WHY DO SOME ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACIES FALL INTO CONFLICT WHILE OTHERS DO NOT?
Evaluating formal and informal mechanisms of distribution through elite bargaining

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

By

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Abstract:

Civil conflict is a complex multi-layered event. As an outcome it represents a product of both the structural framework in place and decision-making between the different elite groups. From a historical neoinstitutionalist perspective, this dissertation will provide an answer as to why some illiberal democracies fall into civil conflict while others do not. It argues that horizontally unequal elites bargain for (re)distribution of political participation, economic assets and social services through formal and informal institutions in order to expand the shares of the goods distributed. The presence of cleavages and grievances amongst groups are enhanced when exclusion through inefficient redistribution takes place; therefore, a bargain failure with the potential to activate violent means, implies a disagreement amongst the elites over the allocation of resources to different societal groups. Bargain failures occur in the presence of non-credible commitments and information asymmetries. Inefficiency in the distribution can also be captured through informal institutions in the form of patronage networks, a side of the transaction spectrum which has been understudied. The contribution of this thesis to the general debate stems from this acknowledgement and alleviates this by incorporating the full spectrum of institutions which operate effectively within illiberal democratic regimes. Patronage networks despite being a fundamental part of how politics is conducted in illiberal democratic regimes have surprisingly been neglected in the contemporary study of conflict onset. By conducting two-level fsQCA along a selection of 21 cases of illiberal democracy across 1980-2012 including cases of ethnic conflict onset, the analysis will show that distribution through patronage networks does play a role in triggering conflict or in aiding to control violence depending on the efficiency of the distribution across grieved groups. Further comparative analysis of a most likely and least likely case for cases of conflict (Thailand and India Bodo conflict) and peace (Namibia and Bolivia) reveals that the effect of the patronage mechanisms when redistributive, plays a larger role as an instrument of preventing violent disputes across horizontally unequal ethnic groups.

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Chapter 1.
Introduction

Civil wars are more prevalent now than ever before, intra-state conflicts seem to be flourishing is every part of the world, particularly in the southern hemisphere. Despite this increase in intra-state warfare and the utmost importance of these processes we still do not fully understand them. Civil disputes are complex events, yet not all such disputes become violent. In this regard, why do some groups decide to use violence while others do not? Or in the bigger picture, why do some states suffer costly conflict onset while others manage to avoid it? Are there any common factors that we can identify across peaceful cases or cases of violence? The present dissertation focuses on civil conflict onset within illiberal democracies and aims to provide an answer as to why do some illiberal democracies avoid civil conflict while others do not.

The academic motivation for undertaking the present research comes from two main factors. First, the research programme is saturated with quantitative analysis which has been useful in revealing significant variables such as development, type of regime or the presence of formal political exclusion. Thus, despite the benefit of revealing variables of interest there is still significant disagreement on the relevance and impact these variables have on augmenting the possibility of conflict onset. Furthermore, the explanatory power of quantitative methods stops there. It does not provide us with explanations as to how and why these variables affect the possibility of conflict. In this vein, building up from there, more analyses focusing on causality are needed in order to, not only provide a better understanding of this phenomenon, but most importantly to use it towards particular policy aims. Of course, this will also bring disadvantages as the inability of generalising to a large N, thus, digging into causality analysis and refraining from the use of quantitative methods will aid to highlight other potential, understudied mechanisms that perhaps could help in providing a better understanding of such an important event.

Secondly, pertaining explanations associated to the political regime or in general the political organisation of societies, I find that, most of these explanations often ignore

the reality of how politics is conducted. When it comes to the policy world coming from above (International institutions and in general the developed world), the positive effects of democracy have been in my opinion overestimated. This has led to a series of -sometimes forceful- democratisations or impositions of democratic systems which have created a grey zone which we now call illiberal democratic regimes. Extensive research on conflict onset and political organisation has pointed towards the relevance of this type of regime. In short, according to the evidence, illiberal democracies hold a higher chance of conflict onset due to their hybrid nature. This main body of research has conceptually defined this hybridisation as: anocracies, illiberal democracies, weak democracies and/or semidemocracies; this terminology has been used interchangeably across the literature. As with many other significant variables we do not know how and why hybrid regimes possess a higher likelihood of conflict onset. Likewise, research on illiberal democracies has failed to recognise the relevance of informal institutions such as patronage networks and as such has ignored much of what drives political behaviour in these societies of interest. Patronage networks represent a key channel of distribution that, in many cases, seems to be more important that formal ones. In fact, when challenged with modernisation processes associated to the formation of the nation-state instead of disappearing, patronage has accommodated, and it has been preserved behind the scenes. In this regard and given its staggering relevance across the developing world in terms of political participation and political support, distribution of public goods and also distribution of economic assets the study of patronage as an informal institution has somehow been neglected.

My contribution to the general debate stems from this acknowledgement. Patronage networks are a fundamental part of the political spectrum in illiberal democratic regimes. Their study is relevant because it does not idealise politics in the third world, but instead it recognises the shortcomings and aims to establish ways in which these flaws can be used for better results such as aiding to control violence. In general terms, I aim to visualise the importance of informal institutions for illiberal democratic regimes in particular, and how these institutions can serve as triggers of conflict or as peace enablers depending on their configuration across an elite bargaining game for redistribution.

I narrow the research to ethnic conflicts within illiberal democratic regimes from 1980 to 2012. From a historical neoinstitutionalist perspective, the present dissertation aims to provide a structural and agency explanation of ethnic conflict onset which effectively incorporates the full spectrum of institutions. Furthermore, I aim to provide an analysis which incorporates causal explanations. The justification for this is two-fold. On the side of the full spectrum of political institutions I believe that a political analysis of conflict onset must contain insights into patronage networks as, within illiberal democratic regimes, they represent a legitimate channel of supply which has the potential to produce (in)equality in the distribution of political participation, social services or economic assets and therefore encourage (or discourage) the use of violence. Distribution undertaken informally denotes a hidden side of the transaction spectrum that might provide answers as to why some societies rebel while others do not. On the other hand, in terms of causal explanations I believe that more research that is able to explain why and how is needed within the conflict onset research programme. We need not only to better understand these processes but also be more accurate in the formulation and recommendation of policy frameworks. I believe there has been a disconnection between the policy world and academia. In some instances, the positive effects of democracy have been overestimated and the reality of how politics is conducted in these regimes is often ignored. Therefore, the analysis presented in the present thesis gives room for some policy recommendations.

A review on the literature on conflict onset reveals that the whole research programme can be divided along four main groups of explanations: Inequality, political organisation, ethnicity and economic performance (which also includes arguments related to resource abundance/scarcity). Each one of these explanations are presented in chapter 3. Summarizing, inequality explanations point towards the existence of inequality as a potential factor encouraging rebellion. However, the Gini coefficient the most used resource to measure inequality has a severe missing data problem particularly for the countries of interest which has undermined the results. Furthermore, scholars have pointed towards the misleading interpretation of attempting to capture collective action through measures focused on the individual. The highlight of inequality explanations however, rests on research cemented in Frances Stewart's (2002) ideas of horizontal inequality as opposed to vertical inequality. Her research states that inequalities can be captured along different

dimensions: political, economic, social and cultural and that they are better interpreted across and between groups rather than individuals. From a conflict onset perspective, this has sparked significant agreement in regards to potential causes of conflict. In particular, research on exclusion as a political dimension of horizontal inequality by Cederman et al. (2010) (2011) has found robust conclusions arguing that exclusion is a strong determinant of conflict onset. These ideas have also been further explored from different angles (dimensions) by other scholars (Baldwin & Huber, 2010) (Besacon, 2005) (Gluber & Selway, 2012) (Ostby, 2008) (Ostby, et al., 2009) (Alesina & Papaioannou, 2016). The conception of horizontal inequality seems more promising in providing robust explanations of conflict onset and as such represents a better interpretation of the effect of inequality on the possibility of conflict. Furthermore, taking a look at the studies provided in regards of ethnicity, there has been considerable disagreement pertaining the effect of ethnic heterogeneity, ethnic salience or ethnic dominance. Thus, when pairing ethnicity with horizontal inequality[1] the results seem to provide robust and compelling explanations.

As for economic performance explanations, they have highlighted a strong effect of economic development on conflict onset. I believe that whilst providing a general evaluation of economic development across the world countries, it is successful at producing relevant results when testing for significance and including Norway and Rwanda for example. Thus, I question whether a narrower assessment in which, the sample includes only an income group such as only low-income countries will still produce relevant results. In this regard, I believe that the degree of economic development might not matter but what matters is how those meagre resources are redistributed. Lastly, political organisation explanations as highlighted above do agree on the effect of illiberal democracies on conflict onset.

A general evaluation of the research programme and its extent also deserves for further questions to be asked and explored. A point of departure can reflect on particularly comparisons across those societies of interest. This exercise begs the question of why do some of these cases of interest successfully avoid falling into

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[1] Horizontal inequality has mainly been studied by differentiating groups by ethnicity. However, it can, not only be captured across ethnic differentials but also across religions and classes.

conflict despite being at risk of it? In particular, I aim to find out why do some illiberal democracies fall into conflict while others do not? Chapter 4 presents the theoretical framework to answer this question.

The answer is complex and deserves a multi-layered explanation. To begin, I believe that outcomes such as a civil war are a product of both structural and agency mechanisms which can be tracked historically. I support this idea because focusing on one or the other does not provide a holistic evaluation of the social processes taking place. Most of the research has done precisely this; focus on -mainly- structural explanations or on agency motivations but not incorporating both. In this regard, I aim to answer the Research Question from both angles. Secondly, within agency focused research, most of the attention has been given to the rebel groups. A growing scholarship is now focusing also on the role the elites play in facilitating or preventing conflicts. The role of elites is of utmost importance as they hold decision-making power and are able to concede or deny demands and they are also able to mobilise constituencies if so they wish. Elites therefore, constantly bargain for the redistribution of political participation, social services and economic assets and they do so within both formal and informal institutions. When redistribution is inefficient across groups in either of the institutional frameworks then conflict is more likely to happen. Contrary to this, when redistribution is efficient across groups in either of the institutional frameworks then conflict is more likely to be avoided.

Following this point, conflict onset can be understood as a product of a bargain failure. According to the rationalist explanations of war (Fearon, 1995), bargains tend to fail in the presence of information asymmetries and non-credible commitments, resembling inefficient distribution which can be captured within both formal and informal channels of distribution and applied to the domestic context. Because human beings are both rule followers and self-interested beings, bargaining and decision-making depends on the structural context (the rules of the game) and on personal interest. Interest is understood as an interest in participating or increasing the redistribution of assets, privileges and rights. Ethnicity works as the binding factor, elites will campaign and bargain for the benefit of their ethnic constituencies. These ideas also depart from the assumption that ethnic groups are horizontally unequal amongst each other, thus, the

degree as to which this inequality plays and the dimension which is most affected by this represent key points of analysis.

Formal exclusion as a dimension of political inequality is able to provide a picture of inequality at the elite level in the struggle for worth. It also represents an important condition that facilitates conflict onset. Likewise, political inclusion might also provide insights into conflict avoidance. However, as conflict is a complex event and political (in)equality could also be captured via informal mechanisms of political distribution there can be cases in which ethnicities are formally included but nonetheless conflict is present. This points out towards the onset of conflicts better to be understood via conjunctural causality.

My answer to the Research question therefore can be summarized in the following two general hypotheses: (1). when there is inefficiency in the distribution of assets, privileges and rights to different ethnic groups via formal or informal institutions, conflict is more likely to happen. As my interest is also to highlight the relevance of informal institutions which have been systematically ignored in contemporary conflict onset research I hypothesize that; (2). exclusionary and inefficient redistribution through patronage networks can increase the possibility of conflict onset.

The methodology selected for evaluating the different hypotheses is a mixed method approach which is presented in Chapter 5. As stated before, one of the problematics identified is that research methods for conflict onset research has mainly focused on quantitative analysis. My belief is that there is a need for pushing a qualitative agenda which has the potential also to enable a modest generalization. Furthermore, understanding conflict onset as a complex event which is commanded by conjunctural causation leads to the selection of a methodology which allows for the analysis of different causes, remains on the qualitative side and also is able to provide a modest generalization. Qualitative Comparative Analysis offers a good point of start.

Implementing QCA for the theoretical framework has several advantages but also constrains. The constrains run along the unit of analysis and time spans, measurement and membership and also the fact that it remains as a newly developed methodology. Time spans challenges have been resolved by the proposition of different variants of

QCA for which I chose to implement Two-level Fuzzy QCA analysis. The two-level variant not only solves the problem of temporality but also fits well with the evaluation of structural (distant) and agency (proximate) causes. Measurement is perhaps the biggest challenge of them all but as such, is also present in other methods. For this particular project measuring the degree of distribution through patronage networks presented the biggest challenge in comparison to the other conditions / mechanisms evaluated. I recognize that the measurement is not by any means perfect, but I believe it has the potential to get us started somewhere and to stimulate the discussion. Finally, as a newly developed methodology QCA might present alternative criticism, however, improvements have come from the need of researchers to adapt the framework and/or explore it potential. The present research is not an exception.

Two-level fsQCA analysis therefore, will help in testing and identifying the relevant structural and agency conditions that facilitate conflict on the one hand, and by negating the outcomes it will also help to identify the effect of opposite mechanisms in aiding to control violence. The QCA analysis will also reveal most likely and least likely cases of conflict onset and of conflict avoidance. The idea of implementing a mixed method approach is to therefore test the conditions previously identified in the QCA as mechanisms via case study analysis from a most dissimilar system design comparative approach. In this regard, chapter 5 will present the QCA analysis and results.

The remaining 4 chapters of the dissertation will present the four case study analyses which aim at testing the mechanism of interest which is informal institutions in the form of patronage networks[2]. These 4 chapters are composed of two cases of conflict and 2 cases of a peaceful trajectory. By using a least and a most likely case the explanatory strength of the mechanism increases. A most likely case represents a case in which there is confidence the mechanism is operating. Conversely, a least likely case represents a case in which the mechanism is thought to be present but to a lower extent, or it might not play any role in affecting the outcome. If the study of the most likely case reveals the presence of the mechanism, this evidence can further increase

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[2] Ideally a full evaluation of the theorised mechanisms would be undertaken. However due to time and plausibility constrains I focus on the mechanism of interest.

our confidence of the role of the mechanism in producing or facilitating the outcome Y. Furthermore, if the mechanism fails to be present in the most likely case then cross-case comparison will determine that the mechanism is likely to not have a significant impact across the whole population. The analysis of the least likely cases serves another purpose. If it is found on the least likely case it updates the confidence in the operation of the mechanism for the rest of the population. This approach also enables cross-case inference for the QCA population.

For the cases of conflict, inefficient distribution through patronage networks is found in the most likely case (Thailand) and it plays a strong role in producing the outcome. Thus, for the least likely case (India Bodo) it is present, but its effect is not as strong. Likewise, for the cases of a peaceful trajectory, the mechanism is found in both cases: Namibia and Bolivia. These results significantly update the confidence in informal redistribution being a key factor is producing a peaceful trajectory in conflict prone countries.

In this regard, Chapter 6 analyses the case of Thailand and the conflict in the Southern provinces of Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat as a most likely case. The Malay Muslims historically most associated with neighbouring Malaysia have been denied cultural rights such as speaking and teaching their language in schools, furthermore the region is highly economically deprived, and the Malays do not have any political participation. This represents salient horizontal inequalities. The Thai government in its attempt to coopt the region has used a forceful approach and till the 1980s it failed. Upon the 1980s and till 1988 General Prem Tinsulanonda rises to power and the strategy towards the south significantly changes. The region gets granted autonomy over security affairs and violence suddenly stops. Research into the causes of violence in Thailand has over-emphasized the effect that the creation of two institutions: the SBPAC and the CMP-43 had on decreasing violence. However, the effect of patronage networks being so important in Thailand has been left unexplained. Patronage networks provided a stabilizing effect in controlling the use of violence by Malays as a means of achieving demands. The significant change in the patronage network between the governments of General Prem Tinsulanonda and Thaksin Shinawatra in 2001 ultimately meant that the poorest Malay population which is the

one holding arms, was not able to receive any redistribution of economic assets, political participation or social services.

Chapter 7 discusses India's Bodoland conflict as a least likely case. It represents a least likely case because India has made considerable efforts in the integration of different ethnicities in the formal realm. For example, it holds a comprehensive ethnic political system and it uses policies such as Affirmative Action programmes to guarantee the participation of Scheduled Tribes. Since independence it has attempted to acknowledge and integrate the different ethnicities and to recognise the power from below. As for informality, patronage has been also present but in the Bodo case it has been non-redistributive. The struggle of the Bodo ethnicity in the North-eastern region has been a constant battle for the recognition of cultural rights and autonomy. The Bodos and Assamese elites within the state of Assam had a series of failed or unsatisfactory bargains which progressively led to the use of violence as the only means. Local panchayats a unit of decentralised government represented the opportunity for Bodos to access assets and to influence decision-making power but the low degree of Bodo integration and the ineffectiveness of Panchayats, impeded the distribution of patronage to the Bodo community.

Chapter 8 and chapter 9 analyse the cases of conflict avoidance with Namibia as a most likely case and Bolivia as a least likely case. Namibia has strong formal and informal mechanisms of power sharing and decision-making which recognise the authority of chiefs and patrons. The recognition of traditional authority has led to a hybridisation of the political system which has enhanced the legitimacy of the nation-state formal rules. Furthermore, ethnic disputes have been brought forward to the state as a product of the recognition of traditional leadership, which in itself remains informal. Namibia is a high ethnically fragmented country, the Ovambo ethnicity represents the majority and historically it has also been the most powerful group. SWAPO the freedom from colonisation force later became the ruling party and to date it has not ceased to do so. SWAPO has a Ovambo base, thus, according to Afrobarometer data, members of other ethnicities feel commonly treated unequally in spite of this, ethnic disputes have not become violent. The brightening point of the Namibia case is the process of formalisation which recognised the traditional

leadership of chiefs and patrons and incorporated it as a branch of the formal state, allowing also for covering and extending the state's arm.

Chapter 9 posits the discussion on Bolivia which is presented as a least likely case. Historically Bolivia has been ruled by the minority Mestizo elite. Mestizos were recognised as higher up in their position in the social strata during colonisation, whilst black communities and indigenous groups were treated as slaves and labourers. The indigenous groups although the majority, up until 2006 had never had political power. Furthermore, they represent the working class of the country being ethnicity a mutually reinforcing cleavage with class. Both of these criteria put Bolivia in a very vulnerable position which favours the proliferation of armed conflict. However, despite this, the country has managed to avoid violence. Informal mechanisms of distribution have been operating during the exclusive mestizo governments, the indigenous groups have been kept content not to fight. Thus, the character of patronage in Bolivia during the mestizo rule is inter-ethnic. The use of patronage has been continuously condemned by the nascent ethnic parties across the 1990s and by the MAS the movement later party which brought Evo Morales to power. Nonetheless, the indigenous now ruling elite continues to use patronage networks to informally redistribute.

Finally, Chapter 10 presents the conclusions, discussion and future areas of research the dissertation has identified. Patronage networks are evidenced to be an important channel o redistribution in illiberal democratic regimes. The QCA analysis and the further testing of mechanisms in the four cases leads me to conclude that informal institutions do matter and have the potential to serve as conflict drivers or as instruments to achieve peace. The dissertation further reveals some points of analysis and areas in which research needs to be expanded. For example, from a four-way case comparison, evidence in the relevance of decentralisation seems to be compelling, decentralised patronage networks are more efficient in controlling conflict than centralised ones if decision-making power can be accessed by the grieved group. Decentralised networks allow for a more efficient and effective redistribution which is able to reach the lower ends of the vertical scale. Furthermore, the impact of formalisation processes seems to be a promising area of research. Formalisation has been studied in the areas of land use and property rights but not to understand the

incorporation or recognition of traditional leadership as an instrument of legitimising the state and incorporating millennial informal institutions into contemporary formal ones. Finally, some insight into a potential balance between institutions which could impact the possibility of conflict has also been highlighted in the theoretical framework and as such represents another potential area of future research.

The dissertation further gives room to provide some policy recommendations in line with the conclusions highlighted above. Firstly, a greater degree of incorporation of traditional forms of leadership or ethnic-based organisations in ethnically diverse countries can be pursued. It has been shown that instances in which there is a sense of recognition, respect and autonomy pertaining traditional leadership or ethnic-based organisations show higher possibilities of peaceful conflict resolution. This recognition formally incorporates differences and accommodates them in the formal state structures, increasing not only trustworthiness in the state, but also extending its arm into rural or inaccessible places. A remarkable side effect of the recognition and incorporation of traditional leadership is also the targeting and tailoring of policies to what is most needed by the community. This can be materialised by implementing decentralisation policies. The evidence from the cases shows that decentralisation policies do increase the efficiency of informal distribution. Departing from the point that within illiberal democratic regimes patronage networks are a reality, it is imperative for these channels to be redistributive rather than non-redistributive an exclusionary. Decentralisation policies give districts the ability to control their assets and redistribute accordingly to their needs, besides, a centralised patronage network favours the pocketing of public assets into central elite's pockets.

Chapter 2.

Literature Review

As stated by Kalyvas (2007), Civil wars are complex multilayered events. It is impossible to identify a single unique cause of civil war; rather, violent conflict and in general manifestations of violence within a society are better understood as an outcome developed through a series of gradual events that when present mingle as necessary conditions, enabling the opportunity for producing contentious collective action.

Conflict onset research can be divided along 4 different trends: Inequality, Ethnicity, Economic performance including arguments of Resource scarcity/abundance and political organization. The most robust arguments come from the economic performance explanations, from the political organization explanations and recently from a new trend concerned with Horizontal Inequalities (Cederman, et al., 2011; Ostby, 2008; Cramer, 2003; Gluber & Selway, 2012). The present chapter will review the literature on conflict onset, surveying the four trends of explanations. Thus, despite this detailed classification of explanations, the general debate, which to some extent still dominates the discussion pertains to the division between greed vs grievance explanations. The present chapter will firstly discuss this common general debate, and secondly will present a review of the four trends of explanations.

Greed vs Grievance explanations of conflict onset

The most common debate within conflict studies depicts the division between greed-based explanations for conflict onset vs. grievance-based ones. This debate stems from the original work of Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (1994). The puzzle in this debate refers to the question of whether rebels are more likely to take arms based on a greed motivation or a grievance one. In other words, whether civil war breaks out where there is opportunity for it to do so or whether it is grievances as a motivation what fuels the desire of rebels to take up arms. Thus, essentially the debate aims to capture which side of the explanation is predominant or has more explanatory power.

On the greed side, research has highlighted the effect of poverty and deprivation, as well as the cost/opportunity of rebelling. On the grievance side, incentives such as political or social discrimination also foment the decision to rebel. Despite the debate aiming at identifying risk factors associated with either side of the debate (see for example: (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Blattman & Miguel, 2010; Cederman, et al., 2010), it is understood here that both motivation and opportunity are factors which need to be present in order for conflict to erupt.

Across the civil war onset literature, it is agreed that the most robust conclusion is that high income is associated with lack of violent conflict, and thus, in other words, that poverty is a strong variable in predicting the likelihood of conflict onset. However, it is also possible to identify a great variety of cases with upper middle income and where conflict still breaks out, and furthermore, cases of very low income in which conflict ceases to happen. This clearly demonstrates that the grievance aspect is strongly relevant, and that conflict can also be present in wealthy countries. Grievances are associated with the discrimination of sectors of the population in social, economic, political or cultural aspects, what is now understood as horizontal inequalities (Stewart, 2002).

Therefore, integrating the grievance aspect into the equation leads the debate into thinking that it is not the absolute wealth of a country what matters but how those resources are distributed (Koubi & Böhmelt, 2014). If great part of a wealthy nation's population is excluded from the redistribution of assets, opportunities, social services and political participation the discontent could drive people into taking up violent forms of action. In this regard, both greed and grievance aspects are relevant in explaining conflict onset; in fact, dyads of actors, motivation and opportunity are all common characteristics across the different theoretical statements to explain civil war; these characteristics can be understood as the upper layer of specificity from which one can start building up arguments.

Theories of conflict onset

As mentioned earlier in the text, it is possible to classify theoretical arguments for explaining civil war in 4 groups which are not mutually exclusive but rather interlocked:

1. **Inequality:** explanations range from economic inequality to more recently horizontal inequalities amongst different groups.
2. **Economic performance and resource abundance/scarcity:** in general, explanations in this area refer to the characteristic of the economy in terms of income, development and growth.
3. **Ethnicity:** refers to the arguments to explain civil war based on the heterogeneity or homogeneity of the population, contestation amongst groups and arguments in terms of polarization and ethnic salience.
4. **Political organization:** this group of theories intends to explain civil war evaluating the quality of the institutions and the type of the regime.

   1. Inequality

Inequality refers to the distribution and access to income resources. Inequality in the distribution of income state assets might increase the risk of civil war (Jakobsen, et al., 2013; Thies, 2010; Boix, 2008). However, research has been unable to find a significant relationship. A possible reason for this is the case of low quality data. The most common indicator, the Gini coefficient, has a severe missing data problem. Additionally, it is difficult to understand the relationship of inequality to civil war if individual data is used. This is because inequality might be there but relying on individual data does not reflect collective action. Also, empirically we are able to find countries which are highly unequal but nonetheless stable (eg. Brasil), meaning that inequality per se is not a reason for civil war to happen.

Inequality is civil war research is a money income variable which disregards access to opportunities and possibility of ameliorating the situation, independently from the quality of the economy. Taking poverty as an example, one cannot say that being poor

is a matter of income or that it can only be measured by income. More sophisticated analysis of poverty integrates the perception of multi-dimensionality in which poverty in defined not only by income but also by deprivation and vulnerability (Sen, 1992). In regards, to inequality something similar happens, it is not possible to define inequality just in terms of income, let alone explain a macro phenomenon as civil war just justifying the distribution of income; however, if we incorporate other ideas like the presence of inequality amongst groups in access to services and opportunities then the explanation becomes stronger.

In this vein, the inequality body of literature has incorporated another set of explanations that explain civil war through horizontal inequalities instead of focusing on vertical inequalities. The presence of social divisions such as religion or ethnicity paired with an exclusion from wealth or economic, social and political power is known as horizontal inequalities. Inequality results if the distribution of assets or jobs amongst contending groups significantly benefits some groups over the others. In fact, Horizontal inequalities can take the form of exclusion from political participation, economic asset exclusion, income and employment exclusion and/or social aspects exclusion -banned cultural practices, for example- (Cramer, 2003; Ostby, 2008).

The theoretical claims behind the horizontal inequality body of literature and its focus on inclusion / exclusion and equality of distribution along dimensions (political, social, cultural and economic), rather than mainly relying on income per capita, is able to provide a better explanation of civil war onset. Consequently, underlining conditions of exclusion from political control or economic asset distribution will create a motive for cohesion and will boost group identity (Stewart, 2000); identity and cohesion are able to overcome collective action problems.

Cederman et al. (2011) has found that political horizontal inequalities based on measures of ethnic group access to executive power are strong predictors of civil war, Gluber & Selway, (2012) has shown that ethnicity reinforced with social cleavages can make mobilization easier, solving the collective action problem.

Lindeman (2008) has also incorporated the analysis of horizontal inequalities to explain civil war onset. In his framework, horizontal inequalities are measured by the

degree of exclusion from public jobs. He argues as well that the presence of horizontal inequalities amongst the elites is able to reflect the horizontal inequalities amongst the contending groups.

In order to measure horizontal inequalities Lindeman takes a look at the distribution of public jobs along ethnic lines perceiving than inclusion is determined by the diversification of ethnic lineage present in public jobs, therefore, the more diverse the allocation of public jobs the more inclusive the elite bargain is.

The highlight of Horizontal inequalities is that it reclaims the importance of inequality in a framework which takes into account a much broader perspective of what inequality actually means, it considers the fact that inequality through exclusion is the element that boosts group identity and cohesion, explaining how inequality affects the motivation of actors to engage in violent warfare, therefore partially giving hints to the question of collective action, and incorporating grievance arguments into a purely economic explanation.

2. Economic Performance

Economic performance presents one of the most agreed on explanations for civil conflict onset. Across findings scholars have come to agree that development is an important variable in predicting or understanding civil war. Underdevelopment and a resource-based economy are both predictors of proneness to civil conflict.

Underdevelopment and poverty in the third world might be a product of colonization (Boix, 2008), a product of merely extractive institutions in place. Extractive institutions were built with the solely aim to plunder natural resources needed by the western colonial states, in fact, when the process of decolonization happens countries are left with a weak skeleton of institutions which in the medium and long term prevents the country from diversifying.

Income per capita has been used as a variable to predict civil war with robust results; however, literature is divided along the lines of whether income is a proxy for state

capacity (Fearon & Laitin, 2003) or a proxy for cost/opportunity (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002; Boix, 2008). This pertains the debate.

In fact, the robust results drawn from the literature are that, either way, income per capita does accurately predict civil war. Hegre (2003) using different databases for evaluating the relationship finds that at a threshold of US$ 1350 (1995) there are no civil wars happening in the second half of the XX century, a period where most of the civil wars are flourishing.

Therefore, in regards of development income per capita proxies the average income along the population, but nonetheless it does not reflect an accurate measure of poverty. Poverty not solely depends on income but also on opportunities and the capacity to achieve desires. This has been pointed out by Amartya Sen (1992)(1999) and the understanding of the capability approach. However, income does catch the essence of wealth (regardless of distribution) but distribution across classes or other socially differentiated groups is what drives conflict. As Koubi & Bohmelt (2014) point out, conflict can occur even at high levels of income if some groups are dissatisfied with their access to shares (Koubi & Böhmelt, 2014)

Poverty and development measured by income per capita reflect both explanations of cost/opportunity and state capacity. Theories that use income per capita as a proxy of state capacity evaluate how income is able to affect the decision of rebels to join or not a violent group. In this regard, citizens will be less likely to get involved in conflict if their income is high. Subsequently, as pointed out by Jakobsen et al. (2013), a low income will affect the decision of joining a rebel movement: people will join a fight if the benefit is greater than being in a regular job; in other words, increasing the income will mean that the utility of rebellion is less.

In terms of opportunity, as stated in (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002)(2004), opportunity is a function of greed, it reflects the possibility of acquiring wealth during the conflict mainly relying on looting of primary commodities and a subsequent desire to take control over the state revenues (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). In this interpretation, the state is seen as a price to conquer, as control over the state apparatus will be the ultimate goal (Boix, 2008). However, individuals who decide to rebel do not necessarily do so based on

mere economic greed incentives (Wood, 2003; Fearon, 2003). Pride, frustration, feelings of vengeance are all sentiments that rebels feel when deciding to engage in violent action. If there is a concentration of wealth in the state (as the price to conquer) and there is a lack of formal channels to change the status quo people are able to rebel not on grounds of opportunity but out of personal duty or as a need. A good example of this is creation and further armed rebellion of the M-19 in Colombia. As opposed to commonly inferred, the M-19 was mainly composed of highly educated academics. The core circles of the M-19 were recognized academics in diverse subjects like economics, journalism etc. The FARC has also been highlighted as an example of a guerrilla group which does not fit into the opportunist arguments (see (Gutierrez Sanin, 2004). Likewise, the insurgencies created in the Bodo rebellion in the state of Assam in India, are also not a product of opportunity.

Furthermore, a country with high income is able to reflect better institutions. These institutions are able to address grievances and provide more services to the citizens (Koubi & Bohmelt, 2013; Collier & Hoeffler, 2002), solid institutions are also a feature of development (Hegre, 2003). This reflects income per capita as a proxy for state capacity (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Jakobsen, et al., 2013; Regan & Bell, 2009). In this vein, a weak government makes insurgency more feasible as the counterinsurgency strategies are less efficient meaning that the military and police are weaker than in a high-income state. Income as state capacity is likely to reflect better state administration, and higher military and political capability. As Fearon and Laitin (2003) point out, a high income will proxy as well for state penetration in terms of roads and a spread and establishment of state institutions that cover basic services like health and education across the sovereign territory. Thies (2010), debates this argument as when changing the proxy for state capacity to fiscal abilities the relationship disappears, he concludes that high income is not an accurate proxy for state capacity. Thus, from the individual perspective, income per capita as a proxy of state capacity aims to reflect a condition in which the state is able to successfully repress and crush any insurrection that might threat the status quo, therefore the cost of rebelling for the individual is higher as its expectations in winning will be lower.

State capacity overlaps with the idea of state weakness from an economic perspective. However, it also falls short when explaining civil war as one can find many examples

of countries which are low income but still manage to avoid violent conflict: Tanzania, Burkina Faso, Mongolia. In this regard, the fact that the country reflects a low-income economy does not necessarily mean that violent action will take place.

Resources

Another important variant of the economic performance body of literature describes the effect that abundance of natural resources has on triggering civil war. Collier and Hoeffler (2002) greed and grievance model remarks the likelihood of civil war in countries dependent on primary commodity exports. However, Fearon (2005) debates the model as a further inspection of the data showed that the variables used lacked information for diamonds or drugs: both commodities[3] highly associated with plundering[4]. Resource literature has solved this problem by avoid using highly aggregated data (first generation of resource – civil war literature), likewise, a good explosion of research has resulted using fine-grain data and differentiating between lootable and non-lootable resources.

Different theories explore the link between resource abundance and conflict onset by providing different explanations. Firstly, commodity resources can enhance conflicts as they are perceived as a rebel opportunity for finance, making the state an attractive target (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002; Ross, 2006; Jakobsen, et al., 2013). Secondly, commodity resources can prevent conflict if the central government uses revenues for repressing uprising or armed insurrections: high income from commodities translates in an increased ability to repress based on abundance of resource revenue (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Basedau & Lay, 2009). Thirdly, resource revenue can lead to conflict based on dependency of commodity goods in regards of trade shocks (Boix, 2008). Research has mainly drawn partial conclusions on the exploitation of diamonds and oil as they are high profit resources in comparison with possible rents gained from other type of products, however, Boix (2008) states that agricultural commodities in Latin America and Africa are associated to civil conflicts, in specific to revolutionary wars.

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[3] Also because the range of countries dependent on primary commodity exports which have not suffer a civil war is far greater than those who have.
[4] Also the data when used with imputed data severely weaken the relationship.

In general terms, dependence and abundance of resources can produce a negative effect or a stabilizing effect, depending on how it is analyzed. Literature on the rentier state theory suggests that the rentier economy can produce a stabilizing effect in a conflict prone country (Smith, 2004). As Basedau & Lay (2009) argue, there are three possible mechanisms: firstly, the use of resource revenue operates through repression: the state authority invests in national security which enhances the capacity to repress; second, the revenues gained from the resource exploitation can be used to keep the opposition quiet and in place, this operates in the form of patronage networks, clientelism and corruption practices. This distribution is however selective; thirdly, the revenues can be used to buy off demands from the society or the opposition in the form of investment in public services; and finally, the stability of the regime depends on foreign support (Basedau & Lay, 2009).

Conversely, there are negative effects of resource abundance and dependence. The resource curse literature (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002; Humphreys, 2005) argues that the availability of lootable resources will stimulate violence. A dispute between the state and challenging groups can flourish as a fierce competition for controlling the resources. As mentioned earlier, asset specificity plays an important role here. Dependence on resources offers limited options to generate revenue from other activity (Boix, 2008) therefore; revenue from the exploitation of natural resources is the main means of generating income.

Additionally, the type of resource is an important feature in this body of literature: the difference between lootable and non lootable resources and also, the resource in itself: diamonds and oil being the most commonly resources associated to it. Non-lootable resources require a high amount of effort to be extracted whether technological or physical, which in turn should impede rebels from plundering as they do not hold economic or technological means to do so. Examples range from alluvial diamonds or secondary diamonds (Lujala, et al., 2005) to narcotics (Pizarro Leongómez, 2004). However, in this case there is also a possibility for plundering by demanding rents from private exploitation companies (Fearon, 2005; Pizarro Leongómez, 2004). Lootable resources on the other hand, must be easy to access and most of the times are

geographically specific meaning that the rebel group would aim to control and isolate the chunk of territory.

Despite this classification the body of literature remains inconclusive. (Humphreys 2005; Snyder & Bhavnani, 2005) argue that it is not resources per se but another set of interfering variables. Fearon, (2005) have found no relationship, whereas (Smith 2004; Thies, 2010; Basedau & Lay, 2009; Lujala, et al., 2005; Collier & Hoeffler, 2002) have found strong positive relationships, although Lujala finds relationships just for incidence but not for onset.

Summing up, the economic performance literature reflects again: highly aggregated data but it remains as one of the most robust body of literature. Thus, what remains interesting is whether the effect of economic performance still holds for smaller comparisons.

3. Ethnicity

Research on ethnic explanations for civil wars had its peak during the 1990's. As other areas of research on civil war onset ethnic explanations have been inconclusive. However, some advancement has been taking place, ranging from the different theoretical statements in regards of fractionalization, polarization or dominance through to horizontal inequalities. In part, the relevance of this theoretical framework relies on the importance of rescuing the significance that grievance explanations should have, due to the fact that economic explanations of conflict onset have been more explored that the psychological and sociological explanations.

Research is divided amongst primordialist and modernist theories (Blattman & Miguel, 2010; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Blimes, 2006; Schneider & Wiesehoimeier, 2008). Primordialists stress the importance of cultural biological similarities amongst individuals which affect the psychological nature of ethnicity. On the other hand, modernists' arguments highlight the influence economic modernization and the development of the modern nation-state have had in shaping identity patterns amongst the population (Blattman & Miguel, 2010). As Blimes (2006) points out ethnicity can also be understood as cleavages that have been formed due to historical

events. Modernists, instrumentalists and constructivists depart from the same idea: ethnicity being a product of economic and political change across 200-500 years (Fearon & Laitin, 2003, p. 76).

Horowitz (1985) explains the relation of ethnicity to civil wars by proposing it is a monotonic relationship, in which at high degrees of homogeneity civil war is less likely as well as in high heterogeneous societies. Homogeneity explains by itself; there are no cleavages amongst the population meaning that there is an overall cohesion and less chances of grievances amongst groups. On the other hand, heterogeneity decreases the likelihood of civil war because high heterogeneity impedes collective action.

Civil war literature departs upon this point; the first studies explain civil war causes using fractionalization indexes. Fearon and Laitin (2003) find that fractionalization does not explain civil war; in fact, they conclude that it is the context conditions that encourage people to fight not their ethnic lines. Their results show that amongst the poorest countries in which civil war is more frequent, ethnicity seems to be not predominant as there is a higher degree of homogeneity among these countries. Also, they find that moving across per capita income regardless of ethnic heterogeneity is the indicator that alters the odds of civil war. Pairing these conclusions, they suggest that the production of violence is a result of conditions that favor insurgency rather than grievance-wise motivations. In a similar vein Schneider & Wiesehoimeier (2008) argue that at high levels of heterogeneity collective action might be hard to achieve. A highly fractionalized society will indicate a higher number of veto players; therefore, collective action becomes a problem as there is no common ground for agreements or a forthcoming coordinated action.

Elligsen (2000) however, argues that heterogeneity substantially increases the possibility of conflict, thus results emphasize that the likelihood increases for small scale conflicts, and to a lesser degree for civil wars; (Hegre & Sambanis, 2006) also conclude this. Additionally, Lujala, et al. (2005) suggests that the looting of secondary diamonds as a means of finance for insurgents positively affects the incidence of civil war, the diamond effect holds depending on the level of fractionalization, affecting more ethnic conflicts.

Reynal-Querol (2005) and also Bahvnani & Miodownik (2009), highlight that it is polarization as opposed to fractionalization what can transform existing tensions into armed actions. Therefore, a second body of literature explores the effect that polarization instead of fractionalization can have on civil war.

Reynal-Querol (2005) examines this relation in highly heterogeneous countries in respect to religion. She argues that religion as a differentiating feature of heterogeneity increases the likelihood of civil wars; this is because religious differences are harder to negotiate (Reynal-Querol, 2002, p. 32). Additionally, the relationship holds stronger if the tensions are amongst animist religions. Furthermore, Bahvnani & Miodownik (2009) develops a model to measure ethnic salience and ethnic polarization, concluding that ethnic polarization can explain the incidence of civil war; the effect however is dependent or moderated by the degree of ethnic salience.

Other studies have focused instead on ethnic dominance. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) stress that proneness to civil war increases in societies in which there is a particular dominance from one group in relation to another. Hegre & Sambanis (2006) sensitivity analysis further confirms this. Additionally, Regan & Bell (2009) argue that heterogeneity in countries where "the largest ethnic group constitutes half of the population" are twice as much vulnerable to civil war. Still there is no agreement amongst the literature as (Reynal-Querol, 2002; Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2005) contradict this theoretical statement, arguing that dominant groups are able to deter political violence, therefore, dominance is expected to lower the chances of civil war instead of enhancing them.

Although cleavages among the society seem to be an important predictor of civil war, it is not per se the heterogeneity, polarization of fractionalization of the society. I believe that it is the relationship that the ethnic groups have with the elite circles and the state, and how the state redistributes its wealth amongst them. The inclusion through formal (political institutions) of informal (patronage networks) channels will reduce the chances of grievance amongst contending groups as being part of the distribution is a better deal than fighting. Nonetheless, if the distribution does not take

place or if it is perceived as not trustworthy or real then the population will be affected gradually and might escalate into choosing violent means to achieve ends.

Ethnicity can be understood as glue that holds together parts of the society. Single individuals are restricted to achieve ends by their own; therefore, clustering into groups is a better alternative to claim benefits or privileges. Acting as a group provides higher bargaining power and also seems more attractive for the patron or elite to bargain with, as the patron or the elite is able to make promises in a broader way (Chandra, 2007). Therefore, it is a better alternative to bargain in groups as in this way each part of the dyad is able to win, thus in an asymmetrical way. The bargain between the group and the elite provides the ethnic group with a higher chance of compliance and enforcement, if the elite does not deliver then the ethnic group has a lot more power to demand than if the negotiation had been taken individually. In the same vein, it is easier for the patron or the elite to reward collectively, or it can also punish collectively if it wishes to do so.

Consequently, I believe that patterns of inclusion in the redistributive network whether formal or informal is the key to understanding violence potential. If contending groups manage to find a way to bargain in the distribution network and enjoy the distribution of assets and jobs then, the chances of civil war lessen. In the same vein, if elites exclude powerful groups from power then the sense of identity present in ethnicity paired with the sentiment of grievance derived from being excluded can significantly increase the potential for collective action.

4. Political organization and Institutions

Literature on political organization and institutions and their relationship to civil war has mainly focused its attention to democracy. It has tried to embrace causes of civil war from the grievance perspective, instead of assuming mainly greed-based explanations. It is certainly important to notice that grievances amongst the population cannot be taken out of the equation when calculating likelihood of civil war. As highlighted above, economic explanations although robust are strongly intertwined with political grievances and also with the way in which the state is organized and operating.

Political organization explanations range from: first, the type of the regime: being democracy, autocracy or a combination of the two (Gleditsch, et al., 2007; Hegre, et al., 2001; Goldstone, et al., 2010; Zakaria, 1997; Carothers, 2002). Second, the political system: whether proportional or majoritarian, or presidential vs. parliamentary (Wegenast, 2013). And third: the quality of institutions, whether strong, stable and capable; or weak, unstable and unable to address demands (Fearon & Laitin, 2003).

Pertaining the type of the regime, a vast amount of research has associated the hybridity of regimes to a higher likelihood of conflict onset. The most cited findings refer to the idea that democracies are: highly stable regimes in which the provision of public goods is effective, there is a protection of civil rights and freedoms are respected (Wegenast, 2013). They generally hold a higher per capita income in which elites do not feel threatened because institutions are solid and reliable, guaranteeing enforcement of economic and property rights (Snyder & Mansfield, 2004). They also facilitate effective bargaining to achieve consensual agreements reducing credible commitment problems (Havard, 2013) and facilitating peaceful collective action (Vreeland, 2008). All features that decrease the possibility of conflict onset.

On the other hand, autocracies are highly restrictive regimes and highly repressive. They are capable of maintain order because high revenue provides them with the possibility to repress dissidents; likewise, they are able to buy off opposition in the form of redistributing through patronage networks or investment in populist social programmes. In these regimes opportunities to organize are also limited; therefore, collective action is difficult to achieve (Vreeland, 2008). These features also decrease the probability of conflict onset.

The category in the middle appears to be a mixture of both types of regimes, commonly referred as: anocracies, illiberal democracies or semi democracies which are understood amongst the literature as: open somewhat repressive: a mix of regimes which both invites to protest and rebellion but also facilitates repression (Hegre, et al., 2001). Weak institutions are also present: unable to moderate political debate or offer opportunity to channel demands. They gravitate towards zero-sum –winner takes all- outcomes (Regan & Bell, 2009). They represent systems in which the executive is

elected by popular vote but elections might not be free, competitive or fair (Goldstone, et al., 2010); they also represent a mixture of political forces that makes them unable to crush opposition (Fearon & Laitin, 2003); they ignore constitutional liberalism and deprive basic rights to the citizenry (Zakaria, 1997).

This terminology within the literature is used interchangeably, with no apparent different defining characteristics between what an anocracy, an illiberal democracy or a semi democracy is (see for example: (Hegre, et al., 2001; Goldstone, et al., 2010; Vreeland, 2008). Thus, despite this, within the categorization of this type of regime there is a diverse amount of defining characteristics which, each on its own, has its own categorical clusters or spectrum. It is understood here that a full democracy, in order to be so has to be both electoral and liberal. The liberal aspect of a democracy is fundamental. Democracies which lack the liberal aspect are not full democracies but rather another type of democracy, what is understood here as illiberal democracy. This type of regimes are democracies by law but not in practice, *de jure* democracies but not *de facto*, democracies in which there are elections, but civil rights might not be protected, and competition might not be free and fair. As Larry Diamond (2002) points out, this hybrid zone can also present a different balance of the authoritarian and democratic aspects across different regimes, ranging from electoral democracy through to hegemonic electoral authoritarianism (Diamond, 2002, pp. 6-7). Diamond's classification approach refers to illiberal democracies as simply electoral.

The use of anocracy as the most commonly used terminology to refer to this type of regime remains ambiguous in its definition. Although is clearly refers to the same common characteristic pertaining the mixture of autocratic and democratic features it does so particularly referring to the rules of the game rather than the practice of the game within the civil society. Anocracy derives mainly from the Polity IV project which codes authority characteristics of regimes. Polity IV project evaluates three main aspects of regimes: executive recruitment, executive constrains, and political competition (Marshall & Gurr, 2017). However, the only descriptive aspect pertaining the implementation of democracy in regards of the civil society is political participation. This aspect within the polity IV project evaluates the regulation of participation and the extent of government restriction on political competition. Referring to the latter, it evaluates whether there is opportunity to 'pursue alternative preferences for policy and

leadership in the political arena.' (Marshall & Gurr, 2017, p. 26). Thus, once again it does so by evaluating the rules of the game.

This therefore ignores regimes in which political competition is allowed by law but in practice it is actually not possible to achieve, as for example in South Africa, Colombia under the Frente Nacional or Venezuela during the treaty of Punto Fijo. Anocracy derived and explained by the Polity IV variables, as a concept is ambiguous in that it does not actually recognize the illiberal aspect of a democracy as understood by the implementation of democracy in practice. Following this point, despite both terms being used interchangeably within the literature, a preference for illiberal democracy is strict for the present research. Thus, despite the necessity of a better approach to identify illiberal democracies, a great amount of research has associated this type of regime to a higher probability of conflict onset.

In regards to this classification, scholars have argued that the relationship between civil war onset and democracy is described as an inverted U shape, in which to the sides of the spectrum: democracy and autocracy there is less probability of civil war onset. In the middle, were we see the mixture of features from both extremes, is where civil war is more likely to happen (Goldstone, et al., 2010; Regan & Bell, 2009; Hegre, et al., 2001). This is because illiberal democracies are able and open to competition but are unable to guarantee it.

Some other scholars discredit these findings, they argue that there is a positive correlation between illiberal democracies and civil war onset because of the data used in the econometric models. Most of the studies calculating level of democracy use the Polity IV database; however, the characteristics associated to an illiberal democracy are classified as a regime in which violence is present. This means that there is a tautological relationship in place: civil war is likely where there is civil war (Gleditsch, et al., 2007; Cederman, et al., 2010; Vreeland, 2008).

Likewise, using the polity scale to draw conclusions on illiberal democracies seems also problematic. A regime to be cataloged as illiberal (or anocratic according to the Polity scale) has to achieve a score between -5 and +5 having the polity scale a total of 20 points. Therefore, democracy just covers 5 points of the scale (+6 to +10), the

same as autocracies (-4 to -10); whereas anocracies cover a full 10 point range of the scale. I think this also affects the possibility of identifying illiberal democracies as related to civil war. In addition to this, missing data is a problem. There is a great chance that cases of missing data in any of the Polity variables will lead to a decrease in the general score for the country; consequently, leading to the classification of the regime as anocratic.

Nonetheless, these results although badly measured are not necessarily wrong. Hegre (2003) points out to the relevance of development as an intervening variable. He argues that the stabilizing effect of democracy only holds for high income countries and countries with high levels of literacy (p. 3). Likewise, autocracies with a high level of GDP per capita have sufficient income to buy off opposition in the form of patronage or social investment, or to effectively repress. Therefore, democracies in poor countries will tend to be less efficient for conflict resolution as they will need more money to maintain stability. Additionally, institutions are weaker in channeling and addressing demands, and the opportunity for authoritarian practices as repression is likely. Consequently, there is a high probability for a conflict to be triggered. In Hegre's words "low income democracies are unstable because they are poor and this instability often leads to armed conflict" (p 21).

Moreover, the debate along this research framework embodies further questions beyond whether it is the type of regime that can trigger a conflict. In this vein, there is an interest in understanding if it is transitions (as regime change) that make the state vulnerable to uprising, or whether it is the presence of weak institutions which is also characteristic of illiberal democracies.

Regan & Bell, (2009) posit the question to analyze if an increasing risk is associated to a process of regime change: a transition. Transitions can be from democracy to autocracy or vice versa. The authors discard the thesis of being prone to conflict because of practicing illiberal democratic practices. They suggest that if that is the case, then the more an anocratic regime endures, the more the probability that a civil war will take place (Regan & Bell, 2009, p. 5). In this vein, it is a regime change that enhances the likelihood of civil war where transitions from anocracy to democracy represent a higher risk as opposed to transitions from autocracy to anocracy.

Mansfield and Snyder (2005) find that the process of democratization implies a general mobilization of demands -institutional or physical- which newly political institutions might not be ready to address. Based on this argument, Cederman, et al. (2010) finds out that democratization and autocratization both operate at different speeds: "democratization requires some time for mobilization to produce civil war; the collapse of rule is generally associated with more or instant outbreaks of political violence" (p. 387). These findings further support regime change as having the ability to increase civil war proneness.

