ARAB MEDIA REPRESENTATION OF THE INTERNAL PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF NEWS REPORTING

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

By

Sawsan Taha

College of Business, Arts and Social Sciences
Department of Social Science, Media and Communications
Brunel University London

June 2014
Abstract
During the summer of 2007, the Occupied Palestinian Territories witnessed a serious domestic conflict as a result of the power struggle between the two leading political parties: Fatah and Hamas. The conflict left hundreds of Palestinians dead and ultimately led to the political division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and further, to a deep political rift between the Palestinians themselves that still remains at the time of writing.

This thesis examines how this conflict was represented in the news reports of the two largest Arab satellite channels, which have different political affiliations: the Aljazeera channel funded by Qatar, and the Al-Arabiya channel funded by Saudi Arabia. The study sheds important new light on the political economy of media ownership in the Arab region and its potential impact on coverage of a key moment in the region’s ongoing struggles in Palestine. The study therefore raises evidence and disturbing questions about the delimiting effect that dominant, privately owned satellite news networks have on the maintenance of the public sphere.

The key findings of this study lie in the outline of the boundaries of the Arab satellite media’s independence and objectivity, and in illustrating its persistent submission to political interests. While this is reflected in the two channels’ coverage of ‘Palestine’, it indicated that these channels’ adherence to high journalistic standards is compromised when the crucial ideological interests of their sponsors are involved. The notion that these two channels are working with objective standards of reporting is, however, weakened when it comes to its coverage of events that involve Qatari and Saudi interests.

Accordingly, Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya presented different versions of the same events of the Hamas and Fatah conflict that are indicative of their clashing political stances. The findings show that the reporting of the conflict did not meet the professional journalistic and ethical requirements of neutrality and value judgements.

Key Words
Arab Satellite Channels, Media Ownership, Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya, Palestinian Internal Conflict, Objectivity, Ideology, Representation, Fatah, Hamas.
# Table of Contents

Abstract iii  
Table of Contents iv  
List of Tables vi  
Acknowledgements vii  

**Chapter 1 - Introduction**  
Reflective Journalistic Practice 13  

**Chapter 2 – Literature Review** 15  
*The Role of Media in Conflict Times* 15  
*Arab Media in Context: A Question of Players and Performance* 28  
  - Media Players in the Region 34  
  - War on Terror, a Turning Point 35  
  - Media and Objectivity 39  
  - Arab Media a Question of Objectivity 41  
*Palestine and the Arab Media* 59  
  - The Internal Palestinian Conflict 2007 62  
  - Palestine and Media Representations 70  
  - Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya’s Covering of Palestine 75  

**Chapter 3- Methodology** 79  
Research Ethical Considerations 81  
Analysis and Coding Schemes 84  
The Methods 96  

**Chapter 4 - Interviews Analysis** 117  
The Participants 117  
The Themes 119  
Themes Discussion :Group one, Arab media experts 121  
Themes Discussion :Group two, Palestinian journalists 130  
Conclusion 148  

**Chapter 5 - Content Analysis** 150  
Key Variables for Analysis 152
Conclusion

Chapter 6 - Critical Discourse Analysis

4th of June 2007: the breakdown of the conflict
Discussion of the 4th June reports
14th of June 2007: Hamas control of Gaza
Discussion of the 14th June reports
Conclusion

Chapter 7 - CONCLUSION

Findings of the Research Methods
DISCUSSION
Limitation and Future Studies

Appendices

Appendix 1
Appendix 2
Appendix 3
Appendix 4
Appendix 5

Bibliography
Tables

Table 1 Average number of items per day, by network
Table 2 Number of news reports for the two rounds
Table 3 Frequency of reporting per week per network
Table 4 Average length of time of news items in seconds
Table 5 Networks reports locations
Table 6 Report format, per network
Table 7 the first five sources mentioned in a single report, per network
Table 7.1 Chi-square tests
Table 7.2 Number of Fatah and Hamas sources, per report, per network
Table 8 Type of Hamas and Fatah sources
Table 9 Chi-square testing of sources by broadcaster
Table 10 Subject of reports, per network
Table 11. Main general themes for the report, per network
Table 12. First five themes mentioned in the reports
Table 13. Representation frame, per network
Table 14 First two tones for reports, per network
Table 14.1 Independent test for the representation frame
Table 14.2. Results of bias of the report frame, per network
Table 15 Summary of the common teams, per network
Table 16 Use of lexicons to describe the conflict by network
Table 17 Use of lexicons to describe the on-the-ground
Table 18 Use of lexicons to describe the violence, per network
Table 19 Description of casualties by network
Acknowledgements

It is a pleasure to thank those who made this thesis possible, from my supervisors to my family and friend. I could not have done it without you.

First and foremost, I owe a debt of profound gratitude to my supervisor, Dr Sarah Niblock, thank you for your unwavering guidance and support in providing me with invaluable insight, advice and direction. And for guiding me on the path I followed since our first meeting. I am deeply indebted for your willingness to take over my supervision in the second year of the PhD, for engaging so thoroughly with my data, and for providing me with hope, strength, encouragement and the benefit of your wisdom.

I would like to acknowledge the academic and technical support of the Department of Social Sciences, Media and Communications at Brunel University that made this research possible.

‘…I come from there and I have memories. Born as mortals, I have a mother and a house with many windows; I have brothers, friends, and a prison cell with a cold window. Mine is the wave, snatched by sea-gulls, I have my own view, and an extra blade of grass. I learnt all the words worthy of the court of blood so that I could break the rule. I learnt all the words and broke them up to make a single word: Homeland… to Palestine I dedicate this work.

This thesis would not have been possible without the support and encouragement of my family. To my dearest mother ‘Khadijah’, thank you for being there always, during my ups and downs. A sincere expression of gratitude goes to you, your kind blessings and prayers have been overly generous and warm-hearted, to which I am deeply indebted. To the most wonderful father ‘Mohammad’ your unflagging and unconditional love, your endless support and guidance and your cheerful attitude to life were like no other. Father: I hope that when I say ‘I miss you so much and I love you’, you know I mean it with profound sincerity and veracity. I wish you were here to see this achievement comes true… so to both of you I dedicate this thesis. To my sisters Enas, Samar and my brother Ammar your positive spirit, enthusiasm and support have made the tough years of the PhD possible. Also, a very special thanks to my friends, a simple thank you would not pay tribute for being incredibly supportive in the most stressful times. My appreciation is beyond expression.
Author’s declaration

This is to certify that I am responsible for the work submitted in this thesis, that the original work is my own except as specified in acknowledgments or in footnotes, and that neither the thesis nor the original work contained therein has been submitted to this or any other institution for a degree.

..................................................... (Signed)

..................................................... (Date)
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Since the early nineties the world has witnessed a tremendous number of agonising news stories from the Middle East, a region undergoing constant war and chaos; from the first Gulf War in 1991, to the invasion of Iraq, the ongoing Palestinian–Israeli conflict, the Palestinian internal power struggle, and the Arab revolutions in various parts of the Middle East and North Africa. The conflicts have been at the forefront of international and regional news outlet coverage. Waves of protest erupted in many parts of major Arab countries, forcing out the rulers of Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen; while the tragedies in Syria and Iraq and the Islamic State continue to grab attention (Reese, 2013). Meanwhile, in the Gulf region, Arabs are caught between the rising influence of Iran and Shi’a–Sunni sectarianism, while at the same time enjoying economic vibrancy driven by high oil prices and domestic investment (Telhami, 2008). Despite all this, Palestine remains centre stage in global concerns (Noueiheched and Warren, 2012).

The Arab region is now living in an era of ‘news wars’, essentially developed and transformed by the end of the Cold War, the triumph of neo-liberalism, and the growth of globalisation. The act of war itself is undergoing vital transformation; increasingly being advanced by what one might call ‘information war’ (Webster, 2003). Whether these conflicts are to be defined as ‘simulacra’, ‘information warfare’ (Webster, 2003) or ‘spectacle’ (Kellner, 2004), examining the mediation or indeed the mediatisation (Cottle, 2006) of conflict is assumed to be central to the way we process and assimilate war, its ‘justifications, conduct, reconstruction and even remembrance’ (Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2010, p.3); media presentation of conflict has become as significant as the conflict itself. In this milieu, the media play a primary role both in the conduct and the instigation of war (Webster, 2003).
It is therefore crucial to provide an overview of the major political and media players in the region. Therefore, this thesis will offer a contextual orientation for the two main media players in the Arab world: the Al-Jazeera news channel, and the Al-Arabiya news channel, by identifying their wider socio-political significance and implications within Arab society. It is also important for this research to offer a brief overview of the current political situation in the Arab world, including the tension between Shi’a and Sunni, and the daily confrontation between Islamists and the authorities that threaten to destabilise the region. At the same time, foreign intervention in these conflicts shows no sign of abating, which is not surprising considering the international nature of politics in the Arab world (Khatib, 2013). From the days of European mandates in the region, the establishment of the state of Israel, and subsequent Arab–Israeli wars, the Palestinian intifada and the second Gulf War, the Arab world has been host to a series of foreign interventions, both political and military (Khatib, 2013).

The great majority of academic studies (El-Nawawy and Iskandar, 2002; Philo and Berry, 2004; Rugh, 2004; Wolfsfeld et al., 2005; Zayani, 2005; Lynch, 2006; Fahmy and Johnson, 2007b; Sakr, 2007; Powers, 2009) that have examined the relationship between media and conflict in the region have focused on the role of international media to a much greater extent than that of regional or local media. Apart from a few exceptions, little deals directly with generalising the role of Arab news media in internal political conflicts. The reasons behind this are varied, some related to the academic field itself, and others related to the complicated nature of the media’s role in internal political conflicts. This shortcoming could be explained by the fact that only relatively recently was the importance of regional and local media in violent conflict taken into account; typical of new fields of research is a lack of systematic empirical material to work with.

The majority of these studies related to Palestine since 1948 have also focused on the Palestinian–Israeli conflict, which has been dominated by international academic research (such as Nir and Roeh, 1992; First, 1998; 2004; Dunsky, 2001; Zelizer et al., 2002; Enderlin, 2003; Qaymari, 2003; Lowstedt and Madhoun, 2003; Mandelzis, 2003; Dor, 2004; Korn, 2004; Everton, 2005; Alimi, 2007; Rinnawi, 2007; Wolfsfeld et al., 2008; Philo and Berry, 2011; Barkho, 2006, among others). Whilst the study is
informed by the literature on the Arab media’s role during political conflicts, the purpose here is not to replicate the debates surrounding the Palestinian case, media and audience, production or media power, but to fill a gap in the current research on comparative studies, focusing on the role of Arab satellite news coverage of the internal political struggles in Palestine and the role of journalistic values of objectivity and balanced reporting. It should be noted that the internal political issues in Palestine have been given less attention in academic studies; therefore, a major purpose of this thesis is to contribute to the body of knowledge on the discourse of the internal conflict by critically analysing the news reports on selected events, and exploring the way Arab satellite channels covered the Fatah and Hamas fighting.

In this light, as a practising Palestinian TV journalist, who has lived in Palestine during the period of the internal conflict my research, covers, including prior to the Hamas takeover in 2007, and beyond, I am able to contribute experiential knowledge about debates that took place during that period and dominant social practices at the time. This helps set the context in which the research was written. Working for a local TV station inside Palestine also provided a vantage point that makes it possible to consider Arab journalism somewhat more critically. I can also sympathise with the Palestinian viewers who followed both channels during the conflict, having been in their position. This research is a reflection of what I, as a journalist, saw going on in with respect to Arab satellite channels. Every day on the news outlets there was and still is very war-oriented reporting, and what many Arab journalists may consider extreme, pro-conflict rhetoric. In this piece I use examples from news reports and testimonies from journalists, as well as incorporating my own experience as a news reporter and witness of the Palestinian internal conflict.

Accordingly, I had the opportunity to observe how the power struggle between the two major Palestinian political factions Fatah and Hamas materialised on the streets, often including open fighting and violence. My attention was drawn to how major news channels of distinct political affiliations gave different representations of the same event related to the power struggle, and how these representations, while appearing to be neutral, seemingly served the purpose of legitimising the actions of one party in the conflict and at the same time criticised the actions of the other party.
Now, as a researcher, I hope to contribute by providing perceptive input into the literature by looking at the internal conflict between Fatah and Hamas in order to provide a novel contribution to the Palestinian case literature; particularly as the internal conflict is considered one of the latest in a series of ongoing struggles which very few studies have examined.

I do not claim that I am fully objective throughout the course of this research. What I can claim is that I am aware of my bias. What would seem more relevant to me is that my objective with this research is to provide an in-depth understanding of this conflict, and the importance of the role of the media that covers it. It is almost impossible to remove all researcher bias from a study; however, I have taken steps to eliminate as much bias as possible by acknowledging the design bias in my research through selecting qualitative and quantitative methods to support my research, so as to compensate for the weaknesses of each. Moreover, I have followed the ethical principles of conducting research set out by Brunel University and guided by my supervisor.

The Arab region is now divided between two camps. First, the Islamic power led by Qatar, with new strategic relations with Iran, Israel, Hizbullah and Hamas in Palestine (Roberts, 2013). This power was designed to bolster the notion that Qatar wanted ‘relations with all states’, no matter their orientation (Roberts, 2013). The second camp is Saudi Arabia and its allies: Jordan, Egypt and the Palestinian Authority (Brichs, 2013). The new division between Qatar and Saudi Arabia has seen the two players challenge each other for greater influence across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) since the second Gulf war (Khatib, 2013). Qatar has invested substantial monetary resources in support of Muslim movements, including the Muslim Brotherhood, across the MENA region to become the organisation’s primary benefactor. Saudi Arabia meanwhile deems these movements a threat to the House of Saud’s religious authority within and beyond the kingdom, and has generally supported rival political forces, including the Salafists and secularists (Wanger, 2013).
The division involves long-standing structural tensions and political and ideological changes that have shaped the bilateral relationship between the two sides since the second Gulf War in 2003. Khatib argues that the two powers have been the central players in this unfolding transformation based on the Sunni–Shi’a divide. The sectarian division primarily affects Gulf countries, and the emergence of the so-called Arab Spring brought the sectarianism issue to the surface not through politics but via media implication. Starting with the Hamas and Fatah political division, the recent conflicts in Syria, Bahrain, Libya and Egypt transformed the hidden war into a media war (Khatib, 2013).

This new media war between Saudi Arabia and Qatar was manifest in propaganda that emerged. What is seen in the media coverage between pro-Qatari propaganda and pro-Saudi propaganda respectively can be identified as a ‘cold war’, which is how the recent relationship between Qatar and Saudi Arabia has been described (Brichs, 2013). It is clear that during the Iraqi invasion, the Arab media became more of a political tool than a means of communicating truth and addressing responsibilities and accountabilities. This could be seen when the Qatari and Iranian governments showed support for Hamas governments in Gaza after Hamas won the election in 2006 (Besaso, 2012).

In light of this, the mediascape in the Arab world has undergone major transformations, putting an end to decades of state media monopoly, which Rinnawi (2007) calls ‘tribal media’, marked by propagandist, censored and state-regulated mass media (Zayani and Sahraoui, 2007). The first Gulf War was marked by the dominant coverage of CNN and other international media; its images of smart weapons and precise bombs colonising television screens worldwide. The establishment of the first Arab news channel, Al-Jazeera, in 1996, was the Middle East’s first attempt at entering the world of 24-hour news. The September 11 attacks lead to a constructional realignment of media communications, manifested by the emergence of pan-Arab transnational satellite television (Hahn, 2007). Such new pan-Arab media outlets have come to compete with leading Western networks such as CNN and the BBC, which previously dominated the Arab market. These channels, which include Al-Arabiya in Dubai (United Arab Emirates) and the Al-Jazeera satellite channel in Doha (Qatar), have encouraged public debate and promoted
dialogue, with Al-Jazeera’s slogan asserting that it presents coverage of the conflict-ridden Middle East with accounts and images that are very different from those provided by the Western media (Srebnery, 2007).

Ever since, Western news organisations have risen to acknowledge ‘some of the young generation of Arab satellite broadcasters by broadcasting their footage and continually referencing them in their news (Hahn, 2007). As a result, such broadcasters have come to be seen as reliable and credible external sources (Hahn, 2007). No other media outlet has shaped such a name for itself, caught the eye of so many Arab viewers, created as much fury among Arab and Western officials, endured constant Strife, and obtained international recognition all at once, as Al-Jazeera. Almost two decades from its inception, Al-Jazeera has managed to perform as a media player in times when the Middle East has been the scene of so many crises. By challenging viewers with uncensored political coverage and breaking embedded taboos, Al-Jazeera has drawn much attention and opened up a new culture of public engagement which, until only recently, was unattainable in Arab states (Zayani and Sahraoui, 2007, p.13; Rinnawi, 2006, p.38).

Khatib noted that the establishment of Al-Jazeera in 1996 was the Middle East's first attempt at entering the world of 24-hour news. However, although Al-Jazeera was a well-respected and relatively well-known channel in the Arab world at the time, it did not enjoy a primary position in people’s homes. It was the second Palestinian intifada in 2000 that established Al-Jazeera as a recognised brand in the region (Khatib, 2013). Arab satellite channels such as Al-Jazeera, Alamanar and the UAE channels devoted much of their broadcasting time to coverage of the second Palestinian intifada, presenting a clear pro-Palestinian stance towards the issue. Zayani argues that in so doing, Al-Jazeera set itself up with a political role in the Arab world:

Al-Jazeera’s intense coverage of the intifada has not only fed Arab fury but also fostered anti-government behavior in the Arab world, making Arab governments vulnerable to charges and open to criticism that they have not sufficiently supported the Palestinians or decisively acted on the Palestinian cause. In this sense, Al-Jazeera places itself as a counter-force to the official indifference towards the plight of the Palestinian people.(Zayani, 2005, p.153)
In 2003, with the escalation of the second Palestine intifada, another important and influential satellite channel hit the screens of the Arab world: Al-Arabiya. This channel’s emergence was supervised by professional journalists from the BBC. This team drafted the code of ethics for the two channels (Khoury, 2010). Since then, Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya have remained the two leading Arab news channels, whilst representing the two main opposing camps in the Middle East. Abdul-wahhab Badrakhan, chief editor of the Al-Sharq Al-Awsat newspaper in London, observed the following in a personal interview with the researcher:

Al-Jazeera expresses a populist view that champions the culture of resistance and tries to be popular and populist at the same time, whereas Al-Arabiya speaks for what is known as the ‘Arab moderate bloc’ led by Saudi Arabia and tries to be both popular and conservative, while occasionally flirting with populism. (Badrakhan, 2012)

According to Lynch, Al-Arabiya has adopted the unbiased vocabulary preferred by Arab and Western governments. Moreover, the main reason for its establishment was to respond to Qatar’s media attack, launched through Al-Jazeera (Lynch, 2008). Its ambition is to establish itself as the responsible alternative to Al-Jazeera (Lynch, 2008). It aims to provide rational news coverage and avoid ambiguous agendas (cited in Wessler and Adolphsen, 2008, p.442). Karam (2007b, p.83 cited in Saker, 2007) indicated that Al-Arabiya has limited scope for criticising the policies of several Arab governments, such as those of the UAE and Gulf countries. Zayani and Ayish (2006) explained that Al-Arabiya strives to match Al-Jazeera’s proclaimed independence while avoiding its provocative style, eschewing its sensationalist appeal, insisting on making a clear distinction between fact and opinion, and steering clear of the politics of other Arab, and especially Gulf, countries. By and large, Al-Arabiya has pitched itself as a neutral channel that cares for Arab interests and resists pursuing ambiguous agendas or other parties’ interests (Zayani and Ayish, 2006).

With the rapid development of new kinds of communication technologies in the Arab region, the role of satellite news media during political conflicts in the Arab world has become increasingly significant. This development challenges the traditional
understandings of flow of information, and has influenced the regional mediascape by providing different perspectives on these conflicts, allowing for different media outlets to contribute to the narrative and to provide their own political, cultural and social interpretations. These features of the current media environment have become more evident in the conflicts that have followed the first Gulf War. Khatib (2013) argued that the impact of politics and ideology significantly influenced the media that covered these conflicts (Khatib, 2013).

Despite many allegations voiced in the past of a direct link between Al-Jazeera and the Qatari regime (Al-Nawawy and Iskandar, 2002; Rugh, 2004; Da Lage, 2005; Powers, 2009), various books on the matter (e.g. Lynch, 2006; Zayani, 2007) and articles (e.g Seib, 2004 2005; Wolfsfeld et al., 2005; Zayani, 2005; Fahmy and Johnson, 2007a), past studies have relied mostly on interviews and audience surveys to identify whether an Al-Jazeera–Qatar bond exists; based on 30 interviews with Al-Jazeera staff, Miles (2005) concluded that the Al-Jazeera staff indeed ‘do not stop to think for a second about the nationality of their station or its financier’. Johnson and Fahmy’s (2007b) study of the Al-Jazeera audience indicates that Al-Jazeera’s Arab viewers see Al-Jazeera as independent of Qatari interests, and look upon the station as more credible than its Western counterparts. Nevertheless, these methods fail to provide conclusive evidence regarding the existence of a Qatari–Al-Jazeera nexus, or lack thereof, since Al-Jazeera employees are, by definition, indebted to the organisation and therefore unable to evaluate it objectively, and Al-Jazeera viewers have little ability to measure the Al-Jazeera–Qatari nexus (Fahmy, 2007b).

This research will examine the two Arab satellite news networks: the Al-Jazeera news channel broadcasting from Qatar, and the Al-Arabiya news channel broadcasting from Dubai, and their coverage of the Hamas and Fatah conflict. These two channels are considered primary news sources for most viewers in Palestine and across the Arab region, hence their inclusion in this study. In addition, an Arab broadcaster’s reporting on Palestine’s political division provides an acute case for understanding standpoint epistemology in journalistic practice in the conflict. As some of the correspondents, editors and chief executives of these channels are originally Palestinians, it is easy to assume that they would have a pro-Palestinian
perspective when covering the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. However, when it comes to the Palestinian internal conflict, it could also be assumed that the Arab media networks view the Palestinian internal conflict as a reflection of the political ideology that exists within their financial supporters, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Therefore, the researcher argues here that the representation of the internal conflict through the two networks does not reflect the reality of the nature of conflict. Instead, it reflects the conflict between Arab political regimes.

The research argues that, during the Palestinian internal conflict, the Arab media shifted into political affiliation, and the two news networks became a political voice for Qatar and Saudi Arabia rather than a voice of truth. This voice of politics revealed a tone focused on power and counter-power. To be clear, my argument is not that the conflict between Fatah and Hamas was driven by political ideology alone, in the sense of elaborate strategies for a political order. My suggestion is that these channels adopted a more flexible concept when covering the conflict; what Michaele Browers calls the ‘ideology of everyday life’, inspired by theorists such as de Certeau, Žižek, and others who have argued that ideologies should not be seen as descriptions of the world, but rather embodied and often unconscious practices constitutive of political subjectivity. Browers suggests that doing so makes it possible to see how they lived experience of autocratic regimes produces registers of political language and potential for mass mobilisation (Browers, 2009).

Before the uprising in 2011, two narratives of the history of the modern Middle East dominated scholarship as well as popular discourse. One claimed that secular Arab ideologies have declined since the 1970s, and the other that Islamic revivalist ideologies have become the new hegemonic force. These broad observations were rarely substantiated by studies of how ideology is produced, or by considerations of how secular and religious ideologies have borrowed from each other throughout the modern period. Furthermore, few scholars of the Middle East sought to bring recent advances in cross-disciplinary ideology theory into communication with textured social, intellectual, and political history. There have been exceptions, particularly in recent years. As Browers showed in her book, Political Ideology in the Arab World (2009), an accommodation has been taking place between liberals, socialists, Islamists and nationalists since the 1980s (albeit an accommodation often based on
mutual enemies rather than common political visions) (Browers, 2009). Others have made an effort to move beyond and challenge the dominant focus on intellectual history and political movements. Asaf Bayat’s *Life as Politics* (2010), and Tarik Sabry’s *Cultural Encounters in the Arab World* (2010) are two recent attempts to incorporate everyday life into our thinking about how political ideas are formed, transmitted, and lived in the Arab region.

This thesis draws its theoretical framework and methodology primarily from the field of political journalism. Useful insight is also gained from diverse issues of news media, political, economic, journalism values and news discursive standpoints. Employing an interdisciplinary approach, the research first integrates content and discourse analysis methods in order to examine the ideological political understanding of the internal Palestinian conflict. The quantitative aspect of the textual analysis follows from an assumption about the nature of the two channels’ content: that the variation in prominence and portrayal of actors and events across broadcast journalism reveals something significant about the values of the news agency.

This approach has further value as it allows for observation of patterns across time and media, enabling an examination of war reporting presented on a day-to-day basis during times of conflict, rather than a selection of iconic texts whose revered status or assumed impact is never politically neutral. It also provides us with an expansive view of news content (Gerbner, 1958). It gives us a schematic map of how special events were covered throughout the conflict, what issues were emphasised, and whose actions and opinions were given greatest prominence. From this, an attempt is made to identify the most prominent themes across the examined networks for further analysis. Macnamara explains that media content analysis is a specialised sub-set of content analysis, and a well-established research methodology (Macnamara, 2006). Shoemaker and Reese (1996) propose that ‘media content and media effects [i.e. audience] research can be combined to help our understanding of the role that the mass media play in society, and also to understand societal attitudes’ (Shoemaker and Reese 1996, p.256).
The thesis then adopts the critical discourse analysis (CDA) method, with the purpose of semantically analysing two of the most important events of this conflict. The start of the military action and the fall of Gaza in June 2007 are identified in the CDA, which looks at issues of responsibility in an attempt to provide a clear picture of how crucial aspects of the conflict have been misrepresented by the two channels. Following this, there is an examination of the extent to which violent acts are represented as being justified and/or legitimate. In short, the chosen methodology incorporates both a substantive content analysis to chart patterns within news from the two networks, and a more interpretative discourse analysis to investigate the ideas evoked linguistically throughout the coverage.

In addition to the content and discourse analysis undertaken for this thesis, the study is supported by another primary method, the 'interview method', with the purpose of providing a practice perspective to the core of the thesis, as well as complementing and enriching the content-specific study. This method also adds a practice analysis to media studies by examining the journalists' perceptions, understandings and analysis of the conflict using their own experiences.

Accordingly, the major aim of this research is to reveal how political ideology affected the two networks reporting the Fatah and Hamas conflict. Arab satellite media was another tool for political alliances rather than a means to communicate objective journalism. Primarily, the aim of this study is to provide a detailed comparative empirical study of news reporting during internal political conflicts, while developing and employing an innovative method of comparative analysis. With these subjects at the heart of the thesis, the review of the literature in the next chapter will be drawn primarily from material relevant to journalism studies, Arab media, war reporting, and literature on the media coverage of the Palestinian internal conflict.

In summary, the present project places itself clearly within the area of media communications research and offers a detailed content and discourse analysis of conflict reporting. I hope to contribute significant knowledge and understanding to the discipline of war journalism in general, with an in-depth focus on regional media during conflicts in the Middle East, and to provide perceptive input into the literature on the Palestinian conflicts. By exclusively looking at the Hamas and Fatah internal
conflict in 2007, the study will provide a novel contribution to the array of Palestinian case literature, particularly as it is the first large-scale internal conflict in a series of ongoing struggles with Israel. Very few studies have examined the Arab media coverage of the militant confrontation, let alone provided a thorough analysis presenting comparisons between the two largest Arab media networks. Also, since the development of the Fatah and Hamas conflict, only limited scholarly research has studied the role of media in representing its events.

The aim of this thesis is to explore a central question: To what extent does political ideology affect the media reporting of conflicts in the Arab world? And how does the reporting of one of the most intractable and important problems of their own region – Palestine – differ? In order to begin to answer this question, this thesis has more than one objective. The first is to investigate the difference – if any – in discourse used in the Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya reporting on Palestine. The second objective is to give exclusivity to the research case study. The third objective is to study the news representations by investigating how both channels reflected their political stance towards Hamas, in other words, to determine the extent to which one or both channels were favourable to one side or the other.

Taking the coverage of the Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya news channels on the Fatah and Hamas conflict as a case study was intended to provide perceptive conclusions to key concerns, such as determining how ‘objective’ or ‘impartial’ Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya are in their reporting of the same event; and as Al-Jazeera Arabic and Al-Arabiya remain the most popular channels amongst Arab audiences, do pro-Islamist – Hamas – voices dominate Al-Jazeera coverage? If so, is the opposing pro-government – Fatah – given voice through Al-Arabiya? Does ownership type make a difference to the news coverage of the two channels? In order to gather the data necessary to draw any meaningful conclusions, from general to particular, the central questions of this study include: What evidence is there in discourses used by each channel of any ideological bias? How are actors represented in the media sources analysed? And how does the representation use label the actors more or less positively or negatively? What are the discursive editorial strategies used to legitimise the actions of one side of the conflict and criticise the actions of the other side?
The arrangement of the chapters follows a logical and traditional thesis structure, progresses from theory to methodological practice, and culminates in findings and conclusions. The thesis is organised into seven chapters. The first two chapters provide the foundation for what follows, and many of the literature and debates introduced are subsequently picked up and developed in relation to specific subjects and case studies in the remainder of the thesis.

**Reflective Journalistic Practice**

In recent years many scholars have expressed frustration over the uncertain status of journalistic practice in relation to the requirement of making a contribution to knowledge (Harcup, 2011, cited in Niblock, 2012). Simultaneously, work in education theory has highlighted contextual shifts in arts and humanities education that signify a pressing need for journalism studies as well as other disciplines in order to define their position regarding practice within research. Recent reflections on practice and research within journalism education (Niblock, 2007) suggest the discipline is seeking forms of scholarship that better cohere with its industry-facing character.

David Machin and Sarah Niblock, in their book, *News Production: Theory and Practice* (2006), proposed a central theme in the relationship between theory and practice in journalism studies. They argued that journalism theory and practice cannot be separated. The use of theory in journalism can help to elucidate the practice of the industry, and practice journalism can help to explore the theory (Machin and Niblock, 2006). Niblock noted the importance of using practice-as-research, which could be considered as an opportunity to interrogate and expand the epistemology of journalism studies, as this can help in exploring the opportunities and limitations of existing approaches in journalism. Niblock describes two models of practice-as-research and research into practice, these models can bring to the fore ontological questions about the status of knowledge in journalism studies. Niblock noted:

> Journalism practitioners and scholars, who increasingly are one and the same person, need to provide critical, reflexive accounts of contemporary editorial practice and decision-making. This will serve to bridge some of the perceived gaps between theory and practice, and will for the practitioner provide a
critical vocabulary through which to identify, exemplify and document innovative autonomous practice-as-research. (Niblock 2007, p.31)

Scrivener (2002) argues that what distinguishes the pure practitioner from the practitioner-researcher is that the practitioner-researcher intends to generate culturally novel apprehensions that are not just novel to the creator or individual observers; he noted that:

In the first instance, most reporters or feature writers would say they conduct research as an integral part of their everyday professional practice. However, this kind of research is, for the most part, directed towards the newsroom, such as meeting a commission or deadline, rather than seeking further scholarly understanding or adding to the base of knowledge. (Scrivener, 2002, cited in Niblock, 2007)

On other hand, Machin and Niblock argued that, while there has been much analysis of the role played by the news media during wartime, the majority of this analysis focuses on the news production aspect and the rolling news. Few academic researchers have asked the journalists themselves how they identify the huge challenges they face. Nor has the issue of inaccurate and biased information received much attention. Machin and Niblock address a point where these journalists have a lake of resources offering full and accurate representations of the different sides involved in the conflict (Machin and Niblock, 2006).

According to Rodgers (2013), reflective journalism is important in the age of uncertainty and change in which we now live. It fulfils two invaluable roles:

‘the first, to record what is happening - while taking every effort to provide primary sources and context in doing so. This informs the second: on the basis of the understanding of the event or time they are covering which reflective journalists are able to build up, they can inform their audiences of the options facing policy makers or voters as they seek to make their choices. (Rodgers, 2013. p. 26)
CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

The role of the news media in conflicts and wartime has been a major concern in the field of political journalism. Interest in the influence of news media during war has grown in recent years, perhaps because the centrality of the news media in terrorism and wars has become increasingly evident to even the most casual of observers. Meanwhile, the role of the news media in internal political conflicts has received less attention.

The chapter will be devoted to explaining the varying role of the news media in wartime, with more attention to the representations of news media since the Gulf War; with a broader understanding, and general themes about the ongoing interactions between the political regimes, Arab governance control and media outlets, and the ways in which these relationships can change through time and circumstance, especially during times of conflict. Furthermore, the final part of this chapter will contribute to examining the news representation of conflicts, focussing on the Palestinian internal conflict in 2007.

The Role of Media in Conflict Times

Since the end of World War II, the role of the media during conflict has developed significantly; most notably seen in – among other conflicts – the Vietnam War (1965–1973) and the Falklands War in 1982 (see Mercer et al., 1987; Yong and Jesser, 1997; Hallin, 1989; Page, 1996; Hammond, 1998; Taylor, 1998; Knightley, 2000; Carruthers, 2000; Connelly and Welch, 2005; Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2010).

The experience of these conflicts revealed the growing impact of political communication, media control, censorship and information management, which could all be seen as influential factors in shaping media coverage. Another factor was the relationship of the media to military, political and corporate organisations. These factors require comprehensive examination, particularly regarding the development of international communication in relation to wartime propaganda and
media strategies, as well as the political economy of media organisations and the possible connections of these organisations to political, economic and military institutions – some or all of which might affect their news content, and consequently could influence the perceptions of news consumers towards the reported wars.

According to McQuail (2006), warfare has been conducted under a new set of conditions since the end of World War II and of the colonial wars that followed:

Compared to a previous era of national total war, it has been framed in terms of global ideological antagonisms, first relating to a Communist ‘threat’ and now to an Islamic extremist threat. There are numerous ‘small wars’ rather than total wars between great powers; much warfare is carried out by proxy by client states with indirect control or support from great powers; the line between war and ‘terrorism’ has become unclear; and large-scale total wars are inhabited by the availability of atomic weapons. (McQuail, 2006, p.108)

With regard to the media, McQuail argued that the predominant conditions of this ‘new order’ involved five main aspects:

More powerful media institutions with a notional independence from war-making states; a presumption of access by media to the reporting of war; an internationalization of media organisation and distribution, coupled with strong trends to concentration in relatively few corporate hands; an assumption that the conduct of warfare requires an effective public communication strategy and some means to control formally free media in conflict zones that cannot be fully closed. It is arguable that warfare of the kind described also requires more support in public opinion than past warfare and that the media are the key to obtaining this support. (McQuail, 2006, p.108)

Media in wartime remains a controversial and complex issue. It comes with multifaceted backgrounds and subsequently evolves numerous constellations of power, namely represented by the actors and nations involved. Such events deal with many unforeseen aftermaths and long-term consequences. In this context, the media are permanently stuck in a dilemma around performing various contradictory
tasks. They are part of the ideological and political machinery involved, yet, they need to fulfil their role as an objective and accurate transmitter of information and, additionally, have to consider their part as a socially responsible institution of the public.

Yet, Cottle (2006) argued that the news media have long occupied an important element in the battle for hearts and minds, and how the propaganda war is fought. The media’s relationship to ‘war’ continues to develop and change, and the role of the news media is becoming more than merely communicating or mediating the events of war, but also increasingly entering its course and conduct. In this sense, most wars are becoming ‘mediatised’ (Cottle, 2006).

Current conflict coverage is suffering a loss of credibility. Terms such as ‘biased news’ come instantly into play when reconsidering recent military action. Cottle argues that today we live in times that generate diverse conflicts; we also live in a time when conflicts are increasingly played out and performed in the media. In his book *Mediatized Conflict* he explores the power dynamics, contested representations and consequences of media conflict reporting. He notes how the media today do not simply report or represent diverse situations of conflict, but actively ‘enact’ and ‘perform’ them. Cottle argues that the media have become a prized arena for waging conflict. Contemporary conflicts are fought not just on battlefields, they are spectacles played out in the realm of the public sphere that is represented by the media. The media’s power is for all to witness, and the exercise of this power can be felt in the theatre and dramatisation of international conflict (Cottle, 2006).

In ‘mediatized war’, Cottle asserted that the involvement of the media within war becomes heightened and, in different ways, constitutive of war itself, influencing its conduct on different fronts:

Indeed it has been observed that in war the news media can form a ‘front’ in their own right, but in mediatized war this becomes even more profound. Here the news media constitute a battleground of images and information, spectacle and spin constructed and communicated for home and global consumption. It is here, too, that relations of communicative power
traditionally enacted between governments, military, publics and media begin to shift. (Cottle, 2006, p.110).

**Reporting Conflicts**

In the global era, news plays a very significant role in structuring our understanding of events, processes and places that we have no personal experience of. We come to understand our world substantially through the representations provided to us by the media. News media provide multiple versions of the same external reality. These representations reflect, in part, the dominant values, norms and knowledge systems of the producers, and perhaps wider society.

Accordingly, selective representation on this level is then squeezed even more thinly through the hierarchies of professionalised mainstream media. News media represent in a specific recognisable and authoritative way. Carpentier and Terzis argue that news is the one area of media that people are most likely to uncritically accept as reflecting reality rather than constructing it (Carpentier and Terzis, 2005).

News media report unusual events and elements of disorder, and put these against an idealised background of order: normality and rational and sane behaviour. Thornton states:

> We could even say that the very regularities of news media production represent this structural order. It turns out that the less people have access to alternative sources of information and to education about politics, the more secure are both images: order and disorder. News reports on conflict are overwhelmingly focused on the violent phases and neglect the 'pre-' and 'post-violent' stages of war. News media also report on some conflicts to the neglect of others. (Thornton, 2005, p.21)

van Dijk indicates that media news reporting is closely linked with the actions and opinions of various political institutions and groups, such as governments and lobby groups (van Dijk, 2003):
Media is often employed by political actors as an instrument of influence to
demonize opponents, commend allies and affect the degree to which the
readership will perceive a situation or event. News coverage often tends
therefore to reflect the attitudes and reveal the interests of political actors.
(van Dijk, 2003, p. 70)

The case here, according to van Dijk, is to understand that through the decisions
about which issues to report in negative or positive tones and how to report these
issues in relation to the political context, the media have the power to choose
particular versions of a particular situation (van Dijk, 1997). Thus, the media
becomes a powerful means by which political actors can shape forms of perception,
of categorisation, of interpretation and of memory, which subsequently has led to the
cutinisation of journalistic objectivity.

Thomson and White argue that this becomes a noteworthy circumstance for
research which is further heightened in cases of high-profile political situations, such
as the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Both the first and second intifada are key events in
the representation of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. While the image presented of
the Palestinians is quite positive during the first intifada, a change can be observed
towards a more negative view during the second intifada. The reverse holds true for
the Israeli image (Thomson and White, 2010).

Another example, presented by Zaharna, with respect to the Palestinian–Israeli
conflict, is that during this conflict Israelis were portrayed rather negatively in the
period of the first intifada and then quite positively during the second intifada.
Several authors notice this shift in portrayal. Some of them explain the change in
representation as a consequence of the first intifada. For instance, Zaharna argues
that at the beginning of the first intifada, Palestinians are highly individualised, and
represented as the underdog in the conflict. It is also the first time that they are
connected with positive values such as courage and self-confidence (Zaharna,
1995). Accordingly, Daniel stresses that the first intifada was a turning point, as the
prevailing David and Goliath pattern – where the Israelis were David and the
Palestinians Goliath – is reversed. Palestinians are depicted as unarmed civilians
who are trying to defend themselves with limited resources against the military power of Israel (Daniel, 1995).

In times of uncertainty and war, people have a tendency to be persuaded by the media that gives meaning to a confusing reality (Mral, 2006). Luostarinen suggests that media has a major ethical responsibility while covering conflicts, because language in the media has the power to nourish either violence or peace. Nowadays, with electronic and visual media, journalists have a unique power to influence the public and to call for hatred and more violence to stop the enemy (Luostarinen, 2002). Nohrstedt, for example, points out that the photographs published by journalists in times of war are chosen through a maze of standards and a process of editing to portray the conflict within a certain political agenda: ‘Images of war are the outcome of the struggle for our sympathies and antipathies to dominate our attention and emotional engagement’ (Nohrstedt, 2009, p.84).

War reporting is evidently when journalists are no longer neutral observers of the conflict, but choose to become part of it – making their involvement salient in the narration, utterances and reporting. The definition of ‘war reporting’ is when the media’s mission transforms from a watchdog into the voice responsible for demoralising and dehumanising the enemy (Mral, 2006). Accordingly, Nohrstedt adds: ‘This means that stories are no longer written to inform the public, but are written to persuade the public to take action and support one side of the conflict’ (Nohrstedt, 2009, p.85).

According to Von Oppen, the methods of war reporting could be spatially represented on a single continuum of the two principles of reporting. On one side is ‘bystander’ reporting, where a reporter describes the event as objectively as possible (Von Oppen, 2009). This is based on a classical idea of objective journalism. The reporter should represent events as they appear and not try to judge or interpret them. On the other side is ‘journalism of attachment’, which was proposed by BBC reporter Martin Bell (1997). In this approach a reporter should be ‘attached’ to the event. The reporter’s position should not simply be passive observation, but active engagement – taking sides, making judgement and influencing a conflict. Both
positions have vulnerabilities that have been criticised (for example, how to be objective and how to make a moral judgement; Von Oppen, 2009).

The media’s reporting of a conflict has become central to the unfolding of the conflict itself. While technology has reduced the tyranny of distance, the commercial realities of news gathering have also affected the reporting of conflicts. The higher cost of news gathering in remote regions, coupled with the geopolitical and economic priorities of the West, mean that conflicts occurring at close proximity to the metropolitan centres receive coverage at the expense of those occurring further away in less developed regions of the world. A study of conflict reporting in the world’s major news outlets in 2000 shows that the Israel–Palestine conflict was by far the most covered – five times greater than the next most covered conflict. Hawkins, the researcher who conducted the study, notes:

By contrast, conflict in Africa, which has been, in the post-Cold-War world, responsible for up to 90 percent of the world’s total war dead, suffered an almost complete media blackout. Coverage of the massive war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which caused in excess of one million deaths in the year 2000, was almost insignificant. (Hawkins, 2002, p. 225).

**Media and Ideology**

In order to understand the theory of ideology, van Dijk (1998) states that one needs to understand the complex relationships between cognition, society, and discourse. Ideologies, he argues, are based on ideas, and ideas can be considered psychological, social, or political. Ideologies are therefore part of social structure and social cognition. They exhibit the relationship of power and dominance between the social groups, and characterise the mental dimension of society or groups. Additionally, ideologies provide the common sense for judgements, so they can act as basic guidelines for social perception. That is why values are essential to ideologies. However, while some values are or can be seen as universal (e.g. equality, truth), this does not mean that ideologies are universal. Each social group is assumed to make a self-interested selection of various values, and use them to serve their social position and goals (van Dijk, 1995).
Van Dijk (1995) discusses a major debate on the study of ideologies, which pertains to whether or not ideologies are dominant by definition. He also questions the ability of ideologies to dominate the minds of the people. This debate challenges Marx and Engels's view on ideology as a dominant unified concept of the elite. However, different types of social groups develop certain group ideologies, especially in the context of conflict and competition, which suggests that there might be a unified ideology of the ruling class or the dominant class (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985).

This led van Dijk (1995) to assume that if there was a unified ideology of the dominant class, it would be geared towards maintaining this class's position, power, access, and wealth. He concludes that dominated groups accept the ideology of the elite class and perceive it as an ideology that serves their best interests. Therefore, van Dijk suggests that the elite groups somehow have the power to control the minds of the masses. As ideologies are usually acquired through discourse, and the elite control the means of ideological production, specifically in the mass media, this means that the elites have the power to control the ideologies of the dominated groups (Bazzi, 2009).

Van Dijk's discourse analysis on the study of the humanities and social sciences systematically examines the structures and functions of text and talk in their social, political, and cultural contexts (van Dijk, 1988a, p.10). Applied to the study of mass communication, van Dijk's approach claims that in order to understand the role of the news media and their messages, we need to pay detailed attention to the structures and strategies of such discourses and to the ways these relate to institutional arrangements on the one hand, and to the audience on the other. For example, van Dijk noted that some quotation patterns in news reports may reflect modes of access of various news actors or sources to the news media, whereas the content and form of a headline in the press may subtly influence the interpretation and hence the persuasive effects of news reports among the readers. Conversely, if we want to examine what exactly goes on if it is assumed that the media manipulate their readers or viewers, we need to know under what precise conditions, including structural properties of news reports, and this might be the case (van Dijk, 1988a).
One of the most obvious properties of media news that is ignored or neglected in both traditional and more recent approaches to media reporting, is that news reports, whether in the press or on TV, constitute a particular type of discourse. The prevailing influence of the social sciences in the study of mass communication has led to a near exclusive focus on the economic, political, social, or psychological aspects of news processing. This orientation provided important insights into the (macro) conditions of news production and into the uses or effects of mass media reporting. The message itself in such studies tended to receive attention only as far as it could provide information about the factors of its various contexts.

Thompson (1984) observes that ideology has a long and complex history and has been defined in two fundamentally different ways: as a purely descriptive neutral term, as ‘systems of thoughts’, ‘systems of beliefs, or ‘symbolic practices’ on the one hand; and as a process of sustaining asymmetrical relations of power and domination on the other. These two views of ideology, the neutral and the critical, have influenced how the role of the media is regarded. As Fourie (2008) suggests, media has been recognised as the main means for both the communication and manipulation of society and for creating and reinforcing ideology.

In this regard, Croteau and Hoynes (2003) define media as ‘a cultural site where common-sense assumptions are produced, reproduced, and circulated’ (p.169). It can be argued that these assumptions are ideologies – media serves as the middle ground for ideologies. In general terms, an ideology is a set of ideas that reflect personal or institutional beliefs, actions, stances, or attitudes. Simpson (1993) defines ideology from a critical linguistic perspective as ‘the ways in which what we say and think interact with society’. (p. 1)

Croteau and Hoynes (2003) argue that ideology has a broader meaning beyond the systems of beliefs and values. He contends that ideology ‘refers not only to the beliefs held about the world but also to the basic ways in which the world is defined. Ideology, then, is not just about politics; it has a broader and more fundamental connotation’ (p.160). In this regard, it can be argued that media becomes a mirror that reflects the unlimited connotations of ideology. Croteau and Hoynes (2003) argue:
Media are, without doubt, not simple agents of the powerful … the ideas of the powerful are not simply imposed on readers or viewers. Media are cultural sites where the ideas of the powerful are circulated and where they can be contested … media products are a part of larger ideological debates. In my opinion, media undoubtedly has its own methodology in presenting the ideas of the powerful. Yet, the ideological stamp, which is embedded within media products is the one that determines the tactic of this presentation to serve the ideological footprint through news media. (Hoynes 2003, p.169).

Croteau and Hoynes (2003) further observe that there were several studies from within a large body of scholarly research that explored the ways in which the news media produce an ideological vision of the world. The first finding from this research was that media news focuses on powerful figures and institutions and reflects their own interests. The second finding is that ‘news reaffirms the basic social order and the values and assumptions it is based on’ (p.169).

Connected to this, Fairclough (1995) also confirms this relationship when he defines media as the power ‘to shape governments and parties … the power to influence knowledge, beliefs, values, social relations, social identities. A signifying power (the power to represent things in particular ways) which is largely a matter of how language is used’ (p.2). In this sense, it can be argued that ideology is the invisible power produced and perpetuated in the machinery of media as discourse that forces language to take a special subjective turn in order to serve the ideological interest of the powers that be. It exists in the media output or ‘product’. Fairclough (1995) concludes that media output is being ‘shaped by ideology … representation in media texts may be said to function ideologically in so far as they contribute to reproducing social relations of domination and exploitation’ (p.44). In this light, it can be argued that media communicates through the discourse as its own communicative vehicle, its own view of social reality, and, thus, influences the minds of others, as we will see later.
Ideology and News Reporting

Many researchers (see, for example, Fairclough, 1995; 2003; Thompson, 1995; van Dijk, 1997; Watson, 1998) argued that, especially in times of war, the media are never free of dominant ideologies. However, the fallacy of freedom of the press still lives on, especially from non-media experts, but also among communication scholars and news people (Shaul, 2003, p.140). The idea of freedom of the press stems from a traditional liberal theory, where the role of the media in a democracy is to place checks on the state (the so-called watchdog role; see Curran, 2002). Nowadays, it is still frequently claimed that in democratic countries the media independently set the news agenda in an objective presentation, free of ideology, and that they have autonomous power that is free from the influence of governments and the elite (Shaul, 2003).

This claim is substantiated by well-known cases in which the media served society by investigating the abuse of authority by public officials, for example the Watergate scandal. On the other hand, there are also numerous examples in which the media are guilty of biased news reporting, sometimes with catastrophic consequences, such as the US news coverage of the issue of Iraq’s illegal possession of weapons of mass destruction. So, contrary to a widespread perception of the media as striving towards an achievable objectivity, there seems to be an ever-increasing awareness that the ways in which mainstream media cover major events are largely determined by dominant ideologies (see, for example, Thompson, 1995 and Watson, 1998).

War reporting is evident when journalists are no longer neutral observers of the conflict, but they choose to be part of it, making their involvement salient in the narration, utterances, and reporting (Nohrstedt, 2009). The definition of war reporting is when the media’s mission transforms from a watchdog into a voice responsible for demoralising and dehumanising the enemy (Mral, 2006). This means that articles are no longer written to inform the public, but are written to persuade the public to take action and support one side of the conflict (Nohrstedt, 2009). Accordingly, Images of war are ‘the outcome of the struggle for our sympathies and antipathies to dominate our attention and emotional engagement’ (Nohrstedt, 2009, p. 84).
On other hand, Fairclough argues that war reporting can be analysed, like any discursive text, in terms of use of language. This type of analysis makes the researcher aware of the power and effect of media discourse (Fairclough, 1999). It is crucial for the analysis of language use to consider the role of actors in media. For example, who is included or excluded in the article? Which actors are foregrounded or backgrounded? Press articles can be considered an example of war reporting when the conflict is portrayed in the text as a battle between two opponents with one goal: winning. Just as in a sports arena, where the only focus is on who advances, who suffers more casualties and material damage, and finally which player is getting closer to achieving the goal (Galtung, 2002).

Two processes that are closely related to dominant ideology in the media have been termed ‘Westernisation’ and ‘Americanisation’ (Hall, 1999). From the late 1960s onwards, the cultural imperialism of the Western-dominated global village has been researched by many scholars and has been debated throughout the world. Perhaps the first to determine that the media were being dominated by the United States was Herbert Schiller. He states (1999) that, along with the American aid programmes, expansion of Western media and business corporations promoted capitalist and consumerist values and eroded local cultures. In the 1980s and 1990s, researchers showed that the notions Westernisation and Americanisation were based on the theory of a one-way flow of communication. They argued that instead of going one way, global flows are ‘multi-directional’ (Curran, 2002). Furthermore, researchers realised that the media-imperialism theory underestimates the critical responses to American domination. Thus, the radical version of cultural hegemony was rejected.

Cultural hegemony can be seen in different fields, from Disney in the film branch, to Coca Cola when it comes to our need for food and drink. Yet, news coverage has also long since been dominated by the West, with big press agencies such as Associated Press (AP), Agence France-Presse (AFP) and Reuters; and international news networks such as CNN (International), BBC (World), and France 24. The assumption of cultural imperialism in the media dominated by the West, or America alone, is the main reason the Arabian satellite broadcaster Al-Jazeera started an English version in 2006, named Al-Jazeera English. In their mission statement, Al-Jazeera English states that it aims to provide both a regional voice and a global
perspective to a potential world audience of over one billion English speakers, but without an Anglo-American worldview. According to many scholars, Al-Jazeera, and especially its English version, is now successfully challenging the hegemony of the West. Seib states:

The rise of Al-Jazeera marked an end to the near monopoly in global news that American and other Western media had long enjoyed: ‘New voices emerged, competing for audiences throughout the world by offering news shaped by varied interests and perspectives’. (Seib, 2004, p. 601).
Arab Media in Context: A Question of Players and Performance

To understand Arab media broadcasts, one has to look at the broader political and economic practices that provide the backdrop. This section will therefore focus on Arab media institutions. Approaches such as that of political economy that dominate the study of Arab media can provide the tools to make sense of the ways in which Arab media is dominated.

Since 2003, the Arab region has witnessed a considerable increase in the number of Arab satellite channels (Sakr, 2007). The reasons for this growth have included the expansion of news and current affairs programming, which has long been one of ‘the most remarked-upon features of the growth of Arab Satellite television’ (Sakr, 2007, p.139). Additionally, the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 motivated ‘non-financial reasons’ for entering the Arab market (Sakr, 2007, p.139). These non-financial reasons contribute to explaining the emergence of satellite channels that were established to serve as platforms for political, religious and sectarian parties and movements.

The last two decades have seen a litany of ongoing news stories from a region undergoing constant war and chaos. These include the 1991 Gulf War, the Invasion of Iraq, the 2006 Lebanon War, the ongoing Palestinian–Israeli and the Palestinian–Palestinian conflicts, and finally the spark of Arab revolution in various parts of the Middle East and North Africa in 2011, or the so-called Arab Spring. The Arab revolutions have been at the forefront of the news, resulting in a regional crisis when a wave of demonstrations and protests erupted in various parts of the Middle East, forcing the rulers of Libya and Yemen out and leading to major protests in Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait and Morocco, to name a few; all the while the tragedy in Syria continues to grab attention. Despite all of this, Palestine remains centre stage, for not only the Arab population concerned, but globally.

Fahmy and Johnson (2007b), Lynch (2006), Rugh (2004) argued that the modern Arab state is enduring an arduous reform process that has altered aspects of the Arab executive administrative apparatus. This is due in part to the expansion of the state bureaucracy, the army and the police in the wake of colonialist retreat. In addition, Arab governments believed that the media should promote national
development goals. Therefore, television stations operated within ministries of information funded by the Arab governments. In the name of preserving national interests and supporting official policies, Fahmy noted that Arab governments exerted, and continue to exert, censorship over the media. Therefore, media reform and political reform in the Arab world goes hand-in-hand. Every country in the Arab world has its own state TV channels. Until the early 1990s, almost all television channels in the Arab countries were government owned and rigidly controlled (Fahmy, 2007).

Zayani and Ayish consider the media systems in the Arab world to be the most closed and controlled. Although the evidence speaks to this argument, to maintain that the media in the Arab world is the most controlled on a global scale is to presuppose that there is a definite institutionalised criteria that designates media systems as officially open or closed in every country (Zayani and Ayash, 2006). However, since the second Gulf War, scholars such as Sakr (2007), Hugh (2004) and Hafez (2006) have argued that Arab mass media has changed tremendously over the past decade. While the period before the advent of satellite broadcasting and the internet was characterised by blatant state control and censorship, the new technologies have opened a sphere for a new Arab debate on public affairs. According to Sakr, after the Gulf War the authoritarian regimes in the region were trying to cope with the new situation and they were not helpless. Even in times of so-called globalisation, the state still matters. Media policies in many Arab countries have adapted to the media developments. New censorship laws have been introduced and regimes have extended their influence to the satellite realm (Sakr, 2007).

**The Saudi Brand of Islam vs. the Islam of Qatar**

During the 1990s, Saudi Arabia made an immense effort to control the flow of information in the Arab world and assure positive coverage of its politics and society, or often to assure no coverage at all. This effort involved saturating the Arab viewer in Arab and Western entertainment and ‘soft religion’, and only allowing as much politics as was necessary. Saudi Arabia’s pan-Arab media empire aimed to promote
specific messages which presented themselves as ‘liberal’, ‘reformist’, ‘moderate’ and ‘modern’ (Da Lago, 2005).

Saudis wanted to present the media with a vision of ‘moderation’ in the Arab world. The new Saudi satellite media had become a useful tool for the ruling elite to challenge traditional Islamists and promote a limited Saudi domestic agenda of openness, which involved co-opting as many ‘liberal intellectuals’ as possible (Da Lago, 2005). Qatar’s challenge to the Saudi hegemony and struggle for supremacy over the Arab media was particularly acute. Saudi Arabia had sensed that its dominance of regional news media was weakened by the growing popularity of Al-Jazeera. Miles noted that under these pressures, Al-Arabiya was launched in March 2003, just in time for the Iraq War. The US$200 million start-up capital for Al-Arabiya came from a conglomerate of Saudi Arabian, Lebanese and Kuwaiti businesses (Fahmy and El-Emad, 2011). Following the establishment of Al-Arabiya, Al-Jazeera faced increasing competition in the Arab media world, and the contrast in reporting manner between the two news stations is indicative of the political motives of the owners.

This divergence between Qatar and Saudi Arabia led to a war of words on the screens of the two channels, a war driven by their competition in the media field and affected by the respective governments of their financiers. Fandy has argued that the rivalry and conflict involves the Saudi brand of Islam versus the Islam of Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood. It is a conflict between oil represented by Saudi Arabia, and gas represented by Qatar. Mellor addressed the point that it was a conflict between Egyptians and Palestinian journalists and Lebanese and Syrian journalists inside the two channels. It is a conflict between Bin Laden and the Saudi royal family on Al-Jazeera and between the Al Murrah tribe and the Qatari royal family on Al-Arabiya. It is a conflict between the Muslim Brotherhood and moderate Muslims; it’s a conflict between Hamas supporters and Fatah Supporters inside these counties. This is nothing short of a proxy war in the Arab media world. (Mellor, 2007, p. 29)

The rivalry eventually ended after Qatar and Saudi Arabia reached an off-air rapprochement (and despite this outcome leading to questioning of the true degree
of Al-Jazeera’s ‘independence’); its main outcome was to paint an image of Qatar as almost on par with Saudi Arabia in terms of influence and importance, an image on which Qatari foreign policy has been capitalising (Khatib, 2013)

**Qatar and the Islamist Movements**

Qatar is one of the smallest Arab states, with an area of under 12,000 square kilometres and a native population of under a quarter of a million. Yet it is the richest country in the world in terms of GDP per capita and the world’s leading exporter of liquefied natural gas. In less than two decades, Qatar has risen to become one of the leading regional actors in the international relations of the Middle East (Mellor, 2007). Qatar has been involved in so many conflicts in the region – mainly as a mediator and provider of humanitarian aid – that it has almost become expected that whatever the conflict facing the region the tiny emirate will find a role for itself within it.

