Crossing Borders. The Making of France's Eastern Frontier in Alsace, 1918-1939

In August 1933, the Contrôleur Général chargé des affaires d'Alsace et de Lorraine reported on a dramatic increase in illegal crossings from Germany into France in the seven months since Adolf Hitler had seized power in the Weimar Republic. As the new regime targeted its political and racial enemies with legal restrictions, violence and imprisonment, the French police reported that increased numbers of German citizens were using barges to cross the Rhine and avoid checkpoints on their entry into France. For the Contrôleur, such crossings were a constant element of life on the border and while the increase in illegal passages was sharp, it was also 'unsurprising' in the situation created by the Nazis' seizure of power. Yet, what was notable in his view was the change in *who* was crossing. Alongside political refugees, the illegal crossers also included a large number of spies and smugglers. Moreover, there had been a shift in those crossing illegally in the other direction from France into Germany, as secret agents headed home and individuals smuggled anti-Hitler propaganda into the Third Reich. To respond to the crossings, he recommended greater policing and highlighted the experience that customs officers had in such surveillance.[1] This short report is illuminating of the response of sections of the German population to the new regime, but it also raises a number of questions with implications for our understanding of the late Third Republic, as well as of the relationship between nation-states and their borders: What was troubling about the crossers in the view of the Contrôleur? What were the implications of increased border policing for the borderland population in Alsace? And, why did illegal passage matter to France?

1933, the year in which the Contrôleur's report was written, represented a momentous moment in European history.[2] Hitler's seizure of power in Germany signalled a broader seizure of the initiative by those determined to destroy the international *status quo*, and marked a significant step on the road to war. This context informed the operating assumptions of the guards working at the border and their reports are revealing of the French state's growing unease about the security threat posed by Germany. Yet, these events were not the only lens through which the French

authorities viewed developments at the border. Rather, reports of crossing guards and administrators reveal that their understanding of the situation at the frontier was equally informed by the relationship between the state centre and its borderland. Alsace had returned to French rule in 1918 following forty-seven years of annexation into the German Empire, and reintegration had proved far less straightforward than hoped by either the French authorities or within the region. On the contrary, return was notable for the clash that it provoked in terms of visions of what it meant to be French in the late Third Republic.[3]

The clash of expectations, along with Alsace's unique experience of successive French and German rule, has generated a lively field of scholarship on the region. Research has analysed the evolution of French policy and considered how the experience of return varied amongst different social groups and political movements, as well as underlining the similarities of French and German nationalising policies and highlighting the ways in which such policies were driven by exchange and imitation.[4] This work has revealed the distinct understandings of belonging and Frenchness that emerged from the French authorities and amongst the Alsatian population, in addition to the clash that these differences provoked. Yet, scholarship on Alsace has so far paid little attention to how the border shaped either these debates or the resultant fixing of the boundaries of the national community. This article seeks to address this gap by focusing on border policy and policing in Alsace after 1918. It argues that the decisions taken at the border are revealing of the ways in which the process of return and the resulting renegotiation of Frenchness involved cooperation and confrontation not just between the region and national centre, but also across the frontier.

A focus upon the border represents a potentially fruitful line of enquiry and has implications for our understanding of developments in Alsace and France. Work in border studies has encouraged us to look beyond the 'line on the map,' and instead to consider the border's role in both dividing and in redirecting flows of people and things across or away from itself.[5] This has significant implications for our treatment of boundaries, as the border emerges as a historical

agent that shapes or drives wider processes, whether migration, smuggling, or the expression of national sentiment.[6] In a similar spirit, historical scholarship on borders has stressed that borders should not be understood as complete, but rather as works in progress.[7] In Europe this progress has been intimately connected to the nation, where borders represent important symbols of national coherence and the borderland represents both the limits of the nation and a meeting point with neighbouring national populations.[8] If, therefore, we follow the cue of Eugene Weber and understand the nation as a 'process', we must consider the role of the border within this process. Ideas of national belonging are in constant evolution and forged (in part) through decisions taken about where the boundaries of the national community lie, but also in interactions with others, including those encounters that take place at the frontier. Borders like the Franco-German boundary and borderlands like Alsace may be unique in terms of their historical experience, linguistic habits and cultural mores, but, as the site of such processes, events at the frontier have significant implications for the borderland and for the national centre. For example, in Alsace, administrators pre-empted mid-1920s Franco-German reconciliation with small local agreements for borderlanders, while the police's preoccupation with apparent Alsatian national ambivalence revealed by the Germanic language and cultural mores was revealing of new ways of measuring national sentiment in the late Third Republic. And, as the Contrôleur's report suggests, fears about the security threat posed by Germany were evident amongst border guards from the very moment of Hitler's seizure of power.

This article adopts the prism of the surveillance and treatment of border crossers to consider the reintegration of Alsace into France and the issues that return presented. Using the records produced by agents of the French state, it questions how police officers interpreted crossings and traces how administrators developed border policy. The focus of the authorities was split between German citizens and Alsatians. This reflected their twin preoccupations in the region, as they voiced concerns about German intentions towards France while grappling with the fact that most Alsatians spoke a Germanic dialect, the region shared cultural mores with German

populations and its recent past as a territory of the German Empire created a range of cross-border connections that led people to cross to shop, work, visit family, or access their land.[9] The problem was that distinguishing between such connections and loyalty to Germany was not always straightforward and unlike the regional identities that the Third Republic had incorporated after 1871, Alsatian ties to Germany represented an apparent 'alternative nation' for the regional population.[10] To make matters worse, this 'alternative nation' was perceived to be France's primary security threat in the years between the First and Second World Wars.[11] In this way, a focus upon the border reveals the ways in which the border guards' twin preoccupations of German influence and Alsatian attitudes were intertwined. It also underlines the difficult balancing act that France faced in Alsace, as the French authorities attempted to integrate the recovered region and cut it off from Germany without alienating the local population.

To analyse how France controlled its new eastern frontier, the first section traces Alsace's experience of annexation and return and outlines the resulting web of connections that provided some of the reasons that led the borderland population to cross the border throughout the interwar years. The following two sections consider the evolution of policy and the treatment of crossers after Alsace's return to France and trace the variable opening and closure of the frontier in response to the shifting local, national and international situation. Section two focusses upon the 1920s and section three upon the 1930s. While the French authorities' approach evolved over these two decades, it is notable that throughout the period France's concerns regarding the potentially detrimental effects of German influence from across the border intermingled with and informed their deep suspicion of any indication of national ambiguity on the part of the Alsatians. This did not result in a coherent border policy; while the French authorities were guided by the overall aim of ensuring the cohesion and security of the Republic, different police officers and administrators adopted a range of strategies in their efforts to control the border in ways which are suggestive of the heterogeneity of state action, albeit amongst agents working towards the same aim. What is more, these state agents could also demonstrate considerable autonomy in their

decision-making, revealing that the periphery was not always peripheral in the evolution of attitudes towards inclusion, exclusion and the value of border crossers.

I.

