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To cite this article: Matthew Hughes (27 Jul 2026): Fawzi al-Qawuqji's moment in Palestine: insurgent military effectiveness and the politics of the Arab revolt, 1936–39, *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, DOI: [10.1080/09592318.2026.2708039](https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2026.2708039)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2026.2708039>



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Published online: 27 Jul 2026.



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Fawzi al-Qawuqji's moment in Palestine: insurgent military effectiveness and the politics of the Arab revolt, 1936–39

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ABSTRACT

When Arab military veteran Fawzi al-Qawuqji deployed to Palestine in August 1936 to command insurgents fighting British rule in the country during the Arab revolt, his military organisation and command style impressed British soldiers. He galvanised local Palestinians and supercharged the insurgency. Initially, this article argues that a charismatic, experienced commander can have a significant impact on an insurgency even though al-Qawuqji fought in Palestine for only six weeks. This examination then develops two arguments. First, al-Qawuqji stood out because other field commanders were ineffective and parochial. Second, Britain thoughtfully married military operations and policy making, facilitating al-Qawuqji's escape from Palestine in October 1936 to effect a ceasefire. Palestinian and Arab political leaders encouraged both the ceasefire and al-Qawuqji's departure as they were uncommitted to violent insurgency. This article emphasises the importance of unified central and local insurgent organisation. It tilts to weaknesses in Palestinian resistance, makes positive comment on Palestinian Islamist insurgent Shaykh 'Izz al-Din al-Qassam, and concludes with how the British permitted Palestinian supreme leader Hajj Amin al-Husayni's escape from Palestine in October 1937.

ARTICLE HISTORY Received 15 June 2026; Accepted 14 July 2026

KEYWORDS Fawzi al-Qawuqji; Hajj Amin al Husayni; the Mufti; Shaykh 'Izz al-din al-qassam; Arab revolt

Introduction

In late August 1936, former Ottoman soldier and Arab nationalist Fawzi al-Qawuqji arrived in British Mandate Palestine to lead rebels in the Arab revolt against British rule and Jewish immigration to the country. Al-Qawuqji invigorated insurgents and in his brief time in Palestine, 24 August to 26 October 1936, he fought pitched battles with the British (Al-Qawuqji served in Palestine for two months, but he was in combat for about six weeks, up to

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12 October.) Al-Qawuqji formed his riflemen into anti-aircraft squads, with his men using metal grids correctly to pattern rifles skywards to shoot down RAF warplanes. He was qualitatively superior to other Arab field commanders. The argument here is that al-Qawuqji in two months started to transform a fragmented insurgency with fragile central and local processes of control to a parochial one with fragile central but robust local processes of control, to borrow Paul Staniland's language.¹

Both the British and Palestinians recognised his charismatic leadership. Laila Parsons in her 2016 book on al-Qawuqji aptly called him the 'commander'.² This article develops two arguments regarding Palestinian military effectiveness and the relationship between operations and policy. First, al-Qawuqji was effective, but weak overall insurgent command structures scuppered his hard work. The Arab revolt's political leader, Hajj Amin al-Husayni (aka the 'Mufti'), resented the dynamic al-Qawuqji. This was emblematic of a fractured insurgency and was a gift to the British – *divide et impera*. Second, the British contrived in al-Qawuqji's escape from Palestine to help forge a ceasefire that had come into effect on 12 October 1936. The Army was unhappy at this political *démarche*, preferring to capture or kill al-Qawuqji. Al-Qawuqji's moment in Palestine speaks to Palestinian military ineffectiveness, and to the British colonial state's successful union of operations to long-term policy. The British, or someone close to them, paid off al-Qawuqji in November 1936 as he left Palestine, and that he was willing to accept such payments re-orientates our understanding of his insurgent commitment. A year after the British let al-Qawuqji's escape, they did the same for Hajj Amin in October 1937 when he left Jerusalem for Lebanon.

This article argues against Palestinian military power. Al-Qawuqji impressed the British because other rebel leaders were unimpressive; and the Army let him leave Palestine because it was politically expedient to do so, not because he was on the verge of victory. Al-Qawuqji was a powerful insurgent leader, comparable in dedication and charisma to Islamist Palestinian rebel Shaykh 'Izz al-Din al-Qassam (whose posthumous followers were Qassamites), hunted down and killed by British Palestine police in November 1935. But al-Qawuqji fought in Palestine for a matter of weeks, and al-Qassam was dead before the Arab revolt erupted in April 1936. Britain's powerful counterinsurgency machine overwhelmed inchoate Palestinian networks of rebellion. Palestinian victory demanded more leaders like al-Qassam and al-Qawuqji, fewer like Hajj Amin, and a protracted, disciplined struggle by the peasantry. The Palestinian insurgency never bridged the gap between urbanite leaders and the peasantry (or lumpenproletariat), a point that Frantz Fanon made more broadly in 1961 in his classic critique of colonialism, *The Wretched of the Earth*. Mao Zedong's anti-Japanese, anti-Guomindang communist struggle in China in the 1930s and 1940s is the model here for successful insurgency.

This study is a work of military history, a subject traditionally fixed on military effectiveness and battlefield manoeuvres, but at its heart this article takes readers to the thorny issue of culture and combat. Military historian John Keegan study *History of Warfare* in 1993 usefully linked war to culture, but ground-breaking books on culture and combat such as John Dower's *War without Mercy* (1986) or Victor Davis Hanson's corpus on the ancient Greeks and their way of war have, tellingly, been written by authors who are not military historians.

The argument here surrounding combatants such as al-Qawuqji and al-Qassam points to social-cultural shortcomings within Palestinian resistance. Comparative analysis of other insurgencies suggests that with different social-political-cultural matrices – what we might call ‘cultures of combat’ – the Palestinians could have achieved more, as, indeed the Vietnamese did, defeating France and then the USA in their anti-colonial struggle, or the Jews in Palestine against Britain, 1945–47, to cite just a few pertinent examples. The Palestinians were brave, purposeful, and passionate, but insurgency requires leadership, charisma, and organisation to vector this emotional state, as al-Qawuqji and al-Qassam prove. Rather than Orientalist assumptions about non-Western cultures and ways of war, the point here is that rural insurgents in pre-capitalist societies without good leadership – based in national, religious, communist-class identities – are social bandits, fighting local injustice rather than mobilising nationally for political struggle – the subject of Eric Hobsbawm's classic 1969 *Bandits*.

