After Interventionism: A Typology of United States Strategies

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After Interventionism: A Typology of United States Strategies

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ABSTRACT
What strategies does the United States pursue when it no longer perceives overt military intervention as politically viable or desirable but the problems or issues for which it was formerly undertaken remain? This analysis identifies three such periods in American foreign policy since the United States became a World Power and draws from the work of Peter Hall to develop a typology of strategies according to the magnitude of policy change. These range from adjustment in the settings of interventionism – persistence; the substitution of alternative instruments of foreign policy – ameliorism; and the principled rejection of interventionism in conjunction with a more systematic critique of prevailing foreign policy assumptions – transformationalism. Yet each approach is beset by certain structural limits and contradictions arising from the domestic politics and constitutional-institutional system of the United States that are important in understanding and appreciating more fully the challenges – and opportunities – of the period ‘after interventionism’.

Investigating the complexities and nuances of policy ideas is thus expected to provide us with a window into our society, how it seeks to solve problems and how the solutions it generates often have unforeseen consequences …

Hogan and Howlett, 2015

And, by God, we’ve kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all.


Long regarded as a fundamental instrument of Great Power statecraft, intervention is a means of projecting power and influence and, importantly, performing ‘Great Powerness’ through demonstrating vigour on the global stage. Yet, as Peter Hall has emphasised, states not only ‘power’, they also ‘puzzle’.

In this regard, intervention has a practical or functional policy utility in addressing a range of foreign policy problems or ‘puzzles’. These two facets, however – power performative and problem solver – are often in a state of contradiction.

After the Cold War, the United States, Britain, and France in particular amongst the democracies undertook military intervention to achieve intrinsically
difficult, higher order goals including humanitarian relief, nation-building, democratic regime change, and advancing human rights. Following 9/11, the focus of interventions became more directly security centric, but in the quest for political stability these, too, were unable to escape from the tasks of state- and nation-building. Yet the experience of Iraq and Afghanistan in particular had a devastating impact on the support base and political viability of intervention such that for many – but by no means all – politicians, it became a toxic issue. In September 2014, for example, President Barack Obama stressed the point that whilst authorising targeted strikes against the Islamic State of Syria and the Levant [ISIL], he would not commit ‘our Armed Forces to fighting another ground war in Iraq’. In so doing publicly, he overruled the chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, who had earlier suggested otherwise. A year earlier, plans to seek authorisation from Congress for air strikes over Syria, with no immediate risk of large-scale casualties, were withdrawn following the defeat of a parallel proposal in the British Parliament. In truth, however, by the end of the 1990s the limits and weaknesses of intervention were already well-exposed, leading the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty to rethink the practice in the form of the – to date ineffectual – 2001 doctrine of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’.

This ‘crisis of interventionism’ is conceptual, political, and strategic and presents a hitherto neglected question. What approaches or strategies are available to democracies when the problems triggering intervention persist but the type of interventions hitherto undertaken become politically unviable, ethically undesirable, or perceived as functionally ineffective? To clarify, this analysis concerns the overt ‘boots on the ground’ type of intervention

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<th>Table 1. A typology of the strategies pursued by U.S. administrations following a ‘crisis of interventionism’.</th>
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<td><strong>Kuhn’s ‘normal science’</strong></td>
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that have been such a prominent feature of United States foreign policy in recent years. Interventions do of course come in many forms but, for this very reason, analyses that recognise the distinct political characteristics and syndromes of the various types is important. The focus here, then, is on intervention defined as ‘direct combatant or combat-preparatory military operations conducted on foreign territory by units of a state’s regular military forces’.

It is in these large-scale ‘boots on the ground’ operations that the crisis of interventionism is most pronounced, but its effects may ripple out to other forms of intervention, too. The term ‘interventionism’ is used here to emphasise the systematic nature of intervention for the United States – and some but not all of its allies; these are not a series of one-off episodes but reflect the political-cultural inclination towards intervention as an appropriate and/or desirable means through which to address a range of international problems.

Often overlooked is that the present ‘crisis of interventionism’ is neither a novel phenomenon nor solely part of the extended legacy of the Vietnam War; it is in fact the third such crisis faced by America since becoming a World Power at the turn of the twentieth century. Whilst that of the 1970s and 1980s following the Vietnam War remains well known, that of the 1920s and 1930s, in which American interventionism in Latin America became increasingly controversial and politically costly, rarely features in analyses of the politics of interventionism. Yet identifying three rather than two such crises allows an examination of the influence of structural factors, specifically those arising from the domestic constitutional-institutional structure and enduring – but contested – American political-philosophical values. Analysing the three crises, comprising eight administrations, reveals three broad types of strategic approach or ‘answer’ to the question posed above according to the degree of change they embody. In the context of the American political system, however, powerful political factors limit the possibility of maintaining any of the strategies, let alone allowing them to become fully developed. This is a function of the domestic ideological, partisan, and/or political divisions within the United States that are able to influence the political and policy process through the multiple leverage points afforded by its constitutional-institutional system.

The typology itself draws upon Hall’s seminal analysis of British economic policy-making in the 1970s with three identified orders of change: the settings – or levels/calibration – of existing policy instruments; policy instruments themselves; or overarching policy goals. When applied to questions of the ‘use of force’ following a crisis of interventionism, they are manifest in the strategies of ‘persistence’, ‘ameliorism’, and ‘transformationalism’, respectively.

‘First order’ change as applied by Hall to domestic economic policy-making referred to adjustments in the ‘settings’ or calibration of the existing
instruments of policy, such as the minimum lending rate, whilst the basic hierarchy of assumptions and goals remained the same. This corresponds to the strategy of ‘persistence’ in which leaders continue to put militarised interventionism in the foreground but are likely to modify the specific form it takes in the hope of adjusting to the changed political environment. Even when policy-makers do seek to re-conceptualise the wider bases of foreign policy, such as Richard Nixon’s turn to détente\textsuperscript{10} or Ronald Reagan’s militant anti-communist liberalism, persistence with military means triggers significant domestic political counter-pressures that are consequential both domestically and in foreign policy. Hall marked the ‘second order’ change by a shift in the instruments of policy yet largely within the same hierarchy of goals, such as introducing a new system of monetary control in 1971. This corresponds to ‘ameliorism’ in which leaders retreat from the use of force and seek alternative instruments of policy, typically diplomacy, whilst tending to operate within existing frameworks and assumptions regarding foreign policy and the bases of international order. A ‘paradigm shift’ distinguished Hall’s ‘third order’ change, entailing change in ‘all three components of policy: the instrument settings, the instruments themselves, and the hierarchy of goals behind policy’.\textsuperscript{11} For Hall, this was evident in the shift from Keynesianism to monetarism; and it corresponds here to ‘transformationalism’ in which the use of force becomes stigmatised as part of a more systematic reconceptualisation of foreign policy – encompassing the ethical bases of American foreign policy and of regional/international order.

