enough) than the Turkish media. The BBC is objective compared to much of the world media. Pictures of the Kurdish and Turkish conflict or the
Kurdish issue in Turkey are regularly broadcast on BBC World - at the time of writing- just the week before during Newroz. Clashes took place between the Turkish police and Newroz participants. BBC World showed that for just a few minutes” (Interview with Azad, London, and 3rd May 2008).

However another Kurdish participant stated that:

“When we came here in 1990 up until 2001 we didn’t see satellite TV. Until 6 years ago, we watched only British TV. Now we have satellite TV. We have British, Kurdish and Turkish channels. But I would say for the past two or three years I have been mainly watching Kurdish TV. “(Interview with Sozan, London 29th March 2008).

2.1. Identity formation and media consumption:

Case One: The first generation

A Turkish participant stated that they have satellite TV and watch mainly Turkish TV because “there are a lot of exciting events in Turkey. Everybody is fighting to have power and I watch the power struggle as a soap opera and to be honest, I have very little time to watch British television” (Interview with Devrim, London 03 March 2008).

The British print media plays a minor role in the lives of the Kurdish and Turkish migrants. Many of them testify that they read only free papers like Metro: “For a while I bought the Guardian. But now I sometimes read it on internet. Unfortunately I have lost the habit of buying a newspaper. I read English and Kurdish newspapers on the internet. “(Interview with Arjin, London, 4th March 2008). Local Turkish and Kurdish newspapers and radio (Zeitschrift Etap, Radyo Metropol FM in Berlin, Telgraf, Haber postasi, Toplum postasi, Olay, Bizim Radio in London, and Sirwan in Sweden) are also important sources of information for migrants.

It is clear that the first generation of Kurdish and Turkish audiences find themselves - their individual identity, behaviour and social norms - more
reflected in the Kurdish or Turkish media. The first generation of Turkish and Kurdish migrants, who had no formal education and are unskilled, tend to consume Turkish media, but also the educated and skilled first generation, who have strong political links and would like to keep themselves up-to-date with ongoing events in their homeland, are the main consumers of the Turkish and Kurdish media. They have been involved in varying degrees in cultural and political life and debate in Turkey, and later on, either as refugees or as voluntary migrants seeking a better life. However the myth of returning “home” is still alive amongst this group. The myth of return has a long history and is still reiterated by the first generation. The narrative constructed around the ‘myth of return’ bears close relationship to the notion of an idealized home: “the concreteness of a familiar home” (Zetter 1999:4) in the country of origin, idealized imagery of the past, the substratum of “the memory of collective loss” (Zetter 1999:5), attachment to the place and its meaning in people’s lives keep the imaginary home and myth of return alive. These help them to reconstruct “a cultural inventory” in the diaspora. Zetter (1999:3) states that the notion of returning home has been “a dominant theme” for many refugees and diasporic communities for whom “return remains a profound conviction”. Zetter provides a useful concept of “how refugees perceive the relationship between their past” (Zetter 1999:5), their aspirations for the future and the mediating role of the present. The 'myth of return' is constructed because protracted exiles are living in a condition where they feel that “their exile is temporary and that they will eventually return home” (Zetter 1999:5). Although they make “numerous failed attempts at reconciliation” and return 'home’, simultaneously they resettle and integrate rather than becoming temporary residents. This means that they create their economic and social spaces within majority society in settlement countries where their lives, livehoods, identities are reshaped in accordance with where they live. But they live in a situation where interaction between myth and reality becomes part of everyday life and
“overlaid with an abstracted or imagined realm” (Zetter 1999:4). Zetter conceptualizes the complexity of the idea of returning as “a future in the past’ and ‘a future without the past’ of diasporas in settlement countries (Zetter 1999:3 and also see Zetter 1994:311-318). The idea of returning home “not only encapsulates this sense of a fictitious past, or at least one that is idealized and reinvented, but also a fictitious future” (Zetter 1999:4). Zetter states that “the construct of the myth of return home also offers insights into how refugee groups frequently manage to sustain both their social cohesion and distinctiveness during exile, despite the countervailing forces of time and assistance programmes. Repatriation constitutes a material objective and the aspiration to an ideal—essentially the restitution of a past shattered by diaspora” (Zetter 1999:5). However this contradictory attitude of “the perceived limbo-like situation of being neither ‘here’ nor ‘there’ can be a paralyzing force and prevent refugees from developing strategies to make a living in the settlement country (Bloch 2004, Al-Rasheed 1994, Al-Ali et al. 2001a). The ‘myth of return’ can also contribute to the establishment of transnational networks which provide potential resources e.g., access to jobs, political participation maintenance of cultural and linguistic elements of ethnic identity for socially bounded groups (Al-Ali et al. 2001b; Al-Rasheed 1994; Portes 1998).

I use the myth of ‘returning home’ in relation to the imagined community, since “myths of return serve to strengthen ethnic solidarity but in many cases have little practical effect. The ‘return’ of many in the diaspora is an eschatological concept used to make life easier by means of a belief in an eventual resolution - a virtual utopia. The return is hoped for ‘at the end of days’ and … ongoing support of the homeland and, a collective identity … relationship (Esman 2009; Hall 1999; Munz and Ohliger 1998; Shuval 2000:8).
But also for many, this dream of returning home is realised in retirement. However most of the Kurdish and Turkish migrants do not return permanently as they had initially hoped. Instead, they spend some months in the settlement countries and some months in the homeland. Because of their dream of returning “home”, both Kurdish and Turkish first generation migrants pay close attention to events in Turkey and Kurdistan and they get all their news about these events from the media. Turkish media call these people *gurbetçi*, - one who lives far from the homeland in a foreign country. This nationalistic phrase is reiterated everyday by the Turkish media underlining migrants are not a part of the society but of the Turkish imagined community.

While living in a ‘foreign country’ where they face multiple forms of discrimination, exclusion and the feeling of not being accepted by the 'host' society, the ‘myth of return’ becomes an alternative, imaginary strategy in the mind of migrants. Therefore they imagine returning to an idealized home. As Ahmet, a Turkish participant in Berlin stated:

“We are gurbetçi [expatriates] and wish to go back to our country.
Y: Where do you get information about Turkey?
A: We have TRT, Kanal D, I read Hürriyet at kahvehane [a social place where men meet up and play cards].
J: Do you talk about the current events taking place in Turkey at kahvehane and about returning to Turkey?
Of course. All our talk is about Turkey”
(Interview with Ahmet, Berlin, 13 July 2007).

Imagined community is the community has been constructed through different nationalistic symbols over time. Within it, one of the most powerful ideas is the myth of return which manifests itself in many
communities (Zetter 1999). Therefore the visually imagined homeland and myth of returning “home” through the media play a crucial role in the everyday life of the first generation. The first generation of Kurdish and Turkish migrants in Germany and Britain tend to define their identities through their ethnic backgrounds, a tendency only strengthened by the war. The “national” identities as Kurd or Turk have been polarised and are seen as surmounting all other identifications in the hegemonic struggle of hot and banal nationalism. In the everyday relations between Turks and Kurds, their multiple identities disappear behind a single ascribed identity and these identities come into competition with each other (see chapter VII). Moreover, they have a strong attachment to their homeland because of their cultural and social norms, their family members in the homeland. For example, the Turkish participant, Sedat has been living in Berlin for 27 years. He owns a newspaper store where he reads all the Turkish papers and also the “separatist terrorist” ones (as defined by Serdar). He states that

“S: I watch mainly TRT or Show TV and I read all the news here [at his newspaper store] about Turkey.
Y: Which newspaper do you read here?
S: I read all. I read Hürriyet, Zaman, sport newspapers and I read the “separatist terrorist” newspaper.
Y: What is the name of this the “separatist terrorist” newspaper.
S Oh you are researching about media and do not know this newspaper. Here you are.

S:...I have been living for 27 years and have dual citizenship. But I feel Turkish. I have my family and my friends in my city [in Turkey]. I go there every summer. I feel more comfortable there than here. I hope I will be healthy when I will be a pensioner and will go to my city and will spend the rest of my life there... “(Interview with Serdar, Berlin, 17 July 2007).

Despite his self employment and dual citizenship, Serdar is thus one of the first generation migrants who dreams of going back to Turkey. In his news
agent’s, he sells a range of international newspapers but only reads the Turkish language ones (both Kurdish and Turkish). He does not read the German newspapers. This is again an indication of his strong identification with Turkey. There was a similar term used amongst the Kurds who wish to go to their *Welat* – homeland.

In contrast to Germany and Britain, the first generation Kurdish and Turkish migrants in Sweden are closer to the second generation interviewees in the ways they express their identity. While they do mention their ethnicity, this identity is always interpreted in a politicised way. The Kurdish and Turkish mother-tongue teachers interviewed emphasised their dual identification as from Turkey but also a Kurdistan or Swedish citizen.

The Turkish and Kurdish migrants who went to Sweden after the military coup, mentioned in their interviews that they were “happy to be in a democratic country” and added that “Okay I am Turkish but I am Swedish too” (Hale, Stockholm, 26th June 2007) or “Kurdistan is our country, but we made our home here and I am Swedish too” (Amed, Stockholm, 10th June 2007). These explanations are similar to some second generation Kurdish and Turkish migrants in Germany and in Britain. In my research I have found, therefore, that Kurdish and Turkish migrants in Sweden differ from those in Germany and Britain. But the Kurdish first generation in Sweden is passionate about Kurdish identity and its reproduction in the diaspora. Kurdishness is their way of expressing their identity and plays an important part in their lives, for example the opening of the first modern Kurdish library in Sweden where I collected a lot of literature about the Kurds. This contradicts somewhat Van Bruinessen’s argument (2002) that it was the Kurdish second generation migrants who politicized the first generation.

The educated first generation are active in their communities and even in mainstream parties and institutions in the country of settlement. They
follow various media including those of the country of settlement, as well as Turkish and Kurdish media. Their media consumption habits are similar to those of some second generation, who have grown up and been educated in the countries of settlement. Therefore these groups constitute the main consumers of transnational media, following media in two or three different languages.

b. Case Two: The second generation

Van Bruinessen points out that “[t]he so-called second generation, consisting of immigrant workers' children who have grown up in Europe, tend to be much more interested in Kurdish identity and Kurdish politics than their parents were, many parents returned to their Kurdish roots under the influence of their children” (van Bruinessen 2000a: 3). While this may be so, my research has found that the second generation migrants tend to define their identities more broadly, integrating their ethnic background and settlement country identity. The cities of Berlin, Stockholm or London are also a part of their identity, as they live there and think they can find a job without a serious problem. These factors give them a sense of being at home and create feelings of belonging.

Baran, a second generation Kurd from London states:

“In my opinion if you are born as a Kurd and if you are aware of Kurdish identity, of your heritage and the Kurdish situation, the Kurdish issue, you automatically are involved in politics. Because you were born in a society in which people have no rights at all to develop and contribute to their language and culture - even in some cases, their existence is put in question. If you are aware of this unjust situation and do something against the oppressor, you are involved in politics and follow all the news about the ongoing conflict in Kurdistan” (Interview with Baran, London 13 February 2007).
This response is typical of second generation Kurdish migrants in Germany and in the UK who also played an important part in politicizing their parents in Europe (Leggewie 1996, van Bruinessen 1999b). Kurdish migrants often came from rural areas and had low levels of education. So they were not highly politicised in the 1960s and 1970s, but their children, who grew up and were educated in Europe, developed a strong attachment to Kurdishness from the 1970s onwards. First, they noticed that their families spoke a different language from Turkish and this led them to search for their identity. The political refugees in Europe together with the second generation Kurds and the Kurdish media developed a more articulated sense of Kurdishness. So the second generation began to follow the Kurdish media more closely and pay careful attention to the Kurdish situation in Turkey, becoming active in Kurdish diaspora politics. They politicized their parents in the process of adopting a sense of Kurdishness from the Kurdish media.

The conflict in the homeland has meant that many second generation Kurdish migrants have revived their sense of ethnic identity and it has strengthened their allegiance to various aspects of Kurdishness. They feel a sense of solidarity or obligation with other Kurds in the homeland. They feel this sense of responsibility all the more as the position of the Kurds in Kurdistan has deteriorated. One young woman born in Germany explains:

“Kurdish identity is important. I have not got the opportunity to experience life in Kurdistan. But I feel emotionally connected to them because of their situation under the violence of the Turkish state. Therefore, I try to do anything I can do from here [to help]” (Interview with Civane, Berlin, 17 August 2007).

Another participant brings a different perspective as to why he returned to his ethnic identity and now follows the Kurdish media:
“My Kurdish identity is an important aspect in all my socio-political relations. Because the Kurdish cause is a burning political issue and this issue has an impact on our identity. It creates a collective and solidaristic identity amongst Kurds. It doesn’t matter where you live. If I say Kurdish identity I am talking about a politicized Kurdish identity that stands up for our rights. I am interested in a new Kurdish identity not the past. Because I see a society which is rapidly forming here and in Kurdistan … Of course the media play an important role in this political transformation. The Kurdish media give the Kurds a sense of belonging after having felt for decades the outsider because of political and economic discrimination in our homeland (Interview with Dilsad, Berlin, 18 July 2007).

These two testimonies demonstrate that for these second generation Kurds, expressing allegiance to a Kurdish identity is a moral issue of showing solidarity with Kurds who are suffering from oppression. Expressing Kurdish identity is for them a political project connected with building a new Kurdish society or defending Kurds from oppression. It is not a search for identity in the lost traditions of the past which has merely been forgotten through migration.

For many Turkish second generation migrants, on the other hand, their sense of Turkish identity has strengthened through media consumption, being involved in community work and emergency of Kurdish identity in Europe. Zeynep, a Turkish community worker emphasises her loyalty to Turkishness:

I am Turkish. Turkishness is my significant identity. It does not matter where I am living or whether I am a citizen of another country. Turkishness is my identity and I am defined by it everywhere. I am a citizen of this country. Citizenship and identity are two different things. My country is Turkey and I feel attached to it and defend it everywhere.

Y: Why do you feel that you should defend it?
Z: We have a problem in Turkey, in East Turkey and here. The Germans are against us.
Y: Did you send any protest letter which has been published in Hürriyet or Sabah against some institutions or individuals who are against Turkey or Turks according to these newspapers?
Z: Yes I... I think I sent one to Spiegel [German weekly news magazine]. They have published some negative news about Atatürk” (Interview with Zeynep, Berlin, 29 August 2007).

The second generation, for example, is able to acquire information from the host countries’ sources as well as from Kurdish and Turkish sources. These groups have started a transnational dialogue between Berlin, London, Stockholm, Turkey and Kurdistan via the media. Many Kurds from different geo-political spaces (Sweden, Turkey, Kazakhstan, and different parts of Kurdistan - Iran, Iraq and Turkey etc) call Roj TV to express their feelings, their views, and their political position in the same programme and at the same time. In a similar way, the Turkish audiences from different European countries and from Turkey communicate at the same time on the same programme.

There are also a significant number of Kurdish second generation in Sweden who primarily consume the Swedish, English and Kurdish media, while the second generation of Kurds in Britain and Germany tend to use more media in Kurdish and Turkish languages. In some cases, the consumption of Turkish or Kurdish originated media depends on the education, social stratification and locality of the migrant. The Turkish and Kurdish media consumption depends on where people live, if they live in certain so-called segregated areas or high-concentration, ethnic minority areas. The young people consume media and discuss the issues, but in areas where the ethnic group is not significant, then young people have friends with non-Kurdish and non-Turkish background and the discussion topic focuses on issues relating to the countries of settlement. In Sweden many people have two televisions on, one for the first generation who
watch Kurdish TV, and a second for the first generation who watch Swedish TV. Some members of the third generation stated that they consume unwanted Turkish and Kurdish TV to appease their family’s desire to be “a proper family watching a film or news together”. Significantly, many people in Sweden also stated that they have two television sets, one for parents and one for children.

While some second generation have loyalties to their Kurdishness and Turkishness due to the ethno-national conflict, Turkish policies of ethnic discrimination against the Kurds and a strong reaction of defending Turkey against the Kurdish accusations and those of the media in the countries of settlement, have led to a significant move by the second generation to acquire information from the host countries’ sources as well as from Kurdish and/or Turkish. They have grown critical of the Turkish and Kurdish media coverage and also of Turkish policies towards the Kurds as well as the PKK.

For example Rebeen, a Kurdish participant from London testified:

“They kill everyday each other. In the mean time the Turks and Kurds have not used the economic growth opportunities, democratization, building civil societies and not tried to integrate their people and political system as well as their economy to the growing globalised world. When they did put all their recourses in this war. I am watching their Turkish and Kurdish nonsense war, discussion and I feel that they are not from this world. Turkey will recognize one day the Kurdish identity and maybe like in Iraq we will have a Kurdish prime Minister or state president and maybe Kurds will have a parliament like Scottish parliament the we will ask us that indeed why we killed each other? It is a pity that many people die from both site everyday” (Interview with Rebeen, London, 19 March 2007).
A similar statement comes from Devrim, a Turkish participant in London:

“To be honest I can not understand why they are killing each other. They have sit down and maybe calm down and then solve the problem on the table. I stop to watch the news on TV” (Interview with Devrim, London 03 March 2008).

Of course there are also some second generation migrants who have very little connection with Kurdish or Turkish issues. They relate to Turkish or Kurdish identity mainly through the stories they have heard from their parents but not through the media. These stories may be emotionally salient, but the interviewees locate themselves in the settlement country and mention Turkishness or Kurdishness only as their parents’ background.

As 20 year old Dêmgul, explained:

“My mum and dad were in prison in Kurdistan and after they were released they fled to Sweden. Therefore we have never been to Kurdistan. But my mum dreams of going back one day to Kurdistan. However I have no memories, or friends who can tie me to Kurdistan. I was born here and have grown up here and all my friends are from here. I am Swedish….. I watch the Swedish TV. My mum and dad watch Kurdish TV. There was conflict between me and them regarding which TV we should watch. But we solved it by buying another TV” (Interview with Dêmgul, Stockholm, 02 June 2007).

The Turkish participant and bank employee, Gulben states:

“To be honest I ask the question - Who am I? It is difficult to answer. Yes, I am a Swedish Turk. I did not grow up in Turkey. But if I go there, especially to the small town where my family comes from, I do not feel Turkish. I like Turkish music. We do not have satellite TV; therefore I do not follow the Turkish media. Sometimes I read some stuff about Turkey on
The first generation tend to watch or read the ethnic-based media more, not only because of the language barriers, but also because of their self identification with their homeland ethnic identity. The first generation have lived in Turkey and the Kurdish and Turkish media help them to relate to their past lived experience. This is particularly important for those migrants who were actively involved in social, political and cultural issues in Turkey. Consuming Turkish and Kurdish media makes them feel comfortable and entails enjoyable moments.

The second generation tend to consume media product of the settlement country where they have grown up. But the particular networks of first and second generation migrants play an important role in shaping their media consumption. For example, the Kurds and Turks in neighbourhoods with many other Turks and Kurds (e.g. Berlin Kreuzberg, Hackney in London and Rinkeby in Stockholm) have easy access to Turkish and Kurdish media. In particular, if they attend Turkish and Kurdish cafes and restaurants or community centres, they are exposed to constant discussions about the homeland. In these places, migrants discuss the Turkish-Kurdish conflict or cultural issues of “their homeland”. Being part of these networks leads migrants to identify more closely with the ethnicity of the homeland because the everyday conversations create commonalities based on the homeland.

2.2. Internet

The new technologies enable migrants to participate in political and cultural developments in their ‘homeland’. In particular, the Internet compresses time and space and connects people from different political and
geographical spaces where they can not only meet for the first time and create a sense of belonging, sharing common experiences and identity with ‘our’ nation but it also helps them to reproduce and disseminate these ideas within a local and transnational setting. This new form of virtual conversation has created new social networks which have been described as ‘virtual communities’ (Rheingold 1993, see also Appadurai 1995:219).

Castells explains how people act and create meaning in this virtualized life in 'virtual communities':

“People increasingly organize their meaning not around what they do but on the basis of what they are, or believe they are. Meanwhile, on the other hand, global networks of instrumental exchanges selectively switch on and off individuals, groups, regions, and even countries, according to their relevance in fulfilling the goals processed in the network, in a relentless flow of strategic decisions. It follows a fundamental split between abstract, universal instrumentalism, and historically rooted particularist identities” (Castells 1997:470).

The scholars focused on the interaction between migrants and the homeland through the internet consider these new conversations and connectedness as an ‘imagined community’ because “everyday ethnicity” is reproduced through the discussion and is reflected back to community living in the settlement countries. Hence it becomes a routinized social practice to consume media in the homeland language.

The activists (expatriates, exiles, stateless) of these virtual communities have created an online virtual ‘home’, ‘homeland’ or ‘nation’ where people ‘meet’, discuss, create forums, petitions, campaigns for homeland politics and develop their transnational political activity across the borders and
“organize resistance activities” (Fink 1998) against repressive policies of ‘their’ homeland government globally (Fink 1998). The virtual political activities of Sri Lankan Tamils, Kurds, Palestinians, Sikhs and diasporic Iranians and Armenians are examples of this.

These new means of political participation are not isolated acts, as Anderson claimed, but dynamic political and social movements which have influence on the governments in settlement countries and on claims for ethnic, sexual, religious rights in repressive states.

The internet has become an institution for stateless Kurds where they have developed their language, culture and sense of belonging to a particular people/nation which has been denied by the nation-states which occupy Kurdistan. There are thousands of materials about how to learn Kurdish and online Kurdish classes, an online Kurdish museum and even cartoons and films available on the net.

Simultaneously the Internet has become one of the most successful mediums for disseminating banal nationalism e.g. internet domain name such as .uk, de, tr. (Diamandaki 2003). Stateless nations dream also of their own domain names. The dissemination of banal nationalistic symbols, flags, ‘the national colours’ of Turks and Kurds, discourses of nationhood decorate the websites, blogs and online newspapers produced and consumed by migrants. These banal nationalist signs are markers of ethnic, national and religious identities. (Bakker 2001 ; Diamandaki 2003 ; Ding 2007 ; Eriksen 2007). This is proof that “Nationalism is flourishing on the Internet” (Bakker 2001:4).

Consequently it does not matter whether the members of imagined community live in the homeland or far away from home it is crucial that they imagine the ‘nation’. This can be more intensive abroad or in
settlement countries where people are ethnically marked in a different way in everyday life and confront multiple forms of exclusion. As Demmers sums up: “by long-distance interference with the conflict in their homeland, diaspora communities are engaged in a sort of “virtual conflict” they live their conflicts through the internet, email, television, and telephone without direct (physical) suffering, risks, or accountability” (Demmers 2002:94).

In particular the groups in the conflict use the internet very effectively to get national, but also international, support for their political projects (Diamandaki 2003; Geser 2004; Smith 2007; Vertovec 2005; Wayland 2004).

Turkish and Kurdish migrants used internet very actively to express and legitimize their political positions within the communities and amongst the politicians, institutions and media in the settlement countries. The articles on the Turkish-Kurdish ethno-national conflict in German newspapers have become a ‘battleground’ between both groups, in particular during periods of ‘extraordinary emotional mood, striking at extraordinary times’ (Billig 1995:55).

While most of the Kurdish internet websites create a virtual Kurdistan in cyberspace and demand an independent Kurdistan (Eriksen 2007) the Turkish websites disseminate banal nationalist symbols in the layout of the website. Therefore, the internet becomes the site of a hegemonic struggle between the groups in conflict. Numerous Kurdish websites are banned in Turkey and the access to them is denied by the Turkish authorities.

The Kurds use the Internet effectively in Europe, not only for mobilizing transnational Kurds for the homeland but also for the re-invention of the Kurdish nation, developing Kurdish language, disseminating national narratives and symbols across the borders (Sheyholislami 2010). As Eriksen sums up: "Since much of the Kurdish elite is in exile, the Internet
has turned out to be a perfect medium for the consolidation of identity and dissemination of news for Kurds” (Eriksen 2007:9).

A Kurdish parent in Berlin told me that that his 14 year-old son had “some problem with his Turkish classmate at school. When teacher asked children where they are from, my son said that he is from Kurdistan. However his Turkish mate stated “where is Kurdistan?” and asked my son to show it on the map. Of course there is not Kurdistan on German produced map at school and my son could not show Kurdistan on map to his Turkish and German classmates. I think he was a bit disappointed and confused. But I told him that he has to say to his Turkish classmate that he should go Google and type Kurdistan then he will find where Kurdistan is” (Interview with Huner, Berlin 13 August 2007).

This is an extraordinary statement to analyse about a virtual Kurdistan which does not legally exist in the world of nation-states (Billig 1995:6) but can be imagined virtually. Also this statement shows us how young people who have been ethnicized in different ways are confronted with the idea of nationhood at school and forced to justify their belonging to a particular group.

The interviewees stated that the internet plays a crucial role in their lives, reconnecting them via email, social networks, webcams and other means, to their families, friends, political, cultural and religious organizations in the country of origin and other countries where their relatives live. Moreover, it is easy to access different sources of information and news and to be part of ongoing discussion in both the host country and country of origin. 61% of Turkish and Kurdish migrants stated that they mostly read newspapers on the Internet. This percentage is higher amongst Kurdish participants (67%) than among the Turkish ones. The Kurds use internet very
effectively to get information from various sources and highlight the Kurdish cause, bringing it into the public domain.

To sum up, scholars agree that the Turkish state has tried to export Turkish nationalism via “state-oriented media” (Hafez, 2002) to create an imagined community. The Kurdish media have tried this by mobilising the Kurds in the Kurdistan region in Turkey and in Europe. But the Turkish and Kurdish audiences have multiple identities, using different sources to obtain information and form their opinion of everyday events. Their media consumption is complex. They consume different media in different languages and in different countries which creates heterogeneous and diverse audiences, owing to their transnational consumption pattern. Undoubtedly this proves that identity is no longer simple, singular, and exclusive. Sen stresses that

“community, nationality, race, sex, union membership, the fellowship of oligopolists, revolutionary solidarity, and so on, all provide identities that can be, depending on the context, crucial to our view of ourselves, and thus to the way we view our welfare, goals, or behavioural obligations”. (Sen 2002:215).

In this sense my interviews show that the Turkish and Kurdish media have reshaped political identity around ethnicity, nationalism, religion and gender by mobilising people for certain political, cultural or religious ideals which can lead to “belonging” and “practical identification with collective agencies” (Anderson 1983:254). But “the commonalities of groups” (Sen 1998:20) do not prevent multiple identities within the group but nor do they create a singularity out of the group’s multiple identities. For example, one of the women interviewed defined her identity as “being a woman, Kurdish, Elewî, Left and urban” (Interview with Roza, London, 17th February 2007) (However she did not define her identity as “a migrant” in the UK. “Being a
woman, Kurdish, Elewî, Left and urban” does not confine her to one geographic place. This identity can be claimed in Kurdistan, Turkey and Germany as well as in the UK. This statement, and many others which I heard from Kurds and Turks who are not confined to a single geographic place, shows that they are echoing the discussion in the media in their everyday lives. Both Kurds and Turks are attuned to events in Turkey and Kurdistan, acquiring all the news about these events through the media.

However my field work also indicates that the media play a crucial role in mobilising and shaping their identities, poisoning them with the ongoing ethno-national conflict in the homeland. The conflict in the homeland is reflected in their conversation and relations with each other. Amongst some Turkish- and Kurdish-oriented groups, multiple identities are subsumed to a single ascribed identity, for example, during the Kurdish demonstration against the capture of the PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan, or during the Turkish demonstrations across the Turkey and Europe “condemning terror” in 2009. The long-lasting ethno-national conflict has, with and without Turkey’s intervention, caused a hostile atmosphere amongst Turkish and Kurdish audiences and a hegemonic struggle in everyday life, both locally and nationally in different countries of settlement. The national identities of Kurd and Turk have become polarised and are seen as surmounting all other identifications in everyday relations between the Turkish and Kurdish migrants in different geopolitical spaces. Of course in other situations, within each group different, dynamic forms of identification e.g. “being women, Kurdish, Elewî, Left and urban”, “being a German Turk”, or “Swedish Kurd” predominate.

2.3. Use of media in the homeland language

The audiences who were interviewed gave various reasons for following Turkish and Kurdish originated media:
First of all, the strong feeling of belonging, of being either Turkish or Kurdish and seeing Turkey or Kurdistan as their homeland. The ongoing ethno-national conflict and conflict between the military and AKP government stoked their interest.

Secondly the failure of the media in the countries of settlement, especially in Germany to transmit positive images of so-called foreigners. Migrants are portrayed as stereotyped characters, liable to criminality (Ruhrmann et al. 2006, Camauër 2003) and mostly a problem or cause of problems.

Linguistic dominance is the principal reason for the prevalence of Turkish media consumption (Hafez 2000, Hafez 2002). As well as lack of competence in the language of the host country, other factors affecting their consumption patterns include: the length of immigration, age, gender, the content of programmes which relate to their memories and interests, the degree they had maintained cultural and political contact with the homeland, and their cultural and linguistic capital, keeping “in touch with their roots by satellite” (Brochure of the Turkish EuroD channel quoted in Aksoy 2000).