In 1871 Alsace, along with a portion of the neighbouring region of Lorraine, was annexed into Imperial Germany in the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War. In discussions over the post-war settlement, Bismarck justified annexation through reference to the fact that the Alsatian population spoke a Germanic dialect and shared cultural mores with populations living in the German lands. The French challenged this view on the basis that the Alsatians had opted to be French at the Revolution of 1789 and should consequently be considered to be French.[12] This juxtaposition between France's civic vision of national belonging and the ethnic version adhered to by Germany formed part of the growing opposition between the two nations over the following forty-seven years, as Alsace-Lorraine was subject to the introduction of German laws, economic institutions and cultural products, as well as the arrival of large numbers of migrants from the Kaiserreich.[13] Each of these measures built upon the longstanding connections between Alsace and the German lands that Bismarck had highlighted. These links were rooted in shared language, cultural traditions and kinship ties. Meanwhile, in France a cult developed around the 'lost provinces,' which treated them as the epitome of Frenchness and described the loss in biological or familial metaphors as akin to the loss of a limb or of the sisters Alsace-Lorraine. Maps of France included the provinces, but shrouded them in black or purple (the colours of mourning) and popular imagery presented them as awaiting their liberation by France from Germany. As a result, Alsace adopted acute symbolism within French nationalism as the nation's lost borderland.[14] What is more, it also acquired symbolism as the national border with the 'blue line of the Vosges' representing a new defensive frontier against the German Empire.[15] When war broke out in 1914, the return of Alsace-Lorraine became France's primary declared war aim.

The end of the First World War triggered the return of Alsace-Lorraine and the French government treated the celebrations that greeted the entry of French troops into the region as evidence of a popular desire to return to France.[16] The German creation 'Alsace-Lorraine' was dismantled and the departments of the Bas-Rhin and the Haut-Rhin were restored to the north and south of Alsace respectively, while the department of the Moselle was created from the formerly annexed section of Lorraine.[17] Return saw renewed symbolism invested in the region, which became France's new boundary, but also a new frontier of Frenchness. However, return was not as straightforward as either France or Alsace had anticipated and administrators who arrived in the region expressed their surprise at the prevalence of the German language and at local commitment to regional cultures and institutions.[18] And, it rapidly became clear that the issue of how to introduce French laws, economic structures and the French language was not a simple one. First, it raised the problem of whether any existing systems or institutions could remain, such as the Napoleonic Concordat, which had been abrogated in France in 1905. Second, it posed the question of how far difference could be permitted within a region of the Third Republic, which had been founded on the principles of centrality and uniformity.

The stakes were raised in these discussions as the 'difference' that the Alsatians requested was frequently viewed as 'German' by the authorities in Paris and Franco-German enmity rendered highly problematic any suspicion of attachment to Germany. Consequently, reintegration provoked lengthy debates. Indeed, in some cases, such as the question of the laws separating Church and State, discussions proved so contentious that the situation remained unresolved upon the outbreak of war in 1939. This was also the case for regional administrative institutions. In 1919, premier Raymond Poincaré established the Commission Général to oversee the administration of the recovered departments. This was intended to be a short-term response to a unique situation, but on its disbanding in 1925 it was replaced with another temporary administrative body, the Direction Général, which reproduced its functions and remained in place in 1939. Politicians, economic interest groups, clergymen and representatives of civil society debated return, but there

was very little consensus at either the Parisian centre or the Alsatian periphery over the question of how to make Alsace French again. What is more, further views came from outside Alsace, whether from Alsatian *emigrés* who had departed for Germany after 1918, from foreign governments or from other so-called 'national minorities' within Europe. The result was that reintegration rapidly evolved into a struggle that was multi-cornered and that straddled the frontier.

In broad terms, the overall method of initial French policy in the recovered departments was to make the region French by removing German influence. Doing so included a wide range of measures, including the replacement of the German mark with the French franc, the introduction of the French language, the sequestering of German companies and the removal of German citizens. With regard to the population, the government embarked upon a three-pronged citizenship policy of classification, expulsion and loyalty trials (commissions de triage).[19] The first prong of the policy classified the population into four categories based on their place of birth and that of their parents and issued identity cards accordingly. The A-Card was granted to those who were born in France or Alsace to French or Alsatian parents, the B-Card went to those born in Alsace-Lorraine with only one French or Alsatian parent, C-cards were delivered to foreign subjects of non-enemy states (e.g. Italy) and the D-Card was issued to those from enemy countries (Germany, Austria, Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria) and their children. Holders of the D-Card faced practical problems including unfavourable rates of exchange for their German marks, difficulties finding jobs in the civil service, post office or railways and limits upon travelling to visit family in Germany or elsewhere in France, as well as the fear of violence and denunciations from their neighbours. In such circumstances, many left Alsace for the Weimar Republic.[20] In the second prong, the French government began to expel German nationals, beginning with Germans who had lost their jobs and were identified as potential troublemakers, as well as known troublemakers, prostitutes, black marketeers and beggars. It then moved on to employed German nationals who received orders to leave the region in order to create jobs for unemployed Alsatians.[21] Finally, the

third prong, the commissions de triage, sought to identify pro-German Alsatians through loyalty trials and resulted in many of those found guilty leaving for Weimar Germany.[22]

Around 80 000 German nationals left the two Alsatian departments and approximately 70 000 left the Moselle after 1918.[23] Many of these Germans had lived and worked for years in the region, where they had built friendships and had families. Their departures reinforced ties between the east and west banks of the Rhine as they maintained their links to Alsace through correspondence and visits. This was the case for Philippe Husser, a schoolteacher from the southern Alsatian city of Mulhouse who recorded his daily experiences in his diary. After the War, his eldest daughter Marie moved to Frankfurt with her Germanophile Alsatian husband Fritz. After a 1920 trip to visit the couple, Husser noted the 'smoothness' of the customs posts on both sides of the border, but, by 1923 his parcels to Marie were being returned as the border was closed to goods and in 1924 the costs of a visa prevented him from making the trip, causing him to remark on the impossibility of travel to Germany for many Alsatians.[24]

For Husser, these family ties offered an insight into the ways in which the border was subject to variable openings and closures, many of which reflected the shifting international situation and evolving relations between France and Germany. French suspicion of Germany coloured the years that immediately followed the First World War, and post-war Franco-German relations reached their nadir in January 1923.[25] German non-payment of reparations led Premier Raymond Poincaré to send troops into the Ruhr valley, where they seized control of coalmines and factories in an occupation that lasted until 1925. Policy shifted from the middle of the 1920s under the auspices of Aristide Briand's period at the Quai d'Orsay; the 1925 Locarno Treaty, Germany's entry into the League of Nations in 1926, the 1927 Franco-German Trade Treaty and the 1929 Young Plan all worked towards this aim, as did Briand's agreement to evacuate Allied forces from the southern Rhineland in June 1930, five years ahead of schedule.[26] This entente was gradually replaced by greater enmity as both countries faced economic problems from 1930, and Hitler's seizure of power marked the onset of further tensions. Yet, the Nazis' appeals to Germans

outside the Reich represented the continuation of Weimar's efforts to undermine Versailles through the funding of pro-German political movements in its lost borderlands or through historical institutions established to prove the German heritage of border populations, such as the Alsatians.[27] In this way, different currents co-existed in Franco-German relations between the two Wars, and as a territory that linked and divided the two nations, these currents found expression and impacted upon life in Alsace.