Hall synthesised Hugh Heclo’s observation that states are puzzle – or problem – solvers as well as power-seekers and Thomas Kuhn’s distinction between normal and revolutionary science. This difference underpinned Kuhn’s notion of paradigms, ‘a cognitive model shared by a particular community of actors, and which facilitates problem solving’,\textsuperscript{12} and expressed the possibility of a fundamental conceptual – or paradigm – shift in how social questions are understood and addressed.\textsuperscript{13} For Kuhn, whereas both first and second order change marked instances of ‘normal science’, the third order was ‘revolutionary’. Hall emphasised the role of ideas and social learning in the development of policy, seeking to highlight the relationship between the nature and breadth of the policy community involved in the policy-process and the scale of emerging policy change.\textsuperscript{14} Hence, policy learning undertaken solely by bureaucracies and technocrats is likely to remain limited whereas more extensive and especially revolutionary change is likely to require greater input from politicians and civil society.

Applying Hall’s framework for understanding change at the domestic level to the international realm does require, however, qualification. All of the strategies discussed below in fact represent ‘bounded puzzling’ in that none was free from considerations of geopolitical and geo-economic risk and contingency as perceived by policy-making elites. Except for the subtle
point that the disavowal of the use of force in foreign policy is itself a revolutionary act, the transformationalists are as well if not better regarded as ‘radicals’ rather than ‘revolutionaries’, in-keeping with their awareness of the problems structural power presents for superseding interventionism. Yet by way of perspective, Hall’s account of the shift from Keynesianism to monetarism is not a truly ‘revolutionary’ occurrence; it was a shift in the episteme governing the organisation of capitalism, not the supersession of capitalism itself.

Since the late nineteenth century, there have been three especially interventionist periods in American foreign relations, characterised by particularly high levels of political and cultural mobilisation for intervention in support of ambitious political agendas. Each ended in disillusionment. The interventionism of the ‘Progressive age’ from the late 1890s through to the 1910s, spanning the administrations of William McKinley, Theodore Roosevelt, William Taft, and Woodrow Wilson gave way to widespread disaffection in the 1920s and 1930s. In the Cold War, the doctrine of ‘containment’ presented a standing rationale for interventionism, particularly in the John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson years, yet became unsustainable after the experience of Vietnam. Likewise, the interventionism of the post-Cold War period in the administrations of G.H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and G. W. Bush collapsed in the wake of Iraq and Afghanistan, even if the political and policy fissures were already evident in the 1990s.

Consequently, a major challenge faced those in office after the tide turned against interventionism: Warren Harding, Calvin Coolidge, Herbert Hoover, and Franklin Roosevelt in the 1920s through to the mid-1940s; Nixon, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and Reagan from the late 1960s to the late-1980s; and Obama from 2009–2017. The challenge was to navigate American foreign policy without the ready ability – or in some cases the wish – of deploying ground troops abroad. These administrations faced a similar set of political and social pressures: ideological divisions, opposition in Congress, a public no longer willing to bear the costs of interventionism, and a critical media. Many also faced adverse economic conditions. Yet as represented in Table One and discussed below, responses can be classified into three main types.

A strategy of ‘persistence’ refers to the behaviour of political leaders who find themselves facing high levels of political opposition and institutional constraints concerning the use of force but seek to override or circumvent these to maintain a militarised approach. When faced with a political and societal turn against interventionism, Coolidge simply persisted in sending the marines, yet both the Nixon/Ford and Reagan administrations developed more sophisticated strategies of persistence by mixing covert actions and military ‘sub-contracting’, but in both cases led the administrations to act illegally and actively subvert constitutional and institutional constraints. A strategy of ‘persistence’ generates strong
domestic political pressures that have at times prevented, constrained, or terminated interventions and displayed to allies and adversaries alike the difficulties of projecting power and providing security guarantees in the face of domestic political opposition. Furthermore, during the Coolidge and Nixon/Ford periods in particular, efforts to persist with interventionism generated more radical critiques and accelerated the rise of alternative political approaches that informed the transformationalist policies of Roosevelt and Carter, but which were already being articulated and developed within Congress, bureaucracies, and civil society. As the cases of Coolidge, Nixon/Ford, and Reagan show, a strategy of persistence is unlikely to be sustainable and prone to energise or even strengthen the very constraints it seeks to circumvent.

For Coolidge (1923–1929) and his secretary of State, Charles Hughes, the 1917 Bolshevik revolution and rise of revolutionary nationalism in the American hemisphere fused into one transcendental threat. In April 1925, Hughes’ successor, Frank Kellogg, used his first foreign policy speech to hint at the prospect of intervention in Mexico in the face of rumoured Bolshevik influence. As the Administration’s representative at the 1928 Conference of American States in Havana, Hughes blocked an anti-intervention resolution and delivered the period’s last high profile defence of the United States’ right to intervene in Latin America. The issue was highly emotive. Not only was an intervention in Haiti continuing, but delegates also bristled at the reoccupation of Nicaragua in 1927 with the return of 5,000 marines and 11 cruisers and destroyers that lasted until 1933.

