

Misinformation Is a Threat Because (Other) People are Gullible

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Abstract

Alarmist narratives about the flow of misinformation and its negative consequences have gained traction in recent years. If these fears are to some extent warranted, the scientific literature suggests that many of them are exaggerated. Why are overly alarmist narratives about misinformation so popular? In two pre-registered experiments (N = 600, UK), replicated in the US (N = 601), we investigated the psychological factors associated with perceived danger of misinformation and how it contributes to the popularity of alarmist narratives on misinformation. We find that the strongest, and most reliable, predictor of perceived danger of misinformation is the third-person effect (i.e., the perception that others are more vulnerable to misinformation than the self) and, in particular, the belief that ‘distant’ others (as opposed to family and friends) are vulnerable to misinformation. The belief that societal problems have simple solutions and clear causes was consistently, but weakly, associated with perceived danger of online misinformation. Other factors, like negative attitudes towards new technologies and higher sensitivity to threats, were inconsistently, and weakly, associated with perceived danger of online misinformation. Finally, we found that participants who report being more worried about misinformation are more willing to like and share alarmist narratives on misinformation. Our findings suggest that alarmist narratives on misinformation tap into our tendency to view other people as gullible.

Preregistration, power analysis, data, materials, ESM, and R scripts are available at:

<https://osf.io/q4pj8/>

Introduction

The news media is awash with alarmist headlines about the effects and prevalence of misinformation (Blake, 2018; Borchers, 2016; Grice, 2017; Schwartz, 2018). The common narrative implies that the Internet, and social media in particular, by facilitating the production and diffusion of information, have weakened the role of traditional gatekeepers, and exacerbated our current information disorder. The truth does not matter to people anymore (Saslow, 2018), lies spread faster than the truth (Fox, 2018), people can't tell falsehoods from the truth (Borchers, 2016), and technological advances such as deepfakes and micro-targeting have made mass persuasion easier than ever (Viner, 2016). However, in contrast to these alarmist and pessimistic narratives, the scientific literature is more nuanced (e.g., Nyhan, 2020). Many of these narrative have been labeled as 'moral panics' (Altay et al., 2021; Anderson, 2021; Carlson, 2020; Jungherr & Schroeder, 2021; Mitchelstein et al., 2020), or 'techno panics', which reappear cyclically with the emergence of new technologies (Orben, 2020). These narratives are successful: in the US, 90% of people believe that social media facilitate the spread of misinformation (Knight Foundation, 2022), and on average people across the world report being more worried about misinformation than about sexism, racism, terrorism, climate change, online fraud, or online bullying (Knuutila et al., 2022; Mitchell et al., 2019; World Risk Poll, 2020). These fears are not totally unfounded, especially considering that people worry the most about misinformation coming from powerful actors, such as elected politicians (Newman et al., 2021), and that in many country these powerful actors do play a central role in the spread of misinformation (Ricard & Medeiros, 2020). Still, most of these narratives are excessively alarmist in the sense that they greatly exaggerate the prevalence (e.g., 'Misinformation on Facebook got six times more clicks than factual news during the 2020 election, study says') and impact of misinformation (e.g., 'COVID Misinformation is Killing People'; for a review see: Altay et al., 2021). Moreover, expressed fear about misinformation seems to be largely unrelated to objective risks posed by misinformation, for instance, fear about misinformation is unrelated to press freedom and misinformation prevalence at the country level (Knuutila et al., 2022).

A growing body of research is pointing at the deleterious effect of these alarmist narratives on misinformation (Altay et al., 2020; Lee, 2021; Nisbet et al., 2021; Nyhan, 2020; Van Duyn & Collier, 2019), and have tried to correct them (Lyons et al., 2020). For instance, alarmist narratives about deepfakes, common in the popular press, have been found to increase skepticism in both true and fake videos (Ternovski et al., 2022). More broadly, if alarmist narratives on misinformation were to successfully increase the perceived prevalence of misinformation (which remains to be proven), they could lead to narrower media diets, less trust in the media (Shapiro, 2020) and reduce the sharing of reliable news on

social media (Yang & Horning, 2020). For instance, the term ‘fake news’ has been used to delegitimize reliable news outlets and to dismiss their news coverage as deeply flawed (Farhall et al., 2019). One online experiment showed that exposure to elite discourse about fake news leads to lower trust in the media and less belief in true news (Van Duyn & Collier, 2019). Similarly, excessive public attention on misinformation is suspected to erode satisfaction with democracy by making electoral processes appear less fair and just (Nisbet et al., 2021).

