Nation Building and Genocide
As Civilising and De-civilising processes:
A Critical Analysis
of the Origins of the Kurdish Genocide from Arabisation to the Final Solution

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Abstract

This study examines a combination of issues around the origins of genocide of the Kurds, drawing on the figurational sociology of Norbert Elias, in order to examine how the Baath Party’s ideology has shaped the Arabisation of the land and its people. The central argument is that through the combination of the long-term focus on the developments of nation building in Iraq and its relation to the domination of the ideology of pan-Arab nationalism, and the long-term focus of the civilising process, created increased ethnocentrism, which formed a road map to the genocide process. The first part of this thesis consists of a literature review of the most prominent writings on genocide, along with a theoretical analysis. This includes approaches to the framework of ethnocentrism and the origins of the genocide concept, its definition and the theoretical models of genocide. The second part of the research examines the theoretical framework of the civilising process, de-civilising process and civilising offensive. This is in relation to the theoretical developments concerning nation building in Iraq. The third part of this thesis attempts to explore the historical developments of an Arab-nation state in Iraq, examining the process of the annexation of Mosul Province to Arabic Iraq and its elements in the framework of the civilising process. This annexation was accompanied by the establishment of ethno-Arab-centrism and the emergence of the Baath Party’s ideology; therefore, the monopolising of the means of violence is explored. The fourth part investigates the classification or gradation of the Kurds in association with the long-term process of ‘Arabisation’ through the evacuation, deportation, Baathification and the destruction of the Kurds, in part through the final solution of the Anfal Campaigns. Additionally, thirty semi-structured interviews have been conducted with victims of the genocide, and eyewitnesses to the events, as well as those not involved in the genocide process; this includes both Kurds and Arabs. Using the approach to the civilising process as a framework for the origins of genocide, this thesis aims to evaluate the causes of genocide in Iraq via the assessment of nation building, the origins of ethno-Arab-centrism, and the emergence of the Baath Party’s ideology. This is in order to identify those responsible for the atrocities that have been committed against the Kurdish people in Iraq.
## Contents

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................... 2

ABSTRACT .............................................................................................................................. 3

CONTENTS .............................................................................................................................. 4

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ......................................................................................................... 8

LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................................... 9

**CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION** ........................................................................................... 10

1.1 THE RESEARCH JOURNEY ............................................................................................... 10
1.2 THE SUBJECT OF THIS THESIS ...................................................................................... 11
1.3 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH ........................................................................ 15
1.4 CONTRIBUTION TO CURRENT ACADEMIC DEBATES .................................................. 16
1.5 THE ARGUMENT OF THIS THESIS .................................................................................. 17
1.6 THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS: ......................................................................................... 18
1.7 THE REASONS FOR CHOOSING CIVILISING PROCESS ................................................ 18
1.8 THE RELEVANT PARTS OF ELIAS’ WORK FOR THIS STUDY ........................................ 23
1.9 THE APPLICABILITY OF THE THEORY OF THE CIVILISING PROCESS ....................... 23
1.10 THE RELEVANCE OF THE METHODOLOGY .................................................................. 24
1.11 CHAPTER OUTLINES ....................................................................................................... 25

**CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW PART ONE:** .............................................................. 26

GENOCIDE PROCESS, ‘FRAMES’ AND ‘DIMENSIONS’ ......................................................... 26

2.1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 26
2.2 ETHNOCENTRISM (ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OUTSIDERS: IN-GROUPS AND OUT-GROUPS) ................................................................................................................................. 27
2.3 THE ETOLOGY OF GENOCIDE .......................................................................................... 35
  2.3.1 National Upheaval ....................................................................................................... 35
  2.3.2 Sharp Internal Cleavage ............................................................................................. 36
  2.3.3 External interference ................................................................................................. 36
2.4 THE CONCEPT OF GENOCIDE AND RAFAEL LEMKIN .................................................. 37
2.5 AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE ................................................................................ 39
2.6 TOWARDS THE UNCIVIL AND A DEFINITION OF GENOCIDE .................................... 43
2.7 THE DEFINITION .............................................................................................................. 44
  2.7.2 Intent and Motivation ................................................................................................. 45
  2.7.3 Political Groups ......................................................................................................... 47
  2.7.4 National Groups ........................................................................................................ 49
  2.7.5 Ethnocide .................................................................................................................. 50
2.8 TWO MODELS OF GENOCIDE ........................................................................................ 53
  2.8.1 The Model of Paradigm ........................................................................................... 53
  2.8.2 The Model of Patterns of Genocide ......................................................................... 54
2.9 CRIMINOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW .............................................. 55
2.10 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 58

**CHAPTER 3** .......................................................................................................................... 60

LITERATURE REVIEW PART TWO: ....................................................................................... 60

STATE FORMATION AND NATION BUILDING ....................................................................... 60

3.1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 60
3.2 NORBERT ELIAS’ THE CIVILISING PROCESS ................................................................. 61
  3.2.1 Civilising and Culture ............................................................................................... 67
  3.2.2 Habitus ....................................................................................................................... 68
  3.2.3 Civilisation and Changing Habitus: ........................................................................ 69
  3.2.4 Violence and State Formation .................................................................................. 70
  3.2.5 De-civilising Process ............................................................................................... 72
3.3 STATE FORMATION AND ITS POSITION IN THE CIVILISING PROCESS ..................... 74
3.4 MONOPOLY AND STATE BUILDING ............................................................................... 75
CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................................. 96

4.1. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 96
4.1.1. Figurational Sociology .......................................................................................................... 97
4.1.2. Unplanned consequences ...................................................................................................... 99
4.1.2. Involvement and Detachment in Genocide Studies ............................................................... 100
4.1.3. Power Relations .................................................................................................................... 102
4.2. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE ............................................................................................................. 105
4.2.1. Early Development of the Research Project .......................................................................... 105
4.2.2. Pilot Interviews and Finalising the Research Context .......................................................... 106
4.2.3. Research Question and Purposes ......................................................................................... 107
4.3. RESEARCH METHODS AND DESIGN ..................................................................................... 108
4.3.1. Qualitative Interviewing: Method, reasons and motives: ...................................................... 112
4.4. METHODS, DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS ................................................................... 115
4.4.1. The field work in Iraq ........................................................................................................... 118
4.4.2. Interviewing: Semi-Structured Interviews ......................................................................... 118
4.4.3. Documentary Data Analysis ................................................................................................ 122
4.4.4 The Methodological Position of the Documents .................................................................. 124
4.4.5. Data Analysis ....................................................................................................................... 124
4.5. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND INFORMED CONSENT .................................................. 125
4.6. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 127

CHAPTER 5: HISTORICAL AND DOCUMENTARY ANALYSES: NATION BUILDING AND PAN-
ARAB NATIONALISM IDEOLOGY IN IRAQ (CIVILISING PROCESS) ........................................... 128

5.1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................ 128
5.2. IRAQI STATE FORMATION: “THE CIVILISING PROCESS” ........................................................ 128
5.2.1. The Process of Annexation of Mosul Province to Arabic Iraq (Imbalanced power) .......... 129
5.3. THE EMERGENCE OF THE BP (DE-CIVILISING PROCESS) ................................................... 140
5.3.1. Pan-Arab Nationalism in Iraq (The Domination) ................................................................. 140
5.3.2. The Origins of the Baath Arab Socialist Party (BASP) ......................................................... 143
5.3.3. Baath Ideology (One Arab Nation) ...................................................................................... 149
5.3.4. The Issue of Culture in Baath Ideology .............................................................................. 154
5.3.5. Non-Arabs in the Baath’s View (The Followers) ................................................................. 157
5.4. THE MONOPOLY OF VIOLENCE BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE POLITICAL PARTIES (PHENOMENON OF MILITIAS) ................................................................. 160
5.4.1. Baathist militias in Iraq after July 17, 1968 ........................................................................ 163
5.5. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 166

CHAPTER 6: PART ONE: HISTORICAL AND DOCUMENTARY ANALYSIS - GENOCIDE AND
THE DE-CIVILISING PROCESS IN IRAQ ......................................................................................... 168

6.1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................ 168
6.2. THE PREPARATION FOR AND ADOPTING OF VIOLENCE (THE OUTSET OF THE DE-CIVILISING PROCESS) .................................................................................................................. 169
6.3. THE SECOND BAATH REGIME AND VIOLENCE ..................................................................... 173
6.4. THE PROCESS OF GENOCIDE THROUGH THE PARTITION OF THE KURDS (DIVIDE AND RULE) ................................................................................................................................. 176
6.5. FAILI KURDS- THE WEakest CIRCLE ....................................................................................... 178
6.5.1. Ethnic Factor ......................................................................................................................... 181
6.5.2. Religious factors .................................................................................................................... 184
6.5.3. Political and Economic Factors ............................................................................................ 185
6.6. THE EXPULSION ....................................................................................................................... 186
6.7. THE DEPORTATION PROCESS FROM FAILI KURDS TO THE REST OF THE KURDS .......... 189
6.8. EVACUATION AND FORCED CAMPS (CIVILISING OFFENSIVE) ........................................ 193
6.10. 1 GENDERCIDE ....................................................................................................................... 199
6.11. THE CASE OF HALABJA .......................................................................................................... 203
List of Abbreviations

Anfal Campaigns ................................................................. AC
Baath Party........................................................................ BP
The Arab Baath Socialist Party ........................................... ABSP
Kurdistan Democratic Party ............................................... KDP
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan .............................................. PUK
Kurdistan Region ................................................................ KR
United Nation’s Convention of Genocide ............................. UNCG
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide .......CPPCG
International Criminal Court ............................................ ICC
Human Right Watch .............................................................. HRW
List of Figures

Figure 1 Map of Iraq shows the three Ottoman Vilayats...........................................(35)

Figure 2 Ethno-religious Iraqi map..............................................................................(83)

Figure 3 Map of Anfal Campaigns, indicates target zones of all 8 stages...............(138)

Figures 4 & 5 general key questions of participants......................................................(192)

Figures 6 & 7 Specific key questions of participants .....................................................(235)
CHAPTER 1: Introduction

‘Except the sons of the Arabs, nobody has a place in the Iraqi land’
(Saddam Hussein)

1.1 The Research Journey

The time is 1974. The places are along the shore of the running water, outside the village where we dwelt. Two airplanes have stormed across the sky of our village. Within seconds, a tremendous force pushed me, causing me to fall into the stream of running water. I fell on my face into the stream. When I opened my eyes, I saw a massive amount of smoke, dirt, stones, stalks and leaves raining on me; it reminded me of the Day of Resurrection.

At that moment, I was stunned. I was confused because I did not know what was going on. Later, I knew the rocket contained napalm (flammable liquid), which was banned internationally. The rocket struck in an agricultural district, therefore the urban population was located miles away from the epicenter. It was not long before we relocated. During the next two weeks on the international border between Iraq and Iran, we managed to survive the bitter cold weather. For the first time in our lives we officially became refugees in Iranian camps, which lacked the basic necessities of life.

As a result, since those days, my family along with dozens of Kurds, have alternated between departure and deportation. The Iraqi authorities blew our village to smithereens as the residents watched- before their very eyes, having no capacity to offer resistance against the authority. I was compelled to switch schools at least 14 times in succession during eight years until I completed my studies. Finally, our fate brought us to Ramadi, a city of Sunni-Arabs. Here, we faced harsh treatment, constant humiliation and racial discrimination at school, and this was repeated at work towards my father, and in every part of our lives.

At that time, the only sin that I could think of was that I was Kurdish, no more, no less. I did not know why I was Kurdish and not speaking Arabic. I did not know why I was being attacked. At home I learned that Baathism is immoral, but at school I was always under compulsion from the Baathists to join them.

Thus, I have been a victim of bitter experiences, as I was deprived of a normal childhood. From those early days, because of my Kurdish background, I have been an expatriate. This kind of life has led me to investigate the meaning of displacement and the meaning of genocide. I wanted to understand why the events occurred, and about the conduct
of Baathists towards the Kurds. For these reasons, I eventually started to study for a Master’s degree and a PhD in the same subject.

1.2 The Subject of this Thesis

The subject of this thesis is 1 genocide and it has two main lines of investigation:

(1) The imposition of Arabic nation building in Iraq and its role in fuelling genocide.

(2) The development of pan-ethno-Arab-centrism, leading to the emergence of Baath ideology as a road map for the process of genocide.

The central aim is: To question why and for what purpose genocide, as a de-civilising process, was carried out in Iraq. If this is the case, what formulation enabled this genocide process to develop and reach the stage of a final solution?

Following the work of Norbert Elias, this thesis will look at the civilising process for nation building as possible grounds for the de-civilising process, and the subsequent genocide of the Kurds in Iraq. The important elements of these two main issues include the studying of the Arab Baath Socialist Party (ABSP) within the long-term civilising and de-civilising process, as well as the factors that have restrained the inter-relationship between the Kurds and the Iraqi authority as the representative of the Arabic majority, to establish the genocidal relationship.

However, the foreign causes and the division of the Kurds into four or more nations are not less important than the internal causes in the civilising and de-civilising process in Iraq. Moreover, this thesis is an attempt to conceptualise the process of nation building in Iraq as a failed state, and it also provides an account of the genocide process.

More specifically, in the context of the micro-level, this thesis will focus on the long-term development of the genocide relationship, along with the emergence of the BP and its views, which are pertinent to various elements of the Baath’s totalitarian model. This model

1 The Anfal Campaigns in 1988 were the most prominent events ever in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR), which I call the final solution. However, it is not the beginning or the end of the story, as has been stated and shown by many writers and scholars in this discipline. Thus, the Anfal Campaigns (AC) is the name of the military campaigns that took place in 1988, but the whole process of genocide goes back to the early days of the emergence of the Baath Party’s ideology in Iraq, specifically when this party seized power in 1968. Therefore, this thesis will investigate the roots of genocide in Iraq and when the process of genocide started to be planned.
was imposed, with different features such as a party-state monopoly of control over the means of violence; transforming the social order into military and paramilitary barracks and intelligence agencies; intervention with the social order in favour of a particular social group; a monopoly over taxes and over the means of production and natural resources; activation of the pan-Arabic and Baath ideology through the only legal media machine available; the isolation of groups and individuals from each other through a strong network of spies; a strict violent policy, in Nazism termed “realpolitik” (Fletcher, 1997:151), and the prohibition of public freedom- “political restraints”. All of these features have been called a “Republic of Fear” by Kanan Makiya (1998). Thus, these monopolies, specifically the military and taxation aspects, cannot be separated, as Elias argues: “The financial means thus flowing into this central authority maintain its monopoly over military force, while this in turn maintains the monopoly of taxation” (Stebbing, 2009:201). However, according to Elias’s philosophy he also states:

“The compelling force with which a particular social structure, a particular social interweaving, is pushed through its tensions to specific change and so to other forms of interweaving… and only then, therefore, can we understand that the change in habitus characteristic of a civilising process is subject to a quite specific order and direction” (Elias, 1994: 367)

Through this insight, it is possible to understand the BP’s specific order and direction in its view of power and authority. In addition to that, the AC as a final security solution or what Elias calls the breakdown of civilization, are considered to be the summit of action in the genocidal process in Iraq, which is conventionally seen as taking place from 1987 to the end of 1988. This final solution must be researched as part of an understanding of the interweaving social process in order to clarify the reasons that led to the de-civilising process and facilitated the barbaric behaviour against the Kurdish liberation movement. This means that it is necessary to trace the root causes of the de-civilising process back to the coming to power of the BP between 1963 and 1968, as well as the Baath style of state formation and the series of socio-political changes that occurred prior to and subsequent to their reign. This is in addition to the failure of nation building, which created the conditions for a new style of inter-dependence and strict constraints on the social order that led to the breakdown in social relations. These circumstances meant that genocide became one of the strategies used by the BP to save some of what, in the BP’s view, needed to be saved.
The BP, with its new social order, prepared the ground for new interdependence to spur on an ideally pure Arabic society, and this therefore made possible the extent of the genocidal events that took place during the 1970s and 1980s. Furthermore, the process of nation building with its transformation of existing traditional social institutions are central to this account as specific aspects of the social order that led to the action against the Kurdish population, including the genocidal process. Here, in line with Elias’s understanding of tribalism, state formation in Iraq faced a contradiction between the traditional and modernity. Throughout his work, Elias points out that “Tribal social structures tended to be seen as unchanging constants” (Dunning, E. and Hughes, 2012:37). This is still an important phenomenon in Iraqi social formation, and involves a man with a tribal mind-set leading the state; as the Iraqi sociologist Ali Alwardi mentions, it is a “conflict between civilization and tribalism” (Alwardi, 1980:10). This conflict between tribal thinking and modern society in state formation is an important subject that needs to be discussed.

Concerning the emergence of the BP’s ideology, this thesis will examine how it is linked to the origins of Nazism, along with the Turkish model of Kamalism or “Grey wolf” (Farrokh, 2007:9). This includes the possible roots of cultural superiority (Arab centrism) in Arabic-Islamic history, and conduct with non-Arabs and non-Muslims. Thus, the Baath ideology is an extension of these ideologies, which are built on the belief in the superiority of one race or one culture over all others. This view evolved through the long-term socialisation process of internalising the specific norms and values of the nation’s predecessors. Regarding the implications of this ideology for the process of Arab nation building as a civilising process, the start of the genocide process involved a breakdown in civility, as several kinds of procedures were strategically used against the Kurdish residents, because the BP considered the Kurds to be outcasts and a real threat to its policies in Iraq. Thus, the first action in the implementation of the BP’s nation building was taken against the Faili Kurds- a community of Kurdish people who lived in and around Baghdad in the heart of the country.

Consequently, genocide in Iraq as a reversal of the earlier civilising process that had promoted post-colonial nation-building, emerged. Barbara Harff has found similarities in the causes of several different cases of genocide, including Anfal. Here, close to Harff’s understanding of the causes of genocide, Elias claims that “During a transition to a new level of integration of a nation state, tensions usually increase between the majority and the minorities within it” (Fletcher, 1997:161). Elias adds that “Assimilation is one answer to this problem, but it is always a long process which may take at least 3-generations” (Fletcher, 1997:161). However, the dilemma in the Kurdish case is that the tensions between the Kurds
and the Iraqi state did not start with the emergence of the Baathist constructed state, but can be traced back to the emergence of the formation of the Iraqi state. In addition to that, similarly, “Elias places the Nazi mass murder of the Jews in the context of inter-state process and the dynamics established-outsider relations” (Fletcher, 1997:160). Thus, we can see a similar process underpinning the Baathist genocide against the Kurds.

Hence, this thesis will examine these different aspects in order to clarify the influence of all of these dimensions. One of the main dimensions is the influence of the Baath Party’s ideology over the Sunni Arabs and their relationship to this episode. Thus, as we will see, Arabic nationalism and its ideology effectively shaped the ground for the Sunni Arab population in terms of seeing the Kurds as traitors, non-believers, and followers of Israel. Meanwhile, the Kurdish demands made to the political Arab elites were often seen as obstacles in the way of progress in the nation building process. In this regard, Fletcher has raised a similar question concerning the reasons for the hatred of Germans “and why did it express itself in the attempt to exterminate the Jews?”(Fletcher, 1997:162). Thus, this thesis aims to discover the factors that caused this long-term process of genocide by examining the objective and subjective factors at play in Iraq’s multi-ethnic society. Therefore, the origins and developments of Iraqi and Arabic nationalism will be traced through the Iraqi civilising process, which is a new figuration that stems from the formation of the Iraqi nation state as a post-colonial and multi-ethnic state since the 1st World War; in particular, how it manifested itself in the form of the BP’s ideology and its aims in the nation building process.

Thus, how did the polarisation occur, and how did the Baathists come to identify themselves as enemies of the Kurds? According to Elias “The emotional bonds or valencies underline the extent to which people say of themselves ‘we’ or ‘I’ in relation to other members of their own group” (Fletcher, 1997:62). According to the framework of the concept of “identification” (Elias, 2000:65), the BP succeeded in mobilising the masses based on its revolutionary ideology. One of the most important aspects which will be examined includes the BP’s view and the division between the ‘we ideal’ and the ‘other’; ‘Nation of civilizations’ and ‘enemies of Arabs’; or as explained by the Eliasian concept, ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. This division, for the BP, was necessary to mobilise the Arab people against the ‘others’ who were against Arab unification (BSAP, 1977). In addition, the inter-relationship between nationalism and the ideology of the BP as a factor in the de-civilising process, and the consequences of genocide, including the inter-dependence of the Iraqi Arab community, will be examined. This inter-relationship possibly stemmed from religion or an ideological
background. The prospect of convergence lies in the ‘we image’ and/or the ‘civilising offensive’.

The other aim of this thesis is to analyse the nation state and its monopoly of forces and natural resources in relation to the foreign factors. Furthermore, the thesis will examine the Eliasian concept of the national ideal in Iraq and the rise of Baathism. This is in relation to the consequences of violence and the de-civilising process in Iraq.

Moreover, it will examine how the Baath Party developed an ideology that sought to use religion as justification for its genocidal actions. Bryan Turner states that, “The civilising process is largely silent about the role of religious norms and institutions in European history in the regulation of social behaviour” (Loyal & Quilley, 2004:251). However, in the study of state formation and genocide in Iraq, the relationship between religion, socio-political and military institutions cannot be neglected. In this regard, Turner argues that “there are important parallels between Max Weber’s account of the routinization of charisma in military bureaucracies and Elias’s analysis of the decline of militarized feudalism” (Loyal & Quilley, 2004:245). This is an important angle for analysing the relationship between the religious leaders that supported the Baath regime against the ‘outsider’, and the military organisations that mobilised religion in the service of genocide.

1.3. The Significance of the Research

This thesis will be one of the first academic works on this specific subject area in the context of Iraq. It is significant because the conflict in Iraq is on-going and the outcomes of the genocide still receive a great deal of attention from the victims; the Kurds; a large number of Iraqis; political parties, and the international community. However, the genocidal process was a direct outcome of two significant elements:

First: The impact of pan-Arab nationalism (the ethno-Arab-centrism), and later on the emergence of the Baath regime’s ideology,

Second: As a result of the first reason, the Arab majority attempted to impose a pure Arab nation state on the Iraqi population regardless of its nature as a multi-ethnic and multi-religious population.

This may be considered as one of the state’s failures in its unwillingness to acknowledge the reality of a multi-ethnic state. Therefore, the importance of this thesis lies in the way that it tackles human, cultural, political and economic dimensions. Moreover,
discovering the causes of the genocide in Iraq will provide lessons that can be learned, which may help in preventing future ethnic conflict.

1.4. Contribution to Current Academic Debates

The genocide in Iraq, with its specific dimensions, particularly the Anfal Campaigns (AC), is an example of modern genocide. It has become one of the most important subject areas in sociology, as Dan Stone says: “Genocide study is one of the fastest-growing disciplines in the humanities and social sciences” (Dan S. 2008: 1). In addition, the origins of the genocide process still have not received adequate attention, including sociologically. Nation building and the Baath Party’s ideology as the other face of fascism in the Middle East1 are two important background factors regarding this issue.

Academic work on the genocide of the Kurds in Iraq, specifically the AC, is rare. One of the earliest writings is the Human Rights Watch’s Report’ from 1993 entitled “Genocide in Iraq, The Anfal Campaign against the Kurds”. This is the first important, reliable research document, and the first recognition by the United Nations’ Human Rights Watch of the genocide in Iraq.

After this report, a number of books appeared, including Ghosts of Halabja by Michael J. Kelly; Anfal Survivors in Kurdistan/Iraq by Choman Hardi; The 1988 Anfal Campaigns in Iraqi Kurdistan by Joost R. Hiltermann; and ‘Iraq: Human rights and chemical weapons use aside’ by Samantha Power published in her book The Problem from Hell.

All these studies, despite their importance, do not exceed a description and the impact it had on the victims. As far as I know, no one has studied the origins of genocide in relation to an illegitimate nation state; comparing this rare work with the gravity of the crime, means that the Kurds still remain an invisible nation. Thus, the importance of this study lies in its dimensions, its causes and ways to prevent it in the future.

An examination of the de-civilising process and civilising offensive will reveal important insights for this thesis because Elias has outlined clear dimensions for both state formation and genocide. It will show the historical processes involved in the inter-relationship and inter-dependencies, inclusive of consequences, internally and externally, for the Iraqi authority as a representative of Iraqi Arab society and Kurdish society. Elias’s

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1 “Middle East” is a political term, commonly used among intellectuals and politicians around the world, and even among residents of the same region. This term was used for the first time by the American naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan in 1902 (Brown, L.C. ed., 2003: XVII)
theory will be used to conceptualise all aspects of the conflict and the causes of genocide through his sub-concepts of the general framework of the civilising process.

1.5. The Argument of This Thesis

The first subject area of this thesis is the formation of Iraq after the division of the Middle East by the colonial forces as a result of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The emergence of the new nation states in the Middle East can be compared to a caesarean birth, unlike the Eliasian civilising process. In this regard, this caesarean birth of the regional states led to instability and totalitarian regimes, apparent in successive military regimes in Iraq. Moreover, the Kurds paid a heavy price as a result of their division into several different countries and nationalities. This social and geopolitical division led to the de-civilising process. Thus, the process of division is very clear and the colonialists did not offer any opportunities for the Kurds, apart from absolute subordination to the dominant nation.

As a result of the formation of Iraq in the post Ottoman era, and annexing the Mosul province to this new state as a modern state, Iraq has struggled to become a state since its formation. Iraq, as a product of modernity, has attempted to solve its problems using modern means. It has always worked towards power concentration and has used violence against its own population to ensure submissiveness. Thus, there is causality between the “civilising” of nation building in Iraq and the “de-civilising” of genocide, as the process of nation building has been pursued unilaterally by one ethnicity against another. From this perspective, the process of building one Arab nation in Iraq in the framework of ethno-Arab-centrism and its attempts to unite with the Arab homeland at the expense of non-Arab communities, has produced regional and international confrontations, which led to the conflict, and then to genocide.

As a consequence of the process of nation building and the successive failings of its governments, Arabic nationalism spread, and later extreme Arabic nationalism in the form of the BSAP emerged. Here, it will be argued that Baathism at the ‘micro-level’ on the one hand stems from the same sources as fascism and Nazism; on the other hand, it is a result of the successive failings of the state at the ‘macro-level’, which could have logically resulted in genocide. Here, “Because inter-dependence is Elias’s central category, he has always been able to bridge the gap between micro and macro sociology with seeming ease” (Mennell, 1990:369). Thus, it will also be argued that the causes of the genocide are rooted in the
ideology of the BP, and the specific socio-historic circumstances that it found itself in during different stages of the process, from 1968 until the main AC.

1.6. The Research Questions:

1. Why was the genocide, as a de-civilising process, carried out against the Kurds in Iraq?

2. To what extent was genocide a result of the state failing or a matter of the illegitimacy of the state?

3. Based on the civilising process, was pan-Arabic nationalism, including the Baathist ideology, a consequence of the nation building that led to the process of genocide?

4. What was the role of religion in its inter-dependence with state organisations?

1.7. The Reasons for Choosing Civilising Process

The most pressing question I faced in many stages of my study was why I have chosen Elias? It is not an easy question because sometimes our soul simply mingles with a concept or a theory. Since the middle of the eighties, I have faced difficult questions, which focus on the division and suppression of the Kurds in the Middle East and why the Kurds are lagging behind others. While I was looking for an answer to this question, I encountered the concept of civilisation, and I attempted to discover any kind of relationship between the Kurds and the civilisation. From this point, when I decided to study the process of genocide of the Kurds in Iraq, the examination of nation building in Iraq as one of the main causes of genocide, was essential. This is because the ship between the Kurds and the state in Iraq has always presented a dilemma that needs to be conceptualised and investigated. Therefore, I have found that there is a relationship between the state, ideology and genocide as a collective process of violence, which I have termed the genocidal relationship. Thus, to find out the causes of genocide in Iraq, it was necessary to investigate the process of state formation in Iraq from the perspective of the policy makers in relation to colonialism, particularly in its early days.
Here, I realised that the study of state formation has been intensively investigated from different aspects and angles. In the literature review chapter, some of the prominent scholars such as Elias, Max Weber, Foucault and others have been chosen in order to understand the process of state formation. Here, I will quickly point to Andrea Wimmer’s book ‘Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict’ and Heather Rae the author of ‘State Identities and the Homogenisation of Peoples’ in order to provide a brief comparison with regard to Elias’s state formation.

Andrea Wimmer, in her book ‘Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict’, has investigated different dimensions and concepts in relation to state formation. Wimmer has attempted to show that modern state formation has not just produced nationalist and ethnic politics, but “modernity itself rests on a basis of ethnic and nationalist principles” (Wimmer, A., 2002:1). Wimmer refers in detail to three different points of view dominating the current debate on ethnicity and nationalism, which are: “genuinely modern phenomena”, “transitory phenomena”, or the “perennial basis of human history” (Wimmer, A., 2002:1). It is a debate based on whether “modern principles of inclusion are intimately tied to ethnic and national forms of exclusion” (Wimmer, A., 2002:1). The empires, particularly the Ottoman Empire, for example, formed a hierarchical umbrella for the pre-modern period, which has integrated different ethnicities. In this regard, Wimmer’s view of the Ottomans is hard to except because the Ottomans’ behaviour was against the interests of the Kurdish Emirates, including the spreading of the policy of Turkification. Wimmer has ignored the successive Kurdish political movements’ attempts to escape the authority of the Ottomans in order to gain their own independence, but they have been suppressed by force, and hundreds of Kurdish fighters have been killed or disappeared. The waging of total war against the Kurdish Soran Emirate is one example from the 19th century. Therefore, Wimmer’s arguments are not particularly relevant for this thesis on two levels: first, this thesis is not a debate about the stages of modern state formation, which has excluded different ethnicities, or the pre-modern period to show the advantages of the Ottoman Empire because of the inclusion of the different ethnicities under its umbrella. Second: this thesis is delving into the mechanisms of Iraqi state building in order to pursue a road map on the process of genocide.
On the other hand, an important aspect which Wimmer points out is the concept of ‘politicisation of ethnicity’ “as a result of the overlapping and fusion of three notions of peoplehood, on which the project of political modernity is based:

1. The people as a sovereign entity, which exercises power by means of some sort of democratic procedure;
2. the people as citizens of a state, holding equal rights before the law;
3. and the people as an ethnic community undifferentiated by distinctions of honour and prestige, but held together by common political destiny and shared cultural features” (Wimmer, A., 2002:2).

Here, regarding the people as part of a sovereign state, the Kurds who formed the majority of Mosul province were not part of Iraqi state formation (1920), or any agreement between Iraq’s new authority and the colonial powers until 1926 when Mosul province was forcibly annexed to Iraq. Therefore, the politicisation of ethnicity and nationhood in this regard was not created and did not emerge as Wimmer has detailed in terms of Iraqi state formation, “from a system of government in which questions of ethnic belonging were of secondary importance only and did not provide a basis for political solidarity” (Wimmer, A., 2002:157).

In contrast, unlike Wimmer’s argument Kurdish nationhood continued from the Ottomans to the new states of the region, ‘Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Syria’, which contained an important part of Kurdish land. For this reason, the process of politicisation of ethnicity in the case of Iraq is not relevant because of the dimensions of the Kurdish question and its background, which goes back to the period of the 19th century and pre-Iraqi state formation.

Furthermore, colonialism is an additional factor which is not ignorable and has its interests in dividing and distributing the Ottoman heritage forcedly, despite the agreement or disagreement of the nations and ethnicities in the region. Thus, when the Iraqi state had been established, a specific policy was pursued under the surveillance of the colonial powers. The interests of one ethnic group, within a specific ethno-sectarian-centric ideology, were developed without any kind of intervention from the colonial authority in order to protect the equal interrelationship and the balance of power. As a result, a specific project with its specific aspects and dimensions was developed. Therefore, it is impossible to take on board Wimmer’s theoretical aspects for a fieldwork due to its typical development of ethnic conflict with common characters. On the other hand, the Kurdish political movement has national dimensions because different ethnicities and religious minorities participated. This means it is
impossible to consider the Kurdish political movement an ethnic politicised movement because a kind of political independence formed the basic principles of its requests.

Heather Rae, in her book ‘State Identities and the Homogenisation of Peoples’, approaches the issue from another angle. She emphasises the “relationship between state-building and the strategies of ‘pathological homogenisation’ (Rae, H., 2002:3), and these two terms together became the central frame for Rae’s work. Rae states that the modern sovereign state has many aspects which can be divided into two aspects:

“The first to denote the state as government, ‘the collective set of personnel who occupy positions of decisional authority in the polity’.

The second is to denote a ‘normative order’, 4 which, in turn, elites play an important, though by no means exclusive, part in constructing” (Rae, H., 2002:4).

Thus, Rae forms a connection between the political elite who dominate the personnel or staff of the ruler, and the ‘normative order, which is equal to the political system. The notion of normative order may be close to that of the notion of the rule of law as a product of the ruling class, which exists in the form of the bourgeoisie in the view of Karl Marx. Marx’s view has been interpreted by David, R. and Brierley J as follows: “Law is a means of expressing the exploited class; it is, of necessity, unjust—or, in other words, it is only just from the subject point of view of the ruling class. To speak of a ‘just’ law is to appeal to an ideology—that is to say, a false representation of reality; justice is no more than an historical idea conditioned by circumstances of class” (Akhtar, Z., 2015).

Rae considers the term state-building as a conscious process implemented by the elites. Additionally, these two aspects ‘denote the state as government’ and ‘denote a ‘normative order’, and Rae explains, ‘cases share the use of what I term ‘pathological homogenisation’ as a means of state-building’ (Rae, H., 2002:4).

Additionally, Elias in his exploratory study of state formation, considers the means of violence and taxation as the most strategic elements under the hand of the political elite to promote the formation. If the elite do not dominate these two elements, they cannot rule, or even enhance their political, cultural or other strategic goals. Thus, without the Eliasian essential elements, all other elements are marginal. All other elements enhance their power according to these two main elements. Here, what has been attempted in this thesis is to structuralise this work under these two main elements of violence and taxation to provide a
theoretical framework.

Furthermore, the attempts of Andrea Wimmer and Heather Rae, or others, with their vitally important studies, could be comparable to the study of Winston Parwa by Norbert Elias or the study of Folkways by Graham Sumner, who invented the concept of ethnocentrism, which has been taken as a framework for Ethno-Arab-centrism. The main goal of these studies is to show the origins of division between the social components and how the conflict between them grew and took on some dangerous directions.

Thus, the civilising process has been chosen as the object of study for several reasons:

First, Elias’ work offers a credible explanation of the causes of the genocide process. By utilising state formation for the process of nation building in Iraq, the conditions and features of de-civilising present a reversal of nation building and the pursuance of the process of genocide. This means that “tyranny and barbarism are seen as a reversal of progress and rationalisation”, which is known as a “de-civilising process” (Zwaan, 2001:1).

Second, state formation is an important discipline in the civilising process with its characteristic of monopolising the exercise of violence and taxation. However, although nation building is one of the phenomena of civilisation, the “civilising process were conflictful affairs which involved ‘hegemonic struggle’ within the emergent nation state and ‘integrational struggle’ between them” (Dunning and Hughes, 2009: 97). Depending on this argument, the civilising process is more appropriate than conflict theory for the fieldwork of this thesis.

Third, the state dominates the forces of violence and “protects civilized modes of behaviour and expression in society, at the same time, it perpetrates massive and organized acts of extreme violence towards specific categories of its citizens” (Swaan, 2001:265). This argument is applicable to this fieldwork, as the Iraqi government attempted to protect civilised behaviour, but only for the benefit of the dominant group, at the expense of the Kurds. Furthermore, the Iraqi government perpetrated massive and organised acts of extreme violence on the Kurdish communities.

Fourth, nation building is a phenomenon of civilisation, although “the civilization is not a permanent state but rather a precarious state that may very well reverse itself” (Swaan, 2001:266). According to this approach, if state building in Iraq was one of the rational goals of colonialism, the outcome has been a total reversal. One of the most important reasons for this reversal is illegitimacy.
1.8. The Relevant Parts of Elias’ Work for This Study

Three parts of Elias’s theory are applicable to this thesis: Civilising process, de-civilising process and civilising offensive. Regarding the civilising process and the de-civilising process, Elias has argued that the civilising process can “have either forwards and backwards direction as a civilising process go along with de-civilising processes” (van Kiekren, 1999:301). The third part of civilising as offensive action is an important framework concerning genocide in Iraq. These three parts of his central theory form the framework of the thesis. The civilising process is generally the main format for the socio-political history of nation building in Iraq, whereas the de-civilising process is the reversal or breakdown of the civilising process in Iraq, including the process of genocide. The civilising offensive is a kind of procedure pursued by the BP against the Kurdish rural dwellers in the service of Baath ideology with the goal of Arabisation.

Regarding discovering the long-term causes of genocide in Iraq, the most relevant aspect of Elias’s theory is the “connection between the state-formation process on the ‘macro’ level, and changes in the habitus of individuals on the ‘micro’ level” (Dunning & Mennel, 2010:340). Thus, this research focuses on utilising these concepts, in combination with a figurational approach, to examine several shifts in exploring the causes of genocide.

1.9. The Applicability of the Theory of the Civilising Process

An important issue for this thesis is to clarify the issue of the inappropriate application of Western theories to Eastern societies, and the answer to this problem is simple. The theory of state formation, for example, according to Mennell, explores the development of the stages of European societies. The mechanisms of transformation in human conduct, and the mechanisms of the transformation of the feudalism (iqta’I) to the nation state by means of the development of the monopoly of the means of violence, have been considered. This transformation in all societies is inevitable given the right combination of circumstances.

In terms of approaching the origins of genocide in Iraq, the theory of the civilising process offers an empirical study framework of variant dimensions concerning social/political developments. This is to explore the stages of genocide according to wider long-term and short-term processes. It is also to recognise what Elias calls barbaric behaviour during the implementation of genocide. Thus, the background of this theory in terms of the mechanisms
of the state formation, the habitus of people in relation to the process of nation building, and the characteristics of violence from its civil forms to state forms, have been taken into consideration.

1.10 The relevance of the methodology

I have carefully attempted to reach satisfying outcomes for this thesis by choosing figurational sociology, which is part of the theory in Elias’s work. In this regard, I have provided an overview of figurational sociology because of its relevant framework for the nature of this thesis. Its importance lies in its mechanisms in relation to social change and the interrelationship between the Iraqi components. This is because humans form chains of ‘figurations’ or ‘interdependence’, therefore it provides a clear picture in relation to the conflict between the Kurds and the Iraqi government, particularly the Sunni Arabs.

More specifically, according to Elias, “a figuration is a social structure consisting of a set of individuals who are linked by a set of positions, rules, norms and values” (Elias, 2009e [1986]). This highlights the need to discover the structure of Iraqi authority led by the ABSP (Arab Baath Socialist Party) and its ethnocentric policy, which is important as it forms the framework for the nature of the interrelationship between the Kurds and the Sunni Arabs. It involves exploring the process of the genocidal procedure throughout three decades during the age of the ABSP in Iraq, and even throughout the previous period of Iraqi state formation. This research has adopted a qualitative approach to examining the causality between the nation state and its institutions, and the process of genocide in Iraq, by investigating the interrelationships between various social characters and state agencies throughout the long-term process. In order to realise these objectives, it was decided to conduct interviews as an appropriate method for this research study, besides the documentation and the ABSP’s literature as a reflection of Iraqi policy. Thus, the participants have been divided into four main types: those who are directly involved in the BP’s authority; those indirectly involved and who were part of the Baath’s authority; individuals not involved in any political activities, and those who were directly affected by the genocide. Additionally, the documents that have been relied on have been obtained from different sources, despite there being no national archive in the Kurdistan region, and the way to the national Archive in Bagdad being closed because of the war and the Sunni and Shiite terrorist groups. It was possible to find a substantial archive from people who are working on the cases of genocide and those who have gathered information and written about these issues.
1.11. Chapter Outlines

Chapter Two provides an overview of the key literature on genocide, explicating various disciplines regarding genocide theories and the concepts employed by the researcher. As per this case, the process of genocide is considered a basis and specific framework for the genocide process in Iraq. Chapter Three highlights the key literature on the civilising process in relation to state formation, and consists of nation building as a main cause of genocide in Iraq. Additionally, in both of these chapters, all of the terms and concepts related to the issue of genocide are defined. Thus, the aim of these two chapters is to present the background and the previous work in relation to the genocide process. In Chapter Four, the methodology and the methods are explicated, along with an attempt to present the journey of the research process to ascertain the origins of genocide in Iraq.

Chapter Five and Chapter Six utilise historical documentary analysis to evaluate the official dimension of the Iraqi authority and its involvement in the violence in Iraq, and the stages of genocide under the rule of the BP, which is pertinent to the ethno-pan-Arab-centrism and civilising process. Hence, specifically, Chapter Five is dedicated to the process of the formation of nation building in Iraq, and its consequences include the emergence of the Baath Arab Socialist Party. Chapter Six focuses on the interaction of the stages and the intentional actions of the genocide process. In Chapter Seven, the Anfal Campaigns, which are considered to be the Iraqi authority’s last resort to terminate the Kurdish cause in Iraq forever, are discussed.

In addition, a connection has been made between these three Chapters and Chapter Eight and Nine, which expands on the interviews. These interviews focus on the different aspects of the genocide process, from Arab-centrism through to Arabisation and the campaigns of deportation, and ending with the AC, which resulted in the destruction of tens of thousands of Kurdish rural civilians in the Iraqi desert in the south of the country.
CHAPTER 2: Literature Review Part One:

Genocide Process, ‘Frames’ and ‘Dimensions’

2.1. Introduction

This research is considered to be a starting point in relation to the process of genocide, as well as the power relations between the Iraqi state and the Kurdish component in Iraq, including the ‘genocidal relationship’ between these two parties. In this regard, two important elements will be examined in relation to Elias’s theoretical framework. The first element is state formation according to Elias’s interpretation, because it is true that Iraq has exceeded the stages of state formation; yet on the other hand, Iraq is still considered to be a failed nation state. The second element is in relation to the monopoly of the means of violence by a centralised state authority and its attempts to create legitimacy, including for its dialectical actions in the process of the crime of genocide. The following sections will highlight this issue in more detail.

The concept of genocide has emerged fairly recently in the sub-discipline of environmental international law, particularly in connection with the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG). While there has been much written about the concept, primarily by historians, political scientists and legal interpreters, there is not a lot of mainstream sociological literature on genocide (see also Kinloch 2005). Therefore, any effort to review all fields of the literature concerning this issue would be impossible. Thus, the key existing literature has been divided into two main categories, namely, historical, political and legal/criminological interpretations, and then the sociological approaches.

The political approach includes those scholars who have handled the subject mostly through international conventions and political backgrounds in relation to “the behaviour of governments; political leaders and ordinary citizens’ contribution to extreme violence” (Day & Vandiver, 2000: 43). These can be classified as general approaches and case studies. The sociological scholars include some psychologists and social psychologists, who have attempted to approach genocide from different angles to analyse the causes of genocide and its impact on the victims, including the study of specific social conditions following the genocide process. Thus, this chapter is an attempt to outline the main theoretical perspectives
in order to reveal the strong and weak points in relation to the different views regarding the concept/theory of genocide and its position in the civilising process. Moreover, a comparison will be made between the initial genocide models as they occurred in the past, and those that have been studied within the disciplines of politics, history and sociology.

Here, before delving into the concept of genocide, ethnocentrism may not necessarily, but could be, particularly in this research’s fieldwork, considered the cornerstone of genocide, or a roadmap for the determination of a specific component of it under the power of an authority. Ethnocentrism, as an ancient phenomenon (Kinder & Kam, 2010:1), is a description of human views, feelings and the behaviour of a group towards themselves and others (in-groups and out-groups) among different units. This element has provided an instrument for authorities in the past in the elimination of a specific group. For these reasons, ethnocentrism has been advanced to form the first and key element of this chapter.

Additionally, there is a short introduction to the model of the Etiology of Genocide, which shows the causality and the basis of the circumstances that can lead to genocide. Finally, there is an introduction to two models of genocide, including the position of criminology in dealing with genocide as a crime.

2.2. Ethnocentrism (establishment of the outsiders: in-groups and out-groups)

Aggressiveness, cruelty and violence in Elias’s view are endemic, innate and universal in any human society. This human behaviour is a social phenomenon and has been emphasised by several scholars in the domains of sociology, psychology and legal disciplines. In this regard, Norbert Elias gives this phenomenon great importance and has explored its influence, in the past and present, over the civilising process. Thus, regarding medieval societies, he argues:

“The pleasure in killing and torturing others was great, and it was a socially permitted pleasure. To a certain extent, the social structure even pushed its members in this direction, making it seem necessary and practically advantageous to behave in this way” (Elias, 2000:163).

Regarding civilised societies, Elias continues:

“But even these temporal or spatial enclaves within civilized society in which aggressiveness is allowed freer play-above all, wars between nations have become
more impersonal, and lead less and less to affective discharges as strong and incense as in the medieval phase” (Elias, 2000: 170).

In addition to Elias’s argument, Graham Kinloch has also raised the potentiality of the endemic roots of violence in society as he states “That genocide may occur in any society since its potential is universal and endemic” (Kinloch, 2005:16). In the same direction, Grayling in his part in the book ‘Contemporary Social Evils’ states: “Crime and violence are endemic in human societies and always have been” (Utting & Rowentree, 2009:112). For these reasons, many scholars have attempted to discover the roots of genocide and to analyse the origins of the concept. One of these scholars is Kinloch, who has utilised the concept of ethnocentrism as a starting point to the process of genocide.

The main goal of Graham Kinloch in his book is to examine genocide as a sociological discipline because of the collectivity of the concept. He has attempted to provide a general framework for the early stages of the division of society and its consequences by borrowing the concept of ethnocentrism. Kinloch adopted the concept from the American sociologist William Graham Sumner, who utilised this term for the first time in 1906 in his book ‘Folkways; a study of the sociological importance of usages, manners, customs, mores, and morals.’ Kinloch has attempted to show the contribution of social scientists in regard to the causes of genocide. These contributions originate from the disciplines of biology, psychology, social psychology and sociology. He has shown how several factors in these disciplines form a causality of human destruction and genocide. He has specifically focused on the psychological factors that led to the holocaust through the study of child rearing and aberration, principally focusing on the leadership of Hitler and his personality, and preconditions. Thus, the dilemma of these factors has resulted in confusion between these disciplines when attempting to confine the background of genocide to sociological factors.

Kinloch has used this term in a more complex way, as one of the quiet, slow and effective causes of genocide, because of its social roots and nature. However, this does not mean that Kinloch has been entirely successful in his attempt to utilise the term, because the generalisation of the concept has resulted in a very short description and lack of clarity. The main characteristic of social division, depending on Kinloch’s view, is ethnocentrism as the central phenomenon within a dominant group and its consequences, such as the de-humanisation of the subordinated or less important group. In association with this issue, Kinloch confirms Sumner’s definition and believes that:

“This kind of ubiquitous normative prejudice represents the basis of in-group harmony and out-group hostility and the perception of out-group members as non-
human, often expressed in extreme forms of nationalism, patriotism and chauvinism under stressful circumstances” (Kinloch, 2005:29).

Here, he uses the terms in-group and out-group as two different antagonist entities in the process of a struggle leading to conflict. Thus, ethnocentrism may be one of the most appropriate sub-concepts to use with regard to this research’s fieldwork because of the nature of the perpetrator in the Kurdish genocidal process, which will be addressed in the findings chapter.

Ethnocentrism is central to the sociological approach of William Graham Sumner in his book ‘Folkways’, which was published in 1906. The nature of this book, to a large extent, is similar to Elias’s work on ‘Establishment and the Outsiders’ in their description of social division, except for the differences in the methodology of both studies and their approaches. This similarity lies in the raising of the subject of the early division between the different components of a society, and individuals’ behaviour towards each other. Despite some similarities between ‘Folkways’ and the ‘Establishment and the Outsiders’, as two sociological approaches, Elias focuses on “How a group of people can monopolise power chances and use them to exclude and stigmatise members of another very similar group” (Elias, 2000:12). Moreover, Elias has elaborately described the relationship between both groups, the ‘establishment and the outsiders’, within his specific codes and concepts. Thus, unlike Sumner, Elias does not mention the concept of ethnocentrism and rarely refers to ‘ethnicity’. This could be because he is addressing it as a study between two similar working class groups. After all, if the level of negative attitude from an establishment towards an outsider group is so highly aggressive, prejudiced and explicit, what is the situation between two different entities akin to? Although the basic information in his work is inherently helpful in understanding the concept more accurately and strategically, it is also important to include the concept ‘ethnocentrism’ in the framework of the de-civilising process, because of ethnocentric tensions and the negative consequences. In addition, both Elias and Sumner have included some books and articles from other scholars, which may be important in enriching the concept of ethnocentrism, along with the study of Kinloch, in order to strengthen the illustration of the genocide process. Here, primarily, the characteristics of ethnocentrism by Sumner as a pioneer of the concept will be defined and illustrated, before comparing it with the ‘Established and the Outsiders’ of Elias to illustrate the differences and the appropriateness to this research’s fieldwork. However, the inventor of the concept of ethnocentrism, Boris Bizumic, in his short paper ‘Who Coined the Concept of Ethnocentrism? A Brief Report’, argues that Ludwig Gumplowicz used this concept before
Sumner, as he states that “A review of classic sources reveals that it was probably Gumplowicz who used the concept of ethnocentrism (more specifically, “Ethno-centrismus”) for the first time in print… from 1879-1905” (Bizumic, 2014:4).

In the first chapter of his book, Sumner starts by stating many of the ‘fundamental notions of the folkways and of the mores’, and among them is ‘ethno-centrism’, including “we-groups” and “others-groups” and “Sentiments in the in-group towards out-groups” (Sumner, 1959:16). These terms and others form the essence of Sumner’s study of folkways. However, central to Elias’s study is determining the roots of the hegemonic position of two similar groups in terms of power chances. Thus, the most prominent concept is the ‘establishment group’ and the ‘outsider’, including some sub-terms like ‘in-group’ and ‘out-group’. These terms form the principle aspect of Elias’s strategy for an important reason, which is the inter-relationship between in-groups and out-groups. Here, Elias’s aim is very specific, and he does not want to discover all folkways, but rather the fate of both groups- the establishment and the outsider- in determining their form of power.

Concerning the definition of the concept, Sumner argues that ethnocentrism:

“Is the technical name for this view of things in which one’s own group is the centre of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it” (Sumner, 1956:41).

This view of one’s own group’s centrality converges with that of Eurocentrism in the frame of civilisation, which has been used by Elias to describe the Western expression in terms of explicit self-consciousness. In this regard Elias argues: “The West believes itself superior to earlier societies” (Elias, 2000:5). Here, in the same direction, George Gheverghese Joseph, Vasu Reddy and Mary Searle-Chatterjee have used the concepts ethnocentrism and Eurocentrism in their paper ‘Eurocentrism in the social sciences’ as synonyms. They argue that “ethnocentrism”, of which Eurocentrism is a special case, refers to “the tendency to view one’s own ethnic group and its social standards as the basis for evaluative judgements concerning the practices of others - with the implication that one view one’s own standards as superior” (Joseph, Reddy & Searle-Chatterjee, 1990:1). Here, according to this definition, the issue is an ideological dilemma because of consideration of the centrality of ethical social standards.

In their explanation of Sumner’s definition, Donald Kinder and Kam Cindy in their book ‘Us against them’, argue that “ethno-centrism is a mental habit. It is a predisposition to divide the human world into in-groups and out-groups. It is a readiness to reduce society to us and them. Or rather, it is a readiness to reduce society to ‘us’ versus them” (Kinder & Cindy,
This attitude makes it possible to include different levels or directions. If we stay focused on the attitude of the in-group, we realise that Elias has approached some unthinkable results. They “think of themselves in human terms as better than the others” (Elias, 1994:19), because “the established group attributed to its members has superior human characteristics” (Elias, 1994:22). In the same direction, Hammond and Axelrod in their paper ‘evolution of ethnocentric behaviour’ explain how “the attitudes include seeing one’s own group (the in-group) as virtuous and superior” (Hammond and Axelrod, 2006:2). Sumner, before all of those theorists, stressed these attitudes and argued that “Each group nourishes its own pride and vanity, boasts itself superior, exalts its own divinities, and looks with contempt on outsiders” (Sumner, 196:41). Here, Boris Bizumic, in his article ‘Who Coined the Concept of Ethno-centrism?’ also adopts such an approach, but with a more general narrative, as he explains it as “anthropocentrism (the belief that humans have the central position on the Earth), but focusing on one’s own ethnic group (nation, people)” (Bizumic, 2014:4). Additionally, Bizumic steadily intensified the issue and describes how “this belief in centrality is reflected in the view that the group is extraordinary, superior, and better in relation to any other group – and not only any other existing group, but any group that has ever existed” (Bizumic, 2014:4). This point has been reiterated by most of those who have focused on ethnocentrism, like Donald Kinder and Cindy Kam in their book ‘Us against them; Ethnocentric Foundations of American Opinion’, which shows the diversity of American attitudes towards different components and how everyone believes in their own superiority. This belief has been utilised by Ken Booth to illustrate the ethnocentric consequents as he argues: “Belief in national superiority naturally leads decision-makers to over-estimate their chances of military success” (Booth, 2014:34). Here, the collective insistence on self-image could increase the imagination in regard to the sense of outsiders as a threat. However, more commonly, the target will be the weakest link because of different accusations and the imagined grievances against an ethnic group. Therefore, as Sumner argues, “loyalty to the group, sacrifice for it, hatred and contempt for outsiders, brotherhood within, war likeness without, all grow together, common products of the same situation” (Sumner, 1956:40).

Further to this approach, if violence and/or at least genocide are one of the potential consequences of ethnocentrism, then as Kinder and Kam put it, what is the nature of ethnocentrism? Why are people more or less ethnocentric? Is it, as Elias has explained in the concept of habitus, a ‘learning process’? Kinder and Kam have attempted to theorise this issue
through the use of different concepts and terms. Here, they are examining ethnocentrism from “four distinct theoretical perspectives:

- Ethnocentrism as a consequence of realistic group conflict
- Ethnocentrism as an outgrowth of the authoritarian personality
- Ethnocentrism as an expression of social identity
- Ethnocentrism as an outcome of natural selection” (Kinder & Kam, 2010:7).

Each of the first three disciplines could be important in discovering the nature of the in-group solidarity among the Arab-Sunni minority, who were dominating the Iraqi authority during the 20th century. A further point is that, in one way or another, one of the principles of Baath ideology was used in order to polarise the components of the Iraqi population. In addition, if we summarise the first three principles, ‘the conflict, the authoritarian personality and social identity’, with power relations as a common motive in the nature of ethnocentrism, according to the figurational theory of Elias and his work with Scotson in Winston Parva, ‘the establishment and outsiders’ could be the most appropriate expression of these principles. Here, both the in-group solidarity and the out-group hostility, as a reflection of conflict between groups, are dependent on power relations, which are necessary to maintain a presence and ensure domination. More correletively to this understanding, “the insiders in a we-group are in a relation of peace, order, law, government, and industry, to each other. Their relation to all outsiders, or others-groups, is one of war and plunder . . . . Sentiments are produced to correspond” (Kinder & Kam, 2010:9). Thus, antagonism between groups, according to Kinder and Kam, is rooted in actual conflict, and cannot be ignored in the social life because of mismatched goals.

This phenomenon is true for the authoritarian personality as well. ‘The Authoritarian Personality’, which was written by Theodor Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel Levinson, and Nevitt Sanford in 1940, is one of the most important studies to examine the dangerous aspects of ethnocentrism. The background to this study is related to the involvement of Adorno and his colleagues as they were experiencing Nazi rule in Germany. Therefore, according to Kinder and Kam, this study was against “A backdrop of horrific events: crushing economic depression, cataclysmic war, and the deliberate liquidation of the Jewish population of Europe” (Kinder & Kam, 2010:12). Despite the psychological nature of this study, its importance in sociology as an empirical investigation is clear. Here, Adorno and his colleagues have emphasised ethnocentrism as an “Ideology concerning in-group and out-groups and their interaction” (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson & Sanford,
One of the most important measures used to centralise any antagonistic ideas is generality, and it is necessary to reinforce the key dogmas against the outsider. According to Adorno and his colleagues, “A primary characteristic of ethnocentric ideology is the generality of out-group rejection.” (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson & Sanford, 1940:147). Thus, out-group rejection is processed under the generalisation of the in-group’s ideological views to prepare an aggressive environment against the outsider, especially if there was a previous plan in place for the elimination of the group. It is, as Adorno and his colleagues argue, “As if the ethnocentric individual feels threatened by most of the groups to which he does not have a sense of belonging; if he cannot identify, he must oppose; if a group is not “acceptable,” it is ‘alien’” (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson & Sanford, 1940:147). This dualism of ‘friend or alien’ will be strengthened if there is a prior purposeful ideology against a particular component.

In the same direction, the other distinct theoretical perspectives on ethnocentrism involve social identity. Here, Kinder and Kam argue that “Social identity theory attempts to identify the environmental conditions that give rise to ethnocentrism (or more precisely, to in-group favouritism)” (Kinder & Kam, 2010:23). This attempt is in harmony with personal authority because of its ideological background and its strong involvement. Kinder and Kam have derived these theoretical ideas from social identity and intergroup relations, as founded by Henri Tajfel. However, there is no big difference between Tajfel’s position and Adorno and his colleagues regarding their suffering in Nazi Germany, as Tajfel’s family perished in the Holocaust because of their European Jewish background. Here, according to these key concepts, the level of ethnocentrism varies depending on the place and the circumstances that surround it. In this regard, Kinder and Kam emphasise differences as they “Argue that people differ from one another-reliably and that some people are very ethnocentric; many are mildly ethnocentric; and a few are not ethnocentric at all” (Kinder & Kam, 2010:24). This means that ethnocentric feelings and behaviour are an integral part of the Eliasian habitus, which is a learning process that takes place throughout a long-term change.

The last and most distinct theoretical perspectives on ethnocentrism involve the outcome of natural selection. This natural selection viewpoint of ethnocentrism could be the most problematic issue due to the huge division between its supporters and opponents. Thus, in order to intensify ethnocentrism, it has been frequently mobilised by different groups and ideologies in terms of their interests and beliefs. Cynthia Mills in her book ‘The theory of evolution: What it is, where it came from, and why it works’, refers to such problematic and dangerous attempts, and claims that “Darwin’s theory was quickly adopted, misinterpreted,
and rewritten to promote various unsavoury ideologies” (Mills, 2004:3). In this direction, Nazi Germany was a pioneer and inventor concerning dividing people and polarising them depending on the theory of social Darwinism. In this regard, Karl A. Schleunes in his book ‘Legislating the Holocaust: the Bernhard Loesener memoirs and supporting documents’ argues that “Central to all race theories was the proposition that the different races were by any measure unequal, be it physically, socially, intellectually, or morally… German racial theorists ranked their own Aryan race above all others” (Schleunes, 2001:5). This ideology spread among many ideological parties and groups throughout the 20th century, from Europe to Africa, Asia and the Middle East. Additionally, the BP in Iraq, according to its historical literature and documentation, is not excluded from believing in social Darwinism.

Consequently, an important question in this regard needs to concentrate on the issue of power: Is power considered to be the ultimate goal of social groups? Accordingly, Elias and Scotson have emphasised that “In all these cases the ‘superior’ people may make the less powerful people themselves feel that they lack virtue that they are inferior in human terms” (Elias and Scotson, 1965:21). This argument proves two points: On the one hand it proves that power is an instinctive part of people’s behaviour, and they may attempt to retain it at any price; on the other hand, people may attempt to secure their power over others using any instrument- even immoral approaches. For these reasons and others, Kinder and Kam describe “Sumner’s principal claim - that in-group solidarity and out-group hostility grow out of inter-group competition” (Kinder & Kam, 2010:9). Thus, solidarity among the in-group could be considered one of the most powerful characteristics in order to maintain their unity; however, this unity cannot be secured without making the out-group feel inferior. This kind of behaviour leads to greater consequences, such as hostility. Therefore, Marc Howard Ross and Robert Axelrod in their paper ‘The evolution of ethnocentrism’ confirm the same point in that “there is widespread evidence that in-group solidarity and out-group hostility develop together” (MH Ross, 2006:5). This means that despite positive cooperation on the side of the ‘in-group’, it is possible to have a negative side because of the strengthening of the enmity towards the out-group. Here, as a result of this power relation, PC Rosenblatt’s argues that “ethnocentrism and nationalism produce isolation between groups” (Rosenblatt, 1964:138). This could be as a result of an ideology or a specific government policy: ‘the representative of an in-group’ against an outsider in order to start the assimilation process.

According to Capucao, “Sociologists label these complex processes of a positive attitude towards in-groups on one hand and a negative attitude towards minorities on the other hand as ‘ethnocentrism’” (Capucao, 2010:163). Here, if the established group considers
its values as an ‘in-group’ to be more civilised and superior, it means they will consider the ‘out-group’ as less or not civilised and inferior. In this direction, Hammond Axelrod adds: “The attitudes include seeing one’s own group (the in-group) as virtuous and superior and an out-group as contemptible and inferior” (Hammond, 2006:1). Furthermore, this attitude increases the gap between both groups, whether positive or negatively, and could lead to bloody violence. Therefore, PC Rosenblatt confirms that “Frustration from out-group produces frustration from the in-group may produce increased ethnocentric or nationalistic hostility” (Rosenblatt, 1964:138). This whole understanding of the centrality of the in-group against the out-group is also rooted in religious texts. For example, it is referred to in the Quran as Satan told God concerning Adam: “I’m better than him, You created me from fire and created him from clay” (Al-a’raf, 12, from N. Starovska, 2005:136).

Additionally, it is suggested that if ethnocentrism is a long-term roadmap to genocide, the etiology of the genocide model could be considered or used to create a short-term or a sudden causality of genocide depending on the previous imbalanced power relations. In relation to this, the following section includes a short explanation of Harff’s model of genocide.

2.3. The Etiology of Genocide

Structural change is the theoretical framework of this model. This framework includes three main factors, which in Harff’s view lead to the outcome of genocide; all factors are based on an authority structure.

2.3.1. National Upheaval

The first basis for taking any genocidal action is national upheaval, which is an abrupt change in the political community, “caused, for example, by the formation of a state through violent conflict” (Harff, 1987:43). This is de-structuralised in the framework of the decivilising process, when the “central power over large territory have been dissociated” (Mennell, 2007:5), and the people are not compelled anymore to restrain their impulses. Thus, violence will be the phenomenon of such a situation. This upheaval could occur when national boundaries are formed, or after a war is lost. Thus, lost wars and the resultant battered national pride, according to Harff, sometimes leads to genocide against groups perceived as enemies (Harff, 1987:43).
2.3.2. **Sharp Internal Cleavage**

The second factor, according to Harff, that leads to the development of genocide is the existence of a ‘sharp internal cleavage’ “combined with a history of struggle between groups prior to the upheaval” (Harff, 1987:43). This means a sharp split between groups in the country. It is part of the de-civilising process, as “Societies without a stable monopoly of force are always societies in which the division of functions is relatively slight and the chains of action binding individuals are comparatively short” (Elias, 1999:370). Accordingly, due to such a sharp split, the imbalance in power relations provides a suitable basis for a clear division between the groups. Thus, in framing the imbalance of the power relations, Harff states: ‘the stronger the identification within competing groups the more likely those extreme measures will be taken to suppress the weaker groups’ (Harff, 1987:43). This flaw, according to Harff, intensifies the polarisation between contending groups and their ideological separation.

2.3.3. **External interference**

“A third factor triggering genocide against national groups is the lack of external constraints on, or foreign support for, murderous regimes” (Harff, 1987:43). This factor also falls within the changing habitus of Elias, because in the civilising process, “the external control is founded on the assumption that every individual is himself or herself regulating his or her behavior with the utmost exactitude in accordance with the necessities of this network” (Elias, 1999:368). However, according to the civilising process, individuals are part of a complex interweaving, both internally and externally. In this regard, in the second half of the 20th century, the world faced a complex dilemma, as sovereignty constituted a security barrier for totalitarian regimes within their own countries to encourage and commit all kinds of crimes against their own people.

It is worth mentioning that these factors can be linked together in a dialectical relationship because any national upheaval consistently intensifies internal cleavage, and depending on this hypothesis, it strengthens the possibility of the process of genocide. The dilemma here is the probability of an accidental event, because the sharp split between the social actors does not match the procedural character of genocide. However, the sharp cleavage, according to Harff, is a result of the factual differences between national groups, as
she states that: “The structural precondition of national upheaval combined with societal receptiveness for internal violence targeted against ‘most different’ groups may pave the path to genocide” (Harff, 2009:113). Thus, the third factor may intensify the upheaval and the sharp cleavage, or become a positive factor in preventing the process of genocide.

2.4. The Concept of Genocide and Rafael Lemkin

As has previously been shown, there are many approaches that have been used to handle criminal acts against humanity. Ethnocentrism is an attempt to understand the causality between people’s struggle, their beliefs and the destruction of other groups. Here, in terms of understanding the concept of genocide, a serious question has arisen: how has the concept of genocide been coined? The invention of the concept primarily goes back to the father of the convention on genocide, Rafael Lemkin, and his landmark book Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (Bloxham, 2010). This essential book on genocide is an analytical study that aims to address and form a definition of the concept of genocide. Before delving into Lemkin’s theory, it may be beneficial to record his scientific journey towards the formation of the concept in order to reveal its different stages. Furthermore, this construction of the concept provides a clear vision of the essence of the term and its impact. Raphael Lemkin, as a Polish-Jewish jurist (1900), has converted the points that were seen as weak elements at that time, like his background and his being chased by Nazis, to strengthen his aspirations of a better future. His efforts to combat genocide-centric behaviour extend back to 1933, when he participated in an international conference on the unification of panel law held in Madrid. During this early stage of Nazi history, he warned the conference about the rise of Hitler as a threat to the entire region. His ideas have been crystallised and introduced into panel legislation as international law crimes, under the frame of “barbarity and vandalism”. He argues that:

“Barbarity is conceived as oppressive and destructive actions directed against individuals as members of a national, religious, or racial group and the crime of vandalism, conceived as malicious destruction of works of art and culture because they represent the specific creations of the genius of such groups” (Lemkin, 2000:91).

These two general concepts confirm an important stage in the development of genocide as a discipline. However, this determination could add extra details to the theory of established and outsider groups put forward by Norbert Elias, or even to ethnocentrism. This
is because barbarity and vandalism could be a possible consequence of any division between an in-group and out-group. Lemkin’s creation of these two terms shows his proximity to the essence of the concept of genocide. In an attempt to give prominence to both concepts, Kok-Thai Eng has explained that ‘barbarity’ means, “the premeditated destruction of national, racial, religious and social collectivities” (Kok-Thay Eng 2010:2). Here, barbarism appears as a description of tragic conditions that have occurred or could occur in human society with regard to the determination of targeting outsider groups who are different from the established group. However, Lemkin distinguishes the term vandalism from barbarism, as he emphasises that vandalism is “the destruction of works of art and culture, being the expression of the particular genius of these collectivities’’ (Kok-Thay Eng 2010:2). Here, if barbarity is a physical and lethal attempt at targeting a group, vandalism is the targeting of symbolic wealth, made up of the customs and the monuments of the outsider group, by the oppressor.

However, the term ‘ethnicity’ was later used by Delanty and Kumer in relation to cultural genocide, and it has the same meaning as vandalism. Thus, Lemkin has proposed these two concepts in terms of the adoption of a resolution against the crimes that he set out before them. Although the matter has been tabled, this proposal has been refused (A. Jones 2010:9) because of the internal affairs of states. During the interwar period, the forms of many states were not complete. However, Lemkin continued his career tirelessly and without failure. He developed a description of the Nazi policies of systematic murder, including the destruction of the European Jewish people. The question was asked: ‘What does “group murder” mean?’ He explains that it is a crime with special elements and vague aspects of a crime against humanity.

Finally, he presented his arguments in legal forums throughout Europe in the 1930s, and as far afield as Egypt (A. Jones 2010:9). Later, he fled to Sweden and then to the USA, and he finally found himself working as a professor at Duke University in Durham, North Carolina. His new position and his linguistic ability inspired him to coin the term ‘genocide’ to replace the term ‘barbarity and vandalism’. This shows the process of the development of terminology as part of the social process. This was a concise and memorable concept. He settled on a neologism of both Greek and Latin roots: the Greek ‘genos’ meaning race or tribe, and the Latin ‘cide’ meaning killing (A. Jones 2010:10).
2.5. Axis Rule in Occupied Europe

Lemkin’s efforts continued and his new step towards theorising genocide was the book ‘Axis Rule in Occupied Europe’ written in 1944. He describes his book as “laws of occupation, analysis of government, proposals for redress”. This book was his first attempt at formulating this term and developing an appropriate concept for the destruction of the out-group or as Elias describes, the ‘outsider’. The fundamental point of Lemkin’s concept lies in the differentiation between national components, particularly between the oppressed group (outsider) and the oppressor (established).

It is imperative to refer to Elias’s theory of Established and the Outsiders in order “to reveal macro structures by researching micro structures” (Mennell, S., 2009:100) as a meaningful comparison of the genocide process. This arrangement is necessary to recognise the characteristics of the power-relations between the perpetrators (in-group) and the group who face genocide (out-group). In addition, Elias has expressed this arrangement as follows: “a well-known way of conceptualising such an observation is to classify it as prejudice” (Elias and Scotson, 1994:29). Here, as previously explained in this chapter, Elias’s theory of the established and the outsiders was presented in the late 1950s; together with John Scotson, from a small community in Winston Prava on the outskirts of Leicester, they compiled a study entitled ‘The Established and the Outsiders,’ which conceptualised established and outsider groups. According to Henrietta O’Connor and John Goodwin, one of these groups, ‘the established’, was clearly dominant; the other, ‘the outsiders’, was clearly subordinate (O’Connor and Goodwin, 2012:481). Consequently, in order to illustrate the scale that sends ethnocentrism into genocide is the imbalance in power relations, as has been explained in a review of Ron Eyerman who claimed that: “members of groups which are, in terms of power, stronger than other interdependent groups, think of themselves in human terms better than the others ...what is more ...the “superior” people may make the less powerful people themselves feel that they lack virtue - that they are inferior in human terms” (Eyerman, 1995). Thus, Elias’s conceptualisation could form a particular framework for the oppressed group and the oppressor, and all other concepts in distinguishing the fieldwork of this research (Vulliamy, 1999, pp. 365-66).

Moreover, within the framework of the de-civilising process, the concept of ‘outsider’ may provide appropriate grounding for the particular view of Lemkin. This view depends on the idea of the ‘outsider’ as the first and most consistent step towards genocide. Here, for one or more reasons, as in the established and outsider group, the target must be determined.
Lemkin emphasises that genocide is “the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group” (Lemkin, 1973). Thus, the target or outsider group must have specific characteristics and vary from the established group. Therefore, an outsider who belongs to the oppressed group is misidentified and is different to the in-group that belongs to the central identity of the oppressor (De-Swaan, 1997). These significant features have been made prominent by Elias and Scotson in the study of Established and Outsider as they argue: “I have already said that dominant groups with a high power superiority attribute to themselves, as collectivities, and to those who belong to them, as families and individuals, a distinguishing group charisma” (Elias & Scotson: 94:35). These differences form an initial starting point to full blown consequences. This is what Palmer has underlined in his article ‘The socio-biology of ethnocentrism in an Indian City’, as he argues that “ethnocentrism is usually correlated with a belief in the superiority of one’s own in-group over out-groups” (R. J. Palmer, 1990:496).

This argument is in line with Lemkin’s argument of a fundamental differentiation between a national component and the oppressor (Vulliamy, 1999, pp. 365-66).

His second measure concerning the concept of genocide, and to give it a specific character, is the process. In this regard, Lemkin argues that “genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation” (Lemkin, 1973:79). This context provides a deep-rooted argument which claims that genocide will take different forms and be made up of different stages or time distances in its perpetration. Here, in terms of the prevention of any genocide act, Gregory Stanton has determined eight stages preceding the destruction of a group. These stages are recognisable and show that there is a process and it may embody elements of ethnocentrism. Hence, Dominik Schaller and Jürgen Zimmerer argue that “genocide - according to Lemkin - have to be understood as a process” (Dominik & Zimmerer, 2013:5). Therefore, in a simple examination of different examples of genocide, the nature of the long-term performance is the basic strain of these processes. In order to comprehend the process of genocide within its target and historical dimensions, it requires additional legal cornerstones. In addition, Lemkin suggests that “Genocide has two phases: one destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed: the other, imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor” (Lemkin: 94:i). This procedure is a measure of the established perpetrator in the process of genocide, who carries out the elimination of the specification of the outsider, whether physically or through any procedure that leads to the destruction of the people. However, in opposition to this procedure is the appearance of the established-centrism, including the imposition of all specifications of the oppressor (Vulliamy, 1999, pp. 365-66).
In addition to all these important points, he delves into intent as a significant element of any crimes committed by the legislator. Thus, according to Lemkin, intent and coordinated planning are two important elements regarding the fulfilment of the legal process. The term ‘intend’ for jurists is central and has been discussed as an essential condition for determining any criminal act, whether in domestic or international law. Hence, if the intent on one side is necessary for distinguishing an accident from a crime, on the other side, it is evidence for the preview of plans by the oppressor as an established group in terms of a previously prepared plan. Consequently, according to Lemkin, the “coordinate plan of different action” is complementary to the whole process of disintegration. This is when the process of civilisation is converted into the de-civilising process. The main purpose of disintegration, according to Lemkin, is “Aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves” (Lemkin, 1973:79). Lemkin, in his effort to circulate the process of disintegration, emphasises two ground elements: De-nationalisation and Germanisation, as the road map or advance planning of the process of genocide. Here, Lemkin is concerned not only with some aspects of the policies of the oppressor, but also the physical destruction of the oppressed groups. These concepts per se are important for the description of certain acts carried out by the authority against its targets. Without these concepts, it is not possible to describe the behaviour of the authority in its effort to change the cultural or demographic aspects of the oppressed group. In this regard, the Iraqi authority fundamentally pursued the policy of disintegration through elements of Arabisation and de-nationalisation. As a result, Arabisation, as a governmental policy in Iraq, does not necessarily mean immediate physical destruction, but it facilitated the way to genocide (Vulliamy, 1999, pp. 365-66).

Another important issue in the “Axis Rule in Occupied Europe”, which has been handled by Lemkin, is the “Rousseau-Portalis Doctrine”. The origins of this doctrine go back to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in his book the social contract, as he emphasises that:

“War then is a relation, not between man and man but between state and state, and individuals are enemies only accidentally not as men, nor as citizens but as soldiers; not as members of their country but as its defenders” (Rousseau, 2003:6).

Here, it seems that Germany during the period of World War II, unlike the Rousseau-Portalis Treaty, was implementing total war without discrimination between nations and state. Nazi Germany in this regard was very clear in the determination of its enemy. Thus, according to Hanna Arendt:
“Lemkin is concerned to prove that the Nazis are waging an unprecedented ‘total war’ since they make no distinction between the nation and the state: The nation provides the biological elements for the state. Such total war is the antithesis of the Rousseau-Portalis Treaty” (Goldoni & McCorkindale, 2012:206).

Therefore, one of the methods used to face up to the ambitions of the Nazi leaders was laws and international conventions, which according to Lemkin, “holds that war is directed against sovereigns and armies, not against subjects and civilians” (Lemkin, 2005:80). Despite the existence of these laws and conventions, the German’s attitude towards all of these agreements was to wage all-out war. Therefore, Lemkin was claiming that wars are between states and the armed forces, as civilian people have nothing to do with decisions about war. Consequently, Germany could not accept the Rousseau-Portalis Doctrine, “first because Germany is waging a total war; and secondly, because, according to the doctrine of National Socialism, the nation, not the state, is the predominant factor” (Lemkin, 1973:79).

Thus, if the nation provides the biological element for the state, Germany would behave differently with the occupied nation because the ultimate goal is the nation not the state. Accordingly, Germany pursued a policy of disintegration to secure the superiority of the Aryan race as well as the policies of Nazi Germany. This governmental policy, within a long process during the rule of the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (1920-1945), led to a significant change in the feelings and behaviour of the German people. This is because, as Marco Goldoni and Christopher McCorkindale confirm in their book ‘Hannah Arendt and the law’: “the Nazis violated this principle not only by waging total war, but even prior to war, through their policies of Aryanisation of the German race (by forbidding mixed marriages with Jews and others; employing euthanasia on the feeble-minded and the retarded, etc); through the Germanisation of peoples” (Goldoni &McCorkindale, 2012:206). This situation has been accurately examined in the civilising process as Elias argues, “more and more people must attune their conduct to that of others, the web of actions must be organized more and more strictly and accurately, if each individual action is to fulfil its social functions” (Elias, 2000:367).

When this integration changes through a specific policy of discrimination, or Germanisation/ Arabisation and misidentification, the whole course of action moves towards the de-civilising process. Here, Lemkin, in his effort to clarify Nazi ideology, argues, “the enemy nation within the control of Germany must be destroyed, disintegrated or weakened in different degrees for decades to come” (Lemkin, 1973:81). Thus, Lemkin attempts to explore the different levels of techniques of genocide, which the German occupiers developed in the
various occupant countries, in the following fieldwork: “Political, cultural, economic, biological, Physical, Religious and Moral techniques” (Lemkin, 1973). However, the physical techniques included, “Racial discrimination in feeding, Endangering of Health and Mass Killing” (Lemkin, 1973). Consequently, every single technique, with its details placed together or separately, has been used as a specific field with an entire policy in terms of disintegration, as a pathway to genocide, as pursued by Nazi Germany.

To conclude, Lemkin has mobilised the ability to stabilise the concept of genocide as a framework for the whole process of “destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed group ‘on one hand’ and the imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor” on the other” (Lemkin, 1973:79). The philosophy of Lemkin, in his effort to frame a concept for the act of genocide, lies in the separation of boundaries and diversities between nations at different levels, excluding any common level inside the nation. However, this effort by Lemkin may be restricted when it comes to the concept of ethnocentrism. In this regard, he never mentions this concept in his historical analysis despite his description in one way or another of the content and elements of the concept. Here, regardless of Lemkin’s historical comparative analysis, according to Dan Stone, “Lemkin was actually conscious of cultural difference and contingency in historical events and social processes like genocide” (Stone, 2012:280).

2.6. Towards the UNCG and a Definition of Genocide

Due to the constant effort of Lemkin, and with the support of the United States, a resolution was placed before the General Assembly for consideration. On December 11th, 1946, the first session of the United Nations General Assembly adopted Lemkin’s draft of the resolution which “affirms that genocide is a crime under international law which the civilized world condemns” (Achabas, 2000:45). However, this resolution, according to William Rubinstein does not provide “a legal definition of the crime” (Rubinstein, 2004). Thus, the concept of genocide, through the legal and historical process, is seen as having special significance according to the UNCG, since it refers to the mass murders committed against certain groups of people to destroy their existence altogether. The importance of the UN resolution and the items that contain a description of the concept of genocide, means that scholars have consistently spared no effort in the analysis and dismantling of such terms. In ‘The Genocide Study Reader’, the authors, Samuel Totten and Paul R. Bartrop, explain that the UNCG has gained much importance from illuminating its parts and phrases, for example the 11th December 1946th National General Assembly Resolution (96 - 1) states:
“Genocide is a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups, as homicide is the denial of the right to live of individual human beings ….. Many instances of such crimes of genocide have occurred when racial, religious, political, and other groups have been destroyed, entirely or in part.

The General Assembly, affirms that genocide is a crime under international law which the civilized world condemns, and for the commission of which principals and accomplices - whether private individuals, public officials or statesmen, and whether the crime is committed on religious, racial, political or any other grounds --are punishable” (Totten & Bartrop, 2009:4).

The legislator here is attempting to address the causal relationship between the established group and outsiders. It appears from the text that the existence of an outsider or oppressed group within the specific background may become the target of an established group that mostly comprises of the state or the dominant group. The targeted group is characterised by certain features that distinguish it from the dominant group to make its members an easy target to be annihilated. The other important point is that this crime is recognised as a crime under international law. This position of the term of genocide should have an impact on the behaviour of any government or a dominant group, as they will be aware that it is a punishable international crime. However, this declaration has gained many reactions and critics internationally. The first reaction came from those who realised that the draft had been tampered with and changed. In this regard, “the initial draft of the Resolution listed four groups, ‘national, racial, ethnic or religious groups” (Schabas, 2000:47). However, according to Schabas the modified version adopted by the Assembly refers to ‘racial, religious, political and other groups’ as was the case previously as well.

2.7. The Definition

It was necessary for this chaotic division, and the disagreement about the content of the concept of genocide between members of the general assembly, to be dealt with in order to reach an agreement. Therefore, in 1948, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPCG) was for the first time entirely adopted by the UN General Assembly. According to the (CPPCG):

Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, by:

- (a) Killing members of the group
• (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group
• (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part
• (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group
• (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group (UNGA 1948:1).

This definition was proposed to form a framework for acts of genocide, and it has been discussed and criticised by several scholars for a variety of reasons. Here, the all-important characteristics of the definition in relation to this thesis will be examined and taken into consideration. The different relevant key characteristics will be assessed along with its definition, in the context of political groups, national groups, one-sided mass killing and ethnocide (Vulliamy, 1999, pp. 365-66).

2.7.2. Intent and Motivation

Primarily, as long as the nature of the concept of genocide is legal and has been defined by international legislature, the most common definition could come from the legal references. Intent in legal and other dictionaries in its simplest and most common form is “a state of mind wherein the person knows and desires the consequences of his or her act. For criminal and certain types of civil liability, intent must exist at the time the offense is committed” (S. Gifis, 1998: 245). It has numerous decisive characteristics, including a particular act with a particular position that is constituted from knowledge and a desire to reach an end. This process in the hierarchy of any crime may form the basic description of a rudimentary route to committing a crime. Here, Helen Fain simply focuses on the preformation of the act, whether directly or indirectly, as she argues that “intent is the actual intention to perform an action and often comes right before the planning stage of committing a crime” (H. Fain 1990:10). In this regard, William Schabas in his book ‘Genocide in international law’ has extensively studied the intent elements. Thus, according to Schabas, the perpetrator’s intent is a crucial element in the crime of genocide; therefore, he argues, “all true crimes require proof of intent” (Schabas, 2000:113). Here, Schabas goes further and emphasises that “even without the terms ‘with intent’ in the definition of genocide, it is inconceivable that an infraction of magnitude could be committed unintentionally” (Schabas, 2000:113). Therefore, it is impossible to consider a crime like genocide an accident because it has been defined as a process. This means it is premeditated and requires surveillance. If it, according to Dunning and Hughes, is “like the universe at large, each human individual is a
process” (Dunning & Hughes, 2012: 51), then without the term intent the processual position of genocide is a foregone conclusion. However, G. Stanton in his effort argues, “Genocide is a process that develops in eight stages that are predictable but not inexorable” (Stanton, 1998). In this regard, and in terms of recognition of the process of genocide, according to Schabas, “the intent to destroy must be directed against one of four enumerated groups: national, racial, ethnical or religious” (Schabas, 2000:102). Thus, the target has to be selected and monitored throughout a long-term process in order to prepare and persuade the majority and sway public opinion. However, some extra characteristics of intent have been mentioned, like ‘the specific intent’, ‘proof of intent’, and that the offender must intend ‘to destroy’. All of these characteristics refer to the consequences of the process of genocide. Here, according to this explanation, through the enormity of the crime of genocide, the criminal intent in the Holocaust, Rwanda, Cambodia, Armenia in Turkey, in Bosnia, the AC in Iraq, and others, exists because of the direction of the will of the perpetrator. This will have been proven in pursuing the stages of the process of genocide, which involve forming the entire image of the crime. This is to bring the aims of the process to an end, which is the destruction of the targeted group in whole or in part. Furthermore, some scholars have attempted to fit the definition of genocide into a tighter frame. One of these alternatives has come from Jonassohn and Bjornson’s book. They argue that genocide “is a form of one-side mass killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group, as that group and membership in it are defined the perpetrator” (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990:23 cited in Jonassohn and Bjornson1999: 10). They use three major criteria for the alternative definition. These are: (1) the evidence about the intent of the perpetrator; (2) The group whose victimisation threatens its survival as a group; (3) The victimisation must be one sided. This definition does not suggest any clear indication that it has introduced any change, but based on these criteria the definition will be stronger.