The Coolidge-Kellogg years marked the lowest point in United States-Latin American relations in the inter-war years, yet it was also a period of attitudinal change and political counter-mobilisation in American politics that pointed towards the transformationalist approach of the 1930s. Republican business internationalists were not the only group now questioning the interventionist turn; so, too, were the progressives in the tradition of William J. Bryan, who had earlier been receptive to calls for intervention on humanitarian or ‘civilisational’ grounds but increasingly came to see that this could readily degenerate into imperialism in the service of ‘money power’. The progressives were important both for a series of specific anti-interventionist achievements and shifting perceptions of interventionism such that ‘policies that professional-managerial elites had once seen as apolitical and stabilizing now churning in the vortex of political controversy’. Indeed, by 1929, the ‘peace progressives’ had established themselves as the ‘most important congressional players on issues relating to the underdeveloped world, a bloc that policy-makers could afford to ignore only at their peril’. Specific achievements in this period included the passage of the Ladd Resolution in February 1925, which sought to end the practice of
military guarantees for loans and raised the profile of the anti-
imperialism cause more widely. Against this shifting intellectual and
political background, Coolidge Administration ‘Red Scare’ tactics and
threats of intervention in Mexico resoundingly backfired as efforts to
manipulate the press and sully the reputation of critics saw a flush of
negative news editorials and, in January 1927, the unanimous passing of
the Robinson Resolution in Congress recommending a diplomatic solu-
tion to the Mexican crisis. When faced with Coolidge’s intervention in
Nicaragua in 1927, peace progressives compensated for their limited
strength in the Senate by seeking to exploit the pluralist institutional
framework by using a series of Congressional hearings to publicise
controversial information about the intervention to arouse public opi-
nion such that Democrat and moderate Republican senators would
oppose the Administration. The subsequent Dill Amendment of 1929
‘marked the first occasion in American history on which a branch of
congress had cut off funding for an overseas military conflict still in
progress’, even if subsequently the Administration cajoled legislators into
reversing the decision.

Besides this high level of Congressional opposition, the strategy of persistence
forced a turning point within the foreign policy bureaucracy. In one view:

… with some backsliding and some dissent, officials in Washington found themselves
unable to escape the conviction that their employment of force in the Caribbean was
not only disproportionately expensive in protecting citizens and property abroad and
ineffective in promoting democracy; it was also positively disadvantageous to their
evolving conception of the national interest of the United States.

Coupled with years of frustration within the State Department at the level of
queries and criticism arising from the lack of clarity in American policy, the
Nicaragua intervention led to internal circulation of the 1928 Clark memor-
andum that repudiated the claim that intervention was permissible under the
‘Roosevelt Corollary’ to the Monroe Doctrine. Indeed, 1928 was also
the year in which Franklin Roosevelt published a Foreign Affairs article
acknowledging his role in earlier Caribbean interventions. He now called
for a new spirit of international relations based ‘not only [on] certain facts
but many new principles of a higher law’, not least recognising the moral
claims of the other American republics and renouncing arbitrary United
States intervention. Persistence with interventionism under Coolidge had
sharpened criticism to the point that by the 1930s, American officials,
intellectuals, and the informed public increasingly reckoned not only that
Washington ‘could’ not impose cultural change in Latin America, but also
that it ‘should’ not.

Nixon (1969–1974) was cognisant of the changed political environment
for interventionism prior to his election and subsequently adapted the use
of military force in the hope of circumventing and disarming public opinion and institutional constraints. Yet his persistence in the use of force abroad, in conjunction with the Watergate scandal at home, led to greater Congressional resistance and contributed to an environment in which Carter’s transformationalism could rise to prominence. In a 1967 *Foreign Affairs* article, Nixon recognised that Vietnam would forge a legacy of ‘deep reluctance on the part of the United States to become involved once again in a similar intervention on a similar basis’.29 His alternative, espoused in the ‘Nixon Doctrine’, was an extension of his ‘Vietnamisation’ approach to the war itself, whereby allies in the periphery would now take responsibility for the maintenance of their own security – precisely to avoid the direct commitment of American forces – but with Washington offering support and resources. Yet the Nixon Doctrine was part of a bigger design, a ‘new structure of peace’, whereby relations with Moscow would be enveloped in a dynamic package linking competition and co-operation, and carrying sufficient incentives and leverage to restrain the Soviets from fomenting crises on the periphery. In this schema, the United States would support its regional allies in their role of proactively preventing the emergence of potentially destabilising local power vacuums.30

It was a creative, conceptually ambitious approach to declining United States geopolitical primacy and the crisis of post-Vietnam interventionism, going beyond a simple adaptation or recalibration of interventionism, but which maintained the centrality of interventionism and the use of force. Nevertheless these efforts to re-formulate an intervention system31 in the face of a crisis of interventionism through the requirement for greater executive latitude, secrecy, and continued militarisation of foreign policy in fact led Congress to re-assert its authority over foreign affairs and constrain the Administration’s use of force. Nixon’s secret bombing of Cambodia in March 1969 exacerbated mistrust, and the public outcry following the land invasion of Cambodia a year later, involving American and South Vietnamese troops, led Congress to pass the Cooper-Church amendment intended to prevent unauthorised funding for United States military operations in Cambodia after 1 July 1970.32 That Nixon’s Administration delayed, diluted, and subsequently defied Cooper-Church and a further revised amendment by intensifying the bombing led Congress to pass, against a presidential veto, the 1973 *War Powers Act* stopping American combat participation in Indochina and restricting presidential powers to commit forces abroad.

Ford (1974–1977) strongly supported by Henry Kissinger, both his and Nixon’s secretary of state, sought to make a robust demonstration of Washington’s enduring resolve and capacity to use force after the fall of Saigon when, in May 1975, Cambodian forces captured the American merchant ship, SS *Mayaguez*, and its 39 crew-members. However, the
Administration was unable to shake-off Congressional constraints, particularly following the election of the ‘Watergate babies’ – new Democrat legislators – in the 1974 mid-term voting. A series of revelations, including the Central Intelligence Agency’s covert destabilisation of an elected government in Chile, collusion with the Mafia to assassinate a foreign head of state, and domestic spying on 10,000 citizens, saw the Hughes-Ryan amendment imposing greater Congressional oversight of the American intelligence agencies.\(^{33}\) Moreover, the Case-Church amendment cut further funding for American military operations in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in the face of intense opposition from Nixon and Kissinger. In Angola’s case, Ford and Kissinger authorised secret assistance to two factions and regarded such activity a vital demonstration of resolve to allies and foes alike, only for Congress to cut funding through the Clark-Tunney amendments.\(^{34}\)

Nixon and Ford’s strategy of persistence carried a high price for presidential authority as Congress denied Kissinger the ‘indispensable flexibility’ he required to maintain an interventionist foreign policy amidst anti-interventionist sentiment.\(^{35}\) The rupture between the executive and legislative branches also had medium-term consequences: Congress pursued a more radical ‘new internationalist’ vision of American foreign relations emphasising demilitarisation, human rights, support for democracy, economic cooperation, and cultural exchange.\(^{36}\) These would feature prominently following Carter’s election in 1976. However, as the case of Reagan (1981–1989) shows, whilst persistence is highly likely to be controversial, it does not necessarily lead to enhanced legal checks on the office of the president or a transformationalist successor.

