Ann Lee

Tino Sehgal’s performance *Ann Lee* was first presented in 2011 at the Manchester Art Gallery as part of the Manchester International Festival’s *11 Rooms*. It has since been performed in several gallery and museum spaces, including the Marian Goodman Gallery in New York (2013), the Stedelijk Museum in Amsterdam (2015) and the Palais de Tokyo in Paris (2016). In my experience of the work at the Manchester Art Gallery in 2011, the title character, played by a twelve-year-old girl, entered the white, cube-like space in which I waited with a dozen more people:

‘Hello. Nice to see you. My name is Ann Lee’, she uttered, sucking out of the room like a vacuum any sound made by the spectators. The effect of her utterance and her demeanour were entirely strange. A blue-eyed girl of no more than twelve years old had commanded everybody’s attention with a simple greeting. It was not what she had said, but the manner in which she had said it. I was looking at a young girl, but I could barely recognise her as human. It did not feel as though she was acting, which is what made this feel stranger. The colouring of her voice, its lack of subtext, the neutrality of her body gestures, all made her seem like a foreign creature. She looked us in the eye with no reservations, without the shyness usually accompanying a girl her age. She was humble, but her humility was that of a mature, knowing person. I remember taking a step back, leaning with my back against the wall in need of more distance to observe and understand what I was encountering. Yet, there was no room – physically or temporally – afforded to me for this until after the performance ended. For the time being, I was arrested by her gaze.
Ann Lee explained that she had never met living people before and that she had many questions to ask. With the look and the voice of a scientist examining an object, she asked ‘What is the relation between a sign and melancholia?’ I did not know whether it was the question or the fact that she was asking it with such naturalness that perplexed me the most. So I did not answer. I continued to observe her as she calmly waited for an answer. One of the spectators spoke up, giving what I remember to be an articulate and informed response. I do not remember its actual content anymore. I do remember that I was more intrigued by Ann Lee’s unmovable reaction than by the sophisticated response to her question. I also remember that the person giving the response – ‘for sure an academic’ I had thought at the time – actually blushed. Like me, he must have also not expected her unshakeable reaction to his response and the fact that she welcomed it like an experienced conference presenter. She did not respond to it but moved on to pose the question again to the rest of the spectators. This time nobody responded. I guess the experience of responding seemed a bit traumatic to the rest of us.

Ann Lee continued, informing us that she had previously existed in several ‘dimensions’: in the first, as an idea in her creator’s mind; in the second, via her transformation into a two-dimensional Japanese animation character; and in the third, via her transformation into three-dimensional artworks (museum objects) with the help of artists Pierre Huyghe and Philippe Parreno.

Ann Lee was initially a Manga character in Masamune Shirow’s manga classic *Ghost in the Shell*. Artist Pierre Huyghe explains that the two-dimensional character was to be discontinued because it lacked adaptability to different storylines. Therefore, in 1999, he and Philippe Parreno purchased the copyright to it in order to save Ann Lee from certain ‘death’ (Huyghe 2007).

Huyghe and Parreno then created *No Ghost Just a Shell* (2002). For this project, they made Ann Lee available for free to a series of artists and commissioned them to speak through her by creating museum artworks (*Kunsthalle Zurich Press Release*)
In moving Ann Lee into the three-dimensional space of the museum, these works were to function as possible scenarios – as different ‘chapter[s] in the history of a sign’ – in which Ann Lee was liberated from her position as a mere product and became ‘aware’ of her identity (ibid.). For example, in Huyghe’s work One Million Kingdoms (2001), conceived as part of No Ghost Just a Shell, Ann Lee, who is now male, speaks about ‘his condition of being a character’, claiming that he is an image representing only himself (Huyghe 2007). It is interesting and important that on this occasion, when Ann Lee has the agency to articulate through language his thoughts about his own ontology, the character is gendered as male; but gender is not my primary focus here. Instead what I want to explore is the sense in which Huyghe’s and Parreno’s gesture, although it gave Ann Lee a kind of agency, nevertheless prevented the character from escaping commodification, as he/she remained a figure to be exploited for artistic and economic gain.