Gleditsch, et al., (2007) analyses motivations. Assuming that democratization and autocratization operate in the same manner, he points out that in a process of democratization existing grievances might become more salient as the opening process might not be enough or fast enough to reduce all the relevant group motivations. Also, a process of democratization might instigate the elites to organize violent action in a quest for recovering the status quo.

In the same vein, Hegre, et al. (2001) argues that the youth of a democracy through a transition determines its proneness to conflict. The level of democracy and the closeness of a regime change are significant in explain civil war onset.

Finally, in regards of transitions, Snyder & Mansfield (2004) argue that not all democratic transitions are dangerous. However, it is the type of institutions that affect the likelihood of civil war. When a transition takes place the lack of strong institutions impedes the democratizing process to work. Weak institutional frameworks lack rule of law and the guarantee of fair and competitive elections. The authors further argue that before institutions of public accountability are in place the risk of cooptation by elites is greater, augmenting the chances of violence.

For democratization to work constitutional liberalism has to be guaranteed by the rule of law, the separation of powers and the protection of liberties. Brett (2010) suggests that in developed nations, as in Western societies, constitutional liberalism was achieved before states became democratic. Britain and France both reached constitutional liberalism before attaining democracy: first they achieved security; then they developed a solid system of tax collection; afterwards, the rule of law commanded the relationships within the society and between the society and the state; after that,

the state was in capacity to achieve growth policies and finally democracy was developed and solidified. What happens in process of democratization into illiberal democracies is that the equation goes the other way around (and in the presence of weak institutions): Democracy – Growth policies – Rule of law – Tax collection system – Security (Zakaria, 1997; Brett, 2010). This situation leaves the state in a weak position to guarantee an environment in which democracy is able to provide its benefits as a political regime.

Consequently, it is weak institutions that determine high probability of civil war in illiberal regimes rather than transitions. Blattman & Miguel, (2010) argue that legal institutions should supposedly enforce commitments, thus, in the presence of weak institutions few check and balances and constrains on the executive are in place, allowing commitments to become vulnerable. Therefore, weak state capacity and limited legal infrastructure favors conflict. Fearon and Laitin (2003) further stress that it is the conditions that favor insurgency what actually affects the possibility of conflict erupting, conditions include a weak government in which there is a lack of resources to repress or to address civil society demands.

There are two possible explanations for this to happen. As mentioned earlier illiberal democracies are unable to control challenges to the central government as they lack state capacity understood as weakness in the institutions; secondly, rebellion would be more likely as resource mobilization is allowed but there is not a guarantee for peaceful opposition (Regan & Bell, 2009).

Following Snyder (2000), institutional arrangements will reflect a power struggle in which exclusion from the power structure and exclusion from the distribution of resources alters the option to choose violence over peaceful means. Resource mobilization happens with changes in the institutional framework, if groups feel excluded or feel and increase in power for another group then violence might erupt as there are no other plausible means to achieve demands (Thies, 2010). In regard of election as a possibility for changes in the resource distribution, in illiberal democratic regimes there might be possibility for an elected incumbent to cancel a subsequent election; this might provide strong sentiment to rebel "if the loss is accompanied by a high distrust of the winner" (Gleditsch, et al., 2007, p. 10). In countries in which there

is a high sentiment of identity amongst groups the chances of mobilization are higher (Jakobsen, et al., 2013), therefore, falling into conflict might be more likely in these cases.

Grievances can grow as exclusion from political power will reflect a chosen unwillingness to redistribute resources or to integrate society. In addition to this, as Jakobsen, et al., (2013) points out: if the size of the excluded groups can approximate those in power then the chances of violence are greater as there is an opportunity to win.

Analyzing other arguments, poor countries with illiberal democratic regimes will be more likely to experience civil war. As Cederman, et al., (2010) points out the state in low income countries is all decisive; therefore, exclusion from decision-making in regards of government jobs and/or military, police jobs will enhance the probability of taking up arms as a product of marginalization. Also, lower capital mobility as explained earlier, in the form of dependence from commodities: non-mobile capital will also affect the possibility of civil war if exclusion takes place. Poor people as in agrarian revolutions will most likely rebel as the only means of survival are coopted by a few, thus, this cooptation – and further exclusion- in the form of economic resources is paired with exclusion in political power then the chances of civil war are greater (Colombia serves as an example of this).

These set of theoretical statements also seem to hold when addressing them from the other side of the spectrum: inclusion. In political systems in which strong coalitions are in place the likelihood of civil war shows to be lower (Gleditsch, et al., 2007; Reynal-Querol, 2002). The level of inclusiveness affects the likeliness of civil war. This also holds from the ruler's perspective. Elites in the central government which hold inclusionary agreements in place and act united are better able to avoid conflicts; also stable cooperative groups achieve low cost mechanisms for distributing property rights (Blattman & Miguel, 2010).

On the other hand, regimes which are undermined by extreme elite division, no cooperation and political conflicts within the state; are more likely to be unable to avoid or constrain a revolution. This idea is supported by (Goldstone, et al., 2010) arguing

that the opportunity for rebellion increases when politics and participation are plagued by factionalism. Factionalism is understood as "a certain kind of relationship among political elites in which a polarized politics of exclusive identities or ideologies is in conjunction with partial democracy institutions" (p.198).

Furthermore, Boix, (2008) argues that as the concentration of wealth declines, elites will have to work together, associate with each other in order to be able to reassert the status quo (p. 8). In this vein, if revolution happens then the elites will choose to not fight each other even if the costs of repression are low.

Briefly, inclusionary agreements at the elite level will benefit elites keeping power; and if the patronage network widens to benefit every interest in the unity of the elites then the likelihood of civil war would be lower as inclusionary elite agreements will avoid a predatory government which only serves sectional interests.

It is possible to say that inclusion / exclusion factors can be associated to the rules in place; consequently, arguments in regards of proportional representation as opposed to majoritarian have also provided explanations to this phenomenon.

In this regard, proportional systems tend to avoid civil war more likely that majoritarian systems.   Power sharing institutions have the potential to decrease the risk of violent uprising in diversified societies (Wegenast, 2013) (Schneider & Wiesehoimeier, 2008) (Reynal-Querol, 2002), also they encourage coalition politics that might help prevent ethnic wars. A case study undertaken by Wilkinson 2004 as cited in (Schneider & Wiesehoimeier, 2008) illustrates that the exclusion of powerful groups from power in Indian states increased violence and illegal militancy (p. 3).

In this vein, social tensions are lowered when inclusion rules are in place, for proportional systems there is –at least by rule- a guarantee that all minority groups will be represented. At the level of the elites what matters is that being guaranteed a proportional representation will motivate them to work together in order to soften cleavages along the whole civil society, which in turn will help them maintain their status.

On the other hand, also (Schneider & Wiesehoimeier, 2008) points out, that the more exclusive the rules of a polity are the more conflict-prone it becomes, this happens because excluded groups prefer to use violence as there are not even reasons to participate in democracy. Subsequently, majoritarian systems reflect a set of exclusive rules and provide a logic of 'winner takes all' which with strong tensions in place is able to trigger violence (Wegenast, 2013). In addition, both (Wegenast, 2013) and (Schneider & Wiesehoimeier, 2008) suggest decentralization or federalism will reduce the likelihood of civil war.

Summing up, illiberal democratic systems seem to be more prone to civil war, hence, the focus of the theoretical frameworks have just focused on the formality of institutions, that is: the state and the political system in itself. Indeed, reasons for believing illiberal democracies tend to fall into conflict easily than democracies and autocracies seems very plausible. However, how do we explain cases of conflict prone countries with illiberal democratic regimes that successfully avoid violence? Illiberal democratic regimes have a remarkable characteristic associated with the strength of informal networks. Most of these regimes operate efficiently informally, through patronage networks and personal ties, supplying state services and efficiently redistributing wealth throughout groups. This specific characteristic that is less likely appreciated in democracies and autocracies (present but to a much lower extent) remains a very important feature in studying illiberal democracies and their proneness to civil war onset.

In fact, analyzing both formal and informal institutional frameworks and evaluating (re)distribution patterns will give us the answer to understand why some illiberal democracies do successfully avoid conflict. Inclusion through elite bargaining can also be perceived informally, reflecting the importance of the personal social relationships amongst the population.

Chapter 3.
Theoretical Framework

As highlighted on the previous chapter, theories of civil war are in need of alternative models. Although the research is extensive, the different theoretical frameworks have remained elusive in finding systematic causes for this phenomenon. Economic performance literature has found that the degree of development significantly affects the possibility for civil war to happen, thus, the analysis leaves behind the political process through which economic policies are implemented and also how decision-making can change the course of development or economic growth and the distribution across different societal groups.

On the other hand, political organization theoretical frameworks suffer from the same syndrome they are mainly focused on structural issues. Again, we can affirm that regime type does affect the probability of civil war, as pairing illiberal democratic regimes with civil war onset does shows a higher level of incidence. But what is it about these regimes that make them prone to conflict? The institutions and structural framework are also affected by agents and how these agents change or exercise decision-making power. In fact, agents are the ones who shape institutions therefore; taking a look solely at structures impedes analyzing patterns of change, whether positive or negative in the short term. Furthermore, it is not only the visible part of the structural framework what matters. Informal mechanisms of inclusion/exclusion in the form of patronage networks represent the hidden part of the spectrum of institutions which are likely to be prevalent in illiberal democratic regimes. In this regard, the systematic exclusion of these institutions in contemporary research; restricts the analysis of what drives political behaviour in such regimes and the societies of interest. Furthermore, literature has highlighted the impact of excluding portions of the society from political participation or economic assets. Thus, a closer look and an analysis of the processes of both formal inclusion and exclusion reveals that there are also instances in which formal inclusion is present yet redistribution is restricted; or more interestingly, instances in which there is formal exclusion of portions of the society but

yet this segments are informally included by their integration in patronage networks, a process that mainstream literature has so far ignored. This further reveals an interesting point in the argument, the fundamental difference between inclusion and redistribution.

In terms of social cleavages, it seems that it is not ethnicity or religious diversity per se what increases the possibility of civil war, but the degree of redistribution to contending groups whithin the different (re)distribution networks. This is because it is possible to find cases in which there is high polarization or salience amongst ethnic or religious lines but nonetheless peaceful societies.

As the literature review depicts, there is significant disagreement across the effect of different variables; nonetheless, there are some general points of agreement. The degree of development for example represents one point of agreement, the type of the regime also generates general agreement, and furthermore, the impact of horizontal inequality seems also to be one of the highlight points in the literature. Due to the perception of the general agreement in the literature across these points, in my opinion they represent key factors to be analyzed in more detail; and perhaps also detaching from quantitative models that remain elusive on causality.

Departing from this point and delimiting the research it is possible to analyze, as a secondary Research Question: how do horizontal inequalities operate in illiberal democracies and does the degree of development play any part in this? Thus, as it will be shown later in the methodology chapter, attempting to explain causality rather than establishing a correlation but still aiming at finding systematic mechanisms drives the selection of cases to a narrower approach rather than a large N. When doing this (see Chapter 4: Methodology), the effect of income and development loses its explanatory power.

The focus on the units of analysis which are of interest also reveals and important factor. The theoretical statements seem to systematically ignore the reality of how politics are exercised in these states. In this regard, none of the studies considers the effect of informal institutions and how these can affect the possibility of conflict. Across the 1980s some literature on patrimonialism (Bayart, 2009) (Médard, 1982) (Clapham,

1982) (Migdal, 1988) (Allen, 1995)mainly for Africa, developed key arguments as to how patronage networks work. Thus, more recent updates on this body of literature have produced a clearer insight into the politics of these networks (see for example: (Chabal & Daloz, 2010) (Van de Walle, 2001) (Erdmann & Engel, 2007) The relevance of this type of institutions is undeniable yet in contemporary research, undermined. In this regard, it is the aim of this thesis to explain conflict onset and trajectories of peace in illiberal democracies by demonstrating the relevance of this institutional framework and its ability to trigger violence as well as aiding to produce peaceful trajectories.

Patronage networks operate as key channels of distribution amongst pre-modern societies. It represents the classical form of organization and redistribution which, when challenged with modernization through processes of decolonization or the formation of a nation-state, instead of disappearing has adapted to accommodate changes in the broader political context. This way of organization did not fade but instead it was preserved as informal institutions. Its influence over the formal structures of the state is staggering in most of the developing world, and thus its relevance and study has somehow been neglected. The study of informal institutions in the form of patronage networks is of utmost importance as it does not idealize politics in the third world[5], but instead, it recognizes the shortcomings and aims to establish ways in which these flaws can be used for better results, such as aiding to control violence.

Adding to the point above and evaluating the nature of informal institutions such as patronage networks and their character in relation to formality in the form of illiberal democracy, it is imperative to highlight that patronage networks can be regarded as both exogenous and endogenous to illiberal democracy. Thus, discerning from the main debates strictly differentiating between the exogenous or endogenous nature of institutions, it is understood here that institutions if tracked across time can be both

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[5] Most of the studies and policy recommendations in terms of conflict and development have been to reform the state expecting illusory results. However, the reality of how politics is conducted, how resources are redistributed has been completely ignored. Furthermore, in terms of corruption policy recommendations and reforms expect to achieve results for which the formal structure simply does not have the maturity for. Reaching maturity is a process, as Douglas North has pointed out; the gradual passing from Limited Access orders to Open Access orders (North, et al., 2009)

endogenous and exogenous, understanding them as either is not contradictory in itself (Carey, 2000); the present case of patronage networks is a perfect example. As mentioned above, informal institutions in the form of patronage networks date from pre-modern time, they represent a response to problems of collective action, they were developed independently to formal institutions and were put into practice in response to various challenges and needs of organisation pertaining efficiency and the need for reduced transactions costs and clear information. The conditions which gave birth to these institutions' pre-date the formal institutional context and in that regard are regarded as exogenous.

Examining institutional path in the developing world and the creation of the nation-state, informal institutions such a patronage networks could have been used as the foundations of the new formal institutions or formal institutions might also have been created disregarding informal institutions, see: (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004) (as per also, cases of formalisation vs cases of no formalisation); thus, the nature of a pre-existing institutional framework is in itself exogenous. However, upon the moment of creation of the nation-state and the design and instauration of a formal political regime, most commonly under colonisation but not solely; the nature of the informal institution can now be regarded as endogenous as it accommodates itself to the new rules of the game. It does not disappear and most commonly it is not absorbed but instead, it remains playing behind the scenes. The preservation of these institutions and the motivation of the actors to try and alter the formal institutional framework as conditions change, within a formal institutional framework entails that informal institutions are also endogenous.

Furthermore, the need to substitute or enhance the efficiency of formal institutions can be regarded as the reason why actors continue to use informal institutions such as patronage networks under formal rules of the game. As Helmke & Levistky (2004) point out in their theorisation of informal institutions there are three possible motivations why actors choose to continue to follow informal rules: 1. Formal institutions might be incomplete, 2. formal institutions might be second best strategy for actors who prefer but can't achieve a formal institution solution, 3. And, the pursuit of goals not publicly acceptable (Helmke & Levistky, 2004, p. 730) . In this regard, pertaining illiberal democracies patronage networks are regarded as endogenous.

Despite the existence of formal mechanisms of rule making, actors still chose to follow informal rules in their quest to maximise efficiency, in fact, each actor is free to choose which institutions to use, in the case of illiberal democracies the stregth of informality is undeniable.

Furthermore, in line with the findings on political organisation, it has been widely accepted that illiberal democracies or hybrid regimes are the type of regime with the highest rate of conflict onset (Regan & Bell, 2010)(Goldstone, 2010)(Hegre, 2001) (Vreeland, 2008), they represent the unit of analysis in the present research. As mentioned before, within illiberal democratic regimes there is a great deal of informality playing behind the scenes. Because illiberal democracies do not function as full democracies, the institutions in place are unable to cope with the demands and obligations of a full democracy. This characteristic further allows for alternative institutions to persist and evolve, the fragility of rule enforcement further favours the proliferation of informal institutions; hence, informal institutions are not always operating in conflicting direction to formal ones (Helmke & Levistky, 2004). I understand regime types as a spectrum in which there is a differentiated balance between formal and informal institutions which is also dependent on the type of the regime. In this regard, horizontal inequality as a product is also affected by the degree of redistribution undertaken through informal channels of distribution. The present theory will focus on ethnic conflict onset within illiberal democracies and how horizontal inequality through informal institutions can affect violence being triggered or controlled.

From a historical neoinstitutionalist perspective I aim to present a theory which can, not only explain the impact of informal institutions as a driver of conflict but that can also explain institutional paths. This can be achieved by looking at the decisions undertaken by the elites in power and how that affects the outcome of choosing violence as a potential form of action. Elite bargains represent a very important variable in decision-making. In fact, elite bargaining is what determines in the short term the evolution of structures. From bargaining amongst influential groups, is how the design of institutions is achieved. Decisions taken influence future outcomes, also if decisions involve legislation in terms of creation of institutions, modifications to existing institutions, or changes in the status quo then those decisions have the

potential to create a nodal point from which further institutional evolution will depart. Therefore, elite bargaining is a key point in understanding patterns of violence as decisions at the level of the elites have the potential to strongly affect the masses in terms of agitation or problem solving (Lindemann, 2010) (Lindemann, 2008). In this regard, it would be advantageous to provide explanations which also account for the failure/success of the process of decision-making. A two-level theory which evaluates mechanisms at the structural and agency levels is therefore, presented here. Elites are expected to bargain for structural changes, thus, the process of decision-making also interferes in the delivery or plausibility of those structural changes.

Conceptual framework:

As stated by (Kalyvas, 2006), armed conflicts are complex multi-layered events. The manifestation of violence is better understood as an outcome developed through a series of events that when present mingle as sufficient or necessary conditions; creating an opportunity for contentious collective action. In an elite bargaining model of ethnic conflict onset, the structured outcome results from the process of decision-making and from the institutional framework in place. This provides us with two levels of analysis which are systematically related to each other. The structural level or basic level and the agent or secondary level (Goertz & Mahoney, 2005) (Schneider & Wagemann, 2010). The agency level is linked by a causal relationship to the primary – structural- level. The secondary level conditions are causes of causes which explain why there is disagreement over the allocation of resources. Furthermore, it is possible to understand the agent causes as mechanisms of the structures (Goertz & Mahoney, 2005). Most explanations of conflict onset rely heavily on structural factors; however, these explanations fall short in explaining the causal link between distant structural causes and the outcome.

I define elite bargains as: "Elite bargain is a relationship[6] of power in which privileges[7], rights[8] and assets are distributed amongst organizations[9] in representation of

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[6] Relationship can be personal or impersonal, that is, in a context in which everyone is treated equally (impersonal)(formal) and/or in a context in which the relationship is selective (personal)(informal)
[7] Selective within Limited Access orders (North, et al., 2009)
[8] Equal to everybody as open access orders (North, et al., 2009)
[9] Organizations are the ones who are able to take opportunities.

contending groups[10]". In an elite bargain model of civil war, the structured outcome results from the process of decision-making and also depends on the institutional framework in place. In this vein, bargaining and decision-making depend on the structural context and on personal interest. In this framework, interest is understood as interest in participating or increasing the (re)distribution of assets, privileges and rights. Actors therefore, are rule followers (whether of formal or informal rules) and self-interested beings (Knight, 1992). Following this idea, I understand institutions as (re)distribution instruments (Knight, 1992) (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010) which facilitate coordination amongst actors (Korf, 2003), they reflect the by-product of substantive conflict over the distribution of resources (Knight, 1992, p. 40) and consequently raise resource considerations in regards of distributional consequences. In this regard, the structural level represents the institutional framework in place which is both formal and informal, and the secondary or agency level that represents a bargaining game between groups.

Generally, one can find two types of institutional frameworks in place in any given regime. Firstly, we can refer to formal institutions. Formal institutions correspond to the visible structure of the regime that represents the legal organization of the state through which it operates. In concrete, institutions are: constrains that structure political, economic and social interactions (North, 1990). Therefore, institutions are rules, forms, procedures that have the ability to shape behavior amongst people. Formality means legality, accountability and third-party enforcement, the state has the capacity and the instrument to produce formal written rules and enforce them. However, the way in which rules are imposed and enforced depends on the type of the regime. Additionally, the way in which the rules as such function depends too in the quality of the regime; within a spectrum from fragile to strong.

Secondly, functioning parallel to formal institutions we have informal institutions. Informal institutions emerge from human interaction and customs. Human beings before the establishment of the state used to administer and redistribute assets, privileges and rights in their own way through and informal network that recognizes authority, virtue and hierarchy. Informal institutions are: "socially shared rules, usually

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[10] Contending groups along: ethnicity, class, religion.

unwritten, that are created, communicated and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels" (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004, p. 3).

Any given regime has informality playing behind the scenes. However, the degree as to which it takes part depends on the trust, the scope of access and the capacity of enforcement of formal institutions. Nonetheless, not all informal behavior should be considered as an institution[11] (Erdmann, et al., 2011) (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004). Informal institutions significantly differ from formal ones, they represent a system in which personal relationships are the means of communication; although, channels of communication are unstable and information sometimes is difficult to interpret. (Re)distribution through informal channels is selective; one has to participate in the network in order to receive the benefits; distribution is not by merit but by sympathy and interest, although in some cases there is chance of participating without belonging when the distribution comes in the form of public goods (schools, parks etc.). The impact of the distribution through informal institutions such as patronage networks is also dependent on the type of patronage dispensed (see below).

A rigorous political analysis will incorporate both institutional frameworks. Informality plays in some instances a more important role than the formal structural framework. As a matter of fact, following (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004) it is possible to affirm that informal institutions have the potential to either complement the formal institutions by providing alternative channels of demand and (re)distribution that supplement weak functioning of the state or, they can act towards divergent outcomes operating towards opposite ends.

Table 1. Formal and informal institutions

Criteria	*FORMAL INSTITUTIONS*	*INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS*
Type of relationship	impersonal	personal
Realm	universalistic	particularistic

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[11] Helmke & Levitsky use the example of abuse of executive power in presidential regimes in Latin America, which is understood not as an informal institution but as a noninstitutional behavior.

Distribution	Assets and rights	Assets and privileges
Allocation	merit	sympathy
Sanction	Third party enforcement	Public dishonor / expulsion from societal organization/group
Source	written	Codes of behavior, customs, conventions
Criteria for (re)distribution	Competitive, non-selective	selective

Source: Adapter from: (Helmke & Levistky, 2004; Knight, 1992; North, 1990; North, et al., 2009)

In this vein, I argue that the predominance of informality over formal institutions is dependent on the type of social order (North, et al., 2009). Limited access orders according to North et al. (2009) are characterized by: "1. Slow-growing economies vulnerable to shocks, 2. Polities without generalized consent of the governed, 3. relatively small number of organizations, 4. Smaller and more centralized governments, 5. A predominance of social relationships, organized along personal lines (…) laws that are enforced unequally, insecure property rights and a pervasive sense that not all individuals were created equal" (North, et al., 2009, p. 12). Limited access orders will favor the preference of using informal institutions to achieve ends. The reason why this happens is because in limited access orders the public sphere is able to support just a few range of organizations and as the concept explicitly describes, the access to the state structure is limited to just a few; trust is limited and there is a general perception of favoritism[12]. Therefore, the inability of the formal structures to cope with all the demands and needs results in a preference for informal channels of (re)distribution in which loyalty and votes are interchanged for assets or privileges.

Conversely, open access orders will favor the predominance of formal institutions over informal ones. This is because open access orders, by definition are more complex

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[12] These perceptions gradually change when passing from basic limited access orders into mature limited access orders.

and such complexity in economic and political terms implies a more sophisticated channel of distribution. In open access orders -OAO-, the state is able to support a much ample and diverse range of organizations, therefore, impersonality takes prevalence. Open access orders are characterized by: 1. Political and economic development, 2. Economies that experience much less negative economic growth, 3. Rich and vibrant civil societies with lots of organizations, 4. Bigger, more decentralized governments, 5. Widespread impersonal social relationships, including rule of law, secure property rights, fairness, and equality – all aspects of treating everyone the same." (North, et al., 2009, p. 11).

Limited access orders therefore, operate as selective regimes in which informality flourishes as the state is unable to ample its distribution. Demands over distribution of assets and privileges still happen and there is a need to use alternative means to channel distribution. The demand for an open access order comes from within the gradual development of political and economic formal institutions and from the development of society itself.

Another important feature of access orders is the way in which they control violence. As North et al. (2009) points out, rent seeking in limited access orders is not just a way of spoiling the pockets of elites; it also serves as a way to control violence. Elite group members of the dominant coalition restrict access to the state controlling the distribution of rents; they agree to respect each other's privileges and rights in order to guarantee the stability of the coalition. Elites know that fighting will reduce their own rents; therefore, they prefer to respect and cooperate rather than to fight. (North, et al., 2009, p. 18). Thus, the inclusion of other elite organizations seems problematic as it entails the distribution of the pie between more parties.

As civil war research has pointed out, illiberal democracies are the regimes which embrace the higher rates of civil war onset. Pictured as an inverted U shape, illiberal democracies are understood as hybrid regimes being somehow repressive and somehow liberal and having the higher incidence of civil war. In fact, illiberal democracies represent limited access orders; thus, they are also able to control violence through elite concessions given that it is in their interest to maintain the status quo and secure further access to rents.

In the present framework, illiberal democracies represent the formal institutions and are understood as limited access orders. In this vein, illiberal democracies are defined as "democratically elected regimes, often ones that have been reelected or reaffirmed through referenda, that are routinely ignoring constitutional limits on their power and depriving their citizens of basic rights and freedoms" (Zakaria, 1997, p.22). Illiberal democracies resemble purely electoral regimes; they restrict and control civil liberties such as freedom of speech, freedom to form organizations, free press, (Carothers, 2002) (Diamond, 2002) (Zakaria, 1997). In fact, a general characteristic of illiberal democracies is the lack of constitutional liberalism (Zakaria, 1997) (Brett, 2010).

The pressure for democratization and adopting western institutions resulted in democracy but without constitutional liberalism. This means that in developed western states the process to achieve democracy began by achieving security, then developing a system of tax collection, afterwards, the rule of law commanded the relationships within the society and between the society and the state after that the state was in capacity to achieve growth policies and finally democracy was developed and solidified. Hence, when we talk about developing states the equation in held the other way around: Democracy – Growth policies – Rule of law – Tax collection system – Security (Brett, 2010) (Zakaria, 1997).

Additionally, the pressure to democratize developing states and newly emergent states in the seconds half of the XX century, pushed the states into adopting an alien set of formal institutions which allowed hybridity to become established. In general, and through the colonial era and all the way through decolonization the way in which society was organized did not disappear, in fact in was preserved as informal institutions. In many African societies for example, informality is more important that formal institutions, this can resemble weak states but strong societies, chief politics or the politics of the Big Men is still in place (Bayart, 2009; Schatzberg, 2001).

Within informal institutions such as patronage, the recognition of virtue legitimizes the hierarchical chain. Dating back to premodern forms of organization and traditional tribe/clan organization and administration of power patrons redistribute and make decisions based on their recognized knowledge and status. The abrupt transition into

a modern state only meant that the natural process onto which societies are meant to become open access orders was nothing less than forced. This led to the preservation of patronage politics as informal institutions under modern regimes.

Table 2. Definidendum characteristics of illiberal democratic regimes

ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACIES

ELECTORAL REGIMES	elections take place but might be not periodical, free and/or fair
CIVIL LIBERTIES	Restricted rights to associate, express different ideas, free press.
CIVIL RIGHTS	Restricted rights in regards of religion and property.
RULE OF LAW	Respect and usage of the rule of law is limited.
CHECKS AND BALANCES	Restricted check and balances, low accountability.
POLITICAL COMPETITION	Controlled
JUDICIARY	Not or partly independent, controlled.

Source: Adapted from : (Carothers, 2002; Diamond, 2002; Marshall & Gurr, 2017; Zakaria, 1997)

The fact that illiberal democracies do not function as full democracies means that the institutions in place are unable to cope with the demands and obligations of a democracy. This characteristic further allows for alternative institutions to persist and evolve, the fragility of rule enforcement further favors the proliferation of informal institutions; nonetheless, informal institutions are not always operating in conflicting direction to formal ones. The main interest of the present dissertation is to explain the impact informal institutions have in conflict onset. Although informality is also present in both full democracies and autocracies and as such also affects the triggering of conflicts, the focus remains on illiberal democratic regimes due to the nature of their hybridity and as such their character of strong informality.

As Helmke & Levistky (2004) argue, informal institutions can be understood through two different categorical dimensions: firstly, whether the institution works towards convergent outcomes in regard of formal institutions; or as opposed, informal institutions in pursue of divergent outcomes. Secondly, whether informal institutions

operate within effective formal institutions or contrary, within ineffective formal institutions. This provides us with a classification framework of informal institutions.

As mentioned earlier, the features of illiberal democracies favor an ideal environment for informal institutions to proliferate. In this regard, I argue that the patterns of dominance can correlate with the type of regime; therefore, within illiberal democracies we can easily identify neopatrimonial types of dominance.

As Erdmann & Engel (2007) point out, neopatrimonialism as a type of dominance can be understood as a combination of both patrimonial and legal-rational types of dominance. In general terms, neopatrimonialism has been a highly contested conceptual term, scholars have argued that it has become a catch-all concept or that is just explains African politics. For the former some scholars have made the concept more rigorous and have solve operationalization problems, for the latter, conceiving neopatrimonialism as an African phenomenon is an inaccurate assumption as we can also see neopatrimonialism in other regimes which are not African. The essence of neopatrimonialism is the same but in practice it is different from region to region. Furthermore, neopatrimonialism is also compatible with high levels of legitimacy and economic development (Pitcher, et al., 2009).

Neopatrimonialism is understood as: "Neopatrimonialism is a mixture of two co-existing, partly interwoven, types of domination: namely, patrimonial and legal-rational bureaucratic domination. Under patrimonialism, all power relations between ruler and ruled, political as well as administrative relations, are personal relations; there is no differentiation between the private and the public realm. However, under neopatrimonialism the distinction between the private and the public, at least formally, exists and is accepted, and public reference can be made to this distinction. Neopatrimonial rule takes place within the framework of, and with the claim to, legal-rational bureaucracy or 'modern' stateness. Formal structures and rules do exist, although in practice the separation of the private and public sphere is not always observed." (Erdmann & Engel, 2007, p. 13).

In this type of domination both legal-rational means and patrimonial means coexists amongst each other, personal relations through patrimonialism and legal-rational

dominance through the bureaucracy. Both forms permeate each other and are able to adequately operate simultaneously. In Erdmann and Engel's words: "informal politics invades formal institutions. Informality and formality are intimately linked to each other in various ways and by varying degrees; and this mix becomes institutionalized. Hypothetically people have a certain degree of choice as to which logic they want to employ to achieve their goals and best realize their interests" (Erdmann & Engel, 2007, p. 13).

As for (Snyder, 1992) neopatrimonialism means that "political and administrative decisions partly follow legal-rational or formal rules but also follow patrimonial or informal ones" (Snyder, 1992), Also he further implies that the degree from which patronage penetrates the society varies from regime to regime, in some cases the institutionalization of informal bargains in the form of patronage significantly undermines the growth of opposition or radical groups within the system, undermining political competition and in fact democracy. Additionally, as (De Waal, 2009) points out, in some locations neopatrimonialism and legal- rational (what he calls state institutions) have been harmonized or closely balanced, therefore, creating and impression of 'classic statehood' (p. 4).

Patronage and clientelism are both part of the Neopatrimonial type of dominance. Patronage is defined as "political motivated distribution of favors not to individuals but to groups" whereas, clientelism is "an exchange or brokerage of specific services and resources for political support often in the form of votes" (Erdmann & Engel, 2007). Likewise, patronage can be understood as the 'buying and selling of loyalties in the political market place' (De Waal, 2009). Regimes with Neopatrimonial type of dominance have a mixture of formal and informal institutions through which actors chose to redistribute depending on their position and needs.

Patronage implies a patron-client relationship in which an asymmetric exchange takes place, a client receives a gift and rewards the patron by supporting his interests and rewarding him with loyalty (Sekeris, 2011) Furthermore, the patron also provides protection for his patronage line in aspects such as property (North, et al., 2009). A patron-client relationship is strategic for both actors (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006) (Alley, 2010). Is it in a patron's interest to prevent clients from breaking away (Di John

& Putzel, 2009) as a break away can imply clients associating with warring factions which is not in the interest of the patron (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006). On the side of the clients, bargains are constantly taking place as clients are regularly testing to improve their share of the deal (Longley Alley, 2010).

Summing up, I believe that neopatrimonialism represents the type of dominance present in illiberal democratic regimes. Therefore, neopatrimonialism as a combination of, on one side patrimonial politics and on the other, legal-rational must be understood as a dyad between formal and informal institutions as present in illiberal democratic regimes.

In this vein, if legal rational dominance represents the formality of institutions in an illiberal democracy and neopatrimonialism the informal institutions in place, then there must be a balance between institutions which can also display the interaction amongst both institutional types. Therefore, what is the degree of penetration of one over the other?, what is the institutional framework prevailing? Or preferred by the actors to undertake their exchange? These questions represent future areas of research that can be explored in order to enrich the input of informal institutions and their conditions of prevalence over formality.

The theoretical model

A. The structures

Firstly, let us part from the empirically observable assumption that illiberal democracies have the higher incidence of civil war onset. As (Goldstone, et al., 2010; Hegre, et al., 2001) argue, illiberal democracies are more prone to conflict that full democracies or full autocracies. Hybrid regimes are prone to conflict because they tend to be less accountable and less legitimate (Collier, 2009), and on the other hand, autocracies have much higher capacity to repress violence (Davenport, 2007). Therefore, illiberal democracies represent a type of regime in which there are civil rights by law but they are constantly violated.

It is right to say that empirical observation and a simple count gives us information in regards of civil war incidence which is higher in illiberal democratic regimes, however, one has to ask what is it about illiberal democratic regimes that encourage the possibility of civil war onset?. As mentioned earlier in the conflict onset literature review, there are different trends to explain this phenomenon. Literature is divided between assuming that the weakness of state institutions in a hybrid regime is the reason why civil war is more prone or; other body of literature claims, that hybrid regimes can be understood as regimes in transition and that specific moment of transition and change is what alters the possibility of civil war onset. I thus argue that given the relevance of informal institutions such as patronage in the (re)distribution of assets, privileges and rights to horizontally unequal groups; they have the potential to explain the control or triggering of the use of violence. We can see cases in which the formal institutions are weak but yet stable and violence fails to erupt; furthermore, it is also highly questionable that hybridity represents a transitional period[13].

The type of regime affects the way in which distribution is undertaken, consequently, the way in which illiberal democracies operate gives ample room for distribution to be inefficient[14]. This therefore, affects the possibility to trigger violence amongst the excluded groups. (Re)distribution takes place through informal and formal channels. The formal structure in the present model is represented by the features of illiberal democratic regimes.

In respect of explaining ethnic conflict onset as an outcome, arguments pointing towards the relevance of Horizontal Inequalities represent a remarkable conclusion. Formal political exclusion can be understood as a dimension of horizontal inequality. These theories conclude that the onset of conflicts can be explained by the political exclusion of relevant ethnic groups from the state structures (Cederman et al. 2010; (Wimmer, et al., 2009). Furthermore, within ethnic conflict research it is expected that groups will sympathise with their ethnic lineage, they are expected to redistribute

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[13] According to literature on this matter, how long does a regime has to be hybrid/illiberal to be categorised as transitional?

[14] I understand inefficiency in the distribution as exclusion. Efficiency in the distribution would mean capacity to control violence.

predominantly to their own ethnic line. This will affect (in)equality in the distribution as depicted by which of the groups are included or excluded from power.

I agree with the results pointing towards the relevance of formal political exclusion. Thus, as Stewart (2011) points out, political exclusion only represents one plausible dimension of horizontal inequality. To explain conflict onset in illiberal democratic regimes it is important to evaluate not only executive[15] political exclusion but also the possibility of policy-making and decision-making in the formal political arena. Also, getting away from quantitative models allows for exploring with greater depth the complexity of these processes. Likewise, with the aim of looking towards policy-making it is unlikely that solely stimulating executive political inclusion could achieve remarkable changes in conflict prone societies. In this regard, there is a fundamental difference between political inclusion and formal distribution. Formal distribution therefore is able to capture broader dimensions of horizontal inequalities, such as social and economic inequality and furthermore, political inclusion can happen as a pure formality with no real instance of redistribution.

As the essence of horizontal inequalities can be captured by evaluating the inequality of the distribution; a highly unequal distribution of political participation, social services and economic assets amongst groups as well as political exclusion is likely to lead to conflict onset. However, it is problematic to infer conflict out of just evaluating exclusion from formal state structures, or just by looking at the degree of formal distribution. As mentioned earlier informal institutions are a core foundation of relationships amongst groups in illiberal democratic regimes. Informality and the degree of distribution carried though informal channels give us a picture of the cohesion of society, informality always plays its role behind the scenes.

In this regard, from the political sphere, the reliance on explaining conflict onset solely on the composition of formal coalitions in power can point towards misleading results. There can be cases in which groups are formally excluded but yet informally included and therefore range towards avoiding war (see Bolivia case study chapter). Or also

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[15] The EPR dataset on which these results are based measures political inclusion only by evaluating access to executive power (see (Vogt, 2014))

cases in which groups are formally included but informally excluded (like Senegal) and therefore conflict is also likely to happen. As a matter of fact, informal institutions in many contexts can prove to be more important that formal ones (Murshed, 2002); putting aside their analysis misses much of what drives political behavior (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004) as actors interact within different institutions (formal/informal) which may allow unforeseen changes in the distribution of resources (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). Additionally, we cannot expect for formal rules to produce the same outcomes in different contexts (North, 1990); consequently, informality claims even a bigger role.

In the present model I aim to evaluate the inclusion of contending groups as invited to take a share of the distribution through informal and formal elite bargaining, in addition to the degree of political inclusion. Formality is understood then as features of the illiberal democratic regime (see table 2); informality is understood as neopatrimonialsm in the forms of patronage networks and clientelism. I assume that the impact of informal institutions is higher in illiberal democratic regimes, as I am expecting to find a strong correlation between type of regime and type of dominance. Patronage as an informal institution represents a significant part of the institutional framework in illberal democratic regimes. I theorise patronage as a form of redistribution that can be interpreted along a spectrum ranging from mobile capital to non mobile capital patronage. Patronage allocation can also range from private goods to public goods. Within the literature different forms of patronage has been identified, most remarkably, a classification of patronage has been done by (Le Billon, 2001) in which patronage ranges from the level of the stakes at exchange (routine to extraordinary) and the number of suppliers dispensing currupt benefits (from many to a few). Thus, what I am interested in is the *form* patronage takes and its characteristics.

Table 3. Patronage classification

	Type of patronage			
	Clientelism	**Job Provision**	**License Provision**	**Public Good provision**
Type of good:	Private	Private	Private/public	Public
Type of Capital:	Mobile	Mobile/non mobile	Mobile/non mobile	Non mobile

Type of transaction:	personal	personal	Personal/impersonal	impersonal

Table 3. Patronage classification depicts the most common forms of patronage distribution, it representes a classification. Clientelistic practices of vote buying are thought to be more ephemeral. The transaction is thought to be more personal as it requires a face to face transaction, the client also has to seek the patronage[16], the type of capital is likely to be mobile, in the form of food or money. When the patronage dispensed operates in the form of public job provision, in other words nepotism the type of good is private as only benefits the particular client. The capital invested in the transaction is both mobile and non moblie. Non mobile as the job allocation is fixed but the wage or retribution to the client is mobile, the transaction is likely to be personal. For the provision of licenses I refer here to the granting of permits and licenses for private construction in the form of public tenders. For this type of patronage the goods are both private and pubic, private if the construction does not benefit the public but public if there are sideline benefits. The trasaction can also be personal or impersonal, personal for the bid winner but impersonal for the rest of the clients benefited or affected by the license. Finally, the provision of public goods in the form of hospitals, roads or schools presupposes an impersonal transaction as the clients benefiting from the good do not directly participate in the transaction, the type of capital is non mobile. This classification will help identify the way in which patronage operates in practice.

It is remarkable however to highlight that neopatrimonialism is not exclusive to hybrid regimes. The patrimonial part of the hybrid domination can take place also under a democratic regime, nonetheless, its degree of penetration is expected to be much lower that what it would be under a illiberal democratic regime. This is because open access orders give priority to the formality of institutions, and bargains are undertaken mainly through the state as the perception of trust, commitmment, delivery and accountability is much higher that in an illliberal democratic regime. The same can happen within an autocracy, autocracies are not just patrimonial in their domination,

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[16] It is the basic distinction between private and public good. In this case, the client has to attend public rallies or meeting in order to receive a portion of the distribution.

but the degree of penetration of the legal-rational aspect of domination is lower than in an illiberal democracy or a democracy. Therefore, in autocracies for example, public jobs are still distributed by formal means but the degree of personalistic relationships is expected to be higher than in a illiberal democracy. These stand as assumptions as the present research only aims at explaining informal institutions and their impact within illiberal democratic regimes.

Having said this, and focusing on illiberal democratic regimes which conform the unit of analysis of the present model; we know that both channels of (re)distribution legal-rational-formal and patrimonial-informal are operating. Thus, each society is different in the configuration of relationships and also on the degree of strenght and efficiency of formal institutions; as a result neopatrimonialism must take different degrees of penetration in different societies and will manifest in different forms.

Following this point, informality is thought to penetrate the state in different proportions, meaning that in some cases informality will be dominant in terms of (re)distribution transactions, and in other cases the balance would turn to formal institutions meaning that transaction are mainly taken through the state itself. Additionally, we could find cases in which the balance amongst institutions is in equillibrium. In this sort of environment it is expected that an increase in the possiblity of civil war onset will be present, if the informal institutions are in competence to formal ones.

Figure 1. Balance between institutions allows us to picture the possible options of balance between institutions:

Figure 1. Balance between institutions

```
INFORMALITY
        ^
        |
        |   I.              III.
        |   + informal      + informal
        |   - formal        + formal
        |
        |_____
        |
        |   II.
        |   - informal      IV.
        |   - formal        - informal
        |                   + formal
        |
        |_____>
                                    FORMALITY
```

Source: Self made

Thus, it is not however the aim of this dissertation to explain this variation in balances between institutional frameworks. The statements come from the general analysis of a combination of institutions but represent future areas of research.

Following research on patronage (Chabal & Daloz, 2010; Chandra, 2007; De Waal, 2009; LeBillon, 2001; Murshed, 2002) it is assumed that it can have a positive or a negative effect. If the patronage network is closed and only benefits a few groups in power then it is expected to trigger conflict; in other words, groups which are excluded and are discriminated in the distribution of assets, privileges and rights through patronal distribution are more likely to become violent. A closed patronage line means non-sharing of spoils across groups and in some instances non-distribution of spoils ethnically, violence can erupt when discriminated groups are aware of the inequality in the spoils or when they are denied access to them (Arriola, 2009). As opposed, patronage can be beneficial when the spoils are shared and distributed amongst the different ethnic groups and within the ethnic group. The patrons have therefore the power to either mobilize their constituencies or clienteles if so they wish, as well as, provide rewards amongst sympathizers if they are to be kept content and not rebel.

Within the present model three structural conditions will be evaluated: exclusion for central power, inequality in the formal distribution through legal state means, and inequality in the distribution through informal means in the form of patronage networks. In this regard, the relationship of formal and informal distribution and exclusion is expected to be equifinal and alluding to conjunctural causation (Goertz & Mahoney, 2005). Some countries do not go to war under favorable conditions (Bolivia, Ghana, Paraguay) while others do go to war under unfavorable conditions (Mali, Senegal). Inequality in the formal and/or informal distribution operates as SUIN condition[17].

Thus, it is imperative to remark that the inequality in formal distribution as well as inclusion/exclusion will only be thoroughly evaluated through the QCA model (see chapter 4. Methodology) which relies on logical assumptions which need to produce a complete model of structural and agency conditions. The focus of this dissertation is to demonstrate the relevance of informal institutions in the form of patronage networks, therefore, the case study chapters (Thailand, Namibia, Bolivia and India Bodo) will focus attention mainly on patronage networks.

B. The agents

Understanding an outcome such as civil war onset would imply a rigorous analysis of both the structures and the agents. As mentioned earlier in the text, decisions taken by the elites are both influenced by the structural framework in place and by the elite's interests. This is because agents are both rule followers and self-interest beings, therefore, the process of decision-making is conditioned by the elite itself and by the structural framework in place.

Institutions as (re)distribution instruments favor those actors that create the rules. As a matter of fact; institutional frameworks are created in such a way that they will maximize utility for the rulers (Knight, 1992). This implies that rules will inevitably have unequal implications for resource allocation amongst different organizations. In any

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[17] SUIN conditions: Sufficient but unnecessary part of a configuration that is insufficient in itself but necessary for the outcome.

case, institutions may represent an unintended outcome of conflict or the result of compromises or settlements between different actors (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010).

As rules might favor those who create –or benefit from- them then they directly imply a relationship of power. If institutions reflect the contest amongst actors to establish rules that might increase their power and/or resource allocation, then it will show different capacities of organizations to force or convince others to decide upon their preferences. As such, institutions are the product of constant bargaining between relevant groups in the social arena.

Agents seek (re)distribution through bargaining. The product of elite bargains can result in either inclusion of contending groups or exclusion of contending groups from the (re)distribution structures, whether formal or informal. This ultimately means the exacerbation of horizontal inequalities if exclusion takes place. Ultimately, a bargaining game between elites has the potential to generate a macro phenomenon such as a civil war.

Therefore, we know that agents bargain for (re)distribution in both formal and informal networks, bargaining takes place in order to achieve agreements that both parts prefer to fighting. Conflict as an outcome represents a bargain that failed (Korf, 2003; Walter, 2009; Wucherpfennig, 2009; Powell & Stiefold, 1977). A bargain that failed symbolizes the disagreement over resource allocation and/or policy choice (Reiter, 2003) However, it is not a simple bargain that fails and invites violence; it is a consecutive process which takes into account further steps of renegotiation over not peer agreed matters. Furthermore, state institutional arrangements in place will inevitably cause various effects on institutional capacity (Bates, et al., forthcoming). A bargain failure therefore also represents a rupture in the social contract that is able to highly challenge current institutional arrangements.

Within the present model, both exclusion from decision-making at the state level and inequality in the formal and informal distribution are a product of a bargain failure; a failure which in the bigger picture, drives the desire for using violence as a means of action. The presence of information asymmetries or non-credible commitments, understood as agency mechanisms explains why bargains fail, working as causes of

causes. However, these agent mechanisms may produce the outcome in a given context but not in others, signifying that the presence/absence of both information asymmetries and credible commitments are expected to be equifinal.

I support the statement that powerful groups will decide to agree or cooperate because challenging is more costly than negotiating and exchanging certain benefits (Fearon, 1995; North, et al., 2009; Wucherpfennig, 2009). Additionally, it is likely that powerful organizations would anyway need to cooperate with other groups to achieve greater benefits as they are unable to control, exploit or demand everything just by themselves. On the other hand, weak groups will cooperate as well, because for them it is "better something than nothing". Armed conflict as an outcome represents a bargain that failed, the presence and physical use of violence is expected to be the last resort as its cost and organization are significantly high (Fearon, 1995).

Elite ethnic groups as actors are expected to be self-interested; groups already included in the distribution network are expected to favour their ethnic lineage and campaign for the needs of their own group. A series of bargains needs to be undertaken before the use of violence, thus, the length of the bargains can be different from case to case. Summarizing, bargains fail because the parties are unable to agree on a settlement that both sides prefer to war. The lack of trust in the promises within a bargain or the accuracy in the information received act as conflict enabling conditions and causes of causes, working as mechanisms that can explain why, in some instances, bargains fail.

Conflict therefore, can be a product of a rational miscalculation of the actors (Fearon, 1995). Fearon's model uses information asymmetries and credible commitments to explain war onset in the international context. Thus, these same mechanisms might be able to explain why bargains fail in the domestic context (Walter, 2009). Following work by Barbara Walter, it is expected that the presence of non-credible commitments and asymmetries in the information displayed could drive the process to a bargain failure. In particular, lack of trust and misleading information will drive groups into rejecting or avoiding bargain demands. An evaluation of the agencies' decision-making process entails analysing the process of communication of information and

also the expectations upon the contender group. This will enable us to understand why bargains between elite groups fail in agency terms.

Bargaining outcomes depend on which party makes the first move. Therefore, signaling and the forthcoming assessment of trust or information displayed are evaluated by the receptor, who forges a judgement and acts accordingly (Lewis & Schultz, 2003). In this regard, when evaluating information asymmetries and credible commitments it is relevant to take into account the source of the signal, this means that both information asymmetries and credible commitments must be evaluated from each source.

In terms of credible commitments, the receptor evaluates trust. If the signaling comes from the elite to the patrons, then the patrons and their constituencies or clienteles will evaluate commitment in terms of reputation, record and past transactions (Walter, 2006). However, commitment is strategic. Politicians know what kind of promises they can make in order to persuade blocks of voters (Keefer & Vlaicu, 2007). They know which promises will be credible and which can lead to a least credible result. Nonetheless, voters and patrons are constantly evaluating commitment and will only deliver their part of the deal if they feel they are going to truly be compensated.

On the other hand, if the first move comes from the group claiming (re)distribution then it is the elites who evaluate credible commitments. For this matter, elites will evaluate past transactions in order to find out if they can trust the group: first, not to mobilise if the claim is denied and second, if they are going to deliver promises which come in the form of votes, security and political support (Muller, 2007). The absence of credible commitments would imply a bigger potential for a bargain failure.

The forging of trust and mistrust is a dynamic process in which different transactions increase or decrease its degree. For example, trust can be bought by proclaiming populist policies, hence this moment of trust can also be disabled when the group realizes the status quo remains the same. On the other hand, trust coming from the groups signifies the provision of security and political support, if the group remains dormant or violently inactive for a period of time, this can increase the degree of trust

that the elites have, up until violence whether strategically or not is triggered once again.

Information asymmetries within this model are understood not only as the projection of misleading or false information in regards of the true will to fight and the capacity to do so (Fearon, 1995); but also as the quality of the channels for reproducing that information (Schultz, 1999; Lewis & Schultz, 2003). Let us remember that the unit of analysis is illiberal democracies. This type of regime is considered to be less informed that old or more solid democracies (Hegre, 2003, North, 2009). If patrons and their constituencies are unable to be well informed, then they lack means to evaluate information affecting their judgement. Also, this variant is important to be taken into account in a domestic model of conflict onset, means of communication and language policies as a feature of ethnic differences is a significant aspect of potential sources of grievance (Borman, et al., 2015). Language and furthermore media in local/autochthonous language is key in analyzing information asymmetries as captured by the patrons and groups. Furthermore, in some instances it is not only whether the language is official or not[18], but also whether there is private media in the local language to deliver and analyze messages as spoken by the dominant elite. In addition to this, most of the population in some instances would not speak the national/official language; therefore, the role played by news media (TV, radio and newspapers) is crucial in delivering a message to the masses, especially if the movement is diffuse and with no visible leadership.