The Reagan Administration’s strong anti-communism focused on reversing the perceived expansion of Soviet power during the 1970s: Vietnam had been a ‘noble enterprise’; ‘Reaganomics’ would revitalise the economy; and the conflict with the Soviet Union, the ‘evil empire’, a ‘crusade for freedom’.\(^{37}\) The bid for strategic primacy over the Soviets included plans for militarising space and new offensive nuclear weapons systems in Europe – matched with proposals for disarmament – and in the periphery found expression in the ‘Reagan Doctrine’. The Doctrine was ‘politically sensitive to post-Vietnam political realities’ given difficulty in deploying ground troops,\(^{38}\) but concurrently drew upon earlier Republican notions of ‘rollback’ by supporting anti-communist proxy forces in reversing socialist and communist gains in the periphery. Levels of Congressional and public support for the Reagan Doctrine varied according to the perceived level of legitimacy of specific campaigns.

At the same time, the question of direct military intervention remained sensitive and vexing. Service personnel were swiftly withdrawn following the deaths of 241 Americans from a suicide bombing in Lebanon in 1983, where they served as part of a multinational ‘peacekeeping’ operation. Nevertheless,
two days later, American forces invaded Grenada to depose a left-wing regime in an operation that conformed to the archetypal domestic political requirements of a 'successful' intervention: swiftly executed with minimal American casualties. In November 1984, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger sought to codify a set of circumscribed conditions for the commitment of troops abroad, which included the need for a 'reasonable assurance' of Congressional and public support, clearly defined objectives, and undertaken only as a last resort, 'wholeheartedly', on matters of vital national interests. They have been as controversial as they are superficially clear.39

With regard to the Reagan Doctrine, support for mujahedeen resistance in Afghanistan appeared to be its most successful campaign until the 'blowback' of al-Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks.40 That the Soviet Union had directly invaded Afghanistan, therein contravening liberal and international norms, led to broad support within Congress for a qualitative expansion of the assistance to local forces initiated by Carter. By contrast, that intervention concerning Sandinista Nicaragua was controversial from the outset reflects the distinction drawn in the theoretical literature between the perceived legitimacy amongst the American public for interventions undertaken to reverse a perceived act of aggression as against the illegitimacy of coercively interfering in other peoples’ civil conflicts.41 The secrecy with which the Administration conducted the mission, the ambivalence of the objectives, and the question of whether force was or was not being used in conjunction with a diplomatic track exacerbated the contentious domestic legitimacy of involvement and produced a breach of trust between the Administration and Congress.

Predictably, the Administration faced greater resistance from the Democrat-controlled House than the Republican-controlled Senate, with key measures including the Boland amendments and Intelligence Authorization Act that curtailed funding for lethal – and latterly all – support for the anti-Sandinista Contra forces. Yet the Administration was determined and returned repeatedly for funding, finding particular success following Reagan’s 1984 landslide re-election, giving him strength to pressure Republican Congressional opponents to support the Administration’s budgetary requests. Nonetheless, the Administration’s unwillingness to accept Congressional constraints led it to pursue a secret parallel foreign policy undertaken by its own National Security staff. This entailed soliciting private donations from American citizens and foreign governments, the mining of Nicaraguan harbours, and channelling revenue from the clandestine sale of arms to Iran to fund Contra operations. When exposed, Congress withdrew all funding for the Contras in 1987 and prohibited further support. As American backing for the Contras ebbed, the Contadora peace process,42 a regional initiative, progressed faster and, under Reagan's successor, George H.W. Bush, gained bipartisan American support for the ensuing peace deal. Yet despite such a spectacular abuse of executive power, Reagan escaped impeachment and Congress did not seek to pass further
legislation curtailing executive power, as it had done after Vietnam. A number of case specific factors combined to forestall such an eventuality. These included Reagan’s tactical handling of the episode, co-operation with the Tower Commission examining the Iran-Contra affair, the lack of evidence that Reagan knew of Iran-Contra, Congress’ ambivalent role in Contra-funding, the political sensitivity of another impeachment scandal so soon after Nixon, and the wider thaw in Cold War relations suggesting that anti-communist interventionism might wither of its own accord.43

Following a crisis of interventionism, a strategy of persistence has always been controversial. They have provoked the other institutions of government to try to counter continuing interventionism and can stir societal and political pressures for a more radical, principled turn from the ‘intervention system’. Persistence tends to require administrations to break the bonds of trust with the legislature, exacerbate societal and political divisions, and subvert due process and legal constraints. It undermines the very moral authority that democracies claim distinguishes them amongst states. These characteristics render it unsustainable as a strategy, short of corroding democratic institutions and process.

Strategies of ameliorism proceed in accordance with the changed political climate and tend toward drawing down or withdrawing from existing interventions, substituting alternative instruments of foreign policy, typically diplomacy, whilst operating within prevailing sets of assumptions about foreign policy goals and hierarchies and the wider conditions of international order. Ameliorists may or may not desire deeper change in United States foreign policy, but through necessity or choice, their approach tends to be pragmatic and evolutionary as distinct from generating a grand new conceptual and political vision as with the case of the transformationalists. The question for ameliorists is whether this type of approach, which tends not to address the underlying structural conditions of hierarchy and inequality amongst states that reproduce tensions in foreign relations, will be sufficient to withstand criticism from the proponents of more radical strategies on either flank. The experience of Harding, Hoover, and Obama is instructive.

During the 1920 election campaign, Harding (1921–1923) seized upon the American public’s weariness of war and interventionism. Pointing to Franklin Roosevelt’s boastfulness regarding his role in drafting Haiti’s constitution, Harding promised that if elected, he would not ‘jam [a constitution] down their throats at the point of bayonets’ nor ‘misuse the power of the Executive to cover with a veil of secrecy repeated acts of unwarranted interference … . [making] enemies of those who should be our friends’.44 The business internationalists associated with the Republican Party did not only object to the moralising interventionism of the Wilson years. They also reckoned that repeated interventions in Latin America and the Caribbean had not only failed to deliver the financial returns promised by the
imperialists in the 1890s and 1900s but had fuelled widespread and counter-productive anti-Yankee sentiment. Central to the rise of political nationalism in Mexico, for example, were grievances over foreign ownership of resources and property rights. Accordingly, whilst Harding remained committed to promoting American financial and commercial interests, he substituted a more conciliatory diplomacy and persuasion for the interventionism and ‘aggressive altruism’ of the Wilson years.45

During his two-and-a-half year term, Harding took several notable steps to improve hemispheric relations, including the initiation of troop withdrawal from the Dominican Republic, mediation efforts in Central America, resolution of the Isle of Pines dispute, and unsuccessful efforts to arbitrate the Tacna-Arica Question between Peru and Chile. In addition, he avoided intervention in Cuba and used the Republican majority to break Congressional deadlock on a number of dormant treaty issues. Yet underpinning all was the continued possibility of menace. The Administration proved unwilling to draw a clear line under the interventionism that had characterised recent relations and, whilst there was no question that Harding sought to avoid full-scale military intervention, ‘perceived that it could substitute diplomatic persuasion for military coercion only so long as the potential threat of the latter remained’.46 This unwillingness to reject interventionism limited the prospects for improvement in relations and, under Coolidge, the threat materialised with the major intervention in Nicaragua discussed earlier.