Yet, very little attention has been paid to *why* these alarmist narratives are so popular. While the news media and politicians have largely alimented these narratives in recent years, the success of alarmist narratives cannot be explained solely by such top-down influence. On social media people willingly share alarmist narratives about the prevalence and effects of misinformation on social media. At best, the media can set the agenda and frame how people think of a problem (Barberá et al., 2019; Lazarsfeld et al., 1948), but they are unlikely to create these fears from scratch and dictate people’s attitudes about it (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955; Livingstone, 2019). Instead, it is more likely that the media and politicians fuel pre-existing concerns about misinformation in the population (Orben, 2020).

To understand the popularity of alarmist narratives on misinformation we draw on the field of cultural evolution (Acerbi, 2020). Cultural Attraction Theory, in particular, puts a special emphasis on the intuitive cognitive mechanisms contributing to the cultural success of ideas and beliefs (Sperber, 1996). In the first experiment, we investigate five psychological factors hypothesized to be associated with perceived danger of misinformation. These factors are not exhaustive – we did not include group level factors such as political orientation, nor individual level factors such as personality traits – yet, they are plausible predictors derived from the literature on cultural evolution and media studies (see below). In the second experiment, we examine whether perceived danger of misinformation contributes to the cultural success of alarmist headlines on misinformation. More specifically, we investigate whether people who are more worried about misinformation are also more likely to share and like alarmist headlines. The pre-registered experiments were initially conducted among UK participants and then replicated among US participants. In the sections below we present our theoretical framework and outline five factors that we hypothesized being associated with perceived danger of online misinformation.

A general negative bias toward new technologies.

Throughout history, people have been concerned about the effects of new technologies, including books, movies, music, the radio, cars, television, computers, or video games (Orben, 2020). These concerns are often exxagerated and many of them have been labeled as ‘moral panics’ (Orben, 2020). Today, numerous

alarmist narratives on misinformation have a technological component, whether it is the internet, social media, or other kinds of new technologies such as deepfakes (e.g. ‘You thought fake news was bad? Deep fakes are where truth goes to die’; Schwartz, 2018). We thus predicted that people holding more negative views about technologies would be more worried about misinformation.

H₁: Perceived danger of misinformation will be positively associated with negative attitudes toward new technologies.

Preference for simple explanations.

Outcomes of collective human behavior are difficult to understand. Why did Trump win the 2016 election? Why did the U.K. leave the European Community? What is driving the rise of populism across the globe? Explaining vaccine hesitancy, or any other puzzling social phenomenon, as an effect of “fake news” or “misinformation” is very appealing to the human mind: the real causal factors are complex, not intuitive, and hard to lay out, while the brevity and intuitiveness of monocausal explanations make them easier to understand, spread and remember (Keil, 2003; Lombrozo, 2016). Many alarmist narratives on misinformation are simplistic, they identify clear culprits and simple solutions to complex problems with no clear cause and no clear solution (e.g. ‘Fake news handed Brexiteers the referendum – and now they have no idea what they are doing’; Grice, 2017). We thus predicted that people who are more likely to think that complex societal problems have simple solutions and clear causes would be more worried about misinformation. Previous work has shown that a belief in simple solutions for complex societal problems is strongly associated with believing in various conspiracy theories (Van Prooijen et al., 2015; Van Prooijen & Douglas, 2017). In particular, belief in simple solutions for complex societal problems is hypothesized to be a cognitive antecedent of conspiracy beliefs (Pantazi et al., 2021).

H₂: Perceived danger of misinformation will be positively associated with the belief that societal problems have simple solutions and clear causes.

The appeal of threat related information.

