PhD thesis title:

*The roles of African states in affecting Soviet and American engagements with Mozambican national liberation, 1961-1964*

Petr Labrentsev

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1st supervisor: Dr. Martin H. Folly
2nd supervisor: Dr. Kristian Gustafson

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In memory of my dear friend and an exemplary scholar,
Dr. Chikara Hashimoto.
Abstract

The early period of the national liberation of Mozambique provided a stage for superpower competition, and a means for different African states, groups of states, and organizations to advance their particular, and often conflicting goals and agendas. In so doing, both the superpowers and regional African actors were supporting different rival Mozambican nationalist leaders and their respective movements. More than being only a conflict between Portuguese authorities and Mozambican nationalists, the process of Mozambican national liberation was also a proxy confrontation between different foreign actors. The thesis examines the relations and power dynamics within the complex of superpowers - African states - national liberation movements, in the contexts of the Cold War, African affairs and the process of national liberation of Mozambique. It assesses the roles played by local and regional African actors in affecting Soviet and American interests and designs throughout their engagements with the process of Mozambican national liberation, from 1961 to 1964.
Abbreviations

AAI  African American Institute
AID  Agency for International Development (US) a.k.a. USAID
ALC  African Liberation Committee
ASAF(s)  Asian-African(s) [group/bloc of states at the United Nations]
ANC  African National Congress (South Africa)
BOSS  Bureau of State Security (South Africa)
CAF  Central African Federation (Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland)
CAR  Central African Republic
CC CPSU  Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CIA  Central Intelligence Agency (US)
Comintern  Communist International
CONCP  Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas (Conference of the Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies) a.k.a. The Casablanca Conference
COREMO  Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique (Revolutionary Committee of Mozambique)
COSERU  Comité Secreto da Restauração da UDENAMO (Secret Committee for the Restoration of UDENAMO)
CPHRC  Contemporary Portuguese History Research Centre
CPSU  Communist Party of the Soviet Union
DGS  Direcção-Geral de Segurança (General Security Directorate; Portugal) also, see PIDE
DIA  Defense Intelligence Agency (US)
DNSA  Digital National Security Archive
EEC  European Economic Community
FBI  Federal Bureau of Investigation (US)
FISB  Federal Intelligence Service Bureau (Southern Rhodesia)
FLN  Front de Libération Nationale (Algeria)
FNLA  Frente de Libertação Nacional de Angola (Front for the National Liberation of Angola)
FOIA  Freedom of Information Act
FonOff  Foreign Office (UK)
FRAIN  Frente Revolucionaria Africana para a Independência Nacional das Colónias Portuguesas (Revolutionary African Front for the National Independence of the Portuguese Colonies)
FRELIMO  Frente de Libertaçao de Moçambique (Mozambique Liberation Front)
FRUS  Foreign Relations of the United States
FUNIPAMO  Frente Unida Anti-imperialista Popular Africana de Moçambique (Mozambique African Peoples Anti-Imperialist United Front)
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<th>Code</th>
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<tr>
<td>GANC</td>
<td>Goan African National Congress (India)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GBAA</td>
<td>Ghanaian Bureau on African Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDR</td>
<td>German Democratic Republic a.k.a. East Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>GRAE</td>
<td>Governo Revolucionário de Angola no Exílio (Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GRU</td>
<td>Glavnoie Razvedovatelnoie Upravleniiie (Chief Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff a.k.a. Soviet military intelligence; USSR)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KANU</td>
<td>Kenyan African National Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>KGB</td>
<td>Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security; USSR)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAA</td>
<td>Mozambique African Association</td>
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<td>MAC</td>
<td>Movimento Anti-Colonialista (Anti Colonialist Movement)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MANC</td>
<td>Mozambique African National Congress</td>
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<td>MANU</td>
<td>Mozambican African National Union (Tanzania)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDIA</td>
<td>Movimento de Defesa dos Interesses de Angola (Movement for the Defence of the Interests of Angola)</td>
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<td>MDM</td>
<td>Movimento Democrático de Moçambique (Mozambique Democratic Movement)</td>
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<td>MO</td>
<td>Mezhdunarodnyi Otdel (International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU; USSR)</td>
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<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola)</td>
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<td>NAP</td>
<td>National African Party (Southern Rhodesia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDPSR</td>
<td>National Democratic Party of Southern Rhodesia (also, see ZAPU)</td>
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<td>NSAM</td>
<td>National Security Action Memorandum</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council (US)</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAFMECSA</td>
<td>Pan-African Freedom Movement of East, Central and Southern Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAIGC</td>
<td>Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCP</td>
<td>Portuguese Communist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDRY</td>
<td>People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen</td>
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<tr>
<td>PEAS</td>
<td>Portuguese East African Society (Southern Rhodesia)</td>
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<td>PIDE</td>
<td>Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado (International and State Defence Police; Portugal)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>RGANI</td>
<td>Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Noveishei Istorii (Russian State Archive of Contemporary History)</td>
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<td>SACP</td>
<td>South African Communist Party</td>
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<td>SARF</td>
<td>State Archive of the Russian Federation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCCI</td>
<td>Serviço de Centralização e Coordenação de Informações (Service for the Centralization and Coordination of Intelligence; Portugal)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIGINT</td>
<td>Signal intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWA</td>
<td>South West Africa</td>
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<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>South-West Africa’s Peoples Organization (South West Africa)</td>
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<td>TANU</td>
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<td>TJCC</td>
<td>The João Cabrita Collection</td>
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<td>TT</td>
<td>Torre do Tombo Archive (Lisbon, Portugal)</td>
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<td>UAM</td>
<td>Union Africaine et Malgache (African Union and Malagasy)</td>
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<td>UAR</td>
<td>United Arab Republic (Egypt)</td>
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<td>UDENAMO</td>
<td>União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique (National Democratic Union of Mozambique)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMI</td>
<td>União Nacional Africana de Moçambique Independente (African National Union of Independent Mozambique)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNITA</td>
<td>União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development (also, see AID)</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Socialist Soviet Republics</td>
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<td>UPA</td>
<td>União dos Povos de Angola (The Union of the Peoples of Angola)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UV</td>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
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<tr>
<td>YAR</td>
<td>Yemen Arab Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZANU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African National Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZAPU</td>
<td>Zimbabwe African People’s Union</td>
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Chapter I

Introduction

The late 1950s and early 1960s saw the most intense phase of African decolonization. The epitome of this process took place in 1960, branded the ‘year of Africa’, when seventeen nations became independent from their European colonial powers of Britain, France, and Belgium. Portugal, however, remained determined to preserve its control over Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, São Tomé e Príncipe, and Cape Verde, as well as its territories in Asia. In March 1961, the first large-scale outbreak of armed rebellion against Portuguese colonial authorities took place in Angola. This set Portugal on a protracted 13-year long counter-insurgency war effort in African territories under its control, drew significant international attention to the issue of Portuguese colonialism, and invited political and economic pressures on the Portuguese government. In the context of the Cold War, where the American strategic aim of preventing Communism from expanding in Africa was opposed by the Soviet bloc’s efforts to increase its sphere of influence on the continent, the processes of national liberation by means of both political and armed struggle in Portuguese-controlled territories progressively gained an East-West-polarized character.

Throughout the 1961-1974 period, a number of rival national liberation movements and factions were formed in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau, competing with each other for political and military headship in each of the territories, and aiming at becoming internationally recognized as the foremost representatives of the respective peoples in their struggle against colonialism. While publicly positioning themselves as nationalists, thus claiming their neutrality in the contexts of the Cold War and the Sino-Soviet rift, in practice most, if not all the leaders of the different national liberation movements were sponsored by the Soviet Union (USSR), the United States (US), or the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Although Soviet, American and Chinese rhetoric before the international community was underpinned by their seeming sense of justice and solidarity with African peoples fighting against colonial oppression and aiming at achieving their countries’ independence, major international players’ engagements with such processes were primarily guided by
their particular conflicting political and strategic interests, in the frameworks and settings of their foreign relations and policies, and subject to changes in leadership.¹

Foreign powers’ support to different national liberation movements included political, financial, and military aid, as well as educational programmes and military training. Not only did the degree and nature of these relations and support vary throughout that period, but they also saw shifts between different movements and their leaders and major powers. While such shifts and variations resulted from, or were dictated by a myriad of different factors, they were largely correlated with nationalist leaders’ apparent or actual political and ideological predilections in the contexts of the Cold War and Sino-Soviet split. Other factors included their political and/or military competence in successfully organizing and leading their movements, and the degree of these movements’ successes not only in their struggle against the Portuguese, but also in their actual or potential ability to gain the upper hand in the context of factional conflicts. Importantly, numerous African states were also involved in the processes of national liberation in Portuguese Africa, supporting particular movements and factions. However, the agencies of African states in affecting the superpowers’ engagements with the processes of national liberation, their impact on Soviet and American courses of action and their influence on the superpowers’ ability to achieve tactical and strategic goals in the early 1960s remain a largely neglected subject in the literature.

Although the armed uprising in Angola in March 1961 is generally seen as the beginning of national liberation in the so-called Portuguese Africa as a whole, this process followed particular patterns in different territories. In contrast to Angola and Guinea-Bissau, the Mozambican national liberation armed struggle began only in 1964, even though the first politically active anti-colonial Mozambican movements and liberation fronts had been formed in 1961 and 1962. While Mozambican national liberation drew greater attention of the international community and brought about more assertive engagements of different international players after the beginning of the armed struggle, the preceding 1961-1963 period was hardly a lethargic phase in

¹ Such frameworks and settings included major powers’ relations with Asian and African states, European colonial powers, and different international contingencies. For example, US Administrations’ policies and decision-making regarding wars of national liberation were subject to their relations with the governments of Portugal and South Africa, and affected by the Vietnam war, and conflicting views within the American officialdom, particularly between those prioritizing relations with African states and organizations on the one hand, and those valuing close ties to European partners, such as Portugal.
this process. It saw intense factional competition and conflicts within the larger Mozambican nationalist milieu, in which both regional and international actors played a role. In particular, it saw the involvement of different African states and groups of states pursuing particular and often conflicting interests and goals, and the engagement of the superpowers, the latter advancing their interests and designs, primarily by covert means. However, the general scholarship has paid only superficial attention to the roles of these actors in the context of Mozambican national liberation during that period. In particular, few works have engaged in examining in depth how regional African actors affected the designs and courses of action of the superpowers, and contributed to the triumphs and failures of their policies. This, therefore, corresponds to the central subject of this research, whose scope and timeframe is limited to the 1961-1963 period of Mozambican national liberation, in the contexts of the Cold War and African affairs.

Most of the contemporary historical studies on the Cold War in Southern Africa, and particularly on the former Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique, have largely revolved around critical episodes of power struggle between rival nationalist political parties, upon and in the aftermath of these countries’ independence. The Front of National Liberation of Angola’s (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola’s (UNITA) unsuccessful attempt to overthrow the Angolan government of the pro-Soviet People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in 1975, or the summary execution of rival political figures of Mozambican nationalism by FRELIMO led by Samora Machel in the same year, are some examples of such episodes. These events, which saw substantial overt and covert involvement or influence of the USSR, the PRC, Cuba, the US, as well as different neighbouring African states, have been regarded as critical inasmuch as being determinant for shaping the subsequent political landscape at local, regional, and international levels. Their bringing about bloody decades-long civil wars in Angola and Mozambique between different factions supported by major international players, as well as African states emphasizes such a critical character.

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One should note, however, that the struggle between rival movements was largely a result of particular settings existent prior to Angolan and Mozambican independence, and in which external inputs played a role. This calls, therefore, for the need to examine the ways in which the development of events in the Angolan and Mozambican nationalist milieux was affected by regional and international players, in the context of the Cold War, the Sino-Soviet split, and the clash between groups of African states divided by their positions regarding Pan-Africanism, encompassing both states and regional and international organizations.

While the period of armed national liberation struggle in Portuguese African colonies stretched from 1961 to 1974, this research examines historical events preceding these countries’ independence by nearly a decade. In particular, it begins by looking at the year of 1961, corresponding to the gestation of Mozambican nationalist liberation movements. This paper is underpinned by two primary questions: what were the major international players’ initiatives and approaches towards Mozambican nationalism, and how did these initiatives develop? Also how were these inputs affected by particular political agendas of leaders of both African states and national liberation movements?

A number of academic works produced after the end of the Cold War addressing the superpowers’ competition in the Third World, and particularly in Africa, have taken a revisionist approach. They have argued that the local political actors, as well as those considered mere Soviet or American client states, often played more significant a role in shaping the development of events in both local and regional arenas rather than simply being pawns in the international giants’ pursuit of their political agendas, shaped by their interests, and particularly their Cold War priorities.3 As Fursenko and Naftali put it when addressing the effects of the explosion of nationalism in the Third World on the superpowers’ relations,

“Khrushchev and his American rivals were hostages to fortune in [the Third World countries] where a few planeloads of weapons and one charismatic leader could install new regimes. One of the great myths of the Cold War was that the superpowers orchestrated events in these regions through handmade puppets. … Nkrumah, Touré, Lumumba, …

and Nasser were nobody’s puppets. Indeed, most skillfully played the superpowers off each other. Nevertheless, Washington and Moscow competed for these leaders’ favor, and the competition undermined any gains made in discussions over the main issues dividing the superpowers in Europe and at home.\textsuperscript{4}

Thus while such a welcome reevaluation of the relationships between Third World actors and the superpowers has gained prominence, emphasizing the proactive roles and agencies of local and regional actors and their impact on Washington and Moscow, it has not been sufficiently applied to the case of the early stages of Mozambican national liberation.

By painting a detailed picture of the development of the first meaningful Mozambican nationalist movements, the thesis asserts that particular political goals and agendas of leaders of different African states, and the respective conflicts between them, significantly affected the international powers’ designs and courses of action regarding the process of national liberation of Mozambique. Not less importantly, the actions and agendas of leaders of Mozambican nationalist movements also represented a critical factor affecting the Soviet, American, and Chinese designs for the region.

In this context, while the superpowers represent one of the main subjects of the present study, it is produced with the assumption that a comprehensive examination of historical events concerning the ways in which the development of Mozambican national liberation movements took place in the regional and international political context is essential for understanding the roles played by, and the approaches of the Soviet Union and the United States regarding the process of national liberation of Mozambique. Unlike many other studies on the subject, which take a top-down approach by examining the superpowers’ policies and actions and their effects on African political state of affairs, this study begins by taking a bottom-up approach focusing on the agencies of African actors and the development of events at local and regional levels. In so doing, it first examines the local dimension of Mozambican nationalist movements and the involved African states, subsequently proceeding to the international sphere involving the superpowers and other international actors. This bottom-up approach helps us to reach an understanding of the ways in which local and regional African actors’ agendas and courses of action

affected the interests of the superpowers throughout their engagement with the processes of national liberation in Portuguese Southern African colonies. By so doing, this study stresses that despite the pursuit of particular agendas by the superpowers, the development of events was significantly affected by the aims and actions of local, regional, and continental African actors, something which influenced the superpowers’ further approaches and courses of action. Also, while not being the central subject of this paper, the role of the Portuguese security and intelligence service in undermining the position of African national liberation movements is addressed, something which in turn affected Soviet interests in the region. As this thesis demonstrates, the implications of these factors were two-fold.

Firstly, while initially the Mozambican nationalist leaders and the respective movements seemed not to have strong predilections for either major international power or respective African clients, the state of affairs in both regional and international political arenas required them to side with one. Rather unsurprisingly, this resulted in a political landscape characterised by division of the Mozambican liberation movement as a whole into largely pro-Soviet, pro-American, and pro-Chinese parties, thus giving rise to, and being the root of further long-term factional struggle throughout the national liberation war, which to some extent was also reflected in the continuation of a similar situation in the aftermath of independence.

Secondly, the political agendas of, and the roles played by different African actors at all levels limited the Soviet courses of action towards the process of Mozambican nationalist struggle, affecting its standing in the region, and influencing its further designs. Ultimately, not only did Moscow fail to meet its objectives at these earlier stages, thus never reaching the desired level of influence over the process of national liberation, but also the development of events provided favourable ground for the PRC and the US to engage more actively with Mozambican nationalist aspirations.
Literature review

Section I

A succinct outline of the literature can be categorized into four broad thematic sets. The first concerns the national liberation movements of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau, and their leaders. The respective works address not only their struggles against the Portuguese authorities, but also inter and intra-factional struggles. Many such works focus on the political and social aspects of national liberation movements and their leaders. Although some of them make reference to these movements’ relations with different regional and international actors, they largely represent only one of the different components in the processes of national liberation, and in most cases are addressed superficially. Among the most well known works belonging to the first thematic set are those of Marcum,\(^5\) Cahen,\(^6\) Davidson,\(^7\) Ncomo,\(^8\) and Cabrita.\(^9\)

The second set addresses the counter-insurgency and political efforts of the white-minority regimes of Portugal, South Africa, and Southern Rhodesia against the escalating threats posed by national liberation movements and the broad phenomenon of African decolonization. The respective works address not only the military and security aspects of this effort, but also political and economic relations between the three countries, and their relations with other international actors, particularly the United States and Western European countries and organizations, in the contexts of the Cold War and decolonization. Among the large number of such works are those of Antunes, Vieira \textit{et al.}, Mateus, Ferreira, and Onslow.\(^10\)


\(^8\) Ncomo, \textit{Uria Simango}.

\(^9\) Cabrita, \textit{Mozambique}.

The third thematic set focuses on the American and Soviet political and strategic approaches towards the processes of national liberation in Portuguese colonies and African affairs in general. The respective works address issues such as American relations with colonial powers and national liberation movements, American and Soviet engagements with the processes of national liberation, and their relations with other African actors in the contexts of the Cold War and decolonization. Some of the most notable authors are Klinghoffer, Schneidman, and Shubin.11

Finally, there is a broad set of literature which only partly or briefly addresses the above subjects or related historical episodes. The respective works largely help to contextualize them in light of other historical events or broader political, military, social and cultural phenomena belonging to a myriad of scholarly fields. Some themes include the superpowers’ naval strategies during the Cold War, intelligence services’ operations in Africa, or the evolving political paths of Soviet and American leaders and their Administrations in the context of African decolonization. Such works not only add valuable pieces of information to the analysis of the central subject of my research, but also provide different perspectives on them. Some books belonging to this final set are Westad’s acclaimed *The Global Cold War,* 12 Hall’s ‘Naval Diplomacy in West African Waters’ in Kaplan’s *Diplomacy of Power,* 13 Katz’s *The
Third World in Soviet Military Thought,\textsuperscript{14} The KGB and the Third World by Andrew and Mitrokhin,\textsuperscript{15} Gleijeses’s Conflicting Missions,\textsuperscript{16} and Fursenko and Naftali’s Khrushchev’s Cold War.\textsuperscript{17} Despite their value for the general historiography, and particularly for the contextualization of particular events, agencies, and perspectives, these works are mostly circumstantially pertinent to the specific subject, region, and time period my research focuses on.

In examining a myriad of different works on the subjects of national liberation struggles or Portuguese counter-insurgency wars in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, and the superpowers’ engagements with these processes, one notes the tendency of different authors to pay especial attention to the roles of particular actors involved, whose perceived importance, therefore, varies from work to work. As a result, by prioritizing the agencies of particular actors over others, the latter are implicitly given a secondary role in the examined historical processes. Moreover, some books do not even engage with them, painting therefore a picture in which a number of political actors represent mere secondary and background components in the studied events. For example, while books focusing on the superpowers tend to disregard the importance of Portuguese political and military officials, books focusing on the latter tend to disregard the importance of nationalist movements and their leaders. In turn, those works addressing nationalist movements and their leaders tend to dismiss the impact of both the Cold War and Portuguese officials’ decision-making. While there is no rule to such tendencies, they are nonetheless perceptible.

This is hardly surprising, given the focus of each study on particular actors, which inevitably tends to portray them as central elements to the detriment of others. The result, however, is a myriad of unbalanced narratives, analyses and discourses regarding such processes and foreign actors’ engagements with them during the examined period. As argued further in section III of this literature review, such tendencies do not simply correspond to different authors’ scholarly predilections favouring the study of particular historical actors. Rather, they represent particular schools of thought, translated into respective discourses and are both a cause and a

\textsuperscript{14} Mark Katz, The Third World in Soviet Military Thought, (London: Croom Helm, 1982).
\textsuperscript{16} Note: The KGB’s First Chief Directorate – Foreign Intelligence, is also referred to as the ‘Centre’.
\textsuperscript{17} Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions.
\textsuperscript{18} Fursenko & Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War.
consequence of analytical limitations inherent to a great majority of academic works on the subject produced hitherto.

Notably, amongst a great variety of the literature on the history of the Cold War and national liberation struggles in former Portuguese colonies, not only has the role of African states and their officials involved in these processes been superficially addressed, but also the impact of their decision-making, goals and agendas on the Soviet and American engagements with such processes has remained a largely neglected subject. The need to fill such a gap in the literature corresponds, therefore, to the primary motivation behind my research.

The involvement of different African political actors in the process of national liberation of Mozambique took place from the early formation of Mozambican nationalist movements in 1961. This not only concerns the neighbouring countries such as Tanganyika (Tanzania), Nyasaland (Malawi) and Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), but also Kenya, Uganda, those in Western Africa such as Ghana and Guinea-Conakry, and North African states such as Morocco, Algeria and the United Arab Republic (Egypt). One of the central questions regarding their involvement concerns their motivations for doing so. Moreover, given that different African states assisted particular Mozambican nationalist factions to the detriment of others, one must question the reasons behind such predilections. Some authors have pointed to, or sometimes only implied, African leaders’ sense of responsibility and solidarity with their brethren oppressed by colonial rule, who should therefore be supported in their struggle to free themselves from colonialism. Others have pointed to such leaders’ seeming political and ideological predilections contextualized in Cold War polarization of Africa, and particularly the strong influence of the Soviet bloc on their policies and economies. Here, the support of leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah and Sékou Touré for movements claiming Marxist and socialist affiliations is sometimes associated with these leaders’ close relations with the Soviet bloc. One should also refer to the case of the Angolan national liberation struggle, where Marcum and Vieira et al. stress the importance of ethnic and tribal identities behind the willingness of leaders of neighbouring Congo-Leopoldville (Zaire) and Congo-Brazzaville in

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providing support to different Angolan nationalist movements. In fact, the politicization of ethnicity is one of the recurring themes in the literature addressing the relationship between national liberation movements and neighbouring African countries. In supporting their arguments, these authors point to how changes of leadership in these countries – often by force rather than by democratic process – translated into changes in these countries’ preference for particular movements and affected their support.\(^{20}\)

Despite the variety of arguments, some works either explicitly or implicitly associate the degree of American or Soviet influence in particular African states and these countries’ assistance to particular national liberation movements with (seemingly or not) pro-Western or pro-Communist leanings. Such a reading of historical developments is inclined, therefore, to paint a picture where the East-West confrontation in Africa was expressed in the superpowers advancing their goals and interests in the processes of national liberation by means of their influence on different African states involved in these processes. As a result, more often than not African states are portrayed as instruments in the superpowers’ goals and designs. The agencies of African states and organizations are given only a marginal role in the development of events, since they are positioned as passive bystanders or subordinate players, acting in response to the pressures and influence of the superpowers.\(^{21}\)

While in some other cases due acknowledgment is made to the initiatives of African states and their leaders in supporting anti-colonial struggle, this is often contextualized in the broad dimensions of the Cold War and the ‘winds of change’, encouraging free African states to help expunge the remnants of colonialism from the continent. Such deterministic discourses diminish any pro-active quality of African leaders’ decisions and actions, suggesting instead that global and regional historical pressures and conjunctures induced their actions. (This issue will be further addressed in section II.)

All such perspectives often go hand-in-hand, without an effort being made in the literature to precisely determine the core or most predominant motivations behind African actors’ involvement in the processes of national liberation. This, however, is not necessarily a totally flawed approach to the factors involved. Given the


\(^{21}\) Davidson, *The People’s Cause*, pp. 122-123;
complexity and multidimensionality of the studied historical events, the above-mentioned factors did find a degree of expression in African leaders’ motivations. However, as the results of this research show, while the motivations behind different African actors’ involvement in the process of Mozambican national liberation often varied on a case-by-case basis (though some of them were congruent), they were primarily dictated by their specific political and economic interests, goals and agendas.

Clearly, it would be an overstatement to say that these motivations were always or totally disconnected from Cold War-derived pressures or aloof to African leaders’ desire to see the continent rid of colonialism and apartheid. In fact, the anti-colonial rhetoric of some African statesmen was often backed by action, and the superpowers’ efforts to influence the processes of national liberation in ways favouring their interests were welcomed whenever this coincided with the interests of particular African players involved. However, as my research has shown, support for the anti-colonial struggle and collaboration with either superpower in the context of these processes was largely a means for a number of African leaders to achieve their particular goals, not an end in itself. In this regard, while African states represented, to different degrees, a means for the Soviet Union and the United States to advance their goals and interests, they also perceived the superpowers as valuable assets in achieving their own particular goals. The power dynamics of such relations, therefore, had a more complex and idiosyncratic character than the one generally presented in the literature.

*Key limitations of the literature*

Apart from the gap in the literature regarding the roles of African states and their impact on the superpowers’ approaches towards the process of Mozambican national liberation, one should stress two other limitations.

One is the scholarship’s generalized focus on later periods of national liberation struggle. Regarding Mozambican national liberation, numerous works in the field have paid greater attention to the post-1963 period of armed struggle, and when major foreign powers’ engagements also became more tangible. In general,
however, the episode of Portuguese colonies’ transition to independence has deserved most attention, and the covert and military interventions of Cuba, Zaire, South Africa and the United States in Angola in 1974-1975 is perhaps the most widely examined topic in this realm.\textsuperscript{22} Therefore, these works have tended to leave the preceding historical period in the realm of Portuguese colonial affairs and/or African nationalists struggle for independence, something which in turn has resulted in a picture that largely sets apart the phenomena of the Cold War and decolonization, particularly during the first half of the 1960s.

The second key limitation in the literature is the generally superficial, inconsistent, or lopsided treatment of the roles of the superpowers in the processes of national liberation in the Portuguese colonies. This is especially evident in works addressing white-minority regimes’ military and security efforts, which largely correspond to numerous memoirs of Portuguese, Rhodesian and South African former military officers, as well as academic studies of these countries’ security services activities. Dalila Mateus’s \textit{PIDE/DGS na Guerra Colonial}, João Ferreira’s \textit{Em Nome da Patria}, and \textit{The Cold War in Southern Africa}, by Sue Onslow are examples.\textsuperscript{23}

Mateus’s book focuses on the history of Portuguese security and intelligence services’ involvement in countering nationalist insurgency in Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea. Like many other works in the field, it falls into the generalized tendency of the literature to make only superficial reference to the roles of both the superpowers and African states in the processes of national liberation. Conversely, Portuguese officials are given the role of protagonists in her account. Apart from references to shipments of Soviet and Chinese weapons and equipment, the impact of Communist propaganda upon African nationalists, and their training abroad, one is left with a vague understanding of the superpowers’ \textit{modi operandi} and strategic rationale in the process of national liberation. Because the roles of local and regional African players are also given scant attention in Mateus’s study, depicted

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almost as mere bystanders in the developments of events, no assessment is made on their impact on Soviet and American engagements with Mozambican nationalists.

In a less academic and more personal fashion, Ferreira follows such a trend in *Em Nome da Pátria*. The author defends the righteousness of Portugal’s counter-insurgency wars by resorting to the Just War theory, and supports the Portuguese government’s resolve to oppose the pressures to decolonize. In referring to the roles of foreign actors, his argument is centered on the idea that African insurgencies were largely a result of an extensive conspiracy of Communist powers and international movements. In so doing, the author tends to greatly underestimate and oversimplify the agency and prominence of both nationalist movements and African states, and even refers to the former as ‘terrorists’ – a label extensively used by the official rhetoric of the Salazar regime. While making vague claims about Communist international conspiracy, and the non-aligned movement’s anti-colonial rhetoric, Ferreira provides no clear illustration and assessment of what exact roles did regional and international foreign actors play in the processes of national liberation. Indeed, the unsubstantiated claim about Communism expansion through Third World proxies remains the recurring theme in the book. This results in an unbalanced account which not only falls in the realm of vague historical research concerning superpower intervention in Portuguese Africa, but also explicitly disregards any agency of both African states and national liberation leaders in the development of historical events.

Finally, and contrary to what the title might suggest, Onslow’s *The Cold War in Southern Africa* focuses primarily on the South African effort to preserve its control over the South West African territory (Namibia). It also addresses the ways in which white-minority regimes reacted to the escalating nationalist violence, and provides a broad historical contextualization of Communist penetration into the region throughout the Cold War. The scenarios of Angola and Mozambique, however, are largely left at the perimeter of analysis, and the book does not provide much information on the roles of independent African states in the context of national liberation in Mozambique, and how they interacted with and affected the superpowers in this realm.
Exceptions to such common traits in the literature are John Marcum’s two volumes *The Angolan Revolution*, produced in the 1960s. Focusing on the rise of Angolan nationalism and developments in the Angolan national liberation struggle, they provide what is perhaps one of the most accurate and comprehensive accounts of the involvement of foreign regional and international actors in the processes of national liberation produced to date. Moreover, Marcum’s valuable references to the states of affairs in both Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea provide a more complete picture of events in the three colonial territories, added by their contextualization in the realms of African affairs and the Cold War. Such an approach is sensible, given the complex frameworks of antagonistic or cooperative relations that existed between different local, regional, and international actors involved.

Regarding the roles of African states, Marcum points to variations in the provision of Soviet aid to Angolan rebels as a result of competing interests of Congo-Leopoldville and Congo-Brazzaville, and the latter’s antagonisms with Morocco and Algeria. He also addresses the Zambian government’s decision to host a split MPLA faction closely associated to Peking, and how this badly affected the position of the Soviet-backed core MPLA faction led by Agostinho Neto. In light of this research, however, Marcum’s works are most valuable in demonstrating the important roles played by African states in the competition between nationalist movements, and their impact on the development of events throughout the liberation struggle. In fact, the conflicting interests in the realm of African affairs have come to the fore as a major factor shaping this process. Nevertheless, given these books’ focus on Angola, and the unavailability of data from the now-declassified Soviet, American, and Portuguese official documents, their incursions into the impact of African actors on the Soviet and American policies and strategies regarding the early period of Mozambican nationalism are insufficient.

In looking at the third thematic set of the literature, two books focusing on the superpowers’ evolving political approaches towards the processes of national

liberation in Portuguese colonies are Witney Schneidman’s *Engaging Africa*,\(^\text{27}\) and Vladimir Shubin’s *The Hot Cold War*,\(^\text{28}\) the latter totally devoted to the Soviet engagement in Southern Africa. Schneidman’s work focuses on the different approaches adopted by US Administrations from Kennedy to Nixon towards Portugal’s colonialism and the ‘white rule’ regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa. In particular, the author highlights the internal conflicting views within each successive US Administration as a critical factor for the changing American policies towards the crises of Portuguese colonies. While Schneidman makes reference to particular episodes regarding the relations between Mozambican nationalist leaders and US Administrations, they are not only scarce, but also meant to put into context and explicate State Department and White House decision-making. By prioritizing internal dynamics within the US officialdom, and paying considerable attention to later stages of national liberation struggle, *Engaging Africa* offers little for our understanding of the role African states played in American decision-making and courses of action, and how did they played out in the particular case of Mozambican national liberation during the 1961-1964 period.

Shubin, in turn, attempts to paint a revisionist picture of Soviet engagement with the nationalist movements of Southern Africa. The author rebuffs Cold War concerns about the underlying motives for Soviet enterprises in the region, and goes so far as to characterise the general tendency of associating the Soviet bloc’s involvement with Moscow’s strategic aims for expanding its influence in the region as an overstatement. Thus, he presents the Soviet economic and political aid to the Angolan MPLA and the Mozambican FRELIMO as an act of genuine support for the oppressed people struggling for freedom and independence. In so doing, not only does Shubin deliberately neglect Moscow’s strategic objectives in Southern Africa, but he also fails to address the roles of intelligence services in advancing Soviet aims. Similarly to Schneidman, by painting a picture of direct relations between Soviet officialdom and the leaders of national liberation movements, Shubin overlooks the impact of regional African actors on Moscow’s involvement in the region. As in most other works, the greater part of Shubin’s book focuses on Angola in the early and mid-1970s. All of this not only leaves an informational gap in his already lopsided

\(^{27}\) Schneidman, *Engaging Africa*.
\(^{28}\) Shubin, *The Hot Cold War*.
historical account, but also contributes little to our understanding of the roles of African states and their leaders in those historical processes and especially of their influence on Soviet engagements in Mozambique.

As this brief review of the broader literature has stressed, not only has the account of the roles played by African actors in affecting Soviet and American designs and courses of action in the context of Mozambican national liberation remained rather incomplete, but it also has mainly consisted of a myriad of superficial or detached references to their involvement in the East-West confrontation during the crises in the three Portuguese colonies. Hence, and rather paradoxically, the examined broader literature has revealed what has not been said, rather than what has, almost naturally raising a number of questions such as what were the motivations behind African states’ involvement in the process of Mozambican national liberation? How was their involvement related to their goals and designs in the realms of the Cold War and African affairs? What roles did African actors play in the superpowers’ designs and goals regarding this process?

Such questions entail that this field deserves deeper examination, let alone the fact that the history of Cold War in Portuguese colonies remains itself a poorly researched dimension, especially in the early stages of the national liberation struggle. As Graham puts it in referring to the general literature on the subject, “a notable gap in the historiography that needs to be addressed is that of lusophone Africa … Many of the studies that deal with lusophone countries are Western or South African-focused accounts, and fail to analyse what was actually going on in Angola and Mozambique - namely, their interactions with foreign powers and the true nature of their role in African liberation in Southern Africa. This is a much under-researched area.”

Finally, one should address the literature focusing on the history of Mozambican national liberation, and point to its limitations regarding the subject of my research. Although the contemporary history of Mozambique has been a widely researched area, scholarly attention has been largely focused on socio-cultural and economic aspects in the realm of Portuguese colonial policies. In turn, most of the

29 Matthew Graham, review article ‘Cold War in Southern Africa’, by Onslow, in Africa Spectrum, 54, 1, 2010, p. 139;
works addressing the process of national liberation have paid great attention to particular and often polemic episodes, such as the formation of Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) in 1962, the assassinations of nationalist leaders Eduardo Mondlane in 1969 and Uria Simango in 1975, and the transitional period to Mozambican independence in 1974. Also, most works produced by African researchers attempt to pay tribute to particular nationalist figures, while implicitly vilifying others, together with the respective foreign supporters and Portuguese colonialism. Works by Ncomo, Cabrita, and Zengazenga, discussed below, are examples. Thus historical studies have largely focused on events at the local level, revolving around inter and intra-factional conflicts in the larger Mozambican nationalist milieu, and provided biased analyses of events, while paying most attention to the post-1963 period.

Only a few works, therefore, have presented a reasonably comprehensive picture of the early period of Mozambican national liberation involving foreign actors. Despite their limitations, João Cabrita’s *Mozambique*, Bernabê Ncomo’s *Uria Simango*, and António Disse Zengazenga’s *Memórias de um rebelde* are among the most detailed works produced to date.\(^{30}\) Other valuable studies are those of Michel Cahen.\(^{31}\) In pursuing different objectives in their works, the three authors resorted to different methodologies and sources, and produced different narratives and readings of historical events. Cabrita resorted extensively to declassified American documents, and has paid significant attention to the political path of Eduardo Mondlane. Cahen, in turn, made use of the Portuguese documents held in the Torre do Tombo archive (TT), attributing great importance to tribal and ethnic differences between Mozambican leaders in order to explain factional clashes. Zengazenga’s autobiography relies primarily on his own memoires as a former member of FRELIMO, firstly training as a guerrilla fighter in Egypt and later pursuing university studies in the Soviet Union. Finally, Ncomo made use of numerous oral accounts in attempting to shed new light on the controversial political path of the prominent figure of Uria Simango, while depicting his rivals as elements of both a greater Communist and Mozambican regionalist conspiracies to gain power. Unsurprisingly,
in pursuing different objectives, these works produced oversimplified assessments of particular historical events, agencies, and phenomena, and ignored many others.

Both Cabrita and Ncomo pay attention, albeit to different degrees and in different fashions, to the roles of both the superpowers and African states in the early stages of the process of Mozambican national liberation. For example, both make reference to the rivalry between Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana as a factor in the Mozambican inter and intra-factional competition. In doing so, they emphasize Ghanaian relations with the Soviet bloc, which Ncomo bluntly paints as part of a major Communist conspiracy. In a more sober fashion, Cabrita points to the risks of Communist infiltration of Mozambican nationalist circles, something which led West-oriented Mondlane to seek help from, and collaborate with American officials in both Dar-es-Salaam and Washington to get the upper hand over the Moscow-sponsored Mozambican leader Adelino Gwambe.

Regarding the early stages of Mozambique’s national liberation, Zengazenga’s book, in turn, aims to pay tribute to Mondlane’s political opponents, such as Gwambe, Fanuel Mahluza, Paulo Gumane and Calvino Mahlayeye. Firstly, the author emphasizes their prominence in this historical process. Secondly, Zengazenga criticizes the historical accounts of FRELIMO’s proponents, which have downgraded, vilified or ignored the roles of these historical figures. Importantly, a common feature of their works is a focus on the local dimension of Mozambican nationalist movements. This, therefore, largely sets it apart from the multidimensional sphere of global and regional dynamics of the Cold War and African affairs. Yet when they attempt to contextualize local events in the global state of affairs, they do so superficially and insufficiently accurately. The authors often fail to comprehensively engage with the mechanisms and relations inherent in the designs, goals and courses of action of the superpowers and African states in the context of Mozambican faction conflicts, the motivations behind foreign actors’ involvement in the process, and their impact on each other. Ultimately, while Cabrita’s, Ncomo’s, and Zengazenga’s contributions to the historiography of Mozambican national liberation struggle are of

32 Ncomo, *Uria Simango*, pp. 95-105;
33 Cabrita, *Mozambique*, pp. 13-16;
34 Zengazenga, *Memórias de um rebelde*, p. 373.
value, they also clearly exemplify a significant gap in the literature that my research aims at filling.

Section II

Schools of thought and analytical problems

Despite the great variety of themes, subjects and scholarly fields of study of the examined works, one can identify two predominant schools of thought and respective discourses in the historiography of the processes of national liberation, and the superpower and African states’ engagements with them. Such schools of thought differ according to their, albeit often implicit, analytical and methodological approaches to the study of those historical processes. This, in turn, has had a two-fold outcome.

Firstly, it has contributed to generating particular views and narratives translated into, or corresponding to the thematic sets of the literature outlined in section I, and encompassed into particular fields of study. On the one hand, works belonging to Lusophone African studies largely correspond to the thematic sets focusing on national liberation movements, and their struggle against the Portuguese colonial regime, or the Portuguese political and military effort to preserve control over colonial territories. On the other hand, works of Cold War studies tend to address such conflicts in the context of the superpower confrontation.

Secondly, it has sometimes resulted in analytical deadlocks found in the literature preventing the respective authors from more comprehensively engaging with particular subjects, given their narrow focus on, and priority given to particular actors to the detriment of others. In order to overcome such a problem, this study takes a more flexible methodological approach, through a combination of bottom-up and top-down analyses involving the three strata of political actors, - local, regional, and international. The bottom-up analysis corresponds to the examination of local and regional political dynamics and their effects on the superpowers, and the top-down analysis assesses the impact of the superpower competition on African actors. Such an approach, therefore, places the African states at the centre of this study, allowing us to reach an accurate understanding of their roles in affecting Soviet and American
engagements with the process of Mozambican national liberation. This section further explicates how this particular approach helps solve the above-mentioned analytical deadlocks found in the literature, thus enabling this thesis to add value to the scholarship.

In the first case, a number of authors have adopted a ‘top-down’ analytical approach focusing on the policies, strategies and actions of the superpowers towards Third World actors, and particularly African states and national liberation movements. This approach emphasizes the agency of the Soviet Union and/or the United States in the development of events in Africa, and their actions in influencing or shaping the courses of events on the continent. Such an approach translates into a discourse either implicitly or explicitly bringing to the fore the somewhat subordinated position of African actors in relation to major international powers, thus prioritizing the agency of Moscow and Washington, whose agendas are portrayed as dictating the development of events at regional and local levels. While this is especially noticeable in the writings produced before the end of the Cold War, which have contributed to the generalized notion that the development of most, if not all events in the Third World, and particularly in Africa have resulted from the actions of, and plans devised by the superpowers and major powers, a number of contemporary studies have continued to adopt such a perspective.

Andrew & Mitrokhin’s *The KGB and the Third World* is a clear example. In discussing this Soviet intelligence organization’s activities in the Third World, the authors systematically follow the paradigm of Moscow’s policy-making and actions effects on Third World players. In referring to Africa, the authors illustrate how the KGB’s disinformation operations targeting different African leaders influenced their decision-making and political orientation, particularly against West European countries and the United States. The book emphasizes the vulnerable and nearly ingenuous character of African leaders, manipulated by the Kremlin’s covert means.35

Another book following such a trend is Gavshon’s *Crisis in Africa*. While not focusing solely on the wars of national liberation, the author’s discourse is underpinned by the popular criticism of major powers’ neo-colonialist intents towards Africa, where the superpowers and West European countries are identified as

35 Andrew & Mitrokhin, *The KGB and the World*. 
perpetrators of the misfortunes of young African nations. According to Gavshon, African peoples could have led much better lives since the independence of their countries, had foreign actors refrained from interfering with them as they pursued their strategic and economic interests, and not used the continent as a battlefield for global supremacy during the Cold War.\footnote{Gavshon, \textit{Crisis in Africa}, pp. 16-17;}

Other works featuring a similar discourse, albeit notably critical of the Western or the so-called imperialist powers, are those of Basil Davidson. He argued that, contrary to Communist powers providing valuable aid to the peoples struggling against colonial oppression, Western economic and political circles aiming at preserving a degree of control over the African continent resulted in American and West European eagerness to support the Portuguese war effort through NATO and bilateral arm deals with the Salazar regime.\footnote{Davidson, \textit{The Liberation of Guiné}; Davidson, \textit{The People’s Cause}.} Although the author pays a great deal of attention to the effort of national liberation movements in their struggle against the Portuguese, the importance of Cold War dynamics and the interests of the superpowers ultimately eclipse the roles of African leaders involved in these processes. For example, in referring to Sékou Touré’s support for the Guinea-Bissau PAIGC, Davidson positions this African leader’s motivations as being underpinned by his sense of solidarity with the oppressed neighbours, while implying that such benevolent actions were only possible due to the altruistic aid provided by the USSR and the PRC through Guinea-Conakry.

More recent studies such as those of Schneidman and Shubin also follow a top-down approach. Schneidman, for example, illustrates how Mondlane of FRELIMO and Roberto of FNLA were attempting to get favour from successive American Administrations, and how they had to change their allegiances and courses of action as a result of changing American attitudes towards them.\footnote{Schneidman, \textit{Engaging Africa}, pp. 62, 63, 83, 102, 103.} With the superpowers’ policymaking being the primary subject of their works, therefore, not only is the agency of both the Soviet Union and the United States prioritized over nationalist leaders, but also the roles of African statesmen almost naturally become secondary.
Hence the first school of thought is generally characterized by presenting the superpowers as the subject of policy and decision-making, whereas African regional and local actors are given the place of an object that policymaking is devised for and upon which it acts. Works underpinned by such postulations have contributed to an oversimplified understanding of the dynamics taking place in Africa in the contexts of the Cold War and decolonization, in which local and regional actors tend to be regarded as mere dummies or victims, being affected by, and acting in response to the influence or pressures of major international players.

The second scholarly trend treats the roles of the superpowers and those of African states and their leaders as part of a secondary or background dimension, and which merely adds to the complexity of events on the ground. By focusing almost entirely on the struggle for power within and between different nationalist factions, the national liberation struggle or the Portuguese counter-insurgency war effort, a number of authors do not seem to welcome contextualizing such aspects in the Cold War and African affairs, or establishing correlations between actors and events in the local, regional and international political dimensions. It goes without saying that different outlooks between the works focusing on Portugal’s war effort under the label ‘war of the overseas’, and those studying nationalists’ struggle as ‘war of national liberation’ are per se a schism in academic approaches to the subject. Despite being unable to fully disregard a degree of influence of foreign actors and respective global and regional dynamics upon the process of Mozambican national liberation, all such works stress either the agency of individual nationalist leaders or, conversely, Portuguese political, military and security decision makers as key (f)actors in the development of events.

One should note that most works following the second school of thought, and focusing on Mozambican nationalists were produced by scholars with backgrounds in sociology, anthropology, and economics. They tend to explicate the formation and organizational issues of nationalist movements and their respective factional struggles through the tribal, ethnic, and regional differences of their members. In so doing, the processes of national liberation are, again, treated as solely local phenomena, whose dynamics are presented almost entirely as a result of individual and community
rivalries on the basis of ethnic diversity and elites vs. populace.\footnote{Opello’s paper produced immediately after Mozambican independence is a clear example of such a scholarly approach, and which has been rather prevalent ever since. Walter C. Opello Jr. “Pluralism and Elite conflict in an Independence Movement: FRELIMO in the 1960s”, \textit{Journal of Southern African Studies}, Vol. 2, Issue 1, pp. 66-82, Taylor & Francis, 1975.} On some occasions, such phenomena go in parallel with nationalists’ apparent ideological predilections, while more often than not both are only implicitly associated with each other. For example, Ncomo does attempt to establish a relation between the representatives of the so-called “southern (Mozambican) regionalist wing” and Communist conspiracies they were part of.\footnote{Ncomo, \textit{Uria Simango}. Strikingly, in making an effort to vilify Mondlane’s entourage as Communist agents, as opposed to Simango, who is portrayed as a honest, righteous and genuine fighter for democracy and freedom for Mozambique and its people, Ncomo bluntly fails to mention Simango’s close connections to Peking, and contextualize the respective internal struggle within FRELIMO in Sino-Soviet competition.} Yet he does so in an emotional and incoherent manner, presenting little or no hard evidence to back his claims, something which drew a lot of criticism of his work.\footnote{See for example Cahen’s reference to Vieira’s attacks on Ncomo’s work, in Cahen, “Moçambique, o fim da história...única: trajectórias dos anticolonialismos em Moçambique”, in \textit{Africana Studia}, nº15, Centro de estudos africanos da Universidade do Porto, 2010, pp. 325-341.} 

Despite the importance of global and regional political dimensions, Ncomo and especially Cahen insist on painting a picture where ethnic and tribal rivalries were key factors behind the development of events. Cahen’s studies perhaps best represents the second school of thought, based on an analytical approach primarily built upon the primacy of ethnic and tribal aspects. The French scholar does so by shedding light on the complexity of the so-called ‘Mozambican nationalism’, a concept he puts into question, given the great socio-cultural diversity of the peoples living across the Mozambican territory.\footnote{Cahen, “The Mueda case and Maconde political ethnicity”. Cahen, \textit{Les Bandits}.} Unsurprisingly, in so doing, there seems to be an implicit neglect of the impact of the Cold War and African political affairs. Therefore, the roles of international and regional political players, and the respective affiliations of different nationalist leaders and their factions, while not being totally ignored, are given only minor attention or alternatively, none at all.

While the two authors adopt such a locally-based approach for their research, thus falling, albeit to different degrees, in the second scholarly trend, Cahen’s review of Ncomo’s book explicitly illustrates the sharp differences existing between the two schools of thought. By expressing strong criticism of Ncomo’s tentative attempts to explain the actions of some Mozambican figures through their pro-Communist and
pro-Western leanings, Cahen argues that despite such affiliations, whose importance he questions outright, the primary motivation affecting different Mozambican nationalists’ actions grew from their tribal and ethnic differences. According to Cahen, it was the internal factors inherent to socio-cultural dimensions that shaped the developments of events, making therefore irrelevant any evidence of foreign actors’ involvement.43

To sum up, while the first trend features an analysis operating through a top-down vector in the relationships between the superpowers and African actors, the second trend focuses almost solely on the local dimension, paying little or no attention to the regional and global dimensions of the Cold War and African affairs, thus failing to contextualize local events in them, to establish possible correlations between the actors and events of the three strata, or to attempt to determine the impact of the local upon the global. As a result, none of the two schools of thought is adequate for providing an appropriate framework for my research. Such a state of affairs is indicative of the gap in the literature which my research aims at filling.

In grasping the differences between the approaches inherent to these schools of thought, one identifies one major methodological shortcoming leading to analytical deadlocks and contributing to further the differences between the two. A core element intrinsic to such an issue concerns the motivations underpinning the actions and decision-making of different actors. For example, as the above-mentioned works by Fursenko and Naftali, Schneidman, and Westad show, while the Soviet Union and the United States were primarily guided by Cold War interests, African actors were largely guided by local and regional political and economic interests, which were only partly related to the East-West competition. Subsequently, when scholars of the first camp attempt to explicate historical events largely through the lens of the Cold War, they find themselves struggling to explicate actions and behaviours of particular African figures or bodies, when these are clearly inconsistent with the East-West polarization rationale. In turn, those belonging to the second school of thought, especially whose analyses are underpinned by sociological and anthropological perspectives, fail to comprehensively engage with events which resulted from, or were correlated with Cold War dynamics and African political affairs. As a result,

43 Cahen, “Moçambique, o fim da história...única”, p. 331.
they tend to either ignore them or to provide explanations which can hardly withstand any criticism. To a great extent, because both schools’ particular rationales are inadequate for critically and comprehensively managing different historical phenomena, they have not only resulted in a myriad of discourses featuring inconsistent assessments of historical events and in explaining the dynamics of their development, but also have contributed to the gap in the literature this thesis aims at filling.

Strikingly, a common trait identified in the works of both schools of thought is their failing to deeply engage with the roles played by the political actors of the ‘middle stratum’, corresponding to the African states. This tendency to bypass the agencies of African states, in turn, has led to the above-mentioned inconsistencies and analytical deadlocks found in the literature. Because the interactions between the superpowers and local nationalist movements were carried out primarily through these regional actors, African states’ particular and often conflicting interests, goals and actions, therefore, gained a critical importance in dictating the development of events and influencing other actors involved. By engaging in a thorough examination of the roles played by African states through a more flexible and comprehensive methodological approach, this study, therefore, not only fills a gap in the literature, but also helps solving the above-mentioned analytical problems.

Needless to say, in principle, both academic approaches are not necessarily flawed per se, and the respective focuses and contextualizations through which they engage with examining historical events should be taken into account. Yet this dichotomy has not only represented a cause, but also a consequence of their avoidance in deeply engaging with the middle stratum and a core dimension represented by regional African actors, something which has set the two schools further apart. As a result, the respective works have painted rather distinct pictures of the process of national liberation, being a phenomenon intrinsic to the Cold War for the first, and an episode belonging to Mozambican and Portuguese history for the second.

Therefore, it is by examining the roles of regional African actors in the contexts of the Cold War and the process of Mozambican national liberation, thus paying attention to political players of the three strata and the dynamics of their
relations, that this research provides a more flexible and comprehensive analytical framework for the study of these historical events. In this regard, given the focus of this research on the impact of African actors’ decision-making and action on those of the superpowers, one should point to a number of works which have challenged the rationale intrinsic to the first school of thought, and whose argument lies in demonstrating the impact of minor political players’ agency on major international powers.

Reassessment of the roles of small political actors during the Cold War

Several relatively recent works have engaged in a reassessment of the roles played by minor political actors in the Cold War, and the ways they dealt with and affected major international players. Such a reassessment has done a great deal in putting into question the notion of a somewhat subordinated position of minor states in relation to the superpowers, by emphasizing the formers’ determination in carrying out particular foreign and domestic policies with a great degree of independence from the designs and expectations of the latter. According to Berger, the central idea inherent in this reassessment is the shifting focus from Europe to the Third World as the central arena of the superpower rivalry. In his view, the situation in a divided Europe remained largely static throughout the studied period, and it was the evolving decolonization and struggle for influence between the superpowers and other major international actors in the Third World that represented the main battleground of the Cold War.44 In this context, the roles of minor players have come to the fore. Regarding African actors, however, few works engaged in such a discussion.

One example is Matusevich’s No Easy Row for a Russian Hoe, which examines the difficulties faced by Soviet officialdom in its relations with the Nigerian leadership, from this country’s independence until the end of the Cold War. Throughout the book, the author emphasizes three key points behind such challenges: the inadequacy of Soviet political and economic perspectives on African development, the socio-cultural differences which often led to misunderstandings, and above all the

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44 Mark T. Berger, (2008), “The real Cold War was hot: the global struggle for the Third World”, Intelligence and National Security, 23: 1, pp. 112-126;
Nigerian leadership’s pragmatic approach towards Soviet attempts to establish closer relations with the African country.\textsuperscript{45}

In other cases, Gleijeses’s \textit{Conflicting Missions} skillfully illustrates not only the great extent to which Cuba pursued a foreign policy independent from Moscow in its endeavours in both Latin America and Africa, but also how heavily it affected Moscow’s courses of action, by playing on the Soviet public commitment to support its Caribbean ally, even when such support was contrary to Soviet interests. In so doing, the book challenges the widely accepted notion that the superpowers were the sole architects of the courses of historical developments in international politics, and dictated the actions of their smaller and seemingly politically submissive counterparts.

A similar approach can also be identified in the works of the Portuguese scholar Antunes, who presents in detail the ways in which the Portuguese government systematically outmanoeuvred White House anti-colonial policies, in an attempt to reinforce the legitimacy of its colonial rule before the international community, and obtain American military equipment badly needed in its struggle against African insurgent movements.\textsuperscript{46}

It is perhaps Fursenko and Naftali’s acclaimed study \textit{Khrushchev’s Cold War} that most explicitly emphasizes the great degree of de facto political independence of African actors from Moscow and Washington. In examining Khrushchev’s political path and decision-making, the authors clearly illustrate that many Third World leaders in Asia, Africa, and Latin America were playing the superpowers off each other, manoeuvring between the rhetoric and the practice of their blurred allegiances to, and partnerships with the West or the East, ultimately aiming at achieving their particular political goals at regional or local levels.\textsuperscript{47}

Here, Markus Wolf’s autobiography also provides valuable insights into the recurrent practices of African leaders taking advantage of the conflicting interests of superpowers and other major international players. For example, in referring to his experience of helping Zanzibar, already integrated into Tanzania, to form a local security service, the former head of the German Democratic Republic’s (GDR)

\textsuperscript{46} Antunes, \textit{Kennedy e Salazar}.
\textsuperscript{47} Fursenko & Naftali, \textit{Khrushchev’s Cold War}, p. 542;
Foreign Intelligence Service writes: “[I]n many ways we [GDR/Soviet bloc] were naïve about the effects of our intervention in Third World countries. … Karume was much more adept than we had suspected at playing off external powers against each other, and our status was eroded by the arrival of the Chinese en masse in 1965.”

Objectives and motivations

The manifest gaps in the literature concerning the impact of African actors on the superpowers’ policies and courses of action in the context of the early period of Mozambican national liberation calls for a comprehensive study of this subject. This research, therefore, is underpinned by a three-fold objective. By demonstrating that the process of Mozambican national liberation had the quality of a proxy conflict between different regional and international players in the realms of the Cold War and African affairs, the thesis throws light on a significant gap in the academic studies concerning the impact of African actors on the Soviet and American engagements with the process of national liberation of Mozambique, in its early stages. The thesis does so by demonstrating how and why African players’ actions and decision-making either limited or favoured the superpowers, and by examining how the latter responded to such challenges.

In order to achieve this primary goal, the thesis determines the extent to which African actors’ competition, and their impact on American and Soviet goals and courses of action was a reflection of the Cold War and East-West polarization of Africa on the one hand, and African actors’ autonomous and self-interested political agendas and enterprises on the other hand. It therefore assesses the extent to which African players acted (in)dependently of the superpowers, by examining the factors shaping their rationales and agencies, and the motivations behind their involvement in the process of Mozambican national liberation.

Finally, by adopting a more balanced alternative analytical and methodological approach underpinned by a comprehensive understanding of the roles of African actors as a middle stratum between the superpowers and the national

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liberation movements, the thesis helps solving the problems and limitations inherent to the schools of thought identified in the general literature in the field.

Methods

Archival research has been the primary method used in producing the thesis, which has been complemented by reference to different sets of literature.

Archival research

Organization, processing, and limitations

In undertaking archival research, I adopt a 4-level categorization in organizing the collected material, according to its relevance to my project, - ‘central’, ‘very important’, ‘relevant’, and ‘potentially relevant’. Documents belonging to the final category are largely used for the general contextualization of particular historical phenomena. This categorization is done in parallel with creating reference and thematic lists of documents. Reference lists are an outline of the topics in each document, and thematic lists are an outline of folders/documents/pages containing any information on particular and the most important subjects of my research. Such an organization of archival material is essential for an effective identification of particular pieces of information, given the large volume of documents collected.

The main challenge I faced during my research in the Torre do Tombo (TT) in Lisbon, Portugal, was the identification and location of the relevant files, according to their subject and content. This was due to the fact that the description of many large folders containing up to 800 pages of miscellaneous documents was vague or incomplete, and the documents varying in terms of their origin, subject and content. This not only made it difficult to identify the folders with documents relevant to this research, but also required a thorough examination of every file, in order to identify relevant pieces of information. Because many large documents contained only a few paragraphs (and, in most cases, only a few lines) with information relevant to the thesis, I adopted the ‘high-volume low-unit-value’ approach in collecting the material. Given the limited number of available documents fully addressing the central subjects
of my research, and the respective difficulties in finding them, I had to identify and collect numerous smaller pieces of information from a large number of available documents. When contextualized and pieced together, they become crucial for producing a comprehensive, detailed and balanced picture of the events this study focuses on. Although a time-consuming method, it has proven to be the most adequate one in terms of accuracy of information and its analysis, since very important pieces of information were often found in seemingly irrelevant documents if judged according to their primary subject.

Finally, the TT regulations prohibit researchers to scan or take photographs of the archival material, while the authorized compiling and recording of the selected documents done by the staff entails a time-consuming and costly bureaucratic procedure. Therefore, I had to type on my computer all the selected content found in the documents, together with the respective references, all of which amounted to around 50,000 words.

Archival research in Portugal and the United States

In the course of my archival research in the TT, I collected around 50,000 words of documentary content. Out of this amount, around 10% of the information is central, 40% very important, and roughly 30% relevant and 20% potentially relevant. The examined collections included documents of the Portuguese former intelligence and security service – PIDE/DGS, the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Overseas, and the Ministry of Defence.

The Portuguese documents primarily address issues at African local and regional levels. The respective documents offer both a detailed picture of the evolving state of affairs in the Mozambican national liberation, and of the roles played by countries such as Tanganyika (Tanzania), Kenya, Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Nyasaland (Malawi), South Africa, Ghana, Morocco, and UAR (Egypt) in this process. They provide numerous details on the relationships that existed between these countries’ leaders with those of Mozambican nationalist movements, as well as on their aims and actions regarding each other. Although Portuguese documents contain limited information about the Soviet and American
inputs in the region, they nonetheless offer a discernible picture of the superpowers’ engagement, as well as that of other major players such as the PRC and India.

In the US, I undertook archival research at Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and at the National Security Archive (NSA) and National Archives, Washington D.C. I collected more than 8,000 pages of documents, of which around 3/4 are of American origin, and 1/4 of Soviet origin. Most of the Soviet documents collected for this research are contained in the Chadwyck-Healey Microfilm Holdings, held in the Lamont Library and the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Harvard University. These documents were complemented with the Russian and Eastern European Archive Documents Database held in the NSA.

Because I worked primarily with microfilms, rather than paper documents, the referencing of the files in the thesis is done according to the respective index supplements especially produced for the microfilmed holdings. For example, the John F. Kennedy National Security Archive, Africa, 1961-1963 microfilmed holding is referenced in this thesis according to the first supplement provided by A UPA Collection from LexisNexis. Therefore, rather than indicating the box, folder and file, as would have been appropriate for paper documents held in the original archives, the referencing for microfilmed files is done by indicating the reel and slide numbers. Each microfilmed file referenced in this thesis, therefore, can be easily identified and found at the Lamont Library archives, Harvard University, by using the respective supplement available at this site.

Out of the total number of collected documents, around 60% are to different degrees related to my project, with 30% being central, 15% very important, 10% relevant and 5% potentially relevant. The remaining 40% includes reference material, and residual material. While most of the documents relevant to my project concern political rather than covert actions, many of these political actions fall into the sphere of the so-called covert diplomacy. Such material is of great value, since it offers insights into the rationales of Soviet and American strategists and policy-makers regarding the African continent in general, particular African states and their leaders, and the processes of national liberation. Of special importance are those documents addressing US secret diplomatic relations with Britain, France, South Africa, and Germany, in the context of these countries’ relations with Portugal, and especially
their policies and actions regarding national liberation struggles and their relations with different African states.

In general the documents in the American archives were better organized than the Portuguese ones. However, similarly to my research in the TT, rather unexpectedly I was finding critical information in folders and documents whose subject had no direct relation to the key themes or geographical areas of my research. For example, vital information on American political and covert approaches towards the Mozambican national liberation movements was contained in the State Department cables sent by the US Ambassador to Nigeria. Again, this led me to examine large sets of documents many of which, in principle, did not concern the central subjects of my research. This approach offered me valuable additional inputs which help explain particular trends and events, or emphasize their importance, when properly contextualized. Such inputs, to which I refer as reference material, include background information on African political figures, and their views and relations with the superpowers, and other foreign actors.

In contrast to the Portuguese documents, the Soviet and American ones paint a deeper and fuller picture of African actors relations with the superpowers, and their influence on the latter, in the contexts of the Cold War and Mozambican national liberation. Also, they explain and establish the relationships that existed between American and Soviet strategic aims and respective confrontations in the Third World, and particularly in Africa, the Casablanca vs. Monrovia groups’ competition, the Sino-Soviet rivalry, the role of the non-aligned movement, and the national liberation struggle in Portuguese colonies.

Methodology

The methodological approaches taken in this research are underpinned by the analysis of sequential actions/reactions of different local, regional and international players involved in Mozambican national liberation, along vectors between the three strata. The bottom stratum corresponds to national liberation movements, the middle stratum corresponds to African (groupings of) states, and the upper one corresponds to the superpowers and other international players.
Contrary to most scholars in the field adopting either a top-down or local-centred approach, I have adopted a two-fold one. On the one hand, the thesis examines the power dynamics between local and regional African actors in the contexts of Mozambican national liberation and the Cold War. Such an approach mirrors the one adopted by Marcum in his studies of Angolan national liberation. Here, the data contained in Portuguese documents is of central importance. On the other hand, the thesis examines the relations between regional African actors and the superpowers, where data contained in Soviet and American documents is most valuable. Thus given the middle position of regional African actors in the interaction between actors of the top and bottom strata, they naturally correspond, therefore, to the core subject and dimension of analysis.