Still, running parallel to the Republican business internationalists’ critique was that of the ‘peace progressives’, who consolidated as a group in opposition to what they regarded as Wilson’s imperial turn. Specific achievements in this period include successfully blocking a controlled loan to Liberia, denying the budget for maintaining marines in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, and maintaining a spotlight on Haiti that would otherwise likely have faded in the wake of Senator Joseph Medill McCormick committee’s recommendations for only minor changes to the occupation.47 They also developed innovative modes of political organisation forging a series of national and transnational networks under the banner of ‘anti-imperialism’ with such diverse actors as the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured Peoples, and the presidents of the Dominican Republic and Haiti. Domestically, criticism was channelled through such media as The Nation and newly popular radio broadcasts and internationally through such fora as the Paris Peace Conference and a series of Pan-African Congresses.48 Such opposition prevented Harding from isolating the politics of post-interventionism through a strategy of conservative ameliorism with its undercurrent seeking to restore rather than redress the imperial nature of United States-Latin American relations.
During his 1928 tour of Latin America when president-elect, Hoover (1929–1933) repeatedly used the term ‘good neighbor’ and signalled to his hosts the intention of setting the relationship on a new footing. Critical of previous interventions, he stated in April 1929 that it ‘ought not to be the policy of the United States to intervene by force to secure or maintain contracts between our citizens and foreign states or their citizens’. This circumscribed disavowal of interventionism was re-enforced in 1930 by publication of the Clark memorandum, which Coolidge had hitherto suppressed. Troops gradually withdrew from Nicaragua – except about 100 marines to train the National Guard and protect United States interests – and Hoover set in train the withdrawal of forces, if not authority over the customs house, from Haiti. One upshot of renouncing intervention and removing the American military was that Washington, now better positioned, could act as a peace broker; in this vein, Hoover took particular pride in succeeding where his predecessors had failed in finding a settlement to the Tacna-Arica dispute.

Whereas Harding’s ameliorism was pragmatic, even opportunistic, Hoover’s was philosophical in kind: grounded in his Quaker pacifist roots but also running a rich vein of Manchester liberalism. The ‘basic reason behind Hoover’s refusal to sanction the use of force in revolutionary situations in Latin America or during the Manchurian crisis of 1931–32 was his belief that no economic world community under American leadership could be permanently established through such means’. More so than Harding, Hoover’s philosophical ameliorism establishes the integrity of the ameliorist approach in its own right, whilst also confirming its limits.

Given Harding’s refusal to rule out the use of intervention and Coolidge’s reversion to it, Hoover’s problem was one of trust and credibility, which despite a de facto policy of non-intervention he never fully shook off either in the minds of Latin and domestic contemporaries or subsequent evaluation of his policies by historians. For this, more positive post-intervention politics was required. Whereas Hoover offered a circumscribed spoken pledge of non-intervention, Franklin Roosevelt made this a general treaty commitment. Whilst Hoover left the impression of indifference through presiding over the collapse of intra-hemispheric trading relations and signing the infamous Smoot-Hawley tariff, Roosevelt sought to extend the political and institutional innovations of his New Deal to Latin America even if domestic political opposition thwarted it.

To turn to Obama, an electoral rhetoric of ‘change’ and desire to ‘transform how we think about ourselves as a country in fundamental ways’ belied what was an ameliorist rather than a transformationalist foreign policy strategy. The comment that Obama was a ‘progressive pragmatist’, who saw his task ‘not to seek transformational change abroad but to “bend [history’s arc] in the direction of justice”’, could also be applied to his
approach to the use of force in foreign affairs in the wake of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. For Obama, an ameliorist strategy enabled him to focus on his domestic political priorities, including the economic bailout following the 2008 crash, healthcare, education, energy, and climate change. Questions of the use of force were brought within the framework of ‘just war’ doctrine, whilst also seeking retrenchment where possible. The significance of the ‘just war’ framework, emphasised by Obama in his 2009 Nobel speech, is to harness the use of force to an external moral standard beyond that of the interest of the state or the fiat of the president and which he cannot therefore claim ownership over but rather can be evaluated against and held to account.

The desire to avoid being pulled into fresh interventions reflected his diplomatic efforts to establish a more stable, institutionalised, and self-regulating security system in the Middle East, part of which was the 2015 nuclear deal with Teheran. This in turn would enable Washington to focus on the ‘pivot to Asia’ to manage diminished American primacy through embedding relations in a series of institutional and multilateral relationships, with the – intended – Trans-Pacific Partnership counter-balancing China’s ‘belt and road’ trade and development initiative.

Obama attuned his ameliorism to the perceived nature and stakes of respective involvements. Hence, in the case of Iraq, he pursued a phased withdrawal whilst in Afghanistan and Pakistan a bounded offensive strategy towards al-Qaeda affiliated groups. In terms of ground forces, this took the form of an early surge in 2009 of 30,000 troops with a view to withdrawal by the end of 2014. However, this deadline repeatedly slipped, as there remained around 10,000 American troops in Afghanistan when he left office – from over 100,000 in 2011 – with the prospect of them becoming semi-permanent. Yet, to avoid adverse political reaction and American casualties, Obama expanded the use of drones and Special Forces, with the latter leading to the killing of the 9/11 mastermind, Osama bin Laden, in May 2011. Drone warfare in particular has been controversial due to the incidence of civilian casualties, the concentration of executive powers, and the longer-term consequences of a mode of warfare that has a light domestic political footprint but maintains a constant oppressive presence locally.

