Introduction

Boom and bust: extractive industries and African states in the twenty-first century

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Following a 'lost decade' for 'the developing world' – a shorthand devised by magazine journalists and policy analysts to bemoan the lack of progress and development in Africa, a 'continent mired in poverty' – the dominant Afro-pessimism of the mid-1990s to mid-2000s eventually gave way to a more hopeful picture.[1] This was largely the result of a period of sustained high commodity prices and high global demand for natural resources between 2004 and 2014 (see Hendrix and Noland 2014, 3), which, coupled with technological advancements (ultra-deepwater/pre-salt drilling, surface/strip mining, heavy sands refining) and, not least, advice from institutions such as the World Bank (Lange 2011, 233–234), opened up new 'resource frontiers' across the African continent. For example, the discovery of natural gas reserves below the seabed off the coasts of Mozambique and Tanzania, and oil deposits under Lake Albert between Uganda and the DRC, as well as promises of a 'blue economy' (see Chapter 3, this volume), created a climate of 'bonanza', with major international corporations rushing to secure concessions and exploration rights. Politics followed suit, with the African Union (AU) adopting at its February 2009 summit the 'Africa Mining Vision 2020', which called for a 'holistic' approach to development through investment in extractives.[2] Investors were euphoric, while African governments were left flush with money from royalties and signing bonuses.

This commodity-driven boom of the mid-noughties, as well as the resulting increase in GDP growth rates across much of the continent, has – to a certain extent – changed the dominant popular narratives about Africa. Lamentations about a 'lost' continent mired in permanent crisis gave way to an optimistic 'Africa rising' narrative, including the preaching of an 'almost obsessive gospel about the role of the middle class in the continent's rapid and accelerated development' by international financial institutions (Melber 2015, 248) and the peddling of 'a crude binary construction of Africa that has shifted almost overnight from basket case to bonanza' (Taylor 2016, 10).

This rapid influx of money led scholars, but also policy designers and advisers from bi- and multilateral development partners of these African countries, to concern themselves with how best to mitigate potential negative consequences from the boom, and help the concerned countries avoid the proverbial 'resource curse' (see below), so as to ensure that mining and oil exploration contribute 'as much as possible to economic development and poverty alleviation' (Davis and Tilton 2005, 233). Articles like 'Saving Ghana from Its Oil' (Van Gyampo 2011), for example, argued that countries where a resource boom was expected should prepare themselves to remedy their perceived policy and administrative deficiencies, although other scholars analysed this very tendency of pre-emptive policy reform more critically (Donner 2009; Weszkalnys 2014; Phillips et al. 2016). Thus, high market demand, coupled with strong normative policy advice, increased the pressures on resource-producing countries to enact new legislation that would give them greater fiscal revenues, grant them automatic equity stakes for

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[1] For the 'lost decade' trope, see various reports from such organisations as the NCPA (www.ncpa.org/sub/dpd/index.php?Article_ID=4167, accessed 3.10.2017) and the UN ESA (www.un.org/esa/socdev/csd/2006/PressReleases/Development-TheLostDecade.pdf, accessed 3.10.2017).

[2] www.africaminingvision.org/about.html.

national oil and minerals companies, and allow them to set local content (employment, training, 'public' services) targets for international investors (Andreasson 2015, 313).

However, declining demand for coal and minerals in East Asia, and the opening up of the exploration of shale gas in North America, led to a precipitous drop in world market prices for natural resources from about mid-2014 onwards. This clearly revealed the fragility and structural limits of Africa's resource-dependent economic boom (see Taylor 2016). New investments were halted or postponed, and many resource-dependent African states saw a drastic reduction in their fiscal, royalty and export revenues. It also put many governments in a much weaker position vis-à-vis foreign investors. Faced with the need to attract investors despite lower expected returns, which made many planned projects much less economically viable, governments more readily bowed to investors' demands, granting them, for example, fiscal or labour law exemptions to reduce seed and operating costs and maximise corporate profits.

Clearly, the insertion of African polities into global economic forces has for a long time been based on crude extraction rather than transformative production, and there is an evident need to historicise such resource dependence and the cyclical downturns of commodity booms (Jacobs 2013, 29; Chapter 1, this volume). However, we hold that the boom-and-bust cycle of the past two decades was coupled with the rise of a specific and dominant normative international framework ('good governance') and the parallel 'unleashing' of transnational economic interests (usually, and ahistorically, conceptualised as 'globalisation'), which have strongly impacted the imaginaries and practices of the state in Africa. So, while the current economic crisis is real in many countries, it also creates a specific analytical moment: crisis and efficiency are potent political imaginaries that are generative of ideas and practices of 'stateness'. What are the imbrications of state, corporate and civil society actors around the planning and implementation of large-scale extractive industry projects? How do these interactions change the ideas, practices and capacities of states in Africa? How are the dynamics of these interactions changing in the current climate of crisis, after ten years of riding the wave of the boom? And how may we, by adopting this approach, say something new about state dynamics in Africa?