Different research in Germany has found out that migrants from Turkey find the German programmes cold and emotionally reserved (Trebbe and Weiß 2007). Therefore they watch either Turkish or Kurdish programmes where they feel more at home.

Age is an important factor in Turkish and Kurdish media consumption. The first generation independent of age is more interested in the homeland owing to their lack of knowledge of the host language (Simon 2007), their interest in Turkish and Kurdish politics and in the ongoing ethno-national conflict.
Gender plays an important role in Turkish media consumption, especially of homemakers. Many homemakers watch Turkish soap opera. Individuals who seek to escape from everyday life concerns, worries and problems, routine, possible alienation, discrimination and isolation in everyday life find refuge in media consumption. Hafez states that Turkish and Kurdish media from a distant world act as a deliberate, almost therapeutic escape from the burdens of modern society such as traffic, work stress and time pressures (Hafez 2002).

Homesickness was attributed as another reason. Many migrants, in particular young people, believe that they have better job opportunities in Turkey. For example, 3 of the Kurds interviewed in London are working in Turkey and in the Kurdistan region of Iraq. So they have an incentive for keeping in touch with the news in Turkey.

3. The Conflict in Media Culture over Contesting Terminologies

This body of research and my own show that both migrant groups in Europe have fallen back on “their” transnationalized and mediated ethnic resources to re-construct coherent identities in the different countries of settlement. Thus they have created a new transnational conversation with their fellow migrants in different countries of settlement and their homelands, which has contributed to the formation of a new media culture.

In general, media culture contributes to the ways we “produce the fabric of everyday life . . . shaping political views and social behaviour, and providing the materials out of which people forge their very identities” (Kellner 1995:1). Media culture provides models of how to live one’s life and how to evaluate it.

“Media culture also provides the materials out of which many people construct their sense of class, of ethnicity and race, of nationality, of sexuality, of “us” and “them”. Media culture helps shape the prevalent view of the world and deepest values: it defines what
is considered good or bad, positive or negative, moral or evil. Media stories and images provide the symbols, myths, and resources which help constitute a common culture for the majority of individuals in many parts of the world today. Media culture provides the materials to create identities…” (Kellner 1995:1).

In the case of both migrant groups, this is complemented by the involvement of different actors and agencies (the Turkish state, the Kurdish national movement, different religious groups) in categorizing and shaping individual and group identities, trying to forge attachments and loyalties to the nation through transnational networks of organisations and media. The Turkish and Kurdish migrants have undergone a social, cultural and political transformation from “guest workers” to ethnicized citizens of the countries of settlement. This has entailed changes to migrants’ identities. They have become part of transnational communities that relate to both the settlement countries and the homeland.

In the process of becoming ethnic minorities in the European countries they live in, Kurdish and Turkish migrants have not only created new complex identities. They have also strengthened their increasingly divergent and conflicting identities as Turkish and Kurdish migrants which they perform in certain socio-political spaces. This performance of Turkishness or Kurdishness has over time heightened the visibility of differences in ethnic identity between Kurds and Turks. This is a case in point of how media and political mobilization can enhance ethnic identification in the diaspora. This political mobilization of an ethnic identity of being Turkish or Kurdish can lead to belonging and “practical identification in collective agencies” (Anderson 1991:254). But “the commonalities of groups” (Sen 1998:20) do not cause a singularity of a group's multiple identities. Instead, as I have argued so far, complex and multiple identities that go beyond ethnic and national labels do exist.
Indeed, ethnic identities are articulated in relation to other political and social identities, such as “being a democrat” (Swedish Kurds and Turks) or showing solidarity with oppressed people. Despite these complexities of identification, the mention of the Kurdish-Turkish conflict in the interview situation often elicited an emphatic reiteration of irreconcilable, antagonistic identities as either Kurdish or Turkish. In these situations many interviewees did not express their identities in a nuanced and complex way.

In Berlin, Halil who regularly visits a local Turkish community centre that supports the Turkish national movement makes this clear:

“H: Who dares to destroy Turkishness? Of course we will make ourselves and our identity visible. We have not abandoned Turkishness …..
Y: Do you have any contact with Kurds?
H: No, I do not want to have any contact with separatist terrorists. What could I possibly talk to them about? About dividing Turkey and accepting that the so-called Kurdish language should be taught in the school? Or accepting that the almighty Turkishness should be a subordinated identity in Turkey just like the recently discovered Kurtculuk?”23
(Interview with Halil, Berlin, 21st August 2007).

Halil’s statement shows us that he follows the debate in Turkey closely in the media. Kurdish politicians and some Turkish journalists have argued that the constitution should be changed so that all references to ethnic Turks are removed from the constitution and it is made to include all the ethnic and religious identities of people who live in Anatolia. Kurds have demanded that the Kurdish language should be taught in school. Halil uses the term Kurtcu which in Turkey is usually used pejoratively by state officials and the media for Kurdishness. Halil takes for granted the dominance of the Turkish ethnic group and is against the teaching of the Kurdish language in school.
On the other hand, Dilsad from Berlin admits that he does not have contact with Turks in general, “only [with] democratic Turks who are not pro-Turkey”. He argues:

“There has been a politicization and polarization of Kurds and Turks since the 1990s in Berlin. All the relations between the two groups have been politicized through the media, the Turkish embassy and the Turkish and Kurdish community centres because of the war in Kurdistan. If they [Turks] ask me which city I am from, I reply that I am from Dersim (Kurdish) or Tunceli (Turkish) [the name of the city, Dersim, was changed to Tunceli after the genocidal massacre by Turkish forces in 1938]. Their face and friendly manner changes and they feel that they should position themselves against me. I think this situation is not nice, either for me, or for them. Therefore I avoid contact with them. The Turkish media has caused hostility with its anti-Kurdish news in Berlin. They cause an atmosphere of fear and hate here. This news has influenced even Turkish exiles from the Communist Party. I have a friend from the Turkish Communist Party. When we talk about the Kurdish question, he states that Kurds are henchman of the USA. But he cannot see that Turkey has been a henchman of the USA since the 1940s. Turkey is a gendarme of the USA in the Middle East and a member of NATO and there are US military bases in Turkey. Turkish politics, economy and media are ideologically and politically dependant on the USA. In the past few years I have witnessed such an ideological blindness among Turks that I lost my interest in talking to such people” (Interview with Dilsad, Berlin, 18.07.2007).

Dilsad uses the name of Dersim to define his identity when he meets up with Turkish people in Berlin. Both Dara and the Turkish people know the name of the city Dersim and its symbolic meaning for the Kurds through the narratives of the people who lost their relatives during the massacre and deportation of the civilian population from Dersim to Turkish populated cities. There are several articles every year commemorating the Dersim revolt and massacre in the Kurdish media. Obviously this symbolic
meaning causes problems for the Turkish people who feel that they are talking to a person who has some affiliation to Kurdishness. Dara talks also about two different nations who have a relation with the USA: the Turks and the Kurds. Although Dara was born in Turkey, he identifies himself with Kurds, including with Kurds in Iraq who have a strong relation with the USA but he does not have any affiliation to the Turkish state.

These testimonies show that both ethnic groups have developed a media culture within the framework of attachment and loyalty to their own nation and nationhood. The process of identity formation entails constant differentiation of identity amongst Kurdish and Turkish migrants according to their particularist attachment in the diaspora.

Moreover, while many Turkish migrants see the conflict as a problem of terror in the “East and South East of Turkey”, the Kurds see it as “legitimate resistance to Turkish state oppression, occupation and violations against Kurdish people” (Interview with Rojhan, London, 5 April 2008). Even Kurds who do not support the PKK take this view, as Hawar in Berlin points out:

“I am not a sympathizer of the PKK but in my view, the real terrorist is Turkey not the PKK. Even the Turkish media report that 17,000 people have been killed in Kurdistan, they do not say Kurdistan, they say East and South East Anatolia and they do not say who has killed these people. They were arrested by JITEM [Special Gendarmerie Intelligence Unit] and disappeared and yesterday Roj TV reported that a mass grave has been discovered” (Interview with Hawar, Berlin, 25 August 2007).

Rojhan sees the PKK as “Kurdish armed opposition” (Interview with Rojhan, London, 5 April 2008). This term has been used by the Mayor of Diyarbakir (in Kurdish, Amed) three years ago. Moreover Rojhan sees the PKK guerrillas as “freedom fighters” and criticises the German media for calling the PKK “Kurdish separatists”. According to Rojhan “[t]his is the
language of the Turkish media, the German media has translated it from Turkish media into German and use it” (Rojhan, ibid). However many Turkish migrants criticised the British and Swedish media for defaming “Kurdish fighters as separatist terrorists” (Interview with Fatih, London, 02. April 2008).

Examples abound of the contestation of terms explicitly referring to Kurds and Kurdistan in the Turkish media. Leyla Zana called “East and South East Anatolia” “Kurdistan” during the local elections in March 2009. The Turkish media became guardians of the nation and attacked her for using the name Kurdistan. The Turkish media avoid using the term “Kurdistan regional government in Iraq” and instead use the one coined by the Turkish military “entity in Northern Iraq” or “so-called ‘Kurdish Federal Region’” (in inverted commas).25 Hürriyet and Vakit newspapers have published several articles about the “Kurdistan Polemic” where they explain that the idea of Kurdistan is only a polemical term. In contrast to this, the Kurdish diaspora has created a country in the mind through everyday conversations and discussions.

During this information war, the habits and thoughts of people have been formed through repeated news, deploying terms like “terrorists”, “separatists”, “so-called Kurds”, “East and South East Anatolia” “so-called Kurdistan Map” in the pro-Turkish media. These terms are used by Turkish migrants in their everyday conversation with each other.

On the other hand, the Kurdish media uses terms such as “colonised Kurdistan”, “Kurdish armed opposition”, “guerrilla”, and “the leader of the Kurdish people” (referring to Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK leader). The repeated use of these terms in the media normalizes them and makes them taken for granted in everyday life in the separate communities. Billig
would define such normalisation of nationalistic terms as banal nationalism.

Halil and Dilsad in their views stated above, provide us with completely different interpretations of the ongoing events in the homeland which they follow through the media. While the Turkish media and Turkish migrants see the east and south eastern part of Turkey, this is defined by Dilsad and politicised Kurds as the “colonized” or “occupied Kurdistan” (Interview with Alan, Berlin, 28 August 2007).

This constitutes a huge challenge for many Turkish migrants who have seen the Kurds for decades as Turks. In their eyes, these people have only “become Kurds” in the diaspora (Leggewie 1996:76). A Turkish teacher, Birsen, in Stockholm states:

“B: When I was in Turkey, we did not know the Kurds. We were all Turks. I still see them as Turks. They are Turks. But when I came here I noticed that they called themselves Kurds. Indeed they are kurdicised here [in Sweden]. The Swedish say “you are Kurdish”. They [the Swedes] woke them up. I mean before coming here I knew us all as Turkish. There was no distinction. I have been witnessing here that they are Kurdish because they [the Kurds] are encouraged here. For example, they [the Swedes] ask the students or pupils from East and South East Anatolia whether they come from Kurdistan. They [the Swedes] encourage them [the Kurds]” (Interview with Birsen, Stockholm, 14 June 2007).

“Y: So in your view the Swedish people or institutions are kurdicising the Kurds or the Kurds are describing themselves as Kurds?
B: To be honest I don’t have much idea but it is my impression that Swedish people are kurdicising them. Frankly speaking, they [the Kurds] define themselves as Kurds.
Y: Yeah do you think there is a Kurdish question or a terror problem in Turkey?
B: Definitely a terror problem
Y: There is no Kurdish question?
B: No. What can I say? I don’t have much knowledge about this issue. I have only very superficial knowledge.
Y: Where do you get information from about this issue?
B: From the newspapers or TV channels.
Y: Which media Turkish or Swedish?
B: Turkish I read Yeni Cag
Y: Do you think that the Kurds are Turks?
B: I see them as Turks.
Y: But do the Kurds see themselves as Turks?
B: No they see themselves not as Turks but they must accept that they are Turkish. They are Turkish too. If they live in Turkey they must accept that they are Turkish and must learn Turkish. They are Turkish.
Y: Yeah, you are a Turkish language teacher. What do you think of prohibition of Kurdish language in schools?
B: It is a difficult question. From my point of view it should be banned because this will cause linguistic and territorial separation of Turkey” (Interview with Birsen, Stockholm, 14 June 2007).

Birsen’s views are shared by many Turkish migrants in Germany, the UK and Sweden. They think that the European countries of settlement encourage Kurds and allow them to reconceptualise their identity. They share the Turkish state ideology in terms of denying Kurdish identity, seeing the conflict as a problem of terror. The Turkish migrants are confronted with different terms like “Kurdistan” that are taboo in the Turkish media. This re-conceptualized Kurdish identity in the diaspora poses a huge challenge to Turkish migrants who see Kurds as Turks.

As Hatice, who has lived in Sweden since 1975 states

“Of course this Kurdish issue has an effect on our wellbeing in Sweden. Wherever you go as a Turk you are confronted with this problem of terror. In this country, the media and Swedish people talk about
Kurds and Kurdistan. Where is Kurdistan? There is no such country called Kurdistan. I am Swedish but if the unity of Turkey is in question, yes I am Turkish. There was an unpleasant discussion between me and my Swedish work colleague about this issue two years ago. They do not believe that we have a problem of terror. That frustrates me. I am Swedish but if I talk about these issues with Swedish people, I become Turkish. I am forced not to be Swedish” (Interview with Hatice, Stockholm, 15 June 2007).

As this statement shows, many Turkish migrants feel that the settlement countries media and institution promote Kurds to create their own distinct identity. The Turkish migrants feel that this is a political game of imperialists towards Turkey and Turks.

However the Kurds see the conflict in a different light. They blame the Western countries for supporting Turkey with economic aid and political support: “Turkey is economically and politically supported by Germany and USA. The Kurdish towns and villages have been bombed and destroyed by German Leopard II tanks” (Interview with Dilsad, Berlin, 18 July 2007).

4. The Construction of a Narrative of “Kurdistani” identity
I asked research participants “where are you from”? This is a question that is a regular part of conversations between Kurds. It is asked to find out which city or region a person comes from in order to make a prejudgment about their ethnicity (Turkish, Kurdish, Laz and Syranic etc) and religious affiliation (Muslim, Eîwî, Christian).

Mirza, a Kurdish participant, who works for a Swedish media company in Stockholm, answers in the following way:

“ M: I am from Kurdistan
Y: OK but from which part of Kurdistan, Turkish Kurdistan...?
M: I do not like this term “Turkish Kurdistan”. Kurdistan does not belong to Turkey. It is occupied by Turkey. You are using this term to legitimize the
The term “Northern Kurdistan” is used in the Kurdish media and also in Kurdish community centres which operate as virtual embassies of the stateless Kurds because they play an important role in reconstructing Kurdish identity in the diaspora, creating solidarity and providing practical assistance. However the term “Northern Kurdistan” has also different meanings for Kurdish individuals depending on whether they engage in Kurdish political movements in the diaspora. For example Mehtav, a PhD student, told me that there is even a debate amongst Swedish Kurds about this term. According to these Kurdish audiences in Sweden, the Kurdish media uses the term “Northern Kurdistan” or “North Kurdistan” wrongly—

“as if all the parts of Kurdistan have nothing to do with each other. As if they are geographically, politically, culturally and economically separate and far from each other’. They blame the Kurdish parties which think ‘only on their interests but not in interest of Kurdish people” (Interview with PhD student, Mektav, Stockholm, 06 June 2007).

The “right term” is not Kurdista Bakur - North Kurdistan - but Bakura Kurdistan- North of Kurdistan - which indicates “the unity of Kurdistan as one country”. The Swedish Kurds who developed the Kurdish language in the diaspora, speaking Kurdish or Swedish in their households but refusing to speak Turkish, display a high level of national consciousness (Anderson 1995) created in diaspora. They have conceptualised a sense of belonging to Kurdishness. During my fieldwork I saw that Kurds from different countries in Sweden had merged Kurdish dialects into one language which the Swedish Kurds use in everyday life. However, such specific and politicised terms used in Sweden did not mean much to other Kurds in Europe, especially if they were not very politicised.
Firat in London exemplifies the difference. After being taught a lesson from Kurdish research participants in Sweden, I asked carefully about “Northern”, “North Kurdistan” and “North of Kurdistan to test whether other Kurds have a similar understanding of these terms. Firat, who came to London recently under family re-union and has “nothing to do with politics”, responds thus:

“Y: Are you from the North of Kurdistan?
F: No I am not from North Iraq. I am Kurdish from Turkey. I was born on the border but later on my family immigrated to Istanbul.
Y: What do you mean by ‘born on the border’?
F: My family comes from Sivas. There was a conflict between our village and the Turkish villagers before 12 September [the military coup in Turkey in 1981]. Our village is exactly on the border between the Turkish and Kurdish villages” (Interview with Firat, London, 7 April 2008).

This statement shows us firstly that he understands the term North of Kurdistan as North of Iraq. The Turkish media use the term “North of Iraq” to avoid naming the Kurdish existence in Iraq, so Firat confused the “North of Iraq” with “North of Kurdistan”. This different understanding can be interpreted “...a split between the people and the intellectuals” (Gramsci 1985: 168) who conceptualize their own understanding of Kurdishness. This clearly show that the language used in the Kurdish media and by intellectuals is not always understood “as an element of culture, and thus of general history, a key manifestation of the ‘nationality’” (Gramsci 1985:170).

Gramsci (1985:325) states that “If it is true that every language contains elements of a conception of the world and of a culture, it could also be true that from anyone’s language one can assess the greater or lesser complexity of his conception of the world”. Firat understands the “conception of the world" through Turkish media because he is not within
the politized Kurdish community and its “unified fields of exchange and communication” of Kurdishness.

Also Firat’s understanding of the term shows how he is influenced by the Turkish media’s terminology. Yet, in the same statement, he refers to being “born on the border” which refers to a socio-political boundary between Turkish and Kurdish settlers. This coincides with the geographically defined distinction between Kurdish and Turkish areas of settlement. In this sense, although he does not use the term “North of Kurdistan”, Firat, too imagines the existence of a distinction between Turkish and Kurdish areas.

Some interviewees confirm the important role of media in forming and entrenching migrants’ views. Dara, an advisor at a community centre in Berlin said:

“D: People are zapping from Kurdish TV channels to German or Turkish channels. Interestingly enough all these channels tell the same things since I have become curious and watch this news.
Y: What do they tell?
D: The Turkish channels report on separatist terrorists and separatist terrorists and again separatist terrorists every hour. They have been saying this for 30 years. On the other hand, the Kurdish channels report on fighting for the Kurds and fighting for the Kurds and again fighting for the Kurds. It is a pity that the Kurdish issue is still the only political topic. An end should be found so people can find peace here and there. German channels show a banal picture of migrants in headscarves and talk of integration and the “foreigner’ problem” (Interview with Dara, Berlin 14 August 2007).

Likewise, in London, Nurhayat, a Turkish community worker observed:

“This place [Hackney] is like a smaller version of Turkey. How can Turkey not have problems, in all aspects, for example economic difficulties, ethnic
problems, for example those which concern the south eastern part of Turkey, and all these similar problems are found here too. People read newspapers; people watch 24 hours television from their satellitized TV system” (Interview with Nurhayat, London, 16 April 2008).

5. Conclusion

My own research on media consumption shows that the Turkish and Kurdish migrants have developed their own media culture which shapes their identities and relations with each other over belonging to the Turkish or Kurdish nation, and taking a position in the ongoing ethno-national conflict in the homeland. In this sense, the Turkish and Kurdish media exert a huge influence on formation of migrants’ ethnic identity, also differentiate them into “us” and “them”. This has contributed to the hegemonic struggle between both migrant groups around certain banal nationalist terminologies in the countries of settlement. In this process the Turkish media has opened up a “front” amongst Turkish and Kurdish migrants who follow the Turkish media. It has unintentionally contributed to creating opposition among Kurds who feel that the Turkish media mainly portrays them in a negative light. This alienation from the Turkish media has led many Kurds to embrace Kurdish media and the values of the Kurdish national movement. The Kurdish media has politically and culturally empowered Kurdish migrants to create a sense of belonging to their homeland, Kurdistan. Yet it has also alienated some Kurds with its highly politicised programmes.
Turkish and Kurdish migrants position themselves through different terms of identification with their homeland which they receive from media and existing Turkish and Kurdish communities in the countries of settlement. This reconceptualisation of ethnic identity is taking place when Kurdish migrants claim their identity as Kurdish rather than conforming to the Turkish state’s demands they identify as Turkish. When Turkish migrants realise that some Kurdish migrants in diaspora are reconceptualising their identity in this way, they often react with shock. This leads to conflicts between Turkish and Kurdish migrants. Indeed, many Turkish migrants feel that it is the European countries which encourage Kurds to express their identity as Kurdish. This discourse has been used by the Turkish media and state. Kurds on the other hand, enjoy the freedom to define their ethnic identity as Kurdish in the diaspora.

While using the term “Kurdistan” can cause prosecution in Turkey, in the diaspora, Kurds can imagine and construct Kurdistan as a country, albeit without legal status in international relations. However, this imagined Kurdistan becomes meaningful for Kurdish and Turkish migrants as well as citizens of the countries of settlement. Kurds and Kurdish issues become visible amongst migrants and these issues are huge challenges to some Turkish migrants. The political and geographical terms and representations of Kurdishness become a part of Kurdish migrants’ publicly expressed identity in multicultural societies. We are currently witnessing a period of transition among Turkish and Kurdish migrants, an adaptation to the values of a multi cultural society. Moreover my research focus has been on examining immigration experiences and the process of division, differentiation and deterritorialization of different political, ethnic and social identities from being seen and accepted as “Turkish migrants” to becoming “Kurdish and Turkish migrants”. These identities have contributed to differentiating the homogenous concept of “Turkish migrants” in Europe as
many Turkish journalists interviewed considered Kurds as subsumed within this designation (see chapter VII). However for many Kurdish migrants, the imposed identity as Turks remains only on paper, once they have migrated. I call this the dissolution of the project of a homogenous Turkish nation in the minds of migrants. This dissolution is also a source of conflict between both migrant groups in some countries of settlement.

The process of differentiation between Turks and Kurds has reached its peak in Sweden where Kurdish and Turkish communities have broken off relations with each other or the Turkish migrants have accepted the Kurdish affiliation to Kurdishness. The Swedish state and society treats Kurds and Turks as distinct and does not encompass Kurds unofficially within the term “Turkish migrants”. The Swedish state even provides some resources for the development of Kurdish culture and language. This has had a huge impact on ethnic self-identification amongst Kurds. Even though the Turkish migrants complain about Swedish support for Kurdish language and culture, Kurdishness has become normal for Turkish migrants in Sweden. This is in marked contrast to the UK and Germany where the period of transition is still in progress and Kurds have not been recognized by the authorities. This creates more conflict and hostility amongst Kurdish and Turkish migrants, a stronger trend in Berlin than in London because Turkish migrants have a strong sense that Kurdish identity is outlawed in Germany owing to the banning of the PKK. Germany refuses to recognize the Kurds publicly as Kurdish migrants but conflate them with Turkish migrants.
Chapter VI: Struggle for “our” Nation in Transnational Spaces: Öcalan’s capture.

1. Introduction
Transnational activities are social, cultural, economic and political movements “across national borders of members of an expatriate community. In political transnationalism "the sending states, the political parties of the sending country, and the immigrant organizations in the receiving countries interact to expand the spaces of political action and citizenship across national borders" (Itzigsohn 2000:1148). In these “transnational settings and dynamics” (Vertovec 2001:573), migrants reconfigure, negotiate and reproduce their individual and group identities (Basch et al. 1994). For people involved in political transnationalism, these identities become visible through lobbying for the homeland, organising rallies, raising funds for political parties and networks in the homeland. It enables migrants to develop different strategies to deal with everyday life and discrimination in the settlement country, opening an alternative way of constructing their presence which is not always accepted by the settlement country’s institutions. Political transnationalism has been subject of numerous debates in settlement countries as well as in migrants’ country of origin.

Some of this political transnational activism developed as a reaction to government policies in migrants’ country of origin where the minority identities are denied. Other transnational political movements are “state-sponsored” (Portes et al. 1999:221) because “governments realized the importance of their expatriate communities and sought to circumvent or co-opt their initiatives,” (Portes et al. 1999:221) and attempt to reincorporate transnational migrants into state centered efforts to construct a ‘deterritorialized’ nationhood” (Smith 2003:469, also see Basch et al. 1994). The homeland political parties can also become active
transnationally, trying to gain influence and power in the receiving countries.

The rapid development of transport and communications technologies (Itzigsohn 2000) have contributed to the “exchange of resources and information along with participation in socio-cultural and political activities” (Vertovec 2001:574). In this sense media play a crucial role in connecting people across nation-state boundaries informing them of and framing the ongoing political issues in the homeland. This has also contributed to political transnationalism. For example

“The pro-Kurdish daily Özgür Politika publishes on its first page a huge picture of the manifestation led by ‘100,000’ sympathizers of the PKK in front of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, with the slogan ‘Free Öcalan and peace in Kurdistan….On the same day (November 22, 2000), the nationalist Turkish daily, Hürriyet publishes, also on its first page, a picture of the same size showing this time the Strasbourg march of the Turks ‘against terror’” (Rigoni 2002:7).

This shows how the transnational Turkish and Kurdish media reproduce their versions of common sense deterritorializing the hegemonic struggle among their readers abroad. The attempts of the Turkish and Kurdish press to carry on their ethno-national struggle, not only in “their” homeland but also cross-border, shows the internationalisation of the Turkish-Kurdish question and the ethno-national conflict to migrant communities via the media. The transnationalized media is attempting to create imagined communities in transnational spaces by invoking nation and homeland to remind the readers of belonging to a particular ethnic group (Aksoy and Robins 2000, Georgiou 2005, Kosnick 2007).

As we have seen, many migrant communities, including the Turkish and Kurdish, build their sense of imagined community in different spaces
primarily through the media. However there are some criticisms of Anderson's and Billig's concepts for ignoring the diversity of identities of citizens and audiences (Balnaves et al. 2009). Hall criticises the idea of unified identities: “The old identities which stabilized the social world for so long are in decline, giving rise to new identities and fragmenting the modern individuals as a unified subject” (Hall 1992:274). Some scholars have highlighted that the political community, as well as the individual subject, is in transformation due to globalisation, communications and information technologies, significant movement of people for various reasons (Castles and Davidson 2000; Holston and Appadurai 1999; Itzigsohn et al. 1999; Sassen 1999). These developments have created huge differences between individual, group identities and sense of belonging and loyalty to a constructed national identity (Glazer 1997).

Moreover, Anderson's and Billig's theories do not address the contemporary diversity of media. This diversity of media means that the media are not any longer able to unify audiences into one imagined community (Allan 2005; Dhoest 2009; Dhoest and Simons 2009; Hassan 2004). In particular the internet has contributed to membership of different political, cultural and social spaces. The intense use of the internet for transnational political projects has created a sense of deteriorized citizeenships (Laguerre 1998, Eriksen 2007). New media contribute to creating an alternative sense of belonging for people who have been forced into dominant ethno-national communities. The excluded people are able to develop “subaltern counter publics” (Fraser 1990:61). In addition to this some media have lost of audiences, in particular print media experience a decline of circulation (McNair 2003). This means that newspapers and TV have lost some of their strength in disseminating nationalist ideology and creating a national consensus. Furthermore national, and even local, media have become part of globalisation (Franklin 2005). Even nation states are affected, which may have weakened the
national loyalty and citizenship (Itzigsohn et al. 1999, Castles and Davidson 2000). Thus a multiplicity of contested belongings have arisen in the media which need to be taken into account. Yet, Anderson’s and Billig’s frameworks remain relevant, as the media continue to play a key role in constructing identity and belonging. They contribute to the creation of contested national identities of Kurds, on one hand, and Turks, on the other, not only at the national level, but also in the European diaspora.

Media discourse, in particular that of the tabloid press, plays an important role in creating the ideological cohesion of the nation. Through sensationalism and emotive language the media produce a sense of national belonging: “from which we increasingly make sense of our world, whether it be in a banal or a profound way” (Conboy 2006:185). Therefore the media continues to play an important role in reproducing national subjects through everyday discourse. Moreover the media contributes to setting the agenda for politicians and institutions, which forms the basis of many everyday discussions among the audiences (Marr 2004). One key element of this is the creation of media events (Conboy 2006). This chapter focuses on an important media event that evokes an identity of belonging to an imagined Turkish or Kurdish political community: representations of the capture of the Kurdish PKK leader, Öcalan, in the Kurdish and Turkish media. The impact of these representations in polarising Turkish and Kurdish migrants in their views on the Turkish-Kurdish relationship will be explored.