On the other hand, the country has also been one of the key backers of the Brotherhood for decades, this relationship being more comfortable than that between the Brotherhood and Saudi Arabia. Qatar has used Al-Jazeera to express public support for the Brotherhood, hosted its leaders in Doha, and given it financial support. For example, Qatar granted the Egyptian scholar Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi an important public platform in the form of his own popular religious show on Al-Jazeera, and he acted as one of the vocal supporters of the Arab revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria that have been championed by Qatar (Khatib, 2013).

According to Robbers, the Qataris have long-standing links to the Hamas leadership and its chairman Khaled Meshaal. Qatar likes to work with people it has deep personal ties with, as it has in Libya and Syria. For example, the US$400m investment in infrastructure, education and health facilities allows Hamas the space to secure its own presence in the strip vis-à-vis far more radical groups, something that it has struggled to do in the past two years (Khatib, 2013). This is the basis of how Qatar prefers to work in the Arab world. The ties are strong, Qatar has a leaning towards the Muslim Brotherhood of which Hamas is a weak offshoot – the interests are to some extent congruent. A political Islamism across the Sunni Arab world that is pervasive but not all encompassing is certainly something that finds support in the Emiri of Qatar (Miles, 2005).
The official Qatari explanation for the country’s relationship with the Islamists was aired in an interview by the Emir of Qatar with Al-Jazeera on 7 September 2011, in which he is reported to have said that he believed radical Islamists whose views were forged under tyrannical governments could embrace participatory politics if the promise of real democracy and justice of the year’s Arab revolts was fulfilled (Dagher and Coker, 2011). If so, the Qatari ruler said, ‘I believe you will see this extremism transform into civilian life and civil society’ (Dagher and Coker, 2011). While this statement falls in line with Qatar’s parameters of engagement with Islamists over the past decade, it offers only a partial view of Qatari motivations.

According to Dagher and Coker, a clear relationship between Qatar and the Islamist groups in the Middle East can be seen during political struggles. The motivation for Qatari mediation to end these struggles is demonstrative of a desire to expand its influence as a regional player, particularly vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia. The Saudi kingdom has traditionally played a leading role in conflicts across the region, for example, during the Lebanese civil war. However, in recent years, Saudi Arabian mediation has been vitiated by a perceived lack of neutrality, rendering the kingdom an active player as opposed to a neutral mediator. Saudi Arabia’s close relationship with the March 14 political bloc in Lebanon, led by the Lebanese Saudi Saad Hariri, is a case in point. Qatar thus perceived a vacuum in Arab international relations which it has been attempting to fill. Its involvement in conflicts across the Middle East and beyond represents an effort to present itself as a viable alternative to Saudi Arabia, and a potential new leader in the Middle East (Dagher and Coker, 2011, p.12).

New Trends for Arab Television

There is a new trend in Arab television coverage, one that at first would make any journalist cringe, the commercial News Channel. Hafez (2006), Sakr (2007), and El-Nawawy and Iskandar (2002) point out, for example, that the success of Al-Jazeera clearly showed that there is a market for news channels. With the volatile situation in the region intensifying in recent years, people have become increasingly glued to their TV sets to watch the news throughout the day, and advertisers have started to approach various outlets to guarantee product placement in their prime-time slots. Another example, as Sakr noted, was Al-Arabiya – a pan-Arab channel that
launched shortly before the war on Iraq in 2003. Al-Arabiya is owned by a group of investors and tries to cover costs through advertisements (Sakr, 2007).

These new channels adopted a more Western broadcasting style: with state-of-the-art technology, advertising as a source of revenue, and broadcasting a wide range of news and public affairs programming shows, as well as entertainment and family-oriented offerings (Ayish, 2004; Seib, 2004; Sakr, 2007). In this light, Khatib argues that Arab governments have opened up new opportunities in the last decade that give more space to private competition in the press, as well as in the broadcasting sector. However, the legal situation is still characterised by flagrant insecurity for journalists and other media workers. The Arab world is still far behind the global trend for more freedom of opinion and heightened media freedom that has occurred over the past 25 years (Khatib, 2013).

These satellite broadcasters are considered to be a window through which Arab audiences have observed alternative ways of living and different value systems, and they have provided a venue to voice concerns that may support or challenge state legitimacy. Douglas noted that the Arab states' response to the exposure of their societies to alternative information broadcast by satellite varies due to differences in state–society characteristics, broadcast content, and the degree to which this content challenges state legitimacy (Douglas, 1999). Sakr (2007), Khatib (2013), El-Nawawy and Iskandar (2002), Al-Nawwai (2007), Hafez (2004), and Ayish (2004) note that these channels emerged as the dominant voice in Arab public discourse for opening lines to the Arab people and providing them with a forum to voice their views. Some of these stations, such as Al-Jazeera, have also been recognised as the CNN of the Arab World, for their refusal to parrot the official line of Arab government officials and their commitment to accuracy and balance, while at the same time showing an Arab perspective on the news.
Media Players in the Region

It is imperative to shed light on the geopolitical pressure Saudi Arabia puts on Qatar and the continuous disagreements between the two countries. Put simply, an analysis of the interstate conflict between Qatar and Saudi Arabia – the two main players in the Arab region – is an effective way to indicate how the governments of Qatar and Saudi Arabia have both manipulated the satellite networks as a political tool.

According to Sakr, Al-Arabiya was set up as a rival to Al-Jazeera, with ambitions clearly inscribed in the long-lasting antagonism between Qatar and Saudi Arabia (Sakr, 2007). There has been considerable speculation as to why the two stations have been able to report the news freely, given the restrictive media environment in neighbouring Arab states. Many commentators have attempted to answer this question by pointing to the nature of the Qatari and Saudi states, as well as to the efforts of their regimes to liberalise their societies, while using these political and social reforms to promote the two states and increase their regional and global influence (Sakr, 2007).

Despite the Saudi dominion, Qatar’s Al-Jazeera entered the fray in 1996 with a ground-breaking news policy that filled the glaring gaps in political and social coverage of the Saudi media, with frank discussions of internal situations in Arab countries where opposition and government figures were equally welcome to offer their viewpoints (Sakr, 2007). Saudi Arabia’s response to Qatar’s Al-Jazeera came in 2003. Part of the MBC network, Al-Arabiya came on air after the September 11 attacks and just in time for the second Iraq invasion, when Saudi leaders were correct in assuming they were due for a round of anti-Saudi sentiment similar to that which followed the 1991 Gulf War. The Saudi leaders felt uncomfortable and vulnerable. Reports circulated in the Western media of recommendations to Washington to break up the kingdom, occupy the Eastern Province, or establish a state in the Hejaz, where the holy cities of Mecca and Medina are located (Khatib, 2013).
‘War on Terror’, a Turning Point

The emergence of Arab satellite channels could also be seen in the light of Operation Desert Storm in 1991, in which an international coalition, led by the United States, launched a war against Iraq to liberate Kuwait, which had been invaded by Saddam Hussein’s forces in August 1990. It could be said that the war in 1991 marked a significant transformation in the region’s politics, especially when troops from countries such as Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and other Arab states of the Gulf, joined the US-led coalition against Iraq. Thus, one of the major consequences of this war was the emergence of new political and military alliances and cooperation in the region, which allowed the US to establish a military presence in the Gulf (Sakr, 2007).

There is no doubt that Arab media outlets have provided a significant contribution to the coverage of the 2003 Iraq war, focusing on angles commonly ignored by Western media during the conflict (and which therefore become controversial), such as the mass of material devastation experienced by Iraqi citizens, and indeed as war casualties - which occupied a substantial part of the war imagery on Arab transnational media. The most important aspect which could be clearly observed during the 2003 Iraq war was the role of Al-Jazeera, which very notably provided an alternative narrative to the war.

According to Seib (2004), the Iraq war gave Arab news media an opportunity to engage in critical reporting and to cover events in the Arab world from a broader perspective and within the global context (Seib 2004). This view is shared with Hoskins (2004), who believes that the broadcasting landscape has been transformed since 1991, with the fragmenting of the previously-dominant American-Western template, where CNN had provided the only established globally-available satellite television news operation at the time.

Khatib (2013) Sieb (2004) argue that The narrative of the conflict on Arab media channels forms an alternative perspective to the war and its consequences, and therefore contributes to the construction of a more critical public discourse on US policies in the Middle East. Reporting of the 2003 Iraq war on Arab channels, especially Al-Jazeera is believed to have two major indications: first, Arab
broadcasters clearly halted western media dominance over information regarding the region and its conflicts, most notably CNN, which was the keystone in reporting the 1991 Gulf War. (Khatib, 2013)

Second was the ability of Arab media to produce effective journalism that was able to cover all sides of the conflict, driven by an understanding of their audiences’ desire and even hunger for information. According to Khatib (2013) what Al-Jazeera did during this war and other conflicts, such as Afghanistan in 2001, Lebanon in 2006, the Palestinian Intifada in 2000 and the ongoing violence and occupation of the Palestinian territories, is clearly giving other versions of the “truth” by focusing on civilian casualties and their devastation during such conflicts. It can therefore readily be argued that without Al-Jazeera many incidents would not have been extensively reported or shown on Western television screens. No one would have imagined the scale of damage and destruction of Iraqi cities during the war, without the footage shown on Al-Jazeera and other Arab channels, which clearly revealed the human cost and suffering during this war. (Khatib, 2013)

According to Wax (2003), Arabs and Americans were therefore interpreting what they were seeing of the war in vastly different ways. However, Wax argued that mistrusting the United States was fuelled by the barrage from the Arab satellite television stations, which in all cases were simply appealing to their audiences in a similar way the American networks were doing. Just as American media produce moving stories about missing and wounded US soldiers, their Arab counterparts run in-depth stories on the victims of US and British attacks (Wax, Washington Post, 28 March 2003).

Yet it is perhaps vital to notice that, despite differences in editorial choices between Arab and Western media outlets of what and how to run images of war casualties, Arab media channels were still following similar professional styles in their coverage to the Western media outlets.

Zayani and Ayish (2006) stated that Arab media imitated the western modes of representation by using “war rooms” staffed with retired generals who discussed the war and how it should proceed (Zayani and Ayish, 2006). In addition, they argued
that many Arab reporters and producers, like their Western counterparts, knew what their listeners and readers wanted to see and read, and they gave it to them (ibid). Similarly, Khatib (2013) considered that Arab networks were functioning like US TV, by showing briefings, sound bites from George W Bush and Tony Blair, allied advances and even interviews with coalition troops.

In addition to the political implications of this war, it was significant that this conflict also marked the presence of CNN covering the course of the action, exclusively from inside Iraq. Khatib noted the role of CNN is believed to have motivated various Arab groups to launch their own satellite channels over the following years (Khatib, 2013). Thus, since 1991, it could be said that Arab satellite media began to evolve in order to meet the rising challenges in the media market of the region. This witnessed the appearance of significant developments that had a remarkable influence on the Arab media scene (Khatib, 2013).

The ‘war on terror’ also challenged the primacy of Al-Jazeera in Arab satellite television 24-hour news. The invasion of Iraq proved to be the greatest catalyst. News of a looming war on Iraq led the Saudi-owned MBC media group to launch its planned news channel early. Al-Arabiya began broadcasting in March 2003. From the start, MBC has marketed Al-Arabiya as an alternative to Al-Jazeera. Lynch argues that Al-Arabiya initially imitated Al-Jazeera in its coverage of the Iraq war in order to gain audiences (Lynch, 2006).

In contrast to Al-Jazeera’s clear anti-war stance, Al-Arabiya chose to be more ambivalent during the early days of the war. Khatib noted that while Al-Jazeera covered it with a degree of lament, Al-Arabiya’s coverage was more hesitant. For example, Al-Jazeera questioned whether the event was one of a ‘foreign invader chopping off another head. Does the world usually use this method to honour national martyrs?’ (Khatib, 2013). After the war, Al-Arabiya’s coverage became more pro-American ‘in order to appeal both to the United States and to Arab elites threatened by Al-Jazeera’s powerful critiques’ (Khatib, 2013, p.19).
Arab Media and Censorship

In many Arab countries the governments continue to control the mass media and use it as a propaganda tool (El-Nawawy and Iskandar, 2002; Lynch, 2006; Mellor, 2007). Some Arab governments have justified their control of the media as a mechanism to protect Arab culture against Western influence, mediated through television (Hafez, 2001). A United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) report by the International Programme for the Development of Communication affirms that in most Middle Eastern countries broadcasting media systems are seen as part of governmental institutions (UNESCO, 2008).

Almost all broadcasting systems in the Arab world are funded by the government, and therefore also controlled by them (Amin and Gher, 2006). Amin divides Arab media control into two main categories: the first, according to him, are the governments which tend to control the broadcasting system and deploy the ‘ideology of national mobilisation’ to introduce restrictions on the media. Such governments use radio and television as a tool of political communication and to persuade citizens of the validity of government actions, and thus gain support for national unity. Amin’s second category includes the governments which run the broadcasting system in a bureaucratic manner – retaining executive control but leaving the day-to-day running of television and radio to professional journalists, thus acquiring legitimacy and gaining national support for the government.

In societies with a high rate of illiteracy, broadcast systems become the main source for circulating information and entertainment (Amin and Gher, 2006). These systems transmit audio-visual content which can affect individuals and groups (in political terms), thus governments can mobilise people to achieve political ends. The rationale behind centralising broadcasting systems is to support national unity, claimed to be threatened by hostile powers in the region as well within the countries. Many commentators have argued that Arab governments control broadcasting systems because they are afraid that their power will be lost to internal enemies, especially during times of sectarian or religious conflict (Amin and Boyd, 1993).

Despite the existence of laws in Arab countries guaranteeing freedom of expression, governments can and do persecute journalists or ordinary citizens on such charges.
as threatening national security. Ayish (2004) notes that although individual rights exist in Arab communication laws, these could be overruled if a journalist or media institution is found guilty of what the governments may consider an offence against the respective state. Governments apply strict censorship laws, and journalists can be prosecuted if they are perceived to be indulging in activities that threaten national unity and security, or even harmful to any individual’s rights. Such regulations severely restrict the freedom of expression and shrink journalists’ professional space (Ayish, 2004; Sakr, 2007; Jamal, 2010). Another method of governmental control is indirect: through funding television and radio, ensuring that media institutions remain obliged to government officials and political leaders.

**Media and Objectivity**

This part looks into the concept of ‘objectivity’ as it applies to the role played by the Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya satellite channels in covering major news events inside the Arab world such as the Iraq war, the Palestinian–Israeli conflict and finally the internal Palestinian conflict. It entails a critical description of the structure, history, ownership and financing of the two channels.

The argument in this section is that the media’s presentation of news is not a transparent reflection of reality, but rather a partial version of it. Therefore, there is no true version of reality but only multiple interpretations depending on how events are reported. The news we consume on a regular basis is not what actually happens, but what gatekeepers tell us or allow us to know about specific events. In addition, events by themselves are not news, but merely potential news stories. They have to satisfy certain journalistic criteria, and submit to three steps (selection, editing, and presentation) before reaching their target audience. These steps operate within a wider framework that consists of non-journalistic factors (for example, societal and organisational ideologies, work routines, commercial and political pressures). News stories therefore, are the end product of news organisations, which are always partial and distorted (in various degrees). Such news production mechanisms do not leave room for objective reporting.

It is for these reasons (and others related to news professionals), that absolute objectivity is impossible to achieve in news media. The concept of objectivity
involves complete detachment from one’s emotions, values and opinions, which is beyond the ability of journalists. There are, however, some journalists who work hard to present what they believe to be fair accounts. The researcher makes the argument that the political and professional environments in which a network operates and the network’s image as perceived by its target audience have to be considered in our judgment of a network as objective or biased in covering conflicts. This sheds some light on the political situation in the Arab world and how it affects issues of censorship, freedom of expression and media laws in this volatile part of world.

**Ideology in the Arab News**

News discourse is highly influenced by ideologies that overshadow what some believe to be ‘impartial’ or ‘objective’ news. The Glasgow University Media Group (GUMG) (1976; 1982) highlighted the role of ideology in the news production process, especially the parts that consider the selection of the news. They argued that the selection of some news stories and the neglect of others by the news media allow certain ideologies to be salient at the expense of others.

Accordingly, the selected events are meant to fit within predetermined sets of assumptions about the world, in which ‘the news follows a narrow set of ideas and interests, and these determine what descriptions are made of events’ (GUMG, 1982, p.8). The primary function of ideology in the news is to define reality to the public through the process of news production. To be more specific, it imposes a way of seeing the world, by virtue of which a society perceives what is normal or abnormal. However, this is not to say that such ideological definition is unchangeable:

It changes in accordance with social transformations and changes in the power balance of societies. For instance, in the 1970s, the nationalisation of industry was a defendable political position in Britain. All that changed after certain industries, previously owned by the government, were privatised in the interests of increasing productivity and efficiency. News discourse, therefore, adapts to the dominant ideology about society as its ‘impartial’ way of representing reality (GUMG, 1982.p.12).
Fowler (1991) noted that the ideological importance of news to two factors, the first of which is the size of the broadcast audience itself. Second, the privileged economic and political status of news outlets allows them to mediate ideas from a specific perspective. In his analysis of various British newspapers, Fowler noted that the press maintains and redistributes the ideological discourse of the status quo, whether intentionally or unintentionally (Fowler, 1991, p.125).

**Arab Media a Question of Objectivity**

In this study news media objectivity simply means reporting facts detached from emotions or opinion. Some news scholars include analytical reporting as part of objective news coverage (Dennis and Merrill, 1996). The sociologist Michael Schudson (1978) defined journalistic objectivity as believing in facts, distrusting values and committing oneself to their separation. Altheide (1976) defines objectivity in relation to 'bias': 'objectivity means reducing or eliminating biases to let the essential phenomenon appear' (p.198). According to the latter definition, 'bias' is the distortion that clouds the truth. However, there is no simple consensus among journalists and researchers as to what constitutes 'bias' or 'objectivity', although they are quite likely to deploy these terms.

However, the central issue relating to objective reporting is whether it is indeed possible for news media organisations to offer 'impartial' accounts of events that are transparently reflective of reality, especially in time of conflict, in which journalists and editors separate facts from their values, interests, and opinions. In other words, can journalists report the truth? There is never a single story but rather multiple, and sometimes conflicting, stories. How the teller narrates a story depends on where they are placed. In an attempt to tackle the question of objectivity, it is vitally important to understand the news production process and its main components – news gathering (or selection), processing (or editing) and presentation – and where journalists are situated in these processes. Professional codes or journalistic practice advise that the main role of journalists is to report factual happenings by providing full, verifiable and attributed accounts that are completely detached from their subjective evaluation or personal baggage. In reality, those perfect journalists do not and cannot exist. The very nature of journalism is to select specific events which only partially represent the real world. To illustrate further, news presentation can be
thought of as functioning like a map. But, because journalists, like any human beings, are socially and culturally determined, any map they draw cannot accurately match the real territory (Dennis and Merrill, 1996).

Thus, journalists are by no means passive transmitters of information. By shaping news content, they cannot detach themselves from their own society and its cultural, political and ideological associations. Chang (1992) confirms the active role of journalists in shaping news content. Chang conducted a national survey of newspaper editors in the United States to examine how editors view the importance of different criteria when selecting foreign news. He found that editors' orientations influence the way they perceive news factors, and that these perceptions of news factors determine, to a great extent, the way in which reality is constructed. According to him, editors with a more internationalist perspective (i.e. liberals who have an interest in foreign news and speak foreign languages) tend to consider factors inherent in the events key to their selection of foreign news. In contrast, editors with a conservative inclination were more likely to view foreign events from an American perspective, focusing on elements having significance to the United States. Altheide (1976) refers to the news worker's 'perspective' as a 'hidden bias' preventing journalists from reporting events 'objectively'. He claims that journalistic 'perspective' is a 'more troublesome 'bias' than values and ideology, because journalists, like most of the audience, take it for granted (Altheide, 1976).

Media scholars, in general, agree with the fact that news outputs are far from being objective. However, they disagree on whether achieving objectivity is possible. GUMG (1976; 1982), Altheide (1976), and Staab (1990) blame news organisations for not being 'objective', but they do not provide a framework for 'objective' journalism. They criticise news coverage for often being 'biased', distorted, and determined by the social consensus amongst journalists. According to the GUMG, journalists' reporting of 'facts' is derived from basic frames of reference (particular ways of seeing the world) that can obstruct the complete picture of a reported event.

What makes 'objectivity' more difficult for journalists is their loyalty to the countries and cultures that they belong to. Journalists cannot distance themselves from their patriotic feelings or cultural affiliations, even if they claim otherwise. Some of them
may control their prejudices and cultural loyalties so that they do not overly shape their reporting on the conscious level. However, they unconsciously reproduce their own cultural values and opinions in their reporting (Gans, 1979). These are also influenced by their cultural and/or nationalistic frame of reference.

According to Adams, Western media have had a history of siding with their governments in times of national crises and political tensions. For example, during the Islamic revolution in Iran (1979), the US media implicitly or explicitly followed the guidelines of the State Department and heavily relied on US officials and Western sources, treating them as if they were independent. The American view of the crisis dominated the news coverage, which concentrated exclusively on what was viewed by the US government as the most important aspect of the situation, that is, the freeing of the American hostages (Adams, 1981). Vital issues which may have helped the Iranians make their case were not covered, perhaps on account of the potential damage such news would have inflicted on the American administration’s campaign against Iran. Facts about the prolonged American support for the Shah’s corrupt and oppressive regime, and the American commitment to protect the Shah after the fall of his regime were marginalised by the American media. The commentary of Rod Macleish, a CBS reporter, was but one example of how Iran was covered during the revolution and the following hostage crises. This is how he explained the situation in Iran to the American audience ‘Khomeini has been feuding with the now departed government of Mehdi Bazargan, a Western-oriented moderate who wanted to solve Iran’s problems with technology and efficiency, while the Ayatollah’s primary drive is to return Iran to seventh-century Islamic principles’. (Adams, 1981, p.132).

Media activities in the Arab region is still totally divorced from the political processes. An Arab viewer who might change his or her mind because of something they saw on television has no effective means of translating their views into political action or impact. The political decision-making systems in most Arab countries are preconfigured to maintain a pro-government, centrist majority that allows more and more debate and discussion of important issues, but maintains real decision-making in the hands of small elite groups.
Since the creation of the two satellite channels, these channels received an enormous amount of publicity for breaking many of the taboos of self-censorship in the Arab media. For example, many experts such Hafez, El-Nawawy and Iskandar have praised Al Jazeera for creating a forum in which Arab opposition movements can freely criticise their host governments without fear of retribution. According to Ghareeb, ‘it has raised the level of debate and opened the door for freer and more accurate news in the Arab world ... Al-Jazeera has helped satisfy a hunger in the Arab world. Its debates and discussion programs are tumultuous even by Western standards’ (Ghreeb, 2000).

According to El-Nawawy and Iskandar, in covering wars in the region, Al-Jazeera, unlike most Western networks, has focused on the humanitarian aspects and the loss of human lives in a way that would appeal to its target audiences in the Arab world. Al-Jazeera’s focus on the human losses in these wars does not necessarily mean that Al-Jazeera has a preconceived anti-Western attitude. It just means that Al-Jazeera should not be expected to operate like other networks in the West because of the difference in perspective. While the Western networks were interested in the progress of the US military on the ground, Al-Jazeera focused on the issue of victimisation – how the innocent civilians in Iraq, Palestine, Afghanistan and Lebanon had been victims to a powerful military machine. Adopting a ‘victims mode’ in covering these wars is what granted Al-Jazeera its legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of its Arab viewers. It is worth mentioning here that Al-Jazeera does not have an anti-US agenda, but reflects the general feelings on the Arab streets, which are overwhelmingly opposed to US policies (El-Nawawy and Iskandar, 2002).

The work of El-Nawawy and Iskandar discusses the term ‘contextual objectivity’, which they coined to demonstrate the hybrid struggle that any network is bound to face between attaining objectivity in news coverage and appealing to its audiences through contextualisation. They apply contextual objectivity to Al-Jazeera’s reporting content, the sources it uses and the way it approaches these sources (El-Nawawy and Iskandar, 2002).
According to El-Nawawy and Iskandar, ‘contextual objectivity’ is best explained in the context of the media coverage of America’s ‘war on terror’, where terms such as ‘terrorism’ and ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ have often been used interchangeably by the Western media. In this regard, the author focuses on Al-Jazeera by shedding some light on its use of terms like ‘martyrs’ versus ‘suicide bombers’. To best explain the logic behind using different terms in different contexts, the author gives examples from Al-Jazeera’s coverage of the Palestinian–Israeli conflict, the Afghanistan war, the Iraq war and the most recent war in Lebanon (El-Nawawy and Iskandar, 2002).

Unlike El-Nawawy and Iskandar, however, Miles believes that the concept of ‘contextual objectivity has a limit. For him, there is a dividing line between abiding by a cultural perspective to convey news, on the one hand; and the respect of veracity, balance, and neutrality, on the other’. This is a line which, he argues, Al-Jazeera did not cross in its reporting of the war against Iraq. Al Jazeera wanted to report on the war but also on the ‘terrible humanitarian costs of it’ (Miles, 2005).

In wartime especially, the notion of objective journalism can be held in two distinct forms. In the first instance, objectivity is conceived as an impossible goal. Objective reporting is associated with fairness, disinterestedness, factuality and non-partisanship. It reflects ‘objective’ ways of gathering news and reproducing them in a detached, impersonal manner surpassing any kind of value judgement. The sociologist Michael Schudson argues that ‘the belief in objectivity is a faith in “facts,” a distrust in “values,” and a commitment to their segregation’ (1987). He refers to the prevailing ideology of newsgathering and reporting as symbols of ‘eyewitness’ accounts of events. Nevertheless, scholars argue that the nature of journalism itself encompasses all of these qualities.

For Schudson, the objectivity is venerable to external circumstances. According to him there are three main circumstances that endanger American journalists’ objectivity’: tragedy, public anger and the threats to national society issues. Schudson’s attempt to wriggle out of the seductive positivistic concept of objectivity is an experience which resonates with many researchers, and perhaps also some
journalists. Hence, Schudson, in his doctoral dissertation on the history of the concept of objectivity in journalism, writes:

I began this study to explore the ideal that facts should be separated from values in social science. I did so because I distrusted the cant of ‘value-free sociology’ and its corollaries … Still, I could not embrace any glib rejection of the value-free ideal. The ideal is so powerful that its critics often believe in it despite themselves … I shall define ‘objectivity’ as the view that one can and should separate facts from values. (Schudson, 1990, pp.2–3).

According to Schudson, the objectivity norm guides journalists to separate facts from values and to report only the facts. In his book Discovering the News Schudson address that during the war editors and reporters perennially have different interests to protect and different ambition to serve. (Schudson,1978,p161). During the Vietnam war Schudson noted, that the government news management is what the press resisted. For the press to cooperate with government in keeping news from the public was one thing, and keeping information from the press was something else. However, the visit of the New York correspondent Harrison Salisbury To Hanoi attracted great attention. Salisbury’s report on the war were disputed by the American government. Salisbury’s reports altered what he calls ‘pattern of acceptability’ (Schudson,1978,p175). According to Schudson, Salisbury’s reports from Vietnam were not only about Hanoi but about the USA, the reports cast doubt on the veracity of the US government statements regarding the war. (Schudson,1978)

In regards to objectivity during war times Schudson explains that… ‘the value of objectivity is confirm specifically against what he calls ‘partisan journalism’. in which the media are the declared allies or agents of political parties and their reporting of news is an element of partisan struggle. (Schudson, 2001,p.151).

According to Harb, in covering war the normal sense of objectivity and distance is impossible in such a context, the only truth that even possible is positioned or contextual truth. Harb argues that seeing it as ‘contextual truth’ or contextual objectivity’ could not be achieved without the ‘contextual objectivity’ approach that
herself and other Lebanese journalists who covered the 2006 war have adapted. According to Harb, ‘contextual objectivity’ could be applied to war reporting in general when the journalists’ own nation is under war, the journalists hardly have any other version of objectivity than his own ‘contextual objectivity’. (Hrab, 2011).

Hrab noted that in circumstances of conflict, it may be argued that the journalist should foster ‘contextual objectivity’, as the willing to ‘partly subvert norms of objectivity, balance and truth’ to convey localised sensitivities and expectations, whatever the cost to political and patriotic loyalties (2008, p. 1138). In her book ‘Channels of Resistance in Lebanon’, and based on her own experience as a journalist Harb noted:

> The ‘truth’ we were intent on showing was the Lebanese version of truth. There is always another version (or several others) available. It was thus a ‘positioned’ truth. (Hrab, 2011: p230).

Tumber (2004) argues that the act of reporting is, in itself, restricting, placing limitations on the ability to report the whole known truth (p.21). It, therefore, indicates that the ‘necessity of selection and the hierarchal organisation of a story, suggests more of a subjective rather than objective outcome’ (p.21). Second, objectivity is employed as a strategic ritual, allowing journalists to act as defenders of the profession (Tuchman, 1972).

However, for all of the praise Al-Jazeera has received, there has been an equal amount of criticism regarding the network’s perceived lack of objectivity. Many scholars have asserted that Al-Jazeera’s Western-style format is merely a cover for a reporting style that is slanted toward a popular pan-Arab, pan-Islamist viewpoint. According to Ajami the station pursues its own oppositional agenda. Al-Jazeera’s reporters see themselves as anti-imperialists. These men and women are convinced that the rulers of the Arab world have given in to American might; these are broadcasters who play to an Arab gallery whose political bitterness they share and feed. (Ajami, 2001)
**Arab Identity and Western Style**

Most Arab private satellite television channels operate according to the same strategy as Western channels, using the approach referred to in the preceding sections. This illustrates the modernisation theory that the Arab media have been encouraged to imitate the West. This imitation of Western media promotes capitalist and consumerist values, which bolster America’s hegemony in global media. Hall describes it as the ‘American conception of the world’ (quoted in Curran, 2002, pp.169, 171). However, the media theory that assumes that the ultimate goal of commercial media is only to make profit does not always apply to Arab private satellite channels. In fact, there are businessmen who are motivated by other factors, such as political influence or philanthropy. Each company or organisation has its own organisational structure and different priorities depending on the owners (Doyle, 2002).

Television in the Arab region, as Boyd and Thussu (2002) remark, has a predominantly ‘Western style’. ‘With regard to production’, he adds, ‘there is very little that is uniquely Arab in Arab-world television’ (Boyd and Thussu, 2002). One can go beyond this argument to say that the stylisation and standardisation of Arab media into that of its Western counterpart, means the incorporation and mimicking of cultural and economic structures that are deeply embedded in structures of Western modernity. In this case, to go back to the original question, what is ‘global’ about Arab media is evident in the way they replicate omnipresent Western and ‘globalised’ structures of cultural product (Sabry, 2010). Today’s rich Arab media owners, according to Sakr, are hardly driven by a historical vision to resuscitate the original Arab satellite project and its intended objectives. They are, with few exceptions, mere cogs in the global media system. The most that can be said about the leading private Middle East satellite channels’ contribution to globalisation’, argues Sakr, is that the billionaires who founded them simultaneously expanded their connections with other members of the super-rich elite whose business interests stretched far and wide (Sakr, 2001).

Since its inception, Al-Jazeera and other news networks in the alternative media order have been heavily contested. The network’s editorial and journalistic decisions position these networks as an alternative news source, and some see the stations as
a powerful force against global hegemonies. In ‘Hegemonic No More: Western Media, the Rise of Al-Jazeera, and the Influence of Diverse Voice’, Philip Seib argues that Al-Jazeera’s success signals ‘an end to the near monopoly in global news that American and other Western media had long enjoyed’ (Seib, 2008, P.30). Others heavily contest the alternative media designation, citing the network’s structure, organisation, and funding; Adel Iskandar argues that much of the alterity that characterises Al-Jazeera is manufactured and ‘resembles the marketing strategy for a corporate brand’ (Miles, 2005). Even though the structure and framework of Western, and mainly American, broadcasting has been adopted by Arab private satellite television, the content also contains Arab cultural and hegemonic dynamics, which means that Arab media are subject to both external and internal influences (Miles, 2005).

**The Ownership Structure of the Two Channels**

This section examines the media and dominant ideologies in the Arab world. Since private pan-Arab satellite television channels have adopted the business models of privately owned television stations in Western countries, this section considers the economic models that see Arab private satellite channels as dependent on governmental capital and power. The next section will consider links between such dependence and the possibility that private media fulfil the political goals of governments rather than the social and economic needs of the people.

The ownership structure of Arab television channels has expanded well beyond the national state channels in recent decades, and certainly beyond the early independence years when the media were handed over by colonial powers to the newly established state governments. In the early years of studying Arab mass media, scholars such as Douglas (1999) and Kamalipour and Mowlana (1994) comprehensively delineated the institutional and regulatory frameworks of broadcasting, country by country, providing a useful description of the era during which television channels were still largely state-owned, and often highly censored. Saker noted that while Egypt may have been the centre of cultural production throughout most of the twentieth century, thus making it the focus of scholars, it lost ground to Lebanon, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and to a lesser extent
Syria and other Arab nations since 2000, with the advent of satellite technology (Saker, 2007).

Launching television stations remains a capital-intensive enterprise dominated by economic elites; however the political elites are loosening their nooses from around broadcasting, although to different degrees among the different Arab countries (Rugh, 2004).

Rugh argued that a taxonomy of a ‘mobilisation’ (Syria, Libya, Sudan, pre-2003 Iraq); a ‘loyalist’ (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, UAE, Palestine); a ‘diverse’ (Lebanon, Kuwait, Morocco, Yemen); and a ‘transitional’ (Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, Algeria, post-2003 Iraq) press proves helpful in understanding the transition from ‘traditional’ media, such as newspapers and radio, to ‘new’ satellite TV (Rugh, 2004).

Sakr (2007) and Hafez (2004) noted that the relationship between station owners and local governments is still strong, if at times tenuous and tense, but the escalating variety of owners has begun to undermine various states’ control over media production; and in countries in which state control of media is still strong, neighbouring satellite channels are perceived as a threat (some of which physically broadcast from Western Europe). The launch of satellite stations has also come to serve broader (national) political strategies, as new media powerhouses – such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Lebanon – vie for audiences and advertisers beyond their national borders. Naomi Sakr’s Arab Television Today (2007), which casts a wider theoretical net than her 2001 monograph on the same subject, covers the important changes which have taken place in the Arab television landscape in the 2000s.

Seib argued that all new established Arab media, including private satellite channels, have limited freedom however, and he noted that the Arab media was most free only during the American occupation of Iraq and the Israeli occupation of Palestine (Seib, 2004). He also implies that the reporting of these media outlets was heavily influenced by the political context in which they had emerged and operated. For example, Al-Jazeera was founded soon after a palace coup in Qatar to add legitimacy to the new regime in the early 1990s. He also noted it was a common
pattern across the Arab world that the media reflected the political context and even the ethnic divisions of the political landscape. According to Ayish, media outlets in some Arab countries – such as Lebanon and Palestine seemed to reflect the sectarian divisions of that nation, with each outlet serving as a voice for a different aspect of the society (Ayish, 2004). Arab media, particularly the Arab satellites, operated on an ‘anywhere but here’ model, engaging in detailed reporting of events outside their host countries but being careful to avoid controversial reporting on domestic events such as in Bahrain, Jordan, and Kuwait (Ayish, 2004).

Hafez (2004), Sakr (2003; 2007), Alnawwai (2006), Saib (2005), and Khatib (2013) all cautioned against the assumption that privately owned Arab media, such as satellite channels, were independent or provided good reporting. And that even for privately owned media, investigative reporting within the Arab world was very difficult due to the lack of legal protections for journalists and their sources, which indicated the importance of the rule of law. However, Arab journalists had more freedom to criticise other governments than they did with their own. While ownership of Arab media was important, other factors – such as financial dependence, personnel selection and protection of journalists by the law – were also very important considerations.

Since transnational satellites became the main carriers of Arab news and entertainment content across the region, Arab states are finding it difficult to control information flows in their mediascapes. They are forced to adopt transnational mechanisms instead of country-specific laws in order to secure their national interests. In early 2008, the Arab states signed the Charter of Principal for Regulating Satellite Broadcasting in the Arab Region. This charter drew intense criticism from international media, as well as from international human rights and free-speech groups, because of the clauses that backtrack on freedom of expression in the Arab region. The charter emerged out of the disparate reactions by Arab governments to fresh challenges posed by pan-Arab broadcasters, such as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya. The charter outlined the code of conduct for satellite channels, ‘for the supreme interests of the Arab world and a common perspective for human development and modernisation in all fields’. Articles 4–7 of the 2008 charter consist of the ‘dos and don’ts’ for satellite channels (Charter of Principal for...
Regulating Satellite Broadcasting in the Arab Region, 2008). The charter empowers league member states to ‘adopt in their domestic legislations all necessary measures to fix any violation by the parties referred to in the subject document according to the principles herein’ (Charter of Principal for Regulating Satellite Broadcasting in the Arab Region, 2008, p.13).

**Dominant Ideologies through Finance**

In order to reveal what powers drive privately owned television, this section examines ideas about media and dominant ideologies. Since private pan-Arab satellite television channels have adopted the business models of privately owned television stations in Western countries, the section will shed light on the function and economics of Arab media.

Despite the paradigm shift in Arab private satellite television away from state ownership, the Arab private market is still under state control, reflecting what is called ‘political capital’. This term suggests that the main purpose of launching this private market was political, not commercial. It also suggests that the majority of these Arab private satellite channels cannot afford to rely on commercial revenues alone, without the financial and political support of the state (Seib, 2005). As mentioned above, these privately owned satellite channels show how inter-linked the private and the state are, with the channels’ owners having links to governments (Sakr, 2003).

For example, Sheikh Waleed Al Ibrahim, MBC Group’s Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO), is King Fahd’s brother-in-law and is connected to the Saudi royal family, which helped him to finance MBC, especially when it was in its infancy (Sakr, 2007). Dream TV is a private Egyptian television channel co-owned by Ahmad Bahgat, an Egyptian businessman whose close ties with the Mubarak government enabled him to launch Dream TV on 2 November 2001. Furthermore, the chief editor of Al-Jazeera is a member of the Qatari royal family.

Despite the claims of some private Arab satellite channels that they are independent, the state remains a major player in the establishment of private satellite television channels; it is not solely subject to market forces. This is reflected in the state’s
influence over programme content, a standard practice in private channels, and by the large amounts of money given by the state for very little, if any, financial return. For example, the annual cost of running the Arab media is said to be US$17 billion, while net advertising revenue in the Gulf countries was no more than US$3 billion in 2004, revealing the hand of the state in making up the difference (Fandy, 2007).

The Emir of Qatar spent US$137 million on covering the initial start-up costs for Al-Jazeera, and he continued to fund it until it reached an annual turnover of US$300 million (Fandy, 2007, p.47). MBC started in 1991 with US$300 million in capital and annual costs of US$60 million (Sakr, 2001). In 2003, the MBC Group launched Al-Arabiya at a cost of US$200 million, and it is still far from balancing costs and revenues. Al-Arabiya’s estimated annual outgoings were US$70 million in the mid-2000s, while its revenue from advertising was no more than US$10 million (Fandy, 2007).

If Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya operate at a loss, there must be non-commercial reasons that motivate Qatar and Saudi Arabia to spend such huge sums of money on unprofitable channels (Fandy, 2007, p.40). Ironically, it is the state that has become the primary entrepreneur in private television, a sector about which it was initially sceptical.

Owners of Arab satellite television channels want to have as many viewers as possible, but each channel has its own style and priorities depending on the owners’ agenda. When MBC emerged on 18 September 1991, it tried to attract viewers by transforming Arab television from the traditional school, confined to national boundaries, to the modern school, judged not only in terms of programme topics and technical excellence, but also for its contribution to a constructive debate on the issues facing Arab societies (Ayish, 2008). LBC and Future TV exploited women to attract male audiences, which was described at that time as like beaming Beirut nightlife into Gulf homes. Al-Jazeera attracted viewers through controversial and uncensored political debates, which were not common in the region. Al-Arabiya tried to attract viewers’ attention with non-political news, such as health, entertainment, news and mainly through its business news and coverage of the stock market (Sakr, 2007).
Satellite channels imported numerous ready-made American and European programmes, or produced Arabic versions of TV formats, for example, *Man Sayarbah Almalion*, which is an adaptation of *Who Wants to be a Millionaire?* This lack of encouragement of creativity and creative endeavours has not only been due to concerns around financial risk, but also because such posts could threaten the political status quo (Sakr, 2007, p.134). Arab media entrepreneurs have thus promoted the mimicking of Western styles.

This rich media environment has challenged the traditional methods of media control, especially in the Arab world, as it becomes much harder to avoid or block widely spread information, especially in terms of political news or crises. Yet political interference due to ownership or political ideology is also a remarkable feature of the broadcasts transmitted through Arab satellite channels.

**The Iraq War and the Arab Media**

Arab governments spend a great deal of time and effort attempting to maintain control over the political environment. Among the most important aspects of control is the ability to initiate and maintain authority over events such as conflicts, and the ability to regulate the flow of information – a good example of this can be learned from the 1991 Gulf War. According to Ayish, this therefore explains the need of Arab governments and the political elites for news management and information-control policies that can support their efforts (Ayish, 2008). Wolfsfeld points out that the ability to control the political environment is threatened by unplanned events, reflected in political actors’ failures, the actions of other antagonists, or outside forces. These become key factors in the possibility of alternative political actors and discourses reaching public visibility in the news media. However, the circumstances and nature of events, then, play a major role in the success of the promotion of certain ideology (Wolfsfeld, 2006).

Since the number of Arab satellite channels has expanded rapidly over the last few years, offering a wide range of ideas and perceptions on political, cultural, social and religious issues, it is appropriate to explore the impact of the surrounding environment – most notably the political environment – that influenced the establishment and the performance of these broadcasters. Fairclough states that ‘the
media, and especially television with its massive audiences, have immense potential power and influence’ (Fairclough, 1995, p.45).

This power and influence arguably includes a mobilising power, as well as the ideological potential of the media (Fairclough, 1995, p.45). Therefore, according to Fairclough, this assertion would explain Arab governments’ interest in controlling media output. With regard to private Arab satellite channels these could be viewed, with no exception to what Fairclough asserted, as being subjected to their governments’ control and interests. However, the emergence of politically and business-motivated private Arab satellite channels, as well as pan-Arab news broadcasters such as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya, has challenged the state-run media output in the Arab world by revealing a wide range of political, social, or even religious positions.

Sakr argued that the Gulf War provided a major catalyst for the spread of satellite broadcasting to the Arab region. Thus, following the 1991 Gulf War, the transformation of the Middle East media landscape gathered pace, involving the physical expansion of the satellite capacity serving the area, a rapid increase in the number of channels, and a matching growth in the size of the satellite audience (Sakr, 2007). Seib meanwhile noted that these privately owned channels amplify the picture of state–private interpretation, because their owners have links to governments. Due to these links, private Arab satellite channels are not entirely financially independent, and are therefore still under the influence of the state (Seib, 2004).

The conflicts in the Arab world play an important role in shaping the visual, political, and economic televisual landscape in the region. Satellite channels such as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya are firmly and actively embedded within this complex structure, and continue attempts to challenge official political points of view. This is mostly seen in Al-Jazeera’s coverage of the Iraq War, which challenges the American version of events (Khatib, 2013).
The role that satellite television plays in the Arab world means that Arab satellite television has itself become a political actor in the Middle East and beyond. In what follows, I will try to offer a critical assessment of this statement.

Satellite channels in the Arab world have taken local political conflicts and given them a regional, and even international, platform. Several satellite television stations remain the satellite versions of state-owned channels broadcasting the official ideology of the state. The coverage of today’s conflicts by the Arab satellite channels is dominated by a style of ‘war journalism’. These channels are structurally and institutionally inclined to offer ‘escalation-oriented conflict coverage’. As Tehranian notes:

> The world’s media are still dominated by state and corporate organizations, tied to the logics of commodity and identity fetishism. Such media generate political or commercial propaganda that constructs hostile images of the other while creating a ‘global fishbowl’ whereby the excesses of the world’s wealthiest are on tantalizing display to the vast numbers of desperately poor. (Tehranian, 2002, p.50)

Scholars argue that the Arab satellite channels were created in an area of conflict, and that the continuous demand for news in an environment that is dominated by 24/7 satellite television had led to the denationalisation and trivialisation of often-complex stories and a temptation to highlight the entertainment value of the news. It engages in processes of political conflict by proxy, becoming a platform for rivalries between Arab countries, clashing ‘national’ political groups, and international political agents. In doing so, satellite television acts as a mouthpiece for warring political factions.

Along the same lines, Shinar argues that the media’s professional standards – which thrive on drama, sensationalism and emotions – are more compatible with war than with peace: ‘War provides visuals and images of action. It is associated with heroism and conflict, focuses on the emotional rather than on the rational, and satisfies news-value demands: the present, the unusual, the dramatic, simplicity, action, personalization, and results’ (Shinar, 2003). Sakr argues that Arab audiences are
likely to tune in more often in times of conflict, therefore news media have little incentive to locate and focus on areas of cooperation in conflicts, and often overstate the proclivity for ‘violence to break out at any moment’ in order to maintain viewership and audience attention (Sakr, 2007).

Thus, in times of war, today’s Arab satellite media often tailor their coverage in ways that construct an ideologically aligned narrative that reinforces the attitudes and opinions of their target national or regional audiences. The emergence of these satellite television stations has created a nexus of power over the Arab television space under competing television stations. The nature of this competition has transformed the landscape of the Arab televisual media from being inherently national, to being regional or pan-Arab (Seib, 2008).

Ayish (2006), Seib (2008), and Khatib (2013) have all argued that the September 11 attack was the ‘absolute event’ for the creation of the news channels in the Arab world. The attacks gave birth to images that have carved a permanent space in the visual memory of people across the globe. The video tapes sent by Al-Qaeda to Al-Jazeera following the attacks form part of this visual memory. Al-Qaeda’s courting of Al-Jazeera after September 11 is well documented, giving the station worldwide notoriety and transforming it into a household name across the globe. Through the ‘war on terror’, satellite television in the Arab world grew in presence and impact, establishing itself as one of the most widely consumed media in the region (Seib, 2008).

In a similar vein, Khatib (2013) and Sakr (2003; 2007) argue that this can clearly be seen in Al-Jazeera’s coverage of the Iraq war in 2003, which challenges the American version of the events. On the other hand, it also engages in processes of political conflict by proxy, becoming a platform for rivalries between Arab countries, clashing ‘national’ political groups, and international political agents. In doing so, it is clear that satellite television acts as a mouthpiece for warring political factions. In the Arab world, the roles that satellite television plays mean that Arab satellite television has itself become a political actor in the Middle East and beyond.
It is not surprising that outside political actors involved in Arab politics have jumped on the bandwagon of using television as a mouthpiece to address the Arab world. The presence of Al-Jazeera International; Al-Arabiya; as well as Iranian, British, Russian and American satellite television stations broadcasting in Arabic has complicated what is meant by ‘Arab’ satellite television, and confirmed television’s role as a participant in political conflict. But even in the case of satellite television stations owned by Arabs that broadcast in Arabic, the situation is complex. As long as satellite television stations engaged in news reporting act as mouthpieces for clashing political actors, whose primary motive is the propagation of messages favourable to the self, a real engagement in political dialogue through television in the Arab world will be difficult. Instead, what we get is the transformation of politics into a commodity, where citizens ‘are turned into consumers’ (Seib, 2008).
Palestine and the Arab Media

This part will explore the politics, representation and journalistic practices relevant to media and conflict in Palestine, in addition of the political parties and their historical and contextual background. It constitutes the basis for analytical work in later chapters on the selected research channels, Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya, prior to the June 2007 Fatah–Hamas military confrontation. In addition it will explore the background of both the political and media context in Palestine.

The Palestinian Society

It is important to note the distinctive history and nature of Palestinian society in order to provide a wider explanation about the political movements in Palestine. Palestine is a society which has lived under Israeli occupation and constant geographical, economic and cultural blockades since 1948. A large bulk of the literature on the topic is concerned with the history of Palestine. Among the most comprehensive histories of the conflict is Edward Said’s *The Question of Palestine* (1992), in addition to the work by the Palestinian author Walid Khalidi (1988). Said argues that history is made by men and women, just as it can also be unmade and rewritten, always with various silences and elisions, always with shapes imposed and disfigurements tolerated so that ‘our’ east, ‘our’ orient becomes ours to possess and direct.

The structure of Palestinian society has been profoundly shaped by its special circumstances, most notably the Israeli occupation. The occupation is ideologically based on transfer policy, in which people are moved from their homelands. Israeli occupation expelled the Palestinians and thus created the refugee problem. This has created a situation in which Palestinians cannot form a complete society. Thus it is not possible to refer to the situation in Palestine as a complete society; instead it is necessary to talk about Palestinian communities. These communities are located in different areas, such as the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and the Palestinian refugees dispersed all over the world (Jamal, 2010).

The way that civil society emerged in Palestine is unique. Not only did it emerge in the absence of a national state, but it also did so in the presence of foreign powers
(British, Egyptian, Jordanian, and Israeli). Civil society in Palestine was and therefore still is burdened with the dual responsibility of being part of the national struggle for liberation, whilst also struggling to position itself in the state-building process. For this reason there has always been role confusion within this society. This confusion has been reflected in heated debates and discussions at every political juncture (Jaeger, 2010).

Political parties in Palestinian society during the 1980s and 1990s reacted by establishing local ‘popular committees’ for the provision of basic services to the population. These committees ‘mushroomed’ in every locality and covered almost every aspect of daily life. However, the transition from ‘popular committees’ to formal institutions was therefore dictated primarily by political considerations. It constituted an attempt to institutionalise the resistance against occupation and hence make it more sustainable. The beginning of the first intifada marked a turning point for Palestinian society. For the first time since the occupation of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem in 1967, the Palestinian occupied territories became the main field of struggle against the occupation. One of the largest and most influential parties was the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). The institutionalisation of the popular committees and the strengthening of chief executive officers in the course of the Intifada, as well as their increasing influence over political discourse, opened new avenues for their leaders (Tamemi, 2007).

The case of Islamic society in Palestine is different and deserves some elaboration. The birth of Hamas as a political movement at the outset of the first intifada was preceded by the active involvement of Islamic activists in service delivery to the poor and marginalised in the occupied territories. According to Jaeger, from the 1970s the Israeli authorities embarked on a policy to create and encourage the emergence of a new alternative to the PLO. Islamic political figures who were de facto not part of the political scene after the 1967 occupation began to speak out, tackling social and religious issues and preaching Islamic morality against what they described as the ‘atheistic’ threat to society. By ‘atheists’ they meant the national factions of the PLO, and the Communist Party, which were particularly active in the West Bank and Gaza. This was a welcome new development in the view of Israel, which saw an opportunity to facilitate the emergence of a new political power that delivered a social
and religious message opposed to the nationalist message of the PLO (Jaeger, 2010).

According to Hroub, the elite of Islamic society maintained a low political profile until the eruption of the first intifada, when Hamas was declared a political movement. The Palestinian Islamists were for at least a decade prior to the intifada, building a religious, social and political infrastructure which enabled them to gain an accumulative influence.

When the Intifada erupted, the Palestinian Islamists enjoyed a significant quantitative presence in several areas in the occupied territories. Their power base relied on an extensive network of social services which helped them expand their power base. Comparing the experiences of secular and Islamic society during the first Intifada, one finds two opposite trends: Islamic civil society elite which emerged as a political elite associated with Hamas, while the political elite of the national secular factions emerged as civil society elite that gradually disengaged from their political affiliation. (Hroub, 2006, p.19)

Many factors have contributed to the failure to complete the Oslo process, including: violence; leadership changes and shortcomings; rejectionist movements with sizeable popular followings (particularly Hamas on the Palestinian side); and a continued Israeli security presence, expanded Israeli settlement of the West Bank and East Jerusalem; and international involvement (Tamemi, 2007). According to Said, one more reason for the failure of the Oslo Accords was that the Palestinians had very little left to give. The common battle against poverty, injustice and militarism and without the ritual demands for psychological security for Israelis – who if they do not have it now, never will. More than anything else, this will show whether the symbolic handshake is going to be the first step towards reconciliation and real peace. It is in this context that Edward Said described the signing of the Oslo Accords as a Palestinian Versailles (Said, 1993). The comparison is obvious: a stronger party imposing grossly unfair terms on a weaker party.
A second Palestinian intifada, from 2000 to 2005, was marked by intense violence inside Israel and actions (asserted by Israel to be necessary to safeguard its citizens’ security) by Israeli security forces that rendered much of the Palestinian Authority (PA) infrastructure built over the preceding decade unusable. US and other internationally supported efforts to restart peace negotiations under various auspices failed to gain traction, and Israel unilaterally withdrew its settlers and military forces from Gaza in 2005 (Tamemei, 2007).

The limited self-rule regime of the PA was undermined further by Hamas’s legislative election victory in 2006 and the Hamas takeover of Gaza in 2007. These developments, along with the subsequent violence and regional political changes, have since increased confusion regarding questions of Palestinian leadership, territorial contiguity and prospects for statehood (Zanotti, 2010).

The Internal Palestinian Conflict 2007

The conflict between Hamas and Fatah seems to be rooted in history. Every day that goes by, a little more is revealed of the dissension between Gaza and the West Bank. Consequently, the political compromises seem meaningless and can hardly mask the fratricidal fights. It seems that Hamas was better prepared and structured for the elections that took place in 2006, and much more effective than the predictions of Western onlookers. In contrast, Fatah and the Palestinian security forces were divided and corrupt, which accentuated its unpopularity.

One can speak of a boomerang effect with regards to the management of the Palestinian crisis; the combined impact of the Israeli attacks on Gaza since 2000 and the ceaseless appetite of funding from Fatah in order to fight Hamas have resulted in the reinforcement of the presence and popularity of the Islamic organisation. Indeed, the search for funding from Fatah has worsened the dissensions within the movement, revealing its incompetence and corruption. In essence, this phenomenon can be explained by the simple fact that the population, held back for so many years, which saw all its rights ridiculed, recognises Hamas as the last remaining shield against the invader. This is one of the reasons behind the success of Hamas in the 2006 general elections.
The internal conflict between the two movements is not the only one in modern Palestinian history. Scholars and journalists have seen and framed the Israeli–Palestinian conflict from many different angles in order to gain a cohesive understanding of the motives and actions of the protagonists (Finkelstein, 1995). In their pioneering research on news values, Galtung and Ruge (1965) suggested that the occurrence of conflict may add more meaning to the country and its people. However, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict has encountered so many obstacles in the search for a resolution, that it seems almost as if peace between Palestinians and Israelis will remain a hope, rather than something that will soon come to fruition. Neither the two-state nor one-state solutions are seriously considered by Israel (Tilley, 2005). The occupation is characterised by incessant – if uneven – violence by both parties.

After the death of Yasser Arafat in 2004, Palestinian elections were called in January 2006. Fatah was still prominent, but Hamas also stood for election, and vowed to disassociate itself from corruption under the motto ‘Change and Reform’. Fatah’s reign in the PA was regarded as corrupt, frustrating suffering Palestinians, ‘turning the proto-state into an instrument of party patronage and brutal domination’ (Brown, 2010).

According to Evans, the result of the parliamentary election represents a major shift in the Palestinian political landscape, as the militant Islamist movement, Hamas, emerged as the largest party in Palestine, winning 74 seats out of 132 in the Legislative Council. Until then it had largely been dominated by the secular nationalist Fatah faction of the PLO (Evans and Bell, 2010). Jamal noted that this frustration and desire for reform gave Hamas an overwhelming majority of seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council, making them responsible for forming a new government. The US’s and EU’s response to the undesirable election results was to cut aid to the Palestinians, effectively punishing the government they had chosen (Jamal, 2010).
The election victory for Hamas exacerbated tensions with Fatah and its affiliated paramilitary forces, and there was sporadic violence in the immediate aftermath. According to Chehab, by May 2006 relations had deteriorated rapidly, as Hamas moved to establish its own rival security force, having failed to exert its authority over the Fatah-dominated PA security institutions. The deployment in Gaza of a new 3,000-member Executive Force during May 2006, under the control of the Hamas-led Interior Ministry, was condemned by President Abbas as illegal and anti-constitutional. He issued a presidential decree nullifying the move, insisting that control of security forces should remain united under the presidency (Chehab, 2007).

By early 2007, a Fatah–Hamas dialogue had started in an attempt to prevent what both referred to as ‘media escalation’ of the conflict. Evans states that the locals and intellectuals tried to reinforce the peace process, and a Mecca National Unity Agreement was signed by Mahmoud Abbas and Khalid Mishal (for Fatah and Hamas, respectively) in March 2007 (Chehab, 2007). However, even though in PA budget discussions, where Hamas members were also present, both parties agreed to share power in a unified Palestinian government, and even though Saudi Arabia pledged to support this government and pay salaries for PA employees, peace had already broken down by June 2007 (Chehab, 2007).

Chehab noted that the clashes between the new force and Fatah paramilitaries erupted in mid-May 2006, prompting warnings of the potential for civil war in the Palestinian territories. The factional tensions were exacerbated by violence involving criminal groups and clan-based militias, with the latter increasingly filling the vacuum left by the PA as a source of basic governance (Chehab, 2007).

**Fighting over Politics**

The first six months of 2007 were marked with intense clashes between forces belonging to Hamas and Fatah. Jamal argued that these incidents of violence, which portray an image of a potential civil war, were based more on a struggle for power than on a genuine confrontation over ideology and, at times, descended into acts based on vengeance. Intra-Palestinian violence was mainly ‘political and
opportunistic’ in character. It is essential to understand that the Palestinian society is not based on ethnic or sectarian divisions (Jamal, 2010).

According to Roy (2011) and Jamal (2010), it must be taken into account that although some factors responsible for the infighting may be rooted in the nature of internal Palestinian conditions, no Palestinian condition can be isolated from the ambit of Israeli occupation. Ideological differences between Palestinian factions have existed since the advent of Palestinian nationalism. Roy points out that the recent infighting was not the product of a genuine struggle over principles and ideologies. Being more of a power struggle, the roots of Palestinian infighting can be attributed to all the realms that characterise it: intra-Palestinian relations, Israeli–Palestinian relations, and the PA’s relations with the international community (Roy, 2011).

Roy points out that although the incidents of violence between Hamas and Fatah were proof of the ideological and political rivalries between the two movements, an assessment of the violent clashes cannot be made on such a basis alone. At times, the enmity driving the clashes appeared secondary to the political developments taking place, which were both internal and external in nature. It seemed to materialise more as a consequence of certain developments, than as the primary driving force (Roy, 2011).