Accounting for state formation in Africa continues to be, as it would appear, a particularly vexing problem in the social sciences. On the one hand, it has often been understood as the process of setting up institutions corresponding to a normative idea of the modern (for which read Western, liberal democratic) state. This view has tended to assume that the difficulties encountered by African modern polities in building the state are technical in nature: that is, a failure of modernisation, to put it broadly. However, the imposition of a normative analytical account of statehood fails to do justice to the contingent nature of politics. If we follow this idea of contingency, then state-building processes are, on the other hand, forms of political action. This means that setbacks experienced by African countries in becoming 'modern' nation-states are not the result of technical failure, but rather outcomes of political interactions which are intrinsically contingent; there is not one single model of stateness. This often results in tautological explanations, based on some essentialist, culturalist reductionism: African states are failing because this is Africa, or so the view goes. We therefore follow a processual view of state dynamics (e.g. Migdal and Schlichte 2005; Hagmann and Péclard 2010) that is grounded on the assumption that social processes produce their own dynamics, and that the consequences of social processes are responses to the practices that constitute them. We may then conceptualise stateness – the ensemble of imaginaries and practices that constitute the field of 'the state' – as an open-ended process of formation that is always contested and incomplete, and constantly remade by processes of negotiation, accommodation, complicity and resistance between different state and non-state actors.

Changing stateness

What we propose, then, is to take such a processual approach to the state, and use the negotiations taking place around the exploitation of the continent's mineral resources as a privileged empirical way in to look at the changing dynamics and processes of stateness. We term this 'privileged' because, due to the capital-intensive and technologically complex nature of large-scale extractive projects, new ventures in Africa are usually undertaken by multinational corporations rather than domestic companies (Jones 2008, 10). The dominance of transnational, non-state actors in what is arguably a key source of revenue for many African states has in turn given rise to a series of (in our view debatable) assumptions about how the activities of transnational mining and oil corporations 'hollow out' or weaken the state. One of the challenges we see, therefore, is to do justice to the realities we attempt to describe without falling into extremes by reproducing simple stories of corporate overlords exploiting poor African countries (or the greed of African leaders to do so) and destroying local livelihoods, or, conversely, uncritically hailing the socio-economic benefits generated by large-scale extractive projects (see Golub 2014, 2). It is true that a great number of African countries are still largely dependent on the export of one or a few primary natural resources. This situation structurally affords the corporate actors engaged in natural resource extraction inordinate economic and political weight. Because of the great socio-economic impact of extractives, the planning, development and implementation of extractive industry projects then engages a diverse cast of players – government and administration, corporations and investors, unions and civil society organisations, local communities and international advocacy organisations, and donors and development actors – in multiple constellations, whose interactions we can chart to overcome an overly state-centred perspective on processes of state-building.

In addition, these processes of negotiation around resource extraction, though they are very much a question of national development, take place against the backdrop of competing, globally circulating ideas about the best way forward in natural resource extraction. These include cultural transfers of managerial ideals promoted to increase efficiency and reduce friction and wastage from the interference of the state, usually glossed as 'neoliberalism' (Ferguson 2010; von Schnitzler 2016). Here we can observe how, across Africa, governments of every political stripe actively promote a 'business-friendly climate' of economic liberalism and a reliable regulatory framework to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). This often comprises promises of reducing state interference in the smooth functioning of the markets and the commercial operations of companies, freely given by governments or demanded by investors, including tax breaks and exemptions from national regulatory regimes, such as employment, local content or environmental laws.[3]

Parallel to, and sometimes in tension with, these economics-based tenets of unfettered market forces stand developmental ideas about the positive role of extractive industries in promoting 'sustainable' and 'inclusive' economic growth for the respective countries, promoted variously and with different emphases by international financial institutions (IFIs), bi- and multilateral donors, the governments themselves (especially those with a developmental bent) and, to a certain extent, civil society actors. Under a programmatic discourse of emancipatory references, such investments and greater flexibilisation of the market are said to promote

[3] See, for example, Moçambique para todos, 'O regime especial para gás da Bacia do Rovuma' (http://macua.blogs.com/moambique_para_todos/2014/12/o-regime-especial-para-g%C3%A1s-da-bacia-do-rovuma.html, accessed 24.2.2017); Reuters, 'Chevron, Angola government in tax, investment talks' (www.reuters.com/article/us-chevron-angola-idUSKBN16113N, accessed 24.2.2017).

formal employment, a broadening of the skills base, cheaper (and cleaner) energy and higher fiscal revenues redistributed to target communities for local development.

Finally, there is also a globally circulating and locally adapted criticism of (or warnings against) the potential negative impact of extractive industries, chiefly on the environment, local communities and the economies and politics of the countries concerned (the infamous 'resource curse'), mobilised to various degrees under headers like 'transparency', 'equitable growth' and '(corporate) social responsibility' by the actors identified above alongside international advocacy organisations, such as Publish What You Pay (PWYP), Global Integrity the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI; see below).