Many alarmist narratives on misinformation closely resemble threat-related rumors: they warn people about dangers causing great harm, often based on circumstantial evidence (e.g. ‘Fake news is killing us. How can we stop it?’; Yoder, 2020). As a rule, it is less costly to at least consider such warnings, even if they might turn out to be false, than to ignore them, as they might turn out to be real (Haselton et al.,

2015). People have a strong appetite for such narratives, being particularly attentive to them, finding them more plausible, remembering them better, and being more willing to share them (Blaine & Boyer, 2018). We thus predicted that people who are more sensitive to threat, measured by the extent to which participants believe that we live in a “dangerous world”, would be more worried about misinformation. Previous work has found that a belief that we live in a ‘dangerous world’ is associated with higher intergroup prejudice, the endorsement of negative stereotypes (Cook et al., 2018) or gun ownership (Stroebe et al., 2017).

H₃: Perceived danger of misinformation will be positively associated with the belief that we live in a dangerous world.

Overestimation of gullibility.

Finally, we may overestimate the reach and the effect of misinformation, and thus be worried about it, if we believe that humans are gullible (e.g. ‘A harsh truth about fake news: Some people are super gullible’; Borchers, 2016). This belief has two dimensions. On one hand, we may believe that everyone, including ourselves, is generally gullible (H₄ below). On the other hand, we may believe that other people are more gullible than we are (H₅ below, see also “third-person effect”, Jang & Kim, 2018; Ștefăniță et al., 2018; Yoo et al., 2022), that is, that others are more easily swayed and manipulated than we are (in particular by false information). The third-person effect stems from a general tendency to downplay one’s susceptibility to socially undesirable messages and overstate others’ receptivity to socially desirable messages (Gunther, 1995). For instance, people exhibiting a stronger third-person effect of fake news are more likely to judge fake news on social media as socially undesirable (Yang & Horning, 2020). The third-person effect is exacerbated for outgroup members (Corbu et al., 2020), and is a good candidate to explain why, for instance, narratives about the influence of misinformation in the election of Trump in 2016 are so popular among Democrats (e.g. ‘A new study suggests fake news might have won Donald Trump the 2016 election’; Blake, 2018).

H₄: Perceived danger of misinformation will be negatively associated with confidence that people in general, friends and family, and themselves, are able to identify misinformation.

H₅: Perceived danger of misinformation will be positively associated with the third-person effect, i.e., the tendency to be more confident that oneself, compared to others, is able to identify misinformation.

In a second online experiment, we investigated whether perceived danger of misinformation contributes to the cultural success of alarmist narratives on misinformation. In particular, we measured how willing participants would be to like and share alarmist headlines on misinformation. We predicted that participants perceiving online misinformation as more dangerous would also be more likely to share (H₆) and like (H₇) the alarmist headlines.

H₆: Participants perceiving online misinformation as more dangerous will be more willing to share alarmist headlines on misinformation.

H₇: Participants perceiving online misinformation as more dangerous will be more willing to like alarmist headlines on misinformation.

Experiment 1

In the first experiment, we investigated the psychological factors associated with perceived danger of misinformation. We tested whether perceived danger of online misinformation was associated with negative attitudes towards new technologies (H₁), the belief that societal problems have simple solutions and clear causes (H₂), the belief that we live in a dangerous world (H₃), perceived susceptibility of the self, close others, and distant others, to misinformation (H₄), and the third-person effect (H₅).

Method

Participants

Based on a pre-registered power analysis, we recruited 303 participants in the UK via Prolific Academic, and excluded 3 participants who failed the attention check, leaving 300 participants (147 women, $M_{age} = 37.79$, $SD_{age} = 12.84$). For the replication, we recruited 302 participants (148 women, $M_{age} = 33.25$, $SD_{age} = 11.96$) in the US via Prolific Academic. Both samples were balanced in terms of gender, and participants were paid £ .38. (i.e., £ 7.60/hour for an estimate completion time of 3 minutes).

Design and procedure

After completing a consent form, participants were asked to report their age, gender, and level of education. Then, they were presented with 16 questions divided in five blocks: (i) perceived danger of misinformation, (ii) attitudes towards new technologies, (iii) belief that societal problems have simple solutions and clear causes, (iv) belief that we live in a dangerous world, and (v) confidence in their abilities, friends and family's abilities, and people's abilities, to spot misinformation. The presentation order of the blocks was randomized together with the questions inside the blocks (except in block (v), where the presentation order of the questions was not randomized because it is standard in the literature on the third-person effect to first ask about the self and finish with distant others). One question was displayed per page. An attention check was presented in the last block of the experiment.