Notably, considering the limitations of the Portuguese and Soviet/American sets of archival material, the respective overlapping dimensions of both correspond to the regional African actors, which therefore become placed at the heart of the analysis. Hence, the information provided by the two sets complements each other, since Soviet and American documents explain and contextualize events at local and regional levels by providing a larger picture of superpower confrontation and respective strategies and policies. Ultimately, the two-fold approach and the use of such different sets of archival material enables the obtaining of a detailed picture of events involving local, regional, and international political players in the contexts of Mozambican national liberation, African affairs, and the Cold War.

Research questions

The central research question this thesis answers is what was the impact of African actors on Soviet and American designs and courses of action regarding the process of national liberation of Mozambique between 1961 and 1964? In doing so, the thesis also answers secondary questions such as what were the Soviet and American strategies for, and relations with the African states involved in the process of Mozambican national liberation? Did they affect African actors’ strategic rationales and political decision-making, and if so, how and why? What were the reasons and motivations behind African actors’ and superpowers’ engagements in the process of Mozambican national liberation? What was the relation between the global East-West
competition, and antagonisms between African (groups of) states in the realm of African affairs? What role did superpowers’ interests, designs and objectives play in those African actors’ involvement and vice-versa? Did African actors’ conflicting interests and courses of action affect the superpowers’ designs and objectives? If so, why and how? Other questions this thesis answers are how did the Soviet Union and the United States cope with the challenges posed to their designs and objectives by political conflicts in the realm of African affairs, and how did this reflect on the process of Mozambican national liberation? What were the means and assets through which the United States and the Soviet Union coped with such challenges?
Chapter II

UDENAMO and Pan-African Cold War polarization: 1961

Geopolitics, foreign actors, and Mozambican nationalist movements

The repressive dictatorial regime of Antonio de Oliveira Salazar outlawed and severely persecuted the formation, organization and activities of any political associations not or only partly affiliated with the state’s sole party, the Partido da União Nacional, in all territories under Portuguese rule.¹ The primary instrument used for enforcing this rule was the Polícia Internacional e da Defesa do Estado (PIDE), the state’s domestic and foreign security and intelligence service, known for the ruthlessness of its operational methods.² Such a state of affairs heavily impeded the formation and effective operation of Mozambican African nationalist organizations aiming at achieving either independence or the autonomy of Mozambique, the latter aiming at attaining more liberal social and political conditions for its African population. Therefore, any nationalist enterprises seeking to be able to develop into politically strong and effective bodies found it only possible to do so outside Mozambican territory.

Tanganyika, renamed Tanzania after merging with Zanzibar in 1964, became the primary base for the formation and organization of the first meaningful Mozambican nationalist movements. There were several attempts at creating African nationalist movements and associations aiming at Mozambican independence or autonomy inside Mozambique before 1961. However, due to the proactive measures of the PIDE, these organizations were either soon destroyed, or had to operate in such an extreme clandestinity, that they could not develop any significant actions to achieve their aims.³ While Tanganyika’s role in supporting and providing shelter to these movements became greater after its independence from Great Britain in

² Mateus, A PIDE/DGS na Guerra Colonial, pp. 15, 26-31, 40, 50-51.
December 1961, the Prime Minister Julius Nyerere’s and his party’s Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) proactive involvement in supporting Mozambican nationalists and undermining the Portuguese position in Africa – two sides of the same coin - were already taking place. For example, on 5th June 1961, Nyerere proposed to the Parliament the immediate closure of the Portuguese Consulate in Dar-es-Salaam, a request which was approved by the majority of its members. Since other neighbouring African countries, such as Zambia and Malawi, became heavily involved in the Mozambican national liberation war (yet not always and necessarily on the side of nationalists) at later stages, and because Tanganyika accommodated the headquarters and training bases of a myriad of different nationalist movements from many African territories, with Dar-es-Salaam becoming popularly known as the ‘Mecca of liberation movements’, the role of this country in the developing of events deserves special attention.

The above-mentioned geopolitical factor is of importance in studying major international players’ covert and political actions regarding the Mozambican national liberation struggle in the early stages. The stringent security conditions, which severely limited the creation and any vigorous activity of nationalist movements in the country, mean that one cannot talk about Soviet and Chinese direct and

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4 It was not, however, immediately implemented by the British General Governor of Tanganyika, who instead left for London to discuss the subject with the British Government five days later. IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process SC SR283/61, Adelino Chitofo Gwambe, Informação nº 1023/61-GU, Lourenço Marques, 19/6/1961, 767. The closure of Portuguese Consulates in African Capital cities throughout the period was intended not only to undermine Lisbon’s political position abroad, but also to prevent Portuguese intelligence personnel from operating in the respective countries. For example, the staff of Consulates in Dar-es-Salaam, Casablanca, and Salisbury were actively involved in both intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination, and covert actions. The latter often aimed to disrupt the relationships between national liberation movements and the Governments of hosting countries, to disrupt the relationships between different movements in order to prevent their cooperation or unification, and to bolster internal dissent within the movements themselves. Other covert activities involved kidnapping and assassination. IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process SC SR283/61, Adelino Chitofo Gwambe, Informacao N° 604/61-SR, From PIDE Lourenço Marques to PIDE Lisbon, 25/5/1961, 778; IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process SC SR283/61, Adelino Chitofo Gwambe, From Ministry of the Overseas, General Directorate of Political and Civil Administration, Office of Foreign Affairs, to the General Director of PIDE, 10/11/1961, 487. IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process SC SR283/61, Adelino Chitofo Gwambe, Informação nº 195/62-SR, From PIDE Lourenço Marques to the General Director of PIDE, 6/2/1962, 402-403; IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process SC SR283/61, Adelino Chitofo Gwambe, From the report by the Portuguese Consulate in Salisbury, “O encerramento do escritório da UDENAMO em Dar-es-Salaam”, 394.

In May of 1961, “Mr. Tom M’boya, Secretary-General of KANU has issued a notice to Kenya Government that, he will put a motion in the Legco to ask the Government of Kenya to close the Portuguese Consulate in Nairobi for the sake of opposing their colorbar [sic] and evil actions they do to Africans of Mozambique.” in Mwafrika, May 24, 1961.

meaningful activities in Mozambique. Rather, clandestine Communist cells in the country were organized and directed by white Portuguese Communists with strongly pro-Soviet predilections, some of whom had direct or indirect connections with Soviet political and intelligence representatives. In the case of Soviet-oriented Communists, these connections were established and maintained through the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP). While being few in number, the white Portuguese Communists were very active and well organized, with one of their aims being the instigation of nationalist feelings among the black members of each cell. Notably, it was in the two largest cities of Mozambique, Beira and Lourenço Marques, that such clandestine cells were more numerous, partly because black nationalists were recruited among the so-called semi-intellectuals: nurses, teachers, former soldiers, and mine workers in South Africa. Apart from these, a minor clandestine movement of white Portuguese intellectuals inside Mozambique was the Marxist-oriented Movimento Democratico de Moçambique (MDM) [Mozambique Democratic Movement]. It was funded by Portuguese living in the United Kingdom, and did not enjoy significant power. It primarily aimed at securing the country’s autonomy in relation to Lisbon, while, as Marcum put it, “making a stubborn effort to close the ranks between the Africans in Mozambique and the Europeans there who favour the independence of the territory.” In Angola, a similar situation was taking place, where progressive [white] Portuguese sharing Marxist views maintained contact with the Soviet-backed MPLA and, as Marcum put it, “tried to neutralize the support that Portuguese settlers gave to the forces of repression and tried to fight for the same objectives as those of the Angolan nationalist movements.”

Further constraints on Soviet and Chinese covert operations resulted from the absence of diplomatic representations in any territories under Portuguese rule, because Lisbon did not maintain any official relations with these countries. Contrary to the United States, which enjoyed the advantage of having embassies and consulates

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8 “Unrest in Mozambique Increases”, in Daily Chronicle, Nairobi, 1st February 1962, 386; From PIDE Lourenço Marques to Director General of the PIDE, 17/5/1962, 364.
both in the metropolis, and in the colonial territories, the USSR and the PRC lacked such bases that could be used as intelligence assets. Finally, given the Portuguese Government’s resolute and unconditional anti-Communist stand (the reason why there were no diplomatic relations between Portugal and the USSR and the PRC), one of PIDE’s primary tasks was not only to preclude any foreign espionage activities in Portuguese territories, but also to track down and eradicate any Communist elements of Portuguese origin both in Portuguese territories and abroad.\(^\text{10}\) This further undermined Soviet and Chinese covert involvement inside Mozambique, given the difficulty of identifying and establishing contacts with ideologically suitable individuals through which further recruitment could be made, and operations could be carried out.\(^\text{11}\) Nevertheless, Soviet and Chinese propaganda through Radio Moscow and Radio Peking was not only directed at African nationalist aspirations, but also greatly exploited white Mozambicans’ anti-Salazarist feelings. Despite originally not identifying themselves with Communist ideology, many Mozambicans were finding their discontent with the repressive regime reflected in the Communist and anti-Salazarist radio propaganda, something which was progressively contributing to their willingness to become affiliated with the clandestine Communist party.\(^\text{12}\)

Hence, major powers’ involvement with the Mozambican nationalist cause beyond political rhetoric at the UN in the early 1960s comprehends, from the beginning, a geographical shift of their field of action away from Mozambique itself towards other African states, something which naturally turned the Mozambican national liberation from a local issue into a regional one, giving it a continental dimension.\(^\text{13}\) Most importantly, as this thesis shows, this not only translated into these

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\(^\text{11}\) While avowed Communists in countries officially opposing such an ideology could have hardly represented valuable assets for Communist-oriented countries’ intelligence services, given their exposure, such elements were still useful for establishing contacts with, and recruitment of those suitable for covert operations. For example, despite being closely watched by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Communist Party USA was actively involved in Soviet intelligence operations in the United States, with its avowed members serving as a link to its clandestine ones. See in, Harvey Klehr, John Earl Haynes, and Fridrikh Igorevich Firsov, *The Secret World of American Communism*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1995).


\(^\text{13}\) Decolonization, A Publication of the United Nations Department of Political Affairs, Trusteeship and Decolonization, Vol. II, No. 6, December 1975, “Fifteen Years of the United Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples”, pp. 11-12. UN General Assembly, *Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration*, 14 December 1962, A/RES/1809, Seventeenth Session, available at: [https://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f1e0c.html](https://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f1e0c.html)
African countries’ impact on the process of national liberation, but also on the major powers’ interests and designs in the context of this process and the Cold War.

In order to understand how did the first Soviet and American courses of action develop regarding Mozambican anti-colonial movement, and identify the roles and aims of African actors in these processes, one should necessarily begin by addressing in detail the initial phases of formation of the Mozambican nationalist movements.

**Gwambe and UDENAMO**

The associative movements of African Mozambicans in Tanganyika started to organize themselves by the end of 1956, as community-based mutual-aid organizations. Attracted by the prospect of a soon to become free neighbouring country under black African rule, and by expectations of better living and working conditions, increasing numbers of Mozambicans were moving to Tanganyika in the early 1960s. The largest number of Mozambicans in Tanganyika belonged to the Makonde tribe, which the PIDE characterized as “a primitive and largely uneducated community”, and the most representative in the host country, whose members were also living in the Northern Districts of Mozambique. By mid-1961, around 250,000 African Mozambicans were already living in the Tanganyikan and Kenyan territories. By September of the same year this number grew to 300,000. Most of those crossing the border were granted the status of refugees. Apart from social reasons for migration, increasing numbers of Mozambicans were entering Tanganyika to escape repression by Portuguese colonial authorities, while also being attracted by

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16 While the numbers provided by PIDE documents and the Tanganyika Ministry of Foreign Affairs vary significantly, the number of Mozambican Africans entering Tanganyika illegally was high. “During 1961, the number of persons entering Tanganyika who were recorded as having been interviewed by an Immigration Officer was 22,793, as compared with 24,831 in 1960 and 21,144 in 1959.” in ‘Annual Report of the Immigration Division for the year 1961’, Tanganyika Ministry of Home Affairs, Printed by Government Printer, Dar es Salaam, 1962, p.1. IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process SC SR283/61, Adelino Chitofo Gwambe, Informação nº 1391/61-GU, 5/9/1961, 672.
the ideal of joining a nationalist movement aiming at achieving their country’s independence.

In this stream of Mozambican refugees was 22-year-old Adelino Hlomulo Chitofo Gwambe, originally from the Vilanculos area, who arrived in Dar-es-Salaam sometime in the first months of 1961, with the objective of organizing there a Mozambican national liberation movement in exile. A year earlier, Gwambe’s first short-lived Mozambican nationalist movement – the National African Party (NAP) - created in Bulawayo, Southern Rhodesia, had been swiftly disbanded, without achieving any substantial goals. It should be noted that several authors, such as Funada-Classen, Marcum, Ncomo, and Zengazenga, have asserted that the movement founded in Rhodesia in 1960 was called National Democratic Union of Mozambique (UDENAMO). PIDE documents, on the contrary, indicate that UDENAMO was created only after April 1961, in Tanganyika. Almost certainly, however, such a contradiction results from PIDE’s misinterpretation of the name of Joshua Nkomo’s Rhodesian liberation movement, the National Democratic Party of Southern Rhodesia (NDPSR), the predecessor of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), which maintained close links to UDENAMO, originally founded in Bulawayo, Rhodesia, in October 1960.

The disbandment of the Mozambican movement in Rhodesia was both a result of PIDE efforts, given its liaison with the Rhodesian Federal Intelligence Service Bureau (FISB), and the movement’s internal differences. In those early days, contrary to Gwambe’s radical demands for total and immediate independence of Mozambique, his moderate colleagues Aurelio Bacuane and David Chambal advocated only better living conditions for Africans, all of which resulted in internal

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dissent. Notably, as shown further in this chapter, these personal divergences between Gwambe and his collaborators later played an important role in negatively affecting the Soviet position regarding the Mozambican nationalist movement. By discrediting Gwambe and his party before the Tanganyikan Government several months later, Bacuane and Chambal badly affected Gwambe’s political position and the interests of his foreign sponsors, thus bringing to the forefront the agency of African actors in impacting on the superpowers’ interests.

Despite his young age and basic education, Gwambe’s high political ambitions and what seemed to be an innate ability for manipulation and intrigue paved his way as Moscow’s central asset in what was the first round of a protracted competition for influence over the process of Mozambican national liberation between the USSR, the US, and the PRC. A PIDE report produced four years later captured what it saw as Gwambe’s shrewd and deceiving character: “From all [Mozambican] terrorist leaders, the maddest and most dangerous one is Gwambe, at least this is how he is assessed by those who know him [personally], knowing him as … shifty and [a talented judge] of human weaknesses, [something] which makes him a sinister monster.”

In Dar-es-Salaam, Gwambe was received by Oscar Kambona, the Tanganyikan Minister of Education, who was also one of the leaders of TANU, and responsible for matters of political refugees. At the meeting, members of TANU informed Gwambe, as well as Chambal and Bacuane who had also arrived in Dar-es-Salaam soon after Gwambe, that a Mozambican nationalist movement, the Mozambican African National Union (MANU), already existed in the country, and had been created under the auspices of both their party and the Kenyan African National Union (KANU). However, because MANU did not have any skilful leadership, TANU suggested that the three should take over MANU’s leadership positions, something they agreed with. As a result, the three Mozambicans, whose personal divergences were unknown to the Tanganyikan authorities, were accommodated by TANU, and provided with an office in the party’s headquarters.

References:
25 From testimony of Aurelio Jaime Bacuane to PIDE in Lourenço Marques, 578-580, op.cit.
26 Oscar Kambona later became Minister of Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister. He also became the Government’s official responsible for managing the activities of national liberation movements based
Gwambe’s movement would have enjoyed TANU’s accommodation until the establishment of its own headquarters some months later.  

While Gwambe’s aspirations to front a large political organization had been realised, his next priority became the elimination of his two political rivals within MANU. In order to prevail over Chambal and Bacuane, he invited to Dar-es-Salaam his close and supportive partners from Bulawayo, Fanuel Mahluza and Calvino Mahlayeye, who would later play important roles as Moscow’s assets in the Mozambican factional struggle.  

Their arrival in Tanganyika and joining MANU reinforced Gwambe’s position. Although he had initially planned to found a movement of his own, - Mozambique National Democratic Union (UDENAMO) - this idea became less and less attractive, not only given his already influential position in MANU, but especially because TANU had always stressed its commitment in supporting that original Mozambican movement.

Yet Gwambe’s original plans for creating his own movement would have emerged again when MANU received an invitation to attend the Conference of the Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies (CONCP), which took place in Casablanca, between the 18th and 20th April of 1961. Although the invitation was sent to Gwambe’s predecessor as leader of MANU, he took advantage of the opportunity and arranged for his nomination as the movement’s representative at the conference. After giving a long speech to some 800 Makonde in the capital city, addressing the ruthlessness of Portuguese colonial authorities towards Africans, thus reinforcing
Kambona’s confidence in his strong commitment to the Mozambican liberation cause, the Minister personally arranged for Gwambe’s trip to Casablanca.\(^{31}\)

Gwambe’s attendance at the Casablanca Conference on behalf of the Mozambican nationalists represented a focal point not only in the internationalization of his political status, thus bolstering his position as the primary representative of the Mozambican nationalist aspirations, but especially in the realm of the early proactive Soviet and Chinese efforts to set out their influence over that country’s national liberation movements. Furthermore, Gwambe’s participation in the conference would draw him and the whole process of Mozambican national liberation into the clash between different African groups of states at the Pan-African level. As we will see further in the thesis, the antagonisms between the radical Casablanca group and the moderate Monrovia group represent an important dimension in this study, given its influence on the course of events and the agencies of African actors impacting on the superpowers’ interests.

_The CONCP Casablanca Conference_

One of the central issues that this thesis focuses on concerns the views, reasons and motivations underpinning different African actors’ agencies impacting on the superpowers’ interests. This section looks at Gwambe’s participation in the CONCP conference, involving Soviet and Chinese representatives, as well as those of the so-called radical African states, Morocco and the UAR. It argues that Gwambe’s receiving these countries’ support and establishing working contacts with Marxist African nationalists and movements resulted from his desire to improve and strengthen his political position and status in the Mozambican community in Tanganyika, rather than being a result of his Cold War predilections or ideological inclinations. Furthermore, this section also shows that the representatives of foreign powers, particularly those of the Soviet Union, did not perceive Gwambe’s ideological inclinations, or the lack thereof, as a fundamental factor for establishing positive relations and offering assistance to the young Mozambican nationalist.

The CONCP Casablanca Conference, where Gwambe projected himself as the representative of Mozambique, was held under the auspices of His Majesty King Hassan II of Morocco, as well as the USSR and the UAR, whose representatives promoted and directed the event.32 The manifest presence of Soviet and Third World countries’ representatives was not a secret. Soon afterwards, African Mail wrote: “The nationalists hope for support from the Afro-Asian States and the Communist bloc. The influence of both was very evident at the [Casablanca C]onference.”33 Enjoying extensive financial support of the Moroccan King, the PIDE reported that the CONCP “represented an authentic centre for propaganda against Portugal.”34

PIDE documents suggest that the Casablanca Conference also corresponded to the first contact established between Gwambe and Soviet intelligence representatives, and marked the beginning of Moscow’s covert engagement with Mozambican nationalists aiming at independence.35 The presence of Soviet intelligence rather than Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee officials is evident by the fact that, according to Shubin, until June-July of 1961 the latter “[did] not have any ties and contacts with representatives of the national liberation movement of Mozambique.”36 It is unclear, however, whether it was the KGB or the GRU representatives who were at the conference.37


37 According to Andrew and Mitrokhin, the KGB’s first active involvement in the Mozambican national liberation affairs started only in 1965, something which suggests that the Soviet intelligence representatives dealing with Gwambe and UDENAMO at those earlier stages might have been Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU) representatives. However, in the summer of 1960 the KGB’s First Chief Directorate (Foreign Intelligence) had created African Anglophone and Francophone departments, with Egypt and Morocco almost certainly being among the countries they dealt with. This suggests that the first contacts of the KGB with Mozambican nationalists were established as early as 1961, in the former British and French African colonial territories. Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The KGB and the World: The Mitrokhin Archive II, (London: Penguin Books, 2006), p. 426, notes, ref. 10, p. 580.
It was also in Casablanca that Gwambe first established close ties with the Soviet-backed Angolan MPLA, through his Mozambican associate Marcelino dos Santos. Dos Santos was central in acquainting Soviet representatives with Gwambe, thus contributing to the prospective leader of independent Mozambique to fall under Moscow’s umbrella. A convinced Communist, and also a member of the MPLA, dos Santos was appointed Secretary General of the CONCP. Having lived in France for many years, where he had been deeply involved in affairs of the PCP, whose numerous members were exiled in that European country, and which had for long been covertly assisted by Soviet intelligence, dos Santos was among the first Africans from Portuguese colonies to coordinate the work between the Portuguese Communists and the nationalists from Portugal’s colonial territories.

According to Cabrita, it was at the CONCP meeting that Gwambe invited dos Santos to join UDENAMO. As the author puts it in referring to the impact of this episode on further events,

“Gwambe’s decision to appoint Marcelino dos Santos there and then as UDENAMO’s deputy secretary general undoubtedly provided the organization with its most capable intellectual and organizer, but also with a dedicated Stalinist. His appointment was to have far-reaching consequences not only in the subsequent armed struggle against the Portuguese, but also in independent Mozambique. It was Marcelino dos Santos who drafted UDENAMO’s constitution, structuring it under the principles of ‘democratic centralism’.”

It should be noted that Cahen asserts that dos Santos, being mixed-race, joined UDENAMO because it was the most representative movement of Mozambicans, and a pluri-ethnic one. While this is certainly correct, and corresponded to both Casablanca powers’ and Soviet aims to promote nationalist, not tribal-oriented movements such as MANU, the reasons behind dos Santos joining UDENAMO

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38 As a result, a frequent correspondence exchange ensued between the two movements. Already in May 1961, in a letter sent from MPLA’s headquarters in Guinea-Conakry by Viriato da Cruz - one of the movement’s leading figures - to Gwambe’s lieutenant, Mahlaye ye, he discussed in fraternal tones MPLA’s aid to UDENAMO (reformed in Tanganyika immediately after the conference), and extolled their mutual friendship and cooperation, while stressing the importance of regular personal contacts between the two movements’ leaders. IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process SC SR283/61, Adelino Chitofo Gwambe, 31/5/1961, 546.

39 IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process SC SR283/61, Adelino Chitofo Gwambe, 1.974-GU, Secret, Lisbon, 30/6/1961, 762; Marcelino dos Santos was also known as Mafalata dos Santos and Kalungano.

should also be seen in terms of Soviet aims to ensure a pro-Moscow Communist was part of the UDENAMO’s leadership. Thus Cahen’s argument that both factors are not mutually exclusive, and are actually complementary to each other is rather sound. Nevertheless, while it is unknown whether dos Santos joining UDENAMO was a condition imposed on Gwambe because of the former’s Communist affiliation, a result of Gwambe’s own initiative to invite dos Santos due to his organizational skills, or the pluri-ethnic nature of the movement, it was most probably dos Santos’s skills, rather than his ideological orientation, that was most relevant in Gwambe’s decision.  

Dos Santos becoming a member of UDENAMO was certainly decisive in the development of further events. Taking into account the presence of Soviet officials at the event, one might suggest that dos Santos’s membership was most probably a condition posed to Gwambe in return for Soviet assistance to the movement, rather than being solely a result of dos Santos having the opportunity of being accepted in a pluri-ethnic movement because he was mixed-race.

The Casablanca Conference, therefore, did not correspond to the first contact established between Soviet officials and Mozambicans with nationalist aspirations and opposing the Salazar regime. As early as 1958, dos Santos was among the few Africans from Portuguese colonies who attended the Afro-Asian Writers’ Conference in Tashkent, Uzbek SSR, where he met one of the MPLA’s leading figures, Mario de Andrade. While Gwambe became the first public figure of Mozambican nationalism siding with the Soviets, dos Santos seems to have played a more instrumental role, yet a more inconspicuous one, in advancing Moscow’s influence in the realm of Mozambican national liberation.

Thus given the Solidarity Committee’s participation in supporting Gwambe’s movement later, the Soviet involvement with the Mozambican nationalists in this period was two-fold. Intelligence service’s contact with and support for Gwambe came first, representing the more significant share of Soviet support. The Solidarity Committee’s role, on the other hand, was to provide limited yet overt assistance,

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42 Shubin, The Hot Cold War, p. 119.
considering, according to Shubin, the allegedly ‘non-governmental’ character of this institution.\footnote{Certainly, Shubin refers to the Solidarity Committee according to its de jure status, since characterizing it as a de facto ‘non-governmental organization’ is rather ludicrous, considering the virtually absolute control that the Soviet state had over all institutions in the country. Strikingly, in the next paragraph of his book the author writes that the Solidarity Committee’s activities took place, “provided that consent from the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs was received.” Shubin, \textit{The Hot Cold War}, pp. 7-8.}

It would be an overstatement to say that in the first half of 1961 Moscow had a sophisticated plan of action regarding Mozambican nationalist movements, or any other national liberation movements for that matter. Moscow’s engagement with the Third World was primarily focused on governments of already independent states. Rather, the steps taken by the Soviets to establish contact with, and provide support for Southern African nationalists were largely a reflection of the changes in Khrushchev’s early Third World forward policy. Such changes were resulting from the mounting pressures exerted by Peking, Moscow’s relations with Washington over major issues in Europe and the Third World, and the Kremlin’s need to show the growing Afro-Asian club, and particularly the progressive African leaders, that its anti-colonial rhetoric was backed by resolute action. Nevertheless, Moscow’s approach towards Mozambican nationalists very probably was also conditioned by the stage of (under)development of the Mozambican national liberation struggle. Portuguese colonial rule had not even been challenged by direct military action, and taking into account the slow and convoluted progress of national liberation struggle in Angola and Portuguese Guinea, it seemed very unlikely that the case of Mozambique was going to be very different.

In the mid-1950s, Moscow’s strategy for expanding its influence in the Third World was carried out by only political and economic means, something which was bringing about Peking’s criticism of what it saw as a lack of Soviet revolutionary commitment to advancing Communism across the world by aggressive means.\footnote{Aleksandr Fursenko \& Timothy Naftali, \textit{Khrushchev’s Cold War: the inside story of an American adversary}, (New York: Norton, 2007), p. 77.} According to Katz, Peking’s criticism of Moscow’s unwillingness to more actively support national liberation movements in the Third World was partly a result of the Soviet military doctrine dictated by Khrushchev’s belief that a total war against the United States was not inevitable.\footnote{Mark Katz, \textit{The Third World in Soviet Military Thought}, (London: Croom Helm, 1982), pp. 18-20.} Such a stance was also in accordance with the
Soviet leader’s commitment to peaceful coexistence with the US. He believed that his country’s involvement in local conflicts had the risk of expanding them beyond the original borders, which would at some point inevitably impinge on US interests, thus leading to a major confrontation involving the use of nuclear weapons. This perspective was also underpinned by Soviet assertion that only ‘imperialists’ could first instigate such local conflicts, which were deemed ‘unjust’ wars. Such rhetoric aimed at preventing the US from getting militarily involved in the Third World, while allowing Khrushchev to redirect more of the country’s resources from military expenditures to economic growth and the rise of Soviet citizens’ living standards.

However, the mounting pressures from Peking and its allies, and Moscow’s desire to come to good terms with them, together with what the Kremlin saw as an increasing Chinese influence in the Third World, all prompted Khrushchev to review this doctrine in 1960. According to the new doctrine, because national liberation wars were initiated by peoples struggling for their freedom from Western colonial powers, such conflicts then became labeled ‘just’. In Katz’s words, this “signalled Moscow’s will to support and encourage movements fighting such wars. This rhetoric also implied that in order to avoid escalating any conflict into a world war, Moscow would not become involved in local wars which the US entered.”

There was no war in Mozambique in April of 1961, but the events in Angola suggested to the parties present at the Casablanca Conference that the question of ‘positive action’ – an alternative term to military action used in order to avoid warding off moderate sectors of European population sympathetic to the liberation cause - and the consequent assistance to Mozambican nationalists was of importance. While the talks at Casablanca were primarily focused on political and organizational issues of the CONPC, the issue of direct military action emerged no less than in the form of direct instructions to Gwambe to begin direct military action in the North of Mozambique against Portuguese colonial authorities, with the support of both the Makonde and Makua peoples. It is doubtful that Gwambe needed sweeteners to be

46 Fursenko & Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War, 305.
49 The CONCP was a successor organization to the Anti Colonialist Movement (MAC), and the Revolutionary African Front for the National Independence of the Portuguese Colonies (FRAIN), involving all nationalist forces in Portuguese territories in Africa and Asia. The need to engage in an aggressive propaganda campaign against Portugal, and the sponsors’ offer to send some Mozambicans to Europe to receive ‘political education’ were some of the issues discussed regarding Gwambe’s
convinced to follow such instructions, yet he was still given a large financial carrot before leaving Morocco.\textsuperscript{50}

The competition between the Soviets and the Chinese in advancing their influence over nationalist movements in Southeast Africa was reflected by both delegations representatives’ promise to provide Gwambe with weapons and facilities for military training in guerrilla warfare. In all probability, the Soviet delegation’s efforts to impress the Chinese more than the Mozambicans themselves ended up playing in their favour, since it was Moscow who ultimately ended up getting the upper hand in sponsoring and managing Gwambe and his movement. Already in August 1961, with the consent of the Moroccan King and its Government, Soviet weaponry for the MPLA and UDENAMO began arriving by sea in Casablanca, where dos Santos and Gwambe were personally in charge of overseeing its unloading and distribution.\textsuperscript{51} Thus given the difficulties in operating inside Mozambican territory, together with the near absence of meaningful nationalist activity in that territory, it was through Rabat and Cairo that Soviet covert liaison with, and assistance for Gwambe began to take place.

One of the primary objectives of this thesis is to identify the reasons and motivations informing the agencies of African political actors regarding the process of Mozambican national liberation. It is important to do so in order to determine the extent to which these agencies were dictated by the East-West confrontation, or by the personal, local and regional goals and interests of African players. Thus, in assessing the roles of African actors in affecting Soviet and American engagements with Mozambican national liberation, it allows us to establish whether or not African players were acting independently from the superpowers, and their influence, pressures and interests. In regard to Gwambe, however positive the Communist presence was at the Casablanca Conference, his determination to represent Mozambique at the event was not dictated by his ideological predilections favouring either side of the Cold War competitors. While PIDE’s assessment of Gwambe’s activities identified his connections to the Soviet bloc from the second half of 1961 onward, something which became more manifest at later stages, there is no evidence

\textsuperscript{50} Informação nº 1023/61-GU, Lourenço Marques, 19/6/1961, 767.
that the young Mozambican nationalist was enthused by Marxism or a sense of admiration for the Soviet Union. Rather, similarly to many other African nationalist leaders’ paths in the anti-colonial struggle, Gwambe was primarily guided by nationalist and personal political ambitions. Yet the Communist bloc’s readiness to support African nationalists, which contrasted with Western wavering, indecisiveness, or ostensible indifference to the developments in Portuguese Africa, tended to compel even those whose stance was originally strongly anti-communist to seek assistance from Moscow and Peking.\footnote{Marcum, \emph{The Angolan Revolution, Volume II}, p. 132.} PIDE files clearly indicate that from the very first, Gwambe was eager to receive support from, and to side with any major international player, regardless of ideological orientation, as long as the sponsor took a resolute stance against Portuguese colonialism, and had the will to provide support for him and his movement. Both the Soviet Union and the United States were on the list of states he was looking to for the necessary aid before attending the CONCP. Other potential sources of support included Israel, Japan and Liberia, which maintained close relations with, or depended on the US in matters of economics and security.\footnote{IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process SC SR283/61, Adelino Chitofo Gwambe, Informação nº 990/61-GU, 12/6/1961, 768.} In particular, apart from Liberia’s historic ties to the US, it was also a representative of the moderate and West-oriented group of African states.

Despite the early Kennedy Administration’s fervent anti-colonial rhetoric, the US did not take the opportunity to establish working relationships with what was perhaps the most plausible Mozambican nationalist leader at the time. The Soviets did, and seemingly ensured their forward position in the realm of Mozambican nationalist aspirations at these early stages. Nevertheless, it would be reasonable to suggest that way before the Casablanca Conference and the internationalization of his political status, Gwambe was finding the Communist bloc more likely to support his cause than the West, considering the differences between their attitudes towards the Salazar regime and Portuguese colonial policies. In his many letters written to Salazar as early as February 1961, and addressing the demand for immediate Mozambican independence, Gwambe stressed the strong Soviet antagonism towards the Portuguese
dictatorship and the country’s colonial policies, something which probably already induced him into looking eastwards rather than westwards for potential support.\(^{54}\)

To sum up, UDENAMO’s establishing working contacts with left-wing nationalist movements from other Portuguese African territories, together with Gwambe’s inviting dos Santos to join UDENAMO, and his accepting Soviet backing, all resulted from his personal political interests and the lack of alternative sources of foreign assistance, rather than his Cold War predilections or ideological inclinations. Gwambe’s desire to reinforce UDENAMO’s political standing, enhance its organizational potential, garnering foreign financial and material support, and bolstering his own status as the leader of Mozambican national liberation cause were the primary reasons and motivations for UDENAMO-Soviet rapport. The Soviet aims, in turn, were to offset the Chinese influence on the continent, to demonstrate the Soviet prompt commitment in supporting African national liberation movements before its African counterparts, and to increase its own influence in Sub-Saharan Africa at the expense of the West. Thus, because it was both parties’ particular interests, benefits, and coincidental goals, rather than ideology, common strategy or political views that drove such a partnership of convenience, it did not translate into, or imposed any limitations on Gwambe’s UDENAMO freedom of action, according to the Soviet side’s interests.

This supports one of the main arguments of the thesis. It exemplifies the limited degree to which the links between a superpower and a national liberation movement represented a top-down dependence or command relationship. This, in turn, brings to the fore a key factor behind the autonomous and proactive agency of this and other African actors, and emphasizes the limitations experienced by Moscow and Washington in advancing their policies and designs in the region. This adds to this thesis argument that, as a result, the agencies of African actors in the development of events at local and regional levels impacted on the superpowers’ interests in the context of Mozambican national liberation, and highlights the important roles played by African actors in the outcomes of the superpower confrontation during the examined historical period.

The role of the UAR

This section addresses the involvement of the UAR in the process of Mozambican national liberation in the context of UDENAMO’s rising to power in 1961. Following the Casablanca Conference, Cairo began playing an active role in supporting Mozambican nationalists. Already in May 1961, “agents [provocateurs] from the zone of influence of the UAR” began to penetrate Mozambican communities in Tanganyika, inciting the Makonde people to turn to arms against the Portuguese authorities, following the Angolan example. The Northern Districts of Mozambique, where Arab communities were also traditionally based, were particularly vulnerable to Cairo’s influence. If nothing [is] done to regain the Makonde [people] to the [Portuguese] Government’s side,” a PIDE report warned, “… the [nationalist ideas] will end up by completely contaminating [sic] our Makonde [popular] masses … which will not hesitate to cross the Rovuma [River] with weapons in their hands. This we should not doubt.” Cairo’s subversive agents were primarily ethnic Arabs and Indians, who controlled the commerce in the Tanganyikan coastal areas, and whose anti-Portuguese influence in Northern Mozambican Districts was very strong. PIDE advanced that this would have facilitated Cairo’s arming of Mozambican Africans at any suitable time. In PIDE’s view, Gamal Abdel Nasser seemed ready to provide as many weapons as necessary. In light of such developments, and given the evidence of increasing popularity of leftist views among the Muslim communities in the region, the US ambassador in Dar-es-Salaam expressed the view that this

“would probably lead to Communist takeover of leadership of southern Africa liberation movements. It would bring war in Mozambique much nearer, further reduce chance of avoiding violence in Southern Rhodesia … and advance Communism in Southern Africa. It would afford Communist lodgement on western reaches of Indian Ocean.”

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59 ibid.
60 Lyndon B. Johnson Library (LBJL), National Security File Country File (NSFCF), Leonhart to Secretary of State, January 28, 1964.
While it would be hasty to assert that Cairo’s involvement with Mozambican nationalism was totally and directly a result of Moscow’s designs, Soviet influence over African Mozambicans through the UAR was noticeably present in the radio-transmitted propaganda emanating from that North African country. With strong leftist overtones, these broadcasts from Cairo were especially directed at those living inside the Mozambican territory. Fearing that such propaganda would encourage African Mozambicans to organize themselves in nationalist movements in the country, the Portuguese colonial authorities outlawed ownership of radios capable of receiving foreign radio stations, especially amongst those living in Northern districts.  

Soviet relations with different regional partners in the Third World during this period were characterised by what Jesse Ferris described as Moscow’s deference to the primacy of regional actors. As we will see further in the thesis, such was the Soviet attitude towards Egypt and Ghana. In seeking to promote its strategic interests, the USSR delegated the main responsibility for planning and action to regional powers, whose interests were largely only coincident or overlapping with those of the Soviet Union. This approach, in turn, brought to the fore the pro-active roles played by regional powers in contributing to the Soviet strategic successes and failures, and made the Soviet strategic interests in Africa dependent on, and vulnerable to the behaviour, sense of initiative and competence of countries such as Egypt and Ghana.

As Ferris argues in his article ‘Soviet Support for Egypt’s Intervention in Yemen, 1962-1963’, Soviet commitment in supporting Egypt’s assertive foreign policy initiatives was dictated by both the aim of ensuring the continuation of close Soviet-Egyptian relations and the maintenance of the threat posed by Nasser to Western interests in the Middle East. Also, it resulted from Moscow’s eagerness to seize opportunities to promote any ‘revolutionary’ enterprises – seen as a ‘step forward’ in advancing Soviet interests in the Third World. By drawing on the example of Soviet-Egyptian cooperation in the Yemeni crisis in 1962, the author asserts that in the management of such endeavours far from the geographical periphery of the Soviet bloc, “the Soviet military and diplomatic establishments, far

from manipulating a dependent ‘client,’ carefully deferred to Egyptian primacy.”

Such a *modus operandi* suggests that although Cairo’s subversive activities in Southeast Africa most probably resulted from its own initiative, they could hardly be disconnected from Soviet designs for the region, and that later heavy involvement of Ghana in sponsoring UDENAMO followed Moscow’s rationale of conveying operational and organizational issues to regional actors, through which Soviet broader strategic objectives were advanced. Importantly, from 1958 onwards Soviet and Egyptian intelligence services maintained very close cooperation, something which the presence of their representatives during the CONCP meeting clearly exemplifies.

*The role of Morocco*

Despite apparently maintaining good relations with Portugal, by mid-1961 Morocco had started to progressively develop activities aimed at bolstering the Angolan insurgency, and to play an active role with regard to Mozambican nationalists. Thanks to the efforts of King Hassan II and his Government, in the first half of August 1961, the CONCP saw a considerable increase in cooperation between the Angolan MPLA, Portuguese Guinea’s PAIGC, the nationalist forces of Portuguese territories in India, UDENAMO, and the Moroccan authorities. For example, on 11th August, the Moroccan Ambassador to Portugal was requested to urgently come to Rabat, where he met with Angolan nationalist leaders several times. On 17th, the Moroccan Minister of Defence, Mahjoubi Ahardane, together with the Moroccan Ambassador to Portugal, received Gwambe and dos Santos in his office in Rabat. The Defence Minister personally financed the CONCP’s anti-Portuguese propaganda activities, and these financial injections also allowed the nationalist leaders, including Gwambe, to freely travel across Africa and Europe.

Such Moroccan support greatly encouraged the nationalist leaders affiliated with the CONCP, of which the CIA-sponsored Angolan FNLA, for example, refused to be a part, to develop more assertive political and military activities. On 24th August

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64 Ferris, “Soviet support for Egypt’s intervention in Yemen”, p. 32.
65 Andrew and Mitrokhin, *The KGB and the World*, pp. 149-150.
1961, a prominent MPLA figure, Mário de Andrade, together with another Angolan nationalist, arrived by plane from Guinea-Conakry in Rabat, where they were awaited by dos Santos, who drove them in a car provided by the Moroccan Government. The next day, they held a meeting with the Moroccan Minister of State, who was also responsible for African Affairs. In order to reiterate the MPLA’s neutral position in the context of the Cold War, they submitted a memorandum on the issue. This was followed by an invitation of King Hassan II, who personally assured them that “Morocco was absolutely committed to providing all the necessary support for the cause of Angolan nationalists”, and proposed they accompany him to the Belgrade Conference of Non-aligned States on his personal airplane. On 26th, MPLA representatives, together with dos Santos and Gwambe, left for the Yugoslavian capital on the Royal airplane.67 The event in Belgrade was used by UDENAMO to issue a communiqué aimed at garnering further international support for its struggle for independence.68

In a lengthy report produced by the Director General of the PIDE on Communist subversion of the Portuguese overseas territories and the Metropolis, he emphasized the importance of Morocco as a base supporting dos Santos, Gwambe, and other ‘Communist-oriented’ African nationalist leaders, stressing that the CONCP had a “Communist structure” and was enjoying “direct support of the Russian secret service”.69 In fact, since May 1961, the command centre for UDENAMO’s activities was located in Rabat, since it was from there that the movement was receiving both the necessary material aid, and instructions for its activities. Earlier Soviet offers of weapons and training facilities at the Casablanca Conference already saw fruition that year. The first group of Mozambicans trained in East Germany and probably Cuba arrived in Rabat in late 1961, where they received arms, which had been arriving there since August. Instructions from Rabat explicitly stressed that they should conduct terrorist operations in the north of Mozambique, and not in other areas.70

While it was from Casablanca and Rabat that Soviet intelligence maintained contacts with, and provided support to Southern African nationalists, Tangier served such purposes for Moscow’s Asian bête noire. On 13th May, 12 Chinese representatives arrived in that city. The delegation was headed by such prominent figures as the Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade, Lu Shu Chang, and Chang Mu Lan, an expert on Africa who had recently spent several months in the Congo. At a highly secretive meeting with Abderrahmane Youssoufi, a leading member of the National Union of Popular Forces, a left-wing Moroccan political party, they also met with MPLA leaders Agostinho Neto and de Andrade, whom the Moroccan politician brought in his car to the event. Although PIDE was unable to establish the subject of their meeting, Peking’s assistance to the Angolan nationalist movement was almost certainly among the discussed topics.71

Enjoying the support of Morocco, the UAR, but most importantly of the Soviet Union as a big back player, Gwambe and dos Santos proceeded with further promoting UDENAMO on both regional and international political arenas, and instigating more assertive political campaigning against the Portuguese colonial regime. As we will see further in this chapter, Ghana also became a key sponsor of UDENAMO. Importantly, these three African countries were members of the Casablanca Group of African states, advancing an assertive anti-colonial agenda, while maintaining cooperative ties with the Soviet Union and promoting the ideas of Pan-Africanism. While each of these African countries pursued their particular goals and interests at regional level, reflecting the ambitions of Hassan II, Nasser and Kwame Nkrumah, their involvement in the process of national liberation in southern Africa strongly influenced UDENAMO’s agenda and had a cumulative effect impacting on the superpowers’ interests in the context of Mozambican national liberation.

UDENAMO-Tanganyikan relations

This section examines the political rising of Gwambe’s UDENAMO in Eastern Africa in mid-1961, and the problems the movement encountered. It shows that the influence of the Casablanca group’s agenda on Gwambe’s political campaigning drew

UDENAMO into the rivalry between different groups of African states. As a result, despite the initial Tanganyikan and Kenyan governments’ support for Gwambe, the conflicting regional interests of these countries and UDENAMO’s Casablanca group sponsors turned the process of Mozambican national liberation into a stage of Pan-African rivalries. As we will see, such a state of affairs strongly influenced by the agencies of the involved African actors impacted on the superpowers’ interests.

Although PIDE forecast that MANU, which was strongly supported by the influential Kenyan politician Tom M’Boya, whose stand against Portugal was much more aggressive than that of Nyerere, and by the Goan African National Congress (GANC), would seek to augment its activity as a result of much greater support coming from abroad after the Casablanca Conference, this was not exactly the case.²² Gwambe’s attitude and agenda were deeply affected by his visit to Morocco, and upon his return to Dar-es-Salaam, he publicly asserted that MANU, being a tribal movement primarily constituted of members of the Makonde people, should be substituted by a new organization which would better represent the whole of the Mozambican people.²³ UDENAMO, whose formation was then announced by Gwambe as its self-proclaimed leader, was the movement that he asserted should take that role.²⁴

PIDE’s initial assessment of Gwambe’s potential to effectively command a national liberation movement in May 1961 was: “Gwambe does not have the knack of a leader, for he lacks intelligence, education, and even [suitable] racial characteristics. (He is [from the] Muchope [tribe]).”²⁵ In fact, before the Casablanca Conference, Gwambe’s methods were moderate. While intending to achieve his country’s independence by pacific means, namely through dialogue with the Portuguese

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²³ IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process SC SR283/61, Adelino Chitofo Gwambe, From testimony of Aurelio Jaime Bacuane to PIDE in Lourenco Marques, 579-580. While Gwambe’s argument to create UDENAMO as a movement representing the whole of Mozambican people supports Cahen’s assertion that the pluri-ethnic character of the movement attracted a number of influential Mozambican nationalists, one should be cautious in accepting it as the primary raison d’être for its creation. Not only Gwambe’s argument does not contradict the greater aims behind the foundation of UDENAMO, but actually favours them, given the strategic advantages of bringing diverse Mozambican ethnic groups under a single banner. From testimony of Aurelio Jaime Bacuane to PIDE in Lourenco Marques, 579-580, ibid. Informação nº 195/62-SR, PIDE Lourenço Marques para Director Geral da PIDE, 6/2/1962, 402-403.
Government, he was also attempting, in his numerous letters sent to many African and others states, to convince their Governments to boycott Portuguese-made products.76

Yet Gwambe’s contacts established at the Casablanca Conference began to pay off, and his political conduct became increasingly aggressive and proactive. Two months later, the Portuguese secret service had to acknowledge that “[t]he political evolution [of Gwambe] seems to be progressing at a fast pace.” In fact, not only did Nyerere promise support to UDENAMO through Kambona, but also Gwambe received official invitations from the Governments of the Casablanca group of states such as Ghana and Mali.77 The purpose of these visits was to receive these countries’ support, primarily financial.78 Gwambe’s first hard-line political initiative was to “ask the free Tanganyika not to allow the Portuguese Consulate to be in [it]s territory”, wrote the daily *Mwafrika*.79 Such actions would continue throughout the following months, with a petition sent by Gwambe to the President of the General Assembly of the UN on 2nd October 1961, requesting the international community to take positive action against Portugal, and to expel it from different international organizations, including NATO.80 Further instructions Gwambe received from Rabat were for him to promote as many public demonstrations as possible against Portugal’s policies in Dar-es-Salaam, in the context of the ‘Week of International Protest against Portugal’, taking place between 20th and 30th of June.81

The official inauguration of UDENAMO’s headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam and in Lindi, a small town near Tanganyika’s border with Mozambique, took place on 16th

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76 “Os refugiados de Moçambique vão ter uma sede em Dar-es-Salaam”, in *Tanganika Standard*, Issue n° 10, Maio 1961, 726. IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process SC SR283/61, Adelino Chitofo Gwambe, Informação nº 990/61-GU, 12/6/1961, 768; Despite PIDE’s initial assessment of Gwambe as a weak leader, the large number of African Mozambicans living in Tanganyika and prone to Gwambe’s influence became a matter of great concern to the Portuguese secret service. Hence in May 1961, the Deputy Head of the PIDE in Lourenço Marques proposed a covert action aimed at arresting Gwambe by locally recruited agents. According to the operation plan, which was immediately approved by the General Director of the PIDE in Lisbon, Gwambe was to be attracted to a bogus meeting somewhere close to the border, narcotized, and secretly transported to Lourenço Marques. The operation, however, never came to fruition. PIDE documents do not provide further information on this matter. IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process SC SR283/61, Adelino Chitofo Gwambe, Nº 604/61-SR, From PIDE Lourenço Marques to Lisbon, 25/5/1961, 778.

77 The only exception to this was Nigeria, which followed the moderate political line in African affairs. IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process SC SR283/61, Adelino Chitofo Gwambe, Informação nº 1.249/61-GU, From Consulate of Portugal in Dar-es-Salaam to PIDE, 10/5/1961, 724.


79 *Mwafrika*, Dar-es-Salaam, 26th May, 1961, translation from Swahili to English by the PIDE, 759.


81 IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process SC SR283/61, Adelino Chitofo Gwambe, From the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the General Director of the PIDE, Lisbon, 24th June 1961, 761.
June 1961, to honour the death of the Mozambicans massacred by the Portuguese authorities in Mueda on the same date, one year earlier.\textsuperscript{82} During the inauguration, which was extensively financed by TANU, Gwambe publicly announced that “the independence of Mozambique should take place before October 1965.”\textsuperscript{83} Not a word, however, was said on the means by which independence was to be achieved.

The rise of Gwambe’s UDENAMO was accompanied by the expansion of his regional and international political alliances, more often than not not associated with leftist and/or Soviet-supported actors. Not only did the Mozambique African Association (MAA) based in Tanganyika decide to side with UDENAMO, but also the Portuguese East African Society (PEAS), founded in February of 1961 in Southern Rhodesia, and led by its Secretary of the Executive Committee, Uria Simango, who played a key role in the process of Mozambican national liberation, were closely collaborating with UDENAMO and Gwambe. The two organizations aimed at helping each other and ultimately organizing themselves into a larger common front operating in East Africa.\textsuperscript{84} Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, Joshua Nkomo’s NDPSR (later ZAPU), covertly aided by the USSR, was also closely collaborating with Gwambe.\textsuperscript{85} It should be noted that PEAS and ZAPU were closely associated in the general framework of leftist Mozambican-Zimbabwean nationalist movements. As Marcum points, the Soviet-backed movements in Southern Africa (ANC, ZAPU, and SWAPO) had a longstanding record of covert cooperation through the CONCP until January 1969, when “Soviet initiative brought these … movements together into formal association.”\textsuperscript{86}

Finally, as early as May 1961, Gwambe assisted Mozambican African Communist elements to establish contact with a prominent

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\textsuperscript{84} IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process SC SR283/61, Adelino Chitofo Gwambe, Informação nº 1.678/61-GU, 1/12/1961, “Portuguese East African Society – PEAS”, 471-472. “Gwambe travels without a passport”, in Mwafrika, 23\textsuperscript{rd} June 1961, 676. MAA was a small organization of Makonde people founded in the end of the 1950s. Collaboration between UDENAMO and PEAS was taking place through PEAS’s D. C. Ntemaganda, an expert in subversive operations who arrived in Dar-es-Salaam in July 1961, and whose role was to provide UDENAMO with ways of penetration of Mozambican territory in order to undertake guerrilla attacks. IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process SC SR283/61, Adelino Chitofo Gwambe, From Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Directorate for Political Affairs and Domestic Administration, Lisbon, to Director General of the PIDE, 30\textsuperscript{th} of September of 1961, 566-567.
\end{footnotesize}
Afro-American activist and a member of the Communist Party of the United States, Benjamin J. Davis, through Ghana. Davis was also known for his strong anti-imperialist stand, and for being a keen supporter of the national liberation struggle in Africa. Notably, such contacts between Mozambican and American Communists, who largely followed a pro-Soviet line and had been known for cooperating with Soviet intelligence in the US since the 1930s, were made through the Ghanaian leader Nkrumah.  

Despite these advances, the position of UDENAMO and Gwambe as the officially recognized leader of Mozambican nationalism depended on the recognition of his status by the UN. This, in turn, was directly dependent on the number of Mozambicans affiliated with his movement. UN financial and political support for UDENAMO as the sole representative of the Mozambican people and its independence aspirations could only be possible if the movement enjoyed the support of a significant proportion of the Mozambican population. In mid-1961, this was far from the case. In a reply to a letter from the Secretary General for Human Rights in the United Nations, asking Gwambe how many members UDENAMO had, the Mozambican had to acknowledge that the official number was only 57.  

Such a state of affairs prompted a ‘competition for numbers’ between MANU and UDENAMO. Aiming at impressing the UN representatives of the United Nations Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration, also known as the Committee of the 7, who arrived in Dar-es-Salaam to assess the state of affairs in Mozambican national liberation efforts, and to identify the party which should officially represent Mozambican independence aspirations before the international community, UDENAMO and MANU leaders claimed the numbers of their members to be as high as 60,000 and 200,000, respectively.  

Clearly, these numbers were very exaggerated.

89 IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process SC SR283/61, Adelino Chitofo Gwambe, Informação nº 1391/61-GU, 5/9/1961, 672. IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process SC SR283/61, Adelino Chitofo Gwambe, Informação nº 1097/62/SR, From PIDE Lourenço Marques to General Director of the PIDE, 12 June 1962, 353. Gwambe reiterated this again, in an interview to The Star, in July 1961, stressing that the 60,000 UDENAMO followers were based not only in Tanganyika, but also in the Federation, and in Mozambique itself. IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process SC SR283/61, Adelino Chitofo Gwambe, Informação nº 1214/61-GU; 17/7/1961, 744. State Department documents point that the
The first rift in Tanganyika-UDENAMO relations began already in June 1961. In the first half of June, the UDENAMO leadership received an invitation from Nkrumah to attend the Conference of Non-Independent States, in Ghana, with the travel being paid for by the Ghanaian Bureau on African Affairs (GBAA). On the one hand, this event would further bolster the movement’s political primacy. On the other hand, however, Gwambe’s determination in advancing UDENAMO to the detriment of MANU was increasingly a cause of deep upset for the large Makonde community in Tanganyika, which felt betrayed by their former representative at the CONCP. This, in turn, gradually brought about contradictions between Gwambe and Kambona, who called a meeting at TANU headquarters on the 13th June 1961, in an attempt to reverse the conflicts between UDENAMO and MANU.

Playing on Gwambe’s militant inclinations and his personal political ambitions, Kambona tried to please Gwambe by acknowledging that the freedom of Mozambique could not be attained by peaceful means, and that UDENAMO should resort to terrorist acts like those in Angola. Yet he further argued that because MANU’s membership was made up of uneducated Makonde people who needed a strong leader of Mozambican origin with international connections, and because the ‘intellectual’ elements in Gwambe’s entourage were unsuitable for carrying out violent activity, the “primitive and easily influenceable” Makonde people would “constitute the most appropriate human material for terrorist action.” The Minister continued by saying that Gwambe should sort out the antagonisms between UDENAMO and MANU, since the Government of Tanganyika had to make up its mind about which movement it should support. Kambona’s discourse ended with the assertion that after the proclamation of Tanganyikan independence (in December

activities of such UN Committees were actively explored by Moscow in promoting Soviet Cold War interests in Southern Africa. JFK National Security Files, Microfilms, Volume on Africa, Reel 1, General, Department of State, Incoming Telegram, Stevenson to Secretary of State, September 20, 1962, 0511-0601.

90 IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process SC SR283/61, Adelino Chitofo Gwambe, Informação nº 1231/61-GU, “Visita do Secretario Americano Mennen Williams à Moçambique”, 19/7/1961, 743. The recruitment of Mozambicans for his party began immediately. For example, from UDENAMO’s headquarters based in the premises of TANU, Gwambe sent a letter to his acquaintances in Vilanculos, asking them to join UDENAMO and to organize themselves politically in order to become one of the movement’s many secret cells inside Mozambican territory, promising to arrange ‘lectures in politics’ in Tanganyika for the new members. IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process SC SR283/61, Adelino Chitofo Gwambe, Informação nº 990/61-GU, 12/6/1961, 768.

91 IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process SC SR283/61, Adelino Chitofo Gwambe, Informação nº 1.384/61-GU, 5/9/1961, 674. Certainly, at this stage Kambona was cautious about promoting decolonization of Mozambique by means of armed struggle, which means that his argument was primarily aimed at pandering to Gwambe’s personal ambitions.
1961), its Government would give all support to a Mozambican liberation movement, and that UDENAMO would be granted military training and action camps. Thus Kambona’s statement seemed to imply that unless Gwambe followed the line of the Tanganyikan Government, by either merging his movement with MANU, and/or taking the leading position of the latter, it could not count on this country’s support.⁹²

Finding Kambona’s implication nearly insulting, Gwambe’s reaction was bitter and derisive. In an arrogant and overconfident manner, given his awareness of the increasing signs of commitment of the Casablanca group members to supporting UDENAMO, Gwambe retorted that if the Government of Tanganyika would not support UDENAMO, he had “better places to go to, and better friends like Nkrumah and [Sekou] Touré”.⁹³ Clearly, Kambona’s diplomatic approach had failed.

Yet behind Gwambe’s hostile reaction was also his awareness of Kambona’s views that the Tanganyikan southern border should correspond to the Lúrio River, which meant that the Mozambican Northern Districts of Niassa and Cabo Delgado should eventually become part of Tanganyikan territory once Mozambican independence were achieved.⁹⁴ Kambona’s rationale for these secret annexation plans was underpinned by the fact that the Makonde communities separated by the Tanganyikan-Mozambican political border would then come totally under Tanganyikan jurisdiction. Such territorial annexation plans convinced Gwambe that Tanganyikan offers of support for his movement were not only ruled by self-interest, but also contrary to the spirit of Pan-African solidarity in vogue at that time, and which was advocated by Nkrumah and other leaders of the Casablanca group of African states. Hence, particular views and interests of the Tanganyikan government in local and regional affairs, rather than stemming from its Cold War considerations or the superpower pressures, gradually began to interfere in UDENAMO’s agenda set at the Casablanca Conference. Such views and interests were not only in conflict with

⁹² IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process SC SR283/61, Adelino Chitofo Gwambe, Informação nº 1.384/61-GU, 5/9/1961, 674. One should note that Kambona’s use of indefinite article ‘a’ when referring to the movement Tanganyika would support, strongly suggests that he meant it could be either UDENAMO or MANU, but implying that UDENAMO could become such a movement if Gwambe met Kambona’s expectations.

⁹³ Informação nº 1.384/61-GU, 5/9/1961, 674, ibid. It should be stressed that at this stage Gwambe’s reaction should not be directly associated with the Casablanca group’s political interference in Tanganyikan domestic affairs. This is corroborated by his interview to Tanganyika Standard in May 1961.

⁹⁴ Informação nº 1.384/61-GU, 5/9/1961, 674, ibid. The PIDE informer producing this account did not specify how Gwambe became aware of Kambona’s annexation plans. In his words, the information “reached the ears of Gwambe” [chegou aos ouvidos de Gwambe].
those of the Casablanca group, but they also represented a factor potentially impacting on Soviet interests in the region, given Tanganyika’s authority over UDENAMO’s fate in the country.

It should be noted, however, that at this stage Gwambe did not oppose the integration of independent Mozambique into the prospective East African Federation, a regional political project which the Tanganyikan and Kenyan leadership advocated through the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East, Central and Southern Africa (PAFMECSA). This is illustrated by his politically sober and tactful comment made in an interview to Tanganyika Standard after the Casablanca conference. Gwambe stated that he would support the integration of Mozambique into the federation with Tanganyika, but that “this would depend on the will of the [Mozambican] people”. This suggests that Gwambe’s political agenda was dictated by the need to preserve UDENAMO’s political absoluteness in relation to other movements, the movement’s independence from Tanganyikan official control, and the territorial integrity of Mozambique. To sum up, it entailed both the objectives set during the Casablanca Conference, thus reflecting the radicals’ agenda, and Gwambe’s personal opposition to Kambona’s secret annexation project, which certainly met, though not necessarily resulted from, the Casablanca group’s negative views on political successes of regionally-based projects such as PAFMECSA.

Given such a state of affairs, any misunderstandings between TANU and MANU, the most representative movement of Mozambicans, exacerbated by UDENAMO’s founding and political progress would be prejudicial for Kambona’s annexation policy in the event of Mozambican independence. By distancing itself from both TANU and MANU, UDENAMO was essentially splitting the Mozambican immigrant community, while refraining from cooperating with the Tanganyikan Government in a way favouring the latter. Kambona’s attempt to reach an understanding with Gwambe sought to make the latter take over the leadership position of MANU, or form a coalition between MANU and UDENAMO. This could have appeased the Makonde community, allowing the Tanganyikan Government to have a greater degree of control over the Mozambican nationalist community as a

95 “The Mozambican refugees will have headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam”, in Tanganyika Standard, Nº 10, May 1961, 726.
whole, and ensuring that a grateful Mozambican leadership would facilitate territorial concessions after the country’s independence. The latter matter corresponded also to the rationale of Hastings Banda, the leader of Nyasaland (Malawi), who supported the small nationalist movement African National Union of Independent Mozambique (UNAMI), based in Nyasaland. Banda’s aim was to annex the areas between the Rivers Lúrio to the north and Save to the south, which corresponded to the greatest part of Mozambican territory. The role played by Nyasaland is discussed in greater detail later in the thesis.

To conclude, this encounter between Kambona and Gwambe marked the beginning of an open hostility of the Tanganyikan Government towards the Mozambican nationalist leader. Its immediate result was in Gwambe and his lieutenant Fanuel Mahluza being declined passports by the Tanganyikan authorities to travel to the conference in Ghana. On the broader picture, this episode exemplifies the vulnerability of Mozambican national liberation movements in exile to the local and regional interests and designs of the governments of hosting African countries. While illustrating the influence of African states on the Mozambican national liberation cause and being a reflection of the rivalries between different African (groups of) states, the conflict between Kambona and Gwambe is, above all, indicative of the vulnerability of Soviet interests to the agency of African actors. Being a Soviet-backed movement, UDENAMO’s freedom of action becoming hostage to the political interests of Tanganyika, whose proactive stance put into question the movement’s success and the stability of its position in the region, thus emphasizes the potential of African actors in impacting on superpower interests. This is clearly indicative of the important role played by African actors in affecting the superpower engagements with the process of Mozambican national liberation, at its early stages.