**Struggle over Religion or Legitimacy**

Scholars such as Tamemi (2007), Brown (2010), and Schanzer (2010) argue that the deepest divisions between Hamas and Fatah probably lie as much in political questions as religious ones. Specifically, the gaps seem most severe on the desirability of a two-state solution and on the appropriateness of various forms of resistance – and even on these issues there are many shades of grey within each movement, and some overlapping of positions.

According to Tamemi (2007), Brown (2010), and Schanzer (2010) there are two settings in which the gap in religion and politics between Hamas and Fatah might be seen as bridgeable. First, Brown suggested that the difference between the two movements might be negotiated; both movements combine national and religious claims with some great differences in emphasis, but not generally in absolutely incompatible ways. Second, in the existence of strong democratic institutions, the
two sides would likely be able to translate their disagreements into contrasting positions on various public policy issues, to be settled through normal constitutional and electoral channels (Brown, 2010).

Brown argues that, in addition, Palestine lacks the structures, the leaders, or the incentives to bridge the gap. It is for that reason that the width of the division may be more problematic for Palestinians than its depth. With regard to structures, Brown noted:

The problem is that Fatah and Hamas do not fight each other in the genteel settings of seminar rooms or the established channels of constitutional democracy. Instead their contest has taken place on the streets of Gaza and the West Bank, where both sides simply impose their will whenever they can. There are, to be sure, some avenues for them to sort out their differences, but those have grown markedly weaker over the past three years. The Palestinian Basic Law – the constitutional framework – is thoroughly broken; the instruments of legality are now employed chiefly to serve partisan ends; and the enforced unity of Israeli prisons has produced no visible outcomes for quite some time. (Brown, 2010, p.3)

On the other hand, Abu Helal added another reason for why this conflict is more political than religious, which is that the leaders who dominate both halves of the Palestinian Authority are those who are profoundly suspicious of the other side and deeply invested in the current division. Those individuals who might lead unity efforts too often seem like yesterday’s leaders (Abu Helal, 2013).

Scholars such as Schanzer (2010), Kessel and Klochendler (2009), and Helal (2010) offer another perspective, that the key word that answers the aforementioned questions about the internal conflict between Fatah and Hamas is ‘legitimacy’. Schanzer notes that

what the Palestinian arena is witnessing today is a natural extension of the conflict over Palestinian legitimacy between Hamas and the PLO. This conflict started when Hamas became a part of the national resistance in 1987 and an important player in Palestinian politics and revolution, as well as a potential competitor for Palestinian
legitimacy, which has been monopolised by the PLO since Fatah gained control of it in 1969. (Schanzer, 2010, p.12)

According to Kessel and Klochendler, the internal political conflict took on a more intense political and security dimension after the legislative elections in 2006, which explains the clashes and provocations following Hamas’s victory in the elections and the formation of its government. This ultimately led to military action which was resolved in Hamas’s favour in the Gaza Strip, leading the conflict over legitimacy to an unprecedented phase that continues today (Kessel and Klochendler, 2009).

Although the Palestinian revolution is still theoretically ongoing, as it has not achieved any of its main goals; Helal adds that the Oslo Accords, and the authority they produced, has led to the formation of a hybrid between a revolution and state, which has led to the decline in importance of historical legitimacy in the Palestinian National Liberation Movement and contributed to its destruction, though it has not yet fully ended it. He stated that:

In exchange for this destruction of Fatah and the PLO’s historical legitimacy, a new historical legitimacy is being gained by Hamas, who have worked on the formation of their own historical struggle for over 25 years, which is a little over half the entire duration of Palestine’s modern revolutionary history. (Helal, 2010, p.31)

Schanzer argues that it is known that the Fatah movement has been able to support its historical and revolutionary legitimacy after the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority through electoral legitimacy. He stated:

The movement, and its historical leader, Yasser Arafat, were able to achieve a clear victory in the presidential and parliamentary elections held in 1996, in light of Hamas and a number of PLO factions’ boycott of the elections. Fatah also continued to preserve its electoral legitimacy after the death of Yasser Arafat, when its candidate, Mahmoud Abbas, achieved an electoral victory qualifying him to succeed Arafat as president in 2004. (Schanzer, 2009, p.13)
Schanzer also noted, however, that the legislative elections held in January 2006 led to the division of electoral legitimacy amongst Fatah and Hamas, when Hamas won a large majority of seats in the Legislative Council, which qualified it to head the government and share power with the presidency, as dictated by the Amended Basic Law. This fuelled the conflict over legitimacy between Hamas and Fatah and deepened the crisis, rather than contribute to the solution (Schanzer, 2019).

Schanzer (2009), Brown (2010), and Abu Helal (2013) all argue that the Palestinian division (which was the inevitable result of the conflict over legitimacy) further fuelled the conflict. This division formed the substance of the dispute between the conflicting parties, as each party claims to possess electoral legitimacy. The truth is that both legitimacies, presidential and parliamentary, are the subject of dispute after the president’s and Legislative Council’s legal terms ended. However, each party is trying to interpret the laws in a way that serves their own purposes (Kessel and Klochendler, 2009; Schanzer, 2010; Helal, 2010).

Lybarger (2007) and Schanzer (2009) add that although historical legitimacy is in favour of Fatah, revolutionary legitimacy is leaning towards Hamas at the moment, and that both movements possess partial electoral legitimacy. They argue that this means that Hamas cannot claim to fully represent the Palestinian people on its own, and that Fatah does not have the right to monopolise this representation. Moreover, neither movement has the right to fight the political and economic support of the Palestinians in Gaza under the pretext of the unity of representation and legitimacy (Lybarger, 2007; Schanzer, 2009).
Battle for Gaza June 2007

By facility or by choice, the international media constantly established a link between the Hamas victory for the Palestinian Legislative Council elections of January 2006 and the multiplication of the inter-Palestinian clashes at the end of 2006 and the beginning of 2007.

Hamas decided to begin its military coup in Gaza on the first week of June 2007, and in the following weeks much of central and northern Gaza was reported to be under its control. Immediately after, Fatah announced the suspension of its participation in the National Unity Government in protest of the seizure of a number of Fatah-controlled security posts. After days of struggle, in mid-June 2007, the Hamas Executive Force took over the entire Gaza Strip, sweeping away Fatah and the different security forces loyal to Fatah (Ulrike, 2010).

Hroub argued that the increasingly visible break between Fatah and Hamas is reflected in the territorial divisions between Gaza and the West Bank, particularly after the normalisation of the PA president’s relations with Western actors as a legitimate alternative. There are now two rival governments, one in Gaza and the other in Ramallah, each one asserting a constitutional legitimacy of its right to power. Hamas profits from popularity amongst the Palestinian population due to the fact that it appears to be a victim of Western pressures, which reinforce Palestinian feelings that they must hold on to the last remnants of their freedom of choice (Hroub, 2010).

As the leader of Fatah, President Mahmoud Abbas immediately dissolved the Palestinian government of which Hamas was a part. The government headed by Hamas thereby became illegal (Hroub, 2010). In the West Bank, a new government was installed with a large majority from Abbas’s Fatah party led by Prime Minister Salam Fayyad. He was internationally respected for his liberal ideas and because of his acceptance of the idea that an ‘approach to governance is anchored in the belief that governance could be improved under continued occupation’ (Brown, 2010, p.42). However, Hilal (2010) and Brown (2010) noted that for most Palestinians this represented an unacceptable compromise, sacrificing Palestinian self-determination for relative freedom within a perpetuated state of illegal occupation.
According to Hilal, the takeover of the Gaza Strip by Hamas and the scission which is taking place within Palestinian society represent a new stage in the development of the conflict which could either prove to be a catalyst for new negotiations or a real danger to them. Some Arab countries interpreted this shift as an opportunity, and consider the fact that Hamas, due to its implication after the Palestinian vote, should become a true interlocutor (Hilal, 2010).

**Palestine and Media Representations**

Tamami (2007), Gunning (2008), Jamal (2010), Hilal (2010), Brown (2010), and Pitner (2012) argue that the media keeps the Palestinian dream of a homeland – Palestine – and quest to end the Israeli occupation alive. Thus, the media has been a potent weapon in the story of the Palestinian people’s struggle for freedom. They noted that the Palestinians were presented in the media in three different periods.

The first period, according to Gunning (2008) and Jamal (2010), begins with the outbreak of the Palestinian intifada in 1987, and ends in 1993. According to Jamal, the first intifada changed the relationship of Palestinians in the occupied territories to the West, and news media were one of the mechanisms of this transformation. The intifada attracted the sustained interest of Western news organisations and created a demand for Palestinian journalists to work with these organisations (Jamal, 2010).

Tamami noted that during this period the Palestinian journalists initially believed that working with Western media organisations could fulfil the national goals of circulating their story to international audiences. The media transformed the mostly unarmed intifada through the Western image of Palestinians from that of refugees or to that of a people resisting one of the world’s most powerful armies in the streets and alleyways of their own cities, villages, and refugee camps (Tamemi, 2007). Kellner (gave an example of this point when the media reported on repressive Israeli policies, like that of breaking the arms and legs of demonstrators (Kellner, 2004). Polls indicated that sympathy for Palestinians and support for an independent Palestinian state grew significantly in the United States during this period, demonstrating that the first intifada also set the stage for Palestinian concern within Western public opinion (Kellner, 2004).
The second period was after the Oslo agreement, which witnessed the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority in 1994, and the second intifada in 2000. According to Bishara, because of technological developments that facilitated transnational media, funding structures developed during the Oslo years, and so did a desire on the part of Palestinian leaders and many others to see Palestinians favourably represented in the Western news media (Bishara, 2006). In addition, during the second intifada the media had a crucial international dimension. In the middle of the second intifada, Al-Jazeera was the most popular Palestinian source for television news (Bishara, 2006). Arab satellite television networks – such as Al-Jazeera, MBC and Abu Dhabi – had such intense focus on the events of the second intifada that it made Palestinians feel that they were at the centre of events and sympathy in the Arab world more than at any time since the Nasser era (Hammami and Tamari, 2001), at least until the US invasion of Iraq. However, Maiola and Ward argued that these stations could never take the place of the kind of national media that could be a forum for discussion of national priorities:

Although they covered the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in some depth, it was covered not only, or even primarily, for their Palestinian audiences, but because it has been a hot topic for many Arab viewers. Internal Palestinian questions have thus necessarily been given less weight. Researchers have found no evidence that Al-Jazeera’s coverage encourages Palestinian media to cover internal issues more critically or thoroughly. (Maiola and Ward, 2007)

However, during this period (and since the PA came to power in 1995) the media remained in the hands of competing political actors. Pitner argued that the regional satellite television stations such as Al-Jazeera were another way for those actors to air their ideologies to an audience beyond the national one. In addition, the local Palestinian media sector is dominated by outlets owned by political groups or the government, or low-capacity operators struggling to attain professional standards (Pitner, 2012).
The situation of the local media under the Palestinian Authority was no better. According to Jamal:

The institutional structure of the Palestinian Authority was highly bureaucratic and, in addition, the dominant role of the Palestinian elite had a major impact on the media system. The Palestinian Authority committed to the Oslo agreement, to peace with Israel, and tried to absorb the Islamic parties, but they have been uncooperative. Both sides were struggling to own the media to gain public support and therefore started to establish media institutions. (Jamal, 2010, p.23)

For example, Jamal noted that Palestine Television (a government TV station) had to back the Palestinian Authority, and its programme features had to support the Oslo agreement. This did not correspond with the policy of opposing Islamic parties which continued to resist the Israeli occupation. Therefore, the Islamic movement Hamas established its TV station prior to the 2006 Palestinian elections and tried to compete with Palestine TV (Jamal, 2010, p.23).

According to Hilal (2010), Brown (2010), and Baudouin (2010), Nofal (2012) the third period of representing the Palestinians in the media began after the 2006 elections, when Hamas came to power. Pitner argues that during this period and after Hamas won the legislative elections, the conflict between PA and Hamas intensified. Subsequently, Hamas took over and controlled Gaza. Different media outlets engaged with this political struggle, with each party trying to use the regional and international media as a means to achieve electoral gains. In such a polarised political situation, the media – especially Arab TV stations – has been used to realise political projects. Ultimately, the Palestinian local media failed to fulfil its duty and lost some of its credibility with the Palestinian public (Baudouin, 2010).
The War over Arab Media

During the first week of the escalation in June 2007, another war appeared to break out between the two parties – the war over Arab media (Baudouin, 2010). However, the truth is somewhat more complex. Neither the Arab world, nor the Arab media, is a monolith. Saudi Arabia and Egypt have sought to prevent Hamas from scoring political gains at the expense of the more secular Palestinian Authority led by Fatah, while Qatar is leading a Gulf bloc that equates support for Hamas with support for the Palestinian people. The fault lines have produced a media war in the Arab world (Baudouin, 2010).

According to Alkhatib, Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya gave this conflict priority coverage and airtime. This was the case in both brief and main news, and even in breaking news, without overlooking news related to the Palestinian–Israeli conflict, and giving such news the lead in news bulletins (Alkhatib, interview, 2011). Jamal argues that the conflict was most evident in the broadcasts of the region’s bitter television rivals; he noted that during the first days of the conflict, Al-Jazeera, owned by the government of Qatar, focused on vivid images of bloodshed accompanied by commentary thick with moral outrage. Rival, Al-Arabiya, owned by Saudi interests close to the royal family, chose to avoid the most graphic footage and took a more measured tone. The contrasting approaches reflect both the very different perceptions of the role of Arab journalism in the two newsrooms and the political rift between their respective patrons. (Jamal, 2010)

However, Abu-Helal points out that a regular Arab viewer of these two channels can only conclude that this discourse lacks objectivity and it is a provocative discourse that brands others with treason and reflects an intellectual doctrine that claims monopoly over the truth. The channels’ performance is based on instigation and defamation, as can be seen in their references to political figures and leaders, such as their personal attacks on some officials from both sides (Abu-Hilal, 2013).

The regional media, especially the privately owned satellite channels, allowed itself to become an actor in a number in the Palestinian conflicts. According to Brown, these channels have a global reach and as such have an ‘agenda-setting effect’. 
This ‘effect’ revolves around the ideological components of political disagreements, and more specifically the way in which key actors in conflict seek to manipulate public perceptions of the disagreement. He added:

Actors in any conflict will seek to either minimize or exaggerate the conflict, depending upon their relative position of power. Weak actors will want to ‘socialize’ the conflict – that is, to enlist allies in their cause against a greater power and to increase the perception of suffering. Actors in positions of dominance seek to ‘privatize’ the conflict and limit attention to or awareness of the conflict. Those who are weak will seek to draw media coverage to the conflict, while those who in power will seek to minimize the extent of the problems. (Brown, 2010, p.20)

In regards to the local Palestinian media sphere, which has long since been dominated by partisan control and self-censorship, it has become further politically polarised and driven by factions during this conflict, rather than citizens’ concerns (Abu-Helal, 2013). According to the Palestinian news agency Ma’an’s 2011 survey, 59% of Palestinians felt that local media negatively impacts the Palestinian internal division. At the same time, Palestinian journalists committed to independent, non-partisan coverage feel under siege because investigative reporting is portrayed as advocacy for the opposing group (Ma’an Agency News, 2011).

The polarisation between the political factions in Palestine and the restricted freedom of expression on the local media also created divisions in the public. Furthermore the media outlets in Palestine had embedded reporters on the ground, positioning themselves opposite each other during the conflict (Ma’an Agency News, 2011).

It is vital to point out that both the media related to Fatah and that related to Hamas contributed to and influenced the information of today, as well as enhanced the existing reality of the division between Hamas and Fatah, because both are quoted internationally. Generally, Palestinian media is as diverse as Palestinian society at large, and there is now a growing body of research on the diversity of the Palestinian media by a number of scholars in communication studies (Jamal, 2010; Pintak, 2011; Abu Helal, 2013). Any medium that is bound to a specific location – typically the territorially bound printed press – is only as free as its immediate society.
Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya’s Covering of Palestine

In 1996, the launch of Al-Jazeera created a boom in the popularity of Arab satellite television channels. This launch was supervised by a professional team from the BBC (Khoury, 2010). Four years later, in 2000, this was followed by the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada. Whereas previously, Arab viewers had to rely on international televisions or Arab state-sponsored channels for news and current affairs programmes, they could now – for the first time – watch television programmes free from state censorship. In 2003, as the second intifada escalated, a second important and influential satellite channel hit the screens of the Arab world – Al-Arabiya – whose emergence was supervised by the same BBC team. This team drafted the code of ethics for the two channels (Khoury, 2010).

Although Al-Jazeera was a well-respected and relatively well-known channel in the Arab world, it did not enjoy a primary position in people’s homes. Khatib Argus that it was the second Palestinian intifada in 2000 that made Al-Jazeera a recognized brand in the region. Al-Jazeera devoted much of its broadcasting time to coverage of the intifada, presenting a clear pro-Palestinian stance towards the issue. (Khatib, 2013). The coverage of the second intifada has given Al Jazeera a truly pan-Arab dimension. The question of Palestine is part of the socio-political consciousness of the Arab nation as a whole. Being the single most important political preoccupation for Arabs since World War II, the Palestinian question has been and continues to be in the minds of practically all Arabs as a cause, a symbol and a reality.

According to El-Nawawy and Iskander (2002) Khatib (2013) Zayani (2005), the second Palestinian Intifada (or what is often called the Al Aqsa intifada, which erupted in September 2000 at the provocation of Ariel Sharon’s visit to Al Aqsa Mosque) has been a “real laboratory” for Arab satellite channels, putting their credibility and their professionalism to the test. (Khatib, 2013). Some of these channels have seized the opportunity to increase their popularity and widen their reach, covering the intifada and its repercussions with full intensity and providing news and analysis on the bloody clashes in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. By
and large, Arab satellite broadcasting has helped the Arab street mobilize its efforts to support the intifada. (El-Nawawy and Iskander, 2002).

All the Arab satellite channels, although in varying degrees, have opened an unprecedented outlet for scenes of the ferocity of Israeli practices against the Palestinians. However, more than any other channel, Al Jazeera has capitalized on the importance of the Palestinian question. Zayani (2005) It has not only provided instant coverage of the events and aired detailed reports on the latest developments, shedding an unpleasant light on the practices of Israeli the Middle East, airing raw footage and images of incursions, death and demolition in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip rarely displayed by Western media. (Zayani, 2005)

According to Zayani (2005): ‘In the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Al Jazeera is a local channel. Because of the difficulties in communication caused by the curfews and sieges, many Palestinians watch Al Jazeera to see what is happening and follow what the reporters say. For these people, Al Jazeera is a convenient and reliable means to find out what is going on’. (Zayani, 2005. p173) . Zayani argues that in doing so, Al Jazeera set itself a political role in the Arab world:

Al Jazeera’s intense coverage of the intifada has not only fed Arab fury but also fostered anti-government behaviour in the Arab world, making Arab governments vulnerable to charges and open to criticism that they have not sufficiently supported the Palestinians or decisively acted on the Palestinian cause. In this sense, Al Jazeera places itself as a counter-force to the official indifference towards the plight of the Palestinian people. (Zayani, 2005. p174).

On other hand, the “war on terror” contributed to the prominence of Al-Jazeera in particular, and satellite television in general, in the Arab world. The events of September 11 were less than a year later; the events of September 11 consolidated the transformation of Arab satellite television into a visual-saturated medium. They also consolidated the role of Arab satellite television as an active political participant in the region, as opposed to a mere carrier of messages.
Since then, Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya have remained the two leading Arab news channels, representing the two main opposing camps in the Middle East. Abdul Wahhab Badrakhan, chief editor of Alsharq Alawsat newspaper noted:

Al-Jazeera expresses a populist view that champions the culture of resistance and tries to be popular and populist at the same time, whereas Al-Arabiya speaks for what is known as the ‘Arab moderate bloc’ led by Saudi Arabia and tries to be both popular and conservative, while occasionally flirting with populism. (Abdul Wahhab Badrakhan, personal interview, 2012)

According to Pintak, both Al-Arabiya and Al-Jazeera have contributed to a significant shift in Arabic journalism towards incorporating the ‘Palestinian issue’ within a general set of Arabic concerns, thus raising awareness of issues within Palestine amongst Arabic-speaking audiences: ‘The two channels are widely considered the main source of news for the Palestinian public, although Al-Jazeera has the larger viewing numbers of the two channels and enjoys a broader, more popular appeal than Al-Arabiya’ (Pintak, 2009).

Massive criticisms, however, were directed at the two networks for their coverage of the internal conflict in 2007 (Tawil-Souri, 2009; Bishara, 2010; Jamal, 2010; Zakout, 2010; Badrkhan, 2012; Abu Helal, 2013). Critics argued that the coverage of Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya was often politically motivated and influenced by the networks’ owners. It is no secret that they were alluding to Al-Jazeera’s Qatar, which supported Hamas, and Al-Arabiya’s Saudi Arabia, which supported Fatah. While no objective audience would deny that Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya’s programmes serve the interests of the Qatari and Saudi governments, the central criticisms focussed on the credibility of the networks’ coverage of the Palestinian issue. Palestinian scholars Abu Helal (2013) and Jamal (2010) also accused the two stations of creating inflammatory lead-in segments to news reports, which often featured montages of violence in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during the conflict.

According to Jamal, the reports from both networks covering this conflict contained flashes of provocative pictures, usually of human suffering, accompanied by dramatic background music. For example, Al-Jazeera called its coverage of the
operation in Gaza on 14 June 2007 – when Hamas took control of the Gaza strip from the PA – ‘Gaza Freedom’. Some suggest that Al-Jazeera is merely following a Middle Eastern tradition of dramatising news events by appealing emotionally to the viewer (Jamal, 2010).

In addition, scholars – such as, Helal (2009), Pintak (2009), and Jamal (2010) – have suggested a lack of professionalism in standards of accuracy, timeliness, balance, context, and comprehensiveness. According to Badrkhan, during this conflict the regular viewer could clearly see Al-Jazeera’s Islamist sympathies with Hamas. He explained: ‘Qatar has been one of the key backers of the Brotherhood for decades, this relationship being more comfortable than that between the Brotherhood and Saudi Arabia. Qatar has used Al-Jazeera to express public support for the Brotherhood, hosted its leaders in Doha, and given it financial support. It is unsurprising that the network sides heavily with Hamas as an Islamic movement in its rivalry with the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority in 2007’. (Badrkhan, personal interview, 2012)
CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

Introduction

This chapter outlines the research methodology of this project, which employs a three-methods approach of interviews, content analysis, and critical discourse analysis of news reporting about the representation of the internal Palestinian conflict in 2007. I will set out the general approach for my research topic, and will explain the research design and methods used for data gathering. I will consider the way these methods were deployed throughout the research, their advantages and disadvantages, and the rationale for using them, as well as explaining the techniques used in data analysis.

After specifying the research topic, I first had to formulate the research questions, which later would dictate the research methods, in accordance with the axiom, ‘the method one should choose when approaching any topic … depends upon the question one wants to answer’ (Jensen and Jankowski, 1991, p.79). Consequently, I found the three research methods most appropriate to finding answers for my research questions.

I will then explore the relevant literature that is instructive for the qualitative approach, which focuses on interviewing professional journalists and investigating the manner in which they perceive and understand the news representation of the conflict. The methodological framework then integrates the analytical tools associated with content analysis (CA) and critical discourse analysis (CDA). The three primary methods are introduced and discussed in a consistent format, providing: (a) a descriptive account of the method, (b) an evaluation as to why it produces valuable results, and (c) how it was applied in this particular study.
I believe that combining quantitative and qualitative methods in this study is extremely useful. One reason for this is to overcome the complexity that research questions call for in answering questions ‘beyond simple numbers in a quantitative sense or words in a qualitative sense’ (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007). Therefore, a combination of both forms of data can provide a well-rounded approach to the analysis. It is also believed that quantitative and qualitative researchers alike recognise the strengths and weaknesses of both these approaches and the manner in which they function towards one another in facilitating increased sophistication in research (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007) – thereby providing a synergy, merging both ends of the methodological spectrum. A mixed-methods approach is useful in this research because it addresses the intricacies present in implementing either method; it provides a discourse analytic methodology and gathers multiple forms of data in order to simultaneously examine media content and discourse.

Another valuable insight into this research is its comparative contribution. Comparative analysis highlights variation and similarity, thereby making it possible to distinguish imperative findings that otherwise would not have been conceptualised. For an objective investigation of this presupposition, I will propose a comparative study of Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya news reporting during the Palestinian internal conflict in 2007. I have chosen both channels because of their worldwide reputation and their clear influence on Arab societies. In addition, satellite channels in Palestine are a dominant source of news today.

According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, a statistical review on the culture of households and persons for 2013 showed that 89.2% of Palestinian households who have a TV set watch Arab television stations. Data also showed that 73.8% of households with a TV set watch Arab news channels including Aljazeera and Al-Arabiya news channels on a daily basis. Therefore the researcher will examine how each news network represented each side of the conflict and the relationship between news networks and newsmakers (e.g., the networks’ favourable coverage of news related to a side).
Furthermore, my aim of employing this approach was to analyse the media coverage across the two networks in order to support the hypothesis of this thesis: that the news representation of the Fatah and Hamas conflict was a site of struggle between different political ideologies. The news reporting of this conflict by the selected channels was not free from bias, but rather it reflected the ownership ideologies and the disproportionate power between the two channels. To the best of my knowledge, this work is the first to perform an academic analysis of the internal conflict coverage of the two satellite television channels Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya with such broad goals and with such an ambitious scale.

**Research Ethical Considerations: A Matter of Research Objectivity**

This study was guided and approved by, first my supervisor, and second by the ethical principles on research process set out by Brunel University (see Appendix 1). As a practice journalist, I consider ethical considerations to be one of the most important parts of gathering information. In this light, I maintained the highest level of research and journalism standards of objectivity, transparency, and honestly throughout the research process – in the data collection, discussions, and analyses. And to ensure quality and integrity of my research, I followed these steps: (1) all interviews were audio recorded and; (2) full consent was obtained from the participants prior to the study (consent was audio recorded); (3) for participants who preferred to be anonymous, their privacy and anonymity was of a paramount importance and I took steps to ensure that the confidentiality and anonymity of their names or any personal details was respected; and (4) I ensured that all participants participated in the study voluntarily.

Personal affiliations in any form, the aims and objectives of the research, my personal details as well as any possible conflicts of interest were declared to all participants. All email communications in relation to the ethical considerations of my research with people who provided the reports from Aljazeera and Al-Arabiya, the journalists, in addition to the postgraduate office at Brunel University were applied with accuracy, honesty and transparency. Analysis paper sheets, translation sheets, audiotapes and all email communications related to the study are archived for future reference. These measures aimed to reduce any loss of meaning and thereby to enhance the validity of cross-English qualitative research.
I believe that the discussions of the findings should be understood as the researcher's own interpretation. For example, the way the interviews were integrated and the way quotations were selected from these interviews. Additionally, the researcher’s primary goal for this research was to add knowledge to the topic, not to contribute judgments on the issue.

**Challenges**

One of the significant challenges in conducting the research was gaining the approval necessary to hold interviews with some participants; for example, it took me nine months to arrange the interview with Al Jazeera chief of news Mr Asef Hemaid. It was also time-consuming gathering the news reports from original sources, and dealing with the bureaucracy inside Arab media organisations to obtain approval for news material. However, my connections with people from inside these channels, in addition to my personal relationships with many of the Palestinian journalists helped to overcome these challenges.

Another challenge was the translation process for both the interviews and the reports for the CDA chapter. Although it was a long and tedious process, transcribing and translating the interviews was the only way for the researcher to effectively see what each participant said and to be able to group certain aspects of the interviews into categories (themes) for the analysis. However, I overcame this challenge by following other scholars work on translation media materials as explained below. I also decided that, based on the population size of the interviews analysis, including the names of the journalists would not add nor remove any substance from the analysis. Therefore, the names were not used in the interview analysis part.
Transcripts and Translation of Materials

The nineteen interviews were audio recorded. The interviews lasted between 1 to 1.5 hours each. I interviewed the participants in Arabic as I had found that when the interviewees speak in English they were uncomfortable and could not express themselves well. Therefore, after careful consideration, I decided to conduct the interviews in Arabic in order to allow participants whose first language is Arabic to fully express them, and thereby manage the communicative exchange between me and participants.

According to Saldanha & O’Brien, that during the design stage of the translation process it is necessary to consider what data elicitation techniques will be used. Lorscher (cited in Saldanha & O’Brien, 2014. P116) address six factors that characterize the data obtained from verbal reporting to be used in research. These factors according to Lorscher can be applied to data from many research tools used in the translation process. They are: number of participants, research context, regency of the event, mode of responses, formality of elicitation and the degree of external interventions. According to Saldanha & O’Brien, 2014, these factors could be useful for any researcher who wants to characterise the data obtained in the transition process for cross-study comparison. (Saldanha & O’Brien, 2014).

For this study, I found it useful to follow broadly Samia Bazzi’s model of transition. Bazzi’s study focuses on the role of translation in the representation of the conflict in Arab media which is similar to this study, she concludes that —the forms of political resistance to an alien media code can be legitimised and built into the translation commission itself, thus achieving the effects preferred by both the target elites and their target audiencell (Bazzi, 2009.p 212). Bazzi suggested a model of translation that can be referred to by translators or analysts when comparisons have to be made with a foreign text, or when translation decisions have to be made. As for decision-making, the model summarized how decisions are made or can be made on translations media materials. Bazzi’s model involves three main phases; Identify factors between the original text and the transited text, the translator’s final decision made according to the first phase and the translation output. (Bazzi, 2014.pp 209-212). In addition I found it also useful to follow the steps of translating and coding texts suggested by John W. Creswell (in Berger, 2000: 121).
Analysis and Coding Schemes

1- Interviews Analysis Process

According to Braun and Clarke, a thematic analysis is a qualitative analytic method for 'identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data. It minimally organises and describes the data set in (rich) detail. However, frequently it goes further than this, and interprets various aspects of the research topic' (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Accordingly, I used this approach for analysing the interviews.

I believe that thematic analysis is the best method to analyse the interviews because the aim is to make a connection between the research questions and hypothesis of this research. Also, thematic analysis allows the researcher to divide the data into parts. A ‘specific theme’ is the unit for analysis in this approach. The themes for analysing these interviews depended on ‘specific phrases’ that were mentioned in the participant’s answers to the questions raised in the interviews, for each theme a different question was asked.

The two groups were interviewed to discuss the main topic of this research – the news representations and the internal conflict. In addition, general issues that are related were raised during the interviews – issues related to Arab media, Arab political systems, democracy and media, internal conflicts in the Arab world, and issues especially related to the Palestinian situation, such as the role of the media and the Palestinian internal conflicts.

My main interest in using this method is to allow both groups to reflect on their beliefs on the topics, by using their different experiences as a basis for answering the questions. The statements were divided into themes for each group. Each theme includes questions related to the main theme. Some questions were similar for all participants, for example: to what extent do you think satellite channels may influence public opinion? do you think that Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya helped in deepening the internal conflict between Fatah and Hamas and how? Do you think that Arab satellite media is independent from their governments? A set of questions were also designed for each group; for example, for the first group questions were
related to their media expertise, such as: To what extent do political actors have the ability and the effectiveness to control and manipulate the flow of information in the Arab world? Do you think the satellite channels were independent from the authorities during the Gaza conflict?

**Interviews Coding**

Questions were asked in order to capture specific narratives from each participant which represent the respondents' comprehension of their rights and duties (positions) as media professionals. Additionally, in an effort to examine the media’s contributions to war and conflict making, the interviews probed how journalists interpret their positions through existing patterns of journalistic practices. Consequently, this helped me to ask direct questions about the journalists’ deciding factors for producing their content when reporting a conflict.

I found it useful to follow broadly the steps suggested by John W. Creswell (in Berger, 2000: 121).

1. Read the material over as a whole and get an overview of it.

2. Pick one transcript and examine it carefully, looking for topics covered.

3. Do this for several transcripts and make a list of all the topics that were covered.

4. Make abbreviations for each topic and go through the transcripts, putting down the appropriate abbreviation beside each example of a given topic.

5. Turn your topics into categories. And make sure that the categories cover all your transcripts and don’t duplicate one another.

6. Decide on a final set of abbreviations for your categories and alphabetise them. You now have an alphabetical list of codes in the transcripts.

7. Assemble all the material found under each category in one place. Analyse it to see what you find.
The two groups were interviewed to discuss the main topic of this research, the Aljazeera and Al-Arabiya news representations and the internal conflict in Palestine. In addition, a number of supplementary issues were raised during the interviews, issues related to Arab political systems, democracy and media, internal conflicts in the Arab world, and issues related to the Palestinian situation, such as the role of the media and the Palestinian conflicts since 2000.

Open–ends questions were asked in order to capture specific narratives from each participant, which represent the respondents’ comprehension of their rights and duties (positions) as media professionals.

The questions for the interviews were placed into main categories, and under each category a set of questions was designed based on the type of group. The categories focused on:

- Conceptualising questions: questions dealing with assessing the general media and the interviewee’s performance during the conflict.
- Strategy questions: questions dealing with satellite media and internal conflicts.
- Influence questions: questions dealing with political impact of the coverage, political relations in the Arab world.
- Personal questions: questions dealing with basic information about the interviewee regarding the two channels and the internal conflict in Palestine.
2- Content Analysis CA- Coding and Analysis

The news networks monitored are both Arabic-language services of two worldwide news media outlets. It is important to know how stations – with major sway over Palestinian public opinion, but with different ownership styles – cover internal crises in Palestine. Such an analysis is especially important given the Arab world’s generally sympathetic view towards the plight of Palestine, as it has been since 1948. It is expected that both Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya gave support to the Palestinian positions and were critical of the Israeli actions. What is of interest here, though, is how these stations changed and expressed support to different political parties inside Palestine. It is also a matter of the relationship with objectivity and impartiality as the Arab satellite channels have challenged state-owned news agencies to build an objective narrative of the stories on the ground when covering internal conflicts. However, it is virtually impossible for the both private and state-owned media to maintain complete neutrality in their reporting.

The period from 17 May 2007 to 14 June 2007 was selected and analysed. This period of 28 days of clashes between Fatah and Hamas military forces was one of the most violent events in modern Palestinian internal history. The period includes the most critical period of the conflict (4 June to 14 June 2007), the so-called Fall of Gaza.

Unit of Analysis for CA

One of the most basic decisions in empirical research is selecting the unit of analysis. In media research, the unit of analysis typically refers to the object identified as a single ‘item’ or ‘case’ to be examined. Most scholarly research classifies a unit of analysis in terms of individuals, organisations, aggregates and social artefacts. According to Krippendorff (2004), sampling units ‘are units that are distinguished for selective inclusion in an analysis’. In communication studies, the unit of analysis is the element of the news story being analysed, which is to be recorded within the categories. In television, for example, the unit of analysis may range from the entire programme, as the largest unit, to the single word, as the smallest.
For this study, it was decided to use the ‘news report’ as the unit of analysis. A news report is a news story of a non-fictional prose that reports news using any one of the various mass communication methods. It is usually presented in a straightforward manner, excluding editorial comment. News organisations are expected to strive to achieve a sense of objectivity when coming up with the reports. News reports usually last between 2.5 to 3 minutes, depending on the channel and the intensity of the coverage. Such a unit of analysis was taken to be a single report, excluding the studio introductions with the anchors before airing these reports.

A total of 31 news reports broadcast during May/June 2007 were chosen and analysed: sixteen news reports from Al-Jazeera and fifteen news reports from Al-Arabiya. Ten were broadcast between 17 May and 3 June 2007 and 21 were broadcast between 4 June and 14 June 2007.

It is also important to note that the chosen timeframe for the study requires some explanation. On 17 May 2007, clashes erupted for the first time between the two sides in the streets of Gaza; however, violence did not occur on a daily basis because a ceasefire was announced. Therefore, ten related news reports were selected and analysed from this period. When the second round of fighting (the military engagement) erupted between Fatah and Hamas on the streets on Gaza on 4 June and ended on 14 June 2007, the two channels focused their reporting on this event and produced almost daily reports from the scene. Therefore, a total of 21 reports from both channels were analysed from this period.

The sample of news reports used in this research proved to be extensive enough to be representative, yet small enough to be controllable given the time limits of the conflict. While not a large sample, it proved to be a valid timescale. Berelson has argued that for most purposes, analysis of a small, carefully chosen sample of the relevant content will produce just as valid results as the analysis of a great deal more and with the expenditure of much less time and effort. (Berelson, 1971, p.19).

The content for each channel’s news reports were coded based upon a set of variables (Appendix B ) created by the researcher though an inductive process by
analysing some of the reports at an earlier stage, in addition to using predetermined variables from previous studies.

The primary variables for this research were set to focus on categories intended to measure various aspects of reporting representation and ownership. The following categories were included in the coding scheme: general reporting, authorship, sourcing, themes, editorial media policy, description of deaths and casualties, tone of the report, use of language, and report direction.

According to Coffey and Atkinson, codes are links between locations in the data and sets of concepts or ideas, and they are in that sense heuristic devices, which enable the researcher to go beyond the data (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996). Each of the themes has a main head, and under each headline the researcher analysed the meanings of these themes with the support of quotations from the participants answers. Each phrase related to a specific theme was coded. A paper-based process was applied to analyse the codes and translate them into themes. The researcher has not used any computer software for the interview analysis.

3- Critical Discourse Analysis CDA- Coding and Analysis

For analysing and coding the four news reports under examination of the CDA, I first translated the four news reports from Arabic to English by following Bazzi (2009) and (Dunne, 2003) works on Arab media and Discourse Analysis.

Each report was analysed individually; I divided each report into three main parts, each part include both the original text in Arabic and the full English translation (word for word). For a further independent and accurate perspective, the translated text was edited by a professional proof-reader.

Each part of the report was coded using a set of variables from the researcher in addition of pre sited variables from other studies, such as David Machine’s book *(How to Do Critical Discourse Analysis, 2012)*, and the work of El-Mustafa Lahlali *(Contemporary Arab Broadcast Media 2011)*.

Norman Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis theory and method formed the basis for the analysis of the reports. I followed Fairclough’s analysis of the text by use of language and rhetoric (text). This stage touches upon specific aspects of language. It involves looking at the writing style (i.e. informal, conversational) and the terminology used for representing a certain reality (Carvahlo 2000), that is, in this case, the vocabulary (i.e. verbs and adjectives) used for constructing the role of news media in political conflicts. Rhetoric denotes the use of language effectively. It is concerned with persuasive moves through such devices as metaphors, hyperbolic enhancements, quoting credible sources, and other rhetorical figures employed in the text. In addition of generally following Fairclough’s key questions for text analysis (1989: 110-111) by looking at:

1 Lexicalisation.

2 Patterns of transitivity.

3 The use of active and passive voice.

4 The use of nominalisation.

5 The choices of mood.

6 The choices of modality or polarity.

7 The thematic structure of the text.

8 The information focus.
Coding for the quotations in CDA (Actors)

This stage involves identifying key political actors, as well as how they are represented in the reports. In this thesis, the actors involve both individuals and parties that are either quoted or referred to in the reports. They usually operate as ‘voices’ (Fairclough, 1995) or sources for the report. In TV media discourse, some political actors may dominate with their perspective compared to others in terms of shaping the meaning. Carvalho (1999; 2000) calls this effect the ‘framing power’ of actors in relation to the media. Having the predominant framing power in relation to a certain issue is an important form of political influence.

Applying CDA on Current Study

There is not a single method for undertaking CDA, but different studies employ different methods depending on the aims of the study, the type of data to be analysed, etc. In this study, news reports on violence on the Palestinian internal conflict is analysed to examine the way different sides of the conflict are presented in Aljazeera and Al-Arabiya news that are issued in different contexts or that have different orientations.

The analysis of the narrative structure considers different elements of news reports, e.g. the choice of headline and lead, the presentation of the story, as well as the use of sources and background information. The headline is the most prominent aspect of a news report; it summarises the story and highlights its most significant details. It also guides readers’ interpretation of the story, e.g. when the consequences of the event are highlighted in the headline, the event is presented as serious or grave; whereas when causes are highlighted in the headline, the event is presented as justified. The lead of the story indicates the source of the story and provides an initial summary which often points out the direction in which the story is developed in the rest of the report. Both the headline and lead are analysed for their significance in the presentation of the story especially given that they present the interpretative frames which highlight particular aspects and understanding of the news story.
In this research, the analysis of transitivity structures considers how syntactic structures are used to represent actions committed by Fatah and Hamas, which can have important implications on the presentation of the action, as it affects the people' understanding of the action and responsibility for it. At the level of transitivity, the selection of actions undertaken by each side is examined, along with the choice of transitivity structures, agency structures, and affected participants. The use of the transitive model and agentive constructions clearly present the agent of violent actions in the news reports by the two channels. The inclusion or suppression of agents can have serious implications on the presentation of the actions of each side.

The analysis of lexis focuses on the presentation of different sides of the conflict, i.e. which labels and semantic roles are assigned to each side, and which actions are undertaken by each side, and the effect of such choices, e.g. the choice of labels related to militancy contribute to the delegitimisation of the actions of a given group, whereas the choice of labels related to the military register have the opposite effect of legitimising the actions of a certain group.

In addition, the analysis includes the choice of descriptions used with each side and their role in their positive and negative evaluation during the conflict. Other categories that are also included in the analysis are the use of categorisation and generalisation with members of each group, which can potentially underrepresent certain groups, e.g. civilians in areas of conflict.

Finally, an attempt is made to interpret and explain the findings of the linguistic analysis of the above features by reference to the institutional practices involved in news production and by integrating elements of the historical, political, socio-cultural contexts. This involves a discussion of how the use of certain linguistic features by the two channels can contribute to the positive or negative presentation of different sides of the conflict and their actions; it also considers how they can contribute to certain strategies of discriminatory discourse, e.g. othering, exclusion, legitimisation, delegitimisation, naturalisation, neutralisation, mitigation, criminalisation, avoidance, vagueness, problematisation, dehumanisation, blaming the victim, etc.
Thus, the critical analysis of Arabic news reports undertaken in this study follows the general version of CDA discussed in this chapter. The linguistic analysis focuses on selected features at two linguistic levels, i.e. transitivity and lexis that are believed to have the potential to be ideologically invested in different channels.

**Transitivity**

Transitivity analysis is crucial for the representation of activities, participants involved in them, and circumstances associated with them. It is the main resource for the representation of social activity and its consequences; therefore, transitivity analysis is a major component of this study. Van Leeuwen’s analysis of social actors, social action and purpose in discourse (Van Leeuwen, 1995; 1996; 2000) is very useful for the current study in discussing the way participants and their actions are represented in different channels, and the ideological implications of such representations. Therefore, the two parties – Fatah and Hamas – are discussed in terms of their roles as agents and affected participants of processes that describe acts of violence in the two channels, and how this relates to the ideology of the channel that offers certain representations. This analysis is closely related to the analysis of narrative and lexis.

Agency is a very important element in transitivity. Davidson defines the concept of ‘agency ‘as follows: —a man is the agent of an act if what he does can be described under an aspect that makes it intentional‖ (Davidson,1971:7). Teo (2000) maintains that —transitivity is a useful analytic tool that foregrounds the agency or, more accurately, the attribution of agency and process to various participants in the textll. Van Dijk (1991) stresses the ideological investment of agency in the press; the way the press presents and represents social actors is part of the broader ideological structure of values.

**Lexicalisation**

The basic function of lexis as a linguistic resource is to enable people to name and describe different elements of the world in which they live. Such nominations and attributions reveal the way they view entities and represent them; therefore, they differ according to the ideologies of different groups of people. With specific reference to lexical choices in newspaper discourse, Pisarek (1983) explains that the
analysis of words used in newspapers will allow us to reconstruct the image of the world presented by the press and the attitudes propagated by it.

The analysis of lexis is very important for displaying underlying ideologies in discourse. van Dijk (1991: 53) holds that —lexicalisation … is never neutral: the choice of one word rather than another to express more or less the same meaning, or to denote the same referent may signal the opinions, emotions, or special position of a speaker‖. Toolan (2001) expresses the importance of lexical choices especially in the context of newspaper discourse; journalists have rich inventories of overlapping descriptors to choose from as they sort out which characterisation fits their (ideologically contextualised) account of things best.

Ideology plays a vital role in the positive representation of certain groups and the negative representation of others. This can be done through the choice of certain lexical items to refer to individuals, groups and actions, as well as to attributing certain traits and characteristics to them. With regard to studying the discourse of the Palestinian conflict, lexical choices can serve ideologically in the representation of different sides of the conflict and the legitimisation or delegitimisation of their actions, depending on the ideology of the channel.

When examining the lexical aspect of news reports dealing with violent events of the Palestinian conflict, it is important to study referential and predicational strategies, as they play a crucial role in the positive and negative representation of different political groups, as well as in the legitimisation and deligitimisation of their actions. In their study of discriminatory discourse, Reisigl and Wodak (2001) emphasise the role of referential and predicational strategies in positive and negative representations and their ideological power. Referential or nomination strategies are used to construct and represent social actors, and predicational strategies are used to provide social actors with predications, which aim at labelling them more or less positively or negatively. They may be realised as stereotypical, evaluative attributions of negative and positive traits in the linguistic form of implicit or explicit predicates.
Testing Reliability

I performed a pilot test in 2011 with two Palestinian journalists who had covered the conflict and watched both channels converge for the violence. This tested the questions and the effectiveness of the interviews in ‘real world’ circumstances before the actual research interviews were carried out.

Focus group: Test the results of the CA method

The researcher decided to arrange a focus group with five Palestinian journalists who had already been interviewed in 2012, during a visit to Palestine in the summer of 2013. The researcher asked the group (three men and two women located in Ramallah city) to watch some of the news reports (from the second period of conflict) that the researcher has used in the CA chapter.

Two aims led to the re-interview of this group: the first was to test the changes in the respondents’ points of view regarding these channels’ representations of the Fatah and Hamas conflict after five years of the conflict; and the second was to test how the participants would respond and participate after watching these reports, thereby testing the results that had emerged from the CA analysis of these reports.

The researcher asked the participants in this group specific questions after watching these reports: have Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya misrepresented the internal conflict in their reporting in 2007 or not? Is there any impact from the two channels’ reporting to fuel and deepen the division in the Palestinian society? Was Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya favourable to one side of the conflict and how?
The Methods

This study focuses on the representation of the internal conflict by two of the largest Arab satellite channels, Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya. Content analysis is combined with CDA and interview methods to investigate the conflict representation from these channels.

1. Interviews

Researchers in the field of media and communication have largely depended on interviews as a method for their research, as some of the information assessed from these interviews helps to broaden the knowledge base, while other interview information may help to understand alternative points of view. As questions are a central part of the communication process, journalists, sociologists and political scientists have drawn on interviews for their academic research in order to understand peoples’ social and cultural conditions, as well as their political and religious views. According to Brennen, interviewing is a valuable method that may be used to gather a large amount of useful, interesting, relevant and important information for researchers (Brennen, 2013). Gubrium and Holestin suggest that in contemporary society, interviews are widely used to obtain personal information and have become an integral constitutive feature of everyday life (Gubrium and Holestin, 2002).

Interviews as qualitative methods are believed to provide a ‘deeper’ understanding of social phenomena than would be obtained from purely quantitative methods, such as questionnaires. Gubrium and Holestin believe that interviews are, therefore, most appropriate where little is already known about the study phenomenon or where detailed insights are required from individual participants. They are also particularly appropriate for exploring sensitive topics, where participants may not want to talk about such issues in a group environment (Gubrium and Holestin, 2002).

Interviews tend to be perceived as an unproblematic method that uncovers psychological or social realities and simply extracts the information, consequently interviews tend to lack critical understanding and their data is under-theorised. According to Warren, the aim of using interviews is often interpretation and
understanding of how and why, not ‘fact-finding’ or getting answers to questions of how much or how many (Warren, 1988). In qualitative interviewing, the respondent’s experience has diverse qualities and meanings and the interview can explore these and their social organisation (Gubrium and Holstein, 2002). It is a valuable research method for exploring ‘data on understandings, opinions, what people remember doing, attitudes, feelings and the like, that people have in common’ (Arksey and Knight, 1999).

Kvale points out that an interview method is an interchange of views between two or more people on a topic of mutual interest; it sees the centrality of human interaction for knowledge production, and emphasises the social situatedness of research data (Kvale, 1996). Interviews are ways for participants to get involved and talk about their views. In addition, the interviewees are able to discuss their perception and interpretation in regards to a given situation. It is their expression from their point of view. Arksey and Knight (1999) argue that qualitative interviews are used to understand the interviewee’s actions and ‘to examine the context of thought, feeling and action … and exploring relationships between different aspects of situation’ (Arksey and Knight, 1999). Interviews also allow people to express themselves and convey embedded feelings and thoughts, and ‘it allows answers to be clarified, which is not the case with self-completion questionnaire’ (Arksey and Knight, 1999).

In regards to using this method with the journalists as participants, with qualitative research interviews the researcher tries to understand something from the journalists’ points of view and to uncover the meaning of their experiences. Interviews allow journalists who covered certain events such as political crises and conflicts to convey the situation from their own perspective and in their own words. Although the interviews with journalists may not lead to objective information, they do, however, capture many of the subject’s views on something. That is why the basic subject matter is not, as in quantitative research, object data, but consists of meaningful relations to be interpreted. On the other hand, qualitative research interviews can also be objective in the meaning of ‘letting the investigated object speak’ and in expressing the real nature of the object. Kvale noted that the interview as such is neither an objective nor a subjective method, since its essence is intersubjective interaction. Quantitative and qualitative methods interact in the practice of
social research and a linguistically constituted social world legitimates the use of qualitative interviews as a useful tool (Kvale, 1996). Kvale, however, raised a point where ethical issues, such as informed consent (confidentiality and consequences for the interviewee) should be taken into account with any qualitative interview. Kvale suggests that the research subjects should be informed of the purpose of the investigation and the main features of the design (Kvale, 1996).

Qualitative interviews have been categorised in a variety of ways, with many contemporary texts loosely differentiating interviews as in-depth, unstructured, semi-structured, and structured. However, this type of interview introduces some rigidity to the interview (Corbetta, 2003). For example, probing can be a problem area for structured interviews. Respondents may not understand the question and be unable to answer it. Moreover, respondents may not have received sufficient information to answer the question.

1.1 In-depth interviews for Group One Arab media experts

According to John M. Johnson (2001), a researcher who uses in-depth interviewing commonly seeks ‘deep’ information and knowledge – usually deeper information and knowledge than is sought in surveys, informal interviewing or focus groups, for example. This information usually concerns very personal matters, such as an individual’s self, lived experience, values and decisions, occupational ideology, cultural knowledge or perspective (ibid.).

Further, Roger D. Wimmer and Joseph R. Dominick (2006) stated that the most important advantage of the in-depth interview is the wealth of detail that it provides. The distinctive features of these interviews could be seen as the following:

They generally use smaller samples. They provide detailed background about reasons why respondents give specific answers. Elaborate data concerning respondents’ opinions, values, motivation, recollections, experiences, and feelings are obtained. They allow for lengthy observation of respondents’ nonverbal responses. (Wimmer and Dominick, 2006, p.135)
In addition, Johnson asserted that, in many cases, researchers use in-depth interviewing as a way to check out theories they have formulated through naturalistic observation, to verify independently (or triangulate) knowledge they have gained through participation as members of particular cultural settings, or to explore multiple meanings of, or perspectives on, some actions, events, or settings (Johnson, 2001, p.104).

According to Alasuutari (1998), the qualitative in-depth interview is different from the survey interview in the following ways:

The main difference is of course that in qualitative interviews the questions are open-ended, and they have not been formulated prior to the interview session. The interviewer does normally have a check-list of themes to be covered in the interviews, but a great deal of the conversation consists of follow-up questions to what the interviewees say in the first place. (Alasuutari, 1998, p.144)

Thus, different forms of in-depth interviews were chosen to generate the qualitative data, semi-structured interviews. The combination and flexibility of interviewing styles and approaches arguably provided a wider perspective on the subject of the research. The narrative element in these interviews helped the researcher to better understand the personal experiences involved for interviewees as chief editors for well-known Arab channels in covering conflicts in the Arab world and the decisions that were taken at these channels about how the events should be reported.

1.2 Semi-structured interviews for Group Two: Palestinian journalists

According to Bill Gillham (2005), the semi-structured interview could arguably be the most important way of conducting a research interview, caused by its flexibility balanced by structure, and the quality of the data so obtained (Gillham, 2005, p.70).

In this context, semi-structured interviews imply that the same questions are asked of all those involved; the kind and form of questions go through a process of development to ensure their topic focus; to ensure equivalent coverage (with an eye
to the subsequent comparative analysis) interviewees are prompted by supplementary questions if they haven’t dealt spontaneously with one of sub-areas of interests; approximately equivalent interview time is allowed in each case. (Gillham, 2005, p.70)

One of the strengths of the semi-structured interview is that it facilitates a strong element of discovery, while its structured focus allows an analysis in terms of commonalities (Gillham, 2005, p.72). Semi-structured interviews contributed to the whole process of generating qualitative data in this research by allowing the researcher to ensure that key areas of research interest were covered in questions and followed up with each respondent. This allowed respondents to reveal different elements regarding their role in covering the 2007 conflict. Their individual experiences do, however, reveal a number of common elements in terms of their journalistic treatment of the conflict events and their views of Al-Jazeera’s and Al-Arabiya’s roles in reporting the conflict. In addition, these interviews with Group Two contributed to the discussion on Arab satellite channels and the internal conflict in Palestine in the literature review chapter.

The face-to-face interview, also called an in-person interview, is probably the most popular and oldest form of survey data collection. It has continued to be the best form of data collection when one wants to maximise the quality of the data collected. Dialsingh points out that face-to-face interviews are often used to solicit information in projects that can be considered to be very sensitive (Dialsingh, 2008).

**Interviews in relation to the research**

This method was chosen because it gives richness and validity by being based on real life experiences (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009). It allows the journalists to share their experiences about covering the 2007 conflict in a way that the other methods used – content analysis and CDA – would not be able to. This is because the interviews enable the researcher to see and understand what is reflected rather more abstractly in other kinds of data’ (Gillham, 2000). Therefore, even though it is not the only method used in the research, its inclusion provides an 'illustrative dimension' (Gillham, 2000). It gives those who actually covered the Hamas and Fatah conflict a chance to share their ideas about the differences in the way the two
media news networks represented the conflict, the factors that affected their work and their own perceptions of how conflicts should be covered.

Few studies have reviewed the role of the Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya channels in the Palestinian internal conflict, and few studies have used the interview method with journalists who work inside Palestine, and chief editors who operate these channels, to collect data about the two channels and the way they represented the conflict.

The data for this study includes direct sources from journalists who worked in covering Palestinian news since 2000, and reported the internal conflict in 2007. All of the journalists in Group Two are working for local and international news outlets in the West Bank and Gaza and are fully independent from Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya. This was important because the aim of choosing these journalists was to make sure that there was no influence of either channel on them as employers.

It must be noted, however, that the use of semi-structured interviews with these journalists was not fool proof; there are limitations to using this method of research. First, although journalists of many media types were represented, it was not possible to speak to every journalist who was on duty during the time of the conflict. Therefore, the use of interviews will inevitably cause certain generalisations based on the experiences of a few. Also, the journalists were contacted in 2011 or 2012 and were asked to remember details regarding both channels’ coverage from 2007. Likewise, interviews do not provide an account of reality; rather, they echo the observations of the journalists themselves.
2. Content Analysis – CA

One of the main purposes of this study is to chart news content from the internal Palestinian conflict broadcast on Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya. The most applicable method in answering questions relating to issues of quantifying the various themes, sources and lexicons employed in media texts is a systematic content analysis. Quantitative content analysis allows for reliability. This means that the research will be done in a systematic way that readers can easily understand and ‘other researchers can evaluate the procedure and the findings and, if desired, repeat the operations’ (Riffe et al., 2005). Also, this method is effective because it will allow us to examine the actual coverage of the internal conflict, almost five years after the conflict has ended, through the use of archived material. Therefore, the content ‘has a life beyond its production and consumption’ (Riffe, 2000).

This method that has been popular since the 1940s in studying the content of communication. It allows researchers to evaluate media output in a systematic, objective and reliable fashion, through the measurement of content and format of text or broadcast material, regardless of the volume of the data sample.

The method enables quantitative measurement of differences between media outputs by systematically identifying and recording their properties; from formal criteria (length of articles, number of photos, use of sound bites) to frequencies of words or actors and presence and character of topics. (Spurk et al., 2006 in BBC World Service Trust, 2008)

One solid reason for the use of quantitative content analysis in this research project is that, unlike the qualitative method of interviews used before, content analysis, according to Riffe et al. allows for the researcher to separate the message physically from the communicator and its receiver (Riffe et al, 2005).

The CA method allows for the analysis of ‘key characteristics of large bodies of texts’ (Hansen et al., 1998), uses a ‘set of procedures to make valid inferences from text’ (Weber, 1990) with ‘sampling and operational or measurement procedures that reduce communications phenomena to manageable data (e.g. numbers) from which
inferences can be drawn about the phenomena themselves’ (Riffe, Lacy and Fico, 2005). It is also a ‘research technique for making explicative and valid inferences from data to their context' (Krippendorff, 1980).

CA has been defined by many scholars in recent years. According to Hsieh and Shannon, CA is ‘a research method for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns’ (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). For Mayring, CA is ‘an approach of empirical, methodological controlled analysis of texts within their context of communication, following content analytic rules and step by step models, without rash quantification’ (Mayring, 2000, p.43).

A number of definitions of content analysis have been available over the last few decades. According to Berelson, ‘content analysis is a research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication’ (Berelson, 1952). Holsti says that it is any technique for making inferences by systematically and objectively identifying specified characteristics of messages (Holsti, 1958). Kerlinger defined content analysis as a method of studying and analysing communication in a systematic, objective and quantitative manner for the purpose of measuring variables (Kerlinger, 1986).

A careful examination of the definitions of the method show that an emphasis has been placed on aspects such as system, objectivity, quantification, context and validity – with reference to the inferences drawn from the communication content about the sender, the message or the receiver of the message. Thus, content analysis is all about making valid, replicable and objective inferences about the message on the basis of explicit rules. The material for the content analysis can be letters, diaries, newspaper content, folk songs, short stories, radio, television, documents, texts or any symbols. And for further understanding of where the content of communication forms the material for content analysis, where does the content analyst find himself/herself in the communication process?

CA can be an unobtrusive research technique that is useful to study sensitive research topics such as conflicts. It is context-sensitive and therefore can process
symbolic meanings of data. Although CA is predominantly seen as a quantitative method, it can effectively capture qualitative content as well (Stempel, 1989). In addition, the context-sensitivity of the CA method is useful in articulating the qualitative dimensions, such as the direction of coverage of news items as favourable or unfavourable.