It has been claimed that, through this project, Huyghe and Parreno intervened in the art market’s economy. By not requiring copyright payment, it has been suggested that they undermined the commercial laws of production and distribution; and by allowing a series of artists to use the same image in different works and contexts, they challenged understandings of authorship, narration and presentation (Kunsthalle Zurich Press Release 2002). However, the more radical move with regards to copyright was made later. Upon the project’s completion, Huyghe and Parreno signed Ann Lee’s copyright over to the character: they ‘gave the copyright back to the sign itself’ (Huyghe 2007). Ann Lee was now ‘existent as a sign; it appears as an image, but it appears as an entity’ (Huyghe 2007). The sign, by being imbued with lifelike characteristics (for instance, it was provided with a past, present and future, agency and self-determination), was given personhood; Ann Lee was animated. However, as Huyghe put it, how the sign “live[d] on” remain[ed] to be seen’ (Huyghe 2001) -- and it is a result of this open-endedness that Ann Lee reappeared with a new identity in Sehgal’s work at the Manchester Art Gallery:

Having existed as an idea in a creator’s mind (first dimension), a two-dimensional animation character and a three-dimensional artwork, Ann Lee explained that, with the help of Tino Sehgal, she was now trying to exist in the fourth dimension: in time. Before exiting the room, she posed a second
question to us: ‘Would you rather be too busy or not busy enough?’ I remember laughing while leaving the space – probably at my own strange reaction to an even stranger work.

Ann Lee is the sign that Tino Sehgal used for his eponymously entitled work at the Manchester Art Gallery in 2011, enabling it to keep on living. Moving her to the fourth dimension further animated her: Ann Lee became a real person existing in time.

In the remainder of this article, I suggest that the two questions Sehgal’s Ann Lee posed (‘What is the relation between a sign and melancholia?’ and ‘Would you rather be too busy or not busy enough?’) form the crux of the work and reveal Ann Lee as the subject par excellence of contemporary neoliberal capitalism. I begin by drawing out the connections between animism, animation, and capitalism – all terms crucial to my analysis of the work. I then offer a close examination of Ann Lee’s two questions, proposing that they point to the melancholy of our times. I suggest that the first question reveals a subject that suffers emotionally because it no longer knows how to ‘do the social’ and does not ‘feel at home’, but instead feels constantly displaced, audited and measured; while the second expresses the contemporary subject’s suffering that arises from the imposition of precarity and unmanageable workloads and which, in turn, contributes to its melancholy. I argue that the questions and the work as a whole point to the manner in which the contemporary subject is animated by the pathologies of our time, which are consequences of capitalism’s acceleration, overproduction of signs, precarity, and appropriation of animism as a resource for the economization of social relations. Following a consideration of potential pharmaca – in the curative sense of the word – for this predicament, I unpick what needs to happen when audiences have stepped back to observe and understand what they have been witnessing and experiencing, much like I did as a spectator of Ann Lee. I then question the potential pharmacological role of animism – in Bernard Stiegler’s sense (2010) – and suggest that the work, by inviting us to see ourselves as being ‘like Ann Lee’, allows us to imagine what it might mean to live differently.
Animism – Animation – Capitalism

‘Animism’, a term coined by anthropologist Edward Tylor in the nineteenth century, refers to a belief in the subjecthood – and therefore animation – of objects (Franke 2010: 11–2). Animation, thought of as the act of attributing personhood to objects and regarding them as being equal to human subjects, was considered the opposite process to that of objectification, which was understood as an act of enclosing, isolating and ‘foreclo[ing] the possibility of dialogic relationships’ (31–2). Karl Marx extended the theory of animism to commodities. The commodity was animated via fetishism insofar as, for Marx, it ‘displac[ed] a social relation (of labor) into an inert object’ (47). Whereas animism is about ‘experiencing relations to things as if they were relations to people’, commodity fetishism, for Marx, ‘represent[s] relations between people as if they were relations between things’ (Hornborg 2013: 9).

In their work on commodity culture in the mid-twentieth century, Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer juxtaposed animism with industrialism. Adorno suggested that industrial capitalism led to social alienation and to the objectification of the mind, which he considered to be ‘the price of modernity, as well as being the pre-condition and symptom of modern power relations’ (Franke 2010: 29):

Not only is domination paid for with the estrangement of human beings from the dominated objects, but the relationships of human beings, including the relationship of humans to themselves, have themselves been bewitched by the objectification of the mind. Individuals shrink to the nodal points of conventional reactions and the modes of operations objectively expected of them. Animism had endowed things with souls; industrialism makes souls into things (Horkeimer and Adorno 2001: 21).