In the cities such as they are, such resistors will be the mob. To justify defeat by saying that Palestinian rebel leaders lacked military training, that they tried hard, that they persevered, that the opposition was overwhelming, and that calling them parochial or incompetent is disdainful and victim-blaming elides the core issue of why insurgents from some cultural communities win, while others lose, against comparable colonial opposition, and with similar peasant-based rebellions. There are two variable factors: the power of the counterinsurgents and the mobilisation of the insurgents, and contra arguments from, say, Caroline Elkins, it is not clear that the considerable force that Britain used in Palestine was any more or less brutal than violent pacification measures it used anywhere else in the empire – at least in colonies that had non-white populations (softer British treatment of the Jews in their revolt in Palestine in 1945 is instructive here) and were not part of the UK metropolitan home area.³ Thus, the insurgency in Palestine is the main variable.

One important point to note, the Arab revolt was a rural-based military insurgency and an urban-based General Strike. They were different but coincident phenomena, with the same objective of Palestinian liberation. Hajj

Amin was the leader of the latter, and he had influence over the former; al-Qawuqji played an important, if short-lived, part in the latter, the military rebellion. Al-Qassam was dead before the revolt started, but his life foregrounds key themes surrounding insurgent power.

Fawzi al-Qawuqji

Al-Qawuqji was a military veteran of standing. He had fought with the Ottomans in the Great War, for and against the French in Syria in the 1920s, as an adviser in Saudi Arabia, and after Palestine he fought Britain in Iraq and Syria in 1941, and (what would become) Israel in 1948. He gave the Arab revolt military momentum, but his force was small, and he was in Palestine fighting for just six weeks. He battled not just with poor recruitment, equipment shortages and the British Army, but with resentful local commanders as well as Hajj Amin. Al-Qawuqji arrived in late August 1936, visited villages, built morale, and established base areas around Nablus.⁴ He infiltrated men into the Mandate government and started a rebel media department under a former Syrian journalist to spread misinformation and to print fake official communiqués.⁵ Al-Qawuqji consolidated local bands with their 'different leaderships' by rationalising rebel forces into three zones around Nablus-Tulkarm-Jenin, under which he fixed smaller local commands.⁶ These vied with rebel areas around Jerusalem that were 'very much pro-Mufti'.⁷ There were special courts 'to punish, judge and try the enemies of the revolt'.⁸ Convinced that the British had infiltrated spies into rebel areas, al-Qawuqji had revolutionary tribunals deal with spying.⁹ The British press took note of rebel autonomy – what we might call Maoist 'base areas' but without the communist ideology (that the increasingly conservative-Islamist Arab revolt detested) – with the *Yorkshire Post* telling its readers how,

These leaders, ensconced in the tortuous hills of Palestine, have succeeded in largely imposing their will on the Arab countryside. They have set up their own courts of justice. They have decreed what headdress Arab men and women, both Moslem and Christian shall wear in Palestine. They have, in short, created the rudiments of a government independent of, and antagonistic to, the Palestine Government.¹⁰

Al-Qawuqji's rebel courts could hit suspects up to fifty times and were able to 'purify' the region of spies; the tribunals frequently passed and 'many times' carried out the death sentence.¹¹ Al-Qawuqji had special groups across Palestine to gather information that he needed for bigger battles like Jaba' and Bal'a in September 1936.¹² Using Iraqi officers, he trained rebels to shoot at warplanes and to counter armoured vehicles. One fighter crudely attacked a broken-down tank in October 1936 by trying to gain entry to the turret with a rock; the crew removed him by rotating the turret.¹³ A Seaforth Highlander's

photograph of a downed RAF aeroplane was one of several shot down by al-Qawuqji's men.¹⁴ Intelligence was vital and al-Qawuqji's Beirut papers mention how 'our secret formations of intelligence inside Palestine did their job very well' by supplying the information needed for operational planning.¹⁵ The organisation, psychological warfare, general staff work, operations room planning, recruiting, training, and use of intelligence and counter-intelligence marked out al-Qawuqji, like al-Qassam before him. The British took note, too. 'A very good man,' noted one soldier, while Captain E. C. W. Myers of the Royal Engineers wrote how al-Qawuqji, a 'soldier of no mean ability,' must have been to the French military academy at St Cyr as he was so good; the Arabs learned 'to realise the value of preliminary reconnaissance and of detailed plans before their attacks'.¹⁶ 'Head and shoulders above all others was the Arab Overall Field Commander Fawzi ed Din Kauwakji,' in the words of a Palestine policeman, who added in conversation with this author how al-Qawuqji was 'a born leader, led from the front'.¹⁷

Al-Qawuqji combined military acumen and popular appeal. Schoolchildren turned out to support him in October 1936, with a 'noisy collection' of small children assembling outside Army headquarters in Nablus, obviously aware that al-Qawuqji had shot down RAF warplanes. 'One of the urchins carried a toy aeroplane on the end of a long pole while another brandished what appeared to be an imitation Lewis gun. They seemed to be repeating some set piece in which the words 'FAWZI BEY' and 'mabsut' [Arabic for 'happy,' Arabic/Hebrew slang for 'pleased with' or 'happy with'] were all that could be distinguished'.¹⁸ Al-Qawuqji's popular appeal impressed the Army:

The following extract from 2 Dorset Narrative serves to illustrate the influence which FAWZI must have exercised over his followers: 'It has now come to light that when they heard FAWZI was in danger from the troops between 23 and 25 Oct his supporters came to his aid in cars from as far afield as HEBRON and KHANYUNIS [Khan Yunis near Gaza]. There is NO doubt that the Palestinians look upon FAWZI EL KAWAKJI much more as a national hero than as a brigand chieftain who goes round terrorising villagers. Before he left RABA [south-east of Jenin] during the night 25/26 Oct he is reported to have congratulated the Palestinians on putting up a stout fight for "The Cause" and to have promised to return to Palestine to help them once more should the need arise'.¹⁹

Al-Qawuqji made exaggerated claims of enemy defeats in battles with the British in September 1936, with convoys of vehicles carrying British dead back to base and 'a number of officers and three planes and around 200 injured and dead'.²⁰ This was inaccurate but al-Qawuqji in short order planned battles against the British and fought set-piece engagements, prior to extending operations to a guerrilla-style campaign. The numbers of British military dead in Palestine were small, but they spiked between September and November 1936, coincident with al-Qawuqji's arrival: 28 dead from 244 across the revolt, equalling 11% of all Army deaths, but the figure is likely to be

around 20% of combat fatalities as most of the 28 seem to be in battle.²¹ Al-Qawuqji's struggle gennuined to organised, protracted people's war, and multiple regiments as a result hunted him down in October 1936, proof of how he threatened colonial power. The Bedfordshire Regiment soldiers who carved the following tribute to al-Qawuqji on the walls of their field emplacement thought him a worthy opponent:

It was in Palestine in 36,
A guy named Fawzi was up to his tricks.
For this occasion the troops were called out,
But this guy Fawzi was never about.
They sought him over hill, valley and dale,
But it was always said with the same old tale
As oft heard in the days of yore,
Fawzi didn't live there anymore.
Upon the top of this hill we made
A sanger of Gold, Silver and Jade.
If dear old Fawzi we do but see
Upon this earth he'll no more be.
Is he in Nablus, Tulkarm or Lenin [Jenin]?
That fellow Fawzi is the fellow we mean.
If dear old Fawzi comes near this sanger
His life will not be worth a tanner [a six-pence coin].²²