According to Woodrum, this method is a safe method in the sense that if the researcher found that a portion of the necessary information was missing or incorrectly coded, it is possible to return to the text and supplement the missing data. This is not always possible in experimental or survey research (Woodrum, 1984).

Content analysis has its own limitations because its inferences are limited to the content of the text only. Similarly, symbols are processed and coded according to the attribution given by the researcher or coder. There is no guarantee that the sender or receiver shares the same attributed meaning. When it deals with semantic differences or differences in regard to the meanings of words, the findings can be less valid and reliable. In addition, it is argued that content analysis – which confines itself to counting the individual units and their frequency of occurrence, such as the number of times the word ‘globalisation’ appeared – may fail to capture the meaning or significance with which symbols are used in the texts analysed. According to Krippendorff, the reliability and validity issues in content analysis still remain unresolved (Krippendorff, 1980).

In addition, content analysis has limitations because it is a purely descriptive method. It describes what is there, but may not reveal the underlying motives for the observed pattern (‘what’ but not ‘why’). The analysis is limited by availability of material. Observed trends in media may not be an accurate reflection of reality, for example, catastrophic events receive more coverage than less dramatic occurrences.
CA in relation to this study

The representation of conflicts through the Arab media has been a significant source of academic research and debate, particularly in the realm of media studies. In order to investigate the role of the various news media as information provision channels – by an examination of the ways in which information relating to the Fatah and Hamas conflict was conveyed differently through different satellite media – it was necessary to focus on the news material itself and to analyse what is presented and how it was presented. The obvious method for achieving this was content analysis.

A considerable amount of attention has been directed at the nature of satellite television news, such as Al-Jazeera and other news channels in the Arab world. Generally, these studies have tended to emphasise its fundamental nature as a visual medium, primarily concerned with the presentation of visual information generally packaged as entertainment. As an information source, it is at its best in dealing with subjects of a highly visual nature; dramatic sights from a war zone, for example. Newspapers and radio cannot compare to television in presenting such dramatic images.

The CA method will be used to analyse the ideologies of the Arab satellite channels during political conflicts and how they try to spread this ideology. The CA method will be applied to show that while some variables used by Al-Jazeera are in favour of the Hamas point of view, the Al-Arabiya channel clearly reflects the Palestinian Authority or the Fatah perspective. The method, therefore, will support the hypothesis of a political bias in both channels. They are found to cover the internal conflict in a rather unbalanced way, in contrast to the conclusions reached by other international studies on the coverage of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. As the main hypothesis of the research is that the selection and construction of news reports by the two channels and the use of chosen terminology with specific images is a filtered, distorted, manipulated, one-sided and simplified news.

The specific type of triangulation that seems most applicable in this research is the methodological triangulation (Denzin, 2006). Methodological triangulation involves using more than one method to gather data, in this research the use of interview,
content analysis and CDA. Hence the qualitative and the quantitative data analysis will provide systematic understanding of the case under investigation. In addition, the purpose of using the content analysis for Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya conflict reporting is to overcome the weaknesses that may arise from the interview method.

Using the content analysis serves as a stimulant to the conduct of discourse analysis, while discourse analysis provides a rich source of contextual data yielding “big picture” of a realm of communication activity, ostensibly leaving no stone unturned in a consideration of all critical messages and opening up of the discovery of variety and texture of communication. Accordingly, the application of discourse analysis is considered the main methodology determining the power relations under study, while content analysis is just meant to be indicative, leading the way to the more in-depth analysis provided by the different types of discourse analyses outlined below.

3. Critical Discourse Analysis – CDA

Limiting the scope of the research to the method of content analysis is analytically inadequate in examining the ‘role that journalism plays in maintaining and/or transforming social inequalities, therefore, a more critical textual analysis is required to examine the text ‘in terms of what is present and what could have been but is not present (Richardson, 2007).

Critical discourse analysts assume that textual contents, in all of its forms, are not born out of thin air but are rather a constructed reality resulting from ‘choice’:

The choice of giving news access to one actor over another, the choice of selecting one way of discursively and semantically structuring a sentence over another and the choice of consciously or subconsciously highlighting one argument or statement and marginalising others. (Fairclough, 2003, p.12)

CDA is a contemporary approach to the study of discourse structures in relation to social structures. It started in the late 1980s and developed rapidly to become one of the most influential approaches, not only in discourse analysis but in the social sciences in general. Van Dijk states ‘that the aim of CDA is to investigate the
relationships between power structures and discourse structures’ (van Dijk, 1993). Van Dijk is one of the major innovators of CDA. For him, the critical perspective on which CDA is based can be traced back to Aristotle, the philosophers of the Enlightenment, Marx and scholars of the Frankfurt School. He defines CDA as

a type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social-power abuse, dominance and inequality are enacted, reproduced and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context. He regards CDA as a multidisciplinary approach which involves the study of discourse in relation to social and political problems and issues. (van Dijk, 2001, pp.301–303)

Critical linguistics and theories have laid the basis of CDA. This discipline has attracted many scholars since the 1980s, significantly with the works of the British sociolinguist Norman Fairclough. He provided the following definition for CDA:

By CDA I mean discourse analysis which aims to systematically explore often opaque relationships of causality and determination between (a) discursive practices, events and texts, and (b) wider social and cultural structures, relations, and processes; to investigate how such practices, events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles over power; and to explore how the opacity of these relationships between discourse and society is itself a factor securing power and hegemony. (Fairclough, 1995, pp.132–33)

CDA assumes that there are systematic connections between discourse practices and social practices and structures, and that systematic asymmetries of power and resources between language users can be linked to their unequal access to linguistic and social resources. These resources can be used to make asymmetric power relations and particular textual representations of the world appear natural, and it attempts to make these connections transparent by means of textual and contextual analyses. The aim of CDA is to investigate critically social inequality, as it is expressed, signalled, constituted, legitimised and so on by language use (Wodak and Meyer, 2001).
Studies in CDA typically deal with data such as news reports, media interviews, organisational and institutional discourse. This data is analysed with the aim of revealing the embodied manipulative structures that seem natural to most people (Teo, 2000). CDA studies power in and over discourse and its ideological potential. It regards itself as a politically involved approach with an explicit agenda, and seeks to have an effect on social and political practices. Therefore, it is important for analysts to be aware of their own stance towards discourses and phenomena under investigation. CDA aims to uncover the ideological assumptions hidden in discourse, as well as to resist power in and over discourse. It is concerned with analysing discourse to reveal the discursive sources of power, dominance, inequality and bias; and how these sources are initiated (van Dijk, 1988).

In summary, CDA is an interdisciplinary analytical approach which aims at describing, interpreting, analysing and critiquing the social world. The principal unit of analysis for CDA is the text, which can be written, spoken or is multimodal, and it analyses texts at the sentence and word level. The task of CDA is both deconstructive and constructive. In its deconstructive moment, it aims to deconstruct, i.e., analyse and disrupt the themes and power relations of everyday discourse; in its constructive moment, it aims to achieve a more equitable distribution of discourse resources (Fairclough, 1992a).

The theoretical framework for CDA is derived from various disciplines, including linguistics, social theory, critical theory, and philosophy. CDA has also been influenced by the ideas of the Russian theorists Mikhail Bakhtin and Valentin Volosinov, since their linguistic theory of ideology posits that all instances of language use are ideological. CDA also benefits from the ideas of Habermas with regard to the relationship between linguistic or other semiotic and social processes (Habermas and Shapiro, 1971; Habermas, 1983; 1988; 1990). CDA is strongly influenced by the critical theory of the Frankfurt School in its investigation of power relations and its rejection of naturalism.
CDA and Ideology

According to van Dijk, CDA questions the taken-for-granted uses of discourse, challenges existing power structures and attempts to change them, or at least to make people aware of things they are normally unaware of. This had also been the purpose of critical linguistics, the predecessor of CDA. Ideology is a core theory in discourse analysis, especially when dealing with media discourse. Ideology can be viewed as a way of representing the world. In this sense, our views of the world are ideologically and symbolically constructed. Ideology is considered to be a multidimensional concept. It has normative and political dimension. Van Dijk describes ideology as

the basis of the social representations shared by members of groups. This means that ideologies allow people, as group members, to organize the multitude of social beliefs about what is the case, good or bad, right or wrong, for them, and to act accordingly. (van Dijk, 1998)

This connotation relates to more judgment and values, which is of relevance to this thesis. From a political perspective, ideology is viewed as the groundwork for the most fundamental political standings – how should society be organised, what is the role of the state, what kind of government is desirable (Carvalho, 2000). ‘Political reading’ recognises that politics is not natural, but ‘contingent, plural and conflictual’ (Carver and Hyvarinen, 1997).

Different theorists (e.g., Thompson, 1993; Fairclough and Wodak, 2000; van Dijk, 2005) have approached the links between media, power and ideology in contemporary societies, identifying multiple strategies usually employed by the media to serve the power, either explicitly or through linguistic practices in disguise. Moreover, according to Martin Serrano (1993), the media institutions interpret the world through socially constructing stable meaning by providing its public tools and frameworks and even being able to integrate contradictions within the discourses of dominant ideologies.
CDA and the concept of representations

Representation refers to ‘the embodying of concepts, ideas and emotions in a symbolic form which can be transmitted and meaningfully interpreted’ (Hall, 1997) as signifiers in the context of cultural circuits. Hence, human knowledge and understanding is socio-culturally constructed. This is one of Foucault’s (1973) assertions as to the representation of knowledge. This argument relates to a constructionist view in that we are fundamentally cultural beings and our views of the world are the ‘products of historically situated interchanges among people’ (Gergen, 1985). Consequently, the ways in which we represent the world are culturally specific and contingent (Phillips and Jørgensen, 2002). In this context, the discourse on social media for social change is concerned with discursive representations and the socio-cultural context that shape and form such representations. Foucault’s concern for discourses, among others, helped to link ‘culture’ to ‘representation’ to the media texts which represent the world in the information age (Hobbs, 2008).

This study pursues CDA as a third method with which to analyse Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya news reporting of the Fatah and Hamas conflict in 2007. Methodologically, CDA does not have a well-defined empirical approach or a definitive way of gathering data. In fact, the process of data collection does not require a specific phase that must be completed before analysis begins: ‘it is a matter of indicators for particular concepts, expanding concepts into categories and, on the basis of these results, collecting further data’ (Wodak and Meye, 2009, p.88).

Discourse analysis, however, offers a wide variety of analytical techniques for construing media texts and their relation to social contexts. Broadly, under the label of discourse analysis there is a vast number of research approaches. The aims and conceptual tools of different research endeavours vary widely, with important consequences for the outcomes of research. Discourse analysis does not constitute a single unitary approach, but rather a constellation of different approaches (Lea, 1996). There are, therefore, no standard approaches to examining texts, but rather a variety of ways of how to proceed. As stated by Phillips and Jørgensen (2002, p.1), there is no clear consensus as to how to analyse discourses (texts), and different perspectives offer their own suggestions.
The aim of this section is to introduce the method used for data analysis; to present discourse categories chosen for analysis, i.e., transitivity and lexis; and to illustrate their potential to be ideologically invested. The analysis follows the three stages of CDA outlined by Fairclough; more specifically: (1) description, (2) interpretation, and (3) explanation (Fairclough, 1992b; 1995a; 1995b; 2001). Description involves describing relevant linguistic features and strategies present at the levels chosen for analysis, i.e., narrative, transitivity and lexis. The description of narrative follows Bell (1998), van Dijk (1991), White (1997), and Toolan (2001) to examine the way that news stories about events of the conflict are constructed. It also involves studying contextual details and use of news sources. The first component describes the linguistic properties of texts (text analysis), the second examines the relationship between the productive and interpretative processes of discursive practice and the texts, and the third evaluates the relationship between discursive practice and social practice (Fairclough, 1995).
Research Framework

This thesis approaches the issue of media ownership and ideology, and for the first issue the perspective of Herman and Chomsky’s (1988) propaganda model will be applied. This study seeks to verify that frame, along with the frame of media ownership theory, as developed by Altschull (1984).

The general framework of this study relies upon a major theory, the political economy of communication. Political economy of communication theory emphasises mass media ownership and its broad societal effects (Graham, 2006), whereas media ownership theory proposed that media owners tend to exert a certain degree of control and influence on editorial policies and news making processes (Doyle, 2002), typically found in Western news media.

Media ownership theory according to Altschull is when ‘the content of the press is directly correlated with the interests of those who finance the press’ (Altschull, 1995). The research therefore examines whether this is also the case among the two major Arab networks Aljazeera and Al-Arabiya. In the political economy framework and the ownership theory, which has been discussed above, media owners are able to control their media, utilising them to serve their own purposes. Altschull (1995) states that news as a commodity would reflect the interest of those who pay the bills, and the journalists could be viewed as ‘pipers’ who are paid to play the tunes composed by their paymasters. He also concludes that journalists tend to overlook the role of financiers despite the fact that their role is to pay close attention to society. It is worth noting that the influence of owners may also be unconscious.

Apart from examining owners, existing theoretical frames also examine the organisational effects of the media in which journalists are working. Ettena et. al. (1987) concludes that journalists’ work patterns are shaped by the economic necessities of a media organisation in the socioeconomic system, and individual level influences would also be reinterpreted as stemming from higher level influences. Altschull (1995) claims that the organisation would keep its content within the 'bounds of acceptability to its financiers', echoing the viewpoint of Gaunt (1990) that the styles and individual convictions of the owners can be seen in the editorial
and administrative policies of their media empires, despite the fact that they are run by corporate functionaries.

Herman and Chomsky’s (1988) propaganda model provides one frame to explain the impact of the mass media today. The propaganda model describes mass media as businesses selling readers and audiences (instead of news) to marketers (instead of the public) (Herman and Chomsky, 1988). The model proposes five classes of ‘filters’ that dictate the news presented by the mass media. The five are: ownership of the medium, the medium’s funding sources, sourcing, flak, and anti-communist ideology (Herman and Chomsky, 1988). The first three are considered to be the most important according to Herman and Chomsky.

Mass media failures in research on recent corporate scandals, the war in Iraq, and US government policy since 11 September 2001, are all beacons indicating the derailing of investigative journalism (Houston, 2004). The majority of coverage either ignores or diminishes news that might negatively affect the bottom line of the corporate owners of the news outlet (Houston, 2004). Rather than function as the fourth estate, the mass media have taken on the role of mass propagandist, serving as little more than a mouthpiece for the government and the corporate elite (Chomsky, 2003).

This links to Chomsky and Herman’s argument that news coverage tends not to question information from the government, instead serving as a megaphone for governmental and corporate propaganda (Herman and Chomsky, 1988). The study tested Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model and the media ownership theory using the definition by Coleman and Wang (2004). The study measured what relationship, if any, existed between the type of Aljazeera and Al-Arabiya ownership and the content produced by the two channels in covering the Fatah and Hamas conflict outlets.

Interviews and content analysis methods are conducted in this research. Both methods followed the definition laid out by Wang and Coleman (2004). The definition of objectivity follows that used by Wang and Coleman (2004), where objectivity is the opposite of bias. Objectivity meant a ‘news story’ gave both sides of the conflict
equivalent attention and coverage, seeking to achieve Boyer’s first element of objectivity: ‘balance and even-handedness in presenting different sides of an issue’ (McQuail, 1993, p.184 cited in Wang and Coleman, 2004). Given that bias and objectivity are countervailing forces, this study tested for objectivity as the absence of bias, through the several variables used in the methods such as the tone and source of reporting.

The second framework approach of this thesis will be the discourse analysis, and Norman Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis theory and method will be the basis for the analysis. In this part of the chapter I will give an overview of the theoretical stand of discourse analysis and its link to power, ideology and media.

**Fairclough’s CDA**

Norman Fairclough became interested in CDA in the eighties. In 1989, he started to develop critical language study to examine the relationship between discourse and power. His later work developed the theory and methods of CDA significantly. In *Discourse and Social Change* (1992b), Fairclough constructs a social theory of discourse and provides the methodological blueprint for the practice of CDA (Blommaert and Bulcaen, 2000). Fairclough defines CDA as:

> discourse analysis which aims to systematically explore often opaque relationships of causality and determination between texts, discursive practices, and wider social and cultural structures; and to investigate how such practices, events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles over power; and to explore how the opacity of these relationships between discourse and society is itself a factor securing power and hegemony. (Fairclough, 1995a, p.132).

Fairclough’s framework is based on a number of linguistic, philosophical and social approaches, for example, Bakhtin’s theory of genre, from which he borrows the concepts of productivity and creativity of discourse practise and its textual realisations. He also draws on Bakhtin’s concept of intertextuality whereby texts become heterogeneous in form and meaning by virtue of being constituted from other texts and discourses. Moreover, he uses Gramsci’s theory of hegemony to
explain political and ideological dimensions of discursive practice. He argues that discourse can be regarded as a mode of political and ideological practice, and it can constitute, naturalise, sustain and change significations of the world from diverse positions in power relations, and that any discursive practise draws on conventions which naturalise particular power relations and ideologies.

Central to Fairclough's approach are ideas related to the discursive nature of power, the political nature of discourse, and the discursive nature of social change. From the field of linguistics, Fairclough’s main point of reference is Halliday’s *Systemic Functional Linguistics* which is considered to be a valuable resource for CDA because it is concerned with the relationship between language and other elements of social life. On other hand, the aim of Fairclough’s work is to bring together linguistically oriented discourse analysis and social and political thought related to discourse and language (Fairclough, 1992b, p.62). CDA sets out to demonstrate that discursive features are systematically connected with what is going on socially, and what is going on socially is indeed going on partly or wholly semantically, or linguistically, or both (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999).

Fairclough describes CDA as a theory and method for studying language in its relation to power and ideology. He defines power both in terms of asymmetries between participants in discourse and their unequal power over the production, distribution and consumption of texts. In his three-dimensional analytical framework, each discursive event is regarded as a textual practise, a discursive practise and a social practise. The framework can be conceptualised as three layers embedded in each other with analysis of language or text at the centre, analysis of the discursive practise in the middle, and an encompassing sociocultural analysis (Fairclough, 1995a).

In the analysis of the first layer, namely discourse-as-text, Fairclough suggests studying textual features and the linguistic organisation of text. He proposes systematic attention to all properties of text that are potentially ideological, for example, choices of specific lexical domains or vocabulary patterns, certain grammatical structures and strategies. The second layer, namely discourse as discursive practise, represents the link between text and social practise. In this
dimension Fairclough suggests examining processes involved in text production, distribution, and consumption in society. Complex processes involved in the practises of text production, circulation and consumption vary between different types of texts and discourses (Fairclough, 1992b). The analysis of this level also involves the relationship of a discursive event with other, orders of discourse, i.e. interdiscursivity, which views a text historically as transformation of past conventions of text production into the present form. This may happen in a relatively conventional and normative way, or it may happen in a more creative way where it involves new elements of orders of discourse. This process needs to be linked to socio-political change to explain discursive change within wider socio-cultural change.

For the actual analysis, Fairclough suggests attending to certain features of texts which act as an intermediate level or link between the textual and contextual levels. Intertextual analysis is a major dimension of Fairclough’s CDA. Intertextuality is defined as ‘basically the property texts have of being full of snatches of other texts, which may be explicitly demarcated or merged in, and which the text may assimilate, contradict, ironically echo, and so forth’ (Fairclough, 1992b, p.84). It provides the basis for an interpretative analysis, as it bridges the gap between text and context. He distinguishes between two types of intertextuality: manifest intertextuality ‘where specific other texts are overtly drawn upon in the text, and constitutive intertextuality ‘or interdiscursivity’ where texts are constituted of elements of orders of discourse (Fairclough, 1992b).

At the level of discourse as social practise, Fairclough aims to relate discourse to ideology and power. Fairclough defines ideologies as representations of aspects of the world which can be shown to contribute to establishing, maintaining and changing social relations of power, domination and exploitation (Fairclough, 2003a). He argues that ideologies embedded in discursive practices are most effective when they become naturalised and achieve the status of common sense (Fairclough, 1992b, p.87). Although he argues that ideology invests language in various ways at various levels, he claims that it is not possible to read off ‘ideologies from texts because meanings are produced through interpretations, and texts are open for diverse interpretations which may differ in their ideological import (Fairclough, 1992b).
CHAPTER FOUR

Journalistic Participation: Interviews Analysis

The purpose of using interviews as a method was to seek evidence and investigate perceptions of Arab media experts and Palestinian journalists about the role of the Arab news satellite channels in the Palestinian internal conflict. The researcher’s aim of using this method was to generate evidence regarding Al-Arabiya and Al-Jazeera’s representations of the Hamas and Fatah conflict. In addition, many studies have examined the role of the two channels but there are few focused on their role during the Palestinian internal conflicts, in addition to using the interview as a method.

Nineteen interviews were conducted in 2011 and 2012 and they were analysed using a thematic content analysis approach. In addition, the researcher collected another five interviews in 2013, as a focus group, to seek more evidence regarding some specific questions. The interviewees included a group of Arab media experts (senior level journalists, media chief editors). The other interviewees are a group of thirteen Palestinian journalists from the West Bank and Gaza.

The participants

The first group of participants (Group One) consists of six Arab media experts in the United Arab Emirates and the UK. The researcher interviewed the Arab media experts, who are also chief editors for leading Arab media outlets. The reason for choosing this group was because these practitioners come from different Arab countries and they have different opinions about the media in the Arab world. In addition, they are experts in the role of media, in particular the satellite channels in the Arab world. All of the participants in this group have witnessed the Palestinian internal conflict in 2007.

The second group of participants (Group Two) consists of thirteen Palestinian journalists (eight men and five women) who covered the internal conflict in the West Bank and Gaza. The researcher interviewed these Palestinian journalists working in
local and international media outlets inside Palestine. The reasons for choosing these journalists was because they covered the internal conflict from the West Bank and Gaza and most of them followed, and watched, Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya news during the fighting. In addition, most of them also covered the second intifada in 2000.

The third group of participants were formed of five journalists from the second group, who were interviewed in 2012, and the researcher then re-interviewed in 2013. These journalists have been living inside Palestine; they are also highly experienced in different types of media. Also, they are fully aware of the political situation in Palestine, as all of them are currently working in media in the West Bank or Gaza.

**Thematic Analysis**

The data were analysed by dividing them into different themes. There are five themes for Group One and seven themes for Group Two. In addition, there are subthemes for some of the main themes in both groups. The answer to particular questions was collected under each theme. The interviewer has the flexibility to use interviewees’ knowledge, expertise and interpersonal skills to explore interesting or unexpected ideas or themes raised by participants during the interview. Some interview questions were similar in both groups, such as: Do you think that Arab media has an impact on the Palestinian public opinion and how? Is there a difference in the news coverage between the two channels? To what extent did the satellite channels influence the situation on the ground during the 2007 conflict? Choosing the same questions for media experts and Palestinian journalists was important for highlighting similarities and differences in what the two groups thought about different issues.

In addition, there are questions specific for each group, because each group has been working within in different contexts. For example, most of the first group (Group One) are from other Arabic countries. They work in different types of media outlets, so they have more experience with different channels in other Arab countries. An example of one of the specific questions for Group One is: To what extent do you think these channels have the ability and power to influence political events?
The Themes

The two groups expressed their beliefs on the topic and used their different experiences to answer questions. The statements made were divided into themes: five themes for Group One and seven themes for Group Two. In addition, there were also subthemes for these main themes. These themes reflect the interviewees' interpretations of the questions asked. The interview answers showed a specific order based on the significance of the question to the overall concept of the way the Arab satellite media behave during political struggles. The two groups were divided between positive and negative concepts, based on the results of the questions and specific thematic descriptions were developed by combining positive and negative responses through a dialectic process. The key themes from both groups are: media representation of conflicts, Arab regimes and control, media ideology and conflict reporting, democracy in the Arab world, Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya and the Palestinian internal conflict.

Media experts’ themes (Group One)

1. Most Arab governments control the press, including satellite channels.

1.1 Subtheme: Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya are controlled by financial support from political regimes.

2. The amount of freedom in coverage of political events is less than desired.

3. Satellite channels have an impact on Palestinian society.

3.1: Subtheme: disagreement about the impact of satellite channels on the internal conflicts.

4. Al-Jazeera support for Islamists’ point of view (the opposition), Al-Arabiya support the political authorities (the regime).

4.1 Subtheme: conflict between Saudi and Qatari regimes was reflected on the two channels’ coverage.

5. Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya lost credibility.
Palestinian journalists’ themes (Group Two)

1. Satellite channels created an open free space for the Palestinian audience.

2. The Palestinian audience trusted Al-Jazeera in the second intifada.

3. Al-Arabiya and Al-Jazeera had both been criticised by the Palestinian audience after 2007.

3.1 Subtheme: satellite channels have political and financial agendas.

3.2 Subtheme: both channels are supported by political regimes which led to division in their coverage on Palestine.

4. Al-Jazeera was favourable to Hamas and Al-Arabiya was favourable to Fatah.

4.1. Subtheme: the channels’ policies toward the political division in Palestine since 2007.

4.2. Subtheme: broadcasting hatred ideology in both channels had fuelled the Palestinian division.

5. Banning Al-Jazeera from the West Bank because it supported Hamas was against freedom of speech.

6. The two channels had an impact on the internal conflict in 2007.

7. Social media played a significant role in exposing these channels’ unbalanced coverage of the situation.
Themes Discussion: Group One, Arab media experts

Theme 1: Arab governments control the media, including satellite channels

This theme arises from the comments and views expressed by the participants in Group One (Arab media experts), which demonstrates how the Arab private channels relate to political parties and function as a mouthpiece for the factions. It will also explore to what extent these channels help in bridging or expanding the political divide in the Arab world.

Most respondents described the media as neither as democratic as they would like and/or as open and free as compared to Western media. The majority of the responses indicated that all Arab media, including the private satellite channels, is being controlled by the political powers that support the regimes. A media expert and channel chief editor for the Arab News Network (ANN) in London commented:

There are several factors from Arab country to Arab country that might affect the amount of democracy that exists, the government being an important factor, but not the only one. In my opinion the most and important factor is the financial control of the political regimes on the media all over the Arab world, how does anyone expect that a free and independent media can operate in a system that does not believe in pluralism and freedom of speech. (Channel chief editor for ANN news, London, 2012)

Another factor is the degree of economic, technological and social development of a society. Most respondents agreed that the more developed countries are more likely to introduce democratic measures and have various forms of free speech and free media. A media expert and channel chief editor for Al-Arabiya Satellite News in Dubai said:

I think the lack of democracy is connected to the history of the region and the type of political regimes that have developed. Today viewers across the Arab region have their choice of hundreds of satellite television news, entertainment and sports network. However, the so-called state-run radio and television news channels, many still exist, but they are no longer the first and
only option, such Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya satellite television have created a pan-Arab public sphere and new political schooling. (Chief editor for Al-Arabiya Channel, Dubai, 2011).

The respondents in this group either implied or stated that the media, including the private channels, or so called the pan-Arab satellite media, would not be more democratic than the society itself – that would be an unrealistic expectation. Media experts and the chief editor of *Al-Quds Al-Arabi* newspaper in London said:

> Arab regimes are afraid of freedom and democracy because the majority of them are not legitimate. Let me give you an example from my daily work in the newspaper, each time we publish a material criticising an Arab country or an Arab regime, we receive a huge volume of telephone calls from Arab politicians, and even Arab intelligence, threatening us or accusing us of being agents of the West and Israel. I have personally been accused of incitement against these regimes, that’s why I have been prevented from entering some of the Arab countries, would anyone call that democracy? (*Al-Quds Al-Arabi* chief editor, London, 2012)

It could be argued that during the past two decades the situation has changed because of greater globalization and regionalization of the media, especially due to satellite television. As a result, many more people have access to information produced outside the borders of their home countries. This has made the Arab media picture much more complicated than it once was. The controls that state governments once had have been eroded somewhat because many more alternative sources of information and comment have now become available to the Arab public. Yet most of the respondents believe that national political, economic and cultural constraints and influences have not disappeared, and thus the analysis I have offered still has some validity. Some of the participants in this group objected to the concept of political control, in particular with regard to satellite channels. This is because some of these channels managed to break the control and criticise these regimes, which eventually created a sense of democracy in the Arab region as people started to hear voices other than the regimes’ media. A media expert and Al-Jazeera senior news editor in Qatar said:
I have been working in Al-Jazeera for many years now; I admit we have an agenda as all channels do. However we practice our journalism work in a very open democratic system here inside Al-Jazeera, many people in the Arab world see us as the voice of democracy. However, I think Al-Jazeera has paid a high price for its high profile. The network isn't allowed to officially operate in some Arab countries. Many of our reporters and cameramen have been killed, detained, or jailed. (Al-Jazeera news editor, Skype interview, 2012)

Subtheme 1.1: political economy controls the media in the Arab world

Participants in this group agreed that both Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya were founded by members of the Qatari and Saudi royal families, respectively, and their coverage of political events reflects faithfully the political positions of their backers. Chief editor of Al-Quds Al-Arabi in London pointed out:

I may say that there’s big money behind both stations: Al-Jazeera was created with a $150 million grant from the emir of Qatar in 1996, and annual expenditure on the network’s multiple channels reached nearly $650 million. The story is similar with Al-Arabiya, which was launched in 2003 with an initial investment of $300 million by a group of Lebanese and Gulf investors led by Saudi businessman Waleed Al-Ibrahim, the brother-in-law of the late Saudi King Fahd. So in the end it’s the matter of who pay the bill. (Chief editor of Al-Quds Al-Arabi, London, 2012)

Theme 2: amount of freedom in coverage of political events is less than desired

Five of the respondents believed that the amount of free coverage of some political events, such as conflicts and internal struggles, reflected in the media did not match the overall desire for a more free press on the part of citizens, or adherence to journalism values. As senior programme anchor in the BBC Arabic said:
Even though the constitutions of several Arab countries support a free press, in reality, a free press has not been allowed to function when a struggle is taking place, such as the case of the Saudi channel and Bahrain. In some ways, however, the citizens themselves were blamed because it was believed they did not understand the importance of a free media during war time and the role of more democratic participation in such times. (BBC Arabic programme anchor, London, 2012)

According to a senior editor at Al-Jazeera who had disagreed on that point:

…After its domination in covering the war in Afghanistan, a new generation of Arab televisions and a new generation of young journalists are expressing courage in reporting their environment unseen before. In addition, don’t forget that Al-Jazeera had a great impact on covering the second Palestinian intifada. Because of Al-Jazeera’s professional coverage of these events, people around the world started to realise that there is another image for the war than the one shown in Western media. (News editor at Al-Jazeera, Skype interview, 2012).

The importance of the diverse voices presented by Arab satellite television stations cannot be denied, and does form a refreshing change from the uniformity of public discourse the Arab audiences had been exposed to in the days before satellite television. All Arab satellite channels have been involved in covering the Iraq war, the ongoing Palestinian – Israeli conflict and despite their differences; they have all presented a degree of criticism of American actions or to some Arab regimes. However, the existence of any kind of real political dialogue through Arab television stations remains unattained. Al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya often present different versions of the same events that are indicative of their political stances of KSA and Qatar. All participants have agreed, as long as the Arab satellite stations engaged in news reporting act as mouthpieces for political actors whose primary motive is the propagation of messages favourable to the Self, a real engagement in political dialogue through television in the Arab world will be under questioning.
Theme 3: satellite channels have an impact in the Palestinian society during the second intifada.

While the 1991 Gulf War was the first real-time televised conflict, brought to audiences by CNN, the second Palestinian Intifada can also claim a “first”: The first televised conflict where Arab transnational TV sets the agenda for Arab (and often Israeli) audiences - the first comprehensive indigenous coverage of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Renawwi noted that:

During the second intifada, Arab satellite TV such as Aljazeera, Almannar news, Abu Dhabi channel and LBC have been characterised by intense coverage of the conflict during news hours, although in most cases the usual programming schedule was not altered (except during peaks of confrontation, such as in October 2000). The coverage of the conflict reflects the interests of satellite television stations, not only in conveying newsworthy events to their viewers, but also in underscoring their desire to bring the suffering of Palestinians under Israeli occupation to the attention of Arab world audiences (Renawwi, 2003).

The majority of the interviewee responses (five out of six) pointed out that, in some sense, satellite television is what makes the second intifada different from all previous Arab–Israeli conflicts. It is not just the sheer volume of coverage, nor the ability to see events almost as they happen, but how near it makes the conflict seem. Media expert and Al-Quds’s Al-Arabiya newspaper chief editor for news noted that satellite channels have opened an unprecedented outlet for scenes of the ferocity of Israeli practices against the Palestinians:

In my opinion the news about the intifada has been repeatedly broadcast on all the Arab satellite channels. Among the Arab satellite stations, some channels such as Al-Jazeera and Almanar have stood out with respect to their extensive news coverage and the issues raised in their talk shows on everything related to the Palestinian cause as a whole. (Chief editor of the Arab News Network ANN in London, 2012)
The impact of these channels was not only on the Palestinian side, most Arab people who watched the live broadcasting of these channels, wanted to do something to stop the bloodshed there. There was a huge amount of global sympathy with the Palestinian people because of what these channels have aired all over the world. According to news editor at Al-Jazeera:

...We can see that for the first time, many Arabs are able to find alternatives to their own government-controlled, heavily censored media. Meanwhile, Palestinian journalists have gained access to all of the foreign press and media. Palestinian camera operators are the only ones working for the major wires in the occupied territories. As a result, Palestinians on the ground have had a greater impact on media coverage. (News editor at Al-Jazeera, Skype interview, 2012).

Arab satellite TV has also promoted a transformation of the Intifada to “al-Aqsa Intifada,” finding its centre of concern in preserving Jerusalem or the Holy Land - a useful, perhaps unconscious move in appealing to a pan-Arab, mostly Muslim audience. The latest Intifada began in the al-Aqsa compound, encouraging pan-Arab identification with the Palestinian side of the conflict. Arab satellite TV has also encouraged emotional reflection on the Intifada. This was manifest in escalating talk about the inefficacy of the Arab regimes and the call for boycotting Israeli and American products and for using oil as a weapon.

Theme 4: Arab media bias, Al-Jazeera supported the Islamists; Al-Arabiya supported the political authorities

Most participants answered the question on whether Al-Jazeera supports Islamism and political Islam and most of the answers revolve around a certain point that over the past decade Al-Jazeera’s sectarian impulse has been moving ever closer to garden-variety Sunni Islamism. A news chief editor for the ANN news channel in London pointed out:

The answer is yes, I’m convinced that Al-Jazeera supported the Islamism since the beginning of its creation in 1996. For example, take a look at the
field reports that been aired on Al-Jazeera during the Iraqi War or the second intifada or recent the fall of Gaza in 2007, nearly all of the reports were overwhelmingly negative, with violent footage played over and over, highlighting Arab defeat and humiliation. And there’s a clear underlying message: that the way out of this spiral is political Islam. (Channel chief editor for ANN, London, 2012)

Most participants agreed that the Sunni religious figures are almost always treated differentially as voices of authority on almost any issue, and Arab governments as useless stooges of the United States and Israel. A BBC Arabic programme anchor said:

When Al-Jazeera covering any war in the Arab world or abroad that involves Islamist groups, you may see the unconditional support of Islamic movements, no matter where they are and how things are covered, the prominence of things, what words are used, sometimes you do see that very clear Islamist subtext in their coverage.. (BBC Arabic programme anchor, London, 2012)

Whether Al-Jazeera is reporting the Hamas perspective from the occupied territories without mention of the Palestinian Authority’s version of events, or the fawning depiction elsewhere of Islamist parties and militias as the grassroots reflection of Arab sentiment, Al-Jazeera has moved away from its ideologically diverse origins to a more populist/Islamist approach. The newsroom in Al-Jazeera is becoming more religiously conservative, as Al-Sharq Al-Awsat’s chief editor noted:

I will give you an example that happened to me personally. During the Libyan uprising, Al-Jazeera used to host me as a media expert to comment on the Libya situation, suddenly everything changed after the Islamists came to power and took control in Libya, a source from inside Al-Jazeera informed me that the channel had a list of only 20 speakers that will only be contacted to comment and speak about on Libya, and all of these speakers are pro-Islamist or related to Muslim Brotherhood across the Arab world. (Al-Sharq Al-Awsat chief editor, London, 2012)
Participants in this group of interviewees (Group One) agreed that the two channels had an unbalanced coverage. The chief editor for the ANN news channel in London described how the two channels’ unbalanced policy had affected the internal conflict in Palestine:

I think both television channels would not allow anyone to criticize any political party. The freedom of someone ends when it harms others. Their editorial policy is not allowing anyone to criticise. When they hear any criticism, they end the call. I agree that for some time when Hamas took over the Gaza Strip, Al-Arabiya allowed people to participate and insult Hamas. Because of that act, I believe that the two channels’ policy towards the political division of Palestine and recognised the role of the two political leaderships in feeding this division through their television channels. (Channel chief editor for ANN, London, 2012)

Subtheme 4.1: conflict between Saudi and Qatari regimes reflected on the two channels’ coverage

Participants argued that Al-Arabiya was set up as a rival to Al-Jazeera, with ambitions clearly inscribed in the long-lasting antagonism between Qatar and Saudi Arabia. According to the chief editor for Al-Quds Al-Arabi in London:

There were attempts to portray Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya as reflections of the competition between two Gulf countries, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. There was little controversy over the far more aggressive coverage between the two networks that, without a doubt, reflected the political competition between the two countries. (Chief editor for Al-Quds Al-Arabi, London, 2012)

The feud between Qatar and its much larger neighbour Saudi Arabia, for all its pettiness, has had real consequences. It led to the creation of Al-Jazeera in the first place, which in turn has helped to shape perceptions and, perhaps, realities across the Arab world and beyond over the past decade. As a BBC Arabic programme anchor said: ‘The satellite media, especially these two channels, today still play much the same role as the pre-Islamic tribal poets, whose role was to praise the tribe
against other tribes, and not tell the truth’ (BBC Arabic programme anchor, London, 2012).

Theme 5: Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya lost credibility

Credibility is the one indicator as how aligned media institutions with the code of conduct and ethics governing the industry. In addition, as technology paved the way of disseminating content in ways never before known, content a credibility push forward. However, the political conflicts in the Arab word brought a promise of more credibility. However, for most Arab media outlets it turned its back on the code of conduct, ethics and even manipulated content, thus becoming predominantly biased with a focus on propaganda.

The majority of the participants (four out of six participants) agreed that the Arab world’s major news Al-Arabiya and Al-Jazeera rivals over the policy lines of their respective funders in Qatar and Saudi Arabia, which eventually lost them their credibility in the Arab streets. Their differences were first highlighted during the internal conflict between Fatah and Hamas, when the television channels gave the Saudi and Qatari perspectives, respectively, in their coverage of the fast-developing events. This conflict between the two major political powers in Palestine led to a polarisation in Arab media. The chief editor for the Al-Sharq Al-Awsat newspaper said:

…I believe that both channels became more concerned about delivering the opinions of their financiers than offering a professional and objective view. The two have lost their credibility to other Arabic language news channels, such as France 24 or BBC Arabic. As Al-Arabiya aired footage of the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah streets, while Al-Jazeera focused the screen to relay images of fighters of Hamas militaries. And what Al-Jazeera branded as a ‘Free Gaza’, Al-Arabiya hailed as a ‘political coup’. (Chief editor for Al-Sharq Al-Awsat newspaper, London, 2012)
Overall, most participants in this group (Group One) have noted that satellite media channels are no more than agents for the political elites. Arab audiences have put their trust in these channels as independent sources of news, tools for freedom and freedom of speech; however, Arab audiences have now started to rely more on Western media for a creditable source of news. This change is reflected in the number of viewers which BBC Arabic, Sky Arabia and France 24 channels have gained during the past few years.

Eventually, responses from interview participants agreed that Arab governments who own the satellite media in the Middle East, and impose their agendas, are pushing them towards journalistic suicide. They are taking the Arab media landscape back to the early 1990s, where mainstream pro-regime media outlets were the only news resources for Arab people, rather than moving it forward to gain more independent and balanced values in their coverage. In addition, participants pointed out that these channels are acting as war agents for the Arab political regimes.

Themes Discussion : Group two, Palestinian journalists

Theme 1: Arab satellite channels created an open free space for the Palestinians

The thirteen participants agreed that the private satellite channels provided new and fresh coverage of the news that was different from what Arab audiences were used to watching. The importance of these channels emerged during the September 2000 second Palestinian uprising, (Intifada Al-Aqsa). For example, participants noted that the way Al-Jazeera covered the intifada and the live images in its broadcasting caused a revolution in the Arab World, and it was accused of fuelling the rage and spreading it throughout the region. It is the first time that the Palestinian people have had a voice in the media. A male journalist news reporter from the Palestinian TV, who covered the second intifada, said:

The satellite channels such as Al-Jazeera, Abu Dhabi, the Egyptian channels had played a very significant role in covering the intifada. It opened a new way of war reporting in the Arab world, using investigative journalism, criticism and creating an open free channel where a variety of Palestinian’s views can be explored. They also provided good coverage of Arabs’ issues like the Arab–
Israeli conflict. It’s the first time, for example, these channels could talk about
the peace agreements between Jordan, Egypt and Israel.  (News reporter
from Palestine TV, Ramallah, 2011)

A female journalist reporter at the Al-ayyam newspaper in Ramallah noted:

I agree that these channels had a positive impact on the Palestinian society at
the beginning at least; as I think that any positive effort from broadcast
journalism will have a positive impact, because it opens the eyes of
Palestinian citizens on new or thrilling ideas and things that may benefit them
and benefit their life. In the beginning it was the Al-Jazeera channel, then
followed by Al-Arabiya in 2003. The Palestinian people look at these channels
as they moved the stagnant water, some major problems had been discussed
live for the first time in the Arab media.  (Reporter at Al-ayyam, Ramallah,
2011)

According to the respondents, because Arab people and the Palestinian people, in
particular, have always depended on interpersonal communication, and the public
discourse being reinforced by Arab channels, satellite television programmes have
raised the level of discussion and reinforced interpersonal communications inside the
Palestinian community. In addition, most of the participants agreed on the point that
some of the Palestinian media organisations follow Al-Jazeera or Al-Arabiya’s
journalism style in their podcasting. A female news anchor at the Voice of Palestine
radio station in Ramallah said:

In my opinion, as a Palestinian journalist, I think that these channels have
broken political and cultural taboos with its call-in shows, Crossfire-format
discussion shows and coverage of Arab government’s events. These
channels have been often seen as having opened up the media environment
for other satellite Arab news stations, such as the local Palestinian
organisations.  . (News anchor at the Voice of Palestine radio, Ramallah,
2012).
The free open style and approach have paved the way for more critical and creative news programming, a far cry from the traditionally dull formats of government-run news programmes that featured the routine activities of the head of state. Furthermore, the content of the news and programmes include public discussions of traditionally private issues that challenge cultural categories of public discourse and bring formerly concealed topics into the public arena. People routinely speak of the ‘the Arab satellite effect’, like the ‘CNN effect’ on the debate on reform in the Middle East. A male news journalist from the Al-Aqsa satellite channel in Gaza said:

I believe that they opened space to the Palestinians. For example, the religious scholars inside Gaza now have a free voice, though these channels, to debate religious teachings and have issues or religious rulings, through the media. These channels opened a new space for the Palestinian people to speak and argue without any fear. (News journalist at Al-Aqsa satellite channel, Gaza, 2012)

Theme 2: impact of Al-Jazeera in the second intifada

During the second intifada in 2000, Al-Jazeera provided a new and fresh style of coverage of the news that was different from what Arab audiences were used to watching. And during this event, the way that Al-Jazeera covered the events caused a revolution in the Arab world. To some extent, Al-Jazeera was accused of fuelling the rage and spreading it throughout the region. A female journalist and Reuters news editor from Jerusalem said:

Al-Jazeera and some other Arab channels such Abu Dhabi and Al-manar gained a very high credibility among the Palestinian people during the second intifada, because they heard the facts that they didn’t hear from any other media – including their own. The Palestinian people followed the channels day and night for the update news, as they put their trust in these channels to send their suffering to the world. (News editor at Reuters, Ramallah, 2012).

The impact of the satellite channels was not only on the Palestinian audience, it influenced the political regimes in some Arab countries also. The channels’ coverage of the Palestinian uprising ignited pro-Palestinian demonstrations throughout the
Middle East. When these channels, such as Al-Jazeera, broadcast opinions from Arabs calling on their leaders to do more for Palestinians, Arab governments reacted swiftly, accusing the network of inciting violence. A male journalist and TV news anchor from Gaza who preferred to be anonymous said:

I covered the second intifada; I remember I used to work as freelancer for some foreign news TV in the USA. However I used to watch Al-Jazeera back then, several and many times I noted that Arab governments, including Egypt and Jordan and KSA, stated that Al-Jazeera’s coverage of the uprising threatened the stability of their regimes and exposed them to criticism by their own people. Egypt and Jordan have been more critical of Al-Jazeera than has Israel. The Israeli government could have cause for concern if Al-Jazeera’s coverage helps incite Palestinians to riot, yet it continues to allow Al-Jazeera correspondents to operate freely within its borders. (TV news anchor from Gaza, Skype interviewed, 2012).

Theme 3: Impact of Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya in the 2007 Fatah and Hamas internal conflict

The participants in this group had argued that these channels have changed the media landscape in the whole region and especially in Palestine. The impact of the channels started with the second intifada when the Palestinians who lived in the isolated territories remained connected through audio-visual transmissions. Palestinians living in both the West Bank and Gaza can freely watch the extensive coverage of the Palestinian–Israeli conflict on these satellite stations such as Al-Jazeera. However, that totally changed during coverage of the Fatah and Hamas conflict in 2007. The majority of responses (nine out of thirteen) believed that the reporting of both channels on the internal conflict between Fatah and Hamas was unbalanced. A male journalist and freelancer broadcasting journalist from Ramallah said:

These channels did not cover the conflict in a balanced and natural coverage, they absolutely were taking the sides. And that clearly has been shown in their coverage of the June 2007 conflict between Fatah and Hamas in the
Gaza Strip. The Arab channels, and mainly the biggest two Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya, helped to worsen antagonisms by using war reporting inflamed language in reports on selected issues to support side over another; they were not balanced for the beginning so why should they be now. (Freelance broadcast journalist, Ramallah, 2011).

When it comes to coverage of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, news agencies such as the satellite channels are unified in their reporting because the interests of Hamas and Fatah are the same, which is to fight Israel. However, the fighting in Gaza and the West Bank, with Hamas and Fatah competing for power, has spread to all aspects of Palestinian life, including journalism. A male journalist and news correspondent for Mazaj radio station in Ramallah said:

The political division between Fatah and Hamas has made it extremely difficult for local journalists to report local news, therefore the Palestinians had to increasingly look for their news from satellite channels, but the problem is that even these channels had their political agenda that influenced their coverage in the ground which led it somehow to fuel the situation negatively. I noticed that the two channels have used different sinister terminology as Al-Jazeera used the term ‘Hamas rulers’ – which happened to refer to a democratically elected government – and Al-Arabiya used the term ‘political infighting’ between Gaza's militant Hamas rulers and their Palestinian rivals (Mazaj news correspondent, Ramallah, 2012)

Subtheme 3.1: Part of this impact, satellite channels have political and financial agendas which affect their journalistic values during conflicts.

The majority of the responses in this group (eleven out of thirteen) agreed that the two channels are financially and political controlled and ruled by the political elites. The respondents agreed that in the Arab world, the traditional role of television as a mouthpiece of ruling political and economic elite groups came under pressure as new groups began to stake their claims in this important medium of mass communication. A female journalist from Gaza (who preferred to be anonymous) said:
… Al-Jazeera, for example, was under a massive criticism recently for reflecting Qatar’s regional ambitions. The massive amount of information available online and from other satellite channels has exposed gaps in Al-Jazeera’s reporting of issues that do not fall in line with the Qatari government’s agenda, while also highlighting its biases in the various of other political events. (Female journalist from Gaza, Skype interview, 2012)

Participants in this group (Group Two) were very disappointed by Al-Arabiya and Al-Jazeera and their contribution to fuelling the Palestinian division. They criticised the way in which the Islamist (Hamas point of view) was supported in Aljazeera’s coverage and the Palestinian Authority’s (Fatah point of view) was supported in Al-Arabiya in monopolising the channels. A female journalist accused Al-Jazeera of fundamentalism and discrimination:

Al-Jazeera channel used and still using abusive words and images which should not be used in media. For example, they opened a free air for Hamas supporters and officials to say what they want on air using words and phrases that Hamas supporters used to say to the Israelis, however they now use it against the Fatah. Al-Jazeera, in my opinion, is fundamentalist, and there is no space for others, and I think that helped in fuelling the division inside the Palestinians. (Voice of Palestine news presenter, Ramallah, 2012)

Critics of Al-Arabiya have similar accusations; participants said that it covers events in such a way that furthers the Saudi government’s political interests. A male journalist and news editor at WAFA news agency in Ramallah said:

I think the two channels did not open the door for criticism, as a Palestinian journalist who as everyone here followed the two channels intensively I clearly noticed Al-Arabiya was supportive to Fatah in its coverage, on the same time some politicians accused Al-Jazeera of supporting Hamas; well, I also believe that Al-Arabiya was not a different case they both took sides in this conflict both of them were not balanced. (WAFA news editor, Ramallah, 2012)
Subtheme 3.2: Both channels are supported by political elites’ agendas

The political control over media channels has been criticised by many scholars and non-governmental organisations (Al-Mezan, 2009; Hammad, 2010; Okal, 2009). Not only do they fail to provide a platform for public debate, the two channels could not ensure freedom of expression for all citizens irrespective of their political affiliation (Abed, 2010). According to Sabah (2010), both channels are manipulated by the two political elites; opinions and comments which are expressed by their members on the two channels are promoting hatred and hostility. The participants in this group agreed that these channels have clearly engaged in the processes of political conflict in the Arab world, becoming a platform for rivalries between Arab countries and clashing ‘national’ political groups and international political agents. A male journalist and Reuters news editor in Ramallah said:

Satellite television in the Arab world acts as a mouthpiece for warring political factions. The roles that satellite television plays in the Arab world mean that Arab satellite television has become itself a political actor in the Middle East and beyond, and we can apply this point in what happened in Gaza in 2007. Both television channels are controlled by political factions, who eventually supported the two Palestinian political parties (Fatah and Hamas); therefore, members of each party participate in the channels which belong to them or support their views. (Reuters news editor, Ramallah, 2012)

Theme 4: Al-Jazeera was favourable to Hamas and Al-Arabiya was favourable to Fatah

Ten of the participants in this group pointed out that the two channels served the two factions in Palestine politically and functionally as a mouthpiece for them during the conflict in 2007. A female journalist from Gaza, agreed on the point and described Al-Jazeera as biased and only recruiting members who support the Islamists or Muslim Brothers movements:

I can say why for example, Al-Jazeera is favourable to Hamas … well, you can’t deny that most of the people who work in Al-Jazeera channel are
members of Muslim Brotherhood, at least I know twelve in the news room there who are supporting Muslim Brothers member and one of them is Wadah Khanfer, head of Al-Jazeera, and Ahmad Mansour, chief programmes editor, and Ahmad Alshaieeq, chief news editor. The recruitment in Al-Jazeera television channel is mainly targeting people with Islamism perspectives. (Female journalist from Gaza, Skype interview, 2012)

The internal conflict in Palestine has taken up a significant amount of broadcasting time in the media. This has affected the coverage of other important topics, such as the suffering of people and issues of conflict arising out of the Israeli occupation. A male journalist and news journalist at the Al-Hayat newspaper in Ramallah said:

The media have played a provocative role in putting out inflammatory broadcasts and have reinforced the existing atmosphere of accusation and mistrust. There was clear evidence that the political parties were using the media as a tool of struggle witnessed the conflict between Fatah and Hamas in 2007 and as a journalist I believe that both channels served the political agendas and not the freedom of speech. Al-Arabiya did not follow journalism values in their coverage, not all the Palestinians in the West Bank are supporting Fatah, many people are supporting Hamas, and that’s the same thing in Gaza. (News journalist at Al-Hayat newspaper, Ramallah, 2012)

Another participant, a female journalist from the Al-falastenyiah news channel in Ramallah responded:

As a journalist, I know how hard it could be to cover internal conflict especially if you are a citizen living there, sometimes its unprofessional to express your personal thoughts, however, I will say that I don’t trust Al-Jazeera television channel. Their policy is based on ‘if you are with us then you are against them’. When I covered the internal conflict, we used to watch Al-Jazeera, you could not see anyone on their air except Hamas officials describing the Palestinian president as a traitor and the Palestinian police as ‘Abbas Gangs’. (female journalist from the Al-falastenyiah, Ramallah, 2012)
Participants also argued that the special relationship between Hamas Leaders and Al Jazeera, and that the channel is given exclusivity to cover Hamas news and events, might lie in the fact that the movement knows exactly how powerful Al Jazeera’s influence has been since it was first founded.

Aljazeera devoted long hours of broadcasting during the 14-day fighting. Hamas provided the channel with first-person details of its operations by hosting Hamas military leaders in Live and recorded interviews, furthermore, Hamas media strategy considered Al Jazeera to be its voice to the outside world.

Subtheme 4.1: The channels’ policies toward the political division in Palestine since 2007

Ten of the participants agreed on the role of the two channels in feeding this division through their reporting of the conflict. The use of selective terminology and repeated images shows clearly biased ideology behind the coverage. Both channels used partisan and political terminology that was not objective, but rather depictions and descriptions that were unprecedented even in its discourse on the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. Journalists in this group agreed on the point that both channels used their air to express hateful ideologies between Fatah and Hamas members, which led to further fuelling the division in the Palestinian society. A male journalist from the Alayyam newspaper in Ramallah said:

The media message in both channels during the conflict reflected in different programmes and performance of their anchors, I remember that Al-Jazeera used to host members from Hamas military forces who used to read press releases on air using holy texts from the Quran to support Hamas’s actions against Fatah members. (News journalist at Al-ayyam newspaper, Ramallah, 2012)

A Gaza female journalist, who preferred to be anonymous, noted:

I think Al-Jazeera is totally unbalanced and biased; I remember that in early July 2009, Hamas took the decision to impose the wearing of headscarves
and robes on female lawyers. The Palestinian and other human rights movements all over the world condemned it as illegal and an unwarranted interference in the lawyers’ affairs, involving serious prejudice to personal freedom and women’s rights. And when Al-Jazeera covered that incident, you could see that all the people that been hosted in Al-Jazeera were from either Hamas or the Muslims parties to defend that decision and accusing others of being enemies to Islamic rules. (Female journalist from Gaza, Skype interview, 2012)

Theme 5: banning Al-Jazeera from the West Bank was against the freedom of speech

All participants have agreed that freedom of speech should be protected during political events, and that the closure of the Al-Jazeera office in Ramallah because of their reporting was against that right. A male news journalist from Alhayyat newspaper said:

I think that any satellite channel has its own political agenda, we have not seen Hamas closes Al-Arabiya offices in Gaza, for example. Al-Jazeera has been devoting significant segments of its broadcasts to incitement against the Palestine Liberation Organisation and the Palestinian National Authority, however that is not an excuse to close its office as the freedom of speech should be guaranteed for all media outlets. (News journalist at Alhayyat newspaper, Ramallah, 2012)

However, in late July 2013, the Hamas authority in Gaza decided to close down the Al-Arabiya office for distributing false news regarding the smear campaign against Hamas and Gaza about what was happening in Egypt. A female journalist from Gaza noted:

Shutting down critical media outlets represents the bad habit of the official Arab order. The PA decision is more troubling than the run-of-the-mill story of Arab regimes hating free media, though, because it comes at a time when the contours of an emerging Palestinian state are being shaped and I personally
believe if the PA continued this action against all media because of its unbalanced broadcasting, well I assume then that 99% of the media outlets in Palestine should be banned. (Female journalist from Gaza, Skype interview, 2012)

Theme 6: Al-Arabiya and Al-Jazeera had both lost Palestinian audience after 2007

The majority of the respondents (eleven out of thirteen) agreed that the Palestinian people have lost their faith in these channels – either the ones who supported the PA in the West Bank or the ones who supported Hamas in Gaza – for Al-Jazeera, which had as its motto ‘The opinion, and the other opinion’, lost its legitimacy and reliability when it failed to provide fair coverage and began to present just one opinion of the story during 2007. A male journalist from Gaza said:

The network lost its balance and its vision years ago, due to the Qatari Emir Hamas policies. It is possible that the station’s managers lost sight of their mandate, given all the power that the network accrued in the Arab world. It is equally possible that the network has served as a tool to promote Qatari interests. I have been working as a journalist in Gaza for many years, I talk to people every day and I can tell you that, after 2007, many things changed in the Gaza strip. The one truth I can assure you that many people here are not supporting Hamas, on the contrary they refused its policies, and what Al-Jazeera showing about Gaza is not even 10% of the truth (Male journalist from Gaza, Skype interview, 2012)

These two major news channels, Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya, are considered to be the primary source of news for and about the Arab world. Participants in this group agreed that the Palestinian internal conflicts have mostly reconfirmed the channels distinctive positions. A male journalist from Palestine TV noted:

These two channels were seen by Palestinians themselves as vital for disseminating real-time information about the situation on the ground. But it is also being accused of incitement as they inadvertently become sympathetic to the some parts in the conflict. It was made worse by the absence of any
independent local media in Palestine; the channels tried to be the independent source of information. But because of its pan-Arab reach, they are turning localised unrest into pan-Arab regimes. (News journalist at Palestine TV, Ramallah, 2012)

A male journalist from the WAFA news agency said:

However, the Hamas and Fatah conflict coverage by Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya has put this into question, not because of journalistic bias, but because of a complex relationship between the organisations' multiple stakeholders; people in Gaza and Ramallah realised that these two channels are not that different to any mainstream media in the Arab world, they misrepresented the Palestinians since 2007, showing only the dark side of the story. (Journalist at WAFA, Ramallah, 2012)

One participant who disagreed at this point said:

I don't think it’s about losing faith or even credibility, I believe that in recent years people in the Arab world, and especially the Palestinians, have found new sources for news other than these two channels; for example, the social media platform and the local media outlets. The two channels are still considered as a main source for news all over the Arab region, however, in Palestine people now started to have faith in their local media such as the private community radios and news agencies. (Male journalist from Gaza, 2012)

Theme 7: Social media played a role in exposing the channels' unbalanced coverage

For Palestinians, social media has become one of the main sources of news in recent years. Most of the events that take place socially and politically are reported and brought to the Palestinian people by “citizen journalists.” This situation is problematic, especially because most of those “reporters” are either ordinary people who have no journalism experience or political activists who are using social media as a platform to express their opinions.
According to Saed Karzoun, a well-known Palestinian activist and digital media expert, 67.5% of Palestinians use computers, while about 24.3% of them use the Internet on a daily basis. There are more than 1 million Facebook users in Palestine. About 49% of youth in Palestine do not read any newspapers or magazines, while 87% watch television daily, and about 27% of Palestinians listen to radio shows daily. Some wonder about the kinds of dialogue that Palestinians hold among themselves in social media. It is accurate to say that social media is seen more as a tool to address non-Palestinians than as an effective tool for any kind of dialogue within Palestinian civil society. (Karzoun, 2014).