In spite of the departures of German nationals from Alsace in 1918-9, a large number of German-born citizens remained in the recovered departments, and many who were permitted to stay became naturalised French citizens. In 1926, naturalisations in the Bas-Rhin and Haut-Rhin represented 1.6 percent and 1.4 percent of the total population of the two departments respectively, and the vast majority of these naturalisations were German (eighty-nine percent in the Bas-Rhin and seventy percent in the Haut-Rhin).[28] This created further ties across the Rhine, while the number of naturalisations indicates just how far these migrants had integrated into Alsatian society. In addition to family ties, other members of Alsatian society were connected to Germany by employment, as borderlanders crossed in order to work in agriculture, as salesmen or in skilled industries such as the railways. For some borderlanders, their work involved daily crossings. Here, their concerns intersected with French citizenship policy and in the case of Strasbourg resident M. Burger, the D-Card that he received prevented him from crossing the border, and consequently posed problems in his job as a chauffeur. When he appealed to have the restriction lifted, his case was taken up by Georges Maringer, the Commissioner for the Republic in Alsace. Burger had received a D-Card as his parents were born in Baden, but Burger himself had been born in Strasbourg and had lived in the city all of his life. According to Maringer's report, he was now married to an Alsatian and an investigation into his attitudes had suggested that he had 'Francophile sentiments,' and was considered in Strasbourg to be a '*bon alsacien*'.[29] The archives do not reveal Burger's eventual fate, but his case nonetheless reveals just how blurred the boundaries between 'French,' 'German,' and 'Alsatian' had become.

Further connections were based upon land, and resulted from the fact that the 1918 borderline separated some Alsatians from their communal land, which they had retained rights to under the Treaty of Versailles. Correspondence from French officials reveals the government's consensus that it would no longer be possible to maintain these usage rights and as Alsatian citizens reported difficulties in accessing their land, officials feared a resultant border incident.[30] However, when the German government offered to purchase Alsatian land, many communes argued that this did not adequately compensate the loss of forests, which generated further communal income through wood, and also allowed inhabitants to hunt and fish.[31] Instead, communes requested compensation with land on French territory, but difficulties in making these arrangements meant that negotiations persisted and many borderlanders needed to cross the border to access communal land throughout the interwar years.[32]

Such links created a web of connections that generated close contact between the population in Alsace and neighbouring populations in Germany throughout the interwar years, with the effect of creating both a clear sense of difference between them, and a closer relationship than that enjoyed with other 'foreigners.' This experience was not atypical. Comparative research on French borders in the north, south and east proposes a model of 'degrees of foreignness,' whereby identities developed in relation to several identifiable groups of others and primarily to cross-border neighbours. According to this concept, the French identity of those living in the border regions grew directly from their experience of the border, as well as from their desire to be protected behind it and recognised by others from within it. In this view, French and foreign identities were 'not so much fixed poles as a sliding scale on which individuals clustered. The positioning of individuals along this scale was determined more by oppositions than affinities.' [33] In the case of Alsace, evidence of naturalisations suggests that Germans were more closely integrated than border crossers from further afield, as does Bettina Gartner's research on cross-border marriages, which were far more numerous than those with other 'foreigners.'[34]

Nonetheless, the problems that Alsatians reported in crossing the border equally underlines the distinctions drawn between the two borderland populations.

Alongside Germans, migrants from elsewhere also arrived in Alsace. This reflected wider patterns of immigration into France, which gradually lost the localised nature that had characterised it before 1914. Between 1919 and 1939 the foreign population increased from just over a million to nearly three million, as migrants arrived from eastern Europe and France's colonial empire, many in order to contribute to the nation's economic reconstruction in the aftermath of the First World War.[35] Their presence has been connected to an increased stress upon race and ethnicity in French political debate, and this equally informed the attitudes of police officers and administrators in Alsace.[36] In a January 1924 report on the sharp increase in Polish migrants (which had risen from 291 to 1368 since November 1918), Commissaire Général Gabriel Alapetite noted his suspicions that these migrants were involved in trafficking or contraband, and consequently recommended an increase in the surveillance of all migrants in the region.[37] Alapetite was not alone in connecting migrants with a potential breakdown in public order; throughout the period Prefects of both departments commented that the population found this transient migrant population a worry, particularly at times of high unemployment.[38] Nonetheless in terms of the overall number of non-national citizens residing in the region, Alsace had more in common with the national pattern than with other border regions. In 1921 when foreigners resident in France came to represent just under 4 percent of its total population, this was also the total in Alsace, whereas in the neighbouring Moselle the equivalent figure was 19 percent.[39] This situation was related to the needs of the local economy and the heavy industry in the Moselle which relied upon migrants from Italy, Poland and elsewhere.[40] Yet it also reflects the fact that, as we saw above, a number of large number of migrants to Alsace were Germans who were able to naturalise, and this situation ensured that discussions over citizenship and belonging tended to focus upon Alsace and Germany.

The differences between nationals and non-nationals were crystallised at the border through identity papers and passes, and mediated by police officers stationed at border posts. In their work, the officers monitoring the crossings needed to balance the broad aim of maintaining the security and coherence of the Republic with the practicalities of policing a busy border region.[41] Some of the difficulties that this presented were set out by the Special Commissioner of the southern Alsatian town of Saint Louis in a report describing his efforts to prevent smuggling. He pointed out that thousands of people and at least one hundred cars took the road that linked the French towns of Mulhouse and Saint Louis with the Swiss town of Basel each day, while every ten minutes a tram crossed the border and multiple trains stopped day and night on their way between Paris and destinations in the centre and south of Europe. This gave the police the option of acting on random searches, which were unlikely to prove productive and would reduce popular goodwill, or acting upon denunciations, which relied on information that they rarely received.[42]

In an effort to understand how police officers overcame such practical difficulties, Peter Becker has identified what he describes as the 'practical gaze,' whereby police officers developed a 'semiotics' of suspected transgressive activity, based upon the reading of physical characteristics and behaviour.[43] In Alsace, this practical gaze was informed by their understanding of the local situation and concern with the coherence of the Republic. And while those officers native to the province may have displayed the local population's finely tuned sense of difference, the majority were sent to Alsace from elsewhere in France, much to the chagrin of the local population who complained that these '*Français de l'Interieur*' were paid indemnities normally reserved for fonctionnaires heading for France's colonies.[44] As a result, their interpretation of crossers and reading of their characteristics and behaviour focussed upon the risk that interaction on the frontier could undermine or destabilise the nation.

The motivations for border crossings in Alsace after 1918 included a combination of practical concerns, such as visiting family or working, and national and international events, such as the transfer from German to French rule and France's subsequent citizenship policies. Equally,

the interpretation of these crossings reflected practicality and what was possible (as suggested by the comments of the Special Commissioner at Saint Louis), but also the wider and shifting national and international context, as France worked to reintegrate its recovered departments, to maintain internal coherence, and to secure its frontier with Germany. These intersecting priorities informed the actions of police officers and administrators working at the border.

II.