Materials

Perceived danger of misinformation was measured with three questions:

- 'How much of a problem do you think made-up news and information are in the country today?' (1[Not a problem at all], 2[A small problem], 3[A moderately big problem], 4[A very big problem], NA[Don't know]), from (Pew Research Center, 2019).
- 'In your opinion, is the existence of news or information that misrepresent reality or is even false a problem for democracy in general?' (1[No, definitely not], 2[No, not really], 3[Yes, to some extent], 4[Yes, definitely], NA[Don't know]), from (European Commission., 2018).
- 'How much of a threat do you believe "fake news" is to our society?' (1[Not much of a threat], 2[A somewhat serious threat], 3[A very serious threat], NA[Don't know]), from (Shapiro, 2020).

For all the statements below, participants were asked 'To what extent do you agree with the following statement?' (1[Strongly disagree], 2[Disagree], 3[Slightly disagree], 4[Neither agree nor disagree], 5[Slightly agree], 6[Agree], 7[Strongly agree]).

Negative attitudes towards new technologies was measured with three questions adapted from Khasawneh (2018) and Tomczyk and colleagues (2021):

- 'I am fearful that someone is using technology to watch and listen to everything that I do'
- 'I am afraid of new technologies because one day it will make us (humans) obsolete'
- 'I think that digital technologies have positively changed our lives' [reverse coded]

Belief that societal problems have simple solutions and clear causes was measured with four questions adapted from Pantazi and colleagues (2021) and van Prooijen (2017):

- 'With the right policies, most problems in society are easy to solve'
- 'Most societal problems have a clear cause and a clear solution'
- 'Most societal problems are too complex to know for sure what the right policy is' [reverse coded]
- 'For most societal problems it is clear how they have originated'

Belief in a dangerous world was measured with three questions adapted from Ackerman and colleagues (2018) and Altemeyer (1988):

- 'There are many dangerous people in our society who will attack someone out of pure meanness, for no reason at all'
- 'Any day now, chaos and anarchy could erupt around us. All signs are pointing to it'
- 'If a person takes a few sensible precautions, nothing bad will happen. We do not live in a dangerous world' [Reverse coded]

Confidence in their abilities, friends and family's abilities, and people's abilities to spot misinformation was measured with three questions adapted from Corbu and colleagues (2020) and the European Commission (2018):

- 'I am able to identify news or information that misrepresent reality or is even false'
- 'My friends and family are able to identify news or information that misrepresent reality or is even false'
- 'People in general are able to identify news or information that misrepresent reality or is even false'

For the last block, we reversed coded all answers to have a measure of perceived difficulty to spot misinformation instead of perceived ability to spot misinformation. The general perceived difficulty to spot misinformation (H_4) was computed as the sum of answers to three questions. The third-person effect (H_5) was computed as the difference between self-perception and others-perception, i.e., 'perception of the self' - $((\text{'close others'} + \text{'distant others'})/2)$. In SI section 2 we show that our results are robust to alternative implementation of the third-person effect.

Results and discussion

First, we report the correlations between perceived danger of misinformation and our independent variables. In the UK, we found that negative attitudes towards new technologies, belief that societal problems have simple solutions and clear causes, belief that we live in a dangerous world, perceived difficulty to spot misinformation, and the third-person effect, were all positively correlated with perceived danger of misinformation. In the US, belief that societal problems have simple solutions and clear causes, perceived difficulty to spot misinformation, and the third-person effect were significantly correlated with perceived danger of misinformation, but not negative attitudes towards new technologies or belief that we live in a dangerous world. The correlations are reported in column 2 and 4 of Table 1.

Second, we report how well each variable predict perceived danger of misinformation with a linear regression including the five predictors. In the UK, negative attitudes towards new technologies and the third-person effect were associated with higher perceived danger of misinformation. In the US, belief that societal problems have simple solutions and clear causes, and the third-person effect were associated with higher perceived danger of misinformation. The betas are reported in column 3 and 5 of Table 1.