Therefore, it is not just true will to fight and capacity that matters but also how the information reaches the receptor (Lewis & Schultz, 2003). The source of the information displayed by the elite to the patrons can be misrepresented due to the channel of communication. In this regard, availability of information in the group's language, availability of radio stations and newspapers are all features than can give

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[18] As (Borman, et al., 2015) point out, some of the reasons for officially not recognising different languages is costs. The example given is that of the Europena Union in which significant amounts of money are put towards transalations and recognising the totality of the languages spoken within the Union. Additionally, the source of linguistic discrimination perpetuates to other areas, having an official language means that ethnic group members should learn that language to be able to be part of the bureaucracy jobs. Thus, despite the great incidence of this element in perceived grievances the influence of private sources of information is also remarkably relevant.

a clear picture of the dissemination of information. The less informed the group is, or the more difficult the access to information the more asymmetries in the discourse.

C. RESEARCH QUESTION AND WORKING HYPOTHESES

Core research question:

Why do some illiberal democracies fall into conflict while others do not?

Having explained the way in which structures operate in illiberal democracies I aim to test the following working hypothesis:

HYPOTHESES:

H1. When there is inefficiency in the distribution of assets, privileges and rights to different ethnic groups via formal or informal institutions, conflict is more likely to happen.

H2. Exclusionary and inefficient redistribution through patronage networks can increase the possibility of conflict onset.

In the following section I will explain the proposed mechanisms responding to the working hypotheses.

D. THE MECHANISMS

Within the civil war and conflict literature, the constant use of quantitate methods has prevented the identification of causal mechanisms. Qualitative research in the form of single case studies or comparative cases prevents generalization due to specificity of the cases. Within the present dissertation I aim to show that it is possible to identify causal mechanisms which allow for a prudent generalization at least for the unit of analysis under study if a set-theoretic approach is implemented. The following section will describe the causal mechanisms which are theorized to play a relevant role in

producing conflict onset as an outcome. As highlighted across the present chapter and from a historical neoinstitutionalist perspective of analysis, conflict onset is a product of both structural and agency causes. Agency mechanisms work as causes of causes, linking the distant factors to the proximate ones by a causal relationship. In other words, proximate factors (agency mechanisms) are mechanisms of the structures.

Following this point, we are in light of 5 causal mechanisms: three structural and two (double-way) agency ones, following a mechanistic explanation of outcome as:
$X \rightarrow [(n1\rightarrow)*(n2\rightarrow)*(n3\rightarrow)...]$ Y. n1, n2, n3: represent the mechanisms, the arrows imply force, the force taken from the agency to the action, X is the independent variable and Y the dependent variable.

Following this idea:

AGENCY CONDITIONS (double-way, impact from each source):

Context: illiberal democratic regimes, presence of horizontal inequalities amongst contending groups.

X exclusionary elite bargains

N1: Credibility of the commitments from the elites to the patrons
Aims at capturing the degree of trustworthiness the ethnic group has on their elected leaders. Bargains will be affected by credible commitment whenever patrons mistrust the promises of elected leaders. As mentioned before, credible commitments can be evaluated by the patrons via reputation and record of past transactions.

N1.1: Credibility of the commitments from the patron to the elite
Aims at capturing the likeliness that patrons and their constituencies are to be trusted with providing security and political support. Bargains will be affected by lack of credible commitment when the elected leaders cannot trust the patrons in the compliance of their promises. Elected leaders will mistrust patrons' promises if they mobilize their constituencies and/or do not deliver political support.

N2: Information Asymmetries from the elites to the patrons

Aims at capturing the degree of information asymmetry in terms of language and channels of communication. Bargains will tend to fail if there are information asymmetries coming from the elites as analysed by the patrons. Elected leaders will incur in misleading information if the channels of communication are heavily controlled by the state or if there is no source of news in the local language.

N2.1: Information Asymmetries from the patrons to the elite

Aims at capturing the degree of information asymmetry in the information displayed by the patrons. Bargains will tend to fail if there are information asymmetries coming from the patrons as analysed by the elected leaders. Patrons will incur in information asymmetries when there is a display of violence with no intent of fighting a fully-fledged war.

These mechanisms are likely to affect the redistribution of political participation, economic assets and social services across groups. In other words, when bargains are affected by credible commitments and information asymmetries the structural context is likely to be inefficient in redistribution and politically exclusionary[19], both structural conditions that, in turn, affect the possibility of conflict. In light of this:

STRUCTURAL MECHANISMS:

N3: Formal distribution

Aims to capture the scope of distribution along different ethnic groups through formal institutions. Elite groups with unequal access to political participation, economic assets and social services will bargain within state structures to reach the best redistributive deal and to keep in power. Inefficient formal distribution is a product of a bargain failure.

N4: Informal distribution

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[19] The outcome of the bargain is likely to be defection instead of cooperation.

Aims to capture the scope of distribution along different ethnic groups through patronage networks. Elite groups with unequal access to political participation, economic assets and social services will bargain through patronage networks in order to reach agreements which will guarantee political support, security and economic distribution. Inefficient informal redistribution is a product of a bargain failure.

N5: Political exclusion

Aims at capturing the de facto inclusion of ethnic groups in the executive power as a form of political inclusion/exclusion. Exclusion is also expected to be a product of a bargain failure.

These three mechanisms in turn are expected to produce conflict. Cases which resemble this institutional framework are likely to present conflict onset. For the collection of mechanisms identified it is likely that the causal path is different in each case. Furthermore, if a mechanism is able to produce cross-case inference, its specificity is thus different within each case.

Chapter 4.
Methodology

Civil wars are complex multilayered events. It is implausible to identify a single unique cause of civil war; rather, violent conflict and in general manifestations of violence within a society are better understood as an outcome developed through a series of gradual events that when present mingle as necessary conditions, enabling the opportunity for producing contentious collective action.

In respect to civil war onset research, there has been a difficulty in identifying mechanisms that would help us explain why civil war happens. In general, the characteristic of high aggregation within civil war research has restricted scholars to point out causality in explaining civil war (Bennet & Checkel, Forthcoming; Lindemann, 2008). We know through regression models that economic development holds a strong relationship to lower chances of civil war onset (Hegre, 2003) (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004) (Jakobsen, et al., 2013), but we do not know why. In the same vein, we know that weak state structures and regime type favor the possibility for civil war to happen, but again we do not know why. These constrains have made the study of civil war inconclusive.

On the other hand, qualitative research has been restricted mainly to case study analysis, and as such has lost the opportunity to claim external validity which allows for further testing the theory. Therefore, I believe there is a need to push forward this research agenda, and a possible way to solve these flaws is to undertake qualitative comparative analysis in a rigorous way. Comparative analysis gives us the advantage of counterfactuals which is an ideal model to undertake theory testing (Bennet & Checkel, Forthcoming). Finding parsimonious mechanisms will facilitate the possibility to generalize, increasing external validity and would eventually enable the opportunity to undertake further tests in order to discover, discard, or better understand the proposed mechanisms in different settings.

The present dissertation aims to contribute to solving this problem. Part of the solution is to produce a framework which enables causal inference; a framework that would

allow us to understand and identify a set of necessary conditions that when present are likely to produce civil conflict[20] and that would open the door towards explaining how and why civil war was produced as an outcome within illiberal democratic regimes. I aim to identify and test through comparative analysis the previously identified systematic mechanisms (Bennet & Checkel, Forthcoming; Beach & Brun Pedersen, 2013) that would have the potential to explain conflict onset. Formulating systematic mechanisms at least will give us a starting point from which it is possible to evaluate how events unfolded in different scenarios. In fact, the importance of formulating systematic mechanisms implies higher possibility for generalization – external validity- and higher chances of theory testing. This is a big shortcoming in the civil war literature as we know correlations amongst variables but not causality at all. Digging into causality might also reveal the relevance of other ignored mechanisms in contemporary conflict onset research.

In this regard and departing from the identified points that can be improved within the research programme, a general objective of the project has relied on formulating and testing a new theory on conflict onset that complies with these criteria:

1. Avoid quantitative models or case analysis: Civil war onset literature is highly quantitative. There is a need to pass from correlations and incur into causality. In the same vein, some research is case based which constrains external validity and generalization, therefore the ideal analysis would entail microanalysis but achieving adequate levels of parsimony in which one is able to generalize, even if it represents only a limited generalization, or a generalization for the sample.

2. The need of formulating a theory in which causality is addressed, explaining why certain event happens. Civil wars are complex multilayered events; therefore, a set of mechanisms should be formulated in order to explain the force of an action causing a result.

3. Testing and replicating. If we are going to formulate a theory which is able to explain causality through mechanistic configurations, then the theory needs to be formulated in a way in which it allows testing for falsifying purposes.

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[20] Absence of X would necessarily mean and absence of Y.

According to this set objectives the middle point between case studies and large N studies in which it is possible to first, address causality in terms of evaluation of mechanisms, and second, in which it is possible to generalize in order to achieve external validity is: Qualitative Comparative Analysis. The strength of the methodology relies precisely on this, being able to generalize but nonetheless basing arguments on mechanistic explanations and combination of conditions which in essence remain qualitative. If applied to civil conflict onset we are able to retain the initial complexity of what a civil conflict or a civil war is and how it is triggered, therefore we would be taking a look at combination of conditions and evaluating their necessity and/or sufficiency. This enables the identification and the differentiation between different causal paths and also enables the evaluation of mechanisms in different contexts.

There are clear strengths of QCA methodology for the present theoretical framework; however, a mixed method approach is preferred. This is because although QCA gives opportunity to evaluate the presence and causal force of the chosen mechanisms, an extensive analysis of the operation of the mechanisms is still needed to understand how the outcome was achieved. Comparative case study analysis is the ideal methodology to combine with QCA in the form of Most Dissimilar System Design (Landman, 2003). For this aim two comparisons will be undertaken a comparison of two cases of conflict and a comparison of two cases of conflict avoidance. Both of the comparisons contain a most likely case and a least likely case. Consequently, the first step would be to apply QCA methodology and from these results undertake the comparative case analysis. In the remaining of the chapter I will highlight advantages and constrains of undertaking QCA and of operationalizing the different conditions/mechanisms selected, advantages of a mixed method approach and further concluding with the outline of the methodology selected.

1. QCA advantages and constrains

Implementing QCA for the theoretical framework has several advantages but also constrains. The main advantage is the process of testing the proposed mechanisms in a setting which allows comparison amongst a broad amount of cases allowing a minimal level of generalization and parsimony. QCA gives priority to the process of

explaining causal complexity by detecting different conjunctions of conditions that lead to the same outcome, and through this, discovering which conditions are necessary and/or sufficient for the outcome to occur (Grofman & Schneider, 2009) pertaining conjuctural causation. In this vein, out of the 5 core mechanisms that have been identified, it is possible to evelute which of the conditions are seen as sufficient and which as necessary if at all. By implementing this method, I expect to find different combinations of factors that lead to the outcome of conflict onset, and with further analysis explain different situations in which the outcome results as a product of different combinations of combinations: equifinality.

Constrains

Although assuming QCA is the best methodological approach to undertake, there are still important constrains which might undermine or mislead the results of the analysis. The main disadvantages can be clustered in three groups: firstly, time spans and temporality which goes by the hand of defining what the unit of analysis is; secondly, measurement constrains and thirdly, the adaptability of the methodology to the needs of the theory.

a). *Unit of analysis, time spans and temporality*

One constrain of using QCA is the limitation of temporality and time spans. The QCA methodology was initially thought as static, resembling an analysis of conditions being present or not in the selected cases, disregarding temporality. Conflict onset as an outcome needs temporality to be present as the set of conditions change through time. As mechanisms are changing through time, they cannot be analyzed statically. However, improvements of the QCA methodology present three possible ways of including temporality in QCA analysis: these three variants are: temporal QCA (tQCA) (Caren & Panofsky, 2005) (Ragin & Strand, 2008), time-series QCA (TS/QCA) (Hino, 2009) and two step QCA (Schenider & Wagemann, 2006).

Each one of the methodological options which allow for temporality to be included, differ significantly from each other. The importance of these variations is the way in which it changes the feasibility of the design and the purpose of the design. The first

option, temporal QCA, significantly increments the considered observations. It aims to capture the sequential mode of the mechanisms, A happens before B and C happens after B. However, including this sequential order increases the number of conditions or N's and therefore, for a medium N or large N studies the implementation becomes unmanageable. The combination of conditions as represented in Boolean algebra are calculated by 2^k, being *k* the number of conditions. In this case, the use of tQCA would be: $k!*2^5$. Increasing the number of combinations discourages the results as many of the cases are likely to appear as logical reminders[21]. (Ragin & Strand, 2008) address this problem proposing further minimization of logical combinations according to the logic of Boolean algebra, but they acknowledge that a set *k*>4 would be very difficult to manage. For the present model, this time sequence methodology is impossible to undertake.

The second method of addressing temporality: Time-series QCA suggests implementing quantitative techniques to address temporality: pooled QCA, Fixed effects QCA and time differentiating QCA (Hino, 2009). However, this technique has been criticized in the sense that it relies mainly on quantitative techniques and leaves behind the conceptions of qualitative analysis for restraining the amount of cases (Rihoux & Marx, 2013).

Finally, two step QCA seems to be the most accurate technique to deal with large amounts of cases and conditions. Two-step QCA as it name describes, is an approach to develop QCA in two stages. Firstly, evaluating remote conditions which act as structural conditions such as development, regime type etc.. Secondly, an evaluation of proximate conditions which are subject to dynamic changes introduced by the actors (Schenider & Wagemann, 2006). The approach relies on the statement that the first step of the procedure will produce inconclusive results that only combined with the second step will elucidate robust results.

This variant of QCA goes in hand with the theoretical statements described in the theoretical chapter as well as with general historical neoinstitutionalist ideas; temporarily and also in regards of agency and structural mechanisms to be evaluated.

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[21] Logical reminders: logical combination of conditions but no empirical evidence.

In conclusion, this variant of QCA analysis seems ideal for the first evaluation of the theoretical statements presented.

b). Measurement and membership

Secondly, the set of mechanisms or conditions proposed to be analysed in the QCA are restricted to data availability and more importantly to feasibility of measuring. Informal institutions in the form of patronage networks represents a particularly challenging mechanism to operationalize and measure. However, one plausible way to solve this problem is to construct new ways of measuring it. In general terms, it remains imperative to give the first step in this direction, it is of course challenging to capture the nature of the connections of the patronage network but what is possible to capture is whether the patronage is redistributive across groups or if it is exclusionary and only benefit a few. Thus, the measures would not be ideal or perfect as in general patronage remains as a difficult concept, but the comparative case study analysis, in addition to previous knowledge on the selected cases can aid to assess whether the measure is capturing what it is supposed to be capturing which is a fundamental part of the QCA analysis.

c). Newly developed methodology

QCA remains a robust but newly explored methodology. As a matter of fact, improvements have come from the need of researchers to adapt the framework to their theories and needs. The case of the present theoretical framework is likely to not be an exception. These innovations have been formulated and put into practice as the methodology evolves. Thus, the variant of QCA selected for this dissertation: two-level fsQCA has been applied to different studies and has also been used to replicate conclusions of seminal studies as Theda Skocpol's work on revolutions (Goertz & Mahoney, 2005).

2. Comparative analysis

QCA will help in identifying events in which countries goes to war under favourable conditions and events in which they also go to war but under unfavourable ones. It will

help in the recognition of necessary, sufficient, SUIN and INUS conditions whenever present. And allow to understand civil conflict as a complex multilayered event. Thus, QCA results in regards of the identification of relevant conditions can also be further tested by incorporating another methodology and exercising a mixed-method approach. In this regard, in order not only to test the QCA results but also to provide better explanations of how and why the mechanisms operate, comparative case analysis will be incorporated for two pairs of countries. This will include a pair of positive cases and a pair of negative cases drawing each pair from a least likely case and a most likely case. This will solidify the results of the QCA or in turn, provide evidence for the null hypothesis.

The cases are selected from the results of the fsQCA analysis. An association of the conditions has been established but there is still a need for further proof that a causal mechanism links the selected X to the outcome Y. A strong approach to this is to precisely select a most likely case, in other words, a typical case and also a least likely case, in quantitative terminology what is understood as a deviant case. The selection of cases departs from the assumption that both X and Y are present and that the conditions to be tested also have an impact in producing or facilitating the outcome Y. The usefulness of this method is that it enables cross-case inferences if the mechanisms are found to be present.

A most likely case represents a case in which there is confidence the mechanism is present. Conversely, a least likely case represents a case in which the mechanism is thought to be present but to a lower extent given the fuzzy measure scores. The function of analyzing a most likely case is to update the confidence in the mechanism of interest. If the case study reveals the presence of the mechanism as hypothesized in the most likely case, then it is possible to infer with greater confidence that it plays a role in producing or facilitating the outcome Y. In addition to this, if the case study fails to reveal the presence of the mechanism of interest then it is possible to establish a cross-case inference which determines that the mechanism does not have a significant impact across the whole population of comparable cases (Beach & Brun Pedersen, 2013, p. 152).

The analysis of least likely cases serves another purpose. If the mechanism is found in a least likely case, then it updates the confidence in the operation of the selected mechanism for the rest of the population. But if the mechanism is not found then it is not possible to update the confidence of the operation of the selected mechanism for the broader population. The high benefit of a least likely case stems from the assumption that it significantly increases the confidence in the mechanism as 'if it can make it here it can make in anywhere' (Beach & Brun Pedersen, 2013, p. 152). The comparison of cases therefore also enables cross-case inference.

3. **Conclusion: A mixed-method approach two-level fsQCA + Comparative analysis**

As mentioned above, the two-level variant of QCA is selected. Furthermore, Among the different types of QCA being crisp QCA (csQCA), fuzzy QCA (fsQCA) and multivalue QCA (mvQCA) the ideal one to implement is fsQCA. The reason behind choosing fsQCA is that the mechanisms or conditions to be evaluated are likely to be present in degrees rather than in sharp-cutting categories. Subsequently, positive and negatives comparisons will be undertaken basing the selection of the cases on the results drawn from the QCA.

Chapter 5.

Two-level fsQCA analysis

A bargaining game between elite groups has the potential to explain a macro phenomenon such as a civil war. Conflict can be understood as the product of a bargain failure between discriminated -powerless, downgraded or underrepresented-(Cederman, et al., 2010) elite groups and powerful –monopoly, dominant- elites in repetitive bargains for redistribution of political participation, economic assets and social services. Political exclusion and economic inequality as dimensions of horizontal inequality have been recognized as a robust cause of ethnic conflict onset (Cederman, et al., 2010; Ostby, 2008; Ostby, et al., 2009; Besacon, 2005; Baldwin & Huber, 2010; Alesina & Papaioannou, 2016; Stewart, 2002). Within these models the state is understood as an organisation of organisations (Boix, 2008; North et al., 2009) which is captured to different degrees by different ethnic groups (Cederman et al. 2009). Elite groups within power hold decision-making power to allocate and redistribute assets and participation. Thus, as highlighted in previous chapters, although these findings remain as strong hypotheses in explaining ethnic conflict onset, they fail to recognize the relevance of informal institutions such as patronage networks as viable and legitimate channels of redistribution.

The present chapter is an attempt to test the mechanisms proposed in the theoretical framework presented in chapter 3 and evaluate whether the conditions are relevant or irrelevant in explaining the outcome. It incorporates the full spectrum of institutions, evaluates structural and agency mechanisms and in that way, aims at contributing to the general debate by highlighting the relevance of informality in either controlling or enhancing violence as well as providing an agency –structure two level theory.

Using fsQCA (Fuzzy Qualitative Comparative Analysis), I provide a comparison of 9 cases of conflict onset vs. 12 cases of conflict avoidance which firstly, shows the significance of patronage networks in both: perpetuating economic and political exclusion by further restraining patronage distribution only to those included (cases of conflict onset) and, controlling violence by keeping the patrons content (cases of

conflict avoidance); and secondly, it demonstrates how information asymmetries and non-credibility of the commitments between the parties can conduct a bargain into failure. For the 21 cases analysed, structural results show that ethnic conflict onset is a product of political exclusion *and* inefficiency in the distribution through either formal *or* informal institutions. Adding to what has been commonly said, informality does play a role in creating conflict if the patronage networks are closed to different ethnic groups. Additionally, whilst evaluating information asymmetries and credible commitments as agency mechanisms, results show that when elites fail to provide credible commitments violence is the preferred course of action to achieve ends. Furthermore, the presence of information asymmetries as coming from the patrons and perceived by the elites in power, affect the willingness of them to redistribute informally and encourage them to exclude.

Research question and Hypotheses

As mentioned in the theoretical framework the research question to be answered is as follows:

Why do some illiberal democracies fall into conflict while others do not?

The implementation of fsQCA aims at testing whether the conditions identified in the theoretical framework are relevant in explaining conflict onset and also, how do they play in the negative cases. In this regard, a series of hypotheses to be tested via the QCA analysis comes to light:

H1. When there is inefficiency in the redistribution of privileges, rights and assets AND there is exclusion from central power, it is likely that violence will erupt.

H2. The lack of trust through the presence of non-credible commitments by the bargaining actors will lead to rejection of the demands for the allocation of resources and in turn conduct a bargain into failure.

H3. The presence of information asymmetries in a bargain for the allocation of resources and assets will lead to a bargain into failure.

Methodology brief and Data

As stated in the methodology chapter, set-theoretic methods approach has been selected in order to allow causal complexity analysis. fsQCA understands the level of membership in each set by scoring degrees of membership between 0 and 1. Membership scores over 0.5 reflect presence of the condition being 0.5 the crossover point. The aim is to evaluate which cases in the sample show presence of the causal condition, and how strong that condition is in explaining the outcome. As the theoretical model shows, both structural and agency conditions are evaluated, therefore Schneider and Wagemann's (2006) proposed two level fsQCA is the variant applied to this model.

Selection of cases

Following research results in regards of type of regime, the universe of cases represents all those countries between 1980 and 2012 that classify as illiberal democracies using the Varieties of Democracy data[22]. The strength of this new database resides in providing measures of both de facto and de jure level of democracy. Most of the civil war and armed conflict onset research which analyse the type of regime does so by evaluating the Polity IV scores which only take into account de jure indicators of democracy level. Furthermore, the Polity IV scores have proven non-robust in the classification of certain regimes[23]. In this regard, the selection of the universe of cases was undertaken by choosing those countries with a measure of democracy between 0.25 and 0.75 in the V-dem Liberal democratic index[24].

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[22] Variable used; Liberal Democracy index. Available at: https://v-dem.net/en/analysis/analysis/ . Published March 2015.

[23] For example, Colombia for the period from 1953 to 1974 is coded as a democracy Polity2 score of 7). However, during this period an agreement between the elites representing the two main parties - conservatives and liberals- is in place to alternate in power but further excluding the legal participation of any other political parties -communist parties for example like PACOCOL-. Therefore, this situation does not reflect a democracy as broadly understood. South Africa under apartheid is another example of misclassification.

[24]0.25-0.75 was chosen because differences in regimes tend to be open ended rather than sharp cutting edges.

A set-theoretic approach implies the selection of a sample of cases rather than the use of the universe[25]. QCA methodology relies in qualitative analysis and in case-based knowledge, therefore the cases were selected in terms of fitness, data availability and suitability for comparison (Goertz & Mahoney, 2004; Schneider and Wagemann, 2007). As the outcome measures need to be fuzzy the final selection of ethnic conflict onset cases are those which have information available for battle related deaths[26]. QCA relies on John Stuart Mill's comparative method; the selection of the cases therefore, relies on both Battle related death data availability and most different system design; being random but obeying most different system design rules. I aim therefore to understand what was sufficiently common among these cases to produce a political event like an armed conflict, which as an outcome is in itself essentially similar across cases. I also take into account negative cases which can help to understand the causal logic driving the positive cases (Schneider and Wagemann, 2006). They provide variety and a negative performance towards the outcome of interest. The negative cases where chosen by evaluating the plausibility of violence erupting in accordance to ethnic cleavages (Goertz & Mahoney, 2005). The final sample contains 9 positive cases and 12 negative cases. For the positive cases, I use a ten year period pre-conflict baseline in order to evaluate how the conditions played before the war began.

Table 1. Selected cases

Positive cases	Negative Cases
Mali 2007 – Northern Mali Tuareg Rebellion	Argentina 1983-2012
India 1994 – Bodoland ethnic conflict	Bolivia 1985 - 2012
Niger 1995 – First Tuareg Conflict	Ghana 1993 - 2012
India 1997 – Tripura ethnic conflict	Madagascar 1992 - 2000
Niger 2007 – Second Tuareg conflict	Namibia 1990 - 2012
India 2009 – Manipur separatist conflict	Nicaragua 1990 - 2008

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[25] The use of the universe should be avoided because it will increase the number of logical reminders in turn affecting the results.
[26] For calculating battle related deaths (BRD) the BRD UCDP database was used for the period 1989-2010. Thus, for covering period before 1989 I used the US Department of state Human rights reports. Avaialable at: http://onlinebooks.library.upenn.edu/webbin/serial?id=crhrp

India 2000 – Nagaland Separatist conflict	Tanzania 1996 - 2006
Thailand 2003 – Malay Muslim insurrection	Zambia 1992 - 2012
Senegal 1990 – Casamance Conflict	Benin 1992 - 2012
	Paraguay 1993 - 2012
	Malawi 1995 - 2003
	Taiwan 1997 - 2012

Operationalisation and calibration of data

As most of the data is interval-scale data I am able to use the direct method of calibration by using the "calibrate" function in the fsQCA software (Ragin & Davey, 2014). The usage of this direct method improves the quality of the fuzzy measures (Rihoux & Ragin, 2008). In order to define the degrees of membership in each condition it is needed to define the full membership score (1), the full non membership score (0) and the crossover point (0.5). The crossover point was selected by using the media for the continuous variables. It is important to highlight that it is not recommended to use the media for selecting the crossover point, as this selection should be done qualitatively. However, the data for the structural conditions and most of the agency conditions does not vary very much from case to case. In this regard, the most unbiased way of addressing membership and non-membership is to use the media. When the upper and lower scores were far from range from the overall sample then they were excluded when assessing the media for establishing the crossover point. This is done in order to maintain the uniformity of the data. The calibrated scores and operationalisation for all the conditions are presented in the table below:

Table 2. Operationalisation of conditions

STRUCTURAL CONDITIONS					
Condition	**Label**	**Description**	**Operationalisation**	**Source**	**Calibration**
N1. Unequal formal distribution	FORMAL DISTRIBUTION	Aims to capture the scope of distribution along different ethnic groups through formal institutions.	Education equality, health equality and Representation of disadvantaged groups	V-dem (March 2015)	Continuous variables, crossover point media
N2. Unequal informal distribution	INFORMAL DISTRIBUTION	Aims to capture the scope of distribution along different ethnic groups through patronage networks	Executive embezzlement, public sector theft*	V-dem (March 2015)	Continuous variables, crossover point media
N3. Exclusion	EXCLUSION	Measure of de facto inclusion of ethnic groups in the executive power.	Exclusion categories: discriminates groups, powerless groups, regional autonomy or separatist. Inclusion categories: Junior partner, Senior partner, dominant group or monopoly of group	Ethnic power Relations dataset	Discriminated or powerless = 1, Discriminated or powerless plus regional autonomy (or separatist claims) = 0.8, discriminated or powerless NOT seeking political power = 0.6, junior partner = 0.3 , senior partner = 0.2, dominant or monopoly = 0
Y. Conflict onset	ONSET	onset is measured by a 25 battle related deaths per year	minimum threshold for categorizing as conflict 25 battle related deaths**	UCDP Battle related deaths database; armed conflict onset database; US department of state human rights reports.	crossover point 24
AGENCY CONDITIONS					
N4. Credible commitments elite to the patrons	CC e-p	Aims at capturing the degree of trustworthiness the ethnic group has on their elected leaders	Trust in goverment or president	Afro, Latin and Asian Barometers and WVS	Survey responses range from "not at all" to "a great deal". This was consequently calibrated to unify the responses in a range from 0 to 1. (national)
N5. Credible commitments patrons to elite	CC p-e	Aims at capturing the likeliness that patrons and their constituencies are to be trusted with providing security and political support	Number of protests per year***	GDELT Project	Number or protests / number of years, crossover point media (subnational)

N6. Information asymmetry elite to patron Infoasymm e-p	Aims at capturing the degree of information asymmetry in terms of language and channels of communication	No data available	No data available	No data available
N7. Information asymmetry patron to elite Infoasymm p-e	aims at capturing the degree of information asymmetry in the information displayed by the patrons.	Number of terror attacks per year plus casualties from those attacks	GTD Global terrorism database	Value = number of terror attacks*number of victims More than 200=1 ; 0=1 ; 2-5=0.9 ; 130-190 = 0.8 ; 6-10=0.4 ; 11-25=0.3 ; 30-100=0.2 (this according to the distribution within the selected sample) (sub-national)

* Executive embezzlement and Public sector theft variables are likely to reflect a bad corruption and/or patronage prototype which increases inequality in the distribution.
** I am using data from both UCPD Battle Related Deaths database (1980-2010) and the US Department of State Human Rights Reports. If the data differ then the deaths were averaged.
*** A qualitative assessment of the data was done to include only ethnic related protests.

I recognize the difficulty of measuring a concept such as patronage. The challenge comes not only from the concept per se but also from the invisibility of the transactions undertaken through this channel. The proxy used here is by no means perfect, but it gives the opportunity to start somewhere. As mentioned in the theoretical framework and in the literature review, patronage is often understood as a negative aspect of politics. Thus, in reality, patronage can also take a beneficial form, providing another channel of distribution for different groups; often this informal channel of distribution is more important or remains more active than formal ones. The proxy selected here aims at capturing the type of patronage that is likely to bring conflict onset: a patronage that remains at the top levels and does not redistribute along the vertical line and also excludes different ethnicities from the distribution of spoils.

The aggregation of executive embezzlement and public sector theft attempts to capture the negative aspect of patronage. Stating that patronage is present in illiberal democratic regimes, it assumes that when assets are coopted and stay at the very top conflict is more likely to happen. Thus, with the proxy as it is, it can be argued that

embezzlement can also be trans-ethnic as in the case, for example, of predominant single party regimes which need nonetheless the support of other ethnicities to maintain themselves in power. Despite the initial contradiction with statements that argue in favor of patrons benefiting only their patronage line, it can also provide the advantage of analyzing qualitatively whether patronage also, in some instances, takes the form of inter-ethnicity (see conclusions and discussion chapter). In this regard and aiming to evaluate redistributive patronage versus non-redistributive patronage and/or the presence of multiethnic patronage redistribution it can be justified as a functional proxy[27].

In this vein, it also highlights the fundamental difference between political inclusion and informal redistribution as well as giving a hint in forthcoming analysis as to whether the patrons need to be 'inside' or 'outside' the state structures to receive patronage distribution. Assuming the difference between political inclusion and redistribution, what matters is if assets are redistributed along the vertical patronage line rather than solely staying at the top; it is the case that even if there is political inclusion, informal redistribution might not be efficient for all the groups.

Results

Within the analysis of the structures, 8 possible combinations of conditions resulted. A frequency cutoff of 1 was used to select the relevant paths and a 0.75 consistency threshold was selected. According to these criteria, 8 configurations of conditions resulted as sufficient combinations for the outcome. I use the intermediate solution for analysing the results. In this regard, the overall configurational analysis presents a consistency of 0.73 and a coverage of 0.70, this means that 70% of the selected cases are covered within either of the paths[28]. The solution formula is as follows[29]:

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[27] After extensive research and evaluation of other plausible ways of constructing this variable as a condition to be evaluated and also taking into account the lack of data for this particular phenomenon; it was decided that although not perfect by any means, measuring in this way might be able to provide some meaningful answers.

[28] If the measures for onset are changed to just differentiate between civil wars and armed conflicts coding: 0.75 armed conflicts and 1 civil wars the results still hold, with an overall coverage of 0.74 and consistency of 0.79.

[29] CAPS LOCK means presence of the condition. As opposed lower case means absence of the condition.

(1) ETHNIC CONFLICT ONSET =   EXCLUSION * (formal distribution + informal distribution)

Most of the positive cases show a presence of EXCLUSION *and* either formal or informal inequality in the distribution; as a matter of fact, none of the cases reports presence of exclusion *and* absence of both formal and informal distribution. This means that as expected, the relationship at the structural level is equifinal in which some countries go to war under favourable conditions (Thailand, Niger) but also under unfavourable ones (Mali, Senegal). Within the solution EXCLUSION*informal distribution the cases with greater than 0.5 membership are Thailand03, Niger07, Niger95, India94 and India03. Whereas within the path EXCLUSION*formal distribution the cases with more than 0.5 memberships scores are India00, India03, India97 and India94.

As most of the cases fall within the path of unequal formal distribution*EXCLUSION which resembles inequality in the distribution of social services and political participation, the coverage score is 0.65 (65% of the cases) with a consistency of 0.75. The informal path which resembles non-redistributive patronage line * EXCLUSION, presents a coverage of 63% of the cases and a consistency score of 0.72.

Hereof, the results from the truth table analysis of the structural conditions and the solution paths further confirm findings by Cederman et al., (2010); Wimmer, (2009) in regards of the significance of political EXCLUSION of ethnic groups and the likelihood of conflict onset. These findings support the theoretical claim that when relevant groups are excluded from power and decision-making it is likely that a conflict will be triggered. As mentioned earlier, it is expected that the degree of informal and formal distribution would also affect the possibility of triggering the onset of a conflict. According to these results, it is possible to infer that EXCLUSION works as a necessary condition but operates as a INUS condition within the structural set, a INUS condition is a causal condition that is an insufficient but necessary part of a causal recipe which is in itself unnecessary but sufficient for the outcome to happen. For this sample of cases, EXCLUSION does not explain conflict on its own because it is not a simple cause which causes conflict but a combination of conditions. Conflict onset is

likely to resemble conjunctural causation. The event of exclusion and the inequality in the distribution in either formal or informal channels jointly together produce conflict onset; rather than one single condition in isolation; different conjunctions prove to lead to the same outcome.

Structural results should not be interpreted as robust results on their own within a two level QCA model (Schneider and Wagemann, 2006). Nonetheless, it is shown here that inequality in the distribution to different ethnic lines is relevant when triggering or preventing violence. The channels of distribution are relevant too, as opposed to the regular arguments which depict formal inequality as a potential cause of conflict, it is shown here that inequality as perceived and as reproduced through informal channels of distribution is also a significant factor in stimulating the decision to use violence. The accumulation of wealth in the hands of the executive and the illegal appropriation of public funds by those elites with access to power with no intent of vertical distribution is a significant condition in triggering conflict. Conversely, in those instances in which appropriation is distributed along the different ethnic elite groups within the state (Namibia, Zambia, Tanzania) or in those instances in which although groups are not per se included within state power but yet receive funds redistributed informally (Bolivia, Argentina, Nicaragua) show proof of conflict avoidance via informal means.

As Horowitz (1985) states, the composition of the power structure and civil service is "an important indicator of whom owns the country as well as of how groups are doing in the struggle for worth". It is true that a picture of the public sphere in terms of access to (mainly) executive jobs, shows the reality of discrimination and exclusion of groups. Although, this is the ultimate effect or the most notorious event or conclusion of such discrimination, still the complexity of the processes along the structures implies there is much more than that. In this regard, the fact that members of an ethnicity are represented in parliament or in government itself can be viewed also as an official recognition of this group. However, this does not necessarily mean that resources are not reaching discriminated groups through other channels. Yet, even if the groups are fully excluded they can still receive distribution via state policies or patronage. This exemplifies conjunctural causation. There are cases in which grieved groups are excluded yet certain degree of distribution whether formal or informal also influences their decision not to fight (Paraguay, Bolivia). It is beyond the single fact of exclusion

what drives groups into violence, there are more layers of analysis over that this broad but accurate conclusion.

In this regard, it is shown here that the degree of distribution of economic assets, political participation and social services is relevant both in the formal and informal realm. Hence, stimulating distribution through formal institutions in the form of affirmative action policies is a plausible way of controlling violence. The formulation of these type of policies can also increase trust in the elites. Additionally, informal distribution through patronage networks although from a western point of view is seen as detrimental, in young and/or illiberal democracies remains as a valid channel of distribution. Therefore, if patronage is redistributive reaching the lower ends of the line, and the spoils are shared by the different ethnic groups then this distributive relationship serves as an opportunity to further prevent violence. Political inclusion and redistributive appropriation of public funds can help to lessen conflict. Contrary, when excluded and grieved ethnic groups perceive and/or are aware of the distribution of spoils to just some privileged groups then this enhances the potential for violent action. The perception of constant appropriation of funds with an intend to redistribute just amongst those included and at the top increases the possibility of violent action. A clear example of this is the Malay Muslims within the south of Thailand. Analyzing two different periods, the Prem Tinsulanonda period in comparison to the Thaksin Shinawatra period, the perception of personal appropriation of funds within the Shinawatra period with no aim of redistribution pushed the Malay groups into a course of violent actions (see Thailand case study chapter).

Furthermore, it is relevant to highlight the importance of conjunctural causality. Mali and Senegal illustrate this point. Senegal has made an attempt to include the Diolas in the formal distribution of power during both Senghor and Diouf governments, they hold political representation and therefore are seen as included within the distribution of power. However, the Diolas lack formal distribution as there have been a large number of land expropriations in favor of tourism projects, the local economy also is in control of people from the north of Senegal. Informally, the patronage distribution does not reach or includes Diola people, the Diolas are also excluded from the spoils distributed through patronage. Therefore, although Diolas share some sort of power within the government, still distribution is highly unequal.

Furthermore, when negating the outcome to evaluate the negative cases I find that there are instances in which there is political exclusion but good formal and informal distribution and no conflict onset. Thus, the overall results of negating the outcome (consistency 0.82, coverage 0.90) show that conflict avoidance is, structurally, a product of inclusion (consistency score 0.89, raw coverage 0.79), informal distribution (consistency score 0.86, raw coverage 0.60) or formal distribution (consistency score 0.89, coverage 0.59). A peaceful trajectory can be achieved through any of the three paths. Consequently, although political exclusion is a fundamental condition for conflict onset, as opposed, political inclusion is not a fundamental condition for explaining peaceful trajectories. Peaceful trajectories can be explained by instances in which there is no political inclusion but there is redistribution formally or informally, or both (Argentina, Nicaragua, Bolivia). Although groups are not included in the distribution of public jobs still resources have found their way to the ethnic group keeping them content not to fight. The Quechua and Aymara indigenous populations have always been excluded up until the rise to power of Evo Morales in 2006, hence there has not been incidents of armed violence. This represents a clear example of this logic.

Credible commitments and conflict onset

Evaluating the credibility of the commitments, the different paths show that if there is a source of mistrust amongst the groups, then it is likely that a bargain failure will occur. A bargain failure based on mistrust causes groups to restrict the degree of distribution and to exclude the grieved groups from central government power. Credible commitments have the potential to affect the rational decision-making of the actors when bargaining for redistribution, which in turn affects the possibility of conflict onset. The perception of credibility of commitments can be evaluated from each side of the bargain. For the side of the patrons and their constituencies whilst evaluating elite credibility it is likely that the elite will use populist policies to persuade the masses for support. The use of populist policies is strategic however, and leaders will tend to promise policies that can be achieved. On the other hand, commitments coming from the patrons can be evaluated by their capacity to control the group not to protest or fight. Within illiberal democratic regimes this is particularly challenging due to the

nature of the regime, the use of force is often a more attractive option when faced with a negative response from the counterpart.

The presence of mistrust amongst both parties in the bargain works as a conflict enabling condition that can drive the bargain into failure. In instances in which lack of trust is present the potential for a bargain failure increases, therefore it is more likely that violent conflict can be prevented when there is credibility of the commitments as expressed by both or each one of the parties. It is worth noticing here whether, depending on the context, there is any difference between the source of the commitment. It remains significant to be able to differentiate whether the credibility of the commitment in one source would be more relevant than the other. In other words, whether the credibility of the commitments, or of the promises as spoken by the elites in power is more, or less, significant in producing a bargain failure than the promises presented by the patron and its constituency.

It is also likely that the source of the commitment would have different impacts depending on the context of distribution: whether formal or informal. In this regard, trust is thought to be a fundamental building block of distribution through patronage networks. In essence, elites will not be willing to redistribute informally if there is no guarantee of receiving political support or security from the patron's constituencies; they would not risk attempting to 'buy' if there is no guarantee of receiving support. Furthermore, the elites will fear those resources could possibly go to the purchase of elements to increase opposition. Also, when patrons do not trust the elites to comply with promises, redistribution through patronage will not take place as there is no interest for the elites to redistribute if there is a lack of affinity with the excluded group.

Credible commitments in the formal context

Analysing the intermediate solution, there is one possible path towards conflict onset. The solution covers a total of 69% of the selected cases with a consistency score of 0.97. The solution formula runs as follows:

(2). CONFLICT ONSET = ccelite-patron * ccpatron-elite * formal distribution * EXCLUSION

When bargains are conducted for the distribution of assets, social services and political participation and inclusion in public jobs the trustworthiness of the promises made by both actors negotiating is relevant. In this regard, within a formal bargain of redistribution lack of credible commitments acts as mechanism that conducts a bargain into failure, this is illustrated by the cases of India03, India94, india00 and India97. The results for the formal context in regards of positive cases is driven by India and the conflicts in the Northeast region: Tripura, Bodoland, Nagaland and Manipur. Thus, although the unit of analysis reflects the same country, still bargains conducted between the state elites and the grieved groups in each case is remarkably different. In fact, the case of India is of particular interest. Firstly, it reflects the game of different sets of elites: the ethnic elites which are bargaining for inclusion and redistribution, the federal elites which control the assets locally and finally the national elites which are most likely to support the federal elites to maintain order. Secondly, India represents a case in which there has been an attempt to *formalize* patronage networks during the process of decolonization and in general informal politics through the constitution of local *Panchayats.* This is thought to further enhance the impact of credible commitments within the formal context. Thus, the question remains as to why did this *formalization* failed to produce results (see India Bodoland Chapter).

Furthermore, the elites in power are expected to treat grieved groups differently, in some cases some groups might represent a bigger threat than others or might enjoy different degrees of inclusion or exclusion at decision-making within the state[30]. Therefore, the bargains conducted between the elites and the patrons for each group is substantially different. For example, comparatively for the case of Assamese elites and the Nagas and the Assamese elites and their bargain with the Bodos, the result of both bargains is significantly different. The Nagas were granted more concessions than the Bodos and in a shorter period of time (first autonomy concession for the Nagas 1963 and for the Bodos 2003). Furthermore, the Naga demands were harder and yet being the Bodos more of a soft line demand, concessions were not granted

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[30] Also as some other theories stating that the elites will fight some groups but not others.

nor partially conceded. This situation also created moral hazard amongst the Bodos which increased their sentiments of discrimination and exclusion product of the concessions made to the Nagas but not to themselves. Thus, despite the Naga concessions or autonomy conceded initially in 1963, still violence broke out in 1992 and 2000 product in fact of increased mistrust between the groups.

Furthermore, for these two examples the credibility of the commitments on the patrons to not mobilise, in other words to provide political support and security is also significant. For example, in the Bodo case, the leadership of the ABSU after repeated failures to negotiate their demands with the Assamese elite opted for civil unrest as their preferred form of action. The period from 1986 up to 1993 saw increased number of protests, hunger strikes, rallies and other sort of repertories of contention which, in the eyes of the Assamese elite only undermined their trust in the ABSU movement which in turn affected their decision to concede. Conversely, despite the Bodo movement being peaceful initially, the Assamese elites decided to repress and constrain the movement which also in turn undermined their credibility to dialogue.

In this regard, it is shown here than when bargains for formal redistribution and political inclusion take place, the credibility of the commitments in both sides of the bargain is a significant condition which can conduct a bargain into failure. If the parties, lack reputation on the side of the elites in power; and lack credibility in the provision of security and political support on the side of the patrons, then the use of violence is the most likely outcome as both sides fail to believe in the credibility of potential deals that can come out of the bargain.

Negative cases which present political inclusion in central power and have credibility in the commitments from each side are: Ghana, Tanzania, Namibia and Benin. These countries therefore, have successfully put into place an agreement in which groups are content and trust each other to exchange demands and offers. Inclusion is likely to be a product of trust amongst the parties. Elites' trust the patrons and their constituencies because they are delivering political support and provision of security. On the other hand, the patrons and their constituencies trust the elite's promises because past transactions have proven successful.

However, the negation of the outcome shows that there are two possible paths to peaceful trajectories (solution coverage 0.87, consistency 0.96). Firstly, those instances in which there is credibility of the commitments as perceived by the elites in power *and* there is political inclusion (CCp-e*INCLUSION: consistency 1, coverage 0.84). And secondly, another path to a peaceful trajectory which includes those cases in which there is trust in the commitments of the elites in power as perceived by the patrons, there is formal distribution *and* political inclusion (CCe-p*FORMAL*INCLUSION: consistency 0.91, coverage 0.39). Political inclusion within the formal context when analyzing trajectories of peace and credibility of the commitments operates as a necessary condition (consistency 0.91). For instances of political inclusion with no formal distribution trust in the patrons is the connecting link (path 1). In Malawi, Argentina, Ghana, Zambia, Paraguay and Nicaragua there is credibility of the commitments as communicated by the patrons, these cases are examples in which the patrons did not mobilized the masses and consequently, provided security and political support. This affected the partial or total inclusion in decision-making or power sharing agreements. Secondly, Tanzania, Namibia, Benin are cases in which the trust in the elites by the patrons and their constituencies permitted arrangements of power-sharing and also allowed those groups to achieve certain degree of formal distribution as captured by provision of public goods and equal treatment of different groups (path 2).

Despite the lower coverage in this second path, it is remarkable to notice that increased degrees of trust in the elites can forbid patrons from refraining to violence, increasing in turn the degrees of trustworthiness at the time of dialoguing or eventually deciding to give room within the state structures. Conversely, trust in the patrons to provide security and political participation can increase the possibilities of political inclusion but not of formal distribution. In other words, when the elites trust patrons' promises this can conduct elites in power into politically including but not necessarily into formally redistributing.

Thus, ultimately the effect of credibility as projected by each side of the bargain seems to affect differently the structural context. Confidence in the patron's promises affects political inclusion but not formal distribution. Additionally, confidence in the elites promises do affect formal distribution.

Credible commitments in the informal context[31]

There are 2 possible paths towards conflict onset in the evaluation of credible commitments within an informal distribution context. The overall solution covers a total of 70% of the cases and an overall consistency of 0.87. The two possible paths are as follows:

(3). CONFLICT ONSET = ccelite-patron * informal distribution * EXCLUSION

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ccelite-patron * ccpatron-elite * EXCLUSION

The first path reports a coverage of 0.37 and a consistency score of 0.81, the second path reports a coverage of 0.61 and has a consistency score of 0.85.

Within the informal context, the decision to constrain patronage and to continue to exclude is influenced by the lack of credible commitments coming from the elite. However, as the relationship is equifinal, the selected cases fall into one or the other path, meaning that both paths are sufficient combination of conditions that lead to the same outcome.

It is noticeable here, that within the second combination of conditions towards conflict onset, inequality in the informal distribution does not come up as relevant, implying that both mechanisms can also solely affect exclusion[32], in other words, lack of trust works also as an exclusion enabling mechanism. Exclusion as mentioned earlier, works as a necessary condition for conflict to erupt, hence the perceived lack of trust in the elite promises and, in turn, the lack of commitment of the patrons to control their constituencies and to provide security influences the decision at the elite level to exclude or to perpetuate exclusion. The cases illustrating this pattern are Thailand03, Niger07, India94 and India97.

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[31] The cases of Senegal90 and Niger85 had to be dropped from this analysis due to data availability for the agency conditions.

[32] Causal complexity also implies that the mechanisms can produce the outcome in a given context but not in others. However, the procedures of fsQCA also imply that consistent paths are sufficient combinations of conditions that lead to the outcome.

In regards of the first path towards conflict onset within an informal context of redistribution, lack of credible commitments in the elites affects both the degree of distribution via patronage networks and exclusion from central power. In this respect, following the selectorate theory (De Mesquita, 2005) leaders maintain their coalitions in power by "*taxing* and *spending* in ways that allocate mixes of *public and private goods" (p. 37).* Leaders can sustain loyalty by providing personal and private benefits; in other words, patronage. Because the coalition who brought the leader to power is exclusive then it is possible to efficiently distribute private goods amongst the few, amongst the "included"; thus, resembling a closed patronage line. Leaders buy loyalty from their supporters by distributing patronage to those included, hence, when the size of the coalition is too big or fully inclusionary, then leaders will emphasize the production of public goods because distributing private goods would be too costly. Following this point, it is consistent that lack of trust in the elites coming from the patrons and their clienteles would affect the degree of informal distribution in the form of patronage.

Furthermore, de Mesquita also includes arguments in regards of affinity between the different groups that conform both the coalition in power or the possible challenger's coalitions. Affinities reflect idiosyncratic preferences and they matter in the consolidation of coalitions. In ethnically heterogeneous countries, the driver of coalition formation is indeed ethnicity. From a leader's perspective and according to de Mesquita (2005) affinity can be assessed along three groups. Those about whom it can confidently be said that they feel a strong idiosyncratic attachment to the incumbent (p.61), those who don't and a middle indecisive range. The degree of informal distribution is affected by trust in the elites because the elites already in power will approach to the groups with the more affinity possible. The discriminated groups as the case of the Malay muslims in Thailand, the Tuareg in Niger and the Manipuri in India will comprise the challengers of the government or the opposition; likewise, those who do not trust the elites or have the less affinity will not receive informal distribution in the form of patronage or private goods simply because it is a waste of money or resources for those already in power.

As depicted above, in an informal bargain for redistribution trust in the elite's promises stands out as a more significant condition than trust in the patron's promises whilst affecting conflict onset. Furthermore, decreased credibility can also trigger splintering of movements. Lack of trust in the elite's willingness and capacity to deliver can prevent group's leadership from accepting offers from the elite. Thus, if the leadership does accept elite's proposals yet the movement is not confident in the delivery of concessions then this can encourage splintering. Splintering divides the group between hard-liners and soft-liners, providing greater chances for the hardliners to radicalize an in turn intensify the use of armed violence. A possible example of this is India94 and the Bodo movement. In 1977 the leadership of the PTCA (Plain Tribals council of Assam) headed by Charan Narzary and Kumar Basumatary accepted concessions of the Janata Party which was then in power. The movement mistrusted the true intentions of the Assamese elite and thought the demands for a separate state, the state of Udayachal were not going to be met. In fact, Basumatary and Narzary withdrew the demand for Udayachal once in power, this in turn triggered the splintering of the PTCA between the remaining PTCA still in head of Basumatary and Narzary and the PTCA-P (progressive) which decided to use a stronger approach towards bargaining for their demands. The PTCA-P more radical in their actions regarded the soft-line as being effectively bought into the Janata government but with no intention of furthering the redistribution along the lower ends of the movement.