In May 1919, the Provisional Administrator of the district of Erstein was stopped at the Franco-German border and refused permission to cross because he did not have the correct papers. He wrote the episode off as 'rather comedic and unimportant,' but stressed that it should never happen again as the potential implications of stopping officials were extremely serious.[45] This followed a similar incident the previous month, when members of the Saar boundary delimitation committee (which included German delegates) had been denied permission to cross the border, prompting the Ministère des Affaires Etrangères to contact Commissaire Général Gabriel Alapetite to bring to an 'urgent halt' such problems for the commissions when crossing 'our frontier'.[46] In spite of this warning, over the following weeks and months, local administrators and members of the border delimitation commissions reported being stopped and denied access as they attempted to cross as part of their daily duties.[47] That local police stopped everyone attempting to cross the new border, regardless of class, nationality, or even status as a member of the border delimitation committee is suggestive of the chaos and confusion that followed the war and accompanied the return of Alsace to French rule, especially in the context of the large movement of people in the immediate aftermath of the First World War.[48] And through identity cards, passports and other legal documents, border guards were able to distinguish between nationals and non-nationals, and to establish the parameters of inclusion and exclusion to the citizen body.[49]

For Alsace, policing and monitoring was intended to act as part of the population's integration into their French nation-state by affirming their belonging to the national community. But, police officers' focus upon borderlanders as they crossed the frontier is suggestive of the ways in which the question of who belonged was not as straightforward as first hoped. Surveillance reports and prefectural records reveal official suspicions over Alsatian loyalty, and frequently conflated use of the German language with attachment to Germany.[50] At the border, the spectre of the population's apparent national ambivalence was brought into relief. In one case, in early October 1924, the Commissaire Spécial at Kehl pointed out that a number of crossers had both French passports and German Reisenpassen, and chose which papers to present when passing through the French checkpoint. This clashed with understandings of the role of papers as denoting national identity, but also with ideas about national belonging presaged upon loyalty to a single nation-state. In the Commissaire's view this situation was 'dangerous' and there could be 'no doubt' over their genuine sentiments as many of these crossers wrote up their observations on their trip to Alsace in newspaper articles on their return 'to their true nation.'[51] The return of Alsace was characterised by concern amongst the French authorities about how French the Alsatian population were, and such cases raised questions over the wider loyalty of the borderland population.

Nevertheless, correspondence from the border equally reveals a growing recognition that border crossings represented a central part of borderland life, and could even be desirable in some cases. As a result, some administrators took steps to make crossings easier for locals. In 1922, borderlanders who had rights to communal or personal land on the other side of the border recounted that crossing guards were making passage difficult, and in some cases preventing them altogether. [52] In response, France and Baden agreed on a 'carte frontalière' that could be issued to inhabitants of the border zone who had rights to land on the other side, and who provided proof of meeting these conditions.[53] Card-holders were then able to cross without passing through the customs point.[54] Other measures to ease crossing recognised cross-border family ties; in 1925 the

Prefect of the Haut-Rhin decided to allow entry without a visa to any German citizen living in a border commune who needed to enter the department in an emergency, such as the death or serious illness of a parent. The special dispensation required them to pay 10 francs, and to leave when the emergency was over.[55] Again, proof of the family connection and emergency was required.

Such measures were not unique to the Franco-German border. At France's boundary with the Italy, the Franco-Italian accord of 1918 had created a carte frontalière which allowed borderlanders to cross into neighbouring districts without the normal restrictions to permit shopping, working, and visiting friends and family on the other side of the border.[56] Moreover, they were not unique to France; in the east of Europe the Soviet Union frequently applied 'small border' or 'small border traffic' agreements to commercial treaties, which granted borderland inhabitants special permits and passes for crossing, in recognition of the need for such crossings at the periphery.[57] While the Franco-German border shared such practical arrangements, it was distinctive in that they were not tacked onto commercial treaties or larger international agreements such as the Franco-Italian accord. Rather they were negotiated by local administrators. This fact is suggestive of the degree of autonomy enjoyed by administrators at France's eastern border where the existence of separate laws and structures dating from the years of annexation was recognised to be unique and where regional administrative institutions existed throughout the interwar years. It is equally revealing of the ways in which this frontier was not always peripheral. On occasion, it was the centre of decision making and the precursor of change.

Such agreements were complex, and were subject to change at short notice. In 1922, an agreement allowed inhabitants of French Strasbourg, German Kehl and the communes that surrounded them to cross the border with a carte frontalière rather than a visa, with each card valid for one year. The only condition was that the holder was a French or German national resident in the commune, or had lived in the commune for at least six months.[58] The new scheme was introduced under the impetus of Strasbourg's Chamber of Commerce, which saw it as an

opportunity to boost the city's economy by encouraging shopping trips and commercial connections. For this reason, Commissaire Général Alapetite suggested that it would be best to limit the card to certain categories of French citizens, lest Alsatians use them to travel to Germany and shop in Kehl to the disadvantage of Strasbourg.[59] At this stage Alsatian industry was attempting to realign itself to French markets and institutions, but efforts had been faltering and the Chamber of Commerce was well aware that in 1925 the grace period allowed by the Treaty of Versailles for the Alsatian economy to transition to France would come to an end. This measure was therefore a practical response to circumstances, but one that was equally shaped by the local and national economic situation. It was also permitted by the international situation, as the French suspicion of Germany that had characterised the years immediately following the First World War was beginning to give way to greater support for Franco-German reconciliation that would become increasingly dominant in French diplomacy from the mid-1920s onward.[60]

The cross-border shopping trips from Germany to France did not prove universally popular, however. When inflationary price rises hit the Weimar Republic in 1923, increasing numbers of German citizens crossed the border to profit from the cheaper prices in Alsatian shops. At first, customs officials deemed the trips to be 'nothing to worry about', and frequently turned a blind eye to the small quantities which these visitors bought.[61] But, shoppers arrived in such numbers that in January 1924, the Prefect of the Haut-Rhin estimated that Germans had spent 80 000 francs in Mulhouse in the previous week, which, when combined with Swiss purchases had led to a 'doubling, or even a tripling' in the normal rate of purchasing.[62] This had the effect of pushing prices up, particularly of the bread, sugar, coffee, meat, vegetables, clothes and shoes that represented the bulk of their purchases. Administrators were so concerned about the impact of rising prices on popular opinion that the Prefects of both Alsatian departments called on the government to restrict movement between Alsace and the neighbouring occupied German territories with a view to assuaging public opinion.[63] In this environment, the Commission Générale limited border crossings by German citizens, stepped up the surveillance

of those Germans who did enter and, when necessary, turned away travellers even when they held a pass.[64]

For Commissaire Général Alapetite the problem was not only the impact of rising prices on public opinion, but also that the crossers were German, and each was potentially 'an agent of the Reich, capable of ... conducting pro-German and anti-French propaganda'.[65] For example, Alapetite pointed to the fact that surveillance officers had reported that German 'tradesmen' coming to Alsace for work were to blame for the circulation of pessimistic rumours about the future of the franc, which had encouraged the Alsatians to withdraw their savings from banks and to refuse to invest in treasury bonds.[66] As we have seen Alapetite had previously recommended increased surveillance of Polish migrants, while his background in colonial administration gave him a particular understanding of national belonging that is likely to have coloured his concerns.[67] But, it is notable that his comments on German crossers are focussed upon their potential anti-French activity, rather than on social transgressions such as trafficking or contraband as had been the case for the Polish crossers. These views were also reflected in the comments of a number of his colleagues in the prefectures and sub-prefectures, as well as in the police. Many border guards in particular were fearful of Germans abusing the 'privileges' of the border, for example the Commissaire Spécial at Saint Louis lamented the 'daily' cases of Germans crossing using the carte frontalière to which they were entitled as a resident of the borderland, who then used this to visit a destination further afield in France to which they did not have permission to visit.[68]