	United Kingdom		United States	
Negative attitudes towards new technologies	$r = .16^{**}$	$b = .08^*$	$r = .01$	$b = .01$
Societal problems have simple solutions and clear causes	$r = .13^*$	$b = .05^\dagger$	$r = .14^*$	$b = .08^{**}$
We live in a dangerous world	$r = .17^{**}$	$b = .02$	$r = .10$	$b = .05^\dagger$
Perceived difficulty to spot misinformation	$r = .14^*$	$b = .03$	$r = .14^*$	$b = .07^\dagger$
Third-person effect	$r = .28^{***}$	$b = .10^{***}$	$r = .30^{***}$	$b = .08^{***}$

Table 1. In column 2 and 4, we report the Spearman correlations coefficients with perceived danger of misinformation. In column 3 and 5, we report the betas of a linear regression including the five predictors. $^\dagger p < .10$, $^* p < .05$, $^{**} p < .01$, $^{***} p < .001$.

Overall, we find inconsistent support for H_1 across the two countries. In the UK, negative attitudes towards new technology were associated with perceived danger of misinformation, but in the US the association was extremely weak ($r = .01$) and non-significant. We find moderate support for H_2 , with weak associations between the belief that societal problems have simple solutions and clear causes, and

perceived danger of online misinformation. We find inconsistent support for H₃, as the belief that we live in a dangerous world was not a significant predictor of perceived danger of misinformation in the regressions, but the correlation was significant in the UK. We find limited support for H₄, with significant correlations between perceived difficulty to spot misinformation and perceived danger of online misinformation, but these associations almost disappeared in the regressions. Finally, we find strong support for H₅, with participants exhibiting a stronger third-person effect being more worried about misinformation (see Figure 1).




Figure 1. Correlations between the third-person effect and perceived danger of misinformation. The cyan shaded area represents the 95% confidence intervals. The top histograms represent the distribution of perceived danger of online misinformation (higher score indicates higher perceived danger), while histograms on the right represent the distribution of the third-person effect scores (higher score indicates more pronounced third-person effect). In the US we removed from the visualization (but not the predicted correlation) one data point with a -6 third-person effect score, and a 3.5 perceived danger of misinformation score.

Exploratory analyses on the third-person effect

We have seen that the third-person effect is, in both the UK and the US, the strongest predictor of perceived danger of misinformation. Here, we investigate what is driving this association by looking at the correlations between the individual components of the third-person effect (susceptibility of the self, close

others, and distant others) and perceived danger of misinformation. We find that the association is mainly driven by the perceived inability of distant others to spot misinformation. Lower confidence in distant others' ability to spot misinformation was associated with higher perceived danger of misinformation (UK: $r = .26$; US: $r = .30$), while close others' ability to spot misinformation was not significantly associated with perceived danger of online misinformation (UK: $r = .10$; US: $r = .07$). Finally, higher confidence in one's ability to spot misinformation was also associated with higher perceived danger of misinformation (UK: $r = .14$; US: $r = .16$). In SI section 2 we provide more details about these correlations and in the Table 2 below we report the descriptive statistics of perceived ability to spot misinformation.

	United Kingdom	United States
Self	5.14 (1.07) Slightly agree	5.13 (1.18) Slightly agree
My friends and family	4.18 (1.65) Neither agree nor disagree	4.17 (1.30) Neither agree nor disagree
People in general	3.47 (1.30) Slightly disagree	3.27 (1.31) Slightly disagree

Table 2. Perceived ability of the self, friends and family, and people in general, to identify news or information that misrepresent reality or is even false (7-point Likert scale). We report the mean (SD) and the median answer. Higher score corresponds to greater perceived ability to identify misinformation.

Experiment 2

In the second experiment, we investigated whether interpersonal differences in perceived danger of misinformation contribute to the cultural success of alarmist narratives on misinformation. We measured how willing participants would be to like and share various alarmist headlines on misinformation, and predicted that participants higher in perceived danger of online misinformation would be more likely to share (H_6) and like (H_7) the alarmist headlines.