The India94 case illustrates how decreased credibility of the commitments, as evaluated by the patrons and communicated by the elite has the potential to affect the distribution of private goods in an exclusive coalition and also how it can encourage the splitering of movements giving rise to more radical movements.

Finally, the negation of the outcomes for the informal context does not provide consistent results, the consistency and coverage scores are too low to be considered as valid.

Information asymmetries and conflict onset

When analysing asymmetries in the information it is likely that the first move is conducted by the groups as a threat display or as a genuine attack. In this regard, the

groups are the first to reveal information about capacity and true will to use violence. However, asymmetries in the information can also come from public declarations from the elites. The elites can reveal their will to fight or willingness to bargain by publicly stating their position about the dispute. In this regard, both language policies and availability of sources of information in the ethnicity's native tongue (tv, newspapers and radio) are prospects of good quality information which are remarkable in affecting the creation and perception of information asymmetries (Schultz, 2003; Schultz, 1999). Information is cleaner if there are various sources, if newspapers and TV news are also distributed in the group's language, and if there is room for opposing and criticising the government. It is expected that conflict will erupt if the perception of the grieved groups is one of miscalculation of the true bargaining intentions of the elite. Or conflict can erupt also when elites misinterpret the information displayed by the groups.

As with credibility of the commitments information asymmetries can also be evaluated as coming from each source. However, due to lack of regional data in regards of number of newspapers in circulation, or TV news in local language or newspapers in local language this mechanism could not be evaluated. Consequently, when testing empirically the information asymmetry argument, it is only possible to test the asymmetry in the information as displayed by the groups but not by the elite. It can be arguable here, that it is possible to use indicators of freedom of speech; thus, it is not per se freedom of information what causes information asymmetries coming from the elites but the quality of the freedom and its diversity[33]. In this regard, in order to evaluate asymmetries in the information as communicated by the elites in power, it is necessary to provide a holistic measure of the media. Some constituencies do not know how to read; therefore, they will prefer to analyse the information via radio or TV. Contrary, there also could be some constituencies which do not have access to electricity, television or radio but perhaps they are able to read. This is only to illustrate the relevance of providing a holistic measure of media communication.

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[33] Illiberal democracies will tend to respect to a certain degree freedom of speech as a feature of democracy as such, however, apart from this de jure right the quality on which it operates is completely different. Also, the measure would have to be regional as freedoms and quality indeed change in respect of the geographical area of the country, especially when talking about ethnoregional groups.

Information asymmetries in the formal context

The overall solution coverage reports 73% of the cases with a consistency score of 0.76. The effect of information asymmetries as displayed by the groups when bargaining for formal distribution is not significant. In this regard, when groups negotiate for acquiring or incrementing distribution through formal institutions, information asymmetries are not relevant in the calculation for decision-making.

(4). CONFLICT ONSET = formal distribution * EXCLUSION

The results for this particular sample reflect that out of the 5 cases of conflict onset only 3 present information asymmetries coming from the groups (India00, India97 India09). The remaining two cases Mali07 and India94 were clear in their willingness to fight (or not to) but in substantial different ways. On the India94 Bodo case, the use of violence was constant and the attacks were sophisticated. The BdSF[34] incurred in a great variety of repertoires of violence which included bomb attacks, attacks to property, raiding of houses and even sexual violence towards non Bodo women (Hussain, 2000). Thus, contrary on the Mali Tuareg case; the group did not commit attacks during the period of study which in information asymmetry arguments will reflect a clear message to the elites of not willingness to fight. Despite this and India00, India97 and India09 presenting scattered, disconnected cases of sporadic violence for the period of study, which could lead to a misleading interpretation of the true will to fight; this did not affect the elites in power in their decision to continue to politically exclude or restrain formal distribution, further affecting the likelihood of conflict onset.

The lack of, or the constrained redistribution through formal channels and the exclusion from central power are not affected by disruptions in the information. Not is the decision to use violence as a course of action.

However, when negating the outcomes to evaluate the relevance of the mechanisms for the negative cases clear information does play a role (consistency score 0.91, coverage 0.91). A clear peaceful trajectory which refrains from the use of violence to

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[34] Bodo democratic front. A product of the ABSU.

manifest or put forward claims in these cases is rewarded by political inclusion and the avoidance of conflict. However, there are some cases which present sporadic minor violence in the form of violence against civilians like in Benin or Malawi for example. Thus, the violence is so minor that it is not considered a threat to the state and does not affect the bargains between the patrons and the elites in power.

Information asymmetries in the informal context

Information asymmetries do play a fundamental role in triggering conflict when there is inequality in the informal distribution or exclusion of grieved groups as opposed to the formal context. When elites misrepresent the true will to fight and/or capacity to fight by evaluating excluded group attacks it is likely that they will respond with violence, leading to conflict onset. The overall solution covers a total of 54% of the cases with a consistency score of 0.77. There are two different paths that conduct to conflict onset when evaluating asymmetries in the information in an informal context:

(5). CONFLICT ONSET = INFOASYM p-e * informal distribution

+

INFOASYM p-e * EXCLUSION

The first path reports coverage of 43% of the cases with a consistency score of 0.78, the second path presents coverage of 43% of the cases and a consistency of 0.75.

When patrons and their constituencies display misleading information concerning their true will to fight and capacity, then elites are likely to retaliate instead of conceding demands, also because they are inclined to control violence. Therefore, conflict is likely to be triggered as the cases of India09, Niger07, Senegal90, Thailand03 and India97 show.

Is it important to notice that the display of a threat can be tactical. Groups can threat the state power in order to intimidate and achieve concession of their claims, hence, if there is no capacity or a true will to fight but the threats are taken seriously by the state then conflict will erupt and the grieved groups are likely to lose. In fact, their bluff

comes at a high price because violence might be extensive (Kirschner, 2010) and concessions are not met, as the case of Thailand thoroughly illustrates.

Information asymmetries as displayed by the groups have the potential to affect distribution through patronage networks or exclusion from central power. Elites will constrain the degree of informal distribution through patronage networks if they feel their investment would not pay off. This means that when groups implement a threat display or a bluff the elites in power will likely restrain patronal investment as the patron is not actually providing security if the threat is taken seriously. The elites will also likely constrain patronage distribution because those resources might be used against them instead of buying them support. As opposed, within a formal bargain for redistribution information asymmetries do not play a significant role in restraining the degree of formal distribution. Whether patrons implement real threats or none to show their willingness to fight does not affect the formal aspect of redistribution, this is due perhaps, to the nature of the transaction.

The presence of information asymmetries as coming from the patrons and perceived by the elites is thought to have a greater impact in bargains for informal redistribution (first path) because the resources that come to be redistributed informally pose a greater threat to the ability of groups to use more sophisticated attacks.

Exclusion can also be affected because the means of negotiating for an inclusionary deal are severely affected when information is conducted through violence. In this regard, when information is misinterpreted by the elites they are likely to close or constrain the access to sharing the spoils which in turn motivates the groups to become increasingly violent, mounting the likeliness of conflict onset.

Conclusions

Armed conflicts are complex multilayered events; they can be understood as the byproduct of a failed bargaining game between elite groups. Centering attention on grievance based explanations of ethnic conflict onset, it is shown here that inequality in the distribution of economic assets, social services and political participation in addition to exclusion from central power work as conflict enabling conditions. Thus, it

has been shown here that inefficient redistribution through informal channels is also relevant when explaining conflict onset.

Illiberal democracies represent the type of regime which is most likely to be affected by conflict. Within this type of regime patronage networks work as a channel of distribution which cannot be ignored when analyzing exclusionary practices of distribution and political participation. As results show, inefficient redistribution via patronage networks is a condition that is present in cases of conflict onset. As opposed, trajectories or peace can also be explained by the use of patronage networks to control violence.

Furthermore, a bargain failure at the agency level most likely is a product of lack of trust and asymmetries in the information within the elite bargain. In particular, it is shown here that the effect of credible commitments is different within each context of distribution. While in a formal bargain for distribution the credibility of the commitments of each side of the bargain is relevant in affecting conflict onset, in an informal context only trust in the elites as perceived by the patrons is relevant. These results are consistent with De Mesquita's selectorate theory in which the more groups are excluded from power, in other words the smaller the size of the coalition in power, the more provision of private goods. This in turn explains lack of credible commitment as perceived by those excluded. Furthermore, cases which reflect good credible commitment coming from the elites are those cases in which the size of the coalition is bigger which in turn stimulates the provision of public goods (as providing private goods to a big coalition would be too costly).

In terms of information asymmetries, redistribution through formal channels as state institutions is not affected by information asymmetries coming from the groups. Whether the groups have a clear intention to fight or perform attacks as a form of bluff or to pressure the state into conceding, this will not affect the elites in power in their decision to politically exclude or restrain formal distribution. However, elites will not provide patronage if they believe the group is serious about challenging the state because they fear those informally distributed assets could be used against them. In other words, groups that bluff or do not hold the true capacity to fight but the state misrepresents the information are not likely to receive any patronage distribution.

Chapter 6.

Thailand:
An analysis of the stabilizing and de-stabilizing effect of patronage networks in the southern provinces of Thailand 1980-2003

Among the selected cases for the QCA analysis of mechanisms, Thailand is categorised as the most likely case because of its position in the factor space. The classification of the cases can be done in accordance to the predominance and strength of each mechanism playing in each case as interpreted by the fuzzy measure. The case of Thailand complies with these conditions, particularly in the absence of informal distribution as a mechanism for avoiding conflict, the score is only 0.17 meaning that there is a very low degree of distribution through patronage networks for the period 1993-2003. This case is categorised as a most likely case. Hence, the idea of conducting case study analysis for the Malay Muslim conflict in the south of Thailand stems from the idea that if the informal mechanism of distribution is present, then this evidence can increase the confidence in the operation of the mechanism.

General background

The southern provinces of Thailand were annexed in 1909 despite them being an independent Malay sultanate. This region is home to Malay Muslims which identify themselves with Malaysian cultural background rather than with Thailand. Thus, ever since, the Thai government has undertaken a quest to homogenise the area and co-opt Malay culture under a common Thai identity. In this quest, it has discredit and undermined Malay Muslims culture.

Violence in the South of Thailand emerged during the early years of the XX century. The Thai attempt to homogenise the country under a common identity has fuelled sentiments of exclusion amongst the Malay communities. The beginning of the

assimilation campaign dates back to the 1920's when the Compulsory Primary Education Act was proclaimed by the Thai government. As in many cases of ethnic and cultural diversification as for example in India the Thai elites wanted to kick-start the process of assimilation by targeting schools and language. In Thailand the policies were radical, apart from making it compulsory for children to learn the Thai language they also forced the students to adopt Thai names and enforced the inculcation of the Thai ethic (Abdullah, 2010). This sparked rebellions and violence across the Malay Muslim community who did not agree with the new Education policies. During the 1930s the Language policies became even more discriminative, this time putting a ban on the use of Malay and other minority languages, the Thai government does not recognise the existence of regional dialects which highly infuriated the Malays and other minor communities (Weinstein, 1990). Since the 1930s to the end of the II World War the policies of Thai ethnic identity, language and religious assimilation were heavily enforced, thus by 1945 a new Act benefiting Islam was launched.

The Patronage of Islam Act 1945 was a strategy by the Thai authorities to counterbalance the growing Malay nationalism product of the 1920s and 1930s discriminative policies. It created dual ethnic institutions that aimed at co-opting the Muslim elites by providing power in deciding and controlling religious affairs. Thus, the strategy was just a pure *formality* of the Thai government and instead of co-opting the Southern elites it became very unpopular in the South as posts within the south were filled with Muslims brought from Bangkok instead of local elites[35]. This gave rise to a series of movements and armed groups which inflicted scattered and sporadic violence. The most affected provinces were Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat in which the repertories of violence ranged from attacks to police stations to governments schools and targeting of civilians (Croissant, 2007; Askew, 2007; McCargo, 2006; Melvin, 2007). There was not a visible head of the Malay movement for autonomy. Thus, by 1980 the violence significantly decreased with the ascension of General Prem Tinsulanonda but refrained aggressively in 2001 with the rise to power of Thaksin Shinawatra.

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[35] This is a pattern which repeats itself further on.

The conflict is a long-standing conflict, however, according to PRIO UCDP data the conflict only takes the character of official onset until 2003 when it firstly reached more that 25 battle related deaths per year. Violence has mainly been sporadic and scattered and the insurgency is made out of a collection of different groups with different objectives but with no visible head or hierarchical organisation.

Figure 1. Map of Thailand's southern provinces

Source: Thailand Business News. Retrieved from: https://www.thailand-business-news.com/politics/47286-peace-talks-thailands-southern-unrest-stalled.html

Elite bargaining in the South of Thailand: Malay Muslims vs. Thai Buddhist

Since the 1930's Thailand elites have taken the quest to unify the country under a national identity. Successive military regimes, have attempted, by the implementation of discriminatory policies; to conceal all differences of the various ethnic populations living under the Thai sovereign territory. The ethnic fragmentation of Thailand is not extreme as we see in some other cases across Africa, hence Thailand is home to at least 5 different ethnic groups: The Thais representing 74% of the total population

across the 1960's, The Chinese representing 14% of the population; The Malay Muslims representing only 3.5% of the total population for the 1960's; the Hill tribes in the North of the country with a representation of only 1% of the total population for the same decade and the ethnic group Shan with less than 0.5% of the population (Vogt, et al., 2015)

The Chinese, the second most populous group is seen as an immigrant group with no aspirations of power. It has played a great role in the development of Thailand economically but politically it does not represent a contender party for political bargain. The Hill tribes on the other hand, is a group conformed but many different ethnicities with no formal organisation amongst them. The north of the country, home to these tribes is also one of the most deprived and poor areas of the Thailand sovereign territory (Jitsuchon & Ritcher, 2007). Although highly aggrieved, the opportunity for collective action is curtailed due to the high fragmentation across these groups (Fearon, 2003; Schneider & Wiesehomeier, 2008; Horowitz, 1985). The south also highly deprived is home to the Malay Muslim community. The Malay Muslim territory, previously the Kingdom of Pattani was annexed to the Kingdom of Siam with the withdrawal of the British Empire from Malaysia and the creation of the Thai state.

The Malay Muslims in the south of Thailand are a homogeneous community which has lived under the Thai rule with no autonomy or freedom to practice its own ethnic customs and traditions and no power to decide on its own affairs. They speak Malay instead of Thai and have different religious and cultural practices. The sense of otherness has been fuelled by the Thai authorities which have attempted to homogenise the country; the constant ban on cultural practices such as religion, the prohibition of Muslim schools, the discouragement of the Malay language and the neglecting of the region have nurtured sentiments of discrimination amongst the Malay population. This pattern continues to date, on the 10th of January 2018 the Thai government announced the teaching of history of Thai kings in private Islamic schools within the southern provinces (Wongcha-um & Thakral, 2018).

Since the 1960's Thailand has experienced sporadic ethnic violence predominantly in the Southern provinces of Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat. The effect of the Cold War signified that the Malay armed groups were receiving aid from foreign governments

specially from Malaysia, because of this reason; during this decade the conflict intensified but it never reached the status of armed conflict in accordance to academic definitions. Hence, in 2003 the status of the violence reached the threshold to be categorised as an armed conflict. Following this point, the present case study aims at explaining the Malay violence which erupted in 2003.

The analysis is divided in three periods and two inflexion points:

1. **A first period ranging from 1980 up to 1988:** the Prem Tinsalunonda inclusive informal elite bargain.
2. **A second period from 1988 to 1996**: Political turbulence and rise of the new economic elites.
   a. **1997 as inflexion point:** Critical juncture characterised by the financial economic crisis, the proclamation of a new constitution and the beginning of the dismantling of the Prem informal elite bargain.
3. **A third period from 1998 to 2003:** Rise of Thaksin Shinawatra to power, replacement of the old elite bargain, and onset of armed conflict in the Southern provinces. Being 2001 the second inflexion point.

Following the selection of these periods, a set of hypotheses in regards of the mechanisms come to light:

Hypothesis 1. The stabilising effect brought by the deals stemming from the Prem Tinsulanonda government is explained by the presence of informal distribution through patronage networks, allowed by the increment of Malays working in the local bureaucracy and also, formally, from the creation of the SBPAC and CMP-43.

Hypothesis 2. The rise of a new economic elite product of the economic boom during the 1980's was augmenting the size of the elite groups which were bargaining for shares of the spoils.

Hypothesis 3. The rise of Thaksin Shinawatra and the dismantling of the previous elite agreements between the Thai and Malay elites means that there is no patronage

distribution which could account for buying peace, instead the increasing sentiments of exclusion and mistrust push the southern provinces into violence.

1. **1980-1988: The Prem Tinsalunonda informal inclusive elite bargain.**

General Prem Tinsulanonda is a charismatic leader, a key member of the elite. Historically General Prem has been a strong ally of the Thai Monarchy, in fact, in October 2016 with the decease of King Bhumibol General Prem is appointed Regent at his 96 years (BBC, 2016). His loyal connections with the monarchy have strengthen his power as a player; in fact, without the influence and support of the monarchy, perhaps he would not have been able to surpass the two coup attempts during his Prime Minister period. By 1978 he won the position of Army Commander the most powerful post within the Thai military. Further on, the monarchy also supported his candidacy for Prime Minister, which he undertook for a period of 8 years, the longest a single person has been in power in Thailand (McCargo, 2005). An unprecedented period of political stability and economic growth was experienced during Prem's rule.

The military in Thailand has a great deal of influence over various aspects, in fact most of the prime ministers since the 1932 revolution have been members of the army (Bunbonggkam, 1987; Phogpaichit & Piriyarangsan, 1994). The strategic alliance between a strong member of the Thai elite and army and the monarchy reflected a major source of power and legitimacy. Power was dispensed by the military and legitimacy by the crown (MacCargo, 2005), this alliance has been called by Duncan MacCargo as the 'Monarchy network'.

The strategic alliance benefited both parties, for the monarchy it permitted pulling the strings and retaining decision-making power through the new 'democratic' deal. It meant that the monarchic elite could still manipulate relevant issues as it pleased by using the visible hand of the prime minister; some sort of update in how a monarchy could influence politics by using networks (McCargo, 2005; Wheeler, 2010; Melvin, 2007). In turn, General Prem's elite group also benefited as it had the support of the monarchy in decision-making and it acted also as a source of legitimacy amongst the

Thai society. Ultimately, because the sympathy of General Prem with the South[36] and his extended power associated with the support the Democratic party[37] had in this area; the monarchy network arrangements accomplished by the strategic alliance between General Prem and the monarchy substantially benefited, and was supported by the Malays in the southern provinces.

Before 1980, the south had experienced significant amount of ethnic violence perpetrated by the Malays with also, a strong military response from the Thai government. By 1980 a shift in the strategy towards the South takes place; General Prem promotes a strategy of co-option of elites, instead of a military attack strategy which had proven unsuccessful in previous decades. In this regard, his strategy was one of cohesion, assimilation and integration of Malay elites (Melvin, 2007). He incorporated Malay Muslim elite members into local politics, giving them representation and access to decision-making within the South. This affected the relations between the two ethnic groups in two ways: firstly, it partially included Malay elites within the South bureaucracy as a symbol of formal inclusion, and it stimulated the sentiments of trust amongst the Malays by creating two key institutions: the SBPAC (South Border Provinces Administration Centre) and the CMP-43 (Civilian Military Police) which solidified bonds as these institutions deal directly with security affairs in the region. Secondly, by having access to positions of power, the Malay elites also had the possibility to establish and benefit from patronage networks which in turn, gave the opportunity to take a share of the spoils.

Formal distribution: The creation of the SBPAC and the CMP-43 and recruitment of Malay elites

In 1981 two key formal institutions were created as part of the political strategy of the 'monarchy network': the SBPAC and the CMP-43. Ministerial order 8/2524 stated the main functions of the SBPAC, it was a centre which 'coordinated local administrative tasks and stressed the importance of public participation by co-opting local leaders and scholars in regional development projects (Poocharoen, 2010, p. 188). It also

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[36] He was originally from the province of Shongkhla within the southern region.
[37] Local government officials were overwhelmingly supportive of the Democratic Party, In fact, the Southern region has historically been supportive of this party (McCargo, 2006)

provided a local government or a 'mini government' to the southern provinces (Wheeler, 2010) and it attempted to 'promote local Muslims to positions in the bureaucracy, notably as district officers' (McCargo, 2006). Firstly, the SBPAC formally represented the initiative to transfer the control of local security issues to this agency; this initiative was very welcomed across the local elites. Secondly, the SBPAC also reflected an attempt to recognise the difference of the Malay ethnicity within the South. For instance, as (Wheeler, 2010) points out, one of the rules of the SBPAC was to train the civil servants into Malay culture and its differentials with the Thai society. Civil servants who work for the SBPAC ought to adjust themselves to the local culture rather than trying to change it. Thirdly, the formal institution aimed at co-opting local elites by holding meetings with local leaders to discuss matters of interest. During these meetings religious, academic, economic or any other type of local leaders could join in and participate (McCargo, 2005). This stimulated the creation of bonds and links between and amongst the members of the meetings, an event that created and solidified the creation of patronage networks.

It can be said therefore, that the main objectives of the SBPAC were threefold: 1. Transferring security administration and decision-making to the local elites; 2. Provide cultural awareness and recognition of different cultural practices and 3. Empowering and inclusion of local leaders. Thus, the SBPAC in some instances was successful, but it also incurred in partial failures.

One of the most outstanding successes which also works as an agency mechanism is the increase of credible commitments between the elites during this period. The tangible proof of inclusion and willingness to transfer security affairs and co-opt Malay elites into power raised the credibility of the commitments to include and recognise differences as coming from the Thai elite[38]. Likewise, when the Malay groups stopped the use of violence they also raised their credibility of the commitments by providing political support to the 'monarchy network' and by providing security[39]. Secondly, the

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[38] As McCargo argues, between 1998 and 2000, 1354 complains about 1322 officials incurring in abuse of force were reported, leading to 51 officials being transferred (McCargo, 2006, p.44)

[39] In this regard, the provision of security was twofold: firstly, violence episodes cease to happen and secondly, an *informal* network of informants was created which aided the security authorities in raiding or preventing future attacks. This network was a significant part of the security operations as the Malay movement did not have any leadership which could control or refrain to violence as it wished.

SBPAC was also successful in stimulating the political participation of local leaders not just in security affairs but also in developmental projects (McCargo, 2006). This is a key point in the creation of the patronage networks and the distribution of private goods.

Figure 1. Terrorist Attacks per year in Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat

Source: Global Terrorism Database

On the security side, the political participation of local leaders which was stimulated by frequent meetings, inadvertently created an *informal* intelligence network (McCargo, 2006). This net of informal information sharing played a significant role in stabilising the area. The network spread all over the region, it consisted of informants who fed information to the CMP-43 about potential attacks, plans or movements of the remainder insurgents (Fair & Ganguly, 2008). Secondly, within the engineering of the network, General Prem had the power to select candidates to serve as senior military commanders (McCargo, 2006). Remarkably within the provinces of Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat he selected Malay Muslim senior military commanders and gave them power to foresee the illegal trade through the Malaysia border. This included the collection of rents and commissions (or in some instances persuasion to pay) for those involved in the illegal trade. Some of these funds were used for development funds

and regional projects managed by the military, which in turn, stimulated the creation of patronage networks and an efficient share of the spoils.

In this regard, on the development side, allowing local Malays to capture rents and private goods within this scheme, in addition to the input and decision-making power -in terms of development projects- that was harnessed from the SBPAC led to an unprecedented empowerment of local elites in the formal and informal distribution of goods.

However, the SBPAC also had partial failures. As pointed out above, one of the core objectives was also to provide cultural awareness. To do this, the SBPAC set training sessions for Thai civil servants to incentivise the knowledge of culture and ethnic differentials amongst both groups. This was done with the aim not of differentiating per se, but with the aim of recognising the cultural, ethnic and religious differences between Thais and Malays. However, this guideline was not really taken seriously. A great majority of the Thai bureaucrats working within the SBPAC skipped these sessions and, authority from above did not enforce the procedures (McCargo, 2005) (Askew, 2007). Common misconceptions about the Malays remained across the years, despite the initial will to change that.

Another strategy of the 'monarchy network' to stabilise the conflict in the Southern region was to increase and improve the level of political participation along the Southern bureaucracy. Despite the willingness and efforts to include, still most the bureaucracy across years remained majorly Thai. In fact, according to census data, less than 20% of the bureaucracy in the Sothern provinces of Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat was ethnic Malay (see below) with the ethnic Malay population in these provinces surpassing 70%.

Locally, some other conditions refrained Malays from accessing these jobs. Lack of education product of neglect and discrimination impedes the population to reach positions of power. Furthermore, most Malay population speaks Malay being Thai the official state language. Thus, for that portion of the population with access to education, some refrain from learning Thai as it is seen locally as a legitimation of the Thai discriminative policies.

Data in regards of ethnicity in Thailand is scarce to find. It is relevant to notice here that Malays and Thais are not necessarily Muslims and Buddhist respectively within the whole territory of Thailand. But for the Southern region there is complete reinforceness of cleavages (Gubler & Selway, 2012). This means that within the southern region being Muslim equates with being Malay and Thai equates with being Buddhist and viceversa, hence this principle does not apply for the whole territory[40]. In this regard, the following figure shows the number of individuals working in public administration by religion for the years: 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000 in the Southern provinces.

Figure 2. Occupation in public administration by religion in the provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat

Source: IPUMS census data. Thailand Census for 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000

According to these figures, in 1970 when the census was conducted only 7.27% of the individuals surveyed who worked in public administration were Malay, of all the individuals that were Malay only 0.38% worked in public administration. By 1980 this percentage rises from 7.27% to 19% for those working in public administration, for the

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[40] Gubler & Selway's produce a score of crosscuttingness for each country per year. The score of Ethno Geographical Crosscutigness is for Thailand is 0.26 for the totality of the period. This means that there is no crosscutingness in the southern region but instead perfect reinforcement of cleavages.

whole sample of Malays in 1980 only 0.25% of all Malay workforce worked in Public administration; for 1990 10 years after the monarchy network this percentage rises to 0.47% of the whole Malay sample. By 2000, 20 years after the execution of the Monarchy network, this percentage rises to 26%, an increment of 9 percentage points since it was first stablished in 1981 for those working in public administration. For the general Malay workforce: only 0.59% worked in public administration. This increase meant that the Malays in the bargaining game against the Thai elites were given concessions at least partially in terms of political participation. Hence, it is noticeable that the proportions of Malay vs Thai bureaucrats are staggering. The concessions given by the Thai elites in terms of political inclusion only came to benefit the top elite of the Malay population.

Patronage stabilising effect during General Prem period in power

As depicted in Figure 1 above, the violent attacks perpetrated by the Malay movement came to a stop when and during General Prem's period in power. Despite the success of the SBPAC and the CMP-43 in generating trust between the Malay and Thai elite groups and the partial inclusion of Malay elites in the bureaucracy, it is an overestimation to argue that the sole creation of two institutions, and an increment of 7% of Malay workforce which started working in bureaucracy was enough to prevent violence from refraining. This points out towards the existence of other ignored mechanisms that helped prevent violence from reappearing.

Two main points stand as relevant: firstly, the unawareness of patronage as a mechanism of inclusion and distribution, despite its indisputable relevance in Thailand; and secondly, the nature and character of the Malay violent movement.

In Thailand, the proliferation of patronage is outstandingly significant and very common. In fact, traditional politics has implied the non-payment of salaries and instead the legal entitlement of 10 to 30% portion of the money involved in a transaction; basically, as a fee for the services provided (Phogpaichit & Piriyarangsan, 1994) (Warsta, 2004). Within Thailand there is also a tradition of presenting gifts to bureaucrats, it is understood by Van Roy (1970) as cited in (Phogpaichit &

Piriyarangsan, 1994) that *corruption* persists because political institutions which can supersede political practices are slow to develop. This is a statement that illustrates the nature of the patronage networks within Thailand and which aids in identifying it as a limited access order (North, et al., 2009). In fact, the distribution of spoils amongst different elite groups can be beneficial to the poorest communities in which formal distribution is not enough or is simply not efficient. Furthermore, as (Phogpaichit & Piriyarangsan, 1994) point out, patron-client structures exist because everyone concerned sees it as a good structure which can bring benefits in terms of stability, order and the resolution of potentially destabilizing conflicts (p.4).

Furthermore, patronage networks as an informal institution is a hidden part of the spectrum of transactions performed in limited access orders (North, et al., 2009) such as the case of Thailand. They represent a fundamental part of how politics are practiced within this social order. In this regard, these networks and coalitions concede or deny access to valuable resources; such controlled trade to a selective elite coalition group has the potential to manage the problem of violence[41]. In some instances, informal arrangements are more powerful in keeping content the population, mainly because of the nature of these arrangements. Patronage is efficient and can act instantly while distribution through formal institutions takes longer to produce results. Thus, as shown on Figure 1, the change in violence attacks was immediate.

The success and influence of the SBPAC and CMP-43 is undisputable, however, there were partial failures like the enhancement of cultural awareness and some other issues that remain unexplained by the supporters of this thesis (Askew, 2007) (McCargo, 2005) (Melvin, 2007) and that can successfully be explained by the proliferation, inclusion and strength of the patronage networks that came to be formed.

First and in line with the argument of partial cultural awareness failure, it remains to be explained how and why Malay elites who significantly differ with the Thai crown came to agree to legitimise it by providing political support. Secondly, and focusing on

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[41] Whenever a broad coalition of different elites such as in: Bolivia, Ghana, Malawi, Tanzania, amongst others is redistributing rents along the coalition, it enables credible commitments amongst the groups, which in turn, supports the regime, aids them in performing their functions and refrain them from using violence

the poor Malay population (as opposed to the elites), how did the SBPAC agreements between the elites integrated the periphery?

For the first point, the 'monarchy network' was strategically engineered between General Prem Tinsulanonda and the Thai crown to 'promote the power and prestige of the throne. That prestige in turn, served to underpin national identity, creating broader legitimacy for those associated with it' (McCargo, 2005, p. 503). The success of the monarchy network nationally and within the Southern provinces can be associated to a cohesive identity and wide span legitimacy. However, if the Malay elites were unarguably opposed to cultural homogenisation, why did they 'joined' and supported the network if it signified accepting and providing legitimacy to the crown, despite the other benefits it produced? Furthermore, why did they 'obey' to a crown that they considered opposite to their cultural practices, taking into account the record of discrimination and attempted cultural homogenisation?. Clearly the Malay elites wanted to defend and expand their own identity which had been undermined since the kingdom of Siam in 1932. Highlighting the effect of patronage networks, Malay elites saw an opportunity to benefit from the repartition of spoils. Being patronage so common and systemic in Thailand it was perhaps the best bargaining deal they could have ever achieved.

Additionally, by joining the network, the coverage and supply of basic needs achieved by informal deals are thought to have reached the population almost immediately. Formal distribution in turn, is associated with more transaction costs, it is less efficient and takes longer to produce noticeable results. Because the cessation of violence with the instauration of the 'monarchy network' was instant it could signify that the effect of the patronage distribution is the one accounting for the pacifying effect during this period. If this is the case, then the psychological impact of legitimising the crown drops its place to a lesser important issue. This accordingly leads us to the second point.

How did the SBPAC agreements between the elites integrated the Malay periphery? Also taking into account the dispersed nature of the Malay movement?. The initial arguments rests in the above explanation, the efficiency of the informal distribution in reaching the lowers ends of the distributional chain serves as a platform for integration.

This however, is also relevant in highlighting the nature and characteristics of the Malay violent movement. The pattern of the violence in the Southern region is one of sporadic, scattered unorganised violence (Croissant, 2007). The only plausible mechanism that can be inferred from the success of the SBPAC and CMP-43 in decreasing the level of violence is the increase of credible commitments between the elites within the bargain. In other examples of bargains for redistribution in which ethnic elite groups are in search for an agreement that both sides prefer to war, most likely the movement has a 'visible head' or leadership. This can, on the one hand, allow for general centre agreements that successfully integrate the periphery in enforcing orders that restrain the use of violence. On the other hand, if the orders are not successfully enforced across the periphery of the violent movement, the most likely case is the division between hard-liners and soft-liners which leads to the splintering of groups (Butler & Gallagher Cunningham, 2011).

Thus, for the case of Thailand, this is rather different. As previously mentioned, the violent movement is scattered and unorganised resembling more of a terrorism feature (Croissant, 2007). It is possible to imply therefore, that an effective enforcement of orders to stop the use of violence relies on a somehow organised, hierarchical movement. Because this is not the case in the South of Thailand then, it is inferred that some other mechanism must be operating to effectively control violence, especially with such a great efficiency. Taking into consideration the nature of the violent actor, which has been previously ignored in explanations pertaining the creation of the SBPAC and CMP-43 as instruments of stabilisation, gives support to the thesis that more than formal institutions is the plausible mechanism helping here to control violence.

2. 1988-1997: Interim period, rise of a new economic elite and political turbulence.

The decade of the 1980s witnessed and outstanding economic boom. Thailand during the 1980s presented unprecedented economic and political stability. The economy significantly expanded, passing from GDP growth rates of 5.17% in 1980, to 9.52% in 1987 and peaking at 13.29% in 1988. The financial sector and industry sector were the most benefited by the boom (Fofack & Zeufack, 1999). Hence rates began to decrease steadily upon 1989, with a final deep decrease during 1998: passing from

12.19% in 1989 to -7.63% in 1998 when the financial crisis hit at its hardest. Commencing the decade of the 1990s the country also started experiencing political turbulence product of the raising economic elites and their push for more democratic practices (Ansell & Samuels, 2014). During this period, there are 10 different PM in power and a shuffle of cabinet members, depending on the head of government in place. As (Uwanno & Burns, 1998) points out, civilian governments in particular after General Prem, were very unstable. Military coups also influenced the changing patterns in the elite. The rise of a new economic elite, which increased income inequality were now eager to dispute the status quo and to protect their economic interests. This new economic elite was willing to 'invest in changing the political regime' (p.5) seeking the displacement of the previous elites and patronage deals.

Because structural changes are not immediate changes, this period is understood as an interim period that gradually paves the way for the big changes happening in 2001 which represents the victory of the new economic elite which, within an elite competition approach effectively displaced old elites obliterating the patronage networks and deals.

Formal structures: Democratisation, inequality and elite competition

As depicted in the previous section, Thailand witnessed unprecedented economic growth and political stability during the decade of the 1980s. The staggering rates of economic growth allowed for the rise of a new economic elite. The economic boom benefited the well off the most and impacted differently in the different economic sectors (Fofack & Zeufack, 1999; Sarntisart, 2000) . Because the effects of the economic boom were felt the most amongst the elites and upper classes this produced an increase in income inequality (Kuznets, 1955; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2002; Fofack & Zeufack, 1999). The findings of the Kuznets curve[42] have been intensively researched and have reached diverse conclusions depending on the countries assessed. According to (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2002) Within South East Asia there are multiple examples of 'East Asian Miracles' and 'Autocratic disasters', which both

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[42] Kuznets finds show that when economic growth increases income inequality tends to also increase, peak and then also decrease

do not obey to the Kuznets predictions and principles. Thus, Thailand represents a typical case in which the relationship between economic growth and income inequality, and, democratisation works as theoretically predicted. This further depicts Thailand as an atypical case of the East Asian pattern (World Bank, 1996)

Figure 3. Income inequality and Economic growth

Source: WB Data

The rise in income inequality not only depicts a potential benefit for the better-off but also signals the up surging of a new elite who is willing to protect its newly acquired interests by intervening in the decision-making of state policies and also by augmenting the size of the coalition or different elites in power, in turn pushing for democratisation (Ansell & Samuels, 2014).

One of the researched contributors to the economic boom in Thailand is the reallocation of production facilities which also increased asset revaluation (Handley, 1997). The new movement of capital and the revaluation made thousands of Thais wealthy and stimulated economic growth. Furthermore, the agriculture sector shrank, while the industry sector expanded considerably, this signals a movement of workforce from one sector to the other which is also evidenced in the total sector employment

shares (see for example: Bosworth, (2005)). Thus, this can also reflect a sense of development of the economy which also supports Kuznets theory. In this regard, the new elite product of growing sectors in industry and finance is thought to come into competition with the 'monarchy network'; the old elite which, within its economic aspect predominantly represents the incumbent land owner autocratic elites (Ansell & Samuels, 2014).

The new economic elite was of course willing to defend and protect its economic interests. In this regard, as opposed to redistributionist explanations of democratisation (Boix, 2008; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006). The democratisation period of the 1990s in Thailand is better explained by elite competition rather than a class struggle of poor vs. rich. The poor population in Thailand is vast but has never organised or demanded economic or political changes. In turn, the product of the economic boom and the subsequent elite displacement leads me to think that democratisation was a product of elite competition between the old 'monarchy network' elites and the new economic elites who were in search of changes in the status quo.

Elite displacement and democratisation

The elites in power during this period represent different political and economic interests from those during the General Prem Tinsulanonda government. In 1988, Chatichai Choonhavan rises to power as the first democratically elected head of government. He ran for office under the National Development party, a conservative party which promoted the interest of the new elite. During his government, he implemented financial liberalisation and deregulation policies for the banking sector and pushed privatisation reforms that later in 1998 came to be implemented (Dempsey, 2000; Handley, 1997). The new government undertook strong measures to reduce the bureaucratic power of the elite. Chatichai himself was a business man, and his government was widely seen as representing the interests of the business elite (Wingfield, 2002).

Chatichai's election represents the initial point of elite displacement and the breaking of the General Prem networks. He introduces his allies to positions of power such as

cabinet members and shifts elites in economic power positions such as the Budget bureau (Chaianan & Parichat, 1998). Thus, further evidence of the elite displacement and the aim of dismantling the General Prem informal networks is the corruption scandals that the Chatichai's government was accused of and which were felt to be worse than during the General Prem government (see blow).

In 1991 a military coup against Chatichai was pursued as an attempt to retake the power and reinvigorate the old elites. The NPKC (National Peace Keeping Council) under the leadership of General Suchinda was formed to run the country as a provisional junta. The junta appointed Anand Panyarachun as temporary head of government, he was close ally to the crown and a respected businessman (LoGerfo & King, 1996). The NPKC comprised all the top military commanders, the junta accused the Chatichai government of 'unprecedented corruption and harassment of permanent civil and military officials (…) attempting to destroy the military and undermine military unity' (Bhuchongkul, 1992, p. 2). Amidst the coup, a new constitution was being drafted, the scrutiny committee was both close to the NPKC and many of its members were senior militaries themselves. There were some controversial reforms. The manoeuvre of the coup plus the drafting of a new constitution can be interpreted as the preparation for the military to retake power, paving the way for General Suchinda to become PM (Bhuchongkul, 1992). After several rallies and protests in Bangkok organised by seven political parties (including the Democrats) on the 4th of December, the crown pronounced itself. King Bhumibol made a televised speech calling for national unity and for the constitution to be passed (Bhuchongkul, 1992).

The legitimacy given by the crown despite the constitution controversy, worked its magic to retake power on behalf of the 'monarchy network'[43]. In fact, Bhuchongkul (1992) further points out that 6.8 million people[44] signed a petition in favour of the constitution and claiming for early elections, and only 2.141 voted against (p.10). After three shifts in the PM position in September 1992 Chuan Leekpai rises to power.

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[43] Thus, General Suchinda publicly announced his non-intention to take on as PM due to the controversy around it.
[44] However, newspapers declared that a great amount of the signatures collected in the North-eastern area were fraudulent.

Leekpai run for office under the Democratic party and served for the period of 1992-1995 (and later from 1997 to 2001). His cabinet was conformed mainly by banking elites. Supachai Panitchpakdi became Deputy Minister of Finance: he was a former banker, the same as Tarrin Nimmanahaemida who being a banker also became Finance Minister (Thoriby, 1997). Nimmanahaemida was the CEO of the Siam Commercial bank from 1984-92, he also served as the Chairman of the Thai's banker association form 1991 to 1992 (Bloomberg, 2016).

The positions of power were progressively but solidly being filled with the rising elites attached to the financial markets and to the services industry. The democratisation process came about by the pushing of this new elites eager to protect their interests and displace the old elites from positions of power.

Within the Southern provinces, the economic boom benefited the Thai elites the most. Most of the workforce in the provinces of Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat works in agriculture and fishing. Thus, as mentioned above the economic boom increased the GDP share of the industry and financial services sectors, shrinking in turn the agricultural sector. As depicted in the graphs below, a greater share of the Malay Muslim population works the land in comparison to the Thais. For the industry sector, according to the data both ethnic groups expanded the workforce in manufacturing as a proxy of the industry sector. Thus, for financial services, the Thais greatly benefited of the expansion of this sector. In 1980 both groups within the sample have the same number of persons working in financial services, by 1990 while the Thais expanded the workforce by 4 times, the Malays remained the same. Furthermore, figure 5 shows the decadal increase on ownership of assets which shows a greater increase for the Thais in comparison to the Malay Muslim group.

Figure 4. Workforce by sector in Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat

Source: IPUMS census data 1980, 1990, 2000

Figure 5. Percentage of households with ownership of assets: automobile, refrigerator, TV and radio for the provinces of Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat

Source: IPUMS census data 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000

The shifting of elites in Bangkok did not have an immediate impact in the Southern regions. The economic policies which were drifting towards more[45] deregulation and liberalisation of markets were implemented (Sarntisart, 2000). However, the process of impact in the peripheral regions is thought to be gradual rather than immediate. The newly elites were focusing on establishing themselves in positions of power at the centre, rather than being worried about controlling the periphery. The patronage networks within the south continued to operate as there were no major elite displacement within the region, thus, changes were on the go.

Informal mechanism: the dismantling of the old elite's patronage networks and instauration of non-redistributive patronage

The aim of the new elites was to protect their newly acquired economic interests and prevent the old elites from continuing not only to dictate economic policies in their favour, but also from controlling the redistribution of spoils. As mentioned earlier, patronage networks remain as a significant channel of transaction in Thailand's politics.

The establishment of new elites in power in Bangkok disrupted the old elites networks. By gaining the main position of power, the new elites were also capable of appointing their allies to positions in which the 'old ways of doing' were displaced. This created fragmentation of the previous patronage deals. Besides this great change, the newly acquired positions of power also changed the nature of the patronage deals from redistributive to non-redistributive. This is proven by the significant increment on corruption scandals in which individuals were accused of pocketing millions of public assets. During the General Prem government in comparison, corruption was felt to be much less (Bhuchongkul, 1992). Appropriation of public assets changed from competitive but legitimate to criminal and monopolistic.

Chatichai's administration for example was accused of a scale of corruption which was unprecedented. His administration became to be known as the 'buffet cabinet'

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[45] The change in the political economy model of the country from ISI to neoliberalism was already undertaken throughout the 1960s and 70s. During the 90s the policies drifted towards more deregulation and deepening of liberalisation policies.

(Dempsey, 2000) (Wingfield, 2002). Because the military and old elites felt the displacement of elites taking over and their patronage deals being overrun by personal appropriation of funds and also by newly assembled networks; during the coup, the junta decided to monitor with jealously the distribution of public funds by establishing an assets examination committee which was chaired by General Jirarochana, minister of interior during General Prem's government. In this regard, the NPKC 'appeared to be determined to deal decisively with allegedly corrupt individuals in the Chatichai government' (Bhuchongkul, 1992, p. 10).

The establishing and functioning of the committee can be interpreted as the old elite's strike back. The committee had extensive powers, such as the capability of freezing assets in possession of the accused, examining confidential documents of the accused such as bank accounts and expropriation of allegedly ill-gotten wealth. Upon Chatichai's ousting, 25 of his cabinet members were accused of major corruption practices but only 12 were found guilty of illegal appropriation of public assets (in total around 1 million Baht). As for Chatichai himself, he was also accused of being 'unusually wealthy'. The committee then ordered the seizure of 266 million baht of his property (Bhuchongkul, 1992, p. 11). The extend of the personal appropriation of public funds by the rising elites in comparison to the previous government signifies the changing pattern in the patronage networks from a redistributive pattern to a non-redistributive in which whomever is in power takes advantage of its position by enriching their personal bank accounts instead of redistributing the assets along patronage lines.

1997 first evidence of impact on the South: New constitution and first attempts to dismantle SBPAC and CMP-43

On October 1997, a new constitution is proclaimed product of a Committee specifically gathered for this task. Being the 16th constitution of Thailand it was the first time the population was able to participate in its drafting, a much more democratic approach. By the beginning of the year the constitutional drafting assembly was created –CDA-, its purpose was to unite a diverse group of elites both national and regional in order to design and rewrite the constitution, in line with the new democratic values and respect for civil rights that came with the process of democratisation. The CDA was composed

of 96 members, 76 were drawn from the provinces. The rest were experts in public law, political science and public administration. Although the CDA tried to include all the visions from the provinces by electing one member of each province to represent them in the drafting of the constitution, none Malay was elected for this task. For the provices of Yala, Pattani and Nathariwat Thais were the selected members to attend the CDA.

The 1997 constitution includes some provisions that can be understood as more democratic or more inclusive of regional differences. However, some of the points included in this 'more democratic' constitution was already mentioned in the previous constitutions. (Che Man, 2003) argues that for the 1997 constitution the difference was that the provisions were meant to be practiced this time in every sense of the word (p.6). Hence, these new provisions continued to be a pure formality, a de jure mention rather than de facto. For example: the new constitution reads: "All local government organizations shall enjoy autonomy in laying down policies for their governance, administration, personnel administration, finance and shall have powers and duties particularly on their own part" a decentralisation command. Thus, 1997 also witnessed the first attempts to dismantle the SBPAC within the South, which were clear staples of decentralisation and recognition of differences.

During the 1980s the SBPAC operated as an independent department under the Ministry of Interior and responded directly to the fourth army commander, deriving its authority from the Prime Minister himself (Wheeler, 2010). Thus, by 1996 under order 56/2539 the SBPAC was removed from the Fourth's Army line and a deputy Prime minister replaced the national security council as chair of the committee on solving security problems. This reform added an oversight on the SBPAC. The Malay elites were confident and trusted the military[46]. However, with these reforms and the removal of the SBPAC from the Fourth's army line the Malays started to feel vulnerable once again.

These changes ordered by the new elites from Bangkok, despite the credited record

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[46] This sense of trust is a product of the 8 years of positive relations between the monarchy network and the Malay elites.

of success in the operation of the SBPAC represent the official rupture of the bond between what was left of the 'monarchy network' and the Malay elites, as Wheeler points out, 'coordination between the military and the bureaucracy suffered (…) order 56 disrupted the unified chain of command' (p.220). The restriction of autonomy soon was realized by the Malay elites which also contributed to major unrest and more importantly to the steady decrease in credibility of commitments.

Thaksin Shinawatra was already maneuvering his way in during his period and also had an influence on the 1997 constitution. He was accused of attempting to influence CDA members by buying some of the commissioners (Bangkok post, 1997). Furthermore, during Chavalit's period he became a non-MP deputy Prime Minister in 1998.

3. **2001-2003: Culmination of elite replacement, patronage networks dissolution in the South and conflict onset.**

The rise of Thaksin Shinawatra in 2001 epitomises the culminating point of the displacement of elites associated to the 'monarchy network' and the rupture of the pre-stablished patronage deals. After a period of significant political turbulence, characterised by military coups and constant shifting of Prime Ministers and cabinets (a total of 10 changes in 10 years); the 2001 elections bring to power Thaksin Shinawatra a billionaire product of the economic boom who symbolises the complete replacement of elites and the dismantling of the patronage deals which were effectively gluing together the society. With the rise of Thaksin Shinawatra, the Southern provinces come to effectively feel the full impact of the elite replacement.

During this time, he created a new party around his figure: the Thai Rak Thai Party in English "Thai loves Thai". It was created in 1998 and during the same year Thaksin entered in liaison for creating a monopoly around the telecommunications system (Wingfield, 2002). This is also a prove of the extreme information asymmetries coming from the Thai elite as there is total control over communications such as radio and TV. The Thai Rak Thai party ultimately is the proof of the alliance between different economic elites to create a party which could be able to dominate the state and in

general the political system, including also those economic elites which had historically dominated the economic sectors in Thailand.

His campaign was cemented in populist practices and a rhetoric of rejection of old elites' interest and mismanagement of the economy. He pictured himself as the new saviour and preyed on the grievances created by the economic crisis (Phongpaichit & Baker, 2008). Thus, son of a prominent business family, his created network comprised significant business allies and also incurred in unprecedented forms of nepotism. In this regard, he benefited holistically of the economic boom and subsequent crisis. On the upper side of the ladder, he secured the strategic powerful alliances to control the bureaucracy and effectively finish displacing the old elites; and on the lower, he secured the popular support of the masses which were affected by the economic crisis by preaching on two clear populist policies: the 1 million baht fund and the reforms to the health care system.

Within the South, the rise of Thaksin Shinawatra significantly affected the relationships between the Malay Muslims and the Thais. Firstly, the two cornerstone formal institutions which had cemented trust between the two groups were dismantled. With their eradication, the informal deals of intelligence and mutual work to keep violence controlled were deterred. Additionally, his strategy of bureaucratic control implied a total replacement of elites in power, the South was not an exception to this mode. Furthermore, his rhetoric of war against drugs effectively masked the real problems in the south and targeted Malay Muslim leaders, a strategy that was counterproductive as the blacklisting of Muslim leaders pushed them into the organised militia strengthening the organisation of the movement and changing the nature of violence.

Formal distribution: culmination of elite replacement, within the South: dismantling of SBPAC

Thaksin Shinawatra understood that the Southern provinces will represent a challenge in the quest for elite substitution. Firstly, the South had always been faithful supporters of the Democratic Party and formal and informal alliances between the military and the Malay elites were strong in the South. His approach to capture and neutralise the area was to attack the military directly by firstly, displacing the old elite from military

positions of power and installing his allies; and secondly, by passing the responsibility of conflict management in the area from the military to the police, justified by the visualisation of the conflict are mere criminality instead of an ethnic based conflict (Wheeler, 2010) (Croissant, 2007).

Despite the unprecedented political support which brought Thaksin Shinawatra to power (over 70% turnout) he lost the elections to the Democratic Party in the south (Croissant, 2007). His populist policies failed to persuade the Malay electorate who regarded Thaksin and his allies with mistrust. Thus, Thaksin Shinawatra knew the importance of managing the south as it was regarded internationally as a main issue in the area[47], he attacked the problem through the military. In September each year, the military is subject to a customary rotation. Thaksin Shinawatra announced the rotation one month earlier as he saw the event as the perfect opportunity to install his allies in positions of power within the military (Pongsudhirak, 2003).