98 IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process SC SR283/61, Adelino Chitofo Gwambe, From Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Director General of the PIDE, Lisbon, 30th of September of 1961, 623.
Before proceeding to a deeper analysis of Gwambe’s attitude towards Kambona, one should first address the broader subject of Pan-African affairs dominating the continental political scene at that time. The accommodation of Soviet-supported centres for coordinating the activities of African liberation movements of Portuguese territories by Morocco and the UAR represented the first stage of a gradual drawing of the Mozambican national liberation aspirations into the antagonistic dimension of Pan-African affairs. As noted earlier, it was characterised by the political and ideological clash between the Casablanca and Monrovia groups of states. While significantly affecting the further course of events for Gwambe and his movement, it also impacted upon Soviet plans for Southeast Africa during this period. A succinct picture of the Pan-African dimension, therefore, should be first given, in order to establish its role in Soviet designs and vice-versa.

One of the primary differences between the Casablanca group, known as the ‘radical’ African states in the West and labeled ‘progressive’ by the Communist bloc, and the Monrovia group or the so-called ‘moderate’ or ‘conservative’ states, which included most of the former French colonies or the so-called Brazzaville group, was the ways they approached the idea of Pan-Africanism. The former advanced an immediate economic and political unification of all African states, as a measure essential for solving the numerous economic problems of the continent, and for preventing any forms of Western states’ interference in African affairs, or so-called neo-colonialism. The latter advocated a gradual approach to the political unification of African states, through ‘self-government as soon as possible or practicable’. 99

Lurking beneath the origins of the Casablanca group were Moroccan territorial claims. In December 1960, the UN General Assembly rejected King Mohammed V’s claim over Mauritanian territory, which seemed to weaken the Moroccan political position in the international arena, and particularly in African affairs. In order to strengthen its position, the King convened a meeting in Casablanca with leaders of countries supporting his views, namely Nasser of the UAR, Nkrumah of Ghana, Sékou Touré of Guinea-Conakry, and Modibo Keita of Mali. Conversely, moderate African states, which opposed Moroccon territorial claims, were not invited. Although

the announced theme of the meeting was to find ways to deal with the Congo crisis, given Lumumba’s threatened position, the event also served to strengthen the alliance of these states regarding their radical Pan-African perspectives in relation to other groups.  

The Ghanaian leader Nkrumah was the Casablanca group’s most active promoter. He advocated the rapid if not immediate creation of the United States of Africa, following the example of the United States of America, with a common supranational political and military command, of which he wanted to become President. Conversely, those representing the moderate states, such as Nigeria, Liberia, most of the former French colonies, but also Tanganyika and Kenya, were in favour of preserving close relationships with their former colonial masters, and the Western sphere in general, stressing that each African country should conduct its foreign policy according to its own national interests.

Noticeably, despite advocating neutrality in international affairs, the Casablanca radical states, such as Ghana, Mali, Guinea-Conakry, and the UAR were openly advancing socialist agendas, and established close ties with the Soviet Union. However, it would be an overstatement to say that these countries were mere Soviet client states. Their leaders’ allegiance to Moscow, if any, was not as clear-cut as Khrushchev might have wished. For example, while Nkrumah emphasized to the Soviet leader that “there is no other path for Africa except socialism”, he did not publicly support some of Khrushchev’s initiatives in the UN. Such was also the attitude of Guinea-Conakry and UAR.

Apart from the Casablanca and Monrovia groups, the PAFMECSA project, advanced by the leaders of Tanganyika and Kenya, had yet another, regionally-based view on the process of African unification. Nyerere’s and Kenyan leader Jomo Kenyatta’s aim was to create an East African Federation, formed by Tanganyika, Kenya, and Uganda. As this paper will later establish, the Mozambican territory had

also been part of these leaders’ plan for the creation of the Federation. Ultimately, the PAFMECSA also represented an element contradicting the radicals’ views on Pan-Africanism.  

Strong disagreements between different groups of African states were further exacerbated by their territorial disputes, leading to increasing spending on military build-up rather than development of national economies, and by the Casablanca group’s, and particularly Ghanaian concern of losing their forefront position in Pan-African affairs to their opponents. It should be noted, however, that because both PAFMECSA and Monrovia groups held a common position towards the Casablanca group and favoured close ties with the West, they represented what became known as the larger Lagos group, established at the Summit of African Heads of States, held in the Nigerian capital, in January 1962. The Lagos group, therefore, encapsulated all the moderate Francophone and Anglophone African states, openly criticized the Soviet Union, and took a generally mild position regarding decolonization.

Nonetheless, the Casablanca group’s more aggressive attitude in African affairs, which was also translated into the Moroccan hosting of the CONCP, determined Gwambe’s political fate at a moment when the Mozambican nationalist seemed to be at the crossroads between a pro-active East and a low-key or nearly absent West. In particular, strong Moroccan involvement in supporting Angolan and Mozambican nationalist movements resulted from its determination to become the ‘Guiding State’ of the new African States, according to the then popular notion of African Solidarity. As further development of events demonstrates, the support received by Gwambe and his movement from the Casablanca group of states implied his allegiance to the group’s Pan-African ideas, and affected his stand in relation to the moderates and particularly the PAFMECSA. Already in September 1961, Jaime Siguaque, UDENAMO’s Secretary for Publicity, stressed in one of the movement’s

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107 JFK NSF, Africa, Reel 14, Nigeria, Department of State, From Palmer to Secretary of State, 1 February 1962, 0001-0067.
108 JFK NSF, Africa, Reel 14, Nigeria, Department of State, From Palmer to Secretary of State, January 30, 1962. JFK NSF, Africa, Reel 14, Nigeria, Department of State, From Palmer to Secretary of State, 2 February 1962, 0001-0067.
many addresses to all Mozambicans: “UDENAMO believes in the immediate national independence [of Mozambique] based on the [principles] of Pan-Africanism”.110

Understanding Gwambe in the broader political context

It would be reasonable to suggest that Gwambe’s reaction in promptly avowing his allegiance to Ghana and Guinea-Conakry before the Minister of the country providing shelter for UDENAMO, demonstrated political immaturity and the short-sightedness of the young Mozambican nationalist. Apart from touching on the delicate matter of African radicals vs. moderates, Gwambe seemed to not have considered that in the event of the beginning of armed struggle against the Portuguese colonial administration, UDENAMO had to ensure it had military camps and political headquarters available in Tanganyika from which to operate. This, in turn, meant that Gwambe should have made an effort to preserve cordial relations with the country’s officialdom, regardless of whether or not he was backed by members of the Casablanca group. Gwambe’s attitude in his discussion with Kambona demonstrated his lack of concern or awareness of such issues. Yet one should be careful in hastily dismissing Gwambe’s behaviour as a mere illustration of his political immaturity.

It is hard to say whether or not Soviet representatives in Morocco were aware of the extent to which Tanganyikan officials would oppose Gwambe’s factionalist enterprises in the country.111 Almost certainly, had there been a carefully devised plan on the part of Moscow and the Casablanca members to keep Tanganyikan authorities in the dark regarding any expeditious subversive activities in the region, Gwambe would have been explicitly instructed to make an effort to preserve cordial relations with the representatives of the host country. This would have been necessary at least until the beginning of the armed struggle, which would have left no choice to Nyerere’s government but to support its continuation.112 Yet this did not seem to be the case for two reasons.

111 Almost certainly, at this stage Tanganyikan government’s apprehension of Gwambe was not dictated by his connections to Communist elements such as Marcelino dos Santos. Moreover, by mid-1961 Ghana was not yet deeply committed to its relations with the USSR.
112 As events at the end of 1961 and beginning of 1962 demonstrated, such international pressures on the Tanganyikan government were strong enough to make it reconsider its position towards UDENAMO and Gwambe.
Firstly, in June 1961, the political status of Gwambe was a result of the CONCP arrangements of creating an alternative Mozambican organization to MANU, and sponsored by a joint Casablanca-Soviet effort aimed at bolstering its political progress so that it would become the leading Mozambican nationalist movement. This implied that it would follow a political agenda characterized by assertive anti-colonialist initiatives, while preserving its autonomy from the TANU and MANU. Yet to say that, at this stage, it was part of a highly secretive subversive Moscow-radicals’ plan for Southeast Africa would certainly be an overstatement. Rather, this process fell into the realm of covert diplomacy intrinsic to the parallel and overlapping interests of both the Soviet Union and the Casablanca group in expanding their political influence in Africa, which did not contradict the genuine commitment of radical leaders to wipe out colonialism from the rest of the continent. Although the Soviets promised Gwambe weapons and training, it should be seen as part of regular aid provided to all members of the CONCP sponsored by the Casablanca group, and such aid had yet to be put in practice. Hence it is most plausible that Gwambe perceived himself (at least primarily) as a Mozambican nationalist political leader in his own right, and a prominent public figure whose views should be respected by TANU leaders, and not as a subversive agent recruited through the CONCP to carry out ‘revolutionary’ tasks for the benefit of his foreign sponsors’ interests. As such, he spoke his mind with the overconfidence of a young man quickly climbing a political power ladder, and underestimating the risks this might entail.

Secondly, while the Casablanca group was at odds with the group of moderate African countries, both of which were made up of already independent African states, Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda were still under British jurisdiction in June 1961, thus not yet having experienced the full extent of adverse political pressures of the radicals on their regionally-based federation project. Both Nyerere and Kambona were active promoters of decolonization in all African territories, something which was in congruence with the assertive anti-colonial rhetoric of Nkrumah, Nasser, Hassan II, Keita and Touré. Tanganyikan leaders’ initially prompt support for politically active Mozambicans such as Gwambe, therefore, was not in conflict with his UDENAMO being part of the CONCP based in Morocco. As the PIDE documents widely confirm, upon Gwambe’s return from Casablanca and the announcement of the foundation of UDENAMO throughout May, his relations with the Tanganyikan
government were positive and the movement enjoyed official support from TANU and Nyerere himself. Moreover, Kambona’s taking the initiative in arranging Gwambe’s trip to Casablanca clearly shows that Tanganyikan officialdom did not see such an event as potentially threatening its political interests by the radicals’ agenda. This strongly suggests, therefore, that Kambona’s attempt to persuade Gwambe was primarily dictated by the resentment of the Makonde community about the creation of UDENAMO, which in turn threatened TANU’s relations with MANU, and ultimately Kambona’s annexation plans, rather than by Pan-African contradictions.

Given such a state of affairs, one concludes that Gwambe’s hostile reaction towards Kambona was dictated by his personal opposition towards Tanganyikan territorial annexation plans, and not a direct result of the radicals’ influence. Also, it was driven by his self-perception as an authoritative Mozambican political leader unrestrained by Tanganyikan official positions, the latter being a result of his overconfidence and a degree of political immaturity. It is, therefore, unsurprising that Gwambe’s straightforwardness was so explicitly demonstrated in his exchange with Kambona.

The analysis of this episode is important inasmuch as it contextualizes the interactions between local political actors in both the local and broader pictures of African affairs, and pinpoints critical elements in their predispositions, self and other perceptions, and respective patterns of behaviour. While at this stage the course of events was largely dictated by local political actors rather than explicit Pan-African and/or Cold War polarization, this episode illustrates how specific settings influencing the further course of events were first generated. It signalled not only local and regional actors’ conflicting political trajectories, but also the proactive character of their postures, all of which had repercussions for Soviet and American designs in the region. This adds to the argument that the agencies of individual African actors played an important role at both local and regional levels in affecting the interests of the superpowers in the context of Mozambican national liberation. It further

114 IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process nº 2963/63 – SR, Gabriel Zandamela, 404. Contrary to MANU backed by Tanganyika, UNAMI backed by Nyasaland (Malawi), and later FRELIMO in the first stages of its existence, all of which were involved in plans of territorial partition of Mozambique, UDENAMO was the only Mozambican movement defending territorial integrity of the country after its independence.
emphasizes the limited degree to which the Soviet Union had control over the leader of UDENAMO at these early stages, while highlighting the proactive character of individual African nationalist figures.

*Conference of the Non-Independent States, Winneba, Ghana*

The UDENAMO leadership’s preparations for the Conference of the Non-Independent States in Ghana were critical inasmuch as being vital for bolstering the movement’s political and material assistance from Moscow through that African country. In a letter to UDENAMO headquarters sent from Rabat on 15th June 1961, dos Santos urged Gwambe and his lieutenants to elaborate a detailed plan and “concrete ideas” before they went to the conference, of which they “should take the utmost advantage”. He also stressed that issues related to the movement’s political programme should be sorted out, and explicitly pointed to the need for conducting deep research into the political situation of Mozambique’s neighbouring countries. In particular, dos Santos was especially interested in their foreign relations, which, in his words, “was an extremely important matter for UDENAMO”.115 Also, dos Santos stressed the need for considering the need to prepare a certain number of Mozambicans to receive technical and military training, as well as training in union work, in “the countries we have contacted”. The CONCP Secretary General reminded his UDENAMO colleagues that in their proposals for these countries, which almost certainly were those of the Soviet Bloc, they should clearly indicate the number of Mozambicans they would be able to send, and the number of Mozambicans who would be prepared to go. Finally, he emphasized the need to discuss propaganda issues.116

Such issues concerned Radio Moscow’s broadcasts, which had been broached by dos Santos in an earlier letter he sent from Rabat to UDENAMO’s headquarters. Acknowledging the possibility of that radio station broadcasting propaganda material favourable to UDENAMO, dos Santos emphasized: “but it is necessary [for us] to organize well this information, and send [them the] news regularly. Moreover, it is also possible [to do that] from other countries.” Such a statement suggests that dos

116 From Marcelino dos Santos to Gwambe, Rabat, 15th of June 1961, 661, ibid.
Santos not only was referring to the need for keeping Moscow well informed of the events in the region, thus serving as an intelligence source, but also that a number of countries, probably those of the Eastern bloc and the Casablanca group, could also be used to transmit such propaganda. While this suggests that the Soviet Union aimed at using UDENAMO as an information source, this could also have provided the CONCP-affiliated movements with the opportunity to feed Moscow’s propaganda agencies, which were de facto under the KGB jurisdiction, with information favouring the nationalists’ interests. The available documents, however, do not offer any clarification on this matter.

On 28th June 1961, Gwambe, Mahluza, and dos Santos attended the Conference of the Non-Independent States, which took place in Winneba, 60 Km away from the Ghanaian capital city, Accra. Rather unsurprisingly, Soviet ‘observers’, as they are referred to in PIDE documents, were also present. Under the motto ‘The Angolan Situation Will Be Created in all Dependent States and the World Will Hear the African Voice’, one of the conference’s aims was for Nkrumah to be comprehensively informed on the financial and material, primarily military, needs of the so-called ‘dependent states’, before his departure to the USSR and Eastern Europe, where he would present these needs to the Soviet sponsors. The issue of provision of weapons for Gwambe’s movement was in fact the primary reason for his journey to Ghana.

119 Informação nº 1.308/61-GU, “Conferência dos Estados Africanos não Independentes Realizada no Ghana, em 28 de Junho de 1961”, 11/8/1961, 714, ibid. Almost certainly, Soviet ‘observers’ the document refers to were officers of the KGB or the GRU, or both.
120 ibid.
Despite his publicly non-aligned stand and his Western education, the Ghanaian leader’s background was marked by his acquaintance with Marxist, Pan-African, and African Nationalist ideas as early as the late 1920s and early 1930s. This period coincided with growing Soviet activity in Africa, during which Nkrumah established close contacts with members of European and American Communist Parties, such as Marcus Garvey, who were also members of the Comintern, the de facto first Soviet Foreign Intelligence Service. Once leader of Ghana, Nkrumah enjoyed an influential position next to the Soviet leadership, and his requests for both secret and overt Soviet military assistance for both his country and for other African states he deemed necessary had always been promptly satisfied. The Kremlin paid close attention to Nkrumah’s voice on African affairs. For example, according to Fursenko and Naftali, it was after the Ghanaian leader’s request to the Kremlin to intervene in the Congo when Lumumba’s fate was at stake that, Khrushchev’s “determination to do something bold in the Congo hardened.”

The Winneba conference’s rally was the all-African countries’ assistance to national liberation movements, with a particular emphasis on the situation in Angola and Mozambique. While the intention to promote the anti-colonial struggle was plainly clear, the organizers took the opportunity to advance their Pan-African agenda in the context of the ongoing clash between the Casablanca and Monrovia groups of states. In a statement entitled ‘Committee for the Resolution of Constitutional Problems’, they took advantage of the material and political needs of national liberation movements to exert pressure on other African states, particularly those of the moderate Monrovia group, to comply with their goals. Implicitly, however, they also compelled the liberation movements, which would potentially become the governing bodies of the respective territories after independence, to accept their views, while championing the Casablanca group’s position as the spearhead actor in unifying Africa under a single banner and advancing its Pan-African and anti-

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124 Fursenko & Naftali, ibid.
125 See Appendix 1.
imperialist agendas. The following points of the conference’s opening statement clearly illustrate such aims:

“1. This Conference condemns all constitutions which allow the colonizers to retain in their hands the domination of respective territories. This Conference requests all Independent African States that they urgently and persistently apply pressure on the imperialists.

2. Given that the need for material aid to the nationalist movements is presented by delegations of freedom fighters of the 15 dependent territories [present at this Conference], [the Conference] requests the Bureau of African Affairs or any other appropriate body to sponsor a Commission of good will, composed by 6 members, representing Central Africa, the Protectorates of South Africa, the South African Group, [and] the Portuguese colonies of Eastern and Western Africa. This Commission should be empowered with the necessary authority to be able to visit and to appeal the States of the Addis Ababa Conference, [for them to create] a Central Fund supporting the freedom fighters in Africa.

3. This Conference notes with deep concern the tendency of Independent African States for division and disunity, which is reflected in the existence of the ‘Casablanca’ and ‘Monrovia’ groups of States. The Conference is also of the opinion that the disunity and the division are seriously harmful to the interests of the African peoples and catastrophic for the [future] of the Continent. Therefore, the Committee insists that the Commission [composed by] 6 members would be provided with the necessary powers in order to [be able to] ask both parties to make the [necessary] efforts to resolve their disagreements, in the interest of African Unity and Economic and Political Independence.”

The final resolution of the Conference, under the title ‘All African People’s Party’, issued on 31st June in the Kwame Nkrumah Institute clearly illustrated the Casablanca group’s efforts to drag the national liberation movements under the umbrella of its Pan-African objectives. A Committee composed of 20 representatives, among whom were dos Santos and Mahluza, discussed the adoption of a common name by the nationalist organizations of African countries under Portuguese colonial rule. The three initiatives resulting from the meeting thus stated:

“a) That the adoption of a common name by the Nationalist Movements, wherever it would be practical to be applied, would be acknowledged as an indication of the desire for African unity.

b) That the mutual aid, both moral and material, between the Independent African States and the National Liberation movements in dependent territories, represents an important factor in the edification of African Unity.

c) That the creation of a United Front of Nationalist Movements in each country as bases of struggle against colonialism, imperialism, and neo-colonialism [represents] a vital factor for the attainment of an immediate and total independence.”

During that first meeting between Gwambe and Nkrumah, the Ghanaian leader promised to provide extensive aid to UDENAMO on the strict condition that no foreigners, - only Mozambicans, - would be involved in Gwambe’s movement, especially with regards to its leadership.\textsuperscript{128} While Nkrumah’s stance was in accordance with the Casablanca radicals’ ideas opposing any forms of foreign interference in African affairs and neo-colonialism, something which primarily implied keeping at bay former colonial powers from African domestic affairs, this particular case grew from Ghanaian desires to prevent Tanganyika and Kenya from influencing the Mozambican nationalist movement, while exerting influence over East African political scene through it. In particular, Nkrumah was opposed to any political successes of the PAFMECSA, which also included Kambona’s plans of territorial annexation of Mozambican Northern provinces or the integration of Mozambique into the federation. Any such accomplishments of regionally-based African organizations such as PAFMECSA or the Union Africaine et Malgache (UAM) [African Union and Malagasy (AUM)] represented a blow to Nkrumah’s Pan-African aspirations.\textsuperscript{129} In the context of the Cold War, they would be damaging to the


\textsuperscript{128} IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process SC SR283/61, Adelino Chitofo Gwambe, Informação 1257/61-GU, 14/7/1961, 723. Since his return from Ghana, Gwambe had always refused to accept foreigners as members of UDENAMO. For example, although some Kenyans wanted to join UDENAMO, Gwambe always refused them such an opportunity, on the pretext of them not being originally from Mozambique. Informação nº 1.249/61-GU, From Consulate of Portugal in Dar-es-Salaam to the PIDE, 10/5/1961, 724. IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process SC SR283/61, Adelino Chitofo Gwambe, Informação nº 1231/61-GU, “Visita do Secretario Americano Mennen Williams à Moçambique”, 19/7/1961, 743.

\textsuperscript{129} JFK NSF, Africa, Reel 16, Togo, State Department, Poullada to Secretary of State, 9 August 1963, 0767-0817.
Soviet interests in Africa, whilst strengthening Western positions on the continent. Hence signs of Gwambe’s growing association with Ghana greatly contributed to the increasing Tanganyikan and Kenyan Governments’ hostility towards UDENAMO, given their limited ability to influence the movement from within, thus losing control over the process of Mozambican national liberation to their Casablanca group counterparts.

It should be noted, however, that Nkrumah’s demand that no foreigners should be allowed to lead UDENAMO also grew from his racial views. In particular, this concerned Marcelino dos Santos, whom Nkrumah did not consider a ‘genuine’ Mozambican, because he was mixed-race. As we will see further in the thesis, such views of the Ghanaian leader badly affected the cohesion of UDENAMO’s leadership, contributing to dissent weakening the movement and undermining Soviet interests. At this stage, however, it was the Tanganyikan and Kenyan influence on the movement that the Ghanaian leader wished to curtail, something strongly supported by dos Santos.

The UDENAMO leadership’s compliance with Nkrumah’s guidelines became increasingly evident. In passionate tones, dos Santos’s letters to UDENAMO sent from Rabat systematically reinforced the idea that the movement should preclude any attempts by foreign organizations or governments to interfere in its internal affairs. Above all, dos Santos was opposed to Kenyan and Tanganyikan political interference, stressing that not only TANU should not be allowed to control UDENAMO, but also that he strongly objected to the interference of Timothy Muinga Chokwe, the spokesman of the Kenyan Legislation Council, and a prominent political figure in Eastern Africa.130 “We appeal to the solidarity of everyone”, dos Santos wrote, “but we shall never accept any conditions. The aid that [others] may want to provide us must always be unconditional and unselfish. If any country or organization should want to impose conditions on us, we [should always] strictly refuse [their help].” However, the pressures for sorting out the conflicts between MANU and UDENAMO had been mounting, and dos Santos also added that the movement’s divergences with

MANU should be resolved. Meanwhile, Ghanaian influence in East African affairs was also exercised through Tanganyikan political agents of influence who attended the Conference in Ghana. Once back in Dar-es-Salaam, a prominent member of both TANU and PAFMECSA, T. K. Msonge, lobbied for TANU to support Gwambe.

Soviet explosives for Southeast Africa

Given that Nkrumah was informed about the assistance needs of UDENAMO, he took advantage of his visit to the USSR in the following month to make a request to the Soviet leadership for military assistance, which could then be used for advancing the Mozambican national liberation cause. The prospect of opening of a second front in the struggle against Portuguese colonialism, this time in Southeast Africa, could not have been passed up by the KGB’s chief, Aleksandr Shelepin. The time was when the Kremlin was planning to build the Berlin Wall. Khrushchev was both extremely anxious about Washington’s reaction to the enterprise, and determined to carry on with the project no matter the consequences. “If this drags us into war”, Khrushchev avowed to the East German leader Ulbricht, “there will be war.” On 29th July, four days after Nkrumah’s departure from Moscow, Shelepin “proposed [to the Presidium] a series of measures around the world that ‘would favor dispersion of attention and forces by the United States and its satellites, and would tie them down during the settlement of a German peace treaty and West Berlin.’” Central to such endeavour was “to activate by the means available to the KGB armed uprisings against pro-Western reactionary governments” in different parts of the Third World, including

132 Msonge further told the journals Mwafrica and Ngurumo in mid-July that while they received no promises [of aid] at the Conference, the event was not only beneficial in getting together the political leaders of different organizations to discuss their ideas, but also that the discussed topic of building an all-African federation was accompanied by discussions about how to help all African non-independent states to achieve their freedom. The Conference also thanked Tanganyika and Ghana for closing down or expelling the Portuguese Consulates on their territories, and emphasized that “the rest of Africa should follow their example”. IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process SC SR283/61, Adelino Chitofo Gwambe, Informação n° 1.587/61-GU, 2/11/1961, 508-510.
134 Fursenko & Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War, p. 377.
As Andrew and Mitrokhin put it, this strategy “envisaged the use of national liberation movements as the basis of a forward policy in the Third World.”

One of such measures was to assist revolutionary movements in Latin America to distract Washington. According to Fursenko and Naftali, such an approach would “mark a major shift in how Khrushchev competed with US power in the Third World. Up to [that time], the Kremlin had not created any national liberation movements and had been reluctant to sponsor revolutionaries who preferred armed rebellion to creating socialism through political subversion.” The plan was accepted by the Presidium and by the Soviet leader, and the KGB engaged in financing the Sandinista movement in Nicaragua to buy weapons, and in recruiting Nicaraguan students to train for subversive operations against the official regime. Andrew and Mitrokhin mention that in the Middle East “Shelepin … conceived a remarkable scheme to support a Kurdish rebellion in northern Iraq.” The authors emphasize that this particular operation demonstrates the KGB’s “hopes for exploiting both [Nasser’s] enormous prestige [in the Arab world] … and his willingness to enter a special relationship with the Soviet Union,” since in case of success, Moscow would endorse the subsequent “integration of the non-Kurdish part of Iraqi territory with the UAR”, of which Nasser was secretly informed beforehand.

Yet Nicaragua and Iraq seem to be only part of what Shelepin referred to as ‘around the world’. The timing and character of events in Southeast Africa between July and August 1961 strongly indicate that Mozambique was another spot to become hot on the KGB’s world map of subversive actions.

In the course of his visit to the USSR in July 1961, Nkrumah received a $2,800,000 military material credit loan from the USSR. Such an amount was great enough to turn the Ghanaian Army, Air Force, and Navy into one of the best-equipped military forces in the region, since Ghanaian inventory of acquisition of

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136 Andrew & Mitrokhin, The KGB and the World, p. 150.
137 Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War, pp. 378-379.
138 Fursenko and Naftali, ibid, pp. 379;
139 Andrew and Mitrokhin, op.cit., p. 150.
140 ibid.
Soviet arms even included two submarines.\textsuperscript{141} It also meant that substantial quantities of armament could be provided to nationalist factions of Portuguese colonies. However, the first substantial shipment of Soviet arms only arrived in Ghana in December 1962, apparently intended for Nkrumah’s personal guard, the President’s Guard Regiment.\textsuperscript{142}

This leaves the question of whether or not Nkrumah’s request for Soviet arms for UDENAMO was satisfied, and if it was, how. The answer should be looked for in purely logistical aspects of the matter; in the character of armaments most adequate for Mozambican nationalists at those early stages; in the time constraints of the Soviet active measures plan; and in the effectiveness of the used means in order to guarantee the deepest impact possible through the implementation of the plan.

In a paragraph of his book \textit{The Hot Cold War}, Shubin addresses the exchange of intelligence information between Portugal and leading Western countries regarding national liberation struggles in Southern Africa, stating that such information “was sometimes rather implausible”. As an example, Shubin refers to a State Department document on an episode when the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Franco Nogueira, informed the US embassy in Lisbon that according to Portuguese Army sources, “[t]he main base of the Soviet explosive supplies for sabotage purposes in the east African countries is located in Yemen”.\textsuperscript{143} Shubin continued by saying that Nogueira claimed that these supplies were then shipped to Comoros and from there, to Tanganyika and Mozambique. While his reference to the State Department document is accurate, to make his case the author concludes with a rather mistaken comment: “Just imagine: a Soviet base in Yemen ruled by a feudal emir, another one

\textsuperscript{142} “The Military Situation in Ghana, Nigeria, and UAM”, March 1963, p. 14, 0754-0831, ibid. The 180-ton shipment included six armoured personnel carriers, three scout cars, grenades, sub-machine guns, small arms and 60 tons of small arms ammunition. By 1963, none of this material was seen in the hands of the Ghanaian army. The US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Estimate suggested at first that these weapons were intended for Angolan rebels. However, DIA’s further assessment disproved this, advancing instead the hypothesis that the arms were intended for the President’s Guard Regiment, an elite military force dedicated to Nkrumah’s personal protection, whose members were selected on the basis of personal loyalty to the President. The primary reason behind Nkrumah’s wish to well equip the President’s Guard Regiment to the detriment of the army was the increasingly tense relations between Nkrumah and the Ghanaian military, who opposed his overtures with the Soviet Bloc. Being more and more concerned about a military plot to remove him from power, Nkrumah made efforts to equip his Guard Regiment, while leaving the military short of advanced Soviet arms.
\textsuperscript{143} Shubin, \textit{The Hot Cold War}, p. 10.
in the French-controlled Comoros and finally supplies being delivered to non-existing
(in 1961) rebels in East Africa!"\(^{144}\)

Apart from Shubin’s appalling ignorance about the state of affairs in the
Mozambican nationalist scene in 1961, this comment also shows his lack of
knowledge about Soviet foreign relations with countries in the Arabian Peninsula
during that period. As numerous Soviet documents clearly show, according to the
Soviet-Yemeni treaty for economic and technical cooperation, signed on 11\(^{th}\) July
1956, Yemen became a major recipient of Soviet economic, technical and military aid
in the region. The USSR offered a no-interest loan of 60 million roubles to Yemen, to
finance the reconstruction of the seaport in Al Hudaydah, an oil depot, and several
factories, while offering free technical education for Yemeni specialists to operate
these facilities, as well as the respective technical equipment. While the seaport,
whose total annual cargo tonnage was estimated at 300,000 tons, was completed in
April 1961, it had begun partial operation already in May 1960.\(^{145}\) Furthermore,
Abdullah as-Sallal, who was deeply involved in the coup that overthrew the Yemeni
monarchy regime under the auspices of Nasser in September 1962, and who became
the first President of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), was director of the al
Hudaydah seaport since his release from prison in 1955. During the pre-coup years,
as-Sallal and some of his coup associates closely collaborated with Soviet intelligence
in Yemen, namely by providing them detailed information on the country’s internal
political matters and those of the Royal family.\(^{146}\)

\(^{144}\) Shubin, *The Hot Cold War*, p. 10.

\(^{145}\) Chadwyck-Healey Microfilm Holdings, RGANI, General Department of the Central Committee (1953-1966), Film A1046, Reel 81, 337, State Committee of the Soviet Ministers of the USSR for Foreign Economic Relations, “On the economic and technical cooperation between the USSR and Yemen”, 11\(^{th}\) August 1960, Nº 02-1/161, 104-107, Lamont Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. In November 1959, a Yemeni delegation headed by the Prince Muhammad al-Badr paid an official visit to the Soviet Union. Due to the Yemeni severe financial problems, its government asked Moscow for a further 1,5 million roubles in foreign currency to pay the Yemenis working on the construction of these facilities. In January 1961, al Hudaydah port facilities were destroyed by a major fire. Yemen asked the USSR to build first only the oil depot and the port in Al Hudaydah, which became partly operational already in May 1960.


On close Soviet-Yemeni relations in different spheres before and after October 1962, see Chadwyck-Healey Microfilm Holdings, RGANI, General Department of the Central Committee (1953-1966), Film A1046, Reel 107, 452, Memorandum on “Relations between the USSR and Yemen” , Soviet-Yemeni relations until the revolution of 26\(^{th}\) September in Yemen, 30-38.

\(^{146}\) Chadwyck-Healey Microfilm Holdings, RGANI, General Department of the Central Committee (1953-1966), Film A1046, Reel 107, 452, “Personal profile, Marshal Abdullah as-Sallal, President of the Yemen Arab Republic”, 14-19. “Personal profile, Minister of Communications of the Yemen Arab
Thus pre-1962 monarchy rule notwithstanding (which the Soviets promptly branded as ‘despotic’ after the coup), the Yemeni financial dependence on the USSR, and the heavy Soviet diplomatic, military, intelligence, and technical presence in the country, supported by well-positioned pro-Moscow figures running strategically vital facilities, provided more than ideal conditions for the Soviet Union to make use of the seaport whose rebuilding it had financed, to store and ship any kind of cargo it deemed necessary. Given the advantageous geostrategic location of the al-Hudaydah seaport, something which probably was of greater importance to the Soviet leadership than the character of Yemeni political regime, it was much more reasonable to ship military material for Mozambican nationalists from Yemen along the East coast of Africa, than through Ghana.

Further constraints existed for Soviet transport routes in Africa, and which made it unreasonable to deliver weapons through Ghana. During the Congo crisis of 1960, the Soviet Union learnt one of its first hardest lessons about the continent. Being denied by, or not having agreements with most African states to overfly their territories or land on them for refuelling, the USSR was unable to swiftly project its military power into different regions of the sub-Saharan Africa by air. In the first years of the 1960s, Moscow was making a tremendous effort to obtain such overfly rights from countries such as Sudan, Uganda, Kenya, and Tanganyika, whilst the US was making an equally tremendous effort to press the respective governments to

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Republic, Colonel Abdallah Dobbi”, 22-23. One might advance the hypothesis that as-Sallal’s release from prison and positioning as director of the al-Hudaydah port resulted from Soviet pressures on the Yemeni government, as a condition for Soviet economic aid to the country. Circumstantial evidence points to Soviet covert involvement supporting as-Sallal in the 1962 coup. As-Sallal and his entourage had always privately expressed their admiration for the Soviet Union and its foreign policies. UAR was the first country to recognize the YAR, immediately followed by the Soviet Union. On Soviet-Egyptian joint political, covert, and military involvement in Yemen, also see Ferris, ‘Soviet support for Egypt’s intervention in Yemen, 1962-1963’, Journal of Cold War Studies, Fall 2008, vol. 10, n. 4, pp. 5-36. Ferris explicitly points to the intensive use of al-Hudaydah port for transportation of Soviet weapons to Yemen, since the mid-1950s.

147 The Soviet pragmatic approach prioritizing its strategic interest in having seaport access is further demonstrated by the fact that despite spending colossal sums of money on such facilities, it refrained from financing the construction of a road from the Al Hudaydah to the city of Taiz, located in Yemen's interior. While not openly rebuffing the Yemeni request, Moscow’s move was to keep continuing talks on this matter, proposing to send a delegation of Soviet specialists to evaluate the specifics of the project on the ground. Chadwyck-Healey Microfilm Holdings, RGANI, General Department of the Central Committee (1953-1966), Film A1046, Reel 81, 337, State Committee of the Soviet Ministers of the USSR for Foreign Economic Relations, “On the economic and technical cooperation between the USSR and Yemen”, 11th August 1960, № 02-1/161, pp. 106-107, Lamont Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
prevent the Soviets from obtaining such rights. According to Soviet documents, Chad, whose large territory was en-route for the air routes Cairo-Accra and Cairo-Conakry, tended first to grant, and then almost immediately to deny permission for Soviet airplanes to cross its airspace, something which was a result of French officials’ pressures on Chadian decision-makers. While being a result of joint Western efforts to prevent Soviet airplanes from maintaining regular air connections with Ghana and Guinea, and to swiftly provide material assistance, these efforts were also aimed at preventing Moscow from using West African countries to make airlifts to Cuba. It goes without saying that, for matters of concealment of the operation, the transportation of such military material to Tanganyika by the Ghanaian air fleet was not an option.

Considering such a state of affairs, and the secrecy of the Soviet-Ghanaian plans to instigate armed struggle in Mozambique in 1961, the delivery of Soviet military material for UDENAMO in Tanganyika from Yemen through the Comoros was not only the most viable logistical option, but also one preventing the arousal of suspicion of direct Soviet subversive involvement in the region, given that the final segment of the sea route was made from a French-controlled territory.

Moreover, time was a critical factor. As Jesse Ferris puts it in referring to the swift Soviet response to Egyptian requests for assistance in military intervention in Yemen in October 1962, “one characteristic of Soviet decision-making stands out…: it was remarkably fast.” Ferris makes a case that in the broader picture of Soviet military interventions supporting beleaguered revolutionaries in the Third World in 1960-1961, “[d]efeat in the Congo and near setbacks in Laos and Cuba must have made Soviet policymakers determined to be prompter and more decisive with military aid in similar situations in the future.” He further adds that “the impulsive alacrity of Soviet response was vintage Khrushchev; on s’engage, et puis on voit”, an attitude


underpinned by “the volatile mixture of revolutionary fervor and strategic calculation that made up Soviet foreign policy under Khrushchev.”

Certainly not all episodes between 1960 and 1962 resulted from, or corresponded to, the Soviet aim of distracting Washington from other issues in the international arena. Yet Ferris’s conclusion drives home the key argument that the Soviet exploitation of the processes of national liberation and/or revolutionary outbursts in the Third World, in which the KGB’s active measures played a central role, not only was intrinsic to the increasingly more proactive Soviet policy in advancing its goals in the international arena vis-à-vis the West and the PRC, but also saw a greater degree of responsiveness as a result of earlier failures. Therefore, the pattern of events involving Nkrumah’s visit to the USSR in the mid-end of July, Shelepin’s immediate proposal for worldwide active measures, and the Soviet shipment of explosives from Yemen via the shortest possible route in August of 1961 matches the decisive and prompt manner in which the Soviet leadership tended to engage in critical affairs in the Third World, in an effort not to lose momentum.

Impact and concealment were other two important elements for the effectiveness of Shelepin’s plan, entailing that the use of material provided to Mozambicans should produce quick results, by causing major damage and impact, while keeping the Soviet involvement concealed. In mid-1961, only a few Mozambicans had begun undertaking military training, which took place outside Africa, and the first prepared militants arrived in the continent, via Morocco, only in the late summer. To supply weapons such as small arms and the necessary ammunition would have been counterproductive. Their effective use would have involved time-consuming training in the tactics and strategies of guerrilla warfare of a reasonable number of fighters, in order to produce the desired effect on the international community. Also, the origin of such arms could be identified, and more exposed to detection by the French in the Comoros and the Tanganyikan authorities, as well as being bulkier than explosive cargo, whose volume was almost certainly not large and which, due to its physical character, could be more easily disguised and its origin more difficult to trace when used.

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151 Ferris, “Soviet support for Egypt’s intervention in Yemen”, pp. 21, 23.
Hence the provision of explosives, which are cheaper, more easily disguisable, whose origin is less prone to identification, whose use does not require special military training, yet whose use can have a greater physical and psychological impact, represented the most appropriate means through which to rapidly turn Mozambique into a stage of terrorist operations drawing international attention. In fact, through 1961-1962, both dos Santos and Gwambe highlighted the need to use ‘homemade’ explosives as opposed to firearms in several private meetings with other members of UDENAMO.  

This suggests that Moscow followed at least two different paths in its covert assistance to Mozambican nationalists from mid-1961, corresponding to different strategic and tactical frameworks. The first was assisting UDENAMO through the CONCP, by providing financial and logistical support, military equipment and recruitment of militants for military training. This was done in the broader framework of assistance to other Soviet-backed factions of Angola, Portuguese Guinea, and Goan nationalists, involving the support of the Casablanca states such as UAR, Guinea-Conakry, Ghana, and Morocco, but also India. Moreover, the operation of this network also involved cooperation with the Portuguese Communist Party, based in Paris, as well as Indian and Mozambican left-wing organizations based in Goa and London. Thus the shiploads of diverse Soviet small arms arriving in Moroccan ports from August onwards, and whose unloading was personally supervised by Gwambe and dos Santos, together with the beginning of training programmes of Mozambican and Angolan militants indicate that a steady and regular Soviet assistance was being provided to the so-called African ‘freedom fighters’.

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152 IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process SC SR283/61, Adelino Chitofo Gwambe, “From the report of the Portuguese Consul to Salisbury”, 337. For example, Gwambe mentioned that his men were being trained in Ghana in the making of rudimentary bombs, starting in the second half of 1961.

The second Soviet approach, through provision of explosives via the Yemen-Tanganyika sea route in August 1961, was prompted by Nkrumah’s visit to Moscow, and aimed at achieving immediate short-term objectives. The opportunity to instigate the beginning of nationalist armed struggle in Mozambique had probably produced an epiphany in Shelepin’s mind envisioning grand-strategy constructs, prompting him to take advantage of, and further promote opportune events in the Third World to assist Soviet endeavours in Europe.\textsuperscript{154} Such a move would also have beneficial political consequences for Moscow’s position in Africa as a whole.

Firstly, it would demonstrate to Soviet partners such as Ghana Moscow’s determination to actively engage in the struggle against colonialism, its will in supporting African radical states’ political endeavours in the continent, and its promptness in satisfying these allies’ requests, all of which reinforcing the Soviet position regarding the Casablanca members. The parallel between Soviet-Egyptian and Soviet-Ghanaiian relations by mid-1961 could hardly be more obvious. While Nasser’s relations with Moscow severely deteriorated due to his persecution of Egyptian Communists, Nkrumah was reticent in deepening his ties to Moscow as he still hoped to get a better deal with the West, which manifested itself in his systematically postponing his first official visit to the USSR.\textsuperscript{155} After a series of disappointments with the US, he finally decided to fully commit to Ghanaian relations with Moscow. The hitherto anxious Kremlin made sure its economic, technical, military, and political doors were open wide enough to convince Nkrumah there was no better friend than the Soviet state, something which it succeeded in doing.\textsuperscript{156} For the Soviets, what the power of Nasser’s magnetism and Pan-Arab vision represented for the Middle East, Nkrumah’s passionate charisma and Pan-African ambitions

\textsuperscript{154} Such links between Soviet policies towards European issues and events in different parts of the Third World in fact existed in Soviet foreign policy practice on other occasions, yet they did not always aim to distract or intimidate the US Administration. In certain instances, Khrushchev instigated a clear relaxation of pressure by Moscow-supported Third World forces towards the Western-backed ones, to signal to Washington that an understanding on other, often more critical matters could be reached, provided that both parties were willing to make some concessions on other issues. Again, this displeased Peking, reminding Khrushchev that the US might interpret Soviet concessions in one area as an indication that further concessions were expected in others. Fursenko & Naftali, \textit{Khrushchev’s Cold War}, pp. 394-395, 425.

\textsuperscript{155} Chadwyck-Healey Microfilm Holdings, General Department of the Central Committee (1953-1966) Film A1046, RGANI, Reel 88, 371, “Development of economic relations of the USSR with countries poorly-developed in economic terms”, “Republic of Ghana”, 120, Lamont Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. Soviet economic assistance to Ghana began in 1960, with the grant of a 36 million roubles credit on 4\textsuperscript{th} August 1960.

\textsuperscript{156} Andrew and Mitrokhin, \textit{The KGB and the World}, p. 150.
represented for the Sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, both leaders were political allies, and on his trip back from the USSR made on a Soviet ship at his own request, Nkrumah planned to stop for several days in Egypt. Thus in mid-1961, the Soviet leadership was presented with a unique chance to make remarkable progress in its relations with the two influential leaders, and there was hardly a better way to please them than to help satisfy their appetites for the expansion of their political and ideological ambitions in the respective regions of interest.

Secondly, by instigating the armed struggle in Mozambique, the moderate Tanganyikan Government defending liberation by peaceful means would have no choice but to endorse such a course of action, which would make it difficult to decline further, more active Soviet involvement and presence in the region. It would also make PAFMECSA more vulnerable to the Casablanca group’s influence, and ultimately facilitate the Soviet bloc’s expansion of its influence in Southeast and Central Africa.

Thirdly, by becoming the primary back sponsor of the Mozambican liberation struggle, the Soviet Union would curtail Peking’s keen efforts to expand its influence in Eastern Africa, bolstering its image as the leading force behind the international struggle against colonialism, imperialism, and neo-colonialism. This, in turn, would promote the Soviet political position regarding the Asian African group, or the so-called Non-aligned movement, which was becoming the primary arena for Sino-Soviet arm-wrestling in the early 1960s. It would also contribute to strengthening the Soviet position regarding the members of the Casablanca group, to the detriment of the PRC.

Finally, at the global strategic level, the beginning of the armed struggle in Mozambique would open a ‘Pandora’s Box’ for the American strategy for Southern Africa, which was underpinned by the primary goal of avoiding by all means the beginning of armed struggle in the region. According to this strategy, such an event would bring about armed escalation at the continental level, opposing the white-ruled Southern Africa to the African countries to the north. The moderate African states would face a tough choice between continuing their close cooperation with the West

in order to advance their economic development, or helping their Southern African brethren in their struggle against the white-rulled regimes of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, and Portugal. Due to progressive escalation of black-white tensions in the region, the State Department reasoned, the white-minority regimes would join forces and form the so-called ‘White Redoubt’, a military and security bloc resolved to keep at bay the anti-colonial subversive and armed forces supported by the Sino-Soviet bloc. Given South Africa’s great economic, industrial, scientific and military resources and development, such a bloc would have enough potential to hold its position and internal political status quo for an indefinite period of time. The moderate African states, on the other hand, would have no choice but to side with, and thus to fall under the influence of the socialist-oriented Casablanca group in the context of the north-south war. Thus the beginning of the armed struggle in Southern Africa would severely undermine vital strategic, economic, and political interests of the West in general, and of the US in particular, in both Southern Africa, and in the rest of the continent, while providing favourable ground for Communist expansion on the continent.\(^{158}\)

To sum up, although the declassified Soviet documents do not refer to Mozambique as one of the KGB targets in its global plan of active measures, the data analysed and contextualized thus far strongly suggests that this African country was due to become a hot spot between late summer and autumn of 1961. The level of secrecy attached to Soviet worldwide active measures devised by Shelepin was such that the KGB preferred to keep secret its direct support for revolutionary factions even from such close allies as Cuba. “We do not help national-liberation movements”, the KGB representatives asserted before Cuban officials one year later.\(^{159}\) This assertion is key for understanding the further course of events, and ultimately the failure of Soviet-radicals’ subversive plans for Mozambique.

While Moscow’s secret plans for assisting UDENAMO in cooperation with the members of the Casablanca group were under way and signalled that a ‘hot’ phase was about to begin in Mozambique, one should also look at the ways in which Soviet covert activities were developing in Angola, in order to identify particular patterns of such Soviet involvement in Southern Africa.

\(^{158}\) JFK NSF, Africa, Reel 1, General, Department of State, “Guidelines for Policy and Operations, Republic of South Africa”, May 1962, 0350-0436.
\(^{159}\) Fursenko & Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War, p. 428.
Soviet vessels in Southern African waters

On the Portuguese side, in the nearly paranoid atmosphere of omnipresent Communist conspiracy, preparations for armed attacks by Mozambican nationalists backed by Communist powers were already taking place. In early July, the PIDE delegation in Mozambique produced an exhaustive report for Lisbon, addressing the Overseas Province’s situation in the first half of 1961. Referring to the military measures to be taken, the report stressed that “… the Navy … will soon be provided with fast vedettes … . These small [and] fast boats could hunt the [rebels] coming by canoe from Tanganyika or landing from Russian submarines.”160 “Some of the [Communist agents] would be Mozambicans trained behind the Iron Curtain”, another report asserted.161

Clearly, the Portuguese intelligence service’s reports, emphasizing Soviet engagement with African nationalist organizations, intensified Lisbon’s belief that it was facing a global Communist conspiracy so committed to put an end to the Portuguese colonial rule and to overthrowing the Salazar regime itself, that even strategic weapons such as submarines were to be employed for the cause.

If such Portuguese views were exaggerated, they were not totally unfounded. Highly suspicious activities of the Soviet trawler fleet had already been regularly registered in Southern African waters since the first months of 1961, when the presence of around 30 Soviet fishing vessels was detected off the Angolan coast. “Fortunately, the Russians are not after sardines”, one local fisherman told the authorities. “It is the flounder and other [species that they want].”162 Yet apparently it was not only the rich fishing resources that attracted the Soviets to those waters. By the beginning of Angolan armed insurrection, a vessel in the Luanda seaport intercepted signal radio traffic from a Soviet trawler off the coast of the Angolan capital city. When the Portuguese maritime authorities requested information about

the purpose of the ship’s presence in those waters, the Soviets replied by only identifying their ship, followed by an ‘end of message’ notice.163

Notably, despite operating in high Southern African waters, Soviet trawlers were found to be mostly engaging in examining the character of the coastal landscape and the sea bottom, by means of “very sophisticated devices which [were] not meant [for fishing]”, which seemed to suggest that reconnaissance was being made for possible amphibious landing and submarine activities in Angolan coastal waters.164

The presence of Soviet trawlers also became a matter of great concern for the South African Government, whose Prime Minister Verwoerd set up a secret emergency meeting with the Administrator of South-West Africa (SWA), D. T. Du Viljoen to discuss the subject.165

The critical aspect of the Soviet ships’ activities was the unconfirmed reports of their involvement in clandestinely landing subversive elements along the Angolan coast, during the ongoing rebellions in that country.166 Further suspicion arose from Soviet ships’ regular requests to enter Angolan ports, especially that of the southern city of Moçamedes (now Namibe), on the pretext of seeking medical assistance, some requests for which were exaggerated and seemed to have resulted from deliberate injuries.167 Portuguese concerns about the activities of Soviet fishing vessels were further exacerbated by the fact that although all ships regularly requesting to enter the Angolan ports were of the same class and type, none of them ever entered more than once. Putting aside the hypothesis of its being a mere coincidence, the PIDE advanced the view that “it should serve the purpose of having as many agents as possible to

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165 ibid.
166 “Barcos russos nas águas portuguesas de Angola. Navios e aviões desconhecidos”, 349, ibid.
167 In April 1961, a large Soviet fishing vessel, Izumrud, on the pretext that one of its crewmembers had appendicitis, and needed urgent medical assistance, called in that port’s harbour. On the 16th May, Manin Sibiriyak made a similar request, claiming that a crewmember needed specialist assistance to extract a metallic shaving from his eye. After examining him, a Portuguese doctor in the local hospital concluded that it was only a simple inflammation of the sailor’s eyeball due to a punch. IAN/TT, Arquivo Salazar, PIDE, Digital, Informação no 397/61-GU, “Barcos russos nas águas portuguesas de Angola. Navios e aviões desconhecidos”, For the Presidency of the Council, and the Ministries of the Overseas, Interior, National Defence, and the Army, Informação no 676/51-GU, 351, 354.
[regularly] make the reconnaissance of the Moçamedes port and the surrounding areas. One should assume the enemy’s intentions to create a new front in the South of Angola, by taking advantage of the situation in [the South West Africa (SWA)] …, a territory where the UN can interfere.”

The question of whether or not Soviet seamen were punching each other for the sake of having an excuse to enter Angolan ports for intelligence-gathering purposes should perhaps be left in the realm of secret intelligence comic tales. Far from comic, however, was the extent to which the Soviet civil fleet was being used for intelligence collection during the Cold War. According to Aldrich, in the 1960s, “the Soviets used a flotilla of small spy ships that looked like trawlers” for signal intelligence (SIGINT) operations. As Byung Kim had asserted quoting Vladil Lysenko, a former Soviet civilian captain in the mid-1970s, “Soviet merchant and fishing vessels are in effect semi-military vessels and their crews are obliged to acquire military knowledge. All Soviet civilian vessels, without exception, carry out intelligence tasks to some extent. The monitoring and interception of foreign navies' radio communications is a duty placed on all Soviet captains. They receive regular briefings in the intelligence sections attached to shipping agencies and fishing industry directorates.”

Although the available documents do not provide further information on the exact purposes of Soviet vessels’ activities in Angolan waters in the first half of 1961, it is reasonable to assume that they aimed to examine the most suitable coastal areas for provision of material assistance to Angolan rebels. As in the case of Mozambique, all of the Angolan neighboring countries and territories were British protectorates, white-rule controlled territories, or moderate African states maintaining close relations with former colonial powers. Hence, the Soviet inability to provide material assistance to Angolan rebels by air through neighboring countries required the identification of both alternative routes by sea, and the most suitable coastal areas where such material could be safely and clandestinely unloaded. Notably, given that

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170 Byung Ki Kim, “Moscow’s South Pacific fishing fleet is much more than it seems”, The Heritage Foundation, in Asian Studies Backgrounder, No 80, 6th September 1988.
most of the MPLA and Portuguese Marxist cells were based in Luanda, one might suggest that the suspicious signal radio traffic from a Soviet vessel intercepted by the port’s maritime authorities was directed at these organizations’ radio receivers. Stealthy unloading of material, however, could only be successfully achieved in sparsely populated or deserted coastal areas to the south. This suggests that, while the coordination of Soviet deliveries was made in the Luanda area, the actual unloading was done to the south. Accordingly, Soviet vessels first had to assess the character of the sea bottom and landscape in those areas, in order to identify the most suitable areas for such activities.

_Gwambe declares war_

On 18th July, in an interview with _L’Afrique au Sud du Sahara_, Gwambe declared war in Mozambique. “From this day on, I am letting the world know that our future policy will be based upon revolt and violence”, he avowed. “There is no other way of achieving our independence, and we will make of Mozambique another Angola”.171 In a public address, he revealed that the GBAA had promised him weapons and ammunition for him to organize an armed revolt against the Portuguese administration of Mozambique. “The main figures of my party”, Gwambe publicly claimed, “will be leaving Dar-es-Salaam to receive weapons intended for 230,000 party members.”

The previous day, in the international news of _Radio Dar-es-Salaam_, Gwambe made the same announcement, saying that “his men left for Ghana where they are having military training and receiving weapons.”

The next day, however, in an interview with the Kenyan _The Northern News_, Gwambe attempted to deny that he had been promised arms by the GBAA. “We have no promises. We need weapons and financial aid, but we do not know where they will come from”, Gwambe said. “We are asking our people to be patient and not to attack the Portuguese until we order it. ... When the time comes, they must use the proper way of revolution: not with sticks or knives or spears.”

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172 “O Presidente da UDM Promete ‘Violencia e Revolta’”, 746, ibid.
article entitled ‘African, Asian Threats to Portuguese Imperialism’ in the newspaper *Contact*, Gwambe attempted not only to distance himself even more from his first pronouncements, but also did not mention UDENAMO’s requests for aid to Accra. “We are at present not prepared to disclose the names of countries which may decide eventually to grant us weapons but at the moment UDENAMO itself has made no formal approach to any country for weapons”, Gwambe said. The article continued, “[h]e said that while he would require ‘moral support’ from other African countries he would not favour the liberation of Mozambique by non-Mozambicans. … Freedom for Mo[z]ambique must be attained by Mozambicans only”, Mr. Gwambe told *Contact* “and for that reason UDENAMO members inside Mo[z]ambique and outside have been making silent preparation over the last few months.” 175

The controversial drastic changes in Gwambe’s public statements represent one of many episodes during 1961 which have not received sufficient scholarly attention. Marcum, for example, writes: “[w]hen in July 1961 in an oratorical response to the rebellion in Angola, Adelino Gwambe announced to the press that UDENAMO was preparing to liberate Mozambique with the aid of several African states and some 70,000 soldiers, he was expelled from Tanganyika.” 176

One PIDE report on the Winneba conference, in referring to the Resolutions of the Conference, entitled ‘All African Peoples Party’, highlights the fact that Gwambe’s name is not on the list of the African nationalist members of the respective commission, and that Fanuel Mahluza and Marcelino dos Santos are the only Mozambicans whose names are referred to in the document. “[This] seems to confirm the information that Adelino Gwambe [was unable] to impress the [members] of the ‘conference’, something which is believed to be the reason for Adelino Gwambe to have immediately returned to Dar-es-Salaam, whereas Fanuel Mahluza moved on to [Guinea-]Conakry, with [travel] expenses paid by the MPLA”, the report states. 177

175 Interview with Gwambe, “African, Asian Threats to Portuguese Imperialism”, in *Contact*, July 27th 1961, 501. It is interesting to note that the thesis asserting national liberation only by the nationals of the respective country was common to all Soviet and radicals-backed African movements, such as PAIGC in Portuguese Guinea, MPLA in Angola, and UDENAMO.
However, the cross-examination of several other documents shows a different reason behind Gwambe’s urgent return to Dar-es-Salaam. A PIDE report produced on 14\textsuperscript{th} July states that Nkrumah promised assistance for Gwambe on the strict condition that only Mozambicans lead the liberation of Mozambique.\textsuperscript{178} Given UDENAMO’s conflicts with TANU and MANU, this meant that in order to receive Ghanaian assistance, Gwambe should first ensure that such conflicts were sorted out, and legitimize UDENAMO as the chief Mozambican movement formed and led by Mozambicans only. Also, one should be reminded of dos Santos’s letter on preparations for the Winneba conference, in which he stressed the need to resolve the conflicts with MANU. Such requirements were prerequisites set at the CONCP, aiming at establishing a movement representing the greatest part of Mozambican population. Considering the pluri-ethnic character of the Mozambican people, whose large black population was formed of numerous tribes from different regions and speaking different native languages, and whose only common bond was to live in a territory under the Portuguese jurisdiction, it was of foremost importance to create a movement representing most of the diverse Mozambican population.\textsuperscript{179}

Gwambe’s political course, however, did not achieve this, something which brings to the fore the importance of individual African actors whose agency impacted on Soviet interests. Instead, his actions further alienated UDENAMO from MANU and Tanganyikan leaders. The Makonde people’s unease with UDENAMO, and Kambona’s concern about such conflicts undermining his plans played an equally important role in these schisms. This further emphasizes the vulnerability of Soviet interests to the particular concerns of individual African political figures. From the Ghanaian and Soviet perspectives, which were oriented towards national unification, to provide assistance to an alienated movement was not an option. Hence Gwambe’s return to Dar-es-Salaam aimed at improving this situation, in order to ensure


\textsuperscript{178} IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process SC SR283/61, Adelino Chitofo Gwambe, Informação 1257/61-GU, 14/7/1961, 723. Moreover, two months later, in referring to UDENAMO’s letter sent in July to Nkrumah, the Portuguese Consul in Dar-es-Salaam reported to Lisbon that “Ghanaian attitude in regard to these requests seems to have been the most favourable possible, given [what was] determined in the ‘secret’ resolutions of [the Winneba] Conference.” IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process SC SR283/61, Adelino Chitofo Gwambe, From the Portuguese Consul in Dar-es-Salaam to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, “About the letter of UDENAMO to Nkrumah”, 26\textsuperscript{th} of September, 1961, 632.

\textsuperscript{179} Cahen,”O fim da história única”, pp. 358-159.
Ghanaian support. The subsequent events explain the failure of Soviet-radicals’ plans for Mozambique in the second half of 1961, largely prompted by Gwambe’s actions.

The fall of Gwambe and the failure of the Soviet-Casablanca plan

The conditions for the political fall of Gwambe in Tanganyika had been ripening since his return from the Casablanca conference. According to the testimony of a PIDE informer, although Gwambe already had some supporters, the decision to create UDENAMO as a substitute for MANU “infuriated the bulk of the Makonde people, who felt abandoned and betrayed” by their former leader, accusing Gwambe of taking advantage of his MANU affiliation only to promote his personal political agenda in Casablanca. One is to be reminded that it was the Makonde resentment that prompted Kambona to attempt persuading Gwambe to merge UDENAMO with MANU, followed by Gwambe’s angry reaction, on 13th June.

Despite UDENAMO’s headquarters being based in Dar-es-Salaam, MANU was always very suspicious of the new movement. Unsurprisingly, the news of UDENAMO’s founding in Dar-es-Salaam and initially enjoying Nyerere’s and Kambona’s personal protection was received rather unenthusiastically by MANU’s leaders. Although the Tanganyikan Government was due to publicly support UDENAMO as a demonstration of African solidarity for the peoples struggling against colonial rule, Gwambe’s new political agenda was deeply troubling for Nyerere and Kambona.

While ignoring the claims of the Makonde people, upset by the creation and growing political primacy of UDENAMO, Gwambe convened a conference between UDENAMO, MANU and MAA in Dar-es-Salaam, allegedly “to see if they could find a solution for their conflicts.” Yet Gwambe’s seemingly good intentions were

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183 Two small associations called MMA existed during that period. For details see Michel Cahen, “The Mueda Case and Maconde Political Ethnicity, some notes on a work in progress”, in Africana Studia, 1999, pp. 34-35.
smoke and mirrors. Because the conference was organized and presided by UDENAMO, its organizational criteria were set in such a way as to undermine the position of the movement’s rivals right from the beginning. The delegations from each movement were limited to only 5 representatives natural of Mozambique. Aware that many of his opponents did not speak any Portuguese, Gwambe determined that Portuguese should be the *lingua franca* of the event. Moreover, he was himself in charge of authorizing the participation of each delegate. All this naturally excluded his competitors Chambal and Bacuane, as well as many other opponents from attending the conference. Moreover, the criteria set by Gwambe also aimed at ensuring that non-Mozambicans could not attend it, thus reflecting Nkrumah’s instructions.\(^{184}\)

As is to be expected, such a state of affairs bolstered PAFMECSA leaders’ unease with the increasingly obvious Ghanaian political intrusion in their domestic affairs. This further contributed towards undermining Gwambe’s stand in Tanganyika. For example, upon UDENAMO’s request to Dar-es-Salaam for it to register as an official party in July 1961, the Tanganyikan authorities claimed that, given the movement’s affiliation with the Conference of Nationalist Movements in Rabat, such a request could not be countenanced.\(^{185}\) Timothy Chokwe, regarded with deep admiration and respect in Kenya and Tanganyika, arrived at the conference organized by Gwambe to defend the interests of MANU, which essentially were the same as those of TANU and KANU. Together with Lawrence Millinga, Chokwe’s primary aim was to discredit Gwambe as a politician, by accusing him of being a foreign agent. Their ultimate aim was to get Gwambe and his supporters to be “immediately and unconditionally” expelled from Tanganyika. Chokwe’s goal and position, in fact, were simply the result of instructions received from Kambona, who was determined to disband Gwambe’s organization.\(^{186}\) As we saw earlier, Kambona’s personal animosity towards Gwambe was another factor contributing to the beginning of


\(^{185}\) Report from the Portuguese Consulate in Salisbury, 399, ibid.

\(^{186}\) Millinga was the former chief redactor of the journal *Voice of KANU*, whose entry in the Mozambican nationalist affairs was marked by this conference. From testimony of Aurelio Jaime Bacuane to PIDE in Lourenco Marques, 579-580, op.cit. note: Gwambe and his supporters were accused of being “vibraka”, a Swahili term for ‘informers’.
Gwambe’s falling out of favour with the Tanganyikan authorities.\textsuperscript{187} Thus, since Gwambe’s departure for Ghana, the winds in Tanganyikan and Kenyan political circles had already begun blowing against him and UDENAMO.

This is illustrative of the degree to which rivalries and competing interests of different local and regional African actors were a factor affecting the political success of the Soviet-backed Mozambican movement. Far from being simply a reflection of Cold War pressures or East-West leanings, the dynamics dictating UDENAMO’s political path, thus impacting on Moscow’s interest, were largely a result of agencies of African actors pursuing particular interests and agendas.