German crossers were not the only concern of French administrators, but they are the crossers that receive the most attention in the reports from the border. In part, this reflected their relative frequency in crossing. But it also reflected French anxieties over German intentions, with regard to both France and Alsace, and their concerns about the situation in the recovered borderland where feelings of disappointment and frustration over the return to France found expression in the *malaise alsacien*.[69] For some Alsatians, the malaise found a political outlet in the autonomist movement which emerged in the early 1920s and represented a broad spectrum of

opinion ranging from the desire for greater regional autonomy within France to separation from France and return to Germany.[70] This movement reached its peak in 1928 with the trial of fifteen autonomists for plotting against the French state (and the conviction of four of the defendants). The malaise and autonomism focussed the attention of the French authorities upon popular opinion in Alsace, and the resulting concern co-existed with and was informed by fears about Alsatian national ambiguity, or the potentially pernicious influence that Germans could bring to bear in the border departments. The result of these competing influences was that measures to ease crossings of the 1920s never surpassed efforts to apply close surveillance to crossers, and particularly to Alsatians and to Germans.

III

France's balancing act continued into the 1930s, as crossings between France and Germany continued and borderlanders visited family, went shopping, or accessed communal or hunting grounds on the opposite side of the border. The reports of crossing guards are suggestive of the continuation of the anxieties about Alsatian loyalty to France, and the border remained a place where questions of nationality were brought into relief. Nonetheless, it is notable that the 1930s saw crossing guards highlight outright rejection of France more often than ambiguity. In one case, a young professor was stopped at the Pont-Route du Rhin on his way to Germany and produced a passport that stated his place of birth as the Haut-Rhin. But, when asked if he was of Alsatian origin he answered 'no, I was born to German parents,' adding in what the guard noted as a 'contemptuous' tone, 'Oh no, I do not want to be French at all.'[71] This shift from ambivalence to rejection reflected the greater polarisation of the international environment, as efforts for Franco-German reconciliation gave way to greater enmity. Moreover, the rise of Adolf Hitler's NSDAP provoked new fears as the party made renewed appeals to populations living outside Germany's borders.[72] In Alsace, pro-Nazi autonomist parties emerged and a number of autonomist politicians

built links with the Nazis, a connection highlighted when a group were caught crossing the border after a NSDAP event in Baden with Nazi material in 1930.[73]

The polarisation was exacerbated by the Nazis' seizure of power in 1933, and the new regime's moves to eliminate its internal opposition triggered a flow of opponents of the regime and Jewish refugees across the border.[74] Fears about the threat that the Third Reich posed took concrete form with the construction of fortifications in the border departments, and in 1936 German troops marched into the de-militarised Rhineland.[75] Cross-border links meant that rumours swirled about events in Germany, and in the aftermath of the arrival of Wehrmacht troops the news spread through Alsace that border villages in Baden had started laying tubing across the roads to make them unusable in the case of invasion.[76] As fears mounted, the numbers crossing reflected the Alsatian population's anxieties over the tense international environment: in 1936, the *Commissaire Spécial* at Kehl recorded a marked drop in traffic in both directions at the bridge over the Rhine for the Pentecost holiday. The number of French cars crossing to Germany declined from the 1935 total of 819 to 312, while the number of foot passengers travelling from Germany to France similarly dropped from 6633 to 2801.[77] The Commissaire linked the decrease to the presence of German troops in the Rhineland and the resulting pessimism about the international situation.

For the borderland population, the major difference between the 1920s and 1930s was that while the 1920s had seen measures to ease or promote crossings introduced alongside policing and efforts to prevent crossings, into the 1930s such attempts to encourage crossing ceased. Instead, administrators insisted upon extra surveillance for crossers. When Francis Laban, the Prefect of the Haut-Rhin encouraged extra vigilance in the granting of visas or travel passes to societies or groups of Germans wishing to enter the border departments in May 1933, he stated that this was 'in view of the current circumstances.' These circumstances did not, however, correspond to the activity of Germans in the department; the Consul in Karlsruhe had reported that no incidents had arisen following the entry of groups of Germans into Alsace in recent months. Rather, Laban's

order reflects the broader circumstances of the Third Reich's pronouncements on the need to overturn the Versailles Treaty, which generated worries over its intentions towards the western bank of the Rhine. For Laban, this meant that groups of Germans entering Alsace should not be trusted. As a result, he insisted that the Consul should collect full information on the nature of the trip, that he be consulted, and that the time period of the visa be limited as strictly as possible. If these conditions were not met, he stipulated, the groups should be prevented from crossing.[78] Meanwhile in the Bas-Rhin, Prefect Émile Roblot argued for the closure of the border to holidaymakers in 1936 after German troops entered the Rhineland.[79] Roblot's concern focussed upon the potential security implications, and he called for Alsatians to visit the Vosges instead. In this way, the Prefects demanded greater control of crossings in both directions. Fears about Alsatian national ambivalence may have represented a continuation of worries that informed administrative policies in the 1920s, but national ambivalence appeared to be much more threatening when it raised the question of Nazi (rather than simply German) influence in Alsace.

Border guards were also vigilant about the vulnerability of the border, thus in November 1936 when a young man of 'apparent German nationality' arrived at Kehl station and asked how to acquire a passport from the French authorities, his presence was duly reported to the police inspector on duty. The man added that he had information to offer France about fortifications under construction in Germany, and could provide photographs. The police inspector told the guard to send the man on his way, viewing this as a pretext to create a border incident. On reporting the incident to the Prefect, the Commissaire Spécial noted that other police officers had reported similar cases and consequently urged all border stations to be on guard against such tricks.[80] These reports reflect the new forms adopted by the earlier fear that Germans may abuse the border. Whereas previous worries focussed on Germans travelling to destinations in France without permission, these reports reveal the guards' concerns that Germans were attempting to create a border incident with serious consequences for Franco-German relations. In this way, the monitoring of crossings in the 1930s is revealing of the shift as Alsatian connections with Germany

were now interpreted through the prism of Nazism, and consequently viewed as unambiguously unfriendly towards France.

IV.

At France's eastern frontier in the years between 1918 and 1939, people crossed the border for a range of reasons; shopping, visiting family or land, and seeking work were but a few of the many motivations behind cross-border trips. These impetuses shifted and evolved during the two decades that followed the return of Alsace, as individual circumstances or change in local, national or international politics drove crossings, whether for the German citizens who left Alsace in the aftermath of the war, or the Jewish refugees who fled Germany following Hitler's seizure of power. Alongside the motivations for crossings, the ways in which the border was controlled evolved, and responses to crossers could change, as German shoppers found out in 1924 when they suddenly found themselves to be unwelcome. Their case is revealing of the ways in which the line between so-called desirable and undesirable crossers was not fixed, and responses could change both across time and amongst people.