General Surayuth was the supreme commander, army chief, of the military force, he had extensive support from General Prem Tinsulanonda and by extension, support from the crown. Thaksin Shinawatra announced his replacement by appointing General Sonthat Attanant one of his allies to the position of army chief. He also replaced navy and air forces chiefs with his supporters and even named, one of his cousins Chaiyasit Shinawatra as personal assistant to General Attanant. In 2002 General Chaisayat was officially named army chief of the military forces. Thus, the military elite replacement also was undertaken in lower rank positions and within the police. Within the southern provinces this process was undertaken during 2001 and 2002 when 'key officials were replaced in the south with his associates and loyalists (Melvin, 2007). By 2004, the network was controlling 'the military's high command as well as the police's and will thus strengthen Thaksin Shinawatra bases of power' (Pongsudhirak, 2003, p. 284).

The shifting of military elites was a national strategy for replacing the 'monarchy network' with Thaksin Shinawatra's personal network, thus, within the Southern provinces this is represented by the abolition of the SBPAC on 2002 (Melvin, 2007;

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[47] As the up surging of terrorism as the new world threat.

Wheeler, 2010; McCargo, 2006). By order 123/2545 of 2002 the SBPAC was officially closed. As Wheeler (2010) highlights: 'bewildered employees arrived for work to find the centre closed' (p.221). There is significant agreement amongst academia in regards of the impact the closure of the SBPAC signified for the Southern provinces.

Thaksin Shinawatra's justification for closing the SBPAC was centred in arguing that the violence was a product of mere criminality (McCargo, 2005; Wheeler, 2010). This not only justified the closure of the SBPAC but also served as an argument for transferring conflict management powers from the military to the police (Melvin, 2007; McCargo, 2006; Wheeler, 2010; Korff, et al., 2007). The police within the region was regarded with mistrust by the Malay elites, they were highly involved in local affairs (Korff, et al., 2007; Wheeler, 2010) and they were connected to businessmen and local politicians accused of both illegal practices and high corruption (Croissant, 2007). Thus, the disbanding of the SBPAC not solely affected the security side but also the economic; during the 1980s and early 1990s the SBPAC had the ability to allocate funds by development conclusions reached out by the local leaders' meetings. With no SBPAC large-scale development projects were allocated without any consultation of the local leaders and their needs.

The dismantling of the SBPAC was a short-sighted and high-handed interpretation of the conflict. The justification of pure criminality was founded in the war against drugs[48]. Violent casualties on both sides increased significantly, the Malay groups changed their repertoires of violence towards the attack of police rather than Thai civilians (Croissant, 2007). On the side of the police, the war on drugs gave policeman 'carte blanche to target selected locals for extrajudicial execution' (McCargo, 2006, p. 15). According to the Crisis Group (2005) those targeted by the state were mainly young, poorly armed individuals. No drug barons were killed or arrested. This justification for extreme violence on the side of the state and violation of human rights in the name of the war against drugs was just a scam to target informal informants who belonged to the General Prem networks during the 1980s and early 1990s (see below). UNDOC figures suggest that the traffic of drugs increased rather than decreased during this

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[48] The drug problem however, has always been a topic of debate within Thailand, Laos and Myanmar seen as the golden triangle of production of opium

period. Drug seizures of methamphetamines and opioids the two most commercialised drugs in this area are reported to be lower on average during Thaksin Shinawatra period than in the early 1990s and 1980s.

Figure 7. Drug seizures of methamphetamines and opioids

Note: The 2003 report of 10240 kilograms of opium seized is the only figure provided by the government for the whole period.
Source: UNDOC

Informal distribution: rupture of patronage deals as causes of resurgence of violence, more than formal institutions?

Despite the notorious impact on trust between the two groups that came due to both first the creation of the SBPAC in the General Prem government and secondly, the dismantling of it under Thaksin Shinawatra; it is clear to say that the influence and operation of the informal system played a significant role in firstly controlling and secondly encouraging the use of violence.

As mentioned in the previous sections, the agency mechanism that can account for the pacifying effect of the SBPAC was the increase in credible commitments coming

from each side of the bargain. Thus, the immediate refraining from the use of violence could intuitively be explained by the existence of the inclusionary patronage networks who were able to supply immediate funds to the poorest. The coverage and supply of basic needs achieved through informal deals reached the population almost immediately, in comparison, formal distribution is associated with more transaction costs.

Thaksin Shinawatra's strategy to dismantle the SBPAC and transfer conflict management tasks to the police significantly decreased trust between the parties. Thus, most importantly it closed the flow of informal transactions that the Malays had achieved. Being patronage such an important feature of Thailand's politics, it is undoubtable that the Malays did feel deeply as part of the system when they were invited to take a share of the spoils during the 1980s and early 90s. With the closure of the SBPAC the signalling to the Malays was that of official expulsion from the patronage networks.

The success of the elite replacement strategy had to major impacts informally: the cessation of informal distribution product of the dismantling of the General Prem's patronage networks and the eradication of informal intelligence networks which were effectively controlling violence during the 1980s. These two consequences of Thaksin Shinawatra's elite replacement within the South encouraged the use of violence by the Malay groups, furthermore, the grievances created by the increment in extrajudicial killings and violation of human rights contributed to formal organisation of the Malay groups to provide more coordinated action and increase violence as a cohesive mass movement, changing the nature of the groups.

From redistributive patronage to non-redistributive

The immediate impact of the elite replacement within the south implied the cut on the flow of informal resources. The links established between the two groups were effectively disrupted and replaced by the new economic elite. The Malays reacted not only to the dismantling of their patronage deals but also were aware of the new elite's corruption scandals which included two PMs: Thaksin Shinawatra himself and Chatichai the first democratically elected PM after General Prem. Thaksin Shinawatra

was accused of assets concealment which should have been declared before taking office[49] (Pongsudhirak, 2003) (McCargo, 2005) though he was found not guilty. The nature of the country's patronage networks changed from redistributive patronage to personal pocketing of public assets with the rise of the new economic elite.

In this regard, from an economic perspective, the cutting of shares from the spoils is thought to have left a big chunk of the Malay population with no access to funds. This, in addition to the decreased credibility product of the major corruption scandals and the evidence of the official take over of a new economic elite, is thought to have motivated the Malay groups into the use of violence.

Furthermore, the dismantling of the pre-established patronage networks not only affected the economic side but also the social. Another cause of the return to the use of violence is the effect that the eradication of the informal intelligence networks had on the ability of the authorities to control violence. The transferring of conflict management to the police opened the door for extrajudicial killings. Thus, most of the individuals which were killed, tortured or disappeared by the police during Thaksin Shinawatra's government were informal informants during the Prem government and belonged to the informal intelligence network, this left the regime within the South with no possibility of anticipating attacks (Croissant, 2007) (McCargo, 2006). These killings were justified under the war on drugs, furthermore, due to the sudden increase in violent attacks on the side of the Malays, Thaksin Shinawatra's strategy was also to highly repress; thus, his downfall was the eradication of the informal deals for which he was inadvertently left with nothing.

The increase in extrajudicial killings and violation of human rights product of the transfer of responsibilities to the police and the justification of the supposedly 'war on drugs', which in fact targeted Malay Muslim leaders instead of drug barons, aided the organisation of groups in changing the nature of the violence. As mentioned earlier in the text, the pattern of the Malay violence is that of scattered, unorganised, terrorist

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[49] Further on, after his ousting by a military coup in 2006, motivated precisely by corruption scandals he is found guilty of a land corruption deal. He aided his wife to buy land from a state agency at a reduced price See The guardian 21 October 2008 URL: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/oct/21/thaksin-thailand-corruption

type form of violence with no 'visible head'. Thus, this significantly changes with the onset of the conflict.

Human Rights Watch produced a report in 2007 about the state of the violence within the Southern provinces of Thailand. Informants reported that the police had blacklisted Malay Muslim leaders and villagers, people with no mechanism to challenge their inclusion on a list had 'turned to separatism militants to seek protection from imminent threats of blacklisting, arbitrary arrests, disappearance and extrajudicial killings' (HRW, 2007). Furthermore, a BRN (National Revolutionary Front) militant declared that Thaksin Shinawatra policies gave the separatists a 'much needed boost in renewing their insurgency' He further argues:

> There was a period of about seven to eight years of quiet, but that did not mean our movement had given up. Thai authorities thought they had succeeded in pacifying the situation. For us, it was a period of recuperating. After the government launched anti-drug campaigns, villagers were deeply in fear. Out of resentment towards Thai authorities, those villagers were desperate and requested us to give them protection. We gave them training in military and self-defense tactics, in parallel with political indoctrination about the struggle for independence. This is how we re-established control of the population and stepped up attacks on the government. We truly believe in our cause—that we are fighting to liberate our land and protecting our people from the oppressive Thai authorities"

> Human Rights Watch interview with
> Asor, Narathiwat, July 25, 2006.

The access to patronage which was curtailed by Thaksin Shinawatra's strategy of elite replacement within the south and the extrajudicial killings of previous informal intelligence informants plus the eradication of trust between the parties product of the abolition of the SBPAC all contributed to the change in the nature of the Southern violence.

Conclusions

Research on the potential causes of the violence in the South of Thailand have cited the dismantling of the SBPAC as the main cause. Thus, it has been shown here that the sole creation of two formal institutions plus their following dismantling under the government of Thaksin Shinawatra is unlikely to be the sole mechanism leading to conflict onset. The effect of patronage networks as an informal distribution channel is undoubtedly relevant in explaining the controlled violence during General Prem's government and the subsequent destabilisation during the Thaksin Shinawatra period.

It is true that during the General Prem period in power the creation of the SBPAC and the CMP-43 significantly increased the trust between the bargaining parties. Providing an official sign of recognition of differences and willingness to integrate the Malay elites. Furthermore, the General Prem era also showed signs of willingness to integrate by opening the opportunities to the Malays to become members of the bureaucracy. The SBPAC and the increase in Malay bureaucratic posts empowered the local elites. However, because the violence coming from the Malay groups ceased to exist immediately it is unlikely that a formal mechanism of redistribution and integration can account for the pacifying effect. A formal mechanism, given the grievances associated with the Malay movement and the nature of the violent movement simply do not provide enough explanatory power to justify the sudden stop in violence within the south. This shows that there must be another mechanism operating which has not been acknowledged.

Given the relevance of patronage networks within Thailand it is thought that it is precisely the informal deals that were forged out the SBPAC that can explain the sudden stop in violence as a strategy. Informal distribution is efficient and its effect is thought to be immediate. These transactions are founded on trust and personal bonds. As opposed, formal distribution takes longer to produce results because it involves more transaction costs.

Secondly, the economic boom favoured the most the well- off which in turn gae rise to a new economic elite. This new economic elite became dissatisfied with the status quo and the old elites' ways of doing. They were ready to protect their newly acquired

interests by pushing for democratisation practices. The second period therefore, saw the beginning of the elite displacement in which not only positions of power were taken by the new elite in an elite competition approach but also sees how the patronage shifts from redistributive to non-redistributive as corruption scandals of personal pocketing of funds become predominant in comparison to the General Prem and previous eras. This paves the way for the rise of Thaksin Shinawatra, the evidence of the complete take over of new elites.

Thaksin Shinawatra, a billionaire product of the economic boom incurs in unprecedented practices of nepotism and takes over the military: the main commander of the 'monarchy network' which represents the old elites. With the rise of Thaksin Shinawatra all the patronage networks of the 'monarchy network' are replaced. The South is no exception. During the interim period the south refrained from feeling any significant change in the shifting of elites, mainly because the new elite was busy taking over the central positions of power in Bangkok. Thus, the dismantling of the SBPAC is the official signalling to the Malay elites of their expulsion from the redistribution of spoils. He also hands in the management of the conflict to the police, a highly mistrusted institution within the South. This, in addition to the dismantling of the informal intelligence nets of information increased the use of violence amongst the Malay groups. Their lines were engrossed by Malay leaders which were targeted under the 'war against drugs' and were suffering mass violation of human rights and extrajudicial killings. This curse of events led to the change in the nature of the violence, as the groups become more organised. In this regard, it is shown here that more than formal institutions explain the resurgence of the violence within the southern provinces, as well as their stabilising effect during the General Prem government and during the early 1990s.

Chapter 7.

India Bodo conflict:
A struggle for cultural recognition

From the fsQCA results, India's Bodo conflict represents a least likely case of conflict. The mechanism of interest is present but to a lower extent. The fuzzy informal measure reveals a 0.42 degree of informal distribution which is close to 0.5 the crossover point. Distribution through patronage if present is likely to stay at the top. As a least likely case, the India Bodo conflict has the potential to provide a cross-case inference if the mechanism is found to be present.

General Background

The Bodos are one of the earlier settlers in the North-east state of Assam in India. As a mongoloid origin ethnic group, they are thought to have migrated to India circa 5000 BC and are widely accepted as Assam original inhabitants (Chadha, 2005). They ruled and had significant power around the VI-X centuries AD. They hold sovereignty over Manipur, Tripura, Jainit and Sylthet. Their power over Assam lasted until 1825 AD (George, 1994), thus in present time they reside in the Northern areas of the Brahmaputra Valley within the state of Assam, they are regarded as a cradle of culture and civilisation within this area. However, during the XIX Century the admiration and prestige of the Bodos was undermined. They passed through a period of religious and cultural mess in which they lost respect from other ethnicities. This propelled a downfall in their status and suddenly they were not only regarded with disdain, but also became victims of exploitation by the other 'advanced' or thriving communities (Samaddar, 2005).

During the British empire, their cultural background and attachment to the land was threaten. Massive migration to the state of Assam was supported by the colonial rulers with the aim of encouraging tea crops and providing major labour force (Samaddar, 2005). The Indian State had two interests in mind; to firstly expand the production of

Assam tea crops and secondly, to grow more food for supporting the troops stationed in Assam (Singh & Mushahary, 2015). The Bodos felt threaten by this migration spells which continued until the early 1970s, during the period after decolonisation migration came from outside India, Bangladesh in particular (Chadha, 2005). The different ethnicities occupied Bodo's land and the Bodo population was substantially reduced: figures show that by 1947 Bodo's still constituted 49% of Assam population but by 1971 they were reduced to 29% due to internal and external migration (George, 1994).

In 1947 India was faced with the process of decolonisation. As a highly-fragmented state across ethnicities and castes the struggle to form a nation-state was daunting. Hence, the legacy of Ghandi and the forthcoming organisation of the state led to the creation of a federation, a union of states which recognises differences not only across ethnicities or tribes but also across castes. This form of organisation gave rise to a three-tier elite bargain between national elites, federal elites and grieved groups.

In terms of political organisation, with the formation of the union of states, local forms of informal governance were officially recognised. *Gram Panchayats* came to be the source of power and organisation of the federal states. This recognition of local patronage power legitimised the castes and provided the pre-decolonisation patronage system with a formal official legal form of power (Pur, 2007). Therefore, the historical domestic power was able to rule under the modernising forms of the nation-state.

Not only the caste system was formally introduced into modern politics; the ethnicities were also included, in some instances with certain provisions of extra autonomy as provided in the Sixth schedule of the Indian constitution. Furthermore, the representation in the federation from each one of the state was legalised by quotas in the federal council of states. Districts within the state of Assam were formally introduced within the sixth schedule as an autonomous district with the Reorganisation Act of 1971. Thus, for the Bodos this process of recognition only takes effect later in the period.

Regionally, the north-eastern region of India is the one of the most conflicted areas. Traditionally called as the seven sister states it is home to different ethnic conflicts

including Bodos, Nagas, Manipuri, Tripura and Mizoram. Within conflict scholarship, it remains as an understudied area as conflicts are regarded as minor and in some instances similar across each other. However, these conflicts are long-standing with in some cases violence sparking since decolonisation in 1947 and also, in some cases as in the Manipuri case, violence has reached high death tolls. In the case of the Bodo conflict, according to UCDP data the conflict reached 25 battle related deaths for the first time in 1989 in a confrontation with ABSU. A second onset in confrontation with the NdFB (an armed arm from ABSU) came in 1994 reaching 100 battle related deaths that year. It is this more violent onset which is the focus of this chapter.

Figure 1. Map of Assam state in India

Source: SocialScienceCollective.org. Retrieved at:

http://www.socialsciencecollective.org/myth-bangladeshi-violence-assam/

Elite bargaining in the state of Assam: Bodos vs. Assamese, Bodos vs. Indian national elite

It is theorised that the Bodo ethnicity became violent in 1994 product of a series of bargain failures undertaken with the Assamese elites but also with the Indian central government elites. The subjective perceptions of deprivation, exclusion and cultural undermining motivated the Bodo middle class to campaign locally and at the state level for representation and recognition. After two failed attempts for recognition, the movement radicalised and so did the demands. The increasing sentiments of mistrust prevented both sides of the bargain from reaching settlements they both prefer to violence. Violence reached its peak in 1994.

Historically, the sentiments of alienation, undermining and non-recognition started to take shape since the early 1960s. Distribution within the formal sector as access to political representation, recognition over cultural differences, decision-making over budget allocation and distribution within the informal sector in the form of patronage networks are thought to be restricted for the Bodo ethnicity within the state of Assam.

In this regard, the bargaining game will be analysed for the period 1960-1994. As stated above, the bargaining games between the elite groups for this case are represented by various dyads given the complexity of the relationships in India. As a highly ethnically fragmented nation-state India has resolved for a Federal Republic, as a federation there is autonomy in the subnational states and a micro cosmos of national politics. As such, it is possible to identify 4 elite bargaining dyads: 1. Bodos vs Assam elites, 2. Bodos vs. Indian –state- elites, 3. Bodos politicised middle class vs. Bodos non politicised middle class; and finally, 4. Bodos vs non Bodos (those other ethnicities that live within the northern area of the Brahmaputra valley, the territory that has been claimed by the Bodos as Bodoland).

The analysis of the bargaining process will be presented by time periods in which the relevant dyads of bargaining elites will be referred to.

Time Periods:

1. **1960-74:** Language bargains, seeds of radicalisation and start of collective action. Formation of the ABSU and PTCA, initial period of non-violent agitation and moderate state repression.

2. **1975-85:** Second round of bargaining. PTCA and ABSU political demands: The road towards complete radicalization and the use of violence.
3. **1986-93:** Period of heighten ARMED violence, culminating in 1993 with the third bargain failure. (1988 inflexion point: ABSU demand for Bodoland and creation of the BdSF)
4. **1994**: Onset of conflict.

Hypothesis:

1. The Language policy act of 1960 and the development of the language bargains between Bodo and Assamese showed the Bodos the unwillingness of negotiation on the Assamese side and turned the Bodo language movement into a politicised movement.
2. The radicalisation of demands was a product of discrimination sentiments powered by the concessions made to the Assamese and other minor ethnicities within Assam.
3. The lack of decision-making power within the Local Panchayats plus the low degree of Bodo integration within this decentralised unit of government impeded the distribution of patronage for the Bodo community.
4. The use of violence came as a last alternative after several attempts to demand peacefully via dialogue or via non-violent activism the recognition of Bodo as a minority.

1. **1960-74: Language bargains, seeds of radicalisation and start of collective action. Formation of the ABSU and PTCA, initial period of non-violent agitation.**

After decolonisation and during the 1960s the state of Assam was recognised as 'unitary' under the federation, meaning no further recognition of tribal areas was in place. Thus, Assam is a highly ethnically heterogeneous state. Under its territorial boundaries, the majoritarian population are the Assamese which have the political power and in turn fill in the quotas for representation on the federal state. Bengalis (who were brought to Assam supported by the British for working on tea plantations) and Bodos conform the second largest ethnic groups and there are many more minority groups such as the Misshings, Chepangs, Boria or Tigua amongst others (Joshua Project, 2017).

The Assamese as a majoritarian group has been the political elite ruling the state of Assam, the Bodos in turn and despite their cultural, political and social sophistication have been permanently excluded[50] from political power within the state of Assam and overall in the Indian union of states. The Bodos conform a highly culturally rich ethnic society, their historical background is quite extent; thus, under the rule of the Assamese and their policies for homogenization the Bodos have felt their cultural background is under threat[51].

Furthermore, there is no access to Assam state assets for local Bodo patronage networks, or great degrees of formal distribution to the Bodo predominant districts. The economic neglect in addition to the language policy of 1960 evidenced the will of homogenisation and discrimination the Assamese elites inflicted on the Bodo community.

The language policy 1960

In 1959, the ASS –Assamese Sandhya Sabha- send a formal request to the Indian government for Assamese language to be adopted as the official language of Assam. In 1960 the union state government officially conceded the demand, making Assamese the official language for the state (Saika, 2011) (Dhar, 2014) (Singh & Mushahary, 2015) (George, 1994) (Karlsson, 2011). The decision of the Indian elite to concede was based on the status of the Assamese being the majoritarian population within Assam, and with the aim of providing homogenisation to the highly ethnically fragmented state.

The concession made by the Indian state raised the subjective status of superiority amongst the Assamese elites. in fact, Maheshar Neog a major figure in the ASS believed that the concession of the Indian state had created a 'new image' in the eyes of the Assamese population (Dhar, 2014). Furthermore, members of the Assamese

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[50] For the whole 1960-94 period of analysis
[51] This is similar to the case of the Malay Muslims in Thailand. It shows how it is not just political representation what drives collective action, but also the undermining of cultural practices particularly: language policies.

political elite such as Prafulla Mahanta or Bhighu Phukan, Chief minister and Home Minister respectively, are perceived as upper caste Assamese *Hindu* Leaders (Dash, 1989).

The language policy not only meant that all official communications had to be done in Assamese language, but also that the education system will instruct Assamese as a unique language. This policy was received with great regret amongst the Bodo elites and all the minority groups.

The Official Language Act of 1960 sparked resentment amongst both the Bodo elites and the Bengali elites, the two majoritarian groups. In 1961 there were protest commanded by the Bengali population to resist the Language Policy Act, the Assamese in turn severely repressed the protests by opening fire in an attempt to stand to its claim of superiority within the Assam state (Deb, 2006). The Bengalis proposed the Shastri Formula which aimed at making Bengali a second official language, this infuriated the BSS –Bodo Sandhya Sabha- which also began its own campaign for recognition and officially sent a statement denying the possibility of imposing the Shastri Formula (Deb, 2006) (Dhar, 2014) and demanding recognition of the Bodo language.

The BSS was created in 1952 but had no major impact until then. It took protagonism by not only demanding to the India elites the recognition of Bodo as another official language, but also by demanding to the Assamese elites the teaching of Bodo in schools. The Language Policy Act sparked the cultural proudness amongst the Bodos, it effectively raised political and cultural consciousness and led the path for the struggles of recognition (George, 1994). The strategic move of the Assamese to be recognised as a superior group within the State of Assam planted the seed for collective action amongst the Bodos and predetermined the character of the elites' relationship between both groups. The Bodo were aware of the Assamese wills of power and mistrust them as the Assamese had shown they regarded other minority groups as unequal.

In 1961 the BSS started making formal appeals to the Assam government for the instruction of Bodo language in schools. The argument referred to the right of Bodo

children to take education in their mother tongue. The Assam government in turn proclaimed a commission to study the case and Rupha Brahma a Bodo poet, politician and scholar was appointed to discuss the matter with the Assamese elites. The Assamese elites partially conceded the claims in 1963 by allowing Bodo to be taught in primary schools (Dhar, 2014). Thus, soon the Bodo realised the concession was not good enough as children struggled to cope with education in another language upon secondary school[52] (Dhar, 2014)

The suspicion on the lack of commitment to the Bodo preservation of the culture began to arise upon this concession. The Assamese did not want to recognise differences as they were aware that doing so, could trigger further demands for autonomy or even secession. Thus, the unwillingness to negotiate and to include cultural differences progressively led to the radicalisation of the Bodo movement, culminating with their radical demand of separation: the state of Bodoland.

Hence, in regards of the primary education concession; the Bodos not only realised that the concession did not fulfil their demands but also that the schools and educational system within the Bodo dominated districts were harshly deprived and underfunded[53]. Moreover, the Bodo schools which undertook Bodo language as official education language were faced with bureaucracy discrimination (Das, 1994). They were understaffed and lack the basic tools for good teaching practices. This further enhanced the realisation of mistrust and dissatisfaction with the Assamese elites.

Upon 1963 and considering the failed partial concession, the Bodo continued to claim for Bodo language to be official in education up until secondary level. The demands continued to be headed by the BSS and by 1968 the Assamese elites conceded the demand. The implementation of the policy was done in stages: initially, Bodo will be compulsory up to sixth grade and by 1973 it was to be compulsory till tenth grade. The ASS on its side, was also pursuing to protect Assamese in consideration of the

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[52] Further on, during the second period of analysis and once the demands start to become more radical; the Bodos start demanding students to be taught in Bodo in university as well as conducting research and publications in Bodo language. A form of preserving the language.
[53] See also further on district councils.

previous Bodo and Bengali demands. In September 1967, the ASS sends a proposal to the Legislative Assembly for two main universities, Gauhati and Dibrugarh to adopt Assamese as the sole language of publication (Dhar, 2014).

The Bodos despite the concession in 1968 for secondary level of education in Bodo, and in addition to the ASS course of act; also demanded Bodo as the sole language of instruction and publication within Bodo dominated districts. Their argument was that a truthful recognition and celebration of Bodo language will allow students to be able to transfer knowledge in Bodo. Therefore, they claimed research and publications should be published in Bodo as the only means to fully preserve, expand and recognise the language (Dhar, 2014). Thus, it is relevant as well to mention that elite groups at universities are powerful players at spreading message for self-determination (or also in another cases even spreading revolution messages, for example in Argentina and Chile under the dictatorship). The power of reproduction of language and messages at the university level can significantly affect the outcome of disputes (Borman, et al., 2015).

In 1971-72 the ASS intentions materialised when Gauhati and Dibrugarh universities abolished English as the education language and changed to Assamese as the only medium of instruction and publication (Dhar, 2014) (Singh & Mushahary, 2015) (Chadha, 2005). This infuriated the Bodos as well as some other minority groups who did not want English to be abolished as main language of upper education and publication[54]. Considering this event, the Bodos headed by the BSS became more radicalised in their thoughts. They were now convinced that their cultural identity could not be preserved under an all Assamese State government.

Further on during 1974-75, a third round of bargaining in regards of the Language issue is fought across Devnagari vs Roman script for the Bodo language. The Bodos were pushing for the adoption of Roman script for written Bodo. Thus, historically the Bodo had been using Devnagari script which is considered to be Assamese (Dhar, 2014). The ASS responded with strong opposition to the BSS demand, arguing that

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[54] This further exemplifies the Assamese exclusionary intentions as for minority groups to enter university, they must learn Assamese.

the Assamese script remained to be enough and suitable for the Bodo written texts. The Bodo script movement, with the accumulation of defeats and mediocre concessions was able to mobilise the common people.

Therefore, the script movement of 1974-75 embodies the unification of mass protest and demonstrates the sentiment of mistrust and dissatisfaction along the Bodo people. It was the first time the movement took on political activism strategies and forged a movement strong enough to draw people to the streets in a form of collective action (George, 1994) (Dhar, 2014). The previous bargains had only been disputed between the BSS and the Assamese government directly, but not with the support of the common people. According to (Dhar, 2014), the script movement was carried out in 4 phases. In the first phase the Bodo students abstained from class; in second phase the protestors raised slogans in the district offices; in the third phase the movement submitted a formal appeal and received no response, which powered the fourth phase in which large amounts of Bodo supporters came to the streets to protest. There were some spells of violent repression, the state government was totally unwilling to provide any concessions. In further dialogue with the Indian central government the BSS ended up withdrawing the demand and accepting the use of Devnagari script in 1975, it realised it could not fulfil its original aim.

The Language issues were the driving force for a more political approach. The BSS was regarded as a literature and language organisation with no political aspirations, hence, the dynamics of the bargain for language recognition instigated the Bodo movement into a stronger political approach and planted the seeds for collective action. This atmosphere pushed forward by the low credibility of the Assamese commitments gave rise to stronger sentiments of discrimination, cohesive collective action and the ascent of ABSU and the PTCA as leader organisations in the fight for recognition and autonomy.

1967-8 PTCA and ABSU: consolidation of the political movement. Formalisation of political, economic and social demands beyond language policies.

The PTCA, Plain Tribal Council of Assam was the first political party created to represent the plain tribes of Assam (Dash, 1989). It served as an umbrella organisation

which represented different plain tribes' interests. However, the plain tribes fall into the Bodo-Karachi category being dominated by Bodo interests (Gupta, 2014) (Dash, 1989) (Joshua Project, 2017). With the solidification and protagonist role of the Bodo movement, smaller plain tribes feared discrimination from the Bodos themselves in Bodo dominated districts. This further gave rise to further ethnic issues in another elite bargain: Bodos vs. Non Bodos[55].

During 1968 the PTCA campaigned for boycotting local elections in Krokajhar, a Bodo dominated district in Assam (Dash, 1989) (Brahma, 2014). The elections were for the Parliamentary constituency of Assam which is the only reserved seat for tribals (Dash, 1989). The PTCA had a strong support. It based its claims in arguing that the implementation of the Delimitation of Constituencies Act of 1962 was misleading and that therefore the elections only legitimised the mistaken interpretations of the Act. The Assamese elites responded by heavily repressing the boycott and the protests (Brahma, 2014). Amongst the repression tactics was: the imprisonment of women and men present at the polling stations (Narzary, 2010), bullet injuries at the hand of the police and police torture (Dash, 1989). This further undermined the relation between Assamese and Bodo elites and for the Bodos it was the last straw.

The Assamese state repression of 1968 plus the major discontent brought by the mediocre bargain concessions of the language demands paired with the inspiration for a more political approach radicalised the demands of the Bodo movement.

Inspired by the election boycott repression, the PTCA took on the most radical demand ever made since the first moments of independence. The creation of a separate state on the north bank of the Brahmaputra river: the state of Udayachal (Pathak, 2012) (Saika, 2011) (Singh & Mushahary, 2015) (Dash, 1989). As the relationship with the Assamese elite was severely weaken and overwhelmed by mistrust, the Bodo took the demand for Udayachal directly to the Indian government in 1973 (Singh & Mushahary, 2015) (Dash, 1989).

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[55] This bargain will not be analysed because even given the dominant role of the Bodos, all tribes were in a powerless position relative to the Assamese.

Thus, the Bodo movement had decreased credibility in the commitments that the Indian elite could offer. The reputation in regards of the track of transactions with the Bodo community was not positive. In 1960, it accepted the Assamese demands for Assamese as official language despite clear disagreement within tribal minorities. Further on in 1963 it conceded further demands to other ethnicities, leaving the Bodos with a strong sense of discrimination. Likewise, in 1963 Nagaland and Meghalaya were carved out of Assam as a process of reorganisation of the state of Assam[56] (George, 1994) (Dash, 1989), and despite the Bodos not formally bidding for autonomy the bargain concession to Meghalaya and in particular to Nagaland created moral hazard. The Bodos demands were soft by the 1960s (up until 1967 and Udayachal), the Naga demands were harder[57] and yet being the Bodos more of a soft line concession they were undermined by the Indian elite. Moreover, this sentiment is further solidified in 1988 when Mizoram and Tripura are included to the Sixth schedule a demand the Bodos have put forward since 1968 when ABSU was created and that was further formalised in 1987 by the 92-point chart of demands and in 1988 with the three main points declaration (Dash, 1989) (George, 1994). Hence despite the pressure for being included in the Sixth schedule the Indian elite had completely ignored this Bodo demand.

Hence, the Bodo had a raised expectative given the evidence of repression on the Assamese elite and the declaration of Indira Ghandi in 1967 of a reorganisation plan of Assam (Gupta, 2014). By this time, the newly created PTCA was demanding autonomy, thus the movement was gaining momentum and the demands are soon to shift to separation. The reorganisation Act of Assam was defined in 1971. As perhaps expected, the Bodos did not receive any concessions on the demands for autonomy. It can be interpreted that the demand was a non-negotiable point for the Indian elite whose interest was to prevent further fragmentation of the Assam state. Another point of view refers to the 'harder' approach of Indira Ghandi towards ethno-nationalist movements as opposed to her father Nehru. As (Karlsson, 2011) points out: Indira Ghandi 'was suspicious of all such expressions [of ethnicity] a thus applied a far more un-accommodating strategy" (p.17).

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[56] Further revised in 1969 by PM Indira Ghandi
[57] Hence, according to (Karlsson, 2011) during pre-independence, Ghandi assured the Nagas their right for independence (pg. 15).

The discontent with the 1971 Reorganisation Act propelled the PTCA into hardening its demands. By 1973 it formally demanded to the Indian elite the creation of the Union State of Udayachal. The movement was at its peak, the protest and resentment from the 1974 protest united the movement. Thus, by 1977 the PTCA withdraws the demands for Udayachal and decides to undertake a softer demand for autonomy. Charan Narzary the Secretary of the PTCA joined the Janat Assamese government, for the Bodo movement this was a proof he was brokered into (Goswami, 2014) (see next time period).

Thus, 1967 not only resulted in the empowerment of the PTCA, another major organisation also started to become predominant in representing the Bodo interests: the ABSU All Bodo Students Union. The ABSU was formed in the Krokajhar district of Assam (Chadha, 2005). Since the politicisation of the movement and further on the dissatisfaction with the leadership of PTCA in the Udayachal bargain, ABSU claims the major role in representing Bodo interests and represents the embodiment of the radicalisation of the group by becoming armed in 1988 creating the NdFB –National Democratic Front of Bodoland-. The NdFB is the product of a series of unsatisfactory bargain concessions, progressive dissatisfaction[58] and inexistent credibility in the Assamese elite despite the Bodo attempts to pursue its demands peacefully (Tiwari, 1995).

Although the Language issue was the force behind sparking further political demands the Bodo movement perceived some other issues as discriminative. There were economic problems directly related to land distribution; significant exclusion in terms of political participation within the Bodo dominated district councils and high rates and perception of bureaucratic corruption which was non redistributive to the Bodos.

Economic Land distribution and Assamese discrimination

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[58] The culmination of the dissatisfaction with the bargain deals is the 1993 peace accord. The Bodos let their guard down and sat to negotiate. However, the outcome of the peace accord was a complete failure, what I would call just a formality of the government to persuade without real compromise to solve the Bodo concerns.

Immigration into the State of Assam affected the Bodos in two different moments. Firstly, during colonial periods and the support of the British elite to provide Assam with high influx of labour to exploit the Assam tea plantations (Pathak, 2017) (Singh & Mushahary, 2015) (Karlsson, 2011). And secondly, they were further displaced with the influx of Bengali refugees circa the time of decolonisation (Chadha, 2005) (Dash, 1989).

The Bodos have been historically a 'sons of the soil' ethnicity. The first migratory movement which began during the XIX Century brought foreign ethnicities to Bodo owned land to guarantee enough labour for tea plantation exploitation (Dash, 1989). Hence, the real problem for the Bodos came from the land-revenue policies of the British colony. In their efforts to safeguard this area of India for tea exploitation (Pathak, 2017), the British imposed a cash based system. This forced the Bodos to work in tea crops, displacing them from their traditional ways of living: agriculture (Dash, 1989) (Daimari & Mishra, n.d.). Furthermore, those families who did not partake in cash earning jobs were forced to get indebted to pay the land taxes. When loans were not repaid to the 'Kabuliwalas' their debts resulted in the Bodos losing their land and being evicted (Singh & Mushahary, 2015).

The British also undertook development projects such as the construction of railways and roads for exportation the Bodos suffered from this, as many were evicted from their land. The dramatic economic transformation of the land had a profound impact not only for the Bodos but also for other tribal ethnicities of Assam (Karlsson, 2011).

After decolonisation, flows of immigration from Bengal and Bangladesh caused the demography of the Bodo dominated districts to change once again. Kokrajhar and Goalpara districts were the most affected. Census data presented in (Chadha, 2005) shows how the population of this two districts increased drastically: in the period of 1951-56 the population grew at a rate of 38.39%; from 1961-71 at a rate of 44.15% and for the period of 1971-81 at a rate of 91.15%.

Figure 1. Decadal Population growth in Assam

Source: (Government of Assam, 2014)

The problems associated to land distribution in Bodo dominated territories created great economic inequality which, during independence was further enhanced by Assamese economic discrimination (Dash, 1989). Bodo leaders have alleged that the remaining Bodo lands have been taken for Assamese government projects[59], displacing Bodo communities into the Assam forest borderline which collides with Bhutan and Arunachal Pradesh. This forest areas are environmentally protected which in turn have forced Bodos to be violently evicted from them by Assamese forces.

Additionally, the Assam administration dominated by Assamese officers has also encouraged the allocation of land for non-tribals despite land protection laws declared in 1860[60]. The Assamese officers, in an effort to provide patronage to their own, helped non-tribal acquire tribal land (Mwshahary, 2004). This resulted in significant chunks of land relocated to the Assamese which in turn significantly impoverished the Bodos.

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[59] However, (Gupta, 2014) point out that the Bodo movement did not include land distribution demands on their claims (p.3). Hence, the demand for land distribution was not explicit but the economic discrimination product of land distribution was.
[60] The Assam Land regulation of 1860 established reserved lands for the 'backward classes'. These land were organised as belts and blocks in which trading of the land was prohibited.

Informal distribution: Political participation in Bodo dominated districts and non-redistributive patronage.

The colonial administration had significant impact in the establishment of the middle-educated class for the Assamese society but also for the tribes. The number of government jobs class I[61] started to expand. Thus, traditionally the Assamese were considered as superior in relation to the 'backward tribes' such as the Bodos. The Assamese in turn, occupying the majority of the government posts and somehow, supported by the British elite took hold of the position of superiority and as such preached their chauvinism (Brahma, 2008).

This is evidenced in the Language policies which not only discriminated within the cultural aspect of inequality, but also, they reproduced discrimination and constrained access to public jobs. The use of Assamese as an official language also introduced legislation which demanded the knowledge of Assamese to obtain employment in government offices of the state (Saika, 2011). This affected any kind of employment post, ranging from administrative low skills jobs to the very end of high skilled prestigious jobs such as those in decision-making. For example, job posts for clerks insisted in the knowledge of Assamese as an essential qualification (Dash, 1989). These policies favoured the Assamese speaking majority and their privileged position in the control of the economy and the politics of the region. For high skilled jobs, the representation of Bodos was minimum even for constituencies which were reserved for ST. Within Bodo dominated districts, bureaucratic posts are taken by the majoritarian Assamese. Despite the Bodo movement being powered by an educated middle class[62] (Das, 1994) (Singh & Mushahary, 2015), Bodo skilled candidates to politics have been unable to capture decision-making posts.

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[61] Those bureaucratic jobs under the colony which were aimed at locals not British bureaucrats. The Covenanted civil service was only for the British.
[62] Because there is no political elite the activist middle class is understood as the political elite.

In terms of parliamentary seats, the design of the parliamentary system in India is based on a majority principle. This prevents Scheduled tribes[63] such as the Bodos to win a majority of seats in the Assamese Assembly. According to (George, 1994) even if the Bodos secured a 100% of their constituency votes, they will only account for 30% of the total due to the constituency boundaries (p.882). The formal rules of the game in addition to the extended control and dominance of the power seats by the Assamese have prevented the Bodos from any chance to gain access to power or rule their affairs.

Elections held for Legislative Assamese Assembly from 1967 to 1991 provide a clear indication of this statement. The constituencies with Bodo and PTCA presence are: Bongaigaon, Dhubri, Krokajhar (west), Krokajhar (East), Sidli, Binji, Golpara (East), Golpara (West), Barpeta, Nalbari (East and West united in 1971), Uldagari, Gohpur (South Asia Terrorism Portal, 2017). From the 12 constituencies with Bodo and PTCA presence only 3 are reserved for ST: Sidli, Krokajhar and Uldagari. Thus, even for those constituencies with reserved seats for tribes; no ethnic party like the PTCA was guaranteed a seat. I some instances Bodo candidates have been elected but not being part of the ethnic movement network.

For the 1967 elections PTCA[64] did not compete. It started formally competing in legislative elections upon 1972, for this election it won only 1 seat out of 6 contested. The seat won was for the constituency of Kokrajhar West, the candidate was Charan Narzary the secretary of the PTCA which was formally sponsored by the party. Later in 1977 the PTCA in the leadership of Narzary came to an agreement with the Janata party, this was seen by the Bodos as a gesture of disloyalty and accused Narzary of being brokered into the Janata government when he suddenly dropped the Udayachal demand (Brahma, 2008). Thus, although both constituencies in Kokrajhar are reserved for tribes; Kokrajhar east was won by the India National Congress, a national party. The candidate was Assamese political leader Sarat Chandra Sinha who was sympathetic to the Bodo cause[65] but was of Assamese origin. Sidli and Uldagari the

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[63] Also, the Bodos were not recognised as Scheduled tribe until 2003.
[64] PTCA was not recognised as a party until 1972. The conditions for being recognised is to reach a certain threshold of votes. Thus, in 1972 it was not officially recognised but it gathered enough votes to win one seat.
[65] He sanctioned 5000 teaching jobs for the Bodos (Hazarika, 1994)

other reserved constituency was also lost to the INC. However, Uldagari was won by a Bodo candidate not from the PTCA.

In the 1978 elections PTCA won 3 seats out of 9 contested. This time, the PTCA lost Kokrajhar West to Ranendra Nayaran Basumatari from the INC but who was a Bodo himself, and won Sidli and Uldagari. In 1983 the PTCA lost both Kokrajhar seats out of 26 seats contented it won only 1. Nataran Basmatari was elected again for Krokajhar West, so did Kumar Basumatary for Uldagari. The 1985 election Charan Narzarany was elected again for Kokrajhar east, thus by this time the PTCA was already divided into PTCA remaining and PTCA-Progressive a splintering product of the 1977 announcement of the withdrawal of the Udayachal demand. The PTCA in the leadership of Narzary is considered to be 'bought into' by the Assamese elites. They essentially withdrew all the autonomy and separation demands and the campaigns retrieved to conservative demands which was seen by the majority of the Bodo movement as a betrayal. However, despite the dissatisfaction of the Bodo movement with the Janata PTCA deal, there were efforts to include the Bodo elite into the Assam legislative assembly. Even another PTCA leader: Samar Brahma Choudhury became Forest Minister. Likewise, another attempt to include the leadership of the PTCA came in 1985 when it again reached a deal with the AGP (Brahma, 2008, p. 11).

It can be interpreted that the efforts of the Assamese elite to include were genuine however not enough in the eyes of the Bodo movement. There is a persistent mismatch of efforts and expectations within the bargaining process. For the majority of the Bodo movement the inclusions and alliances between the Janata party and the PTCA and further on between the AGP and the PTCA did not compel with expectations of an autonomous separate authority. Nor did they transform is tangible changes which improved the Bodo discriminative situation.

TABLE 1. Legislative Assembly election results for Bodo dominated constituencies.

Constituency	Dhubri	Kokrajhar west (ST)	Kokrajhar east (ST since 1972)	Sidli (ST since 1972)	Bongaigaon	Binji	Golpara east	Golpara west	Barpeta	Nalbari (east & west united in 1971)	Uldagari (ST)	Gohpur
1967 No contested seats												
Winning candidate	S.A. ALI	R. BASUMATARY	R.M. DEVI	U. BRAHMA	M.M. SINHA	G.C. PATGIRI	B.K. GHOSE	S.A. JOTDER	S.N. DAS	B. BARMAN; P.N. CHOUDHURY	B. BASUMATARI	B. UPADHYAYA
Political party*	INC	INC	INC	INC	INC	INC	IND	PSP	PSP	INC	INC	INC
1972 Contested seats: 6 / 478, won 1												
Winning candidate	MOHAMMAD UMARUDDIN	CHARAN NARZARY	SARAT CHANDRA SINHA	UTTAM BRAHMA	DHRUBA BARUA	GOLAK CHANDRA PATGIRI	BALABHADRA DAS	SAHADAT ALI JOTEDAR	SURENDRA NATH DAS	BHUMIDHAR BARMAN; BADAN CH. TALUKDAR	BAHADUR BASUMATARI	RAM CHANDRA SARMAH
Political party*	INC	PTCA**	INC	INC	INC	INC	INC	INC	INC	INC, SOP	INC	SOP
1978 Contested seats: 9 / 938 won 3												
Winning candidate	MOHAMMAD UMARUDDIN	RANENDRA NARAYAN BASUMATARI	SAMAR BRAHMA CHOUDHURY	PANCHANAN BRAHMA	MATHURA MOHAN SINHA	PADMALOCHAN BORO	BIRENDRA NATH CHOUDHURY	NAZMUL HAQUE	A. LATIF	NARENDRA NATH DUTTA	BINOY KUMAR BASUMATARY	RAM CHANDRA SARMAH
Political party*	INC	INC	PTCA	PTCA	JNP	IND	CMP	IND	IND	CMP	PTCA	JNP
1983 Contested seats: 21 / 471 won 1												
Winning candidate	MOHAMMAD UMARUDDIN	RANENDRA NARAYAN BASUMATARY	DAMBARUDHAR BRAHMA	LUIS ISLARI	Uncontested	?	MOHAMMAD ALI	HASSANUDDIN AHMED	ISMAIL HUSSAIN	CHANDRADHAR KALITA	BINOY KUMAR BASUMITARY	?
Political party*	INC	INC	INC	INC			IND	IND	IND	IND	PTCA	
1985: Contested seats 28 / 1133 won 3												
Winning candidate	Mosir Uddin Sheikh	Amrit Lal Basumatary	Charan Narzary	Janendra Basumatary	Phani Bhoosan Chaudhary	Ganesh Bora	Maziruddin Ahmed	Sheikh Saman Ali	Kumar Deepak Das	Nagen Sarma	Binal Khungur Basumatari	Ganesh Kutum
Political party*	INC	ICS	PTCA	PTCA	IND	PTCA	IND	IND	IND	IND	IND	IND
1991 Contested seats 15 / 1657 won 0												
Winning candidate	DHRUBA KR. SEN.	PARAMESWAR BRAHMA	PRAMILA BRAHMA	KHIREN BORGOYARY	PHANI BHOOSAN CHOUDHARY	KAMAL BRAHMA	RATNESHWAR DAS	NAZMUL HOQUE	ISMAIL HUSSAIN	NAGEN SARMA	JAMAN SINGH BRAHMA	KOSHESWAR BARUA
Political party*	BJP	IND	IND	IND	AGP	IND	INC	IND	INC	AGP	INC	INC

Source: Statistical Report on General Election1967, 1972, 1978, 1985, 1991 to the Legislative Assembly of Assam. Online at: http://eci.nic.in/eci_main1/ElectionStatistics.aspx

* National Parties: ICS: India Congress Party, INC: Indian National Congress, BJP: Bhartiya Janta Party, AGP: Asom Gana Parishad, CMP: Communist Party of India, PSP: Praja Socialist party, SOP: Socialist Party, JNP: Janata Party.

IND: Independent.

The only two state parties are PTCA and RSP: Revolutionary Socialist Party.

** Party was not officially recognised

Furthermore, in the case of appointment to Government Services of the State which were in fact, reserved for tribals; many of these posts were hoarded by the Assamese elite. The Assamese argued that the Bodos were unfit for the job, though, the Bodo elite is educated and considering generations prior to the Language Policy, they were in fact, literate in Assamese (Mwshahary, 2004). For the Bodos this was the personification of the voluntary and orchestrated exclusion of the tribal elites.

Considering the whole of the public posts in government and recognising the percentage of jobs reserved for ST, there is still a great backlog of jobs effectively taken by ST. This is particularly persistent in fourth-grade jobs, or in other words, those jobs which do not have a lot of visibility. According to (Misra, 1989), 'out of the 83 fourth-grade jobs (10% of the total) reserved for the ST of the plains in the secretariat at Dispur, only 17 had been filled up' (Misra, 1989, p. 1149). The AGP government had simply not make any major effort to change the situation.

Panchayats and patronage distribution

It is nonetheless the District Councils the most important division of authority within the Bodo districts and at the local level. India has a particular organisation of power which *formalises*[66] the traditional forms of power organisation. As a highly heterogeneous country, one way of controlling the population and preventing fragmentation was to recognise the authority of chiefs and community leaders by institutionalising *local panchayats* (Constitution of India, 2015) (Brown, 1994). *Panchayats* are recognised as units of self-government which are endowed with significant powers, they are constituted in every state at the village, intermediate and district levels (art. 243B). *Panchayats* have been recognised as an innovative institutional modernisation. Within India, instead of eliminating traditional ways of self-government like in fact patronage networks, they have become to be institutionalised and formalised in the way of Local *Panchayats.*

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[66] Formalisation describes how informal patronage networks are recognised as a legal way of administering power and decision-making within local communities. The colony and also Ghandi as a freedom fighter recognised the need for formalising patronage networks as a way of preserving the unity of the Indian country.

Thus, their formalisation was not straight forward. They were firstly recognised as sources of power and organisation in 1870 further on legalised in 1915. However, they were not formally addressed or recognised upon independence. In fact, the Constitutional Assembly in 1947 did not make any reference to the Village *Panchayats* (Mithun, 2014), even the chairman of the drafting committee assured that village *Panchayats* were no more than 'a sink of localism, a den of ignorance [and] narrow-mindedness' (Mithun, 2014, p. 48). Hence, the line of criticism was successful in raising the importance of *Panchayats*, which were therefore, formally included as a separate chapter in the constitution. Thus, in present time they are no longer considered as 'agents of state government' (Mithun, 2014, p. 3) but rather as units of local self-government[67]. They offer a form of decentralisation in which the rural local government gains prevalence, thus their effectiveness depends on the ability of the leaders to deliver as well as appropriate funding.

Panchayats are therefore, a "three-tiered system of elected committees stretching from village to district" (Brown, 1994, p. 377). However, their implementation has not come with ease. There is a lack of clarity in regards of the functions and relationships between the elected members and the Assam state administration. Also, because these institutions are the lower end of *formalisation* they suffer from lack of resources or in Brown's words: financial weakness. Furthermore, it has been argued that in some instances, they have become 'vehicles for prosperous peasants' (p.3770) to appropriate scare resources and services whilst the poorer peasants remain with no redistribution or power over those assets. Thus, despite this when *Panchayats* are in fact, captured by local elites (in this case by Bodo elites rather than Assamese elites) then redistribution; even if at a low scale, is possible.

It is plausible the Bodos were unable to capture a great degree of informal distribution by participating in the local *Panchayats* due to two reasons. Firstly, *Gaon Panchayats,* the lower level of the three-tier decentralised system does not hold any decision-making power. At the level of the *Anchalik Panchayat* (the upper level, see below) patronage is likely to be captured by those members of the upper level. Thus, the

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[67] It is fair to say that the line between formal and informal institutions when it comes to the *local Panchayats* is rather blurred.

underfunding of these forms of government also constrain the degree and effect that patronage can effectively take. The overall functioning of the system is also not ideal (see below). Secondly, the enforcement and use of local *Panchayats* does not have an ethnic base. In other words, the process of formalisation through which *Panchayats* were adopted and absorbed under formal institutions was not based on ethnicity[68]. Thus, even if the formalisation and adoption of Panchayats relied on ethnicity, still the Bodos will had continued to be undermined. It would take first to be recognised as a ST/SC for which the Bodos did not until later in the period. In this regard, the distribution to ethnic Bodos through patronage is likely to be present but minor.