Obama’s actions above correspond with the theme of his Nobel speech in which he argued, ‘there will be times nations – acting individually or in concert – will find the use of force not only necessary but morally justified’. Such circumstances included the use of force ‘to prevent the slaughter of civilians by their own government, or to stop a civil war whose violence and suffering can engulf an entire region’. It was, however, in these very circumstances that Obama’s ameliorist approach was most tragically exposed. In 2011, following United Nations authorisation, the United States embarked upon a limited North Atlantic Treaty Organisation-led air operation in Libya in the face of a faltering
insurgency against President Muammar Gaddafi’s regime. Yet after rebel forces captured and killed Gaddafi, the country descended into a state of disorder and violence that persists to this day, allowing ISIL to build a presence and generating large numbers of displaced persons who fled across the region or else were prepared to take the perilous journey across the Mediterranean to Europe. Obama has subsequently said that the failure to prepare for the situation post-Gaddafi was probably the biggest mistake of his presidency and blamed the British, who in turn blamed the French.61

By contrast, Obama defended his decision not to intervene overtly in Syria following the alleged use of chemical weapons by President Bashar Hafez al-Assad’s forces in 2012, an issue upon which he had earlier drawn a ‘red line’. That Russia’s diplomatic intervention at that juncture marked a turning point in the balance of Great Power influence has particularly irked critics.62 Yet for ameliorists, diplomacy is the ace, even when in this case the initiative came from elsewhere. If diplomacy fails, they tend to be at the mercy of events. In such circumstances, the remaining ameliorist option would be a generous humanitarian response, here understood in the ‘classical’ sense of impartial and non-militarised relief of suffering. Yet as Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, was to discover with regard to her refugee policy, this too does not come without controversy or domestic political cost.63

As seen above, a strategy of ameliorism may serve conservative or progressive agendas; it may be pragmatic or principled or both. Central is the drawing down or withdrawal from interventionism and a renewed emphasis on alternative instruments of foreign policy, notably diplomacy, whilst not fundamentally reformulating the general framework of foreign policy goals or assumptions. Ameliorists may be nobody’s heroes and may find themselves squeezed between the toughs and the visionaries, but the strategy merits recognition in its own right. The retreat from interventionism can leave a gap in statecraft: the sense of mission or exalted purpose that the executive can embody has gone, leaving in its place the risk of foreign policy perceived as lacking dynamism or falling into a void.64 Whilst a strategy of persistence might call for a demonstrative reassertion of power, such as Ford’s use of force over the Mayaguez in 1975 or Reagan’s invasion of Grenada, the pure ameliorist response would be attainment of public policy success at home and diplomatic success abroad. But public policy ‘successes’ can be hard to come by, not least in a highly ideological and partisan domestic political environment where the priorities and goals of public policy are themselves often contested. Here, ‘transformationalism’ may have an advantage in generating a fresh vision of foreign policy that can, at least in principle, excite the imagination and mobilise the energies of a democracy.

Hall’s notion of the third order was characterised by ‘radical changes in the overarching terms of policy discourse’; where first and second order changes ‘preserve the broad continuities usually found in patterns of policy, third
order change is often a more disjunctive process associated with periodic discontinuities in policy. Both Franklin Roosevelt and Carter premised their post-interventionist politics explicitly on the need to learn from the mistakes of the past, delegitimised the use of force against weaker nations, and sought to reformulate relations on the bases of mutual respect and recognition. However, in both cases, deep-rooted domestic political resistance to the new foreign policies of, respectively, the ‘good neighbor’ and ‘human rights’ blocked efforts at transformational change, reflecting deep-seated domestic political divisions.

Roosevelt’s (1933–1945) ‘Good Neighbor Policy’ was ‘the most idealist and successful of the New Deal foreign policies’. Its cornerstone was the formal treaty commitment to non-intervention undertaken initially at the Montevideo Conference of American States held in December 1933. Article 8 of the ‘Convention on Rights and Duties of States’ reads, ‘No state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another’. Initially the United States lodged a reservation regarding existing treaty rights but subsequently dropped it at the 1936 Buenos Aires conference. Removing the standing threat of military force from the equation unlocked a political space within which a new approach to the underlying problem – revolutionary nationalism – could emerge as a counter-force to imperialism. The accompanying language of recognition and reciprocity, ‘respect[ing] the rights of others’, was more than symbolic and established audience and reputational costs should Washington break the pledge.

When Bolivia nationalised the property of American oil companies in 1937 and, more significantly, Mexico followed suit in 1938, the marines stayed away. In the latter case, Washington agreed to settle the issue through a mixed commission that exposed the ludicrously high property valuations of the oil companies and went some way to assuage Mexican hostility. More controversial, however, was Washington’s handling of the Cuban crisis in summer 1933 that, at best, may be regarded as an early stumble on the path to non-intervention and, at worst, a repressive interference albeit by non-military means. Probably, it was both.

The Cuban crisis defined the parameters of Washington’s emerging hegemony through ensuring regional states remained within its orbit. After a period of instability, the Ramón Grau regime, supported by Colonel Fulgencio Batista, appeared to be re-establishing political order in late 1933. Yet American officials saw Grau as supported ‘only by the army and ignorant masses’ rather than the ‘better classes’ of the country, and Sumner Welles, the assistant secretary of State for Latin American Affairs and special envoy to Cuba, found the new government intolerable, reporting that it was communist and threatened the Cuban social order. Roosevelt refused Welles’ request for troops but acquiesced in the non-recognition of the Grau regime that in turn halted renewal of a sugar treaty vital for Cuba’s economic viability. Batista
took the cue and, after deposing Grau, secured a deal with Washington whereby respect for American property rights would see the repeal of the Platt Amendment that maintained a right of American intervention, a favourable quota system, and reduced tariffs that would return a better income for the Cubans. The episode, however, did generate unforeseen consequences that defined subsequent policy under Roosevelt. Washington’s actions were the catalyst for the non-intervention clause at Montevideo, as the Cuban crisis likely prompted Mexico to initiate the proposal.\(^7\)

Yet, as Secretary of State Cordell Hull acknowledged in 1935, the renunciation of interventionism could only be the beginning of the process if a positive transformation of relations was going to occur.\(^7\) When Roosevelt spoke about giving the Latin Americans ‘a share’, it was not only of the wealth generated from the region but also ‘decision-making authority in inter-American economic concerns’.\(^7\) It was here that the New Deal reverberated into Latin America, with high-level planning, the development of multilateral institutions, and a role for the state. New multilateral trading and financial institutions would, in the words of Adolph Berle, a State Department assistant secretary, direct capital movements ‘not merely because some concessionaire wishes to make a profit but following the more careful plans of the various governments involved with a view to the steady development of the country’.\(^7\)

The flagship institution was the proposed Inter-American Bank originating in a Mexican proposal at the 1939 Panama Conference.