Factionalism

Local commanders and senior politicians in the Arab Higher Committee – AHC, properly Supreme Arab Committee, *al-Lajnah al-'Arabiyyah al-'Ulya*, formed 25 April 1936 to lead the revolt – vied with al-Qawuqji. His success piqued band commanders and AHC leader, Hajj Amin. Al-Qawuqji never asserted full control over Palestinians, and local bands opposed his return to Palestine in 1938. Before al-Qawuqji, rebel coordination was almost non-existent. Rebels had tried to form a 'unified framework' but neither commander 'Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni nor other southern region leaders took part.²³ Rebels at the end of July 1936 attempted to unify bands and they held a second meeting to arrange coordination on 7 August 1936, where Fakhri 'Abd al-Hadi was regarded as commander-in-chief of bands around Jenin and Tulkarm, but local commanders through the revolt disagreed over their titles and struggled to agree on who should be the supreme commander. This was more symbolic than real as none ever held sway beyond immediate localities. Al-Qawuqji tried to change this. On 2 September 1936, he met six commanders of bands – Fakhri 'Abd al-Hadi, 'Abd al-Rahim al-Hajj Muhammad, 'Arif

'Abd al-Raziq, Shaykh Farhan al-Sa'di, Shaykh 'Atiyya Muhammad 'Awad, and Muhammad al-Salih (the last three were Qassamites) – and they gave him nominal written assurance of his position as overall commander.²⁴ His departure in late October 1936 meant the collapse of rebel hierarchical military structures, and so hopes for a national military insurgent network on the ground to fight the British and Jews.

Palestinian band commanders were suspicious of al-Qawuqji's external pan-Arab connection, as the head of an Iraqi delegation, Sa'id Thabit, had promoted his Palestine mission. Meanwhile, al-Qawuqji's deputy, Fakhri 'Abd al-Hadi, had ties to the Nashashibi family (opposed to Hajj Amin), while Hajj Amin and the Husaynis had power in the AHC, creating further friction within higher command echelons.²⁵ Amidst the September–October 1936 battles with the British, al-Qawuqji received a letter from a messenger from (British-supported) Transjordan's Amir Abdullah, opponent of Hajj Amin, supporter of the Nashashibis, and friendly with the Jews, complaining about the AHC and asking for information on his forces.

I was astonished to hear such an idea which aimed at dividing the country in two parts and would sow sedition and corruption among us As if the revolt was moving from a dispute between Arabs and English to one between Arabs. So, I answered him with anger.²⁶

Al-Qawuqji read the letter many times to check the signature and his amazement increased with each reading. Abdullah wanted him to give up: 'They want us to surrender They want us to give him [the English] the enemy the secrets of the revolt This can't be expected from an Arab prince'.²⁷ Al-Qawuqji was caught between Abdullah's pro-British interference and Hajj Amin's enmity, the latter symbolising for al-Qawuqji 'all that was wrong with politics'.²⁸ Al-Qawuqji may not be the hero here as he was quick on 12 October 1936 to tell his men to stop fighting to facilitate a ceasefire.²⁹ Certainly, there was no unity of command, not even with common enemies. Parsons includes a frank note detailing al-Qawuqji's partisan view of Hajj Amin that is emblematic of rebel leadership problems (and Hajj Amin similarly disliked Qawuqji):

He never fought on the battlefield of any country [the Ottomans had conscripted Hajj Amin during the Great War, but he did not go to the front, it seems]. He lays claim to leadership whenever he feels that his life is threatened, then he steals the money and retreats in defeat. He is an ignorant man. He is not a graduate of either a religious school or a secular one. He claims absolute knowledge and authority. He restricts all work in all fields to his person only and he exerts every effort to destroy any name that starts to shine among the Arabs. He is a conceited man. He believes that each individual must be at his disposal and if it happens that he disagrees with him, he accuses him of betrayal. His motto is either you agree with me or you will play the role of hypocrite and traitor. He is a devious man. Whenever he hears that an influential name has

surfaced, he is gripped by a fit of rage and desperation so he gives orders to annihilate him or assassinate him.³⁰

Hajj Amin, during the Second World War, spread rumours that al-Qawuqji was a British spy sent by Britain's commander in Transjordan, John Bagot Glubb, or that he had links to RAF intelligence officers in Iraq such as Flight-Lieutenant J. P. Domville (sometimes Domville), who worked closely with the Jews and had their agent Reuven Zaslani as a secretary-translator.³¹ Parsons' conclusion on Hajj Amin is damning:

Scholars writing about the Mufti have shown that accusing people of treachery was part of his standard repertoire and served as one of the many weapons he used to silence his opponents. There is no evidence in any of the hundreds of original sources used for this book [*The Commander*] to indicate that Qawuqji was a spy for the British.³²

If he were a British spy, it was a temporary fix, as in 1941 British warplanes machine-gunned al-Qawuqji near Palmyra during Rashid Ali's Iraq revolt, leaving al-Qawuqji badly wounded with a bullet lodged permanently in his head (that cooled down in cold weather, forcing him to wear a hat). Hajj Amin would later claim that al-Qawuqji was an Israeli spy. Al-Qawuqji had his own agendas and to portray the split described here as a 'good' al-Qawuqji versus a 'bad' Hajj Amin is too simplistic, but al-Qawuqji was certainly a nationalist and not a traitor. He offered Hajj Amin and Palestinians at the micro level effective leadership and at the macro level a model for insurgent networks of organised power. But Palestinian leaders were unable to subsume their differences, hobbled al-Qawuqji, and internecine fighting won out over a ruthless focus on defeating the Jewish and British colonial enemies. Local politicians would support al-Qawuqji in public but then 'withhold real resources from him in private, out of fear that those resources might eventually be turned against them'.³³ The issue was securing and consolidating safe rebel base areas without antagonising local people, as Mao Zedong knew, but without unified command – for 'divided commands have plagued guerrilla leaders through the centuries and are probably more responsible for failed insurgencies than any other factor' – this was impossible, and so the British atomised the population and inexorably destroyed rebel units piecemeal.³⁴