In contrast to all of these suggestions, any change to the official international definition in the foreseeable future cannot be imagined under the current divide among the international community and its circumstances. For this, or any other reason, Leo Kuper refuses the creation of another definition, as he clearly states:

“I do not think it helpful to create new definitions of genocide, when there is an internationally recognized definition and a Genocide Convention which might become the basis for some effective action” (A. Jones 2010:16/17).

Another facet of intent that has been discussed deliberately is motive, although the definition does not address this in the text. Most scholars consider that including motive in
the definition could restrict the boundaries of the crime of genocide, as “Fitzmaurice maintained that: `Motive was not an essential factor in the penal law of all countries’” (Schabas, 2000:248). Thus, if this is the position of motive in the penal law of all countries in terms of normal crimes, then its exclusion from the crime of genocide is essential. In this regard, as long as the “motive is a function of the emotional, psychological, and material needs that impel and are satisfied by behaviour”, then “the intent, on the other hand, is the end aim that guides behaviour” (Petherick & Turvey & Ferguson: 2009:154). Accordingly, the intent according to David C. McClelland is largely a conscious preference for doing something, but motive is a “largely unconscious determinant of spontaneously generated behaviour” (McClelland, D. C. 1985:544).

Hence, the intent is the direct stage of planning and preparing towards the implementation of the crime- whatever the motive. Therefore, Schabas argues that “Several individuals may tend to commit the same crime, but for different motives” And the “Domestic criminal law system rarely requires proof of motive” (Schabas, 2000:245). Here, the abandonment of motives in the crime of genocide is crucial due to the denial by perpetrators of genocide and the allegations made against them. This is because “once the intent to destroy a group existed, that was genocide, whatever reasons the perpetrators of the crime might allege” (Schabas, 2000:248).

2.7.3. Political Groups

There is deep disparity when it comes to excluding political groups from the genocide convention. Here, unlike Lemkin, Leo Kuperas, a pioneer of genocide studies, in his book ‘Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century’ shows his opposition to this exclusion, as he argues: “I have included cases where the victims of massacre were political groups (or economic classes)” (Kuper 1983). Thus, why have they been excluded? It seems that in the first debate around the first draft of the general assembly resolution 96 (1), political groups were one of the subjects of debate and a cause of profound controversy. It is difficult to ignore any human group and remove them from the convention, but it should be appropriate to the content of the concept of genocide. This dilemma could be one of the reasons why Lemkin did not agree to including political groups in the convention (Schabas, 2000)- due to of the measurement of the concept. Thus, according to Schabas, the first draft which was offered by Lemkin did not include political groups. This is because political groups were “never considered by Lemkin as subjects of genocide”(Fein, 1990:11). This means that the
draft proposed by Lemkin does not include the protection of political groups. Later, a sub-committee of the Sixth Committee added them, but finally, the UN general assembly excluded them.

Here, despite the resistance of Lemkin, who is the inventor of the concept, many others have criticised the CPPCG’s definition because of this exclusion. They insist that the destruction of political groups should be considered as genocide because they “have been the main victims since World War II” (Kok-ThayEng 2010:2). The reason for this appeal is that the perpetrators “victimize the four protected groups on political grounds” (Kok-ThayEng 2010:2). However, as Kuper notes, interference in a sovereign state to protect victimised groups was the main purpose of the Convention (Kok-ThayEng 2010:2). Regarding this issue, many scholars have been worried about the behaviour of certain states because if the victims belong to the four groups that are mentioned in the convention, then it might be announced by the state that their victims are political (Fein, 1993, pp. 1-6).

Here, the most important question is why and for what motives this group has been excluded from the CPPCG? The most prominent reasons according to ‘The Oxford handbook of genocide studies’ vary from conceptual to pragmatic. It has been argued that political and economic groups have been “excluded for a variety of reasons ranging from the conceptual (i.e., some argued that political and economic groups were not ‘enduring’) to the pragmatic” (Bloxham & Moses: 2010:193). Thus, the permanent nature of political groups could be an important reason for excluding them from the convention. According to Robert Cribb, political identity is a matter of choice, unlike ethnic identity, which is considered to be primordial, or at least historical. This argument is justified because the political opinion does not amount to Eliasian second nature. In addition to the Gribb’s argument, a disagreement erupted as some countries objected to the term “political or any other groups” being included in the resolution for two important reasons: first, because “the membership of political groups is voluntary”; second: “the crime of genocide might use the pretext of the political opinion of a racial or religious group to persecute and destroy it, without becoming liable to international sanction” (Totten and Bartrop, 2009:4). This inclusion, if had been established, would mean the term had been removed from its content. Here, it is worth mentioning that the political excuse has been utilised to justify the Iraqi authority’s harsh violence against the out-group, which is the Kurds (BASP, 1982:69).

This disagreement about the inclusion of political groups has led some scholars to coin an alternative to the term genocide. According to Robert Cribb “this inclination crystallized in the 1988 coining of word, ‘politicide’, by Harff and Gurr to designate mass
killings in which the victims were targeted for their political affiliation, rather than their ethnicity” (Bloxham & Moses: 2010:446). In addition to this dilemma, some scholars ignore International Criminal Law and its important elements mentioned below. Therefore, according to Robert Cribb, “other scholars, Schabas amongst them, prefer to use the term ‘crimes against humanity’ when discussing mass killing with political motives” (Bloxham & Moses: 2010:446).

In this direction, International Criminal Law contains five core international crimes that are confirmed in the 5th article, and crimes within the jurisdiction of the court as part of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. These crimes are: “the crime of genocide, the crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression”, and all have been distinguished from each other. Each of these crimes covers specific elements, and one of them is genocide. Therefore, the terms ‘political groups’ or ‘any other groups’ which do not fall under the concept of genocide, can find their place in other parts of the 5th article, specifically the crime of aggression.

2.7.4. National Groups

Central to Elias’s conception are survival units or attack and defence units, and competition based on the diverse interests among groupings is unavoidable. Accordingly, “when a dominant ethnic collectivity is established as the basis of a “nation state,” a quandary arises in dealing with the out-groups” (Adam Jones, 2006:428). In other words, depending on the map of the distribution of power, which Elias has examined in his book ‘The Established and the Outsiders’, the nature of human societies makes it constantly possible to create separation between its statuses under any designation and circumstances (Orentlicher, 1999, pp. 153-157).

Here, the legislation used to implement the Genocide Convention of the United States means, according to Schabas, that national groups can be defined “as `a set of individuals whose identity as such is distinctive in terms of nationality or national origins” (Schabas, 2000:133). Based on this definition, distinctiveness is the decisive element in the groupings, and this is the core of the concept of genocide.

Here, the ‘national group’ according to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has been described as “A collection of people who are perceived to share a legal bond based on common citizenship, coupled with reciprocity of rights and duties” (Schabas, 2000:115). This definition is more political and could be controversial in comparison to the
nature of the concept of genocide. According to Schabas, the United Kingdom questioned the inclusion of national groups because people are free to join and to leave them. Dependently, if this is the case, then it is very easy to include many groups that have been exposed to serious conditional situations or elimination. In the same direction, the boundaries of national groups have been narrowed to a distinctive identity or distinctions among components. Here, some sources, such as Mark Levene through Pieter Drostwho, refer to it as follows: “the ‘group’ was an entirely self-defining one composed of any body of individuals who saw themselves as part of a collectivity” (Levene, 2005:79). This self-identification has been expressed emotionally because, according to Elias, they have forgotten the long process of civilisation and they have come to think of the traits as innate in themselves as if they had never had to learn these traits. This innateness has a relationship with the theory of ‘habitus’ and has been defined by Elias as second nature. It refers to “that level of habits of thinking, feeling and behaving which are in fact learned from early childhood onwards, but which become so deeply ingrained that they feel ‘innate’ as if one had never had to learn them” (Fletcher, 1997:6). This feeling has an important role in the behaviour of these groups as they may identify themselves as they are or have been identified by the perpetrator. The issue of national groups in the definition of the process of genocide generally is vague and flexible. Here, in the fieldwork of this thesis, both parts have identified themselves, and they identify with each other within the clear lines of conflict and the process of genocide. Thus, according to G. Stanton “All cultures have categories to distinguish between “us” and “them,” between members of our group and others” (Stanton, 1998). This is precisely what has been explored in the fieldwork on the AC (Orentlicher, 1999, pp. 153-157).

2.7.5. Ethnocide

The origin of the word ethnocide also goes back to Rafael Lemkin, the inventor of the concept of genocide. This term, similar to genocide, is composed of the Greek word ‘ethnos’, which means nation, and the Latin word ‘cide’ word which means killing. Despite less fame in comparison to the term genocide, the vast majority of scholars have begun using the term as one of the secondary branches of the term genocide. Here, according to Lemkin “Genocide and ethnocide could be two words to mean the same thing because there was no need to make a distinction. Ethnocidal policies are genocide actions” (Bartolomé, 2008, 42). Thus, regarding the usage of the term, there are different approaches and interpretations. In this respect, William Schabas in his book ‘Genocide in international law’ highlights the
importance of the term through the UNESCO ‘Declaration of San Jose’. According to this declaration, the term “means that an ethnic group is denied the right to enjoy, develop and transmit its own culture and its own language, whether individually or collectively. This involves a massive violation of human rights” (Schabas, 2000:189). In the same direction, according to Alexander Laban Hinton, “Ethnocide is the deliberate destruction of a group’s way of life” (Hinton, 2002:11). Here, it is reasonable that the concept is not limited to one sense only, but extended to include many meanings; it also refers to any criminal acts against a particular race if they lead to full extermination, as Damir Mirkovicin his article argues that ethnocide means “where a group disappears without mass killing” (Mirković, 1996:197).

This method for the ending of an outsider group without bloodshed could be even more dangerous to social diversity. Therefore, Mary Ellen in her article ‘A case Study of Indigenous Peoples: Genocide, Ethnocide and Self-Determination’ has given plenty of space to many examples of the disappearing of indigenous people, as she confirms that “when the culture of a people is destroyed, the group enters a dramatic downward spiral of destruction” (Mary Ellen: 1990:298).

More specifically, according to Adam Johns, this term has been used by the French ethnologist Robert Jaulin in his article ‘White Peace: Introduction to ethnocide’ to describe patterns of cultural genocide. Thus, according to Robert Jaulin ethnocide is “the destruction of a group’s cultural, linguistic, and existential underpinnings, without necessarily killing members of the group” (Jones, 2006:26). Consequently, these values are a prominent indication of all varieties and communities in all societies. Without these values, there is no meaning of diversity and pluralism because:

“For one thing, it means that the murder of a poet is morally worse than the murder of a janitor, because the poet is the “brain” without which the “body” cannot function. This revival of medieval organic imagery is central to Lemkin’s idea of genocide as a special crime” (A. Jones 2010:12).

Throughout this dualism of ‘body and soul’ or ‘group and culture’, and with a will to protect it is, “the perpetrator who is the representative of the dominant group” (H. Fain 1990:13), who does not allow any form of ‘independency’ for “the victims who are subordinated groups” (H. Fain 1990:13) independent from the will of the perpetrator. In other words the perpetrator is “the representative of the dominant” and maintains the interests of the dominant and superior culture or language dependent on “religion or ideology”, without allowing power to any existing ‘body and soul’ who wants to be dominant. They are mere ‘subordinates’, or ‘outsiders’ in the view of the perpetrator or ‘established group’ and should
be destroyed because they are menacing to the dominant group. Regarding this equivalent, “to destroy, or attempt to destroy, a culture is a special kind of crime because culture is the unit of collective memory, whereby the legacies of the dead can be kept alive. To kill a culture is to cast its individual members into individual oblivion, their memories buried with their mortal remains” (A. Jones 2010:12). In this regard, killing of the culture is the killing of the owners of the culture because there is no diversity without the culture. “By Lemkin: cultural discrimination may be a tactic to assimilate or to destroy a group. The objective of genocide was both the social disintegration and the biological destruction of the group’’ (Kok - Thay Eng 2010:1).

The most important issue regarding ethnocide, which is seldom mentioned, is the process of assimilation. Under integration policy, ethnocide may take place in its different forms. For this reason, Mary Ellen argues that “the norm of protection from ethnocide guarantees the right of such peoples not to be forced to assimilate and adopt an alien culture” (Mary Ellen: 1990:298). One of these methods of ethnocide is the dislocation of indigenous people, which has been pursued on a grand-scale. In this regard, Kazuo Sumi has confirmed ethnocide as being “a dislocation of indigenous people from their homeland, destruction of their way of life, and denial of their culture and language” (Sautman: 2006:10). Another method of ethnocide is force, which is considered within one of the eight stages of genocide. Joe Thomas has investigated this issue as he describes one aspect as follows: “ethnocide, with the children in the camps ultimately facing the long-term social and psychological consequences of detention” (Thomas, 2000:276). Thus, ethnocide may operate throughout a long-term process in the form of disintegration, as one of the breakdown steps in civil society. This idea of a spasm between the components could be the most dangerous action in the dismantling of the outsider group. This situation shows the intent of the regime or an established group to develop the policy of integration as an ideological model of civilisation. However, this form of civilisation, sooner or later, could lead to the de-civilising process, as according to Elias, “civilization’ is not a permanent state but rather a precarious process that may very well reverse itself” (De Swaan, 2001:266). Based on this unstable civilising process, Hanna Arendt in her book ‘the origins of Totalitarianism’ and in relation to Nazi Germany, explains that “a period of political disintegration suddenly and unexpectedly made hundreds of thousands of human beings homeless, stateless, outlawed and unwanted” (May, 2010:67). This disintegration policy under any circumstances could lead to the dismantling of the cultural and historical community’s structure. Thus, the dismantling of cultural infrastructure and the destruction of the historical memory of the group lies in the long-term
process towards the ideological goal of the establishment group. Here, ethnocide as a process, according to John Campbell, involves the “community losing its internal cohesion, community structures, networks and direction due to the direct intervention of a dominant group” (Campbell, 2002:276). This means that the true collapse of the entire component will terminate, and through a long-term process, the characteristics of the community will disappear (Thompson, 1975, p. 22).

2.8. Two Models of Genocide

During the preceding parts of this chapter, which is based on the de-civilising process, different subjects have been examined in order to find an appropriate framework for approaching the process of genocide in Iraq. In this part of the chapter, two models of genocide will be highlighted in order to specify the appropriate criteria of the process of genocide, including the AC (Orentlicher, 1999, pp. 153-157).

2.8.1. The Model of Paradigm

In her book ‘genocide a sociological perspective’, Helen Fein has handled different subjects of genocide including social recognition and the criminalisation of genocide. She defines genocide as a sociological concept, and provides explanations of genocide, such as ideological genocides along with some other subjects. According to Fein, there are methods that can identify and separate genocide from other crimes under international law, which have been mentioned in the previous part (2.6.2 political groups). Under the concept of her paradigm, Fein has determined particular elements and sets them out a criterion of genocide, with “the variable characteristics of the criterion specified” (Fein, 1990:25). The propositions that cover the necessary and sufficient conditions in order to find out the criterion of genocide (Orentlicher, 1999, pp. 153-157) are as follows:

1. There was a sustained attack or continuity of attack by the perpetrator to physically destroy group members. In this regard, Fein has raised some questions to elaborate on the circumstances of the process of genocide, for example, did a series of actions or single actions of the perpetrator lead to the death of members of group X?

1) The perpetrator was a collective or organised actor/ commander of organised actors. This, according to Fein, is because “genocide is distinguished from homicide empirically by the fact it is never an act of a single individual” (Fein, 1990:25).
2) Victims were selected because they were members of a collective. Thus, Fein asks: Were victims selected irrespective of any charge against them individually?

3) The victims were defenceless or were killed regardless of whether they surrendered or resisted. This is because it is important to determine if the victims were armed or organised to physically resist.

4) The destruction of group members was undertaken with intent to kill and murder, and was sanctioned by the perpetrator. The importance here is the direct evidence of orders or authorisation for the destruction of the victims.

5) Consistency of sanctions for killing group members.

6) Ideologies and beliefs legitimating genocide. Here, Fein is asking if there is any evidence of an ideology.

2.8.2. The Model of Patterns of Genocide

Raul Hilberg in his book, “The destruction of the European Jews”, which has been hailed as the first comprehensive historical study of the Holocaust, states that the “destruction process has inherent patterns. There is only one way in which a scattered group can effectively be destroyed” (Hilberg, R., 1985:1064). Thus, for the process of destruction, according to Hilberg, the steps are organic to the operation, and are as follows:

2.8.2.1. Specific Legislation

This phase could be the most dangerous phase because of its involvement intentionally in a criminal plan within the administration procedure or by issuing specific legislation. Here, according to Federico Finchelstein the stage consists of “An initial moment of definition of the future victims, made up in nominal terms by the enactment of a specific legislation that defines who was a Jew” (Finchelstein, F., 2005:18).

2.8.2.2 Identification

The second phase is identified and specifies the group that should be eradicated. It could be that all genocide processes have specific characters, in particular according to Federico Finchelstein, it is characterized by the “Aryanization” of properties, job dismissals, special taxes, and food rationing policies (Finchelstein, F., 2005:19).
2.8.2.3 Concentration:

The third phase is the deportation and concentration (or seizure), or concentration camps.

2.8.2.4 Annihilation:

The fourth and final phase is the annihilation, or as Federico Finchelstein has described, the “Extermination mobile killing operations in extermination camps” (Finchelstein, F., 2005:19).

In addition, according to Hilberg, “This is the invariant structure of the basic process, for no group can be killed without concentration or seizure of the victims and no victims can be segregated before the perpetrator knows who belongs to the group” (Hilberg, R., 1985:1065).

There could be other phases, between or after these four major patterns. First and foremost, the selection of the group is essential to be dealt with. As a consequence, the separation of the group’s members from each other, particularly the separation of women from men and children from their parents, could be an important part of the administrative proceedings. Additionally, striping these people of their property can accompany the separation of people from each other or preceding it.

2.9. Criminology and International Criminal Law

Jonathan Fletcher claims that “The attention to violence and its controls lies at the centre of Elias’s theory” (Fletcher, 1997:3). Thus, despite Elias having worked on punishment as part of the criminology, criminology itself, including laws, could be considered as part of the process of ‘division of functions’, which is a development stage in the process of civilisation. However, the means of violence, which are monopolised by the state, are necessary in terms of power relations. In addition, according to Elias, “The State’s assumption of the means of violence had a crucial impact on the way people are related to each other” (Vaughan, B., 2000:74). This relation has to be organised depending on laws and values. Moreover, “the State, in offering a greater degree of protection than before, assumed a ‘survival function’, it would ‘protect its members from being physically wiped out’” (Vaughan, B., 2000:74). Thus, through ‘survival function’ members of society have to be protected, but the most problematic question here is as long as the fieldwork study is the
crime of genocide, and as long as the state is usually involved in committing the crime of genocide, how will the state protect the out-groups from being physically wiped out? It could be that it has a connection to legitimacy, which will be discussed in the next chapter. Thus, criminology, on the one hand is an important discipline to study the prevention of crimes, and on the other hand, how to punish the perpetrator. In this regard, punishment is one of the subjects that have been addressed by Elias, but according to Barry Vaughan, “what we might expect from an Eliasean reading of penalty is that the development of penal institutions did not signal a radical departure in the form of punishment but just a more efficient distribution” (Vaughan, B., 2000:76). Hence, punishment as one of the means of criminal law, alongside history, has been the subject of a huge debate between criminologists and other scholars.

Elias did study punishment in an attempt to adjust it, but for the sake of research, and “Criminology and Genocide studies: Notes on what might have been and what still could be”, by L. Edward Day and Margret Vandiver, is an attempt to derive particular concepts from the discipline of psychology and criminology to position genocide within the fieldwork of criminology. However, the researchers have on the one hand attempted to explain that criminology has little to offer the discipline of genocide, and this has excluded genocide from the boundary conditions of their study; while on the other hand, according to the researchers, it has been claimed by criminologists that it is better for genocide to be explained through the theories and methods of political science than criminology. This position concerning criminology, which the researchers have not fully explained in relation to why they claim to restrict genocide to political science, can be criticised on two levels- the technical level and the theoretical level.

Here, technically speaking, genocide has transnational dimensions and criminology belongs to the national legal system; its authority has limits and costs in front of the state, particularly if the state is behind the process of genocide. The other significant issue in this section is the neutralisation of interrogation centres and involvement in trials of the state. Here, the specific example of this position is Iraq after the invasion of the coalition in 2003. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) established a new Governing Council in Iraq and subsequently the “Supreme Iraqi Criminal Court” was established on the 10th of October 2003 under article-48 of the 2004 Transitional Administration Law. Dependent on this enormous change in the structure of the Iraqi authority, the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Court recognised the genocide of the Kurds in Iraq. Despite this recognition, the Iraqi government still did not recognise nor apologise for the genocide campaigns, and furthermore, the Iraqi government is still not ready to compensate the victims. However, the SICC has been
pursuing a hybrid or a mixture of laws on Iraq and international law. The important question here is how will the researchers ‘Day and Vandiver’ develop the genocide process through the theory of ‘sanctioned massacres’ which include the concepts of authorisation, routinisation and dehumanisation within the framework of the criminological theory of ‘delinquent behaviour’, and to what degree can it help this fieldwork?

Thus, theoretically, it appears to be an attempt to build a bridge between Herbert Kelman’s theory, which is explained in his book ‘Crimes of Obedience: Toward a Social Psychology of Authority and Responsibility’, and the paper ‘Techniques of Neutralisation: A theory of Delinquency’ by Gresham Sykes and David Matza. This combination is an effort to plant genocide within the discipline of criminology. Here, there is a contradiction faced between two inappropriate fields. On the one hand, the theory of delinquency has an individualistic psychological character, and according to Sykes and Matza, delinquent behaviour, like most social behaviours, is learned as part of the process of social interaction. Here, this behaviour in its reversed form, depending on the civilising process, has a psychological make-up and is often referred to as ‘habitus’, and “it essentially means that level of personality characteristics which individuals share in common with fellow members of their social group” (Amanda: 2012:8). However, according to Kelman and Hamilton ‘sanctioned massacres’ involve systematic mass violence and “tend to occur in the context of an overall policy that is explicitly or implicitly genocidal: designed to destroy all or part of a category of people defined in ethnic, national, racial, religious or other terms” (Kelman and Hamilton, 1989:12). Moreover, these two theories are different in their scope, dimensions and structure. Therefore, if criminology as a national law and an internal subject belongs to the state institution and the state is involved in the genocide process, whether directly or indirectly, who will guarantee the neutrality of these institutions? However, in the best position, if the state is not involved, the doubts around the neutrality of a national tribunal still stand. Thus, the effort to combine the theory on “sanctioned massacres” and the “criminological theory of delinquency”, is a limited effort and of little use to any present or future victims.

Furthermore, the concept of authorisation in the frame of the theory of ‘sanctioned massacres’, exceeds beyond the theory of delinquency because of the domination of the authority itself. This is because as Day and Vandiver argue, “the sanction must occur in a context of an authority ordering” (Day and Vandiver, 2000:44). According to them, the authority approves the killing, enhancing the willingness of people to participate in massacres, and the individual feels obligated to obey the orders of the authority. This position
of the authority in utilising its power and state instruments against other groups, gives the
discipline of criminology a major limitation due to the input of the authority. Thus, any
discussion about authoritarian power in terms of its eligibility to have an appropriate legal
system is a point of view. This centricity of the authority is parallel and loyal to the other
characteristic- the routinisation of the sanction of massacres. This point may be seen as a
foregone conclusion because even Nazism will routinise the “practices of everyday
interactions in which the racist motives are more covert” (Capucao, 2010:174). Here, it is
clear that routinisation in society in terms of national groups has many dimensions, and it can
end with the routinisation of everyday mass violence. According to Kelman, routinisation
operates between the individual and organisational level. The arrangement of individuals and
organisations “diffuses responsibility and limits the amount and scope of decision making
that is necessary” (Kelman and Hamilton, 1989:12:18). This diffusion complicates the
process of any national tribunal court in a totalitarian authority, which has a monopoly over
the means of violence.

This routinisation is necessary in order to routinise everyday life and lead to
dehumanisation, which is one of the stages of genocide (Stanton, 2013). Furthermore, the
effectiveness of this process is preparation for the grounds of mass violence or genocide.
However, ethnocentrism is an appropriate concept that can be used to highlight ethnic
boundaries, as Haslam claims: “dehumanisation is arguably most often mentioned in relation
to ethnicity… because it has relation with intergroup conflict” (Haslam, 2006:252).
Dependently, these concepts can best be described as instruments or methods used in the
process of mass extermination under the domination of an authority.

2.10. Conclusion

The genocide process is a theoretical framework for any criminal act that has been
committed according to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (CPPCG). In this chapter, different aspects of the genocide process have been
considered. The first aspect of ethnocentrism, which is an initial attitude and indicates
aggressive behaviour due to the division of social groups, has been elaborated on.
Ethnocentrism according to Graham Sumner, “Is the technical name for this view of things in
which one’s own group is the centre of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with
reference to it” (Sumner, 1956:41). This kind of thinking and attitude increases the gap
between both groups, whether positively or negatively, and could lead to bloody violence. In the same direction, if ethnocentrism is considered to be a long-term process used to create a division between an in-group and outgroup, the aetiology could create appropriate circumstances for short-term or sudden genocide. Here, aetiology is confined to national upheaval, sharp internal cleavage and external interference.

In addition to the causes of genocide, the first inventor of the concept of genocide was Rafeal Lemkin. Lemkin’s main effort lies in his book “Axis rule in occupied Europe” and it led to the United Nation’s resolution on preventing genocide. The General Assembly has affirmed that genocide is a crime under international law, and it means any acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. However, the criminal action has to comply with certain conditions, including intention, motivation and the determination of the target group. Aside from the target group, an exemption has been made for political groups and national groups; hence, the exclusion of political groups from the UN definition has faced various criticisms.

In addition to genocide, other concepts have been invented in order to expand the scope of the target groups from different aspects. One of these concepts is ethnocide, which refers to the annihilation of the culture or the identity of an out-group. Additionally, ethnocide in the view of Robert Jaulin is “the destruction of a group’s cultural, linguistic, and existential underpinnings, without necessarily killing members of the group” (Jones, 2006:26).

The models of genocide have also been highlighted due to their importance in recognising the stages of genocide. The first model is the paradigm, which has been studied by Helen Fein, and the second one is a model of patterns of genocide. These models of genocide follow the position of the crime of genocide through an examination of aspects of criminology and the relevant international criminal law.
CHAPTER 3:

Literature Review Part Two:

State Formation and Nation Building

3.1. Introduction

The reason for studying state formation and the nation state is because of the assumption that the genocide in Iraq was a direct consequence of nation building, and the monopoly of violence being based on an illegitimate authority. Iraq as a state has been described by many scholars, including Toby Dodge, “as a failed state” (Dodge, 2003:249). Here, in the shadow of this argument, and dependent on Elias’s framework of the civilising process, an attempt is made in this chapter to understand state formation in general; in particular, the nation state, including the developments in nation building in Iraq. Thus, the most important elements of state formation according to Elias are the monopoly of physical forces and taxation, including their functional purposes and these will be comparatively addressed in order to analyse the position of power, authority and legitimacy. This is to find out what the elements of the nation state are, as the basic purpose of this research study’s fieldwork. In this regard, power, authority and legitimacy, as three different concepts and elements of the nation state, as prominently highlighted by Elias, Max Weber and Foucault, will be discussed in the shadow of the civilising process. All of this will be addressed in the first part, and then in the second part, the practical steps involved in building the state of Iraq will be interpreted by drawing upon the theoretical framework established in the first part.

Here, despite some aspects of state formation generally, the process of state building in Iraq, and its quick transformation towards an ethnocentric nation state have to be addressed carefully. A major question in this regard is: how was the Iraqi state, in the context of the domination of the Arabic majority, and then its Arabic nationalistic characteristics, formed? In addition, why did nation building in Iraq, as a civilising process, retreat?

The establishment of a nation state in Africa and the Middle East generally, emerged with the fall of the Ottoman Empire (Roshwald, 2001:36). Thus, to understand nation building as a modern term, it is necessary to locate its position in the framework of the civilising process because, according to Elias, nation building is considered to be one of the key phenomena of civilisation. However, according to Elias, the state has long-term
dimensions and has developed in several different forms and using various social structures. Hence, it is possible to consider state formation as a historical foundation and grounding for nation states. Furthermore, an explanation of this process is necessary in order to find out whether the emergence of the nation building process in Iraq occurred as a result of a long term conflict between its components, or if it is just a dynamic result of the great powers conflicting after the First World War. In other words, it is important to find out whether state building in Iraq was, figuratively speaking, a caesarian birth as a result of the exceptional situation, or as a consequence of the First World War and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The importance of state formation in this fieldwork is in order to discover the manners, structure and transformation of Iraq as a figuration process in building a nation state. This process is according to the framework of webs of social ranks, with or without the participation of all Iraqi components. In this regard, the consequences of the process of genocide as a de-civilising process, and as a dynamic result of the state failing, will be addressed.

3.2. Norbert Elias’ the Civilising Process

It is important to indicate some points before delving into the characteristics of the theory of the civilising process. According to Stephen Mennell, “Elias saw his work as explanatory, never as the definitive and exhaustive study” (Mennell, Stephen, 1990:4). Thus, Elias’ study of the civilising process is an empirical insight into the developments of centuries of European history.

The civilising process, Elias argues, “Is a change in human conduct and sentiment in a specific direction” (Elias, 2008:365). In the civilising process, the inter-relationship between long-term changes in human conduct and long-term modifications in state formation are involved. Prior to delving into this mechanism of the inter-relationships between human conduct in society, and the state as a holder of the means of violence, the focus is on the emergence of the state and its formation. It is a dynamic and natural consequence of social, economic and political transformation. In other words:

“According to Elias, the ‘civilising processes’ of Western Europe occurred correlative with the emergence of capitalist-urban-industrial-nation states, and such social units were primarily formed by-and-for war” (Dunning, & Hughes, 201397).

As a result, the emergence of the modern state as one of the phases of the civilising process was not the outcome of a simple process. Rather, the process of civilisation involved
a shift from feudal state, through to an absolutist state, concluding with the nation state in its diverse variants. This transformation created long-term changes in the nature of society-economically, politically and militarily. The characteristics of these changes include the way the “Competition between various groups of people, with associate conflict between these groups, culminated in the establishment of a monopoly of one group and the eventual formation of a state” (Rohloff, 2011:3). This means that “Human beings live and exist together as elements of complex networks (Elias called them ‘figurations’) encompassing people, groups and institutions; (Smith, 2001:1), peacefully or in conflict towards a specific direction.”

The processes of human behaviour accompany this transition towards state formation, and changes in the nature of states; creating changes in the way people connect to each other, “Leading eventually to greater integration and greater inter-dependence between people” (Rohloff, 2011:3). However, Elias argues that “It did not happen without a specific type of order” (Elias 2000:365), but it was largely unplanned and irrationally planned. This social order, according to Elias, triggers the civilising process.

“These figurations are shaped by social processes: Long-term, and largely unplanned, processes which comprises of pattern, structure and direction” (D. Smith, 2001:1)

In addition, the one group who is stabilising the monopoly of the state also stabilises the monopolisation of means of violence and taxation as a mechanical consequence. It refers to “how Europe had moved from the medieval order to a system of absolutist states stressed, first, the revolution in the sphere of taxation, and, second, the monopolization of force that was linked with the military revolution” (A. Linker & S. Mennell, 2010:9). Dependently, the levels of modernity, civility and of human interconnectedness, do not limit the desire and struggle for power and domination, but they do produce different forms of conflict between the various components in society. Furthermore, the emergence of the nation state in Europe, which seems to be one of the important stages and consequences of civilisation in its different forms, has determined its own features and models in the political process throughout the transformation and the change in the society and its institutional powers, as Elias has asserted:

“These changes in civility also chart the formation of the nation state and the centralization of institutional power. The transformation of the emotions is an important feature of this history” (Loyal & Quilley 2004:245)

This process of civilisation is considered to be moving in the right direction towards the legitimacy of the state and creating harmony between the different components of society,
with less violence. It is a ‘forward’ direction, and as Elias has stated, the civilising process has two directions - ‘forward’ and ‘backward’. In this case, “the civilising processes go along with de-civilising processes” (van Krieken, 1999:5). In accordance, the turning point is when the de-civilising process dominates the circumstances of society. This domination of de-civility can emerge due to different variations in the circumstances of the society, or changes in the social system. Thus, the usual trends refer to the moral weakness of the state, for instance Elias has claimed that “the German state was a weak state that failed at pacifying and civilising the Germans and therefore allowed a reversal to barbarism to occur” (Swaan, 2013:267).

This reversal process, according to Elias, is how the “whole reorganization of human relationships had direct significance for the change in the human habitus” (Elias, 2000:366). Dependently, this direction does not mean that it is uni-linear or inevitable, but it is related to the structure of the society and different circumstances, including ideology. Hence, as Elias maintains:

“If we see a particular social structure, a particular form or social interweaving is pushed through its tensions to a specific change and so to other forms of intertwining” (Elias, 2000:367)

According to this approach, Elias is concerned with the balance between choice and determinism, and that the forward direction could turn into a reversal, as the civilising process sometimes moves contrary to the current situation. Thus, when the ruling class acts against the national consensus, such as consciously taking unilateral action, including imposing an identity, as a representative and in favour of one entity, the course will move in the opposite direction, and the process of state building in favour of all citizens may head towards ethnic bloodshed. Regarding this opposition to the national consensus, if there is a consensus, the trend is towards a de-civilising process. From this standpoint,” While the state continues to monopolize violence, promotes and protects civilized modes of behaviour and expression in society, at the same time it perpetrates massive and organized acts of extreme violence towards specific categories of its citizens” (A. de Swaan, 2001:265).

In terms of the subject of the fieldwork in Iraq, the main problem has been the Iraqi state, from its formation until the fall of Baghdad in 2003, and it may still be problematic for two main reasons which cannot be avoided:

The first is that Iraq was formed by British colonial rule, in support of Sunni-Arabs. However, the strangest character of this formation is that a foreign family was chosen to become the royal family of Iraq- Faisal’s family, who were from Saudi Arabia and supported
the British army against the Ottoman Turks when the Western allies invaded the Middle-East region. On the other hand, the British had discovered oil in the Kurdish city of Kirkuk. This event was an important reason for annexing the Mosul province to the other two provinces of Iraq in 1925, without taking into account the wishes of the Kurdish nation within the newly formed country. Thus, the major characteristics of this country are illegitimate, or built in accordance with non-democratic procedures.

The formation of the state by “annexing three provinces” inclusive of their territory, nature and people, lasted well into the 20th century. It was not formed within the principles of a civilising process and “it was not a transformation on the level of social structure (sociogeneic) inter-related to changes in the level of personality” (Buschendorf, Franke & Voelz, 2011:1). It was not a gradual, dynamic transformation, according to the channels that create change in the habitus of people. It was not a process of civilisation that involved a shift from a feudal state, through to an absolutist state, ending with the nation state, as happened in Western society. This form of emergence should be handled more carefully and sensitively; otherwise it can become an independent form with its own characteristics. The specific form of Iraq emerged with the appearance of colonialism directly after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the 1st World War. In this case, a predicament regarding legitimacy is faced, because according to Borneman the state is “A system of legality and legitimacy” (M. Simic, 2008: 2) and, according to this principle, Iraq lacks this kind of legality and legitimacy.

Here, it is essential to distinguish between the social features prior to and subsequent to the development of Iraq, as the social structure faced a certain form of interruption. From the formation of Iraq, there was no longer an inter-relationship or inter-dependence between the past and the future. The new model of life emerged with a special transformation and in new circumstances. This new situation brought about a new figurational process and a new type of interweaving was formulated. The formation of the historic state in 1920, created a differentiation between two separate periods. The first period was when every province, Baghdad, Basra and Mosul, individually or independently, was administrated by the Ottoman Empire and subject to their authority. The Baghdad province, in the central and western region of current Iraq, was composed primarily of Sunni Arabs, and had maintained a good relationship with the Ottoman Empire. Their relationship with the Ottoman Empire was entwined because of the doctrine of religious uniformity, as opposed to the Shi’a Arabs. However, the Kurdish relationship in the Mosul province with the Ottomans, despite the doctrine of uniformity, underwent periods of instability due to frictional movements of independence.
Concerning the background of the Sunni-Arabs, their preparation for the new era was apparent. The Sunni-Arabs were affected by both Turkish nationalism and the Arab nationalist thinker “Satih Alhusary”. Alhusary was a member of the Yong Turks but suddenly turned to Arabism and moved to Baghdad. According to the report of CEIP, the Sunni Arabs had been “trained in the best Ottoman government and military academies and they were the last to break with the Ottoman Empire” (Ottaway & Yaphe, 2003:2). Thus, after the establishment of the Iraqi state the elite from the Sunni Arabs, militarily and politically and with the help of British forces, were ready to dominate the Iraqi state because they were interdependent and living in central Iraq- specifically in Baghdad. Moreover, the British mandate brought the Saudi Sunni political leader, Faisal, to be King of Iraq. This position gave the Sunni Arabs the ability to gain the concentration of power, but as Bauman has argued, such concentration of power is “not under effective control and can be used for good and evil” (Dunning & Mennel, 1998:340).

Here, the inter-relationship between long-term changes in human conduct and long-term changes in state formation entails two dimensions. On the one hand, the roots of human conduct extend in the long-term to the Arab community before the formation of the state of Iraq in 1920. This means that the Sunni-Arabs were living in tribal communities in central and western Iraq. The tribal social structure and the nature of these communities did not exceed mechanical solidarity. The type of personality did not change under the new interrelated social structure due to the nature of the tribal system. However, as Elias argues, within the state’s formation, a huge change began to take place with the new situation in the main Iraqi city of Baghdad, among certain less important cities. On the other hand, during the period before the state’s formation, the elite from the Sunni-Arabs involved the authorities of the Ottoman Empire as the colonial authority in Baghdad and in Istanbul; specifically, as CEIP has revealed, in the military sector. Regarding this relationship, Reeva Simon maintains that:

“Each year from 1872 to World War 1, thirty to forty Iraqi secondary school graduates went on to Istanbul; In 1903 the Iraqis were 10 present of the total number admitted to the military academy. By 1912 some 1,200 had become Ottoman army officers” (Simon, 2004:9)

From this point, it can be observed that the relationship between the Sunni-Arab community and the Ottoman authorities in Istanbul was robust and direct. This sort of inter-relationship left its mark on the Sunni population’s social composition. However, these Arab
officers, accompanied by some intellectuals, chose to return to the new Iraqi state in 1920 to engage in politics and the Iraqi army. Another important point regarding the interactions and the consequences in this case, according to Reeva Simon, is that these Iraqi Arab officers maintained good relations with the German officers who were training these Arab officers in specialised army camps (Simon, 2004:9). This relationship might have extended to their ideological thought, and been exploited by both parties for their personal interests.

Thus, it can be seen that the civilising process among the social units of the Sunni Arabs occurred correlative over the long-term, with the emergence of modern nation states in the Middle East. These social units, according to Elias, were initially primarily formed through and for war, but the only difference is the nature of conflict among these units, which was largely dissimilar to what was happening in Western Europe in many aspects.

The new stage of the civilising process in Iraq, after the formation of the state in 1920, with its monopolisation of violence in correlation with the habitus of individuals, took on a new dimension. One of the most important aspects of this new dimension was the annexing of Mosul province in 1925 to the other two provinces - Baghdad and Basra - without any agreement from the population of Mosul province, who were ethnically and culturally different from the population of Baghdad province. This new political circumstance would affect the individual habitus in the long-term, and in terms of this point, Elias mentions that:

“…. if in a particular region, the power of central authority grows, if over a larger or smaller area the people are forced to live in peace with each other, the moulding of their affects and the standard of their drive-economy (Trzebhaushalt) are very gradually changed as well” (Dunning, 1998:341).

This new position of both the Mosul and Baghdad provinces, according to Elias’s argument, occurred within the specific cultural, economic and political interests of the new dominant force under the mandate of the great and victorious powers of the 1st WW- Britain and France; however, it was not possible to marginalise the regional conditions involved in the division of the heritage of the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East. This new map led to two dangerous characteristics for the Kurds: First, the Kurds were the collateral damage from the re-division of the region because it was at the expense of the Kurds; second, this re-division led to a “Weberian concern” due to the illegitimate domination of the new nations of Turks, Arabs and Persians over the land and destiny of the Kurds.
After the re-division of the region, the drivers of a different crisis emerged. The first Iraqi government, under the supervision of the British mandate, was announced. The Kurds rejected this and continued their political and cultural movements against the British mandate as well as the Arab authority in Baghdad during the 20th century. When Britain attempted to impose the Treaty of June 1930 on Iraq, the Kurdish revolution broke out again in 1930. Here the Iraqi authority, with help of the British mandate, throughout the 1920s and specifically when the Treaty of June 1930 was imposed on Iraq, violently attempted to impose its authority on the North Kurdistan region of “Mosul Province”. Thus, if the formation of the Iraqi state is considered a civilising process, the Kurds can be considered during this period as moving towards an uncharted future or the beginning of the de-civilising process. Moreover, the first military campaign against the Kurdish area was the first failure of the Iraqi state in being a state for all citizens.

The theory of the civilising process has been referred to by numerous scholars on different levels in order to approach the essence of the theory. Here, I will attempt to approach Stephen Mennell’s contribution, depending on the introduction of his book ‘The American civilising process.’

3.2.1. Civilising and Culture

Elias in his introduction to his main work, ‘the civilising process’ states that “the concept of ‘civilisation’ refers to a wide variety of facts” (Elias, N., 2000:5). Elias has explained the variety of meanings of civilisation including English and French use and attitudes, and with regard to Germany. Here, Elias emphasises the German vision and difference regarding the concept of civilisation, as he argues: “The word through which Germans interpret themselves, which more than any other expresses their pride in their own achievements and their own being, is Kultur” (Elias, N., 2000:5). This means Germans are different even in the expression of themselves. Thus, as Elias explains, “the national self-images represented by concepts such as Kultur and civilisation take very different forms” (Elias, N., 2005) This, as Mennel explains, “is one of the ways in which people in the modern West most like to see themselves is as civilised” (Mennell, S., 2009:5). In other words, it is an expression used to display themselves and to present their self-image or self-existence. This desire for self-expression exists everywhere and among all nations, but it appears more
so when the established component or a dominant nation monopolises such rights over outsiders.

Here, Elias brings us back to the origins of the difference between civilisation and Kultur and the function of these two concepts. According to Elias, “the German concept of Kultur took a new life in the year 1919 and in the preceding years, partly because a war was waged against Germany in the name of ‘civilisation’ and because the self-image of the Germans had to be defined anew in the situation created by the peace treaty” (Elias, N., and 2000:9).

Following these developments regarding these two concepts and the formation of feelings and behaviour, Rohloff explains that Elias has “examined these changes in standards of behaviour by analysing etiquette books and other documents, beginning with Erasmus’s 1530 publication, ‘On Civility in Boys’” (Rohloff, 2011:22). As a consequence of these changes, according to Elias, it increases the regulation of “the social constraint towards self-constraint”, which is called ‘personality structure’ or ‘habitus’.

3.2.2. Habitus

In his study, Elias utilises the two concepts ‘civilisation and culture’ in the cultural and configuration development, and considers them to be part of the changes that occur in the framework of psychogenesis and sociogenesis within the social habitus. This means that the intellectual movement is not isolated from the common social movement. Therefore, Mennell includes Elias’s vision that, “the way in which people in the West used the word civilisation showed that they had forgotten the long process of civilisation through which ancestors’ behaviour and feelings had changed and been socially moulded from generation to generation. They had come to think of the traits they considered in ‘civilisation’ as innate in themselves and their fellow Westerners, and indeed as inherent in what they unabashedly then termed the ‘white race’” (Mennell, S., 2009:5). Thus, men could recognise the way of thinking of people through these concepts as Elias expressed, “the national self-image represented by concepts such as Kultur and civilisation take very different forms” (Elias, N., 2000:6).

Regarding the concept of habitus, although Elias had already used the term before being heard by Bourdieu, Paulle, B., van Heerikhuizen, B. and Emirbayer in their paper ‘Elias and Bourdieu’, they state that “the idea was crucial to both thinkers. Throughout most of their major writings, both used the term habitus or some similar notion—such as socialised
‘second nature’” (Paulle, B., van Heerikhuizen, B. and Emirbayer, M., 2012:5). Moreover, regarding habitus, by which Elias means “second nature” (Elias, N., 2001:179), he “refers to that level of habits of thinking, feeling and behaving which are in fact learned from early childhood onwards, but become so deeply ingrained that they feel ‘innate’, as if we had never learned them” (Mennell, S., 2009:5).

In more detail, regarding the differences in individual or social habitus, Fletcher explains: “one can distinguish between individual habitus, which refers to the learned emotional and behavioural dispositions which are specific to a particular person, and social habitus, which denotes the learned dispositions shared by most members of a group or society” (Fletcher, 1997:11). This division helps us to understand more clearly the transformation of society through “codes of feeling and behaviour, the social standards of which change over generations” (Fletcher, 1997:11). Thus, in conclusion, habitus ‘as personality structure’, stretches back to the ‘dark ages’. And Elias is most famous for connecting state formation and other longer-term, macro-level processes to structural transformations in everyday social relations that exert more or less ‘civilising’ influences’ (Paulle, B., van Heerikhuizen, B. and Emirbayer, M., 2012:19).

3.2.3. Civilisation and Changing Habitus:

Elias, in part two of ‘The Civilising Process’, concludes “That the civilising process is a change of human conduct and sentiment in a quite specific direction” (Elias, N., 2000:365). However, this change in the vision of Elias is a dynamic relationship between an individual and their society. Thus, no individual change occurs in isolation of the society because it is not happening individually but collectively. This means that “the figurational framework looks not only to investigate people’s behaviour (micro-sociology) but, also, the structural development of society (macro-sociology) as a long term ‘process’ and therefore, importantly, looks to bridge the micro-macro gap” (Hopkins, 2008:10). For this reason, Elias has used the term figuration “to describe a network of interdependent people in any form of individual grouping” (Rohloff, A., 2011:62). Thus, to simplify this issue, Elias utilises the ‘dance’ to handle any contradictions that occur, stating, “one can certainly speak of ‘dance’ in general, but no one will imagine a dance as a structure outside the individual or as a mere abstraction” (Du Gay, P., Evans, J. and Redman, P., 2000:297).

Another issue is the essence of the process of change and how it happens. In addition, Elias has emphasised that “in fact, nothing in history indicate that this change was brought
about ‘rationality’, through any purposive education of individual people or groups. It happened by and large unplanned, but it did not happen, nevertheless, without a specific type of order” (Elias, N., 2000:365). Here, it means that different factors have an influential role in shifting society and change in the habitus of individuals. Elias, in this regard, continues, “it has been shown in detail above how constraints through others from a variety of angles were converted into self-restraints” (Elias, N., 2000:365). Thus, in the transformation of the civilising process, the restrictions that come from the outside (from other people), leads to the adjusting of the behaviour of individuals in society, and with the passage of time, these restrictions shift to an internal habitual commitment by the individuals themselves. Here, Mennell states that “central to Elias’s conception of a civilising process is the increasing social constraint towards self-constraint. The long-term growth of complexity, of the spreading web of social interdependence, is associated with a tilting of the balance between external constraints (by other people) and self-restraints, towards the later weight in the steering of individual people’s conduct” (Mennell, S., 2009:6). Hence, Elias has thoroughly and elaborately indicated the changes in manners of European societies over five to six centuries. Therefore, as a supplement to the first section, Elias concludes that the concept of civilising is expressed in the self-consciousness of the West.

3.2.4. Violence and State Formation

This field of the civilising process has a direct relationship with the fieldwork in this thesis. If the previous sections have a relationship with the daily social standards of habitus as micro-sociology, here, aggressiveness, violence and cruelty, according to Elias, is another area of habitus “in which a similar long-term curve of the civilising process can be discerned among Western European people” (Mennell, S., 2009:11). Thus, according to Fletcher, “for Elias, violence is seen as an inherent feature of human social life with which humans must learn to cope” (Fletcher, 1997:51). Therefore, Mennell in his interpretation of Elias has emphasised that “certainly they have never been absent from any human society, and the shocking wars and genocide of the twentieth century make it tempting to believe that they are constant and universal” (Mennell, S., 2009:11).

From the above context, it can be understood that violence as a social and political phenomenon, ascending and descending, has dynamic developments in relation to societies. This change by Elias has been considered. Therefore, “in the process of state formation the forms of violence change as well as the meaning that violence has for individuals” (Fletcher,
Thus, according to Elias’s interpretation, we are facing a changing society and violence, as a phenomenon, has its causes and circumstances. For Elias:

“The direction in which the behaviour and the effective make-up of people change when the structure of human relationship is transformed in the manner described, is as follows: societies without a stable monopoly of force are always societies in which the division of function is relatively slight and the chains of action binding individuals together are comparatively short. Conversely, societies with more stable monopolies of force, always first embodied in a large princely or royal court, are societies in which the division of functions is more or less advanced, in which the chains of action binding individuals together are longer and the functional dependencies between people greater” (Elias, N., 2000:370).

Here, it means that the stability of the monopoly of force has a direct relationship with a stable authority, as he also explains: “when the monopoly of force is formed, pacified social spaces are created which are normally free from acts of violence” (Elias, N., 2000: 370). Hence, this monopoly of force is in itself an instrument for stability. Thus, in reverse, a stable force must have a relationship with a strong central power, as Elias emphasises, “to compel people to exercise restraint” (Elias, N., 2000:169). In this regard, Elias explains, “if in this or that region the power of central authority grows, if over a larger or smaller area the people are forced to leave in peace with each other, the moulding of the effects and the standards of emotion-management changes gradually as well” (Elias, N., 2000:169). This factual principle, which is a strong central authority and was and still is, one of the causes of the commitment of a population to live in peace. Therefore, Mennell has confirmed, “the timing of aggressiveness is thus linked, according to Elias, to a broad change in the structure of society” (Mennell, S., 2009:12). Here, because of this change in the structure of society, Mennell describes how, “this position leads Elias into an extended investigation of the formation of states in western Europe, which occupies the major part of the original second volume of the civilising process” (Mennell, S., 2009:12).

Consequently, the monopoly of violence is an indication of the process of state formation. This process according to Elias is an outcome of the competition between various groups of people, “with the associated conflict between these groups culminated in the establishment of a monopoly of one group and the eventual formation of a state” (Rohloff, 2011:22). On the other hand, Elias has highlighted some key conceptions in terms of
understanding the civilising process, which has a link to state formation. Elias claims, “to understand the civilising process it is particularly important to have a clear and vivid conception of these social processes, of what is meant by “barter or domestic economy”, “money economy”, “interdependence of large populations”, “change in the social dependence of the individual”, “increasing division of functions”, and so on” (Elias, N., 2000:206).

Elias argues that the civilising process generally leads towards increased functional democratisation, and a pervasive equalisation of power balances rooted in increasing interdependence within the complex division of labour within urban-industrial societies.

3.2.5. De-civilising Process

Some symptoms have been set out to identify the breakdown in the civilising process. One of those who has contributed to these possible symptoms is Stephen Mennell, as he explains that the “De civilising processes are what happens when civilising processes go into reverse” (Mennell, 1990:205). However, the most important indication for this definition, according to Mennell, is giving a narrow designation to the content of the civilising process. Here, Mennell states, “I am not using the term ‘civilisation’ with all its popular meanings, nor in the very general sense of large-scale complex society or culture area” (Mennell, 1990:205). In this regard, Thomas Salumets has explained that “one of the distinguished characteristics of the civilising trend is a rise in the level of danger and a fall in its calculability” (Salumets, T., 2001:38). It simply means that the crises or the reversal of instruments of stability could increase the conditions necessary for the breakdown of the civilising process, as Elias describes:

“The armour of civilised conduct would crumble very rapidly if, through a change in society, the degree of insecurity that existed earlier were to break in upon us again, and if danger became as incalculable as it once was, corresponding fears would soon burst the limits set to them today” (Elias, N., 2000:532).

This means that when the crisis takes on dangerous dimensions, security gradually decreases and the feeling of fear automatically increases; it could even crack the psychogenesis. These kinds of circumstances create change in people’s behaviour, and therefore a large gash in the social structure is possible. However, it is impossible to isolate the influence of psychogenesis from the sociogenesis, as has been illustrated by Elias in that, “the psychogenesis of the adult make-up in civilised society cannot, therefore, be understood
of considered independently of the sociogenesis of our ‘civilisation’” (Elias, N., 2000:xi). Therefore, any level of change will affect people both individually and collectively.

It is worth mentioning how Elias utilises the concept de-civilising, because according to Fletcher, “Elias did not develop an explicit theory of de-civilising processes” (Fletcher, 1997:83). Additionally, Elias in his book ‘The Germans’ has pointed to the Nazi mass holocaust as a de-civilising spurt. Regarding both the terms ‘spurt’ and ‘de-civilising’, Fletcher states that it “seems to be used by Elias rather loosely to refer to a phase in which the pace of social processes increases, while he uses the term de-civilising to refer to civilising processes which go into ‘reverse’” (Fletcher, 1997:83). Thus, depending on this explanation, any researcher in attempting to understand de-civilising, needs to understand the ideational system of the civilising process. This is because the civilising process according to Elias “has two directions, forwards and backwards. Civilising processes often go along with the de-civilising processes” (Fletcher, 1997:83). Thus, from the signs of the forward indications, it may be easy to recognise any backwards movement.

Hence, the notion of crises has often been used to explain the de-civilising process. Here, a kind of indication of a possible symptom of the de-civilising processes has been discussed by Rohloff at one of Mennell’s suggestions related to the ‘changes in modes of knowledge’: “During times of social crisis military defeats political revolutions, rampant inflation, soaring unemployment, separately or in combination – fears rise because control of social events has declined. Rising fears make it still more difficult to control events. That makes people still more susceptible to wish fantasies about means of alleviating the situation” (Mennell, 1990, p. 205; see also Rohloff, 2011, Goudsblom, J., Jones, D.M. and Mennell, S., 2015).

Thus, the previously mentioned crises measurements depend on the content of the theory of the civilising process. In the same direction, Thomas Salumets also mentions that, “in the Germans, Elias himself wrote about the decline of the state’s monopoly of violence under the Weimar republic, and Jonathan Fletcher has argued that it was then, rather than subsequently under the Nazi regime, the civilising forces were most clearly dominant” (Salumets, 2011: 38). Additionally, the concept of ‘dominant’ here is important to handle the fate of both directions- ‘forwards and backwards’- of the civilising process. In this regard, Fletcher has found that “the relationship between civilising and de-civilising processes are here clearly conceived in terms of a balance between dominant and less dominant processes” (Fletcher, 1997:83), or between the increasing social constraints towards self-constraint, which is central to Elias’s conception of a civilising process.
3.3. State Formation and its Position in the Civilising Process:

State formation in relation to this fieldwork is discussed for two reasons: first, because of its important position in the theory of the civilising process or part of the social structure, influenced and affected; secondly, because the state is one of the most important parts to be discussed in this thesis, as the state is directly involved in the genocide process. Additionally, if ‘according to Elias’ the state is “a violent competitive process through which there emerged successively larger territorial units with more effective monopoly apparatuses” (S. Mennell 2007:15), then it has a larger ability to redesign the society using its own measures and standards. Here, it is worth mentioning that the issue of state formation has taken an important position in the theory of the civilising process, and at the same time, the exploratory nature of Elias’s work mostly refers to the stages of the human struggle in approaching the different successive models of the authorities of the nation state. Thus, the decisive characteristic in this definition is the process of competition in order to control the larger territory through the monopoly apparatuses in Western Europe.

In the same direction, but in more detail, Sean Patrick Hier notes that state formation, historically, is a result of “competition between various groups of people, with associated conflict between these groups, culminated in the establishment of a monopoly of one group and the eventual formation of a state” (Hier, S.P., 2011:3). This means that the process of state formation in different forms accompanies conflict between national or international groups until one of these groups has dominated and monopolised the means of violence.

This is, in the view of Dunning and Hughes, is even more, obvious, as they reiterate Elias’s terms of conflict, in that the state formation in the civilising process included “conflictual affairs which involved ‘hegemonic struggle’ within the emergent nation states and international struggles between them” (E. Dunning & J. Hughes, 2012:97). Thus, state formation according to Elias is a phenomenal social process and an effective part of the civilising process; it occurred in Western Europe, and this did not pass without violence: “correlatively with the emergence of capitalist - urban - industrial - nation - state” (E. Dunning & J. Hughes, 2012:97). Here, huge developments have occurred, from the social structure to the monopoly mechanisms used to cross over to more advanced phases of state domination. Additionally, the civilising process “refers to all the fundamental structural changes that, at the same time, result in relatively stable institutions and personality structures” (Kuzmics, 2002:1). Thus, we can see long term, structural, interactional and
historical changes through international struggle, which has been determined by Elias within
the framework of the civilising process. This process of power transformation, on the one
hand, brought with it “changes in the way people were connected with one another, leading
eventually to greater integration and greater interdependence between people” (Rohloff,
2011:3); on the other hand, it launched a shift from different unities such as city states and
feudal states, through absolutist states to modern nation states. In this regard, Elias argues,
“this change in the form of political rule was a structural change in Western Society as a
whole” (Elias, 2000:188). Here, we realise the transformation of the stages of the state as part
of the civilising process without further discussion about the essence of the state.
Additionally, the scope of monopoly is significant in all changes to the state.

3.4. Monopoly and State Building

The state owns and monopolises all state institutions including the means of violence.
More specifically, in terms of the nature of the state, according to Elias it is characterised by
two important and crucial figures, or in the framework of the historical process of state
formation, it has two specific characteristics due to a certain level of monopolisation. These
two characteristics have been identified as follows: “free use of military weapons is denied
the individual and reserved to a central authority of whatever kind, and likewise the taxation
of the property of income of individuals is concentrated in the hands of a central social
authority” (Elias, 2000:268). However, the emergence of this central state authority according
to Elias involves “grouse and gains increasing monopolisation over the control of violence
and taxation, people come to be increasingly integrated and interdependent with one another”
(Rohloff, 2011:3). Thus, during the formation of the state, monopolies of violence and
taxation grow gradually, and as Elias argues, they are two sides of the same coin; if one
disappears the other automatically follows (Elias, 2000:268).

Accordingly, Elias has focused on the mechanism of state formation and its
monopolising process and developments until this process, through its long-term changes,
attains the most modern component, which is the nation state. This mechanism, as Robert van
Krieken argues, is central to Elias’s civilising process (Van Krieken, 1998:97). In contrast,
Weber’s view is different to Elias in a number of aspects. The most prominent difference to
Weber is that Elias is more materialistic and examines the state through the interpretation of
the development of social processes, and the mutual influence or inter-relationships between
long-term changes in standards of behaviour and long-term changes in state formation. Here, Weber sees the state “as a type of organisation, ‘a political organisation’ that successfully claims a monopoly over the legitimate physical coercion necessary for the implementation of its laws and decrees” (Karlberg, 2005:222). Accordingly, the motivation behind both Elias and Weber’s monopolies are different because according to Elias the aim is to dominate the centrality of power in terms of state formation. Moreover, the monopoly according to Weber is to dominate the centrality of power in terms of bureaucratising the process of legitimate government. Thus, Elias is attempting to discover the ways in which the state has been formed, including peaceful cooperation and peaceful competition. This is in line with Loyal and Quall, as they emphasise that “in so far as war results in a victory, it is the subsequent extension of a coordinating authority that spurs people to both peaceful cooperation and peaceful competition” (Loyal & Qually, 2004:176); whereas Weber examines the quality of managing the government. Consequently, legitimacy, as an important characteristic in this fieldwork, is essential, and it will strengthen the idea of state formation within Weber’s monopoly of legitimate physical coercion.

Here, as long as state formation is part of the civilising process, with its characteristics of monopolisation, the modern state without legitimacy is exposed to several problematic factors. One of these problematic factors is the ‘central system’ which in Elias’s view is considered to be an important factor in the stability of the state. This view goes back to the earlier stages of state formation and feudalism prior to later developments because one of feudalism’s traits is a centrifugal character, which according to Elias has “disruptive, dis-unifying, decentralising tendencies” (E. Dunning & J. Hughes, 2012:98). This centrifugal character is considered by Elias to be a kind of de-civilisation process that was, according to Dunning and Hughes, dominant in Western Europe following the decline of the Western Roman Empire in the fifth century AD. Therefore, the post-feudal state required a centripetal character that had “integrating, unifying, centralising tendencies” (E. Dunning & J. Hughes, 2012:98) in order to form a dominant and strong central state.

This argument about the centrality of the state could be critical to its historical stages in relation to social, geopolitical and economic factors. In contrast, if we take this view in the current social, economic and geopolitical reality of the Middle East, it is irrelevant because the central system in itself led to the instability of the state, which will be discussed in Chapter Five. Here, on the one hand, the central systems of some Middle Eastern countries that have authoritarian regimes are a problematic issue, and on the other hand, the division of the ethnic and cultural components, sometimes inside one artificial country, is very deep and
controversial. Moreover, the current historical reality is extremely different to the reality of the Middle Ages. Therefore, despite the necessity of this discussion for this thesis’ fieldwork model, it is essential to take into account the real political diversity of the Middle East, including Iraq. Consequently, what are the characteristics of a nation state? How does Elias deal with them? Furthermore, what is it about states which dominate multi-ethnic and religious components, specifically in terms of the centripetal system? The most problematic point in terms of this fieldwork in Iraq is the unusual caesarean birth of the state, which is an imposed colonial model. This is unlike the state formation process of Europe, which developed historically due to the conditions of the civilising process, and which has been described by Elias as a ‘conflict full affair’ that led to the emergent ‘nation state’.

In addition, how is it possible to examine the differences between the process of state formation in Western Europe according to the civilising process and state formation in the Middle East, which only goes back to the 1st World War? Historically, it is difficult to find similarities between the process of state formation in Western Europe, which involves research into the civilising process, and those in the Middle East. Here, it could be valuable to indicate a superficial difference between states in Western Europe and Iraq, which have been specified in a special report by the colonial office (1931) itself. It has been noted, “there were two types of state ‘the report argued’: the “civilised nations of the modern world,” and those like Iraq” (Dodge, 2003:40). In this regard, the British mandate clearly indicates the civilised nations and those states that were still in the process of development. Here, according to Sir Francis Humphreys, the High Commissioner in 1932, Iraq is not comparable to an advanced state like Britain, but it could be compared to weak states. However, the notion of weak states is very vague, and it could be an endless weakness and to dire consequences, as will be seen in the findings chapter. This type of comparison, if it indicates anything, shows that the UK, for some reason, was almost sure that Iraq could not be considered a civilised country. Therefore, Sir Henry Dobbs, the High Commissioner in 1927, argued, “An independent Iraq would be no worse off than any of the weak states in the second tier of membership. To ask for anything more from Britain would be highly unrealistic” (Dodge, 2003:39). This announcement of Britain’s mandatory obligations is a kind of evasion of their responsibilities towards the state, and it occurred due to the unsatisfactory placing of its parts in one pot.

Here, Elias has determined the state formation mechanism in European territory in the framework of conflictual affairs processes from the Middle Ages until the formation of the nation state. In contrast to all of these processes involved in state formation, what has been realised from the fieldwork on the emergence of the new state of Iraq is the unusual
introduction of a state that was violently and externally imposed by the colonial power, with the integration of heterogeneous components, and without any mechanical democratic methods or any agreement between the territorial components. Moreover, authority was even given to someone from outside the residence of the regions that were incorporated, including the inauguration of the first king of a new state called the Iraqi Kingdom. All of these procedures were processed and the Kurdish region remained outside the borders of the new state. It is sufficient to refer to two important points which have been specified by Aviel Roshwald in his book ‘Ethnic nationalism and the fall of empires, Central Europe, Russia and the Middle East’, in that:

“To be sure, Britain and France used these state apparatuses as instruments of economic, political, and military control over the Middle East. Yet by the same token, the newly formed states became the primary vessels within which Arab (and, in Palestine, also Jewish) nationalism took root as a hegemonic political ideology and assumed some of its distinctive typological forms” (Roshwald, A., 2001:188).

Thus, the first point is that these states were established as instruments of colonialism in order to impose their hegemony. The second point is the absolute marginalisation of some important components in these new countries in the interest of pan-Arab nationalism.

These two different mechanisms or models of state building (Eliasian and colonial model) created a deficiency in the nature of the change between behaviour and power, or between the structures of both models of nation-building. Here, to approach the process of state formation in terms of Elias’s elements of state formation, it is necessary to consider the specific directions of the civilising process and its consequences in terms of the arguments around the failed state in Iraq. This is because we have to determine the formation of the state before delving into the determination of the contribution of power and the levels of the legitimacy of the state.

In order to accommodate the concept of nation building, primarily it is necessary to determine the concepts of state and the nation, as well as which comes first- the nation or the nation state- and whether they are the same. These approaches have to be within the framework of the theories of nation building as sub-theories in the general concept of the civilising process. Here, according to Joseph Strayer it is “‘regna’ amorphous and at first ephemeral. Yet, some of them survived and merely by surviving, took the first step in nation building. Very slowly, very gradually, they built up a persisting identity” (K. Deutsch & W. Foltz, 1966:18) This ‘regna’ on the one hand is a conclusive name for some historical state
patterns of Eliasian determination, and on the other hand, as Strayer has argued, through different patterns and out of the general process of state building, states developed into two different types of state - a single state or “unitary state” like England, or a “mosaic state” like France.

In any case, from some high level scholars, we can see the simplification of the most complex social organ of the nation. In this regard, Marx and Engels in the Communist Manifesto argue, “The executive of the modern State is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie” (Marx & Engels, 1969). Therefore, a simple question is: is it possible to consider the state as a committee for managing the common affairs of a specific social class or of a specific ethnicity in a multi-ethnic state? If the state is evaluated theoretically and practically as an instrument, there is the possibility of finding several examples of states that have been utilised for a specific class, ethnicity or purpose. Thus, at the theoretical level of Marx and Engels’ ideas on how the bourgeoisie has exploited the state as an instrument for their own goals, Roshwald’s colonial model in the Middle East provides an example, with some tribes and nations utilising the state in the service of their nation. Additionally, it is significant to understand the essence and the importance of the nation state.

3.5. Nation state

In order for a state to be a state, a permanent population is crucial, according to both definitions. This population undergoes early selection to determine how to build a nation. “In the nation state generally, everyone, would speak the same language, probably practice the same or similar types of religions and share a set of cultural, national values” (Srivastava, 2010:128-129). Here, in this definition, four specific characteristics have been determined for a nation. These four characteristics are totally different from those of the state. In contrast to this definition, Hermann Weilenmann has determined the characteristics of a nation as relating closely to those of a state, and he argues that “the basis of every nation is its population, recognizable by certain common characteristics, the most important of which is a sense of belonging to some distinct portion of land” (K. Deutsch & W. Foltz, 1966:33). These basics are substantiated by Elias and Weber’s argument on state formation, including affiliation, which equates belonging to a particular territory. Thus, in the case of a non-nation state or a state within a mosaic type population, the affiliation or belonging of citizens to the
state is more sensitive and yet perhaps more balanced. According to a report by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the affiliation of a suppressed entity is rejected, as it has been stated that “far more newly independent states, however, had within their new boundaries substantial ethnic, religious, linguistic or cultural minorities, many of whom rejected the identification of the state with a nation to which they did not feel they belonged” (OECD, 2009:67). Hence, affiliation could be created in a social-historical context over a long term process and cannot occur without appropriate circumstances or simply through an agreement between the entities. Regarding this issue, “in many cases, these groups were subject to large-scale, semi-voluntary or forced expulsion (as during the creation of Pakistan) or internal suppression (as in Iraq.) Unsurprisingly, many sub-national groups chose to fight back or to fight to get out. The result in many cases was that independence struggles were followed by civil, separatist or irredentist wars” (OECD, 2009:67). Consequently, such belonging or affiliation is not a foregone conclusion and it could involve different models through a variety of means of competition. This competition in its most extreme form involves emphasising the affiliation of people to their land and interests. However, the modern nation is “a historical result brought about by a series of convergent facts” (E. Renan, 1990:3).

Moreover, in terms of population and its importance, Elias’ argument is that “one of the most important motors of change in the structure of human relationships and of the institutions corresponding to them is the increase or decrease of the population” (Elias, 2000:210). Thus, the discussion about which one comes first in regard to this issue is not useful because in any case Iraq was formed before the creation of an apparent nation. Therefore, there is still a question mark around the existence of such a nation. This is according to those scholars who demand common characteristics in the formation of a nation. One of them is Antony Smith who requires “a distinctive shared culture, a common myth of ancestry (descent) involving a shared history, a strong sense of group sentiment and loyalty, an association with a specific territory, territorial contiguity with free mobility throughout, equal citizenship rights, vertical economic integration and a common language” (Kirmanji, 2013:14). Based on Antony Smith’s common characteristics, it is hard to find one specific single characteristic that combines the Arabs and Kurds in Iraq- even the Islamic doctrine. In association with this argument, the best description of such a common relationship between all groups in Iraq is the first Iraqi King, Faisal’s, announcement when he admitted in his opinion that “the Iraqi nation does not exist but there are blocks of human fantasy, empty of any national loyalty, steeped in the religious traditions and untruths and there is no
association to bound them together” (Taheri, 2014). This admission of the first king is the real description of the interdependency of chains of Iraqi groups. Due to the new situation with the domination of Sunni Arabs in Iraq, Arab nationalists began focussing on Iraqi identity in the form of a ‘national identity’ as a product of the governmental policy to unify Iraqis as a previous stage to the unification of the Arab Nation. This is what Srivastava has argued in terms of the modernisation of an existing state (Srivastava, 2010: 129). This view is in contradiction to the interests of minorities due to the assimilation policy of the states within the dominant characteristic of one ethnic entity. From here, as Srivastava has argued, “the state is a political and geographical entity; the nation is a cultural and/or ethnic entity” (Srivastava, 2010: 129). In addition, according to Hobsbawm, the state as a political entity made the French nation a cultural entity, and not French nationalism, which emerged at the end of the 19th century. He argues that at the time of the 1789 French Revolution, only half of the French population spoke some French, and for the Italian language it was even lower, despite resulting in the formation of the Italian nation. This is an indication that the nation state (not the ‘nation’) is a consequence of state formation that takes place as part of a long process in a social-historical context, and they are two sides to the same coin. Hence, according to Srivastava, the state-driven theories of the origin of nation states such as France mean “these states expanded from core regions and developed a national consciousness and sense of national identity” (Srivastava, 2010: 130).

In addition to all of the above, Carolyn Stephenson has produced a definition of a nation, which is also very different to those of a state. She argues that: “Early conceptions of a nation defined it as a group or race of people who shared history, tradition and culture, sometimes religion and usually language” (C. Stephenson, 2005:3).

According to the view of Srivastava and this definition, and as she has emphasised, the state is more properly the governmental apparatus by which a nation rules itself (C. Stephenson, 2005:3). This argument is closer than any other to that of the civilising process because any population has its own characteristics that make it different from others. However, these nations, according to the civilising process, were in the primitive stages of transformation until the stage of self-consciousness and the stage of building their own state. Here, according to Elias “consciousness is an inherent dimension of any society” (Elias, 2000:115). Therefore, according to many scholars, these two metaphors are different and parallel at the same time. Moreover, based on the civilising process, it cannot be separated because of the inter-relationship between social structures on a micro level and state
formation at the macro level. Stephenson argues that “that the building of an integrated national community is important in the building of a state” (C. Stephenson, 2005:3).

At the same time, Khalil Osman has emphasised that “analogously, Mohammed Ayoob has stressed the ‘conceptual as well as real world distinction’ between the processes of nation building and state making” (Osman, 2014:32). However, Stephenson argues that nation building is more than state building. Dependent on this argument, the major question here that needs to be asked is whether nation building could prevent ethnic conflict or the destruction of outsider nations? From here, the three concepts of ‘power, authority and legitimacy’ will be examined as important concepts in relation to the social struggle or the competition between various social groups in order to understand the variety of nation states.

3. 6. Power, Authority and Legitimacy

3. 6.1. Power

One of the most important concepts of figuration in sociology, which has been developed from the literature of Norbert Elias, is power relations. For Elias, “we must understand power as a structural characteristic of all human relationships” (Elias, 1978:74). Here, power is one of the most effectual characteristics in maintaining the balance between social characters, both individually and collectively. Power, as well as the state, is the central focus for Elias, because, according to Eric Dunning, he went on to tie the concept innovatively to that of interdependence and figuration. What for Elias is important in the view of Loyal and Quigley, is developing a relational understanding of social forms, unlike some analysts who “have tended to reify ‘power’ and treat it as a ‘thing’, which can be ‘possessed’, ‘held’ or ‘seized’ in an absolute sense” (Loyal and Quigley, 2004:7). Thus, in place of a technical definition of power, Elias examines the process of power in relation to his theorisation of the established group and outsiders. Here, according to Elias:

“[A] . . . Structural characteristic . . . of all human relationships . . . We depend upon others; others depend on us. In so far as we are more dependent on others than they are on us, they have power over us, whether we have become dependent on them by their use of naked force or by our need to be loved, our need for money, healing, status, a career or simply for excitement” (Elias, 1978: 74, 93).

Eric Dunning has summed up this view of Elias as follows:
• That power is ‘polymorphous’ and inherent in all human relationships; and
• That the key to understanding, power lies in the interdependence of people.

(E. Dunning, 1999:7)

Hence, the central issue presented by Elias in terms of power is interdependency and balance, whether between individual people or collectives- even groups, organisations or institutions. This can be related to an important issue, which is the position of the established group and outsiders, as “all those within society are inextricably bound up with power changes” (Elias & Mennell, 1998:95). Consequently, power in its simplest form in Elias’s study of Winston Parva has been described as ‘oldness’ (Elias and Scotson, 1994), which means the presence of an established group before the appearance of outsiders, enabling them to develop greater cohesion. Here, there is the possibility of making oldness a measurement for any other human characteristic to recognise power according to state relations as well as human relations.

On the other side, Foucault’s examination of power is not far away from that of Elias, but it strengthens Elias’s argument in different ways. According to Elias’s central argument, power is not a “thing” and consequently it is not possible for it to be ‘possessed’, ‘held’ or ‘seized’ in an absolute sense, as Elias has emphasised that “power is not an amulet possessed by one person and not by all human relationships” (Elias & Mennell, 1998:116). Power according to Foucault “is not something that is acquired, seized, or shared, something that one holds on to or allows to slip away; power is exercised from innumerable points, in the interplay of non-egalitarian and mobile relations” (Foucault, 1978: 94). Here, the first point of both views is confined to the diversity of power dimensions and how power is exercised within its contextual reality. In other words, if power for Elias is multi-polar in human relationships within its processual transformation, according to Foucault it is an action, and this action is embodied in relationships, as Foucault has emphasised that “power is only a certain type of relation between individuals” (Foucault & Kritzman, 1988:62). Therefore, human action will be one of those bipolar or multi-polar relationships, as has been stressed in Foucault’s argument, so that power is not a substance or “that power is neither given, nor exchanged, nor recovered, but rather exercised, and that it only exists in action” (Foucault, 1980:89). This is what Elias has argued in that power is a “structural characteristic . . . of all human relationships . . . We depend on upon others; others depend on us. Insofar as we are more dependent on others than they are on us, they have power over us, whether we have
become dependent on them by their use of naked force or by our need to be loved, our need for money, healing, status, a career or simply for excitement” (Best, 2003:205).

Thus, power appears to be like the development of tides, and it can stretch or shrink depending on the circumstances of society, within the processes related to the essence of human relations. When these relations are extremely imbalanced between the ‘composite units’ or different components, society could face instability, as Elias explains, “power ratios have usually been extremely unequal; people or groups of people with relatively great power changes used to exercise those power changes to the full, often very brutally and unscrupulously for their own purposes” (Elias and Mennell, 1998:115). Foucault specifically determines the state as a kind of political power, “which ignores individuals, looking only at the interests of the totality, or, I should say, of a class or a group of the citizens” (Foucault & Kritzman, 1988:21). Therefore, Foucault’s argument “…as soon as there is a power relation, there is a possibility of resistance” (Foucault & Kritzman, 1988:147). This relationship, described by Elias, has been called a “game model”, meaning that the competition is governed by a set of rules within the prevailing balances. This is because according to Elias “in any game the participants always have control over each other” (Elias, 1998:122), therefore, even their power is not balanced. There could be a winner and a loser, or a victor and a vanquished, through the framework of the civilising and de-civilising process. In this regard, Elias argues, “when speaking of the ‘power’ A has over B, the concept does not refer to an absolute, but to a power ratio” (Elias, 1978:122). Here, the game model of social competition by Thomas Salumets is not much different to that of Elias as it describes how “the members of a society becomes players and just as in a football or chess game, they have to follow certain rules and have to be familiar with certain constellations in order to participate in the game” (Salumets, 2001:181). Thus, “the interplay of non-egalitarian and mobile relations” is very important to this issue because this point shows that competition between various groups, in the view of Foucault, continues as long as there is no egalitarian power; or according to Elias, as long as the power is not balanced. The other point is the moveable characteristic of this power among different individuals or agencies, as Foucault points out that “power is not primarily the maintenance and reproduction of economic relations, but is above all a relation of force” (Foucault, 1980: 89). This dynamic characteristic, which is based on monopolisation over the forces of violence on the one side, and the way that people connect to each other on the other, is a vital aspect of the civilising process.
Unlike Elias and Foucault, Weber places power in a specific context and defines it as “the likelihood that one person in a social relationship will be able, even despite resistance, to carry out his own will” (Weber 2005:209). The elements of this definition are social relationships between one or more people in terms of specific purposes. In other words, according to Weber “In general, we understand by “power” the chance of a man or a number of men to realize their own will in a social action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action” (Weber 2005:186). Here, Weber considers power as practised in terms of one or more men’s will for the purposes of their goal. Thus, if one of the aspects of power is action, the other is legality, because the legal order has a direct influence on power; as Weber emphasises, power as well as the economy is under the influence of the legal order in its stages of formation. This means that the legal order indirectly determines any action by people. Here, Weber, unlike Elias, gives a sort of identity to power in the framework of legality. Thus, the advantage of Weber’s view is legality as an important additional concept to state formation in the framework of the civilising process.

3. 6.2. Authority

In order to make the characteristics of the state clearer and closer to the fieldwork in this thesis, in connection with the theory of the civilising process and within the Eliasian concept of state formation, particularly the characteristics of the nation state in Iraq, it is necessary to find out the position occupied by the authority as a quality of the relationship, and its influence. Elias’s two main characteristics of state formation in terms of the civilising process are: “the free use of military weapons is denied the individual and reserved to a central authority of whatever kind and likewise the taxation of the property or income of individuals is concentrated in the hands of a central social authority” (Elias, 2000:268). Power, as has previously been mentioned, is an important structural characteristic of all human relationships; it is central to state formation, but Elias has not determined what the authority of the state is, and particularly its legitimacy. Thus, there are differences between power and authority and it is necessary to look at the importance of these two concepts in the process of state formation, particularly as a main cause of the de-civilising process. Before delving deeply into the issues of power and legitimacy and their position of divergence and convergence in relation to the authority, it is necessary to determine authority and its position to find out its influence and its conduct in relation to the position of the national components. According to Bitty, authority “is the ability to act effectively over people and things, using means ranging from persuasion to coercion” (Balandier G., 1970: 35). Here, dependent on
this argument, the authority must have the ability to implement its aspirations. Despite the compatibility of this argument with Elias’s view of the monopoly of means, Elias is still focusing on physical forces and taxation as the most important means of authority.

Thus, the authority, whether political or non-political, only exists in an organised group. Therefore, authority as a phenomenon is considered to be a social-political phenomenon. Hence, according to McNaughton, power and authority as two terms “are often treated as interchangeable terms but this would be inaccurate. While ‘power’ refers to the ability to achieve certain ends, ‘authority’ refers to the right to exercise that power” (McNaughton, 2001: 14). Thus, it could be proposed that power is more general, and an individual could, via an organisation or a government institution, have power, but authority is more specific- it is a political concept that refers to legal and governmental authority. Accordingly, for all groups, “to have power is to have the ability to compel others to do as they want. To have authority is to have the right to rule. A gunman has power, but he does not have authority. He can coerce his victim to cooperate by the threat of force, but he is unable to impose the obligation to comply” (Shapiro, 2000:6). Thus, a simple understanding of authority is the ability to force others to carry out the desire of the dominant. However, they are not too far from Elias in terms of inter-relationships and interdependence because “Elias makes clear that in these interdependencies rulers like Kings, High officials, and others have influence of broader scope, but he also insists that they themselves remain part of the interdependencies in which they are relatively dominant” (Elias, 1978:12).

Andrew Stebbins in his thesis “The Chinese Civilising Process: Eliasian Thought as an Effective Analytical Tool for the Chinese Cultural Context”; Ralf Dahrendorf in his book “Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society”, and many others, depend on Max Weber and his examination of relationships with authority and legitimacy. According to Dahrendorf “the control of the officer over his men, the manager over his workers, and the civil servant over his clientele is authority occupying the position of officer, manager, civil servant” (Dahrendorf, 1959:166). Thus, positions are part of the structural organisation considered to be an authority, and without the occupation of such positions, it is difficult to imagine any sort of authority. Accordingly, the government occupies the highest position of the state, including all governmental institutions, with different units of positions forming the authority. Here, we can imagine the difference between Elias’s efforts and those of Weber. Elias is absorbed by the outer face of the state, like the formation of the state and the process of its transformation, but Weber’s effort is more internal as he focuses on stratification and social change in connection with the legitimacy of the authorities. Thus, according to Weber,
authority refers “to the likelihood that a demarcated commands will find obedience among a specific circle of persons” (Karlberg, 2005:209). This means that obedience is at the heart of the authority, and without obedience, all relations will take an unstructured turn. Additionally, this is what Foucault has determined as power relations (Foucault & Kritzman, 1988:147) and it may be another face to the concept of obedience because obedience according to Weber, determines the relations between people within a specific circle. This sort of set up has the trait of dominant and oppressor relations that Elias has termed “game models” (Elias, 1978:187). This is because these relations are governed by a set of rules within the prevailing balances, and also there is interaction via bipolar or multipolar relationships.

The most prominent aspect of authority is its organic relationship with power and legitimacy on different levels. If power balance for Elias is important because it is a structural characteristic of relationships, for Weber, legitimacy is essential because it is one of the keys to social structure. Thus, to some degree, for both Elias and Weber, power and legitimacy could be considered as two sides of the same coin when it comes to authority. For Elias “whether the ... differentials are large or small, balances of power are always present wherever there is functional interdependence between people” (Dépelteau, & Landini, 2013:277). So for Elias, there is a causal relationship between the units of the structural characteristic of relationships. However, Weber argues: “If people don’t believe in authority to some degree, they will have to be forced to comply through coercive power” (Allan, 2010:99). Thus, for Elias, functional interdependence is a dynamic consequence of the power balance, but for Weber oppression is part of the authority and necessary to attain the obedience of people. Nevertheless, legitimacy for Weber is an essential condition for any legal-rational authority.