Charting how these different, overlapping and competing ideas are mobilised by different actors to influence the ways in which states manage the activities of and revenues from extractive industries helps reveal the processes of negotiation and accommodation that stand at the heart of processes of changing stateness, while at the same time avoiding a perspective on these processes that is confined to national boundaries.

Rather than, as has often been the case, studying how states can influence the governance of natural resource extraction, we advocate a non-deterministic, empirically grounded viewpoint that enables us to look at how the different ways of dealing with the challenges and opportunities posed by natural resource extraction change the ideas and practices of African states. Much of the scholarly literature on the governance of extractive industry investment seeks to ascertain the presence or absence of 'good governance' in the industry, according to generally accepted international norms, to explain the causes of this presence or absence, and normatively prescribe policy remedies. We suggest taking a somewhat different approach in examining how extractive industry investments and activities influence the changing roles, legitimacies, capacities and authorities of the state. In other words, we seek to make the tensions and negotiating processes around the activities of extractive industries analytically fruitful, and understand empirically what forms of stateness emerge from the interactions around these activities. This allows us to think through the processes of state formation in Africa in a novel and productive way. Indeed, one of the key problems of the political sociology of Africa is that socio-political phenomena are viewed as deviations from a norm – a fallacy that Mahmood Mamdani (1996, 12) describes as 'history by analogy'. Neo-patrimonialism, for example, describes the failure of the African state to be 'normal' (measured against the universalised benchmark of an ideal Western state), and thus implicitly or explicitly suggests there is no way in which politics could ever change in Africa.

The dynamics and controversies around extractive industries demonstrate, however, that things are very much in flux. The challenge, then, consists in accounting for both the power of ideas about 'good' ways of pursuing resource extraction and the structural and political forces that shape these negotiations. This will allow us to understand changing forms of stateness by being attuned to the multiple, unexpected and open outcomes of these processes.

Conceptual parameters

We develop our approach from a number of conceptual premises and engage with debates on both the state in Africa and extractive industries, as well as the links between the two. Although the 'state failure' literature in African Studies has been thoroughly criticised (see Wai 2012), ideal-typical (Westphalian, Weberian) notions of the state – as rational-legal, territorially coherent representative of public authority and holding a monopoly of force – still often dominate media and scholarly accounts of the state in Africa. And while the choice of words might have become somewhat less pathologising since its heyday, when African nations were variously characterised as 'weak' (Jackson and Rosberg 1982), 'failing' (Herbst 1996), 'collapsing' (Zartman 1995; Allen 1999), 'criminal' (Bayart et al. 1999) or 'shadow' states

(Reno 2000), the predominant sentiment often remains strikingly similar, with experts on democratic process and the correct functioning of the state diagnosing and condemning the shortcomings of African states. Given such a perspective, the involvement of external non-state actors in service provision or state-building – such as mining companies or INGOs – is usually also seen as a consequence of 'limited statehood', 'where the state does not have the administrative capacity (either material or institutional) to exercise effective control over activities within its own borders' (Krasner and Risse 2014, 564). Such scholarship is then interested in the 'success' of such interventions in providing services and collective goods 'even under extremely adverse conditions of fragile or failed statehood' (ibid.; see also Cooper 2002 on the gatekeper state).

Similar normativity also often pervades analyses of African states as 'neo-patrimonial', through which scholars seek to make sense of a blurring between the public and the private (for a critical overview, see Erdmann and Engel 2007). Constructed as an inherent characteristic of the predatory state (Bayart et al. 1999) or as cornerstone of the 'traditional' African cultural logic (Chabal and Daloz 1999), neo-patrimonialism is seen as the root cause of underdevelopment and conflict and is placed in contrast with the modern, rational-legal functioning of the idealised and universalised Weberian state. Beyond the normative assumptions implicit in these approaches, such binary opposition tends to ignore the reciprocity implied in Weber's analysis of a legitimate type of authority and overlook processes of adaptation and *bricolage* for which drawing on social imaginaries of personal relations and legal-rational bureaucracy allows (Koechlin 2013, 93; see also Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 2014). Neo-patrimonialism has therefore become

> a catch-all conceptual staple in Africanist scholarship for accounting for and explaining nearly every perceived African socio-political malaise, difficulty or problem – corruption, institutional decay, communication breakdown, authoritarian rule, development failure, economic dysfunction, poor growth, civil and political unrest and especially armed conflicts (all of which are the markers of so-called state failure).
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> (Wai 2012, 31)

We do not claim to reinvent the wheel entirely here; after all, a processual approach to the state has previously yielded insightful analytical perspectives (e.g. Migdal and Schlichte 2005; Hagmann and Péclard 2010). We simply assume that states' functions, as well as people's expectations of what states should do, are changing under uneven processes of globalisation, and that these changes may be observed and made analytically fruitful. However, to avoid the trappings of normativity and state-centredness, we prefer to talk in this volume about stateness as a process, rather than statehood as an ideal-type status/endpoint, somewhat analogous to the differentiation between state formation (open-ended) versus state-building (intentional, directed).