However, the political fighting between Fatah and Hamas has compounded the geographical division of the Palestinian people themselves and is a source of deep anger and frustration. This was the first time there was such a split in Palestinian society. Social media are played a growing role in the current conflict for several reasons. There is a natural increase in use of these technologies, especially in Palestinian society, as internet penetration rates continue to grow. The decades-festering Arab–Israeli conflict has built and galvanised large constituencies around the world who are eager to lend their side a hand in the media battle. A female journalist from the Alayyam newspaper noted that:

The arrival of social media made sharing this information radically easier and faster. We can safely say that these developments have taken the promotion of our cause to new and unprecedented levels, and that social media has become an incredibly important tool for our struggle for the liberation of Palestine. In addition, the internet and the social media platform had played a significant role since the elections on 2006 and during the demission since 2007; many Palestinians have depended on the internet as a primary source for news. (News journalist at Alayyam newspaper, Ramallah, 2012)

Nonetheless, Palestinians have witnessed great success on several occasions when social media was used to organize political or social events. One example is the book chain event that has been held in Jerusalem and is planned to be held again: Palestinians join together to read books in a chain around the walls of the Old City after being invited to do so through social media. The Palestinians have grouped and
gathered online, changing the dynamics of social media as well as changing themselves by adapting to new terminology to maintain ‘political correctness’ as it is becoming vital in this day and age for credibility and acceptability by the common public.

Most respondents agreed that social media has played a significant role in the Fatah and Hamas conflict; supporters of both sides have used social media platforms to post news, pictures and comments that exposed some of the satellite media coverage of the conflict. A male journalist and news editor at the WAFA news agency in Ramallah said:

Both party supporters had open their own online blogs or websites, using YouTube private channels only to expose Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya, it was widely followed. But from what I have noticed on these websites and blogs that the Fatah and Hamas debate between the two supporters was and still often unjustly stereotyped as being hate-fuelled and blinded by bias on both sides of the debate. The reality is that before the infusion of social media into the debate, this stereotype would have been easier to believe as the opportunity for the average Palestinian to express his voice and make it heard was unavailable. (News editor at WAFA, Ramallah, 2012)

With 53% of Palestinian people using the internet (according to the Internet World Stats Report from 2007), social media seems to be on the road to becoming the Palestinian voice instead of news networks and governments, possibly redefining what may become the next generation of governments moderated online by the public opinion that begs so strongly to be heard, and inevitably changing the dynamics on the ground. A female journalist from Gaza said:

Social media, especially Facebook, was the first battleground of conflict between Fatah and Hamas supporters in West Bank and Gaza. I wish to look at it as a platform of debate and so do many others, we must recognise that even in debates you have a winning side and a losing side. The biggest battle/debate right now that faces Palestine is to end the divisions between
Part Two: focus group

The five journalists that form the focus group were interviewed in 2013 after watching some of the news reports about Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya’s coverage of the 2007 internal conflict.

Group dissection

A male journalist and news journalist from Palestine TV (commenting after watching the reports) said:

The contrasting approaches reflect both the very different perceptions of the role of Arab journalism in the two newsrooms and the political rift between their respective patrons. That’s why I started to follow Al-Arabiya recently as I know many Palestinians did. I have my own criticism to Al-Arabiya, however, I think in regards to the Palestinians’ internal conflict they used more journalistic values and standards to cover that conflict. Al-Jazeera represented the conflict as a war between two different nations fighting on small piece of land called Gaza. (News journalist from Palestine TV, Ramallah, 2012)

A female journalist and news journalist at Alayyam newspaper said:

… I used to see in 2007 and there is no doubt that the continuing situation that created the political division between Fatah and Hamas, as well as the use of media channels in smear campaigns against each other, has had a negative impact on sympathisers with the Palestinian cause. I remember one day, it was mid-June, and I will never forget this day because I had to write an article about it, when Al-Jazeera hosted almost 22 speakers from Hamas in
one day to comment on the situation in Gaza, against one single speaker from Fatah. (News journalist at Alayyam newspaper, Ramallah, 2013)

The five participants in this group have additionally raised some important points. They noted that that after violence erupted between the two main political parties, Fatah and Hamas resorted to using the media to justify their actions. Specifically, they used satellite television channels such as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya as a tool to hide or fabricate facts to achieve their goals. Hamas’s control over the Gaza Strip and Fatah’s control over the West Bank has led to an encroachment on media institutions that go against their policies. A female journalist and news anchor at the Voice of Palestine said:

I believe that the real problem was not just the war in the media, it’s about the Palestinian journalists themselves who have an affiliation to a political party, have engaged in an open war that reflects their ideology in an attempt to win public support. Moreover, all forms of media – including television, radio stations and websites – have engaged in that war. Not just the journalists in the local media, it’s also the correspondents who worked for the Arab satellite channels. They had a significant role in reporting hate ideology, rather than reporting real news. (News anchor at the Voice of Palestine, Ramallah, 2013)

During and post the second intifada, the political parties in Palestine have realised the importance of mass media in psychological warfare and winning public support. It could be argued that Hamas’ special attention to Al Jazeera which it demonstrates by providing exclusive news to the channel stems from the conviction that the channel’s viewership consists of millions of Arabs and people around the world, and it is watched in almost every Arab home. The fastest way for Hamas to convey its political and military messages is through Al Jazeera. Perhaps the channel also realizes that the exclusivity given by Hamas helps boost its popularity among Arab viewers while giving it a competitive edge among other Arab channels.
A female journalist and news journalist at Alayyam newspaper said:

Hamas owns a large number of mass media outlets, such as radio stations, newspapers, electronic forums, websites and satellite television channels, while Fatah is trying to catch up and establish its own media channels to counter the strong influence of the Hamas media. The two factions, Fatah and Hamas, are still using the local and international media channels in the internal conflict, which significantly affects the media performance. And that increased the division in society. (News journalist at Alayyam newspaper, Ramallah, 2013)

In addition, participants noted that there were regular interventions in the conduct of the media since 2007, which created a major threat to the professional activities of journalists and the credibility of media channels. A male journalist and news journalist at Palestine TV said:

I remember that late in 2007, the Hamas government attacked all radio stations in Gaza and shut down and confiscated Palestine Television equipment in order not to reveal the truth about their taking over the Strip. In addition, they prevented Palestine Television channel journalists from covering events in Gaza. They arrested all journalists who wrote against them. They used to call journalists and offer them to work with them or otherwise they would be arrested. (News journalist at Palestine TV, Ramallah, 2013)

The political policy in Palestine against media institutions is still an attempt to force the media to work for their interests and to prevent the dissemination of truth. An office belonging to Al-Arabiya television was shut down by authorities in the Hamas-rulled Gaza Strip in late July 2013, for allegedly reporting ‘false’ information regarding the Hamas leadership further to the closer of Aljazeera’s office by the Palestinian Authority in in 2011.

Participants in this group also show a deep concerns about self-censorship among Palestinian journalists since 2007. The journalists exercise self-censorship out of
fear and thus fail the test of neutrality and impartiality, becoming increasingly vulnerable to pressure from political parties which they fear would hold them accountable. Journalistic work is subject to censorship from start to finish both in Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and journalists could face criticism, receive threats or be held accountable for their work. These measures put pressure on journalists who unconsciously develop a fear factor that makes them work under strain, especially that security forces do nothing to take some of the heat off them but increases it instead.

The freedom of media and expression in Palestine has been on the decline over the last years. There are number of reasons that account for this reality, chief among which are political division among Palestinians and the splitting of Palestinian governing structure to two rival powers, one in Gaza Strip and the other in the West Bank. However, participants in this group also blame some Arab and Palestinian media institutions which failed to live up to ethical standards for intervening in Palestinian affairs and fuelling the prevailing state of division.

A male journalist and news journalist at the WAFA news agency in Ramallah said:

I think everything has changed now, in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, journalists are too afraid to write about violations committed by the two factions. Hamas has resorted to violence against Fatah journalists and its media institutions in Gaza Strip. Fatah too has practised restrictions on Hamas media institutions and arrested its journalists in the West Bank, and closed Al-Jazeera offices in Ramallah several times; while Hamas closed all the media outlets related to Fatah in Gaza and forbidden any journalists who support the Fatah party to work in Gaza, and recently closed two of the largest media outlets in Gaza: Al-Arabiya and Ma2an News agency officers. (News journalist at WAFA News, Ramallah, 2013)
Conclusion

All participants for this group agreed that Al-Arabiya and Al-Jazeera have had a deep reach in Palestinian society since 2003, and as such are ‘agenda-setting’ when reporting on it. The analysis of the interviews conducted suggests that most respondents perceive Al-Arabiya to be more balanced and objective in its news coverage than Al-Jazeera. Respondents perceived Al-Arabiya to be more independent and impartial in its editorial and political agenda and its code of ethics, compared to Al-Jazeera, which is more heavily influenced by Islamist discourse and by the Muslim Brotherhood Society. For Group One, one justification offered for why Al-Jazeera might be less independent in its coverage, is that the channel’s editorial policy has been less consistent and more vulnerable to changing political influences.

In terms of participation, Group Two and the focus group data shows that the control by the political authorities on the two channels has led to deepening the political division in Palestine, because each channel supported one side of the conflict and tried to reflect this side’s ideology in their reporting. However, in comparison, most interviewees for Group Two (ten out of thirteen) agreed that Al-Arabiya’s editorial policy is less politically driven than Al-Jazeera’s, and that Al-Arabiya is less aggressive about broadcasting the news that reflects its political positions. Al-Arabiya urges its reporters to be objective and impartial in their coverage. Being a ‘liberal’ channel means presenting the facts without undue influence from personal views and political orientation, an approach that gives the channel more credibility and professionalism than Al-Jazeera.

In addition, through the analyses of the data that emerged from the participants in Group Two, one may argue that the continuation of the conflict in the Palestinian arena has widened the gap between the Palestinian journalist and the political powers, both in Gaza and the West Bank, which led to the destruction of media infrastructure, as well as the values of freedom of expression. This has helped to undermine Palestinian social structure because of the false information that has been broadcast by the two television channels as part of their propaganda strategies.
Freedom of opinion in local media has become one of the victims of the Palestinian conflict, in which many journalists have been tortured, detained or harassed in order to force them to remain silent. Furthermore, it was noted from the journalists in Group Two, that internal violations against freedom of expression in Palestine have also escalated since 2007. Violations included the confiscation of press equipment, beatings, detention, and killings. The escalation of chaos has led to armed clashes in which journalists become victims of the political conflict between Fatah and Hamas. Both parties used violence against journalists and media institutions and satellite channels in the areas under their control.

According to reports published by MADA, the Palestinian Centre for Development and Media Freedoms, the years following the 2007 internal conflict have been a nadir for violence and arrests against journalists. In 2008 to 2010 there was at least 200 violations against Palestinian journalists and media institutions from both the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah and Hamas forces in Gaza. In 2012, MADA’s report states that there were 46 violations in the Gaza Strip and 21 in the West Bank (MADA, 2008–2012).

Most of the participants in both groups have agreed that the Arab satellite channels such as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya are still spreading ideologies of hatred during times of conflict by using false assumptions with biased reporting to support Fatah and Hamas political agendas in the West Bank and Gaza.

Group Two critics argued that the stories of Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya are often politically motivated and influenced by the networks’ owners. It is no secret that they are alluding to Al-Jazeera’s Qatar and Al-Arabiya’s Saudi Arabia. While no objective audience would deny that Al-Jazeera’s and Al-Arabiya’s programmes often serve the interests of the Qatari and Saudi governments, the central criticisms focus on the credibility of the networks’ coverage of the Hamas and Fatah fighting in 2007. Undoubtedly, Group Two noted that the two networks’ coverage has sympathised with the political powers and not with Palestinian society.
CHAPTER FIVE

News Representations of the Fatah and Hamas Conflict

Introduction

Media ownership has remained an intriguing factor in understanding the news production process in the Arab media. This study argues that the ownership influence of the two leading channels did affect the reporting of the Fatah and Hamas conflict. The ownership influence in these channels takes various forms including direct censorship and coercion of editorial staff. The researcher employs the use of content analysis to test how ‘ownership’ shapes the content of the two channels’ reporting. Accordingly, this chapter explores the reporting coverage of the Palestinians’ internal conflict by providing findings from a systematic content analysis of Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya’s news reports of this conflict. The approach therefore was used to test the ownership theory by mapping the areas of difference and similarities in the way the two networks represented conflict based on the two channels’ ownership policy.

The results of the CA analysis will indicate how both Fatah and Hamas were represented in the two channels’ coverage according to a negative/positive and favourable/not favourable representation. If the analysis indicates a high proportion of negative coverage for one side, along with high proportions of positive discussion for the other, it suggests that there was favouritism shown to one side of the conflict, and the possibility exists that the channel contributed significantly to the positive representation of that side and misrepresented the other.

However, as defining bias by an absence of balance requires both a longitudinal and broad research focus – suitable more for explaining entire newspapers or news programmes rather than individual stories – the assessment of bias must also consider the ‘character’, or quality, of media content (Street, 2001, p.33). In other words, particular attention must be paid to individual stories, and their layers of meaning, in order to assess news stories for what are commonly considered the
important features of good journalism, such as the tone of the report narrative (whether it be objective or rhetorical).

A biased news story is, therefore, unbalanced journalism, in that it frames (or, indeed, ignores) certain details of an event or issue in a manner that ‘unfairly’ favours the interests of a particular ontological outlook or ideological agenda. As was first noted in seeking to establish bias in news reporting by the two channels it is necessary to identify whether the different ownership of the two channels differ on how much news space was directly provided to different statements by the two sides of the conflict; the authoritative sources used in explaining this event; and whether the use of certain words or phrases undermined the objective tone or overall balance of different news.

The quantitative results are presented here to provide an overall profile of the coverage, which consists of a thorough assessment of the themes, actors, frames, and language of news reports across Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya. The study will employ content analysis as an empirical method to test the suggestions made from the interview chapter (Chapter Four). This method is a useful tool for investigating the reliability of the results from the journalists’ perceptions. It is also essential to triangulate a number of methodological strategies, and so the CA method is deployed to examine the questions raised in this thesis.

The results are displayed in tables and charts, with data drawn from summarised frequencies produced by coding the content of the sampled reports. Data are presented and measured using frequencies, percentages and the chi-square test, however, some cells have too many observations and figures may not add up to 100 due to rounding. The test of significance for the chi-square test was set at $p < .05$. Furthermore, the percentages and frequencies were analysed using SPSS software for the charts with large data.
Key Variables for Analysis

General Reporting

For this variable, the analysis was divided into two main periods: Round One (17 May to 3 June 2007) and Round Two (4 June to 14 June 2007). The reason behind this division is that the conflict erupted for the first time (17 May to 3 June 2007) between the two sides in the streets of Gaza, however, it was not on a daily basis because a ceasefire was announced. The conflict erupted in a second round of fighting (the bloody clash) on 4 June 2007 and ended on 14 June 2007. The researcher concluded that reporting in ceasefire (peace) time is different to reporting at a time with daily clashes. The frequency of reports is shown in Table 1 below. A total of 31 reports were dedicated to cover this conflict by the two networks, across the sampled period of almost five weeks. Distributed throughout the five weeks of reporting, no significant difference was found on the number of reports between the two networks covering Round One of the conflict. Both networks had the largest number of reports in round two.

Table 1. Average number of news reports broadcasted during the first round of the conflict, by network

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Network</th>
<th>Round One</th>
<th>Round Two</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al-Jazeera</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Arabiya</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Looking at the main values in this category, it is clear that both Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya had no significant difference in the number of reports covering the conflict. Graph 1 below shows the numbers of reports per week and also shows no significant difference has been found in reporting the conflict by the two networks.
Table 2. Number of news reports for the two rounds

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency of the Reports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The frequency of Al-Arabiya and Al-Jazeera’s coverage of the conflict was relatively consistent across Round Two of the conflict period (Week 4 and Week 5). During Round One (the calm/escalation period) 32.1% of the Al-Arabiya and Al-Jazeera reports were produced and during Round Two (the conflict period) 67.7% of the reports were produced.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Frequency of reporting per week per network

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency of reporting per week per network</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The frequency of reporting per week per network is shown in the graph below.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Graph showing frequency of reporting per week per network]
Prominence of Reporting

The prominence of the reports can be measured in a variety of ways, including: total amount of reports, number of reports per period, and length of the reports. The prominence of reports is an important aspect of content studies that compare how news networks treat different sides in a conflict (Elmasry, 2009). This content study analysed the frequency with which the two networks covered Round One and Round Two of the conflict, studying in particular the number and the length of their news reports.

The networks ran a total of 31 reports during the calm and conflict periods combined. As anticipated, coverage of the conflict spiked during the Round Two period, with the networks running a combined total of 22 reports. These general figures about the scale and length of the coverage give some indication as to the substantial yet changing news value of the internal conflict in Palestine. When breaking down this analysis further to consider the daily number of reports by each news channel, both networks had a more or less consistent spread within their reporting, suggesting that the conflict retained news value throughout the sample period.

Report Length

In terms of length, on the whole, Al-Jazeera produced longer reports than Al-Arabiya, therefore the research may conclude that Al-Jazeera had devoted considerably more time to this conflict than Al-Arabiya. Greater than half of Al-Jazeera’s reports (61.5%) were more than three minutes long, and only 11.5% of the reports were two minutes or less in length. Al-Arabiya, by comparison, ran a large number of short reports; almost (23%) of all Al-Arabiya’s reports were less than two minutes in length and only 46.1% were longer than three minutes. It could, therefore, be assumed that Al-Arabiya produced more in-house type of report; this type of reporting usually lasts between two to two and a half minutes with no appearance of a correspondent.
Table 4. Average length of news items per network

![Graph showing average length of news items per network]

The consistent pattern found across the two channels in the extent of coverage suggests that reporting of the conflict is highly event driven or dependent and episodic. The critical discourse moments (week four and week five) coincide with big events concerning the region (heavy fighting with casualties, the fall of Gaza and the end of the unity government). This suggests a reactive, rather than investigative, approach to news gathering carried by the two networks. In total, both Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya had a similar spread within their reporting of these events.

The main finding of the general reporting suggests that both networks had steady interest in covering the conflict between Fatah and Hamas; both networks’ attention to the issue was heavily dependent upon serious escalation. Cross-tabulation of the time period of coverage by the two networks indicated that there were no statistically significant differences. *This result could explain the importance of the daily events in Palestine, and how these events are still considered to be ‘newsworthy’ for the media in general*. Furthermore, it would appear from these figures that the two channels gave a higher priority to this conflict, almost daily news reports were produced by the two channels starting from the first day of the second period on 4 June. Such frequency of counts provides a crude measure of the extent of news coverage in this area because the conflict coverage seems to acquire greater status or news value in this context.
Reports Location

This section looks at the geographic distribution of report coverage, in terms of the locations from which the reports were dispatched. This provides an insight into the comprehensiveness of the different locations that were used in the reports between the two news networks in reporting the internal conflict and the extent to which the spatial location of their coverage differed. The specific locations from where the reports were broadcast were categorised as follows (see also Table 5):

1. Gaza locations: including all the areas within the Gaza strip, the main city, refugee camps and Gaza–Israeli border locations.

2. West Bank locations: including all the main cities, refugee camps, villages, and borders with Israeli locations.

3. Israeli locations: including the areas inside the Israeli territories.

4. Regional locations: Arab countries.

5. International locations: all other countries.

The geographical distribution of reporters has a great impact on the way that conflict is reported and that narratives are constructed, and it is indeed necessary to assume that the locations of journalists in times of conflict – the areas in which journalists are located – have implications for the way that conflicts are constructed visually and discursively. However, it has been noted from analysing the locations of the reports from the two channels in this study that these channels have often depended on in-house reporting, where no correspondents had been used.

The analysis shows that Al-Jazeera has a total of 25 locations mentioned in its 16 reports, while Al-Arabiya has a total of 27 locations in its 15 reports. Considering that Gaza was the main ‘theatre of conflict’, such an imbalance, in terms of ‘newsworthiness’ and reporters’ location, is justified. Analysing the two channels’ locations, paying more attention in using the Gaza location, Table 5 shows Al-Jazeera had 68% of their total locations from inside Gaza, while Al-Arabiya had a slightly different share with 48.2% in the same region. However, both percentages demonstrated a greater preference towards Gaza-based areas during the conflict.
Table 5. Reports locations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Al-Jazeera</th>
<th>Al-Arabiya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gaza Locations</td>
<td>17 (68%)</td>
<td>14 (48.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank Locations</td>
<td>4 (16%)</td>
<td>7 (24.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Locations</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1 (3.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israeli Locations</td>
<td>1 (4%)</td>
<td>2 (5.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Locations</td>
<td>2 (8%)</td>
<td>3 (10.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Locations</td>
<td>1 (6.4%)</td>
<td>2 (8.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Multiple locations have been used in a single news report by each network.

Chi-square results show no significant association between the two channels and the Gaza locations, as the chi-square value was 0.427 which is less than the quintile value of chi-square distribution (5.991) at 2 degrees of freedom at α = 0.05. Also the significance is 0.808, which is larger than 0.05. Other findings for this subject were that there was a significant difference in using the West Bank and other locations. Al-Arabiya had a larger number of reporting locations from different cities and areas inside and outside of Palestine, in addition to reporting from inside the Israeli territories; unlike Al-Jazeera who focused almost two-thirds of its locations from inside Gaza only. A significant difference was also seen in Al-Arabiya’s locations from outside of the conflict zone, where a total of 24.1% of its locations were from outside the conflict zone, while Al-Jazeera’s numbers were only 16%.

In terms of other locations, the Al-Arabiya channel had an immense proportion of their reports related to regional and international locations. In relation to regional countries, the ratio is consistent with notions of political proximity, thus is
understandable given the organisation’s intent in catering for some Arab countries that supported the peace effort to end the fighting, such Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Nations.

**Authorship–Report Format**

Two main categories were set to measure this variable of news format: (1) use of correspondents (full package report); and (2) in-house report format (‘VOs’ – voice over report).

In terms of the report format, Al-Jazeera relied predominantly on packages (full edited reports produced by filed correspondent and featuring video), while Al-Arabiya had a greater use of the simple voice over in-house reports, where a studio anchor reads the report text over video footage. A total of 84.4% of Al-Jazeera’s reports were packages, while Al-Arabiya employed the use of correspondents for 76.9% of the time. However, both networks also relied relatively frequently on in-house reports with interview sound, with Al-Jazeera using this method 15.3% of the time and Al-Arabiya using VOs for 23% of its reports. Perhaps it is not surprisingly given its large budget and general interest in Palestinian issues that Al-Jazeera positioned correspondents/field reporters at the scene of events in its news reports far more frequently than Al-Arabiya, as shown in Table 6. Al-Jazeera used correspondents in most of its reports (76.9%) compared with 73% for Al-Arabiya.

*Table 6. Report format, per network*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authorship</th>
<th>Number of reports</th>
<th>Use of correspondent</th>
<th>In-house report</th>
<th>Correspondent appears in the report</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al-Jazeera</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>22 (84.5%)</td>
<td>4 (15.3%)</td>
<td>20 (76.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Arabiya</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>20 (76.9%)</td>
<td>6 (23%)</td>
<td>19 (73%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The finding of this section shows two features related to the report format. First, these reports presented news from the field of the event, rather than on set as news bulletins; the two channels made extensive use of their ability to produce visual news-style reports, rather than depending on content only; and reporting the event from its original location gave a sense to viewers that 'I'm right here', rather than merely provide the latest news information'. Second, these reports were a staple ingredient of the two channels’ ongoing coverage of the conflict as 24/7 news channels.

Sources: The presence and access of sources

Identifying reporting locations and authorship are just dimensions in which one can classify variations in the different ways the two networks constructed and framed the conflict. Even more significant is the issue of who is reported upon in the conflict and particularly whose voices are heard, repeated, and emphasised. Table 7 addresses what can be termed as the ‘Who dimension of reporting’, which is also important in providing some measure to the extent of which Fatah, Hamas and other actors are given access and presence in the news reports.

In order to provide a clear distinction between presence and access in these reports, the research refers to the work of Deacon (2008). In his book, Deacon explains that ‘news presence and news access are two linked but distinct phenomena’ in which ‘news presence concerns the frequency with which the actions and opinions of individuals and organizations (“news sources”) are the subject of editorial discussion’, and ‘news access addresses the extent to which particular sources interact directly with journalists or reports to provide information and convey their opinions’ (Deacon, 2008, p.51). He then explicates how news access often depends on matters of ‘opportunity and availability’ but can also be a measure of sources’ ‘influence and credibility’, because there is an unspoken process of accreditation by which journalists base their decisions about who they talk to (Deacon, 2008).

Comparing which sources from the two fighting parties have gained momentum and which are side-lined or ignored makes notions of news presence and access a straightforward matter to evaluate. It is, therefore, important to differentiate between news access and news presence, given that the frequency with which sources are
directly quoted in the coverage provides a telling, if imperfect, indicator of the availability and/or perceived credibility of report sources by journalists (Deacon, 2008, p.125). The degree of air time allocated to actors in each single report during conflict is an continual concern, because it offers the most basic yet obvious measure of reporting conflict – that is who is given access to speak, who is neglected, and who is marginalised.

Throughout the 31 reports, Al-Jazeera ran a total of 302 mentions, direct quotations, paraphrased quotations, appearances, and interviews with various actors; the number was 294 for Al-Arabiya. It is important to note here that the content analysis coded up to thirteen actors per single report, however the analysis in Table 7 accounts for the five most prominently mentioned and/or quoted sources. The main reason behind this is the danger that the use of all thirteen categories might cause the over-flooding of data in which the inclusion of all actors, even minor participants, might disguise those who had greater prominence.

Overall, Hamas voices received the greatest reporting time, almost half of the voices in the reports from both networks (49.8%); this was followed by Fatah voices with 28.2%. Both Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya dedicated some report time to quote and reference independent Palestinian actors with a percentage of 6.5% of their total reporting time, however, Al-Arabiya favoured this report category with 9.8% of the voices coming from the interviews or quotations of other political parties, such as the Islamic Jihad movement or actors from the Left party (which Al-Jazeera mentioned in its reports). In regards to other voices on Al-Jazeera, Israeli voices took up 2.9% of all types of speeches with 6.6% of other Palestinian voices, unlike Al-Arabiya’s figures which had a more obvious disparity with 3.7% for the Israeli voices.
In a similar vein, Al-Arabiya was slightly reliant on other perspectives on the conflict, with a discrepancy of 22.2%. In terms of other voices, the sources of information – namely ordinary citizens and independent analysts – make up the rest of the sources. Many of these sources came from interviews given by Palestinian civilians living in Gaza or the West Bank who were able to give first-hand accounts of conditions in the region. Other frequently used sources included interviews with doctors and hospital spokesmen. In addition, Al-Arabiya reported other voices such as Saudi Arabia and Egyptian sources at a level of 4.7%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Al-Jazeera</th>
<th>Al-Arabiya</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hamas Source</td>
<td>56.6%</td>
<td>42.8%</td>
<td>49.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatah Source</td>
<td>25.8%</td>
<td>30.9%</td>
<td>28.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Source</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Sources</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israeli Source</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Sources</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All percentages are column percentages. These figures relate to all references made to sources including direct quotations, interviews, mere mentions, paraphrased quotations and appearances. Up to thirteen sources were coded but only the first five are accounted for in this table, for reasons of prominence. Figures may not add up to 100 due to rounding.
Table 7.1 Chi-square tests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Chi-square</td>
<td>29.165</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Ratio</td>
<td>29.513</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linear-by-Linear Association</td>
<td>26.511</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of Valid Cases</td>
<td>596</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 24.17.

A chi-square shows a significant difference in using the Fatah sources between the two networks. Al-Arabiya depends almost third of its reporting with 30.9% of the reports on Fatah sources, unlike Al-Jazeera with only 25.8% using Fatah resources.

Chart 7.2 below shows the moderate degree of difference in content between each network in regards to Fatah and Hamas sources. The primary focus must still be centred on the collective averages taken from both channels so that an overall assessment can be made. Hamas sources were found to be present in almost half of the coded reports compared to Fatah sources with only (28.3%), therefore it is likely the case that the two channels were heavily dependent upon Hamas sources in order to obtain information and as the main source for their reports.
While considering the individual results for each network, most of the percentage levels for those sources other than Hamas and Fatah source types are similar in number for each network and do not appear to stray far from the median average. The only indication that there may be a difference in content regarding sources concerns Al-Arabiya’s results for reports using other sources. By simply looking at the percentage levels of these source types, it is clear that Al-Arabiya provided content that used higher levels of ‘other’, unlike Al-Jazeera.

Table 7.2. Number of Fatah and Hamas sources, per report, per network

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source Type</th>
<th>Aljazeera</th>
<th>Alarabyia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hamas source</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fateh source</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: These figures relate to references made to sources including direct quotations, interviews, and appearances.

The findings for this section show that the conflict is a highly mediated one, where comparatively few sources from Fatah are allowed to come forward and address their information directly. There are a number of possible explanations for why this is so, ranging from logistical reasons that the Hamas sources preferred to talk to Al-Jazeera, to reasons concerned with news values and impartiality where Al-Jazeera simply displayed favouritism toward Hamas.
News presence and news access: the appearance of military actors

This section examines the extent to which the Fatah and Hamas sources were directly quoted (news access) in the reports and reveals greater discrepancies between the two sides. Similarly, as with news presence, the Al-Jazeera network dedicated more direct quotations to Hamas sources and the Al-Arabiya network was more inclined to directly quote Fatah sources. This higher prevalence of quotation is indicative of greater news access and is even seen to bring significant definitional advantages. Table 8 below demonstrates that Al-Jazeera reveals a further gap in reporting military actors by highlighting the Hamas narrative, especially the official and military voices.

Hamas officials accounted for 53.9%; and almost 26.9% came from Hamas military fighters, most of them were responsible for the operation on ground. Combined together, these figures alone amounted to more than three-quarters of all Al-Jazeera’s voices, giving the remaining sources only a slight chance to make their voices heard. The Hamas military received the greatest attention of all types of Hamas speech on Al-Jazeera, rather than civilian support in Gaza. This increased supremacy was also evidenced as giving Hamas further precedence as a new power on ground. West Bank civilians were rarely mentioned in Al-Jazeera, let alone quoted.

For Al-Arabiya quoting Fatah’s voices, the figures were somehow reversed, with civilian voices making up 18.3% of all voices, whilst Fatah officials, such as counsel and governmental members, accounting for 29.9%. On the other hand, Hamas received a significant share of voices from Al-Arabiya, amounting to 41% of all voices quoted. However, only 11% were from military members.
Table 8. Type of Hamas and Fatah sources

![Bar chart showing distribution of sources]

Note: These figures will only include interviews, quotations, and appearances of the actors.

Breakdown of Fatah and Hamas military sources by broadcaster

Al-Arabiya had a similar spread in reporting Hamas officials rather than military, as shown in Table 9.1 below. Al-Arabiya, meanwhile, dedicated an amount of report time to the supporters’ voices, giving it a mere significance of 8% in total; while Al-Jazeera had only 3.4% of the total voices to the supporters, with 79% supporting Hamas, 12% only supporting Fatah, and the rest quoted as neutral. Al-Arabiya was seen to be equally devoted in quoting Fatah and Hamas supporters, with figures reaching 2% and almost 1.8% to Hamas supporters in Gaza. And Al-Arabiya had 1.2% of the voices for neutral voices.

In terms of news access, Al-Arabiya also proved to have dedicated an equal amount of reporting to quote Hamas military leaders than the reporting time given to Fatah military leaders; only quoting 2.8% from Fatah military leaders, with 3.6% to Hamas military leaders. Fatah military were given almost no time on Al-Jazeera report time – on very few occasions did they attain direct speech and/or interviews to explain the situation on the ground.
Appearance of official actors from Fatah and Hamas sources

Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya reporters were able to gain access to Gaza and the West Bank during the conflict period, and both Fatah and Hamas officials were easily interviewed. Al-Arabiya quoted the Fatah officials’ statements by interviews, direct quotes or paraphrases. In this respect, it is reasonable to suggest that Al-Jazeera had the same opportunities, but chose not to exploit them, whilst, as mentioned, most of the voices on Al-Jazeera came from inside Gaza from Hamas officials. In effect, it creates certain ambivalence on behalf of the journalist regarding the topic of ‘who gains status in Gaza’. This marginalised reporting of Fatah officials raises questions about Al-Jazeera’s journalistic values and professional standards when dealing with the two parts of this conflict.

When Al-Jazeera reported most of its statements from Hamas officials and military inside Gaza, one may suggest that Hamas was recognised as the source of power or authority in the Gaza strip by Al-Jazeera. Also, that ignoring Fatah officials’ right to defend their acts, and the dominance of Hamas’s narrative to what had happened during the conflict, provides strong evidence that Al-Jazeera helped to promote Hamas’s military actions in Gaza against the Palestinian authority (Fatah). Beside the reasons suggested above, this can be viewed as a relational trend which involves the apparent construct that Fatah’s presence was not as frequent as Hamas’s in Al-Jazeera.

Al-Arabiya, however, had a slight change in reporting the Fatah narrative, giving more of their report time to Fatah officials in addition to that of other voices. As one might suggest this relates to the two organisations’ internal editorial policies and strategies, acknowledging that the different policies and powers behind the two networks – the Qatari and the Saudi regimes acceptances and recognitions of Hamas governments and politicians as the new powers that will control the Gaza strip at the end of this conflict.
Appearance of civilians

Palestinian civilians from Gaza or the West Bank were mentioned on both of the two channels. However, the figures were much more prominent on Al-Arabiya, giving it up to 8.2% of its air time; less frequent was Al-Jazeera, in which civilians took up 6.6% of air time. In total, civilians were heard in 8.2% of the two channels reports.

Al-Arabiya was the channel most likely to mention Palestinian civilians in their reports, either through direct speech or interviews. These civilians were directly affected by the conflict; either they were a family member of a deceased person, an eyewitness to an event, or a supporter. Giving report time to civilians’ voices meant focusing on the humanitarian side of this conflict, highlighting the suffering and the negative effect of this fighting on the daily lives of the Palestinians.

Table 9 demonstrates that most variations in reporting actors are of statistical significance. These values provide striking results; predictably, of all items relevant to Gaza, Al-Arabiya dedicated a considerable amount of air time to report on Fatah officials and military. Again, Al-Jazeera featured Hamas members in almost two-thirds of the total voices. Although Al-Jazeera dedicated minimal report time to quote civilians, they were mentioned in almost 6.6% of its reports – constituting the highest figure among the sample for Hamas actors in total.

The analysis, so far, reveals that Hamas locations and sources received more attention from both channels, especially from Al-Jazeera. However, the analysis shows a significant difference in the case of Al-Arabiya using Hamas and Fatah locations – where in some results Al-Arabiya had a slight difference in using both sides’ sources. Compared to Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya had a slight difference in its use of Hamas and Fatah voices; although the balance was not equal, while the difference was significantly more noticeable in Al-Jazeera’s case. Chi-square results show no difference in Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya using Hamas sources, while a test has shown a significant difference in using Fatah resources between the two networks. Table 9 shows, in a similar vein, a significant difference in the military sources between the two channels. Where Al-Jazeera depended on the military as
the second main source for its reporting, Al-Arabiya had a different share, as shown below

_Table 9: Chi-square testing of sources by broadcaster_

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Channel</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Hama s</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Expected count</th>
<th>% within source</th>
<th>% within official military</th>
<th>% of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al-Jazeera</td>
<td>Official</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>102</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>118.4</td>
<td>54.0%</td>
<td>63.4%</td>
<td>39.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>189</td>
<td>189.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>73.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatah</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td></td>
<td>59</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>86.8%</td>
<td>36.6%</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>68</td>
<td>68.0</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Count</td>
<td></td>
<td>161</td>
<td>161.0</td>
<td>62.6%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>58</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>257</td>
<td>257.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Hamas Count</td>
<td>% of total</td>
<td>Expected count</td>
<td>% within source</td>
<td>% within official military</td>
<td>% of total</td>
<td>Expected count</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Arabiya</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>62.6%</td>
<td>87.1</td>
<td>63.9%</td>
<td>52.0%</td>
<td>37.1%</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
<td>76.2%</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
<td>71.8%</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>122</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>122.0</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>58.1%</td>
<td>58.1%</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatah</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>81.8%</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>81.8%</td>
<td>48.0%</td>
<td>34.3%</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
<td>28.2%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>71.4%</td>
<td>150.0</td>
<td>71.4%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>71.4%</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>39</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Subject of reports – dominant topic

Within the broad scope of the Fatah and Hamas conflict, Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya chose to narrowly define some of their reports along a specific topic range. Both networks, for example, situated many of their reports within the more specific ‘war recap’ or war reporting style, and ‘conflict reasons’ – results topics came in second place for the reports. With reports consisting largely of blaming and accusations summaries, Al-Arabiya was less likely than Al-Jazeera to focus on these more narrow issues. A total of 58.5% of Al-Arabiya’s reports took the ‘war recap’ focus, compared with 61.2% for Al-Jazeera.

Al-Arabiya focused 8.5% of its reports around the more specific topic of ‘diplomatic efforts’, compared with only 5.4 % for Al-Jazeera. Meanwhile, Al-Jazeera discussed only 5.1% of its reports within the context of humanitarian efforts, unlike Al-Arabiya who clearly focused on this subject with 11.1% of the report time. Al-Jazeera concentrated on the subject of ‘blaming and accusations’ with 14.2% of reports, compared with just 10.9% for Al-Arabiya. Both networks had similar results when explaining and analysing the conflict’s reasons or results.

Chi-square results show no significant differences in the report topic between the two channels (X2 = .353, df = 2, p > .05). The only significant difference was related to the humanitarian subject, this is because Al-Arabiya presented this subject more frequently (X2 = 0.651 df = 2, p ≤ .05).
It should be noted also that in total percentage for the ‘war recap’ subject reported by the two channels, the number was 53.4% of their total reports, while the ‘peace effort’ subject constituted only 11.4% of the total reports’ subjects. A researcher may conclude from this result that the two channels had covered and represented this conflict by adapting the war and conflict reporting style and not the peace journalism style. According to Canadian journalist and media development in conflict specialist Ross Howard, it does not take a war correspondent to recognise that journalism and news media can incite violent conflict.

*Table 10. Subject of reports, per network*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Topic</th>
<th>Al-Jazeera</th>
<th>Al-Arabiya</th>
<th>Chi-square test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>War recap</td>
<td>61.2%</td>
<td>58.5%</td>
<td>0.094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian effects, civilians conditions, aid, refugees</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>0.651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace treaties, cease fire agreement</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>0.040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict reasons, results</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blaming, accusations, threats</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>0.395</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: these figures made to the general subject, a single report included up to two main subjects.
Themes

Main themes for the reports

One of the most contentious aspects of the coverage of any war is the way in which the narrative is constructed through selected themes that define the reporting. The CA results show that both networks demonstrated similar patterns in the most common themes for their reports. A single report had more or less five main themes. ‘Conflict and fighting’ was the most frequent topic on both networks themes; ‘the political division’ was the second most frequent topic on both channel’s reporting, followed by ‘blaming, accusations and conflict results’ themes.

In terms of themes, Table 11 reveals that the reporting of the Fatah and Hamas conflict was dominated by conflict and military actions. More than half (51.2%) of reports specifically reported both sides’ military action as a primary theme, followed by political division between the West Bank and Gaza and the division of Palestinian society itself, between citizens of Gaza and citizens in the West Bank, with a total of 23.3% of both channels’ main themes. Military action themes were given great prominence: Al-Jazeera gave it the most report time with 60.1%, while Al-Arabiya’s figure was 56.5%. Al-Arabiya, meanwhile, reports 8.5% of the themes related to diplomatic/political efforts – peace themes, while Al-Jazeera had only 4.3% of the peace effort themes from its total themes.

In terms of Hamas’s and Fatah’s accusations and blaming as a result of this conflict, it was given some significance by Al-Jazeera with 13.9%; however, it was less dramatic for Al-Arabiya with only 10.3%. A significant difference was with the conflict’s human conditions – the humanitarian aspect themes – which focused on the direct impact of the conflict and its population on the ground in Gaza and the West Bank; this featured in nearly 8.1% of the total themes from both networks. Al-Jazeera was less likely to report these themes with only 6.5%, while the number for Al-Arabiya was 9.8%.
Finally, no difference was seen in the ‘division’-related themes; however, Al-Arabiya had more coverage than Al-Jazeera, with a total of 29.6% for this theme, while Al-Jazeera had 27.1% in total. Table 11 gives a detailed examination of these themes in relation to Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya.

In regards to the ‘accusations and blaming’ theme, a regular viewer of the Al-Jazeera channel can only conclude that this discourse lacks objectivity and that it is a provocative discourse that brands others with treason and reflects an intellectual and religious doctrine that claims monopoly over the truth. Al-Jazeera’s performance is based on instigation and defamation, as can be seen in its references to political figures and leaders, such as its attack on President Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian president, throughout the Hamas leader’s statements, as well as other leaders of Fatah. For example, the main theme for the report dated 14 June 2007 was a senior political leader of Hamas saying: ‘Hamas won the Gaza battle, and no one can stop us now from building our free state on the land of Gaza’.

**Table 11. Main general themes for the report, per network**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Al-Jazeera</th>
<th>Al-Arabiya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fighting, violence, military action</td>
<td>60.1%</td>
<td>56.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division</td>
<td>27.1%</td>
<td>29.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamas and Fatah accusations, blaming</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace effort</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian aspects</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Most of the report themes that have been analysed have dealt mainly with violence related to the two sides of the conflict. Al-Arabiya’s themes related to violence present Hamas as responsible for this violence and attacks by Hamas forces against Fatah members in Gaza. For example, the theme of the report of 6 June 2007 foregrounds the consequences of the attack by Hamas on the main Fatah headquarters in Gaza city and the killing of at least four of Fatah’s security forces inside the building. The report clearly presents the militants as responsible for the killing. Moreover, the report of Hamas forces raising Hamas flags inside the Fatah headquarters after destroying it makes the theme even more prominent.

In regards to Al-Jazeera, the theme of the same day’s report underlines the involvement of Fatah militants in the raid and underlines its political consequences of raising tension in Gaza. It uses activation and the present tense, which present the event as vivid and relevant. The interview of a military leader from Hamas, who explains the killing of the four Fatah members as self-defence, is also used to make the theme more prominent.

Al-Jazeera’s themes on Fatah violence show responsibility and causal relationships clearly; therefore, regular viewers can confidently make judgements about their actions as aggressive and violent through the frequently presented themes of the responsibility of Fatah for arresting and torturing Hamas members in the West Bank, in addition to the ban on Hamas supporters located inside the West Bank from demonstrating against the Palestinian authority.
**First five themes mentioned in the report**

The first theme of a report serves as a doorway into the report, shaping the content and structure of what is to come. That which the correspondent is trying to convey is condensed into a minimum number of words that seek to pull in the audience. Headline (opening) themes used in the report introduction may also be used to influence the opinion of the audience. The message of the headline theme (headline content) gives the overall picture of the story and relays its relative significance. In theory, then, readers can skim the headlines and have an outline of the news of the day, and some idea of its relative impact and importance’ (Reah,1998, pp.13–14).

It is also significantly important to look at the first themes of each report (headline of the reports) with regard to media bias. The inverted pyramid style of writing in visual journalism calls for the most important information to be included at the beginning of the report (or the base of the inverted pyramid), while the information of lesser importance comes further down (toward the tip of the inverted pyramid).

Another way of testing significance is the running order. In the two satellite channels examined in this research, the most common type of lead on a hard news story they used in their filed reporting is called a ‘summary lead’ because they want to summarise the main points of what happened on the ground. It answers the questions: who, what, when, where, why, and how. The rest of the story then elaborates further on the what, why, and how. Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya’s editorial priority concerns the order in which reports are reported and what is given headline treatment.

‘Headline theme’ in this study is defined by the first five themes mentioned in beginning of a single report. This is especially true since prototypically, news organisations employ the ‘inverted pyramid’ structure, an arrangement in which the ‘most important information’ is in the lead and progressively ‘less important information’ follows after. It is frequently held that ‘authorial neutrality and the inverted pyramid structure are key factors in the distinctiveness and uniqueness of the modern hard news report as text type. (Thomson et al., 2010, p.61)
Both channels’ correspondents employed this technique to make their report headline themes memorable and striking by using words and images that may be emotionally loaded or that carry strong overtones. The use of these techniques may be considered to be the framing of an issue by the two channels for the benefit of one side of the conflict.

By analysing the main headline themes mentioned by Al-Arabiya and Al-Jazeera reports, it can be seen that Al-Jazeera required that the information that supports Hamas come at the beginning of the correspondent report, while information of importance to the other side (Fatah) comes later or was not even reported. In similar vein, Al-Arabiya used the same editorial style, however, most of the first five themes in its reports were regarding the general conflict and not the two parties.

In the first five themes, Al-Arabiya also reported Fatah action against Hamas in the West Bank and Gaza by quoting and paraphrasing Palestinian officials from Fatah, accusing and blaming Hamas for the violence that took place in Gaza during the conflict period, in addition of presenting themes related to assaults, arrest and torture of Fatah security forces (military) in the West Bank by Hamas supporters. Further, Al-Arabiya used some of the first five themes to report Hamas’s total control in Gaza. Al-Arabiya’s first five themes were considered to be a general description of the daily events during the conflict, in addition to presenting the two sides’ violent actions against each other. And perhaps the significant difference with regard to Al-Arabiya’s themes is with the description of the human conditions and of the casualties as a result of this conflict.

Al-Jazeera, meanwhile, had a different representation of the first five themes of the reports, with clear consideration to themes related to escalation, violence and military action. In addition of focusing on the new Hamas power controlling Gaza, this theme was represented clearly through presenting the actions of Hamas military forces ruling the streets of Gaza. These themes were presented through Hamas officials and military actors’ statements in the report.
Themes describing the ‘division’ between Hamas’s Gaza and Fatah’s West Bank were presented as the second largest theme on Al-Arabiya’s reports. This theme was represented on Al-Arabiya through civilians protesting against the division in the West Bank and through statements from regional and international actors involved in the peace effort to end this conflict. Furthermore, it was presented in themes related to Gaza and the West Bank’s human suffering as a result of this division. However, Al-Jazeera represented this theme (division) through statements from Hamas and Fatah officials who were accusing and blaming each other. Al-Jazeera’s first main themes were related to the conflict themes, while the second major theme was related to Hamas ruling Gaza and Fatah’s defeat.

*Table 12. First five themes mentioned in the reports, per network*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First 5 themes</th>
<th>Al-Jazeera</th>
<th>Al-Arabiya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflict, fighting, escalation, military actions</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamas–Fatah relations</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace effort</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division, Gaza and West Bank</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamas ruling Gaza – Fatah defeat</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Reports’ Frames

This variable has been divided into three main categories, with subcategories under each.

Representation frame

This category is associated with the way in which each network represented the situations during the conflict period. This category depended on a pre-determined variable from other research studies, in addition to following Jasperson and El-Kikhia’s (2003) work on CNN’s and Al-Jazeera’s media coverage of America’s War in Afghanistan. This part grouped frames of news reports into government 'official', ‘military’ and ‘humanitarian’ frames:

- A government ‘official’ frame refers to news frames concerning support for the government and political leaders in the West Bank (Fatah government) or in Gaza (Hamas government), including national unity before and after the conflict and public support for the government. In addition to considering the general subject of the report, this frame will include quotations, appearances, statements and images from only officials and politicians from both sides, presented in a single report.

- A ‘military’ frame refers to depictions of the strategy used in the conflict (e.g., operations, fighters from each party, military leaders). In addition to considering the general report subject, this frame will include appearances, statements, quotations and interviews with military leaders and members from each side, in addition to any other military appearances, such as Israeli military or other Palestinian parties (such as the Al-Jihad movement).

- The ‘humanitarian' frames focused on the victims of the conflict in the West Bank or Gaza, notably presenting the suffering and damage caused by military operations and actions against the civilians from each side. This is presented through statements, civilian actions, aid and relief efforts,
demonstrations,

interviews,

quotations

from

civilians,

human

rights

organisation efforts.

Reports that use frames other than the above three categories were coded ‘other’.
This may refer to peace, social movement to end the division, agreements, cease
fire, economic situation, social changes in Palestinian society during the conflict.
Table 13 shows the differences in the type of frames used by Al-Jazeera and AlArabiya. The chi-square results, as displayed in this table below, suggested that
there were significant differences between the two networks in the frames adopted
(X2 = 6.7, df =2, p < .05).
In Al-Jazeera, over 63% were ‘official’ frames, fewer than a quarter were ‘military’
frames (27%), approximately only 8% were ‘humanitarian’ frames, and 2% for ‘other’
frames. On the other hand, for Al-Arabiya, over half of the reports used ‘official’
frames (57%), 19% of the frames were ‘humanitarian’ frames, 16% were ‘military’
frames, and 4% related to ‘other’ frames. The significant differences in summary
were coded as ‘military’, while Al-Arabiya had significantly more ‘humanitarian’
frames. In addition, another significant difference emerged in coding the ‘other’
frame, where Al-Arabiya presented other points of view from outside the conflict’s
main zones, such as the regional effort to end the conflict and the Palestinian social
movement through demonstrations to end the division.
Examples of sentences used to illustrate an ‘official’ frame are when Sami Abu
Zuhri, a Hamas official, said: ‘As an Islamic Movement we will not be ruled by others
anymore, we will not cower in fear. We will not be intimidated, we won the battle of
Gaza, and Gaza is free now’ (Al-Jazeera report, 9 June 2007). An example of a
‘humanitarian’ frame can be seen in the following quotation from a civilian man in
Gaza: ‘Women and children crying, people are leaving their homes in Gaza because
they are afraid of being killed or arrested, it’s the first time we see the Palestinians
killing each other’ (Al-Arabiya report, 12 June 2007). An example of a ‘military’ frame
was when a Hamas military leader from inside Gaza said: ‘It was a battle of dignity
and survival. The land of Gaza is now controlled by Hamas fighters “Mujahedeen”
179


Jihadists. And Gaza will no more be ruled by the enemies of Islam’ (Al-Jazeera report, 13 June 2007). A further example of a ‘military’ frame was when Al-Arabiya quoted Tawfiq Elterawi, head of the Palestinian intelligence in the West Bank, as saying: ‘Hamas's actions and violence in Gaza is illegal and not acceptable, this is a military coup against the Palestinian Legal Authority, Hamas destroyed the national unity and divided the Palestinians into two parts’ (Al-Arabiya report, 8 June 2007).

A further significant difference in the frame has also been seen in quoting the Israeli point of view in regards to this conflict. During the last days of the conflict, Israeli officials and military leaders were interviewed and quoted in both networks. Al-Jazeera used the ‘military’ frame to present the Israeli perspective, such as interviewing military actors from the Israeli army to describe their point of view. However, Al-Arabiya used the ‘official’ frame to explain the Israeli perspective by interviewing Israeli politicians and officials.

On 12 June 2007, both Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya interviewed Israeli actors, but Al-Jazeera interviewed a spokesman of the Israeli army, who expressed his fear of Hamas's control of the Gaza strip, while Al-Arabiya interviewed an Israeli official, who also expressed his point of view about the huge change in Palestinian politics with Hamas in power.

Table 13. Representation frame, per network

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Report frame</th>
<th>Al-Jazeera</th>
<th>Al-Arabiya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Official</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: These figures made to actors including interviews in the report and appearances of the actor only.
Tone Frame

In order to answer the question of whether Al-Arabiya and Al-Jazeera’s reporting was favourable to Hamas, Fatah or neither, the report tone frame was set as a variable in order to analyse favouritism in both networks’ reporting of the conflict. This frame was defined as how both networks portrayed both parties of the conflict, and how both networks framed the political setting in the Palestinian territories, in regards to both parties. This tone of the report frame was set based on the report being favourable or neither favourable nor unfavourable to Fatah or Hamas in a single report from both networks.

In addition, how the spokesmen of the two parties were given time or minutes in the report time to express their views, as well as how the correspondent approached these actors in the type and tone of questions was noted. Furthermore, the tone was set for how the reporters covered both points of view, and whether there was any favouritism toward Hamas or Fatah in the correspondents’ wording, explanations or voice. As for the political setting, it refers to the political and militant conflict between the parties.

In order to test this variable in an independent way, the researcher used the focus group (see part one of the methodology chapter – interviews). The participants had been asked to watch six of the reports from Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya and to analyse the tone of these reports based on the favouritism set explained above. The researcher chose the six reports randomly from the two channels, dated on 4 June, 10 June and 14 June 2007.

The results for the report tone used by the researcher and the independent results test for the tone are shown in Table 14. The chi-square result between the two tests shows no difference in the result of the report tone between the researcher and the independent participants’ analysis.
Al-Jazeera arranged over 83 minutes for the 19 reports and for Al-Arabiya the number was 73 minutes. Of these, 41 minutes were related to the interview time within the reports for Al-Jazeera, while Al-Arabiya had nearly 34 minutes. Multiple tone frames were coded in a single report per channel; however, the research will only include the first two tones in a single report per channel.

Al-Jazeera showed more favouritism towards Hamas during the conflict period. Almost 79% of the total minutes for this period were rated as favourable to Hamas, with only 13% favourable to Fatah. The remaining minutes, 18%, were rated as neither favourable to Hamas nor Fatah because these interviews focused on interviewing citizens who had been affected by the conflict or with independent actors as political analysts.

One of the observations for this period was that minutes when Al-Jazeera was favourable to Fatah were almost non-existent. Reports analysed in this period included evident favouritism by Al-Jazeera reporters towards Hamas – one interview carried a view from a Hamas political spokesperson that Fatah was rejecting Hamas’s offer to form a unity government, insinuating that Fatah’s rejection was the main obstacle to reaching an agreement which led the two parties to the subsequent confrontation and clashes. Another interview with a Hamas military member included an answer that the international community should now recognise Hamas as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and, therefore, Hamas had the right to form the Palestinian government and rule Gaza as a starting point to ruling the free and independent Palestine at a later stage (Al-Jazeera report, 13 June 2007).
Of the Hamas members and leaders Al-Jazeera interviewed, most were from the Gaza Strip; 89% of the interviews were located inside Gaza. In contrast, almost 41% of Al-Arabiya’s interviewees were from the West Bank. With regards to Al-Arabiya’s report tone – although the network’s reports tended toward being neutral in general, with 53% of its total tone not being favourable to any side of the conflict – Table 14 below shows that Al-Arabiya also dedicated more report time to Hamas actors than Fatah actors. This difference however, was almost not significant with only 17% going to Hamas actors and 24% going to Fatah actors.

In a similar vein, Al-Arabiya was seen to be favourable to Fatah in some of the reports because of the type of interviews and the correspondent wording style. Therefore, Al-Arabiya’s report tone can be described as being slightly more favourable to the Fatah point of view. Although Gaza was where the conflict took place, Al-Arabiya depended heavily on Fatah and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) spokesmen and official statements from the West Bank in its reporting. Almost 49% of Al-Arabiya’s interviews were from outside Gaza, including the West Bank, Israel, and regional interviews.

**Table 14. First two tones for reports, per network**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Al-Jazeera</th>
<th>Al-Arabiya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>Fatah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favourable</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfavourable</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither favourable</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: multiple tone frames were coded in a single report per channel, the first two tones were only coded in this table.
Examples within the minutes of coverage favouring Fatah included coverage of funerals of Fatah dead militants, Fatah locations being burnt down in Gaza, and interviews with Fatah officials in the West Bank.

Four of the participants answered that the tone of Al-Jazeera reports was favourable to Hamas, while only one answered that the tone was unfavourable. Meanwhile the majority answered neither favourable nor unfavourable to any side for Al-Arabiya reports. Most of the participants considered the variable unfavourable to be the same as neither favourable, in this regard the total for this consideration could be counted as five of six answers for Al-Arabiya being more natural in the report tone. While in the same vein the number for Al-Jazeera was only two of six because the majority believed that the tone for Al-Jazeera was more favourable to one side than the other when reporting this conflict.

Table 14.1. Independent test for the representation frame

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tone</th>
<th>Al-Jazeera</th>
<th>Al-Arabiya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Favourable</td>
<td>4 of 6</td>
<td>1 of 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfavourable</td>
<td>1 of 6</td>
<td>2 of 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither favourable</td>
<td>1 of 6</td>
<td>3 of 6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Objectivity Frame (Bias in Reporting)

The journalistic code of objectivity can be broken by the journalist, consciously or unconsciously. This would result in a bias of their way of reporting an event, which is an important error in journalism that says a great deal about the moral conduct of a news organisation (McQuail, 2000).

The bias in a report will be coded based on a pre-determined variable from other research studies, this frame will be coded based on (1) no bias (both sides opinion had been shown in the report); (2) bias (one side has been shown in the report); and (3) neither side (this code will be for the reports that showed the other side of the conflict – humanitarian, peace, social movement or others). The researcher has analysed this variable in a similar way to that which has been used to analyse the report tone frame. Furthermore, in order to test the results of this variable, the researcher used an independent measurement based on the results from the focus group interviews with Palestinian journalists held in 2013, who watched and discussed some of the reports from both networks covering the conflict. The participants watched six of the reports from both channels.

The analysis in Table 14.2 shows some striking differences in the way that Al-Arabiya and Al-Jazeera reported the conflict. This data was taken from both the research analysis and the independent test results.

Al-Jazeera had 76% of its reports frame as biased to one side of the conflict; this percentage came from the large amount of reporting that depended on Hamas sources, locations, officials' statements, and correspondent statements. Only 19% of Al-Jazeera’s reports coded that there was no bias. Unlike Al-Arabiya that had a significantly large amount of no bias of report frame, with almost two-third of its reports (69%). However, Al-Arabiya also had 20% of its reports demonstrating bias, this number came from the huge number of interviews and statements from Fatah officials.
The existence of a balance of reporting or bias of reporting is an important indicator of moral conduct and journalistic ethics, since a balance stands for objectivity, impartiality and factuality. One of the main research questions for this study therefore asked: Are there differences in objectivity (bias of news reporting or no bias of news) between Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya when reporting the Hamas and Fatah conflict?