The capture of Öcalan by the CIA (McDowall 2004:443) and Turkish forces in Kenya in 1999 and its representation in the Turkish and Kurdish media marked a significant moment in the war of position because thousands of Turkish and Kurdish people from different geopolitical spaces, went on the streets for or against Öcalan (Vertovec 2005). The state killed two Kurdish demonstrators and arrested about 8,000 people in Turkey and violent
confrontations took place between Turkish and Kurdish migrants in Europe.

Öcalan is a symbolic figure, associated by many Turkish migrants with someone who wants to divide the Turkish nation territorially, undermning its unity in order to establish an independent Kurdistan. Since he attacks the unity of the Turkish nation militarily and politically, he is portrayed as a “separatist terrorist”. In the Turkish media coverage and in the daily conversation of Turkish migrants, the topic of Öcalan and his threat to “the unity of Turkey’ and the 6,000 deaths of Turkish soldiers are discursively linked. When talking about one of these issues, the other issue almost certainly came up in conversation in my fieldwork.

The threat to the territorial unity of Turkey and death of solders are repeated in Turkish politicians’ speeches and in Turkish media coverage. In an interview with the Milliyet newspaper, the Turkish academic Prof. Volkan of Virginia University argued that “Öcalan personally started a deadly terrorist period. Even though he did not do this alone, he is the symbol of terrorism” (Sevimay 2009). While Volkan repeats the official Turkish nationalist discourse, the Kurdish media and Kurdish migrants interviewed for this research blame the Turkish state for killing 35,000 Kurds during the conflict and for the disappearances, torture of thousands of Kurdish dissidents, the burning of 3,000 Kurdish villages and towns, lingocide (Hassanpour 1992), displacements and occupation of their country by the Turkish military. The majority of Kurds, even Kurdish dissidents who criticize Öcalan and the PKK tactics, see him and his political movement as the ones who brought voiceless Kurds onto the international political scene, forcing Turkey to change its discriminatory and assimilationist policies and recognize Kurdish existence in Turkey (Barkey 14.08.2009). Öcalan’s followers call him “the leader of the Kurdish people”. Hundreds of thousands of Kurdish people went onto the streets, in all three
cities, firstly to protest against his capture by the Turkish security forces in 1999 and again when he was sentenced to death for “treason to his country’ and recently over his deteriorating health in prison on İmralı Island.

There are a number of reasons why Öcalan’s capture and imprisonment has acted as a touchpaper for Turkish and Kurdish nationalist sentiments. Firstly the conflict spread from Turkey/Kurdistan to Europe through the media and migrant transnational practices across borders, especially demonstrations, lobbying and street battles for or against Öcalan. Secondly European nation-states in the countries of settlement became involved in decisions about Öcalan in 1999. For example, those European governments opposed to the death penalty argued he should not be extradited to Turkey, once captured. Thirdly, Kurdish and Turkish migrants became active in lobbying and protesting against the political involvement of the USA and the European countries who were either pro or contra the Kurdish political movement and Turkish government policies. Finally, European countries blamed the Turkish and Kurdish media (Heitmeyer 1996) and “foreigners” for becoming political actors in homeland politics on their national territories. Making the Turkish-Kurdish conflict an issue was seen as importing into Europe a divisive external issue.

However as van Bruinessen argues

“the politicization of the Kurdish diaspora, as well as increasing efforts by the Turkish authorities to maintain or regain their control of their Turkish and Kurdish subjects abroad, have gradually made clear that the Kurdish question in not just an Iraqi, an Iranian, a Syrian or a Turkish problem, but that it has also become a problem of European politics” (van Bruinessen 2000a:17).

This became evident, during Öcalan’s short stay in Italy, his abduction by the Turkish state and Kurdish and Turkish migrants’ demonstrations. From
the standpoint of finding a political solution to the ethno-national conflict, it is a political problem for the many international powers involved, including the European Union, not least because of Turkey’s wish to become a member (McDowall 2004). The parties in conflict have also established transnational networks with organisations, parties, embassies and media. In particular, the development of transnational media has created an ethnic, religious-based media culture amongst people in different transnational spaces who share a common experience of language, “kinship, ethnicity, nationality and religion (Karim 1998, Aksoy and Robins 2000, Georgiou 2005). In this media culture, nationalistic symbols, images of political belonging and affiliations to “our” homeland and “our nation” are disseminated to this transnational audience (see TRT 2006 programm). Although some academics overlook the impact of this new media culture as Rigoni (2002) has shown, the Turkish and Kurdish media have a huge impact in mobilising people for homeland politics when they at home in transnational spaces.

Moreover, the tragic, historical events in Kurds’ lives never before received such huge attention among the Kurds themselves before the development of the Kurdish print and audiovisual media (Keles 2008), when Saddam used chemical weapons against the Kurds in Halabja killing 5,000 people, (Hardi 2011) the reaction of the Kurds was not as big as it was to the abduction of Öcalan. Although the genocide was photographed and published in some Turkish and Iranian newspapers, the communications technology was less developed and the Kurds did not own any television stations or even a daily newspaper at that time. The sense of the imagined Kurdish nation had not taken hold compared to today. There were some demonstrations condemning the use of chemical weapon against the Kurds in Europe but not on the scale of the demonstrations against the abduction of Öcalan in 1998 (Gunter 2000; Ozcan 2005; van Bruinessen 2000b).
Kurds have different dialects, alphabets and also communicate in languages of the countries occupying Kurdistan, as well as in those of settlement countries. But the national consciousness, emotional attachment and solidarity shown in the mass movements against Öcalan’s abduction that the imagined community does not need a common language and can be based on multiple dialects and languages. The crucial issue is the media connecting people from different geographical spaces and making them feel part of a nation through shared experiences. These shared experiences do not need to be expressed in one national language. Experiences can be expressed in different dialects or languages but it is important they are shared and interpreted as common experiences.

The Kurdish media has created through its images and text, a strong, popular sense of belonging to the Kurdish nation and having a country called Kurdistan, which is occupied by Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. They used the figure and symbolic power of Öcalan to create a strong historical identification with Kurdishness. This is the way that a historical myth is created around a personality (Castells 1997) stimulating political engagement (Billig 1995) to create a collective “we”. As a consequence, Turkey has lost its “consensual control” over Kurdish migrants in Europe as well as in Kurdistan. According to Gramsci, consensual control “arises when individuals ‘voluntarily’ assimilate the worldview of the dominant group (Ransome 1992:150). This has been done through educating Kurdish children in Turkish and teaching them the history of Turkish ethnic group, their values and norms and education and through religion which is mixed with Turkish nationalism and Islamic values.

On the other hand, Turkey used its media to denigrate the Kurdish presence in the European public’s mind by mobilizing Turkish migrants for the homeland (Rigoni 2002). Hürriyet newspaper and the state TRT INT
played an especially important role in highlighting the state’s voice in Turkish migrant households during the pro- and counter-demonstrations around Öcalan. Therefore, it is important to look at the way in which the Turkish media sought to represent Öcalan and his movement and what meaning it held for the two communities.

In my interviews with migrants from the three settlement countries, it became clear that the capture of Öcalan was seen as an important event in the media culture of migrants and their relation to each other. Therefore, concentrating primarily on the imagined community produced by the media culture during the long lasting ethno-national conflict, I will examine how in the case of the capture of Öcalan, it manifested itself in the Turkish and Kurdish communities.

Different approaches can be used to analyse media texts including the written and audio-visual contents: discourse analysis, semiotic approaches and content analysis. Content analysis, in other words textual analysis, is a research method which entails “collecting, collating and analyzing large amounts of information about the content of media products” (Rayner et al. 2004:70). It is a systematic technique to count the frequency of words in a clearly defined sample of texts and then analysing those frequencies (Rose 2001 :16) This word-frequency count in a text is usually used for quantitative analysis of messages (Neuendorf 2002:10) but also for qualitative analysis. As my central concern is how migrants make meaning out of the transnational media and how these media impact on migrants’ ethnic identities in the context of ethno-national conflict, I do not examine the frequency of use of contested terms but focus on the discourse and language, as well as images, deployed by the media event of Öcalan’s capture.
Discourse is a combination of text, artefact and social practices and discourse analysis looks at how these elements combine to reinforce or challenge dominant relations and power structures (Fairclough 1995; Fairclough and Wodak 1997; Fiske 1982; Foucault 1980; Parker 1992; van Dijk 1993). According to Foucault, who sought to explain the regulation of the individual through the state, institutions, discourses and practices, the construction of knowledge and discourse is articulated with social practice (Foucault 1980). Discourse analysis could be defined as a “set of methods and theories for investigating language in use and language in social contexts” showing how linguistic practices construct the world view of social groups endowed with unequal power (Wetherell et al. 2001). Discourse analysis focuses on the “categorizing, performative, and rhetorical features of texts and talk” (Antaki et al. 2003:1) as well as visual images in order to understand “the nature of power and dominance” (van Dijk 2001:301-302).

The discursive analysis can help us to understand the relations between text and context. Moreover observing and analyzing the discourse of the media can help conceptualize how social realities are constructed through certain power relations and ideologies. As dominant groups disseminate their narratives, subordinated groups are pushed to silence (Parker 1992), so it is also important to examine who speaks for the nation and on behalf of the people, what their positions are and what they say.

Critical discourse analysis aims to understand the role of ideologies in shaping society through specific linguistic features (Fairclough 1989). Scholars in the field of Critical Discourse Analysis are influenced amongst others by Foucault’s notion of power and Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, and apply these to understand how the dominant discourse legitimizes its existence and excludes others (Fairclough 1995, Van Dijk 1991). One of the main scholars in the field, Fairclough describes it as:
“systematically exploring often opaque relationships of causality and determination between (a) discursive practices, events and texts, and (b) wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes; to investigate how .... [they] arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles over power; and to explore how the opacity of these relationships between discourse and society is itself a factor securing power and hegemony” (Fairclough 1995:132).

It has been widely used to analyse the power of language and media in constructing national values, ideologies and identities (Billig 1991).

Fairclough’s (2005) approach to critical discourse analysis is characterised by a realist social ontology that sees social structures and social events as part of social reality and a dialectical view of structure and agency. Therefore social practices are not treated in isolation from discursive practices and discursive practices are seen as part of social and power relations. This approach looks at how language influences people’s identities, knowledge and values, treating language as a tool of political and ideological construction in the process of dominating people (Fairclough 1995; Hall 1982; Parker 1992; Van Dijk 1991).

A similar approach has been developed by scholars analysing the meaning of signs. The study of signs was developed by Saussure and post-Saussurean linguistics to understand how signs are constructed to create meaning. Meaning is socially constructed, therefore it is crucial to analyse the sign and ideology in the representation of different political positions produced through images. The structuralists Saussure (1983) and Barthes (1987) have conceptualized semiotics as “consisting of a material signifier and an immaterial signified. This signifier can thus be dots, lines, shapes, sound waves or whatever physical, concrete entity that we link to, or associate with, some idea or notion” (Gripsrud 2002:101). The signified is the concept invoked by the signifier. Once combined, the signifier and
the signified make a sign. This “associative connection” creates conventions of rules and codes which we unconsciously take for granted seeing them as “normal”, “natural” and “neutral”. “They are conventions, that is to say “agreements” established by way of habit in a community of users of the same language, the same sort of pictures, music and so on. A code is a rule or convention that associates a signifier with a certain signified or meaning” (Gripsrud 2002:101). Saussure, Barthes considered the sign as language through which meaning is created. Language is a constructed system which represents a world view and shapes the understanding of people. The method of critical discourse analysis has been criticized for not being objective and ignoring the active aspects of audiences’ interpretation. Indeed, audiences can actively interpret the context in a critical light (Blommaert and Bulcaen 2000).

The materials used in this chapter were collected by examining the Turkish and Kurdish media’s representation of Öcalan’s capture, scanning the internet for representations of Öcalan from his departure from Syria to go to prison in Turkey in October 1998 until my fieldwork began in 2008. The abduction of Öcalan marked one of the important milestones for the Kurdish and Turkish people within Turkey but also Kurdish and Turkish migrants in Europe. Following Fairclough’s (1995) division of discourse into text, discursive practice and social practice, I will focus on these texts and their interpretation by audiences exposed to the conflict through the transnational media.

2. The Flight and Capture of Öcalan - Live on TV
Abdullah Öcalan (known as Apo, “uncle” in Kurdish) established a left-wing political organisation in 1978, with the aim of establishing an independent Kurdistan in “East and South East Anatolia”, predominantly populated by Kurds. He established the Headquarters of the PKK in Syria and Syrian-occupied Lebanon, where the PKK trained Kurdish guerrilla groups since 1980s coup (McDowall 2004:442). However in 1998, the USA and Turkey
threatened military action against Syria for harbouring Öcalan and the PKK and demanded Syria “expel the PKK and hand over Abdullah Öcalan forthwith” (Mcdowall 2004:442). The Syrian President, Hafez al-Assad, asked Öcalan to leave Syria and find another base for the PKK.

When Öcalan first left Syria, he went to Moscow. But when he received an invitation from 109 Greek Members of Parliament as “leader of the world’s most oppressed people”, he then travelled to Greece. However, as a consequence of US pressure, the Greek government forced Öcalan to leave the country again for Moscow (Weiner 1999). When Moscow refused to grant him refugee status, he flew to Italy where Öcalan hoped the centre-left Prime Minister, Massimo D’Alema, would grant him political asylum. In reaction to Turkish protests and pressure from the US, the Italian government sent him back to Moscow. Then Öcalan flew again to Greece where the Greek Foreign Minister, Pangalos highlighted the need for “humanitarian assistance” to Öcalan and sent him to the Greek embassy in Kenya in February 1999 as a temporary solution for just three days (Testimony of Öcalan’s Greek lawyer Failos Kranidiotis (Özkan 2000). There, however, he was handed over to the CIA (Weiner 1999, Yetkin 2004) and Mossad (see Öcalan statement on ANF News Agency 03.09.2008) who finally handed him over to the Turkish authorities on February 15, 1999. All these travels of Öcalan were published and broadcast in the Kurdish and Turkish media to the migrants who mobilized for or against him in Europe.

In November 1998, Öcalan had come to Europe to tell the European public “what the cruelty and inhuman 75 years of terror [75 years system related to Turkey] has done to the peoples of Mesopotamia and Anatolia and their cultural values and also to highlight the European role and responsibility for this terror” (MED TV, 15 Nov 1998). He called on the Kurds “not to forget the cultural richness of Armenians, Assyrians and Greeks, the oldest
peoples in history who have been wiped off the map by Turkish barbarism. If the Kurds cannot succeed, they will face the same fate and will vanish from history”. The move constituted an important new stage in the Kurdish national struggle: “by leaving Ankara, we became a party, by entering the Middle East we established an army, by entering the world [Europe] we will establish a state” (MED TV, 15 Nov 1998).

For the stateless Kurds, this feeling of hope turned into huge disappointment in the Kurdish diaspora when Öcalan was handed over to Turkey and he gave up the aim of establishing an independent Kurdish state. The first images of Öcalan, captured on a Turkish intelligence-service video of the abduction, showed him blindfolded, handcuffed and drugged in a jet on its way to Turkey (van Bruinessen, 2000). The abduction led to huge protests by Kurds in Europe, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Armenia. The Kurdish media called on Kurds to protest against the Turkish, US, Greek and Israeli governments over their involvement in the illegal act. The Turkish media deliberately reported the role of the Greek and Israeli governments in the abduction in order to divert Kurds’ anger towards these two states. In the protests, Kurdish demonstrators occupied Greek embassies in several European countries. During an attempt to occupy the Israeli embassy in Berlin, the Israeli security forces killed 4 Kurds.

During and after his trial, Öcalan made positive statements about Kemalism (the official ideology of the state) and affirmed the unity of Turkey. Many Kurds criticized Öcalan for his willingness to co-operate with the state during the trial. This caused great disillusion among Kurds in the homeland and the diaspora and polarised his party, leading many members to leave. Some established a new party, the PPDK, while other dissidents, such as Nizamettin Tas, the ex-PKK commander, accused Öcalan of giving up the ideal of an independent Kurdistan, becoming,
instead, a pawn of the Turkish state. Nevertheless, Öcalan was re-elected as PKK president and the party threatened the Turkish state with retaliation if he were executed. In the event, he was sentenced to death, but owing to international pressure and the possible destabilisation of the country, the Turkish government abolished the death penalty in 2002 and commuted his sentence to life imprisonment. Since his capture in 1999, he has been the sole prisoner on the island of İmralı, off the coast of Istanbul. Just recently, the government has brought three other prisoners to the island.

In 1999 Öcalan issued a call from İmralı to his armed organisation to lay down their arms and leave Turkey for Kurdistan in Iraq. Meanwhile, the PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire in order to facilitate a political solution to the Kurdish question. Yet when, in 2004, the Turkish army attacked the PKK, they resumed the armed struggle. In 2009, the PKK again announced a unilateral ceasefire. In 2005, Öcalan had issued a “Declaration of Democratic Confederalism in Kurdistan”, which while accepting the existing state borders of Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Syria, allowed for the Kurds to rule themselves. Yet, the level of support for Öcalan and his control of the party were evident when, in 2007 thousands of Kurds in Turkey and Europe protested against an alleged attempt by the Turkish state to poison him in İmralı prison. The Kurdish diaspora witnessed new pictures of Öcalan (images 6.5 and 6.6) which were taken by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) during their visit in May 2007.

Commentators hold contradictory views about Öcalan’s arrest and his future role in Turkish and Kurdish politics. Ergil echoes the view of many Kurdish dissidents that

“Öcalan is not fit for the leadership role of a peaceful political organization that extends from the Middle East to the Caucasus, all the way to Europe and the U.S. His extreme authoritarian and cruel character
leaves no place for conciliation. His leadership style, forged as a guerrilla commander, has served its purpose. Now he is history” (Ergil 2001:175)

Yet, the Turkish scholar, Ozcan, presents a different view arguing that “Öcalan has a high symbolic value for some Kurds,” (Seibert 2009). Tocci et al (2008:7) found that “through the control of political and associational life in the southeast, the PKK retained influence in the region despite its leader’s imprisonment and the flight of its militants to Northern Iraq”. Öcalan remains the PKK’s symbolic leader and has a strong influence on Kurds. In 2009 he was even portrayed in some Turkish media as a person who could end the conflict through the road map to peace he was drawing up. The negative representations were now complemented by views of him as the Phoenix rising from its own ashes to bring peace to Turkey.

3. Öcalan in the Turkish media
Critical discourse analysis dissects texts, language and communication in their social context and considers them as aspects which shape the society. Text is not just an isolated, passive report but a part of ongoing events which creates meaning and shape people’s world-view. Fairclough (1995) states that the linguistic representations of certain identities aims to categorize them through certain pronouns, names, attributions and adjectives, terms to include and exclude certain individuals and groups to create a certain discourse.

Öcalan and his movement have been represented in the Turkish media in various ways since the 1980s. It is not an overstatement to say this war was also a war between Öcalan and the Turkish journalists who used various negative epithets to describe him. As the Hürriyet’s editor explains “our official discourse was to name him “chief of a bandit gang”, “ringleader” and “baby killer” for decades” (Özkok, Hurriyet Newspaper 18.07.2009). The journalist uses “our” pronouns to describe the Turkish
imagined community and exclude the “other”. Billig would describe this as “distance rhetoric” which describe “we” and excludes “they” (Billig 1995:49).

This outline of “our official discourse” shows that the mainstream media are influenced by the official ideology of Turkish state (cf Masterman 1985:187). The Glasgow University Media Group (1980) which focused on analysing news in the miners’ strike in Britain in the 1980s and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, states that journalists in the mainstream media cannot change the dominant discourse, but they help to reproduce it as “neutral” and objective, (Philo and Berry 2004, Philo 1995) maintaining the “dominant political system” (Hall 1982:87).

The mainstream Turkish media representation of Öcalan have produced a particular “social construction of a reality, a form of knowledge” (Fairclough 1995:18) through nationalistic language and negative representations of Kurds in personifying them, their identity in one describing him as a “separatist” and “terrorist”. This knowledge became institutionalized by the state and media, shaping the social practices of Turkish people in Turkey and in Europe. The Turkish media have used specific narrative codes, photographic and linguistic signs which are not neutral. They are ideological positions in the context of the ethno-national conflict and the imagined political community of the dominant, ethno-centric Turkish state. The connotations of these signs and codes are nationalistic. These images create a continuity, familiarity, and meaningfulness about the dominant group (Gripsrud 2002). All the images refer to Turkishness and its symbols, while anything in juxtaposition to the Turkish imagined community is connotated negatively.

The journalists committed to Turkish nationalism create a common sense of the emerging Kurdish nationalism and its symbols and personalities as the “enemy”, “terrorists”, and a danger to “our” Turkish nationalism, which
is presented as positive and taken-for-granted. These terms have been used by most of the Turkish media (see image 6.1) and also by a large proposition of Turkish audiences I interviewed. Drawing on Gramsci’s concept of hegemony and also semiotic concepts, Hall (1982) considers the “representation” of the other in a negative way as not something directly constructed by the media, which is rather influenced by existing political and cultural norms. However, in Turkey, the majority elite journalists have their own agenda which reproduces the dominant nationalism daily. They filter news which should be published and their main sources are usually military (though in recent years, this has declined), other institutions or extremist politicians. Therefore, the political and cultural norms for the representation of the “other” in Turkey are not neutral or at a distance, because the news bias and ideological character of these newspapers are based on close links with the Turkish state sources and its common sense. Only references related to “we” and the world-view of Turkishness decorate the layout of newspaper. The others are only represented to reinforce the dominant nationalist ideology.


The above headline categorises and identifies other as “terrorists” and differentiates them from “we”. This has been done since 80s for example
when Öcalan was the “chief of a bandit gang”, or “Armenian - Artin Agopyan”\(^{28}\). Later he was routinely called a “baby killer”, “head of the terrorist organisation” and since the ‘90s “head of the bloody separatist terrorist organisation” in news coverage of him in Turkish media. Since the 1980s, the generals of the military junta, three state presidents, and seven governments have come and gone from the public life, but Öcalan and the columnists of Hürriyet, Milliyet, and Zaman are still playing an important role in establishing and reshaping the agenda for the Turks and Kurds as well as speaking for the nation.

Öcalan’s abduction was perhaps the most provocative media event. After the humiliation of being a pawn between Russia, Greece and Italy, he appeared in the Turkish media handcuffed, blindfolded and confused, “waking up from what looked like a drug-induced sleep” (van Bruinessen 2000b:15). The most dramatic moment was when, in his confused and demoralized condition, he told the masked Turkish security men “that he really loved the Turkish people, that he was willing to co-operate and that he could be very useful to them”. Van Bruinessen explains the significance of the capture of Öcalan as follows

“The video images of this humiliating scene, hurriedly and very visibly edited so that doubts remained about the context of Öcalan’s words, were shown again and again in news programs of the major television stations all over the world. The images created an upsurge of nationalistic fervour in Turkey and caused outrage among Kurds of all political affiliations, including Öcalan’s fiercest opponents. These images — of which more were to follow — had the obvious intention of destroying Öcalan’s charisma by showing him as a broken and weak man, ready to betray his cause. In an obvious effort to counteract any pity or sympathy that Öcalan’s plight might provoke, the Turkish media invariably referred to him as ‘babykiller’ and ‘terrorist chief’ in each news item that mentioned him” (van Bruinessen 1999a:1).
Though hot nationalism is typical “in times of social [ethno-national] disruption,” (Billig 1995:44) in the Turkish media, it is an everyday occurrence (Yumul and Özkirimli 2000). The Hürriyet headline read: “The head of terror has been cut off”, and superimposed on the Turkish flag it said: “This is the great Turkey” and in red capital letters: “VICTORY’ (see image 6. 2). This was meant to summarize the atmosphere in the whole country. The producer of this text used symbols which are constantly used in Turkish media. This makes it easy to interpret the image without reading the content. The image is itself a coded text with different information including historical background of the conflict, the celebration of nationhood and the defeated “enemy”. And the headline reproduces the power relationship through the “victory” of “This is the great Turkey”. “Turkey” as the name of country is used to include all the citizens of the country. This shows on one hand, an inclusiveness while also referring to the hegemonic ideology with its motto “Turkey belongs to Turks”.

*Image 6.2 from Hürriyet newspaper (17.02.1999)*

*Hürriyet* published the dialogue between Öcalan and the security forces in the jumbo jet (See image 6.3) which brought an end of the myth of his invincibility to the Kurds.
Language can be used to empower the dominant ideology (Ives 2004), construct alliances and silence the subordinated discourse to “win consent” in conflicted societies (Fairclough 1992:93). The media influences the audience’s “knowledge, beliefs, values, social relations, social identities” (Fairclough 1995:2). The media published photos of Öcalan in the airplane on his way to Turkey under the heading of “DEFEAT”, gloating that “there are moments when one photo can be more powerful than pages of writing. Here it is! …This photo is the state’s answer to those who want to divide the Turkish republic” (Hürriyet Newspaper 1999c 18.02.1999). At that time the Turkish media applied methods of psychological warfare against Kurds in Turkey and the diaspora. The media representations of Öcalan’s capture were aimed at humiliating Kurds and dashing any hopes of realising their demands as the responses of the Kurds whom I interviewed reveal (See below).

The television channels broadcast reports on the capture with a Turkish flag in the top left corner of the screen, repeating the images of an exhausted and defeated Öcalan over and over again. The print media concluded that “the separatist terrorists” lost the battle and speculated that Öcalan would call on the PKK to surrender. Indeed, Hürriyet reported: “Öcalan claims to serve Turkey”. The Turkish media reported that “After
the capture, Öcalan has seen the power of Turkey and now he is worried for his life. Apo said “I repent, do not execute me. I will confess everything” (Hürriyet Newspaper 23.02.1999). He was depicted as a coward only out to save his own skin and escape from Turkish justice. All the Turkish media talked about the “seizure of baby killer terrorist Apo” (See Milliyet, Hürriyet and Zaman Newspapers between February 15, 1999 and April 1999). As much as humiliating the Kurds, this was also directed at boosting Turkish nationalism and celebrating Turks as victors. For example, the Milliyet headlined with:

“‘Congratulations, my Turkey’ …‘the seizure of baby killer terrorist Apo has been celebrated as a festival in all of Turkey…. After watching Prime Minister Ecevit’s statement on television, the citizens flooded into the streets in a happy mood. Hundreds of thousands of people rushed out with Turkish flags in their hands … They shouted slogans in support of the Prime Minister, condemning the PKK. Many citizens sat on the roofs of their cars and even lorries made a triumphal tour waving the Turkish flag. In the meantime many have hung the Turkish flag from their houses. Amongst the citizens flowing out into the street, the martyrs’ mothers’ and war veterans’ tears of happiness have drawn attention. While some groups have demonstrated in the front of HADEP [pro-Kurdish People's Democracy Party], the police have taken strict security measures” (Milliyet Newspaper 17.02.1999)

Here the newspaper positioned itself as owner of the country and attempted to create shared experiences amongst its readers through its discursive practices. The report emphasises that the abduction of Öcalan was celebrated “as a festival in all of Turkey”. Yet Milliyet and other Turkish newspapers avoided reporting how Kurdish people reacted. Kurds in Istanbul and the Kurdish regions demonstrated against the abduction, but this contested the dominant ideology. Newspapers attempted to show that there was a consensus amongst Turkish citizens against “separatists”. Indeed, the Turkish newspapers only represented the version of the
imagined community which was accepted as “natural” (Fairclough and Wodak 1997:258)

However, the newspapers’ European editions did report on Kurdish demonstrations in Europe, using the same familiar rhetoric to delegitimize the demonstrators. In the European editions, Kurdish demonstrators were depicted as “terror sympathizers” and critical voices from Western countries were targeted. At that time, the Turkish media in Germany attacked every critical voice and called on the Turkish migrants to act by attending demonstrations or writing protest letters. The media and its columnists targeted particular German media and journalists. The example below from Kozmopolit is only one of many:

“Now it is enough. The European media shelter the PKK, the Turks will be furious. In particular Öcalan is sheltered by one-sided German media coverage. The Turks who feel unprotected are close to revolt… We are publishing a sample letter of protest in German and Turkish. If you agree with it, you can send it to ARD [the German state television channel]. The address and fax number are in the European pages”

The enclosed sample letter of protest is:

“Your publications with regards to the PKK and Abdullah Öcalan are one-sided. Your view of the Turks is not unprejudiced. I condemn you for your publications which did not include the view of Turkish society. Therefore you have propagated for somebody who has attacked the Turks. In this way, you encourage the terrorists. You call the PKK the representative of all Kurds and deceive the German public. You hurt the Turks who have contributed with their effort and tax to the prosperity of this country” (Sabah 1999 in Kozmopolit 1999, online article).

This style of “campaign journalism” (Hafez 2002:43) addresses the readers as a national “us” (Billig 1995:115) and calls on Turks to stand up for and speak for “our” nation, giving instructions on how to act as “Turks” against the imagined enemy of the nation. The media deliberately use the
term “Turks” in order to “evoke an identity” (Billig 1995:106) of a people whose nation has been attacked.