Building on the critique implicit in Adorno and Horkheimer, and situating his work in the Anthropocene, sociologist Bruno Latour has argued against a strict distinction between nature and society/culture. He proposed instead a ‘Parliament of Things’, a network of humans and non-humans, ascribing agency to objects and recognising them as social agents having a significant role in world making (Latour 1993 and 2004).
More recently, there has been a revival of the concept of animism by anthropology. Here, animism is understood as a ‘relational epistemology’ (Franke 2010: 49) which, as Alf Hornberg proposes, ‘shapes both the knower and the known’ (2006: 28). Eduardo Viveiros de Castro has suggested that animism ‘could be defined as an ontology that postulates a social character to relations between humans and non-humans’, considering ‘the space between nature and society…itself social’ (2010: 240).

In neoliberal capitalism, which marketizes all areas of life (Brown 2015), animism has become a ‘resource for the expansion of capitalist modes of production into the realm of…social relationality’ (Franke 2010: 50--1), a mode of appropriation that contributes to ‘the pathologies of our time’ (Berardi 2009). Which brings me back to Ann Lee and causes me to reflect on how the questions she poses are bound up with contemporary experiences of alienation, precarity and melancholia.

**Ann Lee’s Two Questions: On Signs, Melancholia and Busyness**

‘*What is the relation between a sign and melancholia?’* Is Anne Lee melancholic? What insights into their relation can a closer look at the two terms offer?

A sign is composed of a signifier and the signified. Jacques Derrida suggests that a written *syntagma* (that is, a complex chain of signs) can be mobile; it can enter different contexts in which possibilities for different meanings become possible (1988: 10). He argues that one can detach a sign from its chain and inscribe or graft it into other chains. This process is not restricted only to ‘written’ communication, but is ‘found in all language…and ultimately in the totality of “experience”’, because ‘units of iterability…are separable from their internal and external context and also from themselves’ (ibid.). In Sehgal’s work, Ann Lee is, like Derrida’s written syntagma, grafted onto a new chain; she enters a new context, a new chapter in her history as a sign, but carries with her the history – or trace – of having being in other contexts.
Melancholia refers to ‘a mental disorder characterized by depression, apathy, and withdrawal’ (*The American Heritage Medical Dictionary* 2007). In fact, many have written about its relation to iconology (see Hanssen 1999; Wittkower 1963). Art critic Laszlo F. Földenyi, for example, describes how he perceives an expression of melancholia in the works of the exhibition ‘Melancholy: Genius and Madness in Art’ at the New National Gallery Berlin in 2006:

> Not only is [melancholia] infectious; it deprives the sufferer of everything. [Its] pre-eminent characteristic…is its capacity to undermine even itself. It remains ceaselessly in motion. It is difficult to catch red-handed, and scarcely easier to repress….Eliminate it here, and it is bound to crop up over there soon enough….tough as any weed. Vigorous and viable…and even violent when it takes hold of those who want to evade it. And it is adept at dissembling….It promises connectedness to everything, but the result is merely frustration….It seems to make fertile, while rendering infertile….Can we objectify something whose existential element is movement and unfathomability? Everything testifies to the presence of melancholy, to its being highly amenable to representation, to being nailed down. Yet…each time I catch a glimpse of melancholy in this painting or that sculpture, it instantly plays dead…I no longer see the melancholy itself at all, but instead only the demand that I should perceive it there. But where? (Földenyi 2006).

Földenyi’s description makes certain common characteristics between a ‘sign’ and ‘melancholia’ visible. They are both mobile; they undermine themselves by engendering different contexts and therefore new meanings; and they both promise connectedness to their context but can easily break from it – much like Ann Lee, who moves in different contexts and yet only exists where and when she is staged.

Yet, we might say that there is a significant ontological difference between the two terms: a sign is the ‘thing’ that we read, whereas melancholia is the possible affect (and effect) of an inability to read a sign, of the failure to find meaning. In this respect, melancholia is, perhaps, a state of being. Is the sign – Ann Lee – melancholic because of its uncertain existence? Despite the fact that she was ‘liberated’, she still needs someone else to animate her. She lives when others
speak of, about or through her – as this essay is doing here. Perhaps Ann Lee longs to belong. Or perhaps she is anxious about the success of her attempt, with Sehgal’s help, to exist in the fourth dimension (in time), about how much time she has left, about an imminent end to her existence. Does she long to speak her own thoughts about this predicament?