Weber, as with Elias, considers power to be a factual relationship, which according to Dahrendorf means “the demagogue has power over the masses to whom he speaks or whose action he controls” (Dahrendorf, 1959:166). Here, power is effectively tied to the human character, but the difference appears when Weber considers authority to be a legitimate relationship involving domination; Elias’s view in terms of power, despite its structural characteristic, is more abstract, and in terms of authority is lacking. Here, Dahrendorf, depending on Weber, argues that “While power is merely a factual relation, authority is a legitimate relation of domination and subjugation. In this sense, authority can be described as legitimate power” (Dahrendorf, 1959:166).
The first part of Dahrendorf’s argument, which has been mentioned previously, is close to some examples of Elias in relation to the balance of power, but the interpretation of power relations is structurally different. This is because authority here is built upon the performer’s belief in the rightness of the system, as Weber argues: “authority, on the other hand, implies the ability to require performance that is based upon the performer’s belief in the rightness of the system” (Allan, 2010:100). Here, according to Weber, the performer’s belief is based on the rightness of the system, but for Elias, it is based on the structural relationship of interdependence. Therefore, authority according to Dahrendorf is dependent on Weber’s argument and is described as legitimate power.

3. 6.3. Legitimacy

Max Weber, through his attempt to determine the essence of authority, pays important attention to the legitimacy of the state. Therefore, Weber argues, “today the most common form of legitimacy is the belief in legality, the compliance with enactments which are formally correct and which have been made in an accustomed manner” (Weber, 1978:37). This means that any shortage in the belief of legality could lead to counterproductive consequences, or to the gradual reversal of the civilising process. This view is consistent with that of Elias in relation to the long-term process, as Weber argues: “this belief in legitimacy resulted from gradual usurpation” (Weber, 1978: LXXXIII). This issue in a historical stage could reach its integrated level, and it has been emphasised by Elias as he argues: “by the progressive division of functions and the growth of the interdependency chains into which, directly or indirectly, every impulse, every move of an individual become integrated” (Elias, 1978:368). This integration without a legitimate authority could lead to dire straits or to the disintegration of the state. However, a legitimate authority, or an authority which legally represents all national components, can attempt to ingrain social peace. This is in line with Weber who explains that “authority is based on socialisation, the internalisation of cultural norms and values” (Allan, K., 2010:199). Thus, authority through socialisation depends on the internalisation of cultural norms and values, and should create a sort of harmony among the components of society. Due to this issue, Weber considers violence to be a natural instrument of the authority of the state in terms of its goals and aspirations. This monopoly of violence, without legitimacy, could lead to the de-civilising process. Therefore, according to Chalmers A. Johnson, “the most important function of the value system in a society is to authorise or legitimate the use of force” (Chalmers J, 1982:27).
Moreover, legitimacy for Weber is dynamic and an important feature of the modern state. This appears in his three pure types of legitimate domination-resource or triple models of authority. In front of these triple models of Weber, Elias has also explored different models of authority and the dynamic historical transformation from one stage to another, but the difference between Elias and Weber remains in the manner and methodology of both scholars. Elias refers to authority sometimes as a state, or does not mention it, as he has determined the ‘major means of ruling’ to be “the formation of state monopolies of violence and taxation” (Dunning & Hughes, 2013:107). Weber has classified all of these models into three ideal types, but these three ideal types do not cover all forms of the Eliasian historical models, including authoritariannation states, particularly the Middle Eastern models.

In this direction, according to McNaughton in his book ‘Success in Politics’, “Weber understood that political authority could have more than one single source, any of which could be considered legitimate” (McNaughton, 2001:15). Each of these and other stages according to the ‘civilising process’, through the evolving authorities, have been a consequence of “conflictual affairs which involved ‘hegemonic struggles’ within the emergent nation states and ‘integrational struggles’ between them” (Dunning & Hughes, 2013:107). Thus, these single sources, according to the process of civilisation, are not the result of sudden emergencies, but every type represents a stage of socio-political transition from a previous situation, and could pass from a primitive society to a more advanced society. Elias’s transition of the state has been emphasised by Sharma and Sharma, within one of the elements of the evolution of the state, as they claim that “authority has been the most important element in the evolution of the state. States, first small and then big, were formed on the basis of authority” (Sharma & Sharma, 2000:74). This sort of evolution is a historical transition, according to Sharma and Sharma, and even if it is conflictual according to Elias, it could be considered an important element in gaining legitimacy.

Consequently, Weber classified three ideal types of political systems as legitimate authorities, which are as follows:

**Traditional authority:** “belief in time and custom”, means people “honour the past and they believe that time-proven methods are the best” (Allan, 2010:10). Thus, it is based on traditional societies that follow traditional norms, which according to Weber “are rules of conduct towards which actors orient their behaviour” (Spencer, 1970:124). In other words, traditional authority is “the dominant person or group, usually defined by heredity, is thought to have been preordained to rule over the rest” (Blau, 1963:308). Some of these types of societies still do not rely on the division of labour and roles are not dependent on a modern
social structure. Accordingly, the readiness of the followers is a foregone conclusion because, since they have identified themselves, they do not know any other authority. Thus, according to Weber, traditional authority is “resting on an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of the status of those exercising authority under them” (Weber, 1968:46). The closest model of this type of authority could be the ruling family of the United Arab Emirates in the Middle East. According to McNaughton, this type of authority most certainly base its power on tradition, and there is a relatively little challenge to the principle. Here, “traditional legitimacy can be described as the routinization of charismatic authority, it rests upon the belief that what has always been legitimate” (Weber, 1978: 47).

**Charismatic authority**: “belief in the supernatural or intrinsic gifts of the individual”, means, “they believe that the individual has a special calling” (Allan, 2005:27). Thus, the main characteristic of charisma is based on the superiority of the specific character of the leader. The followers may see a person as a hero for any subjective or objective reason. The most important factor is the apparent charisma of ‘the concerned person’ regarding the needs of their individual and collective followers. In other words, as Weber argues, charisma rests “on devotion to the specific and exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him” (Weber, 1968: 46). These types of characteristics commonly appear in religious and revolutionary leaders, and the way the followers within this situation think about or view these figures. Moreover, according to McNaughton, the term charisma refers to the ability to inspire others and to attract a following. Thus, how is legitimacy created for a charismatic leader? When they exercise power, they may not adhere to the institutions of the state and the obedience of people as they do not come from the customs, laws, norms and values but could be through full faith and confidence in the charismatic person, like prophets. According to Weber “To put it another way, charismatic legitimacy as such originates in the personality of the leader” (Weber, 1978: 47). Thus, the leader’s personality represents the axis in his followers’ lives. The problematic issue regarding a charismatic figure is that they may be charismatic and sacred to their people, but for other people they may be seen as no more than bogus and criminal because they have used their ability and their followers against others. The best example is the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein as he is seen by many Sunni Arabs as a charismatic leader and martyr, but to the rest of the Iraqi people he was just a tyrannical leader.
**Legal – rational authority:** “belief in procedure”, means, “They believe that the requirements or laws have been enacted in the proper manner” (Allan, 2005:27). The state in this model is based on institutions, which means obedience to a “set of impersonal principles” (Blau, 1963:308). Thus, this authority is exercised in accordance with the law. Therefore, the authority has a rational character based on the belief in the legitimacy of the control mechanism and the legitimacy of the practitioners of this control. Consequently, “the rational–legal authority of an agent gives that person a right to command and expect compliance because of the office or role the person fills in society” (Dowding, 2011:37).

Therefore, this organised authority could be described as having a set of legal foundations based on logic and reason, and the source of power is based mainly on the nature of the legal system itself. One of these methods in modern legality, as McNaughton mentions, is an elective authority. This is a democratic system, which according to him “has become the only fully acceptable bases for authority” (McNaughton: 2001: 15). Structurally, there is a clear distinction between individuals and roles. The authority of individuals is derived from the roles they occupy throughout the structural organs. Accordingly, Weber considers legal rational authority as a legal authority due to the legal establishment of the institutions. Here, Weber argues that “in the case of legal authority, obedience is owed to the legally established impersonal order. It extends to the persons exercising the authority of office under it only by virtue of the formal legality of their commands and only within the scope of authority of the office” (Weber, 2012: 328). Thus, obedience through the ‘structural institution or what Weber calls ‘organisation of actors’ as duties in the forms of roles is systematically organised, including rights as a valuation of the performance of those duties. From these duties and rights, legality could be the spirit of the systematic procedure of the authority, or what Weber calls “office”. Here, the details of the legal-rational authority have been provoked by Weber, and also in some ways, they have been examined by Elias, specifically when he is pointing towards tax monopolies.

According to Elias’s view, “‘tax and force monopolies’ also enabled the rulers to embark on the general pacification of the population and to maintain social conditions conducive to the more rational government, long-term planning, material production, and the flow of trade” (Dunning & Hughes, 2013:101). Here, although Elias’s work on the civilising process is explorative and exhaustive, he has not neglected his concern about the quality of the authority. In this regard, Steven Loyal and Stephen Qually have elaborated on Elias’s view of the authority as they point out that “in so far as war results in a victory, it is the subsequent extension of a coordinating authority that spurs people to both peaceful
cooperation and peaceful competition” (Loyal & Qually, 2004:176). This result of coordination is not inevitable, but it creates dynamic developments and could be reversible as well. Here, the key point between Elias and Weber lies in the mechanisms of the historical developments of the state structure. Thus, according to Bertrand Badie, there is an evolutionary aspect to Weber’s theory, as he argues that Western Societies, “are tending more and more towards this type of domination and hence towards a new form of legitimacy” (Birnbaum & Badie, 1983: 22). However, Elias believes it is continuous with no end to the civilising process, as he argues that “the civilising process is a change of human conduct and sentiment in a quite specific direction” (Elias, 1978:365). Hence, Elias has not ensured this specific direction, and it could be reversible depending on social interactions and interdependencies.

Believing in an authority does not come about suddenly and haphazardly. Political history frequently shows the struggle of human societies attempting to establish the most legitimate authority through social-political processes. It is true that Elias has formed the theory of the civilising process without underlining the details of legitimacy, but at the same time, the mechanisms of state formation and its stages of development have been clearly highlighted. Dependent on these noticeable phases of authority, legitimacy could be considered as one of the normative aspects of the prominent faces of civilisation. In addition, contrary to Elias, for Weber, legitimacy is a central case for any authority, as he emphasises that “at the heart of the issue of stratification and social change is legitimacy” (Allan, 2005:152). In this regard, all authorities, whether individually or collectively, during their career, have attempted or are attempting to earn the people’s satisfaction or the highest level of legitimacy. Here, legitimacy can be seen as part of the psychogenesis of human behaviour, or in Weber’s belief in social change, it could have been an important position in the Eliasian social transformation at both the ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ levels of social integration.

Here, as long as the “modes of behaviour” (Dunning, & Hughes, 2013: 78) are central to the study of the process of civilisation, legitimacy could be an important part of this process as one of the features of the modern socio-political era. Hence, ‘legitimacy’ as Mlada Bukovansky states, must “constitute and empower political authority” (Mlada Bukovansky, 2002: vii). Thus, legitimate political authority, according to Mlada Bukovansky is a central feature of a state’s collective identity. Moreover, legitimacy, according to ‘Jean-Louis Quermonne’, is one of the essential characteristics of any government of a state. His argument cites “The political system and the dialectic of legality and legitimacy”, and he claims that the political system of a state has four core components: “the nature of power and
its role, the structure of institution, the system of political parties and principles of legitimacy” (A. Nasoury, 2008: 348). Here, it can be seen that the characteristics of the state, nation and the political system differ, whether a little or a lot and every level has its different specific construction within some common elements. The problematic questions in terms of legitimacy also differ. The most prominent question in relation to power is the possibility of separation of the realities of power from its legitimacy. However, the fundamental problem here is a question which is related to the legitimacy of the state or state building itself, and whether this problematic issue has a relation to the causes of genocide, specifically in the case of Iraq; although both aspects are important to investigate.

Conversely, Foucault in his book, Power/Knowledge, examines legitimacy in relation to sovereignty or the relationship between language and power. He has examined these concepts in a discourse analysis within their historical context in relation to the theory of right. He argues, “The essential role of the theory of right, from medieval times onwards, was to fix the legitimacy of power; that is the major problem around which the whole theory of right and sovereignty is organised” (Foucault, 1980: 95). However, legitimacy is not the main concern of Foucault in itself but he considers right as a central issue, as he has emphasised “right should be viewed, I believe, not in terms of a legitimacy to be established, but in terms of the methods of Subjugation that it instigates” (Foucault, 1980: 96). This is because “the system of right is centred entirely upon the King” (Foucault, 1980: 96). Here, Foucault’s measure of right is not legitimacy, because according to his announcements, he did not find legitimacy in any standard form except the behaviour of the dominant. Therefore, the struggle for legitimacy was and still is dialectical, and throughout processual developments, has been a matter of debate. In this regard, according to Shapiro Scot, many authorities have claimed legitimacy dependent on a specific ideology, but the results are in retreat. Shapiro continues, “The Supreme Soviet Legislature claimed the authority to rule the Soviet Union, but it lacks the moral right to do so. It lacked legitimate, or de jure, authority” (Shapiro, 2000: 6). This decline in legitimacy and specifically the view of the citizens of this kind of authority depends on the previous argument, which will lead inevitably to backfiring or to disastrous consequences, not to mention the disappearance of the manifestations of democracy in governance. For this reason, it is necessary to know the essence of legitimacy and how scholars define it.

Regarding a definition of legitimacy, according to Franke, Bierie and Mackenzie, and drawing on Weber’s (1968) view of authority, Tyler (2003: 308) defines legitimacy as “a quality possessed by an authority, a law, or an institution that leads others to feel obligated to
obey its decisions and directives” (D. Franke, D. Bierie & D. Mackenzie, 2010: 91). This obedience, according to Franke, Bierie and Mackenzie regarding legitimacy, is coupled with the consent of the people as they argue that “legitimacy, refers to the extent to which people feel they ought to obey the law and its authorities” (D. Franke, D. Bierie & D. Mackenzie, 2010: 91). Thus, without feeling or perhaps without mutual agreement between the ruler and the ruled, stability and prosperity will be non-existent, or at least very difficult without force majeure. Therefore, according to Matheson, in order to secure obedience motivated by a belief in legitimacy, “Power holders must convince power-subjects that the command-obedience relation is ‘rightfully’ legitimate” (C. Matheson, 1087: 200). This conviction is central to the relationship between the authority and its population. Such a conviction is associated with the preliminary agreements on state formation among the different components in terms of state building. The modern nation state with its democratic elements could be one of the fundamental factors leading to the stability of a legitimate authority. For example, the “French began to fight a war in a new way, with the nation state as their primary unit of allegiance, defended by citizen-soldiers, and espousing popular sovereignty as the exclusive source of political legitimacy” (M. Bukovansky, 2002: 168).

3.7. Conclusion

The theory on the civilising process has focused on particular elements. Primarily, a comparison between civilisation and culture has been considered, which reflects the habitus of the people of England, France and Germany as examples. These concepts have been explained through the element of civilisation and changing habitus, about which Elias explains: “the civilising process is a change of human conduct and sentiment in a quite specific direction”. Additionally, this has been followed by an explanation of the essence of violence and state formation as an important part of the civilising process and its position in this thesis. Finally, the de-civilising process as a significant basis for the process of genocide has been considered.

Several characteristics are involved in the process of state formation. The most dynamic character according to Elias is the violent competitive process or “conflictual affairs” between various groups of people. The most expected consequence of this competition is a survival unit and successive states, starting with a feudal state, through many other different forms, to reach the nation state. These forms within the state process involve a monopoly over the means of violence and taxation. Thus, Elias has examined the
establishment of a monopoly of one group and the eventual formation of a state through his study of European history, specifically England, France and Germany, which is called the civilising process. Moreover, central to the civilising process is the increasing division of functions. Functions could be one of the central developments of the human structure at both macro and micro levels. Here, the most important function of the state according to Elias is the common defence of its population’s own lives; the survival of their own group in the face of attack, and readiness to launch a united attack on other groups. If these three general functions form the content of the modern structure of today’s society, in the past, specifically for feudal states, these functions were most prominent in the hierarchy of the state.

Here, the state, as well as the nation state, has its particular characteristics. The most important and prominent characteristics of the state are “a permanent population, a defined territory, government and capacity to enter into relations with other states.” However, the state has been defined by Weber as a “human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.” These primary elements include less important elements, which participate in the process of state formation. This formation, according to Elias, is the long-term conflict engaged in to dominate more territory with the growth of the population. Conversely, the characteristics of the nation state are different from the state, which generally has the same language, perhaps similar types of religions, and shares a set of cultural and national values. At the same time, this difference is relational because both sets of characteristics are related to each other—like a body and soul. In other words, the state is more properly the governmental apparatus by which a nation rules itself.

If some scholars have tended to reify ‘power’ and treat it as a ‘thing’, which can be ‘possessed’, ‘held’ or ‘seized’ in an absolute sense, for Elias, power is a structural characteristic of all human relationships and is polymorphous, which means it is many-sided and inherent in all human relations. Power for Foucault, on the one hand, is an action, although he emphasises that “power is only a certain type of relation between individuals.” However, when these relations are extremely imbalanced between the ‘composite units’ or different components, society could face instability. Also, the authority must have the ability to implement its aspirations. Thus, the authority, whether political or non-political, only stands up in an organised group. Regarding legitimacy, it is for Weber, unlike other scholars, dynamic and an important feature of the modern state. In this respect, Weber has classified three ideal types of political systems as legitimate authorities: Traditional, Charismatic and Legal – all with rational authority.
CHAPTER 4: Methodology

4.1. Introduction

To discover the main and most important causes of genocide, an attempt has been made to combine it with Norbert Elias’s civilising process, in order to explore the development of the genocide process as a postcolonial state formation model, and as a product of the nation state as a form of failed consequences. For example, the concept of genocide has been associated with nation building and ideology in terms of the creation of a unilateral state or a single minority state, to impose a unified and colourless model as an ideological framework and as a transformation towards the de-civilising process. This assumption appears to be more appropriate for the concept of genocide. In contrast to this assumption, the conditions of a failed state appear to be one of the main causes of the origins of the genocide process. However, the concept of genocide has emerged as a counter assumption to the civilising process, therefore while the de-civilising process addresses the causes of a failed state, it is also an attempt to discover the process of genocide as a consequence of a reversal from the civilising process to the de-civilising process.

Genocide in relation to the nation state did not occur accidently, but it is a procession of transformation from its origins to the mass destruction that takes place; as Irving Louis Horowitz has argued: “genocide is always a conscious choice and decision. It is never just a fortune of history or a necessity that is imposed by unseen economic growth requirements. Hence genocide is always an essentially political decision” (Horowitz, 1976:39). In this regard, in order to approach the roots of this process correctly and link it to the theory of the civilising process, including understanding the complex causality between its variables within a timeframe both past and present, the thesis will test the amplitude of figurational sociology (FS). This FS is also referred to as ‘process sociology’ “because the theoretical perspective not only examines society by examining the present but, also, by researching historical developments” (Hopkins, 2008:10). Thus, the importance of this approach is its ability to cover other common denominators of different approaches to research, which has been highlighted in this chapter.
About the extent of my ability, I have always been concerned with maintaining a level of neutrality in this research in order to produce a successful and conciliatory piece of research because of my background. Additionally, the second concern was the integrity between the theory and methodology. Thus, it has been acknowledged that the civilising process was utilised as a theoretical framework for the beginnings of genocide in Iraq. In this regard, throughout Elias’s epistemology, the figuration approach has been pursued as a methodological principle in order to maintain harmony between the theory and an Elysian style of methodology. Here, room will be given to highlight the figuration approach, as the central issue in this research is the inter-relationship between different components and/or between the perpetrator and the victims. Daniel Bloyce in this regard has argued, “Figuration lists tend not to write about epistemology and ontology because, it is argued here, there are more object-adequate ways of understanding the focus of our study: human relationships” (Bloyce, 2004:146). This dualism has been labelled a “false dichotomy” (Bloyce, 2004:146). This is because Elias did not recognise this kind of separation due to the continuous overlap between epistemology and ontology.

Therefore, as has been argued, “Knowledge and reality are not separate entities; they are part of the same process” (Bloyce, 2004:146). This position of Elias, according to Nina Baur and Stefanie Ernst, also goes back to his refusal to address the differentiation between subjectivity/objectivity, and it is claimed that “Norbert Elias considered this ‘static subject–object relationship... completely unusable’” (Baur, N. and Ernst, S., 2011:120). Many researchers, including Daniel Bloyce, have confirmed this strict attitude of Elias, as he reiterates: “Elias rejected the orthodox consideration of subjectivity/objectivity as a means of understanding the social world” (Bloyce, 2004:147). From this announcement, FS provides a particular dimension to this research in order to understand genocide as a social, political and legal problem.

4.1.1. Figurational Sociology

One of the dilemmas of figurational sociology is the confusion between various researches in this area. This could be due to the fact that the concept has been developed from the literature of Elias and it holds more than an interpretation. The main difference lies in mixing between mechanisms and its dynamics, which compete with each other in the definitive process. Here, according to Elias, “a figuration is a
social structure consisting of a set of individuals who are linked by a set of positions, rules, norms and values” (Elias, 2009e [1986]). Thus, simply put, we can understand the figurational approach as being a social structure, which consists of positions, rules, norms and values. Nina Baur and Stefanie Ernst at a “reconstructed macro level” have categorised it as “the rules and social structure of the figurational” (Baur, N. and Ernst, S., 2011:120). Thus, it is possible to handle figurational sociology as a source of the figurations. This figurational approach could be considered to be one unit with its historical dimensions and its activities in the present. Here, Elias in another argument explains it as follows: “the word ‘figuration’ refers to ‘a structure of mutually orientated and dependent people and the network of interdependencies formed by individuals’ (Elias, 2000: 482). This quote from Elias could be considered as explaining the previous points. In this regard, Paddy Dolan also claims that, “Elias’s approach became known as figurational or process sociology, as it stresses the development of social and personality structures over time, and therefore the need to generate data in terms of historical flows” (Dolan, P., 2009:1).

As a consequence of the figurational framework, according to Gareth Hopkins, is the concept of figuration. In this regard, Hopkins explains that “figurational sociologists argue that humans form chains of ‘figurations’ or ‘interdependence’ and can therefore not be separated from society (micro-macro sociology)” (Hopkins, 2008:10). This is a figurational approach because the interdependence is a figuration among other figures in a complex relationship, which make up figurational sociology. In other words, Nina Baur and Stefanie Ernst consider the macro-level as figuration and micro-level as individuals (Baur, N. and Ernst, S., 2011). Thus, the individual at the micro level is part of the figuration. In this regard, Katie Liston claims that “figurational sociology is concerned with figurations or ‘the interweaving of pluralities of individual acts’” (Liston; Mennell; Bogner, 2012:625). Here, Nina Baur and Stefanie Ernst explain that together “both individuals and their figurations are changing all the time and at the same time interweaving with each other” (Baur, N. and Ernst, S., 2011:125). Thus, the relationship is based on the interweaving between the interdependency chains as central position to the figuration. “In addition to that, Elias’s figurational sociology insists on an interdependent relation between the micro- and macro-worlds whereby aggressive behaviour is simultaneously tamed through the historically protracted transformation of organizational control and increasing self-restraint” (Malešević, S. and Ryan, K.,
Figurations are binding through the interdependency chains at macro levels, and individuals at micro levels, and all kinds of behaviour are exposed to a processional transformation. However, aggressiveness is an important element in human inter-relationships, and this research is an attempt to understand society as a whole, or as parts, through the evolving networks created by interdependent figurations (Hopkins, 2008). As a consequence, this adoption, of a figurational approach is a crucial part of the examination in order to understand the origins of the process of genocide that are based on the interdependency chains, and its inter-relationship between both the authority (perpetrator) and a target component (victims).

4.1.2. Unplanned consequences

After explaining figurations, another concept that is part of the figurational framework is the unplanned consequences of the human chains (Hopkins, 2008). Unplanned processes in the figurational framework have been examined, and the intention of the crime of genocide is considered in the second chapter, which is intentional and premeditated, as has been made clear: there is no deliberate crime without intent and premeditation. Thus, how far is it possible to harmonise Elias’s unplanned view with the intentional and planed act of genocide? The answer is, Elias did not reject the absence of a plan and intention for human actions, as Elias and his colleagues emphasise:

“In both these cases, admittedly, it was recognized that an unplanned development takes place behind all human plans, but it was indirectly assumed that it concerns a development which is rational, purposeful and meaningful for humans. Time and again it has been mentioned in this regard the unintended and unplanned consequences of planned and intentional human action” (Elias, Norbert; van Krieken, Robert; Dunning, Eric, 1997).

This argument helps us to recognise several non-rational actions in Iraq, after the formation of the Middle Eastern countries and the marginalisation and the division of an existing neighbourhood- the Kurdish people- between these countries, including Iraq. Another example is that of the military invasion in Iraq and the sale of chemical weapons, while they knew that there was nothing to deter the Iraqi authorities from
using these chemical weapons. As a result, dozens of villages and towns including Halabja city were destroyed by these chemical weapons (Document). This is what Elias is concerned with, as van Krieken argues, “often Elias emphasized the unplanned character of social life, largely because he was concerned to counter the notion that there can ever be a direct and straightforward relationship between human action and its outcomes” (Van Krieken - 1998:52). This is along a similar vein, to the figurational network, as “figurational sociologists highlight that, together with planned, a huge number of unplanned outcomes evolve” (Hopkins, 2008:12). This theory has created a common phenomenon in the world due to globalisation, and dozens of unplanned consequences have emerged. In this regard, Kaspersen and Gabriel argue, “a figuration is dynamic and it changes all the time as a consequence of unplanned processes, unintended consequences and human purposeful and planned activities” (Kaspersen, L.B. and Gabriel, N., 2008:373). Thus, plans and intended actions may be blind to the consequences of their actions. This means these planned actions are interwoven with unplanned social processes, and this dualism brings us back to the false dichotomy (Hopkins, 2008). Hence, it is time to discuss the most important part of the figurational framework in terms of methodology, which is involvement and detachment.

4.1.2. Involvement and Detachment in Genocide Studies

As has been previously examined in the literature review, the history of genocide and the invention of genocide, include the concept of developments and the process of recognition of genocide by the United Nations. These developments have had a huge influence on sociologists and all other disciplines’ researchers when investigating the real origins of genocide and its social, political and economic impact. In addition, these developments have also left a deep controversy between countries and organisations on the one hand, and researchers on the other hand, because of the deep disagreement over the definition of genocide, and the components that can be subjected to genocide include the procedure of legal action against the perpetrator. Thus, “writing about genocide is not like writing about other matters, even where the subject often bespeaks human horror and misery” (Levene, 2005:1). Therefore, this reason and many other reasons have been investigated or will be investigated in the following chapters, to engage in the process of research into the
genocide. This may be harder than other studies because of the legal consequences and its direct involvement in human life. In this regard, for some researchers, the crime of genocide is a social problem (Campbell, 2011), and for others it is ‘Complicity with Evil’ (LeBor, 2006) or ‘becoming Evil’ (Waller, J., 2002), as well as genocide being a crime in international law (William A. Schabas, 2000).

However, in some specific genocide cases, no matter how successful and renowned the researcher is, such as the Armenian genocide, it is hard for some to be convinced. For example, many Muslims, particularly Turks and Arabs, cannot be convinced by any research, even if it is neutral, that the Armenian genocide was a real genocide. Furthermore, they even place a lot of the responsibilities of the war at the door of the Armenians, particularly their betrayal of the Ottoman Empire and their involvement with the Russian Empire; in particular, accusing them of being the perpetrators of the genocide of Muslims (McCarthy, J., 1995). The Anfal Campaigns also face many opponents in the Arab and Muslim world, particularly through neglecting what happened and not giving it any kind of consideration, even among the scientific community. This problem leads to a kind of limitation and adherence to a more scientific method to gain more credibility. This credibility requires more detachment, or at least a balance between involvement and detachment.

It is clear that the research problem between objectivity and subjectivity faces a lot of controversy among researchers. As a consequence, “Elias rejected the orthodox consideration of subjectivity/objectivity as a means of understanding the social world” (Bloyce, D., 2004:147). Instead, Elias presents involvement and detachment within figurational sociology as an approach that provides an alternative, to put an end to the controversy between subjectivity and objectivity; as well as a more adequate approach than the arguments that have been defended according to the previous views. In addition, “it does not involve mutually exclusive categories or radical dichotomies; in fact, it is a relational and procession conceptualisation” (Bloyce, D., 2004:147). This conceptualisation is based on a combination of involvement and detachment. In this regard, “Elias (1987) continued to state that it is not possible, nor desirable, for researchers to be wholly detached or wholly involved: it is always a matter of fact” (Hopkins, 2008:14) or “one could never be completely involved or completely detached” (Rohloff, 2011:97). However, Elias has been criticised in that he did not draw a specific criterion as a commitment for researchers
(Rojek, C., 1986:591), and he did not specify the degree of involvement and detachment.

In contrast to these critics, Rich Kilminster provides an overview: “the sociological problem, Elias says, is to develop criteria to determine the continuum that lies between the two poles. The terms ‘involvement’ and ‘detachment’ do not refer to two separate classes of objects” (Kilminster, R., 2007:115). In this regard, Elias argued “that the terms involvement and detachment do not refer to two separate classes of objects, but to ‘changing equilibrium between sets of mental activities which have the function to involve and to detach’ (Elias1987a: 4). In addition, according to van Krieken “involvement and detachment were not mutually exclusive for Elias. The point was more that people constantly moved between the two poles” (Van Krieken - 1998:52); however, it has been reiterated that the important position is that we stay relatively detached (Hopkins, 2008:14), and avoid any signs that undermine the credibility of the research process.

Thus, there has been a balance between involvement and detachment in this research, as Kilminster states, “in each case, the involvement of group balance is tilted in one or the other direction” (Kilminster, R., 2007:117). In addition to that “it is to be seen as a dynamic tension balance embodied in social activities” (Loyal and Quilley, 2004). Here, in conclusion, “we should seek, when engaged in research, to maintain a relatively high degree of detachment” (Waddington, I., 2000:4). Despite all that has been discussed, perhaps each subject varies from another subject, and it could be that every subject forms an independent experience. Therefore, it has been noted that according to Elias, the researcher “cannot and should not abandon their political interests and concerns” (Rohloff, 2011:99).

4.1.3. Power Relations

Understanding power is a vital aspect of this research in terms of the subject matter, which contains two main parts, namely, the perpetrator of the genocide process, and the target who has been exposed to genocide. Furthermore, the elements of these two parts include the state and its institutions, the political parties, the opposition and civil society. Therefore, the core of the subject matter is based on inter-relationships. Without understanding the inter-relationships between these components and their elements, and the reasons that motivate each party, it is
impossible to understand the consequences. Thus, the importance here is to understand the power relations and how they work.

Elias and Scotson refer to “sharp division within it between an old-established group and a newer group of residents” (Scotson & Elias, 1965:19) in a small community of Winston Parva. This argument, along with its consequences of treating newer members as outsiders and stigmatising them as lesser human (Scotson & Elias, 1965:19), reveals the difficulties in human interrelations. Thus, if we compare this case with the case of the Anfal Campaigns, there are similarities in their form, despite significant differences in their essence. However, the nature of inter-relationships between the established group in Winston Parva and its outsiders is the hegemony of the stronger rather than the other interdependent group, as has been argued, “one can observe again and again that members of groups which are, in power, stronger than other interdependent groups, eventually think of themselves in human terms as better than the others” (Scotson & Elias, 1965:19). From this argument, it can be understood that as long as the fundamental differences in the Anfal case are bigger, the conflict will be greater, and more violent and dangerous. The most significant element in the community of Winston Parva and among the established group is the ‘aristocracy’ and its dangerous ideology is “rule of the best”. This figuration imposes its atmosphere on the inter-relationship between the established and strangers. Hence, the similarity of the Anfal case and its prominent element is Arab-centrism within its ideology of “one Arab nation with an eternal message” () and its consequence of the “party leader” being viewed as an alternative to the “rule of the best”.

In the literature review, the kind of relationship between the BP’s authority has been determined as a relationship between the occupier and the occupied people, rather than a relationship between the national authority and its citizens. Based on this kind of relationship, Elias has elaborated on power in the framework of ‘power relationships’. Before delving into Elias’s ideas of power, Weber states: “We understand by “power” the chance of a man or a number of men to realize their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others” (Dunning, E., 1999:190/191). Thus, it is a will, but he has not determined what kind of will, because it could be motivated by any kind of ideology or belief in dominating a group of people or a piece of land or wealth. However, the importance here is the core of the power, which has been mentioned by Weber as “social relations” (Dunning,
and by Elias as “structural characteristic of human relationships”. In this regard Elias argues:

“We say that a person possesses great power, as if power was an entity that he carried about in his pocket. This use of the word is a relic of magico-mythical ideas. Power is not an amulet possessed by one person and not by another; it is a structural characteristic of human relationships” (Elias, 1978:93).

Hence, according to Elias, power is not a thing or an amulet but it is exercised in a mutual relationship “which can be good or bad” (Stacey, R.D., 2003:122); regardless of the percentage of those practising it, or the ability to practice it, because it depends on the circumstances of the parties. Elias has elaborated on the power relationship with more examples, as he claims, “from the day of its birth, a baby has power over its parents, not just the parents over the baby. At least the baby has power over them as long as they attach any kind of value to it. If not it loses its power” (Elias, 1978:74). Thus, the concept of “value” is important to maintain a positive inter-relationship, rather than a negative inter-relationship. Hence, as long as an authority is maintaining the values ‘any kind of values’ in their relationship with its citizens, and as long as the citizens can live in peace along with retaining their rights. Here, Elias mentions the balance of power between parties, as he argues that “equally bi-polar is the balance of power between a slave and his master” (Elias, 1978:74). This is because “the master has power over his slave, but the slave also has power over his master, in proportion to his function for his master - his master’s dependence on him” (Elias, 1978:74). It is similar situation to that of parents, because according to Elias, power chances are distributed very unevenly. Here, more accurately, Elias claims that “whether the power differentials are large or small, balance of power are always present wherever there is functional interdependence between people” (Elias, 1978:74).

In addition, according to Eric Dunning, “what Elias was suggesting is twofold:
(i) That power is ‘polymorphous’, that is, many-sided and inherent in all human relationships;
(ii) That the key to understanding power lies in the interdependency of people” (Dunning, 1999:191).

Two elements are important here: power is multiple sided, and it lies in the interdependency of people. These and another previous elements of the figurational
approach are central and throughout this thesis, and will contribute towards the understanding of the genocide process.

4.2. Research Objective

During the first year, two levels of the research were problematic and they were subject to change. The first level was the theoretical framework, which was the most difficult level to address. In this regard, many theories have been written and later on exposed to change, with much written on the theory and different contexts to work towards framing the key elements of the fieldwork. The second level was the research field and research sample, which were also subject to change and stress. Thus, during the first year and into the second year of this study, it was a period of identifying these two levels of the research, which is a normal process in narrowing down a broad topic.

During the meetings with my supervisors, the process revealed that the research topic, outlines and the problem question needed more concentration, or sometimes even needed to be discarded. Thus, this process could be considered as the most difficult stage, as the student should go and find their own approach to tackling the elements of their thesis. Although one to two years may be considered a long time in narrowing down the topic, it was discovered that the process is complex and requires depth and concentration to create an accurate framework for the research and to address the objectives.

4.2.1. Early Development of the Research Project

In the early stages of this research project, the intention was to expand the fieldwork to cover the process of genocide in Iraq. Initially, it was decided to adopt a mixed methods approach through questionnaires, interviews and analysing documentation.

At the beginning of the second year, the questions started to be organised, revised and amended. In the Kurdistan region, the advice was to carry out some pilot questionnaires to test validity and reliability. The questionnaires were distributed among 15 academic professors and lecturers at the University of Salahaddin and Koya University. The result was 90% identical to the research problem and thus
satisfactory.

The distribution of these forms took more than five months for the purpose of the distribution across the whole of the Arabic regions of Iraq, including the Kurdistan region. Thus, Arabic Iraq was divided into three chambers, with each chamber composed of two or three cities, except Baghdad, which has been considered an independent chamber. The Kurdistan region consisted of four cities including the city of Kirkuk. Here, the specific details of the questionnaire forms will not be addressed, because after the collection of the forms and entering the details into a specific program, a technical error led to the loss of a great deal of information, despite taking three months to insert the 800 forms. In addition, I was advised by the supervisor and the examiners during the annual review to leave the questionnaire forms because the interviews and the documentation are sufficient for this thesis.

4.2.2. Pilot Interviews and Finalising the Research Context

This section will present some of the issues related to the interviews.

During a visit to Kurdistan in 2012, due to the advice from a Salahaddin University professor, it was decided to conduct some pilot interviews. The first pilot interview was with a female Kurdish lecturer at Baghdad University. When she read the questions, she said ‘but you have decided previously that what happened was genocide. Do you know many Arabs are very sensitive when they hear about this concept? If someone does not believe in the process as genocide then you have a real problem.’ In this regard, I conducted some interviews with Sunni Arabs, but most of them said to me: ‘you have claimed neutrality but at the outset you have decided that the AC are genocide.’ However, I definitely had not chosen, but had primarily attempted to form the interview questions in a way that was taking into account the position of the interviewee. Moreover, this research is not aimed at proving that what happened was genocide, because the Iraqi Supreme Court and a lot of studies, particularly the study belonging to the Human Rights Watch of the UN, have decided and proven the case for genocide regarding the Anfal campaigns. Instead, this study is an attempt to examine the origins that led to the process of genocide, because it is another important aspect in understanding the real genocide.

This feedback was the first important measure for the pilot studies, and included other comments that were beneficial in reconsidering the suitability and
representativeness of the questions. Also, the final version of the questions, which have been incorporated into the concept of the hypothesis, led to two different phenomena: On the one side, concerning the Arab participants, most of them who were Ba’athists did not change their sensitivity, not just towards the issues but also towards the whole subject. On the other side, the Kurdish participants were not happy with the term because in the Kurdish vision the AC are no longer an issue. Thus, the Kurds and Arabs were not united with regard to the formula for the questions. However, the pilot interviews enabled me to leave enough space for the participants to express their opinion, and to release the information they have in their possession, including the experiences that they have lived and practised. Thus, the participants were not put in a critical position, but instead the focus was on the advantages and disadvantages of the process.

4.2.3. Research Question and Purposes

Figurational Sociology is designed in order to be aware of the past, present and future. It enables a more accurate explanation of the stages of nation building in Iraq under the leadership of the BP and its inter-relationship with the citizens of Iraq, depending on of its ideology and the policy of Arabisation. The primary object of this research is to explore the main causes of the hypothesis of genocide in Kurdistan. This includes all stages of the genocide, from the emergence of the BP until the termination of the Anfal Campaign.

Table (1) Research questions and purposes

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Research questions</th>
<th>Purposes</th>
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<tr>
<td>Why was the genocide, as a de-civilising process, carried out against the Kurds in Iraq?</td>
<td>To examine the causes of genocide from a macro to micro process through investigation of the structural developments of nation building in Iraq, particularly in the vision of the BP (as macro-sociology) to the Baath behaviour (micro-sociology) as a long-term process.</td>
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<tr>
<td>To what extent was genocide a result of</td>
<td>To explore the inter-relationship between</td>
</tr>
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Based on the civilising process, was pan-Arabic nationalism, including the Baathist ideology, a consequence of the nation building that led to the process of genocide?

To understand the formation of pan-Arabic nationalism in the frame of Arab-centrism, including the emergence of the BP, and its impact on nation building and the crises, including the process of genocide.

What was the role of religion in its interdependence with state organisations?

To understand the inter-relationship between the influence of religion and its mobilisation to strengthen Arab-centrism.

4.3. Research Methods and Design

This research has adopted a qualitative approach to examine the causality between the nation state and its institutions, and the process of genocide in Iraq, by investigating the inter-relationships between various social characters and state agencies in the long-term process. Thus, the research problem is the dynamic point used to determine the nature of the research. It defines the point at which the researcher begins to decode the puzzles that overburden them through the experiences of participants and finding out the meanings of the complexity of human behaviour. Here, in relation to qualitative research, Carter and Henderson have claimed that research “focuses on the experiences and meanings of individuals or groups. In order to analyse how and why people form associations with other people, and with their immediate environments” (Carter and Henderson, 2005: 215). This is what figurational sociology attempts to do to bind micro and macro sociology, and to prove the inter-relationship between various parties as being multipolar regarding exploring power balances.
This qualitative method has been chosen for several reasons. The genocide process is an inevitable consequence of certain causes that are sometimes identifiable, but sometimes not. Therefore, according to Lawrence Wooucher in his report ‘Developing a strategy, methods and tools for genocide early warning ‘the Secretary-General Kofi Annan “has made strengthening the UN’s ability to provide early warning a major part of his proposals and initiatives regarding the prevention of genocide” (Woocher, 2006:i). Thus, to prevent the genocide process, the elimination of the causes that lead to this process is a precautionary measure. ‘Never again’ is announced by Jacob Schiff in his article ‘The Trouble with ‘Never Again!’’. Rereading Levinas for Genocide Prevention, he has claimed: “with the adoption of the Convention in 1951, the parties declared ‘Never again!’ And yet, within the past decades genocides have ravaged Rwanda, Kosovo, East Timor, and Darfur” (Schiff, 2008:218). Thus, the origins of genocide should be highlighted and a strategy drawn up to put appropriate mechanisms in place depending on the circumstances and the place of a possible occurrence, including declaration to prevent such humanitarian tragedy. Moreover, Claudia Roth, co-Chair, German Green Party, on July 4th 2012 put forth an apology because of the involvement of German companies in illegal trade, as she announced: “I apologize for the German participation in the Kurdish genocide. The trade of German companies with Saddam’s regime was an illegal act. They should not have done that. Germany has to tell the people of Kurdistan that it was a mistake. Gassing Halabja took place with the help of German companies” (Kelly, 2013:348). Thus, although the international community is reiterating the idiom of ‘never again’, they did not take appropriate steps to prevent genocide. In this regard, no qualitative study has been conducted to examine the causal relationship between Iraqi state formation, BP rule and its ideology, and the genocide process. Hence, this is one of the most important reasons for choosing this subject and addressing it through qualitative methods.

To reach the meanings and definition of qualitative inquiry, many researchers have made a significant effort to ensure access to scientific research methods to maintain at least the integrity and objectivity of their research. In this regard, it has been claimed by a constellation of researchers, in their published book ‘Qualitative Research Methods: a data collection’, that “Qualitative research is a type of scientific research. In general terms, scientific research consists of an investigation that:
- Seeks answers to a question
- Systematically uses a predefined set of procedures to answer the question
- Collects evidence
- Produces findings that were not determined in advance
- Produces findings that are applicable beyond the immediate boundaries of the study” (Mack; Cynthia; MacQueen; Guest; Emily, 2005:1).

Thus, using these vital features of the scientific approach, researchers have attempted to “study things in their natural situations, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena regarding the meanings people bring to them” (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011:3). This means that qualitative inquiry, in general, is known as a study that can be implemented in its natural position, where the researcher is collecting data to analyse in an inductive way with a focus on the meanings that have been cited by the participants. The process describes, in convincing and expressive language, to delve into meanings in a flexible and broad manner. Thus, according to David Silverman “for some people, such flexibility encourages qualitative researchers to be innovative” (Silverman, 2011). In this regard, Natasha Mack and Cynthia Woodsong mention that, “some aspects of the study are flexible (for example, the addition, exclusion, or wording of particular interview questions)” (Mack; Cynthia; MacQueen; Guest; Emily, 2005:3). This flexibility is another reason for using a qualitative approach to navigate this research.

Hence, this qualitative process should lead to achieving an appropriate understanding, based on the distinctive traditions of a research method that aims to assess a social or humanitarian problem. Furthermore, a “high contribution of the qualitative research is the culturally specific and contextually rich data it produces” (Mack; Cynthia; MacQueen; Guest; Emily, 2005: vi). Additionally, the researcher is attempting to build a proper, reticulate and comprehensive image through analysing data that has been collected, or any other possible source in performing a study in a normal situation. Are there any privileges regarding one method over any other? It seems that the process has little to do with the advantages or disadvantages of a method, but the circumstances and the factors that control the research, and the way the researcher has direct importance and impact over the progress of the study. Here, it has been argued by Susan Imel; Sandra Kerka; Michael Wonacott in their article ‘Qualitative Research in Adult, Career, and Career-Technical Education’, that “no matter which research tradition is followed, the quality of the research is paramount if the findings are to be credible and usable. Before discussing standards for judging
research quality, it should be noted that any articulation of criteria is tenuous each piece of research must be judged within the context of the community of scholars it represents” (Imel; Kerka; Wonacott, 2002:2).

Therefore, according to Daved Silverman this issue depends on the consequences and findings regardless of what kind of methods have been used as he explains that “if you ask someone what ‘research’ means, they may well tell you that it involves ‘finding things out’. There is nothing wrong in this response as far as it goes. But it leaves changing how we find things out” (Silverman, 2006:2). However, when it comes to the advantages of the qualitative methodology, Ian Deyis argues, “on the one hand, qualitative data is often presented as ‘richer’ and ‘more valid’ than quantitative data” (Dey, 1993:14). In addition to this argument, John W. Creswell claims that “qualitative and quantitative approaches should not be viewed as polar opposites or dichotomies; instead, they represent different ends on a continuum” (Creswell, 2013:3). Here, regardless of how the researcher is finding things out, the difference between open ended questions and closed questions could be an important feature for sociological researchers. In this regard, Natasha Mack and Cynthia Woodsong have mention that “one advantage of qualitative methods in exploratory research is that use of open-ended questions and probing gives participants the opportunity to respond in their own words, rather than forcing them to choose from fixed responses, as quantitative methods do” (Mack; Cynthia; MacQueen; Guest; Emily, 2005:4). This is an advantage for this research and is important because participants have a greater opportunity to elaborate on their feelings and experiences. This is an important aspect and another reason for choosing this methodology.

Thus, in addition to the previous factors, many scholars believe that qualitative inquiry is closer to field work because of the direct involvement of the researcher, including John W. Creswell, as he argues “this means that qualitative researches study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meaning people bring to them” (Creswell, 2013:36). This is because the researcher is close to or owns the experience of what happened during the fieldwork. Thus, Creswell assures that “the researcher tries to minimise the distance or physical separateness between himself or herself and those being researched” (Creswell, 2013:18). Here, according to Simon Carter and Lesley Henderson, two features are important: “to identify their preconceived beliefs about a phenomenon in order to minimise personal biases and the focus on the lived experiences of
individuals” (Carter, S. and Henderson, L., 2005:220). These features are another reason for utilising a qualitative methodology.

4.3.1. Qualitative Interviewing: Method, reasons and motives:

Qualitative interviews are the primary step to approaching a common understanding of the circumstances and the conditions of the groups or individuals during a particular period. “We have become an interview society” (Denzin, 2011:23), reflects the importance of this method in order to discover the mysteries of the events that we could not decipher due to its vagueness and its symbols. In a similar way, Fontana and Prokos emphasise that “the use of interviewing to acquire information is so extensive today that it has been said that we live in an interview society” (Fontana and Prokos, 2007:10). Thus, the importance of the interview makes it indispensable in social science fieldwork.

Hence, as Irving Seidman has confirmed in his book ‘Interviewing as Qualitative research’ an interview “is a basic mode of inquiry. Recounting narratives of experience has been the major way throughout recorded history that humans have made sense of their experience” (Seidman, I., 2013:8). Here, one of the important units of interviews is the ‘is a basic mode of inquiry’ with people who lived during a particular period; it “provides access to the context of people’s behaviour and thereby provides a way for researchers to understand the meaning of that behaviour” (Seidman, I., 2013:10). Here, if the process is to be considered in a deeper and more precise form, Svendbrinkmann emphasises that “people talk with others in order to learn about how they experience the world, how they think, act, feel and develop as individuals and in groups, and in recent decades such knowledge - producing conversations have been refined and discussed as interviews” (Brinkmann, S., 2013).

Thus, this is the detail that gives the utmost importance to the study, which precedes the information that has been collected from the fieldwork. Andrea Fontana and Anastasia Prokos have highlighted the provided information as “an active emergent process” (Fontana and Prokos, 2007:42), which means that the interview protocol can generate new questions from its previous answers. Hence, the process of interviews in this research involved creating a worrying position when the interviewees bound the genocide process to the process of state formation. This procedure encouraged me to add a new primary variable to the research, which was
the state structure, and also to add new questions to the interview protocol in order to gain new answers.

Moreover, how the outset of the interviews and the process of recruitment are implemented is important. Primarily, the process of interviews was long and it was hard to carry out fieldwork. However, according to how Natasha Mack has defined it, attempts were made to implement the steps of recruitment carefully and patiently. Here, according to Natasha Mack “the plan should specify criteria for screening potential participants, the number of people to be recruited, the location, and the approach to be used” (Mack; Cynthia; MacQueen; Guest; Emily, 2005:5). Thus, in terms of criteria, age and ethnic background were all considered.

Primarily, the ideal participants are those who are at least forty years of age. This is because the participants have to remember all stages of the Iraqi authority led by the Iraqi BP for more than thirty years, or be specialised in the current history of Iraq. However, they should be living in Iraq and remember certain stages of the Iraqi authority.

The second criterion is ethnicity. On the one hand, the majority of Sunni Arabs were Baathists or pro the regime and supporters of its policy, or complacent in accepting their rule. On the contrary, the feelings and sentiments of both oppressors and the oppressed people or the perpetrator and the targeted people, cannot be equated. It is inherently related to the affiliation, denial or lack of recognition of the process; underestimating the events, or the victims being regarded as traitors to the nation, and whether the state and the retribution was the appropriate treatment, as two Baathist participants admitted (participant, 00000).

Here, as a consequence of this complex background of participants, Natasha Mack and her colleagues have admitted that “often including the delicate nature of working with vulnerable populations; possible stigmatization of participants resulting from affiliation with the study; the high mobility of some populations; participants’ concerns about confidentiality; and misinformation, lack of information, fear, or rumors about the study” (Mack; Cynthia; MacQueen; Guest; Emily, 2005:33). None of these points were a subject of concern to the majority of participants, particularly the Kurds, except some Sunni Arabs who live in the UK, who did not accept maintaining any relationship between themselves and the interviews or researcher. In this regard, Carol Warren has argued, “the hallmark of qualitative interviewing is unrecorded data of this kind and these are as important as those derived from tape
recordings” (Gubrium, J.F. and Holstein, J.A., 2002). Therefore, no recording of the face-to-face interviews took place, and they kept their names and addresses strictly confidential; however, three of those who accepted to participate in interviews withdrew when they knew the content of the subject. Moreover, one of the high level Iraqi officers who now lives in the UK and has been accused of participation in the Anfal Campaigns, did agree to a face to face interview, but later he did not attend the appointment. He kept me waiting for three successive years, and procrastinating; in the end, while he rejected the interview, he also did not accept answering the questions I emailed to him many times at his own request.

Another element, which has an important role, is location. This consists of two main circles: The first circle is Iraqi Kurdistan, including Kirkuk province where the process of one of the biggest AC took place. The second circle is Baghdad and the Sunni Arab region in central Iraq, who formed the major part of the authority and was pro-regime. Iraqi Kurdistan as the first and main area of the fieldwork is reasonably secure and has developed since 2003, because of the relative freedom, and the region’s reduced domination from the authority of Baghdad. The problem is related to the Sunni Arab region, which was and still is a dangerous region to enter, particularly for the Kurds. However, in recent months, I was able to find some people who are living in Britain, as well as conducting some interviews in Kurdistan and Holland.

The other element in qualitative interviews is neutrality. There has been much discussion about the role of the interviewer and if they can maintain neutrality. In this regard, Fontana Andrea and Prokos Anastasia have claimed that “Increasingly, qualitative researchers are realizing that interviews are not neutral tool of data gathering but rather active interactions between two (or more) people leading to negotiated, contextually based results” (Fontana and Prokos, 2007:10). This argument cannot be taken absolutely because it depends on the subjects and the interviewer. However, it could sometimes be a matter that has nothing to do with neutrality, because some participants are smart, and they have the ability to communicate their thoughts accurately and effective. Hence, according to Fontana and Prokos, “the interviewers must establish what has been called ‘balanced rapport’; they must be casual and friendly, on the one hand, but directive and impersonal on the other” (Fontana and Prokos, 2007:20). In this regard, attempts were made not to argue or judge the interviewees and to respect their vision even if I did not agree with it.
Perhaps identifying an interviewee to establish an interview with is one of the most difficult stages, particularly for fieldwork involves transformation and a tyrannical authority, and this clearly led to a crisis of confidentiality among the people approached. In this regard, Irving Seidman argues, “interviewing requires that researchers establish access to, and make contact with, potential participants whom they have never met” (Seidman, I., 2013:12). Therefore, the researcher should seek to produce valuable information on the subject of research, as Clive Seale expresses: “in qualitative interviews, the researcher is often regarded as a co-producer of the data, which are produced as a result of an interaction between researcher and interviewee” (Seale, C., 2004:208). Thus, the information in itself is the goal behind the implementation of the interviews and as Svend Brinkmann has argued, the interviewees “are not an end in themselves but are staged and conducted to serve the researcher’s goal of producing knowledge. All sort of motives may play a role in the staging of interviews, and real interview reports often contain a reflexive account and discussion of both individual and social aspects of such motives” (Brinkmann, S., 2013:21). Hence, as a consequence of this process, Tim Rapley refers to an interview as a “story that describes how two people, often relative strangers, sit down and talk about a particular topic” (Rapley, 2004: 15). Thus, interviews, from the beginning, are the creation of a connection between the researcher and the interviewee, through a particular procedure to gain access to useful information. This kind of expression has been highlighted by Patricia Leavy as she argues, “a face-to-face verbal exchange, in which one person, the interviewer, attempts to elicit information or expressions of opinion or belief from another person or persons” (Leavy, 2014). Thus, access to knowledge starts from the first moment of meeting, and the movements, confessions, psychological, social and even scientific conditions of the interviewee influence the course of the interview.

4.4. Methods, Data Collection and Analysis

“Qualitative research is an interpretive form of research, which relies on the interpretations of people themselves for explanations; the process needs to be transparent and reflexive” (Bowling &Ebrahim, 2005:228). Thus, from this quotation, the importance of qualitative methods is clear. In this regard, it was decided to conduct interviews as an appropriate method for this research study, as elaborated
upon in the upcoming sections. Importantly, an attempt was made to explain everything to the interviewees, including the consent form, and this was handled accurately.

Dependent on the snowballing technique, most respondents from the Kurdistan region could be found, including some Arabs who fled from central Iraq to Kurdistan. “Snowballing – also known as chain referral sampling is considered a type of purposive sampling” (Mack; Cynthia; MacQueen; Guest; Emily, 2005:). To implement the interviews, the method of recommendation was used, where a person guided me to someone else they knew. I would ask him to inform the person that I would contact them, and this provided a secure method regarding trust and a successful interview. Regarding the Kurdish participants, conducting interviews was much easier than with Sunni Arabs. All interviews were carried out after an informed consent form had been filled in and signed by the participants and the researcher. In terms of anonymity, except for one Kurdish participant, all the other Kurdish research participants did not present a problem. However, throughout most of the research, the Sunni Arab participants were a problem, not just concerning anonymity of their names, but also face-to-face interviews, recording and even regarding discovering where they live.

It was recommended to interview Masud Barzani, the head of the KDP because of his leading militant opposition against the authority of the BP, and as most of his Barzani tribe was exposed to genocide and faced issues concerning Kurdish relations with the state institutions of Iraq. After visiting his advisor’s office, they asked me to write down a request letter for the interview and to attach the necessary letters of proof.

I prepared an application letter in the Kurdish language including a letter of proof from Brunel University London, and a letter from the supervisor that I had translated into Kurdish, including my identity and relevant contact details. Although I had been recommended by a person who advised me to interview the KDP leader, my request remained unanswered after two months of waiting and visiting the Office of Advisers. Therefore, I felt hopeless, and I had to give up on conducting an interview because although they did not reject the request, they also did not accept.

Regarding the Sunni Arab participants, except for two participants, conducting an interview was rejected by more than ten of them who have lived in the Kurdistan region since they fled the warzone. Most of the proposed members refused to be interviewed once they were informed that the topic is related to the BP and the Anfal
Campaigns. One of those who live in the UK that did not refuse the interview after two years of conversation via telephone and email is a former Iraqi army general and former commander of the General Directorate of Iraqi Military Intelligence. In the beginning, he agreed to conduct a face-to-face interview. After two weeks of waiting I contacted him again, but this time he asked me to send him the questions by email. The questions remained unanswered after two months. After a while, I called him again to know the fate of the answers, but he apologised and asked me to send him the questions once again because he admitted he has lost the email. Thus, for two consecutive years he did not reject the interview, but also did not answer the questions by email or even by telephone. The only argument was that he was sick and unable to respond these questions, although he is writing articles for many Arabic newspapers and is active on Facebook.

Regarding the Iraqi authority and the BP’s documents and literature, it was almost impossible to visit Baghdad because of the security issues. However, during my residency in the Kurdistan region, I visited libraries and people who owned the Baath’s archives. I was able to reproduce some of the BP and the authority’s pages from Iraqi newspapers and journal articles from that period. I also found a lot of Baathist literature, reports from Central Cultural Program conferences of the BP and brochures belonging to Michel Aflaq, Saddam Hussein and other Baathists. It is hard to find such documents because most of them were destroyed after the Kurdish uprising (Raparin) in 1991 in Kurdistan.

Regarding this fieldwork, some research and articles about the AC have been written, but most of this research and reports simply describe the events, and the suffering of the survivors and their circumstances. To my knowledge, there is no academic research of this size that has examined the special relationship between the state, the AC and the ideology of the BP in Iraq. Thus, despite pursuing semi-structured interviews as a method for the data collection, this research also deals with the primary documents (newspapers, magazines, documents from the Anfal Campaigns, the previous stages of genocide, and also the Baath literature and documentaries, including the literature of Saddam Hussein and the party rhetoric).
4.4.1 The field work in Iraq

The period during which I was working on the data collection in Iraq, except for the Kurdistan region, could be considered one of the limitations of this thesis, because of the political instability and security problems. The limitations are in terms of the documents and BP literature on the one hand, and on the other hand, the fear that was affecting every single person in Baghdad and the rest of the Sunni Arab areas in central Iraq. This includes the predetermined attitude of people in general against researchers as suspicious. Therefore, this area was dangerous, particularly for a Kurdish researcher, in terms of conducting interviews or visiting centres or institutions that may contain relevant documents. This is because Islamic extremist groups and the armed opposition were active in this area, particularly Baathists and Al-Qaeda militants, in addition to a kind of hatred against the Kurdish people for several reasons, including because of the Kurdish participation in the war to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime. Therefore, the only way to find interviewees was in the Kurdistan region or Western countries.

In addition, finding Sunni Arab people in Kurdistan region was not easy, particularly when they were told the subject of the thesis. Therefore, there are particular stories concerning those interviewees who were reached.

4.4.2. Interviewing: Semi-Structured Interviews

Regarding the interviews, once the questions were finished, following several adjustments, the Kurdistan region was visited in 2012. Some pilot interviews were carried out with some people who were victims or linked to the subject, which was recommended to do in order to find them. In the meantime, it was aimed to conduct interviews with victims, and others who were part of the resistance inside the country and had direct contact with civilians and some of the state agencies, to explore the causes that led to the genocide. After around 11 months of trying in 2013 and 2014, and returning to the study, certain theoretical aspects had changed and an important variable had been included in the research following consultations with my supervisor and some colleagues.
Consequently, with the new changes to the research, it was necessary to expand the circle of interviewees. Thus, the importance of the Baath’s ideology as one of the supposed leading causes of genocide, the new additional variable of a nation state and the vision of the BP on nation building, all eventually led to extending and dividing the participants into four main types:

First type: Directly involved in the BP and they still believe in the Baath ideology.
Second type: Indirectly involved and were part of the Baath’s authority, state agencies and institutions.
Third type: Not involved in any political activity, specifically the BP; those who were ordinary citizens or civilian people.
Fourth type: Those who were directly affected by the genocide.

As has been previously mentioned, the interviews as a main method of data collection are central to this research. Additionally, “Semi-structured interviews can make better use of the knowledge-producing potentials of dialogues by allowing much more leeway for following up on whatever angles are deemed essential by the interviewee” (Brinkmann, 2013:21). Thus, this is an attempt by the researcher to approach the accurate information, which is the essence of the target in order to produce successful research outcomes. Dependent on Brinkmann’s argument, I “as a co-producer of the data” (Seale, 2004:208), have realised that semi-structured interviews are the best technique for collecting data on genocide and state formation. This is because “interviewing provides a way of generating empirical data about the social world by asking people to talk about their lives. In this respect, interviews are special forms of conversation” (Silverman, 2004:140/141). Here, the survivors or those who been affected are essential to discover the dark sides of their lives, including their experiences themselves, or those of the community which they were part of. This means that “the term qualitative interview refers to in-depth, loosely or semi-structured interviews, and these have been referred to as conversation with a purpose” (Seale, 2004:208). Additionally, “Semi-structured interviews also give the interviewer a greater chance of becoming visible as a knowledge-producing participant in the process itself, rather than hiding behind a present interview guide” (Brinkmann, 2013:21).

Here, as a consequence of this discussion, what is appropriate for the purposes of the research is Alan Bryman and Robert Burgess’s description of interviews, as they claim: “A common objective in applied qualitative research is to explain, as well
as to illuminate, people’s attitudes, experiences and behaviour” (Bryman& Burgess, 2002:121). Regarding the languages that have been used in this research and the 33 interviews, 25 interviews were conducted in the Kurdish language and eight interviews in Arabic. Here, “the use of language, itself, contains within it the paradigm of cooperative inquiry; and since language is the primary tool whose uses enables human construing and intending to occur, it is difficult to see how there can be any more fundamental mode of inquiry for human beings into the human condition” (Seidman, 2013:7). Thus, language is important for the participant, in expressing his or her feelings, ideas, and experience, particularly when that experience is containing an emotional aspect, as the sense that the participant has been understood and respected could result in a positive reaction. This is certainly not an exception, especially when the participants expressed their thoughts on the perpetrators, and the effect of the ideology still being dominant. An attempt was made to include Baathists in this study for two reasons:
First: In order to know the extent of the compatibility of the documents and the interviews with the non-Baathist participants, with the confessions of Baathists when they talk about genocide.
Second: To understand the psychology of a man who holds the Baath ideology, regarding the extent of acknowledging the occurrence of genocide under the influence of ideology, thinking and the scope of their solidarity with the victims or still opposing it, and whether they are repentant or not. Here, in order to access this information, a significant factor in this research it is the characteristics of the researcher, which are set out in three points:

1. Ability in the Arabic language, as I studied at university in the Arabic language and had an excellent experience for six years as a lawyer in the Arabic language. Thus, my ability to carry out conversations in Arabic and assess the usefulness of the documents, nearly all of which are in Arabic, was a major factor in this study.

2. I am an eyewitness and was present throughout many of the stages of genocide. I remember the collapse of the Kurdish movement in 1974 when we fled to Iran, and then returned to Iraqi Kurdistan in 1976. Then I remember the destruction of my village and our move to central Iraq in 1977. Thus, my coexistence among Sunni Arabs for more than five years has given me experience and knowledge of the Sunni Arab community.
3. Again, I had to flee to Holland because of the Iraqi army returning to Erbil in 1996. At the beginning of 2000, I began voluntarily working in the field of genocide. I also worked as a legal consultant for the ‘Centre of Halabja against legalisation and genocide of the Kurds’. As a consequence, I studied a Master’s degree, which focused on the Anfal Campaigns. However, I was careful not to allow this background affect the interviewees’ responses.

Regarding the length of the process, the interviews lasted between 30 and 100 minutes, except for two interviews that lasted for two hours. The shortest interview lasted for five minutes, and three interviews lasted less than half an hour.

Regarding the place of the interviews, most of them were carried in the offices of the participants in Kurdistan, except for some of the interviews that took place under different conditions:

- Two interviews were conducted in a hotel in Erbil.
- One interview was conducted by telephone with an Arabic Shi’a living in Baghdad.
- Two other interviews were conducted via telephone with two Sunni Arabs in Erbil.
- Two interviews have been carried out via email.
- One interview in the UK was conducted in a strange way, as a friend recommended the participant but the participant refused to meet me, or give me his email or telephone number. Therefore, I sent him the questions and after one week the answers were received from the same friend.

However, all of the direct interviews have been digitally recorded, except for the further questions, as some of them were conducted by telephone or email. Also, all Kurdish participants preferred to speak in Kurdish except one of them who spoke in Arabic, and all the Arabs spoke in Arabic. Hence, it has been necessary to translate the interviews selectively from Kurdish and Arabic to English after the transcribing. Some of the content of the recorded interviews is irrelevant to the study; therefore, it has been neglected because it would waste time and it is not necessary to transfer it into text.
4.4.3. Documentary Data Analysis

The secondary documents, as the second method, were no easier than the previous methods. After the fall of the Iraqi regime in 2003, all public, government and BP documents, including books, magazines, newspapers and audio and video recordings appeared to evaporate. However, these secondary materials from during the rule of the BP were a heavy burden on the shoulders of all Kurdish people. For example, the Annual Report of the BP was possible to find everywhere, especially in central libraries, local university libraries, bookshops and every inch of this region in both languages- Kurdish and Arabic, but suddenly after 2003 they disappeared even from libraries. Therefore, a long time was spent trying to find some of these reports, which were discovered, surprisingly, in a primary school’s small library. In addition, after 2003, tonnes of army and security documents were found and published. Some of these documents are available from certain people who found them and then copied the documents, or saved them on a flash memory stick.

The Iraqi government, led by the BP, has left an enormous amount of written and recorded documents at both the state level and the party level. The BP did not leave any act without codification and the issuance of a special decision. The Anfal Campaigns, as an example, and other stages of genocide that preceded the Anfal Campaigns- all of these acts were carried out in accordance with the official decisions of the central authority and depending on a bureaucratic procedure. Therefore, any attempt to research, requires examining those great documents, although many remain incomplete and so are useless, or incomprehensible. The importance of these documents as primary sources is as Bruce L. Berg explains: “these sources involve the oral or written testimony of eyewitnesses. They may include documents, photographs, recordings, diaries, journals, life histories, drawings, mementos, or other relics” (Berg, 1995:214). There is a real difference between interviews and documents, as Alan Bryman argues, “the emphasis is placed on documents that have not been produced at the request of a social researcher—instead, the objects that have focus of this chapter are simply ‘out there’ waiting to be assembled and analysed” (Bryman, A., 2012:543). Thus, the will that was behind the issuance of these documents is not the researcher’s will, but the will of the issuer of these documents, and no matter what the purpose of the publication is, its source must be reliable and influential. This method could be referred to as natural production, and according to
David Silverman, these “documents are ‘social facts’” (Silverman, 2008:58), as Bryman reiterates, “because they have not been created specifically for the purposes of social research” (Bryman, A., 2012:543).

The documents in this study are very reliable, however, there is a limitation concerning these official documents, because access to all documents seems almost impossible. The reason is because at the period of the collapse of the Baath’s authority in Iraq in 2003, thousands of these official documents were stolen by unknown people and lost or damaged, as well as thousands of official documents being transferred to America by US forces in Iraq. However, despite the limitations around these official documents, there are still a lot of documents available, and they clearly show the fierceness of the process of genocide in Iraqi Kurdistan, and so some of the relevant official documents available have been included in this research. In addition to the official documents, there are newspapers and magazines that were issued by the authority of the BP in Baghdad. The Campaigns were not only shown to the public inside and outside of Iraq, but were also the subject of pride for the Iraqi media and some of the population. In addition to that, there is the BP, which clearly proves the quality of the Baath’s thinking and their ideology.

Thus, depending on the previous description of the data, this research will cover two types of documentary data:

- State documents (laws, decisions of the Revolutionary Command Council, the Commission leadership of the BP, military announcements and procedures of the governmental offices).
- The BP documents (annual reports, literature, media and publications, videos).

The reasons for using such a method in the research are multi-purpose:
First, the issue of genocide is dangerous and affects the lives of people directly. Therefore, exploring this subject based solely on interviews causes it to remain incomplete and could result in it lacking neutrality.
Second: the fact that the documentation is an important area to research, due to the issuance of these documents by the BP themselves, and the Baath’s authority in Baghdad. Therefore, it gives credence to such additional study.
Third, relying on two methods of research gives a kind of balance, confidence and strength to the analysis. By drawing on a combination of two qualitative methods, a
strong background to this research will be presented, because one way method will strengthen the other.
Fourth: the fact that an important variable in this study relates to the state, and not all the participants have such knowledge about the hidden issues within government departments. Therefore, the documents remain an appropriate method regarding exploration of the role of the authority in the lives of all components, and the extent of the exploitation of the state and the reins of power.

4.4.4 The Methodological Position of the Documents

In terms of the organisation and selection of the documents, throughout chapters five, six and seven, they will be stated selectively depending on the themes which have been divided among these three chapters. First: the historical and documentary analyses in relation to nation building and the ideology of pan-Arab nationalism in Iraq. The second part, which is also the historical and documentary analysis, has been investigated according to two parts; the first part is dedicated to the primary stages of genocide, and the second part is devoted to the final solution, which is the Anfal Campaigns.

In order to strengthen the themes and the objects throughout the chapters, the necessary documents have been selected as evidence from an analytical perspective. Thus, the selection is based on the themes in order to preserve the unity of the subject and the sequence of the events. On the other hand, the chronology of the events is important for recognition of the process of genocide and taking its consequences in account. This means the inclusion of the documents is not random, but selective, depending on the themes and the stages of genocide. In order to analyse the documents, thematic analyses in the frame of figurational sociology have been pursued. Therefore, the documents have not been separated from the themes but are considered to be an undivided part of the themes.

4.4.5 Data Analysis

Within the epistemological framework of figurational sociology, it is important to determine the methodological approach to the analysis of the data. In this
regard, in analysing the interviews, thematic analysis has been applied “as one way of looking at data” (Seale, C., 2004:376), because without this method data analysis for the research would be unmanageable. Thus, it has been confirmed that “Thematic analysis is a method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data. It minimally organises and describes your data set in (rich) detail. However, if goes further than this, and interprets various aspects of the research topic” (Marks & Yardley, 2006:79). Hence, after the interviews were completed, and based on the answers of the interviewees in relation to the research questions, the themes have been identified and categorised. However, according to Mark and Yardley “the central analytic task of thematic analysis is to understand the meaning of texts” (Marks & Yardley, 2006:79). These processes have been pursued regarding understanding the meanings of the extracted texts and their relevance to the research questions.

In addition to the process of data collection and the analysis following categorisation, the analysis of documents, which is the second important part of this research, was developed and performed. This has been done based on Mark and Yardley’s recommendations: “take notes regularly and promptly: write everything down, no matter how unimportant it may seem at the time and analyse their notes frequently” (Marks & Yardley, 2003:79); therefore, during the interview process, I listened deeply and carefully to the interviewees and noted everything down in relation to the stories. In addition, I attempted to observe any body language, psychological signs or behaviour of the interviewees and their manner of narrating, including feelings of sadness if they were affected by any stages of the genocide. These signs are based on my knowledge as an eyewitness of many of the stages of genocide and the perpetrators’ behaviour in the region, including my own experience, which also is based on the theoretical framework and literature review.

In addition, I have categorised the data into three main themes and different sub themes. This data has been used as the basis for coding the transcripts. In addition, the translated and extracted data have been chosen selectively.

4.5. Ethical Considerations and Informed Consent

Initially, the nature of the topic of this thesis is sensitive from all aspects, but it has exceeded its dangerous stage in Kurdistan: First, because of excluding Baathists from the power and keeping its leaders in prison. Second, the removal of the Sunni
Arab domination from Kurdistan region and its semi independence. Third, because of the general pardon of mercenaries who participated in the Anfal Campaigns, except for the perpetrators who evidently committed crimes. Fourth, in this regard, people in the Kurdistan region are not frightened anymore, and they will express their views in order to uncover the reality. The only thing that has been kept secret is the sexual assaults on Kurdish women during their detention, and this still remains unthinkable. Thus, all Kurdish participants were happy to give their testimony without any hesitation, but the Arab participants were divided for different reasons, as will be explained in the following paragraphs. Consequently, there is no indication that this thesis has had any negative impact, from any aspect, on the participants.

The commitment to professional ethics, especially in relation to the field of academic study, constitutes a pivotal point, and is essential to ensure credible consequences. Primarily, the ethics form, which my supervisor approved and was sent to the department of Social Sciences, Media and Communications at Brunel University, was filled in and signed in the first year of the Ph.D. study. The subject of this thesis in the social and legal field is risky, but dealing with everyone was done in a transparent way, and I was constantly attempting to avoid any problems, no matter how small or trivial. However, because of the new circumstances in Iraq and most of the leaders of the process of genocide being in prison, I did not face any dangerous position, and I took all the necessary measures to ensure a successful interview procedure for Baathists in the UK. In this regard, all necessary measures have been taken to ensure a successful ethical scientific journey throughout this research. The participants agreed to complete and sign the consent form and participate in the interviews for free, except three of them who demanded compensation for travelling costs.

The interviewees have no serious concerns about leaking information to outsiders under their official name because most of them wanted to deliver their knowledge and experience to as many people as possible. However, a few of them told me that they agreed because the purpose of the interview is for academic study and not something else. The importance of this aspect is the credibility of information because they are eyewitnesses and telling the truth.
4.6. Conclusion

This chapter has illustrated how this research is an attempt at understanding society as whole, or parts of it, through the evolving networks created by interdependent figurations. It can be seen that the civilising process has been utilised as a theoretical framework to illustrate the beginnings of genocide in Iraq. It is hard for many Muslims, particularly Turks and Arabs, to be convinced by any research however neutral it is; for example, the Armenian genocide was a real genocide, yet a lot of the responsibility for the war is placed on Armenians, particularly their betrayal of the Ottoman Empire and their involvement with the Russian Empire, including accusations of supporting the perpetrators of the genocide of Muslims. The research problem is the dynamic point which determines the nature of the research. Regardless of how the researcher is finding things out, the difference between open ended questions and closed questions is an important feature for sociological researchers.

Despite pursuing semi-structured interviews as a method for the data collection, this research also deals with primary documents, which allows for triangulation; therefore, the documents are an appropriate method regarding exploration of the role of all components and the extent of the exploitation of the state and the reins of power. The interview data has been used as the basis for coding the transcripts. In addition, the translated and extracted data has been chosen selectively.

To conclude this chapter, the subject of this thesis in a social and legal sense, has been risky, but dealing with everyone was done transparently, with consistent attempts made throughout to avoid any problems, no matter how small or trivial.
CHAPTER 5: Historical and Documentary Analyses: Nation Building and Pan-Arab Nationalism Ideology in Iraq (Civilising Process)

5.1. Introduction

Understanding genocide in Iraq as a de-civilising process is impossible without understanding two key aspects: on the one hand, the monopoly of the state institutions by the majority party in its process of nation building in Iraq, and on the other hand, the tendency of Arab-centrism, which is divided into pan-Arabism and the ideology of the BP. However, understanding the hypothesis of a failed nation state in Iraq remains incomplete in the absence of understanding the desire for Arab-centrism, which primarily consists of the ideology of the BP. Thus, the main methods used to understand these elements are the historical documents and literature showcasing the practical stages of the process undertaken by successive governments in Iraq, including the imbalance of power, which cannot be separated from the interviews. This macro/micro analysis throughout the figurational developments shows the civilising and de-civilising processes, and how the exceeding of elements is apparent and much more steeped in governmental sanctions.

Iraq, with its furtive construct, has brought with it several other mysterious and problematic issues. These problematic issues are accompanied by the challenges of the identity of the state, legitimation, affiliation, unity and diversity. Despite Iraqi politicians having allegedly shown that they have spent a great deal of effort and energy building a prosperous nation state, its repercussions have been counter-productive and reversed to the other components that are generally considered to be outsiders. However, according to the historical documents and interviews, the politicians involved could not distribute their authority and power on the grounds of democratic principles. This fact was the most problematic issue during the process of Iraqi nation building. Depending on this hypothesis, this chapter will refer to the history of the country as the cause of the de-civilising process; the breakdown of the Iraqi state, and as a result, the genocide process.


The Ottoman Sultanate (Holy Empire) in the frame of the de-civilising process, has been largely divided due to several reasons, including the insurgence of Ottoman components (Kayali, 1997:47); the corruption and the scepticism of state institutions (Becker; Boeckh; Hainz; Woessmann, 2014:24); the new movement of
young Turks (Kayali, 1997:4); the Ottoman Empire partaking in the 1st WW (Shaw, S. J., & Shaw, E. K. (1977:310), and its defeat in the war at the hands of the allies (Akçam, T. 2004:4). Whatever the causes of the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, the consequences of this dissociation led to the establishment of the new state formation and the struggle for monopoly apparatuses in the Middle-East. It has been shown that state formation according to Elias is “a violent competitive process through which there emerged successively larger territorial units with more effective monopoly apparatuses” (S. Mennell 2007:15). Here, unlike the extension or unity of regions, the legacy of the Ottoman Empire was desecrated as its territory was distributed. It is true that the Ottoman territory was shared amongst several nations, but it is also true that this division occurred under the surveillance of the victorious allies, also known as colonial powers. This means that the components in the region were divided and re-annexed from outside without a significant role themselves, or as Elias describes it, ‘competition’.

This establishment of nation states did not accompany any violence between national groups, but the violence, if it occurred, was against the colonial administration because of the dissatisfaction of these components with the divisions that were imposed without their consent, in particular the Kurds. In addition to this process, unlike the process of state formation described in the theory of the civilising process, the domination of a certain group is impossible via the declaration of a victory, but through the imposing of a majority group as a partner to the colonial powers. Thus, the monopoly apparatuses were transferred to the newly established governments through the colonial administration. Therefore, it is important to ask how was the transformation to the new state formation or the ‘annexation?’

5.2.1 The Process of Annexation of Mosul Province to Arabic Iraq (Imbalanced power)

How did the process of the annexation of the Kurdish Vilayet1 of Mosul to Arabic Iraq, and the transformation of the power relations from the Ottomans to an ethnic minority in Iraq, occur? Were the Iraqis united in this regard?

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1 Vilayet (linguistically) has Arabic origins, and administratively was a form of management that was pursued by the Ottoman Empire. Vilayet according to Franck Salameh is considered “a (state) by the same name, ruled by an Ottoman Vali (governor)” (Salameh, F., 2015:148).
In the process of civilisation in terms of the annexation of the Kurdish region to the Arabic region in Iraq, two points need to be investigated. The first point is the annexation or the process of the unification of the Kurds in Mosul\(^1\) province (see Figure 5.1) with Arabs in Baghdad and Basra province. This is to discover the level of social and political integration between these provinces in relation to the elements of the theory of the civilising process. The other point is the process of transformation of power from the Ottomans to an ethnic minority in Iraq. This transformation, on the one hand, according to the theory of the civilising process, is supposed to bring with it “changes in the way people were connected with one another, leading eventually to greater integration and greater inter-dependence between people” (Rohloff, 2011:3).

On the other hand, the transformation from an autonomous city state belonging to an extensive and mighty empire to an isolated and divided region will inevitably lead to a strange and central nation state. In addition to this point, the Kurdish territories were dismembered and its southern part was annexed to Iraq (see Figure 5.2).

So, what was the position of the Iraqi provinces? Was Iraq united before the annexation of its three provinces? Accordingly, the position of Iraqi structural society with “provinces” before and after World War I and during the period of its independency, according to Hanna Batatus\(^2\), constituted something close to “city states”, as he notes that:

“...Iraq was composed of plural, relatively isolated, and often virtually autonomous city-states and tribal confederations, urban “class” ties tended to be in essence local ties rather than ties on the scale of the whole country” (H. Batatu, 1978:7,8).

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\(^1\)The demography of Mosul vilayat (province) throughout 20\(^{th}\) century has been changed to five provinces, including Mosul, Erbil, Kirkuk, Sulemani, Duhok and Halabja.

Figure 1: Map of Iraq showing the three Ottoman Vilayats.

Source: Ottoman Empire (20th Century). (Cited from: https://ottomanempire4.wordpress.com/ottoman-iraq/)
Additionally, this issue has been discussed by many scholars, including James Dobbins, Ian O. Lesser, Peter Chalk in their book ‘America’s Role in Nation building From Germany to Iraq’; they argue: “Iraq has a deeply fractured polity, with entrenched sectarian and ethnic divides” (Dobbins, Lesser and Chalk, 2003:168). This means that this division has two different levels- one is the deeply fractured policy, because of the domination of one ethnic minority, and the other is not just ethnic division but also the sectarian division between Arabs themselves, which was drastically imbalanced. These scholars continue this concern as: “In the case of Iraq, the political structures created by the British after World War I did nothing to resolve these questions” (Dobbins, Lesser and Chalk, 2003:169).

The alternative according to these scholars was “Instead, Iraq was left with no tradition of pluralist democracy,” and also, “Instead, politics have always been about authoritarian rule and the settlement of disputes by force” (Dobbins, Lesser and Chalk, 2003:169). This fact has been confirmed several times by Hanna Batatu in his important and analytical historical book ‘The Old Social Classes and the evolutionary Movements of Iraq’ in which he argues: “At the turn of the century the Iraqis were not one people or one political community” (H. Batatu, 1978:39)

This situation was not something ambiguous for the British authority in the region after the collapse of Ottomans. Thus, why did the British power ignore this ostensible social and political division for a force establishing a country? The answer has been interpreted by Michael Rear in his book, ‘Intervention, ethnic conflict and state-building in Iraq: A paradigm for the post-colonial state’ in which he announces that “The focus was not upon humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping but rather upon the desire by colonial powers to advance their own interests in the region following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire.” (M. Rear, 2008:164)

This means that the colonial powers separated the region using a unilateral strategy without worrying about the future of the people residing in the region, and acted only in the capacity of self-serving interests. More precisely, Michael Rear continues his argument and emphasises that “It is worth mentioning that the decision to make Mosul part of Iraq served several important British strategic interests” (M. Rear, 2008:166). One of these strategies was “the presence of oil in the region” (M. Rear, 2008:166) of Kirkuk, which belonged to Mosul Vilayet. Additionally, Hanna Batatu also pointed out the importance of oil in Mosul Wilayah (1) as he argues:
The continued union of the Mosul Wilayah with Iraq, which earlier that year, been tied to the granting of oil rights to the nucleus of what came to be known as the Iraq Petroleum Company, was now made also contingent upon the extension of the period of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and of its subsidiary Financial and Military Agreements from 4-25 years, or to the date of Iraq’s entry into the League of Nations.”

(H. Batatu, 1978:215)

Here, dealing with fate of Mosul, based on common interests with the Iraqi administration, the views of Batatu are now affirmed. Almost all historians agree that the focal point of the British was on the oil of Mosul Vilayet. Sir Arnold Talbot Wilson, the British civil commissioner in Baghdad in 1918-1920 in his book ‘Loyalties Mesopotamia 1914-1917, A Personal And Historical Record & Mesopotamia 1917-1920, A Clash Of Loyalties, A Personal And Historical Record’, affirms this key point. This is also according to the Kurdish author Ayoub Barzani in his book ‘The Kurdish Resistance to Occupation 1914 – 1958’, as he quotes Sir Arnold Talbot Wilson as saying “we should not encourage any separatist efforts shown by the Kurds living in Iran, as well as those living under Turkish rule, we had to let the Kurds outside the Mosul province with their fate” (A. Barzani, 2002:23). Furthermore, according to A. Barzani, “More precisely the British attention was attached to the oil of Mosul vilayet” (A. Barzani, 2002:23). The other motive according to Michael Rear is legitimacy because of the misbalance between the majority Shi’a Arabs and the minority Sunni Arabs, as he explains that:

“Given the fact that the majority of the population within the newly created country were Shi’a Arabs whereas Faisal was a Sunni Arab from the Arabian Peninsula, who had been installed on the throne by the British, the legitimacy of his regime was suspected from its inception”(M. Rear, 2008:166)

Thus, legitimacy and the balance of the components were important for the long-term stability of the power relations. This problematic equation needed a scapegoat for the balance of the sectarian division. Therefore, according to Michael Rear, “In order to achieve this objective, the number of Sunni Muslims within the mandate would be augmented through the incorporation of the former Ottoman
province of Mosul, with its largely Sunni Kurdish population, within Iraq” (M. Rear, 2008:166). As a consequence of this caesarean birth of the nation, the connection between these two different ethnic components led to disintegration, and the continuity of less inter-dependence between citizens led to the backfiring of the civilising process. Thus, instead of growing inter-dependency, the inter-relationship was transformed into lasting political tensions and a doubtful inter-relationship between the two sides, as Paddy Dolan argues: “This growing inter-dependency is connected to increasing functional specialisation” (Dolan, 2009:6)

Here, as a consequence, the functional specialisation as an element of the civilising process changed to increasing a systematic change in the demography of the vilayat. This breakdown is based on different characteristics of Iraqi state formation, and the following are the five main factors involved:

5.2.1.1. The Interests of Colonialism

The different ethnic and religious backgrounds have been congregated depending on the secluded interests of colonialism. The colonial power has utilised the inability and oblivion of the inhabitant people of these provinces to dominate and divide the region according to their vested strategic interests. In this regard, Michael Rear in his book ‘Interventions, Ethnic Conflict and State-Building in Iraq, A Paradigm for the Post-Colonial State’, argues, “the focus was not upon humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping but rather upon the desire by colonial powers to advance their own interests in the region following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire” (Rear, 2008:164). A similar view was taken by the Kurdish historian Dr. Jabar Qadir in his interview when he emphasised that “The formation of all these entities (states) over the dismantled legacy of Ottoman Empire, did not take into account all those differentiation, especially those that existed between components” (Qadir, Interview N.8).