Although the documents do not clarify how this particular meeting ended, a letter the UDENAMO leadership sent to Nkrumah in July 1961, declaring its determination to free Mozambique from Portuguese rule, and requesting the necessary aid, suggests that it aimed to reiterate UDENAMO’s position as the leading Mozambican nationalist movement before Nkrumah, thus implying and confirming that the conditions he posed in Winneba were met.\textsuperscript{188} However, the letter was intercepted by the PIDE, thus never reaching Nkrumah.\textsuperscript{189} Here, a series of events taking place during that month at international level should be addressed, in order to help to explicate Gwambe’s actions which inadvertently undermined Soviet interests in the region.

On 11\textsuperscript{th} July, during the breakfast given in the Kremlin in honour of Nkrumah, Khrushchev made a public statement:

“Not all countries have [yet] become free from the chains of colonialism. Unfortunately, many peoples are still under colonial oppression. But they are determinedly and resolutely struggling against foreign oppressors. The blood of peoples of Algeria, Angola, Southwest

\textsuperscript{188} See part of UDENAMO’s letter to Nkrumah in Appendix 2. There is no indication of the date the letter was produced, nor of the location it was sent from. Yet one should note that while the letter was sent on behalf of Gwambe, dos Santos, and Mahluza, who departed after the conference to Tanganyika, Morocco and Guinea-Conakry, respectively, their names were typed, not signed by hand. This suggests that the letter was produced by Gwambe upon his return to Tanganyika, given the comments of the Portuguese consul to Dar-es-Salaam on the letter.
\textsuperscript{189} The letter is held in the PIDE archives, which suggests it was intercepted. Given its content, Portuguese authorities almost certainly did not allow it to reach the addressee.
Africa, struggling for their national liberation is shed. … One cannot destroy colonialism only by appeals and good wishes...''

Although Mozambique was not mentioned in his speech, Khrushchev’s statement clearly denotes two important elements: the focus on only those countries where armed struggle was already under way, and the justification for resorting to violence to put an end to colonialism. On 24th July, a joint Soviet-Ghanaian communiqué stated:

“Both governments resolutely condemn the actions of Portuguese colonialists, carrying out in Angola a cruel and bloody war against the people of this country. … The government of the Soviet Union and the government of Ghana believe that all peace-loving states and the organization of the United Nations should take effective measures against the aggression of Portugal in Angola. … The UN sub-Committee on Angola should without further delay undertake international investigation on the situation in Angola in accordance with its responsibilities. The Soviet government and the government of the Republic of Ghana cannot remain indifferent to the fate of the people of Angola and consider their duty to provide help and support to this people, which conducts an heroic struggle for its freedom…”

Such statements strongly suggest that while both the Soviet Union and Ghana were keen on getting themselves involved in supporting national liberation movements, they could only do so provided that the peoples of colonial territories were already engaged in an armed struggle. With this condition met, African radical states and the Soviet Bloc could further and more openly interfere with the pretext of helping and supporting those peoples. Thus the public announcement of the beginning of the anti-colonial armed struggle should have necessarily stemmed from local nationalists, and not seen as instigated by, or resulting from Soviet or Ghanaian encouragement or initiatives. Subsequently, the Mozambican situation could not be publicly mentioned in such official declarations, until UDENAMO engaged in direct action and declared the factual or ‘official’ commencement of armed struggle in Mozambique. In such an event, Moscow could press for the UN Committee on Portuguese Territories to turn Mozambique into another priority subject in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) agenda together with Angola.

191 General Department of the Central Committee (1953-1966) Film A1046, RGANI, Reel 100, 423, 21, ibid.
Taking into consideration the above facts and factors, the most probable development of the course of events since the Winneba conference was as follows. In his meetings with the Soviet leadership, the Ghanaian leader almost certainly addressed the case of Mozambique, and the possibility of instigating armed struggle against the Portuguese colonial authorities in that territory. In Dar-es-Salaam, questions arise regarding the results of the Winneba conference, given Khrushchev’s public speech making reference only to the situation in Angola, during Nkrumah’s stay in the USSR. On 14th and 15th July, T. K. Msonge, a prominent member of TANU and PAFMECSA, and who supported Gwambe, told the journals Mwafrica and Ngurumo that they had received no promises of aid at the Winneba Conference. Msonge’s inconvenient honesty, local political pressures on Gwambe, and his unease about Nkrumah’s/Soviet silence regarding UDENAMO’s letter certainly made Gwambe becoming increasingly anxious.

At this point, three key facts are known. First, on 17th July, Gwambe revealed to the press that “the party’s secret agent in the Rhodesias whose name he was not prepared to disclose had arrived in Mneya and would arrive in Dar-es-Salaam soon.” According to the PIDE documents, this ‘secret agent’ was D. C. Ntemaganda, a member of the Mozambican anti-colonial movement PEAS based in South Rhodesia and an expert in subversive operations, whose role was to provide UDENAMO with ways of penetration of Mozambican territory in order to undertake guerrilla attacks. On the same day, Gwambe publicly announced the beginning of the national liberation struggle. Finally, sometime between July and August, a ship with Soviet explosives was heading from Yemen towards Tanganyika.

One should note that although PIDE documents do not provide further information on Ntemaganda, it is important to stress PEAS/UDENAMO close collaboration with Joshua Nkomo’s NDPSR and later ZAPU. According to Soviet documents examined by Shubin, Soviet contacts with NDPSR were established as

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193 Daily Nation (Nairobi), 17th July. Shubin, The Hot Cold War, pp. 151-153. Quoted from Soviet documents, State Archive of the Russian Federation (SARF), collection 9540, inventory 1, file 102, pp. 98-103; collection 9540gs, inventory 2s, file 25, p. 98; ibid, file 40, pp. 26-27; ibid file 36; Russian State Archive of Modern History (RSAMH), collection 89, inventory 89, file 4, p. 4. in Shubin, The Hot Cold War.
194 IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process SC SR283/61, Adelino Chitofo Gwambe, From Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Directorate for Political Affairs and Domestic Administration, Lisbon, to Director General of the PIDE, 30th of September of 1961, 566-567.
early as November 1960, and discussion of the Zimbabwean movement’s requests for assistance from the Soviet bloc, which included “special training in security and defence”, took place in April 1961. Substantial Soviet assistance was prompted by Moscow’s assessment that “the NDP will come to power in [South Rhodesia] and its leaders will stand at the head of the government”, and by the evidence that “this party is conducting certain work in the province of Katanga against the government of Tshombe in defence of the lawful Congolese government of P. Lumumba.” This suggests that by July 1961, elements of South Rhodesian movements cooperating with UDENAMO had the skills for conducting subversive operations that members of UDENAMO still lacked.195

Gwambe’s awareness that a sabotage specialist from Rhodesia was due to arrive in Tanganyika indicates that confidential communication channels existed through which he was informed about it. It is reasonable to assert, therefore, that Gwambe interpreted approaching Ntemaganda’s arrival as signalling Nkrumah’s ‘green light’ for him to take direct action. As a result, Gwambe publicly declared the beginning of Mozambican armed struggle.

Yet probably such ‘green light’ was not given. Even if Gwambe received a hint that preparations for attacks were under way, it did not mean he should publicly announce war. A number of strong reasons point to Gwambe’s misreading of ongoing states of affairs, and that by July 17th no ‘green light’ was given for UDENAMO’s direct action. Firstly, Gwambe’s letter being intercepted by PIDE means it had not reached Nkrumah, and that the Ghanaian leader was unaware whether or not the UDENAMO leadership resolved local political conflicts and met his conditions. Secondly, Soviet explosives might have been intended for NDPSR or PEAS, and not for UDENAMO. Thirdly, even if both the explosives and Ntemaganda’s arrival aimed at carrying out subversive operations inside Mozambique, time was still required for developing coordinated operational planning for effective terrorist actions. Fourthly, if such actions were part of Shelepin’s plan, which by 17th July was still being developed, they had to be timely coordinated with the KGB’s active measures in other parts of the world, and coinciding with the timing of Soviet-American negotiations for

West Berlin and the building of the Berlin wall, which begun only in October. In this regard, the provision of Soviet small arms to Morocco from August onwards, and the beginning of military training of Mozambicans through that country was intended to provide UDENAMO with elements having the necessary skills for military operations. The arrival of first such trained groups took place only in September. Finally, such actions in Mozambique had to have the vital element of surprise. Gwambe’s disregard for secrecy, if he was aware that such was necessary, was explicitly demonstrated in his ‘unpreparedness to publicly disclose’ the name of Ntemaganda, while pointing that he was a secret agent, where he was coming from, where he was on 17th July, where he was soon heading to, and what his connection was with UDENAMO…

If the shipment of Soviet explosives was intended for UDENAMO as part of Shelepin’s plan, submitted for approval only on 29th July, it was either an impromptu reaction to Gwambe’s declaration of war and the Soviet leadership’s willingness to satisfy Nkrumah, under whose patronage UDENAMO was, or a scheduled delivery which had not been revealed to Gwambe for secrecy reasons. Yet unaware of when, where, and how military assistance would be provided, disregarding the possible reaction of the Tanganyikan government and prerequisites for conspiracy work, Gwambe probably believed that it would come directly from Ghana, hence his public statement about the promise of weapons and ammunition allegedly made by the GBAA.

The prominence of Angola in international political debates, and particularly in the Soviet rhetoric, probably also played a role in Gwambe’s decision to promise turning Mozambique into a second Angola. It suggested to Gwambe that engaging in violent actions would immediately provide him and his movement the political notoriety he so much desired. The later point should also be seen in the context of his self-perception and pattern of behaviour discussed earlier. Considering the pressures from TANU, KANU and MANU, and Gwambe’s concern about his political position in Dar-es-Salaam, exacerbated by Nkrumah’s silence, his blunt promptness in declaring war was further driven by anxiety and the eagerness to publicize his

196 Ntemaganda, however, certainly knew about the shipment beforehand. NDPSR maintained close contacts with South African ANC, fully supported by Soviet intelligence services.
progress as the political leader of Mozambican nationalist liberation engaged in ‘direct action’.

This can also provide an explanation for Gwambe’s contradictory statements to the press. Considering the precedents of his disregard for Tanganyikan authorities’ views regarding his actions, it is doubtful that the young nationalist changed his statements under the pressure of TANU, which was certainly made. Rather, Gwambe was probably informed through confidential channels that conditions were still unmet to engage in terrorist attacks, and that he should refrain from making any such declarations and wait for the best timing. This is echoed in his statement: “We are asking our people to be patient and not to attack the Portuguese until we order it. ... When the time comes, they must use the proper way of revolution: not with sticks or knives or spears.” His reference to patience, to the need to wait for orders to be given in due time, to the means by which action should be carried out, and to ‘revolution’ suggest that soon after his declaration of war, he received instructions along the lines of the above statement. In particular, it indicates the absence of means by which to carry out direct action (firing arms and explosives), and the revolutionary character of such event, which implies sudden and vigorous action aimed at bringing about immediate and strong effects with grave political repercussions. This, in turn, could only be achieved by preserving the tactical element of surprise, which vanished as a result of Gwambe’s ill-timed public statements.

To sum up, Gwambe’s decisions and actions largely disconnected from the designs or planning of his foreign sponsors, emphasize two important elements supporting the main argument of the thesis. First, they are demonstrative of the proactive character of local African actors’ decision-making, largely independent from the superpowers. It is indicative of the weak, if not nearly absent top-down Soviet-UDENAMO liaison, where Moscow had virtually no control over the leaders of African national liberation movements. Rather than being a hierarchical relationship between a commanding superpower and a dependent African liberation movement, it was an association based on mutual advantages and coincident common goals and interests, with no solid chain of command or carefully coordinated strategies and joint actions. This is clearly illustrated by, and was translated into Gwambe’s largely independent decision-making and actions, thus bringing to the fore

the proactive and autonomous character of African actors in the context of the examined events. Secondly, the Soviet-backed Mozambican movement became hostage of conflicting interests and opposing goals of both different African organizations and states, something aggravated by rivalries and personal animosities involving individual political figures at both local and regional levels. As a result, UDENAMO’s political path, upon which Soviet interests depended, fell victim to the dynamics of competing interests of local and regional African actors, upon which Moscow had limited or no control. This further highlights the vulnerability of Soviet policies and designs in the region to the agency of African actors.

*PIDE covert actions*

Apart from the proactive roles played by African actors and their impact on superpower interests, one should also address the ways in which Portugal, and particularly its intelligence organization, contributed to UDENAMO’s misfortunes, further adding to the negative repercussions on Soviet aims.

Gwambe’s public announcement of UDENAMO’s beginning an armed struggle that would ‘turn Mozambique into another Angola’ made the Tanganyikan Government deeply concerned about possible Portuguese armed retaliation against the country. Tanganyikan armed forces had not yet reached enough strength to be able to adequately retaliate to such action, and the country’s domestic problems were already severe enough to be worsened by the likelihood of war. This, in part, explains why, despite UDENAMO’s prominent international stand, the Kenyan and Tanganyikan governments continued to support MANU, whose moderate leaders were averse to violence as a means of attaining independence.¹⁹⁸ Equally, if not more important, was what Nyerere and Kambona saw as Nkrumah’s attempt to interfere in East African affairs using UDENAMO as a proxy for advancing his and the Casablanca group’s

¹⁹⁸ After Gwambe’s return to Dar-es-Salaam, MANU’s President, Mateus Mmole, wrote to the party’s branch in Zanzibar: “If you want to agree with [Gwambe], please let me know, but do not forget about the Congo, Kenya and Angola, where many people are dying because they did not want to reach an agreement with their Government[s]. The Portuguese Government, as you know, is very cruel with those who [struggle for independence]. Do not start another movement [aiming at struggling] for independence. We should reach the independence of Mozambique in peace, like the Tanganyikans did.” IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process SC SR283/61, Adelino Chitofo Gwambe, From Ministry of Foreign Affairs, General Directorate of Political Affairs and of Internal Administration, to General Director of the PIDE, Lisbon, 27th July of 1961, 740-741. IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process SC SR283/61, Adelino Chitofo Gwambe, Informação nº 1391/61-GU, 5/9/1961, 672.
views on Pan-Africanism. Increasing personal animosities between Nyerere and Nkrumah thus badly affected Gwambe’s political position in Southeast Africa.\(^{199}\)

The final strike against Gwambe’s position came a few days after the meeting between UDENAMO, MANU, and MAA. At a meeting of MANU, organized by Lawrence Millinga, and attended by Kambona, Gwambe’s old personal foe Bacuane publicly ‘revealed’ that Gwambe was a spy working for the Portuguese authorities. Such an accusation was in line with the Kenyan and Tanganyikan plans, discussed in the previous section. Unsurprisingly, Kambona’s reaction was to issue an order for Gwambe’s immediate expulsion from the country, “so that he would not be spying around in Tanganyika.” This was also the end of TANU’s support for the Moscow-backed man. “From that moment on, TANU lost all its trust and [consideration] for Gwambe,” a PIDE source stated.\(^{200}\) Around ten days after his declaration of war, Gwambe received Tanganyikan official order to leave the country.

In fact, both Gwambe and, incidentally, Kambona, fell victims of a PIDE covert operation. Chambal and Bacuane, who had arrived in Dar-es-Salaam sometime after Gwambe in early 1961, had been recruited by the Portuguese secret service during that short period of time. Their personal antagonism towards Gwambe since the early days of NAP in Southern Rhodesia, allied to their resentment of his efforts to remove them from the Mozambican nationalist scene in Tanganyika, all brought about their resolve to carry out PIDE’s instructions to discredit the Mozambican nationalist leader in the eyes of the Tanganyikan authorities. The Portuguese Consul in Dar-es-Salaam, who was aware of Kambona’s desire to get rid of Gwambe and his movement, coordinated this operation.\(^{201}\)

Ironically, despite representing a blow to early Ghanaian and Soviet designs regarding UDENAMO, Portugal’s short-sighted strategy in dealing with African nationalist aspirations at these early stages would further contribute to strengthening Gwambe’s pro-Communist stand, and add to Lisbon’s problems in Mozambique in the long-term. Soon after Gwambe was expelled from Tanganyika, both Chambal and


\(^{201}\) One among the intelligence collection tasks Chambal and Bacuane performed on the Portuguese Consul’s orders was to provide him with Gwambe’s personal correspondence, especially that from Ghana. IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process SC SR283/61, Adelino Chitofo Gwambe, 570-585.
Bacuane fled to Mozambique. The Portuguese authorities orchestrated a major propaganda campaign, through numerous press articles and radio broadcasts in which the two Africans were extensively interviewed, and portrayed as “true Portuguese patriots, devoted to their motherland and the Salazar regime”. This was intended to promote Africans’ sense of allegiance to Portugal, by presenting Chambal and Bacuane as role models to be followed by all Africans in Portuguese colonial territories. Chambal’s and Bacuane’s public role was to play Africans who were deeply disillusioned with the so-called ‘terrorist’ movements manipulated by foreign powers, and to praise the great benefits of the Portuguese colonial rule in Mozambique for its black population. Such a campaign aimed at supporting Lisbon’s claims before the international community of the special nature of its overseas territories where, according to Portugal’s discourse, in contrast with the former British and French colonies, no racial discrimination existed. Also, it aimed at preventing the Mozambican African population from engaging in any activities against the Portuguese rule.

However beneficial such a campaign was in the short-term, it nullified PIDE’s achievements in definitively discrediting Gwambe before the Tanganyikan Government. Furthermore, it made official Dar-es-Salaam implicitly holding responsibility for unjustifiably preventing a Mozambican national liberation movement from carrying on its designs. As we will see later, the Soviet bloc and the ASAF group took advantage of such a situation, by pressing the Tanganyikan government to accommodate Gwambe and his movement in 1962. Such pressures were underpinned by a discourse of African solidarity, according to which every independent African country was supposedly ‘morally obliged’ to support peoples struggling against colonialism.

Thus, the repercussions of the Portuguese failed strategy came into being already in early 1962, when Gwambe was given the opportunity of returning to Tanganyika to bolster UDENAMO’s activity. This was a result of international pressures on the Tanganyikan Government, accused of preventing the Mozambicans from achieving their independence. Portugal, therefore, would again face the dynamic Mozambican militant, whose movement would add to the pressures made by those emerging at later stages on Lisbon’s colonial authority from the following year onwards.
Once the news that Gwambe was declared *persona non-grata* by the Tanganyikan Government reached official circles in Lisbon, thus indicating that the Mozambican militant no longer enjoyed Nyerere’s protection, the Portuguese Interpol section suggested that the British Government should be requested to hand over Gwambe to the Portuguese authorities in Mozambique.202 Meanwhile, the Tanganyikan and Kenyan officials took immediate advantage of the situation. Timothy Chokwe sent Millinga, now entitled ‘organizer-administrator’, to Dar-es-Salaam to reorganize MANU, which had the advantage of having more followers than UDENAMO did, and enjoyed the goodwill of the Tanganyikan Government.203 With Gwambe expelled from Tanganyika and the position of his movement severely undermined, MANU, now under the direction of Millinga and Mateus Mmole – “the renowned symbol of PAFMECA since January 1961”, and who was already promised the position of President of the movement – started to grow in number.204

Under the title, “I’ll be back! – Gwambe”, an article in the *Tanganyika Standard’s* attempted to shed light on the nationalist’s situation:

“[A]sked about Tanganyika’s decision to ask him to leave the territory, Mr. Gwambe said: ‘There is certainly some misunderstanding which is bound to be cleared up when Tanganyika becomes independent.’”205

Meanwhile, the PIDE report sensibly concluded that “Adelino Gwambe was expelled from [Tanganyika] precisely because of the spilling of the beans after the conference … with Nkrumah”, referring to his seemingly injudicious announcement of the beginning of the armed struggle with Ghanaian support. It further noted that

“the anti-Portuguese movement [in Tanganyika] decreased significantly after Gwambe’s expulsion. At least, the radio news has no longer

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addressed the issue, which seems to indicate that [the movement] has decreased in intensity, or is operating in great secrecy."

Gwambe – a Portuguese agent?

Apart from the central subjects this study focuses on, this thesis also adds to the scholarship in the area by shedding light on the historical role of Gwambe. Notably, the literature on the history of the early stages of Mozambican national liberation has largely ignored or downgraded the role of Gwambe in the respective historical events. Often, this has been done on the partial grounds that he was a Portuguese secret agent. This superficial assumption, in turn, has led to the notion among different historians that Gwambe’s actions did not represent the aspirations of the Mozambican people struggling for independence and, therefore, do not deserve detailed historical examination.

This thesis strongly opposes such a generalized view, which deserves re-examination, which is also the reason why it pays special attention to Gwambe’s role and political path in the examined historical events. In so doing, this thesis further adds to the scholarship in the area. Importantly, as a result of adopting the perspective that Gwambe was a Portuguese agent, authors such as Ncomo, Cabrita, and Funada-Classen have paid little attention to UDENAMO’s post-1962 activities, focusing instead on FRELIMO and its leader Eduardo Mondlane, - a prevalent trend in the respective historical field. The resulting gap in the literature has imposed limitations on our understanding of the broader picture of Mozambican national liberation, and that of the roles of regional and international players involved in this process. In all probability, such a state of affairs has resulted from the limited or superficial examination of PIDE and other Portuguese archives by some authors, thus translating into the persistent view that Gwambe did collaborate with the Portuguese authorities. As a result, Gwambe’s connections to the Soviet bloc and his role in the superpower competition in the region have largely been ignored.

206 IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process SC SR283/61, Adelino Chitofo Gwambe, From the Deputy Director of the PIDE in Lourenço Marques to the Deputy Head of PIDE in Lisbon, 21st of November 1961, 481.

207 Funada-Classen, The origins of war in Mozambique.
Different authors support their argument by stating that Gwambe allegedly confessed to being a Portuguese agent. For example, Christie writes: “Adelino Gwambe … had been a PIDE agent operating among the Mozambican exiles in Southern Rhodesia. Gwambe admitted this, but claimed he had seen the error of his ways.” However, as this chapter has shown, Gwambe’s being expelled from Tanganyika resulted from a campaign set up by the Tanganyikan and Kenyan authorities because of his public declaration of war and the Ghanaian sponsorship he was receiving. Also, PIDE took advantage of that situation and further discredited him through his former colleagues from Rhodesia, Chambal and Bacuane, who were PIDE agents. Although one cannot dismiss the possibility that Gwambe had been a PIDE informer while staying in Rhodesia in 1960, his further activities in Dar-es-Salaam from 1961 onwards, and the operations against him strongly suggest that he was no longer working for the Portuguese, rather having become a target for PIDE. Evidence is Chambal and Bacuane being instructed by PIDE to steal and passing UDENAMO’s confidential documents and Gwambe’s personal correspondence to the Portuguese Consul in Dar-es-Salaam, something they succeeded in doing. Another evidence further contradicting the claim that, by 1961, Gwambe was still a PIDE agent is PIDE’s secret operation plan to abduct Gwambe on Tanganyikan territory and bring him to justice in Mozambique, something which is evidence of him being regarded as a hostile element by the Portuguese security service. Furthermore, a PIDE secret report produced in mid-1962 expressed great concern about the fact that the Portuguese secret communication lines had been penetrated by a foreign power, and that Portuguese cables were being planted with disinformation. Among such disinformation was the insinuation that Gwambe, in PIDE’s own words, was “supposedly” working for the Portuguese authorities. The report further stressed that immediate security measures should be taken in order to identify the origin of such

disinformation being planted along the communication lines of PIDE and other Portuguese government bodies.\textsuperscript{211}

Furthermore, as is discussed further in the thesis, from 1961 onwards PIDE devised further covert actions aimed to prevent Gwambe and his entourage from continuing to operate in neighbouring African states, after being expelled from Tanganyika. Finally and most importantly, it should be emphasized that even after Gwambe was publicly accused of working for the Portuguese, he and his entourage continued to enjoy active support from the Casablanca group states and covert Soviet assistance. This strongly suggests that even if Gwambe had been acting as a Portuguese informer while based in Rhodesia, he no longer worked for PIDE after moving to Dar-es-Salaam in early 1961. Certainly, such a drastic change of loyalties, in turn, made him a key target of PIDE from that time onwards.

To sum up, the generally held notion in the historiography of the early years of Mozambican national liberation that Gwambe was a Portuguese agent has translated into an oversimplified and limited view of his role and that of UDENAMO from 1961 onwards. Given the complexity of the interconnectedness between these local actors and the regional and international ones, it is vital to rectify such inconsistencies in order to produce a more coherent study of the roles of African actors and their effects on the superpower engagements towards the national liberation of Mozambique.

\textit{The Soviet approach to Third World partners}

In understanding the failure of the Soviet-radicals’ attempt to instigate armed struggle in Mozambique, one should re-address the conclusions drawn from the earlier episode of Gwambe’s exchange with Kambona on 13\textsuperscript{th} June 1961. While it showed Gwambe’s political immaturity and impulsiveness, it also pointed to his over-confidence regarding his position with regard to the Tanganyikan authorities, the latter deriving from increasing signs of the Casablanca group’s commitment in supporting UDENAMO. As later events showed, these signs progressed into assertive and direct involvement of Ghana in sponsoring Gwambe. Clearly, this not only

further bolstered his over-confidence as the leading Mozambican nationalist leader, but also further antagonized the PAFMECSA leaders towards UDENAMO, now seen as a proxy of the radical states aiming to advance their interests in the region. Bearing this context in mind, Gwambe’s inopportune public announcement of the armed struggle is rather symptomatic of the convoluted manner in which the joint Soviet-Casablanca group’s handling of UDENAMO was carried out after the CONCP meeting in April 1961. In particular, it is suggestive of three interrelated key aspects of such (mis)management.

The first concerns the Soviet entrustment of handling of national liberation movements’ activities to the leaders of the Casablanca group members, particularly Morocco, Ghana and the UAR. This was a typical Soviet approach for engaging with ‘revolutionary’ movements in the Third World in the early 1960s, particularly in geographical areas which did not correspond to the immediate geostrategic and geopolitical spheres of influence of the Soviet Bloc. In such cases, Moscow largely delegated such responsibility to its close and regionally influential partners, which served as proxies in advancing Soviet grand-strategy objectives by proactively pursuing their own, regional goals. Nasser played this role in the Middle East and North Africa, Castro in Latin America, and Nkrumah in Sub-Saharan Africa.

This does not necessarily mean that all such enterprises on the part of Soviet Third World partners directly resulted from Moscow designs. In the case of Africa, Nasser and Nkrumah were politically self-sufficient leaders, with clear objectives in mind and comprehensively designed avenues for achieving them. Without doubt, they exploited Soviet willingness to provide different kinds of assistance to their countries, which, apart from the damaging effects of inadequate Soviet advice on economic development, largely facilitated them in advancing their particular regionally-based political interests and goals.212 Active support for national liberation movements in southern Africa was one of such goals. Yet in this symbiotic relationship through which the Soviet Union and its partners cooperated in pursuing parallel and overlapping goals at different geopolitical levels, the latter ultimately had the ball in

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212 Schneidman, Engaging Africa, p. 81. Soviet assistance to African states through advice on economic planning for development proved inadequate and ultimately damaged the economies of Ghana, Mali, and Guinea-Conakry. This also badly affected these countries’ political authority in African affairs, and discredited the purportedly superlative Soviet economic model, as opposed to the relative development successes of Western-backed regional projects such as the UAM [AUM] and PAFMECSA.
their court when it came to the implementation of particular courses of action in their respective target regions. Far from being a result of a competition for primacy, this corresponded to a conscious choice on the part of Moscow, which preferred to see its Third World partners handling the tactical aspects of such regional enterprises, with Soviet political and logistical support, as long as their outcomes would directly or otherwise favour Soviet grand-strategy interests.

The second aspect of Soviet-Casablanca group’s patterns of action followed from the first one, namely that the radicals took advantage of UDENAMO to promote their Pan-African agenda, thus making the Communist background colours of Soviet involvement distant or nearly imperceptible. In fact, only in the final months of 1961 did Gwambe’s connections to Moscow became clearly discernible for the Mozambican community in Tanganyika, as well as to TANU and KANU. It was the primacy of the Casablanca group’s influence on UDENAMO, therefore, that most strongly affected Gwambe’s outlook and political discourse. As a result, rather than advancing the ideas of Communism or advertising the Soviet model, Gwambe promoted anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism and the ideals of Pan-Africanism. Gwambe’s determination in following Nkrumah’s directives and endorsing dos Santos’s planning, to the detriment of preserving working relations with PAFMECSA leaders further exemplifies just that. From the radicals’ perspective, any political or economic successes of their moderate African counterparts, who maintained close relations with the West, represented a setback for advancing their Pan-African agenda, and signified the continuation of Western powers’ political and economic influence on - if not outright control over – most of their former colonial territories. Hence the post-Winneba political course of Gwambe was primarily a reflection of the ongoing schism that existed in Pan-African affairs, opposing the moderate and the radical groups of states, and being only a by-product of the expansion of Soviet influence in Africa, given Moscow’s backing of the CONCP and the Casablanca group. This adds to the argument of the thesis that Soviet interests and designs were vulnerable to the schisms that existed between between different groups of African states. Because such a state of affairs made Soviet interests in Africa dependable on the goals and agendas of different local and regional African actors, the latter’s

213 The US officialdom, particularly the State Department and the CIA, obtained their first information about Gwambe only in August 1961.
agency played a fundamental role in affecting Moscow’s interests in the context of Mozambican national liberation.

The third aspect is related to, and a consequence of the first two. This was the Soviet delegation of direct handling of particular African nationalist ‘revolutionaries’, such as UDENAMO, to the radical African states. This, in turn, entailed the loosening of Soviet control over the means and procedures of such management, inevitably limiting Moscow’s capability in using such local assets for impromptu initiatives of its own when these required these movements’ adequate operative action. In the case of UDENAMO, such a drastic mismatch between Soviet greater designs at the top level and Gwambe’s narrow personal and local-oriented political views and goals, influenced by the Casablanca group’s regional agenda, ultimately translated into an inconsistent and disconnected approach of all parties in attempting to instigate the armed struggle in Mozambique in 1961.

The intermediate and proactive role played by the Casablanca powers, particularly Ghana, in Soviet-UDENAMO relations, contributed to the inconsistent character of such a relationship. On the one hand, the radicals’ promoting Gwambe’s political ascendancy under the Pan-African banner was hardly unmarked by PAFMECSA leaders, something which antagonized Tanganyikan and Kenyan authorities against UDENAMO. Also, Ghana having the last word regarding arrangements of UDENAMO’s further actions in July 1961 kept Gwambe waiting in the wings. On the other hand, while the Soviet Union was in charge of financial and logistical assistance to African nationalists, and advocated their cause before the international community by condemning Portuguese colonialism, Soviet intelligence services had their own plans about how to best explore new opportunities offered in Africa. As we have seen, evidence strongly suggests that preparations for terrorist attacks in Southeast Africa under the KGB’s supervision were under way in the summer 1961. Thus, poor, if not absent coordination of actions between the Soviet Union, the Casablanca group and UDENAMO resulted in Gwambe’s erratic behaviour. By taking an initiative disconnected from the plans and actions of his regional and international sponsors, Gwambe’s agency was damaging to UDENAMO’s reputation, and undermined Soviet interests in the region.

Despite the presence of Soviet ‘observers’ at the Winneba conference, it was Nkrumah who actively assumed the role of chief sponsor of national liberation
movements. On the one hand, he took personal responsibility for dealing with their requests. On the other hand, he took personal responsibility for requesting the Soviet leadership to provide him with the means for assisting these movements. By so doing, Nkrumah was effectively bypassing the representatives of Soviet organizations operating in Ghana, by dealing directly with the Kremlin leadership regarding such issues during his visit to the USSR. Certainly, had direct command and control of UDENAMO been assumed by Soviet intelligence services, the movement could have carried out successful armed attacks, opening a new front in the armed struggle against Portuguese colonialism. Yet because Nkrumah wanted to become personally responsible for managing UDENAMO, he probably discussed the issue of material assistance to national liberation movements at the highest level of Soviet leadership. Considering the Kremlin’s eagerness to satisfy the requests of its valued African guest, such assistance was granted, as is confirmed by the Portuguese and American documents.

In assessing the impact of proactive roles of African actors in the superpower engagements with the process of Mozambican national liberation, it is important to address African actors’ self-perception. As Gwambe’s actions suggest, he did not see himself as a subversive agent following a sophisticated plan of covert activities carefully designed by his foreign sponsors. Positioning himself according to his assumed political status of legitimate representative of the Mozambican people, encouraged and sustained by official support of several African states, the young nationalist, seemingly naively, believed in the righteousness of any of his ventures in the name of the liberation of Mozambique, regardless of whether or not they contradicted the views and aims of the leaders of PAFMECSA and MANU. Moreover, clearly and rather simply, Gwambe did not see himself as, and was not effectively a Soviet-radicals’ subversive agent, because no subversive plan for Mozambique seems to have existed until late July 1961.

Had Soviet intelligence devised a comprehensive plan for Gwambe and UDENAMO before the end of July 1961, and bypassing Ghanaian decision-making to take full and direct responsibility for handling Gwambe from the CONCP meeting onwards, enforcing prudence in his political conduct and public statements, it would have ensured a concerted operational framework and successful attainment of goals at
the international, regional, and local levels. Yet this was not an option, nor a possibility.

The Kremlin’s concerns over Nkrumah’s seeming reluctance to become closer to Moscow until his visit in July 1961 implied that an extraordinary effort should be made on that occasion to fully satisfy or even exceed the African leader’s expectations over the benefits of close Ghanaian partnership with the Soviet state. The Soviet credit loan was one of many sweeteners aimed at achieving such an aim. The chance to promptly respond to the Nkrumah’s commitment in promoting the national liberation of Mozambique by direct action was another. The timing of events in Europe was right, and it was desirable to take the opportunity to pull the rug from under Peking’s self-styled world leadership in the Third World national liberation struggles.

To conclude, in 1961 the Soviet-radicals’ approach towards Mozambican national liberation and the respective mismatch between actors at the top and at the bottom levels proved to be disastrous for both Moscow’s grand-strategic plans, and damaging to the Casablanca group’s interests in the region. In addition, one should not disregard the possibility of internal disputes between the KGB directorate responsible for Francophone African countries such as Morocco, and that responsible for Anglophone ones such as Ghana. The eagerness to emphasize before the Centre’s higher echelons the merit of each one’s (successful) operations in Africa at the expense of the other could have added to the poor coordination of their efforts. Even more tortuous cooperation was to be expected between the KGB and the GRU. Moreover, the CONCP’s role as the original coordination centre for UDENAMO’s activities, and the subsequent Ghanaian proactive involvement in sponsoring the movement also most probably contributed to internal polarizations in the realm of the Casablanca group, underpinned by both Nkrumah’s and Hassan II’s desires to pose as the leading figures behind the anti-colonial struggle. While the degree to which the above schisms contributed to the outcome is something to be yet determined, it should not be neglected in our assessment of the influence of African actors on the superpower successes and failures. Finally, the PIDE-conducted operation to discredit Gwambe before TANU was the last stroke for UDENAMO, undermining the Soviet-radicals’ efforts to advance their interests in Southeast Africa.
The impact of events in July 1961 regarding Mozambican national liberation movements on global KGB plans should not be underestimated. While Shelepin’s plan for active measures presented to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) did not include Mozambique, this Southeast African country was probably part of the document’s draft, only to be excluded due to the course of events in Tanganyika from 17th July 1961 onwards, prompted by Gwambe. Yet even if this was not the case, the Mozambican episode was certainly a precedent contributing to Shelepin’s formulation of the global plan of active measures in 1961.

Ultimately, neither the Soviets nor Gwambe himself established a partnership as the best option among many. It was rather a matter of being the only option each one was presented with. Apart from the PRC, the Soviet Union was the only international power to both directly and indirectly offer its support to Gwambe, and the latter was the only leading representative of Mozambican nationalist cause at the CONCP meeting the Soviets were offered. Dos Santos’s connections with the pro-Soviet elements of the PCP and the Angolan MPLA (despite its simultaneous contacts with the Chinese) facilitated Gwambe’s sheltering under the Soviet, rather than Chinese umbrella. His status as the public Mozambican representative at the Casablanca Conference also became the reason for the Solidarity Committee, which had not yet established any contacts with Mozambican nationalists, to send a letter to the CC CPSU recommending that UDENAMO’s leader should be invited to Moscow in June-July of 1961. After Gwambe’s visit to Moscow in September 1961, UDENAMO received $3,000 through the International Fund. This sum, however, was only the tip of the iceberg. Moscow’s financing of UDENAMO through Soviet intelligence rezidenturas in Rabat, Cairo, and Accra, and later the Soviet embassy in Dar-es-Salaam itself, was large enough to enable UDENAMO to prevail over rival Mozambican nationalist organizations throughout the first half of 1962, regardless of the Tanganyikan Government’s wishes.

Yet paradoxically, the Ghanaian and Soviet support for Gwambe precluded UDENAMO’s political progress, since it was at odds with the goals and agendas of

214 Although references to the document were made by several authors referring to other authors’ works, they have only pointed to covert actions in Nicaragua and Iraq.
216 Shubin, ibid, p. 120.
the Tanganyikan and Kenyan Governments, and particularly contradicted the objectives advanced by PAFMECSA. The activity of the Portuguese secret service would further contribute to damaging UDENAMO’s position, while in the so far passive Washington, the opinion that if nothing were done, Africa would be lost to the Communists, was increasingly gaining ground in official circles. This would be reflected in a more assertive American policy towards Mozambique in the following year. Finally, Gwambe himself made a number of moves which would severely undermine his political fortunes at a time when the beginning of an armed struggle under his command, and under the auspices of the Ghanaian and Soviet governments, seemed imminent.
CHAPTER III

The US policy on Mozambique and Mondlane: 1961-1962

This chapter examines the US government’s policies on Mozambique. It assesses Washington’s views on, and concerns with the subject of Mozambican national liberation cause and organizations, in the context of the Cold War, US relations with Portugal and the political and security dynamics in Southern Africa. It looks at the US plans and courses of action aimed at supporting the politically moderate and west-leaning leadership of Mozambican nationalists in Tanganyika in 1962. It also addresses the American position vis-à-vis Portugal, and US programmes and institutions operating in Tanganyika and providing assistance to Mozambican refugees, with an emphasis on those involved in national liberation movements.

Firstly, this is relevant for illustrating the differences among American views on, policies towards, and the degree of its involvement in the process of Mozambique national liberation in 1961 and 1962. Secondly, it provides a contextualization for the agency of the Tanganyikan government, which played a central role in the outcome of superpower competition in the region during this period. In particular, because the Tanganyikan government capitalized on the US goals and interests driven by the latter’s Cold War concerns, it succeeded in garnering American support for, cooperation in and greater involvement, which all contributed to the establishment of Eduardo Mondlane as FRELIMO President, at the expense of the Casablanca group and Soviet backed UDENAMO under Gwambe. The Tanganyikan government’s successful deception of the UN Committee of 17, a body highly influenced by the Soviet bloc and aiming at restoring Gwambe’s political position, is a striking example of the proactive role played by African actors in affecting the outcomes of superpower competition. This, in turn, contrasted with the cautious, limited and ambivalent US actions. By undertaking such actions, underpinned by local and regional, rather than Cold War considerations, official Dar-es-Salaam achieved its aim of securing control over the Mozambican nationalist movements in 1962, at the expense of the Casablanca group’s and the Soviet backed UDENAMO. Thus, by examining the US policies and courses of action regarding Mozambican national liberation during this period, this chapter provides a solid background, which helps understand and bring to
the fore the critical and proactive roles played by African states in affecting Soviet and American competing interests in the region.

*The US and Portuguese Africa: 1961*

In order to illustrate the changes in the US views and positions in 1961 and 1962, it is first necessary to address the Kennedy administration’s position regarding the situation in Mozambique. This chapter shows that, in contrast with the greater American attention paid to the situation in Angola in 1961, the degree of Washington’s awareness of the situation in Mozambique and the complexity of rivalling Mozambican nationalist movements during that year was somewhat limited. This is relevant in order to emphasize the change in the US paying greater attention to, and its becoming more involved in the rivalry between different Mozambican nationalist factions in 1962. Moreover, this provides a background for explaining that such a change was to a significant degree a result of the Tanganyikan government’s efforts to induce Washington to throw its support behind the politically moderate and west-leaning Eduardo Mondlane, something which badly affected Soviet interests in the region.

The US official position regarding Portuguese Africa was clearly expressed in a position paper produced for President Kennedy, in preparation for the Sudanese President’s visit to the US in October 1961:

“Our policy towards Portuguese Africa, as clearly set forth at the United Nations, is to urge the Portuguese to carry out step-by-step reforms leading to political, economic, and social advancement of all the inhabitants of these African territories – advancement towards full self-determination which we support in Africa as in Berlin (East Germany). In order to implement our policy, that arms will not be supplied to either side in the Angola conflict, we have taken steps to prevent the export of US arms to Portugal for use in Portuguese Africa. We consider the series of reforms announced by Overseas Minister [Adriano] Moreira on August 28 as a hopeful sign but note that the reforms did not address themselves to the principles of self-determination. We believe that unless significant steps are taken now by
The initial impetus of the Kennedy Administration in encouraging rapid and profound changes in Portugal’s colonial policy were accompanied by its desire to establish and promote working relations with promising African nationalist leaders from Angola and Mozambique. Already in the first half of 1961, the Kennedy Administration was maintaining close contacts with Dr. Eduardo C. Mondlane, who became the President of FRELIMO in June 1962. An African native of Mozambique born in 1920, Mondlane received his secondary education in Mozambique and South Africa with the help of the Swiss Mission in Mozambique, and then proceeded to Lisbon for his university studies, financed by the US Government. In 1951 he first arrived in the US to further his education, and received a bachelor’s degree from Oberlin College and a doctorate from Northwestern University. He also studied at Harvard. In 1957 Mondlane was employed by the UN Secretariat in its Trusteeship Division until 1961, when he left the UN and became a lecturer at the Maxwell School of Syracuse University.  

In February-March 1961, Mondlane made a trip across Mozambique to assess the situation in the country. He was cordially received by the Portuguese authorities, who attempted to win him over, to no avail. Once back in the US in May, Mondlane presented a detailed report on his trip to the US Undersecretary of State, Chester Bowles, which was highly critical of the social and political situation in the country. In a conversation with the Deputy Director of the State Department Office of Eastern and Southern African Affairs, William L. Wight, Jr., Mondlane described the situation as “very tense” and affirmed that “there was increasing resentment among the African population as well as a desire for greater freedom, and that the nationalist sentiment was much in evidence.” Describing himself as “a moderate who hoped that a peaceful solution could be worked out, in order to avoid the tragic bloodshed of Angola”, Mondlane urged the State Department to consider implementing US-

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2 Contemporary Portuguese History Research Centre (CPHRC), The João Cabrita Collection (TJCC), Department of State, From Assistant Secretary Frederick Dutton to Senator Strom Thurmond, March 16 1963. CPHRC TJCC, Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Eduardo Mondlane, William L. Wight, Jr., Deputy Director AFE, Conditions in Mozambique, May 16 1961. CPHRC TJCC, Foreign Service Dispatch, from US Consul Lourenço Marques to State Department, Mondlane interviewed by Noticias, February 28 1961.
financed programmes of training and education of African Mozambicans. Pointing out that he was “on the point of giving up his United Nations position in order to lead the nationalist movement of Mozambique” … Mondlane “indicated strongly that he would like to amalgamate all anti-Portuguese liberation movements.” While being cautious about the MPLA’s and other FRAIN movements’ leftist leaning, Mondlane attributed it to the lack of Western support, which led them to seek assistance from Communist countries. He therefore believed that they were “genuine nationalists and that they were definitely ‘salvageable’” from the Communist influence. Wight concluded the memorandum by pointing out that Mondlane “seemed genuinely friendly to the United States and genuinely desirous of seeking a non-violent solution in Mozambique if such a thing were possible.”

Bowles too was impressed with Mondlane, describing him as “a moderate person with the potential for top leadership in Mozambique.” In expressing his view to the Undersecretary of State on the role of the US towards Lisbon and Portuguese Africa, Mondlane stated that “the United States should not let Portugal think that the US are supporting her, that the US should not permit American arms to replenish the Portuguese arsenal, and that the US should stop giving economic aid to Portugal.” While emphasizing his “willingness to work with the Portuguese in order to keep the explosive [Portuguese] forces under control once they have agreed to a step-by-step withdrawal”, both Mondlane and Bowles agreed that “concessions of this kind do not appear to be in the cards”. Mondlane also stressed that

“the US should be in a position to encourage Portugal to accept the principle of self-determination of all African peoples under her control; set target dates and take steps towards self-government and independence by 1965; and help formulate and finance policies of economic, educational and political development for the people of Portuguese Africa and to prepare them for an independence with responsibility.”

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3 CPHRC TJCC, Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Eduardo Mondlane, William L. Wight, Jr., Deputy Director AFE, Conditions in Mozambique, May 16 1961.
4 CPHRC TJCC, Department of State, From Chester Bowles to McGeorge Bundy, the White House, May 23 1961.
5 CPHRC TJCC, Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Call of Eduardo Mondlane of Mozambique on the Acting Secretary, May 16 1961.
6 From Chester Bowles to McGeorge Bundy, op.cit.
Here, an observation should be made regarding the information provided by US documents based on Mondlane’s reports. It should be noted that a number of historians have addressed US officials’ contacts with, and their support for Mondlane. They have also noted Mondlane’s being favoured by the Tanganyikan government, while sharing the view of Gwambe’s inadequacy and inexperience as a political and nationalist leader. However, such historical assessments are largely based on the US official documents produced by the American embassy in Dar-es-Salaam, which, in turn, were primarily informed by Mondlane’s own reports and briefings to US officials. This naturally raises questions regarding the objectivity and comprehensiveness of the said respective information. Although many pieces of information provided by Mondlane were largely consistent with the facts on the ground, and verifiable by other US official sources and Portuguese archives, one should nevertheless treat the information based on Mondlane’s reports with some reservation.

In particular, information presented in a manner favouring Mondlane’s position, interests and supporting his personal views of different Mozambican nationalist figures and the Mozambique national liberation state of affairs should be assessed critically and with caution. For example, his derogatory views of Gwambe, whom Mondlane described to US officials as being inexperienced and inadequate for political leadership, while accusing him of being a Portuguese spy, contrast with the evidence of Gwambe’s objectives and actions found in Portuguese documents. As we saw earlier, not only is there strong evidence of Gwambe’s ceasing collaborating with PIDE after arriving in Dar-es-Salaam in early 1961, but also the shrewd, proactive and deceptive character of his political activism systematically defying influential and determined opponents, let alone his earning Soviet and Casablanca’s unequivocal credit, illustrates a degree of bias in Mondlane’s painting of his adversary. In fact, in his assessment of Mondlane’s reports, the US Consul to Lourenço Marques has himself pointed to a number of inaccuracies in Mondlane’s reports. To sum up, the information provided by such documents should not always be taken entirely at face value. Therefore, this thesis is based on systematic cross-checking of this information.

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8 For example, see Cabrita’s detailed study of Mondlane’s political path, in *Mozambique: the tortuous road to democracy*.
with that provided by Portuguese and, when possible, Soviet documents. This method is most valuable for reconstructing the course of historical events as accurately as possible, in order to ensure a consistent analysis is produced throughout this research.

Importantly, as we have seen in the previous chapter, one is to be reminded that, on several occasions, dos Santos urged Gwambe and other UDENAMO officials to prepare carefully organized and, most probably, sanitized information on the state of political affairs in southern Africa to be presented to the Soviet Union. As was advanced, dos Santos probably aimed to feed Moscow with information which would influence Soviet decision-making in such a way as to advance the CONCP and UDENAMO’s interests. In this regard, both Mondlane and UDENAMO had the chance to influence the US and the USSR, respectively, by presenting views and information favourable to their particular interests. The possibilities of African actors in manipulating Washington’s and Moscow’s views and understanding of the state of affairs in regard to Mozambican national liberation, therefore, should not be overlooked as another example of African actors’ agency influencing the superpower competition in the region. By sanitizing or manipulating the information regarding the situation on the ground, the Mozambican nationalist figures had the freedom and the ability to provide information which best suited their purposes. One should be reminded that none of the Soviet Bloc countries had an embassy in the region, during this period.

Despite Washington’s maintaining early contacts with prospective nationalist leaders with West-leaning outlooks, Mondlane and the Angolan FNLA leader Holden Roberto, and expressing its support to their cause, in 1961 there were limitations to US understanding of the Mozambican nationalist scene and its respective dynamics. As the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Mennen G. Williams, clearly put it in June, Washington “lack[ed] sufficient first hand knowledge on … various anti-Portuguese groups”.10 The following two examples demonstrate that the US officials’ contacts with Mondlane and the information provided by the US Consul in Mozambique were insufficient to offer Washington an in-depth knowledge and understanding of Mozambican nationalist circles. Neither was there a clear and

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common understanding and planning of US policy regarding Mozambique and its movements in exile. The two episodes illustrative of the above-mentioned problems are a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) information request about Gwambe made in September 1961, and the challenging visit of Mennen Williams to Mozambique during his tour of the continent.

In August 1961, Gwambe was sent an official invitation from George Christopher, Mayor of San Francisco, California, “to attend the celebration of Africa Week in San Francisco, a tribute to all the African Nations, to be held [from] September seventeenth through September twenty-third” of 1961. The event was organized by the American Committee on Africa. Once Lisbon became aware of the invitation, the Portuguese Ambassador to Washington, Vasco Garin, expressed his government’s displeasure to the State Department concerning US officials’ attempts to establish positive relations with, as he put it, “all those African revolutionaries”. To the Portuguese, any desire of American officials to contact Mozambican nationalists was an act of hostility towards Portugal.

Diplomatic antagonism between Portugal and the US notwithstanding, PIDE maintained a liaison with the CIA. In September, stressing his almost complete lack of information about Gwambe, the CIA chief of station in Lisbon, Fred Hubbard, requested the Deputy Head of PIDE, Manuel Clara, to provide him with detailed information on the subject. In particular, Hubbard emphasized the need to be provided with Gwambe’s criminal record, as well as all available information on any connections he might have with Communists or Communist organizations. “...[I]t would be of great use for my purposes – which Your Excellency [would certainly] understand – to have copies of each criminal process [Gwambe] might [have been] involved in.” Stressing the importance of CIA liaison with PIDE, and the urgency of the matter, Hubbard ended, “… it would be of great advantage for both of our

countries if the requested information would be [provided to me as soon as possible].”

Three days later, Clara replied to his American counterpart, informing him of Gwambe’s Communist connections through Marcelino dos Santos, and his prosecution for the robbery of the Empório warehouses in Beira city, where Gwambe worked between 1952 and 1956 before subsequently fleeing the country to Southern Rhodesia without serving his jail sentence. Copies of his criminal record were attached to Clara’s message, who added that after being declared an ‘undesirable immigrant’ by the Tanganyikan Government, Gwambe followed dos Santos’s advice and accompanied him first to Rabat, and then to Europe.

When Gwambe made a request for a visa to enter the United States, reportedly in order to present himself at the United Nations, PIDE hoped that the information it had provided to the CIA would suffice for the visa to be declined. This, however, was not the case, and in September UDENAMO’s leader made his first trip to the US. The available documents do not provide any information about Gwambe’s trip, or its results. As Shubin puts it, quoting Yevsyukov, who received Gwambe in Moscow that month, “He came to the Soviet Union from the USA, and not with empty hands.” Although there is no evidence that the Mozambican received any promises of American assistance, and if he did, what it was, Yevsyukov’s critical views of Gwambe contrast with the fact that the International Department of the CPSU allocated $3,000 to UDENAMO. It should also be noted that Shubin might have misinterpreted Yevsyukov’s words “and not with empty hands”, by portraying them as criticism of Gwambe. It might be the case that Yevsyukov was pleased because Gwambe had information after his visit that was useful to the Soviets. Moreover, Gwambe’s regular statements about the situation in Mozambique made on

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18 IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process SC SR283/61, Adelino Chitofo Gwambe, From the General Director of the PIDE to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lisbon, 30th October of 1961, 524.
20 Vladimir Shubin, The Hot Cold War: the USSR in Southern Africa, (Pluto Press, 2008), p. 120.
21 Shubin, The Hot Cold War, p. 120.
Soviet radio broadcasts was indicative of Moscow’s willingness to back him as the legitimate representative of the Mozambican people.

The CIA’s request for information about Gwambe is indicative of the limited degree of the Kennedy Administration’s knowledge about Mozambican nationalist circles in exile at this time. Despite promoting an energetic African policy through the Bureau of African Affairs of the State Department (also known as the Africanists), and having a task force on the Portuguese territories, created in June 1961, which advocated self-determination for the Portuguese overseas territories, US attention was primarily focused on Angola.\(^\text{22}\) Notwithstanding maintaining contacts with Mondlane and setting up educational assistance programmes for Southern African refugees in Tanganyika, discussed later in this chapter, throughout 1961 US engagement with Mozambique was largely expressed through the generally assertive rhetoric stressing before Lisbon the imminence of self-determination in all overseas territories. This was combined with seeking British cooperation in influencing the Salazar government’s position. It aimed to reduce Portugal’s bargaining power over the Azores facilities, while persuading Portugal that the Lusitanian community in Africa could be preserved in spite of changes of colonial policy. Such a US approach contrasted with that in 1962, when the US began paying great attention to the Mozambican nationalist circles in Tanganyika, particularly during Mondlane’s efforts to gain access to, and secure his leadership of FRELIMO.

In 1961, US policy towards Portuguese Africa, and particularly Mozambique, was also hostage to divisions within US official circles. They were embodies by the conflicting views of Africanists, advocating close and active US relations with Africa, and Europeanists, prioritizing American ties to European powers. Mennen Williams’s trip to Mozambique and other African countries in the summer of 1961 is illustrative of both the Africanists’ forceful stance on Portuguese colonial policy, and the conflicting views within US officialdom. In July 1961, while preparing for his first official tour in Africa, Williams requested the US consul in Mozambique’s capital city, Lourenço Marques, William Howard Taft III, to arrange a meeting for him “with those who will be ruling Mozambique in ten years”.\(^\text{23}\) Such a request, which the Portuguese officials learned of through private talks with the US consul, came as a

great surprise to both them and Taft. Not only did the Portuguese perceive Williams’s request as a symbolic act of hostility towards Portugal, but they also wondered how limited was his understanding of Mozambican nationalist movements, and the prospect for the country of being ruled by Africans.

Stressing the virtually nonexistent insurgent activity inside the country, and PIDE’s tight control over any political dissent, a Portuguese official in Lourenço Marques remarked:

“This US Secretary of State seems to believe that in ten years the Mozambican negroes [sic] will rule their country. But is he sure they will be able to do so? … Given the virtual nonexistence of a [Mozambican] Black elite, it seems sensible not to throw to independence a territory which could not nourish reasonable pretensions for such a status, not [until at least] 25 years have passed.”

Taft’s sympathetic stance towards the Portuguese government’s view contrasted with those of Africanists in the State Department such as Williams. Regarding the US policy, the consul wrote to Washington:

“it is certainly better to await the outcome of the struggle in Angola and in Portugal without encouraging even indirectly disorder in Mozambique. Order in Mozambique will allow the African a little more education and economic development. … It is rather any too precipitant move by us which will stimulate a violent reaction on one side or the other that seems inconsistent with our self-interest and Mozambique’s.”

Echoing the views of his Portuguese counterparts on the unfeasibility of immediate self-determination and independence, Taft advanced that:

“African autonomy [in Mozambique] will come with the march of outside events. But its form will be more favorable if it is at least somewhat delayed, and until those events even our relations with Portugal can remain at least tenable. The latter objective joined with the former is not one to be ashamed of.”

Such conflicting views of different US officials not only illustrated the divisions within the American establishment regarding the US courses of action, but also added to the ambivalent character of the American policy, ranging from friendly understanding of its NATO ally’s difficulties to an inflexible determination to press

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Lisbon to carry out drastic reforms and express explicit disapproval of its colonial regime. Further account of Mennen Williams’s trip discussed above exemplifies the latter trend among the Africanists in the State Department.

Lisbon informed the State Department that the timing of Williams’s intention to visit Angola and Mozambique was unsuitable for Portugal. However, Lisbon stated, that if he insisted on making his visit, Portugal required that his visit “should have as little publicity and hype as possible”, and his meetings be limited solely to the chief Portuguese authorities in the country. Despite such requests, the American official was eager to make sure Lisbon got Washington’s message. While the Portuguese media’s coverage of Williams’s African tour was minimal, he was accompanied by a large group of American journalists, film-makers and photographers, which was evidence of the Africanists in the Kennedy administration’s resolve to publicly emphasize its support for African peoples’ right to self-determination and decolonization, even if it meant harming relations with Portugal.26

Notably, the Kennedy administration’s position on Southern Africa alarmed not only the Portuguese, but also their white-minority Southern African counterparts, who shared the Portuguese resentment regarding US policy advancing the principle of self-determination. In late August 1961, during Williams’s visit to Southern Rhodesia, the representatives of PIDE, FISB, and the authorities of the Central African Federation (CAF) held a secret meeting in Salisbury. At the meeting, Sir Roy Welensky expressed his strong antipathy against the American Secretary, whom he had met earlier. Welensky pointed with disgust to Williams’s remark that deep changes should take place in Angola, and that it was the Portuguese - and not those fighting for independence – who should promote such changes.27 Thus, already in 1961, a common perspective of the Portuguese and their regional partners began to emerge, bound by their mutual rejection of American policy for Southern Africa. Similarly to Williams’s visit to Mozambique, his stay in Rhodesia attracted little media attention in the latter country.28 Notably, the increasingly closer cooperation between Portugal, South Africa and South Rhodesia, united by their common sense of

insecurity posed by both growing Black nationalism and international political and economic pressures was a matter of great concern to the US government, given the prospect of the creation of the so-called White Axis or the White Redoubt, a problem discussed earlier in Chapter II. Such a prospect was exacerbated by the Casablanca group’s vigorous military initiatives. As a State Department analysis pointed out a year later,

“[a] shock to the already nervous white communities is the formation of a military High Command among the so-called ‘Casablanca powers’, - Morocco, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, and Mali. … [I]ts political impact probably will be substantial. … [W]e anticipate that it will attempt to become the principal training organization and armorer of ‘liberation movements’ preparing uprisings in southern Africa. In part for this purpose, their members have accepted and stored large quantities of Communist Bloc arms and material.”

Such developments represent a crucial element informing both American and Tanganyikan actions towards Mozambican nationalist circles in late 1961 and throughout most of 1962. By making an effort to ensure that the process of Mozambican nationalist liberation was led by politically moderate figures such as Mondlane, not only could the potential escalation of the Communist influence in the region be halted, but also the threat of open military confrontation instigated by the Casablanca group backed by the Soviet bloc against the Portuguese, South African and Rhodesian regimes could be reduced.

Despite limitations in the US Administration’s understanding of Mozambican nationalist movements and their leaders, and Mozambique being a low priority for the US throughout most of 1961, the crisis in Angola and the potential heating up of dissent in Portugal’s other African territories prompted Washington to set up programmes assisting African refugees from the second half of 1961 onwards. The following section discusses these programmes, in order to further illustrate the character and course of US policy towards the process of national liberation in Portuguese territories in Africa and particularly Mozambique. Importantly, this serves the purpose of providing a more solid background for our understanding of the factors leading to changes in US policy during this period, which is crucial for advancing the

29 JFK NSF, Africa, Reel 1, General, Department of State, July 6 1962, “The White Redoubt”, Secret, Attachment, Flaming Group meeting, 10 July 1962, p. 5, 0436-0511. The military High Command was formed on 8th April.
argument that African actors played a key role in the success of American interests in the context of the formation of FRELIMO in mid-1962.

**US assistance programmes to Mozambican nationalists**

This section discusses US education and humanitarian assistance programmes to Mozambican refugee communities in Tanganyika, in the context of US policy for Africa and the processes of national liberation in Portuguese territories. One should consider several factors as informing these American initiatives. Firstly, they stemmed from the early beliefs of some officials in the Kennedy Administration that Portugal’s colonial rule would soon succumb to the ‘winds of change’ blowing over the African continent. Because those taking such a view considered that a hasty end of Portugal’s colonialism could open doors to radical and Marxist-oriented elements taking power in the newly-independent states, they reasoned that it was necessary to ensure that skilled West-oriented African elites existed in these countries prior to their independence. Through programmes combining covert and overt actions, the US aimed at countering radical and Communist Bloc influence in the region by promoting moderate political outlooks in the nationalist communities. They aimed at nurturing a generation of pro-western elites who could lead Mozambique after independence, and conduct a policy consistent with American interests. Such elites were expected to be able to develop and run free market economies, and adopt a political system according to Western democratic models, or at least to refrain from establishing close relations with Communist countries. It should be noted that American officialdom took into account the problematic experience of the development of events in the Congo, leading to a deep international crisis in the heart of Africa where the hypothetical possibility of a Soviet military intervention coming to the rescue of the Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, would have threatened western interests. It was, therefore, especially important for the US and other western powers to prevent a repetition of the Congolese scenario in other African territories under colonial rule after the handover of power, in order to keep the threat of Communist penetration into the continent at bay.

Secondly, Washington’s concerns at losing the nationalist leaders and peoples of prospectively independent African countries to Soviet influence and the
Casablanca group’s radical agenda were also informed by the need to avoid large-scale armed confrontation in Southern Africa. As mentioned earlier, the prospect of Mozambican nationalist movements being indoctrinated by the Soviet bloc and Casablanca group, and advancing the respective agendas and ideologies threatened the outbreak of a war between the newly independent states and the white-minority regimes in Southern Africa. Such a confrontation, in Washington’s views, could represent the loss of American influence in the region, through further deterioration of US relation with Portugal and white-minority regimes on the one hand, and independent Black African states on the other hand.

In July 1961, President Kennedy approved a series of recommendations of the Task Force on Portuguese Territories through the National Security Action Memorandum no. 60 (NSAM). From August 1961 onwards, the US began materializing some of the NSAM 60 objectives, such as the provision of humanitarian aid to Angolan refugees in the Congo. The presence of American institutions in Tanganyika and its Eastern African partners began to increase from mid-1961, particularly through US humanitarian and development institutions and private American initiatives, directly or otherwise connected to the US government. For example, Frank Montero, the head of the African American Students Foundation, an institution sponsoring African students’ education in the US, became a regular visitor in Tanganyika. Montero maintained friendly relations with Tom Mboya, a central Kenyan figure in PAFMECSA who systematically urged Washington to increase the number of African students who could be granted scholarships for studies in the US. As is to be expected, Portuguese authorities viewed Montero’s activities with great suspicion, considering them of a subversive nature.