Content analysis for this research shows a significant difference in the way that both networks framed the conflict ($X^2 = 5.30$, df =2, $p < .05$). The research may conclude that Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya represented the conflict in an unbalanced way; Al-Jazeera has shown a significant bias toward Hamas when covering the internal conflict in 2007, unlike Al-Arabiya who were more balanced in reporting this conflict.

**Table 14.2. Results of bias of the report frame, per network**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Network</th>
<th>Bias</th>
<th>Balanced</th>
<th>Neither</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al-Jazeera</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Arabiya</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In regards to the results from the participants’ answers, the data shows that – in the cases that required a response or statement from one or more parties (leaving out the ‘not relevant’ cases) – the balance of news was overall mostly not present. The variable ‘bias of news’ has been measured by posing a simple question to the focus group: Does the report show both sides of the story with a relatively fair balance of attention? The responses were: ‘yes’ (coded 1), meaning that there is a balance of news; and ‘no’ (coded 2), meaning there is a bias of news. In some cases – like in a report that is not about more than one party or one that is dealing with other themes, such as the humanitarian aspects or peace effort – the answer is ‘not relevant’ (coded 3), similar to ‘don’t know’. The coding results are shown in Table 14.2.1 below.
Al-Jazeera stood out with four out of six answers showing no balance of reporting of the conflict. Participants noted that Al-Arabiya meanwhile appeared to have more balance of news reporting, with three answers of ‘yes’, one ‘no’, and one ‘I don’t know’. Al-Jazeera’s most biased reporting outcome was based upon the answers of not showing the two sides’ points of view, because most of the respondents said that they only saw Hamas statements and voices on the Al-Jazeera reports.

In addition, the research measured this variable by testing part of the wording (report language) used in the reports. Differences in the balance of news reporting would be shown by the words selected, the results of the participants’ answers showed that there were significant differences in the terminology that the two channels used to describe the conflict. Five of six participants answered that Al-Jazeera’s report terminology were more biased in favour of Hamas. Al-Arabiya, however, had three answers coded as balanced, with two answers coded one, and one answer coded three.
On camera interviews

The two channels provided on camera interviews with particularly important sources within their reports. Measuring the number of report interviews granted to particular sides in a debate or conflict can offer insights into whether balance is provided or whether one side is given a more substantial voice. A single interview inside the reports usually lasted between 25–30 seconds. Al-Jazeera had arranged 40 interviews for these reports, while Al-Arabiya had 33 interviews.

The content analysis carried out here counted the number of on camera interviews in each report, from both Al-Arabiya and Al-Jazeera and covering the intra-conflict period, that were given to Fatah officials, Palestinian citizens in Gaza and the West Bank, Hamas officials, Hamas military members, and Fatah military forces, in addition to others, such as independent Palestinian actors, Israeli officials and military, and regional and international actors. All interviews have been coded as an individual interview, regardless of the interviewee status. If they appeared more than once in the report, each interview was coded separately. The frequency of interviewing the same actors gives an indication of unbalance and bias to one side when covering the conflict. For example, Sami Abo Zuhri – a Hamas spokesman in Gaza – has been interviewed in Al-Arabiya reports six times. Therefore, Abo Zuhri was coded six times and not once.

Both networks gave on camera interviews to the officials from both sides relatively infrequently, as Palestinian officials, collectively, were given more air time by the two networks. Hamas officials who were in Gaza, were interviewed on camera 27 times in all Al-Jazeera’s reports. Al-Arabiya interviewed Hamas officials on camera sixteen times. Fatah officials, meanwhile, were interviewed by Al-Jazeera eight times and by Al-Arabiya eleven times.

The report’s findings show a significant difference in depending on military forces as a source for the on camera interviews. This group was represented less frequently on Al-Arabiya with only eight interviews related to the military actors from both sides (Hamas military were five and Fatah military were three) coded. Meanwhile, Al-Jazeera had interviewed military actors on camera seventeen times out of the 40
interviews for its reporting. On the other hand, Palestinian citizens and independent actors were the least represented groups on Al-Jazeera. Al-Jazeera interviewed citizens seven times, unlike Al-Arabiya who interviewed Palestinian citizens and independent actors more than ten times – 15% of them were related to independent actors, such as political analysis experts.

The findings of this section provided data on the ‘accessed voices’ presented in news coverage. The number of appearances of actors on camera can be seen as a measure of news presence, while the amount of time for each talk is linked with issues of news access. Whose voices did we hear? Who was allowed to speak and for how long? The granting of access on camera to the news is widely recognised as an indicator of the perceived news value, balance and credibility of sources.

For example, Al-Jazeera’s editorial guidelines stress the importance of presenting a ‘balance of views’: ‘we must ensure we avoid bias or an imbalance of views on controversial subjects’ (Al-Jazeera, 2000, p.26). Comparing on camera appearances from both Fatah and Hamas actors may help to assess whether such a balance has been achieved. However, it has been noted that the on camera actor appearances do not, however, necessarily indicate impartiality by the two channels. As the findings above showed, different actors may be treated differently by journalists during the interviews.

Al-Jazeera’s editorial guidelines state that ‘actors with contentious views should be rigorously questioned and fairly treated: we must rigorously test contributors expressing contentious views during an interview whilst giving them a fair chance to set out their full response to our questions’ (BBC, 2000, p.27). Al-Jazeera’s editorial guidelines suggest that both ‘balance’ and fair treatment of contributors are necessary, but not sufficient conditions of impartial journalism. On other hand, giving more access to appear on camera regularly – for example, Al-Jazeera interviewing Hamas military actors – could be seen as demanding a degree of legitimacy of these actors’ actions.
Use of language

Assuming that power in a society is closely linked to how the world is represented through language and words, the news media is undoubtedly one of the most influential channels when it comes to conveying certain representations of the world to a large number of people. People all over the Arab world rely on news channels to give them a presentation of what happens in the area around them on an everyday basis, and news accounts for a significant part of peoples’ daily involvement in discourse. Fowler gives the following definition of news in his book *Language in the News* (1991):

> News is a representation of the world in language; because language is a semiotic code, it imposes a structure of values, social and economic in origin, on whatever is represented; and so inevitably news, like every discourse, constructively patterns that of which it speaks. News is a representation in this sense of construction; it is not a value-free reflection of facts. (Fowler, 1991, p.4)

Arab journalists and editors, inside their channels, tend to claim that they report the events, especially political conflict, in a neutral and objective manner. However, the research findings, when comparing the two news channels selected, show that there is a significant difference when it comes to how events are presented through the use of words. The choice of words and labels when reporting the Middle East conflicts is crucial. Therefore, ‘to capture the language is essential to both sides in the conflict (and their allies), as idiosyncratic language can significantly influence the ways in which viewers interpret the conflict’ (Gaber et al., 2009, pp.254–55).

The ideological perspective of a text is not only to be found in its syntactic structure, but also in the lexical structure – the vocabulary chosen for the representation. Different words may have different connotations and be associated with positive, negative or neutral values by readers. The table below offers a list of terms that were used in the coverage of the conflict to describe the protagonists, fighters and civilians, as well as the locations in which the conflict took place. Among the most
basic, yet imperative, terminologies used when reporting the internal conflict are ‘Hamas’, ‘Palestinian authority’, ‘Fatah’ and ‘Hamas control in Gaza’.

When compared with the term ‘Gaza’, interesting findings emerge given that the conflict was seen to be proceeding in Gaza areas. The two channels dedicated greater references to the term ‘Gaza territories’ than ‘the Gaza Strip’. In this respect, another finding relates to the sharp variation in Al-Jazeera reporting, where the term ‘Gaza’ occupied almost 78% of this station’s terminology, in comparison to the term ‘West Bank’ which took up 19%. This is understandable, given the majority of the fighting took place in Gaza.

One of the main terms Al-Jazeera used was ‘Hamas-controlled area’, referring to areas inside Gaza. Al-Jazeera mentioned this term almost a third of its total terms used (29%), while Al-Arabiya had only mentioned it 23%. Al-Arabiya used the term ‘Palestine’ only six times or 3%, while Al-Jazeera used it only two times. Table 15 shows the most common lexicons by network. Al-Arabiya used the term ‘Palestinian territory’ almost 41% when referring to the territories under Palestinian authority control (West Bank and Gaza), excluding Jerusalem. While Al-Jazeera referred to the West Bank as the ‘Palestinian territories’, considering Gaza as under Hamas control and not the Palestinian authority.
**Table 15: Summary of the common terms, per network**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lexicon</th>
<th>Al-Jazeera</th>
<th>Al-Arabiya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupied territories</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza free territories</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamas-controlled territories</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatah-controlled territories</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian territories</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamas headquarters</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatah headquarters</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 16 compares the different lexicons employed by the two networks to describe the conflict. With no exceptions, ‘conflict’ was the most mentioned phrase to describe the situation, 65% for Al-Jazeera and 60% for Al-Arabiya. ‘Fighting’ dominated 10.4% of the total conflict description for both channels and phrases such as ‘fire clash’ was 5% on Al-Arabiya and 3% on Al-Jazeera. The second definition to describe the situation on the ground was the term ‘division’. Al-Arabiya had used this term almost 33%, while Al-Jazeera used it 24%. ‘Battle’ or ‘fall of Gaza’ were rarely mentioned on Al-Jazeera. While Al-Arabiya used the term ‘fall of Gaza’ in almost 4% of the reports’ total terms to describe the situation.

Al-Arabiya had used new terminology to describe the conflict, using the term ‘the Enemies–Brothers fighting’ almost six times, 2% of their total conflict description. The invention of such a term may refer to the use of this term to shed light on the Palestinian internal conflict between the Palestinians themselves, seeking to humanise both sides.
Table 16: Use of lexicons to describe the conflict by network

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lexicon</th>
<th>Al-Jazeera</th>
<th>Al-Arabiya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighting</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battle</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire clash</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fall of Gaza</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War to free Gaza</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brothers–enemies fighting</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confrontation</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamas assaults</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatah assaults</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Overall, similarities and differences were more visible on the basis of language rather than network, most notable were the terms ‘conflict’, ‘fighting’ and ‘division’. By spotting various disparities between the two networks, it is valuable to quote Samir Abo Shmmallah – Al-Jazeera correspondent in Gaza – who, in his report dated 10 June 2007, explained that the conflict is even more difficult to cover, stating: ‘To find a term to describe what is happening in Gaza is not that easy’.

In regards to other terms used by the two channels, there were the terms to describe each party, the term ‘resistance’ was only germane with Al-Jazeera to describe Hamas, accounting for almost 19%. It was usually used in reference to Hamas as a resistance movement. The practice of ‘labelling’, or in terminology ‘framing’ is well understood in sociology and social psychology and it can be shown that circumstances may be altered, behaviour reinforced and conditioned, attitudes affected and perceptions changed by the consistent application of labels (Eldridge, 1995, p.176).

Al-Arabiya meanwhile preferred to describe Hamas authority as the ‘Hamas government of Gaza’ with 28%, while using ‘Palestinian national authority’ in 47% of reports. Al-Arabiya referred mainly to Hamas as ‘Hamas movement’ with 61% of its total terms to describe Hamas, whilst Al-Jazeera used the ‘Palestinian authority’ term in 36%. ‘Hamas dismissed government’ was only used on Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya in the last three days of the conflict, and after the decision of the Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas to dismiss Hamas as government on 10 June 2007. Al-Jazeera mentioned that term six times, while Al-Arabiya used it eleven times.

A significant difference in the lexicons used by Al-Arabiya in the coverage of the event reflects the channel’s apparent interest in presenting the violence in a neutral manner and not to blame specific groups, while at the same time focusing on the national unity and agreement. The vocabulary used to denote the violent aspects is therefore one that gives the viewer the impression that what took place is negative, but that no deliberate violations are committed by specific agents.
Unlike Al-Jazeera’s lexicons in its coverage of the events which significantly differ from that of Al-Arabiya, in its reports on the violence, a vocabulary which neutralises the responsibility of Fatah is used. Al-Jazeera’s text was modified by a more negatively loaded vocabulary found in the statements of Hamas leaders who appeared in the reports. The majority of the statements presented by Al-Jazeera’s reports were from Hamas in which they deny the accusations from Fatah concerning the killing and torturing of Fatah’s military members in Gaza and at the same time accuse Fatah of actions which disrupt the unity and agreement which led to the escalation.

Al-Arabiya’s report terms to describe the killing between Fatah and Hamas used words such as a ‘serious violation’. The negative aspects of violence are described through the use of a vocabulary which does not put the blame on any specific agent, but rather points to a mutual responsibility. However, the conflict between Fatah and Hamas appears in parts of the text used by Al-Arabiya, particularly in the statements made by the two movements and affiliated groups. The reports used an indirect way to blame Hamas for violence in their own accounts of what took place. Al-Arabiya allowed Fatah officials to accuse Hamas of being responsible for violence, including killings and kidnappings and destroying Fatah’s headquarters in Gaza. The term ‘Hamas destruction of Fatah’s organisations in Gaza’ has been used nineteen times on Al-Arabiya’s reports.

In contrast to the report on peace and agreement, there was a difference regarding the lexical choices in the two channels’ reporting concerned with the efforts to resolve the conflict. The vocabulary that linked both parties and the peace effort, or an agreement to end the conflict on Al-Jazeera coverage was hardly present in the terms. However, Al-Arabiya used more terms linked to a lexicon referring to peace and agreement. Al-Arabiya had used the word ‘agreement’ fifteen times, while Al-Jazeera used it only four times. Al-Arabiya used the term ‘peace effort’ nine times, while Al-Jazeera used it only three times.
Al-Jazeera focused on Fatah as being responsible for the conflict because Fatah arrested Hamas members in the West Bank and terms associating Fatah with the killing of Hamas members were used 18 times in Al-Jazeera reports. Al-Arabiya focused on Fatah’s role in the efforts undertaken to resolve the conflict; such efforts were presented as a joint venture involving both parties. This time, however, Hamas is not given as active a role in this positive aspect of the conflict as Fatah was. Instead, Al-Arabiya presented Fatah as the sole agent behind actions aimed at ending the fighting. Al-Arabiya mentioned the terms ‘Fatah’ and ‘agreement’ together almost eight times, while Al-Jazeera used these two terms together only twice.

Table 17 shows the percentage of the total terms used by the two networks. These terms may refer to places, locations, actors, behaviour or statements. These terms were coded based on the number of words used each time to describe the term, for example: the term ‘assaults and Hamas’ was mentioned nineteen times on Al-Arabiya, almost 23% of the total terms, which included the destruction of Fatah headquarters in Gaza and the killing of Fatah members. Significant difference was coded in Al-Jazeera’s terms to describe the last days of the conflict, where Hamas supporters demonstrated in the streets of Gaza to express their agreement with Hamas Militant being in charge of Gaza and expelling Fatah from the city. Al-Jazeera reported this event as a ‘celebration of victory’ with almost 6%, however, Al-Arabiya used the term only twice (1%).
Table 17. Use of lexicons to describe the on-the-ground situation by network

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lexicon</th>
<th>Al-Jazeera</th>
<th>Al-Arabiya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hamas assaults against Fatah</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatah assaults against Hamas</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blaming and aggression threading</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celebration of victory</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilians protesting</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian condition as a result of fighting</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace, treaty, agreement, solution</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most terms to describe the Fatah leaders used by Al-Jazeera were based on statements from people affiliated with Hamas leaders who appeared on the report interview and the lexical choices vary according to whose statements are referred to. For example, the statements by the Hamas officials were given most space in the report and the vocabulary used in these parts presents the actions undertaken by Fatah as deliberate and illegal actions against Hamas. Statements from Fatah officials are not given the same amount of space in the Al-Jazeera report.
For example, the Hamas spokesperson Sami Abu-Zahri, in a report interview dated 13 June 2007, speaks of the ‘second liberation of the Gaza from herds of agents’, referring to Fatah. This is an example of an Al-Jazeera report in which Hamas uses a vocabulary seemingly aimed at justifying its own actions. Al-Arabiya, meanwhile, quoted Fatah leaders to describe Hamas actions as being illegal; Al-Arabiya had also quoted Israeli leaders to describe Hamas as an illegal movement.

In regards to the use of terms to describe the violence, the content analysis of Table 9.3 included an examination of precise word selection used by the two networks. Specifically, the coding scheme measure assessed the words that Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya used to describe Fatah and Hamas violence in their reporting. The coding sheet item corresponding to this measure explained whether self-defence-related words (like ‘assault’, ‘response’ and ‘retaliation, destroy, burn, escalate’); aggressor-related words (like ‘murder’, ‘killing’ or ‘torture’); or more neutral word choices were used to describe acts of Hamas-perpetrated and Fatah-perpetrated violence.

With regard to Hamas-perpetrated violent acts, Al-Jazeera networks tended to avoid the emotionally charged aggressor-related words and were more likely to condemn Fatah offensives, while Al-Arabiya opted for more neutral descriptors in 59% of reports describing Hamas violence. Al-Jazeera used aggressor-related words in 60% of reports describing Fatah violence, while Al-Arabiya did so in just 31% of its reports about Fatah-perpetrated attacks on Hamas’ headquarters in Gaza. Table 19 below shows these results, which indicate statistically significant differences.
With respect to Hamas attacks on Fatah members or buildings, Al-Jazeera almost exclusively used more defence-related terminology with 59% of Al-Jazeera’s reports describing Hamas’s acts as acts of self-defence and only 28% of Al-Jazeera’s reports using the aggressor-related words to describe Hamas’s violent actions. An example of using self-defence words to describe Hamas’s actions against Fatah members can be seen on a report on 6 June 2007 when Al-Jazeera interviewed a Hamas military leader in Gaza who said, ‘It’s now the time to purify Gaza from the corrupters and traitors’. Al-Arabiya, meanwhile, used defence- or aggressor-related words to describe Palestinian violent acts in 21% of reports.

*Table 18. Use of lexicons to describe the violence, per network*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Al-Jazeera</th>
<th>Al-Arabiya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-defence-related words</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggressor-related words</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More neutral phrasing</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The content analysis results also found significant differences in adapting the term ‘coup’ as a result of the conflict between the two channels. Al-Arabiya had used this term 13% of its total terms, while Al-Jazeera only used it for only 4%. By using the term ‘coup’ to describe a conflict Al-Arabiya reporters were underlining that this conflict had arisen as a result of military action against the political authority.
Casualties and Assaults

Personalising victims in news reports – in the form of offering personal details such as name, occupation, their family situation, and whether they were a member of a political party or the military can humanise victims and delegitimate violent action (Elmasry, 2009). The content analysis of this variable will focus on the personalisation for military and civilians victims. (Note that personalisation here refers to the documentation of personal details about victims, including name, location, their family situation, and whether they were a member of a political party.)

Table 19 below shows that Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya in some of their reports tried to personalise the Palestinian victims of violence, particularly during the second conflict period; with a notable difference in that Aljazeera rarely personalised Fatah’s military victims killed by Hamas forces, unlike Al-Arabiya which showed some degree of personalisation for the Fatah deceased by interviewing their families and depicting the grief of their loved ones.

Al-Jazeera personalised victims in three of its reports (11.5% of all reports); two of them were related to Hamas or to citizens in the Gaza Strip and one was related to a Fatah family. Al-Arabiya personalised Palestinian victims in 26.9% of its reports; six from the Gaza Strip and two from the West Bank.

Al-Jazeera Intensive aired the brutal scenes of Hamas victims of the internal conflict in the same way as they did for the victims of the Palestinian–Israeli conflict, including showing the torn up bodies of the victims and their spilled blood, with long exposure times, and even using these scenes as the background to some reports. The usage of such footage in reports, that were used for instigation against the adversary, would intensify agitation and feelings of hostility and hatred from Hamas supporters. Al-Arabiya, however, showed the funerals of the victims, rather than the victim’s buddies.

Coverage of some events related to the conflict were mentioned by both channels, such as the arrests that took place in the West Bank and Gaza and the torture of prisoners. However, in its reporting Al-Jazeera avoided any mention of arrests and
detentions that were taking place in the Gaza Strip by the Hamas military against Fatah security forces; Al-Arabiya, meanwhile, devoted more time in their reporting to cover these actions, as 14% of the report time highlighted Hamas and Fatah actions with regards to arrests and torture. Al-Jazeera in contrast had only 1% similar reporting. Chi-square results show no significant deference in the two channels’ reporting of casualties from both sides ($X^2 = .322$, df =2, $p < .05$). Both Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya described the casualties as victims from both sides of the conflict. Most of the killings were described as ‘victims’, with 76% for Al-Arabiya and 79% for Al-Jazeera. The second preferred description for these casualties was the term ‘deceased’. Both channels have avoided using ‘martyr’ to describe any of the casualties.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of deaths</th>
<th>Al-Jazeera</th>
<th>Al-Arabiya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Martyr</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deceased</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dead person</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusion

The results accumulated from the content analysis revealed that, in general, Palestine was consistently big news on Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya, and several general points can be deduced from this. The first point is that it suggests that the notion of political proximity played a role in setting the broadcasters’ news agendas, in which, when compared to their respective networks, both Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya dedicated hard news items relating to the war during the sample period. This suggests that the content exists in the same ‘cultural linguistic’ (Straubhaar, 2003, cited in Ksiazek and Webster, 2008, p.486). In the case of Al-Jazeera, political proximity is seen as an important ‘news factor’ in influencing journalists’ decisions on what is considered newsworthy (Galtung and Ruge, 1965). Taking that into consideration, Al-Jazeera still dedicated more report time on Palestine than any Arab channel, this was supported by the findings analysing the length of Al-Jazeera’s news reports. The results showed that 61.5% of Al-Jazeera’s reports were more than three minutes long, while Al-Arabiya’s three-minute lengths made up less than half of its reporting.

This raises the second point: as much as ownership had an influence on the way that news reports are constructed, let alone selected, news agencies’ editorial policies and strategies are key factors in determining which events gain status and effectively become news and which are left in the shadows. The results from this study suggest that the type, frame and length of news reports dedicated to the conflict is better understood as an illustration of the battle between Al-Arabiya and Al-Jazeera in terms of news branding. Thus, the reasons behind this disparity in reporting mainly involve practices of journalistic professionalism, and ownership polices which include journalists’ ‘individual characteristics, ideological or political orientations, professional values, journalistic routines, and organizational ownership’ (Zhou and Moy, 2007, p.81).

In effect, Al-Jazeera’s cultural and political orientations mean that, for the most part, it is the number one channel in the Arab world. Nevertheless, the significant role that Al-Jazeera played in covering the second Palestinian intifada in 2000, in addition to the strong political relations between Hamas and the Qatari regime, meant it had
supremacy with regard to the way the war received prominence both regionally and internationally.

Along the same lines, these journalistic norms, embedded in the news agencies’ culture of reporting war, had obvious preferences in regards to news access and news presence. While Al-Jazeera had more references to Hamas voices, Al-Arabiya gave Fatah official voices more significance. The two channels had a relatively different distribution in terms of reporting both actors. This suggests that even within the same newsroom environment, when catering for a certain owner, differences can emerge – in other words, the channel owners (in this case the Qatari and the Saudi regimes) have power in directing the production of news frames and actors.
CHAPTER SIX

Ideology in News Reporting: A Critical Discourse Analysis

Introduction

The previous chapter offered a detailed content analysis of the media coverage of the internal conflict in 2007. Focusing primarily on Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya’s reporting, it presented some grounded findings that invite further interpretations and analysis. Despite the ability of content analysis to produce credible, countable, and reliable results, giving an air of objectivity to the project, it cannot really explain the hidden meanings of power, ideology or bias embedded in the text or an image discourse. Such power of discourse, according to Rose’s illumination of Foucault’s thought, is proved by the dominance of certain discourses, operating via powerful institutions and technologies that are claiming ‘absolute truth’. In these terms, knowledge intersects with power and ideology, not only for being discursive, but also for its claims of being true.

Through representation and through discursively and semantically analysing news reports, this chapter aims to answer the questions raised in the title of this chapter. Through the representation of violence in the networks’ reporting, my attention was drawn to how the two channels, each with different political affiliations, often gave different representations of events related to the power struggle, and how these representations, while appearing to be neutral, seemingly served the purpose of legitimising the actions of one party in the conflict and at the same time delegitimising the actions of the other party.

This chapter is focused on the role of linguistics used in reporting this conflict, using the method of critical discourse analysis (CDA). The chapter aims to present a comparative analysis across and within the two networks. Representation in this chapter refers to the facilitation of the text used in the news reports, in order to attribute meaning to actors, their social practices, actions/events and their social and political implications.
I have chosen to focus on two significant events in the internal conflict between Fatah and Hamas, and how the two channels represented these events. The reports chosen are two news reports from each channel that were aired in the last week of the conflict. The particular events were chosen because each represented a dramatic change in political and social conditions, and these changes were reflected in the linguistic choices of the two channels. The two events are:

1) The outbreak of fighting in Gaza on 4 June 2007; this report represented extremely serious fighting between the two parties after the signing of the Mecca agreement and the establishment of a national unity government. This report took place in a period when both parties were officially focused on national unity in the spring of 2007.

2) The last day of the conflict and the seizure of the security headquarters in the Gaza Strip by Hamas military forces on 14 June 2007 (or the so called ‘Fall of Gaza’). On this day Hamas announced its full control of Gaza. Later that day, the Palestinian president Abbas took the decision to dissolve the national unity government and declare a state of emergency in the Palestinian territories.

For the linguistics analysis, Norman Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis theory and method will form the basis for the analysis of this chapter. The analysis of both the syntax and the vocabulary are important to critical linguistics, in order to uncover a text’s ideological perspective when reporting on events.
The linguistic features I will look at in the texts are:

1. Transitivity. The choices made regarding the three elements of transitivity, including: the use of transformations and the ideological effect this brings to the texts.
2. Lexicon. How the lexical choices of the two channels carry ideological meaning and serve to link the two parties, Fatah and Hamas, to positive legitimising values or negative delegitimising values.

The texts are ordered chronologically according to the events on which they reported. Starting with the text from both channels, I begin each paragraph with a short introduction to the background of the event. Since the topic of this thesis is how different presentations of events can serve different interests, I find it necessary to point out that the introduction to each event is my own narrative based on my background knowledge obtained from several sources. I go on to analyse the texts related to each event. After giving a content summary of the text, I examine the analytical points outlined above and provide examples from the text. The findings linked to each event are then compared and discussed.

For drawing on verbal analysis of Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya’s reporting, the analysis part in this chapter aims to investigate the ways in which the corporations represented main subject matter and shift attention between a numbers of themes. Unlike content analysis, which can only analyse the content of the data, Discourse analysis attempts to construct the inescapable relationship between a text and its impact.

It must be noted, however, that discourse analysis, unlike content analysis, depends on the quality of material analysed, rather than its quantity. Therefore, I selected samples that particularly expose controversial or strikingly unique points from the two reports analysed. Conducting this analysis has also entailed the translation of the reports from both networks, which were originally produced in Arabic. The translations from which the discourse analysis was undertaken were conducted with extra care in order to be as accurate as possible.
4\textsuperscript{th} of June 2007: the breakdown of the conflict

On June 4\textsuperscript{th}, 2007 the heaviest fighting since the January 2006 elections broke out in the Gaza Strip between the military forces loyal to Hamas and others to Fatah. It seemed clear that the unity government between the two parties, that had been announced earlier, was not going to last and that a full-scale civil war was in the making. Both Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya had covered the event through full breakage reports.

Al-Arabiya's report

This report was divided into three main themes:

1. The renewal of the fighting in the Gaza Strip and its tragic humanitarian result. The report focused on the heavy fighting that took place in different areas of the Gaza Strip and the result of this fighting, including nineteen people being killed and tens more injured and kidnapped. The report gave details of some victims’ names and their titles.

2. The killing of the Fatah leader, Abu Jarad, his family and a journalist, and the mutual accusations between the two parties regarding who was responsible. The report was supported by direct quotations from each side, in addition to other sources.

3. The peace effort from the two parties, Fatah and Hamas, to reach an agreement and end the fighting. Al-Arabiya’s reporter focused heavily on this theme by showing the two parties’ efforts to resolve the situation and to uphold the obligations of the Mecca agreement.
Battle between the fighting brothers in Gaza of Fatah and Hamas broke down today into the most horrific military conflict between the two parties. 19 Palestinians were killed, among them a journalist and a Fatah leader.

A famous leader of Fatah, his brother and his two sons were among the victims of the valiant events, and tens of others were killed and injured from both sides. Sources confirmed that this atmosphere of tension also led to military members and other civilians were kidnapped.

Quotations

It is fundamental to examine the actors’ perceived influence in shaping the overall meaning of a text. In this respect, questions such as: whose perspective seems to dominate, and do these actors possess the capacity to have their viewpoints represented by the journalist, either in the form of quote or regular text, are important for understanding the way the discourse acts in constructing and deconstructing meaning in the media. Accordingly, the representation of actors in the media is best understood by analysing their discursive and semantic strategies.
Al-Arabiya’s first quotation was with the Fatah spokesman Abdalhakim Awad, who describes the killing of the Fatah leader and his family as a horrific murder (جريمه, stating:

نحن ندين بشده عملية اغتيال شهاب ابو جراد ونعتبر هذا تصعيد خطير وجريمه شنيعه وتجاوز خطير للاتفاق المبرم بين الطرفين لانها الاقتتال، لكن على الجميع الان العمل على اعاده الهدتئ الى القطاع باسرع وقت ممكن

This is a horrific crime we, it's a murder, and it's an attack on the national unity and the Mecca agreement, it's a severe violation of the agreement. However, we all now should act fast to end this situation.

The second quotation was from the Hamas spokesman Sami Abu-Zuhri, stating:

حماس تعرب عن قلقها العميق من سلسلة من الأحداث المتسارعة و التي أدت الى مقتل قيادات في حركة فتح، وغيرهم. هذا العنف الذي وقع هو علامة على أننا ينبغي أن نأخذ الأمر على محمل الجد، علينا جميعا ان نعمل سويا لوضع حد لهذا الوضع

Hamas expresses deep concern and surprise over the rapid chain of events which led to the Fatah leader’s death, and others being killed and kidnapped. This violence that took place is a sign that we should take this seriously, we should all work together to end this situation.

Another Palestinian source, Palestinian independent expert Mustafa El-Bargouthi, was also given air space to express his reaction to the renewed fighting. While calling on Fatah and Hamas to show self-control, El-Bargouthi condemned the criminal act of the murder of Abu Jarad and members of his family:

ما يحدث في قطاع غزة وفي كل الأراضي الفلسطينية من عمليات قتل وخطف بين حماس وفتح ما هو جريمه اعتقد أن من يغذي هذه الامور هم اشخاص لهم اجدادات خارجية عملا ولديهم صلة بال العدو الاسرائيلي لتمييه هذا الاقتتال الداخلي
What is happening in Gaza and all the Palestinian cities, the killing, kidnapping, is a crime, striving for internal fighting are those who are working together with the Occupation, agents to Israelis, and they are working with external agendas to destroy Palestinian unity.

A Palestinian civilian (elderly male from Gaza) was also quoted as expressing his anger at what was happening. He was quoted saying:

"انا مش مصدق الي بصير هدول ابطال الانتفاضه الفدائين قاعدن بيقتلو في بعض هذي والله مصيبه على كل الشعب الفلسطيني احنا بنطالبهم انبロー القتل من اجل مصلحه كل الفلسطينين"

I can’t believe that I’m witnessing this. I can’t believe that the intifada heroes, the brothers, are killing each other now. This is a huge disaster for the Palestinian people, we ask them all please stop this fighting for the sake of all Palestinians.

Correspondent voice over:

"حماس وفتح اتفقتا بواسطة مصريه على انهاء الاقتتال وسحب المسلحين والافراج عن المحتجزين عقب هذه الاحداث الداميه وذلك عقب اجتماع عقد الرئيس الفلسطيني عباس ورئيس الوزراء اسماعيل هنيه لمحاوله الخروج من الازمه"

Hamas and Fatah agreed, with Egyptian mediation, to stop the fighting and withdraw the gunmen and free the detainees, this came after the meeting took place between President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Ismail Haniyya, during which they discussed the regrettable events and emphasised the necessity of containing them and upholding the Mecca agreement."
Report analysis

Transitivity

In regards to transitivity in Al-Arabiya’s report text, there is a difference between the parts of the text which deal with the negative and violent aspects of the incidents (such as the killings, injuries and kidnappings and accusations) and the parts which deal with the more positive aspects of how the two sides, Fatah and Hamas, apparently worked to resolve the situation and end the fighting through the peace efforts.

Battle between the fighting brothers in Gaza of Fatah and Hamas broke down today.

In the most horrific military conflict between the Fatah security forces and armed elements from Hamas.

Nineteen Palestinians were killed, among them and a Fatah leader, his brother and two sons and a journalist.

The first, second and third part of the report introduction are all related to the negative aspects of the incidents, and show similarity in the choices made regarding transitivity. The most striking feature is how the predicates are presented as being processes and not actions, meaning that they are seemingly not under the control of any specific agent(s). For example: the battle between brothers (معركة الاخوة الفراقاء) is presented as the process that leads to the result of people being killed and kidnapped, and thus has the role of force in the sentence. The responsibility for what took place remains unspecified, made possible by the use of nominalisation –
nineteen killed and tens injured and kidnapped (19 قتيلا وعشرات الجرحى والمختطفين) – to describe the result.

In this part, Fatah and Hamas are mentioned here in connection to the kidnappings, but still not as the responsible agents for this tense atmosphere (خطف متبادل)، instead filling the role as the force which created this result. Also, Hamas and Fatah were both mentioned as victims (through kidnapping) with no indication to an agent.

The statements (quotations) made by Fatah and Hamas sources (the two spokesmen) used in this report were given the same amount of airtime to comment on this event. In this example, both parties are portrayed equally as having responsibility for the violence, however, the two quotations also indicated the two parties were willing to end the fighting.

Similar nominalisations are also used in other parts of this report with the result that the agents responsible are omitted from the sentence. The only verb left in the sentence is (confirmed) (اك Ihren which describes the verbal action undertaken by the unknown sources, and which is not linked to any violent actions.

Correspondent voice over:

Hamas and Fatah agreed, by Egyptian mediation, to stop the fighting and withdraw the gunmen and free the detainees. After a meeting between President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Ismael Haniyya, during which they discussed the regrettable events and emphasised the necessity of containing them and upholding the Mecca agreement.

In contrast to the manner in which the violent aspects are reported in the rest of the report, the text above presents the predicates related to the efforts by the two leaders of Fatah and Hamas to resolve the conflict, mainly as actions, meaning that there is an active and responsible agent behind what took place. Fatah and Hamas are the agents in this text who actively agree (اتفقا) to stop the fighting, withdraw the gunmen and release the detainees. The president and the prime minister fill the
same role, because during the meeting they discussed (بحثا) the events and emphasised (شددا) the need to contain them and to uphold the Mecca agreement. In this example, both parties are portrayed equally as showing responsibility.

We see here that Al-Arabiya’s report is careful not to directly blame any party or group for what took place, and rather focus on the positive efforts undertaken by the two sides. Viewers of this report will, of course, know that Fatah and Hamas were involved in the fighting, but instead of pointing to their direct involvement in violent actions in its own reports, the report refers to statements made by the two parties in which they accuse each other for being involved in such actions. In this way, the text presents them as being agents behind different verbal actions aimed at hurting the other side, but not as directly responsible for material actions, which would have been more dramatic.

**Lexicon**

The lexicons used by Al-Arabiya’s report in the coverage of this event reflects the channel’s apparent interest in presenting the violence in a neutral manner and not to blame specific groups, while at the same time focusing on the peace agreement. The vocabulary used to denote the violent aspects is, therefore, one that gives the impression that what took place is negative, but that no deliberate violations are committed by specific agents. If anything, a mutual responsibility is indicated:

- **Battle between brothers** – معركة الاخوة الفرقاء
- **The regrettable events** – احداث موسف
- **Domestic clashes** – احداث داخليه
- **Mutual acts of kidnapping** – عمليات خطف متبادلة
- **The clashes** – اشتباكات

214
The few times that agents are mentioned in connection with violent actions, the wordings chosen do not place the responsibility with a certain group or party:

- Elements accountable to the Fatah movement and other elements accountable to the Hamas – عناصر محسوبه على فتح وعناصر محسوبة على حماس
- The masked group – مجموعه مقنعين
- Armed persons – مسلحون

In parts of the accusations and blaming, the only wordings were represented through the direct or indirect quotations mentioned by the two group’s spokesmen, the Al-Arabiya reporter avoided using any wording from his side:

- Full responsibility – مسؤولية كاملة
- Crime – جريمة
- Targeting the national unity – تستهدف الوحدة الوطنية
- Kidnappings, shooting and targeting – قتل وخطف واستهداف

In the parts of the text that were concerned with the efforts to resolve the conflict, a vocabulary which focuses on joint efforts and agreement creates an impression of strong national unity and a functioning and responsible government:

- Protecting – حفاظ
- Proceed efforts – مواصلة الجهود
- Agreement – اتفاق
- Implementation of the agreement – تنفيذ الاتفاق
- The joint efforts – جهود مشتركة
The tendency to use a vocabulary which presents the violence in a neutral way regarding responsibility, and rather focus on positive efforts, is contrasted by the parts of the text which contain statements by the different groups and which include mutual accusations. The majority of the accusations of Al-Arabiya’s text are from Fatah and Hamas and the other sources concerning the killing of the Fatah leader and other civilians; the lexicons used to denote the incident present it as a deliberate and illegal action:

- Murder – قتل
- Crime – جريمة

The responsibility for these actions is also denoted by a vocabulary with strong negative connotations:

- The criminals – مجرمين
- People who are collaborating with the occupation – متعاونون مع المحتل
- The agents – عملاء
Al-Jazeera’s report

The report is divided into three main themes:

1. The first theme gives an account of the fighting that took place in Gaza. It focuses on the clashes that took place in the Gaza Strip and its results, stating that nine people were killed and tens more injured and kidnapped. There are references to violent actions undertaken by both agents, Fatah and Hamas, while no reference was made to the killing of the Fatah leader in this part.

2. The second theme focused on the result of this action, when nineteen people were killed and others injured and kidnapped. In this theme, the reporter had identified the two agents as the Hamas armed forces and the security forces from Fatah; they were presented as being responsible for positive actions as a response to the violence from both sides, with no clear indication of who is to be blamed in regards to this event.

3. The third theme focused on the cause of this event, the blame and accusations which led to this violent engagement between the two parties.

Correspondent voice over: Introduction

A war in Gaza streets, this time between elements of the security forces affiliated with Fatah and armed elements from the Hamas Islamic resistance movement, led to the killing of nineteen persons and tens of others were injured and kidnapped, in the most violence fighting between the two sides since the start of the fighting last May; while the two parties accused each other of the violence acts that took place this day.
The reporter then stated that the Fatah leader Abu-Jarad was killed by splinters from a rocket propelled grenade fired by unknown gunmen, but adds that Fatah accused the Hamas movement for the killing.

Voice over:

Fatah source gives Hamas the full responsibility for the killing, while Hamas on their part deny any connection to the incident and blame Fatah for trying to cause a flare-up in tensions and demolish the air of calm and agreement in order to realise a foreign agenda.

The main message in the reporter’s statement is that Hamas had no connection to the killing of the Fatah leader, and that there are groups which are working to fuel the fire of the situation again and to return to the previous fighting in order to implement a certain agenda.

The reporter used his own wording and not quotations to describe the accusations and blame from both sides, while clearly mentioning the two agents in his statement. The first quotation in this report was dedicated to a statement made by a Hamas military forces member. The reporter used this statement, which contains some serious accusations towards Fatah. The military speaker was quoted as saying:
The Executive Force, belonging to the Interior Ministry of Hamas Government in Gaza, declared a state of general alert within its ranks and called up all of its members for duty in order to protect the citizens; as we will not stand idly by and shall protect our people with full force and prosecute all those who attack or provoke the Executive Force, whatever the cost, and they shall not be silent from now on. Fatah are coup makers and usurpers who implement the plans of the Zionist enemy against the Palestinian people, and have exercised a propaganda campaign against Hamas members in the West Bank and Gaza from the beginning, which also included direct attacks.

The second part of this text elaborates on the events that took place that day, including the spread of gunmen across the Gaza Strip, the setting up of checkpoints and kidnappings. Most of this part is the Al-Jazeera reporter’s own statement and indirect quotations from a Hamas source (مصادر من حماس) is also referred to in which Fatah is accused of kidnapping the dean of the Islamic University in Gaza.

Following the strong attacks from the members of the Hamas Military Force against Fatah, a part of the report is dedicated to the announcement from the Fatah movement regarding its readiness to declare a unilateral cease fire in order to end the internal fighting. However, no statement has been used from a Fatah source as a response to the event.

It is understandable that the length allocated to any news report is limited and thus it is impossible to include a full range of opinions (Richardson and Barkho, 2006, p. 316); however, when reporting conflicts, it is crucial to account for actors from both sides. The absence of a Fatah voice in this report results in an imbalance of access, which further results in a lack of impartiality because the practice of reporting one’s
assertions is not merely a matter of content but also a matter of form and style when presenting an ideological perspective.

The last part of the report presented the efforts by the two leaderships of Fatah and Hamas to resolve the conflict, mainly as actions.

عباس وهنيه بحثا سبل تطويق الاقتتال في غزة

Abbas and Haniyya discussed the confinement of the regrettable events in Gaza.

 فيما اتفق الطرفان على الإفراج عن المحتجزين وسحب المسلحين من كافه شوارع غزة

The two delegations also agreed to the immediate release of all the kidnapped of the two parties.

The reporter used another direct quotation from a Hamas member Ayman Taha in regards to the peace effort, declaring in a statement he made earlier to the press:

حماس ليس في صراع مع حركة فتح على السلطة كبيننا اتفاق لحل هذا النزاع وتنوع قتيل التوتر بين الطرفين

Hamas are not in a struggle with the Fatah movement for the power, and that an agreement was reached between Fatah and Hamas in order to resolve the situation.
Reports Analysis

Despite the focus on Fatah as the active part in the violence, the statement in which the organisation announces its preparedness to enter an agreement in order to end the fighting is also referred to. No transformations are used in this example to conceal responsibility because the two parties and their respective leaders are presented as being the agents responsible for the actions.

Transitivity

The choices made regarding transitivity in the report break with the line of using transformations to blur responsibility in reports on violence. In the text used in this report, the violence is instead mainly presented as actions, with Fatah as the agents.

Al-Jazeera focussed less attention than Al-Arabiya on dealing with the violence and the efforts to resolve the conflict. The report’s main themes included the participants affected by the fighting, the killing, injury and kidnapping, rather than on the peace effort to end the situation.

The use of passive words – were killed and suffered injuries – allows for the agent to be omitted from the sentence, and together with the use of nominalisation – renewal of the armed clashes and mutual kidnappings; war in Gaza streets (حرب في شوارع غزه) – the events are presented as processes which are not controlled by any specific agent.

The Al-Jazeera reporter’s statements towards the end, that the events took place between Fatah and Hamas, has the function of circumstances in the sentence but at the same time placed an agency directly by using direct quotations from Hamas military and leaders to accuse Fatah as the agent responsible for the violence. Hamas is also mentioned in the text, but again they had not been given agency for the killed and injured, which is presented as a process. For example, the event which led to the killing of the Fatah leader is presented as an action in this report, but we still find that the report does not blame any specific group by referring to the agents behind this action as unknown gunmen (مسلحون مجهولون). Similarly, the anonymous the
gunmen (مسلحون) fill the role as agents of the action kidnapped (خاطفون) in the report text.

The report has not shown Hamas as the agent responsible of the killing, while the direct quotation made in this report presented Fatah as an agent of violence. Through the direct quotations there are no references to the violent actions undertaken by Hamas in the text. Hamas is rather presented as being responsible for positive actions, as a response to the violence of the Fatah. Furthermore, a Hamas military member is quoted in this report as declaring that they shall protect (حماية) the people and prosecute (اعتداء) those who attack them. The focus is, thus, no longer on joint efforts to resolve the conflict, but rather on this group as taking responsibility on its own.

In regards to the last theme of this report, despite the focus on Fatah as an active agent in the violence, the text presented is that of Fatah announcing it preparedness to enter an agreement in order to end the fighting.

Transformations are used in these examples to conceal responsibility as the two parties and their respective leaders are presented as being the agents responsible for the actions: discuss (اتفقا), emphasised (أكدت) and agreed (وافقت), however, the direct quotation made by the Hamas representative portrayed Hamas as an agent to conceal their responsibility in the effort to end the fighting, and that Fatah is the violence agent.

Lexicon

The lexicons used in the first part of the report denote to the violence presented as negative with a no specific group being blamed:

- Killing – قتل
- Actions of kidnapping – خطف متبادل
- Acts of violence and destruction – تدمير واعتداء
- The clashes – اشتباكات
Large parts of the text are, however, based on statements from two different Hamas sources, where the vocabulary was found to present the violence mainly as violations committed by Fatah. It is significant that this is the case, not only in statements from Hamas-affiliated persons, but also from reporter’s statement:

- Targeting of members of the Hamas Executive Force – اعداء على القوة التنفيذية
- Targeted Hamas members – اعتداء على افراد تابعه لحماس
- Kidnapping and destroying – خطف وتدمير

When referring to the positive efforts undertaken by the two parties and the government in relation to the events, Al-Jazeera used lexicons that referred to national unity and agreement, however with more focus on Hamas’s role:

- Hamas confirmed its obligation to the signed agreement
- National interest
- Agreement
- Efforts

**Discussion of the results: 4 June reports**

The fighting on 4 June 2007 was the most serious of its kind in the Gaza Strip since the elections in January 2006, and the representation of the events by both Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya reflect the increased tension. In their coverage of the mid-May fighting (the first round of the conflict from 17 May to 3 June), the two channels both followed what may be called a national unity discourse which apparently focused on creating the impression that unity and agreement between Fatah and Hamas was still valid, regardless of the renewed clashes.

In the second round of the conflict starting on 4 June 2007 there were, however, indications of the reports’ respective political affiliations, displayed mainly in the references to statements (direct quotation) made by the two parties. These affiliations are more directly displayed in their coverage of the 4 June 2007 fighting, and the conformity in the two networks' representation is no longer present. Of the
two, it has been noted through the analysis of the two reports that Al-Arabiya remains closest to a national unity discourse, while Al-Jazeera clearly moves in the direction of a more conflict-orientated discourse.

The choices regarding transitivity were different between the two networks, as seen in this analysis; both channels reported on the violent aspects of the conflict and on the efforts to resolve it, but their choices on how to do this contribute to the diversified representation. Al-Arabiya, in its report on this event, continues to make use of transformations such as passives in order to present the events as processes which are not under the control of specific agents. While Al-Jazeera, for its part, mainly presents the violence as deliberate actions undertaken by Fatah and directed against members of the Hamas force. This representation of the violence is similar to what we found in the parts referring to statements made by the two parties in Al-Arabiya and Al-Jazeera’s reporters’ text concerning the 4 June 2007 event.

The representation of Fatah by Al-Jazeera as the aggressive player not only serves to place this organisation in a bad light, but also creates a sense of consensus for the actions undertaken by the Hamas, which are presented as being a necessary response to the violent actions of Fatah. Al-Jazeera apparently aims at building consensus for Hamas by focusing on Fatah as being responsible for violence; Al-Arabiya for its part focuses on Fatah’s role in the efforts undertaken to resolve the conflict. In its coverage of the 4 June 2007 fighting, such efforts were presented as a joint venture involving both parties and the government. This time, however, Hamas is not given an active role in this positive aspect of the conflict because Fatah is presented as the sole agent behind actions aimed at ending the fighting. These efforts by Fatah are also mentioned in Al-Jazeera but the main focus in its report on this event is on the Executive Force’s reaction to the Fatah aggression which includes promises to protect the Palestinian people whatever the cost.

The different choices in transitivity in the two networks’ coverage contribute to two contradicting pictures being painted of the events and of each of the party’s roles in what took place. It is clear that building consensus for the national unity government and expressing support for the Mecca agreement is no longer the main focus, and this impression is further strengthened when we look at the lexical choices in the
reports, and how these link the two parties to either legitimising or delegitimising values

In its reports on the violence, the lexical choices of Al-Arabiya are presented as negative, but not as direct violations committed by specific agents. There are equally no statements included in the coverage in which any group is accused of committing violations, and based on this the vocabulary used does not link either of the two parties to negative or delegitimising values. In Al-Jazeera’s reports, however, we find statements (Hamas direct quotations) which include a vocabulary that clearly links Fatah to such values.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lexicon</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Targeting members of the Hamas Executive Force</td>
<td>Violence, illegality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The coup makers of the Fatah movement who implement the plans of the Zionist enemy</td>
<td>Corruption, illegality, chaos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The traitors and coup makers adherent to the Fatah movement</td>
<td>Corruption, illegality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeting the Hamas government in Gaza</td>
<td>Violence, illegality</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The linking of Fatah, through these quotations, to corruption by accusing it of advocating foreign interests was also present in the report. The allegations take a more serious form in this text, however, as members of the movement are directly accused of collaborating with what is named the Zionist enemy and of being traitors. In addition, there is also a stronger focus on linking Fatah to the negative, delegitimising values of violence and illegality by presenting it as the aggressive party in the conflict.
In contrast to this representation of Fatah, Al-Arabiya for its part focuses on the violence carried out by the two parties. Al-Arabiya also showed the two sides’ efforts to end the fighting, by referring to statements by the two movements; however, the Al-Arabiya report gave the credit to Fatah for the peace effort and the willingness to end the fighting, by using vocabulary that links the movement to positive legitimising values.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lexicon</th>
<th>Values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effort to end the fighting</td>
<td>Responsibility, peacefulness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obligation to the Mecca agreement</td>
<td>Responsibility, honesty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence from both sides</td>
<td>Responsibility</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In these statements we find that Fatah is linked to the values of responsibility, peacefulness and honesty. Focus is, thus, on presenting the movement as the responsible and strong player which can secure peace for the Palestinian people, in line with its historical background as the advocate for a diplomatic approach. At the same time, the impression of Fatah as the aggressive player that was given in the statements, is contradicted. In the coverage of this fighting, positive efforts to end the conflict were linked equally to both parties and the government in Al-Arabiya’s reports. The fact that it is only Fatah that is presented as being involved in such efforts this time shows that Al-Arabiya had taken a significant step away from the national unity discourse, although to a lesser extent than Al-Jazeera.
14th of June 2007: Hamas Control of Gaza

After almost twelve days of intense fighting between Fatah and Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Hamas seized control of the headquarters of the different Fatah-controlled security forces in the Gaza Strip on 14 June 2007. This led to the Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas dissolving the unity government and declaring a state of emergency and a new emergency government led by Salam Fayyad in all of the Palestinian territories, including Gaza. While Hamas, on their side, announced that they would not accept this new government and continue to rule on their own.

The dramatic developments dominated the news on that day. Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya both covered the Hamas takeover of the security headquarters and the response from President Abbas with the same themes, but using a different way of reporting.

Al-Arabiya’s report

Four themes were covered in this report:

1. The Hamas control of Gaza. A spokesperson of the Hamas military force announced that the group took control over all the security headquarters of the Palestinian National Authority in the Gaza Strip, including the presidential assembly room. It was further reported that fighters from Hamas seized the office of the security forces.

2. The president dismissed the government and declared a state of emergency in the West Bank and Gaza.


4. Casualties and death theme: medical sources say that at least 24 people were killed, among them eighteen from Fatah who were found in the headquarters of the Preventive Security.
Correspondent voice over:

Hamas armed forces strengthened its grip on the Gaza Strip, after several days of the heavy fighting in Gaza between the two parties. And as a result the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas dismissed the government led by Ismail Hanyyia and declared the imposing of a state of emergency in the West Bank and Gaza as a response to Hamas’s coup.

Voice over:

Hamas armed fighters control of the security headquarters, including the presidential assembly building, and raised the green flag of Hamas over this building as a sign that Hamas is now fully in control of Gaza.
Quotation

The first direct quotation made by the report was quoting the Palestinian president as saying:

ما حصل في غزه انقلاب على الشريعيه وعلى القانون وردنا الوحيد هو اصدرنا مرسوم بإقالة رئيس الوزراء وتشكيل حكومه طوارئ هذا انقلاب عسكري ضد الوحدة الشعب وهدفه تدمير الوحدة الوطنية لشعبنا

The tragic and unacceptable developments that took place in Gaza is an attempt of military coup against the Palestinian legislation and a violation of the basic law, and as a response to this action we issued a decree dismissing the current prime minister, a second decree calling for the formation of government for implementation of the state of emergency.

Voice over:

حماس تعلن وعلى لسان قادتها بان هذه العملية كانت من اجل ما استمه تحرير غزه للمره الثانيه/ في تصريح للناطق باسم حماس سامي ابو زخري قال ان غزه الان اصبحت تحت سيطرة حماس بالكامل

In response to the decisions taken by the president, Al-Arabiya quoted Hamas, through its spokesperson Sami Abu Zuhri, saying:

نحن نرفض هذا القرار الي بدر من الرئيس محمود عباس وولا يوجد له اي ثيمه عمليه وان الحكومة الحاليه ستوانصل عملها - حماس هي القوه المسيطره ونحن من سيقود ويحمي غزه الان من اي عدوان سواء من الداخل او الخارج

We consider the decisions made by the president to dismiss the government and to declare a state of emergency are unacceptable and do not have any practical value, the Hamas government shall be in operation and in full duty. Hamas is now in charge of Gaza, we will protect it from any one from inside or outside.
Medical sources announced that 24 citizens were killed today, among them members from Fatah, after a group of masked gunmen from Hamas evicted tens of Fatah’s security forces from the building, some of them undressed, and they raised their hands in the air after Hamas took over of the security forces buildings and declared this operation as the ‘liberation’ of the Gaza Strip.

Another quotation was made in this report, one from a Palestinian politician, Azam Alahmad, who is affiliated with Fatah. He was quoted as saying:

The president's decision was a clear response to Hamas' actions in Gaza, this is a coup against everything, and Hamas is responsible for these actions.
Al-Arabiya Report Analysis

Transitivity

The main focus of Al-Arabiya’s coverage of 14 June 2007 events is on Hamas’s takeover of Gaza and the decisions taken by the president in response to the Hamas offensive. The choices made regarding transitivity in this part of the text help create an impression of the president as a strong leader by making him the active agent and Hamas as an agent of violence:

Hamas control of the headquarters of the national security forces in the Gaza Strip.

The president dismissed the government and declared the imposing of a state of emergency in the West Bank and Gaza as a response to Hamas’s coup.

The messages from these quotations, made by Abbas and Al-ahmad, are in these examples presented as actions under the control of the president as the sole agent. He is the one who actively dismisses, declares and decided, while the other aspect of the events, namely refusal from Hamas, are also presented as actions in the text and was given agency.
In the other parts of the report dealing with the killing and the fighting results (‘…elements from Fatah after a group of masked gunmen from Hamas evicted tens of Fatah’s security forces’), Hamas is the agent which actively takes control over the headquarters (اُحکمت السيطرة). In the same sentence, the use of the passive 24 citizens killed (مقتل 24 فلسطينیا) contributes to concealing the direct responsibility for these deaths, but since the armed fighters from Hamas are mentioned as the agent in this part, the impression is that it is also responsible for the killings. Nominalisation is used in this text with seizure (استیلاء), but here the agent fighters from the Hamas movement (مسلحو حركة حماس) are included, making it clear who is responsible.

In addition, there are also elements that modify the responsibility for the actions, as gunmen from Hamas (مقاتلو حماس) and masked gunmen from Hamas (مسلحو مقنعون من حماس) respectively functioning as agents. The mentioning of the Palestinian of Fatah elements (فراد من الأمن الفلسطيني) strengthens the impression that Fatah is the victim in the events, while Hamas is the aggressive agent.

Lexicon

Most of the lexicons are based on statements from persons affiliated with either Fatah or Hamas, and the lexical choices vary according to whose statements are referred to. The statements representing Fatah are given a massive space in the text, and the vocabulary used in these parts presents the actions undertaken by Hamas as deliberate illegal actions. The report statements from the president, Al-Ahamad, and the eyewitnesses used vocabulary denoting Hamas’s actions as violations:

- Military coup – انقلاب عسكري
- Attempted military coup against the Palestinian legislation – انقلاب عسكري ضد الشريعة
- Killing and destroying the legal organisation of the Palestinian Authority – تل وتدمير المؤسسات الشرعیة للسلطة الفلسطينية
- Victims and injured from civilians and military forces – قتلى وجرحی من المدنيین والعسكرين
This is the only example in Al-Arabiya’s report in which Hamas was quoted and it uses a vocabulary seemingly aimed at justifying its own actions. Instead, considerable space is given to statements which focus on the president’s decisions and which contains a lexicon that presents them as being far from legitimate.

The Hamas spokesperson Abu Zuhri, for his part, has a different approach in his statement in response to the decisions by the president. His statement is denoted by a vocabulary with clear negative and violence connotations:

- In charge of the Gaza Strip – تحت سيطره
- The president’s decisions are unacceptable – قرارات الرئيس مرفوضة
- No practical value – لا اساس عملي لها
- Protect Gaza – حماية غزه
- Enemy – عدوان
14th of June 2007: Al-Jazeera’s report

Three themes were used by Al-Jazeera’s reporting on this event:

1. The full control of Gaza, fighters from Hamas took control of the Fatah security headquarters.
2. The legitimisation of Hamas’s actions.
3. President Abbas’s response to the developments.

Voice over:

Gaza is under the control of Hamas, after a bloody frightening end of the Islamic Residence Movement taking over most of the security headquarters in the city, extending its control to the entire Strip, after the surrender and flight of the members and leaders of the Palestinian security apparatus. And the headquarters of the Palestinian Preventive Security, the Intelligence, the Presidential Guards and the National Security in the governorates of the Gaza Strip came under the full control of Hamas fighters.

Voice over:

The Islamic resistant movement – Hamas extended its control in the Gaza Strip by the end of this day, after it seized the headquarters of the
security belonging to Fatah, declared this operation as ‘liberation’ of the Gaza Strip.

Quotation

The reporter in his introduction states that fighters from Hamas took control of all of the security headquarters in Gaza on this day, after the surrender and flight of the members and commanders of the Palestinian security apparatus (الأجهزة الأمنية الفلسطينية وقيادات فتح) and Fatah leaders.