Here, Albert Isa in his book ‘The Arabic nationalism from the Ottoman Empire to the Iraqi fascism’ is more frank about the nature of the formation of the Iraqi kingdom as he has shown that “The great Britain has decided to exploit the Arabic nationalism for their own interests” (Isa, 2008:120). According to Isa, the first step for the British was the inclusion of support for Arabs against the Ottoman Empire and the formation of an Arab state as an alternative to the Ottoman Empire. In this regard, Jochen Hippler has confirmed this argument that “Iraq is one of the large
number of multi-ethnic countries in the third world” (Hippler, 2005:91). In addition, the British administration brought in King Faisal to secure these interests and to compensate him for his support of the British army. Martin Kramer has examined this position in his book ‘Arab nationalism, mistaken identity’ and he claims that “Britain did move to compensate the leaders of the Arab Revolt in 1921: it appointed Faysal as the King of Iraq in expanded borders” (Kramer, 1993:00). This argument has been confirmed by Magnus Bernhardsson as he states that establishing Faisal as the King of Iraq was “because of his family’s integral role in the Allied war efforts during World War I, the British considered Faysal to be the ideal candidate to forge a unified nation out of Iraq’s disparate elements (Bernhardsson, 2103:20).

5.2.1.2. A Foreign King and Pan-Arabism

In addition to placing all the ingredients in one pot, the process was not neutral because the leadership of this new state had been handed over to one specific minority, and their ideology came to the forefront. Regarding this, Elie Podeh in his book “The Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World: The Struggle Over the Baghdad Pact” has pointed out that “the Hashemite rulers in Baghdad, whose source of legitimacy sprang from their religious ancestry and their prominent role in the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire during World War I, regarded themselves as the natural standard-bearers of pan-Arabism” (Podeh, 1995:2). Accordingly, the establishing of the Hashemite family as the rulers of Baghdad, gave a great chance to the rise of pan-Arabism because in King Faisal’s view “it was their “nobel mission” to lead the Arab world toward unity, possible with British support” (Podeh, 1995:2). When they lived with this kind of impression, it led to an attempt to impose one kind of ideology on the rest of the population. This feeling of the Hashemite rulers in Baghdad opened the door wide for the Sunni Arabs to struggle for their domination under the name of Pan-Arabism. This is according to Hanna Battatu, as he argues, “Except during a brief period in 1936-1937, the pan-Arab character of the state became more pronounced” (Batatu, 1978:27).

In more detail regarding the establishment of King Faisal as the first King of the Iraqi Kingdom, Albert Isa gave this issue plenty space to express the nature of the Iraqi state’s ideology. Isa argues that Faisal, with the help of the Ottoman officers, and its political and educational experts, was able to sow the seeds of nationalism in the heart of the new nation (Isa, 2008:15). According to Isa, after formal
independence in 1931, the people who were with Faisal made Iraq an arena for pan-Arab nationalist extremism. What is more important to consider is this new stage of priority and loyalty in Faisal’s discourse. Thus, if previously the priority of their loyalty was towards Islam, later on this priority changed to attaining Arabism. In this regard, Sylvia Kedourie in her book ‘Arab Nationalism: An Anthology’ has discovered the nature of Faisal’s discourse as she states “We are Arabs, he used to say, before being Muslims and Muhammad is an Arab before being a prophet” (Kedourie, 1962:35). The effect of this sort of discourse in Faisal’s mind was rooted and unilateral when it comes to the social diversity before his domination as a king. Hence, in a speech in Aleppo in June 1919, Faisal argued, “There is neither minority nor majority among us, nothing to divide us. We are one body, we are Arabs even before the time of Moses, Muhammad, Jesus and Abraham” (Kedourie, 1962:35). All this expression means they favour Arabism before any other common identity among the Ottoman population, and this collective ego was strongly present when he, as king, seized power in Iraq without any kind of participation of the Kurds. In addition, according to Albert Issa, the King and his politicians turned Iraq into an arena of radical pan-Arab nationalists, whose ambitions and intentions are ostensible, and which include assimilating the non-Arab components. Thus, the King, in addition to educational, military, political and social institutions ‘as one body’ were not able to be neutral ‘for all Iraqis’ … they built a Government that was taking its approach from fascism and Nazism. As a consequence, they educated a generation in this way to counter British colonialism (Isa, 2008:15).

5.2.1.3. The Sunni Ottoman Officers

The Ottoman officers were an important element in the post-Ottoman Sultanate era in the state formation process, because of their professional military background and their position in the management of state institutions. The position of these officers has not been hidden even from the Arab and Kurdish people in the region. Thus, Simon, Reeva in his book “Iraq between the two World Wars: The militarist origins of tyranny’, has confirmed this position and argues, “the officers, educated in Istanbul and returning to Iraq to play a leading role in the new state, were first and foremost Sunni pan-Arab nationalists, dreaming of the unity of an Arab nation encompassing the Fertile Crescent and Arabia” (Simon & Tejirian, 2004:vi). In the same direction, Peter Wien has explicated in detail, the ability of the Iraqi officers
in his book “Iraqi Arab Nationalism: Authoritarian, Totalitarian and Pro-Fascist Inclinations, 1932–1941” as he argues that “… former Ottoman officers of Iraqi origin had received a high military education at the Ottoman Staff College in Istanbul and had learned Western languages” (Wien, 2008:16). Here, it is clear that these officers had received appropriate education and adequate military training to be part of the Ottoman Sultanate army or political administration. However, their role was more prominent when they went back to Iraq to participate in the nation building of the Iraqi kingdom. These officers “who joined Faisal’s service in Syria after the end of the war with the Turks in October of 1918” (Batatu, 0000:319) moved back to Iraq to join the team of rule and administration headed by Faisal. Thus, there is no dispute in the presence of these Ottoman officers, but the disagreement between scholars is about the actual number of them. While Batatu narrowed these Ottoman officers to a limited number of 300, Reeva S. Simon and Eleanor H. Tejirian in their book ‘The Creation of Iraq, 1914-1921, have doubled this number as they argue: “Finally, Iraq’s first army was formed, comprising 600 returning Ottoman-trained Iraqi army officers, most from Sunni-Arab families” (Simon & Tejirian, 2004:32). Here, according to Batatu, “they counted about three hundred in all and, with few exceptions, were of the Sunni sect and hailed from Baghdad or the northern half of the country” (Batatu, 0000:319). In addition to these arguments, and regardless of the official Ottoman figures, the background of these officers appears similar to part of the Sunni-based Ottoman Empire, whereas their ethnocentric concentration extended to those sectarian components that shared the same doctrine. Therefore, the Ottomans were able to benefit from the background doctrine on a high level and to take advantage.

These two characteristics of Ottoman officers were dependent on the social and political consequences of giving the Iraqi authority a specific nature. The nature became part of the state structure and inseparable from it. This argument is not isolated from Elias’s theory of second nature or habitus. It has been discovered that “the level of habitus of thinking, feeling and behaving which are in fact learned from early childhood onwards” (Ritzer, G, 2004:105). In addition, this level of habitus “became innate as if we had never had to learn them” (Mennell, 2007:4). Therefore, the characteristic nature of these officers is threefold, and it is an interesting subject for the scholars who are experts in this fieldwork. Thus, the threefold aspect of these officers has been shown in different ways. Accordingly, Peter Wien has linked these
important characteristics as he argues, “this linked their Arab nationalism to militarism and elitism when they took over crucial government posts” (Wien, 2008:16). Here, dependent on Peter Wien and other scholars, the first prominent aspect of these officers was their ideology. Ideology in the form of pan-Arabism, in accordance with the struggle of Faisal for the unifying of the Arabs, became the main goal of these officers. This is what Liora Lukitz in her article ‘Nationalism in post-imperial Iraq: The complexities of collective identity’ has noticed: “nationalism developed in Iraq before the creation of the modern state” (Lukitz, 2009:5).

This issue created a type of dream of a superior society in their imagination. This is why Lukitz has attempted “to make sense of whether Iraqi nationalism is more “artificial” than that of any other country” (Lukitz, 2009:6), and this is what it is attempted to discover in this and the next chapter. The second prominent aspect of these officers is militarism. According to many scholars, Iraq became an arena of aggressiveness and illegal authorities. This aggressiveness has been reflected in the way that the first coup in “the Middle East was in Iraq’ (al-Kayssi, 1998:11). This is discussed by Martin Kramer in his article ‘Arab Nationalism: Mistaken identity’ in that “in 1936, a coup d’etat established a thinly veiled military dictatorship, in the name of national unity” (Kramer, 1993:181). According to Martin Kramer, Iraq was involved in a massacre against the Assyrian (Nestorian Christian) minority, and accused of infidelity to the Arab cause, only after a year of its joining the League of Nations in 1932 (Kramer, 1993:181).

5.2.1.4. Elitism

The last element of the Ottoman officers mentioned by Peter Wien is elitism. Elitism carries in its context different forms, including authoritarian elitism within its different characteristics. Thus, James Dobbins in his book ‘America’s Role in Nation-Building’ has determined Iraq to have a form of authoritarian rule. In this regard, James Dobbins explains, “Instead, politics have always been about authoritarian rule and the settlement of disputes by force” (Dobbins, 0000:169). Here, in a more specific context, authoritarian elitism has been classified by Cammack in his article ‘The New Elite Paradigm: A Critical Assessment’, as follows: “Three possible elite states are described: ideologically unified, consensually unified, and dis-unified” (Cammack, 1989:2).
Hence, it appears from the Iraqi authoritarian elite, that ideological unification is one of the most relevant descriptions, but the limitation of these elite to one description could be considered as an incomplete approach. These people came from different social backgrounds and formed a new authoritarian elite, and adopted and preached the new doctrine. Hanna Battatu has confirmed this diversity of the Iraqi authoritarian background as he explains: “The ex-Sharifian officers were by origin from the middle or humbler walks of life, but by this time many of them had become properties and, though not yet fully accepted socially by the old families, formed part of the political elite (Battatu, 0000:28). Here, despite the ideological unification of the Iraqi political elite, they were actually dis-unified.

5.2.1.5. Long-Term Marginalisation towards Genocide

These characteristics have together pushed the Sunni-Arabs to defend their domination over the country, with the desire to Arabise the land, its people and to suppress those considered as outcasts in order to disintegrate them. This assessment of the nation state has been described by Elias as he describes how “For those involved ‘in nation state’, there are three main functions of this type of social bonding: “The common defence of their own lives, the survival of their own group in the face of attack; and readiness to launch a united attack on other groups” (Fletcher, 1997: 63). Thus, the Sunni-Arabs collectively attempted to maintain their power under their authority through a united attack on the Kurdish populace and other marginalised groups. The Kurds, on the other hand, have resisted the policy of assimilation through successive political revolutionary movements since the establishment of Iraq. Therefore, the Sunni-Arabs aimed to crush the Kurdish movement, and they were clever enough to utilise the colonial powers to dominate the new state and its components. As a result of this long-term denial of policy, the Kurds acquired the feeling of being outcasts as they were under the threat of a reign of pressure and of assimilation and retreat from their territories. The House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee reported on this issue as they admitted:

“The Kurdish uprising was crushed, whilst the UK put no pressure on the Iraqi government to implement 1925 League of Nations recommendations on the status of Kurds in the Mosul Vilayet. This has not been forgotten in
Iraqi Kurdistan, or the collapse in 1923 of the Treaty of Sevres¹, which
had laid out putative proposals for the creation of an independent Kurdish
state, in what is now South-East Turkey or the UK’s role in the Sykes-
Picot agreement².

(HC 564, 2015:19)

Thus, according to this report, and the international agreements and the
involvement of the mandate, the Kurdish issue could be considered an international
quandary and the responsibility of the colonial powers.

5.3. The Emergence Of the BP (De-Civilising Process)

Under the specific Arabised atmosphere and political circumstances, as well as
the Ottoman officers’ characteristics discussed above, which formed the crux of the
state, pan-Arabism became a prominent identity of Iraq (Liora Lukitz, 2009). These
factors together facilitated a suitable platform for Arab-ethno-centrism, including a
“new version of pan-Arabism by the Baath Party” (Liora Lukitz, 2009:15). Here, pan-
Arabism in Iraq will be examined as a facilitator of Baath nationalism.

5.3.1. Pan-Arab Nationalism in Iraq (The Domination)

At the beginning of the 20th century, the whole area of the Middle East was in
a process of a great transformation, from changing habitus to the division of the
Ottoman Empire. In other words, the civilising process was on-going after the
fragmentation of the Sultanate territory to the victor states. One of the socio-political
movements established that had an effective role in the region was the Committee of
Union and Progress (CUP).

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¹ “The Treaty of Sevres, signed in August 1920 by the delegates of the Allies and of the Sultan,
incorporated the Covenant of the League of Nations and, among other stipulations, provided for the
recognition or creation not only of the Arab states of Hijaz, Syria, and Iraq, but also of an Armenia, and
of a Kurdistan which might include the Eastern vilayets of Turkey south of the line fixed for Armenia,
together with the Mosul vilayet then under British occupation” (Edmonds, C.J., 1971:90).
² Sykes–Picot agreement: a secret bargain negotiated by British diplomat Mark Sykes and his French
counterpart François Georges-Picot in May 1916 (Dodge, T., 2014). Under this agreement, the Middle
Eastern region was divided and several nation states, on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, were
established. Additionally, the division of the Kurdish homeland into four parts took place.
As a reaction to the policy of Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), which adopted pan-Turkish nationalism, many Arabs, as well as other ethnic components, rejected the CUP’s policy of Turkification. As a result of this process and the awakening of Ottoman ethnic components, the Sunni-Arab elite who were officially part of the Ottoman administration, started to emancipate from the Turkish influence towards pan-Arabic nationalism.

After World War I and Iraqi state formation under the surveillance of the colonial powers, two different identities were competing, and it reached a bloody stage. In this regard, Magnus Bernhardsson, quoting from Eric Davis, states that “As a political scientist Eric Davis suggests, two competing and seemingly diametrically opposed models of political community, one Iraqis and the other Pan-Arab, have clashed over which was to be the defining feature of Iraqi national identity” (Bernhardsson, 2103:5). In contrast to this argument, it is true that two identities were competing, but at the same time both of them were integrating. This means that even the supporters of Iraqi national identities disbelieved in pan-Arab nationalism, but they were few and less powerful; they also disbelieved in a country without an Arabic identity. On the other hand, this competing lacked balance and was primarily confined to the Sunni Arabs. In this regard, Batatu affirms:

“The superior weight of the pan-Arab trend was the consequence, partly, of the monarchy’s own initial pan-Arab predilection and, partly, of the fact that a very large number of the younger officers hailed from the northern Arab provinces, which leaned strongly toward pan-Arabism”.

(Batatu, 1978:29)

Here, one important remark from the monarchy’s own initial pan-Arab predilection was the bringing of certain individuals who played an important role in the pan-Arab ideology, specifically Sati’al-Husri¹. This issue has been discussed by

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¹ Sati’ al-Husri (1882-1968) was born in Sana from Syrian parents. He “modified his name to Abu Khaldun Sati’ al-Husri in order to connote his conversion to Arabism. Husri graduated from the Mulkiya Mektebi in Istanbul - the school for Ottoman bureaucrat” (Simon, R.S., 2004:28). According to Reeva S. Simon “Al-Husri could not accept the French nationalist concept that the existence of a nation was predicated upon the existence of a special state, for the Arabs had no state of their own. Nevertheless, to al-Husri, they were a nation. Therefore, German nationalism with its differentiation between the nation and the state, the cultural being distinct from the legal or the mechanical entity
Nur Masalha in his article ‘Faisal’s Pan-Arabism, 1921-33’ as he argues that “Faisal also invited Sati al-Husri, his ex-Minister of Education in Damascus and a native of Aleppo, to Iraq, and appointed him as the director of the Ministry of Education” (Masalha, 1991:2). Thus, al-Husri was invited directly to do a specific task for a specific strategy. This fact has been confirmed by Jankowski and Gershoni as they argue, “Faysal invited Sati al-Husri to direct education in Iraq. A renowned Ottoman pedagogue, Husri becomes an Arab nationalist just before the war and joined Faysal in Damascus” (Jankowski & Gershoni, 1997:93). This invitation of a spokesman for Arab nationalism (C. William, 2015:47) to such an important and sensitive professional position like education, raised questions about his stance concerning all components of Iraq. This is because according to L. M. Kenny in his article ‘Sāṭi’ Al-Ḥuṣrī’s Views on Arab Nationalism’, “the outstanding exponent and populariser of Arab Nationalist doctrine over the past quarter of a century has been Abu Khaldoon Sati’ al-Husri” (Kenny, 1963:231). Here, al-Husri has been considered the first missionary for pan Arabism. In this regard, according to Adee Dawisha in a review of his book ‘Arab Nationalism and Islamism: Competitive Past, Uncertain Future’, it states”it was in the 1920s that Arab nationalism as a clearly enunciated, coherently formed ideology was first propagated by Sati’ al-Husri, a Syrian and former Ottoman official who was in charge of education policies in the newly independent kingdom of Iraq” (Dawisha, 2000:85).

For many scholars, the ideological influence of al-Husri on the educational sector was significant for many decades of the Iraqi kingdom. One of these scholars is Magnus T. Bernhardsson, as he claims in his book ‘Reclaiming a Plundered Past: Archaeology and Nation Building in Modern Iraq’, that “Once Faysal had appointed al-Husri to the Ministry of Education in 1922, al-Husri was quick to incorporate his ideas about the role and content of education in Iraq” (Bernhardsson, 2013:198). Therefore, according to Bernhardsson, “Al-Husri viewed the curriculum of the schools as a mechanism of social change” (Bernhardsson, 2013:198). From this point, it is clear that Faisal and al-Husri rationally understood the sensitivity of education, and there was a strategy for specific mainstream issues. This direction has been confirmed by al-Husri, as he argued “I will employ every means to strengthen the

became the model, the lack of a state now being irrelevant” (Simon, R.S., 2004:28). This is an important point in understanding the belonging of Arab nationalism to the German nationalist school.
feeling of nationalism among the sons of Iraq to spread the belief in the unity of the Arab nation” (Jankowski & Gershoni, 1997:94). Al-Husri, as per James Jankowski and Israel Gershoni in their book ‘Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East’ have gone further than this as they claim “To Husri, compulsory education and universal military conscription were the two most important mechanisms for the cohesion of the nation, military service being a further stage in the assimilation process of the individual to the nation” (Jankowski & Gershoni, 1997:94). Thus, for al-Husri and his most powerful supporter, King Faisal, two sensitive elements in the process of assimilation were essential. Therefore, compulsory education, which comes under the hegemony of al-Husri, and universal military, which formed the monopoly of violence, are two unavoidable elements for any success. However, it seems that their goal was to build an ideological army plus other security units. Sati’al-Husri started his activity as a member of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). In this regard, Albert Issa in his book ‘The Arabic nationalism from the Ottoman Empire to the Iraqi fascism’s period’ claims that the nature of pan-Arabism was an important phenomenon of the new state’s formation.

Moreover, the attempt of King Faisal to ensure the domination of Sunni-Arabs was unlimited. Here, according to Article-17 of the first Iraqi constitution, the Arabic language is the official language (Iraqi Constitution, 1925), without specifying any position for non-Arabs in Iraq. Magus T. Bernhardsson has confirmed this situation and explains how “In Iraq, the 1920s–1930s, Pan-Arabism was the command of the day, eventually leading to various interpretations of Iraqi particularities withal a resistance to Pan-Arabism in the 1940s–1960s.” All these points provided suitable grounds for the emergence and escalation of Arab Baath nationalism.

5.3.2. The Origins of the Baath Arab Socialist Party (BASP)

Regarding the formation of the BASP, Hanna Batatu, states that “the Baath of the 1950s emanated from 3-initially distinct groups” (Batatu, 1978:722). Here, a discussion will be presented, along with an outline of the origins of these wings, as a key guide to understanding the background of the Baathist ideology. The other important point is that all three wings were organised around the World War, when the socio-political position was boiling in the subsequent crises.
5.3.2.1. Baath Party

Alexandretta, the disputed city between Syria and Turkey, according to an agreement on the 29th of June 1939 between Turkey and France, was handed over to the Republic of Turkey (Khadduri, Majid, 1945:424). The impact of this annexation has been described by Battatu as a “disaster” (Battatu, 1978:722) for Arabs who considered it part of the Arab homeland. Here, in specific circumstances under the mandate of French colonialism, and according to many scholars, “All Arabo-phones - Sunnis, Alawites and Christians- found common ground on at least one issue: ‘hatred of the Turk’” (Satloff, Robert B, 1986:148). This new reality led Arabo-phones to carry out extreme oppression, as Hanna Battatu describes, “In the teeth of bitter protests from its Arab and Armenian elements” (Battatu, 1978:722). Thus, dependent on the “‘hatred of the Turk’” (Satloff, Robert B, 1986:148), Al-Arsuzi, who belonged to the Alawites community, declared himself as a “prophet of Arabism” and “the Arab national heritage” as their “religion” (Heyberger Bernard, 2003:315).

In addition to his racial ideology, ”He drew his inspiration from racialism” (Battatu, 1978:723), and the ideas of Al-Arsuzi regarding nationalism were more reflective of Turkish nationalism, due to the conflict over the disputed area of Alexandretta and also the French colonialism. Moreover, this attitude, according to Dalal Arsuzi Elamir, led to the following: “The ‘Urubiyyun (pan-Arab nationalists) in the region of Alexandretta wore the sidara faisaliah (military service caps) as a symbol of their struggle and as their hallmark; this was to distinguish themselves from the Turk, who wore hats” (Heyberger Bernard, 2003:320). This is further evidence of the rooted disagreement between the components in this region.

Thus, Zaki Al-Arsuzi (1901-1968), in his active period, “led the pan-Arab League of National Action’s efforts to oppose Turkey’s annexation of Alexandretta” (Commins, D.; Lesch, D. W, 2013:129). In terms of this, according to many scholars and historians, including Hanna Battatu, he organised in 1938 the “Arab Nationalist Party” (Battatu, 1978:724), but in 1940 he established the “Baath Party” (al-Hamdani, 2007:7). Al-Arsuzi’s ideology has been exposed to severe criticism even by his followers. Here, according to Hanna Battatu and al-Hamdani, his followers abandoned him due to uncertain grounds, and Battatu writes: “They may have found his racism intellectually unsatisfying, or they perhaps thought that he was not sufficiently practical” (Battatu, 1978:724).
5.3.2.2. Arab Revival

Not far from Alexandretta, the situation in Damascus was no more stable than anywhere else in the Middle East. According to Zuher Al-Mardini in his book ‘The biography of Michel Aflaq’ there were several reasons for the emergence of the ‘BP’ and Arabic nationalist thought processes in the region. On the one hand, the national trend that had crawled over from the West was also fast creeping towards Third World countries, specifically in the Middle East. On the other hand, during the late Ottoman era, several political parties were formed and started using the slogans of freedom and unity. However, in 1934, the first Arabic political party was established at the national rather than regional level, called ‘League of National Action’ (Al-Mardini, Z. (1989).

Additionally, during the post-World War I period, under the French mandate, the BP was “founded in 1940 in Syria by two Parisian-educated intellectuals named Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din Al-Bitar (Torrey, G. H. 1969:445). One of these co-founders of the BP, as an important stream of pan-Arabism, was Michel Aflaq, who was born the son of a Greek Orthodox grain merchant in the Maydan quarter of Damascus (Mattar, P., 2004:68). The educational background of Aflaq is that he was “educated in Greek Orthodox schools, he went to the University of Paris in 1929, where he flirted with communism and is said to have written articles for the party’s publication” (Torrey, G. H. 1969:445). The second co-founder of the BP was Salah al-Din al-Bitar, a 32 year old Sunni Muslim who came from a family with a “religious orientation and emerged from his family many prominent clerics” (al-Hamdani, 2007:8). In addition, according to Gordon Torrey, among the Aflaq classmates, “was his friend Salah al-Din al-Bitar, as he was himself from a Muslim Damascene family, who later joined him in his political activism” (Torrey, G. H. 1969:445). The important point here is that like al-Bitar who was “from a family known as religious orientation” (al-Hamdani, 2007:8), according to Ajlouni in his article ‘Arab Christian Nationalist Thinkers and Arab Christian Nationalism in the Levant’, Aflaq belonged to the middle-class, as he claimed “his family was Greek Orthodox, middle-class” (Ajlouni, A. 2009”4). Accordingly, Hanna Battatu also confirms this position regarding both of them as he explains: “Michel Aflaq’ Christian Orthodox school teacher and son of a middle grain merchant and Salah-ud-Din al-Bitar, Muslim Sunni school teacher and son of a middle grain merchant” (Battatu, 1978:723). This social
position enabled them to study in Paris and to become involved in different scientific, social and political activities. In spite of the religious difference between Aflaq and al-Bitar, and according to Battatu:

“It was only in 1929, and at the Sorbonne, that ‘Aflaq and al-Bitar first met. They became in no time intimate friends. They shared experiences, read the same authors Nietzsche, Mazzini, Andre Gide, Romain Rolland, Marx, and Lenin, among others and were caught in the same Marxist wave that swept over the European campuses during the worldwide slump and financial crisis of 1929-1932’” (Battatu, 1978:725).

Thus, according to Battatu’s assertion, they had an important chance to study these ideas and to evaluate and compare the differences between Paris and Damascus. Hence, with regard to the Ba’ah party’s establishment, “they have been working full-time for the party after the expansion of organization’s activity, when the al-Arsuzi followers joined the new party, which led to changing the name of the political party to Arab Baath Party” (al-Hamdani, 2007:7). Here, Maher al-Charif in his article ‘Zaki al-Arsuzi and his Contribution to the Arab Nationalist Ideology’ affirms that “Zaki al-Arsuzi and Michel Aflaq met intellectually through the conception of the Arab Baath” (al-Charif, M. 146). Additionally, throughout the same period, and under the same circumstances and with a close background as minorities, their philosophy on nationalism was similar.

5.3.2.3. Arab Socialist Party

It has been explained that the economic, social and political situation in Syria under the French mandate was unstable, and the ideas of pan-Arabism in terms of freedom from colonialism and the unification of Arab countries was escalating. Therefore, not far from Damascus, according to al-Hamdani, Akram Horani, after two years’ membership of the Syrian National party, he left the party and took leadership of the ‘youth party’ which was founded by his cousin Othman al-Hourani; although later he modified its name to the ‘Arab Socialist Party’ (al-Hamdani, 2007:8), indicating his idealism. Here, in contrast to Michel Aflaq, Akram al-Hurani, was a “Muslim Sunni lawyer-politician and impoverished son of a wealthy landowner” (Battatu, 1978:723). This means that al-Hourani was the most powerful and influential person among his community. In this regard, Adeed Dawisha has claimed that “Hourani’s political influence emanate from a power base centered on the
agricultural region around the Syrian city of Hama, where he organized successful peasant revolts against the large land-owning families” (A. Dawisha, 2000: 154). Thus, al-Hurani due to being “big landlords in Hama” (Battatu, 1978:723) “played a major role in Syrian politics where he was elected as a deputy of Hama and he was involved in 3-military coups in Syria starting with the coup Hosni al-Zaeem on March 30, 1949 and the coup of Sami al-Hinnawi on August 14 of the same year, and the coup of Adib Shishakli in January 19, 1951” (al-Hamdani, 2007:8). This position of al-Hurani reflects the ideology of Baathists in believing in violence to seize power.

5.3.2.4. The Developments and Crossing the Border to Iraq

In addition to the previous statement of al-Mardini, Battatu has included more additional factors in regard to the development of all three groups:

“1. The French occupation
2. The partition of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire and the resultant hindrances to the old trade routes
3. The decline of the Islamic social order (and the Christian millah structure) and of the old values and loyalties
4. The impact of European ideas
5. The enfeeblement of the traditional nationalists, that is, the nationalists predominantly drawn from the upper-landed and mercantile classes and loosely organized in the National Bloc” (Battatu, 1978:723).

Thus, all these factors contributed towards preparing suitable ground for a pan-Arab ideology, and the similarity of their ideas and goals led to strengthening of these groups and their unity in the form of the Baath Arab Socialist party (BASP). Here, in terms of the unification of these two parties, al-Hamdani claims that Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din al-Bitar found their role model in Akram Al-Hourani, because of his political influence, his relations with the Syrian army officers and the expansion of the organisation of his party (al-Hamdani, 2007:9). Therefore, they showed their enthusiasm for the unification of the two organisations under the name of the Arab Socialist BP. Thus, under these circumstances according to Torrey Gordon in his article ‘The Baath: Ideology and Practice’, “In September 1953, the Baath and Haurani’s Arab Socialist Party formally amalgamated to become the Arab Socialist Resurrection Party” (Torrey G., 1969:455). What is remarkable here is the constitution of the BP in 1947, as according to Battatu, the new party and all its
branches of the “basic program, it adopted without any alteration the Bath constitution of 1947” (Battatu, 1978:730).

Thus, that amalgamation paved the way for the party towards the domination of two of the most important countries- Syria and Iraq- in the Middle East. In this regard, the vanguard of the BP ideology was spurred on in Iraq in 1949, and the first seed was planted in the field of pan-Arab nationalist thoughts. Here, Alexandretta was involved again in the first seed of the BP in Iraq, as al-Hamdani argues, “The first group who planted the seeds of the party in Iraq were three sons of Alexandretta” (al-Hamdani, 2007:18). In addition, Battatu focuses on this point, claiming, “suffice it to say that Fayez Ismail and Wasfi al-Ghanim, who planted the first seeds of Baathism in Iraq, were from Alexandretta and, incidentally, also ‘Alawis” (Battatu, 1978:724).

Thus, two points are important to highlight, which are Alexandretta and Alawism. Alexandretta was a sign of the occupation, whereas Alawism was a sign of minority groups. However, a third point is underlined by Joel Cabana in his thesis ‘The Baath Party in Iraq: from its beginning through today’ as he has emphasised that ‘the post-Palestine War era is also an important period for the formation of the Baath in other countries around the Middle East” (Cabana, 1993:25). Thus, it is possible to say that the conflict between the Arabs and Israel in the Middle East until the late of 20th century was an indication of the enthusiasm for pan-Arab nationalism.

Thus, in Iraq since the establishment of the kingdom of King Faisal and the return of hundreds of Ottoman officers, merchants, intellectuals and politicians from Istanbul to Baghdad, the capital of Iraq, the ideology of pan-Arabism in the form of the idea of Arab centrism, and in the form of different political parties, gradually increased and enlarged. Hence, in contrast to the class background of the originators of Baathism in Syria, the background of those who were the vanguards of Baath ideology belongs to the lower income group, as Cabana points out, “the initial organization was made up of predominately lower income groups in Iraq” (Cabana, 1993:26). On the other side, because the first Alexandretta group who planted the first seed in Iraq were Alawits or (Shi’a) groups, the first receiver who embraced the ideology was an Iraqi, Fu’ad al-Rikabi. Although according to Cabana, Fu’ad al-Rikabi was a “Baath member since 1950 assumed the leadership of the Iraqi Baath in 1951 and headed the party for the next eight years” (Cabana, 1993:26).
5.3.3. Baath Ideology (One Arab Nation)

In the framework of pan-Arabism and Arab-centrism, the Baath ideology gradually found suitable ground for spreading everywhere in the Arab areas of Iraq. The spread of nationalism over that period created different challenges for Iraq, and James Dobbins has emphasised that Iraq during this period had “no tradition of pluralist democracy; politics has always been about authoritarian rule and the settlement of disputes by force” (Dobbins, 2003: xxvi). In addition to these political circumstances, the social conditions and low incomes, as Battatu has stressed, caused the Baath ideology to spread, as he points out: “thus 25.5-% of the members of the Iraqi commands originated from the classes of low income, 38.3-% from the classes of lower middle-income, and 29.8-% from the classes of middling-income” (Battatu, 1978:748).

Thus, the society constituted mostly of tribalism, with a mixture of doctrines, beliefs and ethnic backgrounds, as a consequence of the Ottoman Empire and British colonialism. In addition, the humble social status and rampant illiteracy in most parts of the country facilitated the ground for the infestation of a particular thought or ideology, which is typical when there is a kind of political crisis. Here, in the example of Iraq, it could be the nature of the society, its most prominent characteristic was that of a feudalist society with a number of estates, but unlike the Eliasian example of Western Society, internal competition was not intensified to expend the land (Elias, 1999:263); however, the competition was intensified in order to seize power. In other words, Iraqi society was in one of its transformational stages, specifically in terms of power relations, as Elias has emphasised: “in order to properly understand our constraints and opportunities we must understand ‘the shifting balances of tensions’ or power-ratios” (Kaspersen and Gabriel, 2008:373). In this regard, the nationalist groups, who had organised within the BP, had gained broad experience in various fields. They had experience in terms of political and social mobilisation and also in the political sphere for exploiting opportunities, along with the knowledge of the weaknesses of the existing systems.

Hence, the pan-Arab ideology manifested itself through different platforms, but the priority went to the Baath’s constitution of 1947, and Michel Aflaq’s discourses and statements, including in some Iraqi newspapers, in addition to
Saddam’s speeches and announcements. Focusing primarily on Michel Aflaq’s statements because of the domination of Aflaq’s discourses on the pan-Arab nationalists at that time, Joel Cabana points out that “while it is true that the Baath Party was founded by Arsuzi, Bitar, and Aflaq, there has only been one ideologue for the party; Michel Aflaq” (Cabana, 1993:31). If this point is correct for Syria and all Arab countries, for Iraq it is duplicated, because later on Aflaq’s ideology gradually became restricted to within the borders of Iraq. In addition to his ideology, he personally lived and died in Iraq, and subsequently left a statement of his conversion to Islam. Thus, this analysis reveals how the Arabs were able to insist that Iraq was officially an integral part of the Arab homeland from time immemorial, without paying any attention to the feelings and rights of the non-Arabs in Iraq or in Syria, which will be explained later.

Now, before delving into explaining the Baath’s ideology, the BP resorted to a variety of means, using the state and its institutions without interferrance, and the resources of the state to progress the pan-Arab ideology. This fact was reiterated several times by the interviewees that took part in this research. Regarding this issue, Joseph Sassoon has explained in his paper “The Iraqi Baath Party Preparatory School and the ‘Cultural’ Courses of the Branches’, that “the Baath Party’s dominance in Iraq was much more than simply holding on to power” (J. Sassoon, 2014:27). However, Joseph Sassoon has focused his analysis on the preparation of the Baath’s cadre through the “madrasat al-i dad al-hizbi (the party preparatory school)”, which it has been confirmed was the ‘cultural institution of the party’, and was connected to Maktab Amanat Sir Al-Qutr (the party secretariat) both financially and administratively through the office of culture and national media” (J. Sassoon, 2014:28). In this case, it seems clear that one of the Iraqi government’s ministries like the office of culture and national media was mobilised for the sake of the BP’s ideology. Thus, according to Sassoon, this preparation of the cadre “was achieved through a dual process: on one hand, by offering an ideologically educated cadre who could represent the regime’s interests, and on the other hand, by making sure Iraqi society was exposed to the ‘appropriate’ cultural material best suited to the party’s ideology” (J. Sassoon, 2014:27). This dual process is an important sign and highlights the process of Baathification specifically against the Kurds. This strategy according to Sassoon “was very similar to those followed in the Soviet Union and Communist
China, where education and training played a pivotal role in the efforts of the ruling parties to dominate and control society” (J. Sassoon, 2014:27). However, Frank Pieke published his book under the name ‘The Good Communist: Elite Training and State Building in Today’s China’, which is one of the resources of Joseph Sassoon. This title ‘The Good Communist’, reminded me of ‘The good Iraqi is the good Baathist’ (in my diary notebook), as one of the mottos of the BP in terms of highlighting the equilibrium of Baathification and Iraqi nationality as one side of the same coin.

The Baath constitution or ‘internal system’ of the BP reflected the ideological reality of post-colonialism, where most ideas that are mentioned in the constitution, reveal a kind of self-image in the form of Arab centrism. This self-image is related to the emotional bonds in relation to the feeling of being one of the victims of the Ottoman Era as well as colonialism. Thus, as Jonathan Fletcher has quoted from Elias, “the emotional bonds or valences underlie the extent to which people say to themselves ‘we’ or ‘I’ in relation to other members of their own group” (Fletcher, 2013:62). This means that at the beginning of the 20th century, and in the second stage after World War II, this self-image emerged as a result of consciousness. Here, as a consequence, the BP emerged, along with the content of the Baath institution; the last version of this content was authenticated on the 6th of April 1947. However, according to al-Hamdani, this version of the content was written by Michel Aflaq himself, and was never exposed to any sort of change or amendment even after the unification of al-Hurani’s Socialist Party and the formation of the Arab Socialist BP (al-Hamdani, 2007:12). The Baath Arab Socialist in this constitution has been defined in its preface by the slogan: “One Arab nation with an eternal message”. This announcement was established on the basis of the three pillars of unity, freedom and socialism. These three pillars were restricted to the Arab nation. The fact that they were not changed means that these principles were very important for all kinds of participants, and as a remarkable definition of the BP. The preface of the constitution states: “One Arab Nation with an eternal message, the Arab Resurrection Socialist Party, a popular national revolutionary movement striving for Arab unity, freedom and socialism” (the institution context, 1947).

Much has been written about this motto of ‘One Arab Nation with an eternal message’. In terms of the second part of the ‘eternal message’ according to Gordon
Torr in his paper ‘The Baath Ideology and Practice’, this idea has been derived from German philosophy as he argues “Aflaq’s historical studies and his acquaintanceship with 19th-century German philosophy are brought out in the program’s section on the “immortal mission” of the Arab Nation” (G. Torr, 1969:447). Here, Gordon Torr is continuing the argument that Baath ideas had been influenced by German philosophy, as he points out that “Although ‘Aflaq and Bitar emphasize the “uniqueness” of the Baathist message, the influence of Western concepts is found throughout their teaching” (G. Torr, 1969:447). The ostensible influence of the Germans has been shown previously in the army fieldwork and other fields, especially when German officers were training the Ottoman army, which was to include many Arabs from Iraq and other countries.

Furthermore, regarding the one Arab nation, the constitution in its 7th article determines the homeland of Arabs as:

“The Arab national homeland is that part of the earth inhabited by the Arab people and which lies between the Taurus mountains, the Zagros mountains, the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea, the mountains of Ethiopia, the Sahara desert, the Atlas range and the Mediterranean Sea” (Baath Party constitution, 1959:197).

As a consequence of this article, the possession of this homeland has been confined among the Arab habitants as confirmed by: “The Arab homeland belongs to the Arabs, they alone have the right to utilize its resources, its wealth, and to control its potentialities” (Baath Party constitution, 1959:196). The dilemma of these two articles is varied. On the one hand, the areas inside the Taurus and the Zagros mountain borders include half of the Kurdish inhabitants, and is known as South and West Kurdistan or (Iraqi and Syrian Kurdistan), yet in this constitution it is considered as part of the Arab homeland. In addition, Saddam Hussein, made a speech to the Kurdish people on Kurdish National Day “Nawroz” on the 21st of March 1979, and this speech is considered a historical document from the 11th National Conference and was also issued under the name “The Humanitarian Track of Baath.” It was an attempt to prove that the Kurds are living in the land of the Arabs, and they are not different from the Arabs, as he claimed:
“The land, which these nationalities are inhabiting were part of the Arab countries, originating thousands of years ago, the latest of which was the great Abbasid state… and any separatism whatever forms, contents, appearances, grades and motivation is a perverted tendency and contrary to the reality of history, and harmful to the Arab nation, and these nationalities”(Saddam Hussein, 1979:30).

Thus, this position is very clear in that the BP did not accept any kind of autonomy; it is not the matter of degree but it is the matter of feeling it. In addition, the nationalities that inhabited the Arab countries were told they must serve the Arab interests. Hence, any attempt at some form of autonomy is motivated by colonialism, and any incitement of colonialism leads to perdition.

On the other hand, the Kurds are not Arabs, as a preview of religious clerics and the Iraqi vice minister of the ‘Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs’ and later Iraqi MP Dr. Muhammad Sharif has emphasised:

“The difference between Kurds and Arabs is very deep because of the difference of the language, the origin, history and the background. We are in humanity similar and also sharing the same religion but because they did not respect the religion, they have emptied it of its content. It became zero” (M. Sharif, senior politician, 70).

Thus, on the basis of this hypothesis of the Baath constitution, the Kurds did not have a right to live in this area and to utilise its resources. The reason is as contained in its 11th article, which concludes, “Whoever agitates on behalf of or is connected with a racial group opposed to the Arabs, or whoever immigrates into the Arab homeland, for the purposes of colonization, will be expelled from the Arab homeland” (Baath Party constitution, 1959:196).

The motive behind this article or the detour around it, is reasonable and expected, because the Kurdish opposition had been accused of allegiance to Israel or Iran on a number of occasions. This allegiance has been confirmed by the previous Kurdish MP, Aso Karim, as one of the interviewees who stated that “The Kurds by Baath Party were considering as traitors” (A. Karim, politician, 65). In contrast, the Baath constitution also described who is an Arab, as it is explained in Article 10: “an
Arab is anyone whose language is Arabic, who lives in the Arab homeland or aspires to live herein, and who believes in his connection with the Arab people” (Baath Party constitution, 1959:196). In this case, no preference is given to compatriots, but to the race of Arab, and it is assumed that belief in affiliation to this race is a pre-condition for living in that location. This shows that patriotism or citizenship is not included, but, rather, it is about the language and loyalty to the owners of this language. The BP also determined its policy towards the outsider or the non-Arabs, as explained in Article-15:

“The national tie will be the sole (social) bond existing in the Arab state. It will guarantee harmony among the citizens and it will guarantee their fusion in the crucible of a single nationality. It will combat all other denominational, factional, tribal, parochial or regional loyalties” (Baath Party constitution, 1959:198).

Thus, the Baath party’s domestic policy regarding inter-relationships between the social components in terms of national ties is the assimilation of all different entities in the Arab body. Therefore, according to the previous Iraqi MP Dr Muhammad Sharif:

“The BP was following the theory of impossibility. They were always repeating, that the Kurds have two rights, first as Kurd, and the second as Iraqi but if they become a threat, either to becoming an Arab, or being deported from their own region, this means displacement, or if they commit any action against the law or against the Baath’s policy, in this case they will exterminate them, as they did in Anfal campaigns” (M. Sharif, senior politician, age 70.)

5.3.4. The Issue of Culture in Baath Ideology

In addition to the Baath slogan there is another important area of Baath ideology when the discourse is orientated towards outsiders. Baathists, primarily supporters of Michel Aflaq, were distinguishing Arab nationalism from European nationalism, claiming that Arab nationalism is not racist but rather cultural. Here, before delving into Aflaq’s discourse, Saddam’s speech, which is oriented towards the Kurds, will be highlighted. It was issued under the name “the humanitarian Track of
Baath”. Saddam claimed:

“Those who are hostile to our party are attempting to provoke confusion and saying; how can the Kurds (for example) be a member of the BASP?

The proper principle answer is that the adjective of “Arab” for the party is not an ethnicity, but it is described as a nationalist civilized humanity...

Politically, the party has been able to find a peaceful balanced solution to the issue of the Kurdish tendency towards the cultural and social development, in the context of one country, the branch\(^1\) of Iraq, through the general Arabic identity in a sense of nationalist, human and civilization which I have referred to”(Saddam Hussein, 1979:30).

Through these sentences and the complete speech, it can be understood that the overall way of resolving the non-Arab issues was to let them live on the land of the Arabs, or within the border of the Arab country. Moreover, he is suggesting that joining the BASP, which carries the name of the Arabs, is not a derogatory issue, because the name is not racist, but nationalist, although, he is giving the Arab identity to this branch of Iraq. Thus, Arabia or Arabism was the basis of autonomy, and those outside the frame of Arabia were considered to be a threat.

Additionally, the Baath Constitution was a common document for Baathists, and Sati’ al-Husri as a father of Arab nationalism, along with many Arab nationalist writers or even some Arab Islamists, have also affirmed this aspect of pan-Arab ideology. It can be understood from the statement of Saddam Hussein, and the second point of the first fundamental principle of the Baath’s constitution, that “the Arab nation is a cultural unit. All of the differences among its members are artificial accidents, which will cease to exist as a consequence of the awakening of Arab consciousness” (Baath Party constitution, 1959:196). The dilemma in the ideas propagated by Aflaq is the existence of superficial ideas, which are widely scattered in the folds of five books called “On the Way of Resurrection” or “Fi Sabil al- Baath”. I have attempted to find out the exact key words or a definition in association with this cultural nationalism, but there is very little explained or highlighted elsewhere.

\(^1\) BASP has considered these states part of the Arab homeland, therefore these states are a just branch of the United Arab Republic, which does not exist.
However, the content apparently focuses on human nationalism in connection with other keywords, and introducing pan-Arab-nationalism as a necessary resource for all humanity, as Aflaq argued: “Our nationalism is guaranteed from the past because it is combined with a humanity message, and this is something that is only unique in the case of Arabs” (Aflaq, 1987:155)

This means that Arab nationalism has its own roots in the past, and that past is Islam, because “the Arab consciousness accompanied by a religious message.” (Aflaq, 1987:145). In addition, the “Baath movement believe in humanity and the Arab nation has a humanity message” (Aflaq, 1987:62). Thus, this Arab message about humanity is unique and it is different when comparing it to European humanity, because when Europeans were “calling for the humanity, the ambitions of colonialism is behind it as a purpose of expansion. French humanitarian thinking that have been emerged during the revolution was the preparation for expansion” (Aflaq, 1987:155). Here, the problem with Aflaq’s view is his attempt to Arabise every single concept through an imaginative description of Arab intellectual and historical values. In other words, there is an attempt to re-establish Arabism as a resource for every social scientific concept, without offering a logical interpretation of these concepts. In this regard, it has been explained by al-Hamdani that “Michel Aflaq’s ideas and writings contain a collection of scattered speeches, has been written when he was following the events in Syria, which it do not constitute a homogeneous and coherent ideas without careful analysis and development of the facts” (al-Hamdani, 2007:9).

Moreover, Aflaq’s cultural pan-Arabism is dependent on the past- a past made up of different stages, but the most important stage for Aflaq is the emergence of Islam. Therefore, constantly “Islam is renewing Arabism and its perfection” (Aflaq, 1987:144). This is because “Islam is a vital shake, which is moving the latent powers in the Arab nation” (Aflaq, 1987:142). Here, Aflaq has pursued this path to secure two aims:

The first one is to Arabise Islam and to create a social consciousness within Arabs that they are the owners of Islam and others have deviated from its tracks. As a result, Aflaq is attempting to create a sense that the Arabs are the best and they are at the heart of Islam- if the Arabs disappear, Islam will automatically disappear.
The first aim leads to the second one, which is the development of the non-Muslim’s circumstances, specifically Christians in the Arab Muslim society. This could be considered as a result of the Ottoman behaviour towards non-Muslims in Ottoman society.

Thus, Aflaq in his most extreme position, to show Islam as an Arabic culture, announced that “the Arab Christians must know, when nationalism is waking up in themselves completely and they retrieve their natural character, they should know that Islam is their nationalist culture, they must work to understand it and love it and to be careful about Islam, as their eagerness is the most precious thing in their Arabism” (Aflaq, 1987:148). This is one of the principles that “Islam can not be represented except by the Arab nation” (Aflaq, 1987:146). However, this argument is not only Aflaq’s demand but in one form or another, it has been reiterated by the Arab elite, particularly by Islamist leaders. Here, it can be understood that Aflaq aimed to withdraw the legitimacy of the representation of Islam from non-Arabs to anchor it with the Arabs only. This was to create the idea of Arab-centrism because “the epic of Islam is inseparable from its natural theatre, which is the land of Arabs, its heroes and its employees all of them also were Arabs. Thus, He chose for it the Arab nation and its hero the Arab Apostle” (Aflaq, 1987:144,145). All this concentration on the Arabs according to Aflaq did not come from vacuity but as Aflaq argued “the selection of Arabs to convey the message of Islam was due to the advantages and essential virtues in the Arabs” (Aflaq, 1987:145). Here, the bottom line is that they have the ability and employability to become the centre of the world because they are the resource of Islam; in addition to that, they are carrying the essential virtues that distinguish them from others. Thus, they are the centre of the humanity and Islam in the form of ethnocentrism.

5.3.5. Non-Arabs in The Baath’s View (The Followers)

The problematic relationship between the Kurds and the Iraqi Arab authority from the early days of the formation of Iraq includes the Baaths authority. The issue revolves around assertiveness of the Kurds and a certain amount of indefinite denial by the Arabs. The Kurds constantly attempted to prove their existence, their influence and, conversely, denial, substantiated by the interviews and documents of the BP, was the constant policy of the Baath authority, and they always attempted to marginalise
and exile the Kurds from their places, both physically and morally. This denial appeared in different views and behaviours, starting from theorising it and ending with practical implementation on many levels. From this point, the vision of the BP took several detours around the issue of non-Arab components in terms of their existence within the nation state.

The constitution of the BP shows that since its inception, it withstood many problems, starting from the prior accusation of binding the non-Arabs with foreigners, through the neglecting of the historical facts on the existence of non-Arabs, and ending by not recognising the Kurdish component as nationally autonomous. Thus, according to the Baath’s constitution, the only tie in the Arab country is Arabism, as it is stated in article 15 that: “The nationalist tie ‘Arabism’ will be the sole (social) bond existing in the Arab state” (Baath Party constitution, 1959:198). The ‘assimilation’ of other components according to the only tie of Arabism is unavoidable and “it will guarantee their fusion in the crucible of a single nationality” (Baath Party constitution, 1959:198). Hence, it appears that a single nationality is a long-term goal to “guarantee harmony among the citizens” (Baath Party constitution, 1959:198). In addition to this clear integration policy, “it will combat all sectarian, tribal, ethnic and regional fanaticism” (Baath Party constitution, 1959:198). Thus, this is the general and forcible principle of the policy of the BP, with no recognition of the social or political differences. However, in the shadow of the constitution’s articles, Aflaq in one of his speeches described the Kurdish existence in Iraq as a racial minority, as he said, “Let us take racial minorities such as the Kurds, for example; we ask why the Kurds or some of them are afraid of the Arabism “Orouba?” (Aflaq, B1, 1987:181).

Here, according to Aflaq’s ideology, the Kurds should not be afraid because as he argued “this fear mostly is due to the modern colonial propaganda extending to five decades before” (Aflaq, B1, 1987:181). In addition, a very short journey into the literature of Aflaq and his party appears to show that colonialism is the source of all disease and setbacks. According to Aflaq, if there was no colonialism, no problems would have occurred between the Kurds and Arabs because according to Aflaq’s historical theory, “The Kurds have remained for hundreds of years living with Arabs and fighting valiantly defending the Arab territories” (Aflaq, B1, 1987:181). This argument suggests an implicit question that Kurds should remain defending the Arab
state under the Baath’s rule. In this regard, Albert Issa explains that:

“In 1969, Aflaq’s struggle in Baghdad was not just a rejection of the legitimate rights of the Kurdish people but also by some superficial conversations, wanting to link the Kurdish race to the Arab race and blaming colonialism for separating the Kurds from the Arabs” (Issa, 1111:171)

According to Aflaq, “For a couple of centuries, when the Arabs were forming one country, the Kurds were Arab Muslim citizens” (Issa, 1111:171). It is worth mentioning, that there is a kind of compatibility and similarities between the positions of Michel Aflaq and Saddam Hussein towards non-Arabs.

In his speech on the Kurdish national day of Nowruz⁴, Saddam Hussein highlighted the factor of the land, as he repeatedly emphasised the “Arab identity of the land that inhabited by non-Arabs and it did not come through oppression or colonialism or alienation” (Hussein, 1979:30). Thus, the presence of the Kurds on this land is in the vision of Saddam Hussein, and the speech here is orientated towards the Kurds on the Nowruz festival day; he claims that the situation did not come about through oppression or colonialism, or alienation. This means that non-Arabs are immigrants, and as a result of successive migrations of the human groups inhabiting this land. The Baathists accuse the Jews in Israel explicitly that they are immigrants, and the Baathists in Syria deprived approximately 300,000 Kurdish people from Syrian nationality (McGee, T., 2014:174), because they are deemed to be immigrants. In the ‘The Kurdish question and the autonomy’ which was published by ‘a committee in the Labour Culture foundation’ it is emphasised that: “The Mosul case is considered a serious problem, created by colonialism, feudalism and wanting to cut out a part of the Arab homeland to annex it to Turkey” (The Kurdish question and the autonomy, 1975:13)

Thus, in the case of the non-success of the policy of assimilation, aggression or hostility will be the second “option to combat all sectarian, tribal, ethnic and regional fanaticism” (Baath Party constitution, 1959:198). Additionally, this matter

⁴ Nowruz, linguistically means ‘the new year’ idiomatically is a Kurdish national day and its roots date back to the time of the Medes the Kurdish ancestors.
has been handled in the Baath’s constitution, as it argues that “whoever called or joined a racial group opposed to the Arabs or whoever immigrated to the Arab homeland for the purpose of colonialism will be expelled from the Arab homeland” (BP constitution, 1959:197). Here, the common link between Aflaq and the Baath constitution is the ‘racial group’, and in front of the obedience to the assimilation policy is the opposition or rebellion against the authority of the BP. In practice, this policy has been aggressively implemented as a key principle in the ideology of the BP, primarily against the Faili Kurds who were expelled from the capital city of Baghdad, and taken to the borders of Iran with their properties/ assets confiscated.

5.4. The Monopoly of Violence between The State and the Political Parties (Phenomenon of Militias)

The developments of state formation in the modern age of the West according to Elias, meant the “free use of the military weapons is denied to the individual and reserved to a central authority” (Elias, 1999:268). In addition, the monopoly of taxation included to the means of violence because according to Elias “they are two sides of the same monopoly” (Elias, 1999:268). What is not understood according to Elias is the question of “who are to control it, from whom they are to be recruited and how the burdens and benefits of the monopoly are to be distributed?” (Elias, 1999:268). What is important to mention here is that every nation state has gone through a unique experience and has implemented its own particular process in building a state and its formation. This is what we can understand from the detailed interpretation of Elias regarding the history of a long process of nation building in the case of Western societies, specifically when he comes to separate models of European countries and illustrates the differences in the processes of development. In addition to the process of nation-building, these issues concern scholars and political elites of modern societies with regard to finding out how to prevent totalitarian authority within the nation state. Concerning this matter in Iraq, throughout the century after its establishment in 1920, the state with its means of violence was suffering from the monopoly of a single party with a singular leader. This phenomenon has been confirmed by many scholars, including James Dobbins, who has described the region of the Middle East as “an unstable and undemocratic region” (Dobbins, James, 2003:168); he also argues, “Nation building in Iraq faces a number of challenges. Iraq has no tradition of pluralist democracy; politics has always been about authoritarian...
rule and the settlement of disputes by force” (Dobbins, James, 2003:169).

Thus, in addition to the violent aspects of ideology proposed by Baath, which also emanates from the same society, it is clear that there must have been something wrong with the state structure or the culture of the state administration and the society. Here, I will focus on some aspects specific to the creation of the culture of the BP and its experiences.

Violence in Iraq has erupted in multiple forms, and one of these forms is the armed militia that accompanied pan-Arab nationalism. The first militia to emerge in modern Iraqi history was after Rashid Ali’s Movement in 1941 to form the Futwa(1) - organisations under the command of Dr. Sami Shawkat; this is considered a national militia with major similarities to the Nazi youth (Achcar, G., 2010:122). This embracing of Nazi ideology reflects the viability of the community accepting Nazi-style ideology. In this regard, these officers, according to Reeva S. Simon, rejected British and liberal democratic values, “having turned instead to a militaristic Germany, whose political ideology stood at the extreme edge of Romantic nationalism” (Simon, R.S., 1986: XI). Thus, depending on the Eliasian process of figurational sociology to understand this phenomenon, we must be attentive to the past and its procedural dimensions. On the other hand, these officers were part of the society restricted to inter-dependent chains, specifically at the level of the political elite. In this regard and as ratification of Eliasian figuration, Roby Barrett highlights that “By 1939, Syria and Iraq had become hot-beds of Arab nationalist sentiment” (Barrett, R.C., 2015:31).

After the so called revolution of July 1958, which was a military coup, a ministerial order was issued to form a militia of Popular Resistance, and it was considered to be a military arm of the Iraqi Communist Party (Ismael, T.Y., 2008:79), but after less than a year, it was cancelled by ministerial decree. In contrast, secret militias formed in order to confront the militia of Popular Resistance, and the conflict escalated through assassinations and military clashes in the streets, especially in the case of Baghdad, Kirkuk and Anbar. Then, Law No. (35) in the year 1963 formed the militia of the Nationalist Guard, belonging to the ‘BP’ (DeFronzo, J., 2009:59); however, after nine months, it was also abolished by a presidential order. Beside the Nationalist Guard, and in the situation of a conflict of doctrines between Sunni and
Shi’a Muslims, a limited number from another armed militia emerged, known as Khalisi’s group. This was headed by the command of Sheikh Muhammad Mahdi al-Khalisi in Kadhimya, but was terminated when the militia of the Nationalist Guard was officially abolished.

With the rise of the BP to power in 1968, a new phase of militarising society began. Baathists were working constantly on different levels to fortify their authority. Thus, the party, according to Reeva S. Simon, “re-emerged successfully in 1968. Reconstituting the pan-Arab ideology” (Simon, R.S., 1986:157). Here, Simon is highlighting an important point in that, “Baath rulers of Iraq created a political narrative that drew upon the Sunni, pan-Arab history of Iraq instituted from 1921 on and implemented it via military and academic institutions” (Simon, R.S., 1986:157). From the point of the military, we have to highlight the philosophy of the BP, which entails violence in the form of a coup (upheaval). Michel Aflaq, in his writings, constantly emphasises one concept, which is al-inqilab or upheaval (coup). Aflaq questions “how can the party be the owner of its message and able to carry this message? It is to be the nation of upheaval (coup) before achieving the upheaval of the nation” (Aflaq, 1975:74). Thus, the strategy of Baath in achieving power is al-inqilab (coup). However, Aflaq only reserved a single interpretation of al-inqilab (coup) as he concluded, “The coup has only a clear frank meaning, it is a conflict and reflex of mentality, character and prevailing interests. The Baath ideology is born from this conflict” (Aflaq, 1975:76). Al-inqilab (coup) for Aflaq is the synonym of war as he argues, “The stage of a coup is similar to a state of permanent war, whatever war means of vigilance, caution and doubling the effort” (Aflaq, 1975:79). Thus, the only road to achieving all the Arabs’ targets and hopes is war, nothing other than war, according to his statement:

“The Arab revolution in this day and age is war, because it is the broader and fuller field and safest way to open up all their talents and outbursts their skills and heroism. Civilization, which it seeks to build, will not be built only through the struggle at the top of its ranks and forms of any armed popular struggle. Arab civilization is a war, a revolution” (Aflaq, 1975:81).

Hence, when we investigate Aflaq’s literature, we see a world empty from
goodness. In his vision, Arabs are weak because colonialism did not leave any chance for them, and everyone who opposes the conduct of the BP must be a humiliated follower of colonialism and Israel. In a similar direction, regarding the Kurdish areas that were outside the control of Iraqi authority in 1974, and the refusal of the return of the Iraqi army after the collapse of negotiations and the rejection of the Kurdish proposed autonomy project, Saddam Hussein announced:

“We are determined to keep the areas that are not under our sovereignty to a cruel siege. This issue is part of the process of the war, which we explain our perceptions on and its aspects of economic, social, psychological, and its principles include its political and military aspects” (Saddam Hussein, 1974:129).

Thus, according to the theoretical interpretations and practical behaviour of the BP, violence was inherently rooted in the ideology of the BP. They believed in using violence absolutely without any humane or religious deterrent. This ideology is reflected Baath’s behaviour in establishing several militias in different forms after July 17th 1968.

5.4.1. Baathist militias in Iraq after July 17, 1968

Resorting to the formation of the militias in Iraq has been one of the phenomena of the policy of the successive Iraqi authorities, as well as its political parties. However, when the Iraqi Regional branch of the BP seized power, this phenomenon reached its highest level in terms of census and aggressiveness. This is because “a militia is capable of using violence as a means of influence” (Hodgson, T.L. and Thomas, G.R., 2007:8). Additionally, Joel L. Cabana in his thesis states, “the Baath has also sought to control society through the use of its paramilitary force” (Cabana, 1993:68). Here, these paramilitaries and governmental militias will be highlighted, specifically because all of their paramilitaries have participated in the Anfal Campaigns.

5.4.1.1. Youth and Vanguards

The ideology of Saddam Hussein was “let us win the young to safeguard the future” (Hussein, S., 2009: 58), as well as many other ideological principles as a roadmap to a totalitarian regime. As a consequence, two Pro-Government Militias
(PGMs) of youths and students were organised on the order of the Revolutionary Command Council under the name “youth and vanguard brigades No. 162 of 1975” (IRCC, 1975). In addition, in one of Saddam Hussein’s books ‘Social and Foreign Affairs in Iraq (Routledge Revivals)’, it states, “in the Iraqi Youth organisation the first group are the vanguards (Tala’ia) aged from 10-15 years, then the Youth (Futuwwa), from 15-20 years” (Hussein, S., 2009:58). Moreover, recruiting people to the ranks of the party involved going through very advanced stages according to the age of these youths and students, calling them Al-Ansar, which means ‘partisans’. It has been stated that, “the first grade in the ABSP is the supporters (Mu’ayiddin), then the partisans and finally the members” (Hussein, S., 2009:59).

In the same direction, the book of “cultural curriculum”, as part of the educational approach, was prepared specifically for the third phase of youth, the ‘Futuwwa’ students in the first, second and third years of secondary school. This book highlights the dangerous ideological characteristic of brainwashing the children of Iraq. Thus, under the title of “who are the enemies of the homeland and the Arab nation?” in the third section of the book, it says that “Experience has shown that the Zionist entity and the Persian regime, including the traitors of the nation who are supporting those enemies and renegades from the Arab traditions, are not only hostile to Iraq, but fighting in secret and in public all kinds of rebirth and progress in the whole Arab World” (General Federation of Iraqi Youth, 1983:27). Here, Saddam Hussein has also been described as “Father militant leader Saddam Hussein, President and Commander of the Armed Forces”. This book also stirred up many issues in order to prepare these young people from an early age to blindly obey and sow hatred in their hearts.

Additionally, it is worthy of mention that there is a great similarity between these Baath governmental militias and the former Iraqi Futwwa organisation under the command of Dr. Sami Shawkat in 1941 and the Nazi youth (Achcar, G., 2010:122), even in their militant clothes.

5.4.1.2. The People’s Army ‘Militia’ (al-Jaish al-Sha’bi)

According to Hamid al-Hamdani, “After the coup of July 30 1968, the fear of Baathists from the army in attempting to overthrow their rule, the mind of Saddam Hussein may taper in the creation of a partisan army, dubbed as People’s Army, instead of the notorious National Guard” (al-Hamdani, Hamid, 2007:76). Therefore,
as an extension of the Nationalist Guard formed under the Law No. (35), during the year 1963 (DeFronzo, J., 2009:59), as the Baathists returned to power in 1968, they did not give up reviving the new guard paramilitary. In this regard, Joel L. Cabana asserts that the People’s Army militia “is basically the same organization that was responsible for the campaign of terror when the Baath took control of the government in 1963” (Cabana, 1993:68). Additionally, the Revolutionary Command Council formed this nationalist paramilitary in 1970, as a quasi-military organisation, including members of the Arab Socialist party in Iraq. Here, according to Helen Chapin Metz in her edited book ‘Iraq a country study’ she claims, “Officially, it was the Iraqi Baath Party Militia and included a special youth section. Formed in 1970, the People’s Army grew rapidly, and by 1977 it was estimated to have 50,000 active members” (Metz, H.C. ed., 2004:224). However, just before the Anfal Campaigns, according to Joel L. Cabana, this paramilitary force increased to a force of over 650,000 in 1987. In this regard, Helen Chapin Metz explains, “The People’s Army dispatched units to Iraqi Kurdistan before 1980 and to Lebanon to fight with Palestinian guerrillas during the 1975-76 Civil War” (Metz, H.C. ed., 2004:225). Additionally, this militia was harassing people to recruit them into their ranks, and nobody had the ability to reject cooperating.

5.4.1.3. Government Security Organisations

Beside the Iraqi army, within its miscellaneous and large size, which was considered one of the biggest armies in the region, as well as the people’s army militia, there were a large number of irregular forces, militias and security units, including:

- Public security
- External intelligence
- Internal intelligence
- Private security
- Emergency Baghdad
- Military security
- National security
- Presidential guard
- Regiments of National Defence or al-Juhush - little jackass
5.5. Conclusion

What is the purpose of understanding the process of nation building in Iraq as a civilising process? Through many documents and historical literature on Iraq, an attempt has been made to evaluate the ways used to create Iraq as part of a nation building process. This was in order to find out whether this process led to a deep cleavage between the Sunni-Arabs as the dominant ruling elite, and the Kurds who were exposed to genocide. An attempt was made to nationalise the state as a single ethnic minority with a monopoly. Therefore, as Tara Kuzio argues, “the ruling elites of the ‘nationalising state’ often accuse the national minorities of ‘disloyalty’” (Kuzio, T., 2001:137); in fact, the Kurds have regularly been accused of disloyalty. However, as in the case of many instances of nation building, the process of state formation has been considered a violent emergent process, or as Elias describes it, a competition between the components. The establishment of nation states overwhelmingly did not accompany any violence between national groups, but the only violence that happened was against the colonial administration. This is because the Ottoman sultanate was divided, and some new state models were forcibly imposed in the interests of the strategy of the colonial power. Internally, the Iraqi nation’s state model was formed from three provinces, including Mosul province, without a regular legal referendum in the region. Thus, the interests of one ethnic group were taken into consideration, at the expense of other groups in the new nation state. There started the process of suffering and persecution of other groups, particularly the Kurds, by the Sunni-Arab minority. Additionally, the violent approach that was taken by the Sunni-Arab elite, particularly through the policy of the BP in dealing with outcast groups, led to a big change, according to Elias, in the way people were connected to one another. This led to greater disintegration and greater independence between the different components, resulting in the end in the de-civilising process.

Accordingly, this breakdown is based on different characteristics of Iraqi state formation, including the interests of colonialism, fetching a foreign King with their push for pan-Arabism, the hegemony of the Sunni-Arab Ottoman officers, a kind of ethno-pan-Arab elitism, and marginalising or persecuting the rest of the elements. Hence, as a consequence of these characteristics, pan-Arab nationalism in Iraq dominated the state institutions and all public/private sectors of society at the expense of the non-Arabs in Iraq. In this regard, Hanna Batatu has argued “the superior weight
of the pan-Arab trend was the consequence, partly, of the monarchy’s own initial pan-Arab predilection and, partly, of the fact that a very large number of the younger officers hailed from the northern Arab provinces, who leaned strongly towards pan-Arabism” (Batatu, 1978:29). However, these exceptional disintegrated circumstances led to the emergence of the ASBP (the insurgence of Al-Umma), with its aggressive chauvinistic ideology, in order to build one Arab nation according to a specific form of religion, as the culturally best nation. Finally, to attain these goals, the ASBP resorted to militarising the society depending on the formation of several forms of militias and paramilitaries beside the National Army. This process was a systematic way of building one Arab nation in Iraq, and other non-Arab outcast groups had to be wiped out or at least assimilated.
CHAPTER 6: Part One: Historical and Documentary Analysis - Genocide and the De-Civilising Process in Iraq

6.1. Introduction

Alongside the Nazi national ideal, the decades of the establishment of the culture of ethnic-Arab centrism generated an unconscious belief in the ideology of a national ideal. This belief is presented in the policy of ‘the country is part of the Arab homeland’ which is included in the Iraqi constitution, and that Iraq has a responsibility to participate in the Arab issue and resist Israeli expansion; along with the threat to the eastern gate, and the imposing of an ethnic totalitarian rule, which negatively affected the non-Arabs in Iraq. The ideology of the national ideal is similar to the Nazi national ideal, as Arab nationalists “generated an implicit requirement for national ideals, beliefs, principles and standards that could be obeyed absolutely” (Fletcher, 1997:148/149). This led to the internal and external creation of the illusion of enemies. As a consequence of the national ideal, particularly reiterated by Baathists, the internal enemies who were threatening the internal national front needed to be eliminated and destroyed. Thus, dependent on this belief, the stage for genocide was set.

The previous chapter investigated how the process of the annexation of Mosul province to the Iraqi kingdom was established as part of the state formation in the frame of the civilising process. Additionally, the role of British colonialism as a major player, and its lack of neutrality towards the new state’s components, has been considered. However, the inter-dependencies between Sunni-Arabs and the colonial power concerned the Kurds in relation to the domination of pan-Arabism, and later on the emergence of the BP. In this chapter, we now turn to exploring the developments of the process of genocide through all its stages, including the genocide of the Faili Kurds; the evacuation and deportation from Kurdish rural areas, and the Barzani Kurds’ gendercide. Hence, the AC will be addressed separately in a later chapter. These campaigns of destruction of the Kurds in Iraq have been considered to be the result of the unilateral domination of one ethnic group within its totalitarian rule as part of the de-civilising process. Here, an attempt has been made to combine the concept of genocide with the notion of the de-civilising process, including civilising offensives.

Thus, to expand on the ideology of the national ideal and to reach the level of the purity of Arabization of the country, the series of violence and the genocide
process in Iraq started with a policy on three levels: Arabization, Baathisation and deportation. The Baathists started their rule, targeting the Faili Kurds in Baghdad, while at the same time they pursued the policy of awaiting dialogue with the Kurdish movement as a method to gain more time and power. This policy was implemented in the 11th of March agreement. Additionally, after the Gulan war in 1975 between the Kurdish movement and the Iraqi authority, the evacuation of thousands of villages and towns, and the gathering of the inhabitants in forced camps, took place.

6.2. The Preparation for and Adopting of Violence (The Outset of the De-Civilising Process)

As previously mentioned in Chapter Five, the establishment of a number of militias outside the state institutions occurred throughout the process of seizing power. The Baathist’s belief in violence, in order to defeat its opponents, took on different dimensions, including its atrocities and ethnic cleansing against Kurdish civilians in the disputed areas, particularly Kirkuk city (Curtis, Mark, 2008:89), Khanaqin and Shangal. Thus, while strengthening the idea of the purity of the Arabisation of Iraq, the Baathists started the process of genocide from the time of assuming power in 1963. This attempt by the Baathists received international objection, specifically by the Soviet Union and Mongolia, as it had been “urging one of its satellites - outer Mongolia - to level charges of genocide against the Iraqi regime at the UN” (Gibson, B.R., 2015). In addition, Law No. (35) of the year 1963 highlights the real face of the Baathists, besides the aggressive ideology, through the formation of the Militia of Nationalist Guard (al-Haras al-qawmi) (Al-Ali, N.S. and Pratt, N.C., 2009:30). Here, according to Article (2) of the Act, “the National Guard is an organized popular force, have been trained on the use of arms and its pillar are the believer people in their rights to a free and dignified life” (National Guard Law, 1963: No.35).

Consequently, in this preface to the 2nd article of the Act, paragraph A states that the NG is “to protect the Arab breakthrough in Iraq and established a progressive revolutionary way” (National Guard Law, 1963: No.35). Thus, from these contexts it is clear that the NG was an instrument for Arabisation in the form of protecting the Arab’s existence in Iraq (Curtis, Mark, 2008:89); nevertheless, as they were the biggest majority, there were no threats to their existence. In addition to this explanation, the ‘National Guard (al-Haras al-qawmi)’ has been considered by Karol
R. Sorby in her article ‘Iraq 1963: The short rule of the Baath’ as one the BP’s pillars (Sorby, 2009:20). Here, if the process of state formation according to Elias means “the development of the monopoly over the means of violence by a centralised state authority”, (Fletcher, 1997:32) albeit including taxation (Elias, 2000:268), resorting to creating a militia beside the state army institution, would be more problematic. The prominent question here is the issue of legitimacy, because according to Weber and Elias: “The state as a political organisation, whose administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order” (Fletcher, 1997:32).

Here, we are facing a state institution that did not have the power to overcome the multi-polar tensions or multi-central physical forces. This means that the state was still on its way towards formation. However, according to the theory of the civilising process, the shifting balance of power always exists, as Jonathan Fletcher explains, “Tensions within a shifting balance of power always exist between the ‘state’, its representatives and those who have little or no access to control of state power monopolies” (Fletcher, 1997:35). This is a consequence of the conflicting process among the different social, political and ethnic components, which makes matters more complex, and gradually heading towards the de-civilising process. On the other hand, in terms of Arab-centric connotations, the BPs resorting to using its militia against those who were considered as outsiders could be more pre-state than civilisation, which is in contrast to Elias: “With a ‘barbaric’ or ‘primitive’ state of human existence and is used as a substantive in polar opposition to these two terms: it has obvious ethnocentric connotations” (Fletcher, 1997:45).

Thus, al-Hamdani in his study of Baath’s history “Years of Hell’, has portrayed the position of the Baath militia as an early plan to achieve their goals in relation to the future of the country, as he argues: “Baathists, to achieve their hopes and goals, have been dependent on the forces of the fascist ‘nationalist guards’, which have been prepared before the coup and have been expended and legalised after the success of the coup” (al-Hamdani, 2007:26).

According to some scholars and historians, including Hanna Battatu, the nationalist guards “acted as though it were the highest authority” (Battatu, 1978:1012). Karol R. Sorby has confirmed this fact in that “The National Guard was formed to check the power of the Communists and other opponents of the Baath Party
on the streets” (Sorby, 2009:20). This means that this militia were acting freely without a central ruler’s permission. Here, as proof of this argument, Fletcher has described it as a crime, as he concludes: It becomes an offence to perpetrate acts of physical force within the confines of a particular central authority” (Fletcher, 1997:35).

In addition, al-Hamdani, as an eyewitness, has described the BP’s behaviour towards its opponents when they seized power as follows:

“Gangs have started the investigation with the detainees, whether military and civilians”, and he continues “the coup supporters began conducting the screening of the detainees. Thus, who was communist or a Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) member, immediately have been shot without any trial” (Al-Hamdani, 2007:26/32).

Moreover, Ibrahim Jalal as an eyewitness, in his book ‘South Kurdistan and September Revolution, Construction and demolition 1961-1975’ describes the Iraqi army and national guards, including the Syrian Baath’s army of “Yarmouk Forcess”, which interred Iraqi Kurdistan to support the troops of the Iraqi BP’s campaign, creating a disaster. Jalal concludes:

“In addition to the Iraqi army and the Syrian Yarmouk forces, thousands of Arab mercenaries (National guard) were involving the campaign to attack Kurdistan, and they have been told; this is the Kurdish war against the Arabs, if you do not destruct and annihilate them, the Kurds will attack to occupy Arab villages and cities to wipe them out. On the other hand, they were promised if they occupied any Kurdish area, they have right to loot everything. In conclusion, this attack was so brutal; the media of some socialist countries have described it as genocide” (Jalal, 1999:115.)

In addition to this important statement, al-Hamdani as an Arab communist during that period, confirms Jalal’s admission and concludes:

“It was less than four months after the Baathist coup, the leaders of the coup took the initiative even without warning to launch a large-scale military campaign against Kurdistan. They used the destruction weapons
and aircraft, harassed the Kurdish people, the destruction of their villages and killing thousands of their children” (Al-Hamdani, 2007:32).

This kind of admission has also been confirmed by the interviewees who were also eyewitnesses; one of them is a senior lawyer and previous KRG MP, Tariq Jambaz stated, “In 1963 unfortunately the Nationalist guards arrested many people. At that time I was in Erbil and I was around 14 years old” (Jambaz, interview N17).

The interviewee Muhammad Sharif, also an eyewitness, affirmed the behaviour of Nationalist guards and stated:

“In 1963, when Arabs came to our area, they took all the Kurds’ properties. Those people were belonging to the Nationalist Guards, wearing civilian clothes, and taking all the animals of the Kurds” (Dr Sharif, interview Nr 9).

In conclusion, the intention behind this campaign, as Baath’s launched its authority, was to terminate the Kurdish existence forever. In association with the essence of such violence, Fletcher has explained it in terms of the definition of Elias as:

“With respect to humans would include actions which infringe physical integrity, such as torture, wounding, killing and rape or destruction by impact or arson” (Fletcher, 1997:47, from cf. Van Benthem van den Bergh 1980a: 15). Thus, violence in Elias’s understanding according to Fletcher refers “to the direct violation of physical integrity” (Fletcher, 1997:48).

Another crucial point regarding violence put forward by Elias, and according to Jonathan Fletcher, is the number of people involved (Fletcher, 1997:48). For Elias, the image of violence is related to the different kinds of levels of violence, from individual criminal acts, to political violence, and ending with larger scale inter-group violence. Here, “the larger scale inter-group violence (war and the threat of war) is more intertwined with identities centred on a particular state or nation” (Fletcher, 1997:48, from cf. Van Benthem van den Bergh 1980a: 7-8). Therefore, we can note two kinds of characteristics: the numbers of people involved, and the identity of those people, which was the main issue for the Baathist Nationalist guards. Thus, regarding the number of Baathist militia, according to Battatu: “On the day of the coup, in February, this force counted no more than 5,000 men, but by May it had grown to 21,000 and by August to 34,000” (Battatu, 1978:1012).
This huge increase in the numbers of Nationalist guards over just a few months is in itself considered a reflection of Arab-centrism in the form of pan-Arabism, and the desire of the people to join a violent organisation. On the other hand, according to Elias’s we-image in the form of I-identification, the Baathists were, from the beginning, planning a specific procedure against the non-Arabs in order to monopolise the identity of Iraq in the form of pan-Arab nationalism, and this is clearly reflected in its political literature. On the other hand, in association with the figures involved and the identification of violence, they cooperated with the other Baathist party of Syria to collaborate against the Kurdish political armed movement— as Munif al-Razaz called it ‘Arabised fighting’ (Munif al-Alrazaz, 2000:155). Here, according to the Syrian ‘Munif al-al-Razaz’, who was one of the prominent Iraqi Baath leaders, in his book ‘the Kurdish issue in Iraq’, he criticised the Syrian BP for its intervention in favour of the Iraqi BP, explaining that:

“The Syrian Yarmuk forces entered in early October 1963 under the command of Colonel Fahd al-Shair. These forces have been incorporated under the command of the first unit commander of the Iraqi army and then have took the initiative to participate in the fighting immediately after it centered in the regions of Zakho and Dohuk” (Munif al-Alrazaz, 2000:154).

Al-Hamdani explains it as “the liquidation of the Kurdish movement” (Al-Hamdani, 2007:32).

6.3. The Second Baath Regime and Violence

In the previous section, the aim of the campaign of the Baathists has been shown to be to annihilate the Kurdish presence forever. The Baathists, after being expelled from power by a military coup, began to configure and organise their own affairs in order to return to power. Throughout the period of the 1960s, the violence in Iraq continuously increased and “the Baathists returned to power by pulling two coups, one on July 17 and the other on July 30, 1968” (Battatu, 1978:1074). This kind of return could be an inevitable result of changes in the inter-dependency of human relations, due to the internal and external conditions. In this regard, Fletcher, dependent Elias’s interpretation, has described the increase in violence according to Elias’s model of conflict: “This model of a conflict situation in which two groups are
locked together in shared mutual hatred and suspicion described Elias’s concept of a double-bind process in which violence becomes highly likely” (Fletcher, 1997:58).

Here, in Iraq’s example we face the similarity of two or more groups who are resorting to violence under the we-image in relation to Arab-centrism, and attempting to seize power using the army and paramilitaries. Thus, after the collapse of its first coup in 1963, the BP attempted to return more strongly, both ideologically and militarily. This sort of return was possible due to many factors, including the weakness (Al-Hamdani, 2007:64) of Major General ‘Abd-ur-Rahman Aref’, who seized power on April 16, 1966 (Battatu, 1978:1070). These successive coups have raised many question marks around Iraq as a model of a nation state. Concerning the establishment of a state, Dr. Mohamed Mohy Alheims in his article ‘State under formation; Exile dialogue, proof of existence, (Iraqi Kurdistan as a model), concludes that “Is the emergence of a stable government, for a stable popularity, on a certain spot of the earth” (Mohy Alheims, 2013:224).

As a consequence, Mohy Alheims in his analysis of the Middle Eastern nation states did not approach the legitimacy of the authority when a political party seizes power. With regard to this argument, Robert Rotberg in his book ‘When States Fail, Causes and Consequences’ has stated, “When the rulers are perceived to be working for themselves and their kin, and not the state, their legitimacy, and the state’s legitimacy, plummets” (Rotberg, 2010:9).

This statement is an exact description of the Baath’s party’s authority, which was monopolised by Saddam Hussein and his family (Nalepka, Ella; Manoukian, Setrag, 2014:5) or (Post, J.M. and Baram, A., 2002:10). In other words, in a more accurate statement, Joseph Sassoon in his description of the authority states, “Decision making in the 1980s and 1990s become centralized in the presidential domain, but in both decades the party was deeply involved in micromanaging the country” (Sassoon, J., 2011:5).

This distance from legitimacy as a decisive issue has constantly been ignored under the hegemony of the streams of pan Arab nationalism, and throughout the chaotic process of authoritarian rule. Hence, it could be for this reason that Dr. A. Jassim Al-Saadi in his article in the Arabic language ‘Iraq between two cultures, a
culture of civil society and the culture of violence’ has described the nature of violence in the BP’s mentality, as he argues:

“The culture of violence, weapons, power and what is carrying of synonyms and derivatives that were the recipe's membership in both structure, its general strategy of the Baath Party and a condition of belonging to him. They considered it as part of the virility of the party and the masculinity of its sons in conquering enmity and rooting them out when it is necessary” (J. A. Al-Saadi, 2007:26).

This nature of violence, as al-Saadi has confirmed, led the BP to militarise Iraqi society to a large degree. The Baath’s legitimising of violence was fed by revolutionary legitimacy and pan-Arab-centrism. The common features between the BP and Nazi Germany include militarising the society, as has been argued by Cyprian Blamires: “Both Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany pursued the militarization of their own countries domestically through the establishment of mass movements devoted to the creation of alert, physically fit, warlike population” (Blamires, C., 2006:422). This ideology according to Cyprian Blamires is “Based on a social Darwinist belief in the endemic nature of struggle in the world and on the glorification of war as a means of building heroic character” (Blamires, C., 2006:422).