As al-Qawuqji left Palestine and funds dried up, control of bands shifted from 'foreign volunteers and mercenaries' to 'nationalistic' Palestinians.³⁵ British identification of post-battle bodies confirmed to them that by the summer of 1938 there were 'few, if any, foreign gangsters in the country and that the disturbances are now being carried out entirely by local villagers under the leadership of a few professional gang leaders'.³⁶ The rebellion ultimately deflated and sank back on itself, with selfish motives moving armed men: 'In addition the central funds have proved insufficient to finance

the bands and local leaders have been driven to fend for themselves, by employing every means of extortion they have been fairly successful'.³⁷ Rebel organisation and co-ordination evaporated, 'Even in SAMARIA, where the organisation is probably most complete, the various leaders have been quarrelling violently ... In southern PALESTINE, there is even less control and the various gangs are at times in almost open conflict, and it is apparent that some of them are engaged in pure banditry'.³⁸ Such British reports are biased, obviously, but they are secret internal documents to decide military action, and they all make the same point. Parochial, fragmented band structure made simultaneous, concerted action 'practically out of the question'.³⁹ As wild violence from below led the insurrection, the British moved in to 'acquire information, play leaders off against followers, and make taking on command responsibilities a dangerous affair,' as they always did in such situation: 'how essential it is for vanguard insurgents to build social links to local communities, lest they be isolated and targeted'.⁴⁰ By December 1938, rival rebel commands in Jaffa were approaching open warfare, the 'attention' of both factions 'largely focussed' on each other's activities.⁴¹ Intra-communal clashes forced rebels into exile, from where they pathetically pleaded for the British to allow them back into Palestine while admitting their past sins against both the British and fellow Palestinians:

District Commissioner, Jerusalem. We, the undersigned, beg to submit to Your Excellency the following:- You know that we took share in our national revolt, such as did every member of the Palestinian nation, from purely national motives, which you will appreciate, in your capacity as belonging to Great Britain, the mother of democracies and the real type of nationalism. However, when we saw that the revolt was being used for personal motives and fearing to shed the blood of the innocent we took refuge in Syria, condemning all what is happening in Palestine. Our economic situation is, however, bad and we beg you to facilitate our return to Palestine as true patriots. Signatures: Yousef Ibrahim Ijneid of Hebron (Secretary of rebel leader in the South and member of the War Committee). Mohd. Ismail Murib of Halhul [north of Hebron], i/c [in charge] Hebron hills rebels and second member of the War Committee. Badawi Ahmad Ijneid of Hebron. Officer of the rebel guard. Hussein Ismail Murib of Halhul. Rebel.⁴²

Rebel labelling of their units as *fasa'il* (bands or platoons, literally 'groups' or 'sections', sometimes 'factions', singular *fasil*) speaks to a rebellion that never stretched beyond small-scale action.⁴³ A platoon is the smallest military unit commanded by a commissioned officer, but in the Arab revolt, this was the largest rebel unit. Even when al-Qawuqji organised his force into four companies of Iraqis, Syrians, Druze, and Palestinians, totalling 200 men, with an attached intelligence unit, each nominal company was a reinforced platoon of around 50 men.⁴⁴ British counterinsurgency was so effective that the Army quickly spotted, attacked, and smashed larger formations such as Fakhri 'Abd

al-Hadi's 200-strong one in 1936, and "the ease with which its movements could be detected soon persuaded him to adopt the *fasa'il* system".⁴⁵ The issue was not the bravery of the Palestinians but their lack of leadership. Good leadership/command for rural-based bands could have broken the military stasis and grown rebel base areas and forces – platoons into companies into battalions and so on, alongside modes of C3I and a professional officer corps – but local *fasa'il* commanders instead argued among themselves and they resented al-Qawuqji and his pan-Arab Iraqi and Syrian backers. Instead of combining, they generated a multiplicity of contending, separate commands without hierarchy and with forceful names like "the destruction", "the attack", "the struggle", the "black" and "red" hand, but which crumbled when the British killed local leaders.⁴⁶ Rebel high command gave direction by articulating Islamic concepts and declaring a jihad in 1937, the British fighting back by persuading the rector of Cairo's al-Azhar University to deny the call to holy war.⁴⁷ Moreover, while bands reflected socially conservative Islamic rural life, urbane Palestinian resistance at the higher levels was not fundamentally religious but secular and invoked Islam only when it would "result in popular support for nationalist issues".⁴⁸ Al-Qassam's organization is interesting because it resembled earlier jihad movements, articulating protracted struggle in religious terms and forming over a ten-year period a network of secret cells, like "lightning through the clouds".⁴⁹ (Readers' attention is naturally drawn here to comparisons with al-Qaida and ISIS in contemporary times.) Without effective forms of politico-religious leadership, military operations failed. When rebels abducted a fourteen-year-old boy, he was initially terrified but 'soon saw they were only a group of peasants, like our own peasants in Tulkarm, and I didn't feel afraid anymore'.⁵⁰

The reductive notion that 'Arab culture' negatively affects military effectiveness is a well-worn stereotype that must be set against hard-fighting, successful Arab warriors from Saladin to Hizbollah (and, arguably, Hamas more recently).⁵¹ Political organisation transforms peasants into guerrilla warriors, and it gives them the required physical and mental strength: guns, food, and uniforms, but also mental steadfastness. The remarkable tactical-operational triumph of, say, Maoist-based insurgents like the Vietnamese against the French and Americans demanded organisation, commitment, coordination, and good leadership and command at the strategic level, and clear policy goals. Palestinian bands lacked such structures and so never fought positional battles like Ap Bac in 1963 where the Vietcong left the battlefield on their own terms. Palestinian rebels adopted 'shoot and scoot' tactics that left British soldiers exhausted chasing the heels of bands but never even remotely threatened them with tactical or operational defeat, as one officer remembered: 'we could see them silhouetted on the skyline of the ridge opposite and they were raising their rifles and sort of shaking them at us

as if to say "Well we'll be back another day". This was quite a long way awaythey were too far for us to shoot with small armsbut it gave us a sort of slight chivalrous feeling'.⁵² British picquets exchanged shots with the rear parts of retreating bands and never the advancing van.⁵³

Insurgents never left the field of combat on their terms; the British chased them away. The Army remained master of the battlefield throughout. British military files recount endless, repetitive small-scale tactical skirmishes and sniping that exhilarated rather than intimidated troops. There were no set-piece manoeuvre battles and no culminating point to rebel violence. 'Quite honestly we found it fun', one soldier recounted in a later oral history, and very different to the war against Jewish insurgents after 1945 that he fought in, too: 'And I hope the Jews if they ever hear this programme will forgive me for saying that they played a dirty gameOne understood the Arabs in a way. He wasn't as merciless as the Jew could be'.⁵⁴ That the Jews 'ran rings around us' and 'pulled off the most fantastic coups' talks to another insurgency after 1945 that had excellent organisation and political velocity.⁵⁵ British security forces thought Palestinian rebels to be 'gentlemen and sportsmen' – 'give me the Arab every time, said Tommy Atkins' – compared with the organised ruthlessness of the 'bloody Yid' after 1945 who 'kills at night, without a fight, which Jerry [the Germans] never did'.⁵⁶