Hürriyet and Sabah targeted Le Figaro Magazine’s columnist Franz-Olivier Giesbert (Özkok 1999) and Dr Udo Steinbach who were both critical of European countries’ complicity in the unlawful abduction of Öcalan. Sabah published Steinbach’s photo with the headline: “This is Apo’s friend” (Sabah 1999 in Kozmopolit 1999). In doing so, the newspaper and Turkish TV channels created a sense amongst the Turkish migrants that there were people attacking “our” nation alongside the terrorists against whom they were called to defend “our” country. As Billig demonstrates, this “rhetoric distances ‘us’ from ‘them’, ‘our’ world from ‘theirs’, (1995:49) which has “its roots in fear and hatred of the Other, and its affinities with racism” (Anderson 1991:141).

3.1. From “chief of separatist terrorist organisation’ to peace maker
During a talk show on CNN-Turk (the corporation of media tycoon, Dogan, and CNN) the question of whether “Öcalan could be compared to South Africa’s Nelson Mandela” was raised. Subsequently, the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTUK) banned CNN Turk from broadcasting. (The Committee to Protect Journalists 2000) Öcalan’s status as the most hated person in the Turkish media started to change during the local elections in March 2007. Avni Ozgil, a Turkish journalist started a debate on Öcalan, arguing that he could play an important role in disarming the PKK and solving the Kurdish issue in Turkey. Although the media still used all the old epithets such as “chief of the separatist terrorist organisation” in the mean time some journalists believed that he was the person who could bring peace to Turkey because of enduring influence on the PKK and public opinion in Kurdistan, as well as on the pro-Kurdish BDP.

Some journalists advised the government to take Öcalan seriously in order to keep Turkey’s unity. Ertuğrul Özkök, the editor-in-chief of Hürriyet at
that time, one of the hardliners who used to refer to Öcalan as “terror chief”, “ringleader”, “baby killer” (Özkok 2009a) announced that he had applied to the General Staff office to interview Öcalan and hoped that, if he got permission, he would “bring a message back from Imralı. So maybe I can serve to bring peace back to our country which all of us deserve. I am ready to play a postman for this aim” (Özkok 2009a). Here the discourse changed from “us” to “all of us” which included all the people living in Turkey. This signalled what Fairclough has termed was the power relationship in transformation, constantly being renegotiated as the language and discursive practices in the media shift and thereby constitute social and cultural change (1995:29).

In a similar vein, the prominent, progressive commentator, Oral Çalışlar believes that “We are at the end of the road of solving this problem….The address for this solution is Imralı” (Çalışlar 2009). Likewise this was the view of the former pro-Kurdish DTP and new BDP M.P, Tuncel (Çinar 2009). This narrow-minded reaction from the legal Kurdish party assumed that Öcalan and the PKK could speak for the Kurdish nation as a whole, but many of the Kurdish migrants interviewed questioned the meaning and existence of the DTP and newly formed BDP. As a Kurdish participant in London stated that:

“If they push the solution of the problem [the Turkey-Kurdish problem] on a man who is perceived himself by the Turkish public as a key problem for the peaceful solution [of Turkey’s Kurdish question], then I am asking what they are seeking in the Turkish parliament? Are they only in the Turkish Parliament as cosmetic figures for the Kurds?” (Interview with Peri, London, 2nd April 2008).

What is clear is that the representation of Öcalan in written and visual text has changed over time. Structuralists argue that the “Meanings or signifieds of signs tended to change with time and place (...) they are not absolutely and finally determined once and for all. ... Signs that once had
positive connotations can, for example, later come to have negative connotations” (Gripsrud 2002:103). In Ocalan’s case, if he accepts the “red lines” of Turkey’s politics, he may be seen more positively, but if he demands Kurdish self-representation and equal rights in language and education for Turks and Kurds, he is called “head of separatists”.

4. Öcalan in the Kurdish media
In the Kurdish media, views of Öcalan are contradictory. Part of the media represent him as “Serok” (leader) and invincible. During Öcalan’s period in Syria (1984-1998) he was represented very positively as a leader in various Kurdish newspapers and on the London-based satellite channel MED TV. During Öcalan’s short-lasting trip to Europe, the Kurdish media created the hope, through its discursive practice, that the Kurdish question would be turn from an internal issue into a European question, which would help to achieve the solution of a Kurdish state. Kurdish intellectual groups led a popular national mobilisation to establish a nation state. However this dream dissolved after the abduction of Öcalan. During his trip to Europe, his abduction and finally his trial, a war broke out between the Turkish and Kurdish media: the Turkish media propagated the defeat of the separatists and humiliated Kurdish demonstrators with such provocative titles as “They went berserk” (Hürriyet Newspaper 1999b). “They” was used to belittle the Kurds. On the other hand, the Kurdish media tried to raise the spirits of the Kurds who felt deeply disillusioned with the end of the myth of an independent Kurdistan, while the Turkish state used all its powers to stop MED TV from broadcasting (see chapter III). MED TV argued that “The name of Apo has been identified with the Kurdish people who have risen up and are fighting for independence” (Witschi 1999). Therefore it came as shocking news when Öcalan offered the Turkish security forces on the plane from Kenya to Turkey to serve the Turkish republic. The Kurdish media responded that Öcalan was under the influence of drugs and that his statements under conditions of capture
should be disregarded by Kurds. Roseberry provides an analysis of the concrete practice of hegemony that aptly describes the discursive practices of Kurdish media at that time:

“I propose that we use the concept [of hegemony] not to understand consent but to understand struggle, the ways in which the words, images, symbols, forms, organizations, institutions, and movements used by subordinate populations to talk, understand, confront, accommodate themselves to, or resist their domination are shaped by the process of domination itself. What hegemony constructs, then, is not shared ideology but a common material and meaningful framework for living through, talking about, and acting upon social order characterized by domination” (Roseberry 1994:360–361).

Although Öcalan is imprisoned in İmralı in Turkey, some Kurdish media have reinforced his leadership role by repeatedly using the term “Serok” - leader, or “leader of the Kurdish people”. Pointing out the similarities of their struggles and imprisonment, the Kurdish media has created its Kurdish Nelson Mandela. Here the aim of some Kurdish media has been to naturalize the power of the PKK and its leader amongst the Kurdish population. Moreover, it attempts to assume power and depict him as the representative of all Kurds. Online Gündem published a long interview with Nelson Mandela’s lawyer, Essa Moosa, to underline this link. Essa Moosa compared the two thus: “Both Mandela and Öcalan have struggled for their people”(Genç 2009). With this metaphor, the Kurdish media has legitimated Öcalan’s leadership to Kurds at home, as well as internationally.
Öcalan in his small room reading the newspaper. This photo was taken by CPT during their visit to Öcalan in May 2007. These pictures are the most frequently used images of the Kurdish Mandela in Özgür Politika newspaper.

The Kurdish media choose such images to create a sense of Kurdishness to instil a social practice amongst Kurdish people of mutual identification, building solidarity against the “oppressors”. The notion of “the oppressed” (Fairclough 1995:113) is widely used in the Kurdish media. The linguistic and photographic representation of Öcalan by some Kurdish media aims to create an emotional bond between him and the Kurdish people. Moreover, some Kurdish media focused on the discourse of victimhood and vulnerability which had a huge impact on Kurds who had experienced Turkish state violence in their homeland (See image 6.6). Using such signs, it “bring[s] to mind” (Penn 2000:230) similar experiences of Kurds and creates a sense of emotional attachment to Öcalan.
Image 6.6: the picture was shot by CPT during their visit to Öcalan while they were investigating the alleged attempt to poison him. This is a zoomed-in fragment of a photograph of Öcalan in the prison yard under surveillance (Image 6.7). However Yeni Özgür Politika and Roj TV mainly use Image 6.6. This image emphasises Öcalan’s loneliness and miserable condition.

Image 6.7

Öcalan’s character is sometimes abstracted and idealized. This bears similarity to the Turkish state’s ideological portrayal of Ataturk as immortal. For example, the media talk about “loyalty to leadership” relating exclusively to Öcalan: Online Gündem waxes lyrically: “Öcalan is our will, Öcalan is our health, Öcalan is our sun” (Çaglayan 2008). Öcalan and his movement have been partly effective in organising the Kurds in their homeland and in the diaspora to continue the hegemonic struggle against
the dominant Turkish nationalist discourse. In this process both media present the news in the framework of the hegemonic struggle for nationhood which has set the tone of hagiography and whitewashing leadership.

4.1. The Kurdish opposition and Öcalan

As I have argued, Turkish and Kurdish migrants’ multiple identities disappear on the question of the ongoing ethno-national conflict (see chapter IV). In this instance, Turkish and Kurdish communities cohere around their ethno-national identities which determine their political views and social behaviour towards each other. But these identities vary within the groups according to their political and ideological affiliations. For example, while many Kurds state that they are against the Turkish state’s policy of humiliating Öcalan, some Kurdish intellectuals and Öcalan dissidents have criticized and opposed his political and cultural hegemony and that of the PKK and the personality cult around Öcalan. These views were also voiced in my focus group and face-to-face interviews in Stockholm, Berlin and London.

Many Kurds, particularly Swedish Kurds who have had or still have some affiliation to other Kurdish political parties and organizations which are competitors of the PKK, and were attacked by it during the 1970s and 1980s, are particularly critical of the ideas Öcalan developed in prison. They have been key in advancing the intellectual capacity of Kurdish society by establishing and institutionalising Kurdish language and culture. They view the PKK as “not social-democratic” (Interview with Medya, Stockholm, 05th June 2007). This emphasis on social democracy shows how much Kurds in Sweden are influenced by the normative ideal of social democracy prevalent there. One example of this critical view of Öcalan is presented by Aziz Alış, the current chairperson of the European Kurdish initiative, who argues: “Öcalan defends Kemalism in his articles. Therefore I do not see any differences between Öcalan, the Turkish general staff and
the Turkish state” (Vakit Newspaper 01.09.2009). The former editor of the Kurdish website Nasname, who is an ex-editor of Yeni Ulke and Özgür Politika, criticizes Yeni Özgür Politika for their lack of critical distance from Öcalan. He ironically called the paper “ÖP” - meaning kiss in Turkish, referring to its excessive loyalty and closeness to Öcalan. Recep Marasli, an influential leftwing Kurdish intellectual concludes that “the word “İmralı” enters Kurdish literature as a metaphor for harmony and collaboration with the Turkish military. All statements from İmralı show this harmony” (Maraşlı 2009).

Nasname, Gelawej, Kurdistan Post and other Kurdish internet-based newspapers, criticise Öcalan for capitulating since his capture and for having turned Kemalist. They are particularly opposed to Öcalan’s Democratic Confederalism (Öcalan 2005) which gives up on demands for independence or federalism. Some dissidents called him neo-Kemalist (Boti, Nasname.com 19.09.2009) and disparage the “İmralı mentality” as “capitulation” (Tevger 2009). Those who criticize Öcalan are excluded from sections of the influential Kurdish media such as Yeni Özgür Politika and Roj TV. The best example is the sociologist, Ismail Besikci who spent 25 years in prison for researching Kurds and Kurdistan. He criticized Öcalan’s policies for giving up the idea of an independent Kurdistan and so disappeared from the most influential Kurdish media with the largest audiences. Öcalan calls him as a “Kurdish nationalist”.

Even though Öcalan calls on Kurds to “discuss my thoughts”, these discussions are very circumscribed within the Kurdish media. Gunay Aslan, a prominent Kurdish journalist from Yeni Özgür Politika criticises his own paper for not publishing Besikci’s views after he was critical of Öcalan. Aslan argues that this is against journalists’ professional ethics (Çeko 2009). But all these criticisms are focused on defending “our” nation, “our” civic Kurdishness which shows the strong affiliation to the imagined
political Kurdish community. However again the Kurdish migrants interviewed, including some media producers had very different concepts, perceptions and understanding of the imagined Kurdish political community. Gavrilos would argue that “[a] nation as an imagined community is …. defined by a continuously negotiated struggle of competing ideologies and identity differences between groups” (2002:427). This negotiated struggle of Kurdish intellectuals and political groups is taking place to define what is Kurdish and what is not, as excluding and including form part of the process of constituting the imagined community. But the idea of the Kurdish imagined community is not fixed, singular and exclusive, just as Turkishness amongst the migrants, who have different understandings of being “Turks”, is not. However these different understandings of nationhood do not hinder migrants from standing up and speaking out for their nation in everyday life, in their transnational political practices. In this sense, despite their differences, their communality is a part of their particularity as an ethno-national group, primarily constructed around the mediated ethno-national conflict in their homeland.

5. The Öcalan Case and Kurdish-Turkish Relations in Europe
When Öcalan was under house arrest in Italy, it was the first time that Kurds from different diaspora countries and political orientations came together to support him and save his life. Thousands of Kurds from all over Europe came to Rome to demonstrate for Öcalan’s right to remain in Europe and against the threat of deportation to Turkey. This was a significant example of political transnationalism. Many Kurds hoped that if he was allowed to stay in Europe, then Turkey’s Kurdish question would not only be treated as a military issue for Turkey, but as a political problem for the European Union. Many Turkish migrants, in turn, demonstrated by lobbying the governments of their countries of residence to deliver Öcalan to the Turkish state. This led to a hegemonic struggle between Turkish and Kurdish migrants who stood and spoke out for their nation.
The Kurdish dream turned into a nightmare when they saw Öcalan blindfolded and handcuffed on the Turkish media, (See image 6.8) accompanied by triumphant celebrations of Turkish “victory”. On the other hand, many Turks in Europe celebrated his abduction. Many Kurdish and Turkish migrants, interviewed as part of this research, affirmed that the abduction of Öcalan and the Turkish court’s death sentence affected relations between Turkish and Kurdish migrants in their everyday life. In particular, the media images of Öcalan’s abduction exacerbated worsening tensions. This showed that the discursive practices of Turkish media operated differently and created oppositional readings amongst the ostensibly homogenous, imagined Turkish community. This means that the coded messages in written and spoken text addressed a particular group, and not all members of the nation: it could not create a common sense or shared experiences amongst all Turkish nationals.

The testimony of the migrants I interviewed provides us with an important account of the role of the media in fostering the national imagination and “emotions of national loyalty” (Billig 1995:19) in hot and banal forms of nationalism. The migrants are connected to their homeland through the media which is their primary source of information about concerns in the homeland which many migrant interviewees see as their country, even though they have been living in Europe for decades. This strong sense of belonging shows us that “The notions of nationhood are deeply embedded in contemporary ways of thinking” (Billig 1995:11).
Image 6.8. This photo was released to the national and international media by the Turkish state when Öcalan was captured and flown by the Turkish security forces from Kenya to Turkey on February 16th 1998. The image almost caused civil war to break out in Turkey between Turkish and Kurdish ethnic groups and also changed the Turkish and Kurdish migrants’ relationship in Europe. I used this picture in my fieldwork because its publication was a victory for the Turkish state and media, much celebrated by the Turkish ethnic group. However this image represented humiliation and deep disappointment for the Kurds. By showing this picture, I aimed to find out about the perceptions and influence of the Öcalan, i.e. as a cult figure and his symbolic influence over the Turkish -Kurdish relationship.

5.1. “They wanted to shoot even into our dreams”
One interviewee, Rosa, from London stated that she watched this picture on Turkish TV and was unable to express her feelings. She was living in Turkey at that time and points out that she felt that in Turkey, Turks and Kurds were in a state of ethnic war:
"First of all, let me give you my notions as a Kurd who has sympathy for Öcalan. This picture is taken consciously and deliberately in this way. It was taken in revenge for the years they fought but did not win the war against Kurds…. for the defeated military and its media. The Turkish military and media are aware of the influence of Öcalan on Kurds, they know that Öcalan is their representative; they aimed to humiliate the Kurds. They aimed to make him look ridiculous to Kurds. This picture gives out the message to the Kurds that ‘if you dare to fight against us, you will end up like Öcalan’. Öcalan, who was blindfolded, was presented as guilty with the flag behind him. This picture was part of the psychological war against Kurds.

Q: Do you think that Turks feel differently when they see this picture?
R: Turks were over the moon when this picture appeared in the media and the news. They were blind drunk with victory without thinking about the consequences. This picture gave them a psychological satisfaction. That moment was enough for them. They said to the Kurds ‘we’ve caught him, we have humiliated you.’

Q: What do you feel emotionally about the picture?
R: The picture was taken in February 1999. I saw it in the Turkish media. It was awful. I was not able to express my feelings. Not only me, it led to many protests in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Europe. It came to the point of ethnic civil war between Turks and Kurds. People who saw the picture threw their TV out of the window. The Kurds have revolted 28 times and they were defeated. And the 29th uprising, the largest Kurdish revolt has ended with such a humiliation, with such a picture! It has devastated the Kurds emotionally. Severe and heavy street fighting occurred between the Kurds and the police forces in Turkey and Europe. Many Kurds were arrested and Turkey was close to an ethnic war” (Interview with Roza, London, and 17th February 2007).

Roza’s comments were not exceptional during my fieldwork. The words “humiliation”, “psychological war”, “revenge”, “speechlessness” were uttered by almost all the Kurds interviewed in the three countries for this
research. For example, some second generation Kurds from Stockholm who were interviewed commented that they were no fans of Öcalan but

“because of this picture I went onto the street and protested against the Turkish government. This picture is not about Öcalan it is more about all Kurds. The Turkish state humiliated all Kurds. [By publishing this picture the government] said to us ‘you cannot win this war against us, you have to accept our occupation and our oppression in Kurdistan. If you don't accept it, we will capture you like Öcalan” (Interview with Afsan, Stockholm, 4th June 2007).

Despite these interviewees’ different views of Öcalan, they both argue in a similar way that the Turkish state sought to humiliate the Kurdish people and create hopelessness amongst them so they would give up their cause.

Jiyan, who works for the Kurdish media and lives in Sweden emphasised the role of the media in this “hot” form of Turkish nationalism reinforcing the military in its war against the Kurds:

“….publishing these pictures has caused hostility between the Turks and Kurds here and in Turkey, this is still in the minds of people. Because at least Kurds expected from their Turkish neighbours a bit of empathy but instead of empathy, their neighbours distributed sweets to celebrate this abduction. And I think the media has consciously created this atmosphere to get public support to continue the war” (Interview with Jiyan, Stockholm, 8th June 2007).

Maybe this issue was even more sensitive for first generation Kurdish migrants who are political refugees who had experienced state violence in Turkey. When I showed the picture to a Kurdish first generation political refugee in Germany, he looked at the image of the handcuffed Öcalan for a long time without saying anything.
It was a difficult moment for him and for me in the interview. A Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture report confirms this difficult moment. At the time of Öcalan’s arrest many refugees experienced “an acute deterioration of their state of health and re-traumatisation” (IPPNW 1999, online article). Many Kurdish refugees and migrants who had not had any psychological problems until then showed up in the neurologists’ surgeries. Neurologists reported:

“increased emergencies and mental breakdowns by a part of the Kurdish patients. It should be born in mind that a significant number of Kurds living in Germany are traumatized through torture and severe human rights abuses in their homeland. The pictures in the media about the arrest of Abdullah Öcalan cause the recall of memories of torture and maltreatment again, like a horror film that does not want to stop” (IPPNW 1999, online article)

Another medical foundation - XENION - in Berlin reported that “the pictures of excessive violence, threat to life, powerlessness and helplessness can easily be brought to life again if external occasions are suitable for it” (IPPNW 1999, online article). In this sense, the strong psychological reactions of my interviewees were not exceptional but demonstrate how
deeply the media images affected Kurdish refugees and migrants in Europe.

However there were Kurdish migrants who stated that the PKK had reduced the Kurdish cause to itself and Öcalan during the mass demonstrations in Europe. Zana, a Kurdish pensioner in Stockholm declared:

“I do not like Öcalan or the PKK. But at that time I was present at all demonstrations because that was not an attack on Öcalan. They [Turkish authorities] attacked all the Kurds through Öcalan. But again I did not like to see PKK flag at demonstration we should have had only Kurdish flags which is acceptable for all Kurds” (Interview with Zana, Stockholm, 5th June 2007).

The Kurds I interviewed concurred in seeing the Turkish media’s publication of these images as intended to humiliate the Kurdish people, and even viewed them as part of “Turkish psychological warfare” through the “Turkish fascist media”. But this does not mean that all of them support Öcalan and his political movement. What brought and still brings people onto the street is their experiences of similar maltreatment in Turkey or feelings that their Kurdish identity is being attacked and they, demeaned. This has led to a break-away from the Turkish media, also by Turkish people who did not empathise with the campaign of psychological warfare.

5.2. Images as an outlet for Turkish nationalism
While many Turkish migrants I interviewed reacted positively to the pictures of Öcalan’s capture, there was a range of opinions among them. One position among those interviewed was that they had attended demonstrations demanding the handover of Öcalan to the Turkish state but were unhappy with the depiction of Öcalan with “our flag”. Seher, a Turkish participant who was a teacher in Turkey and works on a voluntary basis for a Turkish women’s organisation in Berlin, testified:
S: “I went to demonstrations in Berlin when Öcalan was in Italy. There were over ten thousand of us. We demanded that the Europeans should hand him over to Turkey because he is responsible for the death of 36,000 people.

Q: Where did you learn that there would be a demonstration for the extradition of Öcalan?
S: From the media. I heard it from TRT INT and also from the newspapers.

Q: Which newspaper?
S: I can’t remember but I heard it from the media. The worst thing is that he is not even Kurdish. He is from the PKK. They are Armenian. I told my Kurdish neighbour that he is not Kurdish. We discussed him.

Q: What was the response of your Kurdish neighbour?
S: They see him as Kurdish and their leader.

Q: What do you feel when you see this picture?
S: I think that there should not be a Turkish flag on his left and right sides. There should be photos of the people he killed. It should be the photos of the uneducated young boys and girls who were recruited for his terrorist group. Why should my flag be there? I cannot understand why they blindfolded his eyes. Why did they [Turkish authorities] blindfold his eyes? What is it that he should not see? He should see the photos of the people killed because of his politics. Maybe his soul would shudder.

Q: Do you think the Kurds have a different opinion about him?
S: Yes they think differently from me which makes me unhappy. They see him as a father, as representative of the Kurds. They are influenced by the Kurdish media. But if they need a representative, it means they want a state or a state has been established. They can go to Iraq. Look I am here, in Germany. I am not happy here and I don’t buy a house here. I can go to my country and buy it there. If they are not happy in Turkey they should go. I do not mind. I have no objection” (Interview with Seher, Berlin, 10th August 2007).

Seher provides a rich account of the views of the first generation of Turkish migrants on Kurds and Öcalan and their sources of information on Kurdish issues. She mentions that Öcalan is an Armenian which was the state and
media discourse for a long period during the 1980s and 1990s when Kurds were not accepted as a different ethnic group. The Turkish nationalist slogan “either love or leave” clearly underpins her views. The state and media representation of people who join the PKK as “uneducated young boys and girls” is reflected in her speech. Despite uncritically reproducing these representations of Kurds, she disagrees with the use of the flag in the pictures as she has very positive associations with the flag but sees the moment of Öcalan’s capture as associated with negative issues, namely the deaths of many young people.

Serdar, a Turkish participant from Berlin, is very aware that a number of young people from his hometown in Turkey lost their lives fighting as soldiers against the Kurds. For him, seeing Öcalan captured represents the possibility of justice for the Turkish soldiers killed and the beginning of peace:

“When I saw this picture, we celebrated that he was captured and I slept in peace for the first time. They [two young people from his hometown] were martyred defending the country against these PKK terrorists. Of course these terrorists did not leave us in peace here, either. They still demonstrate for the chief terrorist. … When I see them I get very angry. They build castles in the air. … But I have to tell you. He [Öcalan] will come out one day from Imrali…. what’s done can’t be undone. The MHP [the nationalist MHP at the time was part of the coalition government] should have executed him. The poor families’ children are squandered” (Interview with Serdar, Berlin 17 July 2007).

Mehtap, another interviewee from Stockholm, thinks that the Turkish authorities “presented him as blindfolded and handcuffed to show the unity of Turks” Like many other Turkish interviewees she criticised the Kurds who demonstrated in favour of Öcalan. She emphasised the idea that: “They are Turkish citizens and should be happy about his delivery to Turkey” (Interview with Mehtap, Stockholm, 16th June 2007). She sees
the Kurds as part of the imagined Turkish community and is disappointed “they” did not join the celebrations of Öcalan’s arrest and thus refused to be part of the national imagined community.

This reflects the longstanding argument of the majority of the Turkish media that all citizens of Turkey should identify solely with the Turkish nation. A number of the Turkish migrants, whom I interviewed, while agreeing with the capture of Öcalan, disliked the humiliating nature of the pictures and media representations. One remarked:

“It is wrong to show him like this. OK you arrest him but you do not need to show him. It was a disgusting moment. I do not know whether I should say I felt ashamed of the Turkish media’s exaggerated, manipulative coverage” (Interview with Devrim, London, 3rd March 2008).

There were also left-wing or Elewî Turkish interviewees, often second generation migrants who expressed concern with the media representations and the triumphalist nature of the pictures. Gulben, a second generation, bank employee from Stockholm said

“I think showing this image on TV channels and in the newspaper is intended to cover up their crime in Kurdistan. They think that they can manipulate people. Yes maybe they can manipulate some Turks, but not all of them” (Interview with Gulben, Stockholm, 16th June 2007).

Saniye, a second generation Turkish migrant, who does not consume any Turkish and Kurdish media, was distinctive in having no political view of the image or the conflict.

“I have Kurdish friends. I know what a terrible day this was for them when Öcalan was abducted. And then we saw this picture on television. It was a horrible moment for me. I even wanted to go to demonstrate with my Kurdish friends against such a humiliation. I do not consume any Turkish or Kurdish
Thus, there is a wide range of different views on the capture of Öcalan among Turkish migrants. For all the interviewees, this constituted a key media event. They reacted strongly and emotionally to the pictures of Öcalan’s capture and related these pictures to different aspects of the conflict. While some agreed with his capture, some disliked the use of such pictures to gloat and humiliate (Focus group with Turkish participants in London, 13 March 2008).

For some, the Turkish flag, which they associated with positive feelings, should not have been used in this way. Others agreed with the use of the Turkish flag as it symbolised Turkish unity and the celebration of victory, the beginnings of finding inner peace and justice for the soldiers killed in the conflict (Focus group with Turkish participants in London, 13 March 2008 and 26 August 2007 in Berlin). On the other hand, some leftwing Turkish migrants felt strongly that the images of Öcalan’s capture were triumphalist and manipulative.

6. Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that the capture in 1999 of Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK leader, the subsequent court case and his imprisonment in İmralı became key media events. The Turkish and Kurdish media’s representations of Öcalan were highly emotive and polarised. I have examined media texts (visual imaginary and written language) to see how representations of Öcalan were used to signify “our” imagined community against the “other”.

The Turkish media for a long time vilified Öcalan which contributed to his conflation with the PKK, terrorism and the Kurdish question, all personified in the one enemy. The Kurdish media held contradictory views on Öcalan.
The media with the widest audience, Yeni Özgür Politika and Roj TV, hold positive views of Öcalan and reify him as the leader of Kurds, often reproducing a personality cult around him by emphasising his leadership of the Kurdish people and using his photographs ubiquitously. The respective media have played their part in the hegemonic struggle between the Turkish state and the Kurdish national movement. This has stirred up “hot” nationalist emotions between the Turks and Kurds which almost led to civil war between the ethnic groups in Turkey/Kurdistan and in Europe where the Turkish and Kurdish migrant battle for the “homeland” in their countries of settlement.

This chapter has highlighted the response of the Kurdish community to pictures of Öcalan which proves they have already constituted an imagined Kurdish community, and have no attachment to the Turkish state, but identify Kurdistan as “their” country. This is important as it indicates that the Kurds abroad are not part of the Turkish imagined community, giving clear evidence that Turkey has lost its control over the Kurdish population in Europe and how they think. They respond by acting as a nation. They share the same emotions in different countries of settlement. Why otherwise would they get upset when they see the negative and sometimes racist depiction of the Kurdish in the Turkish media, if not because they recognise themselves as an imagined community?

The contrast between the portrayal of Öcalan in the Turkish and Kurdish media crystallises this struggle for hegemony, with both sides contesting the images of Öcalan as “national hero” or “terrorist” villain of the piece. This is hegemonic struggle manifested through the media. The power and reality of this contest is palpable in the feelings of the people whom I interviewed. Hegemony and it counter-hegemony are not just abstract ideas, but ideas which can have practical effects empirically. The concepts
which Gramsci developed give real insight into the nature of social and ethnic conflict.