A Hamas masked military member is directly quoted:

بعد عون الله وتوفيقك تمكننا والحمد لله من تحرير غزة للمره الثانية والمره الأولى من العدو الصهيوني والمره الثانية من قطاع العملاء والجنود

After the blessing from God we finally managed to extend our control on Gaza for the second time, the first time when we freed Gaza from the Zionist Army and the second time when we freed it from the group of collaborators and traitors referring to Fatah members.

The Palestinian Presidential General Secretary Altayeb AbdIrahim was quoted as saying:

President Abbas decided to dismiss the current government headed by Haniyya and imposed state of emergency after the latest security developments in the Gaza Strip, the president issued a second decree in which he announced a state of emergency in all the territories of the Palestinian National Authority this action by Hamas is a crime and an attempted of military coup against the Palestinian legislation.
The last quotation was made by Sami Abu Zuhri, the Hamas spokesman:

Hamas considers the decisions taken by Abbas to dismiss the government, declare a state of emergency and form a transition government to be unacceptable and without any practical value. He states further that, according to the law, the current government transforms into a care-taking government and that there is no such thing in the law called state of emergency, it indicates that the president responded to foreign pressure, Hamas is the new power in Gaza and we will defend our self from the enemy even if this enemy is one of us.

Voice over:

فيما كانت رد السلطه وعلى راسها الرئيس عباس بان اصدر مرسوما رئاسيا بحل الحكومة واعلان حالة الطوارئ عقب سيطره حماس على مقار الامن الفلسطينيه فيما رغضت الاخيره هذه القرارات

President Abbas decided to dismiss the current government headed by Ismail Haniyya and imposed state of emergency after the latest security developments in the Gaza Strip, while Hamas the president succumbed to external pressure.
Report Analysis

Transitivity

The different aspects of the conflict are presented in Al-Jazeera’s report as actions which are under the control of specific agents. A major difference in Al-Jazeera is that the takeover of Gaza was given precedence in the coverage and not the decisions taken by the president: غزه تحت سيطرة حماس (Gaza under the control of Hamas).

Hamas is presented by the Al-Jazeera correspondent as the agent that controls and strengthens its grip by choosing to use this specific verb from a military person from Hamas. The correspondent indicates that Hamas had already been in control over the Gaza Strip for some time, and that the latest development does not represent a dramatic change. The same is the case in which Hamas is the agent that extended its control. In the introduction, fighters from the Islamic Resistance Movement are the agents who actively took control, but also in this example it indicates that this was more an expansion of its power by the inclusion of nominalisation, extending their control.

A further modifying aspect is the circumstances after the surrender and the flight of the members and leaders of the Palestinian security apparatus, giving the impression that the Hamas fighters moved in to fill a gap left by the Fatah-controlled security apparatus.

The text deals solely with the decrees issued by President Abbas in response to the developments of the event. The correspondent also referred to the decisions made by the president; however this report had quoted a statement from the president’s spokesman and not the president himself. This quoted statement of the president is presented as the responsible agent who decided to dismiss, imposed, issued and announced. This intransitivity can serve to give an impression of the president as a responsible and powerful leader. However, Al-Jazeera has not quoted the president himself, which gives the statement less legitimacy and less
power of representation. On other hand, the reporter modifies this impression by including the quotation from the Hamas spokesman in which he accused the president of not making these decisions on his own, and that they were taken due to external pressure: ‘the president responded to external pressure’. Al-Jazeera’s report did not include any part of the report regarding the peace effort to end the fighting, neither any parts dealing with the human suffering caused by the fighting on this day.

Lexicon

The main focus of Al-Jazeera’s report on this day’s coverage was on the Hamas takeover of the security headquarters and the controlling of the Gaza Strip. The lexical choices in the report covering this specific aspect affirm the impression created by the choices in transitivity, namely that this took the form of more consolidation of Hamas’s existing power than of a dramatic change.

- Strengthens its grip
- Extending their control
- Hamas on this day extended its control
- After the surrender and flight

The report also includes the statements made by the presidential general secretary Abd Al- Rahim. The reporter quoted the statement using vocabulary of denoting Hamas actions as violations and illegal:

- Crime
- Attempted coup against the Palestinian legislation

The report had also quoted the military spokesman of Hamas as a response, his part has a different approach in his statement:
Liberation of the (Gaza) Strip – تحرير غزه

The report uses statements from a Hamas spokesman with vocabulary seemingly aimed at justifying its own actions. Instead, considerable space is given to statements which focus on the president’s decisions, which contains a lexicon that presents them as being far from legitimate, in addition to justifying Hamas violent action against Fatah military leaders and members in Gaza.

- unacceptable
- they have no practical value
- Hamas as a new power in Gaza
- Hamas military forces

Discussion of the results: 14 June 2007 reports

Following the conflict between Fatah and Hamas on 4 June 2007, a change in the coverage of the two networks can be shown from a relatively confirmative representation situated within what can be called a national unity discourse, to a diversified representation in which their respective political affiliations were displayed more clearly than in the coverage of the June fighting.

Both networks entered into a more conflict-orientated discourse, Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya were careful in their reports on the violence to blame specific groups, which as such stayed true to the national unity discourse between the fighting parties. After the events of 14 June 2007, however, which led to Hamas taking over Gaza and President Abbas dissolving the government and declaring a state of emergency, it is apparent that the national unity discourse was abandoned by both networks. Despite covering the same events in their reports, the analysis finds significant differences in the respective representations of these events, which are seemingly aimed at legitimising the actions of one or the other party involved in the conflict, in line with each network’s political affiliations.
The diversification in representation is not only displayed in different choices in transitivity and lexicons, but also in which aspects of the events are focused upon by the two networks. The two reports main focus was on two key themes: the Hamas takeover of Gaza and the decisions taken by the president.

Al-Arabiya’s main focus was on the decisions taken by the president as a reaction to the Hamas takeover. These decisions are in the report text presented as actions which are undertaken by President Abbas as the sole agent, creating an impression of a strong leader who has the power and will act when needed. Since he was elected for the first time in 2004, Abbas had been accused by different elements in Palestinian society of being a weak leader and of being a puppet of Israel and the West. Faced with the challenge from Hamas and Prime Minister Ismail Haniyya, it is therefore seemingly important for Fatah and all the Palestinians to negate this image and to build consensus for him as a legitimate leader of the Palestinian people, and Al-Arabiya contributes to this by making his decisions as the main theme focus of its coverage.

The focus on the president’s reaction to the latest developments also moves attention, to a certain extent, away from the seizure of the security headquarters in the Gaza Strip by Hamas and its affiliated groups, which represented a devastating blow to Fatah’s authority in the area. This aspect could not be ignored in the report, however, and while Al-Arabiya previously had used transformations to conceal responsibility for the violent aspects of the conflict, it here presents these events as actions under the control of Hamas. Fatah fighters for their part are mentioned as only being affected participants in this part of the report, with some indications that Hamas fighters committed violations against them.

Using the image of the slain Fatah security member with another image of his grieving family gives a strong impression about the scale of violence Hamas directed at Fatah members which led to this killing. This representation contributes to creating an impression of Hamas as the aggressive party responsible for the dramatic situation that occurred, and at the same time it legitimises the decisions taken by President Abbas by portraying them as a necessary reaction to this aggression.
Al-Jazeera, for its part, chooses to place the main focus on the Hamas control of Gaza in its coverage. It presented this aspect of the events not as a dramatic change in the situation which might have negative consequences, but rather as a natural consolidation of Hamas's new power in the Gaza Strip. The active role of the movement is also toned down as Al-Jazeera, instead of including statements from the Hamas military saying that Hamas fighters evicted members of the security apparatus, states that the latter voluntarily surrendered and fled (leaving it open for Hamas to move in and take control. Fatah is thereby given its share of responsibility for the developments.

As a consequence of this, the decisions taken by President Abbas are in Al-Jazeera’s report not presented as a strong and necessary reaction to actions undertaken by Hamas. Instead, statements from Hamas which claim that these decisions came as a consequence of external pressure are included, something which challenges not only their validity but also the legitimacy of the president. In addition, the president’s decision was presented through another person.

The lexical choices in the texts also support the impression that the two networks contribute to building consensus in line with their political affiliations, and interestingly this is mainly done by including a vocabulary that links the opposite part to negative delegitimising values.

In its coverage of the 4 June 2007 fighting, Al-Arabiya did not include any statements with a vocabulary that linked any specific groups to negative delegitimising values. This time, however, the statement by the president, which is given considerable space in its report, denotes the actions undertaken by Hamas by using a lexicon which links the movement to such values:
The aim of the president’s quotation was apparently to undermine the authority of Hamas by linking it to *illegality, chaos and violence*. By indicating that the movement took control of the Gaza Strip through an illegal and violent military coup, he not only delegitimised the rule of Prime Minister Haniyya, but also gave legitimacy to President Abbas and his decision to dissolve the current government and form a new government under Fatah leadership.

A similar quotation was also included by Al-Jazeera, however this time by the presidential general secretary, and the linkage of Hamas to negative delegitimising values was thus present. The impression of Hamas’s actions as illegal and violent were, however, modified by the lexicons used in Al-Jazeera’s report on the events which described it as an unromantic consolidation of power, and not as a coup.

In addition, Al-Jazeera’s report also included several statements as direct and indirect quotations from Hamas military and leaders concerning the decisions made by the president. In these quotes, the decisions are depicted by a lexicon that presents them as illegitimate and that links the president to negative and delegitimising values. In addition to avoiding the use of the phrase ‘military coup’,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lexicon</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The criminal war</td>
<td>Illegality, violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military coup</td>
<td>Illegality, chaos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clear violation of the basic law</td>
<td>Illegality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian victims</td>
<td>Illegality against humanity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The armed revolt</td>
<td>Violence, chaos, illegality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed</td>
<td>Violence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
further to include words referring to Hamas as the only power who have control in Gaza.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lexicon</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hamas control</td>
<td>Victory, power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erratic</td>
<td>Weakness, chaos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They have no connection to the constitution</td>
<td>Illegality, corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contradicting</td>
<td>Chaos, weakness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free territory</td>
<td>Victory, control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Power</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The representation of President Abbas as a strong leader is here challenged by Hamas as he is linked to weakness, chaos and irresponsibility. As already mentioned, it has been common for his opponents to portray him as weak and as being under the control of foreign powers. Not using the president’s direct statement, in addition to two other statements made by Hamas, one was from the military and supported this image, which clearly undermined his authority and subsequently the authority of Fatah and the new government.

At the same time, the actions undertaken by Hamas in the Gaza Strip could be seen as a necessary response to the weakness and irresponsibility of the president, and this representation therefore also indirectly gives legitimacy to the authority of Hamas and Prime Minister Haniyyah.
Interestingly, Al-Jazeera also includes statements in its report from the Hamas military group, referring to them as ‘military’ and not as armed groups, which legalises their action. Included in these reports was a vocabulary that refers to legitimising values such as ‘extending their control’, ‘strengthening its grip’ and ‘resistance’.

Conclusion

The methods used to analyse the events in the two channels’ reporting of the conflict, proved the hypothesis of this thesis – that the two channels simply cannot provide a perspective that is totally free from subjective interpretation of events. On the contrary, the two channels tend to construct reality in a manner congruent with their underlying ideological and political functions. In short, the study proved that ideology is among the most important factor which result in a biased representation of the internal Palestinian conflict.

Moreover, the results showed that the language used in these reports is highly ideological while representing the news of conflict between Hamas and Fatah. The study also proved that linguistic tools – or the ways of using these tools – have got an incredible discursive capability to misrepresent the conflict.

It was also observed that such ideological representations and biased languages in the reports of the two channels resulted in the legitimisation of one side and the suppression of the other side. These methods clearly showed that the two channels are not free from bias, and that their coverage of the same event was a reflection of the agenda steered by their funders.

Finally, Al-Jazeera took an Islamic approach in promoting and legitimising Hamas violence, which it referred to as justified or in some events as resistance. Al-Arabiya, however, took the opposite approach, considering these actions as a military coup against the legitimate authority represented by Fatah. The significant difference between the two channels is that whereas it was presented to be ‘bad’ on Al-Arabiya, it was presented to be ‘good’ on Al-Jazeera.
CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

This chapter of the thesis draws together the issues raised in light of the research findings and the discussion. It is within its comparative dimension that perhaps the most significant contribution of this thesis resides. This expansive and more inclusive study of the Arab media coverage of the internal conflict in Palestine allows us to account for ways which outline and evaluate key themes and actors across the two channels under examination. This chapter consists of two main parts: Part One will explore the main findings of the three methods used in this thesis and provide full explanation of the results of each method; Part Two presents a discussion on the findings. As a researcher, I believe that the discussion for this thesis should be understood as the researcher's own interpretation and therefore considered to reflect personal values. My primary goal for this research is to add knowledge to the topic, and to not contribute judgements on the issue.

The significant argument of this thesis is the concept of news objectivity and the effect of ownership political ideology. The concept of objectivity is understood and applied in relation to the background of the station owner, the news workers and the targeted audience. This has been the case with Arab Satellite Channels and other news organisations. With respect to Aljazeera and Al-Arabiya’s ‘objectivity’, I believe that political ideology of the owners and management staff inside these channels has coloured the output of the news content related to the Palestinian internal conflict.
The journalism slandered mechanisms of the news production process in the media (gathering, editing and presentation) are all influenced by the cultural, political, ideological and financial (ownership) proximity factors. However, the data generated from the multiple research methods which is explained in details in this chapter, were consistent in demonstrating that the two channels’ understanding of professional journalistic codes such as ‘balance’ and ‘objectivity’ ‘ fairness’ and their application of these codes in all the steps of the production process of news related to the Palestinian conflict, is influenced mainly by ideology and finance.

The significance of this result is that it identifies Arab satellite media ability to adapt professional journalistic codes to an Arab perspective, and the two channels coverage of Palestine and Iraq is a manifestation of such an emerging perspective. I believe that the integration between professional codes and the Arab perspective has created a dilemma for the two stations. Their adherence to independence, freedom of speech, objectivity coverage, and balance has been the primary cause for its rise in the Arab world. For those reasons too, in the eyes of Western and international media, it is a worthy and credible source of news, different from other government-controlled Arab media. Yet, at the same time, that very adherence to journalism values, particularly the notions of balance and objectivity, have been a source of criticism and suspicion in the Arab world as well as the Western world.

In this light, the research has demonstrated the influences of ownership and political ideology on the news reporting of the two leading Arab news channels – Aljazeera and Al-Arabiya – in covering the internal Palestinian conflict in 2007. I have argued in the previous chapters that such influences can be usefully investigated by adopting a combination of theoretical approaches to the study of mass media organisation. On the macro-level of study, two theoretical approaches were adopted. First, the political economy and the ownership theory approach was employed to understand matters relating to ownership and control as well as the economic determinants in the Arab private media. Second, the discourse approach was adopted to understand the matters relating to the relationship between the media and ideology.
What I personally observed throughout this research, and as an journalist, is that the investment in journalistic credibility, independence and objectivity during the past decade has been in vain. The political and financial elites are dealing with Arab news channels the way they used to deal with Arab state-owned media. Arab regimes that own the media organisations in the Middle East, and impose their agendas, are pushing them towards journalistic suicide. They are taking the Arab media landscape back to the early nineties rather than moving it forward.

Once again, people in the Arab region have started relying more on other sources for news, such as social media and Western sources. Many Palestinians have started to follow local media outlets or other Western media such as BBC Arabic and Russia Today, while leading Arab channels such as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya have been losing viewers. The Arab satellite television landscape is one of contention, a symptom of power struggles within the Arab world and between it and outside forces. As long as satellite television stations act as mouthpieces for clashing political actors whose primary motive is the propagation of messages favourable to themselves, real engagement in political dialogue through television in the Arab world will be difficult. Instead, what we get is the transformation of politics into a commodity, where citizens are turned into consumers.
Findings of the Three Methods

The results of the CDA support this point of view. Different choices regarding transitivity had a major impact on how Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya represented different aspects of the internal conflict in Palestine, and by referring to the wider political and socio-cultural context surrounding the news reports, it showed that these representations clearly reflect the political affiliations of the two channels to the respective Qatari and Saudi Arabian regimes. The interests of Hamas and Fatah are conveyed in a way in which the two channels present certain aspects of the conflict as processes which are neither deliberate nor controlled, and other aspects as actions which are under the control of specified agents.

Analysing the texts of two reports on 4 June and 14 June showed that as these interests change according to developments in political and social conditions, the choices concerning transitivity in the reports also change. This resulted in a move from a relatively conformist representation in coverage of the outbreak of the fighting on 4 June, to more diversified and conflict-orientated representations on the last day, 14 June. The report on the fighting on 4 June is situated within what can be called a national unity and peace effort to solve the conflict discourse. Both channels had used transformations such as passives and nominalisations in order to conceal responsibility for violence in their reporting of these events, while positive efforts to resolve the conflict are presented as actions under the control of both Hamas and Fatah parties and the Palestinian government. In this way, the representations are in line with the interests of both Fatah and Hamas, communicating the message that the unity government between the two parties is still strong.

As the conflict on the ground intensified during the second week of June 2007, the choices in transitivity used in the reports changed, and lead to more conflict-oriented representations which are seemingly aimed at building consensus for one or the other party, particularly with the Al-Jazeera reports, in accordance with the respective political affiliations of the two channels. Al-Arabiya and Al-Jazeera build consensus for ‘their’ party, both by presenting it as the sole agent behind positive efforts to resolve the conflict, and by presenting violent aspects of the conflict as actions under the control of the other party.
Another finding of the CDA shows that lexical choices also play an important role in conveying ideological meaning in the two channels’ reports. Chapter Six lists a set of so-called consensus values which it was expected that the lexical choices of the two channels would refer to in order to help build consensus for the respective parties in the conflict. The findings confirm this hypothesis, as both channels used vocabulary in their reports that, on one hand links the affiliated party to positive delegitimising values, and on the other hand links the other party to negative, delegitimising values.

It should be noted here that ideology and bias in the news are not easy to identify, especially with the factual nature of news reporting and the apparently balanced representation of different views. However, these elements did become evident throughout the study of the positive and negative presentation of different sides of the conflict, as well as the use of agency to represent responsibility for violence carried out by both sides, and also the way news sources were used in news discourse. The CDA method used in this thesis has proven to be a very useful analysis tool, and the linguistic levels chosen for analysis have shown evidence of the ideological use of language by the two channels in representing both sides of the conflict and their actions. The analysis revealed that, in most instances, the two channels used ideological discourse to represent events in the conflict. There are similarities and differences between news reports about the same events, and there are many factors, some ideological, others not, that affect the degree of similarity or difference.

First, all reports represent the conflict in terms of two warring parties, while ignoring the asymmetry of military power between both sides; consequently, viewers may have the false impression that both sides are more or less of equal power. This can result in an inaccurate and superficial understanding of the conflict; the lack of contextualisation to explain Hamas and Fatah military powers since the Oslo agreement. Bennett (1996) maintains that the absence of attention to power further encourages audiences to abandon political analysis. It should be noted that militant Hamas was created in 2006 as an executive force; conceived as a trans-organisational structure, it aimed to unify Palestinian forces to fight jointly against anarchy and insecurity. Within Gaza, its armed wing, known as Executive Force, a very well trained and well-armed force that has a long experience in street fighting
with the Israelis, had up to 20,000 fighters. Unlike the Fatah security forces who ruled Gaza at that time, the Hamas force was created to maintain security and stability; they were not equipped with any weapons and were not prepared to fight.

Second, the reports of the two channels lack proper contextualisation, which results in reports that are not very meaningful to an uninformed Arab viewer. Events of the conflict are essentially represented in terms of incidents of violence and counter violence, and all reports focus on the here and now without presenting any of the underlying issues that affect the conflict. Acts of violence are often contextualised by reference to previous incidents without proper explanation of the wider context of the conflict; in this regard, Dunsky calls for the reconsideration of these practices, and argues that it is time for a new approach to reporting that, over time and across media, investigates and illuminates the organic essence of the conflict as a much needed complement to the easily obtained snapshots of the daily drama unfolding between the Israelis and Palestinians in the field. (Dunsky, 2008, p.368)

Third, the historical and political contexts of the conflict impose certain constraints on the way language is used by the two channels. This is most obvious in the difference in status between Fatah, as a recognised political party and a full member of the PLO; and the Hamas party, who are thus far not internationally recognised. This is most notable in the representation of violence or confrontation between both sides. Fatah is a party with security forces; therefore, aggression against any other side is institutionalised and presented as military action. On the other hand, since the Hamas party lack the same institutions, as it has not been internationally recognised as a political party in Palestine, aggression they undertake against any other side cannot be presented as military action. However, the two channels represent it as militant force.

The CDA analysis also reveals some differences between Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya in the representation of violence between Fatah and Hamas. The Al-Arabiya reports represented the violence in a different manner to Al-Jazeera, most notable in the presentation of the human suffering caused as a result of this conflict, in addition to
representing the violence as a major obstacle to peace between the two parties. The violence against civilians in both Gaza and the West Bank was significant in Al-Arabiya’s reports. Images of civilians in hospital, dead, or grieving created a strong impression that Al-Arabiya was there, monitoring the situation from inside Gaza. In addition, images of Hamas members who had been arrested by Fatah forces in the West Bank were used. This certainly added to the perceived power of the report. Not only is it the immediacy of the report that makes it so powerful, but also the discourse within which the issues are represented. While Al-Arabiya attempted to appear objective, by distancing itself from the news being reported, it decisively focuses on aspects of the story which are normally ignored by other news outlets, such as the effect of the violence from both sides on the daily life of the Palestinian citizen.

Furthermore, Al-Arabiya reports represented the violent side of the conflict; in addition to presenting the volume of death and destruction resulting from the violence, the focus was on the fact that the targets were civilian, not just military, which was confirmed by both verbal and visual evidence. Al-Arabiya represented the events in line with the peace effort by the two parties that took place in Mecca, and the national unity discourse giving the impression that the unity agreement between Fatah and Hamas was still valid.

Al-Jazeera reports present Hamas actions in detail: masked men firing guns, and groups of Fatah security members carrying guns in the streets of Gaza. However, the actions of the Hamas military shown in the reports presented the purpose, identification, and justification for Hamas action against Fatah inside Gaza. In Al-Jazeera reports, the great majority of violent Hamas acts are presented as ‘non-agent’. The clear responsibility of Hamas for violent acts is shown as justified in Al-Jazeera’s reports.

Al-Jazeera mainly follows the informer strategy by focusing on Fatah’s active role in efforts to fuel the conflict, and focuses on presenting Fatah as the agent responsible for violence in the West Bank. In its report on the events of 14 June 2007, which showed that the Mecca agreement would not survive and that a split was unavoidable, Al-Jazeera took a further step away from the national unity discourse
and presented a more conflict-orientated representation clearly aimed at announcing the victory of the Hamas military inside Gaza. Another finding to emerge from this study indicated that Al-Jazeera had adopted a religious approach in promoting and legitimising violence, which it referred to as resistance in a war to free Gaza from its enemies.

Bias in both channels’ reporting is obvious, and is transmitted through the sensationalist media approach. The specific terminology to describe an event, action or actor is often sensational, so as to add emotional impact to the narrative of the report text – i.e. Al-Arabiya’s strict politically driven discourse, and Al-Jazeera’s religious-driven discourse. Idealistically, the reports of both channels perhaps appear more like an invitation to engage with one political party and delegitimise the other. These findings of the CDA support the hypothesis of this thesis; the representation of the events of the Palestinian internal conflict by the two news channels was not free from bias, but rather it reflected the interests and ideologies of the channels’ financers.

To answer the question of how Al-Arabiya and Al-Jazeera represented the Fatah and Hamas conflict, and whether their representation was unbiased, the research used the content analysis method to find answers to the questions raised. The purpose of the CA method was to conduct a comparative analysis of coverage of the Fatah and Hamas conflict by the two major Arabic-language satellite networks, Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya. This content study focuses on the fighting of June 2007, when millions of television viewers across the Arab world were captivated by the violent confrontation between the two aforementioned parties. The reach and influence that these satellite networks have throughout the Arab world should not be underestimated. One only needs to look to the extensive coverage that the networks devoted to the Arab uprisings of the 2011 to understand their ability to shape opinion and even influence the outcome of events throughout the region.

Findings from the CA suggest that both Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya devoted considerable time and resources to their coverage, especially during the period of heavy fighting throughout early June. For example, more than half (61.1%) of the reports that appeared on Al-Jazeera were package stories filed by reporters on the
scene in the Palestinian territories. Such stories are considered to be of a high professional standard and are expensive to produce. Conversely, Al-Arabiya’s broadcasts relied on voice-overs, where a studio-based anchor narrates over video footage purchased from news services such as Reuters and the Associated Press. This is considerably cheaper than sending a correspondent to the field, however, the problem with using this style of reporting is that the network is forced to report unverified, second-hand information. However, it should be noted here that Al-Jazeera’s ability to devote what seems at times unlimited resources to major reports from Palestine likely stems from the fact that it is not a commercial venture, but rather one that is owned and funded by the wealthy Gulf country of Qatar whose population had the third highest per capita GDP in the world in 2010. At Al-Jazeera, resources are not heavily limited. Perhaps this difference in airtime suggests that also senior producers at Al-Jazeera have ascribed a greater level of importance to stories about Palestine conflict in general. Furthermore, The special relationship between Hamas and Al Jazeera, and that the channel is given exclusivity to cover Hamas news and events, might lie in the fact that Hamas as a political movement knows exactly how powerful Al Jazeera’s influence has been since it was first founded in 1996. For Hamas political strategy, the mobilising structure is not only limited to the use of media in attracting people, but also other forms of mobilisation such as social networks and Charites of Hamas. However, Hamas considered global media outlets such as Al Jazeera to be its voice to the outside world. Aljazeera supports for Hamas is part of a Qatar broader regional policy of building a strategic partnership with the Muslim Brotherhood movement, of which Hamas is an offshoot.

Al-Arabiya, however, is owned by the Saudi-controlled MBC group, which is a commercial venture owned by shareholders who do not enjoy the level of wealth possessed by the Qatari government. In support of this point, it is notable that Al-Jazeera had experience in reporting the second Palestinian intifada, where the channel managed to put correspondents in every Palestinian city and establish strong relations with officials and military forces throughout the territories.
The issue of professional standards is not only related to funding. At Al-Arabiya, the amount of reporting devoted to the Hamas and Fatah conflict was less than that of Al-Jazeera, suggesting that Al-Arabiya’s stories were not as complete, compelling, or contextual. At Al-Arabiya, investigation revealed that 23% of reports were shorter than two minutes, whereas at Al-Jazeera almost 61.5% of stories were longer than three minutes. Perhaps this difference in airtime suggests that senior producers at Al-Jazeera ascribed a greater level of importance to stories about the internal Palestinian conflict than the producers at Al-Arabiya.

As noted by Khatib, Arab satellite channels have been criticised for a lack of professionalism across the board. A key finding of this study that tends to confirm this criticism is the significant number of reports on both networks that cited no source of information whatsoever, or used one-sided sources in their reporting. This raises serious questions about the reliability and accuracy of information communicated in those reports (Khatib, 2012). At Al-Jazeera, 49.8% of the reports cited no Fatah sources whatsoever, and at Al-Arabiya, a full 24.1% of the reports cited no sources from Hamas. The networks differed in their treatment of various Hamas, Fatah, other Palestinian, and international actors surrounding the conflict.

The results of the CA also indicate that the networks presented the human suffering, such as images of grieving Palestinian civilians who have been affected by the conflict to different degrees. Al-Jazeera presented images of funerals of military members who had been killed during the fighting; however, there was little use of images of relatives who were also killed during the fighting, even though there were casualties on both sides of the conflict. Al-Arabiya, meanwhile, reported personal details such as the names and ages of the Palestinian victims of violence, both military and civilian.

Where the networks do differ, however, is in how intensely they denounce Hamas’s militant actions. Al-Jazeera, for example, described violent Fatah actions in harsher terms than did Al-Arabiya. Also, Al-Jazeera mentioned a precise Fatah arrest toll of Hamas members in its reports, as if to constantly remind viewers that the Hamas members were overwhelmingly victims in the conflict, whereas Al-Arabiya mentioned a precise Palestinian arrest toll in just one report of its reports. Also, Al-Arabiya
tended to interview more Palestinians, both officials and regular citizens, on camera than Al-Jazeera did, giving non-military Palestinians more on-air opportunities to tell their side of the story. However, Al-Jazeera focused heavily on interviewing military members; almost a third of Al-Jazeera’s interviews (26.9%) came from Hamas military fighters, and most of them were leading operations from the field of conflict in Gaza.

When it came to the direction of coverage, Al-Arabiya was negative toward Hamas, and positive toward Fatah. Al-Jazeera’s direction of coverage was the opposite: positive toward Hamas, and critical of Fatah. Neither of these points is surprising, because Al-Jazeera has long been sympathetic to Hamas, yet it has questioned Fatah involvement with Israel and their relations with Arab counties. Al-Arabiya, on the other hand, has shown sympathy toward Fatah, and has often tended to support their foreign policy in the Middle East.

In regards to the most notable finding from using the CA method, there was a clear distinctive operational competency between civilians, politicians and the military in terms of accessed voices. This suggested that when military voices are given appropriate credence, they are also being given unique opportunities to defend themselves and explain their actions. Thus, the disproportionate distribution of sources in reporting on the internal conflict presents fruitful analysis, and suggests that Al-Jazeera’s reporting focused on justification and validation by the Hamas military, as opposed to that of other Palestinians. And, although it was acknowledged that Al-Jazeera devoted less than a third of their reporting to covering other sources, they did use direct quotations from a member of Hamas military force, in which the narrative of these quotations was very symbolic, representing the war as necessary.

The CA results show the terms of categorisation used by the two channels, or the choice of labels to describe acts and actors; the construction of words, phrases and sentences are able to create and reinforce ideological perceptions through placement or repetition or by ‘associating them with culturally familiar symbols’ (Entman, 1993, p.53). The results of this study suggest that ‘descriptive terms’ used to explain the conflict, locations and actors such as ‘Hamas militant’ or ‘Fatah power’
are best treated as dependent variables consistent (fluctuating up and down) with the location of reporting and news access.

One other similarity emerged from the use of this method. Both channels neglected to investigate the effect of the conflict on the daily lives of regular Palestinian citizens. Reporting generally focused on political elites, the military, and even casualties; however, the daily concerns and worries of the majority of the Palestinians caught up in the series of violent conflicts were mostly ignored. The findings on the two channels’ reports have included the humanity frame, however, these reports focused only on casualties and not the daily lives of Palestinians.

Another significant finding that emerged from both the CA and CDA showed that both Al-Jazeera's and Al-Arabiya’s coverage of the Palestinian internal conflict did not present this conflict as part of the bigger picture of the Palestinian–Israeli conflict specifically, and the Arab–Israeli conflict in general. Al-Jazeera provided its point of view with coverage of the rising Islamic views in the Palestinian territories presented by Hamas as a new power, and as part of a wider regional spread. In turn, this may direct public opinion towards accepting these views as an alternative to the previously dominant secular outlooks.

Journalistic norms and practices are never static, but always changing, media outlets are continuously being renewed and adjusted along the lines of ideology and prejudice. Politics is an equally significant factor in the formation and construction of media texts. The globalisation of certain networks are not born out of thin air, they are developed and maintained to trigger certain schematic ideologies targeted at certain audiences, and will readjust and reformulate their practices and strategies in order to get to grips with the audiences they wish to impart messages to.

In regards to journalist participation, the results showed that the majority of the two groups interviewed for the purpose of this thesis were convinced that news reporting of the conflict was not as objective and free from bias and value judgements as it should ideally be. It was hoped that this may encourage the two channels to reconsider their representations of the Palestinian internal conflict, so as to provide better contextualisation of events, balance the views of both sides, and use natural
structures in ways that do not mitigate responsibility for violence in order to represent events clearly and allow the viewers to have a better understanding of the events in context. The interview analysis showed that the members and actions of different sides are represented differently, and that some of the differences are ideologically motivated.

Another finding discussed through journalist participation is that the two channels considered to be the most popular private stations reported that the internal conflict had resulted in swaying not only Palestinian public opinion, but also large-scale international opinion, and furthermore they presented the public with a superficial and uncritical view of the conflict and its events. Both sides of the conflict are represented in a limited and fixed set of roles that are related to stereotypes of each side: pro-Islamism against pro-regime.

The participants observed that the amount of free and independent media in the Arab world is inadequate. In addition, neither journalists nor the Arab public are permitted a free voice. The participants in the interview chapter explained that the media in the Arab world is still controlled by the political powers, and that the private Arab satellite channels communicate the voice of their financial supporters, not an independent voice that serves Arab public interest.

A significant result of the interview method analysis shows that the Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya news channels played an important role in the Arab world by presenting new Arab news and new points of view, and that these channels had a positive influence on the growth of democracy in the Arab world. It’s clear that for the first time in the history of Arab media these channels have managed to develop and increase the discourse and critique of Arab social, political and religious issues that were previously taboo. However, the most important variable influencing the political role of media channels in the Arab world is still the national political system, as well as the political and financial control of these satellite television stations and the political environments in which they operate.

The participants pointed out that political divisions and lack of security arising from the political agendas have made it difficult for journalists to practice professionally or
effectively as media workers. Journalists suffer both from government censorship and self-censorship, in that most journalists are afraid to talk freely. The findings also illustrated how far the two channels were acting in a limited way in the public sphere, as they tended to only provide a platform for one side and avoided those who critiqued their policies.

The fieldwork interactions with Palestinian journalists, and visits to other Arab countries have enabled insight into how the media can function during a period of conflict, and where there is no democratic state. It is clear that much of the literature concerns media functions in democratic Western societies, but it is important to consider examples from the Arab world, where authoritarian governments still control the media for their own interests. In this context, the need to rethink Arab media culture is extremely important.
DISCUSSION

The aim of this thesis is to explore a central question: To what extent does political ideology affect the media reporting of conflicts in the Arab world? And how does the reporting of one of the most intractable and important problems of their own region, Palestine, differ?

The study’s main significance, then, lies in its outline of the boundaries of the Arab satellite media’s independence and objectivity, and in illustrating its persistent submission to political interests. While this also may reflect on the two channels’ coverage of ‘Palestine’, it does indicate that these channels’ adherence to high journalistic standards is compromised when crucial ideological interests of their sponsors are involved. The notion that these two channels are working with objective standards of reporting is, however, lowered when it comes to coverage of events that involve Qatari and Saudi interests.

The conclusions of other studies have been expressed previously by several analysts (Sker, 2007; Powers and El-Nawway, 2009). This study came to establish this idea through a longitudinal discourse and content analysis. Accordingly, one implication of the study on the ongoing debate on the extent of the Arab media revolution is that Arab satellite media, which many perceive as the most prominent representative of free Arab media (Ayish, 2002; El-Nawawy and Iskandar, 2002; Lynch, 2006; Sker, 2007; Khatib 2013), does not conform to Western standards of professionalism when covering political conflicts that involve ideological interests.

Scholars of contemporary Middle East media typologies positioned the ‘satellite channels’ as a liberal commercial network whose norms contrast sharply with those of state-sponsored channels. Since then, several studies have positioned these channels at the extremes of Ayish’s model: either as a loyalist station (Rugh, 2007) or, in line with El-Nawawys’ notion, as a commercial-independent that upholds Western journalistic norms (Lynch, 2006). This study, however, has illustrated that, despite satellite media in the Arab world’s relative freedom on many political matters, the regime has the final word on issues of importance to ‘the Royals’. Accordingly, this thesis suggests that satellite media should actually be classified as a reformist government-controlled medium, and not free, as some scholars originally suggested.
Although satellite channels have the freedom to report on many matters and controversies, at the same time the ‘political ruler’ has full veto powers and effectively dictates coverage on matters that are of importance to him.

To elaborate, according to some scholars, such as Ayish and El-Nawawy, the reformist government-controlled model emerged in the 1990s after Arab leaders saw that Arab viewers preferred to receive news on the Gulf war via CNN. Consequently, they understood that in order to attract Arab viewers back to the government-backed channels and maintain their clout, they needed to persuade Arabs to believe that Arab government-controlled channels also adhere to the norm of objective broadcasting. The present empirical analysis proves that, although channels such as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya managed to gain the trust of many Arab viewers with their reformist style reflected in bold reporting that often adheres to Western journalistic norms, the ‘Arab regimes’ providing financial sponsorship had the final word on the two channels’ output during the conflict between Hamas and Fatah in Palestine. Thus, the reformist government-controlled model allows maintenance of the traditional tight government hold on media in the Arab world, while at the same time maximising the clout of the proxy channel.

Each channel demonstrates a particular political orientation which reflects the orientation of the channel’s sponsors. Al-Arabiya reflects the Saudi Arabian agenda, and therefore promotes secular Arab regimes, for example Jordan, Egypt and the Palestinian National Authority (Fatah), whilst at the same time promoting anti-Muslim Brotherhood Society views. Al-Jazeera reflects the Qatari agenda, and so in contrast promotes the Islamic perspective (Hamas), as well as opposition forces in Arab countries, underlining Al-Jazeera’s pro-Islamist and pro-Hamas policies.

One significant point to add is that all Al-Jazeera’s staff, including the chief editors, receive their salaries directly from the Qatari government, and therefore it could be assumed that they are influenced by the foreign policy of the Qatari Sheikh. The channel has fallen prey to many unethical policies, and has sometimes been a source of information which is inaccurate and not accountable. It can be argued that Al-Jazeera’s reporting of the Palestinian conflict reflects Hamas’s notion of martyrdom, whilst Al-Arabiya reflects a more peaceful and liberal approach in its
reporting of the conflict. Results suggest that both channels prioritise their respective agendas in their coverage of Palestinian news, as illustrated by the comment of Abdulbari Atwan, that ‘Al-Jazeera concentrates more on the armed struggle (war oriented) and tries to highlight it, whilst Al-Arabiya tries to present violent events in order to promote the peace oriented culture, according to its own agenda, and promotes peace based on compromise’. (Atwan, interview, 2012)

Emphasis was also placed on analysing the differences and similarities between Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya’s coverage of the internal conflict. The research found a correlation between the promotion of Qatari policies and Al-Jazeera coverage, and Saudi policies and Al-Arabiya throughout the conflict. Al-Jazeera’s reporting in the second phase of the conflict that started on 4 June 2007 had increased negative coverage toward Fatah actions, and more positive coverage and ‘legitimation’ of Hamas actions in comparison to the first conflict period. Al-Arabiya, meanwhile, maintained a balance of positive and negative reporting towards the two sides during the conflict. However, this changed slightly when Al-Arabiya reduced the negative coverage of Hamas actions in the second phase of the conflict period by considering this action as a military coup against the ‘legitimate authority’. In this way, the internal political division between the two main Palestinian political parties, Hamas and Fatah, is reflected in the political affiliation of the two channels; Al-Arabiya favours the Palestinian National Authority represented by Fatah, and Al-Jazeera supports Hamas.

The differences between Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya, by and large, reveal a correlation between Qatari politics and bias against Fatah by Al-Jazeera, and show Al-Arabiya to be more or less a defender of Fatah actions. As a researcher, I may attribute the differences between Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya’s versions of events to the different editorial policies and goals of these operations. Importantly, these differences strengthen previous comparative analysis of Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya (Abdul-Mageed and Herring, 2008; Youssef, 2009; Hanaysha, 2011) that also found that the editorial differences and interests of these stations result in dramatically different coverage of various themes. In the context of specific analysis of the internal politics in Palestine, the research contends that it has been argued by journalists who have been interviewed in the research that Al-Jazeera’s intense
criticism of the Palestinian authority can be seen as a mark of Al-Jazeera’s ability to criticise its neighbours (El Oifi, 2005; Powers, 2009) by reporting on the internal affairs in the West Bank ruled by the Palestinian Authority.

Both the Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya networks have publicly embraced a code of ethics that adheres to strict Western norms of journalism, and have recruited many foreign journalists to demonstrate that its reporters have a proven record of adherence to Western norms of objectivity. The networks have also invested heavily not only in all the Arab capitals, but also in most of the big political capitals internationally, such as Washington. However, the study strongly indicates such a link, as the *New York Times* article asserts, that the chairman of Al-Jazeera’s board of directors was present at the historic meeting between the Qatari and Saudi rulers (Worth, 2008). The study strengthens the notion that reducing the opposition from Al-Jazeera to Saudi policies in many Arab countries, including Iraq, Egypt and Palestine, was part of the Qatari–Saudi agreement. It might be argued here that Al-Jazeera’s coverage of some political conflicts in the Middle East indicates that the station was used by Qatar.

Analysis of this research suggests some differences between the reporting of the internal conflict from Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya. Evidence from the content analysis supported by the views of the participants suggests that Al-Arabiya is seen to be more independent and impartial in its editorial and political agenda, compared to Al-Jazeera. The research links this fact to the correlation between the promotion of Qatari policies and Al-Jazeera that is more heavily influenced by Qatar supporting a more Islamist discourse, and by the Muslim Brotherhood Society, a social and political movement established in 1928 in Egypt to promote Islamic values, which later spread its ideology to the rest of the Arab world. However, and from a critical point of view, one justification can be offered as to why Al-Jazeera might be less independent in its coverage, is that the channel’s editorial policy has been less consistent and more vulnerable to changing political influences. A clear example of this could be seen during the siege of the former Palestinian president Yasser Arafat by Israeli forces in 2004, and the international campaign to boycott products from Israel in 2010. Al-Jazeera’s editorial policy during these times was seen to abandon its impartiality and to adopt instead an Islamist agenda represented by the Muslim
Brotherhood movement. This influence led to the resignation of several broadcasters after an Islamic dress code was imposed, and it was suggested in some interviews (Interview with Abdul-wahab Badrkhah, chief editor of Al-Sharq Alawsat in London in 2012) that the remaining ‘liberals’ in the channel no longer had any power to influence current editorial policy. However, others disputed the argument that Al-Jazeera is less objective or balanced in its coverage of Palestinian issues than Al-Arabiya, claiming that the former has come to represent the voice of Arabs and not solely the voice of the Islamic movements. This claim also portrays Al-Jazeera as a channel of diverse opinions which gives space to a wide range of views held by Palestinians, even hosting both Israeli and Palestinian government representatives during the second Palestinian intifada in 2000 in discussion of the conflict where no other Arab channel has done so. Further to this, it can be claimed also that Al-Jazeera directed more attention to the Palestinian cause than any other news channel. Nonetheless, the majority of Arabs view Al-Jazeera as more provocative in its reporting of Palestinian news, encouraging viewers to more assertively adopt specific perspectives on events. For example, after the ‘Fall of Gaza’ under Hamas military forces in late June 2007, Al-Jazeera explicitly accused Egypt and the Palestinian National Authority of closing the Rafah crossing (borders) from Gaza into Egypt and imposing a blockade on Gaza after Hamas took over the city. Al-Arabiya’s broadcast of the same issue took another view by highlighting the existence of international agreements relating to the joint Israeli, Palestinian and Egyptian management of the crossing, and by emphasising the shared responsibility held by all three over the crossing of people and goods between Egypt and Gaza. In this way, Al-Arabiya offered its viewers more information about the closure and blockade, enabling viewers to take a more balanced and informed perspective on the issue.

An important point to emphasise in this dissection is that Al-Jazeera has greater capacity than Al-Arabiya in terms of technical and human resources, giving the former a considerable advantage over influencing public opinion; Al-Jazeera reaches a wider audience and is seen to reflect higher quality standards in its news coverage. However, Al-Jazeera’s editorial policy controls to a large extent the way in which the channel gains greater support and more viewers; a policy which has evolved from being liberal and impartial to reflecting a more Islamist and less objective stance,
whilst adopting a more sensationalist and populist approach. As a result of this evolution of Al-Jazeera’s policy, the research may address how the channel’s coverage of the Palestinian internal conflict reflected a greater emphasis on events related to political ideology rather than journalistic ethics in reporting. Accordingly, the loss of independence in Al-Jazeera’s agenda, in addition to the personal involvement, resulted in the channel imposing restrictions on the reporting boundaries of its journalists, a cause that Al-Jazeera was believed to have championed previously, and a value that was highly respected by journalists.

Whilst the researcher believes that both channels have an ‘Arabic identity’, they are nonetheless seen to be completely different in their approach to broadcasting and in their methods of broadcasting when covering the Fatah and Hamas conflict. However, a slight difference has been addressed in the results of the content analysis and the views from the interviews. It can be suggested that Al-Arabiya’s editorial policy is less politically driven than Al-Jazeera’s, and that Al-Arabiya is less aggressive about broadcasting the news that reflects its political positions. Al-Arabiya urges its reporters to be objective and impartial in their coverage. For example, the Hamas and Fatah actors have both been interviewed frequently in the reports.

By contrast, the results may indicate that Al-Jazeera lost much of its reputation for credibility and objectivity when it was seen to abandon the vision and policy of the liberal and impartial agenda that it had previously held. Now it is believed that an explicit political vision permeates much of Al-Jazeera’s broadcasting in a strategy designed to gain greater popularity and acceptance by its Palestinian and Arab audience. This was reflected in the perception of most respondents from the interview method that Al-Jazeera’s coverage is more ‘sensational’ and emotional in style, and therefore less professional. For example, in the aftermath of a violent event, the channel unabashedly presents brutal images of fatalities and injured victims in most of its reports.

It is clear that the Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya channels influenced not only the Palestinian audience, but also the Arab viewers in relation to the Palestinian–Israeli conflict, according to Maalouf, who suggested in his research on the influence of Al-
Jazeera on the Arab World, that Al-Jazeera has the ability to move Arabs to political participation such as demonstrations and voicing opinions. Al-Jazeera also has the influence to ensure the continued mobilisation of other Arab media like the Al-Arabiya channel (Maalouf, 2008) and the internal political division within Palestine, either by directly or indirectly affecting the political orientation of their viewers and how they perceive the news that is presented to them. Moreover, it is precisely this aggression that continues to undermine previous political achievements, rather than the influence of any subjective news coverage. It is clear though that news coverage of the two channels can sometimes serve the Palestinian national cause, and at other times harm it. One example is clearly seen in the case study of this research, and the role that the channels have played in contributing to the violence resulting from the exacerbation of the internal division within Palestine.

The extent to which the two ‘external’ channels are able to influence Palestinians’ political views is exaggerated by the relatively weak role played by local Palestinian channels in covering the news. Moreover, the dominant role played by external journalism within Palestinian news production has undermined the capacity of the leadership of Palestinian Authority in particular, to communicate official positions that relate to the Palestinian national cause. If the PA, for example, wants to persuade the Palestinian public of the necessity and value of negotiations, and thus the peace process itself, it struggles to do so without effective tools of communication. Moreover, given the lack of attention afforded to local channels which cover more local and ‘everyday’ news, Palestinians will be far less informed of events that are not sensational in nature. In this way, news can appear distorted. External channels such Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya brush aside local issues and focus primarily on the more sensational events, many of which reflect considerable violence and bloodshed. However, it is clear that the Islamic opposition party, Hamas, is considerably stronger in communication terms than the ruling PA, not least because Hamas enjoys the support of the media channels at the disposal of the wider Islamist network, these include the Iranian channel Al-Aalam, and Al-Mannar, which is owned and managed by Hezbollah and supported by Iran. It also enjoys a close relationship with the Qatari Emir, in addition to establishing close ties with the executive editors of Al-Jazeera.
The two channels were criticised for their lack of objectivity in reporting the conflict, their unapologetic political affiliation and the impact this has had on fuelling internal division within Palestine, and their failure to promote ‘peace’ among Palestinians. However, such criticism must be considered against the backdrop of a weak local Palestinian media, weak Palestinian leadership displayed in the lack of attaining an agreement to end the division, the absence of hope amongst many Palestinians given the failure of the peace process so far, the reality of continued, violent aggression by Israeli forces in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in addition to the violence between the Palestinian political parties which led to a division between the Palestinians themselves, all of which beg the question as to whether any media channel could promote the ethics of professional journalism that may lead to a culture of peace under such circumstances.

In a sense, both channels are distorting the environment that they present to their viewers by offering such contrasting visions of reality in their broadcasts. Al-Jazeera fuels public anger through its extensive coverage of conflict and suffering in the Gaza strip, whilst excusing the PA for using excessive violence against Hamas members in the West Bank. Meanwhile, Al-Arabiya highlights the possibility for national union agreement, and accuses Hamas leaders of imposing obstacles against any union. To some degree this has confused the overall picture for the Palestinians themselves. Part of the problem lies in the fact that the agendas of the two channels are dictated by their sponsors; the Qatari government intervened in Al-Jazeera intending to influence representation of Qatari policy and its pro-Islamist, pro-Hamas standpoint. On the other hand, Al-Arabiya serves Saudi Arabia, and consequently promotes the more moderate Saudi agenda. Neither channel can therefore be completely credible in the eyes of the Palestinian public, as neither reflects the current national position, which lately has witnessed an increase in support from officials and the public for a popular, non-violent approach to the struggle.

Both channels are accused of fuelling internal political division within Palestine. This could be rectified if both channels restricted themselves to reflecting the reality of the Palestinian condition whilst promoting values of peace and unity through their broadcasts. This would have the additional benefit of ensuring that a wider global
audience is kept informed of the actual situation in Gaza and the West Bank. Nonetheless, it is important to remember that Al-Jazeera’s viewing figures within Palestine are considerably higher than Al-Arabiya’s, and therefore the former has a more significant influence on the Palestinian public. According to a survey for the most reliable sources of news in Palestine, conducted by Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre JMCC, the poll showed that a ratio of 48.4% of the Palestinian public who watch TV trust Al-Jazeera TV as the most reliable source of news while a ratio of 10.4% of the respondents who watch TV (West Bank and in Gaza Strip) said Al-Arabsia TV is the second reliable source. (GMCC, 2007)

To conclude, the study illustrates that the current structure of Arab media sponsorship is unlikely to allow the satellite channels to adhere to their long-stated ambition to imitate international reporting norms. This is not to say that Western media have not been blamed repeatedly for patriotic cheering and persistent bias. Indeed, political economists such as Herman and Chomsky (1988) assert that the structure of the media in the United States means that the networks constantly depend on the government, and thus marginalise dissent and serve US interests during foreign crises. Political communicants Bennett (1990), and Sheafer (2007) argue that the two-party system in the US means that the media does not challenge the government beyond the Republican–Democrat debate, while sociology scholars such as Tuchman (1978) consider that the journalistic routine means they justify their biases by adhering to objector technicalities (such as number of sources) rather than substance. However, since the international media such CNN and the BBC are not sponsored by the government, even its fiercest critics make no claim that its submission to government interests, particularly in covering Middle East conflicts, is as clear-cut as illustrated in this empirical study of the Arab satellite media and conflict interplay.
Limitation and Future Studies

The analysis and conclusions of this study are limited by three factors. First, this study only investigates the representation of two news channels; Aljazeera and Al-Arabiya. The explanation for choosing these two channels is made in the introductory chapter. It cannot be claimed that the conclusions apply to all other news outlets operating in the Arab region that covered the internal Palestinian conflict. Therefore, future research may look into analysing different news outlets.

Second, the analysed data covered a specific period of time of the internal Palestinian conflict – May to June 2007. Therefore, the conclusion cannot be extended to other periods such as 2011 (the conflict over the Palestinian paper) or 2012 the (first war on Gaza), but it rather suggests further research in these areas in order to explore shifts over time. The extend of the qualitative methodology such as in-depth interviews with other Palestinians and Arab journalists, media academics and media experts may add significant value to such research. Furthermore an analysis of coverage and journalist perceptions of such coverage does not address audiences perceived the coverage of the conflict. Another follow-up study could do audience research to ascertain this.

Third, this research analysed only the text of the news reporting, for two reasons: one is the poor quality of the visual elements of the reports. Second, the time consuming nature of data collection and the limitation pf the study period. However, future studies could benefit from applying a visual methodology approach in analysing Arab TV channels and conflict representations. Such a study would be revealing in terms of comparing and validating the results of the present study. The use of a multifaceted approach of text and visual methodology could illuminate the nature of relations between Arab news networks and their sponsoring bodies. Specifically, since the contemporary regional news map is heavily populated with networks structured on the Al-Jazeera model – allegedly government-sponsored regional and private channels – this method can illuminate the interplay between news sponsors and news output.
The present research may open the door for further research in various directions. For example a future study on the same issue may cover other news sections such as visual analysis of news bulletins and future stories from different Arab private channels.

A comparative study on the Palestinian internal politics and the representations of Arab and international news outlets such as (BBC Arabic, Russia Today Arabic, Sky News Arabiya and France 24 Arabic) is novel, as the majority of literature and comparative studies have been undertaken on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.

In addition, this study may extent to examine the internal Palestinian conflict throughout other periods of time. Such as the 2012 and 2014 wars on Gaza, and the 2011 Arab Spring.
Appendices

Appendix 1 Research Ethics

Brunel Research Ethical Checklist

This checklist should be completed for every research project that involves human participation, the collection or study of their data, organs and/or tissue. It is used to identify whether a full application for ethics approval needs to be submitted. Before completing this form, please refer to the University Code of Research Ethics and General Ethical Guidelines and Procedures. The principal investigator or, where the principal investigator is a student, the supervisor, is responsible for exercising appropriate professional judgement in this review.

The checklist must be completed before potential participants are approached to take part in any research.

Section I: Project details

1. Project title: Arab Satellite Media and Internal Conflicts

2. Proposed start date: 2012

3. Proposed end date: 2017

Section II: Applicant details

2. Name of researcher (applicant): Sawsan Taha

3. Status (delete as appropriate): postgraduate student

4. Brunel e-mail address: Sawsan.Taha@brunel.ac.uk

5. Telephone number: 07449310080

Section III: For students only

6. Module name and number or MA/MPhil course and School: PhD Research

7. Supervisor’s or module leader’s name: Dr Sarah Niblock
8. Brunel e-mail address: Sarah.Niblock@brunel.ac.uk

Supervisor: Please tick the appropriate boxes. The study should not begin until all boxes are ticked:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>The student has read the University’s <a href="#">Code of Research Ethics</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>The topic merits further research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>The student has the skills to carry out the research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>The participant information sheet or leaflet is appropriate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>The procedures for recruitment and obtaining informed consent are appropriate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>A risk assessment has been completed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>A CRB check has been obtained (where appropriate)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments from supervisor:

Research interviews already conducted while the student was under Dr David Machin’s supervision. Verbal consent recorded.

Section IV: Description of project

Please provide a short description of your project:

I'm researching on Arab Satellite media representations of internal political conflicts, investigating on impact of these channels on the Palestinians internal conflict. the aim of this research is to examine the influence of Satellite war reporting on the internal conflict in Palestine .

Section V: Research checklist

Please answer each question by ticking the appropriate box:
1. Does the project involve participants who are particularly vulnerable or unable to give informed consent (e.g., children, people with learning disabilities, your own students)?

2a. Will the study require the co-operation of another organisation for initial access to the groups or individuals to be recruited?

2b. If the answer to question 2a is Yes, will the research involve people who could be deemed in any way to be vulnerable by virtue of their status within particular institutional settings (e.g., students at school, members of self-help group, residents of nursing home, prison or other institution where individuals cannot come and go freely)?

3. Will it be necessary for participants to take part in the study without their knowledge and consent at the time (e.g., covert observation of people in non-public places)?

4. Will the study involve discussion of sensitive topics (e.g., sexual activity, drug use) where they have not given prior consent to such discussion?

5. Are drugs, placebos or other substances (e.g., food substances, vitamins) to be administered to the study participants or will the study involve invasive, intrusive or potentially harmful procedures of any kind?

6. Will the study involve the use of human tissue or other human biological material?

7. Will blood or tissue samples be obtained from participants?

8. Is pain or more than mild discomfort likely to result from the study?

9. Could the study induce psychological stress or anxiety or cause harm or negative consequences beyond the risks encountered in normal life?

10. Will the study involve prolonged or repetitive testing?

11. Will financial inducements (other than reasonable expenses and compensation for time) be offered to participants?

12. Will the study involve recruitment of patients or staff through the NHS?
If you have answered ‘yes’ to any of the questions in Section IV, you will need to describe more fully how you plan to deal with the ethical issues raised by your research. You should use the appropriate School form or the University Application Form for Research Ethics Approval.

If you have answered ‘no’ to all questions, send the completed and signed form to your School’s Research Ethics Committee, for their records.

If you answered ‘yes’ to question 12, you will also have to submit an application to the appropriate external health authority ethics committee, after you have received approval from the School Research Ethics Committee.

Please note that it is your responsibility to follow the University’s Code of Research Ethics and any relevant academic or professional guidelines in the conduct of your study. This includes providing appropriate information sheets and consent forms, and ensuring confidentiality in the storage and use of data. Any significant change in protocol over the course of the research should be notified to the School Research Ethics Officer and may require a new application for ethics approval.

Signed: Sawsan Taha

Date: October 10th, 2013

Principal Investigator:

Supervisor or module leader (where appropriate):

Signed: Sarah Niblock

Date: Dec 1, 2013.

Research ethical approval from Prof Sue Broadhurst, School of Arts, Brunel University, 11th of October 2013

Brunel’s Approval for the ethical checklist form
Hi Sawsan,

The question relates to vulnerable groups and you are not dealing with these and you also have a record of the participants' agreement. So no is the correct answer. It would only be yes if you were dealing with 'vulnerable groups'.