The British assessed Palestinian rebels as lowly opponents set against other insurgents, excepting al-Qawuqji who impressed them. If soldiers 'fired back at them, they ran, they didn't stand and fight', with shooting 'at very extreme range'.⁵⁷ 'They all used to run away in disarray, once we caught their leader. Because they didn't know what to do'; 'they scarpered away as soon as we got near them'; 'not very brave'; and 'they have neither the courage nor the natural aptitude for war possessed by the Pathans'.⁵⁸ As Palestine commander General Sir John Dill put it, 'there is always the comforting fact that the Palestinian Arab is not really a fighting man. The troops out here have been taking risks which would spell disaster on the N.W. Frontier' of India.⁵⁹ An Army report at the close of the first phase of the revolt was equally critical:

A remarkable feature of the rebellion has been the lack of enterprise shown by the rebels even with the help of that reputed soldier Fawzi [al-Qawuqji], and the apparent complete lack of appreciation of the trouble they were in a position to cause. It is only necessary to compare the half-hearted measures adopted in this country with what the Arabs of Mesopotamia did during the rebellion in 1920 to realise what the problem might have been. Another feature was the lack of training and the poor equipment of the rebels. Further they proved very bad shots.⁶⁰

British soldiers were stating that some colonial foes caused them more trouble than others. This is not to denigrate Palestinian resistance as to make the comparative point that soldiers had less to fear in Palestine than

elsewhere. Racist 'martial races' thinking affected British soldiers' views on fighting power, but Arab rebels in Iraq in 1920 impressed them. In any other combat situation, an assessment of one side by the other is useful, if problematic, as a cursory glance on views in the Second World War of Italian soldiers by the British, or Red Army ones by the Germans shows. Israeli soldiers made similar comments to the author regarding service in Lebanon: Hizbollah was a qualitatively superior opponent as opposed to deployment in Israel against Palestinians.

The reductive explanation is that al-Qawuqji struggled against resentful local commanders and weak central command under Hajj Amin. But Hajj Amin was one of many senior political leaders who drifted into internecine fighting as he wanted his faction to win. This made united military action difficult to sustain as personal standing prevailed over national political gain. The result was profound: Palestinians had no robust central guiding command centre, whose absence encouraged factionalism. Once the British forced Hajj Amin into exile in October 1937, he continued targeting opponents 'through violence and intimidation', telling the proprietor of an Arab news agency in October 1938 that he could sustain a five-year revolt but his 'first step, however, was to remove all the leaders of the opposition', by which he meant the Nashashibi-backed *al-Mua'rada* Opposition.⁶¹ Hajj Amin was determined that no-one would fill 'the void' created by his exile to Lebanon.⁶²

This is not to damn the Palestinians. Factional infighting bedevils all insurgent movements, but successful ones keep it in-house or leave their civil wars until after victory, whether it was the Irish over the British, the Chinese over the Japanese (the 1936 Xi'an incident is instructive here), the Angolans against the Portuguese in the 1970s, or, indeed, the Israelis with the *Altalena* battle in 1948. Without effective higher command to decide Palestinian military strategy, untrained field commanders with experience only of banditry and skirmishing made poor ad hoc tactical and operational decisions, or mobs of leaderless peasants came out to fight the British (who easily shot them down). Rebels did not sever the link between violence and politics; they never established the link in the first place. The largest military encounter that Palestinian insurgents had was at Bal'a village north-east of Tulkarm in early September 1936 where al-Qawuqji's men impressively shot down several RAF warplanes and escalated the violence, five weeks before AHC leaders deescalated, finalised the ceasefire that they had been urging throughout, and had al-Qawuqji removed from the country.⁶³ This made neither political nor military sense unless one accepts that Palestinian leaders had never wanted a revolt in the first place, excepting possibly Hajj Amin whose commitment to rebellion must be weighed against his self-serving fight to maintain power.

AHC leaders worked with the British to take back control from the 'golem' released by the revolt before it destroyed the Palestinian ruling class.⁶⁴ The

British targeted middle-rank cadres, arresting sixty-one of them in May 1936, while leaving the compliant AHC fundamentally intact. For Marxist Ghassan Kanafani, the end of first stage of the revolt in October 1936 was a rightist triumph by the effendi class that wanted a return to making money.⁶⁵ The Jewish Agency pitched in by meeting with both Raghīb Nashashibi and Husayn al-Khalidi to push opposition to Hajj Amin, and with AHC secretary 'Awni 'Abd al-Hadi.⁶⁶ British intelligence summaries recorded AHC disagreements in July 1936 between the Nashashibis and Hajj Amin, predicting that although differences were 'very strong' to date 'no splits have as yet occurred'.⁶⁷

The police expected the AHC to call off its general strike by the end of July 1936 after leaders quarrelled at Hajj Amin's residence.⁶⁸ The AHC never channelled the energy of the armed bands, meeting on 20 August 'to stop the wild situation but they still don't know the position of the extremists'.⁶⁹ Violent action outpaced any command authority. One British judge wagered a bet with a Palestinian colleague 'that even after the strike is called off the activities of the terrorist gangs will continue because the Arab Higher Committee has no influence over them'.⁷⁰ He was right. Following the partition plan conclusion of the Peel Commission in the summer of 1937, Qassamites reignited the violence by assassinating colonial official Lewis Andrews on 26 September 1937. The AHC considered calling off the strike on 1 August, a move championed by Nashashibi, but the 'Mufti however was adamant in his opposition to such a course and the Committee, bound by an oath to act only on motions carried by unanimity, was therefore constrained to carry on *in status ante quo*'.⁷¹

A farmers' revolt

Popular anger sparked an uprising without method and such organisation as appeared chased rather than led events on the ground. The argument here is that the revolt wanted leadership once the violence escalated, and al-Qawuqji came late into this vortex of chaos.⁷² Rebels were trapped between a moribund communist movement, a self-regarding urban bourgeoisie, and so dragged to defeat by 'feudal' notable leaders fearful of armed rural resistance and articulate politico-religious 'public apostle' figures like 'Izz al-Din al-Qassam.⁷³ Maoist-style insurgency struggled to take hold in Palestine, as it would later with Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf insurgents in Dhofar in Oman in the 1970s – and in both cases Britain won, the British rallying Dhofari tribesmen to fight for Islam and the Omani Sultan against communism.