In this regard, the BP’s ideology has been discussed as if it was based on social Darwinism. Among those who have discussed this issue is Tejel, J., Sluglett, P. and Bocco, R., Bozarslan, Hamid who argue:

“Very distinct from cultural forms of Arab nationalism, including the brand advocated by Sati’ al-Husri, this nationalism approached to be social Darwinist in ideology as well as in practice” (Tejel, J., Sluglett, P. and Bocco, R., Bozarslan, H., 2012:146/147).

Thus, it seems that the BP was utilising the elements of social Darwinism in terms of shaping their vision towards the outcast or the outsider. The main goal was to establish these militias, according to Kazem Mohammed Ahmed in his article ‘A Brief History of the Militias in Iraq’, as he states that the “militarization of Iraqi society, suppressed any popular movement and the distraction of large numbers of Iraqi people” (K. M.Ahmed, 2006).
6.4. The Process of Genocide through the Partition of the Kurds (Divide and Rule)

The process of genocide in Iraq against the Kurds is complicated because of the intricate strategy of the BP. The BP pursued different levels in order to implement its policy of genocide. The most prominent Baath project was the partition of the Kurds, depending on the Machiavellian principle of ‘Divide and rule’, in order to dominate Kurdish society. In other words, the BP did not see the Kurds as an independent society, but as some untamed or unmanageable groups that they had to civilise through the policy of Arabisation. In this regard, Yitzhak Nakash in his book ‘The Shi’as of Iraq’ argues:

“The different political aspirations of the Shi’is and Kurds played into the hands of Saddam Hussein in his struggle for survival. The Iraqi leader split the two groups, pursuing policies of divide and rule as well as the carrot and the stick” (Nakash, Y., 2003:278)
Figure No. (2) Ethnic and Religious Iraq map

Source: Global Security. Cited from:
However, this policy was not limited to subgroups, but it was very specifically aimed towards the Kurds in terms of absolute domination. In this regard, Yitzhak Nakash concludes:

“While Saddam was probably not surprised by Kurdish desire for self-rule, his violent response to the Shi’i insurrection suggests that he perhaps felt betrayed by the Iraqi Shi’i, particularly after many had demonstrated their loyalty to the Iraqi state in fighting their Iranian coreligionists in the course of the Iran-Iraq war” (Nakash, Y., 2003:278).

Here, as a consequence of this vision, the purpose supposed by the policy of the Baath, as a secular nationalist party, towards Shi’a Arabs was totally different in comparison to the Kurds, because the conflict with the Shi’a Arabs in the beginning was inherently integrative. Later, after the uprising of 1991, as Nakash has confirmed, the interrelations gained some apparent sectarian dimensions. Additionally, the Baath’s policy towards the Kurds was built upon the ethnic background in order to Arabise the Kurds.

Here, as a consequence of the BP’s vision of the Kurds, a specific procedure was initiated. Additionally, as previously discussed, the policy of the BP concerning the Kurds had different levels depending on the principle of ‘Divide and rule’. Therefore, probably every Kurdish component and area gained its own specific genocidal policy and particular genocidal stages in order to conceal the process.

6.5. Faili Kurds- the Weakest Circle

Faili Kurds, initially, were selected because of their membership of a collective group, as well as their background as an out-group. The Iraqi authority, depending on the genocide model, intentionally created a criminal plan within the administration procedure or through issuing specific legislation (Hilberg, R., 1985). In this regard, specific legislation on including deliberate identification was considered. Thus, ‘the political report of the eighth region Conference for Baath Arab Socialist Party, 1974’ purposefully explains all of the justifications for expelling the Faili Kurds from Iraq. The most reiterated justification is the “appropriate treatment of the dangerous foreigners” (The 8th report of BASP, 1974). This justification could be handled through the Eliasian principle of ‘Attack and defence’ as a social formation process. Thus, pursuing this principle is not because of the real threat from the Faili Kurds, but because of the Faili’s background. In addition, Baathists consistently
highlighted the dangers and the existence of the plots to harm the Arabs from external enemies and internal traitors (BASP, 1982:62). Therefore, the BP launched a specific policy involving a long-term process against this important Iraqi Kurdish component.

The first action against the Faili Kurds took place in 1963 when Abd al-Karim Qasim was overthrown from power by the BP and its allies. Here, as an initial base, Preti Taneja has determined that “Under the Ba’ath regime, they (Faili Kurds) were specifically targeted and killed, or stripped of their Iraqi citizenship, under suspicion of having links with Iran, traditionally considered an enemy by Iraq” (Taneja, 2011:8).

The BP attempted to unsettle the social, economic and political position of the Faili Kurds through a process of changing the citizenship law, and they issued multiple instructions against them. The first stage appeared with the issuing of the new Iraqi citizenship Law No. (43) in the year 1963, after the coup of the BP. Thus, according to Article-19 of the law:

“The Minister may withdraw the Iraqi citizenship from a foreigner who has acquired it or if he attempted to do anything is considered as a threat to state security or its safety” (Iraqi citizenship Law No. (43) for the year 1963).

According to this article, Faili Kurds fell under category (B)- those who acquired Iraqi citizenship. Moreover, the Faili community was involved in active participation in the resistance against the coup of the BP in 1963, therefore, their fate after the issue of this nationality act, was in the hands of the minister.

As a consequence, after the Baathist’s second coup in 1968, the security campaigns against the Faili Kurds intensified, and they were targeted everywhere; however, in 1970 these security campaigns become more extreme and more intense. Thus, the security campaigns were reliant on some legal official documents. One of these documents is the Iraqi Temporary Nationality Act No. (21) of 1968. According to Article 20 of this act:

“An Iraqi nationality is determined by the law and shall not be dropped from Iraq who belongs to the Iraqi families and was living in Iraq before 6 August 1924 and have been enjoying the Ottoman nationality and chose the Iraqi pastoral.
B. It is possible to withdraw the citizenship from naturalized citizens in cases specified by the nationality act” (Temporarily Nationality Act No. (21) of 1968).

Here, it means that the person’s nationality could be dropped from the previous non-Ottoman nationality. Thus, it justified the withdrawal of nationality from the Faili Kurds, considering them as foreigners or Iranian dependents. This justification made their expulsion to outside of the country easier, under any pretext.

Hence, because of this reason Michael Gunter states:

“The Faili Kurds were thus one specific element of the Iraqi policy of Arabization that sought to reduce Kurdish numbers, and thus influence, in Iraq in favour of the Arabs” (Gunter, 2009:51).

In addition, we can understand from this argument that the issue is the social, economic and political influence of the Faili Kurds in the Kurdish or other Iraqi political movements. However, the hatred against the Faili Kurds reached a very dangerous level, when the Iraqi government under the leadership of the Baathists during the time of the March Manifesto of 1970:

“Refused to approve the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) nominee, Habib Karim, (the Faili Kurd) as vice president of Iraq under terms of Article 12 of the Manifesto” (Gunter, 2009:51).

In addition to Gunter’s argument, Sherko Kirmanj in his book ‘identity and nation in Iraq’ addeds:

“However, any hope of implementing the manifesto soon evaporated, as shortly after the signing, the regime expelled thousands of Faili-Kurds from Iraq and launched a policy of Arabization” (Kirmanj, 2013:151).

Here, Arabisation appeared at the core of pan-Arab-centrism and as a consistent Baath policy. However, the existence of Faili Kurds in the capital Baghdad and around it, as the home base of the majority of them and their active social, political and economic participation, was totally in contrast with Baath policy. Therefore, the practical steps taken by the BP, in terms of eliminating the Faili Kurds, found their way.

The position of the Faili Kurds, according to the BP, in comparison to the rest of the Kurdish nation, was more dominant and more sensitive. This is because of four main issues, which are ethnic, economic, political and religious factors (al-Fazil, 2013), as set out below.
6.5.1. Ethnic Factor

The Faili Kurds, according to many Kurdish or other historians, are an authentic Kurdish community from both sides of the Iraq/Iran border, and they lived in this area for a very long time. The defence of the existence of Faili Kurds in these areas, and acknowledgement of their presence, is crucial because of the BP’s argument for the process of Faili’s deportation and extermination. One Arab author called ‘Abbas al-Azzawi’, in his examination of the history of the Iraqi city of Amara, declared that “this city was formed in 1860 and was inhabited by the clan (Dozawah) of Allure Faili’s, include some of nomadic tribes” (Z. K. Abbud, 2007:9). In contrast, Zuher Kazim Abbud, an Iraqi Arab, according to a study for ‘The Internally Displaced People of Iraq’ by the authors John Fawcett and Victor Tanner and published by Brookings Institution–SAIS Project on Internal Displacement, argues that many Faili Kurds “in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, began migrating westwards to Iraqi cities, primarily Baghdad, where they took on key commercial, social, and cultural roles” (Fawcett & Tanner, 2002:15). Also, Micheal Gunter’s argument in his book “the A to Z of the Kurds” is that a “group of some 150,000 Kurds originally from the Kirmanshah region in Iran who had lived in Iraq (many in Baghdad) since Ottoman times, but without Iraqi citizenship” (Gunter, 2009:51). This argument, including its simplification of the history of this important entity, is different to the geographical reality of the Kurdish inhabited region, which was divided before the formation of Iraq.

In contrast to their previous argument, John Fawcett and Victor Tanner describe how the Faili Kurds are “a group of Kurds from a region of the Zagros Mountains straddling the Iran-Iraq border. Due to the geography of their homeland, the Faili Kurds have family members on both sides of the border” (Fawcett & Tanner, 2002:15). This argument is closer to the majority of historians regarding the existence of Faili families living on both sides of the border, and it primarily refers to the division of the Kurdish homeland since the ‘Chalderan’ war between the Ottoman Sultanate and the ‘Safawit’ state. In this regard, Zaki Ja’far al-Faili al-Alawi, a Faili Kurdish author, in his book ‘the history of Faili Kurds and the prospects for struggle’ has discussed the division process between the Ottoman Sultanate and the Safawit state, as he argues that, “After several treaties and protocols concluded between the two sides nearly three centuries they ratified a final agreement on 15 July 1929 without consulting the Faili Kurds living in the border areas” (al-Faili al-Alawi, Z.
Thus, according to Zaki al-faili in his description of the Faili region, “as a result of this agreement it remained Faili land located between Kirkuk in the north and Basra in the south of the modern Iraqi state” (al-Faili al-Alawi, Z. 2009:17). This includes the city of Amara, and is referred to by the Iraqi Arab historian Abbas al-Azzawi. In an examination of the origins of the Faili Kurds, Zuher Kazim Abbud has concluded that “the Faili are native to Mesopotamia population (Mesopotamia) and that the current population in the south and central Iraq are descendants of Faili and do not belong to the Arabs or remember any link” (Z. K. Abbud, 2007:29). Here, al-Faili al-Alawi, who is defending this case, has come to the conclusion that “the fragmentation of the homeland of Faili Kurds between the two countries without taking their opinion and even took the Arabization policy of compulsory taking place against the residents in these areas” (al-Faili al-Alawi, Z. 2009:17).

Thus, “Iraq, when it was invented, inherited its political system of democratic governance of Representatives from the State mandate similar to Western democratic systems. Though, after the independence in 1932, this system was emptied from its content” (Nasir al-Faili, 2005:13). However, the pursuance of this Western model by the British mandate was holistically imposed and its influence spread. Thus, the Iraqi constitution has a direct relationship with the formation of Iraqi institutions and a particular model of constitution. This issue has been mentioned by Zuher Kazim Abbud who argues that “Not surprisingly, one of the first who challenged the Kurdishness and also the Iraqiness of Faili Kurds was the representative of the British administration in Iraq ‘Cecil John Edmond’ at the period of the occupation of Iraq” (Z. K. Abbud, 2007:24). However, the shadow of the long conflict and the sectarian ideology between the pan Sunni Ottoman Sultanate and pan Shi’a Iranian Safawit, imposed its influence on all stages of the formation of the Iraqi nation state, including its institutions. This influence of the Sunni pan-Arab Ottoman officers included the pan-Arab King Faisal, as has been explained previously. In this regard, Nasir al-Faili has raised concern and argued that “the survival of the regime under the hegemony of a minority whether a clan, sectarian minority, a political party or racial minority, making the resort to tyranny objectively a reality, because the adoption of a correct parliamentary representation enable the power’s transfer to the majority owners” (Nasir al-Faili, 2005:14).

On the other side, and in association with the Faili position, according to al-Faili al-Alawi “the Ottoman Empire was in dire need of soldiers in the wars with the
Balkans, the Caucasus and northern Iran and Tripoli countries, and if the soldier went to war, he does not return unscathed” (al-Faili al-Alawi, Z. 2009:25). Therefore, the majority of Faili Kurds, according to Ali Nasir al-Faili and other authors, rejected joining the Ottoman army, specifically through the forced recruitment method. However, the difference in the sectarian religious faith could be the most important reason for the Faili and some Shi’a Arabs rejection of Ottoman army service. Here, Ali Nasir al-Faili in his book ‘the Faili Kurds between past and present’ discovered that “there was an easy way to get rid of the impasse forced recruitment. Many people of Faili Kurds and Arabs took the initiative to buy Iranian citizenship for a sum of money. On the other hand the Ottoman staff that were part of the administrative rampant corruption were ready to accept bribes to delete the names of recruits” (Nasir al-Faili, 2005:14). As a consequence of the absence of the Faili registration in the Ottoman records, and as a result of the existence of the sectarian atmosphere, the tendency of discrimination and pan-Sunni- Arab-centrism, the Faili Kurds had their Iraqi nationality removed because of their Iranian dependency. This has actually been reiterated by many authors, one of whom is Shahrough Akhavi, as in his book ‘Middle East Studies History, Politics and Law’ he declared that Faili Kurds “could not receive full Iraqi citizenship, their ancestors having declined Ottoman citizenship in an attempt to avoid military conscription” (Akhavi, 2004:25).

For this reason, many Faili Kurds preferred to gain Iranian nationality to avoid joining the Ottoman army. Therefore, they have been considered ‘Iranian dependency cases’ (The political report of the eighth regional Conference of Baath Arab Socialist Party 1974).

Thus, under Iraqi citizenship Law No. (42) for the year 1924 “the Iraqi established citizenship has been imposed in two cases; the imposition of the Iraqi established citizenship and this citizenship has been imposed on two principals which are usually Ottoman residence in Iraq, and to be an Ottoman employee in the Ottoman government even if they are not normally resident in Iraq” (Shawka, A. 2012). An important question here, is who is the Ottoman? In this regard, according to Ahmad Nasir al-Faili, Ottoman law “No. (42) defined the characters of Ottoman citizen as: who is living in any part of the Ottoman Empire” (Nasir al-Faili, 2005:14). Thus, dependent on this definition, any foreigner from any part of the Ottoman areas deserve Iraqi citizenship, except Faili Kurds. According to Fawcett, J., & Tanner, there were ‘taba’yya’, which means the followers of Iran, and they confirm that “two
specific groups stand out, the Faili Kurds and the taba’iyya who are mostly Shi’i Arabs” (Fawcett, J., & Tanner, V. 2002:14). Hence, this citizenship law was considered as a judgment or as majeure for Iraqiness. In addition, the Faili Kurds who had not served in the Ottoman army and had registered for Iranian dependency, according to Riadz Jasm al-Faili, “became an Iraqi citizen of second class” (al-Faili, 2007), which involves the acquisition of citizenship in place of an established citizenship. This kind of distinction between the two types of citizenship exists in the British legal system, as there is the title “naturalized subjects” (Naturalization, 2008). In addition, “there had always been a distinction in English law between the subjects of the monarch and aliens” (Dunham, William, 1951”43).

5.5.2. Religious factors

“Contrary to the majority of their Kurdish brethren, they are Shi’a” (Fawcett, J., & Tanner, V. 2002:15). This factor, along with the other factors, highlights the position of the Faili Kurds. Thus, the issue of religion could be another dilemma for the Faili Kurds’ citizenship and later the process of genocide. It has been asked, “Why is it the Faili Kurds people were exposed to the worst ethnic disposition operation in Iraq?” (Hasan, D. 2015). Here, more than one factor has affected the position of the Faili Kurds, including geographical position, ethnicity, political activity, economy and religion. However, ethnicity and religion could be the most important issue according to successive Iraqi authorities, from the Kingdom to the republic of the BP. In this regard, according to the report ‘Iraq’s Minorities: Participation in Public Life’ by Preti Taneja and published by ‘minority rights group international’, “the Faili Kurds are Shi’a Muslims by religion (Kurds are predominantly Sunni) and have lived in Iraq since the days of the Ottoman Empire” (Taneja, 2011:8). In addition, the difficult inter-relationship between Sunni and Shi’a Muslims, as has previously been explained, meant the Shi’a were generally were marginalised by the authority of the pan-Arab Sunni King, and later all successive Sunni ethno-Arab authorities. Ahmad Nasir al-Faili has examined this dilemma and he concludes, “the ethnic factor as they are belonging to the Kurdish nation, the sectarian factor is the other reason to double the persecution because they are from the Shi’a doctrine” (Nasir al-Faili, 2005:15). Thus, in a similar tendency, the Arab author Zuher K. Abbud has announced that “the chauvinists who have ruled over power in Iraq, have committed against the Faili Kurds three crimes that cannot exempt them from punishment.
The **first** is disbelieving that Faili Kurds are an integral part of the Kurdish nation... and....

**Second**: they are followers of the Ahl al-Bayt\(^1\) and specifically followers of the doctrine of (Shi’a) Ja’vari. This sect was followed by the Faili’s in Iraq before the conversion of Iranians to this doctrine.

**Third**: the Faili Kurds engaged in the Iraqi national political movement from early on, especially the left-wing parties, because of the injustice they suffered” (Z. K. Abbud, 2007:7).

Thus, this ethno-Kurdishness and Shi’a sectarian background, particularly because of sharing a common background with Iranian Shi’a sectarianism, means the position of the Faili Kurds has always been a dilemma for Iraqi Sunni-ethno-Arab-authorities. This dilemma includes political and economic factors, which is explained in the next part.

6.5.3. Political and Economic Factors

Zuher Abbud’s third point about the political movement is also significant because of the Faili’s political role, not just in Iraqi national politics, but also in support of the Kurdish political movement, both physically and economically. In this regard, the economical ability and their position in terms of their cultural influence in Baghdad played a significant role, as it has been examined by John Fawcett and Victor Tanner: “In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, many Faili Kurds began migrating westwards to Iraqi cities, primarily Baghdad, where they took on key commercial, social, and cultural roles” (Fawcett, J., & Tanner, V. 2002:15).

This has been emphasised by many authors including Preti Taneja, who asserts that, “Faili Kurds were merchants and business people, active in political and civil society, and founded the Baghdad Chamber of Commerce in the 1960s” (Taneja, 2011:16).

Thus, Faili Kurds according to Ahmad Naisr al-Faili “were one of the financial resources to support the Kurdish revolution” (Nasir al-Faili, 2005:18). As a

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1 The term Ahl al-Bayt literally meaning “People of the House of Hashmi, the descent of Prophet Muhammad.” This term indicates Shi’a Muslims as followers of Muhammad’s family in front of the Sunni Muslims (El Sandouby, A.E.I., 2008:28).
consequence of these arguments, the influence of the Faili Kurds over political, economic and social activity became a crucial obstacle for the totalitarian policy of the BP. Therefore, in front of the Faili’s vitality, the Baath’s reactions were absolutist.

6.6. The Expulsion

Since the Baath’s takeover of the authority in 1968, the policy of expulsion took on dangerous dimensions, as it had several serious levels. Hiding behind national security, the Arabisation of the country moved towards advanced stages against the mixed areas and the Faili Kurds.

First: the general motive according to the BP was the Iranian occupation of the three United Arab Emirate islands in the Strait of Hormuz. Here, the pan-Arab centrism in the Baath discourses was activated in practice. This policy was reflected in the media of the Baath authority and its literature. In addition, it is stated in the ‘central report of the 9th regional Conference of the Baath Party’ that:

“...When Shah (Iran) terminated the Convention of 1937 in April 1969 and became a threat to the sovereignty of Iraq, he was threatening the Iraqi sovereignty on the Shatt al-Arab and conspiring against the revolutionary regime and supporting the gangster Barzani, the Iranian residents in Iraq and some of those with acquired naturalized Iraqi nationality, forming the (fifth column) within Iraqi society. They were behind most of the propaganda and the tensions in Iraqi society, they were providing information to the Iranian and international Zionism intelligence on the Iraqi economy, the strategic locations, the armed forces positions and all other necessary information, which the Iranian intelligence and its cooperator intelligence needed” (political report of the 9th regional Conference of the Baath Party, 1974:61).

This announcement through the Baath annual report forms the most believable evidence and reveals the Baath’s policy on Faili Kurds. This text includes further preparation for the campaigns through pan-Arab-nationalistic ideology. It structuralises the idea of conspiracy in order to influence public opinion. Additionally, this report claims:
“When the dispute intensified with the Shah of Iran’s regime, this (fifth column) attempted to repeal the revolution openly and its conspiratorial activity has escalated against the homeland. Here, as a precaution, the revolution has deported a few thousands residents in Iraq to Iran, as a redeem from their evil and their plotting, as a punishment for those who are traitors to the land which has sheltered many generations of them, and this happened at the end of 1971 and continuously to later periods” (Political report of the 9th regional Conference of the Baath Party, 1974:62).

Here, the report is admitting that a few thousand ‘fifth columns’ had been expelled and their properties captured. Thus, as with all genocidal processes, the targets should be dehumanised and demonised in order to dilute the issue and spread support for the process, along with the participation of the public. This is what the BP did to prepare for the next stage of genocide.

In relation to the first step, according to Zaki Ja’far al-Faili al-Alawi, the Baath authority announced that:

“All citizen who wants Iraqi ID documents, has to prove their Iranian dependency. However, who wants the Iraqi nationality certificate they have to visit the residency and citizenship office” (al-Faili al-Alawai, 2009:26).

In addition to this declaration, according to al-Faili al-Alawai “while Baathists were hunting those people and they were preparing lists for their displacement, which affected a lot of Iraqi merchants, even non-Faili Kurds, because for the era of time they were neighbours of Faili Kurds” (al-Faili al-Alawai, 2009:26). Thus, the intention of the Baathists became clear as they launched the start of the expelling campaign, and around seventy thousand Faili Kurds were registered for deportation in 1969, 1970 and 1971. This is in spite of signing the 11th March 1970 agreement between the Baath authority and the Kurdistan Democratic Party. In this regard, John Fawcett and Victor Tanner in their report ‘the Internally Displaced People of Iraq’ state, “In one instance, in the autumn of 1971, up to 40,000 Failis were expelled” (Fawcett & Tanner, 2002:15).

Thus, according to this report, in just one year, 40,000 Kurds were moved to the Iranian borders and many of them disappeared. In the same direction, Riad Jassim
al-Feeli in his article ‘The Crime Of Genocide Against The Faili Kurds’ confirms that:

“The promulgation of legislation and decisions of the Baath’s Revolutionary Command Council in years 1969-1970-1971 has caused more than (70,000) displaced and also the Faili villages and towns has been evacuated and its most Faili residents who have been expelled in 1975 as a collective punishment to the south and western Iraq” (Al-Feeli, R. 2011:2).

There was a decision to expel the rest of the Faili Kurds, therefore, the annual report contains a long explanation that continues: “let it be clear, anyone who is not from Iraqi origin, we will act with them as we have acted with those Iranian traitors when they turned their back on this homeland, which gave them their identity and good deeds” (political report of the 9th regional Conference of the BP, 1974:65).

Following this admission of the past acts and future threats, the biggest campaign started in 1980 after Saddam Husein become the first powerful man to practically seize power as Iraqi president, and he had a lot of power in his possession. In this year ‘1980’, the aggressiveness against the Faili Kurds took on new and dangerous dimensions, specifically at the beginning of the Iraq/Iran war, with its political, economic and social circumstances. Here, the resort to aggressive public discourse began to appear more visible because of the Mustansiriya incident. This incident, according to many documents, was taken as a pretext to launch the next steps (Majeed, 2010). Accordingly, the first step was the issuing of resolution No. 666 of 07.05.1980 in which Saddam Hussein as Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council decided to determine the fate of the Faili Kurds. Thus, in addition, the resolution includes “in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (a) of Article-42 of the Interim Constitution, The Revolutionary Command Council have decided in their session held on 07.05.1980 the following:

1. The Iraqi nationality shall be dropped from any Iraqi of foreign origin if it appears that he is not loyal to the homeland, people, higher national and social objectives of the Revolution.
2. The Minister of Interior must order anyone whose Iraqi Nationality has been dropped under paragraph 1, unless he is convinced according to sufficient reasons, that his stay in Iraq is a matter required by judicial or legal necessity or for
preservation of the rights of other persons which are officially authenticated.

3. The Minister of Interior shall undertake to execute this resolution.

Saddam Hussein.

“Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council” (Resolution No. 666).

Additionally, this kind of legal procedure is reflected in Saddam’s announcement when he admitted that the Faili Kurds:

“Went to the dustbin of history, they went to a non-return. Uprooted from the land of Iraq, in order to not profane the Iraqi weather, nor profane the Iraqi flag when mixing their blood with the blood of Iraqis by intermarriage. Thus they have been eradicated by the revolution from their roots to terminate their existence and to remain pure national Iraqis, who do not accept humiliation upon the forehead” (Hussein, S., 1981).

Thus, as a result of this policy, the number of victims from 1968 onward increased, and “130,000 deported Failis Kurds and approximately 5,000 male individuals aged 16 to 40 have been kept back in Iraq in various prisons” (Kreyenbroek, P.G. and Sperl, S. eds., 2005:102).

In the same direction, according to the Faili legal writer Riyadh Jassim Mohammed Faylee, “the vast deportation in 1980 more than 500,000 Failis without legal justification and the secret detention were between 15,000 to 20,000 people without any information of their fate” (Faylee, R. J. M., 2011).

6.7. The Deportation Process from Faili Kurds to the Rest of the Kurds

In the previous part, the historical developments and the causes of genocide of the Faili Kurds in Iraq has been investigated in relation to the stages and steps the BP took towards the Faili Kurds in Bagdad and other Faili areas. However, the process against the Faili Kurds was not separate from the rest of the Kurds. This is because alongside the Faili Kurds, the on-going effort of the Arabisation of the oil-rich areas and the deportation of its Kurdish residents was in progress. This attempt was in preparation for the coming steps to reduce and restrain the Kurdish region and strengthen state control over the means of violence and taxation. In this regard the BP, with its advent to power, attempted to engage the Kurdish political movement in negotiations. Thus, the negotiations were in full swing, while the genocide of Faili Kurds was on-going, and at the same time the process of Arabisation was in progress. Hence, the unsuccessful 11th March agreement in 1970-
1974, refers to this dilemma. It is because of the BP’s Machiavellian policy “End justifies the means”, or the slogan of Baath “Everything for victory” in order to stabilise its domination over state organisations and institutions. Here, they needed political negotiations according to the BP’s allegations to investigate the issues of non-Arabs who are ‘according to the ‘cultural program for third stage of youthfulness of secondary school”, “living in the Arab homeland” (Cultural Program, 1983:114). Additionally, the allegation of “Arabic identity of the land, where these minorities live” (Cultural Program, 1983:115), provides a justified indication for assimilating or expelling the Kurds from their homeland.

Thus, ‘Iraq’s territorial integrity’ under the hegemony of the ‘party leader’, within the unity of the Arab homeland and Iraq, as an important and undivided part of the Arab homeland, did not allow for compromise or concessions. All these principles were concealed in the BP’s motto “one Arab nation with an eternal message” (Aflaq, 1987:105), which is contained throughout Aflaq’s writings- a form of “exalted we-ideal’ (Fletcher, 1997:149). This Nazi ideal according to Fletcher, “Was also more exclusive than other national ideals in emphasising the primacy of one race and one nation” (Fletcher, 1997:149). Here, what Michel Aflaq has announced about the Arab nation is close to the ideas of the Nazis as he concluded:

“It is (the nation) the same as before thousands and thousands of years ago, it is (the nation) advantage is the united of its origin and race when the unity was the only powerful relation” (Aflaq, 1987:106).

Here, when the BP succeeded in weakening the Faili Kurds and announced the 11th March agreement in order to stabilise its authority, five to seven years after the Baath’s Coup, they neglected all obligations towards the Kurds and the 11th March’s agreement.

The BP, in its push for Arabisation and Baathification of the highest number of people, and after its success in stabilising its authority, turned to the Kurdish movement using all possible tactics and techniques. In this regard:

“The Nazis made extremely effective use of several techniques, including terror, which was a short-term instrument of rule, concentration camps to remove dissenters and to intimidate the rest and a belief and behaviour tradition which reinforced the effectiveness of these techniques” (Fletcher, 1997:155), Baathists have pursued the same techniques, including terror,
deportation and gathering people in a concentrate camps. Thus, beside the Baath’s attempt to annihilate the Faili Kurds, the dodging, twisting and turning, according to many interviewees was the nature character of Baath Party in relation with any issues of non-Arabs. Thus, according to the participant Jabar Qadir “Baath Party was attempting to implement the process of Arabization of all Iraqi citizens and building a single nation in Iraq” (Dr J. Qadir, 8).

As a consequence, if this was the strategy of the BP, it is imaginable that all attempts that were in contrast to this strategy were considered as twisting and turning. Here, according to the participant interviewee Aso Karim:

“Baath’s ideas, its organisation and belief in moulding the society was a type of Nazism” (Aso Karim, 5).

For these reasons the interviewee Chinar Saad stated that:

“The 11th March agreement was a tactic. It was under the pressure of the Kurdish political movement. They were forced to yield to this agreement temporarily, otherwise there was no conviction from the BP to deal with the Kurdish question properly and it was a temporary containment” (Chinar Saad, 26).

In addition, there was unanimity among the interviewees that the BP spent time stabilising its authority in order to pursue its strategy in the form of pan-Arab-centrism at an appropriate time.

What is gradually noted here is the counter-current in the civilising process. Abram de Zwaan concludes with the core of the civilising process as he points out:

“While the state continues to monopolize the exercise of violence, and promotes and protects civilized modes of behaviour and expression in society, at the same time it perpetrates massive and organized acts of extreme violence towards specific categories of its citizens” (De Zwaan, 2001:265).

This kind of antithesis in the Baath’s policy, in the frame of the civilising process, according to Abram de Zwaan, was also applied in Nazi Germany, and later on in Iraq by the BP. However, it should be noted that the Nazis gained power in Germany through a legal election, whereas the Baathists seized power through a military coup. Hence, the BP’s rule until its end suffered from a lack of legitimacy,
yet both of them militarised society and targeted specific categories of their citizens. Therefore, when the Baath authority was in negotiations with the Kurdish political movement to solve the Kurdish issue as a civilising trend, at the same time, they were expelling Faili Kurds from their homes in Baghdad and other places. When they were announcing the national institution, particularly the national army, they were absorbed in building the different armed militias even among the educational institutions through the Baath’s youth organisations and Union of Students and Youth of Iraq (Faust, A. 2015:). Thus, they were militarising society, launching Arabisation in the mixed areas, especially the oil-rich areas in Kirkuk province, and deporting Kurdish civilians from Kurdish areas to Arab areas in south Iraq.

This behaviour has been confirmed by Hamin al-Hamdani as he claims the “Baathists resorted to Arabising the province of Kirkuk by bringing Arab tribes in order to change the nature of the demography. They also encouraged Arab citizens from various parts of Iraq to live in Kirkuk, and pledged to give each Arab family that agreed to live in Kirkuk a piece of land for free with a grant of ten thousand dinars to build a house. They did the same thing in Khanaqin, Sinjar, Sheikhan and where they construct resident camps under Arabic names to accommodate the Arab tribes” (Al-Hamdani, 2007:91). In contrast, according to al-Hamdani, “Baathists prevented the Kurdish citizens from building new homes and even the restoration of the old buildings. They came to falsify the census records of 1957, which was agreed to be adopted as the basis for the census” (Al-Hamdani, 2007:91).

This counter-current led the BP to terminate the 11th March agreement (the agreement, 1970) and to attack the Kurdistan region in 1974, which is known by the Kurds as Gulan’s revolution. Thus, the 11th March agreement was necessary for the BP to stabilise its authority, as has been mentioned by an eyewitness who was participating in the Kurdish movement at that time as one of the closest family members to the Kurdish leader; he said: “Saddam Hussein has used the four years of the peace process as a gift from the Kurdish leadership that followed the statement of March 11th, to strengthen his power and the influence of the Baath Arab Socialist Party, including his security and military apparatus. This stage has been represented through the liquidation of its internal enemies on a large scale, to build a strong army that included the process of Baathfication inside the army and to place the security and police forces under his command” (Barzani, 2011:361). In addition, the argument of de Zwaan has been applied to the BP in Iraq throughout the long-term process of
the totalitarian regime based on the monopoly of state institutions, including the monopoly of violent apparatus in order to centralise pan-Arabism as a state ideology.

6.8. Evacuation and Forced Camps (Civilising Offensive)

It is impossible to understand the BP’s conduct in Kurdistan without examining the inter-relationship between colonialism and the occupied population. Expulsion by the Baghdad authority from this relationship led to incomprehensible results. Here, if the Iraqi authority is not considered to be colonial rule, which dealt with the Kurdish people as occupier, the issues remain incomplete. Therefore, the inter-relationship between the Kurds and the Iraqi authority should be studied in this way. In this regard, it is important to quote Robert van Krieken’s understanding in order to recognise the colonial behaviour towards the indigenous people, particularly his study ‘the stolen generation’. For example, van Krieken argues:

“Central here is the question of colonialism and imperialism, the ways in which nation states have established a brutal and violent relationship between their own ‘civilization’ and the supposedly ‘barbaric’ cultures of subjected peoples” (Krieken, Robert, 1999).

Thus, the Iraqi Baath authority as a type of nation state pursued a specific policy towards the Kurds. Additionally, as Mufti and Bouckaert have concluded, “since the 1930s, but particularly from the 1970s onwards, successive Iraqi administrations have forcibly displaced hundreds of thousands of ethnic Kurds, Turkomans (a Turkish-speaking Iraqi minority), and Assyrians from northern Iraq, and repopulated the area with Arabs moved from central and southern Iraq” (Mufti, H. and Bouckaert, P., 2004.). Hence, alongside different kinds of genocide procedures, three kinds of deportation were in progress. The first one was against the Faili Kurds, second, the deportation of the Kurdish residents of the mixed areas in Kirkuk, Khanaqin and Shingal to be replaced by emigrant Arabs. Third is the evacuation of the borders, which has been concluded in the 3rd act of the Algeria Agreement that “Accordingly, the two parties shall restore security and mutual confidence along their joint borders” (IMCM, 1981:56). In this regard, the UN report concludes “In the mid and late 1970s, the regime again moved against the Kurds, forcibly evacuating at least a quarter of a million people from Iraq’s borders with Iran and Turkey, destroying their villages to create a cordon sanitaire along these sensitive frontiers” (HRW/Middle East, 1995:22). Hence, these multiple deportations were
under consideration, however, the Iraqi authority allegedly claimed that in order to
develop the northern region they would build modern camps for the villagers. This
allegation started under the name of “The campaign of the development of the
northern region” and has called the concentration camps, “the modern villages”
(Muhammad, 2013:18). The UN report also confirmed that:

“In their propaganda, the Iraqis commonly refer to them as
“modern villages”; in this report, they are generally described as
“complexes” (HRW/Middle East, 1995:22).

Thus, the Iraqi claim was that these areas are far away from the cities and they
deserve prosperity like the rest of Iraq, such as better schools and hospitals.
Additionally, Martin van Bruinessen explains:

“In Iraq, there was no overall policy of forced assimilation to the Arab
majority, but there was rather the deliberate annihilation of traditional
Kurdish rural life and its economic basis by the wholesale destruction of
Kurdish villages and the deportation of their inhabitants (i.e., those that
were not killed) to strategic villages, “new towns,” or concentration
camps” (Van Bruinessen, 1994:1).

Here, an important gesture in Van Bruinessen’s research, is that the
deporation did not include Arabs. However, Michael Field has revealed the un-
cultivation of most of the land in central and southern Iraq, as follows: “Travelling
through central and southern Iraq one is struck by how uncultivated most of the land
appears” (Field, M., 1995:18).

Despite such a situation, there is no indication that any Iraqi Arab villages
were exposed to the deportation until the invasion of US troops in Iraq in 2003. Thus,
the UN report confirms, “most of the displaced Kurds were relocated into
mujamma’at, crude new settlements located on the main highways in army-controlled
areas of Iraqi Kurdistan” (HRW/Middle East, 1995:22).

Regarding the civilising offensive, it has been attempted to apply it to the
process of deportation of the Kurds for certain reasons; if we accept the argument that
the Kurds were removed from their homes in order to develop the northern region
under the name of:

“Campaign of the development of the northern region” and building for
them “the modern villages. This means that Baathists will civilise or
Arabise them in modern camps as Ali Hassan al-Majid has argued, “I am
keeping them close to me, to let them hear my voice to implant in their minds what I want of thinking, culture and consciousness” (Majid, M. 2009:5).

However, the Baathists did not conceal their ‘national ideal’ of the pan-Arab-centrism in the form of “one Arab Nation, with an eternal message”. These Baathist national ideals are so close to that of the Nazi National ideal and “were also more exclusive than other national ideals in emphasising the primacy of one race and one nation (Fletcher, 1997:149). Civilising offensive is a theoretical framework that has been derived from Elias’s work. Ryan Powell describes it, as he concludes:

“The term ‘civilising offensive’ is used by Dutch sociologists and historians to refer to a wide range of phenomena, from nineteenth-century bourgeois efforts to elevate the lower classes out of their poverty and ignorance and convince them of the importance of domesticity and a life of virtue, to the oppression of popular culture in early modern times and, in general, “the attack on behaviour presumed to be immoral or uncivilised” (Powell, R., 2013 from Verrips 1987: 3).

Additionally, if any community has been forced to move to a different place than their place under any kind of circumstances, it is considered to be a civilising offensive. However, Rohloff has also used it for the Australian stolen generation, as he states: “Some aboriginal children ‘in Australia’ were forcibly removed from their families in order to ‘civilize’ them to become more like the European colonists” (Rohloff, 2011:74).

Thus, the Australian authority’s “stolen generation”, from many aspects, became an inspiration for the Iraqi authority to deport thousands of villagers to the new camps (called Modern camps), which in reality were concentration camps. In this regard, van Krieken points out:

“It is important to supplement, systematically, the concept of civilising processes with that of civilising offensives, to take account of the active, conscious and deliberate civilising projects of both various powerful groups within societies and whole societies in relation to other regions of the world” (Van krieken, 1999:303).

Here, the relationship becomes counterproductive and centrifugal between the civilising process and the de-civilising process to gain an understanding of the civilising offensive. In the same field, but from another aspect, the resort to
aggressiveness and the discharge of the Kurdish inhabited region, according to Fletcher, should be a result of a decline in power and identity issues, as he argues:

“The deeply conditioned responses of aggressiveness and destructiveness in crisis situations prevalent in Nazi Germany were the result of a long intergenerational tradition bound up with successive defeats, a decline in power, uncertain national identity and an orientation towards the past” (Fletcher, 1997:149).

Additionally, on the one hand the Arab defeat at the Six-Day War in 1967, according to al-Hamdani, insulted the Arab dignity (Al-Hamdani, 2007:81). In the same direction, it has also been considered by Baathists as one of the reasons for the Baath’s coup in order to return the dignity of the Arabs (the Baath manifesto of the 17th and 30th July, 1968). On the other hand, after the defeat of the Kurdish Gulan’s armed movement in 1974 for Kurdish rights (Gunter, 2009:23), the BP’s Arabisation process continued and systematically started to discharge the Kurdish areas. So, why did the BP engage in violence as a passage to reach its ideological goals? If the Arab dignity had been assaulted in 1967 and the BP attempted to return the Arab dignity through the 1968’s coup, what happened in 1974 to affect a large portion of the Kurdish inhabited areas? Here, Fletcher’s argument is that:

“The deeply conditioned responses of aggressiveness and destructiveness in crisis situations prevalent in Nazi Germany was the result of a long inter-generational tradition bound up with successive defeats, a decline in power, uncertain national identity, and an orientation towards the past, the situation in Iraq was quite opposite. (Fletcher, 1997:149).

Primarily, the Iraqi Baath’s authority gained victory over the Kurdish armed movement and they re-occupied all liberated areas. Additionally, the Baath’s power was in its prosperous stage despite the Iraqi army’s tiredness due to the conflict with the Kurds.

6.9. The Impact of the Iraq/Iran War in 1979 and the Kurds

In order to show a zero relationship between the evacuations of the Kurdish rural areas and the Iran/ Iraq war, when the war started, the entire rural areas were annihilated. Therefore, the roots of the conflict between Arabs and Persians, as old as
the advent of Islam to the region and the collapse of the Sasanian Empire in front of the Arab Muslim warriors, continued. After the embracing of Shi’ism by the Persians in 1502, the conflict turned from an intellectual and civilisational conflict into an ethnic conflict in a sectarian form. ‘Geopolitical Determinism: The Origins of the Iran-Iraq War’ is an article by Efraim Karsh, who has determined the general cause as being an ethnic and religious divide, as he argues “In the case of the Iran-Iraq War, the general cause is often attributed to the ethnic and religious divide that has separated Arabs and Persians, Shi‘i and Sunni Muslims since at least the seventh century” (Karsh, 1990:256).

This means the conflict changed to an Arab Sunni and Persian Shi‘a conflict. In this regard, much has been written about the roots of the conflict, and how both sides mobilised religion and history against each other. However, the geopolitical position of Iraq as a new country, caused Iraq to rise to confront the conflict with Iran, as Efraim Karsh confirms, “to the newly established state of Iraq (1921) geography pose an existential challenge” (Karsh, 1990”258). After the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 and the announcement of the idea of exporting the revolution by the Iranian leader Ayatollah Khamenei, the concerns of the Iraqi authority, which was dominated by the Sunni Arabs, about Iranian hegemony in the region, were strongly renewed (Woods, 2009:30).

Here, the dilemma for the Kurds was about the impact of the Iran/ Iraq war. Were the AC a direct or indirect consequence of the Iraq/Iran war? To approach the answer, it is necessary to address some of the dimensions of the conflict. Primarily, there are two aspects to the problem: the first aspect lies in the instability of the relationship between Iraq and Iran for many reasons, including historic; the problems of the border and the intervening of both countries in the internal affairs of each other continuously, particularly because of the existence of the social dimensions on both sides, specifically the majority of Iraqi Arabs are Shi‘a Muslims. This aspect is linked to the second aspect, which lies in the southern section of Kurdistan located in northern Iraq, and the eastern section located in western Iran, both of which are located parallel to the Iran/ Iraq border. Thus, any instability between these two countries is indirectly reflected and affects both sides of the Kurdish population. Due to these common issues, especially the geopolitical factors, many agreements have been signed between both countries since the establishment of Iraq.
The most delicate stages between Iran and Iraq began after the seizing of power by the BP in Iraq. However, in the new era, the BP according to Ibrahim Jalal in his documentary book ‘South Kurdistan and its revolution’ continued its offensive: “Baath’s Party, by all means of war and around 60% of the Iraqi army has attacked the Kurdish areas in November 10, 1968 in all directions” (Jalal, 1998:257).

The Baath authority, in this new era, faced different challenges, including the war in Kurdistan. Therefore, they began negotiations with the Kurdish movement, according to Ibrahim Jalal: “For a temporary peace” (Jalal, 1998:259), to save time in terms of stabilizing their rule in Baghdad”.

Here, even the Baathists acknowledged the serious difficulties in this context, and this is set out in a specific BP booklet regarding the March 11th 1970 agreement, which affirms:

“The Party has found itself in front of a lot of problems, namely: The colonialism and Zionism devote most of their activities to expanding the fighting, even allowing them by passing their known settlement and authoritarian plans” (Committee in the Labour Culture foundation, 1975: 79).

After the collapse of the March 11th agreement, the Iraqi army began moving its troops toward the Kurdish areas and an outbreak of fighting began in 1974 between the Kurdish Peshmerga forces and the Iraqi troops. The most dangerous stages of the inter-relationship between Baghdad and the Kurdish movement, started with the Algerian agreement in 1975 between Iran and Iraq, under the surveillance of the USA and Arabic countries including Algeria. This agreement, at its core, is a concession to Iran in order to encourage the surrender of the Kurdish movement and signal the end of its resistance. Thus, this convention in Iraq was signed under economic, politic and social pressure; therefore, with the establishment of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the convention was cancelled by Iraq. All justifications for the termination of the agreement, including the Kurdish question, have been published in a booklet by the BP under the title ‘why the Algerian agreement between Iraq and Iran has been cancelled (Ministry of Culture and Media, 1981).

The consequences of the war on Kurdish society have been bitter and deadly. In this regard, Martin van Bruinessen in his article ‘The Kurds between Iran and Iraq’ states: “Control of territory and population became even more crucial on both sides than it had been before the war” (Van Bruinessen, 1986:14).
Thus, just before the outbreak of the war, in 1979, when Saddam Hussein became president of Iraq, he intensified the suppression of the Kurds. Since the outbreak of the war, it has been a cover to commit different massacres, as Inga Rogg and Hans Rimscha in their article ‘The Kurds as parties to and victims of conflicts in Iraq’ have claimed: “Baghdad embarked on brutal repression and forcible resettlement campaigns in the rural areas” (Rogg and Rimscha 2007:827).

Thus, under the conditions of the Iraq/ Iran war, along with the daily promoting of suspicion of actions being carried out by the Kurds, some campaigns had a direct influence on Kurdish society. Hence, claiming the implementation of brutal action took place outside the circumstances of the war is difficult.

6.10. i Gendercide

The Barzani tribe, along with other Kurdish components, were under the attention of the Baath’s authority, which could be because of the leadership role of Mulla Mustafa Barzani’s family for the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Kurdish political armed movement. In this regard, as has been previously explained, “As part of the Algiers Agreement of 1975, Iraq, Iran and Turkey agreed to create a security belt around and to move the all the population living within 10-20 km from the border” (Ahmad, M., 2014:173). Hence, Ef raïm Karsh in the same direction has confirmed, “The Algiers Agreement of March 1975 which, at one stroke, terminated the armed confrontation between the two countries, settled the Shatt al-Arab dispute, and paved the way for the suppression of the Kurdish rebellion” (Karsh, 2002:8). Here, as a consequence, according to Mohammad Ihsan:

“The Ba’thist regime implemented this plan immediately and started by deporting the Barzanis by moving the clans of Harki binejeh, Nizari Baroshi and few Mizuries to the south of Iraq by helicopters, military personnel carriers and also by train from Mosul” (Ahmad, M., 2014:173).

This displacement occurred at a time when the Kurdish movement had struck at the heart and the Baath’s authority and dominated the entire region. Thus, the definition of the patterns of displacement entered the implementation phase after the international specific legislation through the Algiers convention under the surveillance of US. It is classed as international legislation because more than one country had an influential role in the success of this agreement, including Iran and
Iraq as two members of the United Nations. It has been included in the 3rd act of the Algeria agreement that:

“Accordingly, the two parties shall restore security and mutual confidence along their joint borders. They shall also commit themselves to carry out a strict and effective observation of their joint borders so as to put an end to all infiltrations of a subversive nature wherever they may come from” (Dilip Hiro, 1989:301).

Thus, the Iraqi procedure and the Iraqi authority’s behaviour contradicted one of the points of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPCG), as it includes the act of “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part” (UNGA 1948:1). Additionally, beside the deportation of some Barzani people to southern Iraq, according to Mohammad Ihsan, “the forced displacement campaign continued on 26 June 1978. The entire population of Argush Village, more than 300 families, was deported to the concentration camp in Harir. On 7 July 1978, the entire population of Mizuri tribal villages was deported along with other the population of some Sherwani villages” (Ahmad, M., 2014:173). Thus, the process of deportation did not subside and did not stop until the Kurdish rural areas alongside Iran/ Iraq and Turkey/ Iraq were entirely evacuated.

Regarding the Barzani Kurds who were deported to the south of Iraq, according to Rebwar Ramazan Abdulla:

“From 1975 and beyond, of the continuity of the deportation of Barzani Kurds, the Baath Party discovered that there is a kind of sympathy between Barzani people and Shi’a residents of the province of Diwaniyah. Thus after five years of their difficult residency in the province of Diwaniyah, Barzani people for the 2nd time in 1980 have been transferred by the military trucks toward Qushtapa, which is a half hour away from Erbil city” (Abdulla, 2011).

Here, what remarkable is, the two prepared complexes under the names of ‘Qudis’¹ and ‘Qadisiya’, which are two names carrying the nature of Arabisation and

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¹ Quds or al-Quds, is the Arabic name for the city of Jerusalem; al-Quds in Arabic means “to be holy”. Arabs consider it to be an Arabic city, therefore, Arab nationalists in Iraq have utilised it as a symbol for their pan Arabic purposes.
religious characteristics. However, the important point here is the purpose of the BP transferring these Barzani people from south Iraq to Erbil, besides those Barzani people who had been transferred to the concentration camps of Harir, Bahirka and Diyana, as has been explained previously. Accordingly, this gathering of all Barzani people in a few complexes, including those who had been brought back from southern Iraq to Erbil, are a clear move in the framework of the stage of concentration camps.

Here, it has been noticed that the deportation of the other Kurdish components continued, but the deportation of Barzani people according to Mohammad Ihsan was sustained until July 1983 when, according to a letter to the Secretary of State dated 29th of March 1989, the Director of General Security reported on the situation in the Harir area:

“In July, 1983 during an Iranian, Zionist aggression on Haj Umran front and as substantiated the participation of the clique descendants of treason the group who are mostly from Barzani family an order from the former Director of Public security “Dr Fadhel Al-Barrak” to the Directorate of General Security in the autonomous region to assemble a big unit from members of the security from units and directorates of the autonomous region on a top secret mission to commence at down on the next day. The mission commenced on 1/8/1983 with members of the Republican Guards to surround Al-Quds, Al-Qadissiya, Qushtappa compounds, which were specifically built for Barzani families. All males from Barzani families over the age of 15 were arrested and transported using large army vehicles prepared for this mission accompanied by military force.” (Ahmad, M., 2014:174)

Thus, those assembled Barzani People from Quds and Qadissiya were suddenly kidnapped from their concentration camps for a reason that is revealed in the same document, as shown below:

“The Barzani clan is known for their disloyalty to the Party, Revolution, and the country for decades, they have persistently resisted the unity of the nation and they were the real traitors. They consider themselves the

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1 Al-Qadisiya: is the name of a previous battle of Arab Muslims force against the Sassanid Empire army. Saddam Hussein chose this name for his war against Iran, which started from 1980 until 1988.
...legitimate representatives of the Kurdish people; they are full of hatred and animosity”

Thus, what we see in this text is a kind of grievance, which has been raised by Bradley Campbell in his short research ‘Genocide as a matter of degree’. These grievances or the de-humanisation of Barzanis, as they have been stigmatised by the Director of General Security, could be located within a framework of conflict, as Bradley Campbell states: “Political elites with grievances against ethnic minorities may curtail their freedoms, expel them from the country, or kill them” (Campbell, 2011:287).

Campbell is locating violence as a response to a conflict, as he argues, “since violence is often a response to a conflict, it can be explained with theories of social control” (Campbell, 2011:288). Thus, adopting the theories of social control for a crime if it is compatible with the changes of habitus, which is associated with the growth of belief in the ideology that these people really are dangerous to the Arabic identity of the country.

Thus, the process of Barzani gendercide as the fourth and final phase of annihilation started to be implemented, and according to the description by definition, it involved, “Extermination mobile killing operations in extermination camps” (Finchelstein, F., 2005:19).

Additionally, after the deliberate preparation in a process of gathering all Barzanis into a few forced concentration camps in Qadisiyah and Quds in Qushtapa area, including the camps of Harir, Diana, Bahirka and quarto, they besieged and deported everyone to the places of extermination. Hence, in two military campaigns, the first one on the 31st of July 1983, and the second one on the 10th of August 1983, every single Barzani male above seven years old, was forcibly arrested and transferred to their fate. Thus, in the third phase, according to Rebrwa Ramazan Abdulla in his second book ‘Extermination Storm of the Barzanis’, Barzanis were buried alive, according to the commandment of the General Director of Public Security, at that time (Fadel al-Barrak) at the beginning of August 1983. He states that the Judgment of the Nation had been implemented against some 667 Barzanis in 16 cases and they were executed. The others were killed in mass graves in the desert of Busaiya. The process of killing Barzanis was under the supervision of Major Assi Ibrahim Assi al-Dduri, who was transferred to Busaiya and remained there for two weeks (Abdulla, 2010:59). Martin van Bruinessen has confirmed this process as he
states, “In August 1983, all men aged between 8 and 70 of this group, eight thousand in total, were rounded up in the camps and driven off in army lorries” (van Bruinessenl, M., 1994:6). However, what exactly happened to the Barzani Kurds is still partly unknown. A report by a preparatory Committee has confirmed that. “On July 30th, 1983, 8000 male Barzani Kurds “have they been reported, imprisoned, tortured or massacred? Still no one knows” (A preparatory Committee, 2005:9). In addition, and horrifically, van Bruinessenl claims that, “According to information confidentially leaked by Iraqi military sources, at least some of them were used in experiments with chemical arms; there is little hope that any of them are still alive” (van Bruinessenl, M., 1994:7).

In addition to this information, among some audiences, Saddam Hussein admitted and clearly has announced that, “some, who were called Barzani, who cooperate with them (Iranian), so they have been severely punished and have gone to hell” (see the video in appendix).

6.11. The Case of Halabja

Periodically, the chemical attack on Halabja is part of the Anfal Campaigns, but because of its enormity, it has been given a specific position even by the Iraqi High Tribunal (IHT). Additionally, the Iraqi authority, through its absolute ruler Ali Hassan al-Majid, was absorbed in the definition of the areas that were supposed to be exposed to genocide, “At this stage, the Iraqi warplanes for the first time in the middle of April 1987 and for a period of 18 months, launched 14 chemical attacks on civilians in Kurdish villages” (Salih, Khaled, 1995:151).

Thus, before gassing Halabja, chemical weapons were used to attack dozens of villages throughout different areas outside of the warzone. This means these areas were intentionally targeted for ethnic reasons. Here, Efraim Karsh in his book ‘The Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988’ states, “In May 1987, when some 20 Kurdish villages were gassed in an attempt to deter the civilian population from collaborating with the advancing Iranian forces” (Karsh, E., 2002:55).

However, this information may not be accurate for two reasons; the first one is these villages were outside the warzone and many of them far away from the borders. Second, the residences of these villages as he mentions were a ‘civilian population’ and mostly women and children. Thus, how could these civilian populations outside the warzone collaborate with the Iranian forces?
Regarding Halabja, there are rumours and controversy about whether the bombing of Halabja with chemical weapons was part of the AC or not. In terms of timing, Halabja is part of the AC because it took place at the end of the first Anfal campaign. The first AC “Took place between 23 February and 19 March 1988” (Hardi, C., 2012:19). Accordingly, Hilterman concludes that, “in the afternoon of the 16th, the Iraqi air force launched a massive chemical strike against the area of Halabja and Khurmal” (Hilterman, 2008:5). However, on the one hand, Halabja is not located in the area of the first Anfal campaign, and on the other hand, many towns and villages had been exposed to chemical weapons prior to the Anfal campaigns. Hence, in April 1987, the first Kurdish village to be attacked with chemical weapons (apart from napalm) was Shekh Wisan in the Balisan Valley (Makiya, 1993:164/165).

Regarding this issue, the UN report states:

“The Iraqi regime did not consider Halabja to be part of Anfal” because
“Halabja was a city, and Anfal was intended to deal with the rural Kurdish population” (HRW/Middle East, 1995:97)

Michael Kelly has reiterated this argument that“The attack on Halabja was not considered part of the Anfals because, in the bureaucratic mind-set of the Iraqi government, Halabja was a city” (Kelly, Michael, 2008:33)

Thus, as a consequence of these arguments, even Halabja is different to the process of the AC because it was a city, and so it will be considered an independent process and an extension of the demolishing of the Kurdish cities, alongside the demolishing of Kurdish rural areas. This is because the demolishing of the cities continued even after the Anfal Campaigns. In addition, this argument does not change the magnitude of the tragedy, the number of the victims, or its position in international or national law, which according to the Iraqi high tribunal is considered genocide.

The enormity of the bombing of Halabja with chemical weapons according to Michael Kelly “was costly, however, as Iraq bombarded the town of 80,000 with gas, killing as many as 5,000 civilians” (Kelly, Michael, 2008:57). In more detail:

“IRNA reported that Iraq had “Chemical bombed Halabja town... twice Wednesday evening” March 16 - Killing and wounding “hundreds of...defenceless women and children” (Hiltermann, J.R., 2007:116).
6.12. Conclusion

In order to establish the ethnic-Arab centrism and to Arabise Iraq, a series of procedures were implemented in the framework of the process of genocide. In this regard, the BP initiated several stages for the preparation and adoption of violence in order to implement its ideology. This stage could be considered as part of the de-civilising process. Thus, when the Baathists took power in 1963, they launched the first act of violence by establishing a militia in order to strengthen their authority. In this regard, for the first time, they utilised the legitimacy of state institutions to build a national guard; Article (2) of the Act provides that “The National Guard is an organized popular force, that has been trained in the use of arms and its pillars are the believing people in their right to a free and dignified life” (National Guard Law, 1963: No.35). In this context, we can understand that the Baathists’ tendencies were to impose their ideology by force, which they did not conceal in their rhetoric and discussions. Hence, they showed their intention clearly, that the NG was an instrument for Arabisation in the form of protection of the Arab existence in Iraq.

As a consequence, the Nationalist Guard, as has been revealed in this chapter, approved of the atrocities against the Kurdish nation. However, the dramatic growth of this militia reflected the Baath’s belief in a national ideal the elimination of the obstacles in the way of Arabisation.

Since the formation of the state, violence has been one of the most prominent political and social phenomenon, particularly throughout the period of the sixties, when the violence continuously increased and “the Baathists returned to power by organizing two coups, one on July 17 and the other on July 30, 1968” (Battatu, 1978:1074). Additionally, the Baathists turned the state institutions into platforms for developing their ideology and oppressing non-Arabs in order to idealise its slogans and to promote pan-Arabism. However, according to Robert Rotberg, “When the rulers are perceived to be working for themselves and their kin, and not the state, their legitimacy, and the state’s legitimacy, plummets” (Rotberg, 2010:9).

These kinds of circumstances also caused a specific vision of the ‘outsider.’ Moreover, according to the stages of genocide in the framework of the de-civilising process, the BP, dependent on the principle of ‘Divide and conquer’, had a particular vision and genocidal plan for every Kurdish component in order to guarantee its success at every stage. Additionally, the BP started with the definition of the Faili Kurds throughout, as “the political report of the eighth region Conference for Baath
Arab Socialist Party, 1974” purposefully explained all of the justifications for expelling the Faili Kurds from Iraq, identifying them as dangerous foreigners. This violent vision towards the Faili Kurds occurred due to four main factors, which are ethnic, economic, political and religious factors. Here, in terms of extermination, the Faili Kurds were considered to be ‘fifth columns’, and due to this grievance some of them were killed and others expelled and their property captured.

The other level is the forcible displacement of hundreds of thousands of Kurds in a deliberate deportation process, from the Faili Kurds to the rest of the Kurds. This stage of Arabisation was initiated throughout a huge campaign of deportation of the Kurds and moving Arab citizens to the homelands of the Kurds. This process was applied in the framework of the civilising offensive, which reiterates the ideology of pan-Arab-centrism. Regarding the impact of the Iran-Iraq war, and the Kurds, Van Bruinessen describes it as the “Control of territory and population became even more crucial on both sides than it had been before the war” (Van Bruinessen, 1986:14). However, this war paved the way for the BP to continue its Arabisation policy against the Kurds and to implement the process of genocide.

Here, the genocide of the Barzani Kurds is another dilemma for the interrelations between the Iraqi authority and the Kurds. The Barzani Kurds were forcibly deported to concentration camps and then they were arrested and transferred to an unknown place in Southern Iraqi to execute them in silence. The genocide case of Halabja is another tragic Iraqi act that occurred when they bombarded the city with chemical weapons, as Michael Kelly states, it “was costly, however, as Iraq bombarded the town of 80,000 with gas, killing as many as 5,000 civilians” (Kelly, Michael, 2008:57). All of these acts were carried out in order to convert Iraq into a purely Arab country.
CHAPTER 7: Part Two: Historical and Documentary Analysis - Genocide and the Decivilising Process in Iraq: The Anfal Campaigns

“Do not even let the children because they will grow up tomorrow and take up arms against us” (Ali Hassan al-Majeed)

7.1. Introduction

In the previous two chapters two important notions have been explored with regard to nation building. The first notion is the process of the Iraqi nation state under the circumstances of the hegemony of the Sunni Arab minority in order to create a national identity within the characteristics of pan-Sunni and pan-Arab nationalism. Throughout Chapter Six, the notion of Arabisation and its implementation through the different instruments, and the process of one Arab state nation building has been explored, particularly in relation to Arab identity. In this chapter, the completion of the Arabising of Iraqi identity, through the process of the last solution, which is the Anfal Campaigns, is considered.

If we take into consideration the process of Arabisation, we also see the de-Kurdification of Iraq on the other side, through the policy of assimilation, evacuation of the Kurdish areas, and large scale destruction of the Kurdish people. Additionally, at the level of the theory of the civilising process, according to the framework of state formation how the process of nation building collapses during the de-civilising process will be explored; as Stephen Mennell states, the “de-civilising process are what happens when the civilising process goes into reverse” (Mennell, S., 1990:205).

On the other hand, if we audit the process of the Anfal Campaigns, we can recognise the applicability of all angles of the theoretical models of genocide, even the CPPCG definition of the UN, which has been examined in Chapter Two. In this regard it has been argued, “The destruction process has inherent patterns. There is only one way which a scattered group can effectively be destroyed” (Hilberg, R., 1985:1064).

This chapter is divided into five sections including the conclusion. Primarily, the definition of Anfal and its essence is considered, followed by an introduction to the Iran/Iraq war and the possible relationship with the Anfal Campaigns. The stages

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1 Before commencing my PhD, my Master’s dissertation was on the same topic under the name of “Religion and Nationalism; A critical examination of the way in which religion was mobilised in the Anfal campaign”.
of Anfal include the preparation of the final solution, concentration and the process of annihilation, which is an important part of the chapter. Finally, a short explanation from the survivors and their circumstances will be presented.

7.2. The Essence of Anfal

What does the concept of Anfal mean, and why were these campaigns implemented under this religious name? Certainly, it is possible to find one of the origins of the campaigns behind this concept. The concept of Anfal is the name of the eighth chapter (Surah) of the Quran and the first Verse (ayah) of the chapter (Ali, M. M., 2011). Additionally, the text or the verse of Anfal in the Quran includes “They ask you (O Muhammad) about the spoils of war (al-Anfal). Say: “The spoils (al-Anfal) are for Allah and the Messenger.” So fear Allah and adjust all matters of difference between you, and obey Allah and His Messenger (Muhammad), if you are believers” (Ali, A.Y., 2004:7). According to Shakhawan Shorsh “The Anfal Surah justifies the Islamization of unbelievers/non-Muslims and was used for the first time against Arab non-Muslims in the battle at al-Badr in 624.” (Shorsh, Sh, 2013:7). And later on this verse became part of Sharia law. In the same direction, the genocide dictionary states that “the campaign was named after the eighth chapter of the Koran, which is titled Surah al-Anfal and is about a battle against ‘unbelievers’ and the need to cut off the roots of the unbelievers” (Totten, S; Bartrop, Paul R., 2008:13).

However, it is worth mentioning that the concept of Anfal existed before Islam for the same purpose, which are spoils of war but what does spoils of war mean? The majority of Islamic interpreters are unanimous about the meaning of the concept being money and property or everything moveable, but according to some traditional sources the ‘spoils of war’ exceed ‘money and property’ to prisoners and taking them as slaves. In this regard, the historian Ibn Katheer one of the prominent traditional interpreters has explained “what is deviated from the infidels to Muslims without a fight from the slave, female or chattel or spoil” (Katheer, Ibn, 2000:77). Here, he is admitting without a fight because everything in the moment of fighting is permitted. Accordingly, the Prophet Mohammad stated “the spoils of war have been made permissible for me, whereas they were not permitted for any before me” (Abdul-Rahman, Muhammad Saed, 2009:97). The problem with this and many other texts of the Quran is they can remain absolutist, and every Islamic group interprets them according to their own interests.
In terms of the name AC within its religious background, which was a war waged by the Iraqi government, led by the BP, it involves different interpretations. In addition to the use of the concept of Anfal for the purpose of the intended insult of the targeted people and stripping them of their humanity, or in other words the purpose of ‘dehumanisation’ and to consider those people as objects or property. However, the ‘Dictionary of Genocide’ states that “Anfal, (also referred to as al-Anfal and the Anfal campaigns). The Anfal (the spoils of war) campaign was the name of a series of military campaigns undertaken by Saddam Hussein’s (1932-2006) Iraqi Baathist regime against the Kurdish population residing in northern Iraq” (Totten, S; Bastrop, Paul R., 2008:13).

Regarding the campaigns being given a religious name, the BP carried in its essence a unique model, therefore, the AC also appear to be unique campaigns. Hence, as based on the literature of the BP and its founder Michel Aflaq, and also according to the Secretary General of the National Islamic Front in Iraq and the Iraqi BP’s representative’ Khudair al-Murshidi:

“Baath Arab Socialist Party based on an organic connectivity between Arabism and Islam. The Baath Party since its inception, was based on these three principles (humanitarian nationalism, National Socialism, the connection between Arabism and Islam), therefore, when Islam came, it created the nationalism, a new creation” (Hassan M., 2015).

Thus, the BP, based on figurational sociology, has always been inspired by the past. It connects the past with the present, mobilising its religious and cultural dimensions as instruments for the purpose of its ideology. Here, having explored in the previous three chapters how the BP as a phenomenon and conduct, is expressing himself as a unique model of thinking, is now being shown to confirm its behaviour theoretically and practically. From this point, we can explore the dimensions of the Anfal Campaigns, however, “it was an odd choice of terms, for the Kurds, themselves are Muslim and Iraq, at the time, was a secular state” (Totten, S; Bartrop, Paul R., 2008:13).

7.3. Mood of the war: does it matter?

Having explored and explained in Chapter Six, the origins of the Iraq/Iran war and its impact on Kurdish society, it is now necessary to examine the relationship between this war and the AC for two reasons: to understand the position of the
genocide process under the circumstances of war, and to explore whether the AC were a consequence of the war or vice versa.

Regarding the circumstances, both sides- Iraqi Kurdistan and Iranian Kurdistan- were under pressure due to the war. Martin Van Bruinessen explains that the “control of territory and population became even more crucial on both sides than it had been before the war” (Van Bruinessen, 1986:14). Dependent on Van Bruinessen’s argument, the Kurds were victims of the Iraq/ Iran war on two different levels, as explained below:

The first level, as Iraqi citizens, was the pressure due to the costs of war. Tens of thousands of Kurdish men, who were under the rule of conscription, were forced to move towards the frontline. Additionally, thousands of public employees and workers were forced to join the militia as backup forces to protect state institutions, and they were also brought to the battle during times of emergency. If someone refused to join these forces, they would have to accept losing their job and risking their life and the lives of their family. This is in addition to the constant bombardment of Iran along Kurdish borders, regions, and in cities.

The second level is the pressure that was coming from the BP, the state and its security forces. People were arrested and accused and the state of emergency became an ongoing phenomenon without interruption. Throughout the period of the war, the process of Arabisation did not subside. For both levels, the Iraqi author Kanan Makiya in his prominent book ‘Cruelty and Silence’ has argued, “The growing brutalization of the whole of Iraqi society caused by the Iraq-Iran War can be seen in the evolution of Iraqi government policy toward its Kurdish population during the 1980s” (Makiya, K., 1993:163).

Additionally, the most important question is what kind of relationship exists between the war and the Anfal campaigns? Here, two different principles must be taken into consideration:

First: the historical and strategic tensions in the frame of the nationalistic and sectarian conflict between Arabs and Persians, or in other words between Iraqi authorities and the Arab political elite on the one hand, and the Iranian authority and its political elite on the other hand. During the 20th century, several conventions and agreements have been signed and all of them have been failed. Thus, the Arab-Persian conflict has exceeded the Kurdish case.
Second: The BP has followed the idea of a permanent enemy, whether external or internal or both together. Moreover, any parties outside the Baath’s will, or any political parties not satisfied with the leadership of the BP in the political process, were considered as an enemy of the Baath’s revolution (BASP, 1972:37). Additionally, the existence of an enemy in the BASP literature is described throughout. The ‘cultural curriculum: the third phase of youth ‘Futuwwa’ students of first, second and third years of secondary school’, is one of the examples as it has been admitted that “the commander and the father-leader Saddam Hussein once asked a group of elementary school students; who is our first enemy? Some of them answered the Persian regime; others said the Zionist entity and others included traitors of the nation. The commander Mr. President, answered, the Zionist entity (Israel) is the first enemy of the Arabs, and then the Iranian regime and the traitors of the nation” (cultural curriculum, 1983:27). Thus, according to this method, the BP with its many nationalist tendencies, was attempting to create persistent enemies, as Avishai Margalit states: “thus in Schmitt’s view we need enemies for the ‘triangulation’ that tells us what we are. Having an enemy is our principal means of acquiring an identity” (McKim, R., 1997:79). Therefore, it is difficult to find any Baathist discourse that is free from the concept of the enemy or describing the out-group using multiple adjectives. For example, they were describing Iranians as “Persians Magi racists” (al-Iraq, No. 3729 in 04/24/1988). Magian is an ancient Persian religion before Islam. Thus, it is a kind of mortification and inferiority that suggests a conversion away from Islam to justify killing them. However, the Baathists described the Kurds who have identified as being a group to be destroyed like dogs. It has been pointed out by Ali Hassan al-Majeed that “Dogs are not linked to any rights in Islam” (Jihani, Shamzin, 2007:18).

Thus, the relationship between the AC and the Iran-Iraq war as causality has mostly been shown to be non-existent. In this regard, Stuart Adam Miller in his book ‘Iraqi Kurds: Road to genocide’ explains, “After eight years of fighting, the Iran-Iraq War had finally come to a halt, but the fight continued for the Kurds” (Miller, S., 2014:60). This continuity of the campaigns, for the High Iraqi Tribunal Court, was one of the most important reasons for considering the campaigns to be genocide (High Iraqi Tribunal Court). Additionally, if the campaigns were part of the war, the continuity should have been considered a breach of the ceasefire, but it was not. Finally, Miller admits, “even after concluding the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam continued
his genocide against the Kurds with the eighth and final Anfal phase” (Miller, S., 2014:61). Moreover, another indication is the pre-genocidal acts of the Iraqi government, when in 1976 dozens of Kurdish villages all along the Iraq-Iran border were evacuated. In this regard, the prominent Iraqi Arab author Kanan Makiya confirms, “In 1976, with Iranian acquiescence, a zone five to ten miles wide all along the Iraq-Iran border was evacuated. Every village inside that zone was destroyed and their inhabitants resettled in new, Iraqi government-designed “housing complexes” on the outskirts of big cities) jamaat, singular, mujama’ as they become known even among those Kurds who did not speak Arabic” (Makiya, Kanan, 1994:160). This evacuation within the propaganda of Iraqi Baath media during that period fitted with the civilising offensive. This is one of the examples of the BP’s violence against the Kurdish population before starting the Iran- Iraq war.

Hence, Khaled Suleiman in his article ‘towards an establishment of a Kurdish reading for what happened’ after a brief account of what happened in Kurdistan since the advent of the Baath rule, particularly in years of the 70s, mentions that “al-Anfal were not the product of a defined political and a military of Iran-Iraq war or to put the pressure on the Kurdish movement to surrender but it was Baathist strategy inspired by the bloody legacy of culture and national project and to declare the death of the Kurds as Aflaq has confirmed for their biggest project, which was the Arab unity” (Suleiman, K., 2002:7). Thus, dependent on one of the Baath’s motto “everything is for victory”, “the Iran-Iraq war provided the crucial element with which Baghdad could cover-up its opportunity to bring to a climax its long-standing efforts to bring the Kurds to heel” (Salih, K., 1995:149).

7.4. The Preparation (final solution)

The preparation for the AC took a specific course under specific circumstances. The specific circumstances, as has been explained in Chapter Six and the previous section, were that despite the lack of causality between the Iraq-Iran war and the Anfal Campaigns, the circumstances of the war from some aspects were exploited in order to implement the genocidal plan in its perfect stages. The reason was, according to Omer Muhammad in his documentary book ‘the Anfal military campaigns in its eight stages’, that “the war has passed its 7th year and both parts of the war were exhausted, therefore, the Baath leaders gathered in order to put the final solution plan for the Kurdish case” (Muhammad, O, 2013:15). Thus, the atmosphere
of the war provided an appropriate base for the Iraqis to implement their ideological policy of Arabisation. In the same direction, Joost Hiltermann argues “these documents unequivocally show, the genocide of the Kurds, such as the genocide process in Rwanda and Yugoslavia in 1990, ‘along on the same lines in wartime’, previously have been studied and planned by the Iraqi regime and then have been implemented by the chosen Baath men” (Hiltermann, 1998:19). Thus, according to Mohammad and Hiltermann, an intentional plan was drawn up before the implementation of the Anfal Campaigns. In this regard, Khaled Saleh in his paper ‘Anfal: The Kurdish Genocide in Iraq’ argues, “The Iran-Iraq war provided the crucial element with which Baghdad could cover-up its opportunity to bring to a climax its long-standing efforts to bring the Kurds to heel” (Salih, K., 1995:7).

Here, as in Chapter Two, indicating Graham Kinloch’s work is important as he has shown how several factors in the discipline of genocide form the causality of human destruction. Thus, the main characteristic of social division, depending on Kinloch’s view, is ethnocentrism as the central phenomenon within a dominant group and its consequences. The indication towards the ethnocentrism here, is important because of two reasons, the first one is Ali Hassan Majeed’s behaviour towards the targeted areas and the victims; secondly, this complete hatred towards unarmed civilians who are at the same time citizens of the state, does not compare to a modern state with its citizens, but it tends to be the behaviour of a primitive tribe against strange people. Additionally, the behaviour of the Iraqi forces under the leadership of the BP, particularly under the leadership of al-Majeed followed the ideas of ethnocentrism, which according to William Graham Sumner: “Is the technical name for this view of things in which one’s own group is the centre of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it” (Sumner, 1956:41).

Back to the preparation, according to Sherko Kirmanj, the AC can be divided into two phases, with the first phase, starting on April the 21st 1987, and ending on June 20th 1987 (Kirmanj, 2010:11). This division according to the sequence of the campaigns is significant, and an attempt to structuralise the events will be made.

7.4.1. Specific Legislation

The legislation regarding the AC started with the first meeting of the ‘Revolution Command Council’ through the appointing of Ali Hassan al-Majeed, as follows:
“The Revolution Command Council decided in its session held on 03.29.1987 as follows:

First: Comrade Ali Hassan al-Majid, a member of the region (al-qutrr)\(^1\) leadership of Baath Arab Socialist Party, represented the national command of the Party and the Revolutionary Command Council in the implementation of their policies throughout the region of the North, including the Kurdistan region of autonomy in order to protect law and order and to ensure stability by implementing the autonomy of law in the region” (Resolution No.160).

Thus, the legislation for the AC under the guise of ethnic-Arab-centrism began, after “Saddam Hussein, appointed his cousin, Ali Hassan al-Majid, to become the overlord of the North” (Hiltermann, J., 2007:3); he has been described by Miller as “the brutally effective and efficient head of Iraq’s secret police” (Miller, S., 2014:53). This ethnic background was prominent in al-Majeed’s mind when he announced, “I am going to the north, though I wear pants\(^2\) or force them to wear Iqaal\(^3\)” (Kirmanj, 2013:14). Thus, this is a clear admission of the intention of Arabisation because one of the prominent differences between the Kurds and Arabs, along with the language and the entire ethnic background, is the traditional clothes as part of the difference in culture and identity.

Hence, this legislative step is considered a crucial move taken by Saddam Hussein, within the stage of preparation for further resolution of the Arabisation of Kurdistan. Here, according to Miller “on March 18, 1987, Saddam replaced the governor of the Northern Bureau in Kirkuk, who had weakly overseen security in northern Iraq, with his own cousin Ali Hassan al-Majid” (Miller, S., 2014:53). Thus, what was happening in Kirkuk due to the Arabisation policy and the deportation of thousands of the indigenous people did not convince Saddam Hussein regarding a crucial development in Arabisation.

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1 The Baath Party believed in the Great Arab state, therefore, they were calling Iraq *Qutrr*, which means branch, region or part of the Great Arab state.

2 Kurdish pants consist “of baggy pants tied at the shoe, a shirt with heavy belt and cummerbund, long embroidered jacket and a tribal-distinctive turban” (Wagner, J.Q., 1992:5).

3 Arabic Iqaal or Agal: this is “worn by Bedouin Arabs to keep the keffiyeh in place” (Kennedy, Graeme, 2004); it is a piece of thick cord known as an igal or agal.
Hence, as has been presented in Chapter Two, Raul Hilberg has effectively indicated a model of patterns of genocide, as he argues, “destruction process has inherent patterns. There is only one way which a scattered group can effectively be destroyed” (Hilberg, R., 1985:1064). In addition to this framework, what Helen Fein has emphasised gives the AC a strong characteristic, which is “the perpetrator was a collective or organised actor or commander of organised actors” (Fein, 1990:25). Thus, it is clear that ‘the Iraqi Revolution Command Council’ was a collective leader and an absolute power in such a position that its orders could not be rejected or criticised. Dependent on this model and other models of theoretical explanation, the AC have been designated as genocide, even as the perpetrators were aware of these theories. Additionally, the nomination of al-Majeed as secretary of the Northern Bureau of the BP could be mixed with the definition of the target group, but it is located within the preparation of genocide.

7.4.2. Identification

The prominent meeting of the Baath’s “Revolutionary Command Council”, which is the highest authority in Iraq, considered within its resolution a clear plan for the final solution to the Kurdish question in Iraqi Kurdistan. In this regard, the 1993 Human Right Watch report entitled ‘the AC against the Kurds’ states, “in the first three months after assuming his post as secretary general of the Ba’ath Party’s Northern Bureau, Ali Hassan al-Majid began the process of definition of the group that would be targeted by Anfal, and vastly expanded the range of repressive activities against all rural Kurds” (HRW/Middle East, 1995:24). Moreover, the HRW’s report is based on the study of fourteen tons of documents, as the report has emphasises that “the PUK cache consists of fourteen tons of documents contained in 847 boxes” (HRW/Middle East, 1995:24). In addition, these documents were “remaining under the joint custody of the PUK and the Middle East Watch” (HRW/Middle East, 1995:17) in order to be studied and analysed. Thus, according to the documents, this first stage of al-Majeed started with two important steps, which are as follows:

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1 HRW: Human Rights Watch
7.4.2.1. The Census

To identify those people who are included in the target group, this specific procedure was indispensable. The Iraqi authority took the first step through the formation of a committee to enumerate the general population for the year 1987 under the category: Revolutionary Command Council resolution, No.Legislation:272. “The title of the legislation: the decision to form a committee of the General Census of the population for the year 1987” (The resolution, 1987). Here, according to Hilterman, “In October 1987, the decennial Iraqi census took place. In Kurdistan, the regime gave it an important secondary purpose.” (Hiltermann, J., 2008:3). Additionally, the UN report states that “in terms of defining the target group for destruction, no single administrative step was more important to the Iraqi regime than the national census of October 17, 1987” (HRW/Middle East, 1995:25). Hence, this extra attention to the census took on serious dimensions because according to Choman Hardi “those who failed to register in the 1987 census were no longer considered Iraqi citizens and thus the road to their destruction was paved” (Hardi, C., 2012:16). As a consequence, this census did not include the prohibited areas.

Consequently, Ali Hassan al-Majid “ordered his intelligence officials to prepare detailed case-by-case dossiers of ‘saboteurs’ ‘families who were still living in the government-controlled areas’” (HRW/Middle East, 1995:25). Here, despite families not living in prohibited areas, and having participated in the census, they were transferred because one of the family members could be participating in the Kurdish movement or, as the UN report confirmed, “when these dossiers were complete, countless women, children, and elderly people were forcibly transferred to the rural areas to share the fate of their Peshmerga relatives” (HRW/Middle East, 1995:25).

7.4.2.2. Prohibited Areas

The scope of the prohibited areas was broad and manifold. Here, if we take a province such as Suleimaniyeh, in the 1977 census according to the UN report, it consisted of 1,877 villages and “by the time of the 1987 census, this number was down to just 186. Almost 1,700 villages had thus disappeared from the official map. Of these, several hundred had been destroyed during the border clearances of the 1970s and at various stages of the war against Iran” (HRW/Middle East, 1995:81). This statement confirms two issues; the first one is that the dimensional process of the
de-Kurdifikation of the Kurdish areas remained in progress. Secondly, the horrific situation of these areas’ residents, which on the micro level, affected their social inter-relationships and interdependency chains. However, “most of their inhabitants had been resettled in the nine complexes that were also listed in the 1987 census. The remaining villages were simply not counted because they now lay in “prohibited areas” (HRW/Middle East, 1995:81). In this regard, these nine complexes were living under the specific life conditions.

The prohibition of these areas, within the administrative plan, was to justify the legitimacy of the destruction and extermination of tens of thousands of families in these rural agricultural areas. With the initiation of the evacuation of these areas, a record in one of Ali Hassan al-Majeed’s meetings with members of the Northern Bureau of BP and the mayors of Kurdistan, the autonomous region/ Iraq, April 15, 1988, he shouted:

“Next summer, we must not remain a village here and there with the exception of complexes. It must be like a chicken when it enters her baby chickens under her wings, they will calm down in silence. We must bring these people to the camps and watch them. We do not let them stay in the villages. Why let them live there like donkeys. Do they know anything? For wheat, I do not want their wheat. It is about twenty years we buy wheat from abroad. Let’s add another five years. I will make this vast and large area, the prohibited areas. I do not let anybody remain there” (Suliman, T., 2014).

This record leaves no doubt that these people were falling under a specific bureaucratic procedure, as Helen Fein explains, “victims were selected because they were members of the collectively, were victims selected Irrespective of any charge against them individually” (Fein, 1990:25). Thus, the only crime they committed was their belonging to specific areas. In order to carry out this selection, here is the official resolution of the Iraqi authority:

7.4.2.3. The issue of Resolution Nr. 4008

Date 20.6.1987

From the leadership of the Northern Secretarial to the leadership of Legion One, the leadership of the Legion II, the leadership of the Fifth Corps.

Subject / dealing with the villages of forbidden areas in terms of security:
Because the official duration identified for assembling these villages, will expire on 21 June 1987 we will decide to start fast action from June 22, 1987, as follows:

1. All villages will be considered as prohibited areas in terms of security, areas that reside, Iranian agents, saboteurs, and traitors, who have betrayed Iraq.
2. It is prohibited to stay in these areas for any human being or animals. These areas are considered prohibited areas; shooting in the areas is permitted without restriction or condition and without instructions, unless other instructions are issued in this regard by our headquarters.
3. Any movement from here to there and from there to here, or agriculture, industry and animal husbandry, is absolutely forbidden. The related institutions have to pursue this matter, and everyone according to their specialty.
4. The corps must be ready for the particular bombardments, sometimes with guns, aircraft and helicopters. It includes 24 hours, night and day, in order to kill the largest amount of those who exist in the forbidden areas and were previously warned.

This resolution includes three extra points in detail. It exists in the appendix.

Signature
Ali Hassan al-Majid
A member of the Regional (Qutrr) leadership
Presidential Office of the Northern
(Muhammad, O., 2013:219)

Thus, according to this resolution, it covers all elements of the crime of genocide, as Fein points out: “The destruction of group members was undertaken with intent to kill and murder, it was sanctioned by the perpetrator. The importance here is the direct evidence of orders or authorization, for the destruction of the victims” (Fein, 1990:25).