Does she long to be remembered? Probably not. After all, she is not ‘real’. And yet, ‘the outline left after [her] body has disappeared’, after the performance has ended, reminds us of our ‘long[ing] to hold bodies that are gone’ (Phelan 1993: 3). Ann Lee however does not disappear; her animated sign/body persists, she continues to reappear in new contexts, interfering with our mourning (as spectators) of losing her (as a character). Melancholia then is perhaps the result of her resistance to disappearing, to being ‘de-animated’, and consequently, of the postponement of our grief.

‘Would you rather be too busy or not busy enough?’ As with the first question (about the relation between a sign and melancholia) that Ann Lee posed, there can be multiple readings. We can assume that Ann Lee is interpellating us as spectators, enquiring as to whether we prefer the artwork to keep us perpetually engaged or whether we prefer that it allows us time for inattention, for mind wandering, possibly for boredom. We can assume too that she is questioning what it means to be a worker in contemporary capitalism. Is Ann Lee indirectly referring to her precarious labour? In her case, her labour is immediately connected to remaining alive, to existing in time through Sehgal’s work, and thus maintaining her relation to an audience which consumes her (thereby constituting her as a commodity – Joseph 2002: 66) and circulates her through their conversations, memories and actions, enabling her to survive.

Ann Lee, then, appears as a melancholic subject (or sign) that moves from context to context; attempts to be social with those she encounters (the spectators); and worries about her work and future.
The Animation of Contemporary Subjectivity & The Melancholy of Our Times

The two questions posed by Ann Lee (‘What is the relation between a sign and melancholia?’ and ‘Would you rather be too busy or not busy enough?’) create a pause for the spectator: we have to reflect on them, as their meaning and intention are not immediately apparent. As illustrated in my recollection and analysis of the piece thus far, they provoke more questions than answers. We, the spectators, have a strange interaction with a strange person who poses strange questions. The work, in its taking place, creates relationships between itself and spectators that feel awfully familiar and yet completely unfamiliar. It gives the appearance of attempting to construct a social situation, but it does not really do this. It maintains its distance as an artwork, like a museum art object that is encased in glass. However, unlike other ‘encased-in-glass’ artworks, this one lifts its lid once in a while to poke the spectator with a question, but then closes it again to forego any kind of real dialogue. The strangeness of the work comes from the appearance of sociality it creates, which is exaggerated due to the encounter of the spectator with a child who converses with the maturity of an adult and communicates profound ideas in a manner that is eerily articulate. Sehgal’s work has a demobilising effect: it stops the spectator midstride (metaphorically but often also physically), demanding that she question its meaning and relation both to herself and also to its context of presentation.

Ann Lee’s two questions point to the melancholy of our times. The first, for instance, reveals a subject that suffers emotionally for it no longer knows how to ‘do the social’ and does not ‘feel at home’. This is because, like Ann Lee, she experiences the appearance of social situations, but does not actually live them or bring them into being in any meaningful sense, and is constantly displaced, audited and measured. As a supplement to the first, the second question expresses the subject’s suffering that arises from the imposition of precarity and unmanageable workloads. The work, through Ann Lee’s animation, points, precisely, to the manner in which the contemporary subject is animated.

Contemporary life, referred to by some as ‘hypermodernity’, is characterised by accelerated rhythms and a sense of instantaneity and constant urgency that make
social interactions increasingly difficult to build (Fortier and Juarez 2017). We feel ‘confine[d] to the present...in “tense flux”, prisoners of “real time”, detached from the past and future, no longer able to distinguish what’s essential to build meaning’ (209). In addition, we are immersed in the overproduction of signs (Lash and Urry 1994). Semio-capitalism, Franco Berardi suggests, produces ‘an infinite excess of signs’ which ‘circulat[e] in the info-sphere and saturat[e] individual and collective attention’ (2009: 108–9). As such, attention itself becomes ‘the main commodity’ (2011). For Berardi, ‘hypervision, an excess of visibility, the explosion of the info-sphere and an overload of info-neural stimuli’ are at the root of many of today’s psychopathologies (2009: 108). This symptomology is caused by the fact that, as Berardi cautions, ‘[m]ore and more signs buy less and less meaning’ (2011). Such inflation contributes to the melancholy of our times. For like Ann Lee, and as is revealed through her first question about the relation between a sign and melancholia, we are continually experiencing an unspecified loss, which affects our capacity to be in the world and, as I will shortly elaborate, diminishes our capacity to be with others.