In September, the first US Peace Corps group arrived in Tanganyika. While being part of the American development programmes in Africa, it represented a projection of the US government designed to counter the Soviet Union in the region. The KGB was highly concerned about the active anti-Soviet propaganda campaigns conducted by the Peace Corps, and its involvement in intelligence collection for the CIA on the USSR’s and Soviet bloc countries’ connections with different Third

World countries and organizations. According to PIDE, Eduardo Mondlane maintained systematic contacts with American intelligence services, whose representatives operated under Peace Corps cover in Tanganyika. Unsurprisingly, the Peace Corps became a target of Ghanaian propaganda, accusing the organization of being involved in subversive activities in Africa and undermining the sovereignty of newly independent states.

The US assistance and educational programmes were more than a mere reflection of Washington’s rhetoric advocating African development and modernization. They stemmed from the urgent need of the US to shore up its Cold War competition for the hearts and minds of Mozambican refugees, attempting to isolate them from radical and Marxist influences, something which they only partly succeeded in doing. Washington’s urgency was understandable. By September 1961, the Soviet Union had already received several hundreds of students from Portuguese Africa. Moreover, Mozambicans were receiving political education at the Kwame Nkrumah Institute in Winneba, and undertaking training in guerrilla warfare and sabotage in Ghanaian training camps under Soviet and Chinese instructors. Yet granting scholarships to Angolans and Mozambicans for studies in the US and Western Europe, namely France and Switzerland, was problematic, as it risked further deterioration in US relations with Portugal. The same also applied to US officials’ publicly supporting and maintaining contacts with leaders of nationalist movements, which was strongly opposed by Lisbon. As a result, under Mennen Williams’s management, the State Department and the CIA coordinated their actions to covertly provide scholarships to refugees from Portuguese Africa through US embassies. In Dar-es-Salaam, the African American Institute (AAI), a central private American institution promoting African-American relations and sponsored by the Ford Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, all of which had ties to the CIA, was particularly active in carrying out such tasks, in an

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37 CPHRC TJCC, State Department, Airgram, From Amembsasy Dar es Salaam to Department of State, Mozambique refugee politics in Dar-es-Salaam, July 10, 1961, p. 4.
attempt to respond to the challenge of Soviet assistance to nationalist movements and communities.\textsuperscript{38}

PIDE sources provide proof that already by the end of 1961 US assistance programmes and education and humanitarian institutions operating in Tanganyika were by no means politically neutral and involved in the covert support of Mozambican ‘freedom fighters’. In December, a PIDE informer posing as a ‘freedom fighter’ held a meeting with the AAI head in Dar-es-Salaam. Claiming that he was representing an underground movement founded in Lourenço Marques, the agent expressed his desire to legalize his organization in Dar-es-Salaam. According to the PIDE agent, the AAI official promptly promised scholarships for the members of the organization, while emphasizing that he was a very good friend of Eduardo Mondlane. In order to materialize such a request, the American said that US assistance could be given if the agent established contacts with the AAI headquarters in Rhodesia.\textsuperscript{39} Thus like many other American private organizations operating in Africa and being funded by the CIA, the AAI’s public mission of providing education and development assistance to African communities was used as a cover for supporting national liberation movements in a manner that Grubbs described as “Washington’s ongoing and covert cultural Cold War.”\textsuperscript{40}

Perhaps the most notable materialization of US-funded assistance programmes was the establishment of the Mozambique Institute in Dar-es-Salaam. After the formation of FRELIMO, only a few dozen Mozambicans left for the US to undertake studies with US scholarships, while numerous scholarship offers had to be declined, due to the generalized lack of basic preparation of most Mozambicans to undertake higher education studies. In order to overcome this problem, the US government provided funds for the construction of the Mozambique Institute in the Tanganyikan capital city, while FRELIMO also created the Mozambique Education Emergency Fund, aiming at collecting further funds for the project,\textsuperscript{41} and established a

\textsuperscript{41} IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process nº 3461-CI2, Gabriel Zandamela, 281, 282.
Scholarship Committee run by Lawrence Millinga, the former secretary of MANU, for the purpose of funding FRELIMO members studying in universities and colleges abroad.\textsuperscript{42}

The first US tranche for the project was of $67,000. It was provided through the Ford Foundation, whose involvement Mondlane never publicly disclosed to FRELIMO members. The Mozambique Institute was established in a new building especially built by FRELIMO in Kurasine, a neighbourhood accommodating the Salvation Army and the AAI. It was led by Mondlane’s American wife, Janet Mondlane, and it was ostensibly a non-political institution, and administratively independent from FRELIMO. Publicly, its aim was to provide basic and high-school education to FRELIMO members, who were taught in English by American lecturers, both men and women, who began arriving in Tanganyika under Mondlane’s personal guidance in the second half of 1962, and who were all affiliated to the AAI. American funding provided through the Ford Foundation also covered travel expenses of Mozambicans studying in the US.\textsuperscript{43}

Yet apart from providing basic and secondary education, the Institute’s task was also to indoctrinate Mozambicans politically and economically. According to PIDE files, FRELIMO members were taught how to run businesses and were given administrative skills. The latter, in PIDE’s view, aimed at preparing the cadres for the Government of Mozambique after independence.\textsuperscript{44} Such an education programme, therefore, met the criteria of promoting Western political values and a free market economy model among the Mozambican refugee community. By seeking to cultivate prospective pro-western Mozambican political and business elites, expected to become naturally inclined to follow an anti-Communist political and economic agendas after independence, the Mozambique Institute was a valuable tool of US policy aimed at thwarting Communist influence in the region. While being in line with Kennedy’s public commitment both to promote African decolonization and to develop and modernize African societies, the American exercise of soft power by means of educational programmes seemed to represent a reasonable option to more

\textsuperscript{42} IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process nº 2963/63 – SR, Lázaro Nkvandame, 3. \textsuperscript{43} IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process nº 3461-CI2, Gabriel Zandamela, 420, 421, 281, 282. \textsuperscript{44} IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process nº 3461-CI2, Gabriel Zandamela, 605.
openly defiant measures antagonising Portugal and deteriorating US-Portuguese relations.

US assistance programmes on the ground were also accompanied by the formulation of operational strategies regarding both the Portuguese Government and leading African nationalist figures. In January 1962, Paul Sakwa, assistant to the deputy director of plans of the CIA, devised a blueprint according to which Portugal would grant independence to Mozambique and Angola within eight years, in exchange for a $500,000,000 NATO subsidy for the modernization of Portugal’s economy. According to Sakwa’s plan, during the eight-year period Mondlane and Holden Roberto were expected to consolidate their positions as the prospective leaders of the two countries, while being on the US government payroll.45

However, because the US risked further deteriorating its relations with Portugal and losing its facilities in the Azores, Sakwa’s plan did not gain the necessary support. This illustrates the challenges and limitations that Washington faced in devising and implementing an action plan that attempted both to preserve positive relations with Lisbon and assist moderate nationalist African leaders. Nevertheless, despite the objections of the Portuguese government and the warnings of the US consul Taft that American contacts with, and support for Mozambican and Angolan nationalists might further jeopardize US-Portuguese relations, a degree of American covert assistance under Williams and the CIA continued for the next three years.46

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the objections expressed by Taft reflected the divisions within US officialdom on devising the best means for dealing with the issue of Portuguese Africa, particularly between the Africanists and the Europeanists. Such contradictions contributed to the inconsistency of US policy and added to the ambiguous character of the American commitment to the cause of national liberation. They also impacted on the consistency of American support for Mondlane after the creation of FRELIMO, as we will see. Such predicaments help explain the limitations of American engagement in, and influence on the region, and the ineptitude of

American policy in effectively countering the Soviet bloc’s influence. Most importantly, however, they are critical for understanding the key role played by Tanganyikan authorities, rather than the US, in the outcome of Mondlane vs. Gwambe’s competition in 1962. Although Tanganyika pursued its specific interests at local and regional levels, only some of which were coincident with those of the US, it was official Dar-es-Salaam’s own actions that played a central role in the outcome of superpower competition in the region during that year, by favouring US interests and undermining the Soviet ones. The contextualization of such African actions in the US policies towards Mozambique is important to support the main argument of the thesis, therefore, as it helps bringing to the fore the central roles played by regional African actors in defining the outcomes of local and regional rivalries, which impacted on the superpowers’ goals and interests. It contributed in emphasizing how vulnerable were the superpowers’ policies to local and regional political dynamics, and how limited was the degree of Moscow’s and Washington’s control of events at these levels.

Like in much of the rest of Africa, US policy, primarily underpinned by US Cold War concerns, aimed at countering the Soviet bloc’s influence, rather than representing a wholehearted commitment to the development and prosperity of African countries and peoples. The case of Mozambican nationalist communities was no different. Despite the implementation of the above-mentioned US programmes, the close contacts between US officials and Mondlane and the operation of US-sponsored organizations and institutions assisting Mozambican refugee communities in the region, little more than a year later their results proved inadequate. In a 33-page long paper entitled ‘Problems of Southern Africa’, produced in October 1962, Robert Foulon of the State Department Bureau of African Affairs expressed the view that although the refugee groups in Tanganyika

“represent a potential rather than immediate threat to stability in the area … an important problem is raised by the student refugees groups in Dar-es-Salaam … who now appear to be the principal targets of the Communist Bloc.”

Pointing to the limitations of the AID/AAI Program in Dar-es-Salaam and the US-sponsored Lincoln University scholarships for Southern African refugees’ studies in the United States, Foulon stressed:

47 JFK NSF, Africa, Reel 1, General, Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, Problems of Southern Africa, Revised draft, October 4 1962, pp. 32-33, 0511-0601.
“our program clearly must be expanded … if we are to meet the political challenge represented by the large Communist scholarship program directed toward the refugee group.”

In fact, by 24th September 1962 there were only 42 FRELIMO members studying in the United States. The US programme not only began to show its limitations in the face of a more urgent need for educated and skilled Mozambicans in the ranks of FRELIMO, but it also fell victim to the increasingly more cautious American policy in the second half of 1962, whereby the US distanced itself from anti-colonial movements in Portuguese Africa and its previously strongly worded criticisms of Lisbon’s policy.

Notably, by the time of Foulon’s assessment, FRELIMO under Mondlane was experiencing a deep internal political and financial crisis, further exacerbated by the political offensive of Gwambe and his followers at local, regional and international levels, attacking FRELIMO’s leadership. The US, in turn, was reticent in taking any substantial and positives steps to help the promising and moderate Mozambican leader it once gave support and encouragement to. Throughout the second half of 1962, the increasing urgency that the Kennedy Administration felt for renewing the Azores bases agreement, and the Africanists losing ground to their Europeanist counterparts, translated into Washington distancing itself from Mondlane and his Angolan counterpart, Holden Roberto. This also affected US financial assistance, with Mondlane becoming more and more desperate to find alternative sources of funding such as Brazil, but to no avail.

A striking result of such US attitudes came in late summer 1962. On 10th August, the US, together with Britain, Australia and Italy voted against a resolution on Mozambique calling for the General Assembly to request the Security Council to apply sanctions against Portugal if it refused to implement the UN Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The resolution proposed by the ASAF group and the Soviet Bloc also demanded Portugal “to desist forthwith from armed action and repressive measures against the people of Mozambique, to release all political prisoners

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48 JFK NSF, Africa, Reel 1, General, Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, Problems of Southern Africa, Revised draft, October 4 1962, pp. 32-33, 0511-0601.
49 IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process nº 3461-C12, Gabriel Zandamela, 605.
50 IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process nº 3461-C12, Gabriel Zandamela, 281, 282.
immediately, to lift immediately the ban on political parties, and to undertake without further delay extensive political, economic and social measures that would ensure the creation of freely elected and representative political institutions and transfer of power to the people of Mozambique.¹⁵¹

Some of the FRELIMO leaders were incensed by the American vote. Paulo Gumane, Deputy National Secretary and FRELIMO spokesman, issued a press statement condemning the US

“...and other colonialist and imperialist countries … by voting against the aspirations of the people of Mozambique while on the other hand, [these countries] go all over Africa preaching against colonialism. If, [the] USA wants to safeguard her military bases in [the] Azores or the millions of dollars which they have given to Portugal to buy [military] material to kill our brothers in Angola through the so-called North Atlantic Treaty Organization pact, they must know that they are riding a losing horse.”¹⁵²

Despite Gumane’s later private apology to US officials in Dar-es-Salaam, the damage to the US image before the Mozambican nationalists had been done. Such accusations against the US, NATO and Portugal became a core thesis of Gwambe’s campaigning in African and international political circles aiming at discrediting Mondlane. Gumane privately acknowledged that he found it necessary to issue such a strong anti-American statement in order to counter Mozambican pro-Communist groups ridiculing FRELIMO for being deceived by the US. According to Gumane, the American vote at the UN raised claims that FRELIMO leaders were serving American interests, all of which undermined FRELIMO’s image and its genuinely nationalist and non-aligned position. Nonetheless, the US vote and Gumane’s reaction clearly signalled a u-turn in the American public commitment to the cause of Mozambican national liberation and significantly increased FRELIMO’s distrust of American intentions. Strikingly, one of Gumane’s complaints to US officials echoed different moderate African leaders’ growing criticism of the US policy on Africa. In particular, he stated that the “US gives millions to [unfriendly/radical] countries like Ghana and neglects [moderate African] friends.”¹⁵³

¹⁵¹ The Yearbook of the United Nations, 1962, Part 1: The United Nations, Section 1: Political and security questions, Chapter 5: Situation with regard to implementation of Declaration on granting independence to colonial countries and peoples, pp. 63-64.

¹⁵² CPHRC TJCC, State Department, Telegram From Dar-es-Salaam (Byrne) to Secretary of State, August 14 1962.

¹⁵³ CPHRC TJCC, State Department, Telegram From Dar-es-Salaam (Byrne) to Secretary of State, August 16 1962.
African level and the increasing dissatisfaction of some moderate African leaders with
the degree of US commitment to assisting friendly African countries found resonance
with some of FRELIMO’s leading figures, contributing to the damaging of the US
position before the Mozambican nationalist community. Such an effect is further
representative of African actors’ roles in impacting on superpower interests.

Conclusion

To sum up, throughout most of 1961, Mozambique represented a low priority for US
foreign policy. While the American attention to Mozambique grew towards the end of
that year, its low-key approach was largely a reflection of the general US policy on
Portuguese colonialism, and Washington’s reaction to events in Angola.
Washington’s awareness of the situation in the country and its understanding of
Mozambique’s nationalist movements and refugee communities was largely limited to
contacts with Mondlane, and informed by partial reports provided by American
officials in Mozambique, whose views were sympathetic to the Portuguese position.
The US approach towards the issue of national liberation movements in Portuguese
African territories throughout most of 1961 consisted primarily in advancing a
political discourse pressing the Portuguese Government for reforms aiming at
promoting African peoples’ self-determination and the subsequent independence of
their countries. Such an agenda was in line with the early Kennedy Administration’s
endorsing the popular ‘winds of change’ rhetoric, which was strongly advocated by
the growing Asian-African (ASAF) group at the UN, and advanced by the State
Department Africanists under Mennen Williams. It also stemmed from Washington’s
concerns about the Soviet Union becoming the leading world power advocating
decolonization, thus increasing its sphere of influence in the Third World at the
expense of western interests.

Despite Gwambe’s continuing political activity involving his lobbying and
establishing contacts with different governments both in Africa and outside the
continent, only in September 1961 did the CIA request information about him from
PIDE. This is illustrative of the fact that Mozambique had marginal importance for

54 CPHRC TJCC, State Department, Telegram From Dar-es-Salaam (Byrne) to Secretary of State,
August 16 1962.
Washington for most of 1961, and the American establishment had limited information on different Mozambican nationalist movements and leaders. Although countering Communist influence in Africa was a key priority for American policy for the continent, the stringent security measures taken by the Portuguese government in Mozambique made the threats of strong Communist influence or power takeover negligible. This also helps explain Washington’s limited interest in the process of Mozambique national liberation in its early stages. On the contrary, it was the inflexibility of the Portuguese government and its determination to eradicate any dissent, together with the intractable position of Portugal’s allies in Southern Africa that represented a greater concern for the Kennedy Administration. In its view, the tenacious resistance of the white-minority regimes to the ‘winds of change’ could lead to an armed escalation in the region, spearheaded by leftist national liberation movements supported by the radical Casablanca group and the Communist Bloc, thus opening the doors to Communist expansion in the region.

As we have seen, the need to prevent the above-mentioned regional armed confrontation, and to counter the growing radical and Communist trends among the nationalist communities in exile, the latter represented by the assertive activities of Gwambe’s UDENAMO, were two key factors leading to a more active US involvement in matters of Mozambique’s national liberation towards the end of 1961 and throughout the first half of 1962. Firstly were the US assistance programmes in Tanganyika aimed at supporting educated, politically moderate and west-oriented nationalist figures opposed to independence by means of armed struggle. Secondly, the US aimed at preparing educated and skilled African cadres who could run the country after independence in accordance with Western political and economic models. By so doing, American programmes, primarily underpinned by Washington’s Cold War concerns, sought both to prevent the expansion of Communist influence among the Mozambicans in exile, and to bring about a peaceful framework for a diplomatic step-by-step process of power handover of Portuguese territories to the Africans. All this provides the context for the American backing of Mondlane, culminating in his becoming President of FRELIMO in mid-1962.

In the broader context of the argument of this thesis, the account of the initial US approach to Mozambique is important to show how it contrasted with its more active engagement in the first half of 1962. Moreover, it is crucial for demonstrating
Washington’s retreat in the second half of that year, when its approach to the question of Mozambique’s national liberation became subject to the dynamics of US-Portuguese relations. In particular, in the second half of 1962, the looming risks of the US losing access to air bases in the Azores had a profound impact on the Kennedy Administration’s change in approach towards both the African nationalists in Portuguese territories and the Portuguese colonial policy. While the dramatic reverse of US policy in the second half of 1962 and its repercussions on the process of Mozambican national liberation will be discussed in greater detail further in the thesis, it is nonetheless indicative of how short-lived was the initial American strong-minded anti-colonial policy and its support to Mozambican nationalists. While this policy succeeded in accomplishing US short-term tactical rather than strategic goals, such as helping the politically-moderate Mondlane to come to power over FRELIMO, the initial US policy for Portuguese Africa fell victim to the competition between the Africanists and the Europeanists within the Administration, and the political and security contingencies pressing Washington to become more accommodating of Lisbon’s interests.

The examination of US policy and its respective assistance programmes in Tanganyika provides a vital background for advancing the argument that Gwambe’s political defeat in the context of the formation of FRELIMO, examined further in the thesis, was largely due to the agency of local and regional African actors, rather than a result of the American support for Mondlane. As we will see in the next chapter, Mondlane’s victory over Gwambe in June 1962, which represented a blow to the interests of the Soviet Union and its Casablanca partners, was primarily a result of PAFMECSA and the Tanganyikan government’s efforts and proactive initiatives, as well as changing personal predilections of key Mozambican nationalist figures. Despite Washington’s favouring Mondlane, offering him moral and financial support in the factional competition and providing assistance to Mozambican refugees in Dar-es-Salaam through US-financed institutions, American commitment was cautious, restrained and sought short-term tactical gains. Tanganyikan interests, in turn, were only coincidental with those of the US, and did not directly result from Washington’s policies or actions, thus making the American role of only complementary importance to the development of events.
CHAPTER IV

FRELIMO, Tanganyika, and the UN Committee of 17: 1962

1962 saw an event of foremost importance in the process of Mozambican national liberation: the creation of the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), which formally resulted from a merger of three movements: UDENAMO, MANU and UNAMI. This chapter argues that the creation of FRELIMO, preceded by intense political competition at local and regional levels, particularly between the Tanganyikan and Ghanaian governments, and involving superpower conflicting interests, was decisive for determining the balance of power in favour of the United States in the context of Mozambican national liberation. Conversely, as well as representing a political defeat for Gwambe’s UDENAMO and its Casablanca group supporters, Eduardo Mondlane’s becoming President of FRELIMO also symbolized a defeat for the Soviet Union. This chapter shows and argues that the triumph of the politically moderate and West-oriented Mondlane, whom the Tanganyikan government supported, resulted primarily from the agency of the Tanganyikan officialdom and its regional PAFMECSA partners, rather than US interference in the local struggle for power between Mozambican nationalist leaders and their respective movements. Importantly, this chapter argues that the agency of African regional actors was primarily driven by their particular goals and interests at local and regional levels, rather than Cold War considerations or superpower influence or pressures. Thus, the examination of this particular episode in the process of Mozambican national liberation is important for supporting the central argument of this study that African actors played key and active roles in the dynamics of superpower competition. It highlights African actors’ crucial roles in superpower triumphs and defeats, something which brings to the fore the vulnerability of the Soviet and American policies, strategies and courses of action to the interests of African actors at local and regional levels.

In order to show the proactive role of Tanganyika in the superpower competition in the context of FRELIMO’s formation, this chapter focuses on two key episodes. The first is how official Dar-es-Salaam successfully deceived the United
Nations Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, also known as the UN Committee of 17, in late spring 1962. This chapter argues that this action aimed at undermining the position of UDENAMO and thwarting Ghanaian influence in the region, in order to bring the process of Mozambican national liberation under full Tanganyikan control. By misleading the UN body, which was strongly influenced by the Soviet and the ASAF blocs, the Tanganyikan Government outmanoeuvred both the UDENAMO leadership and its Casablanca group opponents, something which badly damaged Soviet objectives and interests in the region, while at the same time playing into the hands of Washington.

Secondly, this chapter examines the development of events at local and regional political levels involving the formation of FRELIMO. Particularly, it focuses on the struggle for leadership over the Mozambican liberation front between Mondlane, supported by PAFMECSA and the US, and Gwambe, backed by the Casablanca group and the Soviet Union. It further addresses the Ghanaian attempt to bring the Mozambican front under its control, and the successful effort of the Tanganyikan government to prevent it. In examining these episodes, this chapter supports the central assertion of this study that African actors played a crucial role in affecting superpower interests, by pursuing particular goals and interests at local and regional political levels, which were largely disconnected from superpower interests and their Cold War rationale, or ideological East-West predilections aimed at benefitting either superpower.

Thwarting UDENAMO’s political return

As discussed in Chapter II, the conflicting interests of PAFMECSA countries and Ghana in Pan-African affairs, and in regard to their competition for influence over the process of Mozambican national liberation, together with PIDE’s efforts in the field, led to Gwambe’s being expelled from Tanganyika in August 1961. This not only weakened UDENAMO’s position in south-east Africa, but it also had a damaging effect on Soviet and the Casablanca group’s interests in the region. As has been shown, the agency of the Tanganyikan and Kenyan governments was decisive for such an outcome, bringing to the fore the active roles played by African actors in
affecting superpower interests in the region. Despite the immediate benefits of such an action to the interests of PAFMECSA, the Tanganyikan and Kenyan governments continued facing challenges posed by their Casablanca group’s counterparts and their respective local protégés such as UDENAMO.

One was the looming prospect of Gwambe’s re-emergence in the Mozambican nationalist scene in the region. After being expelled from Tanganyika, the UDENAMO President, enjoying continuing support from the Casablanca group and Soviet covert assistance, continued driving an assertive political campaign in African and international political circles, advancing an anti-imperialist and anti-colonial agenda. For example, Gwambe attempted to seek support from moderate African groups such as the African Union and Malagasy (UAM), while trying to influence them into taking an anti-western political stand. At the same time, both the ASAF group at the UN and the Soviet bloc continued lobbying for Gwambe’s return to south-east Africa and the restoration of his political position there. An important means for advancing such an objective was the United Nations Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration, on which the Soviet and ASAF groups exerted strong influence. Initially known as the Committee of 7, according to the number of its members, this body was disbanded on 19th December 1961 and integrated into The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. This body was known as the Committee of 17 and later as that of 24. It thus became an important means for the Soviet and ASAF groups’ diplomatic leverage aimed at pressing the Tanganyikan government to more actively support and accommodate different Mozambican nationalist movements and leaders, particularly Gwambe.

Another challenge for Tanganyika and its regional partners was the political vacuum in the leadership of Mozambican nationalist organizations based in Dar-es-Salaam resulting from Gwambe’s being expelled from the country. After Gwambe was expelled, PAFMECSA officials felt the need to find a suitable alternative to Gwambe. A politically moderate, cooperative and capable candidate was needed. Although MANU leaders Mathew Mmole and Lawrence Millinga continued their activity in the country and enjoyed support from the Tanganyikan government, their

1 Note: this episode is discussed in detail in chapter V.
movement faced difficulties in being accepted by the majority of Mozambican refugees in Tanganyika. Despite Mmole and Millinga belonging to the Makonde tribe, - the most representative in Tanganyika – they were of Tanganyikan, rather than Mozambican origin. For this reason, the Mozambican Makonde and Mozambican refugees of different ethnic origins distrusted Mmole and Millinga, considering them as ‘foreigners.’ Tribalism, therefore, badly affected the movement’s popular recognition, and weakened its status as a movement representing the majority of the Mozambican population.²

The above two factors led the Tanganyikan Government to try and find an alternative Mozambican political figure, under whose leadership it could solidify the fragmented Mozambican nationalist milieu in a unified front under the PAFMECSA auspices. Furthermore, for the Tanganyikan government, the timing for taking resolute action against UDENAMO and re-organising the Mozambican nationalist movement was key. On the one hand, UDENAMO’s political activity in Dar-es-Salaam in the first half of 1962 was at a low ebb. According to a PIDE informant, in the absence of Gwambe and dos Santos from the country, the working atmosphere in UDENAMO headquarters was “a chaos … where everybody was [only] pretending to be very busy”.³ The movement’s reputation was also badly damaged among the Mozambican immigrant community by Tanganyikan police raids, and UDENAMO’s facing difficulties in gaining the Makonde people’s trust due to MANU’s influence in antagonizing them against UDENAMO.⁴ On the other hand, the prospect of UDENAMO re-emerging in the Eastern African political scene as a powerful militant organization under the Casablanca powers’ patronage was not far-fetched. Not only did the movement continue receiving financial support from Ghana, but also Nkrumah was insistently lobbying for Gwambe’s return to Tanganyika and personally asking Kambona by mail to authorize his entry into the country.⁵ Nkrumah was planning to pay a visit to Dar-es-Salaam in January 1962 accompanied by Gwambe, thus taking advantage of this occasion to ensure Gwambe returned to Tanganyika on

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good terms as his personal protégé. The Tanganyikan government’s concerns about UDENAMO’s continuing activities in the country also stemmed from evidence that its members were receiving military training in Ghana and Algeria and were returning in small groups to Dar-es-Salaam. Therefore, the possibility of UDENAMO militants carrying out armed attacks against the Portuguese authorities in Mozambique, something which the Tanganyikan government opposed, was a matter of great concern for official Dar-es-Salaam.

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**Tanganyika’s deception of the UN Committee of 17**

This section examines how the Tanganyikan government deceived the UN Committee of 17 during its visit to Dar-es-Salaam, in order to outmanoeuvre Ghana and the Soviet bloc, who planned to restore the primacy of Gwambe’s UDENAMO position in the process of Mozambican national liberation. As this section asserts, while such an action was primarily driven by Tanganyika’s own interests at local and regional levels, it also benefited American ones. This episode is important, therefore, for demonstrating the impact of African actors’ agency on the East-West competition in the context of Mozambican national liberation during this period.

The Committee of 17 was created at the sixteenth session of the UN General Assembly. It was known according to the number of its members, who were nominated by the President of the UN General Assembly. The formal purpose of the Committee was “to examine the application of the Declaration [on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples] and to make recommendations on the progress and extent of its application.”

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8 Decolonization, A Publication of the United Nations Department of Political Affairs, Trusteeship and Decolonization, Vol. II, No. 6, December 1975, “Fifteen Years of the United Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples”, pp. 11-12. UN General Assembly, Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration, 14 December 1962, A/RES/1809, Seventeenth Session, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f1e0c.html The resolution 1514 established the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples at the XV UN General Assembly, on 14th December 1960. The 17 original members were: Australia, Cambodia, Ethiopia, India, Italy, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Syria, Tanganyika, Tunisia, USSR, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela and
refused to recognize the Committee’s legitimacy until mid-1974, and the Committee’s activities largely focused on the national liberation movements, from whom it gathered information through hearings and petitions. Santos notes that it was the movements committed to armed struggle, such as the MPLA, FRELIMO, PAIGC and FNLA, who most actively collaborated with the Committee, and used this UN body to promote themselves in the international political arena and to garner financial support from different international actors. The author stresses that the efficiency of the Committee’s work was undermined by its “duality, where radical members such as the USSR urged the adoption of a strong support to the national liberation movements … while Australia, the USA and the United Kingdom stressed the virtues of moderation.” Notably, the position of the USSR and its bloc allies enjoyed great support from the ASAF members, who defended the resort to armed struggle as “the only solution to convince Portugal to recognize the self-determination and the independence.” The ‘duality of the Committee’, as Santos termed it, had only been overcome in 1969 and 1971, when Australia, the US and the UK had withdrawn from the Committee’s membership. Importantly, it was the CONCP that, on many occasions, was the representative of the PAIGC, the MPLA, and the FRELIMO.9

The advantage that the USSR took of its membership in the UN Committee to undermine Western interests in the contexts of national liberation struggles in southern Africa and its relations with ASAF countries was a matter of concern for Washington. On 20th September 1962, the US Ambassador to the UN, Adlai Stevenson, cabled the Secretary of State, calling his attention to the fact that “the USSR has used the Committee of 17 for Cold War purposes”, and that this should be pointed out to African states’ foreign ministers in private talks, who otherwise held a critical posture towards the US position at the UN on Portuguese colonial policy and the South African regime.10 As was the case with South West Africa, whose self-determination aspirations were strongly defended and advanced by the Committee of 17, and especially by its ASAF members, pushing for sanctions against South Africa,

Yugoslavia. The additional 7 members were: Bulgaria, Chile, Denmark, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast and Sierra Leone.


10 John F. Kennedy National Security Files, Microfilms, Volume on Africa, Reel 1, General, Department of State, New York, Telegram no. 831, from Stevenson to Secretary of State, September 20, 1962, 0511-0601.
so was the Committee’s unwavering position in regard to the Portuguese rule in Angola and Mozambique. Such a position contradicted the US and UK objectives of calling for moderate resolution to the question of independence for these African territories.\(^{11}\) The preponderance of the Soviet-ASAF position in the Committee was also reflected, for example, in August 1962, when it reported on the extensive use of NATO arms by the Portuguese in Angola, concluding that “so long as these arms are in the hands of Portugal they will be used against African nationalist movements regardless of any assurances to the contrary that Portugal might have given. It is obvious that any such assistance so rendered represents an implication of the movements for freedom in the territories under Portuguese administration.”\(^{12}\) Therefore, by adopting such a position, the Committee of 17 had systematically frustrated American policy towards Portuguese territories in Africa.

Our understanding of how instrumental the Committee of 17 was for both the ASAF group and Soviet bloc is important in discussing the Tanganyikan government’s deception of this UN body, during its visit to Dar-es-Salaam in the Spring of 1962. According to a PIDE agent, apart from the formal purposes of the Committee’s visit to Dar-es-Salaam, namely the hearings of the representatives of UDENAMO and MANU, the Committee’s aim was to “condemn Portugal, its Government, the Portuguese Administration in Mozambique, by all available means and ways, in order to allow the Mozambican nationalist organizations fighting for independence to garner international prestige and obtain unconditional UN support.”\(^{13}\) Yet the Committee also became a means for the Soviet bloc to press the Tanganyikan government to fully restore Gwambe’s political position in the region.

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\(^{11}\) JFK NSF, Africa, Reel 1, General, Department of State, From Dean Rusk to USUN New York, South West Africa, October 18, 1962, 0511-0601.


\(^{13}\) IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process n° 3461-C12, Gabriel Zandamela, “Report on a briefing in Salisbury, 7-14 March 1964, between a [Service for the Centralization and Coordination of Information] SCCI officer and an informer [Zandamela]”, UN Special Committee, 405, 406, 408. Another example of the Committee of 17’s partiality in regard to Portugal was its report on Angola. “In 1962, the United Nations Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration commented: ‘During its visit to Leopoldville, the Committee heard the representative of the [Movimento de Defesa dos Interesses de Angola] MDIA and from his statement in reply to questions is convinced that the MDIA is being used by the Portuguese government solely for the purpose of being able to claim that it has the cooperation of some Angolan group’.” John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution Vol. II: Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare (1962-1976), (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1978), p. 84.
Throughout the first half of 1962, Tanganyika’s hostile attitude towards UDENAMO and Gwambe brought about increasing pressures on its government from the international community, particularly from the Soviet bloc and the ASAF countries at the United Nations. In order to press Tanganyika to restore Gwambe’s position in the country, they criticized Dar-es-Salaam for its inaction and lack of support for the Mozambican nationalists and their independence aspirations. In their view, the lack of Nyerere’s government’s support for UDENAMO was evidence of it not being genuinely interested in the freedom of Mozambican people. Such a state of affairs put Tanganyika in a difficult position. On the one hand, Nyerere’s government desired to be regarded as the leading African country supporting the process of national liberation in southern Africa. On the other hand, it could not consent to the restoration of Gwambe’s position in the country, something which would represent Nkrumah’s political victory and an accomplishment for the Casablanca group’s agenda in the region.

The visit of the UN Committee of 17 to Tanganyika thus provided a valuable opportunity for the Tanganyikan government to promote its image before the international community, while safeguarding its vital interests. Although it was Eduardo Mondlane’s petition to the UN Committee that formally represented the perspective of African Mozambicans on the problem of Portuguese colonial rule in their country, the need for the Tanganyikan government to publicly demonstrate its solidarity and neutrality towards all movements led it not only to authorize Gwambe’s return to the country, but also to stage a campaign purportedly supporting UDENAMO as a legitimate movement operating in its territory.

Marcelino dos Santos travelled from the CONCP headquarters in Morocco, accompanying the Committee of 17 on their mission to Dar-es-Salaam. On 28th April, thanks to Nkrumah’s pressures and insistent demands to the Tanganyikan

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16 IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process SC SR283/61, Adelino Chitofo Gwambe, From the report of the Portuguese Consul to Salisbury, 337.
government, Gwambe finally arrived in Dar-es-Salaam to testify before the UN Committee. Surprisingly, at the airport, the UDENAMO leader was greeted by a crowd of some 600 Tanganyikans shouting slogans “Freedom and Gwambe” and “Freedom and Mozambique”. Tanganyikan authorities’ permission for Gwambe’s entering the country and the animated rally at the airport were, in fact, part of the Tanganyikan government’s careful orchestration. The crowd had been recruited by TANU with the sole purpose of staging an enthusiastic welcome for Gwambe, in order to impress the UN Committee members by showing Gwambe’s popularity among the Tanganyikan people and their support for UDENAMO and Gwambe. The orchestration continued throughout the Committee’s visit to the country.

On 1st May, during a UDENAMO rally in Dar-es-Salaam, the TANU secretary, Muswaya, speaking on behalf of the Tanganyikan government, avowed that his presence at the event represented “Tanganyikan unconditional support for UDENAMO”. “Tanganyika has been unjustly criticized by many countries, which have accused it of not providing any assistance to Mozambique to help it free itself from colonial rule”, the TANU official said, adding that his government planned to organize a liberation army during that year. Gwambe, in turn, almost certainly inspired by the what seemed a total reversal of the Tanganyikan position in his favour, publicly reiterated his aim of recruiting volunteers to form a military force and begin the armed struggle. Throughout the first half of May during the Committee of 17’s stay in the country, Gwambe continued to enjoy great attention on the part of both the Tanganyikan high-ranking officials and foreign representatives. For example, he held meetings with Chinese representatives on 7th May, with Julius Nyerere and the Prime Minister Kawawa on the 10th, and with the Indian politician, Jaya Prakash Narayan, and Reverend Michael Scott on the 11th.

17 IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process nº 3461-CI2, Gabriel Zandamela, “Relatório das conversações em Salisbury, 7-14 Março 1964, entre um adjunto dos SCCI e uma fonte de informação [Zandamela]”, 405, 406, 408.
20 IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process SC SR283/61, Adelino Chitofo Gwambe, From the report of the Portuguese Consulate in Salisbury about UDENAMO activities during May 1962, 332.
The Tanganyikan government’s deception was a success. As we have seen, firstly, Gwambe’s being authorized to enter the country suggested Tanganyika’s goodwill towards him and his movement. Secondly, being warmly received at the airport by a large crowd painted a picture of Gwambe’s popularity among the locals and their support for his cause. Thirdly, his meetings with Tanganyikan leaders and other foreign high profile officials added to the Committee’s perception of Tanganyika’s recognition of Gwambe’s political legitimacy and status. Finally, UDENAMO’s carrying out rallies in Dar-es-Salaam attended by TANU officials, along with their public pledge to assist the movement and their endorsing of UDENAMO’s plans to prepare for armed struggle, convinced the UN Committee of Tanganyika’s full commitment to actively supporting Mozambican national liberation led by Gwambe. Furthermore, the Tanganyikan government’s deception appeased not only its critics at the UN, particularly the Soviet bloc and the ASAF group, but it also convinced Ghana and Gwambe himself of their success in rehabilitating UDENAMO’s position in south-east Africa.21

The Tanganyikan government’s real position towards Gwambe and UDENAMO, however, became clear once the Committee of 17, together with Marcelino dos Santos, left the country for Leopoldville on 19th May.22 On 22th May, Kambona summoned Gwambe, MANU leaders and the PAFMECSA Secretary General, Koinange, for a private meeting in the Parliament building in Dar-es-Salaam. The Minister’s speech was harsh. It reflected the Tanganyikan leaders’ genuine position towards the young Mozambican and his movement, which had remained unchanged since Gwambe’s first exchange with Kambona the previous year:

“Mr. Adelino Gwambe is warned that he may not make propaganda of violence in order to mislead his followers. The Government of Tanganyika knows that Mr. Gwambe is lying when he says that he will achieve Mozambican independence by waging war against the Portuguese. The Government of Tanganyika wants Mozambicans to continue working towards their independence, yet not by means of war or turmoil. If UDENAMO continues talking about violence, all of its

22 IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process SC SR283/61, Adelino Chitofo Gwambe, From the report of the Portuguese Consul to Salisbury, 337.
members will be expelled from the country. UDENAMO must unite with MANU and work together. These are my orders [to you].”

Clearly, Kambona’s tough words contrasted sharply with Tanganyika’s seemingly friendly attitude towards Gwambe during the UN Committee’s visit to the country, and brought to light the Nyerere government’s cunning deception. Gwambe was deeply upset. After the meeting, he bitterly complained to his UDENAMO colleagues that Kambona reprimanded him for wanting to “mess with the whites”. Dar-es-Salaam’s manoeuvre also caught the Portuguese by surprise. The Portuguese Consulate in Salisbury reported it thus:

“The situation of UDENAMO and Gwambe are … hard to understand, because he continues facing difficulties on the part of the Tanganyikan Government. Despite the coverage and apparent cooperation he had received on the occasion of the [visit] of the Committee of Seventeen, the Ministers Kambona and Kawawa continue openly supporting MANU to the detriment of UDENAMO.”

This episode has clearly illustrated the proactive role played by Tanganyika in impacting on the interests of the Soviet Union in the early stages of the Mozambican national liberation. By deceiving the UN Committee of 17, which was under strong Soviet and ASAF influence and a means for Ghanaian and Soviet to lobby for the restoration of Gwambe’s legitimacy and political activity in Tanganyika, Nyerere’s government safeguarded its good reputation in the regional and international political arenas, and successfully countered the radicals’ attempt to bring the process of Mozambican national liberation under their control. While freeing itself from criticism of the Soviet and the ASAF blocs for its alleged inaction in supporting the Mozambican liberation cause, and leading Ghana and Gwambe himself to believe they had been successful in fully restoring UDENAMO’s political status in Tanganyika, Tanganyikan officialdom protected its national interests. As this section has shown, however, immediately after the Committee’s departure, Kambona took resolute measures in order to ensure Gwambe’s activity in the country was in conformity with Tanganyika’s interests and agenda. Tanganyika’s proactive approach

25 From the report of the Portuguese Consulate in Salisbury about UDENAMO activities during May 1962, 332, ibid.
in countering foreign actors’ pressures on its government in the context of Mozambican national liberation is a clear example of African actors’ agencies in this process. Most importantly, the interests Tanganyika protected were disconnected from those of the superpowers. Yet, in deceiving the Committee of 17 and curtailing Gwambe’s seemingly restored activity in the country, Tanganyika’s actions were damaging to Soviet interests and those of the Casablanca group. The effect of this African country’s proactive involvement in matters of the Mozambican national liberation cause on Soviet designs clearly supports the main argument of this study that African actors played a crucial role in affecting superpower interests in the region in the early 1960s.

Towards a united Mozambican front

Throughout the first half of 1962, the subject of unification of the three Mozambican nationalist organizations, MANU, UDENAMO and UNAMI, became a regular subject of headlines in the international press. For example, on 1st February, in an article entitled “Unrest in Mozambique increases”, the Indian newspaper, Daily Chronicle, published in Nairobi, wrote:

“As in Angola, the nationalists have split into pro-Western and a pro-Communist camp, both of which have their headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam. The UDENAMO is headed by the 30-year-old Adelino Gwambe, who favours a Marxist line. At present, all three organizations are carrying on a campaign to increase their influence among the tens of thousands of Mozambicans now working on plantations in Southern Rhodesia and in [Northern] Rhodesia and in South African mines. As in the two Rhodesias, Tanganyika, and Nyasaland, there has been much talk of uniting the nationalist movement. A strong feeling exists within both the MANU and the UDENAMO that a coalition would be desirable, however, to date all attempts to unify the two organizations have proved unsuccessful.”

Both Nkrumah and Nyerere strongly appealed for MANU and UDENAMO to join their forces and form a common front. Between May and June of 1962, Mmole, Gwambe and other representatives of the two movements paid visits to Ghana, where they met with Nkrumah. The Ghanaian leader assured them that his country would provide their organizations financial and material support, military training, education

and weaponry, on the condition that they would merge in a single liberation front.²⁷

On the Tanganyikan side, despite several unsuccessful negotiations for the merger of the two movements before and after the Committee of 17’s visit, Oscar Kambona and Peter Koinange, the General-secretary of the PAFMECSA, also continued pressing UDENAMO and MANU to unite in a common Mozambican liberation front.²⁸

As discussed earlier, Nkrumah’s goal was to bring the process of Mozambican national liberation under his auspices, and increase his influence in the region. After undermining the Ghanaian and Soviet goals of fully restoring Gwambe’s position in Tanganyika in May 1962, Nyerere’s government took further active steps aimed at securing its control over the Mozambican movements. In particular, Nyerere and Kambona became more determined to draw greater international, especially American, attention to the cause of the Mozambican people, yet favouring their interests. At a private meeting with a PIDE agent posing as a ‘freedom fighter’, Nyerere assured him that he was going to discuss the question of Mozambique during his visit to the US. Once in the US, the Tanganyikan leader expressed his full support for the cause of the Mozambican people aiming at achieving the independence of their country. Furthermore, Nyerere and Kambona devised other practical steps at the regional level aimed at drawing international attention to this matter, and encouraging Washington to back PAFMECSA in securing the upper hand over the Mozambican nationalist movements.²⁹

In this regard, the Indian Ambassador to Dar-es-Salaam disclosed to the PIDE agent that “Nyerere’s … special plan for Mozambique” consisted in making thousands of unarmed Makonde cross the border into Mozambique. If the Portuguese authorities arrested them, the Indian Ambassador explained, this would then serve as a useful justification for the remaining Makonde in Tanganyika to make an appeal to the international community asking for volunteers to join them in their struggle against Portuguese colonialism. Conversely, if they were

²⁸ IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process nº 3461-CI2, Gabriel Zandamela, “Relatório das conversações em Salisbury, 7-14 Março 1964, entre um adjunto dos SCCI e uma fonte de informação [Zandamela]”, 405, 406, 408.
not arrested, then they could become “good agents” of Tanganyika in Mozambique, as the Ambassador put it.\textsuperscript{30}

Although such information should be considered with a degree of reservation, it is nevertheless suggestive of Tanganyikan leaders’ willingness to give the issue of Mozambican colonialism a more dramatic key in the international arena. By attempting to provoke the Portuguese authorities into taking large-scale repressive actions against Mozambicans crossing the border, official Dar-es-Salaam aimed at increasing the international perception of the gravity of the situation in Mozambique. While falling short of appearing to be a provocateur or an instigator of armed confrontation, by acting in this way the Tanganyikan leadership could take advantage of the Portuguese authorities’ reaction to highlight the brutality of the Portuguese colonial regime in Mozambique. Lurking below the surface was also Tanganyika’s ambition to stand at the forefront of national liberation in Sub-Saharan Africa. By capitalizing on the international community’s response to Portuguese violence, the subsequent material support for the cause of Mozambican national liberation would be channelled through, and overseen by the Tanganyikan government. This, in turn, would help to consolidate the country’s position as the leading African endorser of Mozambican nationalist movements, while adding to its political leverage both at regional and international levels. Such a position would allow Dar-es-Salaam not only to limit Ghana’s and its Casablanca partners’ leverage over the process of Mozambican national liberation, but also to ensure its ability to direct and control the movement’s actions and agenda according to its interests. This further adds to our understanding of how Tanganyikan interests lay behind its active involvement in ensuring Mondlane became the leader of FRELIMO. Tanganyikan efforts also encouraged more active American involvement in the process of Mozambican national liberation in 1962, all of which played a role in the superpower balance of power in the region.

Notably, US interests coincided with those of Tanganyika, yet for different reasons. While Tanganyikan actions discussed in this chapter were favourable to US interests, both governments’ goals and actions were of a complementary nature, rather

\textsuperscript{30} Relatório dum informador da PIDE, 431, ibid. Note: personal contacts of this PIDE source with Nyerere and Kambona, and the high reliability of his information are corroborated by the fact that the Indian Ambassador also informed him that “India will soon invade Goa”. The invasion took place on 18\textsuperscript{th} December.
than resulting from a top-down relationship between a superpower and a newly independent African state. In his conversation with the above-mentioned PIDE agent, during a dinner at Kambona’s house, the Minister expressed his strong antipathy for both UDENAMO and MANU. Complaining that the leaders of both movements “talk a lot, but do nothing”, Kambona avowed that they “show no results, and their leaders are incompetent and inexperienced.” Expressing his displeasure with Gwambe’s close connections to Ghana, the Minister asked the agent to establish a new movement in Dar-es-Salaam, called ‘National Union of the Peoples of Mozambique’, and to “urgently find 6 persons with [degrees in] Law” to lead the new organization. Kambona further added that someone fluent in Makua, Swahili and Shangana was also required for being in charge of radio broadcasts on behalf of the new movement. If the formation of this movement materialized, Kambona elaborated, he would abolish both MANU and UDENAMO, and even “expel all their leaders back to the Portuguese territory” of Mozambique, if necessary. Most importantly, Kambona assured the imposter that the United States, but also India, would provide all the necessary financial support to the movement, channelled through the Tanganyikan government.\(^{31}\)

Superpower views on the issue of formation of united national liberation fronts in Portuguese territories in Africa should also be discussed, in order to identify how they differed from, or coincided with those of the Tanganyikan and Ghanaian governments. In contrast to the Soviet bloc and the ASAF group, particularly the Casablanca group of African states, all of whom systematically encouraged the formation of united fronts of national liberation in African territories under Portuguese administration, the United States presented a cautious, if not ambivalent posture. The US position regarding the merger of nationalist movements into common fronts, and particularly the elements it should support, was clearly expressed in points 5 and 7 of the State Department’s “The White Redoubt” report: “The US should give quiet but definitive encouragement to moderate elements in both Angola and Mozambique as they appear. Otherwise, these elements are bound to seek help

elsewhere.” Here, “elsewhere” is obviously a reference to Communist powers and radical and leftist African states, which means that American Cold War priorities, therefore, directly informed its perspective. Point 7, albeit referring to the case of Angola, further clarified the US position regarding the merger of nationalist movements in African territories under Portuguese administration:

“The political pace of events is so swift that a merger of Angolan independence parties is likely. Such a merger would be favored by African nationalists of other Black African nations and it could hardly be opposed publicly by the US. The leverage for these moves is mainly in African hands. Our best recourse, therefore, is to hope that moderate leaders remain in strong positions in the movement, then to give tactful encouragement to them thereafter.”

This assessment clearly illustrates the hard limitations that Washington faced in influencing - much less in controlling – the development of events in the national liberation movements in the Portuguese African territories. By admitting its incapacity to effectively manipulate African nationalist leaders and their respective movements, and therefore, being left only to hope that the tide of events would turn in the favour of the American interests, the above State Department assessment not only shows Washington’s desire to see politically moderate and West-oriented elements taking leading positions in national liberation fronts, but also brings to the fore the primacy of African actors’ influence on the development of events in the Portuguese-controlled territories, and the limitations of US influence on them. The need to ensure moderate elements stood at the forefront of nationalist organizations was further underpinned by the American concern that if such movements were led by the more radical and leftist figures keen to take direct action against the white-minority governments, it would encourage the latter to form a defence pact, or the so-called White Axis, through closer and more assertive security, military and political cooperation in opposing African nationalism in the region. Such a state of affairs, and especially the prospect of a political union between South Rhodesia and South Africa, in turn, would compel other countries of the CAF, Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, to turn to, and cooperate with the Black African countries to the north and east. As a result, the State Department’s analysis advanced, the substantial Western private

investments and the American and British political leverage in these countries would become at risk, the possibility of direct military confrontation in the region would substantially increase, and the US would find itself entangled and losing positions in the confrontation between both white-minority and Black African countries. Such a prospect, in turn, would open a window of opportunity for the Soviet bloc to become more actively involved in providing military support to the Black African countries in the region, all of which contradicted essential American interests.\textsuperscript{34}

American concerns regarding the influence of Nkrumah’s aggressive agenda on the development of events in African nationalist circles was also clearly expressed in the ‘The White Redoubt’ report:

“In West Africa, vigorous efforts have been initiated by the Nkrumah regime to attract nationalists from southern Africa to the Ghanaian propaganda and special training school at Winneba. Of the several hundred Africans who have passed through this school, a large number have received not only political indoctrination, but [also] financial aid and the promise of arms when their plans have matured sufficiently. In East Africa, the present moderate level of nationalist assistance to African liberation movements probably will change dramatically as more of the area’s territories gain independence.”\textsuperscript{35}

Hence, in contrast to the US Government’s limited interest in, and knowledge of different Mozambican nationalist groups and their leaders during most of 1961, by the end of that year American interest translated into promises of financial assistance to the Tanganyikan government. As discussed earlier, the growing American involvement in the region by means of financial and political support to prospective moderate and west-leaning Mozambican figures and the establishment of assistance programmes sponsored through the CIA became quite vigorous from the end of 1961 and throughout the first half of 1962. They aimed at halting the expansion of Communist influence and preventing the outbreak of a major war in the region. Such an American objective, in turn, overlapped and was consistent with Tanganyikan interests in securing its control over the process of forming a compliant nationalist organization based in Dar-es-Salaam. This background regarding Tanganyikan and American covert cooperation is important for our understanding of how Mondlane, - a politically moderate and US educated Mozambican with ties to the American

\textsuperscript{34} JFK NSF, Africa, Reel 1, General, Department of State, July 6 1962, “The White Redoubt”, Secret, Attachment, Flaming Group meeting, 10 July 1962, pp. 13-16, 0436-0511.

establishment, - became the head of FRELIMO, and how it was primarily a result of Tanganyikan, rather than American efforts.

The formation of FRELIMO

Despite both Nkrumah’s and Nyerere’s efforts to unite MANU and UDENAMO in a single front (UNAMI’s inclusion was advocated by Hastings Banda of Nyasaland) throughout the first half of 1962, the movements’ rivalry systematically prevented the unification from happening. Such a state of affairs finally changed after the discordant meeting between Kambona and Gwambe, in the aftermath of the Committee of 17’s departure from Dar-es-Salaam discussed earlier. Unlike Gwambe’s confrontational attitude towards Kambona in the previous year, he refrained from directly challenging the Tanganyikan Minister, for fear of being expelled from the country again. Instead, immediately after the meeting, Gwambe asked a local radio station to broadcast the announcement of the merger of MANU and UDENAMO.36 This was, however, only a gimmick aimed at placating Kambona. Soon afterwards, Gwambe left for Accra, accompanied by seven members of UDENAMO and four members of MANU, including Mmole and Millinga.37 At their meeting with Nkrumah, on 25th May, the members of both movements finally agreed to a formal merger and formation of FRELIMO.38 The announcement of FRELIMO’s being founded in Ghana took Tanganyikan officialdom by surprise. It meant that Nkrumah, rather than Nyerere, took credit for the unification of Mozambican nationalist forces. Moreover, in the realm of African affairs, it symbolized a political triumph for Ghana and the Casablanca group it represented, rather than the moderate camp of PAFMECSA and the Lagos powers.

For the Tanganyikan government, FRELIMO falling under Ghanaian patronage, which suggested Gwambe’s becoming its leader, also threatened its plans

38 From the report of the Portuguese Consulate in Salisbury about UDENAMO activities during May 1962, 333, ibid.
for territorial annexation, because UDENAMO was known for defending Mozambique’s territorial integrity. Also, the weak popular support for Mmole and Millinga suggested UDENAMO’s, rather than MANU’s potential primacy within FRELIMO, and the subsequent difficulties for Tanganyika in influencing the new organization. If territorial annexation of northern regions of Mozambique or the country becoming part of the East African Federation were to be achieved, UDENAMO’s dominant position within FRELIMO could jeopardize Nyerere’s strategic plans. While Nkrumah’s patronage of the new front operating in Tanganyika’s area of influence represented a blow to Nyerere’s prestige in African affairs, for Washington, the prospect of the national liberation front being headed by Soviet-backed Gwambe with ties to Ghana corresponded to the materialization of Lisbon’s claims of a Communist take-over of southern Africa. Kennedy’s Administration’s support for decolonization conflicted with its desire to prevent radical and Marxist elements from spearheading national liberation in the region. Such coincident and overlapping concerns of both Dar-es-Salaam and Washington regarding FRELIMO stimulated their joint action aimed at turning the tide in their favour.

The Tanganyikan government’s reaction was swift and resolved. While the leaders of both MANU and UDENAMO were still in Ghana, Eduardo Mondlane arrived in Dar-es-Salaam on 10th June 1962. Upon his arrival, Tanganyikan officials helped Mondlane in holding meetings with members of both MANU and UDENAMO at their headquarters, and assisted him in starting a dynamic political campaign for the position of FRELIMO’s leadership. US embassy officials, in turn, offered Mondlane financial support.\(^\text{39}\) PIDE’s analysis of the possible development of events advanced that the ultimate intent of official Dar-es-Salaam was to eliminate UDENAMO, and particularly Gwambe, from the regional political scene once and for all, while ensuring Mondlane’s coming to power.\(^\text{40}\) PIDE’s forecaste was correct, as the turning point came on 25th June, when yet another formal merger of MANU and UDENAMO, but also UNAMI, was announced, this time in Dar-es-Salaam. After a week of intensive political campaigning, during which Mondlane gained the support of the Mozambican refugee community in Dar-es-Salaam, he was elected President of


\(^{40}\) IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process n° 2963/63 – SR, Lázaro Nkvandame, 2.
FRELIMO. FRELIMO’s Supreme Council elections took place the same day. The event was attended by more than 200 people, most of whom belonged to the Shangaans tribe to which Mondlane also belonged. Unsurprisingly, given the Tanganyikan government’s plot to oust Gwambe and his close supporters from the regional political scene and bring FRELIMO under its full control, none of the top UDENAMO members were given a position in FRELIMO’s Council.

During the elections, Gwambe and his UDENAMO lieutenants were in Egypt and India, thus being unaware of the state of affairs in the Mozambican nationalist circles in Dar-es-Salaam prompted by the Tanganyikan government’s subversive scheme against them. Upon his return to Dar-es-Salaam on 26th June, and both taken by surprise and enfuried by the turn of events, Gwambe publicly condemned the unification of the three movements and Mondlane’s becoming the President of FRELIMO. Gwambe was further angered by the fact that both his and his lieutenant Calvino Mahlayeye’s names were not even on the list of candidates for leadership positions in the Central Committee of FRELIMO. The next day, members of the Shangaans tribe close to Mondlane attempted to assassinate Gwambe. The young Mozambican survived the attack thanks to the protection of his bodyguards trained in Ghana. However, the cables from the US Embassy in Dar-es-Salaam to the State Department paint a different picture of this episode. Relying on Mondlane’s reports to US officials, they suggest that it was Gwambe who planned


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41 CPHRC TJCC, Department of State, Airgram, Emtels 920, 926, from American embassy in Dar-es-Salaam to Department of State, “Mozambique refugee politics in Dar es Salaam”, July 10, 1962.
42 Lázaro Nkvandame, 2, op.cit.
43 IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process nº 3461-C12, Gabriel Zandamela, 379.
44 IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process nº 3461-C12, Gabriel Zandamela, 375-376.
46 Gabriel Zandamela, 379, op.cit.
47 CPHRC TJCC, Department of State, EMBTEL 920, From Byrne (Dar-es-Salaam) to Secretary of State, June 28, 1962. Mondlane’s account suggests that he was playing a double game, by presenting a version of events favouring his image and standing in the eyes of both the Tanganyikan government and US officials, while discrediting and defaming Gwambe and his circles.
investigation of Gwambe. As a result, Gwambe was arrested by the Tanganyikan police, yet released soon afterwards, thanks to the pressure brought to bear by Joe-Fio Meyer, the Ghana High Commissioner in Dar-es-Salaam, on Nyerere’s government. Kambona immediately requested the Tanganyikan Government to expel Meyer, due to his pressure and assistance for the UDENAMO leader. Also, the Tanganyikan government declared Gwambe persona non-grata, and expelled him from the country for the second time. As a result, Gwambe, Mahlayeye and Mmole left for the Soviet Union on 28th June. Meanwhile, Mondlane continued maintaining close ties to US officials in Dar-es-Salaam, reporting on the development of events in Mozambican nationalist circles and receiving US financial assistance on a regular basis. In the aftermath of Mondlane’s becoming President of FRELIMO, the hitherto local and regional competition gained a more visible Cold War character, with both American and Soviet involvement becoming more discernible.

For the remainder of 1962, both Ghana and the Soviet Union pressed FRELIMO to accept Gwambe in its leadership ranks, while attempting to revive UDENAMO’s position in eastern Africa. For example, Moscow declined to offer scholarships for studies in the Soviet Union to some 60 FRELIMO members in Tanganyika, on the grounds that UDENAMO was the only legitimate Mozambican movement, while asserting that FRELIMO was a “colonists’ organization”. PIDE thus reported:

“The Communist connections of UDENAMO leaders have begun to make pressure in favour of the party. FRELIMO’s officials complained that the scholarship funds offered by the [Soviet Union] could only be used if Adelino Gwambe would be admitted in the executive ranks of the FRELIMO”

On 6th August 1962, after paying a visit to Moscow and then to Ghana, Mahlayeye returned to Dar-es-Salaam and declared that UDENAMO remained an active party,

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48 EMBTEL 920, ibid.
49 CPHRC TJCC, Department of State, Airgram, EMBTELS 920, 926, from American embassy in Dar-es-Salaam to Department of State, “Mozambique refugee politics in Dar es Salaam”, July 10, 1962.
51 Lázaro Nkvandame, 3, ibid. IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process nº 3461-C12, Gabriel Zandamela, 420, 421, 281, 282. CPHRC TJCC, State Department, Telegram From Dar-es-Salaam (Byrne) to Secretary of State, August 14 1962.
52 Lázaro Nkvandame, 369, op. cit.
53 Lázaro Nkvandame, 2, ibid.
while rebuffing the unification of MANU and UDENAMO.\textsuperscript{54} He further asserted before UDENAMO supporters that he had been given Ghanaian financial assistance, and established the movement’s new offices in Cairo, Rabat, Conakry, and Bamaka. Mahlayeye then traveled to Cairo and then again to Moscow.\textsuperscript{55} On 8\textsuperscript{th} August, while staying in Ghana, Gwambe wrote to UDENAMO supporters in Tanganyika, asking them to recruit Mozambicans to be sent for training to Ghana, the Soviet Union and India. Meanwhile, UDENAMO continued to carry out an aggressive campaign aimed at undermining Mondlane’s position in FRELIMO, and accusing him of being an agent working for the Portuguese and American governments.\textsuperscript{56} Mondlane was also attacked for being married to a white woman, and for his assertions in New York that “the people of Mozambique were not politically ready for independence”, and that “it was necessary at least ten more years [for this to change].” For UDENAMO, the latter statements were evidence of Mondlane’s lack of commitment to the cause of Mozambican national liberation and his serving ‘imperialist’ interests.\textsuperscript{57}

In the context of African affairs, and particularly the radicals’ vs. moderates’ competition, the Tanganyikan government’s actions undercut the Ghanaian leader’s plans and had a damaging effect on the interests of the Casablanca group. Already on 27\textsuperscript{th} June, FRELIMO put an end to the military training of Mozambicans in Ghana.\textsuperscript{58} Immediately after the movement’s formation, Mondlane informed top FRELIMO members that he wanted all training centres to be based in Tanganyika, on the allegations that military training in Ghana was too expensive. Such a decision, however, stemmed not only from the Tanganyikan government’s desire to curtail Ghanaian influence in the region through Mozambican nationalist organizations, but also to undermine Nkrumah’s prestige.\textsuperscript{59} When leaving Dar-es-Salaam for the United States in the summer of 1962, Mondlane told the Reporting Officer at the US Embassy that “any future training for the Mozambique Liberation Army would be done in Tunisia, Algeria or Nigeria rather than Ghana”. Subsequently, Mondlane stopped at Tunis, to discuss the issue of military training with the pro-Western

\textsuperscript{54} Lázaro Nkvandame, 316-317, ibid.
\textsuperscript{55} Gabriel Zandamela, 605, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{56} IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process nº 3461-CI2, Gabriel Zandamela, 605.
\textsuperscript{57} IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process nº 2963/63 – SR, Lázaro Nkvandame, 2.
\textsuperscript{58} Lázaro Nkvandame, 6, ibid.
\textsuperscript{59} Gabriel Zandamela, 381, op. cit.
Tunisian leader, Habib Ben Ali Bourguiba. Bourguiba, who was also highly concerned about Communist penetration into southern Africa and the shipments of Soviet arms in the region, offered support to both Holden Roberto and Mondlane in matters of military training of FRELIMO and FNLA members. Thus, by thwarting Ghanaian influence on the process of Mozambican national liberation and undermining Nkrumah’s prestige in African affairs, Tanganyika’s actions and those of Mondlane also weakened the Soviet position in the region.