The British were intensely watchful of communism in Palestine during the revolt, seeing it as the 'greater menace' than the 'petty quarrel' between Arabs and Jews, but they made no note of communist guerrillas during the

troubles and the Palestine Communist Party (PCP) provided only a few rebel fighters, a small communist guerrilla group, and the 'Red Corporal' Fakhri Maraka, right-hand man to rebel leader Hasan Salama.⁷⁴ The communist movement never fomented or directed the revolt. It alienated its Jewish cadres when Moscow ordered the party to Arabize after 1929 at a moment when rebels were attacking Jews, the British arrested its leadership in 1937, and the PCP opposed the renewal of fighting in September 1937.⁷⁵ A Palestinian who took books to men detained in Acre jail in late 1938 found prisoners who 'were not gracious' and who deliberated before accepting the books, rejecting one written by a communist.⁷⁶

The revolt had no good strategy on how to use force. The creation of National Committees and the AHC to guide the revolt happened after, not before, the violence started. This was a bottom-up revolt. No field commander or ideological-political leader appeared to fill the hole left by the dynamic al-Qassam, neither from the Palestinians nor from neighbouring Arab states, not before Fawzi al-Qawuqji's short spell in Palestine, just as the AHC accepted a ceasefire. Fellahin supported al-Qawuqji and came out to fight for him, but he never reappeared as Palestinian rebel *fasa'il* unit leaders resented his foreign presence – al-Qawuqji was born in 1890 in what became Lebanon – compounded by unhelpful politicking at rebel headquarters in Damascus in 1937–38.⁷⁷ Hajj Amin vacillated. He maintained British patronage and did 'his best to convince the Government that he had nothing to do with the rebels and that he was a moderate factor' while being the rebellion's figurehead.⁷⁸

These were incompatible roles. The AHC functioned as a semi-official executive and not a guerrilla high command, until October 1937 when the British abolished it. Instead of its leaders going underground, power shifted to headquarters in Damascus that ran out of money and lost touch with field units, after which no one was in charge. Once Hajj Amin escaped to Lebanon in October 1937, he pursued internecine fighting with other Palestinians such as the Nashashibi family rather than unite against a common enemy. The Arab revolt forced on Palestinian notable leaders unwanted burdens of command that they were unable or unwilling to shoulder – obligations that they tried to escape or foist on others. Palestinians struggled with themselves as they did with the British, but more exactly they struggled with the notion of struggle itself. Without central planning, nationwide terror attacks lacked focus, generated no strategic momentum, and dissipated rebel combat power. Shaky top-down command structures explain the misplaced decision to sustain a general strike in 1936. Instead of an expanding torrent of anti-colonial terror, rebel violence plateaued at a level that inconvenienced but never threatened Britain.

While the revolt started in towns, the violence quickly spread to the country where the rural poor became the 'primary face' of the national

movement.⁷⁹ The countryside was the 'womb' of a three-year rural 'farmers' revolt', attached to which was a discrete secondary urban-based strike.⁸⁰ The revolt and strike were not coterminous. Violence neither forged a new social order in the countryside, nor strengthened old ways of doing things.⁸¹ Rather, prolonged insurgency melded with rural social matrices and the 'fatalism' of village life to channel violence inwards.⁸² Peasants revolted because traditional social relations had failed to protect them from adverse Mandate-induced economic and political changes that they attempted to tackle organically through a peasants' revolt, like Wat Tyler in 1381.⁸³ Palestinian elites saw peasants as metaphorical signifiers of identity rather than literal agents of revolutionary change. Peasants were 'sheep' and the rich enjoyed being photographed 'dressed in mock-village attire' alongside the poor as 'a token of authenticity'.⁸⁴ Villagers felt the 'disdain' of the urban leaders who did not see peasants 'as equal partners but rather as tools to be used in the achievement of their goals' and so went it alone.⁸⁵ This gave the revolt grassroots grit – sufficient to challenge the British Army for three years but also to exhaust Palestinians for the next war in 1948 with Israel – but no means to energise reactionary strength and stop peasant-rebel anti-state violence morphing into supercharged forms of traditional intra-communal violence and robbery, exacerbated by the social dislocation wreaked by British punishment of the countryside.⁸⁶

The absence of vanguard leadership (of any type, be it Islamic, national, or Leninist-communist) was corrosive. It fed down the chain-of-command, corrupted rebels in the field, and transformed potential guerrillas backwards into socially reactionary rural bandit criminal gangs tinged with Islamic religious fundamentalism whose insurgent manifestos proscribed against townspeople listening to the radio, wearing Western headdress, using (Jewish-supplied) electricity, women going unveiled, or wearing make-up or short-sleeved dresses, including Christian women (so alienating Christian Palestinians). Photographs show 'Christian girls' wearing 'Muslim veils' akin to a hijab while simultaneously dressed in Western dresses; Muslim urban women donned conservative forms of veiling.⁸⁷ A captured rural rebel tellingly complained to the British that, while townsfolk may have 'controlled us for a hundred years, we will control them for one year'.⁸⁸ British and Jewish collective punishments and intelligence gathering fed into this insurgent nexus, encouraging vendetta (*fasad*) clashes between parties that many Palestinians instinctively preferred over (or alongside) fighting a common enemy and a pre-capitalist – or 'primitive' in an anthropological sense, respecting that all people are 'cultured' by definition – urge that disciplined guerrilla organisations eradicate. As the mother of a Palestinian girl exclaimed, 'Why don't they fight the Jews instead of each other?'⁸⁹

Rebels ran out of funds and ammunition, lacked medical services, fought one another, and irregular troops reverted to banditry and instinctively

exploited the peasants that they were supposed to be helping.⁹⁰ Mao Zedong wrote in 1937 that the 'moment' that a 'war of resistance dissociates itself from the masses of the people is the precise moment that it dissociates itself from the hope of victory' but what damned the resistance war in Palestine was precisely that it was synonymous with the lumpen mass.⁹¹ The rebels in Palestine were the people, and the people were the peasants. The British had a clear target, and they punished and executed rural villagers. Indeed, the absence of tangible rebel command structures aggravated Britain's counter-insurgency campaign, as security forces could not easily win the war by decapitating non-existent insurgent leadership, even after banning the AHC and deporting its leaders in October 1937. They targeted entire communities with collective punishment.⁹² As General Sir Robert Haining complained, rebels had no central organisation whose 'destruction would cause the rebellion to collapse'.⁹³ The power of the Palestinians lay in the people, not their leaders. All that the British could do once that they had abolished the AHC was energetically to hunt down minor field commanders. The British also successfully targeted rebel access routes to the Syrian safe base area and rebel headquarters in Damascus, ably supported by the British Consul there, Colonel Gilbert MacKereth, in conjunction with Jewish agents and the Sûreté when the French were in the mood to cooperate. Without the October 1936 ceasefire and the 1938 Munich crisis slowing military operations, the British would have won sooner.