Our epistemology is, then, based on historical and recent empirical observations in which different forms of sovereignty are practised beyond the state and by a variety of non-state actors. Indeed, much of the literature on African states under the conditions of globalisation has 'overstated the case that global economic (and other) forces have crippled the state … [as] many international and transnational forces have propped it up more than they have sabotaged it' (Migdal and Schlichte 2005, 9). What we can see is that core functions of the state in Africa are redefined as the continent is respaced (Engel 2009; Engel and Nugent 2010): new actors beyond the state have arisen (from warlords to transnational companies, from new churches to external interventions); new ‘spatialities of power’ – micro-regions, border regimes, local powers, transnational networks – have become important from an everyday life perspective, or are given new attention. At the same time, external actors, such as the BRIC nations (Brazil, Russia, India and, most importantly, China), are changing the conditions under which African states are integrated into the global economy.

The nexus of extractive industries speaks to and crystallises all of these developments: a multiplicity of non-state actors (multinational companies, civil society associations and transnational advocacy organisations, international regulatory bodies) deploy diverse, competing discourses about the best way forward to develop Africa’s mining sectors and are through this engaged in processes of negotiation that generate new forms of stateness as co-produced projects of economic development and integration into world markets.

Resource curse/resource conflicts

One of the dominant paradigms to explore the impact of natural resource extraction in Africa is the notion of the resource curse, with the resource conflicts hypothesis as one prominent subcategory. The concept of the resource curse has gained much traction in the media, policy and scholarship. It is a tale of greed, corruption and squandered billions, with countries like Gabon, Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea and Angola cited as prime examples of everything that can go wrong in an oil-rich country. The paradigm postulates that ‘countries highly dependent on revenues from exports of non-renewable natural resources tend to be characterized by poorer economic performance, lower levels of human development, and higher levels of inequality and poverty’ (Williams and Le Billon 2017, 10). Though some authors (e.g. Ross 2012) advise against asserting a systematic relationship, most cite statistics in their efforts to demonstrate a correlation between the incidence of capital-intensive natural resource extraction and poor governance (Leite and Weidmann 1999). Proponents of the resource curse advance the notion of a strong correlation between natural resource wealth and ‘undemocratic and illegitimate governance … high levels of public sector corruption … [and] greater risk of civil conflict’ (Mailey 2015, 1). Resource booms, in this perspective, promote fiscal indiscipline and undermine the functioning of state apparatus (Karl 1997). Bolstered by statistics, authors claim, ‘Empirical support for the curse of natural resources is not bulletproof, but it is quite strong’ (Sachs and Warner 2001, 828).

This argument is partly based on a reading of macroeconomic indicators as signals of the ‘Dutch disease’, whereby ‘an increase in revenues from natural resources appreciates the exchange rate and makes other sectors less competitive … [crowding] out manufacturing and agriculture’ (Amundsen 2017, 18); while local food production is devaluated, workers are attracted away from agriculture and manufacturing (Yates 2014, 60). However, although countries that rely on the export of one primary commodity do indeed become exposed to volatile world market prices, there are a few problems with this analytic, principally the error of mistaking correlation for causality. This problem seems to puzzle even ardent supporters of the resource curse thesis, although it rarely causes them to reassess the validity of the thesis itself. Once one is willing to acknowledge that ‘resource rents lead to an increase in corruption if the quality of the democratic institutions is relatively poor, but not otherwise’ (Bhattacharyya and Hodler 2010, 608), that ‘the impacts [of the resource curse] are worse in poor countries than in rich countries … [I]f there is a resource curse, it probably lies in the deeper political economy of institutions, rather than in economic management per se’ (Hendrix and Noland 2014, 7), or that ‘in most of Africa’s resource-rich states, the corrosive political dynamics associated with the resource curse actually pre-date the discovery of oil or minerals’ (Mailey 2015, 7), it would appear that natural resources, in these studies, are just proxies for ‘politics in messy African states’. Apart from the fact that most of these studies are premised on a rather normative understanding of statehood, we align with critics who argue that, in such a perspective, oil is just an ‘idiom for doing politics … inserted into an already existing political landscape of forces, identities, and forms of power’ (Watts 2004, 76). Moreover, laying the blame for the worsening of social indicators in resource-extracting countries exclusively on institutional practices undermined by corruption silences structural and power inequalities that are central to issues of the governance of natural resources in Africa (Grant et al. 2014c, 278). Rather than using natural resources as the single determining variable to explain governance failures in African states, analyses should aim to be context-specific, taking into account local political and societal dynamics, and how these are reshaped by transnational resource extraction (see Le Billon 2004).