Both communities share particular spaces in Turkey and Europe but the conflict remains about the ability to construct an imagined community which manifests itself not only in the minds of members but also among Kurds who want their own territorial homeland. So the conflict operates at different levels. My focus has been how the conflict plays itself out psychologically and emotionally – aspects essential to building an imagined community. As Anderson rightly points out that nation is a community and imagined “because members...will never know most of their fellow members...yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (Anderson 1991:6). It comes out clearly in my interviews that the imagined Kurdish community is already there. The reason the Kurdish people whom I interviewed, reacted in that way was precisely because they feel members of an alternative imagined community which is not just about speaking the language, but also an emotional pull, fundamental to nationalism. Nationalism is about passion and “emotion” (Anderson 1991:51). Similar responses and experiences were registered in all three European countries.

In a similar vein, Turkish migrants tended to be united in their celebration of Öcalan’s capture. Even though there are a variety of views on the particular representation of Öcalan in the media, this media event confirmed Turkish migrants’ view of Öcalan as an enemy of the Turks which is the official Turkish nationalist view since he attacked the nation-state. The Turkish migrants reacted with shock when they realised that many Kurdish migrants felt quite differently to them, feeling deeply for Öcalan, rather than celebrating his capture and seeing this as an occasion of unity of Turkish citizens. Yet, for some Turkish migrants the emotive, humiliating representation of Öcalan was seen as manipulative. They felt
bad that such a humiliation was done in their name as Turks and felt sympathetic to the Kurdish migrants' upset.
Chapter VII: Three-way Mediated Banal Nationalism in Transnational Spaces

1. Introduction
This chapter examines the way in which the imagined community is constructed in Turkish and Kurdish transnational spaces and in the homeland. It will look at the impact of Turkish and Kurdish ‘banal nationalism’ in the media on the struggle for hegemony between the two sides seeking to build their own imagined community.

Many scholars have focused on the reproduction of the nation via the flag, maps, television, newspapers, the currency, the names of institutions like sports clubs and so on (Billig 1995:93). But little attention has been paid to the flagging of nationhood amongst migrants in the countries of settlement where the migrant ‘nation’ does not exist ‘out there’ and is not tangible or visible on every street corner. The notion of nation itself, as an imagined entity, is far from the everyday life of migrants. However they are connected to it by the Turkish and Kurdish media ‘flagging the homeland daily’ in their own vernacular.

These media take the “nation” and “ethnicity” as a given, and not as a constructed entity. They see the people who have been living for a long time in the countries of settlement as citizens of their former homeland and take as given the loyalties and attachments of all citizens, including “outside Turks” or “Kurdan li diaspora” - the Kurdish diaspora. These media address their readers as members of the “nation”. However these readers do not share the same psychic space as their counterparts in the homeland so psychologically they do not form part of the “nation”. However, the media “present news in ways that take for granted the existence of the world of nations” (Billig 1995:11) like “we, the Kurds”, “we, the Turks”, “they, the Swedes” or “they, the Brits”. Therefore this chapter will also assess the impact of “banal nationalism” on migrants in
transnational spaces, a topic which, to my knowledge, has not been researched.

Diasporic communities can themselves be highly proactive in reproducing “banal nationalism”. In the countries of residence, migrants’ ethnic identity becomes more salient. Migrants are ascribed ethnic identities in multicultural societies which highlight and commercialise diversity. The way migrants are categorised as “different” in these countries encourages them to identify with “banal nationalism”. In addition, recent developments in communications technologies offer migrants new forms of contact with the cultural and political environment of the homeland where “hot” and “banal” nationalism pervade the media. For example, the Kurdish and Turkish media reports on the war in the homeland counterposes “us” and “them”, as well as presenting “the national homeland as the home of the readers”, (Billig 1995:11) even though the readers of these media do not live there. But the newspapers constantly remind audiences where migrants belong, namely to Turkey or Kurdistan, even though the homeland is only mentioned as a holiday destination for migrants.

In the light of this, we should understand that the nation and its reproduction are no longer confined to the nation-state or to a specific geographical and political space (Appadurai 1996). Moreover, how does this juxtaposition by “banal nationalism” affect the relationship of the migrant groups in conflict in the countries of settlement? Billig’s concept has been used by many scholars to explain nationalism within established states but it has not been used for the televisual, stateless nation in the diaspora. “Banal nationalism” can also exist in stateless nations after a long struggle for the nation, which has made it familiar to the stateless group, as in the Kurdish case.
Billig argues that the state needs to reproduce the “nation” in order to create an “us”, and “them”. This juxtaposition heats up when the “nation” goes through difficult times for example, when Turkishness or Serbian national identity, are imposed by force. These are extreme, irrational cases of imagined identity where they are too complex and fluid to fit in with a certain political project. However it is possible to shake them up for a certain time with harsh and repressive measures, to impose a national identity on a daily basis, in unobtrusive ways which familiarise people with it.

2. Interlocked “Hot” and “Banal” Nationalism

Billig (1995) distinguishes between hot and banal nationalism, and the struggle for unity in Turkey and the Kurdish national movement for independence can be considered as a case of hot nationalism. However, Anderson challenges the notion that banal nationalism is confined to established nations:

“Many ‘old nations’ once thought fully consolidated, find themselves challenged by ‘sub’-nationalisms within their borders - nationalism which, naturally, dreams of shedding this sub-ness one happy day. The reality is quite plain: the ‘end of the era of nationalism,’ so long prophesied, is not remotely in sight. Indeed, nation-ness is the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time” (Anderson 1991: 6).

In the case of the established nations like the UK or France, the sub-nationalisms within their borders have increased and even created their own interlocked hot and banal nationalisms as is the case with Scottish and Corsican nationalism.

Yumul and Ozkirimli (2000) examined the role of the print media in nationalist cultural and political discourses. The study surveyed 38 Turkish daily newspapers on a randomly selected day and their role in the
reproduction of superficial and unnoticed nationalist ideology in a non-democratic, non-Western nation-state. Their findings show the constant reproduction of Turkish nationalism in Turkish newspapers through pointing out internal and external enemies and glorifying Turkishness. This indicates that banal nationalism can take place, not only in established, democratic nation-states but in the periphery too. While Yumul and Ozkirimli’s research made an important contribution to the study of banal nationalism, it did not look at the interlocking of hot and banal forms of nationalism, or of the reception of banal nationalism on audiences. Therefore, my study contributes to these debates, by examining the impact of banal nationalism on Kurdish and Turkish migrant audiences. In particular, my interviews with the Kurdish and Turkish migrants shed light on how they perceive nationhood through the lens of the Kurdish and Turkish media which create the deixis of “us” and “them”.

This study argues that hot and banal nationalism are interlocked in the periphery too, by flagging nationhood in both a soft and coarse manner. For example, the Turkish state sometimes flags nationhood in oppressive and discriminatory ways and sometimes in an imperceptible, fabricated way. This “endemic condition” (Billig 1991:6) of flagging the nation in the media has become an ideological habit used to prove that the nation is unified and inclusive. At other times, it is used to glorify Turkishness. Thus, it creates juxtaposition between these two conditions in which Turkish nationalism is reproduced as acceptable, normal and benign, as a nation that sacrifices itself for the sake of “others”.

How banal nationalism is constructed by highlighting the virtues of Turkish nationhood in the media can be illustrated by the case of one of my interviewees, Ronya, an English language and literature graduate from Turkey, who was appointed to teach in Mardin, her father’s Kurdish hometown:
“After completing my degree I wanted to work and gain some experience before leaving the country for the UK where I was going to do my PhD. I applied to the Ministry of Education to teach English in a school and they sent me involuntarily to teach in Mardin where my father is from. One day, a Turkish journalist called Sonat Bahar from Sabah newspaper (24.11.2005) came to the school to interview me because she had heard of my engagement with the pupils. ....I told her that my father had originated from this city and that I had grown up here until the age of 7. We then moved to Aydin because my father was a bank employee and he was sent to Aydin after serving the state bank for a long time. I said to her that it was very interesting that after completing my degree I came back to the place where I had spent my childhood and that I was enjoying being here and helping the children. I added that this was my second year here and that I could speak Kurdish which helps me to communicate with the pupils and their parents but I would leave here in 6 months time to go to the UK to do my PhD there. She called me one night before publishing the news and stated that she felt so sorry because the newspaper editors in Istanbul had changed the interview slightly in order to make it appropriate and that this was not her fault and that she was sorry for this change but she could not tell me what the newspaper editors had changed in the interview. The next day when I read the news, I was shocked because what I had told her, she or her editors in Istanbul did not publish, instead they published what I did not tell them. They made up a new story and portrayed me as the educated daughter of a wealthy Turkish banker from Aydin (a Turkish city in the Aegean Sea) teaching in the village of Kızıltepe, a district of Mardin having given up her comfortable life in Aydin and sacrificed her life to teach the children in Mardin. They changed my story completely and made up a totally new Turkish story and published with a beautiful portrait picture of me. They created a Turkish heroine teaching uneducated Kurdish children in Kurdistan, who had initially planned to go to the UK but changed her mind and stayed there. I called the newspaper to correct this great lie but they stated that it was too late and asked me why I had problems accepting my
Incidents such as these that emphasise Turkish nationalistic stories about doctors, nurses, soldiers are routine in the Turkish media. Their aim is to give the readers the impression that the nation is reproduced through heroic individuals who serve the nation by bringing Turkishness to Kurdish children in the backward “East and South East Anatolia”. They publicise Turkishness to Turks through a fabricated life-story of Kurdish person. In so doing, they also reinforce the dominant image that the Kurds are uneducated and incapable of helping themselves, and therefore, are in need of help from Turks. The Turks are constructed as their saviours. As the story of a Kurdish teacher did not fit this image, it had to be retold as a Turkish teacher sacrificing herself for her “uneducated” Kurdish pupils.

Hall argues that “‘racism and the media’ touches the problem of ideology, since the media’s main sphere of operation is the production and transformation of ideologies” The reporter “‘speaks through’ the ideologies which are active” in the society and in the country (Hall 1996:271-72). Ideology is generated, produced and reproduced in specific settings which produce meaning for the existing social order. This ideology is transmitted through the media which continually reassures that “the imagined world is visibly rooted in everyday life.” (Anderson 1983:39-40).

In this case, publicly positive norms, values, behaviour can only be imagined as associated to Turkishness. As Ronya stated that

“I was not a teacher anymore but I was a soldier in defence of my country against enemies and I received several letters from men who wanted to marry me. Several charities from Istanbul contacted me to send their cast-offs to school but the pupils were not interested in their clothes” (Interview with Ronya, London, 21st February 2009).

With this news they constructed an official Turkish “orientalism”: an ordinary Kurdish teacher is portrayed as a rich banker’s daughter who serves like a soldier for her country. The media turned her into “a
missionary for the Turkish nation in Kurdistan” who glorifies Turkishness and “decries the position of the Kurds”, (Ronya) in the form of children who need saving.

Incidents like these however, can also have consequences for the private life of the individual involved. Ronya explains how her father and friends called her to ask for clarification of this news and whether she had tried to hide her Kurdish identity and portray herself as a rich Turk in the service of the Turkish nation. Some friends of hers were so angry that they refused to talk to her for a long time.

Yet, Ronya’s experience is routine in Turkey because media- and state-imposed Turkishness have created an orientalist narrative about the Kurdish people and Kurdistan through this “banal” forms of nationalism. As Yumul and Ozkirimli (2000) point out hot nationalism increases during times of political crisis in Turkey, particularly in relation to the Kurdish question, the Armenian genocide, the Cyprus question or Turkish-Greek dispute over the Aegean Sea. When the crisis eases hot nationalism turns into banal nationalism. The media has a significant role in flagging the nation in periods of hot nationalism in Turkey e.g. during the Cardak crisis between Turkey and Greece, the “victory of Turkey” during the abduction of Öcalan from Kenya, and then in cooler times in banal, routinized ways such as fabricating news as in Ronya’s case.

3. Flagging the Homeland Daily

For Anderson newspapers play a central role in thinking the nation, constructing and disseminating nationhood amongst large-scale communities. The press “brought together, on the same page, this marriage with that ship, this price with that bishop” contributing to the creation of “an imagined community among a specific assemblage of fellow-readers, to whom these ships, brides, bishops and prices belonged”(Anderson 1991, 62). His theoretical concept has created a
debate on the relationship between news and nationhood and been subject to varied theoretical and empirical treatment (Billig 1995, Bishop and Jaworski, 2003, Brookes, 1999, Law, 2001, Rosie et al., 2004, Schlesinger, 1991, Yumul and Özkirimli 2000). While some of the scholars have agreed that the media shape nationhood and flag it in everyday life (Billig 1995, Yumul and Özkirimli), others have questioned the viability of banal nationalism in a society which is heterogeneous and consumes media in complex and diverse ways (Conboy 2006, Gripsrud 2002, Harries and Wahl-Jorgensen 2007, Higgins 2004, Law 2001, Rosie et al. 2006, Tunstall 1996). Critical voices accept that the media’s discursive practices reproduce the dominant ideology through the distancing rhetoric and deictic juxtaposition of “them” and “us”, “here” and “there” which contribute to the sense of belonging to an imagined community. The nation and nationhood as ideological and social constructions become normalised and unproblematic to readers.

Hall used the term ideology to refer to “those images, concepts and premises which provide the frameworks through which we represent, interpret, understand and ‘make sense’ of some aspect of social existence” (Hall 1996:271). “Shared meaning” (Hall 1997:1) is not only created through written texts but also through images which are also “texts”. They form a language used by the media to transmit a constructed frame of a society. Hall states that:

“reality exists outside language, but it is constantly mediated by and through language; and what we can know or say has to be produced in and through discourse. Discursive ‘knowledge is the product not of the transparent representation of the ‘real’ in language but of the articulation of language on real relations and conditions” (Hall 1980:131).

In this sense, the language and symbols used in Turkish and Kurdish media have the ideological function to disseminate nationhood. For example, the Turkish media and their European editions are decorated
with Turkish flags (see image 7.1 and image 7.2), images of the founder of the Turkish state, Ataturk (see image 7.3) and different nationalistic symbols that recall the nation. Some newspapers use racist headings such as “Turkey belongs to Turks” (The slogan of the Hürriyet newspaper, image 7.1) and “Happy is he who considers himself a Turk” (The slogan of Ortadogu, image 7.4) The newspapers, Magazins (image 7.5) and TV channel names consist of references to nation-state identity like Turkiye (Turkey), Cumhuriyet (The Republic), Milli (The National), Milliyet (Nationality), the Turkish Daily News (in English), Yeni Asya (New Asia) newspaper, TRT Turk (the Turkish state International TV) channel.

Image 7.1

Image 7.3

Image 7.2

Image 7.4

Image 7.5 There is no minority!
As Anderson argues, nationalist symbols and language, “the single most important emblem” of a newspaper, “provides the essential connection, the steady onward clocking of homogenous, empty time” (Anderson 1983:37). In this way, the media creates a common sense of belonging to a particular bounded territory of unified time and space, that can be conceived as “a deep, horizontal comradeship”, (Anderson 1991:7) despite the unequal power relationships amongst members of the imagined community. However this view has been widely challenged for defining the nation and its history, official language, norms and values in a “dynamic, multi-ethnic setting,” (Elmhirst 1999:814) to the exclusion of subordinated peoples who have a different language and ethno-national identity. The ethno-centric nation-building project and its cultural, linguistic and political policies creates deep rifts within “horizontal comradeship”. People from the dominant ethnic group are empowered through the cultural and linguistic policies while the minority groups are disempowered. This causes strong and weak citizenship and cultural and linguistic discrimination. The excluded groups can develop “alternative visions of the nation” (Itzigsohn and vom Hau 2006:196), a similar ideology to the dominant one and an alternative imagined community which can create a struggle between the consolidated imagined community and that of subordinated groups (Chernilo 2006, Yiftachel 1999). The antagonistic groups will attempt to legitimize their own nationalistic positions, language and symbols through various means including the media (see chapter I).

Images, logos and slogans form part of everyday life and they become familiar, natural and normal to people who follow the media (Billig 1995). However these images are not neutral but have coded meanings associated with nationhood and nationalism (Gripsrud 2002). According to Hall
“There is not intelligible discourse without the operation of a code. Certain codes may, of course, be so widely distributed in a specific language community or culture,...they appear not to be constructed as the effect of an articulation between sign and referent – but to be ‘naturally’ given...however [this] does not mean that no codes have intervened; rather, that the codes have been profoundly naturalized” (Hall 1980-131-132).

A main concern of this mediated nationalism has been the juxtaposition of ethnic “others” to Turkish nationalism that is portrayed as tolerant and benign patriotism. On the other hand, minority groups’ nationalist movements – chief among which the Kurdish - are portrayed as destructive separatism (cf Chernilo 2006, Yiftachel 1999, Elmhirst 1999, Itzigsohn and vom Hau 2006). Furthermore, Turkish banal nationalism in the publication of the European editions of the Turkish press is reproduced in countless subtle and habitual ways. The naming of readers as “we, Turks” is an example of creating a national identification for the readers (Yumul and Özkirimli 2000).

As has been argued previously, (See Chapter III) the Turkish flag can be seen on every page of the Turkish newspapers and TV channels. In the mainstream newspapers “the cult of the flag” (Billlig 1995:39) acts as a “condensation symbol”. Moreover, the emotion surrounding the flag is underlined by being discursively linked to sacrifice in the conflict: “The flag that has been watered [sic!] with the blood of our martyrs” (Yilmaz 2005). The exceptions to this are some left-wing newspapers and magazines (e.g. Evrensel). However, these have a very small circulation. The media use it often on certain days when the temperature of the conflict rises – e.g. between the Turkish military and the PKK or on days of national commemoration, such as the celebration of the establishment of the Turkish Republic, National Independence Day, the 19th of May celebration.
Banal and hot nationalism is used in the Turkish media in order to reach a broader audience. Evindar, a Kurdish MP in Berlin, criticized the media for using alarmist headlines to reach a broader audience. This view is shared by many Turkish and Kurdish readers and viewers who feel that the headlines do not reflect to the news.

As Evindar, a Kurd in Berlin expressed it:

“...I find it really ridiculous to see a lot of Turkish nationalist symbols in the media. It disturbs me to see the fetish of excessive space devoted [to these nationalist symbols]. It has the effect that some Turkish people see red, and behave like a bull charging] towards a matador. In the media the Turkish military is fetishised in many ways to show off the Turkish soldiers’ brutality against the Kurds”

(Interview with Evindar, Berlin, 7th August 2007).

Certainly the Turkish media, particularly the tycoon, Dogan’s media, create a sense of “the Turk has no friends but the Turk”. This saying is often repeated in Turkey but it grows stronger and more visible in Turkish migrants’ lives in the countries of settlement where they are not in a majority and also face discriminatory policies like other migrants. The media have built their news on this saying which creates a feeling among Turkish migrants of being an unwanted group in Europe. The news put out by these media constantly highlights internal and external enemies of the Turks and Turkey. My research has found that reporting the news in a nationalist way has a certain impact on Turkish migrants, in particular on the first generation of Turks in Europe.

The Kurdish media follows a similar line to the Turkish media but is not as aggressive and hostile. For example, the Kurdish media has not developed a nationalism directed against ethnic Turks, but against the Turkish nationalist state and its anti-Kurdish policies. However, the Turkish media
has openly defined Turkishness against the Kurds by stereotyping them or reducing their identity to “separatist” one.

The Kurdish media highlights the social, cultural, economic and political discrimination against the Kurds who currently live in Iran, Turkey, Syria and Iraq but also in the diaspora. In doing so, they have played with the idea of creating a collective ethnic identity amongst Kurds, which aims to establish their own “deep, horizontal comradeship” (Anderson 1991:7) against the domination of nations occupying Kurdistan and their imposed languages.

To create a political, social, cultural and ethnic identity, they use ethno-national symbols in their text and images. This reached its apogee in audiovisual, print and digital media (Hassanpour 1997). All the Kurdish media constantly deploy three colours (green, red, and yellow) in their designs, headlines and published images (Sheyholislami 2010). These three colours signify the colours of the Kurdish flag. They are also perceived by Kurds as the Kurdish national colours and by Turkish institutions as the “colour of terror”. The image below (image 7.5) condenses this kind of banal nationalism (Hasanpoor 1997, Romano 2002, Rigoni 2002)

Öcalan’s banner and the PKK flags become more salient images than the Kurdish flag, a reality which was criticized by many participants especially in Stockholm:

“They [PKK supporters] are not interested in Kurdistan, Kurdish language and the Kurds. We see more PKK symbols or Öcalan images in some of the Kurdish media and on their demonstrations. I do not agree with these people and do not go to such demonstrations. There should be only the Kurdish flag which is accepted by all Kurds” (Interview with Dêmgul, Stockholm, 15th June 2007).

However, this assumes that Kurdish banal nationalism is accepted by all Kurds which shows how unnoticed and routine it has become. Many left-wing Kurds or “unpoliticised” Kurds avoid being part of this “flag-waving nationalism” (Billig 1995:44).

Dara, an immigration adviser in Berlin commented critically:

“Many Turks and Kurds feed their stomachs and souls with flags, slogans, and other people by talking about the concept of Europeanization which is beyond nation” (Interview with Dara, Berlin 14th August 2007).

This indicates that some Kurds remain unhappy about the flag-waving within the Kurdish movement.

Another important and significant example of banal nationalism is the Newroz (see Image 6), the Kurdish New Year celebration. During the celebration, red, green and yellow and fire are the most visible signifiers of Kurdish nationalism. The Roj TV broadcasts live from Amed (Roj TV, 21.03.2008) (the diaspora Kurds refer to Diyarbakir by its historical Kurdish name, Amed, which is considered as the capital city of “Northern Kurdistan”).
Many Kurdish organisations organise *Newroz* to celebrate and highlight Kurdish issues across Europe and their posters are part of the banal nationalism like the Berlin 2007 *Newroz* poster (See image 7.7)\(^{29}\)

Image 7.7

The newspaper and TV stations reported about the “splendid *Newroz* celebrations” (*Yeni Ozgur Politika*, 18 March 2008)\(^ {30}\) in Germany, Holland, the UK and France

Even the name of the television like *MED TV*, *Medya TV* or *Newroz* (Image 7), *Kurdsat*, *Kurdistan* TV are a part of banal nationalist discourse.

Image 7.8.\(^ {31}\) the *Newroz* TV station
The websites which are ideologically closer to the PKK and other Kurdish parties that offer a critical distance and discourse about the media - have similar banal nationalist tendencies in their design and news. The Kurdish flag is one of the commonly used banal nationalistic symbols in Kurdish internet-based newspapers like Kurdistan-post.com (replaced with Kurdistan-post.ru) which defines its position as “the voice of free Kurdistan”. Flags as a non-verbal form of communication have a symbolic power for nations and its citizens (Ablamowicz 1998) because they are universal signs: “The flag language is a universal, the most understood abbreviated code, a language above the global linguistic Babylon. Unlike any other, it is an instantly mastered language, requiring no long training” (Makolkin 2001:3). The flag also demonstrates a national, ethnic identity of the socially bonded group who go on the streets to highlight in public their concerns and demands. For example in 2007, the followers of the founder of the Turkish state, Ataturk, used the Turkish flag at their demonstration to show their opposition to the ruling AKP which is rooted in Islamic values. In using the Turkish flag, the group demonstrated that they own the Turkish republic. Later on, the Islamic group used the flag for the same claim. The flag became a symbolic, collective statement for both groups. For the Kurds, the Kurdish flag is also a collective statement of desire for an independent state and to stake a claim to “our” nationhood. Therefore the Kurdish flag on the Kurdish website appeals “to the most basic emotions of the group, such as the sense of solidarity and community” (Makolkin 2001:8, see Macke 2001) but also opposes Turkish state policies. “To wave a flag means to make a strong political statement, to state one’s belonging, preference, to signal Otherness” (Makolkin 2001:8).

The case of Kurds from Turkey is an excellent case for understanding banal nationalism in the diaspora. The majority of Kurds in Turkey do not call out loud for a separate Kurdistan as they intend to attain “their” cultural, political and economic rights within the current Turkish borders.
On the other hand, the Kurdish diaspora and their media have already created “Welate me” of the mind - “our country”- in Kurdish. The term “Welat” has been used by the Kurdish media, there is even a paper with the name “Welate me”. Many of my Kurdish participants use this term to invoke the homeland by saying they “received a call from Welat” or “will visit welat”

For example, a 36 year-old Kurdish web designer, Zana from Sweden said:

“I am going to Welat-country this summer and will start my journey from Amed and then move to Kurdistana Bashur and visit my friends (Kurdish: hevalan)” (Interview with Zana, Stockholm, 24th June 2007).

This statement shows that the welat has become an “unnoticed” or “mundane” part of Kurdish banal nationalism in the diaspora. He stated that he will start his journey from Amed. Indeed the name of the city Diyarbakir has been used as Amed by Kurds since the late Ottoman Empire, but Amed disappeared for decades and reappeared in the mid 1980s. This Kurdish site signifies an alternative discourse using different historical markers, or in recent decades, new terminology to deconstruct the official Turkishness in the Kurdish region. Certain names have caused a fierce debate in the Turkish and Kurdish media and amongst nationalists. The Kurdish media uses Amed in all its reports including the weather forecast (see Roj TV news or Yeni Özgür Politika search machine which provides 8,089 news items about Amed (Kurdistan-post.com, and Nasname.com).

The mainstream Turkish media tries to put the official Turkish banal nationalism on the agenda by asking “Where is Amed?..... So our Diyarbakir! Kurdistan's capital in their [Kurds] heads!” (Çölaşan 1999). The Turkish authorities insist on using the name Diyarbakir which does not have any historical or geographical roots and was created one day on the
orders of Ataturk (Dundar 2007). The debate in the Kurdish and Turkish media about political and geographical terminologies has caused certain posturing and “political correctness” amongst migrants too. Barzan uses the term *Kurdistana Bashur* and *heval* - also signs of Kurdish banal nationalism because the term *Kurdistane Bashur* (South Kurdistan), *Kurdistana Bakur* (Northern Kurdistan), *Kurdistana Rojhilat* (East Kurdistan) and *Kurdistana Rojava* (West Kurdistan) are used almost daily on the news of the transnationalized and digitalized Kurdish media (Hasanpoor 1997, Romano 2002, Rigoni 2002). *Heval* is another term which resolves the political position of individuals as to whether they are involved in Kurdish national movements or not. It is clear that many terms entering into Kurdish political and social life imperceptibly indicate political positions and contribute to a banal nationalism of the diaspora.

**4. Three-way Banal Nationalism**

The debates in the countries of settlement on Britishness, Germanness and Swedishness centre around social and national cohesion, evidence of the symbolic role of nationalism in politicians’ speeches and in the media (Solomos 2003, Anderson 1991, Billig 1995, Back 1993, Álund 1999, Becker 2001, Spencer 2001, Heitmeyer 1997). During the economic crisis it has become accepted rhetoric as witnessed by Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s demand for “British jobs for British workers”. At such times, migrants become easy targets for the media in the countries of settlement. Sometimes not only right-wing groups, but other native inhabitants are actively racist as was the case when Romanian migrants were attacked by their neighbours in Belfast after negative media coverage on Romanian membership of the EU and the inflow of Romanian migrants into Northern Ireland.

Furthermore, everyday ethnicity (Brubaker 2004), as expressed in routine ethnicizing practices in the countries of settlement give rise in migrants to a new consciousness of political and cultural diversity based on ethnic
difference. This issue has received little attention amongst scholars. Van Bruinessen explains the development of Kurdish nationalism in Europe with reference to the migrant groups themselves: “Due to a combination of political factors and technological developments, these diasporas [Kurdish diaspora] have increasingly become (re-)oriented towards the part of Kurdistan and the state of origin” (2000a:1).

However, this ignores the everyday ethnicizing policies and practices of the countries of settlement that differentiate between “us” and “them” (van Bruinessen 2000) Ethnicity and religion have been turned into key visible markers differentiating migrants’ identity in multicultural societies (Solomos 2003, Hall 2000, Bauman 2000). Baumann notes the tendency of multiculturalism to ignore agency and reduce “all social complexities, both within communities and across whole plural societies, to an astonishingly simple equation: ‘Culture = community = ethnic identity = nature = culture’ ” (Baumann 1996:17).

Ethnic and cultural differences are mobilized by different agencies for multicultural, as well as nationalist, purposes. For example, some of the countries of settlement, especially Germany, blame the Turkish, but also the Kurdish, media for creating a “parallel society” and “media ghettos” within mainstream society (Heitmeyer 1998). They claim that “the integration of the Turkish residential population in German society...[is hindered]... under the influence of the Turkish media” (Lambsdorff Lambsdorff 1998:1). Lambsdorff notes the “constantly negative reporting about Germany” that creates feelings of uncertainty and “sometimes even generates fear” of “individual,... radical rightwing skinhead attacks” on Turkish migrants. In so doing, the Turkish media aims “to keep Turkish families living in Germany confined in the old cultural circles and ways of thinking” (Lambsdorff 1998:1). He blames the Turkish media for printing unexceptional incitements such as “Germans burn the Turks!”. The
German government has talked to the Turkish media to curtail this inflammatory reporting (Lambsdorff 1998).