Best Wishes,

Sue

Prof Sue Broadhurst,
School of Arts,
Brunei University,
London,
UB8 3PH, UK
Direct line: +44(0)1895 266588
I think that the media is a reflection of the amount of democracy in the society in general. It is more democratic and than some and less than others, much like the countries themselves. In fact, where there is more democracy general in an Arab country, such as Lebanon or Palestine as compared to Jordan or Syria, and then the media in each country will correlate in its level of democracy. There are several factors from Arab country to Arab country that might affect the amount of democracy that exists, the government being an important factor, but not the only one. In my opinion the most and important factor is the finical control of the political regimes on the media all over the Arab world, how do anyone expect that a free and independent media can operate in a system that does not believe in pluralism and freedom of speech. For that matter we chosen to broadcast our channel from London, because we know very well that we can never express our views freely in any Arab country. (Channel chief editor for ANN news, London, 2012)

I personally believe that the United Arab Emirates is a positive example for the media democracy in the Arab world. As the country develops and becomes a regional and international player in different economic areas, a knowledge-based economy develops allowed people to access and exchange information freely. I believed that literacy plays an important role as well. I also think that the Arab media suffers from censorship that reflects the lack of democracy in the societies in general. This lack of democracy is connected to the history of the region and the type of political regimes that have developed. Today viewers across the Arab region have their choice of hundreds of satellite television news, entertainment and sports network. However, the so called 'state-run' radio and television news channels, many still exist, but they are no longer the first and only option, such Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya satellite television have created a pan-Arab public sphere and new political schooling. (Chief editor for
I think that a democratic voice through the media would not be acceptable in countries where the regimes do not accept democracy. I do blame the Arab governments for being unable to accept or allow any criticism against current regimes. If the whole society lacks democracy, the satellite media cannot be any better. Arab regimes are afraid of freedom and democracy because the majority of them are not legitimate. Let me give you an example from my daily work in the newspaper, each time we publish a material criticise an Arab country or an Arab regimes, we receive a huge volume of telephone calls from Arab politicians, and even Arab intelligence threatening us or accusing us of being agents of the West and Israel. Many of our offices were banned and closed in many Arab countries. And as the chief editor of the biggest Arab newspaper I personally been accused of incitement against these regimes, that’s why I have been prevented from entering some of the Arab countries, would anyone call that democracy? (Al-Quds Al-Arabi chief editor, London, 2012)

We may look at Al-Jazeera effect, Al-Jazeera has been a source of vexation to the traditionally autocratic governments in the Arab World. With its real-time, 24-hour cycle and uncensored nature of reporting and analysing news, Al-Jazeera changed the Arab media’s traditional role. It shifted from being compliant with governments to being critical. I have been working in Al-Jazeera for many years now, I admit we have an agenda as all channels do. However we practice our journalism work in a very open democratic system here inside Al-Jazeera, many people in the Arab world see us as the voice of democracy. However, I think Al-Jazeera has paid a high price for its high profile. The network isn’t allowed to officially operate in some Arab countries. Many of our reporters and cameramen have been killed, detained, or jailed. (Al-

أعتقد أن الصوت الديمقراطي من خلال وسائل الإعلام لن يكون مقبولا في البلدان التي تكون فيها الأنظمة التي تقبل الديمقراطية. أنا لا أؤم الحكومات العربية لكونها غير قادرة على قبول أو السماح لأي انتقادات ضد الأنظمة الحالية. إذا يفتقر المجتمع إلى انتقاد الديمقراطية، يمكن لوسائل الإعلام الفضائية لا تكون أي أفضل. الأنظمة العربية تخشى من الحرية والديمقراطية، لأن الغالبية منهم ليست شرعية. أسمحوا لي أن أقدم لكم مثالا من حيويي في الصحيفة، في كل مرة نقوم بنشر مادة تنتقد دولة عربية أو الأنظمة العربية، ونحن نحصل على الكم الهائل من المكالمات الهاتفية من السياسيين العرب، وحتى المخابرات العربية يهددنا أو يهتمنا بأنهم عملاء للغرب وإسرائيل. وحظرت العديد من مكاتبنا وأغلقت في العديد من الدول العربية. لماذا أن رئيس تحرير أكبر صحيفة عربية وانا شخصيا قد اتهم بالتحريض ضد هذه الأنظمة، وهذا هو السبب في أنني قد منعوا من دخول بعض الدول العربية، فإن أي شخص يدعو أن الديمقراطية؟ (رئيس تحرير القدس العربي، لندن، 2012)
هناك أموال كبيرة وراء انشاء كل من هذه محطات: قناة الجزيرة تم إنشاؤها بـ $150 مليون من أمير قطر في عام 1996، و أنفاق قناة العربية السنوي يقرب من $650 مليون. التكلفة الأولى من خلال 300 مليون $ من قبل مجموعة من المستثمرين اللبنانيين والخليجيين. في قناة الجزيرة، التكلفة تغذي الميزانية التشغيلية السنوية لـ هذة القناة ليست معروفة، ولكن المبلغ الذي تصل إلى مئات الملايين من الدولارات. حتى في النهاية المطاف، لا يمكن فهم المهمة التي يعبدها القنوات. (رئيس تحرير القدس العربي، لندن، 2012)

في رأيي هو أن وسائل الإعلام المملوكة سواء من قبل الحكومات أو المستثمرين النخبة في هذه المقاطعات التي تعتمد على علاقتها مع الحكومة الرعاية الاجتماعية. وسائل الإعلام نفسها لا يمكن فصلها عن الدعاية الأنظمة لأن الأنظمة هي المنتج الرئيسي. أنواع التجارة، بناء على الرعاية، مثل بعض الدول العربية، عمل على مكافحة إدارة التآكل، ومكافحة الرعاية العامة. ومع ذلك، تم إجلاء قوائم أخرى على جماهير إعلام المملكة العربية السعودية، وقائمة الجماهير العامة. وعلاوة على ذلك، تم الإفacement على الموطنين الذين يتعين عليهم إنهاق الإعلام الحرة في أوقات الحرب ودور المشاركين في المشاركة الديمقراطية في مثل هذه الأوقات. على سبيل المثال، أعتقد أن الكثير من الناس في العالم العربي بدأ يراهن بي بي سي العربية بعد ما يسمى الزعيم العربي في حالة مسيطرة وأكثر تناغما من تلك التي تستخدمها لمشاركتها. (برنامج بي بي سي العربية مرساة، لندن، 2012)

In my opinion that media is either owned by the governments or the elite investors in these counties whose welfare depends on their relationship with the government. The media itself cannot be separated from the propaganda of the regimes because the regimes are the primary sponsor, and it is difficult to find sponsorship through other means. Even though the constitutions of several Arab countries support a free press, in reality, a free press has not been allowed to function when a struggle is took place, such as the case of Saudi channel and Bahrain case. In some ways, however, the citizens themselves were blamed because it was believed they did not understand the importance of a free media during war times and the role of more democratic participation in such times. For example, I believe that many people in the Arab world started to follow the BBC Arabic after what so called the Arab spring as an independent and more balanced channel than the one they used to watch. (BBC Arabic program anchor, London, 2012)

Well, sometimes you get to see a lack of understanding of democracy and the concepts of liberty. There is a failure of leadership from local leaders in their demand for a more open society and the importance of free media during conflicts. Also, I think that in relation to this idea was that democracy media in the Arab countries is a new
experiment, and the people themselves do not know how to sustain a free media or other public discourse to sustain that democracy. Whatever the cause, the consequence is that media, including satellite channels, have not been allowed to practice their natural right as fourth authority specially in covering political events. (Al-Sharq Al-Awsat chief editor, London, 2012)

We, as journalist, all remember the global media competition in covering the second Gulf war was CNN, however, the winner of the third Gulf war is clearly was Al-Jazeera. The Arab media never had such global outreach: Al-Jazeera took thread of the global war reporting. After its domination in covering the war in Afghanistan, a new generation of Arab televisions and a new generation of young journalists are expressing courage in reporting their environment unseen before. In addition, don’t forget that Al-Jazeera had a great impact on covering the second Palestinian intifada. Because of Al-Jazeera professional coverage of these events, people around the world started to realise that there is another image for the war than the one in shown in western media. (News editor at Al-Jazeera, Skype interview, 2012)

As a Palestinian journalist working in Al-Jazeera I believe that the existence of Arab satellite stations such Al-Jazeera, Dubai news channel Al-manar news channel is the most important media development. The second intifada is to these stations what the Gulf War was to CNN. With correspondents on the ground and satellite hook-ups from Jerusalem, Ramallah and Gaza, these stations were able to show the uprising live in 24-hour, nonstop transmission. The result of this satellite blitz is two-fold. It provides not only local Palestinians but all the world with up to date news information and opinions, while simultaneously offering the Arab world and Arabs in the diaspora a full diet of the daily events. We can see that for the first time, many Arabs are able to find alternatives to their own government controlled, heavily censored media. Meanwhile, Palestinian journalists have gained access to all of the foreign press and media. Palestinian camera operators are the only ones working for the major wires in

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arabic</th>
<th>English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>نحن كصحفيين ، نتذكر جميعا كانت المنافسة كانت المحطات الفضائية العربية كقناة الجزيرة، قناة دبي قناة المنار قنواتlevance في غرب الشرق الأوسط في تغطية حرب الخليج الثانية. ومع ذلك، كان الفائز في حرب الخليج الثالثة بوضوح الجزيرة. ولكنها كانت تغطية حرب أخرى في وسائل الإعلام العربية غير معروفة وثرية، وذلك بسبب الإخبارات الطارئة التي قدمتها الجزيرة، والتي أغتنمت النقاد والمؤرخون في جميع أنحاء العالم. ونتيجة لهذا الهجوم الإخباري المستمر، أظهر العرب لعالمهم أن هناك صورة أخرى للحرب من تلك الموجودة في وسائل الإعلام الغربية. (محرر الأخبار في قناة الجزيرة، مقابلة سكايب، 2012)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We, as journalist, all remember the global media competition in covering the second Gulf war was CNN, however, the winner of the third Gulf war is clearly was Al-Jazeera. The Arab media never had such global outreach: Al-Jazeera took thread of the global war reporting. After its domination in covering the war in Afghanistan, a new generation of Arab televisions and a new generation of young journalists are expressing courage in reporting their environment unseen before. In addition, don’t forget that Al-Jazeera had a great impact on covering the second Palestinian intifada. Because of Al-Jazeera professional coverage of these events, people around the world started to realise that there is another image for the war than the one in shown in western media. (News editor at Al-Jazeera, Skype interview, 2012)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arabic</th>
<th>English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| كصحفي فلسطيني يعمل في قناة الجزيرة أعتقد أن وجود المحطات الفضائية العربية مثل قناة الجزيرة، قناة دبي قناة المنار قناة هو تطوير وسائل الإعلام الأكثر أهمية. التظافر الثالث وحلفاء العرب في هذا الصراع ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه محطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حرب الخليج لـ CNN. هذه المحطات ما كان في حbara
the occupied territories. As a result, Palestinians on the ground have had a greater impact on media coverage. (News editor at Al-Jazeera, Skype interview, 2012)

The answer is yes, I’m convinced that Al-Jazeera supported the Islamism since the beginning of its creation in 1996. For example, take a look at the field reports that been aired on Al-Jazeera during the Iraqi war or the second intifada or recent the fall of Gaza in 2007, nearly all of the reports were overwhelmingly negative, with violent footage played over and over, highlighting Arab defeat and humiliation. And there’s a clear underlying message: that the way out of this spiral is political Islam. (Channel chief editor for ANN, London, 2012)

Indeed, yes I agree on that point, and we can notice that from the selection process of guests speakers in each channel during the first week of the internal conflict that Al-Jazeera hosted only the Hamas leaders to speak, however, the Al-Arabiya took the Fatah side when hosting guest speakers. I will give you another example that happened to me personally. During the Libyan uprising, Al-Jazeera used to host me as a media expert to comment on the Libya situation, suddenly everything changed after the Islamists came to power and took control in Libya, a source from inside Al-Jazeera informed me that the channel had a list of only 20 speakers that will only be contacted to comment and speak about on Libya, and all of these speakers are pro-Islamist or related to Muslim Brotherhood across the Arab world. (Al-Sharq Al-Awsat chief editor, London, 2012)

There were attempts to portray Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya as reflections of the competition between two Gulf countries, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. There was little controversy over the far more aggressive coverage between the two networks that, without a doubt, reflected the political competition between the two countries. (Chief
I believe that both channels became more concerned about delivering the opinions of their financiers than offering a professional and objective view. The two have lost their credibility to other Arabic language news channels, such as France 24 or BBC Arabic. As Al-Arabiya aired footage of the Palestinian authority in Ramallah streets, while Al-Jazeera focused the screen to relay images of fighters of Hamas militaries. And what Al-Jazeera branded as a 'Free Gaza', Al-Arabiya hailed as a 'political coup'. (Chief Editor for Al-Sharq Al-Awsat newspaper, London, 2012)

I think when these channels covered crisis from Tunisia to Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria, people expected TV stations to embrace their dreams and defend their causes. But it seems that major networks decided to adopt some revolutions and dump others. One example to support this idea was the way they dealt with the uprising in Bahrain. It was clear that Gulf-financed stations were more interested in regional security than Bahraini dreams of democracy and freedom and their revolt against the lake of human rights inside Bahrain. These channels are now divided, they become like parties; politics dominates the business and on both sides of the landscape and people can’t really depend on one channel to get their full news digest. It is as if the audience have to do journalists’ homework by cross-checking sources and watching two sides of a conflict to get one. (Chief editor for the ANN Channel, London, 2012)

The satellite channels such as Al-Jazeera, Abu Dhabi, the Egyptian channels had played a very significant role in covering the intifada. It opened a new way of war of reporting in the Arab world, using investigative journalism, criticism and creating an open free channel where a variety of Palestinian’s views can be explored. For example, at the beginning of the first weeks of the event, Al-Jazeera was a pioneer in raising issues that no other station had dealt with, such as the refugee camps and the killing of the Palestinian children. They also provided good

The satellite channels such as Al-Jazeera, Abu Dhabi, the Egyptian channels had played a very significant role in covering the intifada. It opened a new way of war of reporting in the Arab world, using investigative journalism, criticism and creating an open free channel where a variety of Palestinian’s views can be explored. For example, at the beginning of the first weeks of the event, Al-Jazeera was a pioneer in raising issues that no other station had dealt with, such as the refugee camps and the killing of the Palestinian children. They also provided good
coverage of Arabs’ issues like the Arab–Israeli conflict. It’s the first time, for example, these channels could talk about the peace agreements between Jordan, Egypt and Israel, in addition of and the gulf war and the impact on the Palestinian case. No one could argue or speak about such matters on the Arab media before. (News reporter from Palestine TV, Ramallah, 2011)

I agree that these channels had a positive impact on the Palestinian society at the beginning at least; as I think that any positive effort from broadcast journalism will have a positive impact, because it opens the eyes of Palestinian citizens on new or thrilling ideas and things that may benefit them and benefit their life. In the beginning it was Al-Jazeera channel, then followed by Al-Arabiya in 2003. The Palestinian people look at these channels as they moved the stagnant water, some major problems had been discussed live for the first time in the Arab media. I remember back in 2001, and after a year of the second intifada, these channels started to talk about ending any relations with the Israel because of the horrible action against the Palestinians. This issue was a taboo in the mainstream Arab media, and I think that is the effort and effect of these channels on the political environment in the Arab world. (Reporter at Al-ayyam, Ramallah, 2011)

In my opinion, as a Palestinian journalist, I think that these channels have broken political and cultural taboos with its call-in shows, Crossfire-format discussion shows and coverage of Arab government’s events. These channels have been often seen as having opened up the media environment for other satellite Arab news stations, such as the local Palestinian organisations. It also set the standard for satellite television news in terms of being independent and critical of many governments in the region and abroad. And we in Palestine are in true need for such media, a real media that can work freely without any censorship. (News anchor at the Voice of Palestine radio, Ramallah, 2012).

Al-Jazeera and some other Arab Channels such Abu Dhabi and Al-manar gained a very high credibility among
I covered the second intifada; I remember I used to work as freelancer for some foreign news TV in the USA. However I used to watch Al-Jazeera back then, several and many times I noted that Arab governments, including Egypt and Jordan and KSA, stated that Al-Jazeera’s coverage of the uprising threatened the stability of their regimes and exposed them to criticism by their own people. Egypt and Jordan have been more critical of Al-Jazeera than has Israel. The Israeli government could have cause for concern if Al-Jazeera’s coverage helps incite Palestinians to riot, yet it continues to allow Al-Jazeera correspondents to operate freely within its borders. (TV news anchor from Gaza, Skype interviewed, 2012).

I have been working as a journalist since 1998 in West Bank, and my own opening would be that during the second intifada, satellite television have been used as a tool for generating resistance and generating steadfastness facing very difficult times. They became very militant, attempting to show the criminality of Israeli attacks, and it’s the first time for the Palestinian audience to watch the situation broadcasted through an Arab channels and not western or even Israeli channels; it’s the only time where the Palestinians had a tool to send their voice to the world through these channels. But that does not mean at all that these channels were covering the conflict in a balanced and natural coverage, they absolutely were taking the sides. And that clearly has been shown in their coverage of the June 2007 conflict between Fatah and Hamas in the Gaza Strip. The Arab channels, and mainly the biggest two Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya, helped to worsen engagements by using war reporting inflamed language in reports on selected issues.

I have been working as a journalist since 1998 in West Bank, and my own opening would be that during the second intifada, satellite television have been used as a tool for generating resistance and generating steadfastness facing very difficult times. They became very militant, attempting to show the criminality of Israeli attacks, and it’s the first time for the Palestinian audience to watch the situation broadcasted through an Arab channels and not western or even Israeli channels; it’s the only time where the Palestinians had a tool to send their voice to the world through these channels. But that does not mean at all that these channels were covering the conflict in a balanced and natural coverage, they absolutely were taking the sides. And that clearly has been shown in their coverage of the June 2007 conflict between Fatah and Hamas in the Gaza Strip. The Arab channels, and mainly the biggest two Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya, helped to worsen engagements by using war reporting inflamed language in reports on selected issues.

I covered the second intifada; I remember I used to work as freelancer for some foreign news TV in the USA. However I used to watch Al-Jazeera back then, several and many times I noted that Arab governments, including Egypt and Jordan and KSA, stated that Al-Jazeera’s coverage of the uprising threatened the stability of their regimes and exposed them to criticism by their own people. Egypt and Jordan have been more critical of Al-Jazeera than has Israel. The Israeli government could have cause for concern if Al-Jazeera’s coverage helps incite Palestinians to riot, yet it continues to allow Al-Jazeera correspondents to operate freely within its borders. (TV news anchor from Gaza, Skype interviewed, 2012).

I have been working as a journalist since 1998 in West Bank, and my own opening would be that during the second intifada, satellite television have been used as a tool for generating resistance and generating steadfastness facing very difficult times. They became very militant, attempting to show the criminality of Israeli attacks, and it’s the first time for the Palestinian audience to watch the situation broadcasted through an Arab channels and not western or even Israeli channels; it’s the only time where the Palestinians had a tool to send their voice to the world through these channels. But that does not mean at all that these channels were covering the conflict in a balanced and natural coverage, they absolutely were taking the sides. And that clearly has been shown in their coverage of the June 2007 conflict between Fatah and Hamas in the Gaza Strip. The Arab channels, and mainly the biggest two Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya, helped to worsen engagements by using war reporting inflamed language in reports on selected issues.

I covered the second intifada; I remember I used to work as freelancer for some foreign news TV in the USA. However I used to watch Al-Jazeera back then, several and many times I noted that Arab governments, including Egypt and Jordan and KSA, stated that Al-Jazeera’s coverage of the uprising threatened the stability of their regimes and exposed them to criticism by their own people. Egypt and Jordan have been more critical of Al-Jazeera than has Israel. The Israeli government could have cause for concern if Al-Jazeera’s coverage helps incite Palestinians to riot, yet it continues to allow Al-Jazeera correspondents to operate freely within its borders. (TV news anchor from Gaza, Skype interviewed, 2012).

I have been working as a journalist since 1998 in West Bank, and my own opening would be that during the second intifada, satellite television have been used as a tool for generating resistance and generating steadfastness facing very difficult times. They became very militant, attempting to show the criminality of Israeli attacks, and it’s the first time for the Palestinian audience to watch the situation broadcasted through an Arab channels and not western or even Israeli channels; it’s the only time where the Palestinians had a tool to send their voice to the world through these channels. But that does not mean at all that these channels were covering the conflict in a balanced and natural coverage, they absolutely were taking the sides. And that clearly has been shown in their coverage of the June 2007 conflict between Fatah and Hamas in the Gaza Strip. The Arab channels, and mainly the biggest two Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya, helped to worsen engagements by using war reporting inflamed language in reports on selected issues.
to support side than another, they were not balanced for the beginning so why should they be now. (Freelance broadcast journalist, Ramallah, 2011)

If we ask the questions of why anyone will lose interest in a TV Channel during time of war ... Well the answer is simple, the two channels' Code of Ethics states that the channels ‘adhere to the journalistic values of honesty, courage, fairness, balance, independence, credibility and diversity, giving no priority to commercial or political over professional consideration’. However, the Hamas and Fatah conflict coverage by Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya has put this into question, not because of journalistic bias, but because of a complex relationship between the organisation’s multiple stakeholders; people in Gaza and Ramallah realised that these two channels are not that different than any mainstream media in the Arab world, they misrepresented the Palestinians since 2007, showing only the dark side of the story. (Journalist at WAFA, Ramallah, 2012)

I don't think it’s about losing faith or even credibility, I believe that in recent years people in the Arab world, and especially the Palestinians, have found new sources for news other than these two channels; for example, the social media platform and the local media outlets. The two channels still considered as a main source for news all over the Arab region, however, in Palestine people now started to have faith in their local media such as the private community radios and news agencies. In Palestine now have a lots of alternatives, more common is the social media platforms. I personally, as a journalist, depend on Twitter as a main news source, but I still watch Al-Jazeera. (Male journalist from Gaza, 2012)

Before the internet and social media, all we had was mainstream media to try and promote our cause. Just as it is today, it was extremely difficult to have the Palestinian voice heard, seen or read through corporate media, because of its inherent pro-Israeli bias. When the internet

| ألا أعتقد أنه من فقدان الإيمان أو حتى مصداقية ، وأعتقد أنه في السنوات الأخيرة الناس في العالم العربي ، وخاصة الفلسطينيين ، فقد وجدوا مصادر جديدة للأخبار مثلسائليا. على سبيل المثال ، منصة وسائل الإعلام الاجتماعية ووسائل الإعلام المحلية. القنوات لا يزال يعتبر المصدر الرئيسي للأخبار في جميع أنحاء المنطقة العربية ، ولكن في الشعب الفلسطيني بدأ الآنهم قوة في وسائل الإعلام المحلية مثل الإذاعات المحلية خاصة وكولات النبأ. في فلسطين نحن الآن أكثر من الدفاع الأكر شيوعا في وسائل الإعلام الاجتماعية. أنا شخصيا كصحفي اعتمد على توتيك كمصدر للأخبار الرئيسي ، ولكن ما زالت مشاهدة قناة الجزيرة. (صحفي ذكر من غزة ، 2012) |
| ألا أو أن يفقدن الاهتمام في قناة التلفزيون خلال زمن الحرب ... حسنا الجواب بسيط ، "تحت مدونة الأخلاقيات أن قنوات "التمسك بالقيم الصحفية من صدق وشجاعة ، الإنصاف والتوازن الاستقلالية والمصداقية والتنوع ، وإعطاء الأولوية لمجافرة أو السياسة على المثلية الإبعاد " . ومع ذلك ، فإن القنوات حساسة ومتقاربة من خلال قناة الجزيرة وقناة العربية قد وضع في السؤال ، وليس بسبب التحلل الصحفى ، ولكن بسبب العلاقة المعقدة بين العديد من أصحاب المصلحة في المنظمة: أدرك الناس في غزة ورام الله أن هذه القنوات التي ليست مختلفة عن أي دليل الإعلام في العالم العربي ، وأنها خيفرت الفلسطينيين منذ عام 2007 ، والتي تبين فقط الجانب المظلم من القصة. (الصحفي في (وفا) ، رام الله ، 2012) |
| أنا لا أعتقد أنه من فقدان الإيمان أو حتى مصداقية ، وأعتقد أنه في السنوات الأخيرة الناس في العالم العربي ، وخاصة الفلسطينيين ، قد وجدوا مصادر جديدة للأخبار مثلوسائل االإعلام مثلسائليا. على سبيل المثال ، منصة وسائل الإعلام الاجتماعية ووسائل الإعلام المحلية. القنوات لا يزال يعتبر المصدر الرئيسي للحصول على الأخبار في جميع أنحاء المنطقة العربية ، ولكن في الشعب الفلسطيني بدأ الآنهم قوة في وسائل الإعلام المحلية مثل الإذاعات المحلية خاصة وكولات النبأ. في فلسطين نحن الآن أكثر من الدفاع الأكر شيوعا في وسائل الإعلام الاجتماعية. أنا شخصيا كصحفي اعتمد على توتيك كمصدر للأخبار الرئيسي ، ولكن ما زالت مشاهدة قناة الجزيرة. (صحفي ذكر من غزة ، 2012) |
قبل الإنترنت ووسائل الإعلام الاجتماعية، كان كل ما كان معنا هو وسائل الإعلام الرئيسية في محاولة لتعزيز قضيتنا. تارةً كما هو الحال اليوم، كان من الصعب للغاية أن يكون صوتنا قويًا في مجتمع يميل إلى الانحياز. تقليداً في ذلك الوقت، كان من الصعب أن نسمع الصوت الفلسطيني، لاحظ أنه قد تم قمعه بسبب سياسات إسرائيل.

عندما جاء الإنترنت لفلسطين، كان هذا يعزز بشكل جذري قدرة وسائل الإعلام على تغطية قضيتنا. وصول وسائل الإعلام الاجتماعي جعل تقديم هذه المعلومات أكثر تجاوزًا، وجعل الانتقادات أكثر قربًا من أعين الناس، وبشكل يعزز من قدرة الروح المتعددة على البحث عن الحقائق والمعرفة.

 wspالانتernet ووسائل الإعلام الاجتماعية، كل ما كان معنا هو وسائل الإعلام الرئيسية في محاولة لتعزيز قضيتنا. تارةً كما هو الحال اليوم، كان من الصعب للغاية أن يكون صوتنا قويًا في مجتمع يميل إلى الانحياز. تقليداً في ذلك الوقت، كان من الصعب أن نسمع الصوت الفلسطيني، لاحظ أنه قد تم قمعه بسبب سياسات إسرائيل.

عندما جاء الإنترنت لفلسطين، كان هذا يعزز بشكل جذري قدرة وسائل الإعلام على تغطية قضيتنا. وصول وسائل الإعلام الاجتماعي جعل تقديم هذه المعلومات أكثر تجاوزًا، وجعل الانتقادات أكثر قربًا من أعين الناس، وبشكل يعزز من قدرة الروح المتعددة على البحث عن الحقائق والمعرفة.

كان كل وكيل أنصار الحزب فتح بلوق على الإنترنت الخاصة أو المواقع، باستخدام القنوات الخاصة في YouTube فقط لفضح قناة الجزيرة والعربية، وألغى ذلك على الفواتر الخاصة في نطاق واسع. ولكن ما لا يلاحظه على هذه المشاهدات، يقول أن الجدل حول حملات من مؤيدي الحزب كان لا يزال في كثير من الأحيان ميزةً لما يتماقدها أعضاء التمثيل الذين تابعوا التفاعل الإخباري، بلقة فتح للمسؤولية. وحول هذا التفاعل الذي تسبب في رفع القضية، هناك الكثير من şiirاتنا التي كتبها الجانبان، ولكن ما لا يمكن أن ننكره أن الإنترنت حرر الفضاء للنقاش والتعارض.</div>

Both party supporters had open their own online blogs or websites, using YouTube private channels only to expose Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya, it was widely followed. But from what I have noticed on these websites and blogs that the Fatah and Hamas debate between the two supporters was and still often unjustly stereotyped as being hate-fueled and blinded by bias on both sides of the debate. The reality is that before the infusion of social media into the debate, this stereotype would have been easier to believe as the opportunity for the average Palestinian to express his voice and make it heard was unavailable. After the social media eruption on the internet, Palestinians solidified their role and status within the online community by embracing platforms such as Twitter and blogging websites in order to debate and explain where they stand in terms of solutions provided for peace.

However, this time these platforms was not between the Israeli and the Palestine, it’s between the Palestinians themselves. (News editor at WAFA, Ramallah, 2012)

Social media, especially Facebook, was the first battle ground of conflict between Fatah and Hamas supporters in West Bank and Gaza. I wish to look at it as a platform of debate and so do many else, we must recognise that even in debates you have a winning side and a losing side. The biggest battle/debate right now that faces Palestine is to end the divisions between Gaza and West Bank or not. I remember I used to follow Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya website on the net, and I could not imagine the amount of anger and hatred from both sides’ supports, and I was shocked when I read death threats coming from Fatah or
Hamas supporters to each other on both channels websites – I can’t imagine why there was not any kind of censorship to control the debate. (Female journalist from Gaza, Skype interview, 2012)

Interviews questions Coding

The questions’ categories:

1. Conceptualising questions: questions dealing with assessing the general media and the interviewee’s performance during the time of conflict.

2. Strategy questions: questions dealing with satellite media and internal conflicts.

3. Influence questions: questions dealing with the political impact of the coverage and political relations in the Arab world.

4. Personal questions: questions dealing with basic information about the interviewee, regarding the two channels and the internal conflict in Palestine.

Interviews participants:

Group One: Arab media experts and chief editors for Arab media outlets

1. Dr Nabil Alkhatib, Chief Editor of the Al-Arabiya news channel in Dubai

2. Mr Asef Hemadi, Chief News Editor of the Al-Jazeera Arabic channel in Doha

3. Mr Abdul Bari Atwan, Chief Editor of Al-Quds Al-Arabi newspaper in London

4. Mr Abdul-Wahab Badrkhan, Chief Editor of the Alsharq Alawssat newspaper in London

5. Dr Mohammad Kawas, Chief Editor of the Arab News Network ANN in London

6. Mr Erfan Arab, Senior News Editor and program presenter at the BBC Arabic in London

Group Two: Palestinian journalists from the West Bank and Gaza strip in Palestine

1. Zied Ghannam, Chief News Editor at Palestine TV

2. Khaldoun Bargouthi, Editor at Alhayyat Aljadeeda newspaper

285
3. Bilal Ghaith, News Editor at WAFA news agency

4. Roleen Tafakgi, News Editor at Reuters in Ramallah

5. Duha Shami, News Presenter at Voice of Palestine

6. Juman Qunais, News Presenter at Al-falasteenya satellite channel

7. Naela Khalil, News Journalist at Alayyam newspaper

8. Nael Manasrah, News Presenter at Majaj radio station

9. Osama Selwadi, Photographer at Reuters in Palestine

10. Hisahm Telawi, Freelance News Journalist for foreign media outlets

11. Female journalist from Gaza, working for a private radio station

12. Male journalist from Gaza, News Editor for Dunai Alwattan news agency in Gaza

13. Male journalist from Gaza, previously employed as a News Editor at Al Aqsa satellite channel

The participants from Gaza in Group Two (numbers 11, 12 and 13) preferred to be anonymous for reasons related to their work, security and safety, because the three of them are still living and working inside Gaza, where journalists are increasingly subject to arrest and intimidation under Hamas control, especially when talking about issues related to the internal conflict.

Types of interviews:

1. Face-to-face interviews – This included most of the participants in both groups. These interviews were audio-taped and transcribed, in addition to note being taken during the interviews. The transcripts of these interviews serve as the primary source for data analysis. The interviews were in the Arabic language, as most of the interviewees could not speak English; however, the researcher has translated a summary of each individual’s answers.

2. Skype interviews – Skype was used to interview some of the participants in Gaza and to interview Asef Hemedi from Al-Jazeera, because the researcher could not travel there.
Interviews questions:

1. Do you think Arab governments control over the media including satellite channels?

2. How can we measure the level of control over Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya?

3. Do you think that Arab satellite channels have the power for impact on the Palestinian society?

4. Did the Arab media had an effect during the second intifada?

5. What kind of effect did the two channels had on the internal Palestinian conflicts?

6. Do you think that Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya support the political authorities of their financiers?

7. To what extent the conflict between Saudi and Qatari regimes reflected on the two channels’ coverage?

8. Do you think Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya still credible?

9. How do you see the two channels coverage of the Arab spring?

10. To what extent social media have an impact on the Arab world? Has social media affected the mainstream media?

11. Do you think that Arab Satellite channels have apolitical and financial agendas?

12. Did Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya report that internal conflict fairly?

13. Does ownership of the satellite media effects the journalism standards?
### Appendix 3 – Content Analysis Coding Scheme

#### Reports Coding Sheets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Aljazeera’s reports</th>
<th>Al-Arabiya’s reports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 17th</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 18th</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 28th</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 29th</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 30th</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2nd</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 3rd</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 4th</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 5th</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 6th</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 7th</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 8th</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 9th</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 10th</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 11th</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 12th</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 13th</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Aljazeera’s reports</td>
<td>Al-Arabiya’s reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 17&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 18&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 28&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 29&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 30&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 5&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 6&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 7&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 8&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 9&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 10&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 11&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Length of report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 12th</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 13th</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 14th</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Report Variables**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Report Number</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date and Month</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report Length per mn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Item</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location of Reporting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name of Correspondent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of report</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Report location coding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Al-Jazeera</th>
<th>Al-Arabiya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gaza Locations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank Locations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Palestinian Locations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israeli Locations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Locations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Location</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Type of reports coding sheet

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authorship</th>
<th>correspondent</th>
<th>In-house</th>
<th>Correspondent appears</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al-Jazeera</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Arabiya</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Actors coding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor code</th>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>actor from Fatah or Hamas</td>
<td>How the actor appears</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of quotation</td>
<td>Location of actor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of interview</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Quotation code:

Theme of quotation from actors

Attack/Defence /natural codes

Actor 1  Actor 2  Actor 3  Actor 4

Codes:

1. ‘presenting own statement of the conflict’

2. ‘defending own statement against attack from within party’

3. ‘defending own statement against attack from the other party or non-party individual’

4. ‘Attacking other party sources or non-party individuals

5. ‘attacking own party statement’

6. Presented in good light

7. Presented in bad light

8. Actor attacked.

9. Actor defended

10. ‘Disposition unclear’

11. Explaining what happened
Lexicon of Hamas and Fatah coverage:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable (Lexicon) code</th>
<th>Number of times used</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
How the Actor appears in the reports

1. ‘Visuals only no direct quotation’

2. ‘Voice only no visuals’

3. ‘Visuals only’

4. ‘mentioned only’

5. ‘Directly quoted (not own voice)’

6. ‘Directly quoted’

7. ‘Indirectly quoted/ paraphrased’

Length of Quotation (Numeric – 3 digits)

Themes of the reports

Peace/ Diplomatic

1. Peace talks

2. Peace proposals

3. Ceasefires/ truces

4. End of fighting.

5. Saudi-Arabia stance on the war.

6. Qatar stance on the war.
Report frame code:

It associates with the way in which mass media represent an object or a situation.

1. Official frame: Refers to news frames concerning support for the government and political leaders in a country, including national unity and public support for the government.

2. Military frame: Refers to depictions of the strategy used in the conflict (e.g., operations, strategic of fighting militant groups, etc).

3. Humanitarian frame: Focus on the victims of the terrorism deeds, notably the suffering and damage caused by militant actions.

4. Other: Frames that cannot be included in the above three categories.

Editorial media policy code:

Refers to the general principles that guide decisions in the two channels outlet about how a report will be presented.

1. Informative policy: If story focuses on answering the “5W and H” and tend to be fact based and less opinion based.

2. Educational policy or “awareness”: If story focuses on presenting the suffering of victims from militant phenomenon, or warning them of the consequences of war on the society, or telling readers not to turn to violence as the main way to express their angers or attitudes towards things.

3. Defensive policy: If story focuses on persuading audience of one point of view regarding one side of the conflict and neglect the other side.

4. Other: If news story did not adopt any of the above three categories.
Appendix 4: CDA Coding

Agencies coding:

**Fatah Agency**

1. Fatah actions against Hamas Schools/ Universities
2. Actions against Hamas private property.
3. Actions against other private property.
4. Actions against mosque.
5. Actions against government building.
6. Actions against hospital/ambulance
7. Actions against health centre
8. Actions against Hamas /general
9. actions against media agencies
10. Actions military stations
11. Actions Persons/Hamas.
12. Actions against Persons
13. against Persons/other
14. Fatah Propaganda war
15. Use of weapons.
16. Assassinations – Hamas
Hamas Agency.

1. Hamas Against Fatah Schools/Universities

2. Against Fatah private property

3. Against other private property

4. Hamas against Fatah government building

5. Hamas against Fatah property/ other/ all attacks on property.

6. Hamas against Fatah media agencies.

7. Hamas against Fatah military targets.

8. Hamas against Fatah persons/ Military.

9. Hamas against persons/ civilian

10. Hamas against persons/ other.

11. Hamas propaganda war.

12. Hamas use of weapons.

13. Hamas initiating the violence.


15. Hamas using civilian infrastructure.


17. Conflict general

18. Hamas Political Agency


20. Hamas violence
Other agencies:

1. Fatah/Hamas Political Agency
2. Intra Palestinian politics.
3. Intra Palestinian violence.
4. Palestinian foreign relations.
5. Palestinian Israeli conflict
6. Hamas / Israeli attacks
7. Fatah/ Israel relations
8. Peace talk with Israel
9. Security – Palestine
10. Democracy in Palestine
11. Palestine economy.
12. Humanitarian conditions/ aid
14. Demonstrations- Palestine (pro-conflict)
15. Role of Media.
16. Historical background to present conflict.
17. Recap of conflict.
18. What’s next (post war)
Terminology coding for the CDA

Use of words

- First word of the report - related to Fateh or Hamas
- Repetition of term.
- Word to Personalize of Hamas victims
- Words to Personalize of Fateh victims
- Words of grieving people from both sides.
- Terms used to describe Hamas military actions
- Terms used to describe Fateh military actions.
- Terms used to describe other military actions.
- Terms used to describe Hamas leaders.
- Terms used to describe Fateh leaders.
- Terms used to describe others in the report

Location coding:

- Hamas locations
- Fateh locations
- other locations
Actors coding:

- Terms used to from military of both sides.
- Terms used quoted from leaders.
- Terms used quoted from Fatah leaders.
- Terms quoted from other sources.

Report Direction coding:

- Overall direction of report toward Hamas (positive, negative, and neutral).
- Overall direction of report toward Fatah (positive, negative, and neutral).
- Overall direction of report toward the peace effort.
- Overall direction of report toward internal or external political powers.
- Overall direction or report of toward changing in internal political powers
- Overall direction or report of toward victory and defeat.
- Overall direction or report of toward peace or war.
- Overall direction or report of toward responsibility
- Overall direction or report of toward military actions.
- Overall direction or report of toward accusations.
Tone of the report coding:

This part also benefited from the focus group analysis (see Table 4.1. Independent test for the representation frame)

Each report was classified as:

- Favourable to Hamas
- Favourable to Fatah
- Natural
Appendix 5 Palestinian function’s Profiles

Fatah

The origins of what was to be known as Harakat Altahreer Alwatany Fatah (the Palestinian National Liberation Movement), Fatah, was found in the Palestinian student activist groups that emerged throughout the Arab world in the beginning of the 1950’s. At that time, Arab nationalism and pan-Arabism were the dominant ideas in the region, with the goal of re-establishing Arab power and to get rid of the influence from the Western colonialist powers. Palestinian nationalism as a distinct movement did not exist, as the pre-1948 Palestinian nationalist leadership had been shattered during the war of 1947-49, and was dispersed. Most of the Palestinian refugees therefore turned to the pan-Arab movements and the Muslim Brotherhood to find support for their cause, the liberation of their homeland (Butenschøn, 2008:346). The concern of many of the younger activists, who were to become the leaders of a new generation of Palestinian nationalist/resistance organisations, was that these movements regarded the liberation of Palestine as just a part of the higher goal of achieving Arab unity. This new generation of Palestinian nationalists insisted that the liberation of Palestine had to be the main priority, and that Arab unity then maybe could be achieved as a result of that at a later stage. “Palestine first” was their slogan, and they were ready to start an armed resistance against Israel without waiting for the Arab regimes, which under the lead of the Egyptian President N!ir did not wish to engage in a military battle with & Israel without being certain of a successful result. In Cairo, Y’isir Araft, leader of the “ Palestinian Students’ Union, and his fellow student, al! Khalaf, were the main propagators’ of this “Palestine first” strategy, but the same ideas also won support among youth across the Palestinian Diaspora.

An important factor in the establishment of the Fatah organisation was the launch of a magazine called Filastnuna (Our Palestine) in 1959, which was published in Beirut under the leadership of Khalil Wazir (Abu Jihid). The magazine became an important tool in the process of spreading their ideas and gain support in the Palestinian refugee camps throughout the Arab world, showing already then the importance of the written media as a tool to carry ideological meaning. According to Cobban (ibid.:24), the Fata organisation was established upon agreeing on five main principles that since have remained at the basis of the organisation:

1. The common goal of liberating Palestine

2. The need for armed struggle to obtain this goal

3. Reliance on Palestinian self-organisation

4. Co-operation with friendly Arab forces

5. Co-operation with friendly international forces

Interestingly, especially in relation to the ongoing struggle with Hamas most of the early leadership of Fatah had connections to the Muslim Brotherhood, out of which its main political rival would emerge several years later. According to Butenschon however, these leaders’ attraction towards the Brotherhood was mainly due to the movement’s opposition to the existing Arab regimes and its somewhat militant line against Israel rather than its
religious significance. When Fata was established, it was therefore along a secular line with the aim of gathering Palestinians across religious and political lines for the battle of liberating their homeland.

Fata began their military campaign against Israel in January 1965 with an unsuccessful attack on water installations in the Galilee region through its first military wing named al-assefah (the storm), and was soon to become the most powerful organisation within the Palestinian resistance movement. This was much due to the devastating defeat of the Arab armies in the Six-Day War of 1967, which left the Arab world in an ideological crisis. Fatah and Arafat, who at that time had become the leading figure of the organisation, used the defeat to gather support among the broad line of Palestinians for its own agenda of guerrilla fighting against Israel. The 1967 War also paved the way for Fata to gain control over the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, PLO, which had been established in May 1964. The establishment of the PLO was initiated at the first Arab League meeting in Cairo in January 1964 where 13 Arab state leaders were gathered and where the necessary practical decisions were taken...in the field of organising the Palestinian people and enabling them to play their role in the liberation of their country and their self-determination" (Cobban, 1984:29). Arafat and the Fata leaders were sceptical to the establishment of PLO at first, and regarded it as an attempt by Egypt to control the Palestinian resistance. However, when the Arab states failed in their military campaign against Israel, they were ready to take over the control of the organisation together with a coalition of other groups that followed the same guerrilla line, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) which had been established in 1967. In February 1969, Fatah took over the Executive Committee and Arat was elected Chairman. Fata"s grip on the Palestinian nationalist movement was thus secured, and has continued until today. A point underlining this is that the current Palestinian President and Chairman of the PLO Mahmoud Abbas, also was among the founding fathers of Fatah in Kuwait in the late 1950's.

Strategically, Fata had at this stage taken a new stand, which was to have a great impact on the future of the Palestinian nationalist cause. By embracing the idea of the creation of a Palestinian 'mini-state' in the West Bank and Gaza, they showed for the first time that they could be ready to pursue a peaceful settlement of the conflict. At the twelfth PNC meeting held in Cairo in the summer of 1974, the PLO agreed upon a ten-point programme, which included a point stating that "[t]he PLO will struggle by every means, the foremost of which is armed struggle, to liberate Palestinian land and to establish the people's national, independent and fighting sovereignty on every part of Palestinian land to be liberated" (Cobban 1984:62). Implicit in this point is the recognition of a possible two-state solution with a future Palestinian state alongside Israel on any land liberated, if only as a starting point from where to later seek liberation for the whole of Palestine. This new formulation was controversial and Fata and the DFLP were the two main groups that pushed it through. Soon after, PFLP and three other groups pulled out of the PLO Executive Committee in protest and formed the 'Rejection Front'. The articulation of this new goal helped Arafat and the PLO win "recognition in diplomatic circles, both in the Arab world and internationally. At the Arab Summit in October the same year, the Arab states recognised PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and in November, Arafat held his famous speech at "the UN, and the PLO was granted observer status at the organisation. The first move had thus been made by Fata and the PLO towards adapting a more diplomatic line, and moving in a direction away from its initial line of gaining results purely through guerilla warfare on Palestinian land itself. Other groups, like Hamas, were later to build much of their popularity "on opposing this direction taken by Fata. It was, however, still many years before the !diplomatic line was to result in the setting up of a Palestinian national authority, as the diplomatic line in the following years was set back by several factors, among them the PLO's refusal to accept the UN resolution 242
as the USA demanded, the Likud climbing to power in Israel and the Camp David agreement between Egypt and Israel in 1978.

Meanwhile in Lebanon, Fata and other guerrilla groups were still caught up in fighting, and in 1982, Israel invaded the country in order to crush the Palestinian guerrillas. The invading army advanced all the way to Beirut where it enclosed the Western part of the city which was under Palestinian control. Following continued attacks on the city during the siege, the Palestinian leaders had no choice but to engage in negotiations about an evacuation of its troops, and on 21 August, the first PLO fighters were evacuated out of Beirut harbour (ibid.:124). Nine days later, Yisir Arafat himself left, thus ending the official Fata /PLO " presence in Lebanon.

The renewed strength of Arafat and the Fata /PLO leadership made it possible for them to reopen the diplomatic line towards the international community, especially after King Hussein in July 1988 renounced Jordan’s claim for the West Bank, leading the way for the PLO to proclaim independence for the state of Palestine in November the same year, based on UN resolution 181 from 1947. Following pressure by the USA, Arafat in December then finally " uttered the words that could allow for direct talks between the American government and the PLO, accepting UN resolutions 242 and 338, recognising Israel’s right to existence and renouncing terrorism (ibid.:40). The ideology of Fata and the PLO had thus taken yet another ! major step away from its guerrilla history in the direction of moderation. At the same time as the intifada provided Arafat with support to seek this moderation, it also brought about a new " expression of the Islamic sentiments that had been growing within the territories for many years already, in the establishment of amils (cf.1.2). In the beginning, amils did not " compose any real political threat to Fata and the PLO on a higher level, and they did not ! enter the UNLU. On the streets, however, amils soon gained a solid following and the " relationship between Arafat supporters and amils members became strained (Schanzer " 2008:25). Interestingly, Schanzer describes how the first public struggle between the two parties in fact took the form of a propaganda struggle, with both groups spreading leaflets calling for support for their own cause.

With the Arafat and the PLO leadership were finally in a position to " return to the territories, and to do so in the form of a government of an internationally recognised Palestinian entity, although an entity that only covered parts of the Gaza Strip and Jericho. Fata had thus completed its transformation from a guerrilla organisation calling for ! the destruction of Israel and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state from the Jordan river to the Mediterranean, to the leaders of a government which mandate was built on diplomatic agreements with the former 'enemy'. Arafat returned to Gaza on 1 July 1994 as " President of the Palestinian National Authority (PA), but within the territories he faced a huge opposition against the agreement with Israel by groups that viewed it as a betrayal against the Palestinian people and its cause. Hamas was at the forefront of this opposition, and sought to "undermine the authority of Arafat and the PA, mainly through a wave of attacks against Israel " carried out by its military wing Kataeb Al-Qassim !the al-Qassim Brigades). These attacks increased the support for Hamas amils among a large segment of the " population, and thus put Arafat and the PA in a difficult situation. Israel and the USA " demanded that it put an end to these attacks in order for the peace process to continue, while Arafat probably knew that a crackdown on Hamas could make him unpopular among the " population. It was also important to uphold the idea of national unity among the Palestinians as a basis for legitimacy for his rule. Leading up to the first formal elections for the PA in January 1996, Fata and Hamas met in Cairo to discuss a settlement to the growing conflict, but it was, as should be the case several times in the years to come, unsuccessful (Schanzer 2008:44). As amils decided to boycott the 1996 elections in protest of the Oslo accords, " Fata’s victory was not threatened, and their grip on the PA was even further consolidated. Hamas
still continued their attacks in the years to come, with the PA subsequently arresting hundreds of Hamas members in an attempt to quell the organisation (ibid.:68). National unity and the PA as a unifying national project was thus clearly not happening, and Arafat kept losing popularity among the population to Hamas and other rejectionist groups. This was not to last long, however, as Arafat soon again found himself under pressure from Israel and the USA to control the different Palestinian factions as the intifada continued. His failure, or unwillingness, to do so, lead the Americans to demand that he delegated some of his power within the PA by creating the office of a Prime Minister in order for there being any chance of the peace process getting back on track. Abbas was appointed the first PM, but did not survive long in the position. The infrastructure of the PA was in ruins and Israel had re-occupied the West Bank and Gaza, and in addition, the movement was hard hit by a culture of corruption. Together with the fact that its diplomatic line had not delivered peace and prosperity to the Palestinian people, these factors lead to a popularity crisis for the organisation that had been the undisputed leader of the Palestinian nationalist cause since the early 1960’s. This was the situation when Arafat passed away in November 2004 and Abbas replaced him as Fatah’s leader. The elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council in January 2006 made apparent the failure of Fata in accomplishing their goal of national unity, and that they had distanced themselves from the people they claimed to legitimately represent. At the same time it clearly showed the strength that Hamas had built up over 15 years.

Hamas

Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya (The Islamic Resistance Movement), Hamas emerged at the beginning of the first Intifadah, with the first communiqué signed by the organisation being released on 14 December 1987 (Tamimi 2007:11). The acronym Hamas has the meaning ‘zeal’ in Arabic. The background of the organisation that was to become the most serious contender to Fatah’s leading role in the Palestinian nationalist movement is to be found in the Islamist organisation of the Muslim Brotherhood. The leader of the Gaza branch of the Brotherhood, which was to develop into Hamas, was Ahmad Yasin who since the 1960’s had built up the organisation there. Across the Arab world, the defeat of the Arab armies in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War left a huge segment of the population disillusioned, since they had seen the pan-Due to the non-intervention policy of Israel towards the Brotherhood, Yasin was able to establish social institutions in Gaza which would provide the organisation with massive popular support. The first of these was called al-Jama’iyya al-Islamiyya (the Islamic Society) which was established in 1967 and provided sports activities, recreational trips, scouting activities and public lectures for the youth (ibid.:36). In the early 1970’s, an even more comprehensive institution was established under the name al-Mujama’ aslami (the Islamic Centre), which also was responsible for establishing mosques, kindergartens, schools and clinics all over the Gaza Strip (ibid.). In 1978, the Islamic University was established in the Gaza Strip under the lead of the Brotherhood, which was to have a significant effect on the movement’s ability to spread its ideology. Through the different institutions it controlled, the Brotherhood was able to build up a network covering most areas of the society in the Gaza Strip, providing, as Beverly Milton-Edwards (2000:141) puts it: “something for everyone, from the cradle to the grave”.

As mentioned, the strategy of the Brotherhood in the 1970’s and the beginning of the 1980’s concerning Israel was that of non-confrontation. The leading thought, especially among the old guard, was that the society had to be based fully on Islam before one could stage a battle against the Zionists, and that the blame for the defeats of the Arab regimes was to be found in the fact that these were secular regimes which had left their Islamic base (Tamimi 2007). The same argumentation was used for not joining the secular nationalist movement in their armed struggle. At the same time as Yasin built up his network inside the territories, the Islamic movement also
became strong in the Palestinian student milieus in the Diaspora, such as in Kuwait, where Fata had been formed some twenty years earlier. Among the leaders here was Kh!lid Mishaal, who today is regarded as the leader of Hamas. This younger generation of "Islamists challenged the strategy of non-confrontation, as they sought to participate more directly in the nationalist cause on the ground, and launched the idea of establishing a jihad" project in Palestine (Rabbani 2008:67). In 1983, a conference was held in Jordan with delegates from the Palestinian Brotherhood both from inside the territories and exile to discuss the organisational matters concerning the launch of this project, and this conference is referred to by Mishaal as laying “the foundation stone for the creation of hamas” (Ibid..68). "Preparations for the start of an armed campaign got under way in Gaza, and in 1984 Ahmad Y!s#n was arrested by the Israelis on suspicion of having been involved in buying weapons (Tamimi 2007:46). He was released a year later as part of a prisoner exchange deal, and continued the preparation for the launch of an armed struggle against Israel in the framework of the Palestinian Brotherhood. The call for actions to be taken came especially from the younger generation in the territories who had lived their whole life under occupation. Gilles Kepel (2003:152) points to the fact that half the population in the occupied Palestinian territories was under fifteen years, and over 70 percent was under the age of 30. Most of them were educated, many from the Islamic University and other Islamic institutes, but had little or no hope of finding work due to the economical situation and the occupation, and therefore had little to lose by engaging in a violent conflict. This group, the shabab in Arabic, thus became the main movers in the intifada when it broke out in December 1987.

Despite most observers regard hamas as having being established at the outbreak of the intifada, Mishaal insists that Hamas in reality was formed in the years following the Jordan "conference in 1983, and thus already existed as an organisation prior to the intifada (Rabbani # 2008:68). The organisation and network building that had been undertaken by the Palestinian Brotherhood in the territories and the Diaspora undoubtedly played a major role in helping hamas take a leading role during the uprising and being able to challenge Fata and the PLO and their UNLU.

The challenge from Hamas became even stronger when they entered the political arena by "launching their charter on 18 August 1988, thereby presenting to the population a clear ideological and strategic alternative to the line of Fata. The charter includes 36 articles lays out the principles for how the organisation would fuse Palestinian nationalism and Islamism. In Article one, it is declared that the Movement's programme is Islam. From it, it draws its ideas, ways of thinking and understanding of the universe, life and man" ( Hamas "covenant, 1988)3. Article six goes on to proclaim that the movement "strives to raise the banner of Allah over every inch of Palestine", thus making it clear that the aspiration is to establish a state built on Islamic principles. Concerning the fight for the liberation of Palestine, the charter states that jihad is an individual duty of every Muslim, and that it is "necessary to install the spirit of Jihad in the heart of the nation so that they would confront the enemies and join the ranks of the fighters". In its charterhamas also clarifies its view on the " secular nationalist movements, and on the diplomatic line undertaken by Arafat and the PLO. "Negotiations and peace talks are clearly dismissed in Article 13: "There is no solution for the Palestinian question except through Jihad [sic]. Initiatives, proposals and international conferences are all a waste of time and vain endeavours. The Palestinian people know better than to consent to having their future, rights and fate toyed with. Although accepting that the PLO stems from the same people as themselves, am!s takes a clear stand against the secular "line of the organisation, stating: "Secularism completely contradicts religious ideology. Attitudes, conduct and decisions stem from ideologies. That is why, with all our appreciation for The Palestinian Liberation Organisation - and what it can develop into - and without belitlling its role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, we are unable to exchange the present or future Islamic Palestine with the secular idea."
One of the most controversial points of the charter is not found among the articles, but rather in the preamble, where it is referred to a statement by Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, saying: "Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it, just as it obliterated others before it". To make Hamas refrain from this point, and " accept the existence of the Israeli state has been one of the main demands from the international community towards the organisation in order to open a dialogue. In later years, there has been a tendency among Hamas leaders to not refer to the charter, but rather to mark " some kind of distance to it. Tamimi (2007:149) cites for example Mishaal saying that the charter "should not be regarded as the fundamental ideological frame of reference from which the movement derives its position, or on the basis of which it justifies its actions". Tamimi also claims that there has been an ongoing process within the Political Bureau of the organisation to rewrite the charter since 2003, but that the election victory in 2006 halted this process, as the leadership did not want it to look as if they had given in to external pressure of hanging the charter (ibid.:150). Based on this, the charter still stands as the primary ideological document of Hamas.

With the launch of its charter, Hamas was able to present a clear alternative to the line of Fatah and soon gained support from those who were opposed to the diplomatic efforts undertaken by Arafat and the PLO. As Fatah moved further away from their guerrilla background, Hamas was in place to fill this role and gained popular support. At the same time, Israel felt increasingly threatened by the Islamist group, and launched a campaign against it towards the end of 1988. Mass arrests among the leadership were conducted, and in May 1989 Yasin was again detained. However, the arrests only lead to a further radicalisation of the movement as younger members who were generally more open for the use of violence emerged to fill the vacancies in the leadership. The hard line of Israel towards the movement also increased its legitimacy in the eyes of the population. In 1991 Hamas military wing, the A-Qassim brigades, was founded and soon launched a series of attacks on Israeli targets. The Brigades are named after the founder and leader of a resistance group from the uprising against the British and the Zionists in the 1930's, thus establishing a bond between Hamas and the historical resistance movement. The increase in violence lead to Israel deporting more than 400 hundred prominent Hamas members to Lebanon in December 1992 in an operation that was only to help Hamas gain international sympathy, andparaphrasing Kepel 2003:327. While Hamas increased its power based mainly on its clear line of confrontation, and opposition to all peace initiatives, Fatah and the PLO saw its own power diminish, and embarked on the Oslo process in an attempt to restore it. With the PA in place in Gaza following the signing of the Declaration of Principles, Arafat could start using his security apparatus to target the opposition, both based on his own wish to reduce the power of amils, and on pressure from Israel and the USA to control the different factions as a part of the peace agreement. The PA's attempted crack-down on Hamas suffered a severe blow, however, when Ahmadi Yassin was released from Israeli prison in 1997 following the infamous assassination attempt on amils' Political Bureau leader, Khalid Mishaal, by the Mossad. Back in Gaza, Yassin could again actively take the leadership of amils, and strengthen it further.

The tension between the PA and amils only increased in the years leading up to the second Intifada, with thousands of Hamas members being arrested and many being tortured (Tamimi #2007:195). The hard line adopted by Arafat at the Camp David meeting in July 2000 and the subsequent outbreak of the second intifad a, however, were to bring the two parties closer together, at least for a short period. As the violence increased, and the pressure on Arafat became stronger from the USA and Israel, it soon soured again with heavy clashes between the two factions taking place in Gaza in December 2001. The retaliation attacks from Israel following the violence hit the infrastructure and the economy of the PA hard and helped undermine its power. Arafat himself was put under arrest by the Israeli army, and these factors only boosted the effective power of amils.
Schanzer (2008:77) notes that by 2003, "am'ls had created a parallel government to the PA’s and controlled a parallel network of social services. The popularity of the movement was displayed when about 200,000 people turned to the streets of Gaza to follow the funeral of Yassin after he was assassinated on 22 March 2004 (ibid.:80). The assassination of the leader Yassin was followed by the assassinations of the two next persons to be named as leaders of the organisation, leading am'ls to decide not to name publicly their leader for the future, even though it is commonly acknowledged that Khalid Mishaal is the current leader. Although the assassinations led to some weakening of the leadership on short terms, the power of am'ls was not affected, and " when the Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon evacuated all Israeli settlers and army personnel from the Gaza Strip in the fall of 2005, am'ls was ready to strengthen the grip they had built " up there. For many Palestinians at that time, it was viewed as a victory for the line of confrontation lead by am'ls, in contrast to the moderate line of Fata. This was the situation " I within the Palestinian territories when am'ls decided to change its political strategy and take " part in the elections called for by Arafat’s successor, Ma Abbas to be held in January 2006.
Bibliography


Bayat, A. (2010) *Life as politics how ordinary people change the Middle East*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.


Fahmy, S., and Johnson, T. (2007b) The caged bird sings: how reliance on


317


**Journals and Reports**


Carpentier, N., and Terzis, G. eds. (2005) Media representations of war and conflict. Workshop organized by the KUB-Center Communication for Social Change, Communications Department of the Vesalius College (VUB) and the Pascal Decroos Fund for Investigative Journalism, Brussels.


Online resource