The resource conflict theory, a subcategory of the resource curse theory, similarly gained much traction from the 1990s onwards, as rational choice theorists sought to develop an alternative to the ‘new barbarism’ approach of theorists such as Robert D. Kaplan[4] to explain the ‘new wars’ in Africa following the end of the bipolar world order (Kaldor 1999). In their view, conflicts, especially in Africa, are ‘resource based’ and almost proverbially driven by ‘greed, not grievance’ (Collier and Hoeffler 2000). Grievances are always present, so the argument goes, but the material conditions for rebellion are not. In resource-rich countries that are already (as per the resource curse theory) afflicted by weak state institutions, poor governance and unsound economic behaviour, the availability of resources gives strong incentives for armed rebellion and plunder, especially in Africa, where many youths are unemployed and poverty is rampant. A variant of the notion that resource abundance causes conflict is what Richards (2005) has termed ‘Malthus with guns’: that is, the idea that competition over scarce resources results in conflict. Some of these arguments are not entirely without merit. It makes sense to include the political economy of conflict when attempting to understand the factors that drive it. Le Billon’s (2001) matching of resource type to type of conflict, for example, is useful and convincing. However, there is still a whiff of resource determinism to the resource curse theory, and a tendency to monocausal explanations. As Englebert and Ron (2004, 61) state in their critique of the resource conflict theory, ‘Politics should be privileged over economic determinism, because resources are unlikely to trigger civil war in a stable political environment.’ Some authors have successfully integrated oil as a complicating factor in internationally entangled local political struggles in their *longue durée* (e.g. Behrends 2011). Overall, however, we see problems with more monocausal proponents of the resource conflict hypothesis that are similar to those identified above for the resource curse theory: it reduces the role of the state, overplays the role of resources as the sole determining factor and pays insufficient attention to politics.

The limits of the argument become even more evident when it is applied to interstate conflicts. In a particularly egregious example, captured in the catchy title *Petro-Aggression: When Oil Causes War*, Jeff Colgan (2013, 4) argues that oil wealth allows political leaders to take risks, ‘including those involved in aggressive foreign policy adventurism’. Apart from taking US foreign policy interests almost entirely out of the equation, Colgan’s book argues that ‘revolutionary regimes’ like Iran and Venezuela are more likely to initiate conflict than more stable polities, which strongly calls into question the explanatory power of oil as *the* determining variable to predict conflict.

In addition to epistemological and methodological problems, there is a political critique to be made against the resource conflict theory, as Jon Barnett (2000, 274) convincingly argues in his appraisal of the environment-conflict hypothesis:

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[4] See his 1994 article at: www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1994/02/the-coming-anarchy/304670/, accessed 26.2.2018.

> the environment-conflict literature is almost entirely premised on the ethno-centric assumption that people in the South will resort to violence in times of resource scarcity. Rarely, if ever, is the same argument applied to people in the industrialized North. There is continued scripting of people from the South as barbaric, strongly implying that those in the North are more civilized.

Overall, we can say that the resource curse theory mistakes correlation for causality, depoliticises political issues, explains violence as 'rational' and, with few exceptions, denies the responsibility of industrialised countries for resource exploitation. Nevertheless, it is a powerful idea that, regardless of the supposed direction of causality, ends up shaping policy decisions, including, as mentioned above, some that are taken with the specific aim of preventing it (Donner 2009; Weszkalnys 2014). 'Through associated policy prescriptions and interventions, the resource curse thesis has power not only as a set of management norms, but as an economic device that shapes how resource development is constructed' (Phillips et al. 2016, 27). The idea is also so pervasive and evocative that it informs understandings of politics across a wide range of actors. Authors of a World Bank study, for example, state that, from a policy perspective, it is 'important to know the mechanism by which [the resource curse] casts its spell … [to] allow a better stab to be made at prescription' (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2003, 5). More surprisingly, perhaps, in Englebert and Ron's (2004, 61) study of rebellions in the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), 'the authors' informants uniformly believe[d] that greed for petroleum rents in a new and uncertain political context was a major motivation for the war'. Rather than dismissing it entirely, we therefore suggest studying the resource curse as one of several powerful discourses currently in circulation that relate to the ways in which African states should manage their extractive resource wealth. These discourses shape the outcomes of negotiations between unequal actors that jointly produce stateness.

Good governance

Owing to the impact of the resource curse thesis, a second strand of literature on natural resource extraction in Africa is chiefly concerned with the good governance of the sector, or lack thereof. In fact, it would appear that the focus of most studies on extractive industries in Africa tends to be on resource governance and the correlated issues of setting normative standards and enforcement mechanisms within a multi-stakeholder collaborative framework as a means to mitigate or eliminate the prolific structures and incidents of resource-based conflict. There have been some important conceptual advances in this field, chiefly a move away from viewing state actors as the main actors of governance to an acknowledgement of 'the powerful role of non-state actors such as multinational corporations and civil society organizations in the governance process' (Grant et al. 2014b, 3). However, although the conception of 'governance' has been substantially broadened by including the 'institutional conditions, the historical and decision-making processes and … the power relations' that shape governance practices in the larger sense (Campbell 2013, 3), and authors increasingly reject presumably universally valid criteria of measurement, their objective often remains prescriptive in the sense that their research on natural resource governance aims to

> contribute to the improved understanding of the consequences of investment in the mining sector in Africa, notably with regard to revenue flows and the conditions which

> might allow the sector to further the developmental and poverty reduction objectives of the countries.
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> (Ibid.)