According to Schicha, “through the media-centred concentration on the prevailing problems, lines of conflict, issues and perceptions in the country of origin, a lasting estrangement of citizens of the majority society can occur” (Schicha 2003:16). Therefore, many German academics call for “media integration” of migrants in Germany. Moreover, Heitmeyer (1996, 1998) goes further, echoing the view of SPD politician, Hans-Ulrich Klose (see Introduction), that the migrants who live in Germany have lost contact with German culture and live in media ghettos where they are prey to fundamentalism and nationalism which endanger Germany society(Heitmeyer 1996, 1998). Migrants who use the media in other languages are viewed as “dissociated from the social life” of everyday German society (Marenbach, 1995, quoted in Aksoy, 2001:344).

As Billig maintains:

“sociological forgetting is not fortuitous…. Instead, it fits an ideological pattern in which ‘our’ nationalism (that of established nations…) is forgotten: it ceases to appear as nationalism, disappearing into the ‘natural ‘environment of ‘societies’. But the other nationalism is seen as dangerously emotional and irrational: it is conceived as a problem” (Billig 1995:38).

But Becker sees the ethnicization as part of multicultural society in Germany: “Ethnicization of the media allows the members of one’s own group to see themselves, one’s own problems, one’s own fate and cultural identity” (Becker and Behnisch 2001 quoted in Kosnick 2007:77). Becker’s multicultural approach insists that in a multicultural society and constitutional state, people have the right to consume media in their vernacular, maintaining their culture as a minority group and remaining in contact with their homeland.
Both the media of the countries of settlement and countries of origin reproduce “homeland deixis” and the deictic practice of constituting “them” and “us”. The dichotomy between the Turkish and Kurdish media becomes more complex because these and other symbolic banal nationalist devices work in multiple ways through: i) reproducing Turkish state-nationhood for migrants from Turkey including Kurds; ii) juxtaposing the “other” in the conflict e.g. Kurdishness vs. Turkishness and vice versa; iii) juxtaposing the nationalism of the country of settlement i.e. Germanness/Swedishness/Britishness e.g. the debate on parallel society. I call this “three-way banal nationalism”.

This triangular relationship can be seen in terms of the conflict and media intervention and influence over migrants. When the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayip Erdogan visited Germany on February 10, 2008, he called on his “compatriots” to reject assimilation and maintain their language and culture. He warned the German authorities not to confuse assimilation with integration, telling the migrants “I understand very well that you are against assimilation. One cannot expect you to assimilate”. While thousands of Kurds were protesting against Erdogan in front of the Köln Arena (in Cologne) at his “human rights violations in Kurdistan”, Erdogan told his “compatriots” that “assimilation is a crime against humanity”. He called on Turkish migrants to become active in politics and lobby for their country. The Kurdish and German media called on Erdogan to look in the mirror before criticizing Germany. The Kurdish and German media stated that an actual “crime against humanity” was taking place in Turkey (Kalnoky 2008, Tek 2008, Der Spiegel 2008). More importantly, the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel and the German authorities reacted to Erdogan’s utterance, criticizing it as interference in “German affairs”. The then SPD leader, Kurt Beck spoke out about “trends towards ghettoization [amongst Turkish migrants] with the support of the Turkish government” (Der Stern 2008).
This case demonstrates the relation between the three different nationalist positions.

The most significant three-way banal nationalism occurs in the countries of settlement when the conflict between the Turkish state and the PKK heats up in the homeland. During this intensified period of conflict, the Turkish media portray the Turkish soldiers as “our heroes”, supported by images of the soldiers. The soldiers who lost their lives in this conflict become “our martyrs”. The mainstream media uses “our martyrs” as an ideological support for state policies of discrimination against the Kurds and to maintain the status quo in Turkey. Therefore the media propagate “dying for the nation” as a virtue in the conflict, to perpetuate the war.

Turkish print and visual media have perfected their visual practices such as “click the photo gallery” and videos of “our martyr’s funeral ceremony” where the endless trauma and sadness of the soldiers’ families and even “the tears of the general” are repeatedly consumed. This tool of clicking on to photos can help the newspaper owners to show how long and how many people visit their online edition so they acquire more advertising. Moreover, the readers are invited to write racist comments on “our martyrs” so click on, thereby raising money from advertisers. Many soldiers complain that the media profits from their stories and the war (Mater 2000:162).

The tragic deaths of Turkish soldiers in the conflict have been used to hide the actual Kurdish problem and legitimize the war in the eyes of the Turkish public in Turkey and in Europe. The media has contributed with its well-constructed dramatized news. While the wailing mothers, partners, relatives are used as background sounds, the audience learns of the stories:- of the soldier who wanted to be chief of the Turkish general staff; of the father and his orphaned two year-old; of “the martyred soldier” who
called his family “yesterday to tell them that he has a feeling that he will become a martyr which made him happy because he fights for his country, performing his patriotic duty” (Hürriyet, 26 August 2009).

The Turkish media takes part in this conflict as a spokesperson of the military (Bulut 1992, Sezgin and Wall 2005) portraying the Turkish soldier as “our martyr” and the Kurdish guerrilla as “Armenian seed”, or as “terrorists captured dead” (Zaman Newspaper 2009a) or “carcasses” (Turkish General Pamukoglu (Bayramoğlu 2011). The Turkish media reports the death of Kurdish guerrillas from the same military perspective which contributes to legitimising the discourse of savagery in the society. This militarized and nationalistic discourse has come into widespread use in the society in language and practice by lynching Kurdish individuals in the street. Many racists were empowered by the Turkish authorities and media and their actions in attacking Kurds in 2006, 2007 and 2008. Balakrishnan attributes the reason for the mobilization of the nationalist masses by the state and media to the political crisis, interstate conflicts and weak citizenship (Balakrishnan 1996).

This tension spread to Europe, for example in November 2007 it rose between Turkish and Kurdish migrants when fighting between the Turkish military and the PKK reached a peak again and many young people from both sides were killed. The Turkish authorities, media and generals publicly discussed the invasion of “South Kurdistan” to prevent the PKK from entering Turkey. Kurds in Europe and in Kurdistan protested against the imminent “invasion of Kurdistan” including in Berlin, London and Stockholm. The German newspaper, Taz’s headline gave the reason for the Kurdish demonstration as: “War drives the Kurds to the Streets” (Wierth 2007). Turks, on the other hand, protested “against separatist terror” A member organization of the Turkish community centre (an umbrella organisation of Turkish communities in Berlin and one of my
interview partners) called on the Turkish migrants to protest against the terror. Many Kurds were attacked by Turkish nationalists - mostly young people in their cafés, restaurants or community centres. The German newspaper *Die Welt* described it thus: “Turks hunted Kurds” (Peters 2007a). The Kurdish, and some Turkish, communities blamed the Turkish media for stirring up problems between both groups (Menne and Taxacher 2007). The Kurdish media contributed to this conflict, too. However the Turkish media fought back and blamed the Kurdish and German media “for supporting the separatists”.

The Turkish media interviewed Turkish politicians and ambassadors as part of this three-way banal nationalist competition. For example, *Hürriyet* interviewed the Turkish ambassador, Mr. Irtemcelik in Berlin about the Turkish and Kurdish ethno-national reactions to the Turkish “martyrs” and the Turkish invasion of “South Kurdistan” in December 2007. He defended the invasion against “the foreign-backed terrorist attacks” on Turkish national unity and praised the Turkish migrants in Europe who demonstrated their support for the homeland as “motivated by our emotional feelings of national solidarity - the highest expression of our national character” (*Hürriyet Newspaper* 2007).

The Turkish journalist posed a further question to the ambassador directed to Turkish audiences in Germany:

**Question:** Although the PKK is classified as a terror organization by the German authorities, the German media use a different language. What is the attitude of the German media and German authorities?*

Answer: "German media organs ignore the fact that the PKK is classified as a 'terrorist organization' in this country and the meaning and content of this state decision. Insisting on presenting this, the bloodiest terrorist organization in the history of mankind with evocations of innocence such as 'insurgents', 'guerrillas', and 'freedom fighters' hurts us as well as our people here, in every way. It is a
futile effort to hope to beautify Hitler by using romantic adjectives. Similarly it is clear what the PKK is. Therefore the effort of trying to portray this bloody gang positively will help us to make a healthy assessment of their [i.e. the German media’s] real face, intentions, and what they are like. As I said, this hurts us; on the other hand, we can exploit this situation” (Turkish ambassador Mr. Irtemcelik, Hürriyet, 31.10.07).

This declaration is also based on juxtapositions such as the comparison between “our noble national character” and the “separatist terrorist”, which is taken by many audiences to mean Kurds. The second juxtaposition is between Turkishness and Germanness. The Turkish media and Turkish authorities expect the European media to act like the Turkish media and report with a clear anti-PKK and anti-Kurdish bias. German journalists who criticize “our nation” are labelled as Nazi. The three-way banal nationalism serves to glorify “our nation” (X say), juxtaposing Y and Z nations, while Y glorifies its nation by different means and creates a juxtaposition between X and Z.

The outcome of these utterances can cause an emotional reaction as reported by members of the Kurdish and Turkish audiences whom I interviewed, who recounted that when they watch or read any news about soldiers killed in battle or about the guerrilla it upsets them. A Turkish migrant in Berlin, Osman explains what this means:

“I know what I am going to say is bizarre but when I watch the funeral ceremony of the martyrs and wailing mothers, crying wives of martyred soldiers, it is as if I lost my brother. I feel terrible and frustrated and I would like to go onto the street and kill 4 or 5 Kurds. This media estranges us from our humanity” (Interview with Osman, Berlin, 26th December 2007).

5. Hot and Banal Nationalism in Transnational Spaces
Different Turkish and Kurdish agencies propagate deterritorialised “hot” nationalism in the countries of settlement to mobilize political and
ideological, as well as financial, support among both migrant groups (Demmers 2002, Eriksen 2007, Rigoni 2002, Hafez 2002). The conflict is already a deterritorialized issue for thousands of people who form part of the transnational ethno-national movements in Berlin, London, and Stockholm and elsewhere. The conflicts in Berlin and London between both groups show that hot and banal nationalism are interlocked. “Hot” nationalism increases amongst both migrant groups during heavy clashes in the homeland. But if the intensity of the clash decreases in the homeland, the activity of both groups decreases too. However as Billig states: “thoughts, reactions and symbols become turned into routine habits and, thus, they become inhabited” (Billig 1995:42). This inhabiting in the form of hot nationalism declines within a certain time but will not disappear but continue in a banal form. However if the conflict starts again, banal nationalism will turn into a form of hot nationalism.

Banal nationalism in the diaspora is not restricted to a territory (Demmers 2002, Ostergaard-Nielsen 2002, Cohen 1997, Vertovec 2005, (King and Melvin 1999), Smith 2007). Territory is replaced by identity in multicultural societies. Identity creates spaces for diasporic banal nationalism to flourish discursively and in practical ways (Appadurai 1996). In this process, nationalism plays a significant role as an “endemic political ideology” (Billig 1995) in all societies in conflict.

The Turkish-Kurdish conflictual relationship with ethnic-based media offers fruitful ground for conceptualising this argument. Firstly the Turkish and Kurdish communities are highly involved in homeland politics in the countries of settlement and play a significant role in lobbying for the nation in different geographical and political spaces (Wahlbeck 1998, Demmers 2002, Ostergaard-Nielsen 2002, Cohen 1997, Vertovec 2005, King and Melvin 1999, Smith 2007). Their activities are reflected in the European sections of the Turkish and Kurdish media, in particular during the local
and general elections and in promoting their businesses, social status and political positions (Rigoni 2002).

Secondly, it is important to highlight the emergence of political, ethnic and social identities amongst Kurdish transnational communities in Europe (Holgate et al 2009a, Eriksen 2007, Hassanpor 1997). The freedom of life in the diaspora has created cultural, political and linguistic spaces where the Kurdish ethno-national and social movements have taken shape (Curtis 2005). The Kurdish media is a cyber-bridge between the homeland and transnational local spaces where Kurdish banal nationalism is reproduced (Sheyholislami 2010, Eriksen 2007).

Thirdly, the Turkish and Kurdish media are heavily influenced by the ongoing Turkish-Kurdish ethno-national conflict (Rigoni 2002). These media have lost their journalistic function of informing their audiences in the diaspora about issues in their homeland and in their countries of settlement. These media have become the mouthpieces of the Turkish and Kurdish political nationalist groups in the conflict. While hot nationalism becomes visible in the partisan publishing and broadcasting habits of these media, the project of banal nationalism works unobtrusively through mediated “hot” nationalism (Billig 1995).

The Turkishness and Kurdishness on the front pages of these newspapers (in the editorial and chronicles) mostly relates to the reproduction of nationhood. This discourse influences and is influenced by migrants’ daily talk. The texts and images of these media focus on commemorating the nation in the homeland and in the countries of settlement. Culture, language, social values and religion become signs of national differences between “us” and “them”, particularly in extraordinary times, such as Turkey’s cross-border operations against Kurdish rebels.
Other significant instances of banal nationalism appear in these media during general elections in the countries of settlement. These media call for support for “Turkish candidates” (Radikal, 16.09.2006, Zaman 09.03.08., Hürriyet 20.10. 08) or “Kurdish candidates” (Yeni Ozgur Politika, 15.05. 07, 22. 09. 09). These media support “Turkish” or “Kurdish” candidates who are supposed to be pro-Turkey or pro-Kurdish and pro-the homeland, while the Kurdish media try to be universalist in supporting a left-wing Turkish candidate. The candidate’s ethnic background is presented as “being from Turkey” (Yeni Ozgur Politika, 15.05.07). During the elections, the pro candidates are interviewed several times and their election campaign and what they will do for Turkey or Kurdistan is extensively reported. The terms “Turkey” or “Kurdistan”, “Turks” or “Kurds” become key in highlighting why people with the same “ethnic”, religious, cultural or linguistic background should vote for this or that candidate. However if the media is not happy with the policy of “our” candidates or party, then they use bold headlines in large letters. For example during my fieldwork in Berlin, a Hürriyet headline ran “SPD [i.e. the German Social Democratic Party] sold out the Turks”. Presenting such a provocative headline helps the Turkish media to increase its circulation and also reminds audiences that they are Turkish, and that the German SPD betrayed them because of this. This kind of news reflects the deictic practice of juxtaposing “us” and “them”. Billig notes that “the crucial words of banal nationalism are often the smallest: ‘we’, ‘this’ and ‘here’, which are the words of linguistic ‘deixis’ ...Beyond conscious awareness, like the hum of distant traffic, this deixis of little words makes the world of nations familiar, even homely,” (Billig 1995:94).

The nationalist deictic discourse in the media brings migrant groups into opposition because the understanding of the Turkish media of “we - the Turks” mirrors that of Turkish state ideology: that everyone from Turkey is Turkish regardless of their ethnic or religious affiliation. This means that the
Turkish media continues to present the Turkish and Kurdish migrant groups as a unified, inclusive, imagined Turkish community in the countries of settlement. Reclaiming other ethnic identities has been seen by mainstream Turkish media as an issue of separatism because multiculturalism, pluralism and cultural diversities are still seen in Turkey as “disintegrative, sapping the strength of the nation” (Cizre 2001:231).

6. Delegitimizing Diversity

The Turkish media’s hegemonic strategy consists of delegitimizing, ethnic and cultural diversity in the eyes of Turkish migrants. Migrants should have one voice for the fatherland. Whoever dares to dispute the national consensus deserves to be attacked by media which acts as the guardian of the Turkish state. However representing diversity as a force for disintegration causes conflict amongst both ethnic groups. In so doing, the media reinforces the feeling that “the Turk has no friend but the Turks”. Drawing on evidence from focus groups conducted with Turkish participants from Berlin, the first generation migrants of ethnic Turkish background expressed how they feel when confronted with ethnic pluralism and the rejection of Turkishness:

Ahmet: There were no discussions amongst Turkish and Kurdish people. We were all Turkish but when the PKK came, the Kurds started to say that they are not Turkish but they are Kurdish. The PKK separated us from each other.
Gurdal: But it is normal that the Kurds indicate that they are not Turkish because they are not...
Ahmet: They are. They are citizens of Turkey. The citizens of Turkey are Turkish. They should accept this fact or go to Northern Iraq.
Gurdal: If the German government banned the Turkish language and forced you to say that you are not Turkish but German, how would you react?
Ahmet: That’s a different issue. We did not want to separate Germany.
Efkan: The Kurds are real Turks. They speak Turkish better than me, why do they not accept to be Turkish?
Gurdal: Because they are a nation like others. They have their own language and culture.
Ahmet: You have no clue about the political game of the imperialists. This is the game of imperialists to separate our country.
Y: How do you know that they are in collaboration with imperialists?
Ahmet: There was a columnist in Hürriyet, Emin Colasan; he washed their dirty linen in public. But later he lost his job at Hürriyet newspaper because of the AKP, the Arab and Kurd party" [the AKP is the ruling party of Turkey. AKP refers to the Justice and Development party but many Turkish nationalists call the AKP the Arab and Kurd party.] (Focus group with Turkish migrants, Berlin, 26th July 2007).

The discussion amongst first and second generation migrants of ethnic Turkish background highlights the intergenerational differences in opinion. Some second-generation migrants regularly follow Turkish media and have a strong relationship with their homeland, very much like the first generation. Some second-generation migrants live in multicultural societies in Europe and find different expressions of ethnic identity normal. The first generation (but also some second-generation migrants) repeat the state and media narrative of external and internal enemies of Turkey. The enemies are sometimes the German media which does not call Kurdish rebels “terrorists” but “Kurdish guerrillas”, sometimes the Kurdish media, in particular Kurdish Roj TV. Kurdish activists are the target of the Turkish media. The Turkish media criticizes Western politicians who are critical of Turkey’s policies towards Kurds. Therefore, it is not always easy for Turkish migrants to accept the ethnic diversity amongst migrants from Turkey. A Kurdish participant working for a youth organization in Berlin blames the Turkish media for the conflict with her Turkish colleagues at work

Arin: We offer Turkish language courses for young people and I wanted to open a Kurdish class for
Kurdish second generation people in order to give them some sense of belonging to their mother tongue language and also many of them cannot speak Kurdish which makes them sad. They blame their families for this reason that the families not were able to teach them the Kurdish language. But my Turkish colleagues very strongly opposed my idea to open a Kurdish class, arguing that a Kurdish language class could create conflict between ‘Turkish youths’. They include the Kurdish youth in the category of ‘Turkish youths’. I think my Turkish colleagues are influenced by racist Turkish news coverage.

Y: In what way are they influenced by the Turkish media?

Arin: Oh in a thousand ways. If you look at Turkish media, there is not any positive news about Kurds and the Kurdish language. In particular they show teaching Kurdish in schools in Turkey as a danger for the integrity of Turkey. Even the government bans the letters which do not exist in the Turkish alphabet but exist in Kurdish like Q, W, and X. These three letters become the enemy of Turkish integrity in Turkey and Kurdish letters are called terrorist letters. It is ridiculous but this policy influences Turkish migrants here too. Because they watch and read the Turkish media on a daily basis. And if the ethnic and cultural diversity is portrayed as a danger to the nation, the migrants who have strong connection to Turkish nationalistic communities or the embassy oppose Kurdish language classes. Because ethnic and cultural diversity is portrayed negatively among migrants from so-called Turkey. I have discussed this for a long time with them” (Interview with Arin, Berlin, 5th July 2008).

As Arin states her Turkish colleagues at work take for granted the Turkish state and Turkish media’s ideological habit to “include the Kurdish youth in the category of ‘Turkish youths’” and while it is normal to teach Turkish, teaching Kurdish language is “disintegrative”. Blaming the Turkish media for the ethnic conflict between the Turkish and Kurdish migrants is widespread amongst Kurdish audiences because they consume the Turkish media and see the glorification of Turkishness in juxtaposition to its negative “other”: Kurds and Kurdishness. Though many Turkish
participants confirmed that they do not follow the Kurdish media, nevertheless they have a clear idea that the “separatist media”, i.e. the Kurdish media cause problems amongst both ethnic groups:

A: The Kurdish media separates Turkish society [including the Kurds] in Europe and causes conflict between them in the society
Y: Do you read or watch Kurdish media?
A: No I do not read or watch the separatist terrorist media or the PKK media
Y: How do you know that the Kurdish or PKK media causes conflict between the Turkish and Kurdish migrants or, if you like, in Turkish society?
A: Oh this media has caused a huge conflict even between Turkey and Denmark where the PKK channel broadcast its separatist ideas.
Y: What is the name of this channel?
A: I do not know and do not want to know.
Y: But you have read the news that this channel caused diplomatic problems between Turkey and Denmark several times? Where did you hear about this news?
A: in the media.
Y: Which media? Turkish, British?
A: Our media
Y: If you say ‘our media’, are you talking about mainstream Turkish media and Islamic media?
A: I read all the Turkish media”
(Interview with Abdullah, London 2nd February 2008).

Abdullah clearly indicates how the Turkish media shapes Turkish audiences’ reception of “our” media and “their” media. Abdullah has a strong Islamic background, therefore if he says “our,” he is referring to the Islamic media. It is common amongst Turkish and Kurdish ethnic groups to divide media into “ours” and “theirs”. But “our” Turkish media are divided into several slices e.g. for example Cumhuriyet newspaper for the Kemalists, Vakit newspaper for Islamists, Ortadogu for the ultranationalists. For some Kurds Yeni Özgür Politika is “our media”.
7. Reinforcing the Legitimacy of Turkish Nation-State Identity through Routine Practices

The repeated and routinized practices of Turkishness are the object of a fierce debate amongst migrants. Some Turkish migrants and even Kurdish migrants unwittingly repeat the flagging of Turkish nationhood. Others oppose this reproduction of Turkish banal nationalism in the diaspora, while the Kurds create their own banal nationalism. Hall argues that people reiterate ideologies that have been transformed by media “unconsciously rather than by conscious intention” because “ideologies tend to disappear from view into the taken-for-granted ‘naturalized’ world of common sense” (Hall 1996:272). Drawing on evidence from focus groups conducted with Kurdish participants from London you can see how the term “Turk” becomes a banal nationalist habit and how the Kurds react to this habit:

Ferhat: “We, Turks, watch TV 30 hours per week. This is quite a lot.
Rebeen: I thought you were Kurdish
Ferhat: Yes I am.
Rebeen: Then why do you say ‘we, Turks’
Ferhat: It’s a bad habit. It is difficult to change the habit. If somebody asks me what is your ethnic background of course I say I am Kurdish. Do you know you hear the term ‘we, Turks’ in Turkish soap operas, news etc and many people repeat it without thinking? Many of my friends say this on a daily basis” (Focus group interview, London, 17 May 2007).

While Ferhat reproduces the Turkish dominant discourse consciously or unconsciously and explains this as a “bad habit”. Rebeen reacts to Ferhat’s statement. Indeed this conversation shows us the differences between Kurdish migrants who follow Turkish media and those who follow Kurdish media. Rebeen reveals that he watches Kurdish Roj TV, Kurdistan TV and Kurdi1 TV where Kurdishness is glorified and Kurdish national identity reproduced and transmitted. But Ferhat follows Turkish media and repeats the dominant Turkish discourse although he is also aware of being Kurdish.
“On a daily basis” people who follow the Turkish or Kurdish media become a part of the “nation” and flag it in everyday conversation. Ferhat states that he is not Turkish but he repeats the Turkish media’s ideological claim that in Turkey, everyone is a Turk without regard to race or religion. This national story becomes routine and taken-for-granted even in the countries of settlement.

Ronya, who as we saw earlier was misrepresented as a Turk in the Turkish newspaper report, provides a rich explanation of how Turkish banal nationalism is taken-for-granted by media and audiences.

“When I showed this news to my Turkish and Kurdish friends who are critical of …the official Turkification policy, many of them criticized me but not the newspaper’s fabrication, while the others just said ‘Wow! You’ve been in the newspapers’ without understanding or noticing the propaganda for Turkishness. Even though they know that I am not Turkish, they did not ask any questions about my identity. That was normal for them or maybe habit that they did not notice that the tale was made up for the nation” (Interview with Ronya, London, 21st February 2007).

The Turkish and Kurdish media do not only focus on the conflict in the homeland but also on migrants’ interests in ethnic-based news to enhance their political and commercial interests.

This Kurdishness and Turkishness debate takes place in different geographical spaces where Kurds are forced to stand up against media expressions of Turkish banal nationalism. Some Kurds express this openly and even reject speaking Turkish and following the Turkish media, particularly in Stockholm, but some follow critically the media dissemination of Turkish banal nationalism.
Baran’s testimony provides rich insight into the debate:

“The Turkish institutions continue the same politics of the Turkish state in London because they are a Turkish institution…. In their view the Kurds are Turks here. I mean you do your PhD on media - when you look at the Turkish media like Kanal D, ATV, Show TV or Hürriyet they have correspondents working here sometime who do programmes and they never mention the word Kurds. They called the Kurds Turks and talk about ‘Turks in London’, ‘Turkish shops’, ‘Turkish migrants’ etc. Someone like me feels sorry for them when I listen to these programmes on Turkish television or read Turkish newspapers. They can’t understand the social, political and cultural changes in the world and continue the turkification policies of the Turks towards the Kurds even in the diaspora” (Interview with Baran, London 13th September 2008).

King argues:

“Straightaway we must …acknowledge here at the outset that the designation ‘Turkish’ (or ‘Turks’ etc) is deeply problematic, especially for the Kurds from Turkey (who resist being called ‘Turkish Kurds’) …. Within Turkey, Kurds have a marginal, persecuted status deriving from the failure of the Turkish state to recognise them – Article 13 of the Turkish Constitution states that ‘in Turkey, from the point of view of citizenship, everyone is a Turk without regard to race or religion’. This hegemonic categorisation travels with the migrants/refugees to the receiving countries, where, despite their persecuted status derived from their situation in Turkey being the raison d’être of their acceptance as refugees and asylum-seekers, they continue to be classed as ‘Turkish’” (King et al. 2008:3).

The case of a Kurdish MP from Berlin shows how “Turks” can be perceived as different. The German-Kurdish MP testifies how the Turkish media organized a campaign against her during her candidacy for MEP in the 2004 European elections as she is the daughter of a PKK supporter. She lost the race to be the candidate due to the Turkish media’s negative campaign, but managed to get elected to the Berlin local parliament.
“After my election to the House of Representatives in Berlin (in German: Abgeordnetenhaus von Berlin) I was not the daughter of a PKK supporter anymore but I was an MP of Turkish descent in these newspapers. They started using the argument that there are several Turkish MPs in the House of Representatives of Berlin in order to show Turkish political power in Berlin. But I am not Turkish and I made this clear in my press releases and my politics, as well as highlighting this to Turkish journalists. But they still portray me as a Turkish MP” (Interview with Lorin, Berlin, 7th July 2007).

The term “Turk” has become one of the most important ideological tools of banal nationalism in the media. The language used by the media reduces multiple identities to a singular term in order to reproduce the nation within the communities which have roots in Turkey. As has been shown in chapter VI, the language used by the Turkish media is based on production and transformation of a consolidated, imagined Turkish political community. In Anderson’s concept of imagined community, language has the function of unifying the fields of communication through media which create common shared experiences and belonging to an imagined community. Therefore the language used in the media actively creates a national consciousness.

On the other hand, scholars in the field of the critical discourse analysis have focused on examining the combination of text, artifact and social practice to understand how social realities are constructed through certain power relations and ideologies. So they look at how the media generate the language (written and audio-visual “texts”) and produce unequal power relationships, constructing identity and social meaning that favours the dominant social group (Fairclough 1995, Fairclough and Wodak 1997, Fiske 1982, Foucault 1980, Parker 1992, van Dijk 1993, see chapter VI). Hall (1996:271) states that “language, broadly conceived, is by definition the principal medium in which we find different ideological discourses [e.g.
nationalistic, racist, sexist and so on] elaborated”. The discursive practices of ideologies are produced and transmitted by the media which “can serve as both reservoirs and reference points for the circulation of words, phrases, and discourse styles,” (Spitulnik 1997:162) within imagined communities (Talbot 2007) The meaning is articulated through the language of imagined community but language itself is also part of the meaning (Fairclogh 1995). However discursive conflict and struggle can arise over the socially constructed and circulated meanings of nation, national identity and belonging to a particularist group. Therefore, the discursive practices of the media can be changed over the time, in accordance with the political climate in the country concerned. An example of this has occurred since the 1980s, when the Turkish media denied the existence of the Kurds and represented them as “separatists”, while today there are “Kurdish intellectuals” who talk about the “Kurdish question” as unmentioned representatives of Kurds on Turkish channels. The media also depict these communities and individuals as “Turks” in the countries of settlement in order more firmly to embed this identity in the institutions of the country of settlement (King 2008).