Al-Qawuqji's 'escape'

Violence during the Arab revolt was not the Clausewitzian continuation of policy by other means but was a popular eruption of anger (or 'passion' of the people in Clausewitz's military trinity) that Palestinian leaders were unable to make purposeful, while neighbouring Arab leaders directed the violence for their own political ends. Alongside the insurrection, there appeared a discrete diplomatic channel, notably by rulers in Transjordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen, to which the Palestinian AHC attached itself, or not as the case may be, as Hajj Amin, for one, was suspicious of Abdullah of Transjordan. These rulers at various times and in diverse ways worked with the British to end the violence. The willingness of the AHC to rely on outside Arab rulers did not help the Palestinian cause, nor did the inclination of some such as the Nashashibis (and Abdullah) to call for an end to violence as soon as it had started, but what was fatal was the unwillingness (or inability) of Palestinian leaders to commit to protracted struggle. Just as Fawzi al-Qawuqji was starting forms of disciplined insurgency from late August 1936, the AHC and leaders such as Abdullah and Nuri al-Sa'id of Iraq brokered the 12 October 1936 ceasefire. The Palestinians had achieved their goal of getting London to re-assess its Palestine policy. At this point, the British and Arab

leaders needed to get rid of the troublesome al-Qawuqji, whose kinetic successes highlighted Arab elites' comprador inaction.

Al-Qawuqji's escape from Palestine is interesting as multiple sources confirm that the British cleared a path for him. The story of his departure adds to our understanding of his place in Palestinian life, his military acumen, and how the British linked diplomacy to military action. Following the ceasefire on 12 October 1936, British military high command told its soldiers who had been hunting al-Qawuqji to halt operations. As policeman Ted Horne later wrote, 'There did come a time when Fawzi was surrounded by soldiers so that he could have been captured and put on trial' but then 'sealed orders came from Jerusalem that he be allowed to escape. It is reported that the army was furious. Years later the army was able to say in 1941, "We told you so" [al-Qawuqji returned to fight Britain in Iraq in 1941, the British severely wounding him in an air strike]'.⁹⁴ When Arab potentates had pushed for a ceasefire in 1936, al-Qawuqji argued that his fighters were in a strong position and that if the British attacked them after any ceasefire, he and his men would resume the war a fortiori. With the 12 October 1936 ceasefire, al-Qawuqji issued orders to his men to stop fighting and not to make any 'spark' that would affect negotiations.⁹⁵ When British troops visited Bayt Iba village on 17–18 October 1936, the *mukhtar* (mayor/headman) told them that he had read a notice in Jerusalem from al-Qawuqji that 'if any Arab fired at a British soldier he would be liable to suffer a severe penalty, the nature of which would be decided by FAWZI. If this is true, it would appear that the gangs are hoping that they will be granted a general pardon if they remain quiet and well behaved'.⁹⁶

Al-Qawuqji left behind a group of key figures – akin to village notables in the transliteration – to be responsible for the safety and preservation of mujahideen arms, keeping them 'ready' 'as and when' they would be needed again, adding that 'command' would keep a list of weapons.⁹⁷ He was ready to resume the fight and added on 22 October 1936 that the enemy would never have accepted the calls for ceasefire but for the recent Palestinian victories. He was proud of his achievements and how 'we brought the country to the point where the kings and leaders of the Arab world can take this to negotiations', adding that 'we will stop the fighting to support the negotiations and we will be back to fighting if the British do not give the Palestinians their rights'.⁹⁸ A day later, Hajj Amin wrote to al-Qawuqji, the latter noting: 'I received this from the Mufti ... I am keen that you come out of the current engagement, that you successfully and safely engaged in, so the nation can enjoy your skills and capabilities in the new era'.⁹⁹

Al-Qawuqji in Palestine was a threat to Hajj Amin and to the British and so they needed to extract him and his men. Al-Qawuqji was preparing to withdraw by 20 October and on the 24th, someone told him that the road was open. On 25 October, villagers came with guns to help him escape, and on

the 26th, al-Qawuqji and his men crossed the River Jordan.¹⁰⁰ As al-Qawuqji crossed the river into Transjordan, up to 5,000 villagers mobilised to help him.¹⁰¹ Al-Qawuqji talks in his Beirut papers about the road and Jordan River crossing points being clear, and how he and his men crossed the night of 24–25 October 1936, with al-Qawuqji sending someone ahead to check whether it was safe or not: ‘The enemy knew of our intentions and the date of our march’.¹⁰² The Dorsetshire Regiment recorded at the same time how ‘Confirmation has been received from several sources that FAWZI crossed the Jordan on the night 25/26 [October]. The general impression amongst the Arabs is that the troops were withdrawn in order to allow him to pass’, adding that local villagers fired off shots to celebrate al-Qawuqji’s safe departure.¹⁰³ West Yorkshire Regiment soldiers covering the ford where al-Qawuqji was to cross then received orders to vacate the area ‘for political reasons’.¹⁰⁴ Army officer A. J. H. Dove recalled how he ‘tried to catch him but we had to call off the operation and for political reasons he was allowed to go back to Iraq’.¹⁰⁵ An RAF officer in Iraq told US diplomats there how ‘the British knew of Fawzi’s intended departure from Palestine and planned to capture him as he crossed the border into Transjordan. They received orders from London, however, to allow him to proceed without molestation’.¹⁰⁶ A CID file attests to a convoy of vehicles taking al-Qawuqji out of Palestine and these can only have been British, probably from the British-led Transjordan Frontier Force (TJFF), not least as al-Qawuqji’s band of fighters was never mechanised:

the country was full of rumour that Fawzi had been surrounded at Raba. Many villagers over a wide area prepared to turn out to assist him ... Had Fawzi been surrounded there is little doubt that a large number of Palestinians would have gone to his aid ... they [al-Qawuqji’s band] were encouraged to move off towards their own country, and accordingly during the night 3rd/4th November some 12 to 20 vehicles passed Mufrak [Mafrak in northern Transjordan], a station on the [Mosul/Kirkuk-Haifa oil] pipeline, conveying the remains of Fawzi’s party, said to be some 200 men, their arms and baggage.¹⁰⁷

Jewish files recorded the RAF flying in financial payments to al-Qawuqji in Transjordan or, more likely, western Iraq. They also noted the presence of at least one TJFF officer with al-Qawuqji. This information came from a Jewish agent, possibly an Arab clerk working at the one of the Mosul/Kirkuk-Haifa oil pipeline pumping stations in Transjordan (or Iraq, as the H3 pumping station on the pipeline was located there near the border with Transjordan, and the H3 site had an airfield), who recorded how al-Qawuqji was at the H3 oil pipeline pumping station on 4–5 November 1936: ‘4th of November ... Fawzi Kavukchi [sic] and his party accompanied by Transjordan Frontier Force Officer Ad’d Bey Sukhon [possibly Ahmad Bey Sukhn]¹⁰⁸ (?) arrived H3 at 2015 GMT night’. There follows a short entry for 5 November noting that an RAF plane landed and ‘payments’ made, for what purpose is unclear.¹⁰⁹ A Jewish commentary on captured Arabic material noted that al-Qawuqji

escaped with £12,000 transferred to a bank in Syria, accrued nefariously while in Palestine.¹¹⁰ Laila Parsons has suggested to this author that the H3 payment might have been from Ibn Saud – who worked behind the scenes in the ceasefire talks – or maybe from the Iraqi government through its emissary Nuri al-Sa'id.¹¹¹ The second edition of al-Qawuqji's memoirs records that on 3 November 1936 an adviser came from King Abdullah and 'I knew from him that the English can pay any cost for me to leave Jordan, even if I ask for British army vehicles to transfer me to Iraq'.¹¹²