For example, in Grant *et al.*'s influential *New Approaches to the Governance of Natural Resources: Insights from Africa* (Grant *et al.* 2014a), contributors Dashwood and Puplampu's case-study of the Ghanaian mining sector is chiefly interested in how far 'multi-stakeholder partnerships have the potential to address institutional weaknesses, governance gaps and the high poverty levels typical of rural Ghana where mining takes place' (Dashwood and Puplampu 2014, 131). Similarly, in the same volume, du Preez acknowledges that 'good governance' is not a panacea, but insists that governance still has an important role to play in ensuring that 'the continent's population benefit optimally and sustainably from its abundant resources' and therefore suggests 'replacing the idea of blanket "good governance" with that of "context-specific governance"' (du Preez 2014, 39). However, 'as analysis [*sic*] of profitable oil ventures in Nigeria or Angola demonstrates, it is problematic to assume that political instability hinders capital accumulation or indeed that good governance enables it' (Phillips et al. 2016, 37).[5] Moreover, critical scholarship has rightly noted that such 'good governance' interventions serve primarily to make countries 'fit for foreign investment' (Sabaratnam 2017), that resource-based economic growth perpetuates historic patterns of dependency and deepens inequalities (Taylor 2016), and that statistics relating to the economic wellbeing of African countries are notoriously unreliable (Jerven 2013). A more open-ended, non-deterministic understanding of governance would seek to analyse it as the imposition of rules and the regulation of access, and the logics and norms that organise the delivery of collective goods (Olivier de Sardan 2011, 22). This then raises the question of who devises these regulations or institutions and who has the power to influence them on multiple scales (Haller et al. 2007; Haller 2010; Niederberger et al. 2015).

Politically, we do evidently share the opinion that it would be preferable if most of the revenues from resource extraction benefited the actual populations (see Schubert 2017, 14); analytically, however, while we share an attention to social, political and historical context, as well as an interest in 'the local and global norms and structures through, and within, which these various stakeholders operate' (Grant et al. 2014b, 3), we reiterate our insistence on a non-normative, processual take on stateness that will also allow us to understand the deployment of 'good governance' in the constant negotiations of stateness in contemporary African states. Indeed, as 'good governance' is an extremely versatile term which ensures that 'debates over resource management will be couched in such terms for years to come' (Phillips et al. 2016, 39), we suggest looking at which ideas and discourses of 'best practice' or 'good governance' in the natural resource sector are mobilised, by whom and to what end.

Extractive industries as co-constitutive of states

A more promising perspective has been to look at the ways in which extractive industries have shaped politics beyond more normative issues of corruption or state failure. A prime example of such an approach is Timothy Mitchell's *Carbon Democracy* (Mitchell 2009, 2011), which looks at how the technicalities and modes of production (technologies, organisation of labour and capital) of oil have produced certain forms of political authority:

[5] Though policy reports such as UNECA's *African Governance Report IV* (2017) or the final report of the Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa (2017) tend to reproduce such tropes.

> political possibilities were opened up or narrowed down by different ways of organizing the flow and concentration of energy, and these possibilities were enhanced or limited by arrangements of people, finance, expertise and violence that were assembled in relationship to the distribution and control of energy.
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> (Mitchell 2009, 401)

Stefan Andreasson (2015, 311) also points to how the mining industry and the nation's fortunes have been historically intertwined in South Africa, and how, until today, 'the mining industry remains a key dimension of the shifting tides of political power'. And Michael Watts (2011, 67), writing about Nigeria, notes how contestations around issues of the equitable distribution of oil revenues and the environmental burden of oil production have led to the 'political fragmentation of the national space called Nigeria – characterised by the emergence of highly contentious and insurgent political (and criminal) spaces, rather than a robust sense of nationalism and a modern petro-state'.

A more anthropologically oriented strand of such scholarship is concerned with how mining or oil companies and local communities interact (e.g. Hönke 2012, 2013). This can also take the form of a somewhat more activist stance, focusing on the 'negative impact on local livelihoods' by detailing the 'traditional resource use' of 'the indigenous peoples' and their 'reactions and strategies' against the 'environmental and social impact' of hydrocarbons extraction in the areas where they live, as well as the strategies of corporations to minimise (or at least give the impression of minimising) their negative impact among local communities (Haller et al. 2007). Others, however, have privileged an approach that seeks to study the corporations and states involved in mineral extraction as a series of shifting – sometimes cooperating, sometimes conflicting – institutions and assemblages (Welker 2014), and show how 'the mining company' and 'the local community' are mutually constitutive (Golub 2014; Kirsch 2014). In a similar vein, Andrew Barry (2006, 243) has suggested studying the oil industry as a technological zone, a framing device or 'an abstraction which draws attention to certain features of the social landscape and its spatial forms which may otherwise go unnoticed'. From this, we heed the call to move beyond binaries of resistance or accommodation and look at the co-production of stateness through the negotiations around the activities of extractive industries.