Capitalism transforms people into economic subjects that need to be self-interested competitors in all activities and areas of life – for all are economized (Brown 2015). It appropriates animism to economize even social relations (Franke 2010) and demands entrepreneurialism and constant productivity. In doing so, it reduces ‘our needs and passions’ to only work and acquisition, making ‘workers out of human beings’, impoverishing our senses and diminishing our ‘affective capacities and modes of sociality’ (Weeks 2013). This de-animation (a severing of our relationality) has a de-socialising effect: we become unable or incapable of being social, of being with – existing collectively with – others. In this environment, constructing and maintaining healthy social relations, becomes hard and, as a result, we become less able to perform ‘the social’ – a failure that has adverse effects on our mental well-being.

Furthermore, much like Ann Lee, contemporary subjects are becoming increasingly unfamiliar with what it means to ‘feel at home’. Not only because we no longer know how to ‘do the social’, but also due to our frequent and forced displacements for work and domicile, an imposed ‘violence’ that weakens social bonds as well as deprives
us of a sense of stability and security. Similar to Ann Lee’s continuous movement and transformation in and through the hands of different artists in order to ‘stay alive’ and ‘employed’, we also change ‘homes’. And, again, as with Ann Lee, our success is measured by our adaptability and through metrics that are unable to measure our worth. We struggle not only to ‘feel at home’, but to obtain any ownership of the present and near future.

Ann Lee’s second question, ‘Would you rather be too busy or not busy enough?’, points to our subordination to temporary, flexible and exploitative employment contracts, as well as to the fear of the impermanency of a ‘permanent’ contract. It also alludes to Ann Lee as an art object that is part of the system of production, circulation and consumption and which faces the same imposed dilemma as that of all labourers in neoliberal capitalism: working constantly (whether due to low wage income or demands for excessive amount of work) or not working enough (due to available paid employment opportunities) to survive. Huyghe’s and Parreno’s gesture of saving Ann Lee is shot through with ambiguity. Did their ‘salvage act’ make her less precarious or did they, in effect, only contribute to her casualization by continuing to give her more short-term contracts, squeezing out as much labour as they could from her? Was Ann Lee ever really ‘freed from her position of a mere product’, and thus ‘able to take her life and identity into her own hands’, as Huyghe and Parreno claimed? To what extent is anybody ‘free’ and ‘self-determined’ in today’s global economy? Where does autonomy actually reside in a world that makes souls into things (Horkeimer and Adorno 2001: 21), in a world that ‘de-animates’ us?

Alongside today’s casualised employment and weakness of our (diminishing) wage income, Berardi sees a secondary level of precarity emerging in the neoliberal economy. He observes that what is also becoming precarious is the worker herself in the respect to which she is being replaced by ‘packets of time’:

The process of abstraction of labor has progressively stripped labor time of every concrete and individual particularity….Capital no longer recruits people, but buys packets of time, separated from their interchangeable and
occasional bearers. Depersonalized time...has no rights, nor any demands (2009: 32–3).

Stefano Harney and Fred Moten discuss the sense of soullessness that pervades our current labour practices:

To work today is to be asked, more and more, to do without thinking, to feel without emotion, to move without friction, to adapt without question, to translate without pause, to desire without purpose, to connect without interruption. Only a short time ago many of us said work went through the subject to exploit our social capacities, to wring more labor power from our labor. The soul descended onto the shop floor as Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi wrote, or ascended like a virtuoso speaker without a score as Paolo Virno suggested (2013: 87).

This de-animation of the soul has led to the ‘crushing experience of a compressed present, to pathologies of excess and meaninglessness and even alienation’ (Fortier and Juarez 2017: 210). Our bodies feel acutely the terrible tension between the rhythms imposed by the outside world – a world ‘of fear, competition and precariousness’ – and those necessitated by their own needs and desires (Berardi 2013). At a subconscious level, it takes a great deal of effort and energy to negotiate between these competing rhythms and demands. There is a price, however, to pay for not having time to pay attention to ourselves and to others: our mind-bodies and our relations begin to break down.