Such variability of the border regime was a product of the changing context, and the result of the competing interests involved. In this sense, it mirrors the reintegration of Alsace into France, which was similarly affected by local, national and international events and characterised by sharp diversity amongst voices at the centre and at the periphery. At the border, this lack of consensus found expression in varied responses to crossers, thus when the Strasbourg Chamber of Commerce successfully lobbied for the introduction of the carte frontalière to encourage shopping trips, it did so at odds with Commissaire Général Alapetite's fear that each German crosser represented 'an agent of the Reich.'[81] Within the French state we can find further evidence of this variability, as in February 1922 administrators agreed a carte frontalière to ease access to land in Baden, while three months later guards prevented the delimitation committee from

crossing the border, and attracted the attention of the Quai d'Orsay who feared a consequent border incident. This represents a reminder of the heterogeneity of state action, as different state agents took decisions and developed policy in a range of ways.

In their interpretation of events at the border, the French authorities revealed the multiple relationships through which they interpreted and understood border crossings. Crossings were read through the prism of the relationship between Alsace and France, and between France, Alsace and Germany. These relationships interacted, thus fears about luke-warm Alsatian commitment to France represented a particular concern as they appeared to result from lingering loyalty to Germany. And, apparent Alsatian connections to Germany looked very different under the Third Reich to Weimar, when Nazi pronouncements treated France as an enemy and made overt appeals to populations lost at Versailles. While the function of border control was to secure the boundary and affirm the place of the Alsatian population within France, the ambiguity that border guards encountered in the recovered departments found expression in the ways in which they treated border crossers. In this way, the border offers a new lens for understanding the return of Alsace to France, and underlines France's difficult balancing act in the region. On the one hand, the French authorities were guided by their overall aim of integrating the recovered region into France and cutting it off from Germany as much as possible. On the other, they attempted to do so without alienating the local population, whose disappointment with their return to France found political voice in the autonomist movement. Thus while French efforts were focussed upon sealing the border against German influence, the examples discussed here are suggestive of the ways in which the reintegration of Alsace involved negotiation not just between the region and national centre, but also in various ways across the frontier.

Events at the Franco-German border thus played an important role in shaping the course of Alsace's reintegration into France, but their ramifications transcended the borderland and could be the precursor of broader change. This was the case for the locally negotiated carte frontalières of the early 1920s which anticipated a shift in policy towards Franco-German reconciliation in

Paris, or the increased surveillance of Germans ordered by Francis Laban in 1933 which pre-empted a greater repression of political movements in the 1930s. This underlines that the periphery is not always peripheral. On the contrary, Alsace was at the centre of a range of important processes, most notably migration and the evolution of national belonging. As the French authorities used their interactions with border crossers to delimit and regulate territory and belonging, this contributed to both the increased suspicion of difference in late Third Republican France, and the ways in which difference was understood. Alsatian connections to Germany which had been construed through the lens of ambivalence in the 1920s were increasingly interpreted as hostility in the 1930s as the Third Reich asserted its opposition to France. In this sense, the border offers an insight into series of negotiations through which acceptable manifestations of Frenchness arose, and the ways in which they narrowed as the Third Republic entered its final decade.

[1]Archives Departementales du Bas-Rhin (ADBR) 286D 385 M. Le Contrôleur Général to M. le Préfet du Département du Bas-Rhin, Strasbourg 26 August 1933.

[2] Zara Steiner, The Lights that Failed: European International History 1919-1933 (Oxford, 2007); Steiner, *The Triumph of the Dark: European International History 1933-1939* (Oxford, 2011).

[3] Alison Carrol, *The Return of Alsace to France, 1918-1939* (Oxford, 2018)

[4] Samuel Huston Goodfellow, *Between the Swastika and the Cross of Lorraine, Fascisms in Interwar Alsace* (DeKalb, 1999); Laird Boswell, 'Franco-Alsatian Conflict and the Crisis of National Sentiment during the Phoney War,' *Journal of Modern History*, 71: 3 (1999): pp. 552-584; Catherine Tatiana Dunlop, *Cartophilia. Maps and the Search for Identity in the French-German Borderland* (Chicago, 2015); Elizabeth Vlossak, *Marianne or Germania? Nationalizing Women in Alsace, 1870-1946* (Oxford, 2010); François Roth, *Alsace-Lorraine : Histoire d'un 'pays perdu' de 1870 à nos jours* (Nancy, 2010); Christopher J. Fischer in *Alsace to the Alsatians? Visions and Divisions of Alsatian Regionalism, 1870-1939* (New York & Oxford, 2010); David Allen Harvey, *Constructing Class and Nationality in Alsace, 1830-1945* (DeKalb, 2001) ; Stephen Harp, *Learning to be Loyal. Primary Schooling as Nation Building in Alsace and Lorraine, 1850-1940* (DeKalb, 1998); John E. Craig, *Scholarship and Nation Building. The Universities of Strasbourg and Alsatian Society, 1870-1939* (Chicago, 1984).

[5] Thomas Nail, *The Theory of the Border* (Oxford, 2016)

[6] Peter Sahlins, *Boundaries. The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees* (Berkeley, 1989)

[7] Eric Tagliacozzo, *Secret Trades, Porous Borders: Smuggling and States Along a Southeast Asian Frontier, 1865-1915* (New Haven, 2005); Paul Readman et al., *Borderlands in World History, 1700-1914* (Basingstoke, 2014)

[8] Edith Sheffer, *Burned Bridge: How East and West Germans Made the Iron Curtain* (Oxford, 2011).

[9] In 1919, just 6.1 percent of the Haut-Rhin population and only 3.8 percent of Bas-Rhiners spoke French as their first language. Marcel Koch, 'Les Mouvements de la Population,' in Comité alsacien d'études et d'informations, *L'Alsace depuis son retour à la France. 3 Vols. Vol 1 (Strasbourg, 1932)*, p.345-6; Fischer, *Alsace to the Alsatians?* p. 135.

[10] Caroline Ford, *Creating the Nation in Provincial France. Religion and Political Identity in Brittany* (Princeton, 1993).

[11] Michael E. Nolan, *The Inverted Mirror. Mythologizing the Enemy in France and Germany, 1898-1914* (Oxford, 2005).

[12] Paul Smith, 'A la recherche d'une identité alsacienne', *Vingtième Siècle* 50 (1996): 23-35.

[13] François Uberfill, *Mariages entre Alsaciens et Allemands à Strasbourg de 1871 à 1914. Etude de processus du formation des unions mixtes* (Strasbourg, 1993); François Uberfill, *La Société strasbourgeoise entre France et Allemagne (1871-1924)* (Strasbourg, 2001); Alfred Wahl, 'L'immigration allemande en Alsace-Lorraine (1871-1918),' *Recherches germaniques* 3 (1973), pp.202-217; Harvey, *Constructing Class,* 78.

[14] Laurence Turetti, *Quand la France pleurait Alsace-Lorraine. Les "provinces perdues" aux sources du patriotisme républicain* (Strasbourg, 2008) & Karine Varley's chapter 'The Lost Provinces' in *Under the Shadow of Defeat. The French War of 1870-71 in French Memory* (Basingstoke, 2008).

[15] Sébastien Stumpp and Julien Fuchs, « The Vosges, border of Alsace (1871-1914) », *Journal of Alpine Research | Revue de géographie alpine* 101-2 (2013).