Our approach: changing stateness under the impact of extractives

Our approach is therefore premised on four interlinked lines of enquiry. First, who are the actors? Here, the challenge is to account for the multiplicity of actors, but also their internal diversity. From this, we can then ask concretely what instruments for the governance of extractive industries are being elaborated and implemented, by whom and at what levels (national legislation, national regulatory bodies, regional/continental strategies). How do these levels interact and impact upon the negotiations and implementation of projects at national and local levels?

Second, which discourses do they deploy around the implantation, development or implementation of extractive industry activities? 'Change', 'development' and 'growth' are not just empty buzzwords deployed by armies of consultants; they are also potent socio-political imaginaries (Hansen and Stepputat 2001; Mbembe 2001; Karlström 2003) that have efficacy beyond the confines of strategy papers and memorandums of understanding, and are generative of new ideas and practices of stateness. They are culturally resonant templates for thought and action (Gaonkar 2002; Taylor 2002; Bertelsen et al. 2014; Nielsen and Pedersen 2015; Schubert 2016) that can be deployed strategically by a variety of actors to make claims on the state and the society in which they live. We therefore suggest that we need to pay attention to the productive and performative dimensions of such imaginaries. How are ideas of change, development and growth, which we often tend to associate instinctively with a top-down, state/corporate development project, invested with meaning and invoked by different actors? What leeway do these various actors have to promote their agendas within, for example, a 'good governance of extractive resources' framework? How are ideas and ideals of the state played out and renegotiated in these interactions of national politics and globalised capital? And how do such – admittedly global – imaginaries of the common good, globalised modernity and inclusive development latch on to and resonate with – local – historical and cultural contexts (Geschiere and Jackson 2006, 3)? We hold that it is of analytical interest to chart how programmatic buzzwords like 'growth', 'redistribution', 'transparency' and 'responsibility' or potent political imaginaries such as 'good governance' and the 'resource curse' are invoked, reinterpreted and invested with meaning by the various actors engaged in making resource extraction profitable, beneficial and socially 'thick'.

Third, what is the contingency of these negotiations? That is, in what ways are they dependent on specific histories of public authority, economic exploitation and boom-and-bust cycles? What happens, for example, to states that rely on revenues from extractive industries after ten years of bonanza in the current period of commodity slump? Also, though, how do country-specific political economies (the capture of strategic economic sectors by political elites, for example) influence these negotiations in ways that were perhaps unforeseen by proponents of a more normative 'good governance' approach?

Finally, as a result, what are the outcomes of these negotiations? How do they reshape relations between the state, society and corporations? Do they, for example, offer inroads for 'civil society' actors to push their agendas, or for state administrations to transform their ways of working? And how are ideas and practices of the state reconfigured through these interactions?

Focusing on co-production does not mean closing our eyes to the very real power inequalities that shape the encounters between such varied actors, or to the disciplining power of neoliberal 'development interventions' (see Macamo 2003) – quite the contrary. However, equally, we should not assume that these forms of political authority that emerge from the imbrication of corporate investments and state power are simply a top-down process imposed on 'weak' African public administrations or supine populations.

The zoning-off of communal lands for a logistics base, the destruction of communal fishing grounds by oil extraction, or the displacement of local residents to make way for a coal mine are often accompanied by real violence, yet these are not complete, totalising projects. Stateness is a process, always incomplete and evolving, and even in the most exploitative, unequal settings, 'political power is far more dispersed and transactional than is most often assumed' (Krohn-Hansen 2008, 8–9).

How, then, can we understand empirically how social actors engage and subvert, or endorse and align with, the projects of extractive industries, and how do they use this avenue to press claims on the state in which they live or pursue avenues for individual or collective social improvement? By revealing the tensions *and* the multiple linkages between spheres commonly held as separate or even oppositional, we may think beyond stories of resistance and struggling grassroots communities pitted against (or accommodating) global corporate overlords. This idea of co-production, which goes beyond totalising state control or the cultivation of consent by the dominant, should allow us to draw out subtler accounts of the role of extractive industries in the reshaping of political authority, public institutions and ideals of stateness in contemporary Africa.

Structure of the book

The contributors to this volume therefore investigate the different areas in which resource extraction and the interactions around these activities are reshaping the ideas and practices of African states. One of the recurring themes is that grand visions of extractive-driven development through large-scale investments in infrastructure are far from confined to the past; rather, such political visions gained a new lease of life with the return to extractivism in the mid-2000s, even though the language deployed shifted from state-led modernisation to market-efficient development and growth. The first three chapters are directly concerned with these competing visions of development, and how these may or may not be influenced by the boom-and-bust cycle of extractive industries over recent years. The five case-studies that follow then map in detail how the interplay between state, corporate and civil society actors reshapes ideas and practices of the state and development through extractive industries in specific cases.