A Turkish journalist from the Islamic Zaman newspaper justified the flagging of Turkish nationhood in Europe by portraying different ethnic groups as Turks and imposing on them an unwanted Turkish state identity in these terms:

“First of all we do not separate the Turks and the Kurds. We include them as Turks because they are from Turkey. But if the Kurdish community centres condemn the terror and violence, this could be interesting news for us and we will name the Kurdish organization with its Kurdish name. Yilmaz: Two interviewed Kurdish MPs stated for this research that Turkish journalists deny their ethnic identity and portray them as Turkish which they see as an identity imposed by Turkish Journalists. Zaman: First of all I know the name of these two MPs. I do not know whether they mention their ethnic
background in their press releases and I do not know whether they have double citizenship but if they have a double citizenship, it means they have Turkish citizenship because Kurdish citizenship does not exist. There are different ethnic groups under the umbrella of Turkish identity. ..........We cannot write about all these identities in our news. It is impossible to do it. If the Kurds mention their ethnic background in their press releases then we will write their ethnic background. However if I work on news about a politician who comes from Turkey, I use the term German politician of Turkish origin. We do not use the term German politician of Kurdish origin........ For example Cem Ozdemir (co-leader of the Green Party) is Circassian. Should we now say German politician of Circassian descent?” (Journalist, Zaman newspaper, Berlin 12th July 2007).

A journalist from Hürriyet whom I interviewed put forward the same argument. While Turkishness is taken for granted, other identities are considered unnecessary to mention because the journalists’ ideological habit is to deal with cultural and ethnic diversity in this way, namely through turkification. Even the second generation become targets of this ideological habit, although they are not Turkish citizens and some do not even speak Turkish. However the journalist from state Anatolia agency explained that:

“The Turkish newspapers here are uncritical and focus on a narrow view around Turkishness. They report on Turkey and Turks here without making any critical points and they are not in the position to understand the social and political changes among migrants from Turkey because they did not study journalism and do not know the ethics of journalism” (Interview with Kazim, X date 2008).

Moreover Kazim gave an example of how his work is restricted by the ideological habit of the Turkish state to prevent people of different ethnic backgrounds from being portrayed by the state Anatolia agency:

“There was a celebration for successful grammar school pupils. The success of a girl was mentioned several times by [x country’s] education officers. Her family name was Turkish. I went to interview her.
When I said that I am from state Anatolia Agency and would like to interview her as a successful Turkish girl at school, she stated that she is not Turkish and if I could mention her Kurdish ethnic identity in my report she would be ready to be interviewed. Of course we are a state-run news agency and are not allowed to mention Kurdish identity in our news. This is the worst obstacle for us to interview such people. I was sad but I cannot change the rule” (Interview with Turkish state press official, 2008 I do not provide date and place of interview to protect this participant’s anonymity).

This testimony indicates that many Turkish journalists are unhappy with the way that they are forced to report on the Kurds but are unable to challenge the ideological habits of the Turkish media. Moreover, it sheds further light on Kurds have a different ethnic self-identification from the imposed Turkish one.

8. Conclusion

This chapter has analysed the Turkish and Kurdish press coverage of issues pertaining to national identity: how the Turkish media imposes national identity; the Kurdish media reconstructs ethno-national identities among the Turkish and Kurdish migrants; and the impacts of these processes on the migrants in Germany, the UK and Sweden. In the process of reshaping ethnic identities, these media deploy ethno-national symbols in their text and images, sometimes in an “extraordinary, emotional mood-striking” way (Billig 1995:45) and sometimes in “unnoticed”, “mundane” and “routine” ways in order to create a collective ethnic identity amongst migrants as “us” against “them”.

These Turkish and Kurdish banal nationalist practices have contributed to inflaming the conflict between the Turkish and Kurdish communities in their homeland and in diasporic spaces in Europe. Here this banal nationalist rhetoric has created feelings of belonging, attachment and loyalty to a “nation” a thousand miles away. Diasporic banal nationalism is not
restricted to a territory and breaks the link with a specific territory. Territory is replaced in diasporic banal nationalism by identity in multi-cultural societies which opens up spaces for diasporic banal nationalism to occupy discursively and in practice. In this process, nationalism becomes a significant factor as an “endemic political ideology” in all societies in conflict.

I have highlighted Billig’s argument that banal nationalism is the main form of nationalism in “established, democratic nations” (Billig 1995:93) as problematic because banal and hot nationalism appear in both democratic and established nations, and in non-democratic, non-established nations, including stateless nations. In particular, the debate on migrants and foreigners in the media and in public institutions in the countries of settlement has contributed to a hostile public attitude towards migrants. Moreover the “everyday ethnicity” (Brubaker 2004) embodied in the ethnicizing practices of the media, including those in the countries of settlement and the ethnic minority press, increases competition over who is a member of “our nation” and who is not, as well as enhancing consciousness of political and cultural differences in the minds of “natives” and “migrants”. In the case of the Turks and Kurds, their media and the European media in the countries of settlement position themselves against other nations and other national identities. The Turkish media’s approach is to juxtapose the “Turkish nation” to the “German nation” and the “Kurdish nation” and create a three-way banal nationalism which has a significant, negative impact on those of different ethnicity.

This explanation sheds light on the repeated examples of “hot” and “banal” forms of nationalism which the Turkish and Kurdish migrants interviewed cited from their everyday life. While many Turkish migrants repeat Turkish banal nationalist media discourse that the Kurdish media and “separatist thinking” have contributed to destabilising Turkey and Turkish society,
the Kurdish migrants highlight how the Turkish media and Turkish institutions impose Turkification on them even in the diaspora. However their opposing arguments are based on Kurdish banal nationalist discourse which is presented on the transnational, digitalized Kurdish media.
Conclusion VIII

This thesis has explored the complex linkages between transnational ethnic media and migrant communities through 6 focus group interviews and 74 individual interviews with Kurdish and Turkish migrants of different ages, gender, occupation, religious and political affiliation and length of residence in Stockholm, Berlin and London. Transnational media play an important role for these migrants in mediating and disseminating the imagined communities of nation and homeland (Kosnick 2007, Robins and Aksoy 2001, Tsagarousianou 2004). By doing this, transnational media contribute to the creation of migrant transnational spaces in the three European countries studied here. In this sense this study has analysed the role of the Turkish and Kurdish media in the formation of migrants' opinions and identity in Europe. The thesis has explored the role of transnational Kurdish and Turkish media in articulating migrants' identities as well as mobilizing different political positions amongst Turkish and Kurdish migrants in the three European countries (Sweden, UK, and Germany).

One of the key themes in Turkish and Kurdish media reporting on the homeland is the ethno-national conflict. This long-lasting conflict is the result of Turkish nationalistic discourse and repression which has denied Kurdish existence in Anatolia (Olson 1989, van Bruinessen 1999b, McDowall 2004) and forced Kurds to assimilate into Turkishness. This has lead to a bitter hegemonic struggle for power between the Turkish ethnic-dominated state and the subordinate Kurdish national movement, based on an attempt to create alternative imagined Turkish and Kurdish political communities (Anderson 1991). Owing to the migration, a Kurdish-orientated diaspora has developed which, through transnational communications and transport technologies has helped to construct a Kurdish imagined community in Europe and elsewhere. This poses a huge challenge to the hegemony of the nationalistic ideology of the Turkish state and its allies in the Turkish media. The latter exerts huge influence by presenting
nationalistic discourse as “common sense”, and mobilizing Turkish migrants in defence of the territorial unity of the Turkish state (see chapter II, III, IV, V, VI, and VIII).

In the theory chapter I argued that the relation between the transnational media and migrants’ national identities can be understood through the concept of imagined community. I have viewed national identities not as given but as socially constructed. For migrants, the transnational media plays an important role in constructing their national identities. A key means of doing this is banal nationalism, (Billig 1995) that is through the repeated use of flags, symbols and rituals to create a meaningful imagined community defined as “our” nation which creates a sense of belonging. I have suggested that a Gramscian approach (Gramsci 1971) is useful for understanding the construction of two alternative imagined communities, that of Turkish migrants and that of the Kurdish. I have examined how these groups have been established in particular through the role of the media in disseminating an imagined sense of who these actors are in their distinct communities.

My theoretical framework has drawn upon Anderson, Billig and transnationalism as they are all concerned with issues of nation, media identification and symbols (Gavrilos 2002) and transnationalized ethno-national conflict (Smith 2007). Yet, they all offer different insights into these processes. The Gramscian notion that hegemony is a process of constant negotiation between different social groups has been useful to look at the different ways in which the Turkish state and media have tried to define Kurds by using different terminologies such as “bandit”, “separatist”, “terrorist” etc. After 85 years, the changes in terminology in the Turkish media are the result of the Kurds’ counter-hegemonic challenge. Kurds as a subordinated group have also used banal nationalism to challenge the hegemonic view of the Turkish state that has denied them recognition of
their ethnic identity. There is an ongoing struggle over the nature of the Turkish and Kurdish imagined communities in which the media, both in the homeland and in the diaspora are involved invoking symbols of banal nationalism.

The thesis has looked at the interrelation of the Turkish state, nationalist ideology, the economy and the media in Turkey to explain the ideological dependency of the media on the state. It has discussed the power of the media in Turkey to define the Kurds and approve the use of coercion against the Kurds. The hot and banal forms of nationalism in the Turkish media form an important part of the daily dissemination of the Turkish imagined community which has a strong impact on how Turks think about themselves and Kurds. Having discussed the ability of the Turkish media to construct a strong sense of Turkish nationalism, racism and national identity, the thesis then turned to examining the Kurdish media. The Kurdish media analyse the symbols and meanings generated by the Turkish media and challenge this. They have developed their own counter-hegemonic project of an imagined Kurdishness. The Kurdish national movement challenges the Turkish state’s and media’s dominant narrative of the nation and has exposed its limitations and weaknesses. The Kurdish media play a key role in this as they have developed and disseminated their own narrative about who they are as an imagined community. Both groups utilize hot and banal forms of nationalism as means to construct an imagined national community and struggle for hegemony of their national projects. This struggle is played out through the media. What is at stake in analysing the media is that the ability of the alternative Turkish and Kurdish national projects to create their own national “common sense” which depends on their ability to disseminate them through the media?

This ongoing struggle for hegemony manifests itself not only in the content of the media but also in the way Kurdish and Turkish audiences make
sense of these texts. Thus, in my empirical work with migrant audiences, I tested out these ideas of hegemony and counter hegemony, exploring how Turkish and Kurdish migrants make sense of the symbols, ideas and stories told by the media. I have shown that they have taken these stories and worked with them, accepting, re-telling and transforming them. It is a complex process rather than a matter of the media disseminating ideas to migrants who simply absorb and reproduce them. However, the media is clearly important as part of the process of making sense, by framing and reiterating a nationalistic discourse which migrants engage with, appropriating the stories told by the media.

Transnational Kurdish and Turkish media have created imagined Turkish and Kurdish communities in different geo-political spaces, repositioning migrant communities in the ongoing conflict. Thus, migrants in Stockholm, Berlin and London engage with the same media stories, laugh about the same cartoons and suffer with the same characters of soap operas, with the killing of Kurdish civilians in Kurdistan or Kurdish guerrillas (Kurds) and Turkish soldiers (Turks). They also receive the same news and are faced with the same polarisation of Kurdish and Turkish identities in representations of the ethno-national conflict. Therefore, the media has created a new culture that includes conversations between those who migrate and those who stay behind. This transnational media culture also connects migrants in different parts of the diaspora.

At the same time, the opportunities of transnational media have also allowed for a freer expression of Kurdish identity (Hassanpour 1998, Romano 2002). Alongside the polarisation of Kurdish and Turkish identities in the homeland media, this process of trans-nationalization of media has created more pronounced Kurdish and Turkish identifications, both among migrants in Europe and in Turkey/Kurdistan. Transnational media connect people across different geographical spaces and build imagined
communities beyond geography. Turkish and Kurdish transnational media talk on behalf of the nation to the nation, regardless of where the members of these imagined national communities live. But these opportunities for connecting people across disparate geographic spaces may also have the effect of polarising them, within the shared geographical space. Thus, the polarisation of Kurdish and Turkish identities, through the media representations of the ethno-national conflict, has lead some of my Kurdish and Turkish interviewees in Berlin, Stockholm or London to stop contact with each other (see chapter V and VI).

The thesis has argued that the Kurdish and Turkish transnational media therefore should be seen as an important factor in the de-territorialisation and differentiation of ethno-national identities of migrants in Europe. The significance of transnational media in enabling migrants to construct increasingly differentiated identities can be better understood with the example of previously denied or marginalised identities. The key focus of this thesis has been on the significance of the Kurdish media in creating Kurdish identifications among migrants in Europe. The role of the transnational media in creating new identities has also played a significant role in the case of the Elewîs. Arinas with Kurdish Elewî background in Berlin argued that she did not know much about the meaning of Elewîsm when she was in Turkey as it was marginalised in public discourse. But after migrating to Berlin, she learned a lot about her Elewî identity, as she put it, through the transnational media. While the transnational media speaks to multiple aspects of migrants’ identities, the focus of this thesis has been on the representations of the Kurdish-Turkish ethno-national conflict and their impact on identity formation in repositioning and mobilizing migrants for homeland politics. A key finding of the empirical work was that migrants’ multiple identities were reduced to single national identifications as either Turkish or Kurdish when it came to the question of how they viewed media representations of the Kurdish-Turkish ethno-
national conflict. It emerged from the interviews that this conflict has reinforced an ethnic division, differentiating Kurdish and Turkish migrants in Europe.

The transnational media has a dual effect: on one hand, their reporting of the Kurdish-Turkish ethno-national conflict is important in mobilizing migrants' allegiances to the homeland. They emphasize one single aspect of migrants' multiple identities, namely their ethno-national identities as Kurdish or Turkish. The transnational media's reporting on the Kurdish-Turkish national conflict plays a key role in migrants' privileging of either their Kurdish or Turkish identity. When migrants position themselves vis-à-vis the media reporting on the Kurdish-Turkish national conflict, most migrants take up polarized ethno-national identities as Kurd or Turk, while other aspects of their identities become secondary. On the other hand, transnational Kurdish and Turkish media play an important role in de-territorializing the Turkish and Kurdish ethno-national conflict. By reporting on the ethno-national conflict and at the same time attempting to mobilize migrants' identities for conflicting identities either Kurdish or Turkish, the transnational media make the conflict an integral part of migrants' everyday lives in Europe. In addition, the transnational media mobilize Kurdish and Turkish migrants and call on them to lobby governments and institutions of the countries they live in, as well as those of the European Union. This clearly shows the tremendous impact of the mediated homeland on migrants.

My PhD has primarily explored the role of media in constructing imagined communities and employing banal nationalism as constitutive elements in the struggle for hegemony between the two communities, to build their sense of ethno-national identity. One important instance I have shown of this de-territorialisation was the capture of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (the PKK). The power of the media can be
shown when contrasting the extent to which two important events in the Kurdish national struggle achieved political visibility in Europe. When Saddam Hussein’s regime used chemical weapon against the Kurds in 1988, the chemical attack on Kurds did not even turn into proper news in Europe about the genocide. Kurds protested locally but this did not have a significant impact in Europe as they were not organized on a transnational level. One reason for this is that Kurdish media had not developed at that time and did not play a role in organizing such a transnational mobilization. This contrast sharply with the capture of Öcalan in 1999: Kurdish migrants followed with high hopes and excitement the live broadcasts and newspaper reports of Öcalan’s arrival in Europe and his journey through the skies above European countries. The Kurdish media message at the time encouraged Kurdish migrants’ hopes by arguing that Turkey’s Kurdish question would be solved if Öcalan could find a place in Europe. The chapter on Öcalan and the “victory” headlines of the Turkish media and the call of Kurdish media to protest his capture has argued that the Kurdish transnational media has considerable power, as the Turkish media does, to mobilize migrants. Thousands of migrants demonstrated from the Middle East to Europe and America. The Kurdish media has interconnected the Kurds, regardless of political, cultural, class, gender, religious or dialect differences as a unified, imagined Kurdish community against the “occupier”. The Kurdish media has used the symbolic power of the figure of Öcalan to create a strong imagined community. This is a development of historical importance that indicates that Turkey has lost its consensual control over a significant group of Kurdish migrants in Europe and in Turkey/Kurdistan. Instead, Kurds have built strong solidarity all over the world through their tragic story.

The Turkish state has used coercion in Kurdistan but Turkey could not use its state monopoly of violence against the Kurds in Europe. Instead, the Turkish state has tried to call on Turkish migrants through the Turkish
media. Some Turkish migrant organisations are closely connected to the Turkish media and influenced by its aggressive reporting about the Kurds. On the other hand, the Kurdish media chose similar ways to mobilize Kurdish migrants to protest against Turkish state policies. This was not only a hegemonic struggle between the Turkish state and Kurdish national movements but between the Turkish media and the Kurdish media as well as the respective migrant communities (see chapter VI and VII). This hegemonic struggle has strengthened the ethno-national conflict between the Turkish and Kurdish migrants. The Turkish state’s handling of the event and media representations of Öcalan’s humiliation have been seen by Kurdish migrants as humiliation of their own personality and nation. Moreover, the images of folded hands and blindfolded eyes brought back the memories of the Kurds who were subjected to state violence in their homeland. In this sense, the Kurdish and Turkish transnational media have played an important role in polarising the ethno-national identification of Kurds and Turks in Europe (see chapter VI and Appendix A).

I have argued that the two communities in conflict share a particular space in Turkey and in Europe. There are different levels on which this conflict is played out. Examining the ways in which migrants make sense of the media representations of the conflict, I have found that the emotional aspects play an important role (see chapter VI and Appendix A). Many Kurdish people, even those who did not identify as supporters of the PKK or Öcalan, had strong emotional reactions to the media reporting on Öcalan’s capture and on the killing of Kurdish civilians and guerrillas. These media representations struck a chord with Kurdish migrants, precisely because they connected to their own experiences and stories they had heard from parents, relatives, friends or the media. They identified as members of an imagined Kurdish community. This was not just about speaking language, but an emotional reaction which, in the context of nationalism, is fundamental. Nationalism is about passion,
feeling and emotion. I found similar responses and experiences in all three European countries. This is an imagined community that does not have a physical basis in a unified homeland, but exists in the minds of Kurds. I have argued here, that it exists in part because of the way the transnational media brought together diasporic groups and connected them with their homeland. This also constitutes a challenge to the imagined community of the countries of settlement which have tried to integrate “others” culturally and linguistically into their imagined communities through different integration policies. Therefore, the intervention of these media in the lives of migrants, mobilizing them for homeland politics is seen as creating “parallel and mutually exclusive media communities” (Robins 1998:11) on their national soil (Piorr et al. 1996). This development is viewed as a potential threat and challenge to the sovereignty of the European countries of residence (Heitmeyer, Müller et al. 1997; Özdemir 1997; Robins 1998; Georgiou 2005) and as “dissociated from the social life” of everyday (Marenbach, 1995, quoted in Aksoy, 2001b:344) in the countries of settlement. I have defined “rhetoric distances” (Billig 1995:49) of the Turkish, Kurdish and settlement countries’ media of “us” from “them”, of “our” world from “theirs” (Billig 1995:49) as “three-way banal nationalism”. This competing triangular banal nationalism can be defined as “…an ideological consciousness of nationhood” which “can be seen to be at work that embraces a complex set of themes about “us”, “our homeland”, “nation” (“ours” and “theirs”, the “world”, as well as the morality of national duty and honour” (Billig 1995:4). The debates on the “parallel society “should be understood from this perspective of competing forms of three-way, banal nationalism in the countries of settlement. “Our” nationalism is taken for granted by the counterposed media to create alternative imagined political communities contesting for a place within the “order of nations” (Billig 1995:1).
Contributions to debates theorizing the role of transnational media

I have shown that the concepts of “banal nationalism” and “imagined community” should be extended to cover the study of transnational communities because transnationalism is a process “by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement”, (Basch et al. 1994:6) “across the borders of multiple nation-states” (Faist 2000:189) which are “multi-connected, multi-referential” (Soysal 2000:13). These transnational communities are not given, but constructed through their involvement and intervention in homeland politics (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2001). The transnational media play an important role in the identity formation of Kurdish and Turkish migrants in Europe and the positions they take up.

Gramsci’s concept of hegemony can be usefully applied to the question of conflict in national and diasporic imagined communities where a constant war of position takes place between different social groups to ally themselves with those in power or to create an alternative set of alliances from below to challenge for hegemony. In particular, this concept has helped in exploring the different ways in which the Turkish state and media have defined Kurds deploying pejorative terminology such as “bandit”, “separatist”, “terrorist” and how the Kurdish national movement and media have challenged Turkish “common sense” by developing a Kurdish alternative common sense in Turkey/Kurdistan and amongst transnational Kurdish communities in Europe. The members of the imagined Turkish and Kurdish communities manifest themselves in diverse places because they share a sense of collective national identity which is, in my account, directed and developed through shared experiences of the media.

The ethnicisation of the media landscape and of the migrant communities has been perceived by some host countries as a problem or threat, defined by the media, some politicians and academics as “a parallel society” within
the imagined community (Heitmeyer 1996; Heitmeyer, Müller et al. 1997; Lambsdorff 1998; Schulte 2002). But what the proponents of a “parallel society” fail to appreciate is that migrants also have individual identities which are no longer singular and exclusive, so they are also no longer passive consumers as a media audience. The ethno-national conflict and Kurdish identity pose key challenges to the Turkish state and media as well as to Turkish migrants. Similarly when the Kurds watch Kurdish TV or read Kurdish and then watch the Turkish media, they feel the victim of Turkish state terror which positions them against the Turkish state and its related symbols and culture. These issues can reduce the multiple identities of individuals in some transnational spaces to a simple polarised opposition of Kurd and Turk, strengthening belonging to the Turkish or Kurdish imagined community in Europe, but there is also evidence of transnational migrant practices that cut across this. The outcome of the research clearly illustrates that Kurds and Turks read the provided texts and media images differently. But individuals within the Kurdish and Turkish communities also read the media contents differently. This different reading depends on the media sources they draw on, but also varies with age, occupation, gender, length of residency, education.

**Contributions to debates about Turkish and Kurdish migrants in Europe**

It is important to highlight that Turkish and Kurdish migrants have multiple identities. In many situations they articulate complex identities. Yet, the effect of media reporting of the Kurdish-Turkish ethno-national conflict is to reduce these to singular, national identities as either Kurdish or Turkish. Thus, identities which were multiple and complexly articulated in other contexts become singular and polarised as migrants reposition themselves as a consequence of the highly politicised media reporting of the conflict.
My research has shown that Kurds and Turks have developed distinct identities in Europe. They cannot any longer be viewed as a homogeneous group of “Turkish migrants”. Therefore the research which encompasses the Kurds within the category of “Turkish migrants” (Robins and Aksoy 2000, Erdemir and Vasta 2007, Çaglas 2007) cannot take account of the deterritorialization, differentiation and division of Turkish and Kurdish migrant identities.

Kurdish and Turkish migrants have developed a media culture which plays a tremendous role in informing them, as well as shaping their opinions. Especially Kurdish migrants’ transnational media provide an important source of information about events in Turkey and Kurdistan, as they report on issues that are not covered by Turkish media or are only covered in a one-sided way.

Rather than arriving in Europe with a fully formed Kurdish identity, many Kurdish migrants have developed an identity as Kurds in the diaspora. In this process, transnational Kurdish media have played an important role. The media have contributed to the construction of an autonomous Kurdish identity. On the other hand, the freedom of expression that Kurds enjoy in Europe has helped to develop the Kurdish language and Kurdish media. Thus, Kurdish television broadcasting, which began in Europe, has made Kurdish media accessible to a wide range of audiences both in Europe and in Kurdistan.

**Contribution to debates on research methods**

This research has contributed to doing politically sensitive research amongst groups in conflict. While many researchers have focused on the problems of doing sensitive research on health, sexual behaviour issues, HIV/AIDS, mental health, dying and death (Davies et al. 1998, Benoliel...
1984, Shreffler 1999, Johnson and Clarke Macleod 2003, Dickson-Swift et al. 2008) and other “socially sensitive” (Sieber and Stanley 1988) or “culturally sensitive” (Johnson and Clarke Macleod 2003) issues, politically sensitive research topics have received comparatively little attention. This research has provided a rich account of migrants’ memories, experiences and politically motivated emotions. It has also gathered data on highly controversial issues affecting both institutions which wield disproportionate power, and individuals in transnational spaces, to show how they make sense of the media framing of the ethno-national conflict through banal nationalism.

**Contribution to debates about the Kurdish-Turkish ethno-national conflict**

The Kurdish transnational media (newspapers and TV) produced in Europe and in Turkey have actively helped to produce a Kurdish identity and imagined community both in Turkey and in Europe. The Kurdish transnational media have created new ways of understanding Kurdish identity and language as culturally and politically legitimate. This has been part of constructing a counter-hegemonic historic bloc and common sense among Kurds against Turkish nationalistic discourse and dominance. The Kurdish media produced in Turkey and transnationally have contributed to the formation of this Kurdish historic bloc in opposition to the Turkish state’s national imagined community. Especially Kurdish migrants’ transnational media culture has acted as an alternative source of information about the war and as a counter narrative. As many European media have limited access to the area of war, they have often relied on the Turkish media for their sources, and therefore not provided any alternative perspective. The Kurdish media have been instrumental not only in providing information from a different viewpoint, but also a different way of
making sense of the conflict that constitutes a counter-hegemonic “common sense”.

In my empirical research I have found that the migrants’ views and ethnic identities are polarised in Germany because of their marginalisation within the society. What is lacking is a multicultural approach which can enable societies to reach mutual acceptance of ethnic diversity. Moreover, the dominance of the Turkish state’s representation of the conflict has led the German authorities to deny recognition of Kurdish identity and ban Kurdish organisations and media. German state discourse has served to legitimise the position of the organisations and individuals loyal to the Turkish state and enabled them to use Germany as a base to undermine Kurdish identity and the legitimacy of the Kurdish national struggle. In the UK there is a greater degree of mutual acceptance of separate Turkish and Kurdish identities because of the acceptance of distinct communities in the British multicultural paradigm and the strength of the Kurds among the migrant population. In Sweden, in contrast to both these two cases, Kurdish identity is better recognised and represented in public life than Turkish identity. This I reflected in the separate Kurdish and Turkish communities, the former feeling well represented in the media, while the Turks feel challenged by this difference. It is clear that mutual acceptance and multicultural policies reduce the transnational ethno-national conflict amongst Turkish and Kurdish migrants in Europe, as the UK and Sweden prove.
X. APPENDIX

APPENDIX A: Print and Visual Material for Research

1. Print Materials:
1.1. A double investigation of the “multi-lingual local council” (From Pro Kurdish Özgür Politika Newspaper)
Ramazan YAVUZ/ DİYARBAKIR, (DHA)

The Ministry of the Interior and the Attorney General of the Republic have started two different investigations into the decision of the local council of Sur in Diyarbakir to conduct turn the local council multi-lingual. Two inspectors sent by the ministry have begun the investigation work in Diyarbakir.

The local council of Sur (Diyarbakir) governed by the DTP (Democratic Society Party) has taken a decision to become a multi-lingual local council last week. In response to this decision, the ministry of the Interior and Diyarbakir Attorney General started two investigations. Ahmet Koyuncu and N. Nursel, Chief Inspectors from the Ministry of the Interior have started their work.

The Inspectors wanted to see the decision taken by Sur local council and wrote the following letter: “We ask that all documents, and information, council decisions, committee reports, proposals, and its applications relating to Sur council’s decision to deliver services not only in Turkish but also in Kurdish, Syriac and English that is against our constitution and its legislation and regulation be sent to our inspectorate”

In addition to this investigation on the multi-lingual council, the inspectors have also started an investigation on a project the council started previously: the development of a Kurdish writing software based on Linux. In their letter on the issue to Sur council they say the following:
“We ask to be sent information on the purpose of having this writing software developed, which company or person was charged with developing the software. We ask for information on the uses of the writing software in official work and procedure, on which and how many units and computers belonging to the council the software is installed and being used. We ask for information on whether the software was paid for out of the council’s budget and if so we ask to be sent the related necessary claim forms and their confirmation, the contracts and the proof of payment. We ask for two copies of all documents to be sent urgently to the inspectorate”.

**Investigation of the General Attorney**

Not only the Ministry of Interior, but also the General Attorney in Diyarbakir has also started an investigation of Sur council’s decision to become multilingual. In its letter marked “urgent”, the General Attorneyship states.

“We ask to be urgently sent one copy of the decision your council made that from now on apart from Turkish languages such as Kurdish, Armenian, Syriac and English will be used in council publications and the identity cards, names and addresses of those present at the meeting in question, as well as the minutes and summaries of the decisions of the meeting in question”

The Sur council leaders have handed in the council decision and all related records and documents to the general attorney’s office.
1.2. The prohibition of Turkish language goes to the UN (from Turkish Hürriyet Newspaper 27 December 2006)

The Turkish civil society organization resisting the prohibition of Turkish language classes at the German town of Rastatt have decided to take the issue to international institutions. The Turkish community organisations will take the issue to the UN and the European Council. The Ambassador of Karlsruhe, Sadik Toprak is holding a press conference relating to the prohibition of mother tongue in Rastatt today at 3pm. Toprak will inform about official initiatives. Toprak will meet parents and representatives of civil society to evaluate the events of Rastatt. The ambassador will give information about the planned official initiatives in response to the prohibition of mother tongue classes in Rastatt. The Turkish public is curious and awaiting Toprak’s declarations.