Method

Participants

Based on a pre-registered power analysis, we recruited 300 participants in the UK via Prolific Academic (147 women, $M_{age} = 38.86$, $SD_{age} = 12.82$). For the replication, we recruited 299 participants (144 women, $M_{age} = 35.37$, $SD_{age} = 16.88$) in the US via Prolific Academic. Both samples were balanced in terms of gender, and participants were paid £ .38 (i.e., £ 7.60/hour for an estimated completion time of 3 minutes).

Design and procedure

After completing a consent form, participants were asked to report their age, gender, and level of education. Then, they were presented with the three questions about perceived danger of misinformation of Experiment 1. Finally, they indicated how likely they would be to like and share four alarmist headlines on misinformation. In total we used eight headlines, but participants were randomly assigned to a set of four headlines. The sets were created to be balanced and not repetitive. The presentation order of the headlines was randomized. One headline was displayed per page. An attention check was present in the last block of the experiment.

Materials

The headlines were selected on prominent news outlets' Facebook page, and many of them were chosen because they have been criticized to be overly alarmists by researchers (e.g., <https://twitter.com/JoeUscinski/status/1398274503571017731?s=20&t=J4GTr0RQ5d25B9ayujdhyA>).

For each headline, participants answered the following questions on a 6 point-Likert scale (1[Very unlikely], 2[Unlikely], 3[Slightly unlikely], 4[Slightly likely], 5[Likely], 6[Very likely]):

- How likely would you be to **like** this post on social media?
- How likely would you be to **share** this post on social media?

The alarmist headlines were presented in a Facebook format (see Figure 2). The full list of headlines is available on OSF.




Figure 2. Two headlines used in Experiment 2, as they were presented to the participants.

Results and discussion

We ran linear mixed effect models with participants as random effect. Figure 3 offers a visual representation of the results. In the UK, we found that perceived danger of misinformation was associated with a higher willingness to like ($b = .41$ [.24, .79]) and share the alarmist headlines ($b = .49$ [.23, .74]). In SI we show that this holds true for each individual question of the perceived danger of misinformation scale. In the US, we found that perceived danger of misinformation was associated with a higher willingness to like ($b = .51$ [.23, .79]) and share the alarmist headlines ($b = .59$ [.32, .85]). This holds true for each individual question of the perceived danger of misinformation scale (except for one p value failing to reach statistical significance at .0523, see SI).

Overall, we find that participants who perceive the danger of online misinformation to be higher are more likely to like and share alarmist narratives on misinformation, offering support for H₆ and H₇.




Figure 3. Correlations between willingness to like/share the headlines and perceived danger of misinformation. The cyan shaded area represents the 95% confidence intervals.

Conclusion

Many alarmist narratives about the prevalence and impact of misinformation, such as its influence on major political events, are greatly exaggerated. Yet, little is known about what makes these narratives so popular. Drawing on the literature on cultural evolution and media studies, we investigated some of the factors that make these narratives appealing, and that motivate us to share them on social media. Our pre-registered experiments were initially conducted among UK participants (N = 600) and replicated among US participants (N = 601). First, we explored the psychological factors associated with perceived danger of misinformation. Of the five factors that we tested, we found that the strongest, and most

reliable, predictor of perceived danger of misinformation was the perception that others are more vulnerable to misinformation than the self ('third-person effect'). Within the third-person effect, the strongest predictor of perceived danger of online misinformation was the perceived vulnerability of 'people in general', followed by self-perceived invulnerability to misinformation—while the perceived vulnerability of family and friends was not significantly associated with perceived danger of misinformation. The belief that societal problems have simple solutions and clear causes was consistently, but weakly, associated with perceived danger of misinformation. Other factors, like negative attitudes towards new technologies and the belief that we live in a dangerous world, were inconsistently, and weakly, associated with perceived danger of misinformation. Second, we examined the association between perceived danger of misinformation and the success of alarmist narratives on social media. We found that participants who reported being more worried about misinformation were also more willing to like and share alarmist narratives on misinformation.