[16] Upon his arrival in Strasbourg, Premier Raymond Poincaré announced 'the plebiscite is complete.' See 'Discours de M. Poincaré,' *Elsässer*, 12 December 1918.

[17] This article will focus on Alsace. On the Moselle see Carolyn Grohmann, Problems of Reintegrating Annexed Lorraine into France, 1918-1925, (PhD dissertation, University of Stirling, 2000); Louisa Zanoun, 'Interwar Politics in a French Border Region: The Moselle in the Period of the Popular Front, 1934-1938,' (PhD Dissertation, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2009); Alison Carrol and Louisa Zanoun, 'The View from the Border: A Comparative Study of Autonomism in Alsace and the Moselle, 1918-1939,' *European Review of History*, 18: 4 (2011): 465-86.

[18] The National Archives (TNA) FO371/14901 (W13614). Foreign Office Commander Maxs, 18 December 1930.

[19] Laird Boswell, 'From Liberation to Purge Trials in the "Mythic Provinces": Recasting French Identities in Alsace and Lorraine, 1918-1920,' *French Historical Studies*, 23:1 (2000): 129-162; Tara Zahra, 'The "Minority Problem" and National Classification in the French and Czechoslovak Borderlands,' *Contemporary European History* 17 (2008): 137-165.

[20] Grohmann, Carolyn, 'From Lothringen to Lorraine: Expulsion and Voluntary Repatriation', *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 16 (2005) 571-587, 583

[21] David A. Harvey 'Lost Children or Enemy Aliens? Classifying the Population of Alsace after the First World War', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 71 (1999), 547-8; Grohmann, 'From Lothringen to Lorraine', 576

[22] *See ADBR 121 899-900-901-903*

[23] Koch, 'Les Mouvements de la Population,' 338; Harvey 'Lost Children or Enemy Aliens?' 550-551.

[24] Philippe Husser, *Un Instituteur Alsacien. Entre France et Allemagne. Le Journal de Philippe Husser, 1914-1951* (Paris, 1989), 184; 217; 235.

[25] John Horne, 'Demobilizing the mind. France and the legacy of the Great War, 1919-1939,' *French history and civilization. Papers from the George Rudé Seminar 2*, (2009) 101-119, 107; Husser, *Un Instituteur Alsacien,* 217.

[26] Peter Jackson, *Beyond the Balance of Power. France and the Politics of National Security in the Era of the First World War* (Cambridge, 2013); Conan Fischer, *A Vision of Europe. Franco-German Relations During the Great Depression* (Oxford, 2017); Fischer "The Failed European Union: Franco-German Relations during the Great Depression of 1929-32,' *The International History Review*, 34: 4 (2012) 705-24; Catherine Germond and Henning Türk, *A History of Franco-German Relations in Europe. From 'Hereditary Enemies' to Partners* (Basingstoke, 2008), 75-137.

[27] *Peter Schöttler,* 'The Rhine as an Object of Historical Controversy in the Inter-war Years. Towards a History of Frontier Mentalities,' *History Workshop Journal* 39 (1995), 1-22, 8-9.

[28] Comité alsacien d'études et d'informations, *L'Alsace depuis son retour à la France*, vol 1. (Strasbourg, 1932), 574-5.

[29] ADBR 286D 160 Commissaire de la République pour la Basse-Alsace à M. le Commissaire Général de la République, Strasbourg, 17 September 1919.

[30] ADBR 121AL 522 le Directeur des Eaux et Fôrets à M. le Directeur de l'Intérieur, Strasbourg, 12 May 1921; 121AL 520 Directeur des Eaux et Fôrets à M. le Commissaire Général de la République, Strasbourg 15 March 1921 ; ADBR 121AL 524 M. Briand (Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères) à M. le Dr Mayer, Ambassadeur d'Allemagne à Paris, Paris, 12 January 1922; 121AL 524 Régime des Propriétés Communales situées sur le rive droite du Rhin et en général de toutes les propriétés françaises, situées en Allemagne à moins de 5 kilomètres de la frontière.

[31] ADBR 121AL 521 Directeur de l'Intérieur to Commissaire Général, 9 November 1919; 121AL 552 Rapport de la Seconde Commission sur les Biens Communaux alsaciens sur la rive droit du Rhin.

[32] ADBR 121AL 552 Sous-préfet de Wissembourg to Commissaire Général, Wissembourg, 18 February 1925; 121AL 552 Extrait du registre des délibérations du Conseil Municipal de la Commune de Beinheim, séance du 2 février 1925; 121AL 552 Note sur la Convention de 1829 et les avis du commissaire français; 121AL 523 Seltz (député) to Ministre, Paris 30 January 1921; 121AL 552 Préfet du Haut-Rhin to Commissaire Général, Colmar 23 Février 1921 ; 121AL 552 *Le Temps*, 'Le cas de la ville de Rhinau,' 20 May 1924 ; 286D 385 M. Haelling to Chief Engineer, 6 October 1932.

[33] Paul Lawrence, Timothy Baycroft and Carolyn Grohmann, ' "Degrees of Foreignness" and the Construction of Identitiy in French Border Regions during the Interwar Period,' *Contemporary European History* 10 (2001), 51-71, 71.

[34] B. Gartner, *Die Nation in der Kleinstadt*, *Die Lebenswelten von Bruneck (Südtirol) und Weißenburg (Elsass) in der Zwischenkriegszeit (1918 – 1939) – ein Vergleich* (PhD Dissertation soutenue en 2004 à la faculté des Sciences de l'homme et de la culture de l'Université de Salzbourg), 293.

[35] Mary Dewhurst Lewis, *The Boundaries of the Republic. Migrant Rights and the Limits of Universaism in France, 1918-1940* (Stanford, CA, 2007), 1.

[36] Charles Lambert, *La France et ses étrangers* (Paris, 1928); Jean Pluyette, *La Doctrine des races et la sélection de l'immigration en France* (Paris, 1930); Georges Mauco, *Les Etrangers en France. Leur rôle dans l'activité économique* (Paris, 1932) ; Herrick Chapman and Laura L. Frader, (eds) *Race in France: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on the Politics of Difference* (New York and Oxford, 2004).

[37] ADBR 121AL 93 Commissaire Général to Préfet du Bas-Rhin, Strasbourg, 24 January 1924.

[38] Archives Nationales (AN) F7 1028 Préfet du Haut-Rhin to Ministre de l'Intérieur, Colmar, 12 November 1934.

[39] *L'Alsace depuis son retour à la France*, vol 1. p. 573; p.338.

[40] Louisa Zanoun, 'Language, Regional Identity and the Failure of the Left in the Moselle department during the Interwar Period, 1871-1936,' *European History Quarterly* 41 (2011): 231-54.

[41] The police had not yet been subject to the streamlining and professionalisation that followed the Second World War. Jean-Marc Berlière, *Le monde des polices en France XIX^e^-XX^e^ siècles* (Bruxelles, 1996); Marie Vogel et Jean-Marc, Berlière, Police, État et société en France (1930-1960), *Les cahiers de l'IHTP*, 36 (1997). On the process for prefects, see Luc Rouban, 'Les Préfets de la République, 1870-1997,' *Les Cahiers du Cevipof* 26 (2000).)