Here, according to Sherko Kirmanj, the AC were divided into two stages: The first stage, starting from April 21, 1987, and ending on June 20 of 1987, when 703 villages controlled by the Iraqi authority were destroyed, and the residents who lived in these areas were deported to the forced complexes, and the evacuated areas were to
be entirely Arabised, particularly the mixed areas (Kirmanj, 2013:11). The second stage, which started on the day of the census, coincided with October 1987, and is identified as the last day for the surrender of those who were living in the forbidden areas. The regime called that day, “the day of return to the national grade” (Kirmanj, 2013:11).

In this regard, the UN report states that “two government instruments the October 1987 national census and the declaration of “prohibited areas”, covering more and more of the Kurdish countryside like a crazy-patterned quilt were institutional foundations of this policy” (HRW/Middle East, 1995:6). Here, it is worth mentioning that the UN report includes an argument comparable to that of the categorising of Kirmanj, as it has been admitted:

“These instruments were implemented against the background of nearly two decades of government-directed “Arabization”, in which mixed-race districts, or else lands that Baghdad regarded as desirable or strategically important, saw their Kurdish population diluted by Arab migrant farmers provided with ample incentives to relocate, and guarded by government troops” (HRW/Middle East, 1995:6).

This recognition does not leave any doubt that the AC were an extension of a process of Arabisation during the rule of the BP.

The critical question here is how did the targeted people return to the prohibited areas that had been evacuated in 1976? The UN report has covered this issue and explains that, “(1). After the start of the war with Iran, which began with the Iraqi invasion of September 22, 1980, Baghdad’s campaign against the Kurds faltered. (2). Army garrisons in Iraqi Kurdistan were progressively abandoned or reduced, their troops transferred to the Iranian front; (3). Into the vacuum moved the resurgent Peshmerga. (4). Villages in the north began to offer refuge to large numbers of Kurdish draft dodgers and army deserters. (5). Increasing stretches of the countryside effectively became liberated territory” (HRW/Middle East, 1995:43). However, many areas were for the first time considered to be prohibited zones. There were other rural areas in the heart of the Kurdish region and not close to the border

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1**Peshmarga**: Kurdish (pêshmerge from pêsh before, in front of + merg death). A member of a Kurdish nationalist guerrilla organisation (Speake, J. and LaFlaur, M., 2002:). The Peshmerga have been an important part of the larger development and refinement of the Kurdish national identity (Gillette, R., 2011:12)
with Iran, but these were also considered prohibited zones. In this regard, Kanan Makiya writes that, “by the mid-eighties, not only villages in border areas but also those in the oil-producing regions in the heart of northern Iraq were being raised, their inhabitants “resetted”. With the 1988 Anfal Campaign, all these residents came to a climax: simply living in areas designated “prohibited for security reasons” (which now extended to virtually all rural areas in northern Iraq and included, incidentally areas inhabited by Assyrian Christians who are not Kurds) because in itself a death sentence” (Makiya, 1993:154).

Thus, these dimensions of the BP’s intentions are significant, because the goal is not only to address the areas adjacent to the border, but also all Kurdish rural areas, particularly the areas that Makiya has included, and “also those in the oil-producing regions in the heart of northern Iraq”. This situation poses a serious threat to the existence of the Kurdish people in the region in the long term, because the rural people are more involved in their land and its region in comparison to those who live in the city. Those who live in the city have a house, and it is not difficult for him to sell his house and buy another one in another area, but the village in contrast- what binds him to the village is land, memories and the historical dimension, and it is difficult to get rid of this.

7.5. Concentration Camps

According to Raul Hilberg, the deportation and concentration (or seizure) or concentration camps are the fourth stage of the procedure in order to annihilate an out-group. The purpose of the process of the Anfal campaigns, according to what have been examined in the procedure, confirms the de-civilising process. It is the dissociation of the interdependency chains and the dismantling of Kurdish community structure, and its dismemberment. Thus, regardless of al-Majeed’s warning of 22nd of June 1987, it could be that the villagers used the atmosphere of war and previous deportation, because as Choman Hardi argues, “the villagers learnt to live with the war, attending to their crops in the night. Even the inhabitants of the villages that had been destroyed earlier, and had accepted deportation to the mujama’t were rounded up, they were expelled to the ‘prohibited zone” (Hardi, C., 2012:29), however, the aggression reached a level of collective annihilation that was previously unthinkable.

Here, it is worth noting that the authors of the ‘genocide in Iraq’ argue that “indeed, the Anfal cannot be understood without an awareness of the half century of
Kurdish armed struggle against the central government of Iraq, through various political regimes” (HRW/Middle East, 1995:3). Thus, binding these military operations to the past is unavoidable because of the nature of the events, which complement each other. Moreover, the Kurdish resettlement camps, despite the difference between the previous resettlement camps and the concentration camps, in terms of their temporary nature, could be considered a prison for the classification of the victims. They enabled the preparation of the final stage of destruction, remaining focused on one goal, which is the Arabisation of the region, and grabbing the large territory that was evacuated from its residents. Additionally, according to the HRW/Middle East report, “as all the horrific details have emerged, this name has seared itself into popular consciousness - much as the Nazi German Holocaust did with its survivors” (HRW/Middle East, 1995:5).

Before delving into the essence of the process, it is important to indicate some of its consequences. Hiltermann states: “previously I proved the Anfal is carrying the characters of anti-Kurds (de-Kurdification). The targeted areas were totally Kurdish areas. I must add that those who were not exposed to any harm in the Anfal areas and not killed at the hands of the regime, did not relate to the lack of confidence, but because they were not Kurds. In the Anfal period, no Arabs been subjected to arrest or murder. At a time, even the villages that were trusted by the regime have been subjected to genocide besides the villages that were destroyed and the families wiped out” (Hiltermann, J., 2008:20). Thus, the nature of the de-Kurdification of the Kurdish region is based on the principles and various documents of the Anfal campaigns, and even the multiple eyewitnesses are still alive, witnesses that include some participants in this research. Hence, according to Khaled Suleiman, the first step will be the destruction of villages and the assembling of people in forced complexes (1). “Here, al-Majeed explained it in clear words “Do not keep one house in the Kurdish villages in Erbil’s plain, except the Arab villages” (Suleiman, K., 2002:9). Although Suleiman denies that there are Arab villages in the plain of Erbil, the emphasis of al-Majeed on the exception of Arab villages from the destruction process is confirmation of the goal, which was Arabisation.

<table>
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<th>The name of the complex</th>
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Table No (2) The names of the complexes
| (1) A list of the forced complexes before the AC in the province of Sulemaniya |
|---|---|
| Al-Ssumud (resistance) | Between Kufri and Kalar |
| Al-Nnasir (Victory) | Sharazur |
| Al-Ukhuwa (Brotherhood) | Sharazur |
| The New Halabja | Sharazur |
| Shorish (Revolution) | Chamchamal |
| Takiya | Chamchamal |
| Bazian 1 & Bazian 2 | Bazian |
| Bainjan, Kubala, and Alai | Bazian |
| Piramagrun | Dukan |
| Haji-Awa and Saruchawa | Pishdar |
| Tasluja and (Qadisiya) \(^1\) | Bakrajo |

7.5.1. On the way to De-Kurdification of the Region

Here, despite the de-Kurdification according to the genocide convention, which appears in General Assembly Resolution 961: “Genocide is “a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups” (Smith, R., 2013:228), the stage of the deportation and concentration camps was still in progress, along with the preparation for the military being well underway. Hence, the second stage was reached, which as

\(^1\)Al-Qadisiya: This is a historical name of an Arabic/Islamic battle against the Sassanid Empire. Hence, on the 2\(^{nd}\) April 1980 at the Mustansiriyyah University in Baghdad, Saddam was drawing parallels to the 7th-Century defeat of Persia in the Battle of Al Qadisiyah when he announced: “In your name, brothers, and on behalf of the Iraqis and Arabs everywhere we tell those [Persian] cowards and dwarfs who try to avenge Al-Qadisiyah that the spirit of Al-Qadisiyah, as well as the blood and honor of the people of Al-Qadisiyah who carried the message on their spearheads, are greater than their attempts” (Zweiri, M. and Zahid, M., 2007:10).
Sherko Kirmanj describes, was the attempt to evacuate the entire areas that had been prohibited. This stage included or preceded the military action of destroying the villages and everything useful to humans and animals in accordance with the scorched-earth policy. Robert G. Rabil emphasises al-Majid’s order that “clause five of the first directive instructed the armed forces to kill any human being or animal present in these rural areas” (Rabil, R.G., 2002:22).

Thus, in order to implement that, these areas were respectively besieged from all sides and then attacked under the policy of “shoot-to-kill” as “the first of al-Majid’s directives bans all human existence in the prohibited areas, to be applied to a shoot-to-kill policy” (HRW/Middle East, 1995:24). In addition, the Arabic author Hamid al-Hamdani has described these military attacks:

“Saddam’s regime had barely finished the five battles with Iran, consequently, he turned to the Kurdistan region. The heart of Saddam Hussein was filled with malice against the Kurds as he issued his orders to the Republican Guard forces, led by the offender ancient Ali Hassan al-Majid, the (Chemical Ali)¹, which his name has been linked to the using of chemical weapons against the Kurdish people” (al-Hamdani, H., 2007:115).

Thus, after appointing Ali Hassan al-Majid as Presidential Office of Northern Iraq, the events were in progress. Additionally, al-Majid according to Totten and William has expressed his intention as follows:

“I told [the village leaders]: ‘I cannot let your village stay. I will attack it with chemical weapons. Then you and your family will die’...I will kill them all with chemical weapons! Who is going to say anything? The international community? F--- them!...This is my intention. As soon as we complete the deportations we will start attacking them everywhere according to a systematic military plan, even their strongholds...I will not attack them with chemicals just one day, but I will continue to attack them with chemicals for fifteen days. Then you will see that all the vehicles of God himself will not suffice to carry them all” (Totten, Samuel; Parsons, William S, 2004:392).

¹ Ali Hassan al-Majid (1941 - 2010) is known as “Chemical Ali” the cousin of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Al-Majeed was one of the Baath Party’s leaders and he was elevated to the post of Iraqi defence minister in the mid-nineties of the twentieth century. Ali-Hassan Al-Majid Al-Tikriti (Majid) is known around the world as Chemical Ali for his role in the use of chemical weapons against Kurdish villages (Newton, M.A., 2007:1525).
This ultimatum issued by Ali Hassan al-Majid, contains words and attitudes that reflect two important points: the first one is the pan-Arab ideology, which involved applying violence as one of its decisive principles; the nature of this ideology has for decades been a source of education in Iraq. Secondly, although the international community always emphasises ‘never again’ (Budick, E., 2012:9), many times such atrocities have occurred with their knowledge and within their sight, but the story has been repeated without end. This issue leads us to the third parties, which are bystanders. In this regard, Philip Spencer in his book ‘Genocide Since 1945’ elaborates on bystanders as he argues: “there are both internal and external bystanders and the inaction of those outside may be more important than that of those inside” (Spencer, P., 2012:50). Hence, al-Majid did not give any value to the international community.

This type of attitude is in accordance with the ideology of ‘national ideals’, which was also propagated in Nazi Germany. Fletcher describes it as “a firmly established centuries old tradition of absolutist rule had generated an implicit requirement for national ideals, beliefs, principles and standards that could be obeyed absolutely” (Fletcher, J., 1997:148/149). Thus, there was no compromise, no mercy and no postponement, because the authority had to be obeyed absolutely. Accordingly, the UN report, “Under this bitter regime, the inhabitants of the prohibited areas struggled to survive. During Ali Hassan al-Majid’s first eight months in office, the groundwork for a “final solution” of Iraq’s Kurdish problem had been laid. Its logic was apparent; its chain of command was set in place” (HRW/Middle East, 1995:82).

Furthermore, the mission was well underway at the highest levels to do what was necessary. Thus according to the authors of ‘genocide in Iraq, the events of 1987 were just a preliminary step and they highlight the admission of a former intelligence, or in Arabic al-Istikhabarat, officer explaining, “Because the war was still going on. The Iraqi government was not so strong and many troops were tied up on the front. They postponed the anger and hate in their hearts… but only until the beginning of 1988, when the major winter offensive that Baghdad had feared failed to materialize, and Iran’s fortunes on the battlefield began rapidly to decline” (HRW/Middle East, 1995:82). Thus, during this period, they were calculating the condition of the weather and military logistics because of the wild and mountainous geography of Kurdistan.
Here it is worth mentioning that Ali Hassan al-Majid was continuing his satirical style of dehumanisation of the targeted people in terms of psychological preparation of his men as he announced “When we started to implement our job, we were expecting to meet some good people, because we are sharing the citizenship, but we did not meet any good people, we never met any good people of them” (Hiltermann, 1988:20). Additionally, Philip Spencer also states that “Kurds were routinely described as donkeys or dogs or human cargo” (Spencer, P., 2012:81). Thus, this kind of language, including the psychological preparing of the army and security units, according to Elias, “always takes a considerable time to unfold in relatively civilized societies. Terror and horror rarely appear in the societies without any long process of social disintegration” (Fletcher, 1997 through Elias 1988c: 197).

Now, with the deadline approaching, announcements were sent to the military units and security forces to be ready for zero hours. Hence, this was the next step according to Omer Muhammad, and as confirmed by the UN report, as “On October 18, the day after the census, Taher Tawfiq al-Ani¹, secretary of the RCC’s Northern Affairs Committee, issued a stern memorandum to all security committees in Kurdistan, reminding them that aerial inspection would ensure that Directive no.4008 of June 20 was being carried out ‘to the letter’” (HRW/Middle East, 1995:82 and Muhammad, O., 2013:19). Thus, despite the day of the census, which coincided with October 1987, it was identified as the last day for those who would surrender from the forbidden areas; the regime called that day “the day of return to the national grade” (Kirmanj, 2010:11). This kind of rhetorical language has been included by HRW in its report to highlight the similarity between Baathists and Nazi Germany, as it states that, “like Nazi Germany, the Iraqi regime concealed its actions in euphemisms. Where Nazi officials spoke of “executive measures, “special actions” and “return to the national ranks” and “resettlement in the south” (HRW/Middle East, 1995:82). In addition, al-Ani instructed the security forces and the army to be ready immediately to kill the largest possible number of people in the forbidden security areas. Accordingly, people were exposed to attack from the ground and the skies, and

¹Taher Tawfiq al-Ani was an Iraqi Baathist politician who served as the Governor of Mosul and the secretary of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC)’s Northern Affairs Committee (HRW/Middle East, 1995:82) during the al-Anfal campaign. He was one of the co-defendants who remain on trial for the AC (Kelly, M., 2007:237).
chemical weapons were used, including comprehensive annihilation weapons such as cyanide and mustard. Consequently, the orders were very harsh and strict, as al-Ani threatened the security forces that if “any committee that failed to comply would “bear full responsibility before the Comrade Bureau Chief”—that is to say, Ali Hassan al-Majid” (HRW/Middle East, 1995:82).

More than nine months after the appointment of al-Majid as the absolute ruler of Kurdistan, on the 22nd of February 1988, the military operation started overwhelmingly to begin the first stages of destruction called the Anfal Campaigns, under the leadership of Ali Hassan al-Majid, and as Omer Muhammad points out, under the direct care of Saddam Hussein and Adnan Khairallah. The operation continued until the beginning of September, as has been confirmed by all authors, and according to the documents of the BP. “On September 6, 1988, the Iraqi regime made its de facto declaration of victory” (HRW/Middle East, 1995:26). However, Michael A. Newton has included that “the series of eight military campaigns conducted from February to August 1988 together constitute one of the most concerted and tragic series of events in the history of human affairs” (Newton, M.A., 2007:1524/1525).

7.5.2. The Anfals, or in Kurdish ‘Anfalekan’: Doomsday

The AC started with eight destructive campaigns from the 22nd of February to the 6th of September in order to kill or assemble the survivors in forced and temporary camps. However, the distance between the census and the operation was four months, as has been confirmed by the UN report, the “AC began four months after the census, with a massive military assault on the PUK headquarters at Sergalou-Bergalou on the night of February 23, 1988” (HRW/Middle East, 1995:25). This means the targetted areas and its residents were placed accurately and with pertinacity. Miller has mentioned the recruiting of well-educated college students to lead the republican guard as he describes how “in the early months of 1988, with the war quiet in the south, Saddam continued to build and fortify his army, recruiting well-educated college students for leading and operating the Republican Guard, which had proved crucial in defeating Iran’s Karbala campaign” (Miller, 2014:55). Thus, the measures taken for this campaign were at the highest level and with the conscious participation of the state authority in Baghdad. However, in regard to the participation and knowledge of Saddam Hussein, it must be taken into account that al-Majid was appointed by order of the President and his signature includes his staff of the
Revolutionary Command Council. The UN report states that “from March 29, 1987, until April 23, 1989, al-Majid was granted a power that was equivalent, in Northern Iraq, to that of the President himself, with authority over all agencies of the state” (HRW/Middle East, 1995:20). This absolute power for al-Majid, who describes Kurds as donkeys or dogs or human cargo (Spencer p., 1912:81), is a clear message that the final solution was underway.

Hence, to carry out the military operation accurately, the Iraqi troops according to the UN report “tore through rural Kurdistan with the motion of a gigantic windshield wiper, sweeping first clockwise, then counter-clockwise, through one after another of the prohibited areas” (HRW/Middle East, 1995:25). This description confirms the magnitude and size of the force that was running the processes that transformed the entire Kurdish region into a closed military area.
Figure No. (4) Map of Anfal Campaigns, indicating the target zones in numbers for all eight stages
7.5.2.1 The 1st Anfal

As is clearly highlighted on the map of the Anfal Campaigns, the first operation took place in Jafayati Valley. Makiya emphasises that “the first Anfal operation began at 2.00 A.M. on the night of February 22-23, 1988 in the village of Yaakh Simar near Sulaimanniya” (Makiya, 1993:166); Yaakh Simar is located in the Jafayati valley. Accordingly, Omer Muhammad describes it as follows: “On 22 // 2/1988 Baathist regime has started its first attempt towards implementing a plan in sending the first and five military corps to the area of the first Anfal in Jafayati valley in southern Kurdistan” (Muhammad, O, 2014:25). The Un report includes more details: “the First Anfal, centred on the siege of the PUK headquarters, took more than three weeks. Subsequent phases of the campaign were generally shorter, with a brief pause between each as army units moved on to the next target” (HRW/Middle East, 1995:26).

Additionally, dependent on the participant forces in this military campaign, we realise the seriousness and the accuracy of the state authority’s plan to successfully complete this military attack. Here, according to Omer Muhammad:

“The attack was led by Lt. Gen. Sultan Hashim, who was commanding the first and fifth Legion. The Participants in this attack was 20 Brigade of the military include the brigade of (2,3,4,5,6,7) and a brigade of 65 and 66 Special Forces. The forces included the Command and General Armed Forces, which include the Commando Brigade Corps (2,4,6) and a brigade (19,31,72,116, 438.445) and commando battalions Corps 4-5. In addition to about 30 Regiment reservist and the strength of emergency include the mercenary forces” (Muhammad, 2014:25/26).

Hence, according to Omer Muhammad, in addition to these huge military forces, they used chemical weapons on the heads of innocent people, including children and the infirm, who could not escape and did not have a plan to escape. Here, it is worth mentioning the continuity of the dehumanisation of the Kurds, again, as Ali Hassan al-Majid stated: “When we started to implement our job, we were expecting to meet some good people, because we are sharing the citizenship, but we did not meet any good people, we never meet any good people of them” (Hiltermann, 1999:20).
7.5.2.2 The 2\textsuperscript{nd}, 3\textsuperscript{rd} and 4\textsuperscript{th} Campaigns

The characteristics of the 2\textsuperscript{nd}, 3\textsuperscript{rd} and 4\textsuperscript{th} campaigns were very specific in terms of the severity for the victims and the purposes of Arabisation. According to the UN report the “third ‘Anfal’, covering the hilly plain known as Germian, took from April 7 to April 20; the Fourth, in the valley of the Lesser Zab river, was the shortest of all, lasting only from May 3 to May 8” (HRW/Middle East, 1995:26). Additionally, Omer Muhammad indicates some important points as he argues:

“the third campaign was waved to the area of Germian. The Anfalising of this region is a significant wound in the body of the Kurdish nation, which started from 31/03/88 until 20/04/88 under the direct supervision of Ali Hassan al-Majid. They initiated the campaign by a circular terrify surrounding the area around Germian, due to the existence of this area close to oil wells of Kirkuk, Tikrit and Diyala, which has a major centre to the Iraqi authority. The Ba’athists was considered Germian as a very dangerou centre” (Muhammad, 2014:54).

Here, three points are important to investigate. First, in auditing the map of the campaigns, it is clear that these two campaigns are far from the borders of Iran, and as a consequence from the international war zone as well. The exclusivity of these two campaigns lies in these two characteristics, as has been reviled by Sherko Kirmanj: on the one hand,

“Iraqi forces in the circle of Kirkuk (Germian), which means 3\textsuperscript{rd} and 4\textsuperscript{th} Anfal, have besieged the whole area before initiating the operations to prevent people to escape from the targeted areas, with the exception of surrender. On the other hand, in both these two stages Iraqi forces previously have prepared transport vehicles for the deportation of civilians to landing places. Thus, after the surrender of people they have been gathered in some temporary areas and then they have been transported to the military camp of Tobzawah to initiate the process of secretion, murdering, concealment and extermination of them” (Kirmanj, 2013:20/21).

Here, according to Kirmanj, this regulation is rarely found in the other stages, except for the 8\textsuperscript{th} stage of Duhok, which was similar to these two phases. The answer to understanding this exception in the proceedings of these two AC in Kirkuk zone
lies in a recommendation of Wafiq Al-Samara’i, the deputy of Iraq’s military intelligence director in 1988, who stated, “you can kill half a million Kurds in Erbil, but it won’t change anything: it would still be Kurdish. But killing 50,000 Kurds in Kirkuk will finish the Kurdish cause forever” (Al-samara’i, quoted in Hiltermann 2007: 134). Thus, the Arabisation of Kirkuk city in order to reduce and minimise the border of the Kurdish areas to besiege them in three cities without the rural dimension, was in preparation for the next stages, as Dr. Mohammad Majid has confirmed:

“Ali Hassan al-Majid has explained his justifications and the purpose of economic blockade in one of the Bath’s meetings, he said, “Today the migration is from the countryside to the city, clear… the northern region must move from the countryside to the city, in the countryside I do not provide anything to obligate him to migrate and move to the city and at the same time to breeding them the pure national education. He continues; I am not giving them the flour, nor sugar or oil or electricity and I am remaining them close to me, to let them to hearing my voice to implant in their mind what I want of thinking, culture and consciousness” (Majid, M. 2009:5).

Accordingly, this statement gives a clear purpose to the Baath’s authority to keep the Kurds under their control, however, rather than educating them, they were mass murdered. In this regard, Dr Mohammad Majid has stated that according to one of the state’s official statements of Ali Hassan al-Majid numbered (289 on 11/4/1988), the villages of 3rd AC areas were some of the villages most affected by the Anfal operations, as the disappearance included the highest proportion of women and children in comparison to other regions of the Anfal. The state’s official statement confirms:

“Assembling points have been made for civilians who have been arrested or have surrendered in the villages of the region before being sent to the security headquarters as described, as stated in the book, for example, the leadership of the oil protection force No. 289 on 11/4/1988

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1Wafiq Al-Samara’i, who is living in UK, was deputy director in the military of intelligence responsible for the Iran branch (Woods, Kevin, 2009:71).
“to the security directorate of al-Tamim\(^1\) (Kirkuk); we are sending you the families listed in the attached, who surrendered to our military units on April 11, 1988, Please take the necessary steps in respect of the regulations of the North Office and let us know of their receipt” (Majid, M. 2009:8).

7.5.2.3. The 5\(^{th}\), 6\(^{th}\), 7\(^{th}\) and 8\(^{th}\) Anfal Campaigns

Every military campaign has its characteristics and is carefully designed, both geographically and logistically. Therefore, to address the essence of every campaign in detail separately, would require at least one chapter for every operation. However, because the purpose of this thesis is different to simply presenting the course of events and its consequents, a very short summary of the campaigns has been presented.

Here, regarding the 5\(^{th}\), 6\(^{th}\) and 7\(^{th}\) operation, which intensified in the province of Erbil, Hardi explains how “the fifth, sixth and seventh Anfal targeted the valleys of Shaqlawa and Rawanduz in the Erbil district, on the border of Iran. This consisted of three consecutive offensives, which started on 15 May and ended on 26 August” (Hardi, C., 2012:21). Thus, these campaigns were carried out respectively, in areas adjacent to each other. However, the victims in these areas were much less in number in comparison to the previous campaigns, due to the rugged region on the one hand, and on the other hand, according to Omer Mohammad, “the majority of the residents had left the areas before the beginning of the military offensive” (Muhammad, 2014:164) and they had sought refuge across the border. Additionally, “these campaigns including the final campaign and the essence of the plans have been explained carefully in a private report from the Commandant Yuns Mohammad al-Zarb to the Army General Staff under the No. 1475 On May 30, 1988” (Muhammad, 2014:164)

In terms of the 8\(^{th}\) or the final Anfal, which “took place between 25 August and 6 September” (Hardi, C., 2012:21), this was characterised by particularly fatal cruelty and even more civilian casualties; strangely, in addition to that, this area is

\(^1\) Within the policy of Arabisation, the Baath authority changed the names of many places into Arabic, with political connotations. Thus, based on this policy the name of Kirkuk has been changed to al-Tamim.
located on the borders of Turkey, which is very far from the war zone. The strength and magnitude of this operation reflected the termination of the Iran/ Iraq war, and the end of the last populated rural area. In this regard, Stuart Miller points out: “even after concluding the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam continued his genocide against the Kurds with the eighth and final Anfal phase, which targeted the heavily populated Badinan region of the KDP in late August and early September” (Miller, 2014:61).

7.6. The Process of Annihilation

With respect to the Baathist’s perpetration of the entire annihilation of the targeted people in the death zone, I will attempt to approach Elias’s framework of violence. Thus, if, according to Elias, the process of state formation with its characteristics is considered to be a civilising process, and also Elias’s examination of the process of genocide in the framework of the breakdown of the state, it could be that in Iraq principally, it is difficult to find an independent process of state formation due in part to its failed characteristics. In other words, state formation in Iraq constantly carried in its matrix the seeds of the collapse. Here, Elias is raising a confusing question about what happened in Nazi Germany as he states:

“How was it possible that people could plan and execute in a rational, indeed scientific way, an undertaking which appears to be a throwback to the barbarism and savagery of earlier times– which, leaving aside all differences of population size and provided one is allowed posthumously to grant slaves the status of human beings, could have taken place in Ancient Assyria or Rome? But in the twentieth-century one no longer expected such things.” (Fletcher J., 1997:158).

Dependently, as long as Jonathan Fletcher is referring to the unique aspects of Nazi mass killing, there is certainly a unique aspect for the Baath’s mass killing. If there are philosophical and historical dimensions for Nazi Germany and its ideology, there are at the same time levels of philosophical and historical dimensions for Iraqi Baathists and their ideology. Here, Fletcher continues his argument that “genocide was a calculated action which served to reduce the enemy’s military strength” (Fletcher J., 1997:158).

In such a situation, what happened in Kurdistan could be replicated in the context of the colonial fieldwork. It has been explained that Iraq was been created from different regions- the Arab region and Kurdish region. However, the Kurdish region was divided into four regions, and every region was annexed to a state
dominated by different ethnicities. Thus, according to the Turkish sociologist Ismail Beshkchi, Kurdistan is an international colony (Beşikçi, İ., 2004). Here, the Kurdish genocide can be compared to the characteristics of the Holocaust because of its similarity in this aspect, as “Elias places the Nazi mass murder of the Jews in the context of inter-state processes and the dynamics of established-outsider relations” (Fletcher J., 1997:160). Hence, there are two important characteristics: the interstate, and the established-outsider relations, and both exist in the Anfal Campaigns. First is the cooperation of international community with the Iraqi authority politically, financially and militarily.

Militarily, and under the surveillance of national authorities, many EU companies supplied Iraq with forbidden weapons, and these weapons were used against the Kurdish people, making it the first country in the world ever to use chemical weapons against its own citizens in this way. Accordingly, Stuart Adam Miller states, “the use of chemical weapons on the defenceless rural population of Kurdistan was both the first use of chemical weapons by a state on its own civilian population (without a legitimate military target) and the first direct chemical gassing of a town or village” (Miller, S. 2014:54). Here, the subject of bystanders arises again, because as pointed out by Philip Spencer, “it is important to remember that genocide does not take place in a completely closed system but in a global context” (Spencer P. 2012:50). This is because according to Spencer “there are both internal and external bystanders and the inaction of those outside may be more important than that of those inside” (Spencer P. 2012:50). In this regard, Henrik Edgren and many others, including Spencer, have interpreted from Raul Hilberg his category of the bystanders in an even wider sense, to include helpers (those involved directly), ‘gainers’ (those who benefited directly or indirectly from the despoliation of victims) and onlookers (those who watched passively) (Edgren, H., 2012:54).

In addition to this categorisation, Stuart Adam Miller claims: “the United States certainly knew about this prohibited use of chemical weapons, and issued weakly-worded statements of disapproval, but took no actionable steps to stop them” (Miller, S. 2014:48). However, opposite to the Iraqi authority themselves, the US at the period of using the chemical weapons, confirmed that Iran is the country that had used chemical weapons, and this was their position until the US Congress announced that it was the Iraqis’ responsibility. Consequently, this case confirms the inter-state nature of the Anfal Campaigns, including the internal emphasis on the established-
outsider relations, which have previously been noted, in that the relationship between successive Iraqi authorities and the Kurds led to the genocidal action.

Based on this theoretical explanation, the fourth and the final phase with regard to the Anfal Campaigns, is the annihilation, or as Federico Finchelstein has described, the “extermination mobile killing operations in extermination camps” (Finchelstein, F., 2005:19). In this regard, Ali Hassan al-Majid was not hiding his intention to eliminate the targeted people, as he emphasised “taking care of them means of burying them with bulldozers. That’s what taking care of them means. Those people gave themselves up” (Makiya, 1993:167). Here, an important question arises regarding the question of Elias of “how was it possible that people could plan and execute in a rational, indeed scientific way?” (Fletcher J., 1997:158): does it matter for killing whether it is in a rational or in a scientific way? It is true that the Holocaust was carried out in a highly rational and scientific way, as mentioned by Martin Shaw, “the Holocaust was a textbook case of scientific management, a paradigm of modern bureaucratic rationality, exemplified by the department in the SS headquarters in charge of the destruction of European Jews, officially designated as the Section of Administration and Economy” (Shaw, 2007:135). However, it is also true that more than one million people in Rwanda have been killed by militias who typically murdered their victims with machetes and machine guns, and far away from bureaucratic procedures. In this regard, Martin Shaw argues, “in Rwanda, notoriously, machine guns and machetes proved quite as murderous as the gas chambers were, without the need for bureaucracy on the German scale (although the organiser did employ modern political organisation and mass media)” (Shaw, 2007:136).

Thus, it is possible to determine all models of genocide as being unique in their method of killing and annihilation. However, despite the nature of rationality and scientific approach taken in the Anfal Campaigns, the primitive mentality in the Baathist rhetoric, particularly the rhetoric of al-Majid, still strongly existed. As a consequence, it may be possible to state that the process of the AC has gathered together both models of Rwanda and the Holocaust. This is because, theoretically, the tribal nature of the Rwandan mentality emerged in the Baathist literature, particularly in al-Majid’s rhetoric, and their behaviour was in accordance with the tribal totalitarian model towards the outside; also, practically, the modern implementation of technical administration was similar to that of the Holocaust in bringing the process to a ‘successful’ end. Accordingly, dependent on the admission of one of the
commanders of the mercenary forces, who has confirmed that “al-Majid was fiercer than Saddam Hussein. He was not respecting anybody and he was obeying the orders of Saddam only” (Jihani, 2007:18). This is evidence of the lack of a structural mind in one of the state institutions, which is the army. Al-Majid, in virtue of his family relations with Saddam, and the blood relationship of the tribe, would not listen to anybody except the words of his cousin Saddam Hussein. Hence, this kind of power relation is still the prisoner of the tribal mind.

The methods used for the transformation of victims were implemented in different ways, depending on multiple formats and in accordance with the process. Primarily, the victims were transferred to the temporary camps, throughout several stages and locations. The victims were arrested and detained in areas near to the military campaigns (Fatih, Latif, and Salih, Majid, 2003:174), pending their transfer to military bases. This was done in difficult circumstances without food or drink or any kind of cover to protect them from the extreme cold. In the end, they were transferred to the allocated camps for the victims in order to categorise them and separate families from each other (Fatih, Latif, and Salih, Majid, 2003:175). However, in some cases, some of those who were arrested from the villages and the surrounding area were killed in the same place by Iraqi forces (Resool, 2003:122).

**Temporary allocated camps**

- Al-salamiyah
- Tobzawah¹
- Nugrah Salman
- Nzarka Castle
- Abu Ghreb
- Dobbs
- Khaled Military camp
- Poseah

(Mzuri, 2011:15)

¹**Tobzawah** is one of the worst military bases which were built according to the proposal submitted by the Soviet Union and their planning in order to keep the city of Kirkuk safe. This castle is composed of a large fort containing 2,500 soldiers. In some places there are 2 or 3 castles (Resool, 2003:122).
Meriwan Qani also explains how, “initially, the state arrested the target people to turn them into detention centres and private camps. Then the state separated males from females to transfer them in groups in order to open fire and murder them by the special teams. This means that death in the AC was a cumbersome death and was not carried out directly in one place. Additionally, those who were involved in the process of the AC were not involved in direct murdering, but everyone carried out a function and the state arranged a special place and special squads to murder and genocide them” (Qani, 2008:31). This means that bureaucracy, as was the case in the Holocaust, constituted the most important part of the process. The process of killing has shaped different stages and the victims suffered under very poor conditions. People were transferred in closed vans from one place to another like animals. Then they were murdered and buried in mass graves. In such a moment, according to Martin Shaw, “bureaucracy provided the ‘moral sleeping pills’ that made possible the Holocaust’s technical-administrative success” (Shaw, 2014:136). Here, Khalid Suleman also indicates the consequences of the AC as he explains: “the summit of the Bath’s fascism, after the termination of all Anfal campaigns, tens of thousands of the Kurd men, and women, the elderly and children have been transferred to a military complex. Then they are deported for the second time in the southern Iraqi desert, Nugra Salman1, Ramadi, Samawah, and the desert of Arar, near Saudi Arabia. There is some information is indicating that a lot of victims of Anfal have been sold to the Arab countries” (Suleiman, K., 2002:11).

7.6.1 Survivors

It is important to present the experiences of some of the survivors to understand the real circumstances in these military camps and prisons. One of those of survivors is Mam Anwar who had 51 members of his family disappear. He said, “When they took us to Topzawa they have separated us from each other. My oldest

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1Qalat Al-Salman

Qalat Al Salman Prison is sited in the middle of the desert, about 150 km from Samawa and 80 km from the Saudi border in Ar’Ar region (see map of Iraq) and has no access road. This prison was built in the early 1980’s, about five kilometres from the prison of Nugrat Al Salman (which has now been converted into a warehouse for building material). Until testimonies were received from some of the hostages released in the late 80’s, Qalat Al Salman was thought to be Nugrat Al Salman (CRHDI, 2009).
son was with me, when they came to take him from me I told him this is my son and he was always with me but they took him forcedly from my hand and he was taken crying, and I did not see him anymore. I do not know what has happened to him” (Ahmad, 2008:260). Muhammad Kakamin is another survivor who said, “I have 21 missing from my family, and 45 missing from my relatives” (Ahmad, 2008:261).

Mariam Malik (79 years old): four of her children went missing in the Anfal Campaigns. She spent the whole seven months in this prison and witnessed the huge insults, and the torture of prisoners in the camps of “Dobbs, Topzawa, and Nugrat Salman” in Arar. These prisons were full of women, children and young people from the Anfal of Garmiyan.

She said: “‘what should I tell, who can tell what have happened? It was a disaster and even our memories have been shattered’… ‘When we arrived at Nuqrat Salman it looked like a hell, and I wish I could not even see my enemies in this place.’” Her husband, who was sitting next to her said, “the prison was containing 8000 prisoners and the place was not fit for any kind of life. They were assaulting and torturing people in terrible ways. My mother died because she was not strong enough for the sufferings of the prison. I placed her body in a ditch of a small depth within half a meter, because they were not giving us enough time to bury her” (Arar, 2008:235).

On the side of the Baathist participants, here are some portions of an admission from an Arab Shovel Driver who buried Anfal victims. The journalist Arif Qurbani, who is also one of my interviewees in this research, after the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, found this man and interviewed him. Qurbani in his forward, stated:

“In a series of booklets of recording the stories of Anfal witnesses, I have tried to reveal some hidden aspects of this horrific genocidal campaign that Saddam Hussein’s regime carried out against the Kurdish people of Iraq. Those witnesses were Anfal subjects who could one way or another escape the firing squads.

The witness is Abdulhasen Murad, an Arab born in the south of Iraq. Murad had worked for a long time with Iraqi security forces as a shovel driver. Murad’s job was covering the victims with sand no matter whether they were alive or dead.

Within the Arabization plan of the Kurdish city of Kirkuk, Abdulhasen got a house in Kirkuk. He was provided with false papers to prove that he was a decent inhabitant of Kirkuk” (Qurbani, Arif, 2011:12).
Thus, Murad was one of those who was brought to Kirkuk in order to Arabise this city.

Qurbani asking the Shovel Driver to reveal what had been happening in Tobzawa and other places. He writes:

“Would you like to tell us a couple of torturing stories that you heard about?

The Arab Shovel Driver: “Torture was used as a means to force people to admit what they have done or they know about others. Some were tortured to death, others were cut to pieces. There was a method to pull a man from both legs until he is torn to two parts. In addition, there was psychological torture, this was done by bringing other members of the family and torturing them until the concerned person says: Stop I say what you want me to say. I personally had seen murdering people and piling their corpses to be thrown into the mass graves later on. You better ask me about such things!” (Qurbani, Arif, 2011:24).

Dependent on the content of this interview, it seems that the Baathists strongly accredited Murad, as he admitted that in this interview that he witnessed many scenes and attitudes of the Baathists. Moreover, Murad continued, “For the last fifteen years, memories struck my mind just like movies. The sight of killing and burying all those innocent women and children cannot be forgotten, especially the sight of that 35 days old baby that I buried it alive!” (Qurbani, Arif, 2011:25)

How could we understand Murad’s behaviour and his regression? It seems that when a person goes back to the position of his individuality and his emotional accounts, his memory returns to him in way that embarrasses his soul. Thus, the satisfaction he gains from conducting this interview, as well as his admitting that he cannot sleep, is the main impression from that case. Here, according to Elias, the situation does not have a relationship with good and bad, but with the circumstances of people. Elias explains, “our kind of behaviour has grown out of that which we call uncivilized. But these concepts grasp the actual change to statically and coarsely. In reality, our terms ‘civilized’ and ‘uncivilized’ do not constitute an antithesis of the kind that exists between ‘good’ and ‘bad’, but represent stages in a development, which, moreover, is still continuing” (Fletcher J., 1997:12). Hence, according to Fletcher, “for Elias then, the question of why behaviour and emotions change is really the same as the question of why forms of life change” (Fletcher J., 1997:25). Thus, the political, economic and social developments impose their influence on the self-restraint of people.
Moreover, Murad continues talking about his experience as a Shovel Driver in his interview with Qurbani regarding the digging and pits in terms of preparing the mass graves:

Did you ask your friend Farhan what were all these digging and pits for?

Could you discuss it together?

No, I couldn’t ask him because we were on different bulldozers.

Who ordered you, where to dig?

Major Nazhan did.

When did you start digging the holes?

We started at 9 o’clock in the morning.

How long were you busy with digging?

Till about 8 o’clock in the evening (Qurbani, Arif, 2011:25:31)

How many pits did you dig?

I remember, we dug about 4-5 pits. Each of them was 20-25m in dimensions and about 3m deep (Qurbani, Arif, 2011:25:32).

Here, I will refer to two important indications. First, there were more than a group of Shovels, secondly, the number of graves and their sizes. These two points are enough to imagine the horrific process of annihilating the victims. Murad continues describing the process of the campaigns as he answers another question: When were the Anfal victims brought to that shooting place?

Murad including, “before bringing the victims, they brought the Executioners.

Did you see the executioners by your own eyes?

Yes, I saw them personally.

When they brought the executioner groups, on which side of the pit was you standing? What was the distance between you and the executioners?

We were all together (Qurbani, Arif, 2011:25:36).

When were the Anfal victims brought?

Not long after were they took us to the killing field. I think all the steps were planned together.

How did they bring them? I mean by what kind of vehicles?

They brought them with trucks.

What kind of trucks?
They looked like an ambulance, but they were longer and larger (Qurbani, Arif, 2011:25:38).

Can you describe the process of the killing? Did the victims come down in queues?

The first and the main point is the killing was under the command of Tahir Habush. He ordered all of us to switch on all our machines. Even the bulldozers were switched on to make noises. The victims’ trucks were heavily guarded. The trucks were brought one by one to the side of the pit; two guards were engaged in watching the doors of the trucks. The victims were brought in singles in front of the officers, and they started shooting them at the head. Thereafter, the bodies were thrown to the holes.

Were the victims blindfolded and hands tied before being shot?
Yes, I saw that all of them were blindfolded (Qurbani, Arif, 2011:25:39).

Were all the victims killed in the same way?
As I told you their full load of six trucks, each one contained fifty people, the total of 300 victims were divided over four pits, so each 75 of them were buried in one hole. Therefore, I could not see all of them (Qurbani, Arif, 2011:25:41).

According to your description, the victims were just brought and pushed in front of the killers. Isn’t that right? Yes, that is quite right. They pushed them like animals and were shot altogether.

Nobody was able to find a way to survive like asking a soldier to ease his escape!

The bullets were coming like rain. There was no chance for the slightest move. Nobody could help at all.

Had it happened that an old man, a woman or a child, going to a soldier or an officer begging to save his or her life? Or asking for what reason they receive this punishment?

Yes, that had happened. A woman came to me and asked me those questions (Qurbani, Arif, 2011:25:51).

Thus, this is the admission of the Shovel Driver at the field of the mass graves. It reflects the level of capabilities and the possibilities that mobilised everyone to enable the process and its success. Additionally, here is the story of 32 year old Muhammad, one of the survivors highlighted in a UN report. It is compatible with the admission of the Shovel Driver, and states:
“Muhammad spent two days in Topzawa. He was not questioned. He was given nothing to eat. On the third day, the guards came to his “hall,” which held about 500 prisoners. They handcuffed the men in pairs and took them to a line of vehicles painted in camouflage colours. Each vehicle held twenty-eight prisoners; Muhammad counted the seats. It was the middle of the afternoon when the convoy moved off. They drove for perhaps six hours, but Muhammad quickly lost all sense of direction and had no idea where they were going. All he could tell was that most of the journey was on the paved highway; the final hour was on a bumpy dirt road.

When the convoy eventually stopped, the driver kept the motor running. Over the throb of the engine, Muhammad could hear the sound of gunfire outside. The prisoners were hustled out into the darkness and searched for any identity cards and money that might have been missed earlier. Muhammad lost his last 700 dinars. When the search was completed, the guards removed the handcuffs that bound Muhammad to his neighbour, a man from the village of Babakr, close to Aliyani Taza. In place of the handcuffs, the guards brought a length of the string, which they used to tie the twenty-eight prisoners in a single line by their left hands. The men were ordered to stand to face the edge of a freshly dug trench, just long enough to accommodate the twenty-eight bodies as they fell.

The knot binding Muhammad’s left hand had been carelessly tied, and he managed to tug it free of his wrist and bolt a moment before the soldiers opened fire. Beyond the trench was an open field, and the springtime grass had grown tall enough to conceal Muhammad from the truck headlights that were now trained in his direction. To his astonishment, the guards did not give chase. Behind him, the clatter of gunfire continued.

Muhammad ran and walked for four days without food, drinking rainwater from puddles along the way” (HRW/Middle East, 1995:188/189).

Hajar Aziz Surme states that “according to a census, the number of annihilated residents of these villages dependent on a structured program has exceeded 180,000 people” (Hajar, 2006”65).

7.6.2 Characteristics of the Anfal campaigns:

The AC of 1987 – 1989 were characterised by the following consequences:

- The AC were characterised by inclusiveness and continuity. It is a misreading of the AC is to believe that they involved the state with all its titanic resources,
standing monitoring the villagers and arresting helpless people one by one. If Anfal on the surface was surrounding and arresting villagers, inwardly it was carrying out a dismemberment of the Kurdish cities psychologically, socially, economically and logistically. Making the outside of these cities the military zones meant paralysing the movement between cities entirely in order to restrict the mobility between cities and to impose a psychological fatigue to push people to migrate towards the south to the Arab cities. In this regard, Mariwanqani argues, “If an analysis cannot tell us what the formation of the Iraqi authority is, and that the annihilation was one of its products, at the same time they cannot tell us why the destruction of the Kurdish towns after the Anfal operations occurred and how we can understand it. The authority, which has destroyed the villages and the bases of its life, was the same authority that destroyed the cities of Qaladze, Sayed Sadiq, Rania and other cities in Kurdistan. Therefore, the target inherently was wider and further than the destruction of the villages.”

- The AC were characterised by pursuing the scorched-earth policy for the purpose of planting despair and ruining the ground. Thus, the rural areas were completely and utterly demolished- the nature of its beauty completely eliminated, including the destruction of all that was owned by those villagers. According to Miller, the “current estimates claim that upwards of 4,000 villages was completely destroyed in this campaign.” (Miller, S., 2014:62). Makiya has including that “roughly 80% of all the rural villages in Iraqi Kurdistan” (Makiya, K., 1993:167) have been destroyed. This demolition according to the UN report, included “the wholesale destruction of civilian objects by Army engineers, including all schools, mosques, wells and other non-residential structures in the targeted villages, and a number of electricity substations” (HRW/Middle East, 1995:20).

- The widespread use of chemical weapons against civilians on a large scale during two complete years. Makiya states, “the first Kurdish village ever to be attacked with chemical weapons (apart from napalm), was sheikhWigan in the Balisan Valley... at April 1987” (Makiya, 1993:164/165). Throughout these two years, several kinds of chemical weapons were used as a UN report confirms: “mustard gas and the nerve agent GB, or Sarin, against the town of
Halabja as well as dozens of Kurdish villages” (HRW/Middle East, 1995:188/189).

- Mass summary executions and the mass disappearance of many tens of thousands of civilians, including large numbers of women and children, and sometimes the entire population of villages.

- It has been characterised by announcing it in official military statements through the state media, and as a heroic national military operation. In this regard, Makiya points out, “there was nothing secret about the fact that something new was in the works because all through 1988 Iraqis heard over and over again, in all the major government-controlled media, about the (heroic Anfal operation)” (Makiya, 1993:166).
7.7. Conclusion

In this chapter, the final solution in the form of the AC against the Kurdish people in Iraqi Kurdistan has been studied. This process lies within the framework of the process of Arabisation of the Kurds in Iraq, or in other words, de-Kurdification. The concept of Anfal is the name of the eighth chapter (Surah) of the Quran, which means spoils of war, and it has been used as justification in terms of the Islamisation of non-believers. This is based on figurational sociology, and the ideology of the BP, in order to mobilise its religious and cultural dimensions as instruments for the legitimation of their authority.

In addition, the difficult circumstances of the Kurdish region in the period of the Iran-Iraq war doubled because of the Baath’s pressure on Kurdish society on the one hand, and because of transferring the war to the Kurdish borders on both sides of Iraqi and Iranian Kurdistan. This has been noted by Martin Van Bruinessen as he explains, “control of territory and population became even more crucial on both sides than it had been before the war” (Van Bruinessen, 1986:14). However, if the war had created an extra difficulty for Kurdish people, at the same time it has been argued that there is no relationship between the war and the Anfal Campaigns. In this regard, Stuart Adam Miller points out, “after eight years of fighting, the Iran-Iraq War had finally come to a halt, but the fight continued for the Kurds” (Miller, S., 2014: 60).

The AC as a process were implemented according to the four theoretical stages of Raul Hilberg. Hilberg has effectively set out a model for the pattern of genocide, as he argues that the “destruction process has inherent patterns. There is only one way in which a scattered group can effectively be destroyed” (Hilberg, R., 1985:1064). The first stage is the preparation, which is an intentional plan that had to be drawn up before the implementation of the Anfal Campaigns. The second stage is the legislation, and it started with the first meeting of the ‘Revolution Command Council’ through the appointing of Ali Hassan al-Majeed as absolute ruler of the Kurdish region. The third stage is identification, which means, “the definition of the group that would be targeted by Anfal, and vastly expanded the range of repressive activities against all rural Kurds” (HRW/Middle East, 1995:24). This stage started with a general census and as a consequence, the prohibition areas were designated in preparation for the destruction of the residents of these areas. However, according to Raul Hilberg, the deportation and concentration (or seizure) or concentration camps was the fourth stage of the procedure in order to annihilate an out-group.
This procedure fits with the General Assembly Resolution 961, which is a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups. Thus, this denial has been implemented practically through the eight Anfal military campaigns, which led to the annihilation of hundreds of thousands of victims, and the destruction of the entire Kurdish rural areas.
CHAPTER 8: Interviews, Personal Views and Experiences in the Process of Iraqi State Formation and Ideology (the Civilising Process)

8.1. Introduction

In the preceding two chapters, through a range of the literature and documents of the BP, the notion of state formation as a civilising process has been examined, along with analysing the Baath’s ideology, and the stages involved in the process of genocide against the Kurds. This chapter builds on the previous two chapters by analysing the developments in knowledge and the experiences of individual people and their perceptions of genocide and the BP’s behaviour towards individuals and groups in Iraqi Kurdistan.

In this chapter, there is an attempt to approach the most important causes of the genocide in Iraq by focusing on state formation and the Baath’s ideology. For this reason, 34 participants have been selected and interviewed, from different levels and based on two conditions: their age and residency in Iraq under BP rule. Five participants who were involved in the Baath’s authority in Iraq, or who worked for the government, have been interviewed. Seven participants involved in the opposite spectrum of the Baath’s rule have also been interviewed. In addition, the women who have suffered due to the genocide process have not been forgotten.

As has been confirmed in the previous three chapters, the genocide was carried out during a long-term process. In this regard, Mam Qadir, who is one of the participants, was jailed for five years on charges of belonging to Peshmarga guerrillas; also, and his birth place destroyed twice, and some of his family members were mass murdered in 1988. He has described these stages through his own experience of these events, with its bitterness and sorrows. The stages of genocide took on different forms and models. Mam Qadir, is illiterate but has an excellent memory and significant experience, and he lived among Sunni Arabs for more than 10 years under the Baath’s order of deportation. The importance of Mam Qadir’s description is he counts the stages and difficulties of these periods under the rule of Iraqi authority as follows:

“Primarily, the Baathist’s started by Arabising the land and the people everywhere and everything, specifically in the contact areas. However, Arabising was and still depends on an ascending order and does not have

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1 Contact areas is all areas adjacent to the Arab areas in Kirkuk, Diyala and Mosul. Mam Qadir rejected the word ‘mixed’ areas because as he said “these areas are not mixed but adjacent to the Arab areas and have been Arabised. Thus, it is mixed or cleansed from the Kurds because of the Arabisation”.

247
more stages. It is an ascending order of a continuous Arabising in a single-stage before Baath’s power and still. When the Baathists seized power, the Faili Kurds were easy to track down. Then, they faced deportation, and murder and plundering of their possessions were waiting for them in the most shocking forms. I was in Baghdad and one of the deported people with his family was my close friend. The Baathists deceived the Kurds through the 11th March 1970 agreement. Then after four years of procrastination, and when they had strengthened themselves, they waged relentless war on the Kurdish region and began to discharge the villages and rural areas in terms of creating a security belt with a depth of 20 to 40 km, alongside the borders of Kurdistan with Iran, Turkey and Syria. They deported the villager residents and threw them in the coercive camps under very harsh conditions, or deported them to the Southern Arab areas. In 1980, they returned to the rest of the Faili Kurds, killing the Barzani men in 1983, and the biggest ever campaigns under the name of Anfal occurred for nine months in 1988 across thousands of km’s in the depth of the Kurdish rural areas. It resulted in hundreds of thousands of victims and they were buried alive in Arar in the western desert of Iraq. They would have shown more aggression and destruction towards the Kurds if they had stayed in power for a longer period” (Mam Qadir, victim, age 75).

8.2. The Establishment (Beginning) and the Instability

Despite the passage of a long time from the establishment of the Iraqi Kingdom to the later stages of state formation, the second generation still recounts many political, social and economic events from different eras of Iraqi state formation. However, the era of the BP and its effects are still evident to the present day as the victims still remember the entirety of both macro and micro events. Many of the participants have been involved in intellectual, political and social activities, and suffered directly and indirectly from the BP having hegemony over the elements of freedom.
The establishment of the Iraqi state from the beginning and its unilateral behavior towards the Kurds was consistently one of the key issues raised by the interviewees. The previous MP Dr. Chinar Saad has suffered a lot because of her father's Peshmerga affiliation, and after the national uprising against the Iraqi Baath’s regime in 1991 she became the ‘Minister of Martyrs and Anfal affairs’ in the Kurdistan region and the President of the ‘Kurdish Institute to Prevent Genocide.’ She argues:

“If we want to understand the coup led by the Baath in terms of the Iraqi state, and if we justify it in the case of the BP, what about the previous stage? The Arabs were behaving normally with the Kurds, even during the era of the Iraqi Kingdom at the beginning of the Iraqi state formation; the conduct of Arabs and their view of the Kurds were similar. Later, because of the colonial power and England as well as the political interests of the international community vested in the region, an effect on the conduct of Arabs emerged as it was comparatively less aggressive. Otherwise the Kurds under the pressure of these successive regimes, under a similar Arab mentality, were suffering. Therefore, I do not think that the coup is the only reason for genocide, but they were already thinking and behaving in that direction. This type of mentality has always existed” (Chinar, political activist, age 42).

This quote highlights two important postulates: the unipolar state that was ruled by the Sunni-Arab minority from its establishment, inclusive of the Baath’s rule following 1968. Hence, the Kurds were driven away from power sharing. In addition to the persecution, it led to the genocide in different forms. Thus, this figure of the state and its different characters includes unipolar eradication through violence and one form of conduct. Here, the main issue, which has been focused on by the interviewee, is the Arab mentality. Thus, the whole quote is expressing pan-Arab centrism, not only through the marginalising of other groups, but also in order to mobilise everyone and everything for its purposes and its ideology.

Here, another interviewee, who is a Sunni Arab Iraqi thinker from al-Anbar, and an academic expert on Political Sciences, Prof. Dr. Tayseer Abdul Jabbar Al
Alousi, primarily focuses on the state that failed because of the absence of harmony between the Iraqi groups, as he argued:

“The emphasis on building a modern Iraqi state was not implemented in the correct manner. The reason is because of the patriarchal authority of the Kingdom, and its falling under the influence of some elements that had contradictory purposes, making them tired from what those elements would push the state towards concerning the different conflicts. The implications of this are that it fell upon the shoulders of the Iraqi components, especially the non-Arabs…. then dragging the state institutions towards a tyrant authority, instead of following legal and constitutionally proper principles” (al-Alusi, Baath opposition, age 58).

Thus, according to al-Alusi, non-Arabs became the victims of the power conflict between the Arabic ideological tendencies and the most prominent goal of all Arab political tendencies centring on Arab-centrism. However, his concept of “tyrant authority” is a useful summary of a non-democratic and totalitarian system that marginalised non-Arabs and put them under tremendous pressure.

In this regard, Kurdish historian professor Dr. Jabar Kadir, who is from Kirkuk city, having been intensely exposed to the Arabisation process, stated:

“The process of nation building, or the process of a nation under the name of the Iraqi nation, has completely failed. Primarily, as King Faisal and his followers were struggling, this continued when the Arab nationalist movement in Iraq in the form of its fascist and Nazi model of the 1930s emerged. As a result, the non-Arabs reaction led to even more affiliation with their language and ethnic culture. This kind of state policy compelled the Kurds to hate the country that had become a big prison and full of suffering” (Kadir, deported, age 64).

Here, we can understand that one of the main causes of the failure of the state institutions was the rise of pan-Arab nationalism, and the monopolisation and exploitation of state institutions in the interests of an Arab-centric ideology. This situation led to the despair of the non-Arabs with the state, and a lack of the cooperation with the Arab nationalists. Thus, this unilateral rule of the state led to the dilemma of political legitimacy. Moreover, the failure of the state led to the
persecution of the Kurds who strongly opposed the regime, having marginalised them and gradually tightened their pressure. In addition, Kadir states that:

“During the period of the republic, particularly during the period of the reign of Baath, the common sense that existed was terminated. We can admit that there is no nation called the Iraqi nation, even there is not a common Iraqi culture. For example, in Kurdistan, no one felt that he is part of a state called Iraq and no one felt that he has membership of a nation called the Iraqi nation” (Kadir, deported, age 64).

Hence, according to Kadir a sense of affiliation from the Kurds is absent. In the same trend, al-Alusi adds that:

“The BP is an Arabised and chauvinistic party, par excellence. This party has exploited the tyrant authority mechanisms to impose its influence, as the predominant task. However, the subject of building an Iraqi nation failed as the predominant aim, except the case of assimilating the non-Arabs and non-subordinates to the tune of their philosophy, and also in the interests of Arabic chauvinism, disadvantaging the people and commensal nations historically in this region. There is no neutrality for the BP, and no cultural background that believes in pluralism. Baath is a party, with totalitarian unilateral discourse having entered into fascist territory, and its performance reflects that” (al-Alusi, Baath opposition, age 58).

Thus, the most prominent point from al-Alusi is that he believes that the BP was a non-democratic party, and pan-Arab-centrism was a very strong part of its ideology. Therefore, the assimilation of other non-Arabs is one of the constant principles of Arab-centrism. In addition, the BP’s view of a nation state is the hegemony of Arab culture led by a party leader under the leadership of a president commander. Kadir also reiterated this idea as he argued:

“The Arab nation state in Iraq was imposed upon the non-Arabs, particularly upon the Kurds without an agreement. Government officials in Iraq, in terms of the nation state concept, only considered the Arab nation. They were attempting to prepare Iraq to include Kurdistan as a central place for Arab nationalism” (Kadir, deported, age 64).
The importance of Kadir’s statement lies in two points: the lack of an agreement between the Iraqi components, as Sunni-Arabs had monopolised the Iraqi authority for more than eight decades, and Iraq was considered to be a central place for all Arab nationalists. This attitude did not arise out of a vacuum, but it was encouraged and highlighted by the BP authority, as announced by the Baa’th’s ‘Revolutionary Command Council’ on law decisions called “Legislation Title: The Arab Citizen Naturalized by Iraqi Citizenship, Has A Number of Privileges”, which stated that:

“According to the provisions of paragraph (a) of Article-42 from the Constitution, the Revolutionary Command Council held on 09.14.1985 decided the following:

**First** - the Arab citizen naturalized by Iraqi nationality, enjoys the following privileges: 1.2. The grant of a piece of land (200 m²) in any province of Iraq even Baghdad after 5 years living in Iraq. 3. Giving them a disposal from the land bank in both cases referred to in 1 and 2 above.

**Second**- the privileges have been provided in this resolution apply to Arab citizens naturalized by Iraqi nationality before the date of issuance (The decision nr. 1906, 1985).

This is a clear decision, in line with Kadir’s statement, to prepare Iraq to be a central place for Arabs from all of the Arab countries. Thus, this decision could be interpreted as one of the most important mechanisms for Arabisation of the non-Arab areas in Iraq, as the decision was to “grant a piece of land in any province of Iraq” (The decision nr. 1906, 1985).

Another participant confirmed the dilemma of the Iraqi nation state and its consideration as a failed state. Muhammad Sharif, who was part of the Iraqi authority and worked for the Iraqi Ministry of Endowment and Religious Affairs as a deputy minister claimed that:

“Of course, Iraq is a failed state because of these reasons:
First: from its establishment, the state was a vacuum concerning the meanings of a state. It has been built on three wrong bases. In addition, Iraq could not become a suitable environment for democracy because of the hegemony of the Arab element.
Second: because the Arabs were the majority, they wanted to build an Arab state, for this reason they have marginalised the Kurds. In contrast, this situation from the beginning has been refused by the Kurds. They
have considered themselves as being oppressed and they have struggled for salvation from this situation” (Sharif, part of the Iraqi authority, age 81).

There are several examples that we can investigate in these quotations from participants. Firstly, there is unanimity among the participants with regard to considering Iraq to be a failed state, with terms such as ‘the absence of harmony’ and ‘the Arab nationalism’, as well as concepts such as chauvinism and Nazism. Secondly, all participants focused on the Arab hegemony that led to monopolising the state institutions and marginalising other components, particularly the Kurds.

8.3. The Annexation and the Unity (Civilising Process)

The previous part of the vision of the participants, regarding Iraqi state formation, has been addressed. In this section, the issue of Mosul province, which is indivisible from the Iraqi state, is examined. The issue of Mosul province discussed in the Chapter Five has been clearly set out. In this respect, the explanation of Muhammad Sharif includes important notes, as he claimed:

“In my view, it can be hailed as the crime of the century. Jamal Abdul Nasir has described the Balfour promise when Palestine was given to Israel as: ‘they gave something to someone which was not their right’. We ‘as Kurds, as Kurdish nation or as residents of Mosul province,’ were not part of the war. This means the decision on war was not in the hands of the Kurds, so why did they make us part of the equation in this political war? They handed us over to Iraq, and the Iraqi authority did not have the right to accept us as part of them. This was a historical crime in depriving a nation from its basic rights to live as any other nation, and in time this right was known. The decision of self-determination was not something new. The 14-points of the US president for self-determination, one of these points was that every nation has a right to self-determination. However, he commented that the Kurds were given to Iraq and other nations to someone else; they are not property to be distributed. This is a crime and a continuous crime. In criminology, this is a continuous crime. It has been 100 years, and the Kurds want to eliminate this crime” (Sharif, part of the Iraqi authority, age 81).
This statement from someone who has been in close co-existence with the Baath authority and party members of Baath, has important indications. He, as a legal expert, has pointed out that the annexation of Mosul province to Iraq is a continuous crime. In addition, he included the 14-points of Woodrow Wilson regarding the new world order as evidence for the Kurdish rights and determination. He has mentioned the information on Woodrow Wilson’s 12th request to assure the undoubted security of life of non-Turks, as Wilson declared: “The Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured as a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development” (Wilson, W. 1918:3).

Mosul province was an opportunity because of its multi-dimensions. In this regard, it was announced that King Faisal requested to integrate Mosul province with the rest of Iraq in terms of a kind of stability. Therefore, regarding such a request Sharif added:

“Of course, this is an assumption. King Faisal had such a request to save the balance between Shi’a and Sunni Arabs, but this is an Arab problem. What were their benefits? The Kurds were not ready to support Sunni-Arabs against Shi’a Arabs” (Sharif, part of the Iraqi authority, age 81).

Sharif, despite his religious background as a Sunni-Muslim, refuses this assumption and claims that the Kurds were not ready to support an Arab minority when they were against any rights of the Kurds. In addition, this annexation could have created deep anxiety for Arabs from the re-division of Iraq. Therefore, the BP constantly focused on the unity of Iraq, as Sharif asserted:

“Yes. Saddam Hussein ‘psychologically’ in his mind had a theory of impossibility that the Kurds would never will accept the current situation and they will separate one day. Therefore, he wanted to create a specific situation to make this impossible goal. He faced two impossibilities, one of them was physical and the other was moral. The physical one was to evacuate Kurdistan. For example: five million Kurds should be screaming we want Kurdistan, but where do they want Kurdistan?” (Sharif, part of the Iraqi authority, age 70).
From this extract, we can understand that the focus on the unity of Iraq by Iraqi leaders did not come from nowhere, as there were continuous attempts to prevent the division of Iraq. Chinar views the issue from another angle as he claimed that:

“I wish they handled us as a colony because when the colonial powers occupied a region, they always have a sense that they are guests but they are coming for the issues of economics and to expand their authority. They never think that they are occupying a country, but they came to reconstruct the country. In contrast, when Kurdistan was annexed to Arabic Iraq, they did not handle Kurdistan like that. They believed that Kurdistan is their personal property and a region called Kurdistan is non-existent. Therefore, the Arab view was more chauvinistic than the colonists” (Chinar, political activist, age 42).

Thus, the dilemma not only concerns the annexation of Mosul province, but he also believes that they viewed this province as their property, as is shown in the Baath constitution, that Mosul province is included in the borders of the Arab homeland. Under this belief, they handled the Kurds in the constitution of the BP in Article -7 which states that:

“Article-7: The Arab National Homeland is that part of the earth inhabited by the Arab Nation and which lies between the Taurus mountains, the Zagros mountains, the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea, the mountains of Ethiopia, the Sahara Desert, the Atlas range and the Mediterranean Sea” (Constitution of the Baath Party, 1959).

As per this article, even Arabs did not inhabit the Kurdish region, and the Kurds never belonged to Kurdistan as they immigrated to this area. From this point, the viewpoint of Chinar explains the Arabs’ fear. The fear meant that they tried to refuse to recognise Kurdistan as an occupied area, but saw it as part of Iraq, and Iraq as directly part of the Arab homeland, as she claims:

“Of course, this fear accompanied Arabs constantly because of the sense of deprivation that existed among the Kurds, and the Arabs knew that. Fear from the Kurdish activities, political movements, fear from their history that they had never been controlled, led to such a fear. In terms of the Arab sense and their view of the Kurdish land and the Kurdish nation,
it is problematic because this nation, according to the Arabs is emigrant, and the Kurdish land has been considered as Arab land. Still, many Arabs do not recognise Kurdistan but believe it is Iraqi land” (Chinar, political activist, age 42).

Thus, two points are important here- the fear of division and the foreignness of the Kurds in Iraq. Here, Chinar is explaining the results of annexation as she claimed: “The annexation was in the benefit of Arabs and as a result you have to convert to an Arab or to be a good Iraqi in accordance with Arab standards, or it is impossible for you to exist. You are a foreigner. You are a guest” (Chinar, political activist, age 42).

Falakaddin Kakayi was one of the main Kurdish political figures, and a journalist and writer. He was an MP and later Minister of Culture of KRG. In 2013, after conducting this interview with him, he died at the age of 70. I have the transcript of a long-uncompleted interview with him, because later on, the questions on state formation were added to the previous questions. Thus, regarding the annexation of Mosul province, Kakaye claimed that:

“This became a strategy, but where did it come from? Why did they inflict from Mosul on Iraq anyway? They told us you are a nation but they inflict us on the Arab nation. What is the issue? The issue is oil as the economic and geopolitical strategy. In fact, England was behind the annexation of Mosul Vilayet to Iraq” (Kakayi, political figure, age 70).

This statement of Kakayi is another but different view on the dilemma of Mosul province. It is a view from different angles. He is viewing the issue both economically and geo-politically. He continued:

“When Iraq became a new state, they wanted us to be a new state. It was for a goal, or Iraq itself was a goal and this goal should have the ability to protect itself” (Kakayi, political figure, age 70).

This view of Kakayi starts from the belief in the existence of a super power that does as it pleases, but as on the other hand, it is closer to pessimism rather than optimism. In addition, he is highlighting the economical aspect as a main cause of the annexation. In relation to the issue of balance between Shi’a and Sunni Arabs, he also has a different view, as he admitted:
“I could not believe in this balance. It is not true that the Shi’a and Sunni Arabs are different. For them, the Arabisation is important. The Da’wa party existed and it might be that they are more backward than Baathists, but they are not different in their belief in Arabism” (Kakayi, political figure, age 70).

Hence, his thoughts were more radical as he believed that the state was built upon the pillars of Arab identity. In addition, the Arabs in Iraq are the majority, and the Kurds were annexed to them against their will.

This issue of establishing a state upon a minority within its pan-Arab-nationalistic pillar at the expense of other components, who were considered outsiders, was problematic and exploitable for the majority of the participants. Here, a senior lawyer and a former MP of KRG parliament stated that:

“The annexation has had a very bad influence. The economic and geopolitical interests led to the re-division. This time we became the victims as the assumption was that the majority of Arabs in Iraq are Shi’a Arabs so it was decided to annex the Kurds to Iraq to form a balance for Sunni Arabs” (Jambaz, Senior Lawyer, age 66).

This means that to increase the weight of Sunni Arabs, the weight of Shi’a Arabs should be reduced in order to create a parallel between both of them, but at the expense of the Kurds. Thus, it meant that the Kurds were a project used to manipulate, and their fate was utilised for the benefits of the ruler and the colonial power, including its allies in Baghdad. In this regard, this issue of creating a balance has been answered by the participant as he claimed:

“Yes, the King had been told to assist with this demand. The trend of the King was pan-Arabism as he had never been emotional about the Kurds. The Iraqi constitution in 1925 did not mention Kurds. They issued a law called the ‘law of languages’ but it was for the membership of League of Nations. The things were selectively directed and the only official language was Arabic” (Jambaz, Senior Lawyer, age 66).

This exert is approved by many documents, including the 1925 constitution, confirming that the Kurds were utilised as outsiders, and in Chapter Five, the King’s position has been illustrated as being pan-Arab-centric. Therefore, the participant is referring to an important point and stated that:
“There was a phobia called the ‘Kurdish phobia’ and that led to the commencement of the Arabisation of Kurdistan” (Jambaz, Senior Lawyer, age 66). Thus, the statement provides a clear perspective that all trends from the beginning led to the establishment of a unilateral state with Arab nationalist dimensions.

A serious attempt was made to include as many Arab participants as possible in this research, but most of them who were contacted, were not ready to give their view or any information. This kind of circumstance with its consequences is not empty from the dilemma of the complexity of the inter-relationship between the components. This complexity has been commented on by a Sunni-Arab individual, a university professor, residing under the BP rule for 30 years; he was not ready to provide an opinion and declined to give any information about the history of Iraq or even the Baath ideology. Consequently, regarding the question of the annexation of Mosul province to Iraq, he claimed:

“I do not have any information about the history of Iraq” (Alsamarrayi, Lecturer and Sunni Arab, age 68).

At the same time, this participant considered himself as being anti-BP as he admitted that:

“I was against BP from the beginning to the end; this is known. It is a real opinion without compliment (hahaha)” (Alsamarrayi, Lecturer and Sunni Arab, age 68).

This position is problematical. He is an Iraqi-Arab Sunni participant with a higher education background, who considers themselves as being against the BP, but laughs loudly as if he is unaware of the history of Iraq. This sort of abstention is in contrast to the reality of higher education, as the history of Iraq, specifically the contemporary history of Iraq, is an essential part of the education program. Therefore, it seems this reaction is in contrast to the seriousness of this issue on the division of Iraq, even if they were resistant to the BP, the reaction is unacceptable.

Another Sunni participant is al-Alusi who radically acknowledged the rights of the Kurds, but his view regarding Mosul province and some other issues are problematic, as he claimed that:
“In the context of the formation of Iraq, the poll in the state of Mosul led to the approval of the Kurds and the option was for an Iraqi state. Signals were installed in the Iraqi constitution and affirmation of the request to the King to respect the identity and the privacy of the Kurds” (al-Alusi, Baath’s opposition, age 58).

There is a lot of confusion about this commission. In addition to this issue, there are many question marks around the configuration of this committee. Regarding this matter, one participant who is a professional trial lawyer for Anfal victims, Abdul Rahman Haji Shaban, stated:

“The referendum was inherently wrong and an encroachment on the Kurdish rights. They gave the Kurds just two options; the sweetest was bitter. Both options were void. The question was; do you want to be with Iraq or with Turkey? It does not contain a question about them wanting to be independent: I want to be with myself. Thus, the referendum was invalid” (Haji Shaban, A., Victims lawyer, age 52).

In contrast to the declaration of this commission, and in accordance with many historical documents, such as polling station ballots and the Kurdish approval as it has been alleged, it never happened since it was an ambiguous process. In this regard, the author Sarah Shields in her article ‘Mosul, the Ottoman legacy and the League of Nations’ has addressed many difficulties and obstacles that were created for the commission as she claimed “the League Commissioners held Great Britain responsible not only for public outbursts, but also for the heavy police presence that accompanied the Commissioners wherever they went and kept them from sleeping” (Shields, 2009:8). However, this commission, which was called ‘the commission for the search of the truth’, did not organise a common poll but its task was to gather information and ask some Nobles, Sheikhs and Agha’s or Muslim clerics about the common affiliation of the people. Moreover, according to Kibaroğlu, M. and Kibaroğlu, A. in their book ‘Global security watch--Turkey: A reference handbook. Greenwood Publishing Group’, “Mosul should be under the rule of British mandate for 25 years” (M and A Kibaroğlu, 2009:23). In contrast to this decision, the British mandate, according to a treaty with the Iraqi authority for independence was “Signed on June 30, 1930, this treaty acknowledged an independent Iraq with complete
sovereignty over its internal affairs (Hala Mundhir and Frank, 2009: 172). Regarding this treaty, Abdulrahman Haji Shaban stated:

“In 1932 Iraq officially became a member of the League of Nations. According to the treaty, some of the pledges were imposed on Iraq, especially Article X, which says there should not be any Iraqi law contrary to this treaty. In contrast, Iraq throughout the 20th century has violated the terms and the laws of the treaty continuously” (Haji Shaban, A., Victims lawyer, age 52)

In addition to this admission, the British mandate, which depended on this treaty, did not lead to the finishing of their obligations in Iraq, particularly in relation to the Kurdish question. However, despite this information, al-Alusi has claimed that:

“No one respected the rights of the Kurds and the State handled them unjustly, persecuted them, so it pushed them to revolt for their own rights. Thus, the chauvinists called it the separatist spirit, which means divisional, but it is certainly not true and the Kurds do not deserve such a diseased description. They have all rights to self-determination” (al-Alusi, Baath opposition, age 58).

In the same direction, a Shi’a Arab participant did not recognise this causality and said:

“I do not think so. I do not think the geographical division had anything to do with this subject. If this view was right, all Arabs have participated in this opinion in southern Iraq, but they did not share their vision” (Saad alMutallibi, Iraqi political activist, age 55).

Iraq is a country for all Arabs, even Sunni/ Shi’a Arabs; it was and still is a united country and it is essentially indivisible. This is what I discovered from the majority of interviewees, but the Kurds have been accused of being separatists, as expressed by the participant al-Mutallib:

“The spirit of separatism exists in some of the Kurdish brothers only”
(Saad al-Mutallibi, Iraqi political activist, age 55).

There are several points that can be explored from these extracts, but the most prominent point here is the division between the Kurdish and Arab interviewees. This similarity emphasises the historical dimensions, common characteristics and interests between members of a group. In this regard, David Laitin in his book Nations, States
and Violence explains culture as an important element binding the ideas of people about collective concerns, as he describes:

“Culture as equilibrium in a well-defined set of circumstances in which members of a group sharing common ancestry, symbolic practices and/or high levels of interaction” (Laitin, 2007:64).

Here, we face an established group, or as Laitin argues, a cultural group who “are able to condition their behaviour on common knowledge and beliefs about the behaviour of all members of the group” (Laitin, 2007:64). This belief of the participants is understandable in that they share a similar belief in a common issue under the influence of common interactions, even though it may be modulated or apocryphal. This commonality led to the sharing of knowledge, specifically about a set of ideological issues, which were reiterated through the internal state media on a daily basis.

8.4. Baath’s Ideology (The De-Civilising Process)

Chapters five and six examined aspects of Baath ideology according to the BP’s literature; here, the participants have also contributed and expressed their views on the issue. The focus will be on the prominent concepts which were put forward by the interviewees.

8.4.1. Racism of Baath Party

After the annexation of Mosul province and the process of state formation in Iraq, as a consequence of the Sunni Arab domination and the hegemony of pan-Arab-nationalism, many Arab-centric trends emerged, including the Baath Arab Socialist party, as explained in Chapter Five. Here, it is important to note that the ideological dimensions are based on the experiences of participants in relation to the direct inter-relationships between citizens and the authority. Al-Alusi, as a Sunni Arab, without any hesitancy about confidentiality stated that:

“The BP is an Arabised and chauvinistic party” (al-Alusi, Baath’s opposition, age 58).

In this regard, Sharif being one of those participants who has had direct experience with the Baathists, being a deputy Iraqi minister, explained that:

“The ideology of BP is Arabic racism: Who lives on the Arab land, is Arab. The Arabs have a historic message. They consider the message of Islam to be their message. When they have a message, it means they are
the best people. It means Arabs are better than any others. When they become better than others, they should be dominating others. This is the theory of superiority and racism” (Sharif, part of the Iraqi authority, age 81).

Sharif, who was actively involved in the Baath’s authority, understood the aspects of the practical ideology of Baath members of the highest level. Therefore, he admitted that:

“They told us the history of Islam is the history of Arabism” (Sharif, part of the Iraqi authority, age 81).

Sharif worked in ‘The Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs’ and he has studied the required program of religious clerics. Thus, as a consequence, he knew what this statement means and what their intention was regarding the outsiders. Hence, he stated:

“Those who believe in the Baath ideology are serving this party as a religious task” (Sharif, part of the Iraqi authority, age 81).

From this declaration, it is possible to explore the religious language and symbols, which the BP adopted, specifically in the Al-Anfal campaigns. Another participant who belongs to an old Kurdish religious minority called “Kakayi” announced that:

“In 1969, Saddam Hussein’s uncle and his educated, Khairulla Tulfah, who is one of the Baathist leaders, appeared on TV with his newly publicised book, and he claimed that: Three kinds, God should not create them: The Jews, the Persian and the Flies” (Kakayi, political figure, age 70).

This statement of Tulfah coincided with the eight-year language war against Iran and the Baath state media against Israel. This language during the Baath era confirmed their Arab superiority, as there are dozens of documents and newspapers calling the Persians: “Persian Magi or Populists”. Kakayi showed his astonishment as he declared:

“This arrogance comes from a primitive ideology. It is a racist tribal ideology. It comes from blindness and a spellbinding arrogance. I do not know where it comes from, possibly comes from history”. (Kakayi, political figure, age 70)
Thus, Kakayi, along with the other participants, accused Baathism of being a racist ideology because of several theoretical and practical evidences. In addition to that, the other participant, Dr. Khalil Ismael Faili, who belongs to the minority Faili Kurds and suffered from the Baath’s policy against Faili Kurds, depending on his memory, argued that:

“Khairallah Talfah has honestly claimed that Arabs are the best nation raised up for mankind. This is a Quranic verse, ‘You are the best nation raised up for mankind’. It means Arabs are the best nation as Nazis” (Khalil, deported, age 65).

This point has been reiterated by Aflaq indirectly as he claimed: “Our nation has guaranteed the past because it is combined with a message of humanity and this is something unique to the Arabs alone” (Aflaq, 1987:155). Thus, the uniqueness according to Aflaq is limited to the Arab nation and the other nations have no relationship with humanity. Here, Aflaq continues that “Arabs with Islam become a great nation but the Arab nation has carried the message of Islam and its strength is from the strength of Arabs and its weakness is from the weakness of Arabs”. Thus, Aflaq here is closer to narcissism and claims that Arabs are at the centre of Islam and even humanity. They overtly believe in the superiority of the Arab nation, as they are “One Arab nation with an eternal message”. Hence, the eternality makes Arabs the best nation from the whole of mankind, exactly as the Nazis claimed their superiority due to their origins going back to Aryan race, as it has been described by Dr Goodrick-Clarke, who concludes that the Nazi leaders were obsessed by “Semi-religious beliefs in a race of Aryan god-men” (Goodrick-Clarke, 1993:X). Here, if we compare Saddam Hussein to Adolf Hitler, it is possible to find several common characteristics between these two leaders, as Adam Jones claims, “Malignant narcissism and psychopathy are common among génocidaires in modern history. Consider Adolf Hitler, whose stunted, injured ego found transcendence in the holocaust” (Jones, 2010:262).

Kadir, as one of the residents of Kirkuk, the oil rich city, which was exposed to Arabisation on a large-scale, and Kadir’s house as with other Kurds’ houses, were exposed to demolition and its habitants expelled. Regarding the ideology of the BP and its dimensions, Kadir stated:
“Baath nationalism was based on reactions. It is always binding to the past of the Arabs. They have been defeated by Mongols. They have been defeated in front of Ottoman power, which was a dark era for Arabs. When the BP emerged, they wanted to bring the old history back. Baath was working on a history. When Saddam took power, he was talking about rewriting history. Rewriting the history from the beginning or forming it in another model, or at least making a history as the Baathists wanted, and not the real history which has happened and should have ended” (Kadir, deported, age 64).

Thus, it could be the humiliation and historical defeats, according to Kadir, that had a large-scale influence on the people’s behaviour. Jonathan Fletcher has mentioned this kind of reason as he argues: “The largely unexpected defeat of 1918 brought great humiliation and trauma for broad sections of the German people” (Fletcher, 1997:122). In this regard, the politician, Aso Karim, a previous Kurdish Peshmerga guerilla and Kurdish intellectual, has added a different dimension to the Baath’s characteristics in that:

“Baath ideology began in the forties. It has its dimensions based on the German school” (Karim, previous Peshmerga guerilla, age 61).

Thus, anybody that has information about the process of the Holocaust, they refer to the characteristics of the BP. Baathists, according to Karim’s view, followed German ideology, and most of the interviewees confirmed this. Karim continued:

“Theyir beliefs and organisations, they were moulding the society. It was similar to the Nazis. They were beginning from the children to change them to vanguards. They must become the vanguards, the Union of Iraqi Students or Iraqi Youth” (Karim, previous Peshmerga guerilla, age 61).

Those who lived during the era of the BP could easily recognise these kinds of characteristics. This is similar to what Donald L. Horowitz has emphasised:

“Organizations, often tied to ethnically-based political parties [that] reflect and reinforce inter-ethnic hostility via propaganda, ritual, and force” (James, 2010:293). In a similar direction, the participant Saadi Pira, a previous Kurdish Peshmerga guerilla and political figure, reiterated the similarities to Nazism, as he argued:
“The principles of Baath ideology in ‘its growing and learning’ profited from the Nazis. Especially in using violence, burning the land, deportation, Arabisation and Baathisation, they were copying Nazism. Th Baath’s philosophy was: if I cannot rule a country I can burn it. This is the summit of sadism and the most advanced Nazism” (Pira, previous Peshmerga guerilla, age 64).

Hence, we can acknowledge that the concept of Nazism and fascism have been reiterated from most of the participants. Jambaz, also confirms this kind of conduct and argued:

“Baathism was a very bad imitation of Nazism and fascism. They were arguing that they are ‘God’s chosen people’ and always reiterating Arab and Arabs. For example, they were helping Yemen and other Arab countries. The strongest Baath organisation was in Iraq, and they had some excited young men who believed in the BP. They believed in using force and they seized power by armed forces”. (Jambaz, Senior Lawyer, age 66).

Here, according to the majority of participants, Nazism and fascism are two inherent traits of the BP, particularly their conduct in relation to the non-Arabs, which was significant. Hence, Chinar presented a deeper and clearer view on this issue, as she argued:

“In his view of other components, Aflaq saw the Arabs as a superior race, civilised and the greatest. Be sure his view is not different from Hitler’s view or the Nazis’ view in relation to the Aryan race. Aryans took preference because their blood is pure and clean, and others are inferior. Even Saddam Hussein had a similar feeling. Therefore, in my thesis, I made a comparison between Hitler’s and Saddam’s discourse. There are huge similarities between them from their reading to their behaviour in relation to other ethnicities” (Chinar, political activist, age 42)

Finally, according to all participants, it is clear that the non-Arabs were outsiders and they systematically had to be assimilated, whether they wanted it or not.
8.4.2. Rewriting History

In addition to rewriting the Iraqi and Arab history, it was one of the most serious Baath projects to rebuild the Iraqi collective memory according to Baath’s vision in order to centralise Arabism and to assimilate the non-Arab dimensions in Iraq. Here, Davis Eric in his book ‘Memories Of State, Politics, History And Collective Identity In Modern Iraq’ argues, “The essence of the Baathist attempts to rebuild the historical memory lies in the so-called draft rewrite history. The BP has started to implement this project immediately after its reins of power in 1968; however, it was officially not clear until 1979” (Davis Eric, 2005:235). In a similar trend, in one of his articles ‘Saed Qazzaz and the rewrite history in Iraq’, Professor Kadhim Habib, who is also one of the participants, claims: “The historical events has been exposed to distortion and the fact’s neck has been flexed in favour of the Arabs, the BP and Saddam Hussein” (Habib, 2006).