The shortcoming of adequate funding has been an issue since the first establishment of *Panchayats* (Choudhury, 1982) (Brown, 1994) (Mithun, 2014)*.* According to (Mithun, 2014), within Assam the establishment of *Panchayats* dates back to 1870 implemented through the Village Chowkidary Act. During this time, the *Panchayats* were only implemented in three districts: Sylhet, Goalpara and Cachar. Thus, the implementation and functioning back then was hardly democratic, members were not elected but rather appointed. In 1915, the Assam Local-government Act was passed; members of the *Panchayat* were to be elected or appointed for a period of three years (Mithun, 2014). In 1948 the rural Panchayat Act aimed at developing local self-government in rural areas and providing for development of villages (p.50). The responsibilities of the *Panchayats* were associated to water supply, medical relief and sanitation; hence, with the 1948 Act the functions were further expanded to a list of 34. Further on, in 1959 the Assam Panchayat Act was declared. This act formally established the *Gaon Panchayats* as the lower level of administration, as a three-tier system the Panchayats are divided in *Zilla Parisad* operating at the District level, *Anchalik Panchayat* operating at the Block level (known as Community development blocks) and finally *Gaon Panchayats* operating at the village level. In 1961 there were 43 *Gaon Panchayats* in Dhubri, 34 in Goalpara, and 38 in Kokrajhar (Choudhury, 1982). Each *Gaon Panchayat* has an average population of 10000 to 20000 persons. Thus, the resources struggle to reach the *Gaon Panchayats,* they are underfunded and their earning is meagre (Choudhury, 1982) (Brown, 1994) it Is unclear whether resources get stocked in the mid or upper level.

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[68] As for example in Namibia, see Namibia chapter.

Furthermore, in regards of the lack of clarity within the functions of the Panchayat in relation to the Assam government, initially in 1959 they were organised as three-tier structure with *Gaon Panchayat* at the base level (Mithun, 2014). However, in 1972 with the implementation of the Panchayati Raj Act it was reverted to a two-tier system (p.52) and further in 1986 reversed back to three-tier*.* The dismantling of the three-tier system in the period from 1972 to 1986 created disarray, which in turn created confusion in the functions and distribution of funds. In 1978 there were 'Community Blocks which were implemented to bring development administration as near to the village as possible' (Choudhury, 1982, p. 237). They provided highly qualified staff to guide the villages in developmental issues, such as: agriculture, social welfare, education; they also coordinated the *Anchalik Panchayats* (intermediate level). Thus, with the dismantling of the *Anchalik Panchayats* in an attempt to implement a two-tier system, the functions developed both by the *Anchalik Panchayats* and the Community block were removed (Choudhury, 1982) (Ramen, 2009). There was a lack of clarity as to how the funds were going to be spent as well as how the *Gaon Panchayats* were going to be held accountable.

Moreover, as (Choudhury, 1982), (Brown, 1994) and later on (Ramen, 2009) point out; there is a general perception of corruption by the public. Choudhury in his study of *Panchayats* within the District of Hailakandi finds that rural voters do not share a good opinion of their *Panchayat* leaders, they consider them as 'corrupt and indifferent to the well-being of the common men' (p. 86). As for Brown, she remarks that *Local Panchayats* have been instruments of 'prosperous peasants' for the appropriation of the already scarce resources. Ramen in turn, in his analysis of functionality of *Panchayats;* examines decision-making in terms of budgetary and spending allocation. He points out that decision-making in terms of resource allocation for all the districts in Assam, from 1994 onwards, depends upon the intermediary level: *Anchalik Panchayats.* He argues that *Gaon Panchayats* 'depend heavily on the technical persons, normally the Junior Engineer'[69] (p. 95). Furthermore, the 'technical persons' are not accountable to the Assam state *Panchayati Raj* institutions. Thus, the Junior

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[69] The Junior Engineers are responsible for 4-5 *Gaon Panchayats* and their responsibility is to assist the *Gaon Panchayats* in preparation for the Developmetal action plans (p.95).

Engineers must verify and report completed and efficient work as well as approving the budget estimation. Consequently, Ramen finds this procedure is piled with bribery. Financial assets are entirely controlled by the *Anchalik* leadership. The *Gaon panchayats* therefore, as legitimate representation of the village do not hold any efficient decision-making power in terms of redistribution of funds[70].

Corruption and bribery can represent a form of non-redistributive patronage in the form of appropriation of public funds with no will of redistributing and persuasion for non-focalised investment. It is likely therefore, that funds will be invested in the priorities of the leaders rather than those of the community. Thus, leaving the majority of the community with no access or benefit from those resources. At the level of the *Gaon Panchayat,* secretaries, members and presidents have pointed out that 'they never get the resources according to their requirement' (Ramen, 2009, p. 97). Furthermore, being a function of the *Gaon Panchayat* to suggest the budget to the *Anchalik Panchayat,* some presidents have pointed out that they have never undertaken the task of Annual resource estimation. Some others did not even know that was part of their functions (p. 99).

If budget allocation is firstly, undertaken at the *Anchalik Panchayat* level and secondly overwhelmed by bribery it is likely resources will reach the community. Likewise, decision –making at the *Anchalik Panchayat* level is not guaranteed to be Bodo. Furthermore, there is great resentment between the Bodo and the Assamese ethnicities. Assamese leadership, is likely to invest resources not accordingly to the – Bodo- population needs.

In fact, Assam is an Agricultural state. Its income depends mainly in the production of food for export (Daimari & Mishra, n.d.) (Choudhury, 1982) (Das, 1997). Das (1997) work studies the peasant movement in the district of Goalpara one of the poorest and also a Bodo majority district (Nath, 2013) (Government of Assam, 2014). Studying the agricultural policies and the peasant movement Das finds out that the leadership in Goalpara district is mainly Assamese despite Goalpara being a Bodo majority district

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[70] One example of this is the task of *Gaon Panchayats* to construct houses for the poor. Thus, the amount required for construction is allocated by the Development Block.

(Das, 1997, p. 173). He argues that this displacement of leadership has undermined the ability of the 'common people' to influence in investment and decision-making for resource mobilisation. Das points out: "The district leadership or the State leadership (mostly come from Assamese community) had to face difficulties in membership drive." (p.173).

Thus, upon 1994, *Gaon Panchayat* consisted on 9-11 members elected by popular suffrage. Conversely, the president and vice-president were elected from amongst the members of the *Gaon Panchayat* on the very first meeting (Ramen, 2009). Within the Bodo presence districts there is also Assamese and Bengali population which have, to the detriment of the Bodos, driven the votes. However, India is also recognised for its outstanding Affirmative Action Programmes for SC/ST and women. Reserved seats of SC/ST operate at all *Panchayat* levels; *Zilla, Anchalik and Gaon.* As determined by the 1994 Act, in 2001 there were 109 ST reserved seats at the *Gaon Panchayat* tier in Goalpara, conforming 13.9% of the total seats. At the *Anchalik panchayat* level there were 13 ST reserved seats in Goalpara, for a total of 16% or the total seats. Thus, at the *Zilla panchayat* level, out of 16 members only 3 seats are reserved of ST.

Table 2. ST reserved seats for *Panchayats* (2001)

Districts	Zilla Panchayat (2001)		Anchalik Panchayat (2001)		Gaon Panchayat (2001)	
	Total Seats	ST Reserved seats	Total Seats	ST Reserved seats	Total Seats	ST Reserved seats
Dhubri	19	0	150	6	1500	4
Barpeta	25	0	121	0	1188	9
Binji	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Bogaigaon	6	0	55	0	549	8
Goalpara	16	3	81	13	784	109
Krokajhar	Deferred By BAC	Deferred By BAC	3	0	30	0
Nalbari	12	0	62	0	596	23
Sidli	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Uldagari	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a

Source: Adapted from (Ramen, 2009) The Assam state election commission.

Affirmative Action programs such as this one which aims at guaranteeing ST inclusion in *Panchayat Raj* institutions, works according to the formal regulations and is indeed successful in ensuring political representation. Despite this, the problematic associated to the functioning of the *Panchayats* goes beyond mere allocated seating.

Leaders of *Panchayats* tend to have strong political association holding membership in political parties or social movements. Thus, as Ramen points out in his interviews with *Panchayat* Leaders, 'the *Panchayat* had to function under the state ruling party' (p.246). This means that ultimately despite having an opportunity for inclusion and gaining benefits from the virtues of decentralisation, the strong influence of the state ruling party particularly over the *Gaon Panchayats* resulted in decision-making in the interest of the ruling party, displacing ethnic interest represented by for example, the PTCA or the ABSU.

Panchayat institutions are an ideal way of recognising the authority of local leaders, as well as legitimising patronage networks, which despite the introduction of modernisation remained as the most important ways of decision-making and redistribution at the local level in India. Hence, within Assam heterogeneous districts such as Goalpara or Krokajhar face considerable structural problems. The strong influence of the State Ruling Party and the way in which resource allocation is decided, in addition to the appropriation of funds by elites with no intend to redistribute undermine the opportunity of ethnic elites within heterogeneous districts of taking control of the village needs, and deciding upon investment and resource allocation. It also considerably affects the perception of trust between Assamese and Bodo elites. The 'common people' do not trust the leaders as the record of delivery in promised transactions is meagre. The Bodo leaders, elected to the reserved seats have no power over resource allocation or decision-making. Furthermore, although the reserved seats have been guaranteed over the period of time covered in this analysis, for the Bodos it is simply not enough as it defeats the objective of taking control of their own affairs.

There is also another form of *Panchayats* which continue to be fully informal (Pur, 2007). Informal local governance institutions (ILGIs) remain to be prevalent in rural India, they are inter-caste institutions with functional, oppressive and progressive features (Pur, 2007, p. 402). Thus, the distribution that can be captured through both institutionalised and informal patronage networks is limited for the Bodo community. The formal Panchayats are captured by the Assamese whose power determines decision-making, and they remain unwilling to increase the shares of the pie. The Bodo

patronage line does not have a significant access to public and/or private good distribution.

Moreover, funds allocated by the State of Assam to district councils have been reported to be unduly and development programs to be meagre (Sharma, 2006). There is perception of corruption along the district councils which further enhances demands for autonomy within Bodo dominated districts as per the inclusion of Bodos in the Sixth Schedule. Patronage networks at the India state level have proven to be effective in preventing violence by redistributing goods informally (Kenny, 2011) , thus they way in which these networks operate differ from state to state.

2. **1975-1986: Second round of bargaining. PTCA and ABSU political demands: The road towards complete radicalization and the use of violence.**

This period is marked by three main events: the withdrawal of support to the PTCA by ABSU in 1979, the splintering of the PTCA into two different groups and the 1985 Assam accords. By the end of the 1960's decade, the ABSU highly supported the PTCA; thus, the mishandling of the Udayachal demand by the PTCA propelled the ABSU into withdrawing its support by 1979. The PTCA softened its demands and gradually distanced itself from ethno-nationalist goals (Saika, 2011), the ABSU highly condemned this and pre-empted the intentions of the PTCA to succumb to Assam power politics in 1984.

In 1967 when the PTCA was formally created to address the claims of the plain tribals, a memorandum was sent to Indira Ghandi for the creation of an autonomous region (Chadha, 2005). The hopes of the PTCA to gain concessions on this demand were lost when in 1971 the Reorganisation Act of Assam was published with no reference to the Bodo issue. The demands were hardened by 1973 when PTCA with the support of ABSU demanded the creation of the Union state of Udayachal (Pathak, 2012) (Saika, 2011) (Singh & Mushahary, 2015) (Dash, 1989) (Ray & Agrawal, 1994). A state that would be majority Bodo but that will embrace other tribal minorities from the plains in the north valley of the Brahmaputra river.

Thus, by 1977 the PTCA made an announcement stating that they were giving up on the Udayachal demand, and instead they were pursuing a campaign for an autonomous territory (Ray & Agrawal, 1994) (Chadha, 2005). The Bodo movement had witnessed some quiet years since the 1974 protests; hence, despite the passiveness of the movement during this years, the statement put forward by the PTCA infuriated both the hardliners of the PTCA and ABSU itself (Ray & Agrawal, 1994). This resulted in the division of the PTCA into two different groups: the remaining PTCA and the PTCA-P progressive in 1979 (Ray & Agrawal, 1994) (Chadha, 2005). The remaining PTCA joined the Assamese ministry and gave up its demands, this was interpreted by the hardliners and by ABSU like a gesture of disloyalty.

As stated earlier, Charan Narzary joined the legislative assembly and Samar Brahma Choundry became Forest Minister (Brahma, 2008) (Nath, 2014). This appointment and in fact, the Narzary election were a product of the Assamese elite efforts to include the PTCA leadership in government. However, the deals between first, the Janata party in 1977 and then the AGP party and the PTCA in 1985 were interpreted by the Bodo movement as betrayal. In fact, the ABSU considered Samar Brahma Choudhry as "the most treacherous, opportunists and crooked (with devil mastermind) fellow" (Nath, 2014, p. 30). Both hard-line PTCA and the ABSU considered that the remaining PTCA where effectively 'bought' into by the Janata government. They thought the Assamese was providing both private and public goods to alienate this portion of the PTCA (Misra, 1989). Consequently, Samar Brahma and Narzary were accused of 'drifting into corruption practices' (Mullick, 2001). In this regard, the access to potential patronage funds in the eyes of the PTCA remained at the top level, across the elites rather than spilling further down the line.

ABSU and PTCA-P aligned themselves in 1979 forming a new political force (Misra, 1989) (Butler & Gallagher Cunningham, 2011). By 1980 the first demand of the coalition was put forward to Indira Ghandi. The relationship with the Assamese elite was broken since the 1974 protests and the lack of trust product of the Language policy bargains. Therefore, in the same vein as the Udayachal demands, this bargain claim was send directly to the India State government. The demand was once again,

for a separate union state which they named: Mishing Bodoland (Ray & Agrawal, 1994) (Misra, 1989).

The ABSU was interested in unifying a stronger movement. The Mishing Bodoland project did not take effect because the bargain between Bodos vs non Bodos[71] became predominant. Particularly, the ABSU failed to bring together the other plain tribals (Nath, 2008) and instead decided to campaign for a Bodo unitary state; therefore, the coalition between ABSU and the PTCA-P stopped campaigning for it. Thus, the ABSU in its interest for a more unified Bodo organised movement; prepared a convention in 1984 to discuss Bodo issues. A new political group was born product of this convention: the UTNLF (Ray & Agrawal, 1994) (Butler & Gallagher Cunningham, 2011)[72]. This new group distanced itself from collective plain tribal interests, and instead focused attention on Bodo issues.

Meanwhile, the turn towards ethno political goals by the Bodos also sparked resentment along the Assamese population in regards of outland immigration into Assam. As such, the Bengal immigration problem not only affected the Bodos but also it sparked fears amongst the Assamese ruling elite (Baruah, 1986). By 1979 the Assamese elite was also focused on their own ethno nationalist worries. The AASU – All Assamese Students Union- organised a series of peaceful protests to raise awareness of the illegal immigration into Assam (Misra, 1989), their demands were for 'detection, disenfranchisement and deportation of foreigners" (Baruah, 1986, p. 1192). There was good popular support but conceding for the Indian State government was costly. Thus, the Indian government whilst recognising the power of the Assamese anti-immigration movement[73] conceded on several aspects. The bargain culminated in 1985 with the Assam accords (Baruah, 1986) (Misra, 1989).

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[71] Some minority groups became dissatisfied with the Bodo predominance in the ethnic issues within the north Brahmaputra valley region. The Mishing Bodoland sparked initial unity between both ethnic groups. However, the Mishings soon became reluctant to accept a Bodo leadership in the matter. The Bodos always had it clear and were just attempting to gather more support (Misra, 1989).

[72] Thus, (George, 1994) states that in 1984 the PTCA did not unify but split to form the UNTLF

[73] This process of bargaining lasted 6 years. The Indian elite gradually recognised the need for conceding. See: (Baruah, 1986)

The results of the AASU and their bargaining with the Indian State government raised the hopes of the Bodos as they witnessed significant concessions to the ethnic Assamese (George, 1994). The accord also shuffled the Assamese elites in power which made the Bodos think they had further opportunities of negotiating their claims as new elites could mean a change of players. Thus, when the excitement of the Accord had passed, they soon realised the new government was not very different from the past one (Dhar, 2014)

This sentiment of dissatisfaction, low credibility and discrimination launched the ABSU into a period of violence marked by the 92 points charter demands and the 1988 creation of the BdNF.

ABSU completeness of radicalisation and use of violence as a strategy to succeed in the demand for the state of 'Bodoland'.

The radicalisation of the ABSU and the decision to take up arms is a product of the failed bargains preceding the 92 charter of demands put forward in 1988. The PTCA and ABSU (and earlier on the BSS) in representation of the Bodos, via legal and peaceful means attempted constantly to raise their concerns and create a dialogue to put their demands on the table and receive some sort of room for negotiation. Thus, on the part of the Assamese elite and the regional government they received mediocre concessions which didn't meet their interests. When the Bodos further claimed, the Assamese responded with force and denial.

In this vein, when the channels of demand were depleted and commitment between the elites was at its low; the Bodos directed the bargain demands towards the Indian elite. The Indian elite did not even acknowledge the Bodo concerns. In turn, it completely ignored their demands and undermined their pleas by conceding to other groups in Assam.

The relative deprivation on economic, political and social-cultural aspects became subjective when the movement witnessed several attempts to claim for equality and in return discrimination took a stronger effect. For the Bodos there was no other choice but to take up arms. The initial spells of violence were a display to force the Indian

elites into taking their demands seriously, though the main interest was not to fight a fully-fledged civil war but to pressure the government into bargaining. The Bodos did not have the potential to defeat the Assamese state forces, let alone the Indian federal government. However, as the frustration intensifies and also the violence increases the movement starts realising that the only way towards reaching their demands is by fighting.

3. **1986-93: Period of heighten armed violence, culminating in 1993 with the third bargain failure. (1988 inflexion point: ABSU demand for Bodoland and creation of the BdNF)**

In 1987 the ABSU under the leadership of Upendra Nath Brahma submits a 92 point charter of demands to federal and national authorities (Brahma, 2014) (Chadha, 2005) (George, 1994) (Mwshahary, 2004). For the state of Assam it was sent to the Chief Minister of Assam on the 1st January 1987; nationally, it was submitted to the then Prime Minister Indira Ghandi and also to the Home Minister of India: Buta Singh and to the President of India Sri. Giani Jail Singh (Brahma, 2014). The 92-point charter was a collection and socio-political, economic and cultural demands which embraced or collected all the sources of grievances and discriminations as perceived by the Bodos[74]. Despite the absence of trust between the ABSU and the Assam or Indian government the ABSU advocated initially for a peaceful approach to highlight and communicate their demands. The strength of the 'chain of command' within both PTCA and ABSU meant that violence was efficiently controlled in the leadership of the movement[75]. Thus, the position of peaceful means was about to be discarded in 1987 after the death of a Bodo student by the police and the 18Th ABSU Annual conference.

In 1988 in the District of Dhubri, ABSU was preparing for its 18th Annual Conference. During this meeting amongst ABSU leaders and sympathisers a significant decision

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[74] 27 of these demands are related to Language issues. There are other several demands that relate to the plain tribals in general. (Misra, 1989)

[75] This poses a significant difference with Thailand and the displacement of elites within the Malay districts. The Malays lacked a central chain of command, in turn the movement was dispersed with no visible head. It has been described as some sort of terrorist organisation. The Bodos in turn had a strongly organised and respected organisation

was made to discard 89 points of the 92-point charter and focus just on three main political points. The three main demands were:

1. Creation of a Regional Council for non-Karbi tribes angling Autonomus Council.
2. Creation of autonomous council for the Tribals living in the southern part of the Brahamaputra valley; and,
3. Creation of a separate state with the status of Union Territory on the Northern Bank of the Brahmaputra river for the plain tribes of Assam. (Mullick, 2001) (George, 1994) (Dash, 1989) (Misra, 1989)

Besides the narrowing of demands, during the Conference it was decided as well to create the BPAC: Bodo People's action committee. The aim of the BPAC was to serve as a 'people's organisation', solidifying the base of the movement (Chadha, 2005). ABSU was conscious of the need of popular support and cohesion, they realised that without it, the authorities were simply not going to pay attention to their demands. ABSU also was clear about the possibility of drawing the movement to the streets for parades, blockages, hunger protests, Mass rallies amongst other repertories of contention (Chaklader, 2004). These protests were even held in Delhi in various opportunities commencing even since 1987 (Mwshahary, 2004). In fact, the achievements of the ABSU could not have been made possible without the BPAC. The embodiment of the demands was reflected in the campaign slogan: 'divide Assam 50/50', which also for the first time claim the lands as mainly Bodo by naming it 'Bodoland'[76]. It is remarkable to mention however, the division amongst moderates and extremists; the moderates continue to demand a union territory, whereas the extremist (embodied also in the mass movement) demanded the separate state of Bodoland (Chaklader, 2004) (Misra, 1989).

This period is marked by heighten violence thus, the strategies implemented by BPAC and ABSU to pressure the central government were initially not intended to be violent,

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[76] As noted earlier, the bargains between non- Bodos and Bodos were also taking place at this time. The non-Bodo community conformed an organisation representing different plain tribal groups which were not Bodos and who opposed a Bodo dominated state. Furthermore, within the official talks between the Assam government and ABSU it was stated that ABSU with its use of violence upon 1989 was forcibly attempting to establish hegemony over all the other plain tribes (Misra, 1989)

in fact the movement pointed out the idea of 'following Gandhi's path of non-violence (Hira Moni, 2009) (George, 1994) (Chaklader, 2004). The organisations knew their impossibility to win if violence was the main strategy. Hence, the Assam state repressed harshly which in turn motivated the Bodos to use armed violence (Chadha, 2005). (Misra, 1989) significantly disagrees with this, stating that the ABSU purposely used violence to 'attract central attention as well as to establish itself as the most powerful plains tribal organisation in the state' (Misra, 1989, p. 1147).

Nonetheless, since before the period of state repression -1989-1993-, both the Assamese state leadership and the Indian elite were open to discussion and negotiation upon the receipt of the ABSU memorandums of demands. In 1987 and 1988 there were a series of bipartite talks between the Assamese elite and the leadership of the ABSU, thus they proved to be fruitless (Dhar, 2014). The response from the government, despite its openness to dialogue was not positive (Saika, 2011). (Mwshahary, 2004) points out that these two bipartite talks were taken by the state of Assam as 'mockery'. One of the Assam representatives: the Home Minister, failed to show up to the subsequent meetings, which was seen by the ABSU leadership as a lack of commitment and disrespect. This further undermined the perceived credibility of the commitment of the Assamese to respond positively to the Bodo demands, the failure of these talks and the subsequent events contributed to the bid for violent action amongst the ABSU leadership.

Initially, the ABSU – BPAC strategy was to threaten and pressure the Assam government by calling the movement into *Bandhs* –general strikes-. The strategy was to increase the time lapse of the *bandhs* progressively if the Assam government did not call for a serious formal meeting, the ultimate goal however by this time, was to achieve the creation of a separate state by 1990 (Hira Moni, 2009, p. 116) (Mwshahary, 2004). The first round of tripartite talks in 1988 was a product of a 1000 hour *bandh* (Mwshahary, 2004)*.* After a series of strikes and protests, the Assam and Indian government agreed to hold a negotiation meeting with the leadership of ABSU. The talks were held in New Delhi in August 1987. ABSU and BPAC had a strong chain of command, which initially kept the strikes peaceful as their intention was to pressure but not to fight. Thus, this gradually changed when the leadership condemned state repression and supported the use of violence.

The use of mass movement mobilisation on the side of the Bodos decreased the trust between the parties before and after the series of talks. Despite the Bodo mass movement being initially peaceful in its demonstrations, the Assamese elites were left with a sense of unpredictability and mistrust; as the Bodo leadership could change the curse or intensity of protest and strikes at any given moment[77]. This is perhaps a product of the ABSU's strategy of gradually increasing the duration of *Bandhs,* it successfully pressured the Assamese and the Indian elites to dialogue, but the sense of commitments were so far at its lowest. The subsequent use of state repression to contain the protests, strikes and rallies further undermined the credibility of the commitments to negotiation and concessions on the Assamese side.

The first ever rally in Guwahati 1987, sparked some violence by Assamese youngsters, the victims sought attention with the police. The aftermath of the rally left one Bodo student with a head injury inflicted by the police and he later died. This episode led to the first Bodo martyr: Sujit Narzary (Hira Moni, 2009) (Mwshahary, 2004). The police released without charges the other Bodo participants who were arrested as a product of the violence that broke out. Hira Moni further points out that this initial stage of the mass movement 'definitely shaped the further course of action for ABSU' (Hira Moni, 2009, p. 119).

The death of Sujit Narzary in 1987 along with the frequency and intensity of rallies and strikes, the growing sentiments of anger on the side of the Bodos embodied in the 18th annual conference (1988), the willingness of the police to control violence and their sentiments of anger and devastation inevitably led to violent episodes sparked by the animosity, lack of trust and misinterpretations on both sides of the bargain. The Assamese police was it is 'right' to control episodes of violence by using force, thus, the force used was excessive and was also inspired by sentiments of animosity embedded in ethnicity. On the side of the Bodos, despite their initial non-willingness to fight a fully-fledged war[78] the creation of information asymmetries came from the extreme feelings of anger which had been fuelled since the 1960s, violence on their

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[77] Mass movement was indeed a powerful tool to have.
[78] They were not armed, they did not have to this point any access to fire arms. Nor they had any sort of financing plan.

side was starting to be used as a means and during this period culminated with bomb explosions and acts of destruction (George, 1994). Thus, although violence was initially used as a way to pressure the government, it later took the form of main strategy. The mistrust created from this bargain between the mass movement and the Assam government embodied in the security authorities, significantly affected both the conditions for negotiation in 1993 in the creation of the BAC – Bodo Autonomous Council- and also increased the use of violence on each side.

The solidification of the mass movement is a product of the minor accommodation of the language policies and an eloquent mismatch of demands and rights between the groups, which were sparked by the death of Sujit Narzary and the conclusions of the ABSU 18th annual conference. After the death of Sujit Narzary, ABSU increases the bid on the use of violence, changing the discourse and withdrawing from the initial Gandhian inspiration.

In this vein, 1989 to 1993 is regarded as the period of heighten Bodo violence which also inspires the creation of the NdFB –Bodo democratic front-. The beginning of 1989 witnessed the violent turn in the mass movement (Mwshahary, 2004) (Chadha, 2005). The sustained strategy of ABSU of holding rallies and strikes was seen as a threat to the authorities who heavily repressed in a will to maintain order. Both sides inflicted significant use of force, the Bodo targeted civilians in some instances and they were themselves victims of police brutality. There are reports of torture, arbitrary arrest, sexual violence against Bodo women and extrajudicial killings. On the side of the Bodos there are reports of bombs on trains and bridges, ambushes, overriding of military camps; and against civilians reports of attacks to non-Bodo villages killing children and women, extortions and damage to private and public property (Chaklader, 2004) (Saika, 2011).

For instance, in 1990 two bombs exploited in railway tracks. One between Binji and Chapakhata and the other one between Sesapani and Fakirgram in the district of Krokajhar killing 15 people and injuring 50 more (Misra, 1989) (George, 1994). The year continued with episodes of violence and state repression, having its peak during 1989 (see graph). This further pushed the Indian Federal Government to intervene and hold a series of tripartite talks which will culminate in the 1993 peace accord. The

1993 peace accord is regarded as the zenith of inexistent credible commitment between the parties. It effectively reflects the reliance of the Indian and Assamese elite on producing purely formal concessions with no will to address the real problems.

It also reflects the unwillingness to redistribute shares of the pie with Bodo elites. The concessions are – somehow- present *formally* but it is just that. Furthermore, the lack of informality and the excessive reliance on formal agreements and rules led the Bodos into major dissatisfaction and further use of violence.

Figure 2. State repression and rebel violence.

Correlation between incidence of Violence and State Repression

Source: (Saika, 2011)

Upon 1992 there were around 8 rounds of negotiation but no actual agreement on any side. The Assamese did not commit to the talks and the Bodos instead used violence to voice their discontent. The talks finally reached an agreement in 1993 thus as mentioned above, the agreement was not enforced and the non-adoption of the points agreed led the Bodos into further violence leading to the death of 100 people on both sides in 1994.

Conclusions

The India case of the Bodo ethnicity depicts a three way elite bargain which after repetitive failures due mainly to lack of credible commitments reached a point of systematic violence upon the denial of bargaining demands. Structurally the formal aspect of the bargain seems to be more relevant in this particular case. The Bodos, focused on demands to the government campaigned for the recognition of the cultural rights and their difference as an ethnicity. The movement was commanded by the middle class and the demands focused initially on the cultural aspect. Despite economic deprivation and economic neglect of the Bodo predominant districts the trigger of the conflict was based on the language policies of the 1960s. During the 1970s- 1990s the demands also focus on the economic and political dimensions as the movement gives rise to the PTCA and the ABSU. The access to informal distribution seems to be meagre and for those members who were able to capture funds it is likely the distribution remained at the top without reaching the lower ends of the vertical line. However, the informal aspect is thought to be less relevant in contributing to the conflict as compared with the formal one. Perhaps this differentiation is also dependent on the focus of the demands, for the Bodo case cultural and political rather than economic.

Furthermore, the informal mechanisms also fail to produce any benefits due to the ineffectiveness of the local *Panchayats.* Economic reassurance and in essence buying off the opposition encourage the constituencies not to fight as the inclusion is perceived informally rather than formally. Thus, the *Panchayats* highly underfunded and with resources that get invested not in the Bodo priorities do not have the capacity to maintain content the population. Furthermore, the functioning of the *Panchayats* and also other institutions within Assam are seen by the Bodos as highly corrupt and untrustworthy; this means that, for the Bodos the perception of non-redistributive patronage is salient which can also influence the sentiments of exclusion and otherness towards the Assamese further fuelling the economic discontent.

Chapter 8.
Namibia:
Recognition of Traditional Authority

Results obtained from the fsQCA analysis position Namibia as a most likely case of peace according to the mechanisms evaluated. The score for the informal mechanism shows a strong presence of patronage distribution at 0.76. Being a most likely case, Namibia has the potential of updating the confidence in the effectiveness of the mechanism in facilitating a trajectory of peace.

General Background

Southern Africa represents a region of the African continent which has been substantially disputed by European colonial powers. Its geostrategic point has been appreciated by European colonial administrations since the 1400's and the co-optation of different Spice routes. Namibia, located just above South Africa and in what was previously called South West Africa, was a German colony between 1884 and 1919. In 1919 with the German loss of the First World War, South West Africa was put under control of the British by a League of Nations mandate. Upon 1919, The British annexed South West Africa to South Africa who came to rule the territory until its independence in 1990. Consequently, what came to be known as the Namibia nation-state is a product of European interference, as well as South African post-independence rule.

These historical features stage Namibia as a complex yet very interesting case to evaluate the presence and strength of informal mechanisms of distribution which are set to influence the peacefulness of independent Namibia. It portraits an ethnically diverse region which is fragmented along 8 main different ethnic groups. Within each group there are also further divisions along different clans. Despite known ethnic issues, Namibia in comparison to other countries has managed to avoid violent conflict as a course of action for resolving ethnic disputes. It resembles a case of ethnic

political inclusion and a success story in the recognition of traditional chiefs and embedded patronage networks.

Namibia is home to 8 broad ethnic groups which have historically controlled areas of the country. These groups are further divided or conformed by different communities. Each community has its own chief and its own set of rules. For the Ovambo for example, which controls the northern part of the country there is a collection of at least 6 major communities: Ondonga, Ukuanyama, Ukuambi, Ongandjera, Ukualuthi and Ombalantu (Cooper, 2001) along with some other minor tribes.

Figure 1. Political map of Namibia

Source: Ezilon Maps. Retrieved from:
https://www.ezilon.com/maps/africa/namibia-maps.html

Since the early XX century the territory of what is now Namibia was divided by two thirds south by a red line which separated the white settlements from the aboriginal, 'backward' original settlers. The zone to the south; the police zone was almost cleared from ethnic settlers (apart from Hereros and Nama and other minor groups) and communities in the north were forbidden from crossing the red line. Ethnic members could only cross if they were required as labour. Part of the reason why the police zone was created was due to the inability of the Germans to capture the powerful Ovambo and Kavango dominated territories (Werner, 1993). They therefore, created the zone in order to protect areas of influence of the railway and railroads (p.5).

The colonial powers granted autonomy to the ethnic groups. As far as the police zone was protected they did not care about intervening in local ethnic affairs. This is further sustained by the Odendaal Commission which in the 1960s established homelands for the different ethnic groups. The commission's objective was to fully establish apartheid policies in the Namibian territory, by that time South West Africa (Werner, 1993). As cited by Werner (1993) the commission had no interest on economic development thus, 'development would best prevail if homeland residents 'were not unsettled unnecessarily by disrupting their existing strong traditional family and homeland ties' (Werner, 1993, p. 12).

Figure 2. Odendaal Commission map

Land allocations: The Odendaal Comisssion's 1964 proposals

Source: ACACIA project. Retrieved from:

http://www.unikoeln.de/sfb389/e/e1/download/atlas_namibia/e1_download_land_history_e.htm

Elite bargains across different ethnicities in Namibia

The Ovambo group represents the majoritarian group in Namibia, it is also one of the most powerful groups. As mentioned above, the colonial powers mainly respected the traditions and recognised the power of certain ethnicities. They remained subject to colonial power but nonetheless autonomous. Different groups held different relationships to the colony, furthermore, they also in some instances had animosity relations amongst each other in regards, mainly, to land disputes.

The legacy of the colonial period and the introduction of the modern nation-state led to a process of recognition of traditional authority. The present chapter aims at explaining how and why the recognition of Traditional Leadership led to peaceful problem solving across different ethnic groups. Furthermore, it demonstrates how

chieftainship and patronage as informal institutions led to the dispute of ethnic issues within the formal state structures (this includes disputes between different groups and between groups and the government elites); and how the state is effectively seen as a neutral guarantor despite being an Ovambo majority government. The process to be analysed is the formalisation of informality starting throughout the South African colonial period and culminating in the instauration of the Traditional Authorities Act and the Traditional Authorities Council in the mid 1990s.

There has been recognised agreement amongst the academia in regards of the effect of political inclusion and power-sharing structures. Thus understudied; ethnic inclusion explanations of conflict avoidance point out to the idea that those countries in which the majority of the ethnically relevant countries share power there is a decreased possibility of conflict onset. Thus, despite the intuitive accuracy in this prediction, a substantial political argument has been left unexplained. Political inclusion is unlikely to be the only mechanism relevant for achieving peaceful trajectories. In fact, there are cases in which there has been agreed power-sharing amongst ethnically relevant groups yet conflict is still present, for example in Mali or Senegal (See QCA chapter).

In this regard, the peacefulness of the Namibian state is explained not only by political inclusion but also by the huge role patronage networks came to play in political decision-making and economic distribution. The case study analysis of Namibia is presented as follows:

Time periods:

1. **1919 to 1989:** studying the colonial background of South West Africa. This period analyses the alliances and animosities between the colonial settlers and some of the ethnic communities, as well as, the initial points of recognition of Traditional Leadership.
2. **1990 – 1994:** evaluates independent Namibia and the establishment of the rules of the game: in particular, the road towards the recognition of Traditional Leadership under the SWAPO government and some of its advantages.
3. **1995 – present:** the official formalisation by the proclamation of two key pieces of legislation: The Traditional Authorities Act and the Regional Council Act.

Two working hypotheses come to light:

1. The recognition of Traditional Authorities through a process of *formalisation* created a hybrid political system which enhanced legitimacy of the nation-state formal structures.
2. Ethnic disputes are brought forward to the Namibian state as a product of the recognition of Traditional Leadership in the form of indirect rule.

1. 1919 – 1989: Traditional Authorities and the Colonial Administration: Elite bargains of co-optation and dissuasion

Previous intervention of foreign colonial interests, Namibia as many countries in Africa and other parts of the world was ruled by ethnic groups in head of chiefs and headmen. Their authority is recognised as an autochthonous form of government. The chiefs and headmen have ultimate power in decision-making pertaining allocation of funds, development projects and even other personal aspects of life such as marriage and death. They are also recognised as patrons as they provide or are responsible for the safety of the community, receive and exchange gifts with members of the community or other communities, and foremost distribute goods along the community.

Different ethnic groups have different set of informal rules in accordance to their different traditions. Thus, rules are not written and are sanctioned by the chief. The strength of the different chiefs changes depending on their quality of governance and their charisma and personality. For the eight broad ethnic groups in Namibia the relationship with the colonial administration was outstandingly different (Werner, 1993). In fact, each chief saw the arrival of colonial commanders with their own particularistic interest. Each chief from each community played its game of power in no different way as the feuds played the game in Europe, they acted foremost to protect their interests (Cooper, 2001). The political game between the different groups and within the different clans in each group within Namibia resembled a highly sophisticated political game.

Alliances and antagonism between the Colonial Administration and the different ethnic communities.

The colonial authorities treated the communities and their chiefs outstandingly different depending on their political and economic interest in the area. As mentioned above, communities within the 'Police zone' were massacred and evicted from the area (Kossler, 2007) (Forrest, 1994) (Keulder, 2010), whereas communities in the Northern part of South West Africa were dealt with via negotiation or again, eviction and murder if they did not wish to cooperate.

The relationship of the colonial administration with the Ovambo group in the North part of Namibia was not different. Despite being the majoritarian group, the Ovambo did not receive any preferential treatment. The same rules of the game applied when the colonial authorities reached this area; the different tribes within the Ovambo group had different relationships with the colonial authorities and with other sources of power such as the Christian Missions[79].

Cooper's analysis on Ovambo politics in the XX Century (2001) clearly illustrates this pattern and demonstrates how each community decided to align or not with the colonial authorities to defend its political and economic interest. The Ukuanyama and the Odonga communities were the strongest players as they represented most the population in the Ovambo area.

King Mandume from the Ukunayama community was a strong chief, he had refused to collaborate with Portuguese and British forces in the past and kept on defending the autonomy of his people in Ovamboland. In 1911 he expelled all foreign traders from his territory (SWAPO, 1980) , in 1917 he fomented a revolt against the Portuguese (Melber, n.d.). Hence, since 1916 the colonial forces were conspiring to assassinate him as his power was regarded as a challenge to the colonial interests. He had continuously refused to send men to seek employment in the Police zone, arguing that he needed them to raid cattle and to defend the sovereignty of the region (Cooper, 2001), furthermore he refused to submit to the colonial demands. The truth of his death has been contested, some say he was assassinated by the colonial commanders in battle, other stories point out at him taking his own life (Cooper, 2001)

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[79] The Ovambo were majorly Christians.

(Hayes, 1993) (Hayes, 1997). Thus, King Mandume represents a venerated freedom fighter in Namibia and foremost illustrates how the Chiefs of the communities were highly respected and represented a key element of power. His death dates back to 1917 (Hayes, 1993).

As a game of political power between the different communities was in place given the differences in power between different clans, there were some communities who supported the colonial authorities in the conspiracy against King Mandume. The Odonga community[80] for example, in the head of Chief Martin of Odonga who was following his own political agenda, decided to support the military mission against Mandume (Cooper, 2001). Chief Martin of Odonga provided circa a 100 men to raid King Mandume. The Ukunayama were left with no leader to follow after the death of King Mandume. Because of this, the colonial administration appointed an European officer with the rank of 'Assistant Native Commissioner'. His task was to advice and guide the Ukunayama community into the political and bureaucratic system employed by the whites (Cooper, 2001). It was the beginning of an indirect form of rule to control the Ukunayama clan.

Many of the tribal rules were evaluated and those who contradicted the colonial law were abolished. However, the Native Commissioner mostly did not interfere in local affairs, the ruling system implied that the native communities were free to decide their own affairs. In other words, they were free to carry on with their political and decision-making systems as long as they did not interfere with the colonial interests (Dobler, 2014) .In this regard, the colonial administration partly respected and recognised the informal institutions which ruled the Ovambo community. It was in their interest to safeguard loyalty coming from the Chiefs and not to spoil this by heavily interfering in their local affairs.

For the Odonga clan, Chief Martin of Odonga had strong interests in forging a political alliance with the colonial authorities. Within Ovamboland, the Ukunayama were the strongest community amongst the Ovambo ethnicity; thus, Chief Martin wanted to

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[80] The Odonga and Ukunayama to data have a conflicting relationship. In 2015 the High Court of Namibia produced a judgement on a border dispute dating back to 2004. For details see: High Court of Namibia Case No. A44/2013. Online: http://www.saflii.org/na/cases/NAHCMD/2015/170.pdf

establish an Odonga superiority. Furthermore, as Cooper (2001) points out, Chief Martin had legitimacy issues associated to how he became Chief therefore, he also needed to associate with the colonial authorities to strengthen his own position within the Odonga community (p.181). His collaboration to the colonial authorities extended from military support, sending men to work in the Police zone through to providing informal intelligence information about local affairs and politics within other Ovamboland communities.

Thus, with the decline of the Ukuyanama product of the assassination (or suicide) of King Mandume; King Iipumbu of Ukuambi became the most serious threat to the colonial administration in Ovamboland (Cooper, 2001). In 1932 he was also assassinated. The colonial authority had to make sure no serious opposition to their political interests was in place. Thus, this did not undermine the principle of non-intervention in local affairs. If the chiefs were eliminated because they were perceived as a threat, a council of headmen was created and the rules that governed the society remained the same. The communities retained their autonomy in decision-making. Likewise, the Chiefs of cooperating communities were respected in their ability to make decisions following their traditions and seeking the best interests for the communities. In other words, clans who collaborated and those who did not were still administered according to their own decision-making structures. An illustrative example of this is the construction of dams by the colonial authority after the end of the 1920's famine.

During the end of the 1920s Namibia suffered a devastating drought which led to major famine all over the territory. Communities which were allies of the colonial administration had dams constructed as development projects to prevent future famine product of extended periods of drought. Thus, the whole decision-making process involving the construction of the dams was autonomous to the communities. Geographers were sent to the area to determine the most adequate locations for the dams. Despite the scientific advice of the geographers, the colonial commanders did not interfere with the decision of chiefs to locate the dams where geographically it was not adequate to do so (Cooper, 2001). This furthermore exemplifies the recognition of the traditional authorities and their set of rules and procedures. The funds were

invested and the dams were constructed according to the will and rule of the chiefs and councils of headmen.

Fast-forwarding into the formalisation of traditional leadership in Namibia in its final stages, this can be understood as a product of two laws: The Traditional Authorities Act (1995) and the establishment of the Traditional Authorities Council (1997). Thus, the roots of these two elements of formalisation can be traced back to the colonial period between the 1920's and 1940's. In particular, the traditional authorities Council is derived from the forms of government which were exercised when Chiefs were eliminated, as the case of the Ukunayama and the Ukuambi. According to Cooper (2001) the colonial administration felt more comfortable with those communities being ruled by councils lacking a chief. This solidified a form of indirect rule which later came to take form in the Traditional Councils Act. The advantage for the colonial authorities was twofold: efficiency and enforcement of their own rules.

In regards of efficiency, the Chiefs are regarded as the deity of the tribe. Because of this, they rule their own time and govern at their own pace. This caused potential problems for the colony when decisions needed to be taken fast and in a certain period of time. Though they could not force the chiefs to respond in their set timelines. Furthermore, in regards of enforcement of colonial law, they were able to easily press for changes in tribal law, even for the most critical issues. Thus, in independent Namibia the authority of Traditional Leaders under the 1995 Act, respects and recognises the customary law of each one of the individual communities.

Another significant issue in the recognition of Traditional Leadership during and after colonial times was the payment of salaries. The new Native Commissioner Eedes circa the 1940's requested a formal payment of salaries for Ovamboland chiefs (Cooper, 2001) (Keulder, 2010). His argument was based on long distance travel for meetings. Chiefs sometimes were encouraged to travel for meetings with European bureaucrats, however, the expenses of that journey were paid by themselves[81]. Thus, the official establishment of salaries for Chiefs was a very disputed matter. Some colonial officials

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[81] This is also a significant change in tribal law. Chiefs were traditionally forbidden from leaving their land. It was a gesture of abandonment. Thus, by the time the Councils were formed and the colonial authorities were planning on meetings in Windhoek mainly, this rule was completely abolished from most of the communities.

argued that paying salaries could lead to corruption and misappropriation of funds, and even jealousy amongst the headmen in the community. Others argued in favour, stating that the payment of salaries will provide legitimacy to the colonial order, a sort of co-optation mechanism. Hence, during Eedes period as Native Commissioner no salaries were paid to the chiefs. It was not until 1957 were salaries began to be paid and were regulated in 1995 with the Traditional Authorities Act in 1995. The payment of salaries fills in the loop of formalisation as the Chiefs are regarded as civil servants.

SWAPO and the rise of traditional authorities – One Namibia, one nation

The political landscape in South West Africa was starting to heat up. Increasing discontent with the Apartheid administration and the discrimination of Black communities was starting to take place. By the late 1950's diverse organisations of Black nationalists were being spread along the South West Africa territory. These groups merged in 1960 to create an umbrella organisation: the SWAPO, South West Africa People's Organisation (Forrest, 1994).

SWAPO operated in bordering Angola and Zambia as well. In Namibia its zone of action was based in the north, in Ovamboland. Although the independence of Namibia was not a freedom struggle as in the other countries, the significance of SWAPO as a liberation movement is undeniable. UN resolution 435 of 1978 stressed the importance of the UN to assist a process of decolonisation and further democratic self-government in Namibia (Berridge, 1989) (Forrest, 1994), throughout the process, SWAPO was the ruling political force. Since the early 1960's, SWAPO began establishing a bond with the Traditional Authorities, in fact, the recognition of SWAPO by both the general people and the Traditional Authorities was extensive (Cooper, 2001).

SWAPO appealed to the public by its slogan One Namibia, One Nation. The objective of the organisation was to 'unite all the people of Namibia, irrespective of race, religion, sex of ethnic origin, into a cohesive, representative, national political entity (…) to combat all reactionary tendencies of individualism, tribalism, racism, sexism and regionalism' (Cooper, 2001, p. 284). Furthermore, a competing political organisation was also being formed. In 1978 South Africa organised the Turnhalle Constitutional

conference, within the conference an alliance of various political forces united into one organisation: the DTA, Democratic Turnhalle Alliance. It was set as the opposition of the SWAPO and it aimed at safeguarding the interests of the colonial administration in the forthcoming political order. Some communities, like the Damaras, aligned with the DTA (Pauli, 2010) and others with SWAPO, like most of the Ovambo communities (Cranenburgh, 2006) as a result the country was highly polarised.

SWAPO as a liberation movement also had an armed militancy. Those Traditional Authorities who did not support SWAPO were targeted with violence. In the process both chiefs, headmen and their families were assassinated. Thus, when it became apparent that independence was going to take effect a big deal of Traditional Authorities from across the territory of South West Africa came to support SWAPO. Upon the moment of decolonisation SWAPO had significant baseline support from Traditional Leaders and the general population.

2. **1989-1994: Traditional Authorities under SWAPO, instances and advantages of formalisation**

SWAPO's main political platform was the unification of all differences under a same national identity. Thus, upon independence the party started studying procedures to recognise traditional authorities and as such assess the possibility of decentralised ruling incorporating traditional authorities. For this matter, the government appointed a Commission to study retrospectively the plausibility of bringing back Traditional Leadership and incorporating it into formal governance structures. As Cooper (2001) points out, the appointed commission produced a report which highlights various aspects of the importance of Traditional Authorities in Namibia. In its conclusion, it remarks the necessity and viability of incorporating Traditional Leaders into formal structures of government. This gave way to the integration of Chiefs into formal politics. Thus, the integration of traditional leadership could only work if some sort of hybrid system was created. The institution needed to remain legitimate but also comply with formal rules of leadership.

Many challenges arose from the idea of incorporating Traditional Leadership into decentralised forms of government. Firstly, SWAPO had campaigned for one Namibia, one nation, implying a unique national identity. Recognising ethnic chiefs could only mean the fragmentation of that united identity and ideology. Secondly, some traditional rules contradict formal politics. Thus, a recognition of Traditional Authority could only imply the official recognition of informal institutions criteria such as selection process, sanctions and source of rules. In this regard, a system which both recognises customary law and traditional procedures and also regulates these rules needed to be created. In essence a hybrid system.

A clear example of this pertains the selection of the Chiefs, exercised by succession or any other means which are based mainly on personal issues rather than by merit. Other examples include justice procedures and systems of punishment for felonies; as well as customary rules which contradict Human Rights practices. These traditional procedures needed to be recognised and enforced, but also sanctioned or regulated via formal political procedures. In this regard, a mandate was established pointing out to the constitution as being the predominant set of rules (Keulder, 2010). This utmost exemplifies the nature of the hybridity of the Namibian system.

Analysing the first challenge of fragmenting the society by the recognition of Chiefs and ethnicity is a preoccupation that made sense. However, the fact that the struggle for independence was united and embraced in the 'one Namibia nation' campaign reflects the reality of all different discriminated ethnic groups against one common enemy: the colonial power and the Apartheid discriminatory system. Despite the Namibian independence being agreed and enforced by the UN resolution, for SWAPO the political campaign of one national identity implied the unification of the country for a common cause. All different ethnicities as heterogenic as the country is agreed on one common cause which was the rejection of the Apartheid. Further on, the unifying ideal started to wear off as the enemy was defeated. Differences across ethnicities are impossible to hide or ignore and the banner of 'One Namibia, One Nation' could only be maintained if ethnic differences were recognised.

This was precisely SWAPO's line of thought, to recognise differences but under a common umbrella: a Namibian nation. The strategy played well along the

communities. Afrobarometer survey data provides empirical evidence on the popular perception of Namibia as a unified nation, and also on the relevance of personal recognition of ethnic identity.

Round one of the survey (1999) asks the public whether they agree or disagree with the following statements:

1. You would want your children to think of themselves as (ethnic group).
2. You would want your children to think of themselves as Namibian?
3. It is desirable to create one united Namibian nation out of all the different groups who live in this country.

The graph below shows the results of the Questions. It confirms the common will across the different communities of belonging both to their specific ethnicity and also of having a unified Namibian identity.

Figure 1. Opinions on Identity in Namibia

Source: Afrobarometer 1999 round.