**Initiatives on the international level**

The Turkish civil society organizations resident in Rastatt have come together under the name of Union of Turkish Community Organizations to unify their forces. The prohibition of mother tongue has provoked a strong reaction among the Turks living in Germany and the “Union of Turkish Community Organizations” has announced it will resist it on the one hand on the local level on the other hand it has decided to take this to international institutions.

Representatives of the Union are determined to take this to international platforms, foremost to the United Nations (UN) and the Council of Europe and other institutions. They will apply to these organizations to counter inequalities and follow up the issue to the end they stated.

**Meeting on 13 January**

Those who said that they would not remain silent in the face of this issue that denies equal education are calling for a protest meeting. The Protest meeting will be realized with the support of other civil society organizations
such as Italian or Croats and will be held in the first month of the New Year on 13th January. The meeting will be held in front of Rastatt Townhall from 2pm. Under the slogan “If you want to speak Turkish to your grandchildren come here for your children!” the meeting plans to draw attention to the injustice done to Turkish pupils. The Rastatt council had taken the decision not to provide classrooms for the provision of Turkish language classes.

2. Visual Materials

2.1. Pictures

2.1.1. The Turkish Flag (From Hürriyet Newspaper)
2.1.2. “The Capture of Öcalan” by Turkish security forces (Photo from Milliyet Newspaper)

![Photo of Öcalan](image)

2.2. Audio-visual material

2.2.1. Speech of the Chief of the Turkish General Staff for Migrants in the USA (from Turkish Star TV)

APPENDIX B: QUESTIONS ABOUT VISUAL AND PRINT MATERIALS FOR FOCUS GROUPS

1. The Turkish Flag
   a. What do you feel when you see this flag?
   b. Do you think that Kurds feel differently when they see the Turkish flag?

2. The Capture of Öcalan
   a. What do you feel when you see this picture?
   b. Do you think that Turks feel differently when they see this picture?

3. Speech of the Chief of the Turkish General Staff for Migrants in the USA
   a. How do you find his speech?
   b. What is the content of his speech?
   c. He talks about the internally and externally “enemies” in his speech. Do you know about whose he talks?
   d. He mentioned in his speech about dynamic forces (dinamik Gucler) who will fight against enemy. Whom does he mean with the term “dynamic forces”?
   e. Do you think that military should express its opinion about political situation in Turkey in public?
   f. Do you agree with him? Could you define yourself as a part of “dynamic forces”?

The issue of the Languages (Newspaper coverage)
   a. What are differences between both situations?
   b. Do you think the intervention in Turkey is justified?
   c. Do you think the intervention in Germany is justified?
   d. Do you think Kurds in Turkey should have the right to use their language? Why?
   e. Do you think Turks or Kurds in Germany should have the right to use their language? Why?
f. What should the state do in Germany about language rights of minorities?
g. What should the state do in Turkey about language rights of minorities?
h. What should the EU do for the language rights of minorities in Germany?
i. What should the EU do for the language rights of minorities in Turkey?

APPENDIX C: QUESTIONS ABOUT FOCUS GROUP
These questions were given to participants after the focus group discussion in the one-to-one interviews.

1. How did you feel during focus group? How did you find the atmosphere?
2. Which opinion or persons have irritated you?
3. Which opinion or person did you find close to you?
4. Do you think that you felt free and said everything which you wanted to say regarding the focus group discussion?
APPENDIX D: QUESTION FOR LONG INTERVIEW WITH KURDISH PARTICIPANTS

1. Interviewee’s background in the country of origin and in the settlement country including education, age, gender, income, family, place/locality of residence, work experience, professional background, and why did s/he emigrate?

Question related to the Kurdish participant and her/his media consumption and to the relationship between Kurdish participant and Kurdish community as well as Turkish state institution in the UK

2. Do you have any contact to Turkish people, Turkish communities or Turkish state institutions? Are you member of any Turkish associations? What do you think about these contacts?

3. Do you have any contact to Kurdish people, Kurdish communities or Turkish state institutions? Are you member of any Kurdish associations? Do you involved in political issues regarding Kurdistan or Kurds in the UK? Which identity are for you important e.g. Kurdishness, Islam, Secularity, Elewite, Feminism, Britishness, and Londoner Etc?

4. If you think of Turkey or Kurdistan what is important for you in Turkey or Kurdistan e.g. your family and relatives, Kurdish culture and Language, Kurdish Flag, Religion, Laicism, Kurdish guerrilla, Kurdish economy, Kurdish media, Turk and Kurds Relations, Kurdish democracy, Human rights and Right of Minorities, Freedom of opinion and expression, Press Freedom

5. Have you ever watched Turkish channels or read Turkish Newspapers? What do you think about Turkish media?

6. How many hours do you spend watching TV or reading Newspaper everyday? How many hours do you watch Kurdish or Turkish channels/read Kurdish or Turkish Newspaper?

7. Which Kurdish and Turkish media do you watch/read? Why these Newspapers/Channels? How often do you watch news on Kurdish or
Turkish channels and which programs do you watch on Kurdish channels?

8. Where do you watch Kurdish or Turkish channels? With whom do you watch Kurdish or Turkish channels? Who manages the remote control at home?

9. Who watches more Kurdish or Turkish channels in your family? Gender/Age/Occupation/Education

10. If you are interested in news which news are you more interested in from Turkey or Kurdistan? Which subject is important? E.g. Sport, Governments-, Military-, Guerrilla activates, Kurdish issue, human rights, economy, religion, laicism etc. why?

11. How do you find news on Kurdish channel and in Newspapers? How do you find the use of language in news?

12. Do you think the Kurdish or Turkish television and Newspaper have had a positive or negative influence on Turkish and Kurdish migrants regarding integration of Turks and Kurds in settlement countries and Nationalism, ethnic conflict between the Turks and the Kurds in EU? How do you know that?

13. Do you think that Government or military has influence on media in Turkey?

14. What about Kurdish media? Does this media independent Kurdish media or by parties run media? What about freedom of opinion and expression and press freedom within the Kurdish society and Kurdish media?

15. How satisfied are you with the Kurdish media’s coverage of people and events in your own community? Do you feel involved in Kurdish media? Could you give an Example?
Question related to spread of ethnic conflict:

16. Do you have any contact with Turks? How do you get on well with Turks in London? What do you think about Turks?
17. What do you think if the Turks go in street and demonstrate against policy of Kurds?
18. How is Kurds portrayed in Turkish media? How satisfied are you with the media’s coverage of news about Kurdish question in Turkey? Do you agree with the Kurdish media coverage about the Kurds?
19. How is Turks portrayed in Kurdish media? Do you agree with the Kurdish media coverage about the Turks?
20. Do you know that the relationship is different between Kurds and Turks in other countries where Turkish and Kurdish migrants live?
21. How does the UK depict in Kurdish media? Which role has to play the UK in conflict between Kurds and Turks?
22. How does the EU depict in Kurdish media? Which role has to play the EU in conflict between Kurds and Turks?
23. Do you join any demonstration which the Kurdish television or Newspaper have had announced?

Question related to settlement country and participants knowledge about settlement

Country and its media

24. How do you feel in London?
25. Do you have any knowledge of the relevant policies of the settlement country and how did you acquire such knowledge (through the settlement country media or Kurdish/ Turkish media, ethnic networks, friends or relatives, other sources of information)? What kind of information do you have on these policies and who gave it to you?
26. Contact with various types of authorities, including direct or indirect experience. Can you give me examples? How did you feel about it?
27. Contact with natives (individuals, families). Again illustrate both facts and perceptions of the contact. Can you give me examples? How did you feel about it?

28. Contact with non-statutory agencies: Immigrants associations or other non-governmental organizations. Can you give me examples? How did you feel about it?

29. Do you also watch British channels? If yes how many hours do you watch British channels? Which British channels do you watch? Which programs do you watch on British channels?

30. How does the Kurds depict in British media? And how does the Turkish and Kurdish conflict depict in British media?

31. Who watches British channels in your family? Gender/Age/Occupation / Education of them

32. How often do you go back and forth between the country of origin and the country of settlement? Do you have any contact to other countries in Europe?

33. Which country do you consider as your home?

**Internet**

34. Do you read Newspaper/watch television on internet? From which particularly Internet Newspaper (except regularly Newspaper) do you get information? Many migrants read Newspaper on internet. They can send their comment about every news. Do you send any comment via internet to Kurdish internet Newspaper? Were your comments published on internet Newspaper?

35. Do you take contact to your relatives/ party/ organization in Turkey/ Kurdistan or in EU by internet? If yes. Could you please give name of countries/party/organization?
APPENDIX E: QUESTION FOR IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW WITH THE TURKISH PARTICIPANTS

1. Interviewee’s background in the country of origin and in the settlement country including education, age, gender, income, family, place/locality of residence, work experience, professional background, and why did s/he emigrate?

Question related to the Turkish participant and her/his media consumption and to the relationship between the Turkish participant and the Turkish community as well as the Turkish state institution in the UK

2. Do you have any contact to Turkish people, Turkish communities or Turkish state institutions? Are you member of any Turkish associations? Do you involved in political issues regarding Turkey or Turks in the UK? Which identity are for you important e.g. Turkishness, Islam, Secularity, Elewitism, Feminism, Britishness, and Londoner etc?

3. When you think of Turkey what is important for you in Turkey e.g. your family and relatives, Turkish culture and Language, Turkish Flag, Religion, Laicism, Turkish Military, Unity of Turkey, Turkish economy, Turkish media, Turk and Kurds Relations, Turkish democracy, Human Rights and Right of Minorities, Freedom of opinion and expression, Press Freedom

4. How many hours do you spend watching TV or reading Newspaper everyday? How many hours do you watch Turkish channels/ read Turkish Newspaper?

5. Which Turkish media do you watch/read? Why these Newspapers/Channels? How often do you watch news on Turkish Channels and

6. Which programs do you watch on Turkish channels?

7. Where do you watch Turkish channels? With whom do you watch Turkish/Kurdish channels? Who manages the remote control at home?
8. Who watches more Turkish channels in your family? Gender/Age/Occupation/Education

9. If you are interested in news which news are you more interested in from Turkey? Which subject is important? E.g. Sport, Governments activates, Military, Kurdish issue, human rights, economy, religion, laicism etc. why?

10. How do you find news on Turkish channel and in Newspapers? How do you find the use of language in news?

11. Do you think the Turkish/Kurdish television and Newspaper have had a positive or negative influence on Turkish and Kurdish migrants regarding integration of Turks and Kurds in settlement countries and Nationalism, ethnic conflict between the Turks and the Kurds in EU? How do you know that?

12. How satisfied are you with the Turkish media's coverage of people and events in your own community? Do you feel involved in Turkish media? Could you give an Example?

**Question related to spread of ethnic conflict:**

13. Do you have any contact with Kurds? How do you get on well with Kurds in London? What do you think about Kurds?

14. What do you think if the Kurds go in street and demonstrate against policy of Turkish state?

15. Do you think that Government or military has influence on media in Turkey?

16. How is Kurds portrayed in Turkish media? How satisfied are you with the media’s coverage of news about Kurdish question in Turkey? Do you agree with the Turkish media coverage about the Kurds?

17. Have you ever watched Kurdish channels or read Kurdish Newspapers? What do you think about Kurdish media?
18. Do you know that the relationship is different between Kurds and Turks in other countries where Turkish and Kurdish migrants live?
19. How does the UK depict in Turkish media? Which role has to play the UK in conflict between Kurds and Turks?
20. How does the EU depict in Turkish media? Which role has to play the EU in conflict between Kurds and Turks?
21. Do you join any demonstration which the Turkish television or Newspaper have had announced?

Question related to settlement country and participants knowledge about settlement country and its media

22. How do you feel in London?
23. Do you have any knowledge of the relevant policies of the settlement country and how did you acquire such knowledge (through the settlement country media or Kurdish-/Turkish media, ethnic networks, friends or relatives, other sources of information)? What kind of information do you have on these policies and who gave it to you?
24. Contact with various types of authorities, including direct or indirect experience. Can you give me examples? How did you feel about it?
25. Contact with natives (individuals, families). Again illustrate both facts and perceptions of the contact. Can you give me examples? How did you feel about it?
26. Contact with non-statutory agencies: Immigrants associations or other non-governmental organizations. Can you give me examples? How did you feel about it?
27. Do you also watch British channels? If yes how many hours do you watch British channels? Which British channels do you watch? Which programs do you watch on British channels?
28. How does the Turks depict in British media? And how does the Kurdish and Turkish conflict depict in British media?
29. Who watches British channels in your family? Gender/Age/Occupation / Education of them

30. How often do you go back and forth between the country of origin and the country of settlement? Do you have any contact to other countries in Europe?

31. Which country do you consider as your home?

**Internet**

32. Do you read Newspaper/watch television on internet? From which particularly Internet Newspaper (except regularly Newspaper) do you get information? Many migrants read Newspaper on internet and they can send their comment about every news. Do you send any comment via internet to Turkish internet Newspaper? Were your comments published on internet Newspaper?

33. Do you take contact to your relatives/ party/ organization in Turkey or in EU by internet? If yes. Could you please give name of countries/party/organization?

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### APPENDIX F: ACESS TO INTERVIEWEES AND LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

#### Table 1: Kurdish Interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Stockholm</th>
<th>Berlin</th>
<th>London</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 interviewees</td>
<td>2 interviewees at Kurdiska Biblioteket i Stockholm (Kurdish Library in Stockholm)</td>
<td>3 interviewees at Kurdisches Zentrum e.V. Berlin (Kurdish Centre in Berlin)</td>
<td>2 interviewees at Kurdish Community Centre in London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>at Kurdiska Riksförbundet Kurdish Federation in Sweden</td>
<td>1 interviewee at Kurdiska Riksförbundet Kurdish Federation in Sweden</td>
<td>2 interviewees at Kurdisches Volkshaus e.V. (Kurdish People House)</td>
<td>1 interviewee at Halkevi-Kurdish-Turkish Community Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 interviewees</td>
<td>4 interviewees at Apec Publishing House</td>
<td>1 interview via Kurdistan-AG (Kurdish Student Group)</td>
<td>2 interviewees at Day-Mer Kurdish-Turkish Community Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>at Apec Publishing House</td>
<td>6 interviewees contacted through my own exploratory field trip to Stockholm- Rinkeby, Tensta, Alby at cafes and restaurants</td>
<td>2 interviewees at Dersim Kulturgemeinde e.V. (Dersim Cultural Community)</td>
<td>3 interviewees contacted via Kurdish Studies and Student Facebook</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 interviewees</td>
<td>5 interviewees contacted through Facebook and Viva Kurdistan social network</td>
<td>2 interviewees at Yekmal e.V (Kurdish Parent Organisation)</td>
<td>2 interviewees at Elewî Cem House and Cultural Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>snowballed</td>
<td>3 interviewees snowballed through previous interviewees’ contact</td>
<td>2 interviewees at Kurdistan Kultur- und Hilfsverein e.V. Berlin (Kurdish Culture and Aid Organisation on Berlin)</td>
<td>5 interviewees contacted through my own exploratory field trips to Hackney, Harringey and Islington in London (cafes, restaurants, Minicab office)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 interviewee at Elewîtesches Kulturzentrum (Elewî Cultural Centre)</td>
<td>5 interviewees snowballed through previous interviewees’ contact</td>
<td>7 interviewees</td>
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<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Contact Method</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| Stockholm    | 2 interviewees via former leader of Turkska Riksförbundets (Turkish federation) in Stockholm
|              | 3 interviewees via a Turkish mother tongue teacher                            |
|              | 2 interviewees via Stockholm Bredäng Monsque                                  |
|              | 3 interviewees contacted through my own exploratory field trip to Stockholm-Rinkeby, Tensta, Alby, Kista at cafes, restaurants |
|              | 2 interviewees contacted through Facebook                                     |
|              | 3 interviewees contacted through Facebook                                     |
| Berlin       | 1 interviewees at and 1 via Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin (Turkish Community in Berlin) |
|              | 2 interviewees at Familiengarten des Kotti e.V. Berlin (Families Garden of Kotti-Berlin) |
|              | 2 interviewees at Şehitlik Mosque in Berlin                                    |
|              | 2 interviewees at Hilfs- und Solidaritätsverein für Rentner, Behinderte und Senioren (EMDER) |
| London       | 1 interviewee at The Süleymaniye Mosque                                        |
|              | 2 interviewees at Aziziye Mosque                                              |
|              | 2 interviewees at Turkish Cypriots centre                                     |
|              | 4 interviewees at a restaurant where people from the Embassy and Turkish federation regularly visit |
|              | 3 interviewees contacted through my own exploratory field trips to Hackney, Harringey and |

Table 2: Turkish Interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stockholm</th>
<th>Berlin</th>
<th>London</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 interviewees via former</td>
<td>1 interviewees at and 1 via Türkische Gemeinde zu Berlin</td>
<td>1 interviewee at The Süleymaniye Mosque</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>leader of Turkska Riksförbundets (Turkish federation) in Stockholm</td>
<td>(Turkish Community in Berlin)</td>
<td>(Turkish Community in Berlin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 interviewees via a Turkish</td>
<td>2 interviewees at Familiengarten des Kotti e.V. Berlin</td>
<td>2 interviewees at Aziziye Mosque</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mother tongue teacher</td>
<td>(Families Garden of Kotti-Berlin)</td>
<td>(Families Garden of Kotti-Berlin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 interviewees via Stockholm</td>
<td>2 interviewees at Şehitlik Mosque in Berlin</td>
<td>2 interviewees at Turkish Cypriots centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bredäng Monsque</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3 interviewees contacted</td>
<td>2 interviewees at Hilfs- und Solidaritätsverein für Rentner,</td>
<td>4 interviewees at a restaurant where people from the Embassy and Turkish federation regularly visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>through my own exploratory</td>
<td>Behinderte und Senioren (EMDER)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>field trip to Stockholm-Rinkeby</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 interviewees contacted</td>
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### Demographical information of Participants

**Stockholm**

Demographic information about focus group interview Kurdish participants in Stockholm

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**Berlin**

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## London

**Demographic information about focus group interview Kurdish participants in London**

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### Demographic information about focus group interview Turkish participants in London

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Demographic information about In-depth interview Turkish participants in London

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Accessed date:10.09.2010
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Notes

1. The Kurdish-oriented parties have been shut down one after the other by the constitutional court on the grounds of separatism and/or supporting the Kurdistan Workers Party (Marcus, 2007; Valentine 2007). The recently banned DTP was replaced with the Peace and Democracy Party. In addition left-oriented and critical, PKK opponent, pro-Kurdish parties have been banned from politics.

2. Gramsci did not use the term counter-hegemony however the term has been used widely by scholars of hegemony including Neo-Gramscians (Pratt 2004), and realists (Jospeh 2000), to explain the way in which the alternative forces pose a challenge to the hegemonic domination and its legitimacy within the cultural, economic, ideological, and political frame (Schwarzmantel 2009).

3. The idea that the ethnic differentiation among Turkish migrants was created by European countries was a common idea by Turkish participants in Berlin, Stockholm and London.

4. Kromsey claims the mixture of languages as ‘speech disorders’

5. According to Andrews there are more than 40 ethnic groups in the Turkish Republic (Andrews, P. A. 1989. Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey, Wiesbaden, Benninghaus, Rödiger.)

6. While some Kurds supported Mustafa Kemal, others in the Kocgirl uprising in 1920 revolted against his movement and organised an insurrection.

7. Law for the Maintenance of Order (Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu), promulgated on 4 March 1925. By virtue of this Act, martial law was declared which granted the Government broad powers to ban all kinds of organisations, propaganda and publications that could lead to a reaction and rebellion against Turkish public order and security.

8. Kemalism refers to the principles of the founder of the Turkish republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk who defines the official Turkish state ideology as consisting of 6 pillars: Republicanism, Populism, Secularism, Revolutionism, Nationalism, Statism. Kemalism has outlawed three ideologies in the Turkish political and cultural sphere: Komünizm (Communism) ve Kürşülük Kürdism (Kurdish nationalism) and İslamilik (Islamism/political Islam)

9. The Eastern Revolutionary Cultural Hearths (Turkish: Devrimci Doğu Kültür Dernekleri, DDKO, Kurdish: Civîngehên Çandî yên Şoregerê Rojhilat) in 1969, Partîya Sosyalîsta Kurdistan (PSK) in 1974. Later on National Liberation of Kurdistan (KUK), Kawa, Rizgarî etc. were formed.

10. The PKK started out as a Marxist Leninist party with some instances of Stalinist tactics. Thus, Kurdish political opponents were fought with cruel violence (van Buijpeness, 1999). Many Kurdish political opponents of the PKK live in Sweden. Therefore the PKK could not find many Kurdish supporters in Sweden compared to Germany and the UK (see chapter 4 and 6).

11. The 2 million figure is an estimate made by the U.S. State Department. See Turkey: Human Rights Report, 1996 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. State Department, 1996), HADEP, in a report it prepared for the 1996 HABITAT II Conference, stated that over the last four years some 3 million people had been made homeless as 3,000 villages and hamlets had been burnt down or evacuated. Cumhuriyet, June 20, 1996). The government claimed that by the end of 1994, 988 villages and 1,676 hamlets had been destroyed, resulting in an outflow of 311,000 residents (Milliyet, July 28, 1995).

12. The People’s Labour Party (Turkish: Halkın Emek Partisi, HEP 1990-1993), the Democracy Party (Turkish: Demokrasi Partisi, DEP 1993-1994), the Freedom and Democracy Party [ÖZDEP] the People’s Democracy Party (Turkish: Halkın Demokrasi Partisi, HADEP 1994-2003), the Democratic People’s Party (Turkish: Demokratik Halk Partisi, DEHAP), the Democratic Society Party (Turkish: Demokratik Toplum Partisi, DTP 2005-2009) These parties have been shut down one after the other by the constitutional court on the grounds of separatism and supporting the Kurdistan Workers Party (Marcus, 2007; Valentine 2007). The recently banned DTP was replaced with the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP). In addition left-oriented and critical, PKK opponent, pro-Kurdish parties have been banned from politics including the Democracy and Change Party (Turkish: Demokrasi ve Degisim Partisi DDP 1994 -1995), Democracy and Peace (Turkish: Demokrasi ve Baris Partisi DBP 1996-2003), replaced with the Rights and Freedom Party (Turkish: Hak ve Özgürlükler Partisi Hak)-Par, the first liberal pro-Kurdish Democratic Mass Party (Turkish: Demokratik Khile Partisi DKP 1997-1999) replaced the Democratic Participation Party (Turkish:Katılımcı Demokrasi Partisi, KDP).

13. See PKK Fifth Congress programme

14. Today the Turkish mainstream media is a tool for the interest of multi-sectoral groups like Dogan Group. “Operating in newspaper, magazine, book, radio and television publishing, production, print, digital media, distribution, retailing and alternative telecom segments,
DYH is the pioneer, innovative, steering power of the Turkish media” (Dogan Group, 2009). The Dogan Group has 9 daily newspapers, 7 TV Channels, 49 Digital TV, 4 radio stations, 4 magazines, distribution and retailing company etc)...

15 Up to 2003 especially the distribution of Kurdish newspapers to Kurdish areas was prevented by the state of emergency regulations.

16 According to the 2001 Census, there are around 53,000 people in the UK, born in Turkey. The Turkish Consulate estimates the number of Turkish nationals living in the UK at 150,000. The Kurdish community which acts as an embassy for the Kurds estimates the Kurdish population from “Northern Kurdistan” living in the UK at around 200,000. Holgate, J., Pollert, A. & Keles, J. 2009b. The influence of identity, ‘community’ and social networks on how workers access support for work-based problems, Paper presented at the International Labour Process Conference, Edinburgh, Scotland, 6-8 April 2009, including undocumented Kurdish migrants Bloch, A., Sigona, N. & Zetter, R. 2009. ‘No Right to Dream’: The social and economic lives of young undocumented migrants in Britain. London: Paul Hamlyn Foundation., students, au pairs and the Kurds from Cyprus.

17 TGFRA is in state service in different European countries which aims to preserve Turkish culture and religious identity and the European countries have opened their doors to this organisation to regulate religious issues amongst migrants and protect them from Muslim extremists. However they have created a strong sense of identification with homeland and its nationalistic discourse and represent only Muslim migrants but not those of Elewî beliefs. Organised worldwide, TGFRA has played an important role in lobbying on behalf of the Turkish state in religious dialogue and propaganda amongst migrants in recent years. It is worth noting that TGFRA magazine 17 counts different Muslim ethnic groups in Germany, Sweden and other European countries and also states that the religious authorities serve all citizens without any ethnic, religious and political discrimination (Yigit, 2008:15) but the religious authorities aim to serve “our citizens”(15) in relation to “the unity of state-Nation-religion” (15). Therefore “in recent years different games have been contrived for countries aiming to separate our nation. It is incumbent on us, Muslims as indicated in the Koran to stand up against these games”(Hakan Öztürk, 2008 issue, 105, 23). It is interesting enough to mention that many Kurdish participants interviewed stated that since the Turkish state had started to establish some religious and Turkish nationalistic Masjid (a Muslim place of worship) or mosques since 1990, “the relation between Kurds and Turks has been getting worse because” they are Turkish state civil servants who work in synch with the Turkish Embassy and the sermon (which is delivered at the noon prayer on Fridays and on certain other occasions) at these mosques and Masjids target us”(Interview with Karzan, Stockholm, 07 June 2007). (Avrupada Diyanet 2008. Immigration to Sweden. Avrupada Diyanet, Turkish General Directorate for Religious Affairs, 108.)

18 The Swedish and UK institutions have encouraged the local migrant communities, with generous financial help, to set up their organisation and participate in the political and economic life of the country of settlement. These organisations have an important role in participation in domestic socio-political life e.g. the London Kurdish community organisations run campaigns and hold dinners in support of the Labour or Conservative candidates for the 2010 general election in order to get their support after the election for immigrant issues and issues related to their homeland. However the German authorities tend to exclude the migrant communities from public participation (Östergaard-Nielsen 2001) and have excluded migrant communities from public life. This policy has been reviewed in recent years owing to the significant increase in the number of migrants who have obtained German citizenship which plays an important role in shaping German political life. Germany has seen the Kurdish transnational organisations close to the PKK as counterproductive for its integration policies.

19 The political transnational network and the political transnational practices operate in-between, ‘here’ (the settlement country) and ‘there’ (the homeland). In some cases, the actors in these networks are more influential than the long-established political parties and politicians. For example, the UK Foreign Office has not given an appointment to Leyla Zana to whom the EU awarded the Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought in 1995 and who has twice been nominated for the Nobel Peace prize. In contrast to this, the Foreign Minister, David Miliband took time to meet Kurdish community leaders of London. The Kurdish community leader highlighted the urgency of the political solution of Turkey’s Kurdish question during their meeting.

20 Dogan group is in cooperation with German conservative Alex Springer media group

21 TRT broadcast programme about The Armenian issue and Terror on 25 April 2005

22 First-generation refers to migrants who have left one country to settle in another country and spent their childhood and youth in their homeland

23 Kürşü, which in Turkey was usually used pejoratively by Turkish officials and some right-wing activists for Kurdishness

24 Genocidal massacre describes ‘shorter, limited episodes of killing directed at a specific local or regional community’ (Kiernan 2007:14)


26 Being from Kurdistan.

27 As an aside I argue that this event sheds critical light on Anderson’s claim that a unified print language is central to creating nationalism, for Kurds orality has been important in establishing a national consciousness. Wogan (2001:404) also argues that orality plays an important role in establishing an imagined community as it is infused with emotion.

28 The Armenien minority has been confronted with racist media coverage which intended to describe Kurdish movement over racist term referring to Armenien migrant

29 The Byzantine empire called Diyarbakır, Amida and the Kurds, Amed.

30 http://www.yeniozgurpolitika.org/?bolum=haber&hid=29511
Amed is the Kurdish name of the unofficial capital city of the Kurdish region and in Turkish: Diyarbakir.

While the Turkish ultra-nationalist journalist, Emin Colasan writes about 'so our Diyarbakir!' the DTP sympathizers in Diyarbakir shout out "Hey Turk, go home, Amed is not yours," after the DTP success in the local election in Diyarbakir. See http://www.Hürriyet.com.tr/english/domestic/11326137.asp

The number of Turkish candidates in the French election increased despite the pressure to recognise the genocide [Armenian Genocide].


The success of Kurds in Bremen http://www.yeniozgurpolitika.org/?bolum=haber&hid=17103

The preference of the Kurds was clear http://www.yeniozgurpolitika.com/?bolum=haber&hid=51637

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