Our results should be interpreted with three limitations in mind. First, we did not investigate an exhaustive list of factors that could be associated with perceived danger of misinformation. We focused on individual-level factors for which we had solid theoretical ground to expect an effect. Second, we only measured participants' willingness to share and like alarmist headlines, not actual behaviors. Even if some data suggest that the two are correlated (Mosleh et al., 2019), very few people, when given the opportunity to share the headlines they said they wanted to share, actually share them on social media (Henry et al., 2020). Third, we relied on UK and US samples, two countries where concern about misinformation is high, so it would be interesting to replicate our findings in countries where concern is lower (e.g., Slovakia; Knuutila et al., 2022; Newman et al., 2020).

In line with previous findings in the literature on the third-person effect of misinformation (Corbu et al., 2020; Jang & Kim, 2018; Ștefăniță et al., 2018; Yoo et al., 2022) we found clear evidence that people think that others, and in particular distant others, are more vulnerable to misinformation than themselves. In our experiments, 77% of participants believed that people in general were more vulnerable to misinformation than themselves, and only 18% believed that they were more vulnerable to misinformation than people in general. This should not necessarily be taken as evidence that our participants are biased or overconfident, as some of those who report being less vulnerable than others are correct in their assessment (Lyons, 2022). However, the pessimistic perceptions of our participants about the ability of other people to spot misinformation may not be fully justified. At least three reasons suggest that some more optimism may be warranted. First, on average people are good at identifying fake news in experiments (Acerbi et al., 2022; Arechar et al., 2022)—in fact, people are more likely to recognize

false news as false than to recognize true news as true (Batailler et al., 2022; Bryanov & Vziatysheva, 2021). Second, people generally distrust hyper partisan and fake news sources, and as a result largely avoid consuming misinformation (Allen et al., 2020; Guess et al., 2019; Pennycook & Rand, 2019). Third, humans are endowed with a suit of cognitive mechanisms allowing them to evaluate communicated information (Mercier, 2020; Sperber et al., 2010), and are able, even from a young age, to reject information coming from incompetent or malevolent sources (Harris, 2012).

Alarmist narratives could help raise awareness about misinformation and thus have various kinds of societal benefits despite being overly alarmist. For instance, they might help hold social media companies accountable, incentivizing them to intensify their efforts to reduce the visibility of misinformation and to make their data more broadly available to researchers. Alarmist narratives might also motivate people to correct misinformation when they see it, and to take active measures to counter it. However, these benefits are conditioned by the level of public awareness of misinformation. Once the population is aware of the problem, as it seems to be the case, the benefits of alarmist narratives should diminish. And by being overly alarmist, narratives on misinformation risk having detrimental consequences. They could divert our attention and resources from the real causes of the current information disorder (Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017), such as lack of trust in institutions and high partisan animosity (Osmundsen et al., 2021; Zimmermann & Kohring, 2020). They may also be used to justify regulations with anti-democratic consequences, such as reducing freedom of speech or silencing political dissidents. Finally, as mentioned in the Introduction, overly alarmist narratives on misinformation could contribute to reducing trust in the news media and decreasing the acceptance of reliable information (Shapiro, 2020; Ternovski et al., 2022; Van Duyn & Collier, 2019; Yang & Horning, 2020).

The finding that alarmist narratives on misinformation tap into our tendency to view other people as gullible could help address some of their negative effects. For instance, while it is important to raise awareness about misinformation, it may also be necessary to communicate to the public the scientific evidence that misinformation is less widespread than they think and that its effects are more nuanced than often assumed (Lyons et al. 2020; Nisbet et al., 2021). Moreover, correcting the perception that ‘people in general’ are more gullible than oneself could help sustain support for democracy, as the legitimacy of democratic decisions should decrease as a function of the perceived irrationality of (others) people (Stafford, 2022; for a similar argument see: Karpf, 2019). For instance, people who think that misinformation has stronger effects on others as opposed to oneself, are more likely to be dissatisfied with the American electoral democracy (Nisbet et al., 2021). Finally, correcting overly alarmist perception

on misinformation, most notably by dispelling the myth of a generalized gullibility, may help improve the quality of our information ecosystem by increasing trust in the news media.

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Ethics

Ethics approval for the study was granted by the College of Health, Medicine and Life Sciences Research Ethics Committee of Brunel University London (34105-MHR-Jan/2022- 37733-3).

Competing interests

The authors declare no competing interests.