As the survey data shows in Figure 1. Opinions on identity in Namibia, Namibian population regard themselves both as Namibian and as part of their own ethnicity. A

high percentage of respondents strongly agreed with the statement indicating that their children should also regard themselves as Namibian. This data is from 1999 almost 10 years after independence and 4 years after the *formalisation* of traditional authority. Despite the strong debates about the danger of recognising ethnicity fearing the possibility of leading towards a fragmented society; the data shows the desire of the population of having a dual system in which ethnicity is recognised as a defining feature and also the recognition of a common national identity.

SWAPO's ideal of recognising ethnic differences and also of fomenting a Namibian common identity not only provided legitimacy across the formal and informal structures of the state, but also provided the link between heterogeneity and homogeneity. In other words, the recognition of heterogeneity served as a channel for bringing disputes into a homogenic system in which the Namibian state was seen as a neutral authority to resolve disputes[82] instead of an enemy. Likewise, this also exemplifies the hybrid nature of the system in which both traditional sanctions and rules are recognised as well as formal legal-rational mechanisms for solving disputes.

Afrobarometer survey data also provides empirical evidence on the legitimacy of both Traditional Leaders and formal Leaders like Government councillors. Responses in regards of the Question: "During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons about some important problem or to give them your views?" illustrated in the following graph show that citizens who responded that they have contacted either their Traditional Leader or their Government councillor for solving an issue see the Leader which was contacted as legitimate, or as a plausible useful intermediary in the resolution of a potential conflict or dispute.

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[82] Between different groups and between groups and the nation-state. Thus, SWAPO is regarded as highly Ovambo dominated.

Figure 2. Influential point of contact for problem-solving

Point of Contact for solving problems (%)

|	2002	2003	2006	2008	2014
Local Gov Councillor	19.83	7.42	16.5	16.59	19.25
Traditional Leader	45.25	29.95	17.75	22.33	34.16

Source: Afrobarometer rounds 2,3,4,5,6.

For those respondents who answered that they have contacted an influential person: often, sometimes or only once[83], the data shows that Traditional Leaders are the preferred point of contact for solving disputes. However, the formal institutions, particularly since 2003 are increasingly regarded as plausible channels for conflict resolution. This foremost reflects the undisputable relevance of informal institutions in the form of Traditional Leadership, but also shows that the political system functions on the base of hybridity and recognition of diversity.

Furthermore, despite traditional leaders being the preferred point of contact for problem-solving; the legitimacy which stems from the hybridity of the system is shown by the respondents' recognition of the need for a government which is not entirely dependent on Traditional Leadership authority.

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[83] The majority of the respondents in either category responded that they have not contacted any authority.

Figure 3. Decisions by Traditional Authorities

All decisions should be made by traditional leaders or chiefs

Source: Afrobarometer data rounds 1,2.

As it can be inferred from Figure 3. Decisions by Traditional Authorities, most of the respondents in both rounds (1999, 2003) disapprove the idea of all decisions being made by their Chiefs or Traditional Authority representative. In this regard, graph 2 and graph 3 provide evidence on two main factors. Firstly, the legitimacy of both institutional frameworks and secondly, the desire for a dual hybrid system in which Traditional leadership is preserved but also regulated by state institutions.

The way in which a dual or hybrid system works would imply that disputes and conflicts are taken indirectly to the state by the Traditional Leaders. In other words, the mechanism of controlling violence is exercised by the *formalisation* process in which Chiefs and informal rules of the game are recognised by the state, and the absence of violence does not entirely respond to the formal inclusion or the presence of a pseudo-democratic political system. In this regard, the formal rules of the game are reflected in the type of the regime, a single party illiberal democracy. SWAPO and its political machinery is recognised as the main authority. Despite current accusations of SWAPO's autocratic practices, the party has had considerable political support. Ever since independence, in the 4 elections run during this period until present,

SWAPO has retained significant majority in voting polls (Bauer, 2001). The political regime is recognised as a democracy and if not one of the most solid ones in Africa, thus, in reality SWAPO has undertaken increasing autocratic practices to retain power.

The party is and remains an Ovambo majority. Thus, the leadership of the party has attempted to co-opt elites from the other ethnic groups by selecting members of different ethnicities for ministerial posts (Dusing, 2000). This ultimately represents formal political inclusion and distribution of political participation across the different ethnicities, with the aim of co-opting key political elites of ethnic minorities in order to prevent any meaningful divisive opposition.

The illiberal democratic characteristic of the Namibia political regime has been reinforced by the absolute winning of the party in all general elections as well as some amendments made to the constitution along the process. SWAPO has made considerable attempts to hold onto power (Cranenburgh, 2006). One example that illustrates this is the amendments made to the constitution in regards of the selection and appointment of Governors for the 13 demarcated regions. Namibia is divided along 13 regions, since 2010 with reforms introduced by the Regional Governors Appointment Act, the elected president has the power to appoint the 13 Governors (Melber, et al., 2016). The reforms are likely to be brought to strengthen the hold on political power; thus, despite this the party continues to be visualised as multi-ethnic and the population seems accepting of SWAPO increasing autocratic practices.

Furthermore, the selection of candidates for ministerial positions increasingly recruits candidates with a SWAPO activist background. According to (Melber, et al., 2016) between 2000 and 2010 a 100% of SWAPO candidates in cabinets were activists. Melber's et al. argument relies on the increasing gerontocracy of the party and the lack of upward mobility. They point out to the average age of cabinets and in general political posts being representative of older generations and retaining political power in just one political elite (p.301). This ultimately means that power is concentrated in a small political elite, the one that rose with the independence process.

Afrobarometer data also provides empirical evidence consistent with Melber et al. argument. Despite the integration of various ethnicities within government as an

attempt to co-opt elites, there is still a feeling amongst the population of being treated differently. In other words, the formal mechanism of inclusion is present but the de facto feelings of the general population seem otherwise. Retrieving data from rounds 1, 5, 6 of the Afrobarometer survey in regards of the question 'How often are _____s [R's Ethnic Group] treated unfairly by the government?' one can see that across the different ethnicities there is a pattern of feeling mistreated by the government. Data from 1999 was crosstab with language spoken at home whilst data from 2008 and 2014 is crosstab with the ethnic group the Respondent feels belonging to. Taking this into account, from 1999 to 2008 the feelings of mistreatment rise steadily for all the ethnic groups except for the Kavango. In 1999 The government brought forward a reform which allowed Sam Nujoma the then president, to run for a third period (Cranenburgh, 2006) (Cooper, 2014). The reform was highly controversial; thus SWAPO still was able to secure the majority of the votes. It is possible that the rising sentiments of mistreatment are related to the grip on power SWAPO was able to achieve through the reforms. Overall there seems to be some discontent in the way the government treats the different ethnic groups. Thus, what is remarkable is the lack of violence or discontent with the government despite this being the case.

Figure 4. Ethnic group treated unfairly by the Government

The data also reflects an interesting trend. Ovambos are the majoritarian group and are thought to be the core of the SWAPO party. The creation, establishment and baseline of SWAPO is Ovambo. Thus, surprisingly, this group also falls with the pattern of respondents feeling that sometimes their group is treated unfairly.

Respondents in all the Afrobarometer rounds also pointed out towards the rejection of a one-party rule, yet again no significant discontent or violence has emerged despite these trends. This evidence could be pointing out to the effect Traditional Authorities and their recognition can have. This further shows that political inclusion goes beyond formal institutions and that democracy as such cannot be either responsible per se for peaceful solving of disputes amongst the different ethnicities.

In this regard, notwithstanding the importance of the formal mechanisms of inclusion that SWAPO has implemented and the general sense of agreement with the government; the core elements which have been identified as potential sources of violent conflict are still present. Being Namibia highly heterogeneous and holding these triggers it is not just the effect of a 'good' inclusive government what has prevented the country from violence[84], but also the relevance of other hidden mechanisms which put an extra effect on the prevention of violence. Ultimately, arguments are pointing out towards the recognition of Traditional Leadership as accounting for the legitimacy of the government, without legitimacy and the Traditional Leaders operating as a middle point between the formal government and the local communities, it is likely that conflict could have erupted in Namibia, particularly for those ethnicities which were historically undermined and excluded politically and economically.

Talking about economic factors, the recognition of Traditional Authorities also had a significant impact in rural Namibia and in preventing inequalities from triggering violence. In terms of economic inequality, Namibia ranks amongst the most unequal

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[84] See below for Caprivi arguments.

countries in the world, according to the Gini coefficient, for the mid 1990's the Gini index has a score of 0.71 (Melber, 2007). The internal socio-economic cleavages are both between classes and also amongst ethnic groups, in other words both horizontal and vertical inequality. The stark inequalities can mostly be captured across rural and urban settings. Within Namibia, the formal state structures do not have a presence in rural areas, a characteristic that is shared with many other developing nations. In fact, rural communities remain unaffected by state policies and there is lack of state infrastructure within rural areas (hospitals, schools etc) (Kaulder, 1997) (Dusing, 2000). Thus, it is precisely the archaic forms of government such as Traditional Authorities that has come to fill in this gap. Duties such as division and mobilisation of labour, collection of taxes, decision-making in investment and even provision of health facilities have been provided by Traditional Authorities to this date. Furthermore, a staggering 60% of the population in Namibia lives on rural areas (Dusing, 2000, p. 212). Thus, this further confirms the relevance of the recognition and formalisation of traditional leadership. In this vein, the preservation and recognition of traditional leadership has therefore affected rural areas in several ways; but economically and most importantly, with the *formalisation* process the Namibian state has incorporated and extended it's state arm to the rural communities.

The state has effectively used Traditional Leadership as a link between the formal central state leadership and the rural communities. This can be reflected in the involvement of Chiefs in targeted state development or poverty alleviation policies. Hence, without the recognition of Traditional Authorities this task would prove impossible. One possible example pertains another drought event in 1992. Since independence and during the process leading to formalisation and integration of Traditional Authorities, the Ministry of Agriculture integrated traditional leaders into the Land and Farming committee. Farmers were then selected by the Chiefs to receive subsidies (Dusing, 2000, p. 216). Without the Chief's authorisation and decision-making power, the allocation of funds would likely be inefficient. The representation of an effective administrative and political authority in rural areas means that the funds are allocated efficiently and they incorporate the needs of the population. Furthermore, the success of projects aimed at rural areas is also dependent on key chief leadership elements such as the control of the community labour and land allocation, both things only regulated by the Chiefs.

Another potential example of extended state support dependent on traditional authorities are social services. As mentioned above, figures form 2015 report that 60% of the Namibian population resides in rural areas. The state of the health care sector is positive in comparison to other countries in the area, but its coverage is likely to be mainly urban. For example, WHO data reports 27 beds per 10000 population. It is likely that most of these beds are in urban areas. Thus, the number of nursing and midwifery personnel is good in comparison to other countries in the region. Nursing and midwifery personnel density per 1000 population reports 3.056 in 2004 and 2.775 in 2007. Thus, once again, despite the good reports in personnel density it is still unlikely there are many hospitals in rural areas[85]. Furthermore, data on number of physicians is not very compelling, in 2004 there were 598 physicians; and in 2007, 774. This roughly gives a density of 0.37 per 1000 population.

In this regard, traditional medicine is formally supervised by Chiefs and Headmen in communities and it has come to fill the gap of health facilities in rural areas. One of the functions of Traditional Authorities refers to the register and administration of traditional healers (Cooper, 2001). The practice of Traditional healing becomes particularly relevant for this matter after independence (during the colonial period it was illegal). The number of recognised traditional healers is much greater than physicians and they are foremost located in rural areas (WHO, 2001). The Lumpkin Report published by WHO in 1994 certifies that there is at least 1 traditional medicine practitioner per 500 people in the Kavango and Ovambo region, 300 in the Caprivi region and 1 per a 1000 people in Windhoek (WHO, 2001).

The process of formalisation implies that the Ministry of Health and Social Service regulates the practice of Traditional medicine, that is incorporating informal practices and customs into the state formal structures. The government aim is to include medicine practitioners into a form of community-based health care, regulated by the Traditional Leaders. Their job is to register and administer traditional healers in each community. This represents a way of incorporating traditional health services within

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[85] Unfortunately, there is no data on number hospitals in rural areas.

the state services but without the need to invest or have a physical state presence in rural areas.

There is a certain degree of economic Horizontal Inequality present in Namibia across ethnic groups. According to data on economic inequality[86] provided by Cederman et al. (2011) the Damaras hold considerable wealth in comparison to the other groups. Likewise, the Baster are considerably poor in relation to the other groups. Thus, The Hereros and Mafwe are closer to the average mean of per capita economic production. Despite this there is harmonic tendency in the accumulation of assets across the different groups. The distribution of labour across the communities as well as the distribution of funds is decided by the chiefs. By using data of the DHS in ownership of assets it is possible to provide a portrait of the accumulation of wealth across the different ethnic groups. The advantage of using ownership of assets for this task is that it is likely that funds redistributed informally are invested in household assets rather than other major investments. In this regard, it is possible to capture the very detail of the informal distribution, whether Chiefs allocate funds to labourers and the spare is invested in household assets.

Figure 5. Ownership of assets (TV, fridge, radio and car) across ethnicities.

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[86] This is measured by "dividing the total sum of the economic production in the settlement area by the group's population size enables us to derive group-specific measures of per capita economic production… …we derive an indicator of group wealth by summing up the (population-weighted) proportions of the Nordhaus cells covered by a group."

Ownership of assets (%) by language spoken

Source: DHS surveys 2006, 2013 Figures for ownership of cars, TV, radio and fridge.

The DHS does not provide data for ethnic group, thus, language spoken reinforces crosscutingness across ethnicities. English is the official language, but the ethnic languages represent the different ethnic groups. From the figure above, it can be inferred that the changeability in the accumulation of assets across time follows the same pattern for all the groups except for the Lozi. This means that following the pattern of the economy, for this case a contracting economy from 2006 to 2013; none group was treated preferentially. All the ethnicities felt a negative repercussion in the accumulation of assets during this period meaning that the distribution of economic assets informally impacted similarly across ethnicities. The Lozi are the exception, thus the increase in assets is of only one percentual point: from 36% to 37%. The graph further confirms economic inequality across groups, almost 80% of whites own cars, radio, TV and fridge while only 27% of the Kavango group owns those assets. Thus, as mentioned above this extreme inequality has not produced conflict in Namibia, further evidence that informal mechanisms of redistribution are operating across communities.

3. **1995-2012: Formalisation: Analysis of the Traditional Authorities Act and Council of Traditional Authorities Act.**

The culmination of the process of recognition of the effectiveness, legitimacy and adequacy of informal institutions for decentralised forms of government is evidenced in the promulgation of the Traditional Authorities Act in 1995, the Traditional Authorities Council Act (1997) and a collection of other minor legal rules. The need for decentralised forms of government was early spotted in the Namibian process of decolonisation. As has been mentioned earlier, Pre-colonial Namibia was ruled by kingdoms in which each ethnic group governed its own portion of territory. The preservation of these forms of government is evidenced in the recognition of Chieftanships as decentralised forms of government.

To begin, Chapter 12 of the Constitution of Namibia defines the structure of Regional and Local Government. It states that Namibia should be 'divided into regional and local units, which shall consist of such regions and Local Authorities as may be determined and defined by Act of Parliament.' (Chapter 12, article 1). It further stipulates that the boundaries of regions (article 2) shall be geographical only, with no reference to race, colour or ethnic origin. Article 2 attempts to eliminate ethnicity from the formal decentralised structure of the government. However, Traditional Leadership has its roots in ethnicity and the foundation of chiefs and local administration stems from ethnic differences.

The *formal* elimination of ethnic boundaries and the establishment of political boundaries served as a strategy for minimising ethnic identities as the main identity feature. However, as illustrated in Picture 1. Opinions on identity in Namibia; the common people do feel identified by their ethnic background as much as feeling Namibian. In this regard, the baseline of local government in political terms does not eliminate the ethnic component of the local administrations. Besides, it was ethnicity in the first place what gave rise to Traditional Leadership in precolonial times. In fact, there has been an increase in ethnic disputes since the promulgation of the local authorities acts. Thus, the post-enactment of the Traditional Authorities Act disputes are precisely related to borders and control of natural resources (Cooper, 2001). Cooper argues that the establishment of Traditional Leadership in modern politics in Namibia advocated by SWAPO has 'opened the Pandora box of ethnicity' and that it has increased the number of ethnic disputes. Hence, as opposed to Cooper's argument, what opened the Pandora box of ethnicity in terms of ethnic disputes was

not the promulgation of Traditional Authorities Act and their recognition as local forms of government, but the political delimitation of the regions which did not match the ethnic borders.

Figure 6. Political Regions vs. Ethnic boundaries.

Source: Right map ETH GROWuP platform. Left map: USAID.

On the right a map of the ethnic settlements post-independence, 1990. On the left, a map of the political regions established with the constitution. When the Act stipulated the demarcation of political boundaries, the borders stepped on ethnically claimed lands which historically had been governed by one group. Basically, a low scale delimitation which resembles the border demarcation between countries post-independence in Africa. The Namibian government was keen in enforcing the boundaries and as such fuelled many border disputes between the communities (Cooper, 2001). Thus, the disputes were minor and often referred to the construction of dams or roads or other development projects. In the bigger picture, the recognition of Traditional Leadership had much more other benefits than minor border disputes.

The constitution is regarded as the superior Law. Article 102.5 in Chapter 12 stipulates that the Council of Traditional Leaders is established to 'advise the President on the control and utilisation of communal land and on all such other matters as may be referred to it by the President for advice'. This article demonstrates the importance that is given to Traditional Leadership as it is the only body of the executive branch which is by rule of the constitution enforced to advise the President directly.

By promulgating legal frameworks of recognition, these informal institutions transfer to be formal thus they maintain the essence of the criteria that defines them as informal. The Traditional Authorities Act 1995 recognises firstly, customary law: as the collection of norms, rules and traditions of a traditional community. Secondly, the rules of designation: In relation to the institution of a Traditional Leader including the appointment, election or hereditary succession to office of a Traditional Leader or any other method of instituting a traditional leader recognised under customary law (p.3). These two interpretations and provisions clearly illustrate the informal aspect of the institution as well as the hybridity of the system.

Legal-rational authority as the foundation of the modern nation-state establishes the selection of bureaucrats or leaders by competitive mechanisms underpinned by merit. Thus, the interpretation of the legality of Traditional Authorities as recognised by the Namibian state still refers to the selection of Chiefs by informal customary processes. Article 3 of the Act stipulates that the 'selection, tenure and removal from and succession to the office of a Chief is regulated by the customary law of the traditional community in respect of he or she is designated' (p.4). Thus, the link between the formal and informal mechanisms of selection is triggered when the community needs to formally notify the Minister of Regional and Local Government of the designation, who then needs to authorise it. Thus, the invalidation of the designation of the Chief by the Minister is only valid if the Leader is selected not following the customary law or traditional procedure, a conjunction of formal and informal rules. In this regard, this illustrates how, on the one hand the institution is *formalised* but yet retains key aspects of informality; and secondly, how it is established as a hybrid system of rules. Pertaining this last point, the recognition of customary law for each one of the communities has often gone in contradiction with the formal rules and the constitution. Despite this, the recognition of customary law is one of the key aspects of the recognition of Traditional Leadership.

The Traditional Authorities Act also defines their functions, duties and powers as well as stipulating remuneration, an element of the link between Traditional Leadership and the nation-state that had been debated since colonial times. The promulgation of laws for salaries completes the cycle of formalisation, as the chiefs are now regarded as civil servants. The duties of Traditional Leaders specified in the Traditional Authorities

Act remain loyal to their functions before independence, the administration of land being the most important. Likewise, the enforcement of cultural practices as well as assisting and cooperating with the central government in the execution of policies and Law enforcement. Thus, the limitation of power clearly stipulates the Constitution as the norm or norms. Any custom, tradition of practice which contradicts the Constitution would cease to apply. This represents the recognition of informal mechanisms and customary law but yet presents a link to formal sanctions.

Furthermore, Traditional Leaders cannot participate in politics per se. In fact, the Act clearly stipulates that no person holding political office can be a Traditional Leader, and viceversa. If a Traditional Leader is appointed to political office he must resign from his duty as Traditional Leader. This rule, in addition to the Constitution being the norm of norms has created significant disagreements in the communities. Some of the Traditional Leaders have openly criticised their inability to hold political posts (Cooper, 2014). Their interest in politics has been stimulated with the establishment of this hybrid system, and their duty as a traditional leader is rooted in inheritance or succession, reason why they consider it is sacred. In this regard, they consider it is discriminatory not to be able to participate formally in politics when them can accurately and legitimately represent their constituencies.

Besides the Traditional Authorities Act which as stated above formalises, regulates and incorporates the duties of Traditional Leaders into the Namibian modern state, the Council of Traditional Leaders Act (1997) is also a key piece of legislation. Within this Act The Council is created, it's main function is to advise the President on '(a) the control and utilization of land; and (b) all such other matters as may be referred to it by the President for advice' (Article 2. p. 2). Each Traditional Authority can designate members to the Council for a period of 5 years with possibility of re-appointment. The restrictions in terms of formal politics operate here as well. Members cannot hold any post in political office and cannot be active members of any political party. Thus, the formation of this Council is the only direct point of advice to the President. In fact, it pertains the utmost representation of the relevance given and recognised to the Traditional Leaders by the modern nation-state. The Council, in hierarchical terms is above the Ministry of Regional and Local Housing and the Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rehabilitation; and is directly advised and connected to the

Traditional Authorities at the local level (Keulder, 2010). This represents the direct link between the local people and the upper level of the Executive branch.

Thus, it could be argued that the informal mechanism of integration and political inclusion has failed in the Caprivi region. The Caprivi strip is one of the most illustrative examples of the deliberate demarcation of borders performed by the colonial powers. The Caprivi border lines were solely drawn to serve exclusively the interest of the European colonial powers. It was product of a land trading deal between German Chancellor Graf von Caprivi and Great Britain as part of a settlement between the two countries in 1890. The main interest of the Caprivi strip as a part of South West Africa was access to the Zambezi river which flows mainly through bordering Zambia, at that time the British colony of Northern Rodhesia (Kangumu, 2011) (Fisch, 1999).

The annexation of the Caprivi Strip to the territory of the then South West Africa disregarded, as in many places in the African continent, the indigenous bonds amongst the resident population. For the Caprivi case, the communities that live there, were separated and arbitrarily divided, in fact, the population living in the Caprivi strip has historical bonds more associated with the population of Zambia and Botswana rather than that of Namibia (Kangumu, 2011) (Zeller, 2010) (Fisch, 1999). Thus, as well as being annexed to South West Africa completely arbitrarily, a consequence the Namibian government is still feeling today; the region was very inaccessible due to the rainforest landscape.

Even since colonial times the region was neglected due to inaccessibility and the toughness of the landscape[87]. For the Europeans it was difficult to administer the area because of malaria and other known diseases. Also, the land as such was regarded useless for it did not have any mineral resources as diamonds or copper (Kangumu, 2011). For the South African administration, the rough tropical rainforest landscape and the diseases led them to declare the Strip as a Bantu Reserve: 'where the natives, it was presumed would be happy to live under their own laws and customs and where 'detribalization' could be kept to a minimum' (p. 93).

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[87] AS Fisch points out, when the Germans got granted the region by the settlement played with Great Britain they underestimated the economic and human cost an effective administration of the region could bring. This is the reason of the neglect of the area.

Thus, likewise since colonial times the recognition of Traditional Leadership was in place. As Kangumu (2011) points out, in 1939 the then Magistrate and the Native Commissioner had written instructions for the Caprivi administration, amongst them 'to foster the operation of native institutions and to endeavour to improve them and make them an effective instrument of Government' (p. 96). As in the other regions of Namibia, the formalisation of Traditional Leadership took place, the same mechanisms of inclusion both formal and informal were implemented (Zeller, 2010). In fact, in 1987 when the ideas of secessionism started taking form, the chiefs did not support them because under an independent Caprivi, they will lose their positions; as Caprivi would be ruled by politicians rather than by chiefs (Kangumu, 2011).

Thus, there was some discontent associated to the isolation of the region and the colonial policies implemented. The Chiefs and their communities felt like the administration cared more about animals and nature conservation rather than themselves. This is a concern that the locals had continuously voiced to the colonial administration. Due to the nature protection laws imposed, communities could not hunt and their crops were frequently destroyed by elephants or hippos protected by the colony (Kangumu, 2011, p. 102). Furthermore, they could not eradicate pests and overall they felt the administration cared more about the landscape than the welfare of the Caprivian communities.

The discontent was evidenced with the Odentaal Commission in which the South African administration held discussions with the different regions of South West Africa to 'impose' the Apartheid measures in the form of Batustan. The Caprivi region was also part of these meetings. During the Caprivian meetings the chiefs of different communities got a chance to voice their discontent to which they were clear about willing to be governed by another government which 'would have the people's interest rather than the protection of wild animals at heart' (Kangumu, 2011, p. 197).

The source of neglect was not precisely the product of deliberate exclusion of the region, but rather a product of the absurdity of the annexation of Caprivi to South West Africa and the isolation of the region. For the people, the sentiments of neglect solidified in the creation of CANU: the Caprivian African National Union. In 1964, in

the head of Mishake Muyongo CANU was merged with SWAPO to fight the common enemy in the freedom struggle. There is debate as to whether CANU was absorbed or merged into SWAPO. On the side of CANU, it has been argued that independence or political autonomy was promised by SWAPO. On the SWAPO side it is argued that such a promise was never made and that when the first constitution was drafted Muyongo did not mention any issue regarding political autonomy or independence (Fisch, 1999) (Kangumu, 2011). Muyongo despite being appointed to positions of power within SWAPO did voiced his dissatisfaction with the Caprivi issue. This discontent grew progressively within CANU itself and in 1987 the movement joined the DTA for which Muyongo was elected Vice-President and president in 1991 after the resignation of Chief Kuaima Riruako (Fisch, 1999). The DTA as previously mentioned represents the South African interest and serves as the principal opposition to SWAPO.

In 1999 coordianted by Muyongo, attacks on government institutions and buildings took place. Katima Mulilo represents the biggest urban area in the Caprivi reason why it serves as an ideal target point for violent manifestations (Melber, 2009). The organisation and planning of the attacks took place in Katima Mulilo, where most of the population in the city are SWAPO supporters. Many armed men belonging to the newly created Caprivi Liberation Army took control of main roads, a situation which left Namibia shocked as it was its first experience with armed opposition. The Katima Mulilo attacks left 15 casualties on both sides. The government reacted violently and heavily repressed the movement (Zeller, 2010) (BBC news, 1999) (Menges, 2015). Most of the Chiefs opposed to the idea of a violent movement and even the idea of an independent Caprivi. In Fisch (1999) analysis of the movement, she questions how Muyongo (even despite his political background) was able to convince people into violence, knowing that realistically the chances of succeeding were dim and that support regionally and in Katima Mulilo was slim. Her take on the real causes of the rebellion in 1999 are linked to the real personality of Muyongo. It is argued that the rebellion was partly a personal take on revenge by Muyongo to the Namibian state (p. 40).

In this regard, the mechanisms of informal political inclusion and economic redistribution did not fail in the Caprivi Strip. Thus, the inaccessibility to the region and

its isolation did play a major role in the formal administration and ruling from Windhoek. A clear example of this is the presence of roads and ways of accessing Katima Mulilo. Ever since colonial times the transport to take supplies or mail had to be taken by separate journeys by ship and by train and ox wagon (Fisch, 1999). From Windhoek the capital, journeys across Botswana and South Africa had to be taken to reach the Strip, a direct route via inner Namibia was simply impossible. Also, until the 1950s the only way to reach the Caprivi Strip in a reasonable timespan was by air. Journeys by land took at the very least 3 months to complete and the landscape was rough making the journey not pleasant. It was only in 1999 when the Caprivi highway which connects Rundu with Katima Mulilo was officially opened. Perhaps the integration of the Caprivi Strip was curtailed by geographical impediments, it was the only region in Namibia which was completely isolated since colonial times and which was annexed to Namibia (South West Africa then) by trading of regions between colonial powers. Because of this, and also keeping in mind that the violence which erupted in Caprivi was minor, it is possible to say that the mechanism of informal political inclusion did not fail to operate.

Concluding Remarks: The success of a hybrid system, revealing the effect of informal mechanisms of inclusion and redistribution.

Due to its colonial background and unique transition to independence and democracy, Namibia depicts a very interesting analysis on how the recognition of traditional leadership allowed for non-violent problem solving. Many authors point out to the idea that the peacefulness of Namibia is a product of the UN assistance on decolonisation. However, it has been shown here that the model of state which recognises and enforces Traditional Leadership and that has been adopted by Namibia upon decolonisation, is firstly a product of the recognition of Traditional Authorities during colonial times and secondly, a product of SWAPO's reliance on a baseline of Traditional Leaders to gain political support. The UN mission in Namibia UNTAG did not stipulate or guided any issue pertaining Traditional Authorities. It only assisted in ensuring free and fair elections upon 1990.

Thus, another set of arguments has pointed out to the idea that it is precisely the solid democracy what has guaranteed non-violence in the Namibia context. Comparatively and across many assessments of the quality of the political system and the level of democracy in Namibia it has been pointed out that Namibia remains a stable country in Sub-Sahara Africa due to its quality and levels of democracy. Thus, it has been shown here that the political system in Namibia despite being categorised as democratic is hardly democratic in practice. SWAPO as the main political force has increasingly solidified its grip on power by using diverse autocratic practices. Despite some discontent with the single party system, SWAPO continues to dominate the political landscape and to date has not lost any election. In this regard, it is not per se the formal rules of the game what are keeping violence from erupting, as the possibility of the common people to change or protest their government via democracy; but the non-democratic mechanisms of informal inclusion that are visualised in the incorporation of Traditional Authorities.

The incorporation of Traditional Authorities in the formal state has given birth to a political system that is both formal and informal. The mechanisms of political participation and distribution abide by informal criteria based on the customary law of Traditional Leadership. The Namibian *formalising* rules depicted in the Traditional Authorities Act 1995 and the Traditional Council Act 1997 recognise and respect customary law, but also regulate Traditional Leadership pointing out to the norm of norms: The Constitution. The outstanding levels of legitimacy of Traditional Leaders somehow guarantee that problem-solving and disputes between ethnicities and between ethnicities and the state itself are brought to it indirectly via Traditional Leaders. This means that the state is able to reach locally and provide problem-solving instances as well as present itself as 'existent' in regions in which it does not have a *formal* state presence.

Finally, Namibia portrays and ideal case of recognition of informal institutions and their channels of redistribution and political participation. Thus, many other cases might also employ informal channels efficiently and prevent conflict by their recognition but do not reach the point of integrating or *formalising* them. However, it is undeniable that informal institutions do have a significant impact in either fostering or controlling violence locally.

Chapter 9.

Bolivia:

Rise of the ethnic elite

From the results drawn from the fsQCA analysis in chapter 6, Bolivia comes up as a least likely case of a peaceful trajectory. This is because it is an illiberal democracy with strong constant political exclusion and high degrees of horizontal inequality, yet it managed to avoid civil conflict. It also presents features of mutually reinforcing cleavages (Selway, 2012) which have also been highlighted as triggers of conflict. Bolivia therefore reflects a case in which the avoidance of conflict seems particularly hard. In this regard, the question to be asked is: how and why did Bolivia not fall into civil war given the fact that all conditions were present for it to present a case of contemporary conflict onset?

According to the mechanisms studied informal distribution through patronage networks comes to claim a protagonist role. The degree of informal distribution through patronage networks reflects a score of 0.56. The measure makes sense in relation to Namibia, the other peaceful trajectory case studied; however, it is likely to be more redistributive that what the initial measure accounts for as it will be explained along the text. Thus, as a least likely case if the mechanism is found to be operating effectively in the case of Bolivia it improves the confidence that it can be also operating in the broader population of cases.

General Background

Bolivia is often referred to as one of the most unequal countries in Latin America. Thus, despite poverty and inequality it has managed to avoid violent conflict, a common form of action in the region. It is a multi-ethnic landlocked country, hosting different indigenous communities autochthonous from the Andes and from the plains. As all other countries in Latin America, during colonial times the process of '*mestizaje*' took

place in which the blend of different ethnicities took place to form the 'mestizo'. The mestizo is the product of the mixture between black slave communities, local indigenous and foreign Europeans (mainly Spanish) the mestizo came to rise as the dominant elite within Bolivia and across all the other Latin American countries. Their status of elite is a product of decolonisation, in which the original indigenous communities as well as the black communities, continued to be regarded as inferior members of the social strata. After the wars of independence, the mestizos consolidated their political and social power, the black communities continued to be enslaved and the indigenous communities were regarded as agrarian labour force. This principle of division of power and wealth in the 1800's served as the starting point for the modern Latin American conflicts with a twofold character: a mutually reinforcing ethnic and class dispute (Albro, 2007).

Elite Bargains in Bolivia: historically ruling mestizo vs. Aymara, Quechua and Guaraní

Bolivia is a highly heterogenic country; thus, ethnic fragmentation in other Latin American countries is higher than in Bolivia. According to ACNUR in Colombia there are between 87 and 102 ethnic groups composing 3.63% of the population; in Bolivia on the other hand, according to CEPAL data there are around 37 ethnic groups which conform 66% of the total population. Bolivia is considerably smaller than Colombia but the relative size of ethnic indigenous population in contrast to mestizo population is staggering. Bolivia is perhaps the most ethnically diverse country in South America (CELADE, 2000, 2010). Out of the 37 ethnic groups there are three main groups which occupy not just the sovereign state of Bolivia but also spread to neighbouring Peru, Argentina and Chile[88]: The Aymara, Quechua and Guaraní.

Despite the mestizos being one of the minorities, they have dominated both political and economic power. Thus, since the early 1980's significant changes began to happen, which planted the seeds for the rise of ethnic indigenous communities to

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[88] This is both the product of colonisation and decolonisation processes. For example, during colonial times the Spanish conquistadores allowed for the Incas to continue to rule Bolivian territories. Before the arrival of the Spanish, the Inca had also colonised what came to be Bolivia, displacing native ethnic indigenous groups along the way. Furthermore, during decolonisation the formation of the Bolivian nation-state was territorially challenged by wars with neighbouring Paraguay and Chile.

power later in 2006. Multiple factors associated to the implementation of the Structural Adjustment Policies, the decline of the left and the increase in the 'ethnic cause' discourse, in addition to the formal institutional changes all paved the way for the rise of Evo Morales in 2006 an Aymara who epitomises the rise of the indigenous communities to power.

Despite historical political and economic exclusion exemplified in very high degrees of inequality and mestizo elite consensus to alternate power and exclude indigenous groups; struggles for power in Bolivia have mainly been peaceful. Bolivia therefore presents an ideal case to refute the idea that civil conflict as an outcome is mainly dependent on the distribution of power via formal channels.

The analysis of the Bolivia case will be presented in three different periods:

1. **1980 to 1994:** Explains the change in the political parties from a class base to an ethnic base across the 1980s decade and culminates with the promulgation of the Popular Participation Law which decentralised political power as a response to poverty and rising popular protest.
2. **1994 to 2006:** A second period which describes the effects of the LPP, the relevance of patrimonialism and the establishment of the ethnic base across parties.
3. **2006 to 2014:** A third period which highlight the shift in the elites and proves the relevance of patronage networks showing how the MAS, Evo's political party continue to usufruct from them.

In this regard, the following hypotheses comes to light:

1. Informal mechanisms of distribution efficiently operating under a highly exclusionary mestizo government explain the lack of violent conflict.
2. The rise of Evo Morales and the 'change in the elite' in 2006 did not alter the informal deals of distribution that had been operating since the end of the dictatorship at the beginning of the 1980's despite them being highly condemned.

1. **1980s – 1989: From class base to ethnic base political parties, beginning of the erosion of the mestizo *'democracia pactada'* (agreed democracy).**

The history of Bolivia during the XX century has been one of political instability. During the 1960's and 1970's there was a continuous alternation of military leaders brought to power by coups d'état. Beginning the decade of the 1980's and after the bloodiest coup which took effect on the 1st of November 1979, there was a call for elections. The winner was a coalition of communist parties: UDP (Popular Democratic Union) which leader was Hernan Siles Suazo. Thus, despite winning in the polls and following the 'tradition' of military coups in the way of exercising politics, he was deposed and General Garcia Meza rose to power. Two years later Garcia Meza was also deposed by another general: General Natusch Busch, who, after successfully taking power exited and gave power to General Celso Torrelio. The atmosphere of instability was reaching it maximum point, in 1982 General Vildoso deposed General Celso. Vildoso restored constitutional rights and called for general elections. Due to the impossibility of holding elections the congress then was in charge of selecting a president. Following the results of the 1980 election Siles Suazo was then recognised as the legitimate president (Sanginés Krause, 1987).

By this time the country was also suffering extreme economic instability. Inflation was at its peak and as many other countries in Latin America, Bolivia was also suffering from the external debt crisis. Siles Suazo policies could not significantly remediate the economic downfall (Sanginés Krause, 1987) also partly due to parliamentary blockage (Torrico Teran, 2006), he renounced the presidency in 1984, a year before his presidential period was due. In 1985 Victor Paz Estenssoro was elected as the new president. Paz Estenssoro in light of the economic crisis and by external pressure of the IMF; had no other chance than to apply Structural Adjustment Policies.

The implementation of SAPs significantly affected the political landscape, empowered economically more the mestizo elites and impoverished more the indigenous communities. In regards of the political landscape and in light of the previous instability, deposing of leaders and also the parliamentary blockage of policies; the elites opted for consensual deals of political power (Torrico Teran, 2006) (Alenda, 2004) (Mayorga, 2003). This strategy was undertaken to please all or at least almost

all of the political sectors with significant access to power and to guarantee legislative support in congress. This strategy was partly elaborated based on previous experiences of presidents who were unable to rule due to no support within congress. This therefore gave rise to a hybrid presidential and parliamentarian political system (Pachano, 2006). Three main political forces were favoured from the consensual deal: the MIR (Leftist Revolutionary Movement), the ADN (Nationalist Democratic Action) and the MNR (National Revolutionary Movement) (Alenda, 2004). According to Alenda (2004), with this coalition the three political parties had access to 63.2% of the electorate. This alliance was ultimately what made possible the implementation of Decree 21060, the decree that gave rise to the neoliberal reforms.

In fact, these coalitions in power (from 1985 up to 2003) generated political stability and a formal inclusion of diverse political players from the mestizo elites. For example, and illustrating on the first coalition, that of 1985: the ADN was a far right political party which sympathised with neoliberal policies; the MIR on the other hand, is a leftist party based on Marxism ideology. By this time, the base of the parties was on class. Parties appealed to social strata for gathering support.

In part, the inclusion of the MIR was due to the extensive political support it had which was proven by the 1980 elections when Siles Suazo legitimately won the presidential elections. The party had its base on the workforce and it had significant support also from the indigenous working class. Within Bolivia indigenous population and working class (peasant and industrial) is a mutually reinforcing cleavage (Selway, 2012). Thus, this type of coalition clearly illustrates the nature of the formal inclusive elite bargain which allowed for the redistribution of political participation, social services and economic assets across different sectors of the mestizo elites, but excluding the indigenous communities.

Although the indigenous electorate helped to bring the MIR into the coalition they remained politically, socially and economically excluded. The Structural Adjustment Policies were implemented in an attempt to restore macroeconomic stability. Thus, the route of action of the restructuring ethos was neoliberal, meaning that the inclusion of the MIR and its interests was purely strategic, via policies the indigenous population did not receive any benefit from the restructuring or from the MIR being in power. In

fact, the policies implemented could only be detrimental to the poorest population which is a mutually reinforcing characteristic with ethnicity[89]. Rates of poverty were increased within the already impoverished rural areas, in 2001 90% of the rural areas were living in poverty (USAID, 2005) (Esposito Guevara, 2008). This had two significant effects: firstly, the discrediting of the leftist parties (Guisselquist, 2005) and secondly, the triggering of a wave of migration to the main cities (Esposito Guevara, 2008). These two consequences of both the implementation of the neoliberal agenda and the production of the 'democracia pactada' (agreed democracy) since 1985, come to influence significantly the subsequent events which paved the way for the rise of ethnicity and the subsequent shift in the elites in power which takes place in 2006.

The discrediting of the leftist parties as a product of the elite deal between ADN, MIR and MNR, and the *si ne qua non* implementation of the neoliberal reforms substantially helped to bring up the ethnic call (Guisselquist, 2005). Thus, this discrediting came not only from the national events but also from the fall of the USSR; the consequence was in fact, that most of the electorate base conformed by the peasants, the workforce and the poor was left with no political party to sympathise with. In some instances, in the remote rural areas the indigenous population was alien to voting and engaging with the political system but, due to the triggering of migration into cities many indigenous population came to thicken the urban voting base which, for the parties only facilitated the capturing of votes.

As Guisselquist (2005) points out, the ethnic base of the political parties is not a phenomenon stemming from the social movements and the early 2000s protests; it is better understood as a process which was constructed along the 1980s and which shows its biggest effect with the protests and the rise of Evo Morales to power in 2006. In fact, the ethnic base of the political parties is also strongly related to the strength of the indigenous civil society. Parties dominated by the mestizo elites had to appeal to indigenous votes in order to prevent them from being significantly challenged.

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[89] This can be evidenced by the conversion of peasant trade unions into indigenous movements. After the 1952 revolution two main trade unions were created: the Central Obrera de Bolivia (COB) and the Centro Nacional de Trabajadores Campesinos (CNTC). By the end of the 1970s, the CNTC transforms itself into the Indigenous Movement Tupac Katari (OEA, 1978).

Informal mechanisms of distribution

The decade of the 1980's and the 1990's however, despite increased inequality, increased poverty rates, loss of prestige of the political parties and perpetual exclusion of the majority indigenous groups, shows no signs of political violence. Extensive research has pointed out to the idea that in scenarios of political exclusion and increased horizontal inequality; both conditions that are present in Bolivia, ethnic conflict is likely to happen (Stewart, 2002) (Cederman, 2011). Thus, the fundamental shortcoming in this hypothesis is the lack of attention to informal processes of distribution that are likely to be more important than formal ones. Informality drives political behaviour, keeps content the population if distribution is efficient and is in fact a legitimate channel that bonds people together.

Patronage networks are an embedded characteristic of Bolivian politics (Alenda, 2003) (Hicks, et al., n.d.) thus, with the electorate it can be described as a love and hate relationship. Since the 1952 revolution, political parties have constantly attempted to gain political support by redistributing goods and assets at pre-election rallies, basically what can be regarded as clientelist strategies. Indigenous peoples in the rural provinces are at the very low end of a vertical patronage network, they were 'occasional beneficiaries of state promises, and more rarely of state largesse' (Albro, 2007, p. 4). However, since the 1980s political parties began intensifying the provision of patronage as a way of pleasing the demands of voters for redistribution (Shakow, 2011). Patronage can be regarded as conformed of different degrees of distribution. At the top of the scale there is full blown patronage which is characterised by full investment such as the construction of public roads, schools or any form of non-mobile capital investment. At the lower end of the scale there is more of a monetary or mobile capital investment, which can be regarded in the form of clientelism, or the exchange of favours for a fee (see Theoretical Framework). As Albro (2007) describes, Bolivia's type of patronage distribution fits within the lower end, an exchange of favours for a fee. This also can be explained by the populist character of Bolivian politics, which is a characteristic which can also be seen across other countries in Latin America during the period (in Latin America this form of politics is commonly identified as *caudillismo)* (Mayorga, 2003). In Bolivia, the existence of patronage networks is a characteristic that is often seen as detrimental and is stigmatised as referent of the politics originated

with the Conquest: the *politica criolla* (creole politics) (Albro, 2007). Within modern Bolivia, it is regarded as a love and hate relationship where it is highly condemned but yet highly practiced. It refers to the submission of locals to a *patron* and the characteristic of being willing to please the patron by any possible means, it is so embedded in the colloquial relationships that there is even a word in Quechua for it: *Llunk'u* (Albro, 2007, p. 295) . As Albro suggests, *llunk'us* (clients) are regarded as dishonourable. However, despite the public perception or rejection of this type of practice, it is widely undertaken[90].

Patronage in Bolivia, despite its public condemnation has aided clients to be socially mobile (Albro, 2007). It has empowered beneficiaries to achieve better prospects of life. How it operates in Bolivia also implies than clients are able to move from patron to patron, seeking the greatest benefit offered. Thus, mestizo patrons allude for ethnicity but without discrimination across the different indigenous groups: Aymara, Quechua and Guaraní. Because of this reason, clients or beneficiaries are kept content, both clients and patrons see the relation from a utilitarian perspective. In this regard, patronage networks can instead be regarded as an informal network of distribution which operates efficiently and that works as a buffer zone to compensate for the economic, social and political exclusion of the formal structures. This redistribution of assets can be regarded as ephemeral but, that nonetheless, is practiced constantly. Because this mechanism is present and patronage is a well-functioning form of informal redistribution, indigenous communities were able to capture crumbs of the informal distribution undertaken by the elites. This allows elites in power to purchase political support and peace and for the benefit of the clients, the resources are able to reach the lower end of the vertical scale more efficiently.

In Bolivia ethnicity and class are mutually reinforcing cleavages (Selway, 2012) (Selway, 2011). According to this theory on crosscutting cleavages and civil conflict, leaders (in this case patrons) appealing to ethnicity and other salient cleavage such as class, are more likely to be successful at collective action as ethnicity is reinforced by the other salient cleavage; in the Bolivia case: class. Thus, given this set of

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[90] As we will see later in the text, the pinnacle of the condemnation is perhaps the public discrediting of the practice made by MAS, Evo's political party. However, and despite this the MAS also has its patronage and clientelistic networks.

conditions, because of inter-ethnic patronage conflict did not break out in Bolivia[91]. Mestizo elites campaigned ethnically for the rights and inclusion of indigenous groups (see for example CONDEPA below) in their own interest to keep in power, if they were able to convince and buy support from the indigenous electorate which they did, then they could retain political power. Thus, on the process inadvertently informal redistribution took place and therefore, this hidden mechanism accounted for the population not willing to rebel despite the reinforcing of cleavages and the great degrees of horizontal inequality. Thus, the change in the elites on 2006 comes from the realisation of the strength of the civil society and the willingness to take over both formal and informal structures. Because the network was inter-ethnic it also implied lower levels of trust between patron and client, which eventually led to an easier break off of the network in 2006. Bolivian inter-ethnic patronage provided a parallel movement between the efficiency of buying peace but also increased the cohesion of the civil society.

As patronage practices are highly embedded in the natural course of 'doing' politics in the country; during the 1980s, it is not a surprise that political parties used these strategies to capture political support. The underlying nature of ethnicity has been also present since the 1980s. As Guisselquist (2005) points out in her analysis of the ethnic identity of political parties; between 1980 and 1993 the appeal to voters in terms of class was losing validity given the erosion of the leftist ideas (p.5), in contrast, ethnicity was gaining power. In this regard, is possible to infer that the distribution of assets via patronage networks, aiming at purchasing votes and political support was being migrated from a class angle to an ethnic base in the public discourse. The migration to the cities triggered by the implementation of neoliberal policies is also a strong variable in this regard, it boosted the ethnic call as it reflected the most common base for populism across the cities where the majority of the votes could be more easily captured. This thus, substantially changes with the Ley de Participacion Popular (popular participation law) which decentralised power and assets to towns and municipalities (see below) (Ley de participacion popular, 1994).

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[91] Patronage claims here more importance than formality because the public promises on formality were just that, promises (no real formal inclusion was achieved, but informal inclusion was achieved via patronage). A variant of the populism seen in Latin America, this time based on ethnicity.

Because the strategy to capture political support with ethnic claims has its base on class struggles, the purchasing of support via patronage by the mestizo elites did not discriminate between the Quechuas, Aymaras or Guaranies. There was no preference in the distribution of assets to a particular group but rather a homogeneous distribution (see Asset distribution by ethnic group figure below). For the mestizo elites, votes were votes whether they come from Aymaras or Quechuas; mestizo elite strategies were purely instrumental to remain in power but no group was benefited over the others (Barragan, 2006). This can be described as an *inclusionary informal* elite bargain in which resources were distributed indiscriminately to different groups. The nature of the inclusive informal bargain had an effect in the decision of clients not to rebel.

In 1989 the visibility of the ethnic preponderance becomes visible. It serves as evidence of the solidification of the ethnic call and how, the base of the political party migrated from a class appeal to an ethnic claim. It is with the creation of CONDEPA the first self-proclaimed ethnic party with significant visibility and the election of Remedios Loza, the first ethnic candidate in congress that ethnicity claims *formal* visibility.

Figure 1. Accumulation of assets by indigenous group (%) Automobile, fridge, TV

asset accumulation by ethnicity (%)

Source: IPUMS international 2001 census data. LAPOP data: 2004, 2008, 2010 online on: https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/raw-data.php

*not indigenous population accounts for mestizo and white population.

**Radio data could not be included due to missing values across datasets.

From Figure 1. Accumulation of assets by indigenous group (%) Automobile, fridge, TV, it can be inferred that the difference between ownership of assets is diverse amongst groups but follows the same pattern. Ownership of assets is able to reflect absorption of patronage because income received via patronage (the type of mobile capital patronage) is likely to be spent on assets rather than household structure investment (as improving household structural conditions). The graph clearly depicts that all the groups, despite different degrees of ownership move along in the same pattern. This implies a harmonic distribution of informal assets. Furthermore, by 2008 the mestizo and white population assets shows no increase as the other groups. This can be explained by the co-optation of power by the indigenous Aymara and the forthcoming decrease in the distribution of informal assets to mestizo groups.

2. **1989-1994: First instances of formal inclusion and ethnic informal redistribution, CONDEPA as evidence.**

CONDEPA (Homeland's conscience) is a political party created in 1989 by Carlos Palenque (Alenda, 2004). Carlos Palenque was initially recognised by the population due to his work in Bolivian folklore, he was a performer who attempted to highlight the importance of Bolivian folklore cultural heritage. Since the 1970's he had a recognised track of public solidarity events, by 1985 he buys Radio Television Popular (RTP) a telecommunication company which later is set to be privatised (Alenda, 2003) (Alenda, 2004) (Mayorga, 2003). From RTP he creates several radio and TV programmes in which he assisted poor population with judicial and medical advice. (Teran, 2006) He also publicly condemned indigenous discrimination by mestizos as they regarded people with a basic understanding and pronunciation of Spanish as plebs, the same as discrimination toward women who wore the traditional Bolivian dresses: Polleras. Remedios Loza, an Aymara woman supports Palenque in his radio programmes by translating into Aymara is regarded as a symbol of ethnic salience; her presence also legitimises Palenque's labour.