[42] AN F7 14841 Commissaire Spéciale to Directeur de la Sûreté Général, St Louis 22 December 1924.

[43] Peter Becker, *Verderbnis und Entartung: Eine Geschichte der Kriminologie des 9. Jahrhunderts als Diskurs und Praxis.* Veroffentlichungen des Max-Planck-Instituts für Geschichye, vol. 176. (Göttingen, 2002)

[44] Joseph Schmauch, « Novembre 1918. L'administration française s'établit en Alsace-Lorraine », *Revue d'Alsace*, 139 (2013), 259-276.

[45] ADBR 286 160 L'Administrateur provisoire du territoire d'Erstein to M. le Commissaire de la République à Strasbourg, 27 May 1919.

[46] ADBR 121AL 520 Télégramme chiffre. Affaires étrangères à Commissaire Générale, Strasbourg. 7 April, 21h10.

[47] ADBR 286 160 L'Administrateur provisoire du territoire d'Erstein to M. le Commissaire de la République à Strasbourg, 27 May 1919; 121AL 518 Le Lieutenant Colonel de Lavalette du Coetlosquet, Président de la Commission de Délimitation à M. le Directeur de l'Intérieur, Strasbourg, le 14 March 1922 ; ADBR 121AL 521 Président du Conseil de la délimitation du bassin de la Saar à M. le Haut Commissaire de l'Alsace-Lorraine, Sarrebruck, 28 April 1920.

[48] Matthew Frank and Jessica Reinisch (eds), *Refugees in Europe, 1919-1959. A Forty Year Crisis?* (London, 2014)

[49] John Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport. Surveillance, Citizenship and the State* (Cambridge, 2000).

[50] ADBR 286D 174 Préfet du Bas-Rhin à M. le Maire de Strasbourg, April 1922; Préfet du Bas-Rhin à M. le Maire de Strasbourg, 8 June 1922.

[51] ADBR 121AL 888 Commissaire Spéciale de la Gare et du Pont de Kehl, 3 October 1924.

[52] ADBR 121AL 524 M. Briand à M. le Dr Mayer, Ambassadeur d'Allemagne à Paris, Paris, 12 January 1922; 121AL 524 Régime des Propriétés Communales situées sur le rive droite du Rhin et en général de toutes les propriétés françaises, situées en Allemagne à moins de 5 kilomètres de la frontière.

[53] The border zone stretched for ten kilometres on each side of the border.

[54] ADBR 121AL 552 Arrangement administrative provisoire entre la France et l'état de Bade, 2 May 1922. Circulation entre la France et le Bade.

[55] ADBR 121AL 888 Commissaire Spéciale de Police de Colmar à M. le Directeur des Services Généraux de Police d'Alsace et de Lorraine à Strasbourg, 3 juillet 1925.

[56] Lawrence et al, 'Degrees of Foreignness,' 55.

[57] Sabine Dullin, 'The Interface between Neighbors at a Time of State Transition. The Thick Border of the Bolsheviks (1917–1924),' *Annales HSS,* 69, no. 2 (April-June 2014): 255–286, 278

[58] ADBR 121AL 552 Arrêté 20 October 1922.

[59] ADBR 121AL 552 Commissaire Général to Préfet du Bas-Rhin, Strasbourg, 20 October 1922.

[60] Horne, 'Demobilising the Mind.'

[61] ADBR 121AL 93 Commissaire Spéciale, Wissembourg, Rapport, Wissembourg 14 January 1924.

[62] ADBR 121AL 93, Préfet du Haut-Rhin to Commissaire Général, Colmar 22 January 1924.

[63] ADBR 121AL 93 Préfet du Haut-Rhin to Commissaire Général, Colmar 22 January 1924; Préfet du Bas-Rhin to Commissaire Général, Strasbourg, 18 January 1924.

[64] ADBR 121AL 93 Commissaire Général to Président du Conseil, 29 January 1924.

[65] ADBR 121AL 93 Commissaire Général to Président du Conseil, 29 January 1924.

[66] ADBR 121AL 93 Commissaire Général de la République to Préfet du Haut-Rhin, Colmar, 19 January 1924.

[67] ADBR 121AL 93 Commissaire Général to Préfet du Bas-Rhin, Strasbourg, 24 January 1924; Francois Leblond, *Gabriel Alapetite- Un Grand Serviteur de l'Etat* (Colmar, 2017)

[68] ADBR 121AL 888 Commissaire Spécial de Saint Louis to Préfet du Haut-Rhin, Saint Louis, 26 June 1925. The Commissaire noted that 'such cases occur with a frequency that increases on a daily basis.'

[69] Bernard Vogler, *Histoire Culturelle de l'Alsace* (Strasbourg, 1994) 392.

[70] Léon Strauss, 'Le malaise alsacien et le développement de l'autonomisme. La vie politique en Alsace dans l'entre-deux guerres', *Historiens et Géographes*, 345 (1995), 227-236 ; Philip Charles Fairwell Bankwitz, *Alsatian Autonomist Leaders. 1919-1947* (Kansas, 1978).

[71] ADBR 286D 160 Le Commissaire Général à M. le Directeur Généraux de Police d'Alsace et de Lorraine à Strasbourg, Strasbourg le 20 July 1930.

[72] Thomas Williams, 'Remaking the Franco-German Borderlands: Historical Claims and Commemorative Practices in the Upper Rhine, 1940–1949' (University of Oxford, 2010), 45-49.

[73] ADBR 286D 160 Commissaire Spéciale to M. le Directeur des Services Généraux de Police d'Alsace et de Lorraine, Strasbourg, 13 November 1930.

[74] Vicki Caron, *Uneasy Asylum: France and the Jewish Refugee Crisis, 1933-1942* (Stanford, 1999) Erin Corber 'Insiders and Outsiders in the Borderlands: Les Juifs en Alsace de la Periode Reichsland jusqu'aux Crises de Refugies,' in Ségolène Plyer (ed.) *Frontière et mobilités en Alsace après 1918* (Strasbourg, Forthcoming 2021).

[75] General Armau de Pouydraguin 'Les Fortifications du Nord-Est', in Comité alsacien d'études et d'informations, *L'Alsace depuis son retour* à *la France.* (Strasbourg, 1937), p.35 ; *Die Freie Presse*, 'Ne construisez pas de mur autour de nous' 6 December 1928.

[76] ADBR 286D161 Rapport, P. Elbling, Inspecteur de Police Spécial, Schoenau, 5 November 1936.

[77] ADBR 286D 161 Commissaire Spéciale to Préfet du Bas-Rhin, Strasbourg 10 June 1936.

[78] AN F715167 Préfet du Département du Haut-Rhin to M. le Sous-Secretaire de l'Etat à la Présidence du Conseil, Colmar, 16 May 1933.

[79] ADBR 286D 161 Préfet du Bas-Rhin to M. le Ministre des PTT chargé des affaires d'Alsace et de Lorraine.

[80] ADBR 286D 161 Commissaire Spéciale to Préfet du Bas-Rhin Strasbourg, 30 November 1936.

[81] ADBR 121AL 93 Commissaire Général to Président du Conseil, 29 January 1924.