Initial Latin American enthusiasm for the project did turn, however, to disappointment because of failure to facilitate the means through which they would be able to repay loans, namely an American commitment to purchase Latin American products, leaving the risk of further indebtedness rather than development. Within the United States, proponents faced a powerful combination of private banking interests and Senate opposition to the New Deal approach to Latin American relations. Specifically, the bankers disliked the prospect of competition whilst a number of political heavyweights were hostile: Bernard Baruch, a Roosevelt advisor, suspicious of government involvement in economic affairs; Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg protective of Congressional autonomy in the face of rising bureaucratic power; and another Republican senator, Robert Taft, opposed on grounds of national interest.\(^7\) Despite a nudge from Roosevelt to stop stalling, this body of interests let the proposal wither in committee chambers. Other multilateral developments concerning trade and investment either continued favouring the American private sector or else did not come to fruition, albeit with the partial exception in 1940 of the Volta Redonda steel complex in Brazil, a step towards economic diversification and industrialisation, funded by the Export-Import Bank’s public money after private companies refused.\(^7\)

In terms of a post-interventionist strategy, the Good Neighbor policy deserves recognition. This bounded transformationalism paid off for the
Administration as Latin American states, with the effective exceptions of Argentina and Chile, either declared war or broke relations with the Axis Powers in the Second World War. Nevertheless, the effort to extend the New Deal and forge a new approach to revolutionary nationalism was less successful due to the limits of the proposals and institutions themselves, and the blocking power of entrenched interests within the United States. In the case of the Inter-American Bank, there is the tantalising possibility that the outcome might have been different if the proposal had been more acceptable to the Latin Americans but then, again, this might simply have increased resistance amongst the bankers. In any case, as the war progressed, attention increasingly shifted towards Europe and, in 1945, America re-established a right of (counter-) intervention against aggression through the 1945 multilateral Act of Chapultepec and, subsequently, the 1947 Rio Pact as revolutionary nationalism increasingly refracted through the prism of an international communist threat.

The ambition within Carter’s (1977–1981) foreign policy to move beyond the ‘Cold war paradigm of containment’ and make a ‘clear break from the power politics of Nixon and Kissinger’ is widely acknowledged. Central to this was an unwillingness to intervene militarily in the affairs of smaller nations and to rejuvenate a sense of progressive moral purpose in international affairs through the promotion of human rights and respect for the rights of small nations. As Carter told an audience at the University of Notre Dame in 1977, ‘we have fought fire with fire, never thinking that fire is better quenched with water’. Whilst during the first two years of his Administration Carter had considerable success in redirecting American foreign policy towards North-South issues, the thrust of foreign policy by the end of 1978 had reverted to the Cold War struggle against the Soviet Union.

The Administration realised that the turn from interventionism alone would not provide the necessary momentum to redefine the American role in the world. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter’s national security advisor, stated, ‘if we do not stand for something more than anticommunism, then indeed we may confront the decline of the West’. Carter explained that as ‘we are not trying to send in troops to make other nations conform to us’, the promotion of ‘human rights’ will enable ‘a President to exemplify ... what the American people believe’. Whilst human rights was the flagship policy, it was part of a wider set of ‘world order’ themes designed for an increasingly complex and multipolar world to be pursued alongside the continuation of détente. The management of interdependence was foremost of these considerations, with Brzezinski and Carter bringing their experience from the Trilateral Commission, a non-governmental policy-oriented forum, to deal with issues of trade, energy, and conservation. So, too, was the rising profile of the global South following decolonisation, the Vietnam war, and the rise of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries’ political leverage, enabling Carter to stress the importance
of respect for small nations not only as the right thing to do but also as fundamental for America’s longer-term interests and security.

Carter was able to build upon the moral turn in Congress, and early policies included the Panama Canal treaties, greater support for Black majority rule in Africa – particularly in Rhodesia – normalising relations with China, establishing peace between Egypt and Israel through the Camp David Accords, and promoting human rights in Latin America. By late 1978 through 1979, however, Carter’s foreign policy took a distinct geopolitical turn leading both to the proclamation of the ‘Carter Doctrine’, claiming the right to intervene militarily to protect American interests in the Persian Gulf, and limited covert funding of opposition movements in Afghanistan following the Soviet invasion.

A widely held yet contested perception was that détente had become a veil behind which the Soviets – or their Cuban proxies – had consolidated if not expanded their positions globally, notably in Ethiopia, Angola, Cuba with the ‘discovery’ of a Soviet brigade there, and, most significantly, Afghanistan after the Moscow-directed invasion in 1979. In addition, the Islamist revolution in Iran and socialist revolution in Nicaragua brought to power governments highly sensitive to the legacies of American interventionism, exposed Carter to criticism from the Right that he was failing to support allies, and left him humiliated following the 1980 failure of the hostage-rescue mission to Teheran to free American diplomatic captives. Worth noting, however, is that whilst the marked, even exaggerated Cold War turn in Carter’s foreign policy was clear enough, he still rejected intervention in Nicaragua even after losing confidence in the Sandinistas’ commitment to democracy.

Adverse international developments are not in and of themselves sufficient to explain the failure of Carter’s transformational foreign policy during his one term of office. Scholars have identified a range of factors including poor leadership ability, the power of a reinvigorated and re-organised conservative movement, the wider societal shift to the Right, intra-Administration divisions, and the rising influence of the realist Brzezinski over the liberal secretary of state, Cyrus Vance. There was also the unfavourable economic environment, the abstract nature of the new tenets of foreign policy such as human rights, and the failure to articulate a compelling post-New Deal vision of American politics in the round. Where these points tend to converge is on Carter’s limited domestic political support.

By the time of Carter’s election in 1976, conservatives were already turning the liberal tide. For example, they twisted the issue of Congressional constraints on the president over Angola into one of loyalty and appeasement rather than secrecy and accountability, chastening many Democrats to become more cautious when they saw the possibility of electoral defeat. In Reagan as presidential candidate, conservatives had a gifted communicator who appealed to a more militant strand of American nationalism,
unapologetic about the use of American power, and deeply resentful of liberal criticism of America and its role in the world. For this group, Carter’s Panama Treaties touched a raw nerve and marked an important point in the consolidation of the ‘New Right’ as a highly co-ordinated grass roots movement that ‘reassert[ed] the primacy of the Cold War paradigm at the precise moment that Carter was attempting to move beyond it’.