Finally, Mondlane secretly agreed with PAFMESCA officials to hand over to Tanganyika the northern territories of Mozambique after independence. Tanganyika’s interest in Mondlane leading FRELIMO, therefore, was also underpinned by its desire to ensure that independent Mozambique was headed by a friendly leader, something which was paramount in Nyerere’s plans for territorial annexation of northern parts of Mozambique.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the active role played by the Tanganyikan government in the outcome of the superpower competition in the context of how local and regional struggle led to the formation of FRELIMO. It has demonstrated how Tanganyikan actions, stemming from its local and regional concerns and interests, and particularly the Nyerere government’s antagonism with Ghana, had a damaging effect on the Soviet and Casablanca group’s influences and agendas in the region. By preventing Gwambe’s UDENAMO from prevailing in the struggle for leadership of FRELIMO in the first half of 1962, Tanganyika’s actions were fundamental to Mondlane’s coming to power, thus favouring US interests. However, as we have seen, Tanganyikan interests only overlapped or were coincident with the American ones, being primarily driven by this African country’s own objectives and designs at local and regional levels.

60 CPHRC TJCC, Airgram A-102, From Thomas R. Byrne, Chargé d’Affairs ad interim, Amembassy Dar-es-Salaam to State Department, Annual Conference of Mozambique Liberation Front, August 23 1962.
63 Lázaro Nkvandame, 3, ibid.
This chapter has looked at two critical events highlighting the active roles of African actors in affecting superpower interests. The first was Tanganyika’s deception of the UN Committee of 17, during its visit to the country in April-May 1962. The second was the Tanganyikan government’s actions facilitating Mondlane’s becoming the President of FRELIMO, and eliminating Gwambe and UDENAMO from the regional political scene. As we have seen, such an action was a response to Nkrumah’s attempt to take credit for the formation of FRELIMO and to bring it under Ghanaian control. In both cases, Soviet interests in the context of Mozambican national liberation were severely undermined.

Regarding the first event, this chapter has shown how official Dar-es-Salaam deceived the UN Committee of 17, in order to secure its control over the process of Mozambican national liberation and curtail Ghanaian influence in the region. As we have seen, Ghana and the Soviet Union aimed to restore UDENAMO’s primacy in the process of Mozambican national liberation and rehabilitate Gwambe’s political legitimacy and status in Tanganyika. Facing continuous political pressures from the ASAF and the Casablanca groups and the Soviet bloc at the UN, particularly through the latter’s influence on the Committee of 17, the Tanganyikan government staged a warm reception of Gwambe during the Committee’s visit to the country. TANU officials gave ostensible support to UDENAMO and the movement’s desire to liberate Mozambique by means of armed struggle. Moreover, Tanganyikan government officials, including President Nyerere, held personal meetings with Gwambe during the Committee of 17’s visit. Such actions of Tanganyikan authorities convinced the Committee of 17, Gwambe and his foreign sponsors that UDENAMO’s position and Gwambe’s political legitimacy were fully restored in the country. This, however, was not the case, given the revelation of the Tanganyikan government’s hostility towards Gwambe immediately after the Committee of 17’s departure from Dar-es-Salaam. Nyerere and Kambona, therefore, skillfully outmanoeuvred the Casablanca group and the USSR, and protected Tanganyikan interests.

Furthermore, we have seen that while conducting a public policy intended to give credibility to the restoration of Gwambe’s and UDENAMO’s political legitimacy and status in the country, the Tanganyikan government devised a parallel alternative course of action aimed at bringing a pro-western and politically moderate figure to the leadership of FRELIMO. Its promptness in taking decisive action against Gwambe
during the latter’s absence from the country, and promoting Mondlane’s accession to FRELIMO’s leadership in a swift fashion clearly illustrate the degree to which political dynamics in the realm of Mozambican nationalist circles were affected by African states.

Tanganyika’s actions contributed to Gwambe and his foreign sponsors being caught off guard when Mondlane was elected President of FRELIMO. Subversive political manoeuvres devised by Kambona, it should be noted, played into American hands, by curtailing the influence of the Casablanca group and the Soviet Union through UDENAMO in the region, reducing the risks of war, and establishing a moderate and West-leaning nationalist leader. They created favourable conditions for securing American assistance projects in the country, discussed in Chapter III, while reinforcing Tanganyikan authority over the Mozambican exile community and highlighting this country’s image as primary sponsor of national liberation in southern Africa. Importantly, however, while being congruent with US interests, Tanganyikan action was driven by its government’s particular goals and interests at domestic and regional levels, rather than a willingness to accommodate American objectives or the taking of sides in the Cold War. The two episodes discussed in this chapter, therefore, emphasize the proactive role played by the Tanganyikan government in adversely affecting the interests of the Soviet Union at the early stages of Mozambican national liberation, while facilitating the United States in securing its objective of keeping the Communist influence on Mozambican nationalists at a minimum.
As we have seen in Chapter II, the conflicting interests of PAFMECSA countries and Ghana, representing the Casablanca group, together with PIDE’s efforts in the field, weakened Gwambe’s political position in Southeast Africa in late summer 1961. Importantly, the actions and conflicting interests of different African actors undermined Soviet and the Casablanca group’s objectives in the region, thus impacting on the superpower competition in the region, during that period. In particular, the role played by the Tanganyikan and Kenyan governments was decisive for such an outcome. This, however, resulted in a political vacuum in the leadership of Mozambican nationalist organizations based in Dar-es-Salaam, which PAFMECSA officials aimed at filling with a moderate, cooperative and capable candidate.

This chapter asserts that the American-educated Eduardo Mondlane with close connections to US officialdom being elected the President of FRELIMO in June 1962 met the above Tanganyikan objective. It demonstrates that such an outcome was to a great degree brought about by the Tanganyikan government’s agency, especially after the country’s independence on 9th December 1961, rather than US interference in these affairs. The agency of Tanganyika, therefore, substantially surpassed that of a superpower, in bringing Mondlane to the Presidency of FRELIMO, despite the fact that the US and Tanganyikan interests were coincident or overlapping.

Although numerous studies in the history of Mozambican national liberation have paid attention to the connections between Mondlane and official Washington, and which were shown as being important for facilitating his political success at the local political level,1 few have looked in depth at the proactive role played by Dar-es-Salaam in both prompting Washington to become more actively involved in this process, and at Tanganyika’s government effort in the field to promote moderate

leadership in the Mozambican nationalist circles. Equally so, few historians have looked in depth at the systematic attempts of Tanganyikan high-ranking officials to curtail the influence of radical elements within the Mozambican nationalist circles, such as Gwambe. The Tanganyikan government’s determination and its pro-active approach aiming at ensuring the defense of its national interests, as we see in this chapter, affected the balance of power in the superpower competition, in favour of the United States, in the context of the early period of Mozambican national liberation.

*Nyasaland (Malawi) and the Portuguese covert operations*

After Gwambe was expelled from Tanganyika in 1961, PIDE considered that UDENAMO would operate in greater secrecy and with greater caution. Despite the blow it had suffered, the Portuguese authorities did not dismiss the possibility of his continuing to operate from other countries neighbouring Mozambique. In particular, Hasting Banda’s Nyasaland, named Malawi after the country’s independence from Britain, was of major concern to the Portuguese. This section examines the role played by Nyasaland in the developments of Mozambican national liberation, between 1961 and 1962 and assesses its effects on the superpower competition in this process.

In order to prevent Gwambe from operating in the region, the Portuguese Ministry of the Overseas considered that it was vital to ‘isolate’ UDENAMO’s leadership from the political circles of Nyasaland and Malagasy by discrediting the movement before the two African governments. Not only the geographic location of these countries made them strategically well-situated to host operational bases of Mozambican nationalists, but also the political stand of Nyasaland and Malagasy was becoming increasingly more hostile towards Portugal. PIDE knew that already in the first half of 1961, Hasting Banda’s Malawi Congress Party had begun infiltrating

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2 IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process SC SR283/61, Adelino Chitofo Gwambe, From the Deputy Director of the PIDE in Lourenço Marques to the Deputy Head of PIDE in Lisbon, 21st of November 1961, 481.

3 IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process SC SR283/61, Adelino Chitofo Gwambe, Ministry of the Overseas, General Direction of Political and Civil Administration, Office of Political Affairs, to the General Director of the PIDE, 10th November 1961, 487.
agents provocateurs into Mozambique.\(^4\) By August, Banda no longer made it a secret that once Nyasaland gained full independence from Britain, it would actively assist the Mozambican rebels.\(^5\)

In such circumstances, the Ministry of the Overseas proposed that PIDE establish confidential contacts with Gwambe and Marcelino dos Santos, and later leaked this information to the public domain, in order to publicize it as factual proof of Gwambe and dos Santos’s collaboration with the Portuguese authorities.\(^6\) The Ministry reasoned that this would further convince the Tanganyikan officials of UDENAMO leaders’ duplicity, and discredit them before other African leaders. This, in turn, would make it difficult, if not impossible for Banda and Philibert Tsiranana, the leader of Malagasy, to shelter and provide assistance to UDENAMO in their countries. The Ministry of the Overseas was aware that Banda attached great importance to his relations with the Tanganyikan leaders, and was highly considerate of their political views. For this reason, the Portuguese reasoned, the leader of Nyasaland would avoid bringing his image into question before his counterparts in Dar-es-Salaam, by giving shelter to UDENAMO.\(^7\) Thus, in addressing the roles played by African states in the process of Mozambican national liberation, and how they affected the superpowers’ engagements with this process, one should take into consideration the ways in which the Portuguese authorities contributed to the formation of African leaders’ views and decisions regarding different nationalist factions. This factor adds to the complexity of the examined relations between local, regional, and international actors, where the outcomes of particular initiatives of African leaders were also a result of the Portuguese authorities’ efforts to manipulate the local and regional actors involved.

Although there is no evidence that the Portuguese succeeded in establishing personal contact with UDENAMO leaders, they were able to further discredit them by resorting to other disinformation methods. By the end of 1961, in order to further

\(^6\) Note: Contrary to the thesis of some scholars that Gwambe was a Portuguese agent, such plans of the Portuguese authorities further corroborate the fact that he was not so.
\(^7\) IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process SC SR283/61, Adelino Chitofo Gwambe, Ministry of the Overseas, General Direction of Political and Civil Administration, Office of Political Affairs, to the General Director of the PIDE, 10\(^{th}\) November 1961, 486, 487.
convince the Tanganyikan Government that UDENAMO was an asset designed to advance the interests of foreign governments, the Portuguese Consulate in Salisbury began producing false letters on behalf of foreign governments, addressing them to UDENAMO headquarters. These disinformation letters, which the Portuguese expected to be intercepted by the Tanganyikan authorities, made promises of large financial assistance to be secretly provided to Gwambe and his entourage, thus representing proof of UDENAMO’s acting on behalf of foreign African governments in Tanganyika. Although the Portuguese archives do not indicate on behalf of which governments had supposedly sent these letters, Tanganyikan authorities’ crackdown on UDENAMO in January 1962 strongly suggest that Nyasaland was among them.

The prospect of active Nyasaland support for Mozambican nationalists greatly alarmed the Portuguese authorities. Banda and his entourage were keen to expand Nyasaland territory to the north of the Zambezi River, and take control over the mineral resources of the Tete district. Already in 1960 Banda publicly stated: “When Nyasaland is free I will not rest until the greater part of Mozambique is joined to it. We are all the same people.” Such a threat made the Portuguese more willing to welcome foreign companies to explore the natural resources across the western borders of Mozambique. In their view, the foreign governments’ need to protect their companies working in the area would guarantee the integrity of Mozambique’s borders.

According to an unidentified foreign diplomat in Lourenço Marques, the more “unscrupulous character” of Banda in comparison to that of Nyerere made him a greater threat to Portuguese interests. For them, the fact that Nyerere was a Catholic, and apparently averse to violence, were two sides of the same coin. They considered that Gwambe being expelled from Tanganyika after claiming he intended to “turn Mozambique into a second Angola” was proof of Nyerere’s moderate political stand. The Portuguese authorities’ concern, however, lay in the possibility of Nyerere being overwhelmed by his domestic political opponents, whose hostility towards the

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8 IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process SC SR283/61, Adelino Chitofo Gwambe, Relatório do Consulado em Salisbury, “O encerramento do Escritório da UDENAMO em Dar-es-Salaam”, 394. There is no indication on behalf of which foreign actors were the letters addressed.
Portuguese colonial rule was more explicit. Ultimately, however, Banda was perceived as a greater threat, and this increased Portuguese concerns about the security of Mozambique’s western borders. Such concerns were further exacerbated by the fact that the tribes living in the Niassa District of Mozambique seemed to be easily influenced by the Malawi Congress Party, thus representing a valuable human asset for any clandestine operations that Banda deemed necessary to undertake inside Mozambique.

The resolutions of the ‘Seminar on the Portuguese Colonies’, which took place in New Delhi, India, in December 1961, further exacerbated Portuguese concerns. At the venue, which gathered numerous leaders of nationalist movements, including Gwambe and Marcelino dos Santos, as well as numerous leaders of African and Arab states, it was determined that new operation fronts of subversion should be opened across Mozambique borders. In particular, it reasoned that the beginning of combat operations in Mozambique from both Tanganyika and Nyasaland would compel Portugal to withdraw part of its armed forces from Angola, thus dispersing its focus across different areas, and facilitating the insurgency struggle in each one of them. Moreover, turning Mozambique into another front of armed struggle was an essential step for giving the ASAF countries a stronger political basis for more vigorously attacking the Portuguese government at the UN. In this context, Banda’s vocal support for Mozambican nationalists gained a critical importance, given the prospects of such a rhetoric being translated into direct action. Given such a state of affairs, one should assess the impact of Nyasaland and Banda’s objectives and actions in the contexts of the Cold War and Mozambican national liberation, even at such an early stage.

It would be far-fetched to suggest that until the dissolution of the CAF, and Nyasaland’s full independence from Britain in 1964, Banda’s decision-making in foreign affairs had enough autonomy to allow him to pursue political courses contradicting Western, and particularly British, interests. Banda maintained positive

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relations with the US and his country was receiving substantial US economic aid.\textsuperscript{15} He was one of the first African leaders to be received by President Kennedy, and held a strongly anti-Communist outlook. According to Portuguese archives, Banda’s stand regarding the future of Mozambique was dictated primarily by domestic and regional concerns, rather than Cold War considerations. However, his relations with regional counterparts impacted on Soviet interests, since they undermined UDENAMO.

Although Banda had an agreement with Nyerere regarding the annexation of Mozambican territory to the north of the Zambezi River, the Tanganyikan leader also hoped that Nyasaland would become part of PAFMECSA, upon this country’s independence. This, however, was something Banda was reluctant to accept. As a result, political misunderstandings between the two leaders began to build up, progressively setting them apart. Such tensions were also exacerbated by the Tanganyikan government’s suspicions that Banda covertly assisted UDENAMO, a belief nurtured by Portuguese authorities’ covert operations discussed above, aiming at playing Banda and Nyerere off against each other.

On 9\textsuperscript{th} December 1961, Tanganyika gained full independence from Great Britain. Contrary to dos Santos’s earlier hopes that Gwambe would be allowed to return to the country to continue his political activity there, the first action of official Dar-es-Salaam was to order a police raid on the UDENAMO headquarters, on the grounds that the movement was illegal.\textsuperscript{16} During the assault, Fanuel Mahluza and David Mabunda were arrested and sent for trial, while the police confiscated all documentation contained in the UDENAMO headquarters, in order to find out which foreign governments were secretly assisting UDENAMO.\textsuperscript{17} Although there was the alleged threat that the UDENAMO office would be closed down, Mahluza told the press that the Tanganyikan Minister, George Kahama, had promised to support UDENAMO and promised Gwambe, who was in Ghana, that the headquarters would remain open. Mahluza further publicly denied that UDENAMO was being financed


\textsuperscript{16} IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process SC SR283/61, Adelino Chitofo Gwambe, Relatório do Consulado de Salisbury; “O encerramento do Escritório da UDENAMO em Dar-es-Salaam”, 394. The Tanganyikan Government declared UDENAMO illegal because it was not officially registered in the country. The same pretext was used earlier in July to prevent Gwambe from travelling to Ghana.

from abroad. Hence, rather than aiming at putting an end to UDENAMO’s activities in Dar-es-Salaam altogether, the raid was primarily intended to discover whether or not UDENAMO served the interests of other regional players, such as Banda.

This clearly shows the deep suspicion that Tanganyikan authorities had of Banda’s support for UDENAMO. While Nyerere and Kambona were well aware of the Ghanaian support offered to Gwambe, it was the disinformation provided by the Portuguese by means of false letters addressed to UDENAMO, and the ongoing misunderstandings between Dar-es-Salaam and Blantyre, that gave the Tanganyikan authorities strong reason to suspect covert Nyasaland involvement in the Mozambican nationalist milieu in Dar-es-Salaam. Undoubtedly, the Portuguese were not only able to exacerbate the tensions between Nyerere and Banda, but also to bring about a further blow to UDENAMO, which, in turn, was greatly damaging to Soviet interests.

Although the tensions that had started to build up between Tanganyika and Nyasaland were of regional character, rather than being directly related to the Cold War, they had an indirect, yet punitive effect on UDENAMO’s stand in Southeast Africa, and subsequently, on the Soviet and Casablanca group’s aims in the region. No longer being restrained in its actions after the country’s independence, the Tanganyikan leadership’s crackdown on UDENAMO illustrated its concern about foreign governments’ interference in its internal affairs, further undermining the prospects of Gwambe’s activity being restored in Tanganyika. Throughout 1961 and early 1962, Banda’s Malawi Congress Party had not yet become a key player in the affairs of Mozambican national liberation or the superpower competition in the region. In fact, only after Malawi gained independence in 1964 did it begin playing a more prominent role in regional affairs. Nevertheless, the dynamics of the relations between Banda and Nyerere, influenced by the Portuguese at this early stage, were among the factors that posed obstacles to the Soviet and Casablanca group’s aim at promoting UDENAMO’s position, in order to advance their influence in the region.

The effects of Banda’s intervention in Mozambican nationalist affairs were most felt in the context of the formation of FRELIMO in June 1962. Similarly to Tanganyika, Kenya, Ghana, and Northern Rhodesia, each of which were supporting

different Mozambican movements, Nyasaland gave strong support to the National African Union of Independent Mozambique (UNAMI), secretly founded in 1960 in the Tete district. Although there are divergences between different sources regarding the actual strength of this movement, most information suggests that UNAMI was numerically small, and had little or no international prominence. Ncomo, however, argues that contrary to the information found in PIDE documents and the official account of Mozambican history, by the time of the formation of MANU and UDENAMO, UNAMI already had several hundreds of members. Regardless of what UNAMI’s actual strength was, the available sources state, directly and otherwise, that the movement essentially acted as Banda’s influence group in the realm of Mozambican national liberation. Thus while FRELIMO was a protégé of Tanganyika, UDENAMO was that of Ghana, and the Mozambique African National Congress (MANC) was that of North Rhodesia (Zambia), UNAMI became an asset of Malawi for advancing Banda’s interests. This, in turn, had a destabilizing effect on FRELIMO.

Although UNAMI was formally made part of FRELIMO upon the latter’s foundation in June 1962, UNAMI’s leader, Jose Baltazar Chagonga, like Gwambe, was not given a seat in FRELIMO’s leadership. It was only after intense pressure from the Malawi Congress Party and the leaders of the Nyasaland Government on Mondlane, that the latter agreed to give Chagonga the marginal post of Assistant of the Central Committee for Social Affairs. Although Mondlane personally disliked Chagonga, he believed that UNAMI could become a valuable asset for carrying out guerrilla operations across Mozambican borders in the Quelimane and Tete districts. Yet his hopes did not materialize, given his increasingly sour relations with Chagonga. While FRELIMO leaders wanted to take advantage of UNAMI members as human assets for guerrilla operations, Chagonga took a non-belligerent stand.

21 ibid, pp. 88-89. According to a former UNAMI member interviewed by Ncomo, the movement’s leader Baltazar Chagonga ”received instructions to accept any conditions for its integration in FRELIMO.” Although no direct reference is made to Banda, PIDE documents state that the movement was under the effective control of the Nyasaland leader. IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process 3461-CI(2), 3/9/1973, Gabriel Zandamela, “Relatório das conversações em Salisbury, 7-14 Março 1964, entre um adjunto dos SCCI e uma fonte de informação [Zandamela]”, 408-409.
22 “Relatório das conversações em Salisbury, 7-14 Março 1964, entre um adjunto dos SCCI e uma fonte de informação (Zandamela)”, 408-409. ibid. According to Ncomo, Chagonga was the Secretary of the Department of Health. pp. 109, 146.
reflecting that of Banda, and demanded instead that FRELIMO provide scholarships and education abroad for his men. He stressed that UNAMI members “should be intellectually prepared, in order to become useful to Mozambique.”

This shows that, similarly to the Tanganyikan Government’s plans for FRELIMO, Banda expected UNAMI members to play an active political role in the ruling bodies of Mozambique after its independence, something which would advance his own influence in that country, and facilitate his political, economic and territorial ambitions. In the context of regional politics, Banda was opposed to UNAMI acting as a mere guerrilla asset of FRELIMO, which would only benefit Tanganyikan long-term interests. This, therefore, was consistent with his giving priority to UNAMI’s political education, rather than being a military force serving the interests of FRELIMO leaders.

Most importantly, Banda’s advocacy of non-belligerent methods stemmed from his unwillingness to damage relations with Portugal. The economy of the landlocked Malawi depended on the railroad access to Mozambique’s seaports, something which restrained Banda from endorsing movements advocating liberation by means of armed struggle, and contributed to his seeking to reach an agreement with the Portuguese. While Banda’s political and security entourage collaborated with the Portuguese authorities and PIDE, the need to publicly demonstrate solidarity with the cause of independence, largely due to the pressures from other African states on Malawi, translated into Banda’s largely symbolic support for nationalist movements advocating independence by non-belligerent means, as in Malawi. Notably, when the armed struggle began in Mozambique in 1964, Malawi prevented FRELIMO fighters from transiting through the country, and collaborated with PIDE in arresting and killing FRELIMO members engaged in operations across its borders. Banda’s security measures against FRELIMO fighters forced them to seek alternative routes through Zambia, in the Zumbo region. All of this translated into severe animosity between Tanganyika and Zambia on the one hand, and Malawi on the other, given the former’s support for FRELIMO.

In late 1963, Chagonga was expelled from FRELIMO, having returned to Nyasaland to reorganize his movement there, thus putting an end to Banda’s attempt

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23 Ncomo, Uria Simango, pp. 89-90, notes.
25 Christie, Samora Machel, p. 27.
26 IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Processo SR 2826, FRELIMO, 14th April 1965, 285.
at having a hand inside the Mozambican front. Ultimately, however, the episode of Nyasaland’s pressures on Mondlane to ensure Chagonga became part of FRELIMO’s leadership, and Banda’s instructions for Chagonga to join the front “on any conditions”, is illustrative of the destabilizing role Malawi played in the process of FRELIMO’s institutional solidification. It shows the importance which the Malawi leader attached to ensuring he maintained a degree of influence on FRELIMO, as a means of guaranteeing his political leverage in Mozambique after its independence. Banda’s resolve to ensure UNAMI played an active role within FRELIMO had a negative effect on FRELIMO’s internal consistency. Because Chagonga was primarily acting in Banda’s interests and those of UNAMI’s militants, this contributed to the instability within the movement’s highest echelons, and had a divisive effect. It made it more difficult for FRELIMO to devise and follow a single, effective and coherent political and operational agenda. This, in turn, contributed to its vulnerability to Soviet and African radical states’ pressures in that early stage.

Moreover, ethnic differences and different ideological backgrounds of FRELIMO militants added to the organization’s weakness. According to Raimundo Pachinuapa, a FRELIMO militant interviewed by Christie, FRELIMO aimed at cultivating a “single line of thought” in its freedom fighters’ ranks. Tribal and regional differences became a challenge for consolidating FRELIMO’s forces as a “truly national guerrilla army.” In his memoirs, Zengazenga also addresses tribal differences as a central factor leading to animosities within FRELIMO and political assassinations. Mondlane’s ethnic background also made it problematic for FRELIMO’s gaining overwhelming popular acceptance. Belonging to the Shangaans tribe from the south of the Save River, Mondlane’s authority suffered from the lack of recognition by the Makonde people living in the Cabo Delgado District to the north, and brought about their opposition to the movement at its inception. Although Mondlane’s candidature was politically beneficial to the Tanganyikan authorities, tribal differences contributed to the difficulty in FRELIMO carrying out a unified political action in the country.

29 Zengazenga, Memórias de um rebelde, pp. 280-281, 286, 290.
some FRELIMO fighters had been trained in Algeria and others in the socialist countries, they often endorsed different ideological views, something which risked having a divisive effect on their group effort.\textsuperscript{31} In this context, Banda’s aim to influence FRELIMO through Chagonga and his men, originally from the Tete, Zambezia, and Niassa districts, further contributed to the destabilization of the Mozambican front.\textsuperscript{32}

\textit{Nkrumah and dissent within UDENAMO}

In the aftermath of Gwambe being expelled from Tanganyika, the need for UDENAMO’s leadership to preserve its credibility both regionally and internationally led it to openly endorse a belligerent rhetoric. Thus, on 24\textsuperscript{th} August 1961, \textit{Contact} reported that when dos Santos was asked “whether he would favour nationalists taking up arms to fight the Portuguese, who were obviously armed with superior weapons, Mr. Dos Santos retorted: ‘Yes, we shall take up arms, because the Portuguese do not understand any other way of settling disputes.’”\textsuperscript{33} Yet beneath the general shift towards an openly aggressive position was also the beginning of dissent within UDENAMO’s leadership, in particular between Gwambe and dos Santos. This section argues that Nkrumah’s racial views greatly contributed to such dissent, thus weakening UDENAMO and having a damaging effect on Soviet aims in the context of the early stage of Mozambican national liberation. As a result, dos Santos’s position as the Secretary of the CONCP towards Gwambe became more and more critical throughout the first half of 1962, something which undermined UDENAMO’s public image among African nationalist circles and thus added to the difficulties posed to Soviet interests, in the context of the formation of FRELIMO in mid-1962.

\textit{Gwambe vs. dos Santos}

An example of the impact of personal rivalries of African nationalist leaders on the broader interests of the superpowers in the context of Mozambican national liberation

\textsuperscript{32} Zengazenga, \textit{Memórias de um Rebelde}, p. 404.
\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Contact}, 24\textsuperscript{th} August 1961, article entitled “Help Against Portugal”, [in IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process SC SR283/61, Adelino Chitofo Gwambe, 461].

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was the growing animosity between Gwambe and Marcelino dos Santos, and Nkrumah’s racial views. Already in November 1961, in a long statement on behalf of UDENAMO made to Voice of Africa, entitled “The threats of a new colonialism to Mozambique”, Gwambe argued:

“from my own experience, I came to the conclusion that what the oppressed people of Mozambique desires is not a well educated leader, but rather a leader who is resolved and dedicated, [and who is] armed with the principles of Pan-African Nationalism, because the political leadership of a mulatto-assimilated group will never be accepted by the people of Mozambique.”

On this occasion, Gwambe announced that UDENAMO proposes to change the country’s ‘colonial name’ - ‘Mozambique’ - for ‘Monomotapa’.

Gwambe’s reference to the ‘well educated’ and ‘mulatto-assimilated’ members was an indirect allusion to Marcelino dos Santos, who was mixed-race and had university studies. Such a discourse, however, stemmed from Nkrumah’s own views of dos Santos. The Ghanaian leader believed that movements of national liberation of Black Africans should only be led by Black Africans, and that highly positioned members of different ethnic origin not only could not be trusted, but also could not be considered as the legitimate representatives of the respective countries and movements. He, therefore, did not regard dos Santos as being truly Mozambican, and found dos Santos’s leading position in UDENAMO an anachronism to the core principles upon which, in his view, the liberation of Black Africa should be based.

As we saw in Chapter II, such views were related to Nkrumah’s thesis that ‘Mozambique should be liberated by Mozambicans only’, and that no foreigners should be allowed to lead the struggle of the Mozambican people.

Dos Santos, in turn, became resentful of Nkrumah. Such a state of affairs represented the first sign of animosity between Gwambe and dos Santos. According to Cabrita, in attempting to preserve good relations with the Tanganyikan Government,

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35 “The threats of a new colonialism to Mozambique”, November 1961, 479, ibid. Monomotapa is a Portuguese ancient name given to the African Kingdom of Mutapa, which existed between the 15th and the 18th centuries, and whose territory included the present-time Mozambique and Zimbabwe.
36 Ncomo, Uria Simango, pp. 101-102.
37 Cabrita, Mozambique, pp. 8-9.
“bearing in mind the strategic importance of that country for the attainment of Mozambique’s independence, Marcelino dos Santos advised his fellow leaders to merge with MANU. Gwambe rejected the idea outright; Marcelino dos Santos reacted by threatening to leave UDENAMO and join MANU.”

Importantly, this later played a role in Gwambe’s being excluded from any leading positions in FRELIMO, of which dos Santos became a prominent member. Throughout the first half of 1962, however, the Secretary of the CONCP and the President of UDENAMO continued to cooperate.

The works of both Cabrita and Ncomo make reference to such personal disputes between dos Santos and Gwambe, underpinned by Nkrumah’s racial views, and point to their effects on the struggle for power in the context of the formation of FRELIMO. However, the impact of Nkrumah’s attitude on the greater dynamics of Soviet-American competition over their efforts to influence the Mozambican nationalist scene has been left out from their analyses.

Considering the difficult situation in which UDENAMO was after July 1961, and the Soviet desire to restore its activities in Southeast Africa, the preservation of internal consistency of the leadership of the movement was crucial for achieving such an aim. Yet Nkrumah’s dogmatic personal views about Africanism, and his influence on Gwambe, planted the seeds of dissent within UDENAMO. These views and influence created a breach between the CONCP – a vital coordination centre for all left-wing movements in Portuguese Africa – and UDENAMO. In effect, while Gwambe was initially sponsored by the USSR, Ghana, and other radical African states as part of a greater coalition composed of the racially inclusive MPLA of Angola and PAIGC of Portuguese Guinea, the influence of Nkrumah’s rhetoric on UDENAMO’s leadership progressively turned Gwambe’s movement into a pariah within the African left-wing front. Gwambe’s ‘blackness radicalism’ thus contributed to an internal schism, and weakened UDENAMO’s status as part of the common effort of Soviet-sponsored liberation movements. Dos Santos’s critical response to Gwambe’s attitudes was made known throughout the first half of 1962. In his letters to UDENAMO headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam, he criticized the organization’s leaders for their inability to come to terms with MANU, and for the movement’s ineffectiveness, threatening to leave UDENAMO.

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This clearly suggests that the coordination of Soviet-Ghanaian efforts in advancing their common interests in the realm of Mozambican national liberation was not as clear-cut as it seemed to be in the first half of 1961. As discussed in Chapter II, it was the Soviets who jumped on the bandwagon of radical pan-Africanism of the Casablanca group, and thus engaged in supporting national liberation movements which advanced the political agenda of the Casablanca member states. Yet the primacy of Ghanaian influence on Gwambe’s discourse and political agenda was such that it overwhelmed the Soviet line, and undermined Moscow’s attempt to achieve at a common, effective, CONCP-coordinated strategy. Ghanaian assertiveness, therefore, again badly affected Soviet designs in the context of the Mozambican national liberation. While such dynamics played into the hands of Washington, upon the formation of FRELIMO in mid-1962, they also illustrate the proactive roles played by African actors in the successes and failures of both superpowers at the early stages of Mozambican national liberation.

**Ghanaian aggressive policies**

Late 1961 and early 1962 saw the beginning of a new phase in a coordinated Soviet and Ghanaian effort to advance their goals on the continent by means of more aggressive action. This section explains the reasons for such a shift, particularly in the context of the Congo crisis and the Soviet policy towards Western Africa. It establishes the relationship between these developments and the more assertive character of Gwambe’s discourse and action in the regional political arena. Assessing such changes, in turn, helps us to understand two reactive trends on the part of moderate African states and the US. Firstly, this was the determination of official Dar-es-Salaam to find a more acceptable i.e. politically moderate and West-oriented candidate to lead the Mozambican liberation cause, as an alternative to Gwambe and UDENAMO. As the thesis argues, Nyerere’s trip to the US to discuss such an issue and the emergence of Eduardo Mondlane on the Mozambican nationalist political scene were part of such a reaction. Secondly, the support Mondlane received from US and Tanganyikan officialdom to establish himself as the leader of FRELIMO aimed at neutralising the radicals’ more forceful strategy and ensure PAFMECSA’s control over the process of Mozambican national liberations.
In order to better understand the general turn of Nkrumah’s regional political course towards more aggressive means and actions, this section addresses the schisms involving Ghana in 1962 and its regional counterparts such as Togo. The case of Togolese-Ghanaian antagonism is important inasmuch as it depicts the growing hostility between moderate African states and Ghana, and illustrates the opposing positions, views and aims of the two African groups of states in regard to both regional and international politics, particularly the Cold War. This, in turn, not only helps to contextualize the events surrounding the Mozambican national liberation in the Pan-African dimension, but also in regard to the superpower competition in the region.

In the final months of 1961, Ghanaian assertiveness in regional politics and its Soviet backing became an increasing concern both for Ghana’s moderate neighbours and the United States. “Nkrumah is a Black Hitler, whose megalomania is exploited by Communist sympathizers manipulated by the Russians”, President Olympio of Togo avowed to the US Ambassador, Leon Poullada in December 1961. Describing the Ghanaian leader as a “definite menace to moderate African states, making it essential they unite to contain him”, the Togolese leader pointed to numerous cases of intensification of Ghanaian subversive activities in different African countries. In support of his contention regarding the far-reaching influence of Ghana across the continent, he spoke about Nkrumah’s interference in Eastern Africa, particularly in Kenyan internal affairs.39

Olympio’s posture in regional and international politics was representative of the moderate Monrovia group. He maintained a moderate posture in African affairs, and had a pro-Western stand in the Cold War. Olympio enjoyed popular support and his domestic political position was virtually unchallenged.40 Concerning the question of Portuguese Africa, and particularly Angola, like most moderate African leaders, he “hoped that the settlement of the Algerian problem would serve as an example for the Portuguese”, something which reflected his advocacy of non-belligerent means to

40 JFK NSF, Africa, Reel 16, Togo, Rusk to the White House, Memorandum for the President, “Proposed message to Prime Minister Sylvanus Olympio upon his inauguration as President of the Republic of Togo”, 13 April 1961, 0230-0262.
achieve independence.\[^{41}\] Olympio was also very critical of the Soviet leadership and its foreign policy, considering that Soviet actions in East Berlin, the resumption of nuclear testing, and nuclear threats “had torn [the] mask off Russian claims [for] world peace. Khrushchev [is] apparently drunk with power”, Olympio said to Poullada in September 1961, and he “belie[ves] Russia [is] now sufficiently powerful [to] disregard world opinion and gain its ends by terrorizing [the] rest of the world.”\[^{42}\]

Like many other moderate African leaders critical of Moscow, all of this not only made Olympio an antagonistic figure for the Soviets, who were actively involved in neighbouring Ghana, but also a nuisance to Nkrumah himself, who was eager to annex Togo.\[^{43}\] In December 1961, eight months after being elected, Olympio barely escaped an assassination plot covertly organized by Ghana, with the possible backing of Soviet intelligence services, all of which led to the escalation of hostility between the two countries and further contributed to the growing antagonism between the Casablanca and the Lagos groups.\[^{44}\] At the Lagos Conference in January 1962, Olympio openly accused Nkrumah of subversive activities in different countries in the region, a claim the leaders of the UAM states supported.\[^{45}\] In view of the threat posed by Ghana, during his visit to the US in March, the Togolese leader asked Kennedy for military assistance for his country, while the Lagos powers, of which Tanganyika and Kenya were part, had earlier agreed to provide military support to each other, in the event of Ghanaian military aggression.\[^{46}\] Until 13\(^{th}\) January 1963, when Olympio was shot in a coup d’état, both Ghana and Togo continued to assist opposition groups from the other country.\[^{47}\]

While increasingly aggressive Ghanaian action to subvert pro-Western governments in the region, such as Ivory Coast and Upper Volta, continued, together

\[^{41}\] JFK NSF, Africa, Reel 16, Togo, State Department, Memorandum of Conversation, Farewell Call on the President by the President Olympio of Togo, 21 March 1962, p. 2, 0318-0389.
\[^{42}\] JFK NSF, Africa, Reel 16, Togo, State Department, US Embassy Lome, Poullada to Secretary of State, 10 September 1961, 0230-0262.
\[^{44}\] JFK NSF, Africa, Reel 16, Togo, State Department, Poullada to Secretary of State, 15 December 1961, 0230-0262.
with the continuing Soviet presence in the country, US-Ghanaian relations were progressively deteriorating. The US perceived Nkrumah’s “African unity and all considerations predicated on this principle” as a threat, a view shared by moderate African states. Like the US Administration, the Government of Nigeria and prominent moderate African leaders such as Nyerere and Felix Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast saw Nkrumah’s assertive advocacy of the Pan-Africanist philosophy, the implications of his regional policies and their divisive effect on the community of African states as a factor contributing to the spread of Communism in Africa. Nkrumah, in turn, perceived regional organizations such as the UAM, which were friendly towards the US and maintained close ties to West European powers, as a threat to his agenda aiming at achieving immediate African unity. Not only was the Ghanaian press becoming increasingly critical of the US, but also the Soviet-sponsored press in India, such as the Goan Tribune, a periodical published in Mumbai, engaged in fierce attacks against American presence in Africa, particularly in Ghana. At the same time, they actively gave publicity to national liberation movements supported by the radical African states and the Soviet bloc. For example, an article entitled “Peace Corps for Ghana” commenced thus: “President Kennedy’s Peace Corps was bitterly criticized as a machine for perpetuating colonialism, at the All-African People’s Conference in March.” Notably, a big picture of Gwambe covered this October 15 edition’s front page. As discussed earlier, Peace Corps were involved in covert actions on behalf of the US government in Africa. It is unsurprising, therefore, that this organization became subject to attacks by the Soviet-sponsored press and leftist movements.

A shift in the nature of Soviet-Ghanaian cooperation, particularly in the context of the effects of the Congo crisis, is of importance for understanding the

changes in the general strategies of these countries in advancing their interests in Africa. In his article entitled “The rise and fall of the ‘Soviet model of development’ in West Africa, 1957-64”, Iandolo builds on the works of Legvold and Mazov to address the first Soviet attempts to export its model of development to Ghana and Guinea. Iandolo argues that, in Ghana, such an enterprise ended in failure due to the inadequacy of the Soviet economic model as applied to West African countries, and Moscow’s inability to defend its interests during the Congo crisis. The author concludes that this “highlighted the importance of ‘hard power’ to build influence in the Third World” for the Soviet leadership. As he explains, the Congo crisis, which led to the assassination of Lumumba in 1960 and the defeat of his supporters in January 1962, was not only clear evidence of the USSR’s inability to support its African allies by intervening militarily far away from the Soviet Bloc’s borders, but was also a demonstration of Western resolve to use forceful means to prevent further Soviet encroachment in sub-Saharan Africa. The author argues that this convinced Khrushchev that the competition with the West in the Third World could not be carried out only in the sphere of economics and development models.

Iandolo shows that while Soviet-Ghanaian relations continued on a good standing throughout 1961, the lessons of 1960 made Moscow less willing to pursue its initial design to turn Ghana into a model of the success of socialist modernity in Africa. Soviet investments in agriculture and other development projects in the country were greatly reduced. However, as we saw earlier, Soviet military assistance to Ghana increased, materializing through a $2,800,000 military material credit loan from the USSR. Such an amount was great enough to turn the Ghanaian Army, Air Force, and Navy into one of the best-equipped military forces in the region, since Ghanaian inventory of acquisition of Soviet arms even included two submarines. Iandolo recognizes that it was at this point in time that Moscow considered training African ‘freedom fighters’ through Ghana. Although he does not establish a direct relationship between the decrease of Soviet economic aid and the

55 Iandolo, p. 696-698, ibid.
56 ibid, p. 698-700.
58 Iandolo, p. 698, op.cit.
increase in cooperation in the military and security spheres, there is a clear connection between these changes on the one hand, and Ghanaian subversive actions against the governments of moderate countries such as Togo, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Nigeria and Upper Volta, on the other hand.59

Iandolo points out that Nkrumah was also highly concerned about American military intervention in the Congo, and was critical of the UN’s position towards the crisis, which in his view favoured Western interests. For the Ghanaian leader, this was a clear sign of coordinated imperialist aggression. During the crisis, therefore, Nkrumah concluded that it was the independent African states, spearheaded by Ghana under the motto of African independence and unity, that should take the military initiative to support African forces critical of the West.60 Throughout 1962, the leaders of most African countries were already well aware of Ghana’s following a consistent policy of subversion, often conducted by Moscow-trained Communist elements, all of which increased their efforts to cooperate with each other in order to counter the Ghanaian threat, particularly in the military sphere.61

This context involving Soviet-Ghanaian relations and Ghanaian more aggressive strategy in the region is crucial for our understanding of their effects on the process of Mozambican national liberation. Throughout the first half of 1962, Ghana was giving military training to UDENAMO members, later returning to Tanganyika. The subversive component of the training involved learning how to make bombs using gasoline and flour. This was in contrast to political and ideological education the UDENAMO members received in their earlier trips to Ghana. In May, 46 Mozambican fighters had already returned to Tanganyika, and others were to follow. Moreover, in that month the High Commissioner of Ghana in Dar-es-Salaam, Joe-Fio Meyer, had offered several Land Rover vehicles to UDENAMO. Such actions were

61 From Lagos to Secretary of State, 7th February, 1963, p. 2, op.cit. From Cotonou to Secretary of State, 19th February 1963, p.1, op. cit. From Lagos to Secretary of State, 8th March 1963, section one, p. 2; section two, pp. 1-3, op. cit.
accompanied by a more and more fervent Ghanaian propaganda campaign against Portugal.  

Thus, the Ghanaian aggressive policies in regional affairs, aiming at undermining pro-Western African states went hand-in-hand with its designs to bolster UDENAMO’s military strength and encourage the movement’s direct action in Eastern Africa. Such Ghanaian courses of action conflicted with both the American policy for Portuguese territories, and the Tanganyikan and Kenyan governments’ desire to see a cooperative and politically moderate Mozambican nationalist leader advocating his country’s independence by peaceful means. Such a state of affairs represents an important context for understanding a greater US engagement with the issue of Mozambican national liberation in 1962, and the eagerness of countries such as Tanganyika to see a moderate, West-oriented Mozambican leader heading the liberation movement, rather than Gwambe. This demonstrates that while the specifics of Soviet relations with Ghana were a factor in Accra taking a more aggressive course, it was the regional politics and the conflict between Ghana and moderate African states that underpinned this country’s eagerness to prop up UDENAMO’s direct action in Eastern Africa. It shows that Ghana’s role in advancing Soviet interests in the context of Mozambican national liberation was less a reflection of the Cold War, and mostly resulted from Accra’s goals and agendas in the realm of African affairs.

The UAM, national liberation movements, and US roundabout tactics

When considering the above changes in the Ghanaian-Soviet strategy from late-1961 onwards, and how it reflected on the Mozambican national liberation, one should also look at the ways in which they reflected on Gwambe’s discourse and political activity throughout that period. This provides a background for understanding the Tanganyikan and American responses in regard to the process of Mozambican national liberation, leading to the emergence of Eduardo Mondlane as the President of

FRELIMO. This section addresses Gwambe’s more radicalized inroads into African politics and the ways in which western powers, and particularly the US, countered them. By demonstrating the importance that both the USSR and the US attached to the political position of the UAM on the Cold War, African affairs and the process of national liberation in southern Africa, and which Gwambe aimed at influencing, this section highlights the potential political weight of African actors, even those as vulnerable as the UAM members. It argues that although African states not directly involved in Mozambican national liberation only played a secondary role in affecting superpower interests in this process, they represented instrumental political assets for nationalist leaders such as Gwambe, regional African actors such as Ghana, and the superpowers.

Following the failure of the Soviet-Ghanaian covert attempt to trigger war in Mozambique in mid-1961, UDENAMO carried on its assertive political activity outside Tanganyika. Gwambe’s rhetoric became more aggressive and radicalized. Being directed at moderate African states, it both aimed at mobilizing their support for UDENAMO, and antagonizing them against the West. This was done by harshly attacking Western imperialism, NATO, and the regimes of Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa. This also served the purpose of widening the gap between the West and its moderate African counterparts. Clearly, UDENAMO’s sponsors, - the Casablanca group and the USSR, exploited such an activism to the fullest extent, in order to advance their broader agendas in Africa, and to repair UDENAMO’s badly damaged status in Southeast Africa, and restore its activity there.

The extent to which Gwambe became a handy asset for the Soviet propaganda apparatus was well illustrated by his participation in Soviet world broadcasts. For example, on 23rd November 1961, he spoke on Radio Moscow, in an English language broadcast targeted at Africa, entitled “A New Colonial Alliance”. Gwambe stated that the three regimes had made a secret military pact, termed ‘The Lisbon-Salisbury-Pretoria Axis’, after the South African Prime Minister Verwoerd, and the CAF Prime Minister Welensky travelled to Lisbon, where they met Salazar. The pact, Gwambe
claimed, aimed at preventing the spreading out of anti-colonial armed rebellion in Angola, and its eventual breaking out in Mozambique.63

This shows that, contrary to Shubin’s allegations that the Soviets were not impressed with Gwambe during his first trip to Moscow in September 1961, Moscow gave legitimacy to Gwambe as the voice of the oppressed Mozambican people and their aspirations, thus openly demonstrating its endorsement of Gwambe and his movement. Notably, from this period onwards, because Gwambe’s discourse changed from mere condemnation of Portuguese colonialism to a broader criticism of the West and NATO, it became more instrumental in advancing Soviet efforts to undermine Western interests in Africa by means of propaganda.

From early 1962 onwards, the dynamics of East-West competition in the context of national liberation in Portuguese Africa gradually acquired continental and international dimensions, as opposed to purely local ones. With regard to Mozambique, this both manifested itself in, and resulted from, Gwambe’s propaganda efforts across the African continent, and his more radicalized and aggressive political discourse and activism, which aimed in particular at mobilizing the support of the major grouping of moderate African states, - the African Union and Malagasy (UAM), - in support of the cause of national liberation, and, by extension, the objectives of his Soviet and Casablanca group sponsors. If Gwambe obtained the moderate African powers’ support, it would have been damaging to the interests of the former European colonial powers, and would have represented a setback for the US policy of encouraging step-by-step liberalization reforms by Portugal that would lead to the end of Portuguese colonial rule by peaceful means. Moreover, it was intended to advance Ghanaian Pan-African agenda.

Throughout 1961, the UAM states remained largely uninterested in questions of Mozambican national liberation. In part, this was due to their geographical distance in relation to Mozambique, and mainly, it was because of their moderate outlook and a political standing favouring the West, together with their own post-independence domestic challenges. Despite facing substantial economic problems, the UAM had a degree of political leverage in both regional and international affairs, mainly as a

result of its members’ joint political initiatives and decision-making. At the UN GA, they had the potential of influencing key issues in the international arena. Because it represented a challenge to the Casablanca group and Soviet goals in Africa, movements such as UDENAMO and MPLA sought to change the UAM’s outlook and decision-making, and take advantage of it. In this context, Gwambe’s political campaigning was instrumental to achieve such ends.

This section examines how leaders of leftist national liberation movements, including Gwambe, attempted to mobilize UAM support and to change its pro-western outlook, and the ways in which the US sought French cooperation in order to prevent the UAM from undertaking political initiatives contradicting US strategy for Portuguese Africa in particular, and Western interests in general. In so doing, this section demonstrates that UAM’s political leverage, potentially capable of influencing the state of affairs of Mozambican national liberation, was limited by concerted Western action. By preventing the UAM from moving to a more aggressive political course against Portugal, which would have favoured the African radical states’ and Soviet agendas, the US contributed to the preservation of the status quo of Portuguese rule in Africa, and restrained the impetus of Mozambican national liberation. Moreover, the difficulties of the Casablanca group in advancing its agenda before the moderate African states further contributed to a deterioration of regional stability in West Africa, and an escalation of tensions between Ghana and its moderate neighbours, discussed earlier in this chapter.

In order to understand the ways in which UAM’s policies were affected by regional actors and the subsequent effects of this group’s agency on the superpowers’ interests and courses of action in the context of Mozambican national liberation, a succinct overview of the UAM, its background, and its political outlook and behaviour in both regional and international affairs should be made.

The UAM: background

Created in 1961, with behind-the-scenes support from France, the UAM aimed at maintaining close political, economic, military, and cultural cooperation between its members. It was formed by twelve former French colonies: Mauritania, Senegal,
Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, Dahomey, Cameroon, Chad, Central African Republic (CAR), Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, and Malagasy, thus representing a substantial part of the sub-Saharan Africa. Apart from Ivory Coast, the members of UAM were among the poorest countries in Africa. They depended on French economic and defence assistance, something which translated into strong French political leverage upon these countries.64

According to State Department documents, UAM’s political stand was characterized by the “gospel of moderation, compromise, and constructive cooperation with the West.”65 As was to be expected by the State Department, UAM states became “ready targets for attack from the radical Casablanca states as ‘neo-colonial stooges’ of the French and of the Europe of Six”, since they were all members of the Franc zone and associate members of the European Economic Community (EEC). Such attacks drew UAM countries closer together in political terms, thus further contributing to the inter-group stalemate in African affairs.66 Moreover, UAM’s moderate political stance made it difficult to mobilize these countries’ support for ‘direct action’ in the cause of national liberation. Such a state of affairs drew fierce criticism from both Communist powers and the Asian-African group in general.67

UAM’s close cooperation with the West, its generalized aversion to both Communism and the ideas of their Casablanca group counterparts was a barrier to Soviet attempts to expand its sphere of influence in sub-Saharan Africa in the political, economic, and military spheres. It also posed strategic logistical problems for Moscow, such as obtaining over-flight rights over large African landmasses. These rights were critical for maintaining regular and cost-effective air connections to Ghana and Guinea-Conakry, to establish flight connections with Cuba through Africa, and, if necessary, to enable prompt and effective interventions in regions farther to the south.68 One example of the difficulties the Soviets experienced in obtaining

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64 JFK NSF, Africa, Reel 18, UAM, Department of State, Confidential, “UAM (Afro-Malagasy Union) Guidelines for Policy and Operations”, May 1962, 0438-0487.
66 ibid, pp. 4, 5, 0438-0487.
67 ibid, pp. 9-10, 0438-0487.
68 Digital National Security Archive (DNSA), Department of State, Secret, Memorandum, October 29, 1962, 3 pp., From Mennen Williams to Secretary of State, “African Governments attitudes and reactions to US request interdict Soviet Bloc flights to Cuba via Africa”.

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overflight rights over francophone Africa was the authorization, and then immediately following interdiction, imposed by Chad for a Soviet aircraft flying to Ghana, in October 1960. The Chief Marshal of Aviation, Konstantin Vershinin, reported that the previously considered alternative route over Algeria and Sahara was “categorically objected to by the French Government”.

Such problems were not limited to UAM members alone, rather being a common trait to formally neutral, but anti-Communist African states. For example, the Sudan under President Addoub took a firm attitude in declining to grant to the UAR and the Soviet Union transit to provide supplies and personnel to Gizenga regime in Stanleyville, in the Congo, while granting US requests for blanket overflight and landing clearances for United States Military Air Transport aircraft. Furthermore, the strong Western influence on UAM states was an obstacle for their closer trade cooperation with the USSR. According to a secret Soviet report of August 1961, the continued economic dependence of Cameroun, Ivory Coast, Malagasy, Dahomey, CAR, Gabon, and Senegal on France represented an important obstacle to Soviet efforts to expand its cooperation with these African states.

Importantly, UAM states represented 11.5% of votes in the UN GA. Given their tendency to vote jointly, it made UAM’s political initiatives and stance a force in international affairs that could not be ignored by major international players. According to the State Department analysis produced in May 1962, “the UAM group has assumed a key position in the General Assembly and on some key issues actually possesses the balance of voting power. To date, their performance has been quite good from the point of view of the US. The UAM has taken a moderate, responsible stand on a number of questions, such as … colonialism, despite the absence of any

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70 JFK NSF, Africa, Reel 16, Sudan, President Abboud’s visit, 4-6 October, 1961, scope paper, background of visit. JFK NSF, Africa, Reel 16, Sudan, President Abboud’s visit, 4-6 October 1961, background paper, “United States – Sudanese relations”, 0112-0218.
significant support for their stand from other African states and often despite Afro-Asian as well as Soviet Bloc pressure.”  

It further stressed the fact that “the UAM … has displayed a healthy awareness of the Communist danger.”

*The UAM and Gwambe’s political offensive*

Given the considerable political weight of the UAM in African affairs, the leaders of different national liberation movements often took advantage of conferences, joining the heads of the UAM states in order to appeal to them directly to take decisive steps to support their causes. One example was the Summit Conference of Heads of African and Malagasy States, which took place in Lagos, Nigeria, in January 1962. While playing on UAM leaders’ generalized sense of solidarity with the oppressed Africans in Portuguese colonies, Gwambe’s new rhetoric brought in a broader Cold War agenda reflecting Soviet and the Casablanca group’s discourses. By urging the UAM to take decisive steps against the Portuguese government and its colonial rule in the UN, he aimed to kill several birds with one stone: advance the cause of national liberation, advance the interests of the Casablanca group and Soviets, and promote UDENAMO’s status and agenda.

At the summit conference, Gwambe claimed there were looming threats to UAM member states and all of Africa, posed by what he now referred to as ‘NATO imperialist powers’. Far from simplistic ‘colonized vs. colonialists’ discourse of the past, Gwambe’s speech now stressed and intimately associated the concepts of colonialism, Western imperialism, and NATO, as indivisible forces threatening the essential principles, values, freedoms, and aspirations of all Africans. He argued that the crackdown of colonial authorities on native Mozambicans was part of a ‘NATO imperialist’ master plan aimed at first securing militarily the white regimes in Southern Africa, and then to re-colonize the whole of the continent by economic and

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During the UAM conference, “representatives [of] serious [national liberation movements were] circulation on [the] fringes of the conference but some [were] seen even at [the] Government of Gabon reception.” Among them were Holden Roberto of the UPA/FNLA, and Andrade of the MPLA.
political means. Resorting to Nkrumah’s argument that “unless Mozambique, as well as other portions of Africa are free [the Independent African States] are not free and in the light of this, they must not be confident of themselves as free people”, Gwambe appealed in the name of UDENAMO for:

1. The immediate direct financial and technical assistance etc, to the patriotic forces engaged in struggle against the Portuguese Colonialism;
2. To urge the United National organization to force Portugal to remove her military forces from our country and grant immediate unconditional National Independence to the people of Mozambique;
3. To urge Portugal to release our brothers in political imprisonment.”

Gwambe’s discourse continued to attempt to further exploit any potential unease of the UAM leaders regarding allegedly hostile Western plans:

“On other colonies generally, UDENAMO wants first to call upon all Independent African States to realize that Salazar, Verwoerd, and Welensky are puppets of Imperialists and backed by NATO Powers as to set up a base in Southern Africa aiming to reoccupy the whole of Africa by Military Force, although force may not be used, but [there] are other ways of dominating Africa, as we see the example of Katanga which now belongs to Salazar, Verwoerd and Welensky as well as all imperialists, and tomorrow shall be the whole Congo and so on until the whole continent [is dominated]. While Africans are splitting and fighting amongst themselves, imperialists are training saboteurs to overthrow the legal and real peoples Government, such facts are listed in some of the Independent African States such as United Arab Republic, Guinea and Ghana where their leaders were nearly assassinated by imperialists trained stooges.”

Gwambe concluded:

“The UDENAMO believes that if Independent African States give 3 or 2 years more to the imperialists they will have chance in this period to reoccupy the whole continent of Africa; although not politically in other countries, but, yes, economically and otherwise.”

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78 ibid.
Clearly, however far-fetched such rhetoric was, it nonetheless reflected the aims inherent in both the Soviet and the Casablanca group’s discourses, particularly that of Ghana. On the one hand, it aimed at mobilizing moderate African states to become more actively involved in the support of national liberation processes against Portugal and other white-minority regimes. On the other hand, it sought to bolster distrust of their leaders towards Western powers, thus attempting to make a breach in their ties. By seeking support of such a major regional conglomerate, Gwambe also shored up his own political status. However, his efforts in January 1962 were unsuccessful.

Not only did Lagos powers openly express their opposition to the expansion of Soviet influence in the Third World, particularly in the Congo, but they also criticized the Soviet nuclear test programme. The summit resolutions on the situation of Angola and Algeria, as Palmer, the US Ambassador to Lagos put it, were “comparatively mild by African nationalist standards”, and set no time limit for decolonization of Portuguese territories in Africa. The summit stressed, once again, that African unity could only be reached by short steps and blamed Ghana for the Monrovia vs. Casablanca split.80 As Palmer summed up the results of the conference in his cable to Rusk,

“from [the] point of view [of] western interests, we believe [the] conference generally showed disposition towards moderate and constructive solutions.”81

The position taken at the Lagos summit echoed the African vote at the UN. At the UNGA on 15th January, the Soviet bloc introduced an aggressive resolution against Portugal and its colonial rule. Forty-five Afro-Asian states, however, put forward a moderate version, advocating only liberalization amendments in Portugal’s policy in Africa. Such a position was also a result of the US Ambassador to the UN,

Submitted by: Hlomulo Chitofo Gwambe, National President, União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique, 290-294.
81 JFK NSF, Africa, Reel 14, Nigeria, State Department, from American Ambassador to Lagos, Palmer to Secretary of State, Deptel 781, 1 February 1962, 0001-0067.
Adlai Stevenson’s lobbying ASAF states, and the approved resolution was far from meeting the aggressively anti-Portuguese line advocated by the Soviet bloc and its radical African counterparts. It represented, as Schneidman called it referring to Dean Rusk’s opinion given to the President on the African vote at the UN on the issue of Portugal’s colonialism, the “conciliatory” position of “the Afro-Asian states … towards the United States” at the United Nations.

It was only in September 1962 that appeals from leaders of national liberation movements finally appeared to bear fruit. At the UAM conference in Libreville, Gabon, the chiefs of state “issued a communiqué … announcing [that] UAM would propose expulsion of Portugal and South Africa from [the] UN at [the] GA session.”

It should be noted that such a resolution primarily concerned the dynamics of rivalries between Angolan nationalist movements, with the left-wing MPLA leadership campaigning for the formation of a common front, something which had already materialized in the case of Mozambique, with the creation of FRELIMO. The UAM leaders, and particularly the chairman of the Libreville conference, President Felix Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, fully supported the call of left-wing movements and promised immediate UAM assistance to national liberation united fronts.

Such a u-turn in UAM’s position, however, posed a challenge to the US strategic rationale in regard to Portugal, African states and African national liberation movements. The prospects of a more decisive action led by the Communist-leaning MPLA in Angola supported by hitherto moderate African states, and the greater pressures on Lisbon in political, economic, and military terms, all posed a risk to US hopes for gradual and peaceful political transformations of Portugal’s colonial policies. Also, it challenged Washington’s aim to prevent the radicalization of moderate African states, something which could facilitate Soviet bloc’s encroachment in the continent. The African moderates’ gesture of concession to the Casablanca group suggested a step towards their radicalization, and signalled an unwelcome

83 Schneidman, Engaging Africa, pp. 36-37.
84 JFK NSF, Africa, UAM, Reel 18, State Department, Rusk to US embassies in Paris and Lisbon, incoming telegram, 19 September 1962, 0438-0487.
setback to the western influence in Africa, which could ultimately play into the hands of the Communist powers. Because UAM’s decisive support for the MPLA was underpinned by the prospects of a common Angolan front, it also meant that FRELIMO would directly and otherwise bear the fruits of the UAM’s resolution.

The American need to preserve its image of apparent neutrality in the affairs of African states, and to avoid running the risk of alienating them by opposing their more extreme position on Portugal and South Africa required Washington to devise indirect or roundabout approaches to influence the traditionally moderate African states’ decision-making. Equally important for the US was to maintain a degree of credibility in its policy towards Portugal’s colonialism before the ASAF group, expressed in the American 15th March and 20th April votes at the UN, endorsing self-determination in Portuguese Africa, and which Schneidman described as “a stark and total reversal” of the US policy under Eisenhower.86 Given such a state of affairs, covert diplomatic cooperation with France and Britain, both of which preserved significant influence on the governments of their former colonies, was vital for the US to bring about the necessary adjustments in African states’ policies. In the case of the UAM, France was a vital partner.

Once the news about UAM’s resolution reached Washington, Dean Rusk cabled US embassies in Paris and London, requesting them to

“sound out FonOff whether [the] French [are] willing and able [to] effectively use their influence during GA with former French states to modify their position to [the] extent of supporting moderate constructive action in GA on Por[tuguese] Africa.”

He further continued:

“If [the] Government of France appears favourable to such [a] request, we propose [to] suggest to [the] Government of Portugal in Lisbon [that] it may wish [to] approach [the] French along this line. FYI We do not want [to] urge [the] Government of Portugal [to] make appeal which [is] likely [to] be turned down.”87

Washington’s attempt to ensure UAM states did not deviate from their moderate position sought not only to forestall the strengthening of the Soviet bloc’s

86 Schneidman, Engaging Africa, pp. 15-16.
line among African states, but also to avert further pressures by the international community on the Portuguese government, and lessen its sense of being besieged even by its Atlantic allies. By mid-1962, the Kennedy Administration had come to the conclusion that a reversal of its initially tough position on Portugal was necessary, especially because the deadline for the renewal of the Lajes airbase agreement, on 31st December, was quickly approaching, and Kennedy was determined to preserve the vital strategic asset in the Azores.\(^\text{88}\) Salazar’s determination to defend Portugal’s colonial policy at all costs, and his aversion to continuous US demarches had led to a grave deterioration of Lisbon’s relation with Washington. Already in January 1962, in an explicit show of its displeasure, Portugal interdicted United Nations aircrafts from landing or refuelling in the Azores.\(^\text{89}\) Thus while Washington began seeking a rapprochement with the Portuguese government from the second half of 1962, it also made an effort to reduce African states’ pressures on Lisbon, and endorsed a softer line at the UN.