Saadi Pira described the policy of historical correction, as under this policy they intended to embark on Arabising the non-Arab population, specifically Kurdish religious minorities in the strategic or contact areas, as he explained:

“Primarily, they attempted to assimilate non-Arabs under the name of the correction of history because ‘according to Baathists’ they were Arabs but they had changed their nationality to Kurdish nationality. If they were unable to succeed in this process, they would use force. This is by deportation, or by uprooting them from their roots. They cut-off all date trees and filled the water sources with cement to destroy the sources of life for the purpose of coercion. Now, most areas in West Tigris, which is Sinjar and the tribes as Ezidi’s, Miran, Musa Resh, Hasan, Gargari and Kiki, all of them are Kurdish tribes. Now they are wearing Arabic clothes because they were forced to wear these Arabic clothes. If they did not wear them, they would have been killed because of their identity” (Pira, previous Peshmerga guerilla, age 64).

Thus, in order to centralise Arabs and assimilate non-Arabs, a systemic process was preferable, otherwise resorting to violence in order to implement its policy was the last solution or a security solution. Here, it is can be understood that the BP was attempting, through dozens of writers and post-graduate projects, to de-
colourise the history of Iraq in order to implant the idea of pan-Arab-centrism in the minds of future generations, and remove all kinds of diversity from the memory of the people who reside in Iraq.

“Hitler was speaking about history and saying that they will rewrite the history of Germany; we are rewriting it in order to serve the future generations. Saddam in a similar trend said we are not rewriting history for dead people but for those who are alive. Look, he will deviate from the history to show the greatness and beauty of Arabs in the framework of rewriting history. Therefore, in Aflaq’s view, the Arabs are a great race, intellectuals and followers of Islam. The prophet is Arab, thus Arabs must remain superior and lead the other nations with no possibility of equality” (Chinar, political activist, age 42).

8.4.3. Ideology for Unification and Power

One of the main ideological principles is unification. In order to unify all Arabs as an established entity, the outsiders should be assimilated. Chinar is not far from the previous statements about the Baath’s ideological principles, including its desire to use hegemony and authority, as she focuses directly on the central dilemma in the Baath’s view, which is unity through power:

“The unity of Arabs is in the raising of the Arab nation. The unity is in the frame of Arab nationalism. The greatness of Arabs is part of Baath ideology. Arab nationalism is strong; therefore, it must be predominant and ruling. All nationalities in the region should be under the hegemony of Arabs”

(Chinar, political activist, age 42)

Thus, the unity of Arabs could be not the end goal, but the hegemony and power at the expense of other nations, as the ultimate goal of pan-Arab-centrism. In a similar direction, Khalil has argued that:

“It is the Arab ideology, which is ‘one Arab nation, with an eternal message’. In the Arabs view, the Arab state starts from the pacific to the gulf. This view led to the uprising of other non-Arab nations. We sought
the south of Sudan, which is now an independent state. Therefore, there is a movement to get rid of this kind of ideology.

This kind of ideology generally belongs to Arabs, because it is existent in other Arab countries. Because the universal policy is heading towards self-determination, and they could not stop other components gaining their self-determination”.

(Khalil, deported, age 65)

Al-Mutallibi, warned me in the beginning that the Arab Shi’as’ view is different to that of the Arab Sunnis’ view in relation to the BP, and his view here is more radical than that of the Kurdish participants, as he claimed that:

“The BP does not amount to having an ideology. They were some gangsters that seized power”

(Saad almutallibi, Iraqi political activist, age 55)

This statement reveals a complex disagreement between Shi’a and Sunni Arabs. However, here, what is remarkable is that Shi’a Arabs have more aggressive views on the BP than the Kurds. In contrast, because this participant is one of the Islamist Shi’a Arabs, he has a specific view about nationalism, and he claimed:

“An ideological system or political thought is based on nationalism; the direct consequence is they are hostile to other nationalities”

(Saad almutallibi, Iraqi political activist, age 55)

Thus, according to al-Mutallibi, nationalism is a typical cause of hostility and ethnocentrism. The Arab Shi’a was very brave in accusing the BP of being gangsters. Though, al-Samarrayi, while he was in a safe place and despite the end of the BP’s power, along with reassurance that the researcher is a Ph.D. student and this information would remain secret, he was reluctant. He was hesitant and I read the fear in his eyes. With every question, he started his answer with “I do not know”. For example:

“I do not know what you mean by resistance because I am not a Baathist.
The probability is I do not encourage many things of the BP, so you know, I do not know. I think it is based on nationalism. I expect, I expect so” (Alsamarrayi, Lecturer and Sunni Arab, age 68).

I noticed this kind of hesitation from other Sunni-Arabs who were very powerful people in the era of the BP, but living in the UK, in comparison, a safe haven, they were unwillingly and complaining throughout three years of promising and procrastination; finally, they declined to meet me or even answer me on Skype or via phone.

8.4.4. Religion and Failure of the State Institution (De-Civilising Process)

Here, was the Baath ideology caused by the division that exists between the components, and thus caused the bloody conflict that led to the genocide or at least to the failure of state institutions? Regarding this issue, Chinar links the violence to some dimentions of Arabic culture, as she added that:

“Certainly, when they are embracing such ideology, they should and they will serve it. The complexity here is not the state but the culture. This kind of ideology is part of Arab culture. It has been proven that Arab regimes in other Arab countries, deal with their own people using violence and isolate culture. This is part of the Arab culture” (Chinar, academic and political activist, age 42).

It could be that this generalisation of the idea is not scientific and all other participants have avoided this point. However, it is understandable that every participant has had a specific and unique experience with the Baath authority. On the other hand, Sharif is seeing this ideology as the main cause of this conflict and the failure of the state institutions, as he confirmed this argument and admitted that:

“Those who hold the Baath ideology perform it as a religious duty”
(Sharif, part of the Iraqi authority, age 81).

Thus, from most of the interviews, the position of religion for Baathists has priority to be under the command of Arabs. Here, Karim goes back to Arab history to find the relevant answer, and he claimed:
“First: I said Muslims were divided into Arabs and followers. Imagine Omer bin Khattab (the third Muslim khalifa) was not agreeing with followers staying in Madina, the capital of Arab Muslims. If we are going back to the literature of Aflaq, his view is: who is in an Arab homeland resident, is Arab. Therefore, they accept you when you are serving them. In Baath ideology, national security is divided into two kinds: First: Those who came from the outside of the borders. Second: Ethnic minorities, who are causing the sabotage of the internal harmony” (Karim, previous Peshmerga guerilla, age 61).

Thus, the religious position, in the BP’s doctrine is important on two hierarchical levels:

**Cultural level:** this is because they consider it to be part of Arab culture, as is naturally comes from the Arabian Peninsula. In this regard, Aflaq has stated that: “Islam is an Arabic movement and it means renewal of Arabism and its perfection. The language of the message was the Arabic language, and its understanding of things was through the view of the Arab mind. The virtues which were reinforced were Arabic virtues including its overt and covert virtues, and the defects that have been fought were Arabic defects on the way to their demise. The Muslims at that time were only Arabs” (Aflaq, 1977:145). Thus, for Aflaq, Arabism was central to every movement and every silence.

**The spiritual level:** Here, Aflaq is considering religion as being the spirit of Arabs as he claimed: “In our past is an authentic spirit, in our past a free and Semitic life” (Aflaq, 1977:74).

8.4.5. The Correction of the Nationality (Assimilation)

In a similar trend, Karim in his statement continued:

“Look, for the general census of 1966 I was here. They (Baath authority) imposed the Arabic nationality upon all Christians, Shabaks and Ezidis. It was compulsory, whether they agreed or not. Baath’s concern was how to create an Arabic homogeneous society from one nation, one party, one
flag, one army, one media, one leader and one doctrine. It is totalitarianism” (Karim, previous Peshmerga guerilla, age 61).

Hence, the Revolutionary Command Council, which is the highest Baath organisation, decided on changing nationalities, and the totalitarian element was a daily phenomenon for all Iraqi residents. However, the BP’s totalitarian procedure in Kurdistan was exceptional and dependent on emergency situation. Jambaz has revealed this element as being a Kurdish phobia as previously been mentioned:

“There was a phobia called ‘Kurdish phobia’ and this led to the commencement of the Arabisation of Kurdistan” (Jambaz, Senior Lawyer, age 66).

Thus, there was a systematised policy for Arabisation, as Jambaz claimed:

“The Bathists, except the Arabs, considered all non-Arabs as guests. They would use every possible method to assimilate Kurds and the Amazighs in ‘North Africa’. The best example is the correction of nationality form, or changing nationality for Kurds and Turkmen in Kirkuk city” (Jambaz, Senior Lawyer, age 66).

8.5. The Coup and Totalitarian Authority as Part of Baath’s Ideology

The majority of the participants interviewed, depending on their ethnic affiliation, differed about their view on Iraq as a country, but were united when it came to the discussion of the BP. Legitimation is another dilemma which is important for any authority. A coup is one of the methods used to seize power specifically in the Middle East and Africa. Thus, Iraq is considered the second country in terms of military coups, after Turkey, if we only include the major coups. In addition, after examining nine coups, in the case of Iraq, seven of these coups occurred from 1958 to 1968 and all of them by the Sunni-Arabs, except the movement headed by Abdul Karim Qasim on the 14th of July 1958, when he used the monarchy rule of having Shi’a roots from an Arab Shi’a Father and a Kurdish Shi’a Mother.
Here, these coups are considered one of the main causes of the failure of the state, and as a result, led to the process of genocide. In addition, an MP of KRG and a Kurdish intellectual, Aso Karim, noted:

“We cannot generalise it. Many coups have happened in Iraq even inside the BP. It is true that is a non-democratic method to seize power because in democratic countries nobody attempts to seize power through a coup. These coups are a phenomenon in countries that have no constitution, or they have weak institutions or are backward countries in the in third world” (Karim, previous Peshmerga guerilla, age 61).

As a result of this kind of method being used to seize power, it caused an imbalance in the political culture, as Kevin T. Leicht and J. Craig Jenkins in their book ‘Handbook of politics, State and Society in Global Perspective’ claim: “Commonly, any substantial increase in normal political tensions leads, with or without a military coup, to a more repressive government” (Leicht & Jenkins, 2011:169).

In this regard, according to al-Alusi, seizing power through a military coup is causes instability, as he claimed:

“It is true that the political and military coups have always been the reason for the absence of the institutional building of a civil state that respects the law, serves the people and guarantees the chances of its components” (al-Alusi, Baath opposition, age 58).

For this reason, al-Alusi has confirmed the possibility of genocide in such circumstances:

“It is not possible for the occurrence of crimes of genocide to take place under democratic conditions, and therefore the absence of democracy deprived the people from expressing their true position and the opportunity to respond to the crimes and the criminals”. (al-Alusi, Baath opposition, age 58).

This means there was a failure of society and a failure of its institutions. This kind of failure led to a lack of inter-dependency chains and inter-relationships, which is beneficial to totalitarian rule and unilateral domination. In this regard, Sharif also
excluded the possibility of genocide if there is a democracy, but the problematic issue was that the Kurds were considered to be the enemy. This means they were close to the ideology of enmity and there was a lack of inter-dependency chains, making them close to the circumstances of genocide, as Sharif has confirmed:

“In democratic circumstances, genocide is not a requirement and it is not considered as an option. The importance here is that the Baathists considered the Kurds to be enemies; therefore, there are no conditions that would have prevented what they have done. The only component that was not subordinate to the BP was the Kurds” (Sharif, part of the Iraqi authority, age 81).

Thus, Baathists with their aggressive ideology, and the consideration of the Kurds as outsiders, meant the possibility of genocide was more of an option. Chinar is not far from this view as she has confirmed that:

“Without a shadow of a doubt, any military coup leads to a dictatorial regime and is inherently mentally active” (Chinar, political activist, age 42).

However, Chinar is going back to the past and has observed no difference between the past and present because of their mentality. Here, as she previously mentioned, the dilemma is the culture and their mentality, as she claimed:

“If we want to understand it and to justify this coup of the BP, and its aggressive ideology, we should justify the previous rulers; but how? Why Arabs before the BP did not behave with the Kurds in the right way? Even during the era of King Faisal and at the time of the establishment of Iraq. The behaviour of Arabs with Kurds was less aggressive in the past because of colonialism and the existence of Britain and the interests of international policy in the region. Otherwise, Kurds under the hegemony of the successive regimes and their similar mentality were always suppressed. Thus, I do not think that the coup of the BP is the only reason
for such a mentality and their behaviour. This is an existing mentality”
(Chinar, political activist, age 42).

This kind of argument and feeling exists among the majority of Kurdish participants and it was noted that throughout more than ninety years of the establishment of the state of Iraq, the ruler’s elite could not find an appropriate political, social and economic solution for the suspended issues between the Kurds and the Iraqi Arab authority. This long suppression led to one participant arguing that:

“Another aspect is the Arab Bedouin culture, which has its hegemony in their social life. Bedouin culture includes the raid, looting, self-esteem and a kind of social life through violence. This nature of the Bedouin has been transformed and become innate in the Arabic personality. Therefore, Arabic design through the religion and Bedouin persona is a feeling of greatness because always the Bedouin is the source of pride. He is oppressing but it is justifiable because of the evidence of the power and force. This greatness proudly led him to a view of the surrounding. Therefore, he is not seeing himself as an occupier but considering himself to be an owner” (Chinar, political activist, age 42).

These ideas are from the theory of Ibn-Khaldun, which binds the Arab personality to the Bedouins, which includes being aggressive due to the dependency on “al-Asabiyyah” (a type of virtuous solidarity)” (Ritzer, G. and Stepnisky, J., 2017:15). Here, according to H. Ritter in his article ‘Irrational solidarity groups: A socio-psychological study in connection with Ibn Khaldun’, Ibn Khaldun “is also convinced that when the Asabiyyah becomes absolutely ingrained in a nation, it turns aggressive by its inherent nature” (Ritter, H., 1948:40). Al-Asabiyya is a concept which forms the central element of Ibn-Khaldun’s sociological work. However, it was critisied by Prophet Muhammad, yet ‘the Islamic Brotherhood’ replaced Al-Asabiyya Al-Qabaliyya, which means tribal solidarity. In addition, Ritter has questioned: “What is Asabiya? It is pointed out that this concept is close to the idea of virtue proposed by Machiavelli” (Ritter, H., 1948:2). Hence, the concept of ‘virtue’ could have a positive feeling that is different to that of ‘Al-Asabiyya’, which connotes a negative feeling. It has appeared in an article called “The Concept of Virtue in Machiavelli” by Timo
Laine, who argues that “Virtue is a skill, especially political ability: A virtuous man reaches his goals in political life” (Lains, 2008:3). The Machiavellian concept of ‘virtue’ is closer to Machiavelli’s famous sentence “The end justifies the means”, because he justified the use of virtue in terms of legitimacy. Moreover, Al-Asabiyya means ‘support one’s own fellow tribal members even when they are right or wrong’. In this regard Buziyani al-Darraji in his book ‘Tribalism, socio-historical phenomenon, in the light of Ibn-Alkaldon’s thought’ has argued, “Tribalism descended through the different ages from the Moroccan societies to the highest level of rotting, disintegration and collapse” (Al-Darraji, 2003:8). Thus, Chinar was drawing on Ibn-Khaldun’s interpretation of Arab tribalism, which is inherently a very negative exploratory understanding of Arab communities.

Kadir in this regard, has a different vision as he argued:

“The coup is a group of army officers deciding to seize power. The dilemma is who has disposed, did not have legitimate authority because they also came via a military coup” (Kadir, deported, age 64).

Here, Kadir binds the authority with state legitimacy, as it is necessary for the stable inter-dependency chains and inter-relationships between the different components. However, Kadir links this coup to the defeat of Arab countries against Israel as he claims:

“I, many times, have linked this coup to the Arabs defeat against Israel in 1967. If you imagine, the Baath manifesto of 17th July 1968, admitted the reaction to the Arabs’ defeat in 1967. I think, they are, ‘as a defeated nation in a war’, their dignity was offended because it was the defeat of many Arab countries against one small country. They were speaking about the end of Israel but later they discovered the large Arab areas had been occupied” (Kadir, academic, age 64).

Hence, the coming of the Baathists may be seen as the result of a crisis, therefore, it has been examined whether the emergence of Baath’s ideology was a result of different crises in the region. Thus, if the ideology itself is an outcome of a crisis, and the mentality has been shaped by successive endless crisis, the creation of a
future crisis could be a determinist consequence. According to many documents and interviews, when the Baathists seized power, they had a tendency to seek revenge for their defeat. They were looking for a target. They could not reach Israel for revenge. They also could not do anything with Iran. They were continually looking to find a target.

8.5.1 In order to find a target
Thus, Iraqi society with its instable state institutions and tribal dimensions, including different and suppressing components, formed the dominant ruling elite, who under the influence of an aggressive ideology, meant that violence was a forgone conclusion. These circumstances were accompanied by the tensions in the relationship between the Kurds and the Iraqi government. Here, Karim highlights an important aspect of the situation, as he argued:

“The ideology of many Arabic political organisations is built on hostility to other ethnic groups, nationalist arrogance, and some populist tendencies based on demagogue characters, to influence the lower social classes” (Karim, previous Peshmerga guerilla, age 61).

This understanding means that such an environment is an appropriate haven for the growth of an ideology, and for finding a weak link in terms of a possible target; specifically, the Kurds were the determined target. Kadir elaborately mentioned this point:

“The Kurds were the easiest target for two reasons; primarily, due to the accusation that they played a significant role in the defeat of the Arabs. Secondly, that they were an obstacle in the way of the Iraqi army, including the relations with Israel. Moreover, they are ‘a dagger in the Arabs side’. Thus, for these imagined reasons, the Kurds were a weak circle because all support had been disabled. All the states around them were against the Kurds. However, in the atmosphere of the cold war, the Kurds could not support any side, simply because all the other sides were against them” (Kadir, deported, age 64).

This gloomy picture was painful and led to the disability of all aspects of life in Kurdish society. The creation of these circumstances was an outcome of the successive crises in the Arab countries, including Arabic Iraq and all its political parties and elites. According to Kadir:
“What has occurred against the Kurds by the BP, generally, was part of the Arabs defeat” (Kadir, deported, age 64).
Furthermore, when the major crusade of the AC occurred, all Arabic and Islamic authorities, even the international community, were in complete silence.
8.6 Summary of the interviews

The charts below provide a summary and illustrate the results concerning the particular causes of genocide. These causes have been selected from the questions and answers of the interviewees in order to assess the answers and divide the participants between two different charts. The first chart shows the number of participants who answered all the questions. The second chart shows the sharp division between Arabs and Kurds in regard to all issues in relation to genocide and different issues concerning Iraq.

Table No. (3): The key questions

<table>
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<th>Has Mosul been annexed to the two other Iraqi provinces?</th>
<th>Is Iraq a failed state?</th>
<th>Is Iraq NOT a national state with all components?</th>
<th>Was the hegemony for a pan-Arab state?</th>
<th>Was deportation systematic?</th>
<th>Was there a decision about national correction?</th>
<th>Did the evacuation of at least 4500 villages occur?</th>
<th>Was it because of the Iran/Iraq war?</th>
<th>Have you been affected?</th>
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278
Chart No (4) General key questions of participants

This chart shows the total number of participants who agreed, those who did not agree and those who do not have any opinion or are neutral.

Chart No. (5) General key questions of participants

This chart shows the background of the participants who agreed, those who did not agree and those who do not have any opinion or are neutral.
8.6. Conclusion

The essence of this chapter is an attempt to approach the most important causes of genocide in Iraq by focusing on state formation and the ideology of the BP through the explanations of the interviewees. The first indication of the formation of the state is its establishment and the subsequent instability. The participants insisted that the Arab’s conduct before and after the BP’s rule remained the same, and the coup did not affect the process of the nation state, whereas the non-Arabs became the victims of a power conflict. However, despite the failure of the state institutions, Arab centrism presented the strongest face of Arab ideology.

The annexation of Mosul province to Arabic Iraq, according to one participant, can be compared to the Balfour promise, when Palestine was given to Israel, in that they gave something to someone, which was not their inherent right. It has been described as a continuous crime because it is worse in comparison to colonial rule. Thus, the dilemma is not only the annexation of Mosul province, but the belief that this province is their property. Additionally, if there are some Arab participants who consider Mosul province to be undivided, all the Kurdish participants see it as an injustice that was imposed on the Kurdish people and it should be terminated.

In addition to the issue of Mosul, which is inherently Arabised, the advent of the BP caused the annihilation of all hopes of peaceful coexistence between the components of Iraq, particularly for the Kurdish people. Here, the participants have expressed and shared their memories of the BP. The experiences of the interviewees affirm that the conduct of the BP towards the non-Arabs was similar to the racism observed in Nazi Germany, particularly the use of discriminatory procedures against the non-Arabs. These procedures consist of rewriting the history, the ideology of unification, and power. Moreover, the role of religion and the failure of state institutions have been explicated. In addition, the correction of nationalities in order to Arabise the rest of the remaining Kurdish population has been noted.

The last point in this chapter focuses on how the BP increased its power and the steps it took towards totalitarian authority, which is part of the systemic thinking of the BP’s ideology. If there are various visions of Iraq as a country, all participants were united about the BP, except those who were members of the BP. One of the important points regarding the Iraqi authority under rule of the BP is its lack of legitimacy. In such circumstances, particularly when a regime seizes power through a
coup, it disables the society and its institutions. This kind of disability led to a lack of inter-dependency chains and inter-relationships, which benefitted the totalitarian rule and ensured unilateral domination. In contrast, according to one of the participants, in democratic circumstances, genocide is not a requirement and is not considered a choice. The final point is that the Kurds were a very easy target for the BP, in accordance with its ideology and the propaganda that Baathists were issuing among Iraqis. Thus, for these reasons, the ground for genocide was set for the Baathists.

9.1. Introduction

As demonstrated in Chapter Six, the process of state formation in Iraq was based on pan-Arab-centrism, with an attempt to marginalise non-Arabs in order to establish a pure Arab state; its successive failings include dimensions of pan-Arabism. In addition, the role of Baath ideology in strengthening pan-Arab-centrism has been examined, including its influence in relation to the unilateral tendencies in Iraq. This chapter will analyse the inclination of the BP towards genocide in five main sections, chosen according to the concepts that the participant interviewees expounded upon. The concepts and titles in this chapter are structured according to the chronology of the events. Thus, it starts with the policy of Arabisation undertaken by the BP, which became an excuse for the behaviour of Baathists. In this regard, it will focus on the forced camps, the Faili Kurds, Barzi men, chemical attacks on Halabja city and its causes, as well as the procedure and the implementation of the Anfal campaigns. Here, the causes of genocide and the utilisation and exploitation of state institutions and the economic wealth of Iraq remain imperative in examining any de-civilised activity. In addition to the theoretical description of pan-Arab-centrism, the so-called chauvinist behaviour and the stages of the genocide process will be examined, especially during the Anfal Campaigns. Here, before delving into the views of the participants, I will quote one of the standpoints which Saddam Hussein took:

“It is imperative that in our view to history and in writing it, we should have a ... Baathi way” (Baram, Amatzia, 1983:426)

Thus, the BP’s path for Iraq, as envisioned by Saddam Hussein and various Baath leaders including Aflaq, was an inevitable endeavour at a de-civilised model. As a consequence, through the statements of the participants, the previous chapter explored how Arab-centrism or al-Uruba was one of the main goals that led to the eventual genocide process. This process was implemented in different stages and
forms in the name of “Allah\(^1\)”. Thus, if the mass killing of the Jews was carried out in the name of a nation (Lash, S. and Featherstone, M., 2002:266), in the case of Iraq, it was carried out in the name of Allah (God), as well as in the name of the nation.

9.2. The Arabisation Policy of the BP

The previous long quote from Mam Qadir reflects the causality of the harsh and total ideological violence meted out against the Kurdish people, who were deemed as outcasts. The definition of ethnocentrism by Graham Kinloch was indicated in Chapter Two as a roadmap to genocide, and also Elias’ theory of the establishment and the outcast group. In this regard, Elias in his theory explains:

“How a group of people can monopolise power hegemony and use them to exclude and stigmatise members of another very similar group” (Elias, 2000:12).

Additionally, if this is the case of a “very similar group” depending on the groundwork of Elias, the groundwork of this thesis involves a “very different group”. Article 11 of the BP’s constitution provided a permanent road-map for the implementation of a pure Arabic state in order to secure the “one Arab Nation, with an eternal message”. Thus, in this section, via the ideology of Arabisation, the Arab nationalist behaviour towards the non-Arabs, particularly the Kurds, will be highlighted according to the real experiences of the participants.

Mam Qadir described the suffering of an elderly man through a long period of poor conduct by the Baath against the Kurds. In addition, there is a common perception among the Kurdish participants regarding the aggressive and prejudiced attitude of the BP against the Kurds.

Senior academic lecturer at Baghdad University, Professor Nouri Talabani, suffered from the Baath’s policy, including deportation. She is the author of ‘The Policy of Arabisation of Kirkuk’, and in a detailed interview concluded that:

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\(^1\)Allah (=allah\(\text{ب}^\)\(\text{l}^\)) is the Arabic name for God. All the official documents and decisions from the BP and the Iraqi government and its institutes, were liberated in the name of God and the laws in the name of God and the nation, even the documents of AC and the aggressive policy of BP.
“The first stage of genocide in my view was the Arabisation of Kirkuk region, then the Anfal campaigns. The policy of Arabisation before the AC started intensely during 1963. After the collapse of first the Baath’s coup and the coming of both Arifs successively, the Arabisation was continuous but a little less operative. When the Baathists returned, the Arabisation started again” (Talabani, deported, age 75).

It seems that the process of Arabising Kirkuk, according to Talabani, involved different procedures and stages. What caught my attention from Talabani’s book is the mentioning of a short conversation between one of his colleagues in the US and Hanna Batatu the author of ‘The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq’. Accordingly, in his visit to Kirkuk, Batatu was asked if he had met any communists or Kurds in terms of gaining more knowledge and understanding their vision. His answer was “no because the Iraqi regime did not let him do that” (Talabani, N. 2003:46). Thus, from this conversation, it shows how the Iraqi regime had a single-minded attitude towards Kirkuk and the Kurds in order to expedite the completion of the process of Arabisation.

Murad Hakeem, another participant with family who were exposed to genocide, has a Ph. D1 in sociology and hails from the Barzani tribe, and works as a lecturer in Salahaddin University argued:

“Arabising the land was important for Bathists.
They were ready to deport Faili Kurds to Iran. They were ready to exclude people from their places.
They attempted to Arabise the Turkmen.
But Arabising the Kurds was not as important as land if the Kurds were leaving the land that they alleged to be their land. It means discharging the land. However, the land was not important if it was not part of Arab land”
(Hakeem, deported, age 48).

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1 Murad Hakim’s thesis is ‘The social consequences of the policy of deportation of the Kurds in Iraq at the Baath’s period’.
Thus, the first important stage concerning Arabisation was the evacuation of the land from its indigenous Kurdish people and bringing Arabs in to replace them. The reason according to Hakeem is:

“I think they understood that confronting the language and culture needs time and it is not necessary because when this region converts to an Arab region, the remaining Kurds will assimilate through a normal process” (Hakeem, deported, age 48).

Thus, they were thinking to assimilate the non-Arabs in the contact areas through different procedures, which have been mentioned by Nouri Talabani in his book ‘The policy of Arabisation of Kirkuk’. Initially, the deportation was on-going in a soft way and intermittently, to cover the operation and to prevent the occurrence of any public display. However, the writer and genocide activist Arif Qurbani¹, from Kirkuk, was able to collect a lot of information and painful stories from the victims and some of the perpetrators in the campaigns. He is one of the interviewees that have accumulated a large and indispensable archive for researchers; he concluded that:

“The Arabisation has a direct relation to the tribal Arab mentality in Iraq. History has shown that the Arabs could not live with diversity. They always attempted to eliminate disparity among themselves or assimilate, whether religious doctrine or ethnic differences” (Qurbani, deported and genocide activist, age 50).

For this reason, according to Arif Qurbani, the Kurds, without any reason, were the target of Arabisation. This is because:

“The main reason was to change Iraq to a pure Arab country and to cleanse Iraq from the non-Arabs but with long term patience” (Mam Qadir, victim, age 75).

Thus, it was a soft procedure as long as the process of assimilation was possible. In this regard, historian professor Jabar Kadir, the senior lecturer, who also hails from Kirkuk provided a deeper interpretation of the Arabisation phenomenon and the Arab mentality, as he argued:

¹ Arif Qurbani was able to write 18 books: 4 books about the witnesses of AC. 5 books about survivors from mass graves, one book about the children of Anfal, 3 books about Halabja and its victims who were deported to Nuqra Salman. Also, one book about the driver of the Bulldozer, three books on ethnic cleansing in Kirkuk and one book about Timor the most prominent survivor.
“In terms of the Kurds, in the Baath’s foreseeable, Iraq is an Arab country, the Kurds are part of the Arabs. They were interpreting it according to the different time stages. They believed that as long as the Kurds are able to speak Arabic, and they have adopted the Arab culture because they are Muslims, and the majority of Kurdish intellectuals speak the Arabic language. According to some of the Baath’s vision they have to be counted as Arabs. This means cultural, not racial, integration” (Kadir, deported, age 65)

This interpretation of Aflaq’s view and other Baathists is precise. The Kurds and other components in the Arab homeland have a commitment to the Arab regime, which is the Baath party. The most striking point is they obligated the Kurds to be educated in the Arabic language, and they were exposed to other Arab procedures to change the culture of the citizens, as they argued that the intellectuals were speaking Arabic. However, they were speaking Arabic but they maintained their language and culture.

Additionally, Ahmad al-Darraji as one of Baathists who still believes in his ideology, roughly but honestly, concluded that:

“Iraq has been an Arab state since time immemorial. The unity of Iraq for us is part of our holy places. Iraq’s affiliation with the Urubh is in good standing. Who wants to live with us, they will be respected and who does not want to, the doors are open.”

Question: “It Means Kurds are Guests?”

“I’m not saying the Kurds are guests but they were part of the Arab people, who are respected as long as they remain part of the Arab people. When they do not want to stay, so, this is their choice and they can live in any place they want” (Al-Darraji, Baathist, age 56).

Thus, this admission from al-Darraji confirms what has been said by Murad Hakim as he concluded “but Arabising the Kurds was not so important as land if the Kurds were leaving the land that alleged to be their land”. Thus, in the Baath’s vision, the land is Arab land, as has been identified in the constitution of the Baath.
Consequently, the Arabisation was centralised and became the preoccupation of all Arab rulers in Iraq. In this regard, Falakaddin Kakayi implied that Arabisation precedes the Baath rule:

“The Arabisation started before 1963 with the advent of Abdul Karim Qasim. We have learned to applaud Qasim and we thought he was a good man and friend of the Kurds, but later we discovered that Qasim was worse because he had designed the policy of Arabisation. I’m not telling it from myself but I can prove it:

For example, Kirkuk from its management formation and the establishing of its Provinciality from the 1920s until 1958, its Governor was Kurdish or sometimes a Turkman. There is a list of Governors and it does not include any Arabs. Thus, Qasim imposed an Arab governor without any previous agreement, despite his knowledge of the sensitivity of the equation. We did not know until later on that it was part of the Arabisation procedure. The mayors of Makhmur town from 1937 until 1958 were successive Kurds but with the advent of Qasim, the successive mayors were Arabs, until the collapse of Saddam Hussein. Even Erbil, the capital of Kurdistan region, go and look at the official governor list until 1958, as per which, all of them were Kurds, including one or two Turkmen, but with the advent of Qasim and onwards, they became Arabs” (Kakayi, political figure, age 70).

This elaborate explanation from a participant is a reflection of their awareness of the dimensions of Arabisation as a central unchangeable policy of the Arab political elite. Moreover, it also shows the seriousness of the process of Arabisation, with no essential distinction made between the parties of the political process since the establishment of the state, and through the rule of the BP with its Uruba unification.

In addition, another neglected but important side of Arabisation was discovered. It was raised by the participant Chinar Sa’d (who holds a PhD in sociology); she concluded:

I studied this subject for my Master’s dissertation. Look at the history of Iraq; it does not refer to the Kurds as a nation specifically, it is as if they do not exist. They talk about many aspects of the state since the Caliphs, but without
any reference to the Kurds. See, for example, the famous Shanidar Cave. The history is talking about the beginning of the origin of man, Neanderthals, which is located in a mountainous area in the depth of the Kurdistan region. However, the history of Iraq considers it as part of the Arab homeland without referring from near or far that this cave is located in the Kurdish areas, even it does not mention the name of Kurdistan. This is the forgetfulness. This is an implied reference that there is an orderly process to the rooted oblivion.

Therefore, we believe the Baathists were acting based on an accurate program. There were many topics in the Kurdish or Arabic lessons; they were totally focusing on the Baath and Arabism as it has nothing to do with the Kurds” (Chinar, political activist, age 42).

Here, we discover that the BP was working on the memory of citizens because after one or two generations, individuals forgot their own cultural and national values. Therefore, as Jeannette Marie Mageo in her book ‘Cultural Memory: Reconfiguring History and Identity in the Postcolonial Pacific’ explains:

“This grounding in narration, in recapturing existence in the form of a story, suggests that memory is a point of transit of unparalleled import, most significantly perhaps between the social and the personal. What remains in memory for the long duration (long-term) is what has significance for us individually or collectively” (Mageo, 2001:2)

Thus, when the history or any other national literature has been changed or rewritten to benefit a specific ideology, it could form a dangerous issue for the future generation. This is what Saddam Hussein emphasised originally, to rewrite history, and this is what they attempted to do in order to Arabise Iraq at its heart.

Hence, whatever the means, the goal was to perpetuate Arabisation as a first step to changing Iraqi identity to that of a pure Arab country. Here, I had a chance to meet one of the senior BP members in London to find out his perspective on different matters in relation to the Kurds on one side, and the Arabs and the Iraqi state on the other. In this regard, Abdul Razzaq al-Baathi described his view on the process of Arabisation, stating that:
“Look, I want to express my opinion downright. The country of Iraq is a sincere Arab country. The Kurds and other components that live in this country have to know the country’s Arab identity and respect it. There is an overwhelming Arab majority in this country, thus the minority has its rights and duties according to the philosophy of the state and also the majority have its rights and obligations. However, a few men wanted to distort the facts, but when the state did not listen to their irrational demands, which were colonial and Zionist demands to weaken Iraq, in this case these people should be hit with an iron fist. Do not provoke nor shall they grieve” (Abdul Razzaq, Baathist, age 73).

In this extract, two points are significant, primarily, the only identification of Iraq is Arabism, the ‘we-identity’, which contradicts with a democratic system and the commitment to the philosophy of the state is essential, which according to Saddam Hussein, is the ‘way of the Baath. This vision is inherently similar to that of Aflaq and the constitution of the BP. This is what al-Husary emphasised as “he has refused the establishment of Uruba dependence on the diversity” (Ziyada, R. 2005).

Thus, the contradiction between two different visions: the established group, the Arab nationalists including Baathists, and the outsiders, the Kurds, is conspicuous. Here, Baath’s vision of a perfect Iraq is only the way of the Baath and the way of the Baath is single-minded and al-Uruba only. In this regard, we face the German model in its acceptance of Jews, as Fletcher describes, “In keeping with the relative instability of the we-identity and sense of self-worth encoded in the German national habitus, acceptance of outsiders such as the Jews proved not only extremely difficult, but tragically impossible” (Fletcher, 1997”161). Thus, the Arabs as a dominant group did not build the Iraqi state on a specific, collective and coherent philosophy for all people, but contradictory, alongside the age of the Iraqi state, they proved that the non-Arabs in this country were unwelcome. Consequently, this policy led to the building of dozens of forced concentration camps in the Kurdistan region.

9.3. Forced Complexes

After the collapse of the armed movement of Gulan in 1975, the situation in the Kurdish region was one of disarray. The process of Arabisation and the oppression by the BP increased. The process of evacuation of villages and rural areas
in 1976-1977 was the most dangerous stage for several reasons: firstly, the Kurds had become like broken wings because they could not defend themselves, and they were arrested through an easy process and for trivial reasons. Secondly, the majority of these villagers and rural residents were farmers, and they were producing to meet the needs of the urban population. Thirdly, these deportees were accumulated in forced camps, jobless, and living in a deadly vacuum without knowing what to do. In his description, mam Qadir explains how the process began:

“To discharge the village and rural areas in terms of creation, a security belt of a depth of 20-40 km, alongside of the borders of southern Kurdistan with Iran, Turkey and Syria was created. They deported the villager residents by throwing them in the coercive camps under very harsh conditions” (Mam Qadir, victim, age 75).

In the same direction, Arif Qurbani reiterated this approach as he concluded:

“A security belt around the borders of Iraq was built. It meant by 1976 - 1979 after the collapse of the revolution led by Gulan, a security belt from the beginning of the Iranian border to Syria through the Turkish border had been created. The villages in these targeted areas were destroyed up to a minimum depth of 15-km on the pretext of security conditions” (Arif Qurbani, deported and genocide activist, age 50)

Adalat Omer who was displaced to Iran and as a genocide activist also confirmed this information and stated that:

“I was among those who were displaced to Iran after the setback in 1975 with my family. Then we discovered that the regime had discharged the border areas up to the depth of 20 km and no one could walk around these areas” (Omer, displaced and genocide activist, age 55)

In accordance, tens of thousands of people, including children and the elderly, were displaced in a chaotic situation. They were “Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part”
(UNGA 1948:1). In this regard, the participant Fatih¹, who identified himself as previous Imam, concluded:

“These forced camps were lacking the most basic means of a dignified life. Many important social figures having social and political influence died from anxiety and depression. The BP did not kill them, but this was what they wanted. The Baathists were happy because those people were dying but not in mass graves. They died in a ‘modern complex’” (Fatih, victim, age 76).

Thus, the residents who were mostly illiterate or non-professional in any industrial sectors in these areas were collected together in forced camps. However, these forced camps were very similar to the Nazi concentration camps. The previous Iraqi Environment Minister Abdul Rahman Siddiq, who studied civil engineering and lived in one of the forced camps for some time as one of the participants, described the circumstances inside the forced camps in Kurdistan. Siddiq argued that:

“To my knowledge, there was a kind of similarity between both models of camps in Kurdistan and Germany:

1. The movements of residents of these camps in Kurdistan, was significantly restricted in a limited area inside the camps. We were under constant surveillance.
2. These camps were inside the Kurdish areas; therefore, residents were quickly accustomed to the situation. They started building houses, including attempting to engage in agriculture on small areas of land; for this reason, many of them were exposed to expulsion from these camps to another in order deprive them from new natural conditions of life.
3. Inside these camps, the BP built extensive security centres of military and intelligence around the camps for Ba’alification process.

¹ Fatih ‘as he argued’ was working as imam at one of the mosques of the Ministry of Endowments (Awqaf), but he left the mosque when BP launched the AC because as he said “he could not bear to hear one more word in the Arabic language, particularly the term Anfal”.
4. Appropriate work for men was restricted, and also they were subjected to arrest if they attempted to work, therefore, the women had to work under bad circumstances” (Siddiq, deported, age 53).

This and Fatih’s extract illustrates many different themes that led to a dangerous psychological position for the deported people. The first important theme is restriction of movement inside the camp for rural residents who are from, mostly mountainous areas, and therefore accustomed to a free environment, which made it traumatic. This situation could be an important reason for people engaging in some activities similar to their previous work. What we have discovered from this extract is that along with the displacement of the population, they were exposed to psychological and spiritual torture because of limited freedom and restricted movement, as well as being deprived from engaging in any kind of work, particularly agriculture even on a small piece of land, due to Baathification. The other strange theme in this displacement of people was the work of women. This is not because people do not allow women to work. Culturally, men and women in the Kurdish rural areas were working together without any restrictions, but movement limitations placed on men gave the Kurdish men a very bad impression. However, the BP, according to ‘Siddiq’, pursued the policy of scorched earth to evacuate these areas from its residents as a process for ecocide. However, if we audit the percentage of farmers from Kurdish rural areas, we find that the majority of the Kurds were living outside the cities that were exposed to destruction. Here, Siddiq explains that:

“According to the census of 1965:
85% of Sulaymaniyah province was rural residents,
85% of Erbil province was rural residents,
76% of Duhok province was rural residents” (Siddiq, intellectual, age 53)

Thus, according to this census, 82% of Kurdish residents in these three provinces were living in rural areas, and the majority of this population was working in the agricultural sector, so at least they were not importing foreign products. Destroying the infrastructure of the area, and the displacement of the population in this way, led to a terrifying decline in production, and the destruction of heritage and archaeology. Furthermore, draining wells is considered as a reason for the
displacement of animals, thus creating agonising circumstances which were difficult to revert to their original state.

In a similar trend, the prominent Kurdish writer and political figure Nawshirwan Mustafa\(^1\), who led "Komelei Rencderani Kurdistan\(^2\)" a national Marxist group in the 70s and 80s within the Kurdistan Patriotic Union against the Iraqi authorities, stated that:

“Baathists in 1963 had a program to seize the oil-rich areas. In addition, they attempted to capture areas that were considered as a central strength for the Kurds” (Mustafa, Peshmerga and political Leader, age 71).

Hence, two paradigms are noticeable here, which are acquisition and deprivation. On the one hand, the BP was attempting to control all oilfields in the Kurdish area, while at the same time implementing its policy of Arabisation through deportation and inventing settlements for settlers. On the other hand, they were attempting to deport and assimilate indigenous people from these evacuated areas in order to deprive them from a decent life and enjoying their wealth.

In contrast to these Kurdish visions, with differentiable themes, it all led to one inevitable result, which is Arabisation or Arab-centrism in the form of the establishment and outsiders; here, two different Arab visions need to be considered.

The first participant is Al-Alusi, who describes Arabisation as a crime and states that it must be acknowledged as a crime, as he explained:

“This is not a hypothesis. The Arabisation actually has been implemented on the ground according to each definition of the crime.

The crimes of Arabisation have been committed throughout the period of Ba’athist rule.

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\(^1\) Nawshirwan Mustafa has been a prominent political, intellectual and Kurdish struggler since 1960. He joined the ranks of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and became deputy party secretary of Jalal Talabani, the previous Iraqi president, until late 2006, when he announced his resignation from the party and opened the centre of Wisha “Word”, including the issuing of a weekly newspaper in the Kurdish language, as well as a website titled Sibei “tomorrow”.

Finally, he was the founder of the “Movement for Change” in 2009 and his party became the second winner in the last election in the Kurdistan region (Danly, J., 2009:5). He has written dozens of books and articles.

\(^2\) Kurdistan’s Labour League.
Everyone must turn around to this crime based on an accurate historical and political minute, to be available in the hands of everyone” (Al-Alusi, Baath’s opposition, age 58).

Thus, according to Al-Alusi, Arabisation as a definitive act that was pursued without any hesitancy and should be admitted as being a crime. However, in front of this decisive vision, here is a participant figure that was involved in the BP’s mission, and he still believes in what the BP implemented. He is not just sure of what the BP did, but he is also valiantly defending what has been committed. He considers it to be a struggle and patriotism, as he added:

“My dear, the state was responsible for the security of its citizens. The deportation of families from an area A to another area B, since their lives were in danger, or when the state’s strategy for the economy or for any other reason to maintain the stability of the state, the state has its right to change them to a place elsewhere- to another place. Thus, the cylinder of deportation and Arabisation are the concepts of colonialism and its tails. Iraq was fine and people were living blissfully. So, it was the multiplication of the enemy and the result was devastating” (Abdul Razaq al-Baathi, Baathist, age 72).

Hence, the most important point here is that this participant is admitting that the deportation has happened, but he claims it was a procedure in terms of pursuing a strategy by the government. The other important point is the state as a robot or as an idol has been sanctified, regardless of the quality of life under the shade of this type of state. The third important point which is prominent in this extract is that Baathists have considered an attempt or opposition to the Baath’s plan or ideology. Thus, based on the theory of conspiracy, the subservience to Israel and the West, was an accusation for anybody expressing their opinion or demanding their rights.

9.4. The New Era of Destruction (De-Civilising Process)

When the first phase of the deportation had gradually terminated during the years 1977 to 1988, with the rural areas evacuated and termed as prohibited areas, the camps became the new inhabited crowded areas. As a consequence, the Arab BP members who owned absolute power became very active inside these camps in terms of the process of Arabisation and controlling the security situation. In addition to this
new model of establishing forced camps, the deportation, Baathification and Arabisation processes were on-going, as well as other forms of oppression undertaken. This continuation was dependent on the possibility of a kind of action, as Kadir has implied:

“The Iraqi government was classifying Kurds into a few groups. The most concerning group for the BP after the Faili Kurds were people who resided in rural areas because these areas were appropriate for the guerrilla movement. They thought the cities were under control. They could handle it any time they wanted” (Kadir, deported, age 64).

Here, two divisions are important in terms of controlling the Kurdish society. On the one hand is the classification of its components, and on the other hand, gathering them in some areas in terms of the enforcement of Baath’s purposes.

9.4.1. The Faili Kurds

Thus, the classification of the targeted population as a pursued culture of genocide was an on-going process. The most concerned group had been gathered in camps and was being deprived of everything they owned to be an easy target for purposes hypothesised by the Baathists. Hence, regarding the Faili Kurds, who were the first target of the BP, the participant, Dr. Khalil Ismail Faili, who is a professor and a senior lecturer at Salahaddin University asserts that:

“The project of Arabisation started after the establishment of the Iraqi state. This project had three axes. The first axis of Arabisation was Mosul province. The second axis was Kirkuk province, and the third axis was the province of the Faili Kurds, which started from Baghdad and extended through the borders of Iran-Iraq. Strategically, the axis of the Faili Kurds was very important because of its proximity to Baghdad” (Khalil, deported, age 65).

Here, Ismail argues that Arabisation was a project, and as has been explored in the literature review, Arabisation could be considered part of the Arab elite’s morality, because most of the Arab political elites and army officers, including King Faisal, participated in the Arab revolt against the Ottoman Sultanate out of Arabism
and Arab unification. In addition, the impulse of Arab rulers was organised for the long term to convert Iraq to a pure Arab country, and it claimed three axes of provinces. These three provinces separated Arab areas from the rest of the Kurdish areas on the one hand, and on the other hand, all three provinces are considered as rich areas in terms of agriculture, energy and tourism. The other important point, as has been reiterated, is the position of the Faili Kurds in terms of their proximity to the capital, Baghdad.

Here, Mam Qadir as a participant and because of his close ties with the Faili Kurds, sees it as a more complicate position regarding the psychological consequences of the Faili Kurds. In addition, he was more specific, as he claimed that:

“The position of the Faili Kurds is difficult because as a consequence of Baath’s policy against them, they could never return to a similar situation as they were in before. Now, as a reaction against Saddam as a Sunni Arab, they lost their sympathy with the Kurdish movement in order to strengthen the Shi’a sectarianism against the Sunnis, and because of their remoteness from Erbil the Kurdish capital, despite what had been done against them because of their Kurdishness, and Shi’a Arabs being prevented from this kind of procedure- why?
Because the spirit of Arabisation in Baathists was dominant in contrast to the pure religious doctrine, although some people claimed that they utilised religion for their own interests. In addition, the number of Shi’a Arabs who were used to implement the Baath’s policy was not few” (Mam Qadir, retired, age 75).

Here, according to this extract, the central issue is the Faili survivors who returned to Iraq after the collapse of the Baath regime in 2003; they lost their sympathy with the Kurdish movement as well as Kurdish society for two reasons: because of their distance from the Kurdish centre, and due to their proximity with adjoining areas of Arabs. The other reason is because the majority of them joined the Shi’a movements as a reaction to the Baath’s Sunni rule that pursued ethnic cleansing against them. This change in behaviour is a direct consequence of the crimes perpetrated against them. It could be considered affection for Arabisation, including
the reduction in the huge numbers of the Faili population. To understand the sorrow of the Faili Kurds, Sami Faili, the other participant, asserted that:

“The BP started the destruction of the Faili Kurds in 1963. Yes, it was genocide. Imagine, 12000 Faili youth have been buried somewhere. We have attempted to find them without any result. Even, those who have participated in the Faili Kurds genocide are in prison, like Mezban Khidir Hadi who was directly responsible, and Barzan the brother of Saddam Hussein, as well as a group of military intelligences that are still in prison. Unfortunately, even the Maliki government has not attempted to ask those accused Baathists in order to find out where these Kurdish Faili youth have been buried” (Faili, deported, age 60).

Thus, they were exposed to the genocide process on a large-scale, and even the trial of Baath leaders did not help to calm down their tempers. In this regard, one of the previous BP members working at the Kurdish office of the Ministry of Interior concluded:

“I’m not specialised in the legal field, but I know it is confirmed that Baath authority was attempting to end the Faili existence using every force. Actually, in the early eighties, the existence of the Faili was in limbo” (Hiwa Afandi, previous Baathist, age 63).

This extract is in line with the next point about the migration of Faili Kurds to Iraq. Despite his denial that the Faili Kurds are a national Iraqi group, the participant Abdul Razzaq al-Baathi claimed that:

“There were no campaigns against anybody, specifically because they are a component, but the state implemented what was necessary to maintain the prestige of the state, its independence and unity. The so-called Faili’s, they were an Iranian minority living in Iraq, and when we knew about their betrayal and loyalty to Iran, the authority sent them back to their native land” (Abdul Razzaq, Baathist, age 73).

Thus, if the Faili Kurds were mass deported, with many of them dying or killed on the way to Iran, it is immaterial to the causation and its consequences. For
the progression of the BP, and in line with Arabisation, they were mass murdered in Iraq.

9.4.2. Barzani Men (Gendercide)

Despite the indifference of the genocide process between Kurdish elements, the division and classification of them according to the documents and interviews have been confirmed. The second mass campaign against the Faili Kurds started during 1980, just after the initiation of the Iraq-Iran war. However, the pressure on people and violence against them using different techniques, and for various purposes, continued. Thus, in 1983, another dangerous campaign on a large-scale against Barzani men aged 14 years and above, was implemented. In this regard, Mam Qadir stated:

“In the case of the Barzani tribe, who were dwelling in camps, generally they were ordinary people and were busy in their non-political lives and the majority were not involved in the Kurdish political movement. It could be because Mustafa Barzani’s family was leading a political party and the time of the Baath’s authority was appropriate to take revenge and cleanse the Kurdish areas, even if there was only one Kurdish citizen. Therefore, Barzani men from 14 years old were arrested inside the complexes and they were exterminated and buried in mass graves under mysterious circumstances”
(Mam Qadir, victim, age 75).

Hence, given the reason behind this campaign, according to this participant, the cleansing of Iraqi Kurdistan and the reduction in its Kurdish residents were one of the motives behind these campaigns. On the other hand, the majority of these people were not involved in any political action- they were children, and unaware of the ongoing circumstances. In addition, it fails to justify how a tribe can be made liable for their opposition to the present regime. Here, in terms of an answer to this question, the participant Hiwa Afandi claimed that:

“Barzanis were taken to mass graves and it has been acknowledged by Saddam Hussein on a live TV programme that ‘Barzanis have been taken to hell and they have got their punishment’. However, in contrast to this acknowledgement, the whole picture is shown in the image of the long-term
impact, because these people were uprooted from their villages and taken to the camps and then onto the second stage, when they were taken to their fate” (Hiwa Afandi, previous Baathist, age 63).

In addition to this extract from the interview, and according to Taha Suleman in his book ‘Genocide of the Kurdish Nation, Search, statistics, information and documents’, “8000 Barzani were arrested and shot in the desert of “the southern bourse” (Suleman, 2014:37).

In contrast to Hiwa Afandi’s extract, Abdulrazaq al-Baathi has admitted that:

“Some Barzanis were clear agents of Iran and they were helping Iran to control the capabilities of the Iraqi people. The state could not stand idle and the authority should deal with the issue from a legal perspective. So, a couple of hundred who plotted against Iraq, were arrested and as our martyred president has acknowledged ‘they have gone to the hell’ and this is an appropriate penalty for the traitors” (Abdul Razzaq, previous Baathist, age 73).

In this section, two important aspects have been explored: the first one is that these innocent bystanders were dramatically arrested and simply murdered for an unproved allegation because, even if they were a couple of hundred citizens arrested, the question is: how and where were they were plotting against Iraq? The second one is, according to Iraqi president Saddam Hussein himself, they “have been taken to hell and they have got their punishment”. Thus, if they were guilty, when, where and how did they appear in court? These questions, even in the Iraqi High tribunal, remained without answers, since they were arrested and mass murdered in the Iraqi desert.

9.4.3. Halabja Chemical Attack

The devastating war between Iraq and Iran was exploited at the highest level to cover the success of the process of genocide. In 1987, many villages and towns were attacked with chemical weapons, including Halabja city. Regarding this issue, Hiwa Afandi has claimed that:

“Chemical attacks on Halabja included a series of chemical attacks on many Kurdish villages and towns as a supplement to what they had started- to ensure
any possible chance in terms of the end of the Kurdish presence or at least the Kurdish opposition to the BP’s plans” (Hiwa Afandi, previous Baathist, age 63).

Chemical weapons are the fiercest weapons in existence due to the extent of their reach beyond any barrier or wall. The thematic aspects are analogous to Holocaust mechanisms and the only difference lies in its bureaucracy. The other theme, as has been reiterated in different forms, is the process of genocide which this extract describes, in that the end of the Kurdish presence was one of the possible forms of genocide. In contrast to this view, Abdulrazaq al-Baathi from his totally different view argued that:

“Halabja is an excellent Iranian scenario. It was attacked by Iran but they declared that Iraq had launched a chemical attack on the city of Halabja to discredit Iraq” (Abdul Razzaq, Baathist, age 73)

Here, we have a unanimous view between the participants about the theme of the chemical attack on Halabja, despite the vision of the Baathists that Iran was behind this tragedy. However, the Iraqi Supreme Criminal Court has confirmed the responsibility of Iraq, and it has been recognised as genocide (Suleman, 2014:166).

9.5. Anfal Campaigns (Final Solution)

The AC are considered the main operation, and took place over seven months in 1988. Despite some possible macro-causes of the AC, the question around the causality of the AC, or the retreat of nation building as a micro-cause, has been directed to the interviewees in terms of exploring the feelings and beliefs of the participants. These feelings and beliefs are important because of the direct experiences of the interviewees, who were involved or not involved in the activities of the BP or the Iraqi authorities. This part builds the inspection of the Baath’s behaviour, or the position of Iraqi authority towards the Kurds in its inter-relationship or inter-dependency chains, in order to highlight the prejudice of the state authorities regarding the process of de-civilisation.

9.5.1. The Causes of the Anfal Campaigns

Due to the main question of this thesis, the participants were generally asked to explore the common theme that spurred the Anfal campaigns. The aim of asking
the participants a general question is to discover whether there is a common theme regarding the involvement of people. Here, one of the senior lecturers that is living with the feelings and circumstances of his students, and has been directly under the radar of the security forces, Nuri Talabani, argued:

“It is not necessary to ask about causation. Look at the Baath’s cadre, except the Arab homeland; they do not see anything else. They have extended the Arab homeland borders to the city of Wan\(^1\) in the North and to the city of Kermanshah\(^2\) in the East. This is totally Kurdistan territory, but they consider it as part of Arab land. The Arab wise men are saying the Kurds are living here and we should care about them until they become Arabs” (Talabani, deported, age 75).

Thus, the indirect yet specific theme here is Arabisation, whether the Arabs are concerned with expanding the Arab homeland or assimilating the non-Arabs into Arab society. What draws my attention in this extract is the vision of the Arabian wise men. This common vision is not surprising because of the other extreme themes. Nuri Talabani’s vision is a consequence of his very long experience as a legal expert, lecturer and writer who was involved and lived among Arab society in Baghdad and Basra. Thus, if the wise men hoped for the assimilation of the Kurds, it means that Arab-centrism became innate and they cannot see the difference, and all different characters should be eliminated. In this regard, Arif Qurbani, as a participant who lived in Kirkuk province, stated that:

“What we have seen from this new state (Iraq) and what has been implemented by the BP in a very bloody destructive manner, I think it was a strategy to refuse difference, or to refuse those who were considered as outcasts. The Kurds as an ethnic and religious or sectarian component, simply

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\(^1\) Van or (Wan) is a Kurdish city located in the eastern Anatolia region on the eastern shore of Lake Van in Northern Kurdistan. It has an area of 19,069 km\(^2\) and has a population of 1,035,418 inhabitants (2010).

\(^2\) Kermanshah in Kurdish (Kermashan) is a Kurdish city and the capital of Kermanshah Province, located in Eastern Kurdistan (Western Iran) close to the Iraqi Kurdistan borders. According to the 2011 census, its population is 851,405. People mostly speak Southern Kurdish.
were not acceptable to the state of Iraq” (Qurbani, deported and Genocide activist, age 50).

Thus, the majority of the participants have confirmed the refusal of the idea of difference at the level of the state and within the Arab population. Examining this theme requires a focal point due to various reasons, which have been previously explained. As a consequence, the established culture of Arabism took place over a long period and accompanied the state’s formation. The Kurds, whether invisible because of their geographical position, or in the context of Baath propaganda, had their image tarnished and this reputation has been the subject of controversy as the main reason for the division of the state. This highlighting of the division is not something that came out of nowhere. The difference was well-known to both sides, but the authority was unable to find an appropriate way for them to live together. As a consequence, a participant, who has had direct involvement in the state authority, also has raised the theme of difference. Muhammad Sharif, as a previous deputy Iraqi minister, argued:

“Of course, the difference caused the Anfal campaigns. There is a distinction between a difference and a difference. The difference between the Kurds and the Arabs is a profound difference, because the difference lies in the language and the foundations, including interests, history and background in all its dimensions. For example, there is a difference between Jordan and Iraq, but the commonalities between them are much more. Here, humanity is the only common factor between the Kurds and the Arabs. We also share the same religion, but the values were not being respected, and they did not make any account for it- it remains zero on paper” (Sharif, part of the Iraqi authority, age 81).

The importance of this extract is in the expression of his desperation for a common life between Kurds and Arabs, and this from a Kurdish Iraqi figure that worked for the Iraqi Army as a religious Imam for a few years, and then become part of the authority as Deputy Minister of Endowments and Religious Affairs. Thus, the limitation in the commonalities between two different national components still leaves one factor, which is the humanity. This suggests a sense of the impossibility of
co-existence between the two traditions because of the scarcity of common factors between them. This traditional mentality lacks knowledge and broad-mindedness, which is reflected in the inter-relationship and inter-dependency chains.

When difference becomes a dilemma, and ideology becomes the main principle for the inter-relationship, and as an alternative to the inter-dependency chains, the way to the de-civilising process is clearly paved. Here, Falakaddin Kakayi, who was part of a religious minority, and was considered one of the Kurdish leader figures in the Kurdish political movement, expressed his feelings regarding the causes of genocide:

“I attribute it to the structure of the state and to the policy of Arab nationalist ideology. Basically, who dragged us to Iraq was the British colonial power. When Britain announced the existence of oil in Kirkuk, Kirkuk became an Iraqi-machine. Thus, they tied Kurdistan to Iraq to form a state. However, the policy of the Arabs towards the Kurds is very old and rooted. I do not agree with those who just in courtesy say that war is not between the Kurds and Arabs, but in fact I have to say it is the Arab war against the Kurds. I am saying it due to my knowledge and experience, and this is the case. In my view, it is an old policy, likely 1500 years old. It is old and this means it is not just today’s policy. The proof is, when they wanted to exterminate the Kurds, there was no resistance. It is a long process which does not need any proof. If there was resistance in 1988, then what about the previous attempts? The proof is the policy of Abdul-Karim Qasim and his motivation for Arabisation. The primary reason is Arab nationalism or Arab ideology in Iraq. The state of Iraq was built on the basis of the ideology of Arab-centrism. It is a chauvinist ideology. The successive regimes in Iraq were similar, from the Kingdom, to the republic, from Abdul karim al-Qasim to the communists. There was a very strong wing and hegemony within the Communist Party, which was an Arab nationalist wing against the Kurds even its Kurdish communists. Then, both president Arifs of the Baath regime, none of them could behave differently. After the collapse of Saddam Hussein in 2003, a similar policy has been implemented. Nouri al-Maliki has a similar approach and he has willingly called his people to an ethnic war against the Kurds. Sunni Arab Islamists include Tariq al-Hashemi as an example of someone with a similar policy.
Thus, the state was built to eliminate the Kurds. Kurds are not part of this state. We delude others and ourselves if we say it is an easy matter. People opining, saying it is an easy matter, are deceived. It is unusual and it is a national dilemma. The dilemma is the system of the state. The structure of the state, because the state was built for the interests of one nation, and in order to guarantee these interests, the Kurds have to be eliminated. This is the reality. Therefore, no matter which party or which sectarian is seizing power, all of them are similar” (Kakayi, political figure, age 70)

In this long extract, two themes are important, and both themes have sub-themes. The most important theme is the state or the system of the state. Here, the Arabs as an ethnic entity do not believe in sharing power for two reasons; the first reason is because the system of the state was unilateral. It has been formed and measured for one ethnicity. They are monopolising the means of violence and all other constitutions of the state, including taxation. The other part of the dilemma is the ideology, which owns the various dimensions, including the religious aspects. On the one hand, they are the majority in Iraq, and in particular the capital is seen as an Arabic city and far from the Kurdish areas. On the other hand, they think Kurdistan has always been part of Iraq and any decentralising of the state means the waiving of their rights. Thus, the ideology of Arab-centrism is the main dilemma, which is creating a strong difference based on an outsider. As a consequence, this kind of Arab-centrism has become a culture and is rooted in the memory of the Arab population. Therefore, if they theoretically believe in sharing the power, practically it is impossible.

In addition, it seems that all other participants emphasised a similar dilemmas and themes. Mam Qadir in a very short extract concluded that:

““The main reason was to change Iraq to a pure Arab country and to cleanse Iraq from non-Arabs, but with long-term patience” (Mam Qadir, victim, age 75).

Thus, in order to strengthen the hegemony of the Arabs in Iraq, they planned to evacuate at least some areas from non-Arabs, depending on economic or strategic grounds. In a similar trend, Jabar Kadir stated that:
“The reasons are related to the Kurds themselves. Because the authorities in Iraq understood that the Kurds throughout the age of Iraq could not be assimilated into the crucible of the Arabs, as the Arab nationalists required. Thus, according to their analysis, the Kurds are always endangering the unity of Iraq. Kurds are the dagger in the side of Iraq.

Any Kurdish entity in Northern Iraq will become a second Israel in the region. This is related to the extremist ideology, which has been adopted by Baathists. Politically, because the Kurds have always been in opposition, and Kurdistan has always been a safe haven for fugitives from the oppression of the regime it also has an ideology aspect. From the ocean to the Gulf it has to be monopolised for one nation, and the imposition of one culture with one ideology. The message of Arab immortal nationalism, as an eternal message, was an expression of that will. Baathists wanted unity and to be led by themselves under their leadership. Thus, in general, the main reason stems from that ideology, and all other reasons strengthen and support this main reason” (Kadir, deported, age 64).

Here a new theme has emerged, which is the opposition. The Kurds from the beginning could not accept the marginalisation and the process of Arabisation. They were considered as outsiders and their existence was at risk. This is a simple consequence of the ideology of pan-Arab centrism. Interestingly, the Arabisation policy has its roots in the pre-Baathist rule, and the pan-Arabic-centrism seems to be solid and non-negotiable. This type of causation has been voiced by the previous Iraqi environmental minister, Abdul Rahman Siddiq, who stated that:

“The first cause is the ideology. The ideology has priority. The ideology was a filter and the consequence was something else. These causes became the foundation for the same goals: Primarily the Pan-Arab nation. Secondary is the process of poorness” (Siddiq, deported, age 53).

The theme of poverty here could be important as it carries different consequences. One of the penalties of the forced camps was that citizens were
stripped of their crafts and industries, which they originally owned. When they were isolated inside the camps, they became physically disabled and slowly become emotionally disabled. This disability included the total dimensions of life; even relationships and the stability of personality were affected, including interdependency chains.

In addition to all of these extracts from the interviews, the vision of Khalil Ismail al-Faili is more concentrated on the logistic factor as he stated:

“Why were the AC delayed to the eighties? Why did they not occur in the seventies, with the exception of displacement? It is because the situation in the eighties was suitable. This means Saddam Hussein and the Baath authorities knew that the situation for the process was now convenient. But unfortunately, the situation continues” (Khalil, deported, age 65).

Thus, despite the ideology, there has always been the question of why the AC were delayed to 1988. This is another aspect of the strategy of the process of genocide. It means the genocide was planned, but it had to be postponed until a convenient period. However, the participant is concerned about the continuity of the process because of the current tensions between the Kurds and the Iraqi authority.

On the other side, for the Kurdish participants, what drew my attention was the Arab participants who are more severe than the Kurds themselves when supporting the Kurdish question. Al-Alusi, one of those few Arabs, confirmed that:

“The annihilation was based on a political, fascist and chauvinistic decision” (Al-Alusi, academic, age 58).

Thus, he is admitting that the annihilation is an important theme. The other different themes could in essence be a second aspect of pan-Arab-Centrism, but more specifically it is a reference to the BP. In contrast to the figures like al-Alusi, here is one of the Baathists who still believes in the BP’s policy regarding the Kurdish position in Iraq. The participant is Abdul Razaq al-Baathi who admitted:

“It is not true. Iraq did not want to destroy our Kurdish brothers, but the Iraqi government due to its duty was required to end the insurgency of separatists
who wanted to split Iraq, in service of global Zionism, and it was a major conspiracy against the Arab nation. Iraq, under the wisdom of our martyred leader and president, could finish the plot with minimal losses. It could be that some people have suffered, but the plot was significant. What are you waiting for the state to do? Open its borders to foreigners and welcome them? No, it was supposed to deal with the situation due to a required format” (Abdul Razzaq, Baathist, age 73).

This extract includes many themes, which are a reflection or similar to the vision of Aflaq or Saddam Hussein, or any other Baath figure. The themes of unity of Iraqis, conspiracy, separatists, Zionism, the wise leadership of Saddam Hussein and so on, have been reiterated without any critical vision of the relationship between the Kurds and the Iraqi authority. However, the extract shows what happened to the targeted people, and how it is considered a successful campaign against the Kurds as outsiders.

9.5.2. AC as Genocide

Despite the reasons for genocide, or whether the AC were a consequence of internal or external factors, the participants did not conceal their belief in describing whether the AC were genocide or not. Thus, in this part, some of these beliefs are highlighted.

The circumstances of war for any perpetrator are an opportunity for the implementation of any intended act. The participants, in different ways, have reiterated the theme of genocide and its sub-themes. In this regard, Jabar Kadir claimed that:

“Yes, what has happened was an act of genocide. It was an act according to all genocide definitions, like the measures of the Holocaust or the Armenian genocide and all acts of the 20th century genocides from Rwanda to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Yes, what has been happened was an act of genocide” (Kadir, deported, age 64).

Thus, the theme of genocide as an act is one of the main themes and the participants are aware of their views. In the same direction, Newshirwan Mustafa is one of the opposition leaders, and he claimed:
“Of course, it was genocide. What the BP did, particularly in the years of the 1980s under the name of the series of Anfal 1, Anfal 2 and until the 9th Anfal or the terminated Anfal, during which thousands of people were killed” (Mustafa, Peshmerga and political Leader, age 71).

Thus, the AC are substantially considered as genocide. In addition to that, there is strong agreement between the Kurdish and Arab participants in terms of the adjectival genocide of the Anfal campaigns. Here is one paradigm of a Sunni-Arab participant Tayseer al-Alusi who argued that:

“The annihilation or genocide was based on a political, fascist and chauvinistic decision” (Al-Alusi, Baath’s opposition, age 58).

Hence, the choice of the Baath’s authority to commit genocide, according to al-Alusi, despite of its adjectival form, was based on its fascist and chauvinistic nature. The other participant, Al-Mutallibi, who is an influential Shi’a Arab, concluded:

“Yes, the AC were a systematized process against a particular race. It was not based on a political or ideological factor. The Kurds are a particular race or a specific nationality, and they have been exposed to mass destruction because of their ethnic affiliation” (Saad AlMutallibi, Iraqi political activist, age 55).

Thus, here we have four figures, as well as all the other participants who agree that the Anfal Campaigns were based on the crime of genocide. However, it is important to include two other participants who were members of the BP. The first one does not believe in the ideology of the BP anymore, whereas the second one still believes in the Baath ideology. Regarding Hiwa Afafandi who has left Baath ideology, they argued:

“Finally, the Anfal Campaigns were aimed at putting an end to the Kurdish issue after suffering from displacement and destruction. A lot of people during the period of the war returned to their places, but the Baath authority took advantage of the conditions of war to carry out a final elimination once and of
all the Kurdish presence in these as well as other areas” (Hiwa Afandi, Baathist, age 63).

Thus, this is an admission that the Baath’s authority exploited the war to put an end to the Kurdish existence in the prohibited areas, or other areas, specifically in Kirkuk province. At least this is an admission that the intention of the Baath authority was to reduce the Kurdish influence both physically and emotionally. He has not mentioned the concept of genocide, but ‘to carry out a final elimination’ is a reference to genocide. In contrast to this statement, Abdul Razaq al-Baathi claims that:

“The Republic of the quack Khomeini has exposed Iraq to a criminal campaign and a brutal aggression. There were some villagers in the north, which harboured greedy motives and turned their back on the country that sheltered them, approached and served them, but nevertheless they were helping our enemy; therefore, the state decided to deal with those malefactors, so, they received their just punishment” (Abdul Razzaq, Baathist, age 73).

Here, regardless of underestimating the lives of tens of thousands of rural citizens, he has admitted that those people were punished. The sub-theme in this, and other extracts, refers to an intentional act, regardless of the causes of the existence of these people in these areas. The other important theme is the involvement of the state in these acts of genocide. All participants, regardless of their background, have referred to the involvement of the state directly or indirectly in these inhumane acts.

9.5.3. The Preparation for the Anfal Campaigns

The preparation for this process was mainly on two levels: the first level is its dimensions and historical roots. The second level is the relationship with the quality of the implementation in an accurate process. The next section mainly relates to the first level because, strategically, it is associated with the ideological dimensions and the intention of the Baath authority. The second level is mainly correlated to the logistic and bureaucratic implementation of the process.

9.5.3.1. The 1st Level of the Dimensions and Historical Roots

In this part of the thesis, the participants are seen to highlight the historical roots of the Anfal campaigns, directly or indirectly. The information provided here is
partly associated with their experience and eyewitness accounts of the interviewees. The other information is considered to be as a consequence of the direct or indirect involvement in the events of that period. Nuri Talabani, who was indirectly involved, argued:

“I think the policy of Arabisation in the regions of Kirkuk, was the beginning, and the AC were supposed to be the last stage. According to the plan, which had been exposed and was to Arabise the targeted areas, they were able to implement it in a highly professional way. So, the policy of Arabisation was a clear face of genocide” (Talabani, deported, age 75)

Here, the theme of Arabisation has been reiterated as a most dangerous prior level in association with the process of genocide. The roots of this dangerous level could be considered a strategic level in relation to the nation state’s dimensions. A state according to the Baath’s vision should be intellectually stable and take on the Urube characters as a pan-Arab-centric model. Thus, the most important targeted areas had been Arabised on a previous level prior to the evacuation of the large areas along the borders as a security belt. According to another participant who is one of the 1983 Barzani survivors, he claimed that for the Iraqi Baath authority, the land was the most important aspect, as he continued:

“First: the Arabisation of the land
Second, the Arabisation of the people
Third, they were rather indifferent to the language, because they were only targeting the land” (Hakeem, deported, age 48).

Thus, Arabisation of the land was imperative, as opposed to its people, therefore, could this point be interpreted as an argument for the entire destruction of the population specifically in the targeted areas? However, the targeted areas at the time of evacuation have been smashed to smithereens. This is in order not to leave a mark of human life or even something beneficial for the wildlife, including water sources. The area actually became barren like a desert. This is what Abdul Rahman Siddiq meant when he concluded:
“The implementation of a scorched-earth policy, after discharging it from its residents at the border areas, includes the areas in Kirkuk province that have also been evacuated and the Arabs have been brought to those places for the purpose of Arabisation. Finally, they started a race in carrying out the annihilation of the unsuspecting people from the so-called Forbidden areas, in addition to many other regions outside these areas in the Anfal campaigns” (Siddiq, deported, age 53).

Thus, we are facing two kinds of evacuated areas; on the one hand, the areas in Kirkuk, Diyala, and Mosul were evacuated from the Kurds and then inhabited by the recruited Arabs. On the other hand, the areas adjacent to the Iraqi / Iranian, Turkish and Syrian borders and all the border gateways were considered as purely Kurdish areas. These evictions formed a challenge for the Kurdish citizens on two levels: for the first level, there was progress in forming a security belt, in addition to the possibility of Arabisation of these areas in the coming stages. Secondly, the creation of a scary block between Kurdish citizens on both sides of the border, where there are mixed families on both sides in terms of familial relations, or affinity, or cultural commonalities. This factor in itself makes it possible to form an understanding of the aim of the Iraqi Baath authorities, because of the mutual emotions and the inter-dependency chains, the inter-relationships between Kurdish political parties on both sides, and the cooperation between them increasing. Moreover, the cultural inter-relations include historical dimensions- Kurdish language and literature knows no borders between the four sections of Kurdistan. Thus, regarding the theme of Arabisation, Sami Faili concludes:

“Believe me, the stages of annihilation are clear. They start with the Arabisation of the land and then the Arabisation of the people. When they failed to Arabise the people, they started with the stage of genocide to end the Kurdish presence in some places and to humiliate them in other places” (Faili, Politician, age 60).

This extract emphasises the similar trend of the pan-Arab policy, and it shows the importance of land above people. Here, another participant who is a genocide activist stated:
“I have about 5,000 documents in my hands. Since 1983-1987, the destruction of villages and regrouping people in camps was on-going. Elimination of the Kurdish people by the state varied from period to period. According to some archives, many people were executed because of cultural, language and clothing issues. But the whole acts show that the process was planned and masterminded.” (Omer, displaced and genocide activis, age 55).

This participant did not mention the theme of Arabisation, but the extract shows that the destruction of the villages during eighties was on-going. This is consistent with the previous extracts, and confirms that the deportation was for the purpose of Arabisation, and the Arabs were brought to the Kurdish areas in the city of Kirkuk and its subsidiaries, in addition to Khanaqin and large areas in Mosul. Thus, it could be that Arabisation was the most important reason behind these executions. In the same trend as the theme of Arabisation, a participant, who will be considered as having direct involvement with the Iraqi authority, claimed:

“‘The Arabs’ acceptance, initially, to bind the Kurds to the state of Iraq, is an inhumane way to address the issue of the Kurdish people. Primarily, just thinking about the Arabisation of the Kurdish areas and the Kurdish personality is enough to consider the inhumanity of the successive authorities in Iraq.

Unfortunately, they did not stick at this point; they actually started the stage of destroying the Kurdish society, principally by humiliating the Kurds, and ending them through mass killing. If they had the chance to stay, they would have attempted to exterminate the last Kurdish man” (Sharif, part of the Iraqi authority, age 81).

In addition to the theme of Arabisation, some other themes have been reiterated such as inhumanity, humiliation and destruction. In addition to the theme of inhumanity, specifically regarding the extract: ‘Arabs should not accept the annexation of the Kurds to Iraq’, is due to fraternal feelings, which stems from an over-confidence in others based on the religion. Thus, the emphasis on such
overconfident feelings within the religious brotherhood is a prominent feature of Kurdish political ideology, forgetting that the interests overcame the emotional aspects. In addition to this disappointment, which represents the dominant feature of the Kurdish figures, the bitter answer was the Arabisation of the entire region using the theme of the destruction. In this regard, Falakaddin Kakayi has claimed that:

“The first steps began to create distrust amongst Kurds themselves and they became afraid of taking any initiative in general, as a result of insults and the on-going humiliation, including the stripping of human sense. Second, they strangely began to lay-off the Kurds from administrative, social and political aspects. Third: The beginning of the phases of displacement and deportation to make these people dependent on the authority. In addition, the Baathists exploited the dire situation of these people to buy their receivables and then forced them to take up arms as mercenaries of the state. Fourth: These mercenaries were used and exploited in a very bad way during the Anfal Campaigns because without these mercenaries the success of the campaigns was impossible. Fifth: The BP took the advantages of the modern instruments, from the weapons to the modern military system, through the building of isolated camps to control its residents, and finally the completion of the process through starvation and terrorism, to carry out its objectives. Sixth: The denial of genocide widely and until this moment continues”
(Kakayi, political figure, age 70).

Here, the new themes in these extracts are striking. The psychological impact on the lives of those people who were expelled from their hometown and gave their lives to it, suddenly after the destruction of everything that was built and invested in, were banished and exported to another place, which is entirely different from the previous place; the psychological morbidity is an expected consequence and generated serious results. Thus, as a consequence, the theme of de-humanisation is applicable to such social, economic, political, and psychological circumstances. In this regard, throughout collecting these people in these camps, the BP could approach several targets.
On the one hand, the emptying of rural areas was a major attempt to isolate the sources of funding from the Peshmerga. This influential procedure included social and moral aspects in addition to the economic aspects.

On the other hand, the residents of these camps were easily controlled because they were crammed into surrounding camps by the Iraqi army, Popular Army (Al Jaysh ash-Shaabi), the security and intelligence services, and BP’s circles. These camps were mobilised to create mercenary groups, or in Kurdish, ‘Jash’, or in English ‘jackass’ as another theme mentioned by the participants. In addition, the Baathists aimed to force these people to comply with joining the armed mercenary organisations, through the Baath’s authority’s ‘Light regiments’, which were attractive units since its part-time obligations included a good salary.

Moreover, the Baath authority attempted to evacuate these areas, adjacent to the international border between Iraq / Iran, Turkey and Syria, to enable the creation of a security belt of more than 15km in depth. This security belt led to the isolation of the other three parts from the Iraqi portion of Kurdistan, since the Kurds from across the border were related to each other on a variety of levels, inclusive of political interdependence between the Kurdish parties, who were sometimes cooperating with each other. The inter-relationship included cultural aspects, particularly at the levels of literature, intellectual, historical and linguistic commonalities. They were also socially related across both sides of the border, mingling through birth or marriage and kinship, or even emotionally, they were united by a common background and sense of Kurdish brotherhood. The other theme is the modern instrument in all its dimensions and its subsidiaries. Primarily, the idea of gathering people in the camps could be a modern idea which may have been derived from the Nazis, because they were similar to the Nazi camps in some aspects. They were comparatively easier to manage and control, preventing people from joining the armed opposition or running away, and it was possible to arrest any person they wanted, as they did with the Barzani community. This was accompanied by a modern army, and a huge military arsenal of heavy and light arms, equipment and military vehicles, in addition to a bureaucratic structural management. The other theme, which has been emphasised, is denial. This is one of the essential concepts in all genocide processes. However, although the crime of genocide in Iraq has been recognised by the Iraqi High tribunal court and Iraqi parliament, the BP, including the current Iraqi presidency system, did not apologise for the implementation of the heinous crime.
This extract, although it comes from a Sunni Arab, brings together the most important previous themes. Here, regarding the preparation al-Alusi, with his rich background as an academic expert in Political Sciences and long experience as a left-wing activist, admitted:

“Primarily, there was a socio/political preparation, via two kinds of discourse, through the media and social direction. Campaigns of cleansing, Arabisation and the division of administration in a way that facilitates the crime from the border villages to the contact areas between the Kurds and Arab sections, within the Kurdish area, were underway.

Using the imposition of the economic siege and the mechanisms of its implementation to increase the control over local lifelines; inclusive of the exploitation of collective punishment in every city and village and suburb. The provision of infrastructure schemes logistically to serve its objectives. The regional and international conventions were bypassed to enhance the potential of committing the crime, such as the Algiers Convention. Preparing of its elements in a manner commensurate with the idea of bloody fascistic criminal behaviour” (al-Alusi, Baath’s opposition, age 58).

Thus, the preparation exceeded a lot of expectations. The political and media preparation required enough time, and was accompanied by the preconditioned intention for the implementation of the supposed plan, using the available means of media and social platforms, which belonged to the BP; inclusive of television channels, newspapers and the Party’s platforms- even some religious platforms. Hence, the preparation underwent several dimensions in order to implement of previous plan accurately and without any errors. Thus, among the themes contained in the extract, the practical numbers confirm the campaigns were brutally ruthless and lacked discrimination between adults and children, men or women and senior citizens; they included the economic siege and other forms of collective punishment. Hence, cleansing and Arabisation was the ultimate goal of the BP, which was passing through the means of bureaucracy, of administrative divisions, such as the administrative procedures in Kirkuk, Diyala and Mosul, and also the social measures of ethnic division such as the correction of nationality among other procedures. All of this was passed through the enormous possibilities of the state and its institutions, which were
recruiting members of the society by exploiting the legitimacy of the state and the national economy. The exploitation did not stop at this, but skipped the international border and violated international law and the possibility of neighbouring countries assisting, to end the Kurdish movement. Thus, they resorted to the Algerian agreement, which was signed between Iraq and Iran, under the supervision of the Algerian state and the knowledge of the US and possibly other countries.

Here, regarding the international community, Arif Qurbani has also referred to the international factor as he asserts that:

“"I think in case of the Iran-Iraq war, the bipolar system between the Eastern and Western powers, the foreign interests and the fear of the victory of the Islamic Republic of Iran caused the silence from the international community. I do not think that the world did not know what was happening in Southern Kurdistan” (Qurbani, deported and genocide activist, age 50).

Hence, this extract is further confirmation of the exploitation of international circumstances, including the national capabilities of ensuring the success of the operations. Therefore, Fatih in terms of the international bystander position, stated:

“It is the crisis of ethics, sir. The wickedness of these nations reached the bone. I was always worried about this level of abjection” (Fatih, Victim and Imam, ages 76).

Thus, both participants believe that the international community did know about the process, but they did not interrupt for several reasons. However, according to Fatih, this was a crisis of morality in the international community at large.

9.5.3.2. The Bureaucratic Level

The second level has been considered a process of large magnitude, which must have been prepared previously and accurately. The process needed funding and equipment, both militarily and civilian, and much of this equipment was monopolised by the state, especially the army inventory. This process demanded a large military force to be able to carry out the campaigns according to an accurate process. In this regard, Gregory Stanton argued, “preparation for genocide includes identification. Lists of victims are drawn up. Houses are marked. Maps are made” (Gregory
Stanton). For these reasons, Jabar Kadir has referred to important points as he claimed that:

“I guess the Baathists were benefiting from the previous genocide acts with all three main stages: the identification of the target, regrouping them and then eliminating them in silence. All these stages needed to be prepared on a higher level. It needed a set of institutions, preparation, the steps of application and rationalising its implementation. They did, however, in relation to these matters, design and carry out what they wanted, in respect of the intellect, education, and the preparation of people who would carry out the process of genocide, including the utilisation of the state’s institutions in a highly professional manner. Moreover, they gave the confidentiality aspect of this ethnic cleansing great priority. All this demonstrates that the process was highly organised and systematic, orchestrated and had been previously planned” (Kadir, deported, age 64).