At least as damaging as the intensification of partisanship, if not more so, were the divisions amongst Democrats themselves. Carter did have a majority in both houses, but this was ‘less potent than it seemed’. Carter was not of the established liberal-left and had little commitment to Democratic ‘Great Society’ programmes or seeking to accommodate the Party’s traditional support base in the labour unions. The decision of Senator Edward Kennedy to run against Carter for the presidential nomination in 1980 epitomises this division, with the bitterness of the split evident in Kennedy’s unwillingness to offer Carter an endorsement following his defeat. As such, Carter’s transformationalism suffered from a disjuncture between the nature and scale of his vision and the extent of his domestic political support. His experience as a naval officer, in agri-business, and the Trilateral Commission could not compensate for him being a political outsider in Washington politics and, in the absence of a strong working relationship with the Congressional doyens of his own Party like Kennedy and Representative Thomas O’Neill and the interests they represented, a programme of transformational internationalism was unsustainable.

For the liberal transformationalists, the principled disavowal of interventionism has been a necessary marker of credibility. But without perceived success in effecting a wider transformation of American foreign relations such a move can backfire and appear hollow, raising in turn the question of whether this type of change is possible in the face of institutional and structural constraints. At the very least, there is a need for unusually high levels of political support at home and, as appropriate, relevant constituencies abroad.

It was remarked some 60 years ago that the United States ‘occasionally indulge[s] in great bursts of intense aggressive egoism’ that are ‘usually a source of self-recrimination, disillusionment, and apathy in the aftermath’. Yet besides disillusionment, interventionism tends to leave policy-makers with the same or expanded set of ‘problems’ that they initially intervened to address. If intervention’s force majeure marks the failure of politics and diplomacy, what is left when the intervention option itself is proscribed? The answers to this question have given rise to some of the most controversial and ambitious periods in American foreign relations. When viewed beyond the lens of the ‘Vietnam’ or ‘Afghanistan syndromes’ to encompass systematically the crises that followed the three major periods of interventionism since the United States became a World Power, the structural bases of the phenomenon becomes evident. Rooted in the nature
of United States domestic politics, one finds the same ideological, constitutional, and institutional factors that generate crises of interventionism paving the contradictions of foreign policy after interventionism.

Evaluated in relation to the further use of force, Administration responses may be analysed in terms of their respective order of change, comprising the three main strategies. Each, however, is beset by a particular set of limits and contradictions arising from the contested nature of American politics and the ability of contesting groups to influence the policy-process through the many leverage points afforded by American constitutional-institutional system. Strategies of persistence have triggered high levels of domestic political opposition, the intensity of which has varied principally according to the perceived legitimacy and specific circumstances of particular operations. Persistence in the use of force abroad tends to correlate with an assault on democratic institutions and processes, running the risk of backfiring by serving as a catalyst for the emergence of antithetical, transformationalist approaches to the use of force. Ameliorism winds down a period of interventionism and, likely matched by fresh diplomatic initiatives, is vulnerable to criticism on both flanks from persisters and transformationalists. Transformationalism offers a more systematic reconceptualisation of the nature of the foreign policy ‘problem’ and the appropriate response but may lack the capacity to deliver, becoming vulnerable in turn to charges of weakness or insincerity.

In the first of two further questions, do Republicans tend to be ‘persisters’ and Democrats ‘transformationalists’? Using great care, any such inference simply cannot devolve from the limited pool of cases available. Whilst to date all persisters would appear to have been Republicans, not all Republicans are persisters. Moreover, whilst the two cases of transformationalism have both been Democrats, it would be theoretically possible to conceive of a conservative transformationalism under the auspices of, for example, a libertarian foreign policy; but this would be a challenging political proposition. Ameliorism remains an option for both. Second, is the phenomenon and respective pathways outlined above applicable only to the United States or to democratic allies such as Britain and France? As the 2013 vote on Syria in the British Parliament shows, the phenomenon is not restricted to the United States. But precisely how extensive it is and how it is manifest would require further research taking into account the colonial pasts of third states, their political culture, and the specific character of their domestic political system.

Ultimately, ‘after interventionism’ marks the re-awakening of politics. Therein, ‘bipartisanship is not the natural state of affairs in the conduct of American foreign affairs’, which when combined with wider sets of political and ideological differences pertaining to the interests and role of the United States in the world make it difficult to sustain any of the approaches discussed above. At the same time, however, better understanding of the
recurring and structural nature of the problem may help address it. Indeed, one of the points to emerge from identifying the range of responses pursued during the three periods under discussion has been that the political and ethical horizons of foreign policy are not fixed, and that crises of interventionism can signal the opportunity for statecraft rather than its demise.

Notes

10. For example, Jussi M. Hanhimäki, The Rise and Fall of Détente (Washington, DC, 2013).
31. The term is adapted from Paine’s “war system”; see Thomas Paine, *Rights of Man* (Harmondsworth, 1984), 171.


42. For example, Susan K. Purcell, “Demystifying Contadora,” *Foreign Affairs* 64, no. 1 (1985): 74-95.


58. David Rohde, “The Obama Doctrine: How the president’s drone war is backfiring,” Foreign Policy, February 27, 2012; Mike Aaronson, “Interventionism in US Foreign Policy from Bush to Obama,” in Obama’s Foreign Policy: Ending the War on Terror, ed. Michelle Bentley and Jack Holland (Abingdon, 2014), 130, notes the wider expansion in American use of drones deployed in over 70 states.
59. Obama, “Nobel Lecture.”
60. Ibid.
64. Whilst the emphasis here is different, there is clearly an overlap with Hillary Clinton’s point about Obama’s foreign policy that “Great nations need organizing principles,” and “Don’t do stupid stuff” is not [one]. “It may be a necessary brake on the actions taken in order to promote a vision”: Jeffrey Goldberg interview with Hillary Clinton, Atlantic (10 August 2014): .
66. Rhodes, Foreign Policy, 126.qq.
70. Ibid., 559–60.
71. See Gardner, Economic Aspects, 194; see also Green, Containment of Latin America, 35.
72. Green, Containment of Latin America, 38.
73. Ibid., 70.
74. Ibid., 59–84.
75. Ibid., 44–45.
76. Ibid., 173.
77. Ibid., 276–83.
88. Johnson, “Unintended Consequences”.
89. Zaretsky, “Restraint or Retreat?” 536, 556.

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