Seeking French cooperation regarding UAM states’ position through diplomatic back-channels also took into account Paris’s positive outlook on Lisbon. France not only held close cultural and political ties to Portugal, but also was sympathetic to Lisbon’s resolve to preserve Portugal’s status of a colonial empire. Portuguese presence and rule in Africa was, to Paris’s eyes, an important factor in the continuation of European influence on the continent. In this light, already in March 1961, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Maurice Couve de Murville, told his American counterparts that Western nations should not force Portugal out of Africa.\(^\text{90}\) Notably, the French position was also shared by West Germany, something which illustrates the common perspective of West European powers on the situation of Portuguese Africa. Gerstenmaier, President of Bundestag, and Werz, the head of the Foreign Office division West II, considered that the US “should not push the Portuguese too hard”, and that the “problem of Portuguese territories [was a] decisive factor in [the] position of [the] West in Africa”. While warning the US representatives in July 1962 that “trouble [was] likely to break out soon in Mozambique”, West

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\(^{89}\) Deptel, Lisbon 789, 29 January 1962, NSF, Box 154, JFKL.

\(^{90}\) Current Intelligence Memorandum, OCI No. 0391/62, 3 January 1962, NSF, Box 154, JFKL. Paris 3717. From American Embassy to State Department, March 8 1961, Interview with Foreign Minister Couve de Murville”, Secret, JFKL.
German concerns with the American policy towards Portugal were underpinned by the presence of a significant German community in Angola and Mozambique, and by the threat of Communist expansion in Africa, which they thought was a menace to NATO. In Robert Foulon’s assessment report “Problems of Southern Africa” mentioned earlier, he thus stressed:

“The Germans and the French are as concerned as we are over the danger which Portugal’s policy creates for the Western position in Africa. We must enlist their help along with that of the British. At the very least, a strong expression of Western concern will put the Portuguese on warning in the event it becomes necessary for us, individually or jointly, to take measures to forestall heavy [Soviet] Bloc influence with and support for the Angolan and Mozambique nationalists and their African allies.”

Thus while the US cooperated with its European partners on African matters, Washington’s urge to influence African states’ position on the question of Portuguese Africa stemmed from the UAM leaders becoming more and more convinced that the critical state of affairs in Angola and Mozambique called for severe measures against Lisbon. Such a gradual change in the UAM leaders’ positions, however, was detrimental for the US, while being justified by the incoming information on the deteriorating situation in Portuguese Africa. For example, in September, the chairman of the UN special subcommittee for Portuguese Africa, Carlos Salamanca, reported the grave situation in Angola, and particularly the problem of numerous refugees who had escaped to the Congo and were afraid to return to their country. Yet moderate African states’ resolve to adopt tougher measures also reflected, and resulted from, their more critical view of the American insistence to adopt a mild, if not apathetic approach towards the Angolan crisis at the UN, and to promote dialogue between Portugal and the UN. Such a change in US position now favourable to Portugal brought about African states’ suspicion of American policy and a more reserved attitude towards Washington’s intents during the fall of 1962. This explains the change of their position at the Libreville summit in September. The reaction of

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91 JFK NSF, Africa, Reel 1, General, State Department, from American Ambassador to Bonn, Morris to Secretary of State, Williams consultations on Africa, July 16 1962, 0436-0511.
92 NSF JFK, Africa, Reel 1, General, Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, Problems of Southern Africa, Revised draft, October 4 1962, p. 26, 0511-0601.
93 Embtel, New York 806, 18 September 1962, NSF, Box 4-5, JFKL.
African states was reflected in their attempt to amend the US restrained resolution at the UN, in December 1962, and instead impose sanctions against Portugal and condemn what they termed as “the mass extermination of the indigenous population of Angola.” The rift between the US and African states’ positions was further exacerbated when the US chose to join Portugal, South Africa and West European powers at the UN and voted against the hard-line resolution proposed by ASAF members.95

The Libreville Conference resolutions and the disputes surrounding the anti-Portuguese resolution at the UN illustrate that despite the west-leaning political orientation of moderate African states, particularly those of the UAM, and their dependence on major European powers and their generalized aversion to Communism, they nevertheless attempted to carry out policies independent from, and even conflicting with US and its West European partners’ interests. Moderate African leaders’ taking a decisive stand supporting the initiatives of left-wing national liberation movements in Libreville and attempting to advance a strongly anti-Portuguese agenda at the UN demonstrated their determination to pursue an independent policy underpinned by their views and concerns in the sphere of African affairs and bolstered by the influence of different African actors, such as national liberation movements, rather than direct Cold War pressures or an attempt to favour Communist bloc interests.

While UAM members’ attitude at the UN was not fully incompatible with Washington’s earlier policy pressing Salazar’s government to adopt drastic and swift changes to its colonial policy, it contradicted the new 1962 American approach towards Portugal, which attempted to both appease Lisbon and lessen international pressures on the Portuguese government at the UN. US covert diplomacy cooperation with France successfully prevented UAM’s Libreville initiatives to back left-wing national liberation movements’ proposals from coming into being, thus nullifying left-wing movements’ effort to mobilize UAM’s active support for their cause. It was evidence of Washington’s ability to curb moderate African states’ political leverage and manipulate their decision-making, both in spite, and because of, their possession of the balance of the voting power at the UN. Yet it also demonstrated the potential

political weight that even vulnerable African actors had on critical Cold War issues, and their importance as instrumental assets for nationalist movements, regional African counterparts and the superpowers.

As a result, and despite Angola rather than Mozambique being at the centre of international attention and debates at the UN, Western powers’ effort to prevent the UAM from advancing a severer agenda against Portuguese colonialism in general and bolster the impetus of national liberation halted the potential streamlining of direct action advocated by the Casablanca group and Communist powers, thus further protracting the status quo of Portuguese rule in Mozambique. On the one hand, this episode exemplifies the vulnerability of francophone moderate African states to Western powers’ influence, as opposed to radical states pursuing a more independent, albeit confrontational, policy. On the other hand, it also demonstrates that even highly dependent West-leaning African states approached the problem of white-minority and colonial regimes in Southern Africa based on their concerns in the ambit of African affairs. Furthermore, we saw that their decision-making was susceptible to the influence of local and regional African actors, particularly the leaders of national liberation movements, rather than being strictly underpinned by East or West predilections in the context of the Cold War. Ultimately, it emphasizes the importance of the roles played by African actors in affecting the Soviet and American engagements with the process of Mozambican national liberation.

While this episode illustrates the limitations of African states freedom of political manoeuvre vis-à-vis major international players, it underscores the significance of their roles in affecting superpowers’ interests in the context of national liberation in Portuguese Africa, and particularly in Mozambique. Firstly, Washington’s urge to try and modify UAM’s decision-making is indicative of the latter’s considerable political weight in international and African political arenas, due to its potential to shape local and regional balances of power and undermine Portugal’s ground in the international arena, thus affecting the development of events in Portuguese Africa in ways conflicting with US interests.

Secondly, while resorting to France’s influence on the UAM exemplifies the American policy of delegating to European powers the main responsibility for preserving Western influence on their former African colonies, it also points to the
degree of US cautiousness to avoid disgruntling and alienating otherwise friendly and cooperative African partners. This cautious approach, often associated with the ambivalent character of American policy on Africa, was underpinned by State Department officials’ conviction of the need to

“demonstrate to Africans that the United States is a truly disinterested friend and that [it] genuinely and fully support[s] their aspirations to run their own affairs free from outside interference.”

It reflected Washington’s taking into consideration African leaders’ sensitivity to signs of their interests and independence being disregarded or taken lightly, and their governments’ eagerness to convey an image of politically autonomous and sovereign actors. In this light, and despite the American success in influencing UAM’s decision-making, the latter’s Libreville initiatives and UN resolution amendments informed by its concerns and interests in African affairs, while conflicting with those of the US, is indicative of UAM’s determination to carry out policies regardless of Washington’s views and interests. The outcomes of such contradictions emphasize the roles played by moderate francophone African states in affecting, albeit indirectly, the superpowers’ engagements with the process of national liberation in Portuguese Africa, particularly in regard to their moral standing. The change in the American approach towards Portugal, and Western pressure on UAM to refrain from endorsing a more assertive line and supporting the unification of different national liberation movements, - something Moscow systematically pressed for, - undermined Washington’s moral standing in the eyes of the hitherto accommodating African states, the ASAF community in general, and national liberation movements. By bringing to the fore the circuitous character of US foreign policy, this episode not only represented a blow to the US image as an advocate of African peoples’ independence and a truly disinterested friend of Africans, but it also played in the hands of radical African states, left-wing movements, such as Gwambe’s UDENAMO, and the Soviet bloc.

Although evidence of US ambiguous policy reinforced leftist forces’ moral ground to accuse the US of neo-imperialist intents and highlight Western neo-colonial practices in their relations with former African territories, UAM states did not fully

swing away from their moderate position and continued maintaining close relations with Western powers. It is important to emphasize UAM’s continued West-leaning position in order to stress that its attempt to take a proactive stand in regard to national liberation in Portuguese Africa did not seek to favour USSR’s interests and did not represent an attempt to become politically closer to the Soviet bloc. Moderate African states’ concerns about preserving friendly relations with Western countries was illustrated by the Sudanese and Senegalese ambassadors private conversation with a senior Soviet Foreign Ministry official.

In June 1964, the ambassadors of Sudan and Senegal to Moscow, Jacub Osman and Seini Lumom, held an unofficial meeting with the Head of Soviet Foreign Ministry Chief Directorate of the Near East countries, A.D. Shiborin. After clarifying that they were speaking on behalf of all other African states’ official representatives in Moscow and at their request, Osman and Lumom expressed their concerns about their being invited to participate in protest rallies and other manifestations in Moscow organized by Soviet public organizations such as the African-Asian Solidarity Committee and the World Peace Committee. While these African officials found rallies supporting the causes of political freedom in Southern Africa valuable and important, they also felt they were being put in an awkward and delicate situation. Osman and Lumom explained to their Soviet counterpart that African official representatives in Moscow felt uncomfortable because such venues were accompanied by condemnatory speeches and resulted in resolutions strongly attacking other countries with whom African states maintained friendly relations. African ambassadors attending these rallies, therefore, were reprimanded by their governments and were demanded to give clarifications. This was especially critical when the Soviet press made only brief reference to African ambassadors’ names present at such events, followed by full publication of the rallies’ resolutions, whose content they were unfamiliar with beforehand. The Senegalese and Sudanese diplomats told Shiborin that African officials no longer wanted to take part of rallies organized by Soviet unofficial organizations, and asked him to explain their viewpoint to these organizations.97 Although no direct reference was made to Western

97 Chadwyck-Healey Microfilm Holdings, RGANI, General Department of the Central Committee (1953-1966), Film A1046, Reel 107, 451, Memorandum of conversation, Jacub Osman (Republic of Sudan), Seini Lumom (Republic of Senegal) and A.D. Shiborin, 29 June 1964, Lamont Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
powers or the PRC during the conversation, this episode is nevertheless indicative of African states’ cautiousness in avoiding deteriorating their relations with countries whose policy was conflicting with the USSR’s. In the context of African affairs, and critical issues such as apartheid and national liberation in Southern Africa, moderate African states’ bilateral relations with no-African countries thus were put to test. They pointed their cautious attitude in preserving positive relations with actors whose policies contradicted the generally African shared goals of putting an end to colonialism and white-minority rule in the continent.

The UAM: from conciliation to radicalization

Despite UAM’s failure to push forward an agenda deviating from their otherwise moderate stand, their resolve in doing so, despite going against American interests, deserves closer examination. This is important for supporting a key argument of the thesis that African actors, regardless of the degree of their vulnerability to, or dependency on major international powers, pursued their particular interests and agendas, rather than being mere instruments in the latter’s hands. This, in turn, helps driving home the central argument that the successes and failures of the Soviet and American policies in the context of Mozambican national liberation were significantly affected by the agencies of African actors pursuing their interests in the realm of African affairs. Despite being manipulated by, and representing instrumental assets for different players at local, regional and international levels, the case of the UAM states exemplifies the potential impact that such African actors’ leverage had on superpower interests.

While African states’ increasing concern about the situation in Portuguese Africa was among the reasons for their more assertive initiatives at Libreville and the UN, such a move should also be seen in the broader context of the dynamics of their relations with the US. In particular, economic issues concerning US AID programmes to African states, and the degree of Washington’s perceived regard for their political weight should be addressed. This section looks at UAM’s changing perception of US policy in regard to African development and bilateral relations, and argues that signs of American half-hearted or ambivalent commitment to African welfare and development led to a degree of UAM states’ both wariness and disillusionment with
the American partnership. This, in turn, contributed to a degree of UAM’s unrestraint in pursuing policies and taking initiatives which were not as conciliatory with US interests as Washington’s might have desired. As a result, the UAM members’ position on issues critical for the US foreign policy became less conditional on American and western interests, rather prioritizing their own interests and regional agendas.

In 1962, resentment on the part of some UAM leaders began to emerge towards what they saw as a lack of consideration by Washington for their role in African and international affairs. In a private conversation between the American ambassador to the CAR, his French counterpart, and the leaders of Chad and Niger, Tombalbaye and Diori Hamani, the two African leaders “complained of the casual interest US shows in UAM and its potential as a useful and friendly organization in African affairs.” They argued that “UAM could be helpful [to US interests] in many ways”, such as in issues regarding the Congo crisis, “but to do so would require strong US support [for their countries].” This hinted at the UAM states’ desire to see Washington adopt a more unambiguous position regarding the Casablanca vs. Monrovia groups’ confrontation, and show greater commitment to the development needs of moderate African states. Unsurprisingly, the American ambassador “not[ed] it was not US position to become intimately involved with any regional groupings in Africa”. This reflected the view of George Ball, an influential top ranking State Department official who preferred a noncommittal and cost-effective Africa policy, and advocated that the Lagos powers should not be overidentified with the US, as this “could be regarded as gratuitous slap at [the] Casablanca powers.”

It was the Niger leader’s final remark, however, that most clearly reflected the growing signs of moderate African states’ sense of disenchantment with the American attitude, and an indirect subscription to Casablanca group’s rhetoric regarding US policy for Africa. “In [sub-Saharan] Africa”, Hamani remarked, “the United States is interested only in Nigeria and the Congo”. Although Nigeria and the Congo were not the only countries at the top of the US Africa policy priority list, Hamani’s somewhat impulsive observation drew home the generalized UAM’s view that the US

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98 JFK NSF, Africa, Reel 14, Nigeria, State Department, Ball to US Embassy in Lagos, Confidential, 27\textsuperscript{th} January 1962, 0001-0067.
99 JFK NSF, Africa, Reel 18, UAM, Airgram, From Burns (American Embassy in Bangui) to Department of State, March 29 1962, 0438-0487.
engagement with Africa was primarily focused on countries of either economically or security more critical importance.

Another example of such a trend of UAM states’ dissatisfaction was Upper Volta (UV). While most UAM countries displayed what the State Department called a “healthy awareness of the Communist danger”, countries such as UV demonstrated a fervent anti-Communist outlook. In October 1961, the UV President Yameogo privately ridiculed Khrushchev and was especially critical of the Soviet display of power by means of atomic tests.  

When discussing the question of Soviet landing rights with Mennen Williams in the following year, he lectured his American guest on the dangers of Communist penetration in the region, in reference to Ghana, Guinea, and Mali. Yet remarkably, it was also the Voltaic government that later most exasperatedly expressed its disappointment with the lack of American commitment to the country, once it became clear that the demonstration of fervent anti-communism and high regard for the US did not translate into the expected payloads of American economic and technical assistance to the UV. Already in December 1961, the US embassy in Ouagadougou cautioned the State Department that cuts in economic assistance to the country could potentially have a negative effect on UV political orientation, especially given greater American efforts with regard to Ghana and Mali. As US Ambassador Estes put it,

“to pour millions into antagonistic pro-left Ghana and [at the] same time plead lack [of] funds for friendly pro-West Entente [is] difficult if not impossible [to] explain here.”

A month earlier, he questioned Washington: “what is it worth to the United States that Upper Volta remain pro-Western and anti-communist, constituting a barrier between Mali and Ghana, instead of a bridge[?]” The ambassador urged the State Department to find economic means or “other manifestations of the sincerity of the United States interest in Upper Volta … as assumed it is still in our interest that Upper Volta

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100 JFK NSF, Africa, Reel 18, Upper Volta, State Department, From Thomas S. Estes (US Ambassador Ouagadougou) to Secretary of State, 4th October 1961, 0487-0517. JFK NSF, Africa, Reel 18, Upper Volta, State Department, From Thomas S. Estes (Ouagadougou) to Secretary of State, 30th October 1961, 0487-0517.
101 JFK NSF, Africa, Reel 1, General, State Department, Report on Fourth African trip of Assistant Secretary Mennen Williams, Attachment to trip report, From G. Mennen Williams to the President, the Secretary, 14th May 1962, p. 7, 0350-0436.
102 JFK NSF, Africa, Reel 18, Upper Volta, State Department, From Carson (US embassy Ouagadougou) to Secretary of State, 18th December 1961, 0487-0517.
maintain its present [political] orientation.” Mennen Williams strongly defended such a view in the US Administration: “We simply cannot at the beginning of the highly publicized Decade of Development, tell these badly underdeveloped countries that we are not interested in assisting them.” Nevertheless, as Larry Grubbs had rightly argued in *Secular Missionaries*,

> “Williams’s complaint illustrated a key ambiguity at the heart of a US aid policy ostensibly based on such ‘hard’ criteria as planning and absorptive capacity, but also influenced by ‘soft’ diplomatic concerns about American influence across the continent.”

Furthermore, high-ranking officials in the Kennedy Administration, such as George Ball, identified with the ‘Europeanist’ rather than ‘Africanist’ official circles, had systematically opposed to major US aid commitments to Africa. As a result, even Nigeria, held as the most important African recipient of the US aid programme fell victim to failed American promises of major assistance for its development.

Despite US deliveries of economic and military assistance, Mennen Williams’s African trip aiming to promote American relations with the young African states, and Estes’s request to Washington to “submit [a] campaign to emphasize our assistance and interest [in] friendly Entente states [which] would help [us] counter highly publicized [Soviet] bloc aid to [the Casablanca Group] states”, the somewhat conflicting expressions of broader American strategy for Africa found their reflections in the increasing disillusionment of moderate African states. Reflecting Yameogo’s views, by April 1962, high ranking UV government officials began explicitly criticising the “West generally, and US AID program specifically for failure [to] provide anticipated assistance”. As one UV official put it,

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103 JFK NSF, Africa, Reel 18, Upper Volta, State Department, From Estes (US ambassador Ouagadougou) to Secretary of State, 24th November 1961, 0487-0517.
107 JFK NSF, Africa, Reel 18, Upper Volta, State Department, From Estes (US ambassador Ouagadougou) to Secretary of State, 21st March 1962, 0517-end of reel.
“We welcomed your survey teams year ago, because we could tell our people [the] West would help us. Teams gone year and we have nothing. What can we tell our people as result [of] our diplomacy?”

The UV official further argued before his American counterpart:

“the West tells Africa one thing, but follow[s the] line [of] ‘your NATO allies’. For Africans, Russia and [the] US [are] in the same basket, both pretend interest but all they want is [to] keep Africa from going to [the] other side.”

Such a disillusionment with the American promises of assistance was also bolstered by evidence of significant support the Soviets were providing neighbouring countries such as Mali. In their view, the US was paying only lip service to the country’s development aspirations, - an outlook shared by other UAM states. For example, in regard with Mauritania, the poorest member of the UAM, Williams expressed his strong belief to his USAID counterpart that the US government cannot “remain unresponsive to this pro-Western Government’s repeated requests for aid when we have programs under way in every other West African country”. In his view, refusing aid to Mauritania while continuing assisting radical states such as Ghana, Guinea, and Mali would reinforce the general African suspicion that the US was more interested in aiding countries with close links to the Soviet bloc.

A degree of UAM states’ disappointment with Washington is of importance for understanding why their hitherto conciliatory attitude favouring the American ‘constructive policy line’ on critical issues such as Portuguese colonial rule and South African apartheid changed to a more unconstrained and assertive position at both Libreville and the UN. Furthermore, it should be noted that even when in 1961 the United States took a hard-line approach to Portugal in order to appease the Afro-Asian bloc and imposed an arms restriction on Portugal in August, the notion that the US was responsible for Portugal’s aggressive conduct in Africa and was supporting Portugal’s war effort continued to prevail in African official circles. Unsurprisingly, the change in the American position in 1962 seemed to fully corroborate such beliefs, exacerbated by the intensive propaganda campaigns carried out by Communist

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108 JFK NSF, Africa, Reel 18, Upper Volta, State Department, From Estes (US ambassador Ouagadougou) to Secretary of State, 10th April 1962, 0517-end of reel.
109 From Estes to Secretary of State, 10th April 1962, ibid.
110 ibid.
111 Mennen Williams to Fowler Hamilton, USAID Administrator, 23rd February 1962, box 10, Mennen Williams papers, RG 59, National Archives II.
powers, left-wing organizations and national liberation movements such as UDENAMO. Thus, the UAM’s changing position in regard to the question of national liberation in Portuguese Africa exemplifies the self-interested, rather than fully dependent character of its policies and decision-making in relation to the US. It shows how the most representative organization within the Lagos group of African states, despite its vulnerability to the pressures and interests of Western powers, took proactive steps potentially impacting on the superpower competition in the context of the national liberation struggle in Portuguese Africa. Although the implications of such a change in the UAM’s position on the state of affairs in Mozambique were negligible, in part due to the US-French covert diplomacy reaction, it nevertheless highlights the vulnerability of the American policy to the agency of African actors.

In addition to the above factors influencing the UAM’s political behaviour, one should also consider the peculiar character of African states’ joint decision-making regarding Portugal’s colonialism as a factor in their new position. As the Portuguese Foreign Minister, Franco Nogueira, noted in a conversation with President Kennedy about Portugal’s attempts to have a dialogue with African states, tête-à-tête meetings were constructive and sensible, yet when African officials were together, they seemed to compete with each other over the most radical stand.112 Such behaviour reflects the need many African leaders felt to shore up their public image as strong defenders of the anti-colonial movement and all African territories’ independence, something which most probably played a role in the UAM’s shift to a more assertive position towards Portugal and South Africa in September 1962.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the change in UAM’s position should be viewed in the context of the overall progress by national liberation movements in Angola and Mozambique. In contrast with early 1962, when Gwambe attempted to mobilize the UAM’s support for UDENAMO alone, by the end of that year a common Mozambican front – FRELIMO - had been formed, and the same goal was being energetically pursued by the MPLA of Angola, despite the resistance of Holden Roberto’s FNLA. The trend of unification of different national liberation movements into single and larger organizations suggested their potentially more vigorous and coherent action in each of the respective territories, and their more inclusive

112 Memorandum for the President, 7 November 1963, NSF, Box 123, JFKL.
representative character of many different ethnic and tribal communities. It also signaled the ending of the factional rivalries buttressed by different regional and international players, advocating conflicting political agendas and ideological outlooks. Furthermore, for African states to back larger nationalist coalitions as part of a broader and popular campaign against colonialism was less of a controversial endeavour than to support different antagonistic factions not representative of the majority of the respective countries’ population. In addition, while the new UAM’s initiative was directed against Portugal and South Africa, it did not involve an anti-Western agenda such as Gwambe had attempted to put forward in his appeal earlier that year. Thus, in contrast with Gwambe’s earlier move, when he attempted to make the UAM states antagonistic to the West, while his movement’s regional reputation was at a low-ebb, the September proposal was of conciliatory character, and showed greater potential for effective results, as it did not pose the risk of openly and directly challenging Western powers, all of which contributed to moderate African leaders’ endorsement of nationalist leaders’ plea for their support.

For the US, to preserve the ability to directly influence the UAM states’ decision-making would have required it to maintain greater levels of political and economic commitment to the regional grouping. This, in turn, contradicted the broader American strategy for Africa, characterized by its image of neutrality in African affairs, its disinclination to maintain high-level financial and economic commitment with most African states, and its aim of delegating the main responsibility for managing political, economic and defence issues of independent African countries to their former colonial powers, Britain and France.

While the limitations of the American leverage to directly influence political decision-making of different African countries were largely self-imposed, the US lack of commitment had led to a degree of disillusionment among the UAM states with Washington. This factor, together with African leaders’ generalized belief that the United States was favouring the continuity of the Portuguese colonial policy, played a role in their increased willingness to endorse a more assertive anti-colonial agenda promoted by the Soviet and Casablanca blocs, in spite of US interests. As this chapter has shown, US cooperation with France through diplomatic back-channels became, therefore, vital for Washington to be able to make the necessary ‘corrections’ in the UAM’s political decisions and courses of action. While such American countermoves
in the second half of 1962 were primarily underpinned by the need to lessen the pressures on Portugal in order to secure access to the Lajes airbase in the Azores, they also demonstrated the means and methods available to the US to prevent moderate African states from moving ahead political initiatives advancing the cause of left-wing national liberation movements. Nevertheless, the UAM’s decision to endorse a policy line deviating from its usual moderate course is evidence of the degree of the UAM’s political autonomy in relation to Western powers and its potential to impact on American interests. UAM’s joint action compelling Washington to take measures in the realm of covert diplomacy and at the UNGA revealed the ambiguous character of the US policy towards the process of national liberation. It also weakened the US prestige with the ASAF group and the hitherto pro-Western leaders of national liberation movements. The examined episode, therefore, illustrates the crucial role played by African actors in affecting the superpower engagements with the process of Mozambican national liberation.
CHAPTER VI

Uganda and the superpowers’ competition in the process of Mozambican national liberation

This chapter addresses Uganda’s involvement in Mozambican national liberation in 1963, and focuses on the ways in which it impacted on Soviet and American interests in the region. It identifies and examines the factors influencing and dictating Uganda’s leader, Milton Obote’s decision-making in the context of regional and international politics and its effects on regional political dynamics and the balances of power involving different national liberation movements and African states; and the subsequent repercussions on Soviet and American interest in Mozambican national liberation. This chapter argues that Soviet interests fell victim to Obote’s erratic decision-making, which was influenced primarily by his regional political concerns, thus exposing the vulnerability of the Soviet strategic course to the agency of African states in the context of Mozambican national liberation. This chapter, therefore, supports the core argument of the thesis by showing the central role played by African states in affecting superpower engagements with the process of Mozambican national liberation in the first half of 1960s.

Notably, despite Uganda’s involvement in Mozambican national liberation, and its role in affecting the superpowers’ competition in the region, authors who have addressed the roles of regional players in the context of Mozambican national liberation have largely left this country outside of their analyses and accounts. This, therefore, adds to the importance of making a detailed study of Uganda’s role in Mozambican national liberation and its effects on the superpowers’ interests in this realm.

The inclination of the scholarship to leave Uganda at the periphery of their studies is somewhat understandable. One factor is this country’s geographic distance from Mozambique’s borders. In contrast to Tanganyika, Zambia, and Malawi, this not only made the country a less convenient base for Mozambican militant groups, but also the Ugandan leadership had no ambitions for territorial expansion in Mozambique after its independence. Geography, therefore, naturally limited the country’s relevance in the study of the Mozambican national liberation. In fact,
authors such as Marcum and Schneidman have only mentioned Obote’s promise to support national liberation movements in Southern Africa during the Addis Ababa Conference in May 1963, without further elaboration of its results.¹ In this study, however, the use of unique Portuguese archival material containing detailed and valuable information about Uganda’s involvement in Mozambican national liberation makes it possible to reach a deeper understanding of this country’s role in that process, and its impact on the superpower competition in the region.

This chapter illustrates how the complexity of regional politics, despite the influence of the superpowers, dictated and limited Uganda’s role and decision-making in the early stages of the Mozambican national liberation, thus impacting on Moscow’s and Washington’s respective aims and designs. In particular, it focuses on three events. The first concerns how Milton A. Obote, the Prime Minister of Uganda upon the country’s independence on 9th October 1962, sought to pursue a neutral stand in the Cold War upon his country’s independence, yet was soon induced by the United States to take a pro-Western stand. This, in turn, consolidated Uganda’s moderate standing, and limited the Soviet ability to influence Uganda government’s decision-making in both the Cold War and Mozambican national liberation dimensions.

The second event relates to the Addis Ababa Conference in May 1963. It illustrates how the subsequent leftist pressures on Obote at both domestic and regional levels, together with the radical African states’ influence in the context of the Addis Ababa Conference led the Uganda leader to make decisions which were in conflict with his hitherto pro-Western and moderate stand and the interests of his PAFMECSA counterparts, Tanganyika and Kenya, and those of the US. Markedly, Uganda providing shelter to Gwambe’s UDENAMO, and not the Tanganyika and Kenya-supported FRELIMO, together with Obote’s endorsement of Nkrumah’s views, and his criticism of civil rights in the US are illustrative of the impact of the leftist forces on the Ugandan political stand, all of which ultimately benefited Soviet and the Casablanca group’s interests. Notably, while the Ugandan decision to support the Marxist UDENAMO in mid-1963 has not been addressed by the scholarship, it

represents a striking example of this country’s involvement in Mozambican national liberation; the vulnerability of this young African state to regional political pressures, and its impact on superpowers’ interests.

Finally, this study addresses Tanganyikan and Kenyan political pressures on Uganda to cease its support for UDENAMO, thus showing how Soviet interests in the context of Mozambican national liberation fell victim to the tensions in African regional politics and regional actors’ conflicting interests.

*Obote: from cautious neutrality to pro-Western standing*

In order to comprehend the ways in which regional and domestic politics, particularly in the context of the Addis Ababa Conference, impacted upon Uganda’s involvement in Mozambican national liberation, and its subsequent effect on the superpowers’ interests, it is first necessary to address Washington’s efforts to ensure Obote’s commitment to a pro-Western political course upon Uganda’s independence. This serves the purpose of demonstrating the contrasting change in the Ugandan government’s public position towards the issues of national liberation in Southern Africa, civil rights, and African politics in general, before and after the Addis Ababa Conference.

A former British territory, Uganda continued maintaining close ties with Britain after its independence in October 1962. According to State Department documents, the US considered Uganda to be in many ways more advanced economically and socially than Kenya and Tanganyika. Washington considered the country to have good development potential, and as a valuable regional asset for ensuring political and economic stability in Central and Eastern Africa. For the US, Uganda’s importance was less about the country itself, but rather the value of its strategic location. Washington believed that a moderate and stable Uganda was vital not only for a successful establishment of the PAFMECSA federation with Tanganyika and Kenya, but that it could also play a positive role in lessening the

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tensions in the Congo and Rwanda, and those within the Central African Federation. Uganda was expected, therefore, to set an example to other African partners, and act as a temperate regional player, by precluding possible radicalization, and ultimately, lessening the danger of Communist influence in the region. Clearly, such views were informed by Washington’s apprehension regarding leftist national liberation movements. It is unsurprising, therefore, that Uganda’s relations with Tanganyika and Kenya, and the prospects of a federal constitution was the first topic of discussion between Obote and Kennedy during the former’s visit to the US, when the Prime Minister expressed his optimism in this PAFMECSA project. In fact, Nyerere was eager to see Uganda become a member of the prospective PAFMECSA project. In October 1961, Battle stressed to Bundy that because Uganda held a

“more conservative political outlook than Kenya and Tanganyika, [it] could play an important role in such a federation and would probably act as a brake on any tendency within the federation to court friendship with the Communist Bloc.”

Such an assessment of the country’s moderate political course was based on the views of Obote’s predecessor, Benedicto Kiwanuka, whom Bundy described as

“staunchly anti-Communist, friendly towards the United States, and one of the few African leaders who has risen to power without stooping to the use of anti-Western invective to gain his ends”.

Obote, however, soon outran Kiwanuka in the domestic political arena, and was elected Prime Minister in April 1962. Although Obote expressed his interest in Uganda’s cooperation with the United States in a conversation with Hendrik Van Oss, US consul to Kampala, the American official found him “very cautious”. In a report to the State Department, Van Oss advanced the view that Obote’s

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4 JFK NSF, Africa, Reel 18, Uganda, State Department, Memorandum of Conversation, “Call of Prime Minister of Uganda on the President: situation in East Africa”, 22nd October 1962, 0392-0438.
5 JFK NSF, Africa, Reel 18, Uganda, State Department, From L.D. Battle to McGeorge Bundy, “Visit of Chief Minister Benedicto Kiwanuka of Uganda: Request for Appointment to see the President”, 11th October 1961, 0215-0392.
“relations with the United States will be governed by cold, hard considerations of self-interest in both personal and Uganda-wise sense, rather than by pro-Western ideological convictions.”

While describing Obote as a moderate, Van Oss noted that Obote

“is not contemplating any drastic move to the left, at least until he is convinced that there are advantages to be gained by adopting neutralist position”.  

Such a cautious position of Obote is exemplified by Uganda’s relations with Britain, which according to Susan Gitelson, was Uganda’s key foreign non-African partner in the first half of the 1960s. Yet, as Dale Tatum points out in *Who influenced whom?*, although

“Great Britain had more money invested in Uganda than any other foreign country and had the most contacts with Uganda’s military establishment … [it] was still not able to control the direction of Uganda’s foreign policy” during Obote’s first rule.  

Given the degree of unpredictability of Uganda’s political course, Van Oss’s report concluded:

“I therefore believe it be of outmost importance to our relations with Uganda that we demonstrate our friendship and interest in some concrete fashion. … We should lose no time in doing what we can to dispel any suspicion [Obote] may still have of American motives and policies [in Africa].”

Here, it should be noted that the association Van Oss established between ‘neutralist position’ in the Cold War and ‘leftist political orientation’ reflected the general schism between Third World non-aligned countries. While countries such as Sudan or those of the UAM claimed to be neutral while closely cooperating with the West, other countries’ neutrality was perceived by the US as a propensity to close relations with Communist powers.

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7 JFK NSF, Africa, Reel 18, Uganda, from American consul in Kampala to State Department, “Prime Minister Obote expresses interest in close relation with United States”, 9th May 1962, 0215-0392.  
10 “Prime Minister Obote expresses interest in close relation with United States”, 9th May 1962, op. cit.  
Pointing to the White House the importance of ensuring Uganda followed a moderate political course, and stressing the country’s beneficial role for US interests in the region, the State Department promptly adopted a hands-on approach to draw Obote’s favour. Soon after the formal transfer of sovereignty from the UK, the US senator Benjamin Smith presented the Ugandan leader with a gift from President Kennedy – an engraved, silver desk set – and a personal letter from the President. Smith further referred to American financial and material commitment to Uganda, and passed on Kennedy’s personal invitation to meet Obote in Washington. The Prime Minister was “visibly impressed” and “deeply touched”. The next day, in a warm reply to Kennedy’s letter, which Obote found “inspiring and most encouraging”, he said that

“although he had just cancelled his trip to the UN, he would change his mind in view of the President’s ‘kind consideration’ in inviting him to Washington [on] October 22-23.”

In order to ensure Obote received full media and official attention while in the US, Van Oss recommended to Washington that his visit should not coincide with those of Kenyatta or other prominent African leaders. Apart from a lunch with President Kennedy, the State Department had also arranged a country tour organized through the African American Institute. Thus the significance of Uganda’s political course for US interests in the region translated into a diplomatic effort aimed at flattering the cautious leader, “lest we start out on [the] wrong foot with another sensitive African”, as one US official noted.

It did not take long for the effects of American efforts on Obote’s outlook to be felt. In an interview with the Baltimore Sun, he expressed his distrust of Soviet intentions towards Africa, and rejected the Ghanaian political agenda, while emphasizing the importance of the American role in world politics, and particularly in

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12 JFK NSF, Africa, Reel 18, Uganda, State Department, from William Brubeck, Memorandum for McGeorge Bundy, “Recommendation Prime Minister of Uganda be invited to visit Washington while at United Nations”, 29th September 1962, 0215-0392.
14 JFK NSF, Africa, Reel 18, Uganda, from American consul in Kampala to State Department, “Prime Minister Obote expresses interest in close relation with United States”, 9th May 1962, 0215-0392.
15 JFK NSF, Africa, Reel 18, Uganda, Private message from RKW to Carl, October 16, 1962. This message addressed the need for organizing a lunch between Ugandan Prime Minister Milton Obote and President Kennedy, 0215-0392.
As Gitelson pointed out, it was only in the second half of the 1960s that Obote’s Government began prioritizing its relations with both the Soviet Union and China, something which went in parallel with an orientation towards socialism, a degree of Uganda’s radicalization in African affairs, and closer ties to Tanzania.\footnote{JFK NSF, Africa, Reel 18, Uganda, from American consul in Kampala to State Department, “Views of Prime Minister Obote as expressed to Baltimore Sun correspondent”, 1\textsuperscript{st} June 1962, 0215-0392.}

Obote’s trip had a positive effect on his views of the US. In a press conference upon his return to Uganda, the Prime Minister expressed his great pleasure with the trip, and

“showed genuine appreciation for … the courtesy which the President and other American officials had shown in receiving him during the height of the Cuban missile crisis.”\footnote{Gitelson, “Major Shifts in Recent Ugandan Foreign Policy”, p. 364.}

While publicly denying that his trip represented a turn to the West, and reasserting Uganda’s neutrality in the Cold War, Obote expressed at length his approval of Kennedy’s action during the Cuban missile crisis. He further claimed that he should not visit the USSR solely because he had visited the US as a Prime Minister of a neutral country. Perhaps in an attempt to dispel any Western concerns, while preserving his image of neutrality, Obote added: “If I go to Russia, I am not going to become a Russian – I am not a Russian. I am an African of Uganda.”\footnote{JFK NSF, Africa, Reel 18, Uganda, Airgram, Embassy Kampala to State Department, “Obote’s press conference on return from United States”, 9\textsuperscript{th} November 1962, 0215-0392.} Yet, in a private conversation with US Charge d’Affaires in Kampala, Obote clearly acknowledged his West-leaning stand. Hoping the American “had not misunderstood his [public] statement on non-alignment”, Obote explained that

“for political reasons, there were some things that could not be said publicly, but … there was no question but that Uganda was ‘aligned’ with [the US]. ‘You cannot be unaligned on such issues’”, Obote said.\footnote{“Obote’s press conference on return from United States”, 9\textsuperscript{th} November 1962, 0215-0392.}

It should be noted that Obote’s wary public statements regarding the Soviet Union should be seen in the context of Washington’s foreign policy rhetoric, taking advantage of the anti-colonial campaign to attack the Soviet Union before the leaders of Third World countries. For example, the recommended position to President

\footnote{JFK NSF, Africa, Reel 18, Uganda, Airgram, Embassy Kampala to State Department, “Call on the Prime Minister”, 19\textsuperscript{th} November 1962, 0215-0392.}
Kennedy for his talks with his Sudanese counterpart in 1961 was expressed in the following terms:

“The continuing tide of self-determination has our sympathy and our support. Colonialism, however, in its harshest form, is not only the exploitation of the new nations by the old. That is why we cannot ignore the fact that the tide of self-determination has not yet reached the Communist Empire, where a population far larger than that officially termed ‘dependent’ lives under governments installed by foreign troops instead of free institutions.”

Although the anti-colonial struggle was not part of Kennedy’s conversation with Obote, US officials’ public and explicit demonstration of sympathy for the cause of self-determination and independence in Africa, shrewdly connected to their condemnation of the Soviet grip on Eastern Europe before African leaders, could not have left the latter indifferent to such a sensitive matter.

To sum up, the initial cautious position of Uganda’s leader towards the Cold War prompted Washington to take active steps in order to ensure that the newly independent African country followed a West-oriented political course, and had a positive effect on the consolidation of PAFMECSA as a stable and moderate African grouping, counterbalancing the impetus of the radical Casablanca group, and averting the expansion of Communist influence in the region. American efforts to gain Obote’s favour and induce him to follow a pro-Western - albeit formally neutral - political course, proved successful. Active steps towards the expansion of diplomatic relations and official exchange visits between the two countries began to take place, and the United States promised considerable AID assistance to Uganda.

Yet whatever room for political manoeuvre Obote believed he initially had, it was virtually lost when he privately assured his American counterparts of his commitment to the West. As in many other cases of African states demonstrating their commitment to the West, despite the expectation that this was intrinsic to guaranteeing American assistance, such a step had the opposite effect. On the one hand, Western assistance to Uganda was slow, limited, and under unfavourable conditions. On the other hand, it invited increasing leftist and third-worldist political pressures on the Ugandan leadership, both at home and in regional political arena. In

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1963, finding his government in an increasingly difficult situation, Obote expressed
the feeling to Mennen Williams that “Uganda was not considered really independent”,
and was “written off” by Western partners. “We are either too good or … we don’t
count for much”, Obote remarked, and pointed that both Kenya and Tanganyika were
receiving American and British economic assistance much more promptly, and in
greater amounts than his country was.22

Such a decrease of confidence in the West and its intentions towards former
British protectorates was also connected to a marked decline in the British position in
East and Southern Africa. According to the State Department, the lack of an over-all
British policy for Africa posed a challenge for the preservation of Western influence
on the continent, because the UK was “basing its action largely on the exigencies of
the moment as imposed by the different national or private British interests in the
many different situations in Africa”.23 In January 1963, Rusk cabled US embassies in
Kampala, Dar-es-Salaam, Nairobi and London, expressing the State Department’s
concern about the “damage to overall Western interests and influence” in Africa,
caused by the great “extent to which Britain’s good repute has sunk” on the continent,
particularly in the PAFMECSA countries. These countries’ leaders, Rusk pointed out,
“now tend increasingly to equate British policy with the narrow outlook they expect
from certain financial interests.” He stressed that the dissipation of confidence that
African leaders had had in the past in Britain’s desire to help their countries achieve
their aspirations “would decrease [the] British ability to exert constructive and
credible influence on [the] remaining problem of political transition in Eastern and
Southern Africa.” Pointing out that African leaders’ confidence in the value of their
cooperation with Britain “[was] a primary asset to [the] West in Africa and
throughout former colonial areas”, the Secretary of State warned that

“to sacrifice this prime asset for tactical purposes or short term
advantages would risk not only radical solutions in southern Africa, but
could [also] involve serious loss [of] Western influence throughout
Africa.”24

22 JFK NSF, Africa, Reel 18, Uganda, Airgram, State Department, United States Mission to the United
23 JFK NSF, Africa, Reel 1, General, “Problems of Southern Africa”, State Department, Confidential,
24 JFK NSF, Africa, Reel 8, Congo, State Department, Confidential, Rusk to Dar-es-Salaam, Kampala,
Hence, despite Obote’s continued commitment to the West, a degree of his disillusionment with its unfulfilled promises of assistance, contrasting with greater Western assistance being given to Tanganyika and Kenya represents one of the factors leading to the changes in Uganda’s position. Firstly, this change was regarding the issue of national liberation in Southern Africa, particularly Uganda’s backing of the pro-Soviet UDENAMO. Secondly, this change translated into Obote’s favourable attitude towards Nkrumah’s agenda and the causes of leftist lobby movements, in the context of the Addis Ababa Conference in May 1963.

The following section examines other factors affecting Obote’s public stand at the Addis Ababa Conference regarding the anti-colonial struggle in Southern Africa, which translated into Uganda’s involvement in Mozambican national liberation and its support for Gwambe’s UDENAMO. It argues that the limitations and vulnerabilities of Uganda’s political prowess in regional affairs, when exposed to the influence and pressures of different regional political forces, were among other determining factors of the country’s involvement in the process of Mozambican national liberation. In particular, it demonstrates that the moderate-oriented Uganda’s decision to shelter the Soviet-backed UDENAMO was underpinned by regional political dynamics and the influence of leftist civil-rights groups, rather than by an aim to favour Moscow’s Cold War interests in the region. Ultimately, it supports the general argument that superpower interests in the realm of the Mozambican national liberation were affected by the agency of African states, something primarily underpinned by their regional and domestic political concerns, rather than Cold War considerations.

*The Addis Ababa Conference and the leftist pressures*

This section discusses the beginning of Uganda’s involvement in the dynamics of Mozambican national liberation marked by the Addis Ababa Conference, which took place in Ethiopia’s capital city from 22-25 May 1963. The Addis Ababa Conference was a long-awaited event of foremost importance in African politics in the first half of the 1960s. After years of disputes, the leaders of both the Casablanca and Lagos powers had gathered together, in an attempt to settle the antagonisms between them, and create the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Although the Conference
adopted a charter which largely represented a blow to Nkrumah’s hopes for his version of African unity, and pushed him into increasing political isolation, moderate African leaders also acknowledged the need “to eradicate all forms of colonialism from the continent”. For such purposes, an OAU African Liberation Committee (ALC) and its ‘liberation fund’ were created. This institution aimed at sponsoring and coordinating all kinds of assistance from both African and non-African actors to national liberation movements. Such an initiative resulted from an active campaign of Casablanca group leaders such as Ben Bella of Algeria, who made an emotional appeal “urg[ing] his listeners to rush to the assistance of the men dying south of equator”, in particular the MPLA in Angola. Sékou Touré of Guinea, in turn, proposed that each ALC member country (Tanganyika, Ethiopia, Algeria, UAR, Uganda, Guinea, Leopoldville Congo, Senegal, Nigeria) should contribute one percent of government budgets to the OAU’s liberation fund. Such initiatives were undertaken in close coordination with leaders of different liberation movements, both those with leftist and moderate outlooks.

Both FRELIMO and UDENAMO from Mozambique were represented at the conference. Despite strong antagonisms between different movements, a joint memorandum of 20 liberation movements’ leaders was produced. Featuring the signatures of both Mondlane and Gwambe, the document was presented at the Conference, requesting African states’ assistance. National liberation leaders asked for the creation of a ‘Bureau of African Liberation’ [the ALC] - a body which would act as a strategic centre for coordination and distribution of information, and material and logistical support to fighters and refugees. Other requests concerned political, material, and moral support, as well as scholarships for members of the movements to study in African countries.

Despite the seemingly conciliatory character of the document, one point of the memorandum denoted an aggressive leftist agenda, reflecting the rhetoric of the

27 CPHRC TJCC, Department of State, from Leonhart to Secretary of State, May 28 1963. Marcum, p. 72, op. cit.
28 Marcum, ibid, pp. 70-75.
Soviet-sponsored UDENAMO, MPLA, and PAIGC. It called for African states to take assertive measures not only against the Governments of South Africa, Portugal, and Southern Rhodesia, but also against Great Britain and France. This suggests, therefore, that although the memorandum was a unified call of all African liberation movements, members of the Casablanca group such as Ghana, Algeria, Morocco and the UAR – the “sources of financial and material support” of left-wing movements – took advantage of the popular anti-colonial rally at Addis Ababa to try and disrupt relations between African states and Western powers, decrease the latter’s influence on the continent, and advance their anti-imperialist agenda through liberation movements under their auspices. Notably, Mario de Andrade, the leader of the Soviet and Casablanca group-backed MPLA, was amongst the most determined leaders to seek united African action against Portugal and NATO. Although it is reasonable to consider the possibility of Soviet involvement in, or encouragement of the African anti-western démarche, it was Obote’s welcoming such a position, as we will see further in this chapter, that represented a turning point in his hitherto pro-western stance.

Leftist démarche notwithstanding, most African leaders endorsed a moderate position regarding both international affairs and national liberation in Southern Africa, and the Conference resolutions resulted in no action being taken against Britain and France. Clearly, despite a degree of disillusionment of moderate African leaders with the West, their position was far from shifting to a clear favouring of the Communist powers. For example, in regard to the Congo crisis earlier in December 1962, the PAFMECSA countries decisively rebuffed the Soviet bloc’s aim at “re-establishing strong and paramount influence” in the country, while giving “ringing endorsement to Adoula’s Government.” Nkrumah’s position at the Addis Ababa Conference, in contrast, was greatly jeopardized, leading to his political isolation in the African arena. As Marcum put it,

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32 Marcum, ibid, p.71.
33 JFK NSF, Africa, Reel 8, Congo, State Department, Confidential, From Leopoldville to Secretary of State, “Nature of Communist threat in Congo”, section one of two, 19th January 1963, 0720-end of reel.
“President Nkrumah had antagonized many of his colleagues by pushing unflaggingly for acceptance of his own, more ambitious, formula for African unity. … Nkrumah pressed his case well after it was hopeless, and in doing so, he isolated himself – a rejected prophet.”

Furthermore, he fell victim to incensed attacks by the moderate states’ backed FNLA leader Holden Roberto, who accused the Ghanaian President of failing to support his cause, and contributing to divisions between Angolan nationalists, due to his political ambitions. Notably, such accusations echoed those of the Lagos powers, discussed in chapter III. Such attacks by Roberto continued at the OAU Conference in Cairo in the following year. Despite the failure of the radical side to achieve the sanction of an anti-British and French clause in the Addis Ababa Conference resolutions, most of the other requests of national liberation movements were met by African states, including cutting all diplomatic and economic relations with South Africa and Portugal, and denying over flight rights to these countries. While this represented a conciliatory gesture of moderate African states to their Casablanca group counterparts, Mondlane, who arrived in Dar-es-Salaam on May 26th from Addis Ababa aboard President’s Nyerere’s plane, was particularly satisfied with the conference’s results. Leonhart, the US Ambassador to Dar-es-Salaam, thus cabled the Secretary of State:


The somewhat emotional atmosphere generated around the question of national liberation at the Addis Ababa Conference had a profound effect on Obote’s hitherto moderate stance. Not only did he endorse Nkrumah’s pan-Africanism, but also, as Marcum put it, “caught up in the rhetoric of the occasion, [Obote] offered his country as a ‘training ground’ for freedom fighters.” A State Department report pointed out that “as freshman at his first heads of state meeting, Obote undoubtedly wished [to] build up his personal stature as [a] liberal and fighter for civil rights” and that Obote’s attitude at the conference was “influenced by the fact that … Nyerere

35 Marcum, ibid, pp. 73, 139, 140.
37 CPHRC TJCC, Department of State, from Leonhart to Secretary of State, May 28 1963. Marcum, pp. 73, op. cit.
38 Marcum, ibid, p. 72.
had [an] established reputation for assisting southern African refugees and exiles.”

In fact, the strength of the political ties between Uganda, Kenya and Tanganyika imposed limitations on Uganda’s foreign policy. Earlier, Obote privately acknowledged to a US official that Uganda “was not completely free … because of the PAFMECA agreements, and because Tanganyika … had set certain precedents which Uganda, as an East African country, would find it difficult not to follow.”

PAFMECSA’s already established freedom fund for liberation movements represented one such precedent, and was used as a basis for the creation of the ALC, of which Oscar Kambona became chairman.

Thus, Uganda’s regional political concerns and the effects of the leftist radicalized rhetoric played a role in the change of Obote’s stance regarding the issue of national liberation in Southern Africa, prompting him to actively support this cause at the Addis Ababa Conference. However, these were not the only causes of Obote’s change of stance and subsequently on Uganda’s involvement in the process of Mozambican national liberation.

The atmosphere at the conference was further enthused by the spirited appeals made by members of different civil rights and leftist lobby groups. A US official reported that

“an American Black Muslim representative resident in Cairo who [has] been very active in lobbying among journalists and delegates to [the] conference against racial discrimination in [the] US, got Ugandan delegate … fired up over [the] idea of making protest [against racial discrimination in the US].”

Obote immediately agreed, and an open letter was drafted to President Kennedy, condemning the state of affairs in US civil rights of the Afro-American population. Although no official reply followed from Washington in the aftermath of the conference, the Prime Minister soon began receiving numerous letters from the US, “critical of him for attacking the US Government while Uganda was a recipient of US

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40 JFK NSF, Africa, Reel 18, Uganda, Airgram, Embassy Kampala to State Department, “Call on the Prime Minister”, 19th November 1962, 0215-0392.
aid”. Obote’s attitude greatly contrasted with his earlier talks with Kennedy, when not a single word was said about civil rights in the US, national liberation in Southern Africa, and the problem white-minority rule regimes. Importantly, similar leftist campaigns critical of US civil rights and Western imperialism, represented by the so-called ‘New Left’, were equally building up in Uganda. Thus left-wing pressures on Obote at the Addis Ababa Conference proved effective in inducing him to take actions deviating from his hitherto moderate position, and were a factor contributing to Uganda’s decision to offer support to the most extremist Mozambican liberation movement, UDENAMO.

The question of growing Chinese influence in Africa, leftist pressures on Obote, and his support to UDENAMO deserves further discussion in this chapter. At this point, however, one should stress that in the context of the Addis Ababa Conference not only could leftist lobby forces undermine Western socio-political stability at home by exacerbating racial tensions through public campaigns, but they also were potentially damaging to the Western standpoint in the Third World. In regard to the anti-imperialist campaigning, such forces also had a destabilizing effect on Western relations with moderate African countries such as Uganda. Hence, leftist pressures on moderate African leaders should be taken into account as a factor that exacerbated Obote’s urge to show solidarity in public with the civil rights movements and national liberation causes. In addition, one should note that this episode illustrates what the State Department saw as a tendency of African leaders to “back the position of the Arab/African countries on major African colonial problems, i.e. Algeria,

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43 JFK NSF, Africa, Reel 18, Uganda, State Department, Memorandum of Conversation, “Call of Prime Minister of Uganda on the President: situation in East Africa”, 22nd October 1962, 0392-0438.
44 The lobby anti-colonial and anti-imperialist campaigns at the Addis Ababa Conference were part of the broader so-called tiersmondiste (thirdworldist) or the ‘New Left’ drive, which added to the pressures on Obote’s West-leaning neutrality. In Westad’s words, “during the 1960s the idea of the Third World as the future – in political and moral, if not economic, terms - linked the European and American ‘New Left’ to the politics of Africa, Asia, … and Latin America. … The approach did much to internationalize … the liberation struggles and … [acted] as a mirror for the criticisms that some young Westerners had of their own countries as undemocratic, racist, and elitist.” As Westad further explains, the New Left was a largely Western movement defending “direct action from below”, through a more assertive and radical attitude against Western imperialism in the Third World. The scholar points that while Che Guevara and Communist China “became symbols of the impassioned action” that the New Left advocated, it also found “both the Soviet development model and Soviet foreign policy as too dogmatic, too self-satisfied, and too timid. Often claiming to criticize the Soviets from a more radical Marxist position”, some of its representatives “viewed Maoist China as a new lodestar”. Westad, The Global Cold War, pp. 106, 191, 192.
Angola and Colonialism”, despite following a moderate and pro-Western line in the context of the Cold War.⁴⁵

Regarding leftist and civil right pressures at home, Obote confessed to the US Ambassador, Olcott Deming:

“… I cannot keep silent on this matter [of civil rights]. I want Uganda to put her roots down with the West, while not shutting off contacts with the East. My people … will not understand me … if I seem [to] condone obvious shortcomings and denial [of] civil rights by Western countries.”⁴⁶

Deming commented to the State Department: “[It is] obvious that [the] repercussions from his letter have been much on Obote’s mind and he seemed relieved [to] discuss it.” Pointing out that the Prime Minister seemed sincere in his “desire to see Uganda adopt political and ethical values of [the] West, while maintaining plausible facade [of] ‘non-alignment’,” the American noted that “radical and left-wing pressure from inside and outside Uganda is [a] force [Obote] must reckon with.” Obote’s backing of the Ghanaian line was a further sign of his attempt to please the forces critical of the West. Deming pointed out that

“…since [Obote] has gone on public record at Addis endorsing Nkrumah[’s] approach [to the] Pan African organization and generally took [an] extremist line there, it may be difficult for him [to] shed [the] radical label if that is what he really wishes [to] do.”⁴⁷

In this regard, Nkrumah’s influence on Obote should be considered as a factor contributing to Obote’s decision to shelter UDENAMO. Obote’s growing sympathy for Nkrumah’s views in the realm of African politics translated into his commitment to build and preserve positive relations with Ghana and other radical African states, thus bolstering his image of neutrality and commitment to African, rather than superpowers’ Cold War interests. Notably, personal relations between African leaders played a central role in inter-state affairs. Relevant to this is Schneidman’s reference to a State Department note about relations between African states and their leaders, “in Africa, perhaps more than in any other part of the world, relations between

⁴⁶ JFK NSF, Africa, Reel 18, Uganda, State Department, Embassy Kampala to Secretary of State, 7th June 1963, 0215-0392.
⁴⁷ Embassy Kampala to Secretary of State, 7th June 1963, ibid.
governments are viewed as personal relations between leaders.” Although the available documents do not indicate whether or not Nkrumah made a personal request to Obote for him to shelter UDENAMO in 1963, other examples of such interactions between different and sometimes antagonistic African leaders suggest that this might have been the case. For example, in 1962, Nkrumah’s personal request to Nyerere asking him to authorize Gwambe’s return to that country, despite the antagonism between the two leaders and Tanganyikan government’s hostility to UDENAMO, was successful. Also, in 1964, Nkrumah made such a request to the Malawian leader Banda and the Zambian leader Kaunda, and they authorized UDENAMO to open their offices in their countries.

To sum up, such trends strongly suggest that Uganda’s decision to shelter UDENAMO stemmed from its government’s concerns with regard to domestic and regional African politics, the influence of leftist and civil right lobby groups, and the personal influence of prominent and progressive African leaders such as Nkrumah. The campaign against racial discrimination in the US at the Addis Ababa Conference overlapped with anti-colonial and anti-imperialist rallies. Together with leftist domestic pressures, the need to avoid isolating Uganda from the Socialist world, and the influence of the Casablanca group leaders, all contributed to Obote’s public endorsement of a more radical line. This, in turn, led to Uganda’s subsequent involvement in the process of Mozambican national liberation by offering shelter to the openly anti-Western and Marxist UDENAMO led by Gwambe.

The episode of Obote’s finding himself in a complex situation in the context of the Addis Ababa Conference, taking into consideration his deviation from his hitherto moderate position, represents an important example supporting the central argument. Despite the influence of the superpowers and other major international players on African states and their leaders, their involvement in the process of Mozambican national liberation with its consequent effects on superpower interests

48 Schneidman, Engaging Africa, p. 89.
was primarily a result of domestic and regional concerns and respective conflicting vectors of political forces shaping African leaders’ behaviour and decision-making. It, therefore, brings to the fore the agencies of African actors in affecting Soviet and American interests in the context of Mozambican national liberation. The Addis Ababa episode further exemplifies how the vulnerabilities of African leaders committed to the West and exposed to the influence of leftist groups and regional political actors led them to endorse a more radical line which conflicted with the broader American agenda in Africa.

Most importantly, under the influence of other African actors, Obote’s sense of his own self-image and standing, rather than in response to Soviet inducements, and despite FRELIMO, rather than the radical Marxist FUNIPAMO [UDENAMO] being recognized as the legitimate Mozambican organization at the Addis Ababa Conference, Obote opted to offer support to the latter organization. As a result, in May 1963, UDENAMO had found shelter in the Uganda’s capital city, Kampala. This made it possible for Gwambe and his entourage to carry out their political activity in the region, opposing FRELIMO and advancing an anti-Western agenda. Markedly, while based in Kampala, UDENAMO adopted an explicitly Marxist programme for its political activity. While, almost certainly, this did not result from, or reflect Obote’s political views, it is indicative of the Ugandan leader’s eagerness to demonstrate to different local and regional leftist political actors his solidarity with the movements of progressive political orientation, even despite this conflicting with the interests of his close regional partners, Tanganyika and Kenya, who supported FRELIMO. As noted in a State Department report about the dramatic change in Obote’s position, “While cautious and experienced in directing internal political policy in Uganda, Obote has given other examples of rash and impetuous action on [the] international front…”50 His attitude in the late spring of 1963 has shown just that.

50 JFK NSF. Africa, Reel 18, Uganda, Embassy Kampala to Secretary of State, May 25, 1963, 0215-0392.
In order to further support the argument that Obote’s decision to back UDENAMO was primarily underpinned by domestic and regional concerns, rather than direct Communist powers’ influence on him, or his desire to benefit any of the major international players, one should also address the Sino-Soviet competition in the region, in order to demonstrate that such a decision did not stem from Peking’s or Moscow’s influence on Uganda.

International politics in the first half of the 1960s were marked by the intensification of the antagonism between the two largest Communist powers, - the USSR and the PRC, something which translated into their competition for influence in the Third World. In Westad’s words, “the most obsessive phase of the Third World competition between the Chinese and the Soviets came as the Sino-Soviet alliance finally collapsed … in the summer of 1963.” According to Westad, in an effort to surpass Moscow’s influence in Africa, leading Chinese figures such as Zhou Enlai paid visits to Egypt, Algeria, and Ghana, in order to “project a China that was on the offensive in the Third World.”

As has been mentioned in the previous section, different leftist lobby groups, particularly those of the ‘New Left’, often favoured the PRC at the expense of the USSR. Hence, in the context of the Addis Ababa Conference, a case could be made that their pressures on Obote reflected the increasing Chinese drive in Africa, aiming at challenging the Soviet influence in the realms of both inter-state relations and influence on different national liberation movements. This section, however, shows that not only there are no grounds for establishing such a relationship between increasing Chinese influence and Uganda’s sheltering UDENAMO, but also that this decision did not result from Soviet influence, or Obote’s willingness to favour Moscow’s designs in the region.

According to numerous Portuguese documents, it was only in early 1965 that Gwambe’s UDENAMO shifted its allegiance from Moscow to Peking. It then began operating under direct Chinese instructions, while based in Zambia, which in turn

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maintained close relations with the PRC.\textsuperscript{52} In 1963, however, UDENAMO was still under Moscow’s auspices. Although Uganda sheltered UDENAMO, the bulk of the Soviet funding of the movement was coming through Cairo and Ghana, where Gwambe was frequently travelling to.\textsuperscript{53} Uganda’s backing of the pro-Soviet UDENAMO was in spite the fact that the PRC had already established its embassy in Kampala that year, while the USSR did not establish its embassy until 1964,\textsuperscript{54} and the fact that the PRC’s arms shipments and financial aid to Uganda were also made earlier than those of the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{55}

It should also be noted that in contrast to Obote’s suspicion of Soviet intentions in Africa, he held generally positive views of the PRC. Although he advocated the need for settlement of the Sino-Indian border conflict by diplomatic means, - something which was making it difficult for the PRC to become a UN member – Obote favoured the admission of China to the UN. The Ugandan leader did not see Maoism as a threat or a predicament, and believed that a government “ruling over millions and millions of people” could no longer be disregarded.\textsuperscript{56} In fact, so-called Red China’s admission to the UN was a key topic of discussion in international politics in the early 1960s, and Peking was making an effort in the Third World, and particularly in Africa, not only to become officially recognized by different governments, but also to gain their political support at the UN. For example, Sudan maintained a large Communist Chinese embassy in its capital city, Khartoum, and consistently supported the PRC’s admission into the UN during the early 1960s.\textsuperscript{57}

However, while in the early 1960s countries such as Sudan and Uganda favoured China, and did not perceive its influence in Africa as a threat, they strongly opposed Soviet inroads and influence on the continent, and those of Moscow’s


\textsuperscript{54} Gitelson, “Major Shifts in Recent Ugandan Foreign Policy”, p. 362.