Thus, in 1988 RTP is closed by the government due to an interview held with a coca recognised narco dealer. The closure propelled a series of protests with an ethnic base which led to the creation of CONDEPA. In 1989 the party was officially launched, in time for the parliamentary and presidential elections to be held that year. Palenque ran for the presidential elections, and for a newly created party, CONDEPA was able to capture a significant number of votes. Data compiled by the University of Salamanca sourced from the Corte Nacional Electoral, shows that CONDEPA got 173,459 votes accounting for a total of 12.25% for the presidential election votes (Garcia, 2005). For a party competing with traditional parties created circa 1952 as a consequence of the revolution, it signified a remarkable win. The parliamentary elections also show outstanding results: for the senate, the party was able to win 2 seats accounting for 7.41% of the votes. The only parties able to win seats at the senate were MIR, MNR and ADN. The chamber of representatives depicts a similar result for the 1989 elections: CONDEPA won 9 seats representing 6.92% of the votes. The great winners once again: MIR, ADN, MNR and IU.

CONDEPA's successful launch shows proof of the process that was taking effect since 1985: the migration of the parties calls from a class base to an ethnic base and the

increased visibility of the ethnicity issues. In some instances, CONDEPA has not been regarded as an ethnic party, mainly because Palenque is not an indigenous himself (Guisselquist, 2005). Thus, his proven record of ethnic campaign, elucidated personally in his passion for Bolivian folklore and also in his labour during the years of RTP as an activist against ethnic discrimination of women in Polleras, shows proof of his sympathy towards the ethnic cause. Furthermore and most importantly, CONDEPA was the first party with an ethnic Aymara representative in parliament: 'La comadre' Remedios Loza (Alenda, 2004) (Alenda, 2003) (Guisselquist, 2005) (Mayorga, 2003). CONDEPA reflects therefore the first moment in which ethnic Aymaras were able to burst into political posts. Thus, Remedios Loza as the pioneer of this inclusion was not the only one, upon 1993 bigger winnings were achieved. Victor Hugo Cardenas, an indigenous Aymara was vice-president under the presidency of Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada (Alenda, 2004). Thus, he did not belong to CONDEPA but to Movimiento Indigena Revolucionario Tupac Katari (MIRTK). Despite this movement being a political player before CONDEPA (since 1985) it really did not gain any visibility. It was unable to gather more than 1.5% of the votes before the 1993 elections (Alenda, 2004).

As mentioned earlier, patrimonialism is highly embedded in Bolivian politics, reason why CONDEPA also incurred in informal mechanisms of distribution. As Mayorga (2003) points out, CONDEPA's way of action could be regarded as some sort of asisstencialism which came to fill the gap left by the state and its retreat given the implementation of the neoliberal policies back in 1985. He also points out to CONDEPA pioneering the formal embodiment of social demands claimed from an ethnicity perspective. Furthermore, as Alenda (2003) referring to Mayorga (2002) points out: 'political patronage allowed for lessening the major inequalities, mainly thanks to complimentary mechanisms of material and symbolic redistribution which temporarily deactivated social tensions' (Alenda, 2004, p. 14). Furthermore, according to (Mayorga, 2003) the party successfully combined a mixture of formal and informal rules to guarantee the fidelity of the electorate. It is also remarkable to highlight the characteristic of charismatic patronage that CONDEPA practised.

Palenque was regarded as the 'big patron' or *compadre* (Alenda, 2003). People who were captured under the patronage network of CONDEPA expected to gain from

social mobility as well as being guaranteed some sort of economic and social security in exchange for providing their support. The pact is mutually bonding and responsibility comes from both sides of the bargain (Alenda, 2003). The traditional view of the *compadre* complies with this vision. Thus, it is likely that the clients fulfilled its promises as CONDEPA increased it electoral gains by the next election in 1993 and 1997, likewise, CONDEPA was also delivering its side of the deal.

In 1993 presidential elections CONDEPA won a total of 235.427 votes, 14.29% of the total voting. In 1997 the subsequent election it reached 373.528 17.16% of the votes. From 1993 to 1997 elections it gained almost 3% more electorate. Most importantly, in 1993 Palenque reached sufficient votes to go to a second presidential round, thus, Sanchez de Lozada from MNR won over him (Political Database of the Americas, 1999). Furthermore, winnings were not only taken in the Presidential elections. For the legislative elections in 1993, CONDEPA came up also in third place capturing 13.6% of the votes: accounting for 1 seat in the senate and 14 seats in the chamber of representatives. This substantial and steady increase in the votes received by CONDEPA meant its strategy was working.

Also in line with the effect migration to the cities had on the facilitation of capturing votes, during the 1990s CONDEPA captures La Paz, the biggest urban electorate (Teran, 2006). During the decade CONDEPA also came to monopolise municipal power in La Paz and El Alto, in 1999 Monica Medina a member of the party is elected as the major of La Paz the most important regional executive post in the country, this win also represents the first time a candidate from non-traditional parties gains this position (Mayorga, 2003).

It is undeniable that the inexistence of violent ways of action is also a product of both the increased formal visibility of the ethnic cause and the baby steps towards an inclusion in terms of political representation for the indigenous groups. Both events generate a sense of trust in the population and give a sense of inclusion and value to their claims. Thus, this element although important is insufficient to explain why the indigenous groups settled for minimum amounts of formal inclusiveness given the high degrees of horizontal inequality experienced by these groups.

These formal mechanisms of inclusion also fail to explain why, given a higher cohesiveness of the discontent across ethnic groups and the increased possibilities of collective action product of the migration to cities (and also backed by the strength of the civil society organisations) and supported by the reinforcing of cleavages, did not end up triggering violent protest or conflict just then. In this regard, informal mechanisms of inclusion are considered to have played a fundamental part.

These significant changes brought up the ethnic cause to the core of the political debate perhaps no evidently but intrinsically. It is the declaration of the Ley de Participacion Popular in 1994 what most clearly illustrates this.

Ley de participación popular 1994 (LPP)

In 1994 the Ley de Participación Popular is approved. The core aim of the law is to decentralise political and economic power to municipalities. The congress at time of approval was dominated by the MNR, the AP, UCS and CONDEPA (in order of number of seats) (Garcia, 2005). The law had been implemented partly to compensate for the economic effects of the implementation of neoliberal policies and the increased visibility of the discontent of the majority of the population (Sioto, 2010). The government did not have any other chance but to address the rising poverty and the increasing inequality gap. According to Alenda and based on PNUD figures, from 1999 to 2002 poverty incidence rate passed from 63% to 64%. (Alenda, 2004, p. 8)

Following this, the design and implementation of the law aimed at increasing political participation locally and to guaranteeing civil and political rights by providing autonomy to municipalities by decentralising resources (Esposito Guevara, 2008). In essence, it promised to: 1. improve the economic and social conditions of the population by decentralising resources co-opted via taxation, 2. To create improved mechanisms of response between the state and the civil society, 3. To create a social mechanism of participation that could integrate the population demands into the planning of policies and strategies of action (Esposito Guevara, 2008) (Alenda, 2004). Ultimately, it empowered municipalities to intervene in local development.

In practice, to deliver on these points, the Law regulated the transfer of 20% of the income generated by tax to more than 300 newly created municipalities. Most importantly, in terms of the recognition and inclusion of the population's demands and incorporation of the population in decision-making; the law *formally* recognised two institutions which abided by the traditions of the indigenous groups and the peasants: the *Organizaciones territoriales de base (OTB) and the Comites de Vigilancia (CV)* (Lucas, 2006) This mechanism of formal inclusion leads to the recognition of 19000 OTB (Anon., n.d.).

The OTBs are basically the 'actors' of popular participation. There are 3 forms of OTB: first, the indigenous communities, second, peasant organisations which were previously organised in the form of trade unions; and third, neighbour juntas: as a group of people who live in the same neighbourhood of a city and are organised to improve the delivery and quality of social services such as water, electricity, education etc (Supreme Decree 23858, 1994). Locally, not all the indigenous communities were happy with the implementation of this law. Most of the organisations opposing the law argued against it as being insufficient for providing true autonomy and empowering the indigenous communities (Strobele-Gregor, 1999). In fact, the law although recognises the OTBs and empowers them with the ability to remark the most urgent and needed sectors of investment to ameliorate poverty and inequality; it doesn't allow the OTBs to make decisions. The power of deciding is held by the political parties in charge (Strobele-Gregor, 1999). This *formalisation* of local power came to be implemented from a top-down perspective.

In this regard, in comparison to the status that indigenous organisations had before; it is true that the LPP and the recognition of OTBs improved the participation and inclusion of ethnic communities. It resembles a formal mechanism of inclusion, but nonetheless, communities still regarded it as an imposition from above of a set of alien institutions (Strobele-Gregor, 1999). As Strobele-Gregor (1999) describes, the implementation of the law still faced significant challenges associated with embedded characteristics of exclusion and margination. She highlights the fact that the meetings were undertaken in Spanish, where the majority of the population speaks other indigenous languages. Most importantly, she mentions how indigenous groups were faced 'with a form of administration based on the occidental model, where they had to

abide by a set of rules, norms and procedures that were imposed from outside' (p.8). In fact, the main claim of challenging indigenous organisations revolves around the need for the state to formally recognise traditional authorities and/or to provide OTBs with decision-making power (Strobele-Gregor, 1999). In 2013, Evo Morales reforms the LPP replacing it with the *Ley de participación y control social*. Within the law OTBs are replaced with more relaxed forms of organisation and these organisations are granted decision-making power. The process of recognition and formalisation of traditional authorities in Bolivia follows more of a bottom-up approach.

As mentioned above, the implementation of the LPP for some ethnicities did create a sense of inclusion and improved their status. Furthermore, despite the dissatisfaction voiced by some of the indigenous communities, the law did plant the seeds for the future empowerment of the social movement which brought Evo Morales to power (Esposito Guevara, 2008). Thus, initially the law was not implemented out of altruistic incentives emanating from the Sanchez de Lozada government, rather it was an attempt to strengthen the state but for the benefit of the political parties. (Shakow, 2011) argues that one of the aims of the law was also to quell patronage by shifting responsibility for development to municipalities (Shakow, 2011) Thus, the political parties were the great winners out of the LPP, and patronage instead of being reduced, actually solidified.

Political parties were granted a great degree of power in decision-making with the implementation of the LPP (Esposito Guevara, 2008). The side effect of this was precisely the decentralised control of the patronage networks. In other words, the decentralisation policies allowed the political parties to reproduce, keep and more efficiently control the redistribution of assets via informal channels.

Because the decentralisation policies increased decision-making power in the municipalities for the parties; it also meant that the patronage practices were also extended to the allocation of public jobs. Leaders in power increased their offering of public servant post in exchange for political fidelity and support (Alenda, 2004) (Esposito Guevara, 2008). As Esposito Guevara (2008) highlights, due to increasing rates of unemployment, the offering of public jobs became the most attractive offering to sustain the loyalties, in this regard the type of patronage used passed from being

purely clientelisic around election times, to be more constant and providing a higher level of patronage.

The decentralisation policies also altered the closeness of the patronal relations. Patrons were able to organise more rallies or parties held for the purpose of gathering support, this in turn, solidified the closeness of the relations and established a stronger bond between clients and patrons. The decentralisation policies ended up strengthening the patronage networks. As mentioned earlier, the relationship of the indigenous population to the existence of patronage networks is one of love and hate. It is highly condemned and repudiated yet people continue to allow the parties to buy their political support.

In this regard, the enlargement of the public servant indigenous population product of LPP, is not an effect of legal-rational modes of selection conquered by merit, but rather by personal relations. This characteristic somehow shifts with the change in the elite brought up in 2006 with the rise of Evo Morales, thus the practice and use of patronage networks continued to operate.

Figure 2. Employment in public administration by ethnicity (2001)

Source: IPUMS international, Census data 2001

The love and hate relationship with patronage can't be more evident than here. Despite public condemnation of patronage practices by the decentralisation reformers and also, by the Bolivian electorate, it is still emphasised by leaders that redistribution could be accomplished through patronage (Shakow, 2011, p. 5). For the indigenous organisations, it was clear that they were only receiving the crumps, what comes to change with the change in the elites in 2006 is the shift of the patronage leadership to indigenous themselves. (Shakow, 2011) demonstrates this with a set of examples drawn from Socaba (see below).

3. **1994-2006: Rise of Evo Morales, downgrading in the mestizo elites: taking formal and informal channels of distribution.**

Bolivia has a history of a strong civil society particularly associated to the indigenous movement and the peasant and workers trade unions. Political and economic power has historically been in the hands of the mestizo elite. Thus, given the strength of the organisations coming from the base, upon the 1980s the mestizo minority has had to concede. The indigenous organisations have been successful in pressuring the mestizo government by using massive protests as an instrument of demand most successfully since early 2000s. Successes have been materialised in firstly the promulgation of the LPP and secondly in the rise of Evo Morales to the presidency. Since the first concessions or wins on the side of the indigenous movement a sense of accomplishment has spread out increasing collective action and boosting confidence across the movement. This sense of confidence after initial concessions is what explains the movement seeking bigger wins, eventually ending up in a motivation and empowerment to dispute the state structures. When the mestizo elites were downgraded with the winning of the presidential election by ethnic Aymara Evo Morales, this also meant the taking over the pre-established patronage networks.

The practice of politics in Bolivia is highly embedded in patronage so despite the MAS deeply condemning patronage it ends up accepting and also using the logic of patrimonialism. The party therefore continues to redistribute informally, thus, this time solely between the indigenous electorate and not to the mestizo higher class. Thus,

the mestizo still remains as a junior partner within public administration, the shift in the elites only meant a downgrade for the mestizo.

This significant change in formal politics in 2006 can be argued to be explained by the inefficiency of the patronage deals to buy peace and keep the indigenous content only with the capture of the informally redistributed crumbs. Thus, the strength of the civil society gained by the partial concessions along the way had a significant effect (LPP), and also, despite mutually reinforcing cleavages of class and ethnicity and due principally to patronage the course of action did not become violent[92]. The character of inter-ethnic patrimonialism is also another cause in the shift in the elites[93]. This was its weak point. Despite patronage being successful in buying political support for a very long period of time (1980s – early 2000s), the gaining of concessions and the lack of trust between patron and client which was not ethnic binding became its weakest point. In other words, if patrimonialism was to be dispensed by Aymaras or Quechuas themselves then trust would be higher and breaking from the network would be more costly. In this regard, inter-ethnic patronage provided the ability to buy peace and gather political support for the mestizos but is lacked the biding force of ethnicity to guarantee the deals in the long run.

In this regard, patronage although successful in keeping peace since democratisation, despite political exclusion and great degrees of horizontal inequality it simply was not enough to stop the indigenous groups in seeking a place in the formal structures. While it works as a political instrument to redistribute, in the case of Bolivia (due to sole provision of mobile capital patronage) it does not have the ability to ameliorate structural problems such as social inequality[94]. The implementation of SAPs had a profound effect on the indigenous communities and by early 2000s discontent was mounting up. Thus, the rise of the indigenous movement was partly due to the discontent derived from the SAPs and increasing levels of inequality, but it also was due to the changes in the political system (Pachano, 2006) (Albro, 2007). The mestizo

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[92] This is precisely my main objective to provide explanations as to why it did not become violent rather than explaining why there was a downgrading in the elites .

[93] The case of Bolivia is very illustrative in this regard. Amongst the four cases selected from the QCA Bolivia is the only one which shows a clear picture of interethnic patronage.

[94] This is partially dependent on the type of patronage that is dispensed. In cases of non mobile capital investment such as schools and health facilities it is possible that social inequalities can be partially addressed.

only inclusionary deals of the *Democracia Pactada* generated the will to take over the state structures. The success of political parties such as CONDEPA generated a sense of achievement across the indigenous communities which later pushes them to contest legally for political power.

(Stefanoni, 2006)the *Guerra del Gas* as the only elements that launched the social movement into success (see for example: (Stefanoni, 2006) (Neso, 2013)). In turn, the argument here points out towards the rise of the indigenous cause since the 1980s (as opposed to the 2000s), the empowerment of the indigenous elites via the LPP and the character of an inter-ethnic patronage. The penetration of ethnic groups into formal politics was a gradual process. As seen in the previous sections, 1989 marks the first moment of infiltration when Remedios Loza was elected as the first Aymara women in Congress. Thus, by 2000 the Congress shows significant changes and also reflects the uselessness of the agreements between the mestizo elites to dominate legislative power. In 2002 in the chamber of representatives the MAS and MIP have 27 and 6 seats respectively, for the mestizo elites it is NFR with 25, UCS with 5, MNR with 36 and MIR with 26. For the senate MAS conquered 8 seats, MIR 5 seats, MNR 11 seats, NFR 2 and ADN only 1. Although still minority the shift is significant (from only 3 seats by CONDEPA 1997-2002, or 1 by CONDEPA from 1993-1997) (Garcia, 2005). This changes from 2002 polarised legislative power.

On the executive side the results are no different. In 2002 Sanchez de Lozada was reelected. He won with very slim support, the MAS on the other hand contesting him on their first elections, showed significant signs of captured electorate. Sanchez de Lozada enters a coalition between MNR, MIR, UCS, and NFR. The MAS and MIP decided to stay in the opposition and as such polarised the political system. Thus, by 2003 the coalition that sustained Sanchez de Lozada in power disintegrated and he resigned as president (Pachano, 2006). 2003 represents also an important year for the civil society organisations. There are a series of public protests which are highly repressed by the state (Alenda, 2004), this state repression is its last attempt to hold onto power as it realises the strength the social movement had acquired. Thus, the effect of the repression was straight forward. The empowered movement now highly repressed lost all trust on the government as their only will was to protest peacefully and get some concessions on their demands. The response on the government only

showed the non-willingness of the government to negotiate and ended up empowering even more the movement. As Sanchez de Lozada resigns, his vice president Carlos Mesa takes on power, political instability continues to take effect up until 2006 when elections are held again and Evo Morales wins the presidency.

Evo Morales is the first ever indigenous president of Bolivia. An ethnic Aymara who proudly defends and represents his ethnic background (Salman & Sologuren, 2011) he won the presidency for the first time since democratisation with an outstanding majority of 54% of the votes (Assies, 2006) (Hicks, et al., n.d.). The success of the MAS his political party, in comparison to the other indigenous parties was the ability to create a discourse which embraced ethnic salient urban and rural voters (Cardenas, et al., 2011). Thus, the borders between ethnicities are blurred and for the MAS the idea of a particular ethnic identity becomes harder to establish.

The taking over of power by the indigenous movement in the leadership of Evo also affected the pre-established patronage networks. The MAS was now able to undertake them and present an alternative to 'the status quo of traditional patronage' (Albro, 2007, p. 5). As mentioned earlier, I believe that the traditional patronage was inter-ethnic between the mestizo providers or patrons and the indigenous Aymara, Quechua and Guaraní as the principal clients. Thus, what changes with the MAS overtaking is the creation of a new indigenous-indigenous patronage coalition in which, this time the mestizo are not a part of. However, because the rise of Evo and the indigenous movement did not represent a complete shift of elites but more of a downgrade, mestizo-mestizo patronage still retained.

Anthropological studies of patronage and clientelism in Bolivia such as Albro's seminal work, have pointed out to the public condemnation of the practice during and after the mestizo governments. For example, for the MAS patronage was used in the campaign to promise to 'break with vertical politics' (Albro, 2007), and to promise the end of patronage (Shakow, 2011) . Thus, what these studies also highlight is the condemnation by word but the love affair in practice. Shakow's (2011) study in Socaba shows how ethnic supporters of the MAS are open in applauding Evo for not offering patronage, yet she also presents evidence of how MAS supporters also complain of the lack of patronage reaching to themselves. In effect, what this demonstrates is

firstly, the love and hate relationship with patronage: condemned yet used because it is highly efficient. And secondly, the creation and establishment of new indigenous-indigenous patronage deals. With the establishment of new networks and the overtaking of old ones the networks seem to not favour any particular group (Hicks, et al., n.d.). There is no evidence of economic benefit of one group over the others.

In addition to the creation of new informal patronage deals, the presidency of Evo Morales also has introduced major formal changes. The replacement of the LPP by the *Ley de participación y control social* and the changes in the constitution are the most significant. The constitutional changes were the most challenging task (Salman & Sologuren, 2011). During the political campaign the changing of the constitution was one of the party's electoral promises. When Evo won the presidency an *Asamblea Constituyente* was formed with the aim of starting to discuss the reforms. Thus, since the installation of the *Asamblea* the opposition parties (MNR, MIR, NFR, ADN) ruled by the mestizo blocked all the discussions, the process of discussion and implementation of changes was highly contested.

The 2009 constitution acknowledges the character of exclusion and undermining of the indigenous communities, and it aims at correcting these inequalities. The opening page of the constitution reads:

> "Históricamente, Bolivia se ha construido a partir de la exclusión de los pueblos indígenas. Es por eso que en el marco de las transformaciones profundas y democráticas nos hemos propuesto cambiar esta situación injusta. Todos quienes nacimos en Bolivia somos originarios de esta tierra; algunos somos originarios milenarios y otros son originarios contemporáneos. El problema es que los originarios milenarios somos muchos pero pobres y los originarios contemporáneos son pocos pero ricos. Me- diante esta Nueva Constitución Política queremos que todos los originarios bolivianos seamos iguales. Eso estamos buscando, sin racismo, ni discriminación." (Constitucion Politica del Estado Plurinacional, 2009)

Which translates: Historically, Bolivia has been constructed based on the exclusion of the indigenous population. This is the reason why, in light of profound democratic

transformations we have undertaken the task of changing this unjust situation. All persons born in Bolivia are natives to this territory; some of us are millennial natives, others are contemporary natives. The problem is that millennial natives are the majority and are poor and the contemporary natives are minority and rich. By the implementation of this constitution we wish for all native Bolivians to be equal. This is what we are seeking for, no racism, no discrimination.

This introduction to the constitution for the first time acknowledges the profound unequal divide between mestizos (contemporary natives) and indigenous groups (millennial natives). It formally addresses the problem and states its source. The aim of equality upgrades the character of being indigenous and remarks on the solution being profound changes from the root that empower the indigenous population. It puts the ethnic cause at the centre of the debate by introducing a whole chapter on the rights of indigenous and peasant groups. Chapter four formally recognises the different languages, the right to exercise autochthonous or traditional knowledge in terms of traditional medicine and rituals, the right to an educational system with no discrimination of language. It provides full autonomy. In regards of the legacy of the social movement and its confrontation with the state concerning development projects and privatisation of natural resources (water and gas), it established consultation processes before the state could decide on the exploitation of resources. These are the reasons why the mestizo elites disagreed with the 2009 constitution.

The replacement of the LPP with the *Ley de Particiación y control social represents* another major formal change undertaken by the presidency of Evo Morales. Within this law OTBs are replaced by a more relaxed form of organisation composed of three actors: Organic actors: which are neighbouring juntas and trade unions which are legally recognised by the state; community actors: which are indigenous and farmers organisations which are recognised by constitutional mandate by the state, and circumstantial actors which are actors which are organised for a particular goal and when the goal is achieved cease to exist (Article 5 Ley No. 341, 2013). The pinnacle of the reform in the law is the provision of decision-making power to these organisations.

The main criticism Evo Morales had of the LPP was that it failed to empower and give a voice to the indigenous communities as well as ultimately benefiting the same old politicians (Diario La Razon, 2013). Conversely, this new law stated as right of the organisation the participation in the process of decision-making (Article 8). This reform formalised traditional authority from a bottom-up perspective.

Despite the LPP being successful in allowing for a greater degree of participation amongst indigenous communities, the lack of decision-making power for the organisations ultimately was what truncated its success. FES-ILDIS (2004) presents a study based on interviews to the people involved in the implementation and design of the Law. Mario Galindo's opinion on the failure of the law relies on trust. He points out that when the LPP training workshops took place only a handful of people attended, the reason for this was that people did not believe their voices were actually going to be influential in decision-making. Ultimately, it was a waste of time for them to participate if the result was not going to change (Galindo, 2004). Furthermore, another interviewee Javier Medina states that the recognition of Bolivia as a multi-ethnic state was nothing more than 'preach to the flag' (Medina, 2004). The root problem of the law addressed by Evo Morales is thought to allow for a better incorporation and actual recognition of traditional authorities and traditional leadership, thus it is still too early to drive political conclusions on its performance.

Conclusions

The selection of Bolivia as a case study stems from the QCA results which highlight it as a least likely case of peace given its structural conditions of political exclusion and horizontal inequality. It makes a good case study for highlighting potential explanatory problems drawn from quantitative conclusions. Most research on conflict studies and the very slim research on peaceful trajectories fails to recognise the relevance of informal institutions as drivers or controlling mechanisms. As Bolivia depicts, the lack of violent conflict despite the perpetual exclusion of indigenous groups which conform the majority of the population and the increasing degrees of social, political and economic inequality can be explained by the hidden mechanism of patronage distribution.

Patronage represents an embedded characteristic of Bolivian politics, since the 1952 revolution it has been used as a strategy to capture votes. During the 1980s the dominant political parties representing the mestizo elite have used populist promises based on class to buy political support, their strategies have been successful as the electorate has supported the parties despite their condition of exclusion and undermining. Voting has been used as an instrumental activity which has benefited both mestizo elites by keeping them in power and has benefited the indigenous groups as it has provided them with informal assets, as pointed out earlier in some cases providing even social mobility. The persuading discourse of the mestizo elites appealed to class but due to various reasons including the discredit of the leftist political parties and the increased visibility of the ethnic cause, party discourse migrated to ethnicity as the vehicle for capturing votes. Patronage was dispensed based on ethnicity, but because of the lack of indigenous people in positions of power the patronage took the form of inter-ethnic patronage.

Bolivian civil society has been historically strong, the increase on ethnic salience evidenced in the creation and success of CONDEPA, and the forthcoming capture of the vice-presidency by an ethnic Aymara increased the cohesion of the movement and brought on forward the ideas of rejection of discrimination. The electoral results of CONDEPA had a profound effect in the motivation of the ethnic movement, motivation for capturing power started to spread across. Furthermore, the character of the inter-ethnic patronage meant that it was easier to break off the patronage network. Early 2000s shows proof of this course of actions. An empowered movement motivated on previous winnings and patronage promises which were broken on the side of the clients due precisely to the non-binding ethnic character of the deal. The empowering of the movement has its pinnacle with the repression measures implemented by the state to hold to power during the 2003 mass protests.

With the rise of Evo a take over the formal and informal channels of distribution takes place. Despite the MAS and Evo highly condemning patronage and stating that it only reproduced practices from the colonial era, patronage did not cease to be practiced in fact new indigenous-indigenous patronage networks were created. The old mestizo-indigenous networks were still operating as the change in the elites was not a complete

shift but more of a downgrading. This illustrates the love and hate relationship Bolivian politics has with patronage and how patronage comes to play a significant role in the lack of violence despite political exclusion and high degrees of horizontal inequality.

Chapter 10.
Conclusions and Discussion

Research on civil conflict has remained elusive in producing substantial conclusions. Most of the research has focused on producing correlations via quantitative methods. From the four main groups of explanations highlighted in the literature review, a series of conclusions have been achieved and can be recognised as the most robust assumptions from the whole research programme. However, we still fail to thoroughly understand these events and there appears to be a disconnection between the policy and the academic world. In this regard, it is imperative to contribute to the debate by providing alternative understandings of conflicts which aim at explaining why and how these events happen.

My particular interest sets on the effect of regime type in the triggering of conflicts. As highlighted in the literature review and across the different chapters, illiberal democracies are thought to significantly affect the possibility of conflict onset. Thus, I find that contemporary research has failed to acknowledge the relevance of informal institutions such as patronage networks within these societies. Ignoring the effect of patronage networks leaves behind much of what drives political behaviour and also disregards the reality of how politics is conducted in illiberal democratic regimes. Patronage networks therefore, represent a fundamental part of the political spectrum and their functioning can affect conflict or peace.

In this vein, within this dissertation I aimed to find out: why do some illiberal democracies fall into conflict while others do not? Furthermore, what is it about these regimes which avoided civil wars that can be identified as common across cases and might point towards plausible ways of preventing conflict from erupting?

I have attempted to solve this question by providing a multi-layered answer. I believe that an outcome such as a civil war is a product of both structural and agency causes which can be also understood as distant and proximate causes. Structures as the

rules of the game represent both formal and informal institutions and agency causes understand conflict as a product of a bargain failure. Elites constantly bargain for the redistribution of assets, privileges and rights and they do so within the state and its formal institutions and also through informal institutions as patronage networks. Bargains fail in the presence of non-credible commitments and information asymmetries, furthermore, structures as a cause, affect conflict when distribution is inefficient across groups. This reveals a set of structural overall hypotheses as answers to the research question:

Structural Hypothesis:

H1. When there is inefficiency in the redistribution of assets, privileges and rights to different ethnic groups via formal or informal institutions, conflict is more likely to happen.

H2. Exclusionary and inefficient redistribution through patronage networks can increase the possibility of conflict onset.

I aimed at testing these overall hypotheses by using a mixed-method approach. fsQCA was selected based on the understanding of civil conflicts as complex multi-layered events commanded by conjunctural causation. fsQCA allows for the analysis of different causes. It also remains on the qualitative side and gives room for a modest generalization. The purpose of conducting fsQCA analysis is to test the theory and to investigate whether the conditions are present in the selected cases and how strong they are in predicting the outcome. The hypotheses were therefore put to the test. Subsequently, the mechanism of interest: informal distribution in the form of patronage networks is further tested in two settings: where the outcome Y is a conflict and where the outcome Y is a peaceful trajectory. Following most dissimilar system design each setting is composed of a comparison of a most likely and a least likely case.

The hypotheses tested in the QCA analysis are confirmed. Furthermore, some insights into processes are also revealed. As has been shown in the previous chapters, inequality in the distribution of political participation, social services and economic assets can be captured within informal channels of distribution like patronage networks. The QCA analysis has shown that exclusion as a political dimension of

horizontal inequality works as an INUS[95] condition in the conjunctural causality that leads to conflict onset. Distribution is not only relevant through formal channels like the state, but also through informal transactions in the form of neopatrimonial relations. These findings add to the debate of the relevance, impact and usefulness of informal institutions in preventing or triggering conflict. Furthermore, agency conditions come to play a significant role. As a matter of fact, structures are the product of decision-making at the level of the elites and as such is what builds up structures for the future. Decision-making is a product of bargains between different elite groups with different interests and asymmetrical power. There is significant agreement that credible commitments and information asymmetries represent factors which explain a bargain failure, the QCA analysis further confirms that and also presents evidence for their relevance within informal contexts.

The fsQCA results in a comparison of 21 cases of illiberal democracy across 1980-2012 showed that these agency mechanisms have explanatory power in elucidating the degree of inclusion and redistribution in the structures and also the possibility of triggering conflict. Furthermore, it reveals that these mechanisms also play differently in formal or informal contexts. In terms of credibility of the commitments, while both sources of credible promises are relevant in affecting exclusion, formal distribution and in turn conflict; for an informal context only credibility coming from the elites seems to have an impact. As formal distribution is in itself visible and more transaction costs are associated with its use it is likely that both sources of credibility have to be optimal in order to produce the desired effect of redistribution. Thus, on the side of informality, and given the differentiated factor of the nature of the transaction, only credibility of the leaders has an impact. Accordingly, leaders sustain loyalty by providing personal and private benefits. If the coalition is exclusionary then aggrieved groups will remain excluded, isolated; for those included this is beneficial as the slices of the pie will remain the same. Excluded patrons therefore are likely to sustain a relationship of mistrust and their lack of affinity with those in power will further curtail their possibility of receiving patronage distribution.

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[95] Insufficient but necessary part of a configuration which is in itself unnecessary but sufficient for the outcome to happen.

In terms of information asymmetries, only asymmetries coming from the group in the form of their true will to fight and their capacity to do so was evaluated as data availability in the quality of communication channels was not found or could be constructed. However, despite this difficulty and incompleteness, asymmetries as coming from the group also revealed differential impact depending on the context of the transaction. Whilst for formal distribution no impact was identified, for the informal context asymmetries as coming from the group do affect informality or exclusion. In this regard, the presence of information asymmetries as coming from the patrons and perceived by the elites is thought to have a greater impact in bargains for informal redistribution because the resources that come to be redistributed informally pose a greater threat, in other words, informally redistributed assets could be used against those in power.

The fsQCA analysis in this regard, helped to identify the conditions which are relevant in facilitating conflict, also, negating the outcomes allowed for an analysis into the relevance of mechanisms for the cases of non-conflict. In this regard, and having identified relevant mechanisms, 4 cases were further studied. A least likely case and a most likely case of conflict and of conflict avoidance. The comparative case analysis further explains how the mechanisms operated in the selected cases.

For the cases of conflict, inefficient distribution through patronage networks is found in the most likely case (Thailand) and it plays a strong role in producing the outcome. Thus, for the least likely case (India Bodo) it is present, but its effect is not as strong. Likewise, for the cases of a peaceful trajectory, the mechanism is found in both cases: Namibia and Bolivia. These results significantly update the confidence in informal redistribution being a key factor in producing a peaceful trajectory in conflict prone countries.

Following this point, for the case of Thailand there was significant confidence that the mechanism of interest was operating; in essence, that patronage networks were non-redistributive and that in turn they were stimulating the use of violence. Results from Thailand therefore, update the confidence in the mechanism of interest. In particular, it allows one to infer with greater confidence that it played a role in facilitating or producing conflict onset. Thus, as for the case of India Bodo conflict as a least likely

case, the mechanism was present but played a much lower significant role in affecting the outcome. In this regard, results from India show that it is not possible to make a strong cross-case inference of patronage being a significant factor across the population of comparable cases. In sum, the mechanism is present but the strength as to what it implies is not enforcing for conflict cases.

The India case seems to be better explained by the formal mechanisms of distribution. In other words, the Bodo conflict is reflected more through the nature of inefficient redistribution within the formal state structures. However, constraints associated with resources and language can also affect the results. In other words, it could be the case that the lack of significance of informality is a product of lack of information (accessible sources) pertaining patronage networks for the Bodo Assam case or simply, a product of the inability to dig further into microdata or interviews.

In regards of the non-conflict cases, the mechanism of interest was present in both cases. Namibia the most likely case, updated the confidence of patronage distribution being a key factor in affecting a trajectory of peace. Moreover, Bolivia being a least likely case can assertively update the confidence in redistributive patronage networks being a key factor in cases of conflict avoidance. As the methodology suggest, if patronage operated effectively in facilitating trajectories of peace in a least likely case such as Bolivia then it is possible to cross-case infer that it will likely be a key factor in the rest of the comparable cases. These results lead me to conclude that patronage, for the selected cases provides a stronger impact as a mechanism for achieving peaceful resolution of disputes across different groups rather than as a mechanism that when non-redistributive is likely to promote conflict.

Within the remaining of this concluding chapter I will discuss the specific results for each case study along with some comparative salient conclusions and I will close by pointing towards future areas of research.

Informal institutions matter: drivers of conflict in Thailand

The trajectory of conflict in the southern provinces of Thailand revealed an interesting pattern. The evidence on violent attacks suggests that during the Prem government violence was controlled in comparison to the instability that came upon 1997 and culminated with Thaksin Shinawatra's rise to power. The highlight in the literature studying the Thai conflict points out towards the relevance formal institutions such as the SBPAC and the CMP-43 had on the decreasing use of violence. Thus, the informal aspects of the bargain are severely under-appreciated. As recognised by various scholars of Thai politics, patronage is a fundamental part of how politics is conducted, the hidden transactions are a common way in which the functions of the state also operate. The type of patronage dispensed in Thailand is likely to be on the side of public job provision and provision of private licenses as the evidence suggests. The effect of patronage networks as an informal distribution channel is undoubtedly relevant in explaining the controlled violence during Prem's government and the subsequent destabilisation during the Thaksin Shinawatra period. What the Thai case displays is also the difference of bargains within two PM periods, a minor elite shift across periods within the Southern provinces.

The Prem era also showed signs of willingness to integrate by opening the opportunities to the Malays to become members of the bureaucracy. The SBPAC and the increase in Malay bureaucratic posts empowered the local elites. However, because the violence coming from the Malay groups ceased to exist immediately it is unlikely that a formal mechanism of redistribution and integration can account for the pacifying effect. A formal mechanism, given the grievances associated with the Malay movement and the nature of the violent movement simply do not provide enough explanatory power to justify the sudden stop in violence within the south, furthermore formal mechanisms take longer to provide results as opposed to informal ones. This shows that there must be another mechanism operating which has not been acknowledged. Given the relevance of patronage networks within Thailand it is thought that it is precisely the informal deals that were forged through the SBPAC that can explain the sudden stop in violence as a strategy. Informal distribution is efficient, and its effect is thought to be immediate. These transactions are founded on trust and personal bonds. As opposed, formal distribution takes longer to produce results because it involves more transaction costs. Furthermore, the new patronage deals also allowed for distribution to reach the lower ends of the vertical line in a more

efficient way than a formal institution could achieve, allowing therefore for a peripheral integration.

The material aspect of the Malay grievances was given priority over the cultural aspect. The SBPAC failed to correctly address the cultural grievances despite attempting to, thus, on the material aspect the grievances were partially covered during Prem's era via the formal inclusion (rise of 10% in Malay bureaucrats) and the informal distribution achieved. Thus, in comparison to the India Bodo case, the neglect of the cultural aspect did not produce any significant impact in the movement, the SBPAC failed to enforce the recognition and differentiation of cultural aspects. For the Bodos in turn, the material aspect came secondary to the cultural one as the struggle for worth for them was more focused on cultural recognition rather than on material distribution.

Salient comparative characteristics to the case of India Bodo conflict:

India's background and point of departure significantly differs from Thailand. Firstly, it depicts a three-way elite bargain between Bodos and Assamese in the state of Assam, Bodos and Indian national elite, and Bodos and non Bodos locally. This main difference brings to light a remarkable point of argument across the four cases: the relevance of decentralisation policies for the informal distribution of assets and rights.

Allen (1995)(1999) studying patronage in Africa has pointed out towards the benefit of a centralised patronage network as opposed to a decentralised one. In his analysis of patronage networks, he argues that those in which the government is centralised are more efficient in controlling the distribution of assets, therefore also more effective. Allen only studies patronage, democracy and decentralisation in African politics. Thus, as highlighted in the theoretical framework informal institutions in the form of patronage networks are a salient characteristic of illiberal democracies. Extending the argument to illiberal democracies and following the evidence of the case studies, it is stressed that decentralised patronage networks seem to be more effective than centralised ones.

Decentralisation provides a four-way comparison across cases. Reflecting firstly on the negative cases, Thailand for example only was able to control violence when the patronage network was decentralised and patronage was being dispensed from the SBPAC and the CMP-43 particularly[96] in both the form of jobs, assets and intelligence information. A centralised patronage network only benefited the Thai elites as total control was in their hands with a nucleus in Bangkok, where no Malay Muslims are part of the bureaucracy or occupy any positions of power.

In the case of India, decentralisation has been implemented as a necessity since decolonisation. The great degree of ethnic heterogeneity and the vastness of the territory have protracted decentralisation as a need. Within the State of Assam as in the rest of the country local Panchayats have been implemented as a tool of decentralisation. Although the informal mechanism failed to play a significant role in the case of the Bodo conflict it is plausible to assure it was present. As highlighted in the chapter, for the Bodos the patronage network did not produce any benefit as the Bodos did not have any chance of reaching informal or formal distribution via decentralised decision-making. The positive effects of processes of *formalisation* as local Panchayats did not achieve any material or cultural benefits for the Bodo community. This is also reflected in the decision-making processes at the three-tier level in the Panchayats. The Bodos did not have the opportunity to interfere in decision-making at the upper tier, this explains why the decentralisation policies failed to benefit the Bodos and also why the recognition of Traditional Authority in the form of *formalisation* of local Panchayats also did not produce much advantage for the Bodos.

Extending the argument to both Namibia and Bolivia, the decentralisation policies actually empowered the local elites and in turn solidified the patronage networks. For the case of Namibia, SWAPO's incentive to decentralise via the incorporation of Traditional Authorities empowered the local elites and gave decision-making power to the different ethnic communities from the base. In terms of formalisation the recognition of traditional leadership and the decentralisation policies which recognised

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[96] SBPAC and CMP-43 were autonomous institutions. Full political decentralisation was only implemented in 1999.

this local authority power produced a hybrid (formal / informal) political system which contributed to the peaceful trajectory witnessed in the country. As for Bolivia, the Ley de Participación Popular LPP which also recognised traditional authority and also decentralised political power helped to empower the local communities. Thus, initially benefiting the political parties, it soon came to benefit the communities as the parties where migrating from a left/right political base to an ethnic base. With the rise of Evo Morales to power the formalisation of traditional authority plus the effectiveness of the patronage network empowered by the decentralisation policies reached a peak point, the formal inclusion of indigenous population regionally also permitted the creation of indigenous-indigenous patronage networks which in turn strengthen the informal deals.

In this regard, in terms of decentralisation the evidence seems to be compelling, a decentralised patronage network seems to have an impact in the possibility for reducing conflict onset if decision-making power can be accessed by the aggrieved group. Decentralised networks allow for a more efficient and effective redistribution which is able to reach the lower ends of the vertical scale. However, more research is needed to evaluate the plausibility of this statements for the broader context. For example, evaluation on whether the patronage network is operating in conflicting direction to formal institutions.

Focusing back on India and the case of Bodo conflict, another salient point of comparison concerns the degree of violence. India's case is significantly more violent than Thailand. The extent of the failure of the mechanisms in comparison is a plausible answer, thus, the difference in the conflict is also to be highlighted. For example, for the Bodos, there was a previous organisation of the civil society: like the BSS the ABSU and the PTCA. For the PTCA, the partial inclusion in this case (Charan Narzary) also shows how events like this can likely cause problems such as the splintering between hard-liners and soft-liners. In this regard, a mild inclusion not bargained collectively might create bigger problems. In contrast, the Malay Muslim movement in Thailand lacked any form of organisation or cohesion, it represented more of a sporadic unorganised violence pattern which resembles more a terrorist type than an organised political violence act; as such, for the case of Thailand it represented less of a challenge. Furthermore, the Bodos also suffered from moral hazard whereas the

Thais did not have point of comparison to other ethnicities in detriment. For the Bodos, as remarked in the chapter, part of the motivation to fight was the moral hazard felt upon the recognition of rights for the Nagas. In this regard, the extent of the failure of the mechanisms could explain the intensity of the violence but also considering these other features mentioned.

In terms of horizontal inequalities, the cultural aspect was more important than the economic for the Bodos as opposed to the Malay Muslims. Highlighting the differentiation between the impact or relevance of the different dimensions of horizontal inequality can also produce interesting comparative results. Some quantitative studies remark on the relevance of the different dimensions but yet fail to measure them correctly. Some other studies also highlight the relevance of one dimension over the others, however I believe more research is needed in this area, particularly more comparative research (see: Gisselquist & Narvaez Rodriguez, forthcoming).

More than formal institutions? Namibian and Bolivian effect of patronage networks on redistribution and processes of formalisation.

Namibia and Bolivia both present cases of successful effect of patronage networks yet in very different ways. Both cases are also substantially different in their nature. Digging deep in the processes through which bargains were successful and how the different groups were kept content leads us to analyse more than just formal institutions. For Namibia, the fact that SWAPO is majorly Ovambo and that there is discontent with the party and how groups are treated unequally, indicates that another mechanism can be keeping the society content. Moreover, the process of recognition of traditional leadership lead to the creation and acknowledgement of a hybrid system of formal and informal authority; the patronage undertaken informally remained informal as well as the institution of traditional leadership. The process of *formalisation*, which co-opted patrons and/or traditional leaders, increased the trust between the bargaining groups and the recognition of their legitimate power kept the different groups satisfied, avoiding the possibility for the use of force.

Therefore, another key finding in this regard is the impact of processes of *formalisation*. The evidence drawn from the case study analysis has suggested that instances in which traditional authority is recognised and subsequently formalised allows for better processes of material, cultural and political distribution between different ethnic communities. Both the peace trajectory cases: Bolivia and Namibia recognised the power, legitimacy and effectiveness of traditional leaders and in doing so, incorporated the customary ancient forms of organisation into the state. For the case of Namibia in particular this allowed for the state to extend its arm to the rural communities where before there was no state presence at all. The recognition presented difficulties as much of the customary law goes in contradiction to formal laws; thus, the hybridity of the system allowed the state to, indirectly, enforce its presence and authority. At the same time, this recognition increased the trust between the parties and for the traditional leaders it also implied an acknowledgement of their ancestral authority. In the case of Bolivia, the recognition of both peasant and indigenous organisations also incorporated traditional leadership into the formal structures of the state. For Bolivia, initially the LPP did not provide decision-making power to the leaders, it represented a first step towards recognition and formalisation but it remained operating solely as a pure formality (de jure). Thus, with the rise of Evo Morales and legal reform: the Ley de Participación y Control Social granted decision-making power to the organisations as well as allowing for a broader recognition of organisations. Both of these processes in Bolivia and Namibia helped to improve the relationships between the groups and enforced a link between ancestral and modern ways of administration.

As mentioned above, India also formalised through the recognition of Panchayats. Thus, for the Bodos this recognition was not effective as, as opposed to Namibia and Bolivia the Bodos did not acquire decision-making power and the base of recognition was not based on ethnic ancestral differences. In India, the ethnic aspect of the Panchayats is recognised via the ST/SC quotas as affirmative action programmes but not as a formal identification of the different rules of different ethnicities. In fact, the

recognition can only be achieved if the group is officially recognised as an ST/SC in the first place, for which the Bodos were not recognised until late in the period[97].

As the cases suggest, the impact of formalisation seems to provide meaningful answers to the research question. However, these processes are in need of further research. It would be imperative to find out some other cases of formalisation, how where they achieved and whether or not they have any significant impact in bringing peace to conflict prone countries. Also, some other aspects of formalisation processes could be studied in depth, for example, whether the formalising process had an ethnic aspect or not, whether it produced a hybrid system as in Namibia or it became to be fully formally institutionalised in other words, completely absorbed. What were the conflicts of interest in this process? And furthermore, whether the relationships between different societal groups were improved or whether it created more conflicts across groups. Florian Kern (2016) provides a comprehensive literature review pertaining this topic in what he calls dual governance, he further reviews research conclusions on consequences and advantages of dual governance on democracy, conflict and peace and development. I strongly agree with his conclusion on the lack of a general theory and the need of more analysis pertaining the effect of integration of traditional leadership into formal institutions. Perhaps the strongest area of research in regards of formalisation is land and property rights (Benjaminsen & Lund, 2002) (Sjaadstad & Cousins, 2009) (Bromley, 2009) (Toulmin, 2009) (Benjaminsen, et al., 2009)).

Another key finding drawn from the positive cases pertains to the idea of whether it makes any difference if the patrons are part of the bureaucracy or not. Following this point, the operation of patronage is more effective when the patrons are 'inside' the state structures; thus, the case of Bolivia shows that they can also be 'outside' and that the patronage line would also operate effectively. This further reveals two points: firstly, that inclusion per se is not a mandatory point of action to achieve credible commitments and in turn successful bargains; and secondly, that patronage can also be inter-ethnic.

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[97] It would be interesting to analyse how and if whether this process was effective for other Indian communities.

In regards of the first point, one of the main doubts when beginning the process of study of the different cases was in fact whether the patrons needed to be co-opted into state structures in order to be able to provide patronage. In other words, whether political inclusion was a pre-condition of patronage distribution, as the patrons were given access to assets and political power previous to their ability to redistribute informally. This was suspected initially given research conclusions on ethnicity that, patrons are likely to distribute primarily to their ethnic lineage assuming they have access to assets to redistribute[98]. Thus, for the QCA analysis both of the dubious statements were assumed (patrons 'outside' and inter-ethnic distribution) in an attempt to evaluate them. In this regard, what the evidence of Bolivia thoroughly illustrates is that political inclusion is not a pre-condition of distribution via patronage and that what political inclusion does affect is not informal distribution per se but the degree and the type of distribution that can be achieved. The cases analysed and included in the QCA fall within this classification. When patrons are 'inside' the state it means they have political power or decision-making access over legally transferred funds, in turn, allowing for more sophisticated forms of patronage to be distributed as public good provision or licenses. Thus, on the opposite side, when patrons are 'outside', decision-making power is less straight forward or subject to more *formal* barriers; therefore, patronage is likely to be more predominant on the type of job provision (non-political power jobs) and clientelist practices. These are all theorising statements or speculations as there is not enough evidence to produce claims. Thus, it is imperative to provide more research into how and why different types of patronage are dispensed and achieved and if they do actually have any significant impact.

In terms of inter-ethnicity, Bolivia brings to light the idea that patronage can also be inter-ethnic. Thus, interethnic patronage networks are easier to break as the binding agent is purely instrumental. Before the rise of Evo Morales, mestizo elites needed the support of Aymaras, Quechuas and Guaraníes to stay in power. The provision of patronage for this aim was purely instrumental. Thus, the inter-ethnic patronage networks of the clientelist type redistributed assets to the lower ends of the vertical

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[98] Focusing on the big men. It can also be the case of a three-tier relation in which there is another step in the relation connecting the big men with an intermediary. But this would be much more difficult to establish and capture.

scale, keeping content the population and preventing them from rebelling violently. The rise of Evo Morales to power allowed for the creation of indigenous-indigenous networks, likewise some of the old inter-ethnic networks, mestizo-indigenous remained active. It is likely that the patronage dispensed since the establishment of indigenous-indigenous patronage lines and in general since the rise of Evo Morales to power also allowed for other types of patronage to be distributed such as licenses and provision of public goods[99].

The effect of patronage networks in Bolivia is particularly illustrative. It provides compelling evidence in regards of the importance of this mechanism. Within illiberal democratic regimes it also highlights the importance of informality as valid and even more relevant channel of distribution. Bolivia represents a case in which there is no political inclusion of indigenous population, and where cleavages are mutually reinforced. Thus, despite these characteristics the country managed to avoid violent conflict. Bolivia should reflect a case of conflict onset as it provides favourable conditions for conflict, thus, exploring the informal side of the bargains provides answers as to why the country remained peaceful.

Research ahead

Highlighted here has been the need for more research into formalisation processes as recognition of traditional leadership. Decentralisation policies also are highlighted as an interesting path in the quest of understanding how patronage operates more effectively. Both of these areas of research would provide a clearer picture on how patronage operates. Additionally, questions remain as if the type of patronage provided can be affected with the position of the patron being 'inside' or 'outside' state structures.

Furthermore, in terms of informal institutions within illiberal democratic regimes, it has been theorised that a balance between institutions must be in place. Informality is thought to penetrate the state in different proportions, meaning that in some cases informality will be dominant in terms of (re)distribution transactions and in other cases

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[99] Thus, in any given case it is likely that patronage is a combination of different types.

it the balance would turn to formal institutions meaning that transaction are mainly taken through the state itself. There are also cases in which both institutional frameworks are in equllibrium, it would be interesting to find out whether this equillibrium is likely to trigger conflict if the institutional frameworks are in competition.

In general terms however, the starting point is to find out whether it is possible to find this balance in different regimes, why certain regimes lean more towards one institutional framework or the other and how does this balance affects the quality of the democracy if at all. This will help to further solidify knowledge on the real way politics is undertaken in illiberal democratic regimes.

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