Thus, according to this extract, the hierarchy of the steps of genocide and the structure of the plan ensured that the decision was made collectively, and no national institutions were excluded from participating in the process of genocide. Furthermore, Hiwa Afandi, as a previous Baathist, experienced this issue and concluded:

“For me the picture is very clear because I was behind the camera. I remember when I saw the decision for the deportation and it was on the table, but I do not remember when this decision was made. I also remember prejudiced decisions such as forbidding the Kurds from taking certain kinds of jobs and specific kinds of studies related to security or anything in relation to secrets concerning the Baath or the State. The Kurds were always the subject of contempt and they attempted to de-humanise them. They were always insulted, perceived as violent and uncivilized. They were deliberately attempting to make them hopeless in order to expedite surrender.

The 11th March agreement was just a game, not just for inside, but also it was a message to the international community, primarily in order to leave a positive image, then nobody would believe anything about the atrocities. The decision of 11th March has different dimensions. In the case of compliance of
the Kurdish movement to the agreement, there were many measures of Arabisation and the alternatives did exist. Therefore, I actually know that the government was not serious about implementing that agreement.

The AC was a postponed plan. They were looking for appropriate conditions. When they realised that the war with Iran would soon terminate, of course, through their secret intelligence and their special sources, they embarked on a mission centring on Kurdistan to carry out the Anfal campaigns.

As I said, the campaigns were implemented according to a plan in advance. The areas had been identified previously. The areas had been named as forbidden areas. These areas had accurately been identified to include the most crowded and sensitive areas, specifically the areas of the 3rd Anfal. The Anfal areas, at the beginning, were besieged. Then the areas were shelled using different kinds of heavy arms, even poison gas. People were forced to flee and surrender, but most often surrendered, because the escape route was very difficult. After the surrender, the citizens were transferred to prepared complexes in advance. In these prepared complexes men, women and children were separated. Then each group was taken to a prepared complex or a prison. So everyone was carefully handled according to the plan in advance” (Hiwa Afandi, previous Baathist, age 63).

Thus, according to the knowledge of this participant, who was aware of much of the events that were taking place in Kurdistan because of his membership of the North branch of the interior ministry, what was happening was not spontaneous or reactionary. Hence, the themes in this extract have great importance. The process of dehumanisation that has been reiterated includes many sub themes, psychologically and pragmatically, leaving its influence on the Kurdish personality. This extract shows that al-Uruba or Arabisation is the unchanged factor that formed the core of the state’s strategy and it is a constant point in the BP’s agenda; all tactics revolve around this agenda, which in all probability is located within the proximal and distal accounts. In this regard, al-Uruba as Arab-centrism is at the core of the process of the Anfal campaigns, and it has been a way of addressing an ethnic state in spite of a nation state.

The following two extracts are totally different in their expression compared to those previously approached. The first participant considers himself as not having
any involvement, even indirectly, although he has admitted that he was in opposition to the regime. In contrast to his admission, he has rejected any stages or anything else, because everything was under the control of Saddam Hussein and no one owned his word. Thus, sarcastically, he answered:

“Stages? I am not aware of the stages. I know Saddam Hussein was issuing his orders and nobody would oppose his orders. This is the problem. This is what I know. There are no stages and sub-stages. He was saying a word and the subject is finished.” (Samarrayi, Lecturer Sunni Arab, age 71).

This admission is slightly bordering on ignorance, because if he was a political activist in the ranks of the opposition, he should know the ideology of the opposed party. This line of response does not exceed two possibilities- it could be that he was not part of the opposition, but actually does not want to reveal any recognition because it falls within those who deny the genocide, particularly because of his belonging to the Arab-Sunnis, or he is still living in fear of the BP and he is escaping from any potential liability in the future.

In contrast to this or other extracts, here are two different Baath participants: the first one admitted:

“There were neither steps nor genocide, nor shall they grieve. The state was working hard to create a safe space for all citizens. Enemies besieged Iraq and traitors inside were working for the collapse of the state. The state began to cut-off the road from the traitors aiming to hand over Iraq. Is this what you call stages? Yes, some pocket clients were planning openly to divide Iraq and we cut-off the road”’ (Abdul Razzaq, Baathist, age 73).

Thus, these participants are not denying the atrocities, but he is augmenting the events and calling the Kurdish movement pocket clients in terms of de-humanisation of the outsiders. In the same trend, the second participant argued that:

“There was no extermination process, but what happened was a process of returning the prestige and sovereignty of the state over its territory, which was occupied by Iran. Thus, the Iranians were expelled with some Iraqi traitors. As
a consequence, the Iraqis celebrated the victory in all parts of Iraq and it was indescribable. The steps evident in this case, were the state and the institutions concerned about developing plans to address the crisis” (Al-Darraj, Baathist, age 56).

Here, both statements concur as one ideology in two different contexts. Both of them consider the Kurdish insurgency to be traitorous in order to justify the military campaigns against the Kurdish population. Both of them are using the war as a pretext to cover the operations and consider the atrocities as part of the war. They highlight the similar mentality of the BP’s pan-Arab ideology, which is the fear of the division of the country and considering the Kurdish opposition as the pocket client of an imagined enemy.

This negative attitude of the two previous examples can be compared to the position of an opposition participant on hearing such an admission. In this regard, Fatih explained:

“I left my job as Imam in a mosque, because I do not like hearing the word Anfal any more when someone was reading Quran or praising the behaviour of Saddam. Simply, they were mere spectators. If someone told you nobody could say a word against the regime, I am saying what about during the post-fall of the regime? Arabs, especially Sunni-Arabs, do not consider Saddam or his team to be criminal, but rather they consider him to be a martyr. Thus, they are worse than the Nazis. And ask me why? Because the Germans, after the fall of Nazism, they followed a strict procedure against the Nazis, even they prevented Hitler’s name and his book being shared. However, the Arabs call their president a martyr. The Germans apologised and offered compensation, what the Arabs did in Iraq? There is a massive difference” (Fatih, Victim and Imam, age 76).

Finally, this contrast between the victims and perpetrator or supporters of the perpetrator, in one way or another, highlights the contrast between two we-differences. This contrast is confirmation of the strength and inflexibility of the ethno-Arab-centrism.
9.6. Summary of the Interviews (General causes)

The charts below illustrate the results in relation to the general causes of genocide. These causes have been selected from the questions and answers of the interviewees in order to determine the exact answers and divide the participants between the two different charts. The first chart shows the number of participants who answered all of the questions. The second chart shows the sharp divide between Arabs and Kurds regarding all issues in relation to genocide, and different issues in relation to Iraq.

Table No. (4): The specific key questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Was what happened to the Kurds genocide?</th>
<th>Did BP seize power through a coup?</th>
<th>Were there crises of democracy?</th>
<th>Has religion been influential?</th>
<th>Was Baathification systematic?</th>
<th>Was there national upheaval?</th>
<th>Was there sharp internal cleavage?</th>
<th>Does BP have Nazi style aspects?</th>
<th>Was there external interference?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Chart No. (7) Specific key questions of participants
This chart shows the total number of participants who agreed, those who did not agree and those who do not have any opinion or are neutral.
Chart No. (8) Specific key questions of participants

This chart shows the background of participants who agreed, those who did not agree, and those who do not have any opinion or are neutral.
9.7. Conclusion

The aggressive policy of the BP, and its authority as an established group opposing the Kurds, who were considered as outsiders, is highlighted via the real experience of the participants quoted in this thesis. Some of these participants are survivors or eyewitnesses, even if they were the followers of the BP. The Arabisation is the first and foremost behaviour of the BP in order to secure the Arabic identity of Iraq. This extreme focus on Arabisation is confined within the theoretical term ethnocentrism. It means that Bathists inherited this policy from pan-Arab-ethno-nationalism. Thus, Iraq was built upon the philosophy of Arabism without giving any space to non-Arabs. Additionally, as a consequence of the policy of Arabisation, hundreds of thousands of Kurdish people were resettled in forced concentration camps. This process entered the implementation phase after the Algiers Convention between Iraq and Iran. In addition to the campaigns of the BP against the Faili Kurds in 1980, in 1983, Barzani people were taken to five concentration camps in a large-scale campaign, and all Barzani men were taken to an unknown place in South Iraq. As a consequence, Saddam Hussein has admitted that Barzani men “have been taken to hell and they have got their punishment”.

Events were successively flowing and the pressure on the Kurdish factions was increasing with and without cause, until the preparations were underway for the Anfal campaigns, with the appointing of Al-Majid as commander of the northern district. In this regard, the participants have indicated the causes of the Anfal military campaigns, and see Arabisation as a main motivation of the BP to confine the Kurds in the narrow spaces as a prelude to psychological and spiritual surrender; or alternatively, they were to be subjected to genocide. Additionally, many factors have been mentioned by the interviewees, including the illusion of the Arab homeland borders; the rejection of ethnic diversity; the economical motivation; the origins of state formation and pure Arab-centrism; the preference of Arabs over the others in residing in limited areas and the expulsion of the indigenous population of Kurds; dehumanisation and humiliation of the Kurds in a range of ways, and the BP’s ideology, which according to one participant, included a political, fascist and chauvinistic decision.

Clearly, the events that occurred were an act of genocide and the preparation for the AC took place on two different levels: the historical and the bureaucratic.
Thus, the origins of the historical dimensions vary, and the policy of Arabisation of the land and people remain the most problematic dilemma in this issue. Here, in order to Arabise the land, different atrocities were perpetrated. In addition to the deportation of the Faili Kurds and the gendercide of the Barzani men, it includes the destruction and the gecocide and finally, the lasting solution, named as the AC confirmed the genocide process. However, all of these elements of the genocide process were not implemented without a clear plan and bureaucratic approval. Additionally, the state institutions and its means of violence were mobilised in order to execute the process successfully.
CHAPTER 10: Conclusion

10.1. Introduction

Several points will be covered in this chapter, which is divided into four sections. The first section summarises the research findings. The second section examines the nature of the factors that were, and still are, some of the concerns of this thesis; it highlights the contributions to the framework of the civilising process, the essence of the ideology involved, and genocide. The third section examines the limitations of this thesis in relation to the previous studies and the methodology. In the fourth section, some areas have been determined for future research. Finally, there are some concluding remarks.

10.2 Summary of the research findings

The main aim of this research was to find out the causes of the process that led to the genocide of the Kurds in Iraq. The main argument in this regard is the interrelationships in the process of genocide and the notion of nation building in Iraq, which has been analysed using the framework of the theory of the civilising and de-civilising process. The process of genocide, as has been theoretically addressed under the discipline of sociology, as well as in international law, is never an accident or a spontaneous event; rather, it is connected directly or indirectly to the state as the perpetrator, particularly in the case of Iraq. For this reason, the process of nation building in Iraq, as an important element in the theory of the civilising process, has been examined in connection with the process of genocide in order to discover why and for what reason genocide, as part of the de-civilising process, was carried out in Iraq.

Thus, this thesis has addressed two main processes which have been pursued in Iraq in terms of causality and its effects. The first process, as the main cause of the genocide, concerns how Iraq was created and the subsequent nation building that led to such a critical imbalance in power relations between the main ethnic groups inside the country, particularly between the Kurds and the Arabs. The second process, as an outcome of the first point, focuses on how successive Iraqi authorities, particularly the Baath authority from 1963, pursued the policy of Arabisation of the country in various ways, from evacuation, deportation, and the destruction of land and people in
a clear process of genocide. The research aim was to find out how nation building in Iraq caused the process of the destruction of the infrastructure of the land, and the physical and psychological destruction of the Kurdish people, throughout a systematic process using all possible governmental instruments and dependent on the legitimacy of the state.

Here, before delving into the direct answers to the research questions, the theoretical chapters, Chapter Two and Chapter Three, will be drawn on to analyse the framework of ultra nationalism in Iraq, including the policy of the BP’s ideology, and how its instrument of violence has been confined. In this regard, Graham Kinloch strove to examine genocide as a sociological discipline because of the collectivity of the concept. He has attempted to provide a general framework for the early stages of the division of society and its consequences by borrowing the concept of ethnocentrism. Having examined the concept of ethnocentrism, it became clear that it was possible to approach the origins of the tendency towards genocide. Moreover, this tendency is important in the prevention of the process of genocide. In reality, two elements are important for recognising the tendency towards this process, and these include the elements of official and traditional ethnocentrism. In this case, it could be through the Baath’s ideology and the governmental procedures put in place against the targeted component. Thus, I believe that the roots of genocide are based on multiple sources, and these sources participate in the creation of ethnocentrism.

The main characteristic of social division, according to Kinloch’s view, is ethnocentrism as the central phenomenon within a dominant group, and its consequences include the de-humanisation of the subordinated or less important group. In association with this issue, Kinloch complements Sumner’s definition and claims that:

“This kind of ubiquitous normative prejudice represents the basis of in-group harmony and out-group hostility and the perception of out-group members as non-human, often expressed in extreme forms of nationalism, patriotism and chauvinism under stressful circumstances” (Kinloch, 2005:29).

Here, the best reflection of the ethnocentric behaviour of Arab nationalists during the period of the Baath’s rule, appears in the Iraqi state’s implementation of “national correction”, in that the Kurds should change their nationality, particularly in Kirkuk province, Khanaqin city and the rest of the contact areas. Ezidi Kurds and Shabaks in
Mosul province were forced to change their nationality from Kurdish to Arab, and this was enforced on a large scale. This policy even led to the imposition of Arabic clothes and the wearing of the Arabic black Iqal headdress (al-Iqal al_Arabi), which still remains.

It is worth mentioning that this view of one’s own group’s centrality converges with that of Euro-centrism in the framework of civilisation, which has been used by Elias to describe the Western expression in terms of explicit self-consciousness. In this regard Elias argues: “The West believes itself superior to earlier societies” (Elias, 2000:5). This kind of vision existed among Arab nationalists during the establishment of the Kingdom of Iraq throughout the periods of republican authorities, and after the overthrowing of the King, ending with the Baathists in Iraq as a main principle ideology.

Additionally, employing these different theories and models of genocide, which have been examined in Chapter Two and Chapter Three, forms the basis for understanding the sequence of events since the formation of the Iraqi state up to the Anfal Campaigns. This includes the definition of CPPCG for genocide, which is the basic rule and the content that defines genocide and gives it an official description. In the international community, there are two models that have been employed to address the genocide of the Kurds in Iraq. The two models are the model of paradigm of Helen Fein and the model of patterns of genocide by Raul Hilberg. According to the CPPCG definition and these two models, the successive events that occurred in Iraqi Kurdistan, including the AC, are considered acts of genocide. Additionally, after the collapse of Saddam’s Regime, the Iraqi high Criminal Court made a clear decision that the events that occurred during the era of Saddam Hussein’s Regime, including the expulsion of tens of thousands of Faili Kurds; the arresting and extermination of 8000 Barzani men in mass graves; the killing of 5000 innocent people during the bombing of the city of Halabja with chemical weapons, and killing more than 100,000 civilians from rural areas during the AC, are considered as genocide and a crime against humanity. Dependent on the decision of the Iraqi High Criminal Court, the Iraqi Council of Representatives also admitted that the Kurds were exposed to the crime of genocide.

Chapter Three has focused on the theory of the civilising process, including a literature review of nation building, and this has illustrated how the civilising process as a general framework shaped an important approach to recognise the most
significant elements of nation building in Iraq, and the power relations involved. The concept of the civilising process has been linked to different factors. Primarily, a comparison between society and culture has been considered, which uses the habitus of people of the U.K, France and Germany as examples. These ideas have been explained via elements of culture and altering habitus, and Elias explains that the civilising procedure is a change in human behaviour and emotion that follows a quite specific course. Moreover, this has been backed by a clarification of the essence of aggression and the formation of a state as a significant part of the civilising process. Therefore, the de-civilising process, as the reversal of the civilising process, is a noteworthy basis for the genocide process.

Numerous characteristics are involved in the process of state formation. The most vibrant characteristic, following Elias, is the fiercely competitive process or “conflictual affairs” between numerous groups of people. The most predictable consequence of this rivalry is a persistent unit and consecutive states, starting with a primitive state, via many dissimilar forms to reach the nation state. These forms in the state process follow the control of means of aggression and taxation. Therefore, Elias has focused on the founding of the control of one group and the ultimate creation of a country within his analysis of European history, particularly the U.K, France and Germany, which is referred to as the civilising process. Furthermore, vital to the civilising process is the snowballing division of functions. Utilities could be one of the central developments of the human structure at both micro and macro levels. The most significant purpose of the state, as per Elias, is the shared defence of its populace’s own lives; the existence of their individual group in the face of attack, and a willingness to launch an all-out attack on other groups. These three overall functions form the system of the modern construction of present societies, where in the past, precisely in the case of feudal states, these functions were very prominent in the hierarchy of the state.

Here, as a consequence of the summary of the theoretical chapters and their frameworks, the rest of the chapters will now be discussed in relation to the research questions. In order to answer the first question, as well as the sub-questions, which relate to each other as causality and consequence, a mixed methods strategy has been utilised, which includes analysing historical documentation, and carrying out semi-structured interviews with both the ethnic backgrounds involved- Arabs and Kurds.
10.2.1 The main research question:

The main research question is: Why was the genocide, as a de-civilising process, carried out against the Kurds in Iraq? In order to understand the whole process of genocide as a di-civilising process, it was initially necessary to fully understand the state of Iraq, and how it has been formed and structured. Hence, through the state formation, this research question required understanding all of the characteristics involved in the process of Iraqi nation building in order to find out the causality between the process of nation building in Iraq and the process of genocide.

In this regard, Iraqi state formation in Chapter Five has principally investigated the civilizing process and its elements, and how three Ottoman provinces were deliberately annexed in favour of colonialism and its allies, the Sunni Arabs, in the region. This compulsory formation facilitated the way to an imagined nation, built in favour of the Sunni Arabs who were courting British colonialism against the Ottomans, although previously they were the essence of the Ottoman Sultanate. This kind of facilitation led to placing all the ingredients in one pot under the artificial monarchy with the support of hundreds of the previous Sunni Arab Ottoman Officers.

This kind of artificial monarchy, under the surveillance of the colonial power, led Sunni Arabs to strengthen and defend their domination over the country, with the desire to Arabise the land and its people, and to suppress those considered as outcasts in order to disintegrate them. These new circumstances led to the emergence of Baath ideology, which has been examined in detail in Chapter Five. Thus, with the pan-Arab-ethno-centric ideology, the process of genocide took on dangerous dimensions. The ideology of ethno-pan-Arabism, and later on the Baath’s ideology, may be considered to be the result of around 50 years of Iraqi Sunni Arab attempts to build a pure Arabic nation in Iraq, and as a direct second main cause of the genocide. These two main causes of the genocide in Iraq will be addressed in more detail in the following sections.

10.2.2 Second research question

The second research question is: To what extent was genocide a result of the state failing or a matter of the illegitimacy of the state? In order to understand the process of nation building and its retreat, it has been necessary to study two main stages of the formation of the state of Iraq. The first stage was the formation of the
Kingdom of Iraq under the surveillance of the colonial power in the Middle East after the 1st World War terminated and the Ottoman Sultanate was defeated, including the annexation of Mosul province. The second stage started when the BP began to dominate Iraqi state institutions, starting in 1963, including the Iraqi army and the security forces.

Although this research has dealt with the BP’s authority and its ideology as a roadmap to genocide, a brief investigation is essential regarding the process of state formation, including how and why King Faisal was chosen to lead Iraq; the ideological tendencies of the Arab Ottoman officers who supported the King and shaped the core of the Iraqi army, including pan-Arab-nationalist theorists who interred Iraq accompanied by King Faisal, and how ethno-Arab-centrism evolved in Iraq. From these different macro and micro points, “the relationship between civilising and de-civilising processes are here clearly conceived in terms of a balance between dominant and less dominant processes” (Fletcher, 1997:83). Thus, according to historical documentation, the only concern of the dominant group in Iraq was not the democratic state or state citizenship, but the absolute domination of King Faisal and his ideologist administration team, ‘Sati’ al-Husri as an example, over the Iraqi institutions and their strategy of assimilating non-Arabs, in order to convert the country into a purely Arabic nation state.

Here, I will refer to some points in order to determine the causes of the retreat of nation building in Iraq as a civilising process, and the lack of legitimacy of the state. In a quick description by the historian Hanna Batatu, one could imagine the situation of the region before creating the state of Iraq or “the annexation of three Ottoman Vilayats”, as he explains:

“…Iraq was composed of plural, relatively isolated, and often virtually autonomous city-states and tribal confederations, urban “class” ties tended to be in essence local ties rather than ties on the scale of the whole country” (H. Batatu, 1978:7,8).

In addition, when Iraq was created, there was no civil strategy on economic, social or political integration, as Dobbins, Lesser and Chalk argue, “In the case of Iraq, the political structures created by British after World War I did nothing to resolve these questions” (Dobbins, Lesser and Chalk, 2003:169).

This means the leadership was effectively handed over to the previously planned group in order to serve the colonial power, which has been carefully
explained in Chapter Five, under the title ‘the Interests of Colonialism’. The other important point concerning the imagined Iraq is the recruitment of a foreign person from a religious family of al-Hijaz (now Saudi Arabia). Here, as a starting point to Iraqi state formation, King Faisal and his elite followers, from the beginning, struggled to become the identity of Iraq. This kind of nation building, while not pursued outwardly as the Al Saud in Saudi Arabia did, was inwardly pursued in order to have a pure Sunni ethnic Arabic kingdom. Therefore, King Faisal wanted to build Iraq based on two important criteria, which are Arabic nationalism and religion. In this regard Elie Podeh in his book ‘The Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World: The Struggle Over the Baghdad Pact’ explains that “the Hashemite rulers in Baghdad, whose source of legitimacy sprang from their religious ancestry and their prominent role in the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire during World War I, regarded themselves as the natural standard-bearers of pan-Arabism” (Podeh, 1995:2). Thus, pan-Arab-nationalism and religion as two criterions have been utilised to dominate the country. Additionally, pan Arab-nationalism was the prominent element of identity for the imagined Iraq, and religion had always been the second, and the main element of it, as Sylvia Kedourie has discovered from the nature of Faisal’s discourse: “We are Arabs, he used to say, before being Muslims and Muhammad is an Arab before being a prophet” (Kedourie, 1962:35). Thus, this kind of national policy as the de-civilising process throughout more than seven decades of attempting to build a nation in Iraq as a civilising process, caused extreme failure, which also led to genocide.

Thus, the retreat of the state institutions and the lack of legitimacy were the principal causes of failed nation building in Iraq. There is another related point concerning an imagined Iraq, which was that the Sunni-Arab Ottoman officers were elected to have a vital role in the future of the country. This vital role has been described by Simon Reeva, who explains, “the officers, educated in Istanbul and returning to Iraq to play a leading role in the new state, were first and foremost Sunni pan-Arab nationalists, dreaming of the unity of an Arab nation encompassing the Fertile Crescent and Arabia” (Simon & Tejirian, 2004:vi). Thus, the imagined Iraq was created through the annexation of three different vilayats (provinces), under the leadership of a foreign Sunni Arab King with the assistance of Sunni-Arab Ottoman officers. These and other characteristics pushed the Sunni-Arabs together to defend their domination over the country, along with a desire to Arabise the land and its
people, and to suppress those considered as outcasts in order to remove or integrate them. This situation affected the legitimacy of the state, and with the emergence of the BP, this legitimacy decreased to its lowest levels.

Hence, an imagined Iraq was created under the leadership of an elite who was carrying a prejudiced ethno-pan-Arab-nationalist ideology, along with Sunni Arab religious sectarianism. This ideology paved the way for the emergence of Baath ideology, and the new stage in the inter-relationship with non-Arabs in Iraq. However, the only characteristic of this inter-relationship with the Kurds was the genocidal relationship in its different forms, from Arabisation to the highest degree of destruction.

10.2.3 Third research question

The third research question is: What was the role of religion in its inter-dependence with state organisations? If we look back to the Iraqi elite’s attitude and its media from the early days of this state, religion always has been the second face of Arabic ideology, and has been widely utilised in the process of Arabisation. Hence, as a consequence of the answers to the previous questions, the religious and sectarian background of King Faisal provides one answer to the research question concerning the influence of religion, due to its inter-dependence with state organisations. Moreover, this background of the King had a vital impression on building a specific relationship inside the Sunni community and for the future identity of Iraq.

Here, the influence of King Faisal spread across the Sunni Arab community, and it had a fateful impact on the political elite in Iraq. In addition to these kinds of dimensions, although the BP was a secular party in its rule of the state and its administration, it had religious dimensions and they could be mobilised internally and externally for various purposes. These dimensions have been indicated in the interpretation of the BP’s ideology and the vision of Michel Aflaq in this research. These dimensions quickly emerged and were mobilised against Iran, as a Shia Muslim state, during the war with Iran. In this regard, the BP in its genocidal campaigns against the Kurds also adopted the religious language and its symbols. In order to gain support for the military campaigns under the guise of religion, several Islamic names and symbols, including the term Al-Anfal and the names of some military offensives, were adopted in the war against the Kurdish areas. This included a broad change in
the names of schools, streets, towns, complexes and cities from Kurdish to Arabic/Islamic names, and this was considered to be part of the BP’s religious policy against the Kurdish existence. Thus, relying on sectarianism and religious mobilisation as a weapon, this led to a lack of inter-dependency and inter-relationships between components, and this could be a major reason for the decline of the state’s legitimacy.

10.2.4 The fourth research question

The fourth question is based on the civilising process, and asks: was pan-Arabic nationalism, including the Baathist ideology, a consequence of the nation building that led to the process of genocide? The emergence of the BP as a new era in the history of Iraq meant the continuation of the policy of Arabisation against non-Arabs, and Arabising the state institutions more accurately and more aggressively. Hence, all the mechanisms of the civilising process were turned into the de-civilising process. The signs of the de-civilising process in Iraq under the leadership of the BP have been addressed often, particularly the BP’s relationship with the non-Arabs in Iraq. The main Baath ideology, displayed from different angles, includes Arab-centrism as the first ethnic structure of self-image. This self-image appeared in the phrase “one Arab Nation with an eternal message”. This motto is defined in the institution of the BASP as “the Arab Resurrection Socialist Party, a popular national revolutionary movement striving for Arab unity, freedom and socialism” (the institution context, 1947). Thus, the motto refers to the Arabs as a nation- one that owns an eternal message. According to this motto and all the articles of the Baath’s institution, there is no autonomous space for non-Arabs in Iraq, as it is the eastern gate of the Arab homeland.

Michel Aflaq and other Baathists have interpreted the eternal message in different ways and forms. According to Gordon Torr, the idea was derived from German philosophy, as he argues, “Aflaq historical studies and his acquaintanceship with 19th-century German philosophy are brought out in the program’s section on the “immortal mission” of the Arab Nation” (G. Torr, 1969:447). Thus, there is more than an indication that Baathism developed its theory based on the ideas of the Nazis. Additionally, Gordon Torr continues with the argument that the Baath ideas were influenced by German philosophy, as he confirms that “Although ‘Aflaq and Bitar
emphasize the “uniqueness” of the Baathist message, the influence of Western concepts is found throughout their teaching” (G. Torr, 1969:447).

Moreover, various issues of culture in the Baath’s ideology, particularly regarding the non-Arabs according to the Baath’s view, cannot be ignored. The only social tie for Baathists is Arabism- not citizenship, and the ‘others’ had to be assimilated, as the BP’s constitution states: “it will guarantee their fusion in the crucible of a single nationality” (BP constitution, 1959:198). However, the Kurdish struggle for Baathists was always the subject of concern, therefore they utilised a different kind of discourses to tame the Kurds. In this regard, Aflaq has described the Kurdish existence in Iraq as a racial minority, as he stated, “Let us take a racial minority such as the Kurds, for example; we ask why the Kurds or some of them are afraid from the Arabism ‘Orouba’” (Aflaq, B1, 1987:181). Aflaq here is simplifying the inter-relations between Kurds and Arabs and wonders why the Kurds are afraid of the Arab culture. This contradiction is an expression of the dominant mentality, as they denied the recognition of the rights of the Kurds to have an autonomous existence. Thus, Aflaq here is admitting that fear is the essence of the inter-relationship between both groups, which, as has been explained, is a genocidal relationship.

Thus, as the process of genocide was a product of pan-Arabic nationalism, including the Baath’s ideology, the process of Iraqi nation building facilitated suitable ground for the emergence and spread of pan-Arabo-centric nationalism in Iraq, which led to the process of genocide. It has been explained that Iraq as a country was created under specific circumstances under the surveillance of colonialism. The inter-relationship between all components of the new state of Iraq was unbalanced from the beginning. This is because the authority had been handed to a minority with its specific desire to build a judicial nation state. Thus, a nation state, as Elias has described it, where in the “free use of the military weapons is denied to the individual and reserved to a central authority” (Elias, 1999:268). The dilemma in this case is that the state with all its authority, including the military weapons, has been handed to a minority, and the rest of the population has been marginalised. Thus, from the beginning we face a serious problem of legitimacy, and the oppressed groups will not surrender to the dominant authority, particularly when the policy of the new state is based on an ethno-sectarian-centric ideology. In this regard, James Dobbin argues, “Nation building in Iraq faces a number of challenges. Iraq has no tradition of
pluralist democracy; politics has always been about authoritarian rule and the settlement of disputes by force” (Dobbins, James, 2003:169). Here, in the case of Iraq, as long as the state was losing its emotional control, the dominant authority instead of developing the interdependency chains and building a balanced inter-relationship, developed a policy of ethno-sectarian-centrism and moved towards authoritarian rule.

In addition, regarding the process of nation building in Iraq, when we study the power relations, we realise a kind of a convulsive psychological attitude was dominating Iraqi Arab politicians. This means that the delegators of the power resources still did not leave their tribal attitude and culture in the form of ethno-Arabic centrism. Therefore, the creation of an imaginary internal or external enemy always existed. This is because as long as the state is weak, the ideas of the imagined enemy become stronger and start to appear in the nationalist discourses. Thus, after four or five decades, particularly after World War II and the establishment of Israel, Iraq and the other Arabic countries, they drowned in their ultra-nationalist ideology, as Barrett points out, “By 1939, Syria and Iraq had become hot-beds of Arab nationalist sentiment” (Barrett, R.C., 2015:31). This is an indication that the ultra-nationalist ideology accompanied the crisis of the country, and the apparent cause was the internal or external enemy. Therefore, in the case of Iraq, after the military coup in 1958, which caused the overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy, during the following five years two armed militias were established outside of the national army. The first one belonged to the Iraqi Communist party, which was close to the new authority of the military coup of Abdulkarim Qasim, but it was annulled after one year. The second militia, which belonged to the Baathists and was established in 1963, and is the “Nationalist guards”, and these ‘guards’ perpetrated several atrocities. These consequences could be considered a dynamic result of the state failing, which led to the genocide process.

Thus, regarding these atrocities, for the establishment of ethno-Arab-centrism in an attempt to Arabise Iraq, a series of procedures were applied to begin the process of genocide. In this context, the BP began adopting violence in order to execute its philosophy. This stage could be thought of as the beginning of the de-civilising process. Therefore, when the Baathists assumed power in 1963, they launched the first task of violence by creating paramilitaries in order to fortify their authority. In this regard, for the first time, they utilised the legitimacy of the state institutions to
build a national guard under Article-(2) of the Act. From this situation, it can be understood that Baathists were bent on imposing their philosophy by force, as they propagated it openly through their rhetoric and discussions. Henceforth, it is clear that the National Guard was an instrument used to further Arabisation in the form of protecting the Arab presence in Iraq.

10.2.5 General overview of the research questions

Principally, the Baath Party, through its discourse from 1968 and onwards, was working in two directions: On the one hand, to transform the state into a protectorate of its dominance, and on the other hand, to militarise society through the creation of enemies in order for it to find its feet and strengthen its population. This kind of discourse succeeded in transforming the state into an instrument against non-Arabs in Iraq, and the non-Arabs were targeted as enemies of the Arabs and the state of Iraq.

Thus, it can be concluded that the Baath’s struggle to build a nation paved the way to legitimising the extermination of its enemies through different methods. This attempt initiated the establishment of several armed militias outside the national army, and their names are mentioned in Chapter Five. This phenomenon caused several atrocities and at the very least the process of genocide, which has been carefully analysed in the documentary parts of Chapter Six and Chapter Seven, as well as the experimental work of Chapter Eight and Chapter Nine.

In more detail, the framework of the Baath’s ideology of the national ideal is mentioned throughout the policy of ‘the country is part of the Arab homeland’, which is contained in the Iraqi constitution. The BP developed the idea of disintegration through the pathway of purging the country from all those who did not have loyalty to the regime’s policy. These policies were dependent on some pillars that the BP pursued. One of these pillars, which has been studied carefully, is violence. Thus, dependent on “the development of the monopoly over the means of violence by a centralised state authority”, (Fletcher, 1997:32), the BP was struggling to seize power, regardless of the method used to access that power, in order to implement its policy. Therefore, the BP, during its rule from 1968 to 1988, established several armed militias outside the national army. These armed militias were used everywhere, as a hammer against the Iraqi people, particularly against the Kurds.
The Baathists, in order to subjugate the Kurds, pursued a prejudiced policy. One of these methods was the partition of the Kurds (Divide and Rule); therefore, the process of domination was ongoing during the BP’s power until April 2003. The first Kurdish group that was targeted from the first day of taking power, was the Faili Kurds, as Preti Taneja has determined: “Under the Ba’ath regime, they (Faili Kurds) were specifically targeted and killed, or stripped of their Iraqi citizenship, under suspicion of having links with Iran, traditionally considered an enemy by Iraq” (Taneja, 2011:8).

The Faili Kurds were dramatically targeted for ethnic, sectarian, political and economic reasons. The majority of them were expelled twice, in 1970 and 1980, to Iran, and many of them, particularly Faili youths, disappeared.

Coinciding with what happened to the Faili Kurds, all Kurdish components, including all cities, towns and villages, were under threat of the Baath’s authority. During the years of the 70’s and 80’s, thousands of Kurdish rural areas were evacuated and destroyed. The population was transferred to south Iraq, or was gathered in forced complexes. This kind of transformation is confined to the framework of the civilising offensive. The civilising offensive is a theoretical framework that has been derived from Elias’s work. Ryan Powell describes it as follows:

“The term ‘civilising offensive’ is used by Dutch sociologists and historians to refer to a wide range of phenomena, from nineteenth-century bourgeois efforts to elevate the lower classes out of their poverty and ignorance and convince them of the importance of domesticity and a life of virtue, to the oppression of popular culture in early modern times and, in general, “the attack on behaviour presumed to be immoral or uncivilised” (Powell, R., 2013 from Verrips 1987: 3).

Additionally, if any community is forced to move to a different place other than their own, under any kind of circumstances, it is considered a civilising offensive. This kind of deportation was imposed upon the Kurdish rural population who were forced into complexes. In this regard, Human Rights Watch, in its study, argues:

“In their propaganda, the Iraqis commonly refer to them as “modern villages”; in this report, they are generally described as “complexes” (HRW/Middle East, 1995:22).
In addition to this kind of displacement of the Kurds, the Kurdish suffering from the Iraqi authority's policies continued. Several other atrocities against the Kurds were committed, including due to the impact of the Iran-Iraq war between 1979 and 1980; the second mass deportation of the Faili Kurds in 1980; the gendercide of Barzani men in 1983, and so on which have been explained in Chapter Six, along with the case of Halabja and the Anfal Campaigns.

In Chapter Seven, the AC has been approached independently. The name Anfal Campaigns carries in its essence several dimensions, and these have been explained. Terminologically, this name was chosen very carefully and was very effective. Primarily, the BP, based on figurational sociology, has always been inspired by its past. It connects the past with the present, mobilising its religious and cultural dimensions as instruments for the purpose of its ideology. AC in its meaning sends a dangerous message to the targeted people that they are considered non-believers, traitors and spoils of war. This assisted with the tasks of dehumanisation and inherent humiliation. In this chapter, along with the religious interpretation, the term Anfal, and the mood of the Iran-Iraq war and its direct effect on the Kurds, have been explained. Thus, there is no causal relationship between the AC and the Iran-Iraq war, as Stuart Adam Miller in his book ‘Iraqi Kurds: Road to genocide’ has argued: “After eight years of fighting, the Iran-Iraq War had finally come to a halt, but the fight continued for the Kurds” (Miller, S., 2014:60).

Furthermore, the stages of the AC, primarily from its preparation, which involved legalisation, identification, the census of the population, the advent of prohibited areas and the issue of Resolution Nr. 4008 of the campaigns, were determined. The second stage, as it was implemented, was the concentration camps. Thus, according to Raul Hilberg, the deportation (or seizure) and concentration camps are the fourth stage of the procedure in order to annihilate an out-group. Additionally, the whole process was with the intention of the de-Kurdification of the region, which is how it appears in the General Assembly Resolution 961: ‘Genocide is “a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups” (Smith, R., 2013:228). In addition to examining the stages of the AC, the phases of its implementation throughout eight campaigns, and how those people were annihilated, has been analysed. Finally, the characteristics of the AC have been determined.

The second part of the empirical work is the interviews with different participants, made up of Kurds and Arabs from different ideological backgrounds,
including both innocent people or those who were active in opposition in an organisation, as well as those who were active members of the BP. Here, some of the main points from the interviews, with regard to looking for answers to the causes of genocide in Iraq, will be mentioned.

If we concentrate on the answers of participants, primarily, there is a kind of difference between the Kurdish participants and the Arab participants. The Kurdish participants unanimously accused the Iraqi authority of prejudice and bias towards the Kurds. They stated that there was national racism on both an official and a popular level, including the personation of the policy of Arabisation. Here is one example of the Kurdish participants, which illustrates these three points:

“The process of nation building or the process of a nation under the name of the Iraqi nation has completely failed. Primarily, what King Faisal and his followers were struggling for continued when the Arab nationalist movement in Iraq, in the form of its fascist and Nazi organisation, modelled on 1930s Germany, emerged. As a result, the non-Arabs’ reaction led to greater affiliation with their language and ethnic culture. This kind of state policy compelled the Kurds to hate the country that had become a big prison for them and full of suffering” (Kadir, academic, age 64).

The dilemma is that around 30 years after the AC, some Arab participants, who were also Baathists, still do not believe that these atrocities occurred, and their view is totally in contradiction to what the Kurdish participants believe.

Additionally, it is imperative to examine the root causes of genocide in the Iraqi domain by concentrating on the spirit of the age, as well as the ideology of the BP from numerous interviewees. The first indication of the formation of the state is its formation and then its deformation. The interviewees emphasised how the Arab ultra nationalist behaviour with the Kurds was standard prior to the BP’s rule. It changed after the BP came to power, as the coup was ineffective in destabilising the nation state process, and the non-Arabs were the ultimate victims of the power struggle. However, despite the failure of the state institutions, Arab-centrism was the focal point of Arab ideology, which could be termed an elitist ideology.

Apart from the issue of Mosul, which was fundamentally Arabised, the arrival of the BP instigated the obliteration of any hopes of non-violent existence between the Iraqi elements, mainly the Kurdish population. The participants described their
recollections of the BP, and these have simply confirmed that the conduct of the BP towards non-Arabic groups was similar to the racism recorded in German schools, as largely discriminatory practices were perpetrated on the non-Arabs. These processes consisted of redrafting the history books, and the philosophy of union and power, in addition to the role played by religion and the failure of the state institutions. Apart from that, the alteration of citizens’ nationality in an attempt to Arabise the remainder of the Kurdish population was also undertaken.

The latter theme of this chapter concentrates on the dynamics through which the BP increased its power, and the steps it took to establish its totalitarian authority, as this is an integral component of Baath ideology. There existed various visions regarding Iraq as a nation; entire members were cohesive about BP, except those known as diehard members. One of the significant points concerning the Iraqi authority during the tenure of the BP is its alarming legitimacy. Under such conditions, chiefly when an administration seizes power through an overthrow, it dismantles the society as well as its organisations. This kind of disability led to a lack of inter-dependency chains and inter-relationships, which benefits a totalitarian rule and unilateral domination. In contrast, according to one of the participants, in democratic circumstances, genocide is not a requirement and is not considered an option. It can be reasonably assumed that the Kurds were an easy target for the BP, since it was vulnerable to its own ultra nationalist ideology, and it spread propaganda against the Kurds to further its agenda. Therefore, due to these reasons, the grounds for genocide became possible for Baathists.

10.3 Research Contributions

Discussing and justifying this research’s contribution forms the main aim of this section. The main contributions of this study involve three key areas of work: First, the contribution towards revealing the implementation of the essence of the civilising process; second, the contribution to research on the BP literature, and third the contribution to the research regarding the causes of the genocide process, in particular in Iraq.
10.3.1 The contribution to relevant literature

Adding to the knowledge in relation to the essence of the civilising process is the main contribution of this research. In the framework of the philosophy of the civilising process, the knowledge of the process of nation building in Iraq, and the position of the existing components within the state, have been analysed. In addition, the state institution’s relationship with its components on the one hand, and the levels of the inter-relationship between the components themselves on the other hand, and the interdependency chains, are necessary to discover the roots of genocide. In this regard, throughout the investigation of the governmental documents and historical literature, as well as the interviews, it has been revealed that Iraq has been built on the denial of the existence of the Kurds, who have been considered the outsiders or out-group. This denial, along with the rise of the BP’s power, has been systematised.

10.3.2 The contribution to the research on the BP’s literature

Within the literature on the BP’s ideology, governmental regulations and the admissions of the participants, particularly Baathists, Arabo-centrism in the framework of ethnocentrism as a new concept in the Arabic literature should find its place. It has been revealed in several ways that Sunni Arabs in Iraq, from the establishment of the state until the end, emphasised the denial of the rights of the Kurds through the policy of Arabisation. The roots of the policy of Arabisation include religious motivations, whether by utilising religion, or believing in it as part of their history, and as a way of assisting the march towards the ‘Arab renaissance.’

10.3.3 The contribution to the research on the causes of the genocide process

In order to build a pure Arabic nation state, along with excluding non-Arabs from power, the state authority insisted on denial and marginalisation. The evolving of traditional Arabo-centrism against the Kurds, and the pursuit of the policy of Arabisation throughout the various decades of successive powers, especially during the period of Ba’athist rule, was all an indication that the state of Iraq under the BP’s authority, would commit massacres against the Kurdish people. Thus, it has been revealed that genocide in Iraq was not an accident, and it was not a consequence of the Iran-Iraq war. Hence, this means that the hegemony of the unilateral state, of the
political authority and the influential official and traditional Arabo-centrism, led to the genocide.

Moreover, all of this history of denial and prejudice towards the rights of an important component of the state should have been enough for the international community to intervene to prevent these massacres against the Kurds.

10.4 Limitations of the Research

During the research journey and analyses, a lot of obstacles were found waiting for me. Choosing a subject like this in Iraq has its own huge complications and risks. This is because a crime as significant as genocide will result in limitations and difficulties, as long as there is a direct or indirect intervention in collective or individual lives. These difficulties can be divided into the following two fields:

The first is the scarcity of the previous studies in the area of genocide in Iraq as a comprehensive process that includes the Anfal Campaigns. As far as I know, there have been no studies that highlight the causes of genocide in Iraq in relation to nation building and the BP’s ideology. Thus, this study, if not the first, will form one of the most comprehensive and important studies in this area of fieldwork on genocide in Iraq so far. Therefore, one of the problems that have been faced is the conceptualising of all the factors and their relationship with the process of the genocide of the Kurds in Iraq. This means that there are primary materials that had not been researched before and not placed within scientific fieldwork, despite their relationship to other related disciplines. Moreover, there is a lot of information, regulations and data related to this area, but all of this information is scattered and in the hands of multiple people in different places. There is no special archive in this area in any of the related ministries, especially the Ministry of Martyrs and Anfal affairs in KRG, nor in public libraries- it is rare. This situation complicates the mission of researchers attempting to gain access to adequate information, apart from some information that has been placed on the internet, or has been published in different non-academic books.

The second limitation is in relation to the methodology. Conducting sociological research on crimes that have taken place in Iraqi Kurdistan by the Iraqi security forces and some of their collaborators, has its difficulties, and perhaps dangerous consequences. For this reason, serious difficulties were faced in attempting
to find some participants who were involved with the BP or working for the BP’s authority. Although all communications were conducted with Arab residents in safe areas inside Iraqi Kurdistan or in Europe, they were afraid when they found out about the exact subject, and some were not ready to be involved in this kind of subject at all. Additionally, there are two samples of interviews conducted with two university lecturers, but they did not reveal any kind of information except for saying “I do not know”; however, even with the Arabs who were interviewed, I felt that they were attempting to evade some of the facts and information. On the other side, there was no way of travelling to the Arabic areas in central or south Iraq because of instability and security problems.

10.5 Direction for Future Research

There is a basis for a modest reading of all the factors, individually or collectively, towards the production of further research in the field of the state, authority, ideology, or identity in relation to the process of genocide. This research has emphasised the causes of genocide and has determined the nation state as the central problematic element; the essence of the models of the relationships between components, and the reasons behind the creation of conditions for the full conviction of the decision to carry out the final solution.

Thus, based on the macro elements, this research has focused on the origins of the creation of the country, which is an annexation of three provinces in ‘Vilayat’ including Mosul Vilayet with its Kurdish majority. Regarding the conduct involved in the civilising process, this issue requires more investigation separately from many aspects, including the genocidal ideology of the Ottoman Sultanate because of the Armenian genocide. Additionally, the influence of Sunnism as a factor in creating a mutual strategy for all Sunnis and its relation to the genocide of minorities, from the Armenian and Dersim genocide, to the process of de-Kurdification in Iraq, Syria and Turkey, requires further research.

Furthermore, while this thesis has focused on the origins of Arabic ethnocentrism through the emergence of the BP’s ideology and its military coups to seize power, there is considerable scope for the study of the problematic relationship between religion and Arab nationalism in general, and the BP in particular. Here, the
Arab nationalists were not able to get rid of the impact of religion, and this led to a lack of success in building a democratic secular state dominated by Arabs.

Another research avenue would be the policy on ethnocentrism. It was not possible to find any researchers who had studied Arabo-centrism independently, although many Arab authors have written about Euro-centrism, and one of them is the Marxist writer Samir Amin. Thus, Arabo-centrism, which is influential in Arab countries, has formed the notion of in-group and out-group in relation to non-Arabs. Under this ideology of Arabo-centrism, the policy of Arabisation started in Iraq in the early days of the successive Iraqi authorities. Hence, Arabisation is the most prominent element that has formed the relationship between Kurds and both the Arab population and their authority in Baghdad. Thus, it is essential to investigate Sunni Arabs’ opinions deeply and in more detail.

10.6 Concluding Remarks

While studying the formation of the Kingdom of Iraq, Sunnism with its twins of Uruba (Arabism), as a hidden element between the Ottomans and the new kingdom, suddenly dominated the political, economic and social reality in Iraq. This element has been revealed through the investigation of the integration of hundreds of Arab Sunni officers in the Iraqi Army, and as a consequence, an army mentality has dominated the power in Iraq. This kind of domination over the power in the country, led to various military coups during the successive governments; from the period of the Kingdom until the BP seized power through a bloody military coup. Thus, this research study has focused its attention on this issue as one of the most important dimensions in genocidal relations.

The research has also involved investigating the unilateral attempts of nation building in Iraq as part of the civilising and de-civilising process. Through this approach to the civilising process, an attempt has been made to examine the violent behaviour that occurred in Iraq. Thus, as has been illustrated in the third chapter, according to Elias’s interpretation, we are facing a changing society, and violence, as a phenomenon, has its causes and circumstances. Therefore, the violent behaviour was an element used to impose one style of nation building on Iraq through state genocide, because the inter-relations between the state and the Kurds had been built on the policy of assimilation and Arabisation.
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361


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A.1. Ethics Application

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY AND COMMUNICATIONS RESEARCH ETHICS CHECKLIST

If the ethics submission relates to staff research for which an application to an external funding agency will be/have been made, then please complete and submit the full University ethics submission form.

**Section I: Project Details**

1. Project title: *The causes of genocide against the Kurds in Iraq: a critical analysis of the Ba'ath Party’s ideology.*

**Section II: Applicant Details**

2. Name of researcher (applicant): Ibrahim Sadiq
3. Status (please circle): Undergrad Student/ Postgrad Student/ Staff
4. Discipline (please circle): Eco & Fin/His & Pol/Psy/ Anth/Soc & Com
5. Email address: ibrahim.sadiq@brunel.ac.uk / ibrahim.malazada@gmail.com
6. Telephone number: 07515891499

**Section III: For Students Only**

7. Module name and number: PhD in Social Research Methods
8. Brunel supervisor’s or module leader’s name: Dr. Peter Wilkin
9. Brunel supervisor’s email address: peter.wilkin@brunel.ac.uk

Supervisor: Please tick the appropriate boxes. The study should not begin until all boxes are ticked:

- The student states that he or she has read the Brunel University Code of Research Ethics.
- The topic merits further research.
- The student will possess the skills to carry out the research by the time that he or she starts any work which could affect the well-being of other people. He or she will be deemed to have acquired such skills on passing the relevant research skills module.
- The participant information sheet or leaflet is appropriate.
- The procedures for recruitment and obtaining informed consent are appropriate.

Please confirm the professional research ethics code that will guide the research (please circle):

ASA/BPS/BSA/Other (please state) __________

[Signature] __________________________ 19/01/2011

Supervisor’s signature __________________________ Date __________________________
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<td>1. Does the study involve participants who may be particularly vulnerable and/or unable to give informed consent, thus requiring the consent of parents or guardians? (e.g. children under the age of 16; people with certain learning disabilities)</td>
<td>☐</td>
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<td>2a. Will the study require the co-operation of a gatekeeper for initial access to the groups or individuals to be recruited?</td>
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<td>2b. If the answer to Question 2a is Yes, then will the study involve people who could be deemed in any way to be vulnerable by virtue of their status within particular institutional settings? (e.g. students at school; disabled people; members of a self-help group; residents of a nursing home, prison, or any other institution where individuals cannot come and go freely)</td>
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<td>4. Will the study involve discussion by or with respondents or interviewees of their own involvement in activities such as sexual behaviour or drug use, where they have not given prior consent to such discussion?</td>
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<td>5. Are drugs, placebos or other substances (e.g. food substances, vitamins) to be administered to the study participants or will the study involve invasive, intrusive or potentially harmful procedures of any kind?</td>
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<td>6. Will blood or tissue samples be obtained from participants?</td>
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<td>10. Will financial inducements (other than reasonable expenses and compensation for time) be offered to participants?</td>
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<td>11. Will the study involve recruitment of patients or staff through the NHS?</td>
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Give a brief description of participants and procedure (methods, tests used etc) in up to 150 words
To examine the process of genocide in Iraq, three main methods will be used: firstly: Primary sources including records, texts, material and visual artefacts and audio visual sources. Secondary sources will also be used such as monitoring the content of newspapers, magazines, TV programs, audio and video recordings and historical textbooks. The documents may sometimes include both primary and secondary documents. The recording of oral memory will include interviews and stories. The documentary sources are scrapbooks and newspapers.
Secondly: Interviews
Thirdly: Surveys

Name of Principal Investigator at Brunel University (please print): Ibrahim Sadiq

Signature of Principal Investigator at Brunel University:

E-Mail Address: ibrahim.sadiq@brunel.ac.uk

Date: 19.08.11

This request for expedited review has been:

1) Approved (no additional ethics form is necessary)
2) Declined (full University ethics form is necessary)

Signature of Departmental Research Ethics Officer: 

Date: 23 August 2011
**BLS CONSENT FORM**

The participant should complete the whole of this sheet

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<th>Please tick the appropriate box</th>
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Have you read the Research Participant Information Sheet? [ ]

Have you had an opportunity to ask questions and discuss this study? [ ]

Have you received satisfactory answers to all your questions? [ ]

Who have you spoken to? [ ]

Do you understand that you will not be referred to by name in any report concerning the study? [ ]

Do you understand that you are free to withdraw from the study:

- at any time? [ ]
- without having to give a reason for withdrawing? [ ]
- (where relevant, adapt if necessary) without affecting your future care? [ ]

(Where relevant) I agree to my interview being recorded. [ ]

(Where relevant) I agree to the use of non-attributable direct quotes when the study is written up or published. [ ]

Do you agree to take part in this study? [ ]

**Signature of Research Participant:**

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**Witness statement**

I am satisfied that the above-named has given informed consent.

**Witnessed by:**

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**Researcher name:**

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**Supervisor name:**

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A.3. Participant Information Sheet

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Nation Building and Genocide as Civilising and De-civilising process</th>
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<tr>
<td>A Critical Analysis</td>
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<td>For the Origins of Genocide from Arabization to the Final Solution</td>
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Contact details:
Principal researcher:  Ibrahim Sadiq  PhD Candidate  Sociology & Communications School of Social Sciences Brunel University, Uxbridge, Middlesex, UB8 3PH, GB Phone: +447515891499  Email: Ibrahim.sadiq@brunel.ac.uk

Primary supervisor:  Dr. Peter Wilkin  Reader  Sociology & Communications School of Social Sciences Brunel University, Uxbridge, Middlesex, UB8 3PH, GB Phone: +441895 267241  Email: peter.wilkin@brunel.ac.uk

Participant Information Sheet:
My name is Ibrahim Sadiq. I am a PhD student at Brunel University, London in the Department of Sociology & Communications. For my PhD, I am carrying out a research project on the Nation building and Genocide, Civilising and de-civilising process, a critical analysis for the origins of genocide and ACAs final solution.

For my research, I would like to interview you. The interview will last for approximately 60 minutes. It will be a discussion about the process of nation building in Iraq and the process of genocide of the Kurds in Iraq as an essential cause lead to genocide include other causes depend on micro and macro connection.

Participation in this research project is entirely voluntary. If you decide to participate, you may withdraw your participation at any point during the research without giving a reason. If you decide to withdraw your participation, any data that has not yet been anonymised (i.e. from which identifying details have not yet been removed) will be destroyed.

The interview will be recorded, to enable more accurate transcribing and analysis. The audio recording and handwritten notes from the interview will be kept in a secure
environment. To ensure that your interview answers are kept confidential and that your identity is not revealed, I will remove identifying material from the interview transcription. All audio files and any other potentially identifiable material will be kept in a secure environment that only I have access to.

This research project will eventually be submitted as a thesis (and will also form the basis for several conference papers and publications, including: articles and book chapters). If you would like to receive a summary of the completed research project (due for completion before October 2013),

Please email me at anytime with either your email or postal address. If you have any questions about this research project, please feel free to contact me. You may also contact my primary supervisor, Dr Peter Wilkin.

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B.1. Interview (English)

Brunel University London

Questions for interviews

NATION BUILDING AND GENOCIDE AS A CIVILISING AND DE-CIVILISING PROCESS:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
OF THE CAUSES OF GENOCIDE OF THE KURDS IN IRAQ
Between 1968-1988

Ibrahim Sadiq

Supervisor: Peter Wilkin

There are a variety of points of views between Kurds and Arabs generally, therefore it is important for this thesis to reach the truth by carrying out interviews.

Here, we would draw your attention to these points:

First: you have the right to answer or not answer any question you like or dislike.

Second: you have the right not to disclose your name, and you can use any name you like. There is no need to give out personal information, and if you consider any question to be personal, you can pass over it and refer to it as personal.

Third: the researcher will ensure that neither your name nor any other piece of information related to your privacy will be disclosed.

Fourth: all information contained herein is for research purposes only.

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1. What is your age and location?

2. Did you live under the BP authority? This question depends on the position of the person in the previous Iraqi government or opposition; for example:
   a. Part of the Baath authority
   b. Member of the BP
   c. Member of the opposition
   d. Normal person and far from politics

3. Concerning the assumption that Iraq, from the beginning of its formation, was suffering from instability as a nation state, what is your opinion about the crises of instability and of the Iraqi state generally?
4. The BP had a specific view of nation building. In your opinion, did they want to build:
   a. A purely Arab racial nation
   b. A purely Arab cultural nation (according to Baath’s mottos)?
   c. Or a state for all Iraqis without any exceptions and with a neutral identity?

5. Do you think that the BP had the motto of building an Arab nation and considered Iraq to be part of this nation? If you believe in this hypothesis, do you think this is one of the causes of the failing of Iraqi nation building, in that they wanted to build a one sided nation which means the isolation of all other non-Arab components?

6. There are some who believe that the Kurdish movement was an obstacle to Iraqi nation building; are there still many Arabs making this assumption? Do you consider this to be a cause or are there other reasons?

7. Do you consider that the failure of the nation state in Iraq was a reason for the hypothesis behind the genocide campaigns against the Kurds, if you believe in the occurrence of these campaigns?

8. Do you think that the BP has used the Iraqi state with all its instruments, in that it owns the means of violence for the purposes of ideology and nationalism?

9. Do you believe the events of the genocide campaigns against the Faili Kurds, Barzani tribe, ACand the policy of Arabisation and deportation, led by the BP, was genocide? Specifically, the Iraqi Supreme Court issued its judgment as genocide: What is your opinion on this?

10. If you consider that these campaigns were genocide, in your opinion, what are the causes behind the Iraqi government, led by the BP since 1988, resorting to genocide against the Kurdish people?
11. According to many documents, and as is known from the Iraqi state’s history, the formation of the Kingdom of Iraq occurred in 1920 from two different provinces, Baghdad and Basra, belonging to the Ottoman Empire. Then, Mosul province with its Kurdish majority population was annexed to the new Kingdom of Iraq in 1926, six years after the formation of the state of Iraq. According to these documents, the Kurds and Arabs, administratively and regionally, as well as according to other variations such as language, origin and history were different from the beginning. In your opinion, what have been the effects of the annexation of Mosul province to Arabic Iraq? Or do you think it is just a story and not true?

   a. The majority of the Kurds think that the formation of the state of Iraq was in the interests of the Arab component, and that Mosul province was annexed to Iraq in accordance with the demand of the Iraqi King Faisal from the British consul to create a Shi’a-Sunni balance in the Iraqi parliament? What is your opinion?

   b. Do you think this sort of formation of an Iraqi state motivated Iraqi Arab politicians and members of the BP to evacuate Iraq from the Kurds in terms of their presence and will, in order to build a purely Arab cultural state? Is this because of the fear of the dismantling of Iraq once again and its dis-integration. The effort has been to save Iraq as united country and as part of the Arab nation forever. Do you think this is the main reason for insisting on the unity of Iraq as an Arab state?

   c. Do you think that the Kurds were the only obstacles and dangerous to the unity of Iraq?

12. Do you think that there were economical causes for annexing Mosul province to Iraq?

13. Do you think that the economy was one of the causes behind the process of genocide?

14. If you believe that Kurds are different from Arabs, and if you believe in the assumption that the BP is attempting to save the unity of Iraq, its pure Arabic identity and to remain it as part of the Arab nation:
a. In your view, was this situation enough to provoke the Kurds and push them to the outside?
b. Or do you blame the Kurds for this provocation and accuse them of disobedience?

15. If you believe the BP seized power through a military coup and far from the democratic process:
   a. Do you consider this coup and the previous coups as the reasons for the failed Iraqi state?
   b. If you believe that there was no democracy, do you consider this to be a reason behind the Anfal campaigns, if you believe in the process of genocide?

16. The BP was following Arab nationalistic ideology
   a. In your view, what were the most important pillars of the BP’s ideology?
   b. Do you thing that this ideology was one of the main reasons for the political division and then the conflict between the Kurds and Arabs?
   c. Do you think that the BP’s ideology was to carry the images of hate and hostility against the non-Arabs, specifically the Kurds?
   d. Do you believe in the assumption of the policy of deportation and Arabisation? For example, the deportation of tens of thousands of Kurds from their homes, and the resettlement of the Arabs in their homes, or the deportation of hundreds of thousands of Kurdish villagers along the Iraqi borders with Iran and Turkey and coercive camps, or to central or south Iraq, or do you not believe in all this?
   e. Do you think that the Kurds were an obstacle in the way of the Arabs achieving their national goals in Iraq, and therefore the Kurds were exposed to genocide?

17. In your view (if you believe in the process of genocide) what were the most important steps taken by the BP to complete the process of genocide?
18. According to your experience of living under the hegemony of the BP, do you remember any events, even theoretically or practically, that took place against the Kurds?

19. Was the reaction of the security forces to the opposition’s activity equal in response? For example, according to most of the Kurds, when someone joined the Kurdish Peshmarga, their family, even third and fourth generation grandfathers or children and sometimes their friends, were arrested to impose pressure on the Peshmerga to surrender and to give up their arms. In terms of any military operations, the street with its buildings and shops, became the area of a military operation against the security forces and were destroyed entirely. Do you believe that the BP were behaving similarly with the Sunni Arabs if one of them was against the regime?

20. If you believe in the process of genocide, including the Anfal campaigns; in your opinion, what were the reasons for the silence of most governmental officials and civil societies from Arab and Islamic countries, and more specifically, why were there were no interventions from the Arab league and the World Muslim Congress (WMC)? Why did this silence occur in your view?

21. Do you have any other additional comments?

Thank you for your participation

B.2. Interview (Kurdish)
پژوهشیکی رهگیری‌اموزه با هولکارکی چین‌سایسی کورد عراق له 1990

بر له دستیکی پرسارکان دموعیت سرمینان بو دوو خال رایش:

۱. منفی نمانتان همه هر دیمارکان بناپبود ولام بدینه، یان ولام ندعموه
۲. دژنون ناوی خوانان تخوس، یا هر ناولک حزنان لیستک یونس. جگه لکوش پوپست ناکات هیچ زانایی‌کیکی نایب‌بند. نگامر زاناییک هر پرسارکیک نایب‌بند، دژنون نازاری یبین رکک و ولام ندعموه.
۳. توزویر پابندوه بهوی که ناو و هیچ زانایی‌کیکیکی نایب‌بند به پرپس نیوه پاو نکامیومه.
۴. هموو نامه زانایی‌پانیک که ایرداد، نایب‌بند به توپیلبیمیه.

واکم: نیا دهنکی نمخته و دوکنی دانشتننین پین باینیت؟
دودوم: نیای تلار دستعلیسی باعسی عرایعی سوسیالیتیا زاین بردوثه سمر؟ لیکمیوه نتاکی?
سیسه: بیرای تو نخوی حکومتی باعس هدجسی دا یبرپی‌بایمی حیزسی باعس، چین‌سایسی بو، چه دانگی با،
باین ناناهکیکی عراق بیراری لسم داوه؟
چوارم: بنشکنی: نگمگ واینیت، بیرای تو نامه هولکارکی چی بوون که حکومتی عراق پنای برده بیر
چین‌سایسی بو لحافبردنی کورد لهچارچویی پرسریکی دریز‌خایه؟
پینهم: حیزسی باعس نیروی‌تینیکی نایب‌بند بو دویبول نخووه، گامی عرایفیشی وکو بخشک له
نخووه عرب‌ب تکانیاریه دمکر کب، بکلبیشسر سپارن به پرسارکی بیناکردنی عراق. بیرای نامان
دی‌بناتیک نامجعیکی عربی‌ب رگنر خانون با نامی پیکی خاوهی کونجولیکی عربی‌ب توکمه بینا بکنی?
شامنی: زورک له زانایی بدین وایه بیناکردی نخووهی عراق فشلی‌هینا. نیروی‌تنیکی تو سپارت به
برسپ‌چه بیراسی بیرای بیناکردنی نخووه له عراق فشلی‌هینا؟ نگمگ ولانامکه به پسی باین
پوز؟

جمه‌تم: بیرای بیناکردنی دویبول نخووه عرب‌ب له عراق سپارنه‌ا بیاه نخووه هیچ چین‌سایسی
لکشوم‌ی بیناکردنی کورد؟

هشمک: پینها وایه بیناکردنی ستنازی‌زیری بوپونیت له عراق؟ لشلایش نافع‌یکی بیرای یب پناکوکون و
سپارنیکی سیسیانکی عرایعی؟

نویم: پینها وایه کورم و پرورونیشکی‌بیربی‌تینیکی زور توند بیورن لهب‌می‌بیناکردنی دویبول له عراق،
ومکو نامه عربی‌بکان باسی دکچن؟

398
دبیرم: یبت وایه فضه‌هایی بین‌کردنی دوم‌الحکم، نعم‌روه و علایق‌ی بیکر بینه و هورکامکی اندامی کورد، یک
نمونه; شالاکانی نخال؟

با همد: بهبهچنی‌های دومنوئی قانونی دزدی، هرورکامک نوره و علایق‌ی بهبودی آگاهی جواز بون و سرور به سالم‌پروری‌های علوم‌سیاسی برون. نماه، نوره علایق در میانه، و پلتاهی موسیقی به علایق‌ی لکی شاه، به‌وبه نوره دومنوئی قانونی کورد و علی‌مردان هر کاکو کور، نازنین بون و پلتاهی موسیقی به علایق

علی‌مردان چ این‌گروه‌کان، و پر جوزه دسته‌نامی علایق‌ی نوره موسیقی در دسته گیره

١. نامی نامه‌ی کویر، نویسدگی نامه، بی‌مفتاح، به‌تاریخ، هرورکامک نوره و نسخه سیاسی

سونه علایق‌کان و نشنالی‌می به نص، علایق یکنما بلکه نگه‌بانه و نوره پرچم‌ی نامه‌ی اسلامی که پیپ دین

پرچم‌های قر، نویسنده بون و ناپاره؟

٢. نامی نیاین نیاپوری، هیچ‌رلیک یکه چ دروم‌پری؟

دوه‌زوره: هرورکامک ناشکاری‌که رگ‌گزی کورد جیاکه، نوره، علی‌مردان

۱. به‌نوره تو نام‌ی جیازی، هرورکامک نویسندگی، و دروست‌نامه نوره، هم‌مردان مسلم‌نام دوور و

۲. درزه‌ی توخی نامه، نوره، رگ‌گزی؟

۳. به‌نوره تو سیاسی، علایق‌کان و سرحانی، بخش‌ی پیشگان پی‌کوره، نمایش‌گاه‌های کودکه

۴. رگ‌گزی‌ی جواز بون و نوره، گرداگرد، نزدیک، نوره، نوره، نوره، نوره، نوره، نوره، نوره، نوره، نوره، نوره، نوره، نوره، نوره

۵. به‌نوره تو بخش کاری، نوره، ناپاره، نوره

سپس‌در: نامه‌ی ناشکاری‌که به‌خانی‌ی بخش‌ی کوره‌گان، کوره‌گان، هزینه‌های سر حومه، نوره، نوره، دوی، موسیقی‌دان، لاهکی‌ان و عارض‌ی‌ان، نازنین، نازنین، نازنین، نازنین، نازنین، نازنین، نازنین

۱. به‌نوره تو دوکریت، نامه‌ی کورنی‌های به‌هورکامک، نزدیک‌ان و نامه، موسیقی‌ی علایق

۲. به‌هی‌پردازی‌های بخش‌ی مهم‌های، معروف‌های، نوره، نوره، نوره، نوره، نوره، نوره

۳. نزدیک‌ی دوی‌دنی‌ی نازنین‌کار، هرورکامک نویسندگی، نازنین‌کار بون و

۴. سر‌هادی‌کان، موسیقی‌دان، نوره و نوره؟

۵. به‌نوره تو کوره‌گان، نامه‌ی تاریخ‌نامه‌ی کورنی‌های کوره‌گان، نوره، نوره، نازنین، نازنین، نازنین

۶. نازنین‌کار، نوره، نازنین‌کار، نوره، نازنین‌کار، نوره، نازنین‌کار، نوره، نازنین‌کار، نوره، نازنین‌کار، نوره، نازنین‌کار، نوره

۷. به‌نوره تو کوره‌گان، نامه‌ی تاریخ‌نامه‌ی کورنی‌های کوره‌گان، نوره، نوره، نازنین، نازنین، نازنین

۸. نازنین‌کار، نوره، نازنین‌کار، نوره، نازنین‌کار، نوره، نازنین‌کار، نوره، نازنین‌کار، نوره، نازنین‌کار، نوره

۹. به‌نوره تو کوره‌گان، نامه‌ی تاریخ‌نامه‌ی کورنی‌های کوره‌گان، نوره، نوره، نازنین، نازنین، نازنین

۱۰. نازنین‌کار، نوره، نازنین‌کار، نوره، نازنین‌کار، نوره، نازنین‌کار، نوره، نازنین‌کار، نوره، نازنین‌کار، نوره
چوادم: لغوازونیتی تو دستوردادنی درمکی چ رژیکی هیه می پرسیسی جینامیده ب نسیمیکی پژوهشی

یا نیمختی؟

نا نجمیع عراق نطور لنام و ویوود هاکاره یو سرکورتنمی وی پرسیسی یا وخدی

نامنهکه بیوه هوکارهکه وی نامدو پرسیسیه بیو دوام هوکارهکه نیت؟

نا نامخندبیونی یا هاکاری خردن درآویکاک و کومشکانی نوویقوینیکه لی نجمی عراق

نطور دکترینک ووک فاکتارتیک نامشنا بیرکت لمرسی جینامید؟

رژی نجمی عراقه و بلوک خربه و چورسنا تو بهیه کد بیونه؟

تоворی ندیئئوزیا

پازد: همروهمو همومان دنیایننه که حیزی بحص هلمگری نادیئئوزیایی نامیتازی عربی بیوه؟

1. بیاری تو گرگئگین تو نشکانیکی ندیئئوزیایی عربی چی بیوه؟
2. نا دکترینک ووک هاکاری عربیکی نمایشی نام او ندیئئوزیایی بیرکت بیو دستیوینی
3. ممکنی نینی کورد و پینکهایی عربی؟ نا دکترینک ندیئئوزیا ووک هاکاریکه بیو
4. جینامیده نامشنا بیرکتی؟
5. بیاری تو نا نیک کارانکتیکی نامشیه لی ندیئئوزیایی backward لتخاسی عربی عربی
6. چیه؟
7. بیاری تو نا نیک دزیر و دیوی نه که عراق لنحرا کورد؟
8. بیاری تو نا نیکهای یک کورد ریگر بیو لمرسیبی دنیایی که عربیکن نامشی جینامیده
9. تو نامهگنیکننامان بحص بین، نیما یووسیرو نخکان کردن بیوه؟
10. حادیها استهکه ویه همومان دنیایی سیستمیکهکتی تحریل و تعیین و
11. تعریف، که حیزی بحص لنحرا گیلی کورد پریبری نی دنکرد؟ بیهپی بیو سیاست
12. دیوان هزار کورد لن نئویی کردنیهکانی سر نوویро عربی مشین هننی ناته کردیکن و
13. ویهشتیکهکنی عربی لن شونیدنی. بیا نئولیکنی کردنیکه لن نئویی گلینشکتیکه نی
14. تورودی یاربیکهکان دینیه سیتویی لانیکنی، بیا نئولیکن درویی نئویی
15. نهایتی تهیهکی عراق ندنام شیتی کورد ووک بیرآبیکی کی نامشنا پیگمتهه نامشنا
16. بیرکت بیو فننی ناری و پیشکوتو نری جینامیده؟

شازد: بیاری تو گرگئگین نام همکارته چیوینی یو سرکورتنمی پرپرسی جینامیده؟

همکاره لن نامزونی تن، وک که کامیکه که دسته‌ای بحص بینیو، ق شیگی گرگن یا چ رودوآکی
1. نرستنیت دن نبر نامدو نامدو تویری و پرپارکیکه لثم راک کوره لن عراقا به لن بیوی
2. کوردنکه؟
3. همکاره: بیاری تو گرگئگین بحص نئونشیه لن حوممی بینی، نیپ ویو همزمی نولی ندایوی به که بینیویکی
4. بین نامزی ویوندرین کورد ناکه لن؟ بیاری تو نامگامهونه پن راسته؟ بو یو نریاقه‌یچی چی بیوه لن بحص
5. نماینکه پیچریکه بیاری؟
6. نزودم: دیزگا حکومته و نامگامهونه لن ولاته عربی و پیشامکاکی هیه کاردنآمیکیتی نووندن لن کاتی
7. شیلورهکان نظربری‌کهادا، رابیاپی نری، هیه و ولاته مکه لن لاخاین جناتی ولاته عربی و کوئری
8. ولاته نسیمیکیکه. بیاری تو یو نام بیدهگه رووی دا؟
بیست: نانا هیچ زیانیکت بزر کهتوه له حفظکانهو نا شالاومکای نفعل له نعمانی جینوساپی کوریدا؟

بیست و یک: نانا هیچ شتیکی دیکت همه بیلیت؟

سوسان
B.3. Interview (Arabie)

بناء الأمة والإبداء الجماعية كعملية الحضارة وعملية الاحضار

تحليل نفدي

لفرضية أسباب الإبداء الجماعية ضد الكورد في العراق بين 1963 و1991

للطالب إبراهيم صادق

جامعة برويلندن

أخي العزيز: الغرض من هذه المقابلات هو إكمال متطابقات دراسة الدكتوراه وتتبعي نوعية الموضوع، هناك وجهات نظر كوردية وعربية مختلفة، لن نريد الوصول إلى الحقيقة عن طريق هذه المقابلات التي أجريت وتجري مع الجانبين.

وأود أن أستعرض تناهك الكريم إلى (بعض النقاط):

أولا: لك الحق في أن تجيب أو لا تجيب عن أي سؤال تعجبك أو لا تعجبك.

ثانيا: لك الحق في استخدام اسم غير حقيق وـ عدم الكشف عن اسمك. لا حاجة لإعطاء المعلومات الشخصية، وكل سؤال تعبيه شخصيا باستطاعتك تركه والإشارة إليه بأن شخص.

ثالثا: البحث يعتمد على كشف عن اسمك وعن أي معلومة أخرى تتعلق ب حياتك الخاصة.

رابعا: كل المعلومات الواردة هنا تستخدم لغرض البحث فقط.

الأسئلة

1. كم عمرك من فضلك؟
2. هل عشت تحت سلطة حزب البعث؟ (أو حسب مكانتك الشخصية في الدولة أو المعارض).
   مثال: هل كنت جزءا من سلطة البعث أو منتميا أو معارض أو إنسانا بعيدا عن السياسة.
3. يراي الكثير من المحتلرين العراقيين من دياراً جنبًا إلى جنب من مぜر وباشاك شاها نائب الدولة.
   الأمي، في زمن رياض أتى تعداد أفراد العائلة في العراق بشكل عام؟
4. لجنب البعث وخصوصاً نائب الدولة الأمي، أتى أنت كانوا يريدون نائب
   أمغربة عربية خاصة؟
5. أو أمغربة عربية خاصة؟ (هل تعتقد بأن هذا ما تؤدي، شعارات البعث).
6. أو دولة للآرامين جميع من دون أستئناء ويهودية محايدة.
7. هل تأكد أن البعث رفع شعار بناء الأمة العربية، واعتبار العراق جزءا من هذه الأمة؟ إذا كنت تؤمن بهذه الفرضية، فهل هذا في رأيك يعتبر أحد أسباب فشل بناء الدولة العراقية التي أرادوا
   بناءها من جانب واحد، أي لإعداد جميع المكونات الأخرى غير العربية؟
8. هناك من يعتبر الحركة الكردية سبباً معوقاً لبناء الدولة في العراق. كيف يمكن أن يزال كثير من
   القوميين العرب يتش
'بناء الأمة والإبداء الجماعية كعملية الحضارة وعملية الاحضار

تحليل نفدي

لفرضية أسباب الإبداء الجماعية ضد الكورد في العراق بين 1963 و1991

للطالب إبراهيم صادق

جامعة برويلندن

أخي العزيز: الغرض من هذه المقابلات هو إكمال متطابقات دراسة الدكتوراه وتتبعي نوعية الموضوع، هناك وجهات نظر كوردية وعربية مختلفة، لن نريد الوصول إلى الحقيقة عن طريق هذه المقابلات التي أجريت وتجري مع الجانبين.

وأود أن أستعرض تناهك الكريم إلى (بعض النقاط):

أولا: لك الحق في أن تجيب أو لا تجيب عن أي سؤال تعجبك أو لا تعجبك.

ثانيا: لك الحق في استخدام اسم غير حقيق وـ عدم الكشف عن اسمك. لا حاجة لإعطاء المعلومات الشخصية، وكل سؤال تعبيه شخصيا باستطاعتك تركه والإشارة إليه بأن شخص.

ثالثا: البحث يعتمد على كشف عن اسمك وعن أي معلومة أخرى تتعلق ب حياتك الخاصة.

رابعا: كل المعلومات الواردة هنا تستخدم لغرض البحث فقط.

الأسئلة

1. كم عمرك من فضلك؟
2. هل عشت تحت سلطة حزب البعث؟ (أو حسب مكانتك الشخصية في الدولة أو المعارض).
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3. يراي الكثير من المحتلرين العراقيين من دياراً جنبًا إلى جنب من مżeر وباشاك شاها نائب الدولة.
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   القوميين العرب يتش
7. هل تعتبر نقل بيئة الأمان - الدولة في العراق سبباً فردياً في ظل ظروف الحماية التي تعرض لها
الكرد في العراق، في حال كنت تتبع بحوث تلك المفاعلات؟
8. هل تعتبر أن حركة البيئة استغل الدولة بكل مقوماتها، والتي تملك وسيلة العنف، لأغراض
أيديولوجية قومية؟
9. هل تعتبر بحوث حملات ضد الكرد الفيليين، وعشرة الدارادار، وحملات الألف والدكتور
التي قادها مسامع في العراق؟ خاصة وأن الحماطة العليا العراقية أصدرت حكمها حول حملات الألف والدكتور
أخرى مثل تلك التي كانت إحدى
جماعة. ما هو رأيك؟
10. إذا اعتبرت أن هذه الحملات جزء من الأزمة التي أدت إلى أن تجاوز
الحكومة العراقية حماية حركة البيئة منذ سنة 1988 إلى عمليات الانتفاضة الجماعية ضد الشعب
الكردي، بشكل طبيعي؟

11. حسب وثائق كثيرة، كما هو معروف أيضا في تاريخ الدولة العراقية، تشكل عراق
اليوم من ولايينين بغداد والبصرة، كانتا تابعتين للسلطة الإدارية عام 1920. ومن ثم الحاق
ولاية الموصل بالعراق سنة 1926 أي بعد 6 سنوات من تشكيل العراق. ويعود ذلك الوثائق،
فإن الكرد والعرب كانوا ياجين إداريا ومناطقيا للسلطة بشكل متفرد، أما إلى تبادلات
أخرى مثل اللغة والأدب والتاريخ. ما هو وقائع الحاكم والديا الموصل ذات الأثرية
الكردية، بالعراق العربي "الولايينيين الآخرين" في ذلك الوقت? أما أنك تعتقد أن هذه مجرد قصة
ولست صحيح؟

12. برأيك أكترية الكرد، كان تشكل دولة العراق في مصلحة المكمن العربي، والحق
ولاية الموصل تم طبظ من الملك فلما رفع إلى الحكومة البريطانية عن طريق
الفصل البريطاني في بغداد، لخلق نتائج سيئي في البرلمان العراقي؟ ما هو
رأيك بهذه الفرضية؟
13. هل تعتبر مثل هذا الدراية لتشكيل دولة العراق داعي لتهيئته السلطة الحساسين العرب وأعضاء
حركة البيئة لجعل العراق خلياما من مكون اسم الكرد Hindusي، من حيث يوجد أو
الإرادة، أي بناء دولة دينية أو دولة ذات ثقافة عربية? خوا من تلك الدولة
واعتها إلى حرقها الأولى، ولكن هذه العراق جزء من الدولة العربية إلى الأبد. ولذلك
كانوا دائما بحريون على هويات العراق وإرثيتها العربية.
14. وهل المعنى بخط الفرضية دائما في الكرد أتى خروج؟
15. برأيك، هل كان هناك أسباب اقتصادية لإرث ولاية الموصل؟
16. هل تعتبر أن هناك أسباب اقتصادية لهذا الحرمان، خصوصا لتشمل عمليات الإبادة
المجعمة ومن ضمنها عمليات الألف؟
17. إذا كنت تتمنى أن يكون الكردي مختلف عن المنفعة العربي، وإذا كنت تتعدى
بفرضية أن حركة البيئة كان يعمل من أجل أن تكون العراق دولة هوية عربية خالية، وجزء
من الدولة العربية.
18. أين يؤكد ذلك كافيا لا يستفز الكرد وباعتماده عن الدولة وممارستها?
19. أم أن الشعب الكردي كان يرام على هذا استفزاز وعدم إطاعة المركز؟
إذا كنت تعتقد بأن حرب البعث جاء إلى الحكم عن طريق القوى العسكرية ويعودا عن الآلية الديمقراطية المعروفة:

. هل تعتبر هذا الانقلاب والانفصال التي سبقته سابقاً في كل من الدولة العراقية؟
. إذا كنت تعتقد بعدم وجود ديمقراطية في العراق في ذلك الوقت، هل تعتبر ذلك سباً للجهة الدولة إلى عمليات الإبادة الجماعية، في حال كنت تعتقد أن تجربة هذه العمليات،

كما هو معروف، حرب البعث كان يحمل أيديولوجية القومية العربية:

. برأت، ما هو أهم مقومات أيديولوجية حزب البعث العربي الاشتراكي؟
. هل تعتبر أن تلك الأيديولوجية تعتبر أحد الأساليب الرئيسية لحدث اختلاف ومن ثم السوء بين المكونين العربي والكردي؟
. برأت هل أيديولوجية البعث تحمل في طياتها إشارات عداء وكرهية تجاه غير العرب، خاصة الكرد؟
. هل تعتبر وجود اتفاقية سياسة الترحيل والتعريب عند حرب البعث على سبيل المال ترحيل عشرات الآلاف من الكرد خاصة من مناطق النزاع بين العرب والكرد ومن ثم إسكان العرب في أماكنهم، أو ترحيل من النزاع بين كوارنة الكرد من مناطق حدودية إلى مجمعات قسرية حول الدلم، أو ترحيلهم إلى جنوب ووسط العراق، وما إلى ذلك أم أنك تعتبر العكس هو الصحيح؟
. برأت هل المكون الكردي كان معروفاً أمام تحقيق العرب لأهدافهم القومية في العراق، لذلك تعرضوا لعمليات الأنفال؟
. برأت (إذا كنت تؤمن بوجود عوامل إبادة) ما هي أهم الخطوات التي خطتها حزب البعث لإجهاد عملية الإبادة الجماعية؟

. حسب تجربتك كشخص عاش تحت هيمنة البعث، هل تذكر أي حدث جدير بالذكر على المستوى الفكري والمعنوي تجاه الكرد؟
. هل كان يتوزع قرى المناطق 내الكرد لحرب البعث ما تجاوب الكرد بنفس القدر مع المعارضين الكرد، فمثلاً حسب روايات أعلى الكرد، كانت دوراً للكرد في الفرق المحافظ على أكراد الشام وعلى سكان الكرد حتى أصولهم. وتاريخ نزاع بلاد النزاع على نهر السهول على في المقاومة ضد الاستقلال والتحلي عن السلام والمأتم، والتي كانت تتحدى فيها العملية العسكرية ضد تزايد يمكن في المناطق المحيطة بالأكراد. هل كان النظام يستعمل نفس الخطط في المناطق المجاورة بالكرد. هل كان النظام يستعمل نفس السلوكيات ضد الكرد السنة؟

. إذا كنت يجري عمليات الإبادة، فما هو السبب برأت أنك لم ترى أي حدث في ذلك للسماحة الحكومية أو الأطلية في البلاد العربية والإسلامية عمليات الأنفال، و بصورة أخص لم ترى ما يذكر من قبل الجامعة العربية ولا منظمة المؤتمر الإسلامي الداخلي (منظمة التعاون الإسلامي) ولماذا هذا الصمت؟

. هل عتقد أن تعلين أو إضافة أخرى؟

شكراً لمشاركتكم.
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Brunel University  
28-9-2011  
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01895 267241

To whom it may concern. I am happy to confirm that Ibrahim Sadiq is currently registered as a PhD student at Brunel University where he is undertaking research. I would be most grateful if you could afford him any assistance that he needs in the course of his research. If you require additional information from me please contact me care of Brunel University, England.

Yours,

Dr. Peter Wilkin

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