The first two chapters, by Paul Nugent and Jana Hönke, respectively, look at the building of transport infrastructures and the different ways in which the activities of extractive industries have – or have not – contributed to the development of transport corridors and hubs, and the development of state capacities with regard to the levying of customs duties. Chapter 1 maps the changing patterns as well as the principal actors in Africa's recent infrastructure boom, with a view to assessing how far the needs of the extractive industries are driving and shaping these investment flows. By historicising the 're-enchantment' with infrastructure investments, Nugent paints a differentiated picture that questions the ability of extractive industries to shape infrastructural provision. These different drivers of the infrastructural 'big push' then have uneven implications for African governments' ability to shape the development agenda and for state bureaucracies' capacity to undertake their (partially reconfigured) functions.

Chapter 2, on infrastructure investments in Tanzania, deepens this line of argument. Hönke carefully explains that the assumption that much of Africa's infrastructure boom is driven by resource extraction does not entirely stand up to scrutiny, especially when China is the principal investor. She traces the deployment of competing, new and old imaginaries of development by actors involved in making the new transport corridors work, including China and the Gulf states. These imaginaries, she demonstrates, inform how 'states' are performed alongside transnational political geographies, and point to the political potency of alternatives to the liberal–capitalist models of development.

In Chapter 3, Ulf Engel looks at the nascent 'blue economy' in South Africa, which pulls together the exploration of submarine minerals and offshore hydrocarbons, aquaculture and marine protection, and maritime commerce and manufacturing in one common imaginary and policy framework that is intended to 'unlock' South Africa's development potential. He shows how a cultural transfer of a great economic leap forward from Malaysia has been adapted to the local context, thereby reconfiguring the governing ANC's role in shaping a vision for South Africa's development.

In Chapter 4, Erika Tchatchouang investigates the development of participatory mining legislation in Cameroon. Based on extensive interviews with the actors involved in the process of reforming the country's mining code and documentary research, she analyses the dynamics and processes involved in the emergence of participatory codes by highlighting their advantages and limitations with respect to the clearly stated objective of capitalisation of foreign direct investment. It seems that the current generation of participatory mining codes is attractive, at least in theory, to local and foreign investors, optimises state revenues *and* helps to protect people's fundamental rights and the environment. However, it remains to be seen whether this more participatory approach to legislation will generate the desired outcomes.

In Chapter 5, Padil Salimo looks at the reshaping of state–community relations at the local administrative level brought about by the advent of onshore liquefied natural gas (LNG) extraction in the Rovuma Basin in northern Mozambique. The political-economy dynamics related to these investments have resulted in extraordinary demands for land by multinational oil companies and ruling elite actors in the private sector, putting pressure on the local government to manage land acquisitions. Thus, insecurity of land tenure for local communities has become a serious concern as their interest in 'securing a good deal' is threatened by the competing interests of multinational oil companies and ruling elites. Salimo argues that the bargaining power of local government is too weak to secure the interests of local communities when pitted against the competing interests of multinational oil companies and ruling elites. In consequence, the rights of local communities to land and fair compensation are at risk.

In Chapter 6, Sonwabile Mnwana analyses the ways in which the power of traditional authorities has been reconfigured through platinum mining in South Africa's North-West Province. He demonstrates how South Africa's post-apartheid state's mineral policy reform, particularly its redress mission, has been significantly compromised by the local institutions that shape the structure of power at the local level. Although the 'new' mineral policy has nationalised all minerals rights and placed them under state custodianship, rural land in the former 'homelands' remains largely under the control of traditional authorities. The rural expansion of the platinum industry coincides with post-apartheid legislation's attempts to redefine residents in these communal areas as 'traditional communities' (or 'tribes'), under local chiefs. Subsequently, they have become the mediators of mineral-led development and conflictive mining deals.

In Chapter 7, Rita Kesselring looks at how the entry of a new economic actor – the copper mine – transforms the relationships between local government and residents in Zambia's 'New Copperbelt' in the context of post-structural adjustment reforms and the global commodity slump. She carefully details how the presence of the mine in Solwezi has had an impact on revenue collection, urban planning and administrative capacities and, ultimately, voting patterns at the local level, thereby demonstrating how the capacities of the local state are indeed changing, though not for the reasons typically advanced by the resource curse literature.

In Chapter 8, Monica Skaten investigates 'petroleum legacies' in Ghana's domestic politics. As she details, development through domestic hydrocarbons production and refining has been a core element of the political vision of Ghana's development since independence under Kwame Nkrumah. This gives the Tema Oil Refinery enduring political weight beyond the successive regime and government changes since that time. In contrast to oil-rich, dominant-party regimes such as Angola and Equatorial Guinea, Ghana's competitive democracy means that the two main parties, which have been alternating in power since 1992, both seek to bolster their fortunes by claiming credit for the development of the 'new' oil sector while at the same time accusing their rival of mismanaging the sector.

Finally, the Conclusion pulls these diverse case-studies into focus under the heading 'The Political Ecology of the State' and links them back to the common theme and the overarching research question: how are extractive industries reshaping political authority, public institutions and ideals of stateness in contemporary Africa?

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