\textsuperscript{55} Tatum, \textit{Who Influenced Whom?}, p. 193.

\textsuperscript{56} JFK NSF, Africa, Reel 18, Uganda, Airgram, Embassy Kampala to State Department, “Obote’s press conference on return from United States”, 9th November 1962, pp. 2-3, 0215-0392.

\textsuperscript{57} JFK NSF, Africa, Reel 16, Sudan, President Abboud’s visit, 4-6 October 1961, background paper, “United States – Sudanese relations”, 0112-0218.
regional partners, such as the UAR and Ghana. Such apparently contradictory perspectives on the two Communist powers were less underpinned by ideological factors, but rather by the difference of their perceived threats. For example, the Sudanese government, similarly to others of moderate African states, “was concerned about the possibility of a [pro-Soviet] Communist government in the Congo, because this would threaten the stability of Sudan’s southern region, and undermine the government’s efforts to integrate the northern and southern parts of the country. Sudan, therefore, actively supported the UN operations in the Congo”,\(^{58}\) while “interdicting to UAR and Soviet Union” – whom it perceived as threats – “the transit to provide supplies and personnel to Gizenga in Stanleyville.”\(^{59}\)

Given this attitude, it is highly unlikely that Obote’s willingness to shelter UDENAMO was a result of his favouring Soviet interests, or of Soviet influence on him, at least not of a direct character. In fact, as Dale Tatum points in *Who influenced whom?*, “the Soviet Union … does not appear to have had an impact on Uganda’s foreign policy” during the first half of the 1960s.\(^{60}\) The author further emphasizes that despite Soviet attempts to gain Obote’s political favour, “Uganda’s policies were mainly determined by regional and domestic concerns.”\(^{61}\) This contributes to supporting the argument that Uganda’s providing shelter for the Soviet-backed UDENAMO in 1963 was not a result of Moscow’s direct influence on Obote, or the latter’s willingness to favour Soviet interests in the region, and that Obote’s decision were heavily influenced by African affairs, rather than superpower competition. Although his decision greatly played into Moscow’s hands, it was underpinned by Obote’s desire to accommodate the leftist forces at the regional and domestic levels, and bolster his image as a supporter of the national liberation cause, regardless of its ideological (Marxist) orientation.

Soviet documents further corroborate the limitations of Moscow’s leverage in Uganda once diplomatic relations were established between the two countries, while also showing the great degree of Tanganyikan and Kenyan political influence on Uganda. For example, in May 1964, in a note to the Soviet Ambassador to Uganda,

\(^{58}\) JFK NSF, Africa, Reel 16, Sudan, President Abboud’s visit, 4-6 October 1961, position paper, “The Congo”, 0112-0218.

\(^{59}\) President Abboud’s visit, 4-6 October, 1961, scope paper, background of visit, ibid.

\(^{60}\) Tatum, *Who Influenced Whom?*, p. 191.

\(^{61}\) ibid., p. 177.
Dmitry Safonov, Obote pointed to the difficulties of his government in satisfying the Soviet request for obtaining landing rights at Entebbe airport, arguing that such a decision depended on the views of official Dar-es-Salaam and Nairobi, which were opposed to foreign airlines using East African airports. Markedly, however, Obote requested, through Safanov, for the Soviet government to provide Uganda with extensive technical and financial assistance for the country’s development projects, including major construction work for the modernization and the enlargement of Entebbe airport. This is evidence that even after the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, the Soviet position in Uganda was far from being advantageous, it being rather a bargaining chip in Uganda’s aim to advance its domestic economic interests. Such a state of affairs is indicative that Obote’s sheltering the Soviet-backed UDENAMO a year earlier could hardly be a result of any pro-Moscow predilections, or Soviet influence on him, rather stemming from purely regional and domestic concerns. Ultimately, this shows how Soviet interests and designs in Mozambican national liberation were vulnerable and subject to the agency of African states, particularly Uganda, and demonstrates the limited degree of Moscow’s control over Uganda’s decision-making, all of which represented a factor of unpredictability affecting Soviet strategy in Mozambican national liberation. Although Uganda’s sheltering UDENAMO was in Moscow’s interest, in the late spring and summer of 1963, and affected the balances of power at local and regional levels, and that of the superpowers in these realms, it was primarily a contingency event, rather than evidence of Soviet strategic and tactical policy success.

Having shown how the political dynamics and pressures at the regional and domestic levels turned a hitherto passive and moderate actor such as Uganda into a more active and assertive player, thus impacting on both the confrontation between Mozambican nationalist movements, and the superpowers’ conflicting interests, it is necessary to examine the course of UDENAMO’s political action and agenda during this period. In particular, its rivalry with FRELIMO in the context of the Addis Ababa Conference, and the effects of Tanganyika and Kenya’s influence as regional players on Obote’s decision to expel Gwambe’s movement from the country in August 1963 deserve close examination. Firstly, this serves the purpose of demonstrating the

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explicitly Marxist line endorsed by UDENAMO, something which contrasted with Obote’s moderate outlook, and despite which Uganda sheltered this movement. Secondly, it is further indicative of the overwhelming degree of leftist pressures on Obote, in opposition to his commitment to carry out a policy in concert with the views of Dar-es-Salaam and Nairobi, which backed FRELIMO. Thirdly, it clearly illustrates how regional tensions within the PAFMECSA, rather than Cold War considerations, compelled Uganda to act according to its regional neighbours’ political views, which subsequently had a negative affect on Soviet and radical African states’ interests in the context of Mozambican national liberation. It, thus, further corroborates the thesis that superpower, and particularly Soviet, interests and designs in Mozambican national liberation were vulnerable to the dynamics of regional African politics, and brings to the fore the importance of African actors in affecting superpower interests.

**UDENAMO vs. FRELIMO: the struggle for OAU’s support**

This section addresses the rivalry between UDENAMO and FRELIMO in the context of the Addis Ababa Conference in 1963, and shows how Uganda’s initiative in sheltering UDENAMO was countered by Tanganyika and Kenya, which forced Uganda to withdraw its support for Gwambe’s movement. Illustrating how contradictions between PAFMECSA countries in the realm of regional politics were central in affecting Uganda’s position in the realm of Mozambican national liberation, and thus were central in terms of their effects on superpower interests, particularly those of the Soviet Union, further demonstrates how subject Soviet interests and designs were to the agency of regional African players.

On 14th May 1963, in the wake of the Addis Ababa Conference, Gwambe and his lieutenant Calvino Mahlayeye joined forces with Sebastene Sigauke of the Mozambique African National Congress (MANC) - a movement created under the auspices of Kenneth Kaunda of Northern Rhodesia, and Gwambe’s former rivals, Mateus Mmole and Lawrence Millinga of MANU. The resulting new organization, ‘Mozambique African Peoples Anti-Imperialist United Front’ (FUNIPAMO), attempted to present itself as the legitimate alternative Mozambican united front,
replacing FRELIMO as the leading Mozambican movement.\textsuperscript{63} The Ghanaian Bureau of African Affairs sponsored Gwambe’s endeavour with 6,000 GBP.\textsuperscript{64} By trying to discredit FRELIMO before African leaders at Addis Ababa, FUNIPAMO aimed at becoming the sole recipient of all-African support through the OAU’s liberation Committee, while posing as a new United Mozambican Front. This was due to the terms of reference of the ALC committee for allocating funding and political support to national liberation movements, namely that “as a condition of assistance the [ALC] should insist on the creation of one Common Action Front in each [dependent African] territory.”\textsuperscript{65}

In a carefully orchestrated move, on 21\textsuperscript{st} May, Gwambe sent a formal letter to FRELIMO headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam, as well as copies to the leaders of African States gathering in the Ethiopian capital city. Entitled “Declaration of the Dissolution of FRELIMO”, the document formally notified FRELIMO of its own disbanding. Such a decision, Gwambe claimed, was based on “long and thorough discussions about the righteous requests of the people [of Mozambique] to the ‘Security and Vigilance Council’”. The Council, he wrote, had concluded that FRELIMO was unable to effectively defend the interests of the Mozambican people, because it was controlled and directed by the ‘United States imperialists’.\textsuperscript{66} This, however, was misleading rhetoric. In reality, both FUNIPAMO and the so-called Security and Vigilance Council were bodies that largely existed only on paper. In contrast to FRELIMO, FUNIPAMO was designed only to create the impression of a meaningful and powerful organization, while in reality having little political or military capability.\textsuperscript{67}

The next day, FUNIPAMO sent a telegraphic letter to the Heads of African States at the Addis Ababa Conference, announcing the official dissolution of
FRELIMO, and requesting immediate assistance in military and political training for FUNIPAMO’s members, and financial and material support. It also asked for this movement’s leaders to be recognized as the legitimate political leadership of Mozambique, in the event of its forces occupying at least one square mile of the country’s territory. Other requests included “active opposition to NATO imperialist forces led by the United States”, and the “confiscation [sic] of all properties belonging to the Portuguese Government in Africa.” Yet the plan of Gwambe, Mmole, and Sigauke failed, and the OAU gave preference to FRELIMO as the sole Mozambican liberation organization.

This was a rather predictable outcome, given the political primacy of FRELIMO’s African and international supporters, and Mondlane’s advantageous standing in Tanganyikan and Kenyan political circles, as well as those of the US, all of which contrasted with the precarious position and image of FUNIPAMO and its leaders. Dar-es-Salaam being the main base of FRELIMO and accommodating the offices of the African Liberation Committee and its Secretariat was also in FRELIMO’s favour. Moreover, Gwambe’s radicalized anti-Western rhetoric could not be accommodated by most African leaders. In contrast, despite FRELIMO receiving assistance from the West, the East, the non-aligned states and both the radical and moderate African states, including the USSR, the PRC, Great Britain, the UAR, the US, and India, the movement was primarily identified with a political line characterized by moderation and constructive dialogue, underpinned by Mondlane’s background and outlook, and his being supported by Tanganyika and Kenya. Markedly, the rival Angolan movements, the leftist-MPLA and Holden Roberto’s FNLA/GRAE (Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile), supported by the West, saw a similar outcome in Addis Ababa, with the latter being recognized as the legitimate national liberation movement of that country by the OAU. As Marcum pointed out regarding foreign actors’ reactions to such outcomes, while the Western actors “were euphoric … Nkrumah’s Ghana and the Soviet Union were silent”.

69 CPHRC TJCC, Department of State, from Leonhart to Secretary of State, May 28 1963.  
70 IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Processo SR 2826/62 FRELIMO, 351.  
failure of both the MPLA and UDENAMO to be recognized by the OAU represented a blow to Accra and Moscow’s interests.

Radicals’ counterattack and moderates’ retaliation

After the setback suffered by the Soviet-backed movements at the Addis Ababa Conference, UDENAMO openly endorsed a Marxist line, although Gwambe’s pro-Marxist orientation had been known from early 1962 among Mozambican nationalist circles. This was a move towards further radicalization of the movement, and part of a concerted political counterattack of radical and leftist forces against the OAU, the ALC and FRELIMO.

In fact, and rather unsurprisingly, despite losing its bid for OAU recognition and FUNIPAMO’s formal disbandment after the Conference, Gwambe continued his activism as the leader of UDENAMO-Monomotapa, based in Kampala. Gwambe received full support from Ghana, the UAR, Algeria and Morocco. Despite the blow that OAU’s decision represented to Gwambe’s plans, and those of his Soviet and African sponsors, he continued maintaining close cooperation with MANC and began planning a major recruitment campaign for its ranks in the region, aiming at getting the upper hand over FRELIMO. Gwambe reasoned that the much-anticipated independence of Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) would offer UDENAMO the opportunity not only to recruit many Mozambican immigrants in that country, but also to establish its offices there, and obtain additional logistical, political, and material support, in order to build a force strong enough to overwhelm FRELIMO. Such an action was coordinated with MANC, which continued operating clandestinely in Southern Rhodesia, despite the arrest of its leaders.

At the same time, Gwambe’s political attacks on FRELIMO and its Western sponsors became more and more intense. In an article entitled ‘FRELIMO Rift’, Contact magazine wrote that a severe breach had opened up in the Mozambican national liberation, along the lines of the Cold War, where the Secret Committee for

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72 Note: Although Gwambe continued to operate as leader of UDENAMO, the name ‘FUNIPAMO’ continued to be used in correspondence.

the Restoration of UDENAMO (COSERU) under Gwambe and Mmole, the Presidents of MANU and UDENAMO, respectively, had been demanding the dissolution of FRELIMO and the restoration of international recognition to the two original movements. The article continued by stating that in a communiqué signed by Gwambe in Kampala in June, he had attacked FRELIMO, calling its members ‘imperialist stooges’ led by the US, and who were being induced by Mondlane to follow a ‘traitorous bandwagon’ [to the interests of Mozambican people] by means of bribes and political and physical threats.74 In the long document produced on behalf of COSERU stressing the invaluable support of the Pan-African and international progressive forces for the Mozambican liberation struggle, Gwambe was particularly hostile to the US and NATO, emphasizing that they, more than Portuguese colonialism, were the foremost enemies of UDENAMO and the Mozambican people.75 He asserted that the military aid provided by NATO to Portugal, and the financial and political support offered by the US to FRELIMO was part of the US plan to gradually replace Portugal in its African territories. Gwambe thus stressed:

“while the hyena keeps giving up its position through the front door, we should at the same time prevent the leopard from entering through the back door and taking the place of the defeated hyena.”76

In essence, this document mimicked FUNIPAMO’s declaration sent earlier to the Head of African States during the Addis Ababa Conference, while advancing the radical African states’ agenda.

At the same time, UDENAMO became an explicitly Marxist organization. While enjoying shelter in Uganda despite not being recognized by the OAU, on 16th June 1963, together with FRELIMO dissidents Paulo Gumane and David Mabunda, and his partners from MANC, Gwambe produced a new UDENAMO bylaw along Communist ideological, political, and economic lines, and reflecting radical African countries’ agenda. Among its objectives were ‘the formation of People’s Democratic Republic [of Mozambique]’, ‘the formation of a People’s Government according to the will of the peasants and all proletarians’, ‘the nationalization of all means of

76 Actividades dos chamados ‘movimentos de libertação de Moçambique’, Comunicado de Imprensa, COSERU, Recomendações, 4, 13/7/1963, 259-261, ibid.
production and markets’, and ‘total liquidation of the imperialist and colonialist culture’. Nkrumah’s pan-African agenda was also explicitly present in the Article 5:

“To fight for … the total political unification of Africa, as a powerful family, with a common market, common economic plan, a powerful Army, Navy and Air Force for the defence of Mother Africa, common currency and a common foreign policy”.

Other articles clearly reflected both the Casablanca states’ and Communist powers’ strategic goals in the Third World. For example, Article 6 stated that the movement aimed

“To collaborate and coordinate with the peoples of Asia and Latin America and with all progressive forces of the world engaged in the struggle with no truce against imperialism, in order to isolate and smash internationally the imperialist conservators, and immediately materialize the righteous and legitimate demands of the people.”

The relevance of emphasizing the explicitly Marxist line endorsed by UDENAMO through this bylaw, all of whose points reflected or mimicked Communist countries’ political and economic principles, which UDENAMO adopted as its own for a future government in independent Mozambique, lies not only in it being UDENAMO’s first document clearly identifying itself as a Marxist movement, but also in the fact that this did not prevent Uganda from accommodating Gwambe’s organization in the country.

At this point, one should address the state of affairs in the moderate African pro-Western camp. Despite the political victory of FRELIMO and FNLA/GRAE in Addis Ababa, in practice it did little to advance their interests. The generalized predilection of moderate African states for non-violent means for achieving independence in Portuguese Africa, and the economic difficulties of their countries translated into the OAU’s ALC failure to live up to its promises of offering meaningful assistance and bolstering direct action for national liberation. As a

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result, in late 1963, in an interview with the Tunisian newspaper *Jeune Afrique*, Mondlane complained that although African states agreed in Addis Ababa to provide significant and centralized moral, diplomatic and material support to FRELIMO through the ALC, “such wonderful principles” had not been applied as anticipated. Mondlane claimed that the Committee of the 9 of the OAU, in charge of managing such support, had shown in a few months its “deficiency, or at least severe problems. Most participants” Mondlane continued, “do not contribute with money. One does not know whom to address in the ‘Liberation Committee’, [now] transformed into a ‘Ghost Committee.’”

Strikingly, according to Marcum, the Angolan FNLA/GRAE was facing the same difficulties, while falling victim to MPLA’s criticism for its inability to carry out an effective national liberation struggle, and for GRAE’s internal dissidence and violence. Throughout 1963 and 1964, the MPLA assertively campaigned before the OAU Council of Ministers “to grant ‘freedom of action’ and a portion of OAU liberation funds to the MPLA.”

This context is important to show that despite Mozambican and Angolan leftist movements’ failure to be recognized as the legitimate liberation movements at the Addis Ababa Conference, the malfunctioning of the OAU’s ALC weakened FRELIMO’s and FNLA/GRAE’s image as effective organizations. Their inability to carry out effective action against Portuguese rule reinforced such an image, thus making them vulnerable to the political attacks of both UDENAMO and MPLA, supported by relentless Ghanaian criticism. Mondlane’s own repute among FRELIMO members was challenged. On 13th June, the Acting Deputy Secretary General of TANU, Bellege, told US embassy officials in Dar-es-Salaam that “TANU officials were increasingly concerned regarding Dr. Eduardo Mondlane’s ability to maintain his position of leadership in the FRELIMO.” Bellege said that Mondlane “was living in a ‘white man’s hotel’ and spending more time with Europeans (and Americans) than with the Makonde members of FRELIMO”, which, in view of TANU and Tanganyikan Government circles, was undermining the Mozambican leader’s authority. In particular, Bellenge stated that Gwambe and Mmole, “assisted by ousted FRELIMO officials Paul Gumane and David Mabunda … are having some

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80 IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Processo SR 2826/62 FRELIMO, 351.
82 CPHRC TJCC, Department of State, Airgram, from Robert Hennmeyer to Secretary of State, TANU Official Expresses his Doubts Concerning FRELIMO Leadership, June 20, 1963.
success in a campaign to undermine the position of Dr. Mondlane.” Such a state of affairs is widely confirmed by Portuguese documents. It bolstered the leftist UDENAMO and MPLA motivation to try and overwhelm their opponents in the regional and international political arenas. This, in turn, is of critical importance for our understanding of the following fierce counteraction campaign of FRELIMO against the re-assertive FUNIPAMO/UDENAMO based in Kampala, accompanied by the mounting pressures of Tanganyika and Kenya on Uganda’s government, compelling it to expel Gwambe’s movement from the country.

Given OAU’s inability to provide the promised support to liberation movements, and as was to be expected, the OAU, the ALC and its Committee of the 9 fell under strong attack from Nkrumah and the Ghanaian press, accusing these organizations of “the failure … to work effectively for the liberation of Southern Africa” and their “serving imperialist designs”, in Marcum’s words. As Marcum further points out, Nkrumah also condemned the Tanganyika-based ALC for its inability “to provide security, arms, food, clothing, or medicine to guerrilla trainees”, while “frightening the imperialists sufficiently to strengthen their defences and repression in southern Africa.” The author emphasizes how exasperated Nyerere’s reaction was. In retaliation, he accused Nkrumah of “‘strenuous efforts’ to block regional unity in Eastern Africa [PAFMECSA] while carrying out ‘incessant’ propaganda for his own impractical scheme for continental unity ‘in one act’”, and “called upon the Ghanaian leader for at least refrain from undermining the effectiveness of the Liberation Movement, including the Committee of Nine [ALC].” Notably, the Ghanaian press also attacked Mondlane, condemning him for not carrying out any direct action against the Portuguese colonialists, something which prompted FRELIMO’s leader to go to Accra and explain to Nkrumah FRELIMO’s “projects of armed action”, while expressing to the press in January 1964 his hopes that the outbreak of armed struggle in Mozambique would take place during that year. As Marcum pointed out in regard to the OAU’s recognition of national liberation movements in southern Africa, “diplomatic recognition generally

83 CPHRC TJCC, Department of State, Airgram, from Robert Hennmeyer to Secretary of State, TANU Official Expresses his Doubts Concerning FRELIMO Leadership, June 20, 1963.
85 IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Processo SR 2826/62 FRELIMO, 350.
seemed rhetorical, casual, and symbolic and not meant to entail legal consequences.”

Such a state of affairs provides a valuable context for our understanding of Tanganyikan and Kenyan actions compelling Uganda to expel Gwambe’s UDENAMO from the country, as a retaliation to the radicals’ counterattack. While undermining, once again, Ghanaian interests and those of UDENAMO, it also badly damaged the Soviet ones, something which emphasizes the importance of regional politics in shaping Uganda’s decision-making, and the vulnerability of Soviet interests in the region to the interests of African actors.

To sum up, one should outline the factors that posed a threat to both FRELIMO, the interests of its regional supporters, Tanganyika and Kenya, and those of the United States, thus triggering Mondlane’s and Nyerere’s subsequent urgent need to counter both Gwambe’s increasingly assertive activity in the region, and the Ghanaian political offensive:

1. UDENAMO’s aggressive political activity attacking FRELIMO and its leader, together with Gwambe’s effort to discredit and weaken Mondlane’s movement, while trying to win over its members to UDENAMO’s side.

2. UDENAMO’s close collaboration with MANC in Kampala, aiming at recruiting numerous militants in Northern and Southern Rhodesia for guerrilla operations in Mozambique, in order to overwhelm FRELIMO numerically, politically, and militarily.

3. Gwambe’s movement openly endorsing a Marxist line, and advancing an intense campaign promoting Communist and African radical agendas in the region.

4. The ALC’s failure to provide consistent and significant support to FRELIMO, thus undermining its image and effectiveness, something which Ghana took advantage of when criticizing Mondlane and attacking the OAU and its Committee of the 9.

As a result, according to PIDE files, such developments in late spring and summer 1963 led to Mondlane’s increasing awareness that he was losing ground to the “extremist and Communist” UDENAMO, something which made it necessary for FRELIMO to demonstrate its commitment to the national liberation struggle by means of direct action being implemented in practice. FRELIMO’s difficult situation was further exacerbated by the generalized disgruntlement of the Maconde people in southern Tanganyika, due to evidence of the movement’s funds being embezzled.\textsuperscript{88} This, in turn, led to the Maconde tribe’s increasing willingness to see Gwambe and Mmole returning to the country and leading either FRELIMO, or UDENAMO and MANU, respectively.\textsuperscript{89} Nyerere, in turn, felt compelled to deviate from his hitherto non-belligerent stand and authorize FRELIMO to engage in military action against the Portuguese. The Tanganyikan leader saw his image as a prominent African leader being jeopardized by Nkrumah’s attacks, by the evidence of the ALC’s ineffectiveness, and by the increasing degree of radicalization and leftist inclinations of Mozambican freedom fighters in his country, a regional trend Rusk had warned London about earlier in January. Despite Nyerere’s desire to preserve Tanganyika’s internal political stability and to maintain the course of peaceful resistance to colonialism, the need to authorize guerrilla operations in Mozambique became more and more obvious to him. He hoped, however, that the limited intensity of such operations would not give the Portuguese a reason for retaliation against Tanganyika. Even if they did, Nyerere reasoned, the all-African solidarity would immediately come to his support, and none of his actions would be regarded with criticism by the larger African community.\textsuperscript{90}

It was as a result of such regional and local political dynamics that it became vital for Tanganyikan and Kenyan Governments to press Uganda to expel Gwambe’s UDENAMO from its territory, even though Obote’s passionate promises of offering training camps to ‘freedom fighters’ during the Addis Ababa Conference did not materialize. Furthermore, there was no indication of open hostility on the part of the Ugandan government towards Portugal either. A proof was Uganda’s authorization to import Portuguese-made textile products into the country, something which

\textsuperscript{88} IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process nº 3461-C12, Gabriel Zandamela, 605.
\textsuperscript{90} IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Processo SR 2826/62 FRELIMO, 350, 351.
contrasted with the hostile attitude of the Kenyan government, which closed the Portuguese consulates in the country in 1963. Despite the threat UDENAMO posed to Mondlane and Nyerere’s agendas was more of a potential than actual character, it was serious enough for Dar-es-Salaam and Nairobi to press Kampala to expel Gwambe’s movement from Uganda. In addition, no less important for Nyerere and Kenyatta was the fact that Uganda’s backing a movement hostile to FRELIMO represented a challenge to the stability of the PAFMECSA project and the friendly relations between its members, thus representing a threat to the Tanganykan goal of promoting deeper integration of the three countries into the East African Federation, something which also coincided with US views.

In late spring, Mondlane returned from the US to Dar-es-Salaam and, with the full support of the Tanganyikan Government and the OAU, he started an intense campaign against FUNIPAMO/UDENAMO-Monomotapa, accusing its leaders, especially Gwambe, of being Communists. Importantly, during this period, Mondlane enjoyed significant financial support from the CIA, which according to Schneidman, in April 1963 offered “fifty grand to keep the lid on his people and also stay on top”. According to the author, this was followed by further CIA assistance of 60,000 dollars in late spring, and a grant of almost 100,000 dollars extended in June through the Ford Foundation “to the African-American Institute to assist the training of Mozambican refugees at the Mozambique Institute in Dar-es-Salaam” run by “Mondlane’s American wife, Janet [Mondlane].” Tanganyika and the OAU, in turn, mounted increasing pressures on Uganda’s government to expel UDENAMO/FUNIPAMO from the country. As a result, in August 1963, the Ugandan Government declared Gwambe’s movement an illegal organization, and forced it to close its headquarters in Kampala.

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93 “Relatório das conversações em Salisbury, 7-14 Março 1964, entre um adjunto dos SCCI e uma fonte de informação [Zandamela]”, 414, ibid. Interestingly, Nyerere’s influence on neighbouring countries’ decision-making regarding Mozambican movements was also exemplified in his personal requests to, and pressures on Zambia’s Kenneth Kaunda to recognize FRELIMO as the only legitimate Mozambican national liberation movement in 1965, something Kaunda was reluctant to do, given his...
This episode clearly demonstrates the great degree to which Uganda’s decision-making and its course of action in regard to Mozambican national liberation were dictated by the agency and influence of other African regional players, rather than by solely Cold War considerations or outright superpower manipulation. By being compelled to expel FUNIPAMO from the country, thus leaving it baseless, Uganda’s action heavily undermined Soviet aims, and those of its radical African partners, to revive Gwambe’s Marxist movement as the strongest organization of Mozambican national liberation. Not until February 1964, when UDENAMO was authorized by Malawi to establish its headquarters on its territory, thanks to Nkrumah’s personal request to Banda for such consent, Gwambe’s movement remained a roaming and weakened militant body.

Although Gwambe was able to secure further financial and political support from Ghana, the UAR and the USSR after being expelled from Kampala, in practice Moscow became more and more in favour of FRELIMO, providing it with steady financial, material, military, and political support, and offering training and education to its members. Moreover, the prominent position of the pro-Soviet Marcelino dos Santos within FRELIMO’s top leadership guaranteed Moscow’s leverage within the organization throughout the whole period of national liberation and in its aftermath. Because FRELIMO became, by every way, the most promising, prominent, and representative Mozambican nationalist movement, and became part of the CONCP alliance, Moscow readily embraced it, channelling funds and other support to the organization. Although Moscow did not break its links with Gwambe altogether, the bulk of its assistance was now directed to Mondlane’s organization. In this context,


95 IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Processo 3461-CI (2), Gabriel Zandamela, “Relatório das conversações em Salisbury, 7-14 Março 1964, entre um adjunto dos SCCI e uma fonte de informação [Zandamela]”, 413-416. In September 1962, Gamal Nasser offered FRELIMO financial support and promised assistance in education and military training to its members. This assistance programme began in December of 1962. The Egyptian government accommodated a FRELIMO office in Cairo, which first belonged to UDENAMO. After the split within FRELIMO in 1963, the office was returned to UDENAMO. IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process nº 2963/63 – SR, Lázaro Nkvandame, 6, 7.

96 IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process SC SR283/61, Adelino Chitofo Gwambe, Carta para José Carlos Sousa de Horta de Oliveira, Jâri-Gagarin Str. 18, Zinomer 449, Dresden – Al DDR, Republica Democrática Alemã, de Artur Jorge Marinha de Campos, Rabat, 5/8/1962, 278-280. Importantly, this letter intercepted by either the West German or the French intelligence service and sent to PIDE points that despite dos Santos’s becoming a FRELIMO member in June 1962, this was a deceptive manoeuvre, as he continued advancing Soviet interests and his opposition to Gwambe’s UDENAMO was a façade.
UDENAMO-Monomotapa became an expedient asset favouring the Chinese strategy aimed at frustrating Soviet influence in Central and Southeast Africa. According to Westad, citing Soviet archives, this was part of what the Soviet Foreign Ministry identified, by late 1963, as a

“large and coordinated Chinese campaign to push Third World countries away from cooperating with the Soviet Union in any area. … The Chinese ‘spare[d] neither funds nor time, did not shun away from the most unworthy methods – blackmail, flattery, bribery, [while] using the services of splitters and renegades’.”

In the realm of Southeast African politics, Peking was actively flirting with different governments, particularly those of Tanganyika and Northern Rhodesia. Chinese funding and building of a railway linking the two countries was an example of this effort.

In the context of national liberation in Southern Africa, such a Chinese campaign targeted those movements receiving large Soviet support and/or endorsing Moscow’s agenda. For example, it split the MPLA into the pro-Soviet faction led by Agostinho Neto, and the pro-Chinese one, led by Viriato da Cruz, - former secretary-general whom Neto termed as ‘extremist’, and whose aggressive rhetoric against MPLA’s core reflected Peking’s criticism of so-called Soviet ‘revisionism’.

In the case of Mozambique, Chinese action had similar effects on FRELIMO by the late first half of the 1960s. Uria Simango, a leading figure within the movement, endorsed Chinese views and advanced Peking’s interests. This gradually transmuted from him covertly plotting against Mondlane, given his pro-Western inclinations, into an open hostility towards FRELIMO leaders dos Santos and Samora Machel, endorsing a pro-Soviet line. Over the next years, while FRELIMO was increasingly solidifying its position as the leading Mozambican organization, UDENAMO became a pro-Chinese pariah movement conspiring with pro-Chinese elements within FRELIMO, particularly Simango, to destabilize and damage the organization.

In 1965, Gwambe gained the support of the Zambian leader Kenneth

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98 Westad, ibid, p. 163.
Kaunda, who closely cooperated with the PRC, while being determined to overthrow Banda’s regime in Malawi. Kaunda, in partnership with the Tanganyikan government, took advantage of Gwambe’s friendship with Banda’s domestic political adversary, Henry Chipembere, to encourage UDENAMO to sabotage the Malawian railroad to Mozambique, aiming at badly damaging the Malawian economy and thus the stability of Banda’s regime.101

To sum up, in the mid-1960s, while conflicting agendas and antagonisms between different African actors continued playing a central role in shaping the development of events with regard to Mozambican national liberation, and impacting on the interests of major international players in the region, it also became a stage for Peking’s efforts to undermine Soviet influence in Central and Eastern Africa, and to damage the Soviet reputation in the Mozambican nationalist milieu. Hence, the Sino-Soviet antagonism, rather than the Soviet-American competition, became an increasingly dominant dimension of major international players’ involvement in Mozambican national liberation in the late mid-1960s. In regard to the present study, such a shift also marks the end of the historical period examined in this thesis.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the ways in which the shifts in Uganda’s regional policies during the first years of Obote’s leadership impacted on Soviet and American interests in the context of Mozambican national liberation in its early stages. Particularly, it has demonstrated how the conflicting political influences and pressures at local, regional and international levels shaping Obote’s views and decision-making in regional African affairs contributed to the changes in Uganda’s involvement in the process of Mozambican national liberation. In so doing, this study has supported the argument that the pro-active character of African states’ policy-making driven by local and regional political dynamics played a central role in contributing to the

101 IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process SC SR283/61, Adelino Chitofo Gwambe, Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, 22 Fevereiro 1965, 197. UDENAMO was renamed the ‘Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique’ (COREMO). It failed to carry out Kaunda’s orders, and was also expelled from Zambia. COREMO continued enjoying full Chinese support, nevertheless. IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process SC SR283/61, Adelino Chitofo Gwambe, Informação Nº 314-SC/CI (2), de PIDE Moçambique, Assunto: actividades dos chamados movimentos de libertação de Moçambique, 1/5/1965, 196.
successes and failures of Soviet and American engagements with Mozambican national liberation. Furthermore, it has supported the assertion that African states’ actions impacting on superpowers’ interests were greatly underpinned by African leaders’ aims and concerns at local and regional levels, and by their responses to the pressures and challenges in the realm of African affairs, rather than their mere predilections towards East or West in the Cold War. It, therefore, adds to our general understanding of superpower competition in the Third World, - a confrontation significantly shaped by local and regional actors pursuing their particular interests and agendas, rather than being solely a result of the materialization of operations and strategies devised in Moscow and Washington.

This chapter has shown how the vulnerability of Uganda to the vectors of conflicting political forces at local, regional and international levels resulted in Milton Obote’s erratic decision-making in the contexts of the Cold War, regional politics and Mozambican national liberation. Despite initially attempting to preserve an image of neutrality in the Cold War, Obote was induced by Washington to make his pro-Western position more tangible, thus subsequently inviting leftist pressures on his government both at home and in the regional political arena. This, together with a degree of Obote’s increasing disillusionment with Western promises of assistance to the country, and the influence of prominent African leaders such as Nkrumah on the Ugandan leader’s outlook encouraged him to endorse a political line leaning towards the leftist and radical agendas at the Addis Ababa Conference.

The great magnitude to which such factors impacted on Obote’s discourse and attitude in regard to the issue of national liberation in Southern Africa was evident in his decision to provide shelter to Gwambe’s radical and Marxist FUNIPAMO/UDENAMO, something which conflicted with the interests of Uganda’s highly influential PAFMECSA neighbours, Tanganyika and Kenya. In regard to the superpowers’ interests in the realm of Mozambican national liberation, while such a decision played into Soviet and Ghanaian hands, it went against Washington’s interests of ensuring the primacy of FRELIMO and its moderate leader, Mondlane. Moreover, by giving its preference to FRELIMO’s rival, Uganda not only acted against the interests of Tanganyika and Kenya, but also challenged the American goal of encouraging a concerted regional policy of Central and Eastern African countries, thus threatening the prospects of PAFMECSA’s further integration.
However, as has been shown, while the Soviet Union and its radical African partners benefitted from Uganda’s sheltering UDENAMO, and despite the movement adopting a clearly Marxist line, such a decision resulted from Obote’s political deliberations in the realm of regional and domestic politics, and his concerns about his political image in the African arena, rather than his willingness to favour Soviet bloc interests or because of Moscow’s influence on him. Neither did it result from the PRC’s increasing influence in the region, because not until early 1965 did UDENAMO change its allegiance from Moscow to Peking. Obote, therefore, attempted to carry out a policy towards Mozambican national liberation which was independent from the interests of Uganda’s East African neighbours and those of the US. Moreover, his support for UDENAMO conflicted with the OAU resolutions, which offered official recognition, as the only legitimate Mozambican national liberation movement to FRELIMO.

The vulnerability of Uganda to the pressures of regional politics, however, had once again become evident when Gwambe’s movement was expelled from the country in August 1963. Most importantly, it also brought to the fore the vulnerability of Soviet interests to interests and agencies of different African actors. While Uganda’s decision to expel UDENAMO made Obote’s initiatives and passionate promises made at the Addis Ababa Conference empty, it also demonstrated the frailty of a policy inconsistent with the interests of influential neighbouring African states, and being contrary to those of the most powerful Mozambican national liberation movement, FRELIMO. As has been shown, the strength of political ties between PAFMECSA countries and the overwhelming influence of Nyerere and Kenyatta in regional affairs translated into their pressures on Uganda to expel UDENAMO. Such a retaliatory action of moderate forces against the threat posed by UDENAMO and its radical African supporters was also accompanied by the American effort to covertly enhance Mondlane’s position. By losing its valuable safe heaven in the region, the Moscow and Casablanca powers-backed movement saw its capability badly damaged, remaining baseless until February 1964, when Malawi accommodated UDENAMO’s headquarters as a result of Nkrumah’s personal request to Banda.

In terms of Soviet designs to shore up the position of its protégé in the process of Mozambican national liberation, the Ugandan government’s decision was damaging to Moscow’s interests, thus impacting on the superpower, African states
and national liberation movement balances of power in the favour of moderate forces. While such a state of affairs also translated in UDENAMO’s becoming Peking’s asset in the region in the following years, the solidification of FRELIMO’s position, in turn, was accompanied by more open and increasing support from Moscow of Mondlane’s movement.
Chapter VII

Conclusion

This study is underpinned by the aim to fill a gap in the literature concerning the roles played by African actors in superpower engagements with the process of Mozambican national liberation in the early 1960s. The central question it answers is: what was the impact of African political actors on Soviet and American designs, interests and courses of action regarding the process of national liberation of Mozambique between 1961 and 1964? In answering the question, this study assesses the development of events at local, regional and international political levels, and how these events were influenced by the involved actors, during this period. These levels correspond to, and are represented by, the Mozambican nationalist movements and their leaders, African states and groups of states, and the superpowers and other major international players, respectively.

This study argues that local and regional African actors played a crucial role in affecting Soviet and American engagements with the process of Mozambican national liberation in its early stages. In order to better understand the impact of African actors on Soviet and American interests and designs, this study first answers the question concerning the motivations behind superpower engagements in the process of national liberation in Portuguese Africa in the early 1960s.

As we have seen in Chapters II and III, the Soviet Union under Khrushchev strongly supported the cause of national liberation in Southern Africa as a means to advance Communism, promote the Soviet model of economic development, and undermine Western influence in the Third World. The process of decolonization in Africa, the struggle of African peoples against Western colonial rule, and the Pan-African philosophy advocating African unity and strongly opposing Western imperialism and neo-colonialism were seen by the Soviet leadership as a means and a unique historical opportunity for the Soviet Union to prevail over the West in the Cold War. Soviet covert and political support for national liberation movements in Portuguese African territories was, therefore, a means for achieving Cold War objectives. In the particular case of Mozambican national liberation struggle, the
Soviet Union threw its support behind Adelino Gwambe and his movement UDENAMO, which was affiliated with the CONCP.

The United States’ involvement in the processes of national liberation was underpinned by Washington’s aim to contain the expansion of Soviet and Chinese influence in Africa, and to preserve Western influence on the continent, by preventing African nationalist movements and newly independent countries from falling under Communist influence. As we have seen, the US regarded the philosophies of African unity, the struggle against neo-colonialism and anti-imperialism advocated by the Ghanaian leader Kwame Nkrumah and the Casablanca group of African states as hostile to Western interests and the United States. While aiming at bringing about the break-up of formal European imperial power in Africa, the US desired that the European metropoles preserved a high degree of influence, if not outright control, over their former colonial territories. Strategically, this was seen as a means to preserve Western influence over the continent, and prevent the advance of Communist influence in general and Soviet one in particular, on the continent.

Associating the Casablanca group’s countries with leftist outlooks and being concerned about Soviet overtures to leaders of the respective African states, the US also perceived these countries’ strong support for national liberation in southern Africa as a threat to Western influence and a means for the USSR to increase its power in the region. The Kennedy Administration was particularly concerned about the possibility of African states engaging in direct military confrontation with the white-minority regimes of South Africa, Rhodesia and Portuguese authorities in Angola and Mozambique, in their resolve to wipe out colonialism from Africa and directly support nationalist movements in these territories. Therefore, the American approach towards the process of national liberation in Portuguese territories aimed at ensuring that national liberation movements were led by politically moderate and pro-western leaders, who advanced their cause by peaceful means, rather than armed struggle. Equally, the US position towards the process of national liberation was informed by Washington’s desire to encourage the political and economic primacy of what it called ‘moderate’ African states and leaders in African affairs. As we have seen, these African actors, representing the so-called Lagos powers encompassing the Monrovia or Brazzaville groups of African states whose governments prioritized close ties with former colonial powers, rejected immediate African unity as advocated
by Nkrumah, and were friendly towards the US, being opposed to the expansion of Communist influence on the continent. As we have seen in Chapters V and VI, such different positions of African states translated into their forming the competing Casablanca and Lagos groups of states.

The second question this study answers concerns the motivations behind different African actors’ involvement in the process of Mozambican national liberation. As we have seen throughout this study, more often than not, African actors involved in this process pursued their own particular goals and agendas which did not result from, or were largely or totally disconnected from Soviet and American aims and designs in Africa. Rather, these goals and agendas belonged to the realm of African national and regional affairs, intrinsic to the particular interests of the African actors involved. In the realm of Mozambican national liberation, this study has shown that the motivations behind African actors’ involvement in this process largely fell into two dimensions. One corresponds to the above-mentioned Cold War-independent policies and objectives of African states and groups of states. Regarding the other, the superpowers and different African states had coincident or overlapping interests and objectives.

Importantly, as this study has demonstrated, in cases where African actors’ objectives and interests coincided with, or overlapped with those of either the US or the USSR, this did not correspond to, nor can be understood in terms of a top-down relationship where local and regional players’ actions were dictated by the superpowers. Rather, the character of superpower-African actors’ relations resulted in African states’ and liberation movements’ autonomy and freedom of action, something which informed their agencies and political proactivity. The superpowers aimed at taking advantage of particular initiatives and designs of African states which would favour their interests. As a result, two vectors of foreign actors’ conflicting goals and interests opposed each other in the context of Mozambican national liberation. One corresponded to individual African states’ interests in the realms of national and regional affairs, while the other was a blend of such individual African interests and those of the superpowers. This study helps to explain, therefore, why the larger academic debate has revolved around the question of whether or not, and to what degree African states were acting independently of the superpowers. As this study has shown, one cannot devise a single framework for such relations, since they
varied on a case-by-case basis, and when superpower interests were involved in African states’ actions, this did not necessarily mean a top-down dependent relationship between them.

As we have seen in Chapter II, Gwambe and his movement UDENAMO’s establishing cooperative relations with the Casablanca states, particularly Ghana, and the Soviet Union resulted from Gwambe’s own political interests and goals at the local level being coincident and symbiotic with those of the radical African states and the Soviet bloc, rather than resulting from Gwambe’s ideological predilections or his favouring the Soviet camp in the Cold War. Also, the lack of Western support for his organization, contrasting with that of the radical African states’ and prompt Soviet assistance contributed to his starting to cooperate with these political actors. Furthermore, Chapter II asserts that Ghanaian-Soviet relations were also primarily underpinned by mutual and coincident interests, where Moscow’s eagerness to please the charismatic Ghanaian leader translated into Nkrumah’s assertive initiatives at the regional level and his playing a proactive role in influencing and taking advantage of national liberation movements assisted by the Soviet Union. These conclusions are important for asserting that UDENAMO’s connections to the Casablanca group and Moscow, and Ghana’s close ties to the USSR and its support for UDENAMO were largely disconnected from the Cold War rationale underpinning superpower agendas. The Soviet support for UDENAMO and Ghana did not mean Soviet control over them, something which, in turn, translated into the proactive and independent character of Ghanaian and UDENAMO’s actions. While local and regional African actors’ interests, therefore, only overlapped or coincided with those of the Soviet Union, their actions in pursuing particular goals in African affairs were independent of Moscow’s objectives and its decision-making. This, in turn, explains why their actions and behaviours had negative repercussions on Soviet interests in the region. By pursuing particular interests and agendas detached from Moscow’s strategic rationale, both Ghana and UDENAMO shaped the development of events in ways conflicting with Soviet plans and objectives.

In this regard, the failure of the Ghanaian and Soviet attempt to trigger the beginning of armed struggle in Mozambique through Gwambe’s movement exemplifies the lack of coordination and disconnection between plans, objectives and actions of the involved actors at superpower, regional and local levels. Because
Gwambe’s decision-making and respective actions were autonomous, rather than resulting from a top-down commanding relationship between him and his foreign sponsors, the Mozambican leader’s erratic behaviour undermined not only Ghanaian, but also Soviet strategic interests and damaged Moscow’s designs in the region.

Kenyan and Tanganyikan officials’ plot aiming at eliminating Gwambe from the local political scene, something which PIDE took advantage of, further exemplifies how superpower strategic interests fell victim to regional African actors. The Tanganyikan government’s eagerness to take active steps to ensure its control over the Mozambican nationalist milieu and the instrumental roles played by Chambal and Bacuane in discrediting Gwambe, all of which led to the UDENAMO leader being expelled from Tanganyika in August 1961, is yet another clear example of the primary roles of African actors in affecting superpower interests, as discussed in Chapter II.

In regard to American engagement with the process of Mozambican national liberation, we have seen how the initial apathetic US approach contrasted with its more active engagement in the first half of 1962. Chapter III highlights Washington’s retreat in the second half of that year, when its approach to the question of Mozambique’s national liberation became subject to the political and diplomatic dynamics of US-Portuguese relations. In particular, in the second half of 1962, the looming risks of the US losing access to air bases in the Azores had a profound impact on the Kennedy Administration’s change in approach towards both the African nationalists in Portuguese territories and Portuguese colonial policy. While the reverse in US policy in the second half of 1962 and its repercussions on the process of Mozambican national liberation were partly prompted by US-Portuguese relations, this study has shown that the dynamics in African affairs, driven by conflicting interests and agendas of both nationalist movements and groups of African states, played a fundamental role in affecting the American position.

The examination of US policy and its respective assistance programmes in Tanganyika in Chapter III provides a vital background for our understanding of the importance of local and regional African actors’ agencies in Gwambe’s political defeat in the context of the formation of FRELIMO in 1962. As we have seen in Chapter IV, Mondlane’s becoming the President of FRELIMO, something which represented a blow to the interests of the Soviet Union and its Casablanca partners,
was primarily a result of PAFMECSA and the Tanganyikan government’s efforts and proactive initiatives aimed at eliminating Gwambe and UDENAMO from the local political scene. Despite Washington’s favouring Mondlane, offering him political and financial support in the factional competition and providing assistance to Mozambican refugees in Dar-es-Salaam through US-financed institutions, American commitment was cautious, restrained and sought short-term tactical gains. Tanganyikan interests, in turn, while being only coincidental with those of the US, and not resulting from Washington’s policies or designs, drove the Nyerere government’s actions, which favoured American interests. The primacy of Tanganyika’s role, therefore, made the American one of only complementary importance in the development of events, and led to Mondlane’s becoming the first President of FRELIMO.

Rivalries between leaders of different African states and liberation movements also played a crucial role in the development of events and impacted on superpower interests. As we have seen throughout this study, the reasons for Nyerere’s and MANU’s antagonistic view of UDENAMO were largely two-fold. Firstly, UDENAMO was the only movement defending Mozambican territorial integrity after independence, something which contradicted Nyerere’s plans for territorial annexation of the northern provinces of Mozambique after its eventual independence. Secondly, Ghanaian patronage of UDENAMO represented what moderate African leaders largely saw as Nkrumah’s meddling in their countries’ domestic affairs. UDENAMO’s advancing the Casablanca group’s assertive Pan-African agenda, supporting Ghanaian subversive policies, and attempting to antagonize the Lagos powers against the West all played against Gwambe in Tanganyika and Kenya. Moreover, both Nyerere and Nkrumah disputed for the leadership position over Africa’s anti-colonial struggle, a rivalry which affected the unification process of Mozambican liberation movements. While both African leaders were attempting to unify the Mozambican movements into a common front, they sought for their protégés, UDENAMO and MANU, to become the dominating political force within the Mozambican Liberation Front.

In Chapter V, we have seen how political tensions between the leaderships of Nyasaland and Tanganyika undermined the prospects of Gwambe’s activity being restored in Tanganyika in the first months of 1962, and had a damaging, albeit
indirect, effect on Soviet and the Casablanca group’s interests. Also, this chapter addresses the effects of Nkrumah’s racial views on Gwambe’s relations with Marcelino dos Santos, and the subsequent cohesion of UDENAMO’s leadership. By demonstrating how the Ghanaian leader’s personal views influence on Mozambican nationalist leaders contributed to dissent within UDENAMO and weakened the movement, thus having a damaging effect on the Soviet aim to reinforce the capabilities of liberation movements it assisted, this chapter further highlights the influence of individual African actors on superpower interests.

The complexity of Southeast African politics and its implications for superpower strategic interests are also illustrated by Hastings Banda’s influence on FRELIMO and PEFMECSA affairs. Banda’s desire to ensure the prospective government of Mozambique led by FRELIMO accommodated his interests regarding territorial annexation and influence in regional politics prompted him to back UNAMI, and its leader José Baltazar Chagonga, as a third force within the Mozambican front. As we have seen, antagonisms between Chagonga and Mondlane, reflecting the conflicting views and interests of Banda and Nyerere, undermined FRELIMO and were damaging to its cohesion and operational effectiveness. For the superpowers, both of which saw FRELIMO as a central player in the process of Mozambican national liberation, the movement’s internal instability added to their difficulties in influencing the organization in ways favourable to their interests.

While this study has largely focused on African states directly involved in the process of Mozambican national liberation, it has also examined the ways in which the positions of the UAM states impacted on superpower competition in the above dimension. The case of the UAM, also discussed in Chapter V, is illustrative of the political pressures and limitations imposed on a major grouping of African states. As we have seen, the UAM was exploited by nationalist movements, who attempted to mobilize the respective African countries in order to apply political and economic pressure on Portugal, at the UN. Subsequently, when the UAM’s position at the UN threatened American interests, this group’s political leverage was neutralized by Western powers, in order to preserve and protect American strategic political course regarding Portuguese Africa, according to the US Cold War interests. As we have seen, the UAM changed its political position towards the process of national liberation in southern Africa, by adopting a strongly anti-Portuguese agenda, despite
this contradicting Western interests in general, and the US ones in particular. Despite the UAM’s being generally compliant with the West, the leaders of this major African group of states reacted to both the contingencies surrounding the increasingly more alarming situation in Portuguese Africa, and the calls for their active support by leftist African national liberation leaders at the Libreville Conference. By adopting strongly anti-Portuguese resolutions, the UAM effectively endorsed an agenda which was favourable to the Soviet and the Casablanca group’s interests. However, this initiative was instigated by contingencies in the realm of African affairs, rather than the UAM’s intention to favour Moscow’s interests. Although Washington was able to counteract the UAM’s initiative through diplomatic cooperation with Paris, this had a damaging effect on the American reputation in Africa.

Nevertheless, the political weight of these African states, expressed in their taking unilateral action regardless of superpower interests, demonstrates their potential in impacting on the East-West competition in Africa. Importantly, because the adoption of anti-Portuguese resolutions was prompted by active lobbying on the part of national liberation leaders at the Libreville Conference, this episode also exemplifies the influence of local African actors on regional powers, contributing to shaping the latters’ outlooks and behaviour. Such influence of the local players upon the regional ones and, subsequently, on the global contenders, adds to our understanding of the vulnerabilities of Soviet and American interests and designs, not only with regard to the actions of African states, but also to the agencies, albeit indirect, of local African actors, such as Gwambe. It is illustrative, therefore, of the complexity of political interactions at local, regional and international levels that shaped the sphere of African affairs, and their impact on the superpowers’ engagement with the process of Mozambican national liberation.

As we have seen, Washington’s response to the UAM’s resolutions actively supporting national liberation was not only indicative of how short-lived the initial American strong-minded anti-colonial policy was, but also how ambivalent its commitment to African development was. While this policy succeeded in achieving US short-term tactical rather than strategic goals, the initial US policy for Portuguese Africa also fell victim to the competition between the Africanists and the Europeanists within the US Administration, and the political and security contingencies pressing Washington to become more accommodating of Lisbon’s
interests. The assessment of the UAM’s role, therefore, is demonstrative of the ways in which African states’ agencies affected superpower interests in the context of Mozambican national liberation, thus showing the importance of African actors in affecting the outcomes of the Soviet-American competition in that region.

Chapter IV discusses how the Tanganyikan government successfully outmanoeuvred Ghana and the Soviet bloc, which attempted to press Tanganyika to restore UDENAMO’s position in the country and Gwambe’s political legitimacy and primacy in the Mozambican national liberation process through their influence on the UN Committee of 17. By examining the events surrounding the visit of the UN Committee of 17 to Tanganyika in late spring of 1962, this chapter shows how Nyerere’s government deceived Gwambe and his foreign sponsors, by convincing the UN Committee of the full rehabilitation of Gwambe’s political standing and legitimacy in the country. However, Oscar Kambona’s hostile stance towards Gwambe immediately after the UN Committee’s departure, and the Minister’s continuing support for MANU to the detriment of UDENAMO brought to the fore the genuine intentions of the Tanganyikan government. Firstly, it secured its influence over the Mozambican community in exile, and blocked the Ghanaian attempt to interfere in Tanganyikan domestic affairs. Secondly, Tanganyika preserved its reputation as a committed supporter of the national liberation cause in southern Africa, before the ASAF community and particularly the other African states. Such Tanganyikan endeavours, however, were damaging to Soviet interests. By counteracting Moscow’s pressure in attempting to restore Gwambe’s political status in the country, Tanganyikan officialdom frustrated Moscow’s aim of preserving its influence on the process of Mozambican national liberation through UDENAMO’s leadership. Such an outcome clearly represented a setback for the Soviet grand strategic aims in southern Africa during this period.

Chapter IV also discusses the formation of FRELIMO and the development of events preceding this affair. We have seen how the prospect of the formation of a Mozambican unified front under Ghanaian patronage and dominated by leaders who were either pro-Soviet or lacked the popular support of the Mozambican people was something both the American and Tanganyikan governments were eager to prevent. Notably, however, their efforts were driven by different reasons. This chapter argues that, at the Cold War level, the implications of Mondlane’s becoming President of
FRELIMO was a setback to Soviet influence and objectives in the region. Conversely, therefore, it represented a success, albeit temporary, for American policy, through the safeguarding of immediate US interests in South-east Africa. In the context of the central argument, we have seen how the rivalry between, and the actions of the two African states, reflecting the broader competition of radical versus moderate African groupings, was fundamental for the outcome of the Soviet-American competition in the region. As this chapter has shown, the American-educated Eduardo Mondlane, with close connections to US officialdom, being elected the President of FRELIMO in June 1962 met the objectives of the Tanganyikan government. By attempting to eliminate Gwambe from the Mozambican nationalist political scene once and for all, Tanganyika aimed to put an end to Ghanaian influence in the region, and to gain full control of the unified Mozambican national liberation movement. This allowed Tanganyika to reinforce its position as the primary Sub-Saharan African state supporting the cause of national liberation, to increase its political leverage both regionally and internationally, and to take advantage of the material support provided by international sponsors to Mozambican liberation movements.

Importantly, however, Chapter IV demonstrates that such an outcome was to a great degree brought about by the actions of the Tanganyikan government, especially after the country’s independence on 9th December 1961. Although numerous studies on the history of Mozambican national liberation have paid attention to the connections between Mondlane and official Washington, which were important for facilitating his political success at the local level, few have looked in depth at the proactive role played by Dar-es-Salaam. This study, therefore, contributes to the scholarship in the field by examining and highlighting the role played by the Tanganyikan government in this process, thus allowing us to clearly assess the impact of this African actor on the balance of power in the superpower competition in favour of the United States.

The actions of the Tanganyikan government benefited American interests, and played a central role in the outcome of East-West competition in the context of

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Mozambican national liberation during this period. Tanganyikan agency, however, was primarily driven by its own interests at local and regional levels, rather than Cold War pressures or ideological predilections. This is of central importance for supporting the thesis that the outcomes of the superpower competition in the context of Mozambican national liberation during this period were subject not only to the agency of different African states and organizations, but also individual nationalist figures. It, therefore, demonstrates the vulnerability of the superpowers’ strategies and political interests, particularly those of the Soviet Union, to the agency of local and regional African actors, contributing to the argument that the latter significantly affected Soviet and American engagements with Mozambican national liberation.

Finally, in Chapter VI, the study of Uganda’s involvement in the early stages of Mozambican national liberation supports the argument that superpower interests were impacted upon by the agency of African states following their own particular interests and agendas in the realms of domestic and regional politics. In particular, it shows how Soviet interests became hostage to political dynamics, pressures and challenges intrinsic to the regional and domestic dimensions involving the young Ugandan government and neighbouring African states, rather than being a result of African states’ East or West predilections or direct superpower influences upon them, and even despite them. In particular, we saw how Milton Obote’s erratic behaviour in regional and international politics translated into Uganda’s decision to give shelter to the Soviet and Casablanca-backed UDENAMO. Importantly, however, such a decision was unrelated to Uganda’s relations with the Soviet Union and did not reflect in any way Obote’s disposition to favour Moscow’s interests in the region. Because UDENAMO, based in Kampala, continued to challenge FRELIMO, which was supported by official Dar-es-Salaam and Nairobi, and given the close political ties between the three countries, Tanganyika and Kenya actively pressed the Ugandan government to expel UDENAMO from its territory. As we have seen, Uganda’s subsequently declaring UDENAMO an illegal movement, thus forcing Gwambe and his associates to seek a new base for their headquarters, represented a success of Tanganyikan and Kenyan power-playing. Such an outcome, however, not only was a heavy blow on UDENAMO, but also on Soviet and Ghanaian hopes of seeing this movement’s activity being restored in the region.
The examination of the roles played by African actors in affecting superpower engagements with Mozambican national liberation in its early stages leads us to the overarching argument of this study. The decades-long superpower confrontation in the Third World, and particularly in Africa, was a complex and global process. It involved numerous local and regional actors and contributed to the ultimate outcome of the Cold War, represented by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Throughout the superpower confrontation in the Third World, both the Soviet Union and the United States saw tactical and strategic successes and failures, triumphs and defeats. Being the culmination of the superpower global competition, the collapse of the Soviet Union, therefore, was also the cumulative result of the shifting balance of power and the aforementioned Soviet and American successes and failures, all of which, albeit to a different degree, contributed to such an outcome.

Importantly, as this study has shown, both Soviet and American tactical and strategic successes and failures were not simply and directly a result of Moscow’s or Washington’s carefully devised strategic calculations or sophisticated planning of tactical actions. Rather, because the superpowers’ interests and designs saw themselves embroiled in the complex landscape of antagonistic relations and competing agendas of multiple local and regional actors, they were affected, either positively or negatively, by the latter. Thus, Soviet and American successes and failures, and by extension the ultimate outcome of the Cold War, cannot be seen simply and solely as an expression of supremacy, strategic superiority or greater tactical effectiveness – left alone the righteousness of one political and ideological system over the other.

Certainly, apart from the superpower global confrontation and the challenges that the USSR faced on the world arena, the collapse of the Soviet Union was also a result of internal factors. The sclerotic dogmatism and inflexibility of the Soviet administrative and political system of the late Brezhnev era, the ineffectiveness of the Soviet economic model and the stagnation of the country’s economy, and the inconsistent manner in which Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika reforms were conducted were among some of the domestic factors that contributed to the demise of the USSR. Yet the existence of domestic problems alone does not fully justify or explain the outcome of the Cold War. Soviet foreign policy, and the ability of the country to project its power globally and to defend its interests vis-à-vis the West,
represented a crucial factor for the stability and security of the USSR. Ultimately, therefore, the vulnerability of Soviet and American strategic interests to the agendas and agencies of regional and local Third World actors, including the African ones, over whom the superpowers often had limited or no control, was important in determining the outcomes in, and of the Cold War. It is reasonable, therefore, to conclude that the outcome of the Cold War, rather than representing a victory or superiority of one superpower over the other, was a cumulative result of complex, global and long-term systemic political dynamics, involving multiple local and regional Third World political actors, whose actions significantly contributed to shaping the superpower balance of power throughout the course of the Soviet-American global confrontation.
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Appendixes

Appendix 1

Signed by the President of the Conference, Kenneth Kaunda, representing Northern Rhodesia, and the Secretary, Robert Meska of South Africa, the ‘Project of Resolution on Paramilitary Affairs’ stated:

“This Conference of dependent countries reiterates the resolution of the Conference and of Peoples of Africa, [which took place] in Accra in 1958, that it provides its support to nationalist movements struggling by pacific means, as well as to those who are compelled to defend their rights by military means. (...)"

The Conference’s resolutions were preceded by: “Considering the grave situation of the African continent and particularly of:

a) Angola, where a war of extermination is conducted by Portuguese colonialists [in order] to smash the people’s movements;
b) Mozambique, where slaughters are secretly taking place, [in order] to originate a situation similar to that of Angola (...),

The Conference resolves therefore to:

1. Appeal to all independent African states to adopt common and concrete action against Portugal, including:

a) economic sanctions,
b) cutting diplomatic relations with Portugal, [following the] examples of Ghana and Tanganyika,
c) preventing Portuguese vessels [from entering] their ports and
d) not consenting to Portuguese airplanes [overflying] their territories.

2. Appeal all African states to request NATO and especially the Governments of the Great Britain, the United States of America, and Western Germany to suspend their supplies of frigates and weaponry to Portugal (...);

3. Appeal to all African States to supply material [aid] and any [other] aid to Angolan nationalist movements.”

Appendix 2

Written in poor English, the letter’s concluding statement stressed that

“[t]he UDENAMO exprimes [sic] the firm conviction that concrete and immediate aid from African States would permit the people of Mozambique to do Great economy of human lives sacrifices, on the struggle of emancipation [sic].”

This was followed by four requests seeking political, financial, military, and logistical assistance from Kwame Nkrumah:

“Following the same reason the UDENAMO have honour introducing [sic] your Excellency Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, Chief of State and the Government of the Republic of Ghana, the following proposals:

1. Diplomatic support including all International Organizations such as UNO, including Afro-Asian Governments and Commonwealth countries in order to have on the line of obliging the Portuguese Government to recognise and satisfy the lawful aspirations of the people of Mocambique the auto-determination and National Independence [sic].

2. Immediate financial aid

3. Aid for formation in Ghana political, military and syndicate bodies, the same applies to the scholarships for our people [sic].

4. Concession of Passports to Mocambique citizens. These passports shall be granted only by request of the Central Committee of UDENAMO as the responsibility to be taken by our organisation [sic].”

Source: IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Archive, Process SC SR283/61, Adelino Chitofo Gwambe, Letter from UDENAMO leadership to Nkrumah, July 1961, Signed by Gwambe (President), Mahluza (Vice-President), and dos Santos (Representative of UDENAMO in Morocco), 636.