Sense is not to be found in the world, but in what we are able to create. What circulates in the sphere of friendship, of love, of social solidarity is what allows us to find sense. Depression can be defined as a lack of sense, as an inability to find sense through action, through communication, through life. The inability to find sense is first of all the inability to create it (Berardi 2009: 117).
‘All Attachment is Optimistic’: Imagining with Ann Lee

How, then, to respond to the catastrophe that Sehgal’s Ann Lee embodies? Perhaps by developing alternative *pharmaka* that may include changing our relation to work, transforming our *noetic* processes (processes of perceiving and processing information / thinking[[note]3]) and enhancing our capacity for *being with* others. Kathi Weeks suggests that we need non-work time ‘to cultivate new needs for pleasures, activities, senses, passions, aspects, and socialities that exceed the options of working and saving, producing and accumulating’ and which are ‘quite different from [the sociality] orchestrated through the capitalist division of labor’ (2013). Berardi believes this is possible. He suggests that if working time was reduced and ‘the relation between income and labour’ was rescinded, if we did away with ‘the obligation to exchange living-time for survival’, then this reduction or unplugging could become ‘the premise for freely deploying cognitive energies for the benefit of everyone’ (Berardi 2017).

In common with Berardi, Bernard Stiegler suggests that what needs to change, above all, is our relation to noetic processes – the manner in which we are animated as subjects. He makes two points. First, he considers that we need to invest in new processes of de-proletarianisation and re-noetisation (2018: 31--2). For Stiegler, proletarianisation is understood as ‘a process of the deprivation of knowledge’ (21) and de-noetisation as the effect on our mind-body of that very proletarianisation, a loss of the ‘knowledge of how to live, do and conceive’ (84). Stiegler attempts to respond to these losses and deprivations by using mnemotechnics (the techniques and tools intended to support memory by transmitting or recording it) as a *pharmakon*: an ambivalent ‘organology’ that is capable of both curing and poisoning ‘the psychic apparatus’ (74). He proposes that ‘the only way to confront contemporary psychopower’ (the control and modulation of consciousness[[note]4]) is to re-invent ‘this same mnemotechnical system in such a way that it enables the emergence of a new culture of care’ (Van Camp 2012). Second, Stiegler suggests that we need to be courageous (Stiegler 2018: 32) and to move away from the current *econimico-political complex of consumption* (2010: 6; original italics). He contends that it is imperative that we ‘enter into the complex of a new type of investment’, which must be a social and political investment or, in other words, an
investment in a common desire, that is, in what Aristotle called *philia* (ibid.; original italics). This investment in *philia* can then ‘form the basis of a new type of economic investment’ (ibid.) and also slowly help us recover from our melancholy.

In so far as she seeks to invest in new social relations, Lauren Berlant is in alignment with Stiegler. Politics, Berlant argues, requires ‘genres of checking in to provide a little breathing space that allows for redistributing and disturbing negative affect, de-isolating ourselves-in-damage, and hatching strategies for not reproducing the violence’ but instead ‘for moving the scene of life to an alter-real’ (2013). ‘All attachment is optimistic’, Berlant continues, in the respect to which optimism is understood as ‘the force that moves you out of yourself and into the world in order to bring closer the satisfying *something* that you cannot generate on your own but sense in the wake of a person, a way of life, an object, project, concept, or scene’ (Berlant 2011: 1–2). For me, this scene was my encounter with *Ann Lee* and the thinking that ensued from it. In her calls for an encounter with a generative external force – an outside to thought – that promises new attachments and productive intimacies, Berlant is ostensibly arguing for what Isabelle Stengers terms a ‘reclamation of animism’ (2012), an alternative way of being in the human and ‘more than world’ that assumes a politics and ethics of care. Anselm Franke makes a similar point when he contends that animism can become ‘a tool for the tackling of the qualitative, political aspects of relationality’ (2010: 51).

Returning to Tino Sehgal’s work and approaching it through a reclaimed animism provokes a new set of questions that are dormant, perhaps, in the initial two that Ann Lee posed to the spectators in the gallery. What would Ann Lee do if she slowed down and had non-work time? What new needs would she cultivate? How could she de-isolate and invest in more generative relations with human and non-human others? Holding onto her long-gone body/sign and imagining who and what she could become individually and collectively might be a way to move forward both for her and for us. What I am suggesting, in other words, is that the work, by inviting us to see ourselves as being ‘like Ann Lee’, has the capacity to animate us by setting in motion the ‘soul’, again, by allowing us to imagine, dream, and desire a world beyond the present.
Notes

1 In the context of neoliberal capitalism, the term ‘economization’ refers to the casting of all activities and areas of life in an ‘exclusively economic frame’ (Brown 2015: 62), thereby marketizing them and treating human beings as ‘market actors’ (31).

2 Pharmakon as that which, depending on its dosage, can be a remedy or a poison (Derrida 1981).

3 From the Greek adjective noētikos.

4 That is, the control and modulation of consciousness, as opposed to biopower which refers to the discipline of bodies or regulation of life-processes.

References