Worried that the withdrawal might be a British plot, al-Qawuqji made a condition that the Amir's (so Abdullah's) adviser and his secretary 'be with me during the withdrawal, and not to appear on our journey any English plane or armoured vehicle. Otherwise, I will destroy the pipelines ... and the Prince accepted so I asked immediately for vehicles to transfer the Iraqi units and some soldiers from the Palestinian units and Druze unitsPalestinians to Palestine, Syrians [literally Levant] to Damascus', concluding how in the morning his sixty vehicle-convoy headed east to pumping station H5 (in Transjordan) where they 'took a rest there in the view of the English soldiers. Then we continued the journey with the groups', arriving in Iraq on 6 November 1936.¹¹³ An Army officer recalled how al-Qawuqji 'had actually been captured by the Transjordan Frontier Force and released because he wasn't really ... you know they didn't want to be bothered with having to court martial him'.¹¹⁴ The Army was sure that politics muddled operations: 'I don't think they wanted to get him'.¹¹⁵

Troops were ready to block al-Qawuqji's escape but the AHC came to the rescue on 24 October and 'announced that the strike would begin all over again on the 26th unless the military operations in the hills were stopped. The armistice, it claimed was being broken' in the words of Colonel H. J. Simson.¹¹⁶ 'Open the chain of soldiers' to let him escape, in the words of a Hebrew-language source as there was 'an agreement' with the AHC.¹¹⁷ The Government had either to let al-Qawuqji go or postpone the forthcoming Peel Commission for Palestine and see a renewal of resistance, so it facilitated his escape. The evidence of high-level directives to achieve this end is overwhelming.

Hajj Amin's escape

Security force personnel were sceptical regarding Hajj Amin's escape in October 1937, too, blaming it on politics and London's desire to keep Hajj Amin as its negotiating partner out of jail. Hajj Amin hid in the *Haram al-Sharif* (Dome of the Rock/Temple Mount) after the British banned the AHC and as the British High Commissioner had earlier complained, 'we can't "eliminate" the Haram area!'¹¹⁸ Similarly, General Archibald Wavell's comment on Hajj Amin was that Palestine would 'never have peace till we get to the source of

all the trouble. But to wrinkle him out of his lair is not easy, and an unsuccessful attempt might be disastrous'.¹¹⁹ The Mandate Chief Secretary's observation to the High Commissioner was that if Hajj Amin made 'a determined effort in disguise I think his attempt is bound to be successful. It is not possible to keep police at all exits from the Haram and from the Old City ... the Mufti could get out by hidden exits which almost certainly exist'.¹²⁰ (Such passages are still visible in the city's curtain walls but are now gated.)

When Hajj Amin did flee by ship to Lebanon, the Army was sure that the civil authorities had a hand in his escape, senior intelligence officer Dudley Clarke recording how, 'It was said that there was some collusion high places, for the Palestine Police made no effort to stop his flight, whereas the Lebanese authorities had ample warning to welcome him when he arrived by sea off Beirut'.¹²¹ Berkshire Regiment intelligence officer Tony Simonds thought the same, aided by police corruption: 'I had the job of carrying out his arrest with a small group of my Intelligence men. I went down the street to the Mufti's house in time to see a Palestine Police car drive away. It subsequently turned out that the Mufti was in it. [The following section is struck out but legible] The car belonged to the D.I.G./Palestine Police, a man called Kingsley-Heath,¹²² and the rumour was that he/someone took a £1,000 bribe to do it [the struck-out section ends]. Anyway, the Mufti was driven down to Jaffa in a Palestine Police car and taken off in a launch to a tramp steamer, which then took him to Beirut'.¹²³ (To note: £1000 was a huge sum of money and Simonds' re-written unpublished memoirs are an engaged, lively read.)

Conclusion

Palestinians' protracted suffering at the hands of British security forces is testament to their commitment to their cause. Their endurance prompted London in May 1939 to reverse its policy of supporting Jewish immigration. But Britain had other priorities – not least the need to pull back troops for the impending war with Germany – and the revolt was not the primary cause of the change in policy. We need to look inside the insurgent camp to see why the violence failed, or, put another way, why the British won. Palestinian insurgents in 1936 were without a central command, had no cadre of effective field leaders such as Vo Nguyen Giap in Vietnam, and were without a commander-in-chief, excepting Hajj Amin who was no Ho Chi Minh or Le Duan. Al-Qawuqji, like al-Qassam before him, was a skilled field commander, but before he could transform the Arab revolt, he was gone. Instead of uniting muja-hideen to their commanders, the fragile, corrupted command and force structures described here cleaved motley bands of fighters in the field from their leaders and from the people, and as the revolt unwittingly devolved violence to the people it could not halt the endemic banditry

that consumed the revolt and further alienated the masses. Jewish intelligence concluded that 'one cannot talk of an Arab Military Organisation' but instead there was one in the 'oriental style which cannot be compared with occidental conceptions, because they are of two separate worlds, that cannot be joined'.¹²⁴ John Lynn, for one, has critiqued such cultural perceptions – or racist stereotypes – on 'Eastern' ways of war, but combat flows from cultures (and political structures thereof) that will approach violence as is their wont.¹²⁵

The issue is perhaps one of tone and sensitivity. The immediate problem for Palestinians in 1936 was material – lack of guns and equipment – as it was political or ideological – command structures to make men fight effectively. It is surprising that the revolt lasted as long as it did and is partly explained by Britain's willingness initially to push for a political ceasefire in October 1936, and then the distraction of the Czechoslovakia crisis up to September 1938. Without effective networks of rebellion, Palestinian passion stood little chance against Britain's well-oiled colonial pacification machine, ably supported by Jewish military-intelligence networks. (Indeed, between 1783 and 1947, it is hard to think of a failed overarching British counterinsurgency campaign, excepting perhaps Ireland in 1921–22, and the Irish remained in the British empire up to 1949; if one disregards the American colonies, one could take the argument back farther.)

The lives and struggles of men such as al-Qassam and al-Qawuqji prove that there was continuity to Palestinian resistance, and that it could be effective (or more promising) when properly vectored. They make us think about the nature of Palestinian resistance and rebel leadership and this helps us to understand the successful British counterinsurgency campaign after 1936. For instance, the death of the popular al-Qassam was a potent mobilising national symbol for the Palestinians, comparable to that of the one-armed Jewish fighter, Joseph Trumpeldor, killed in 1920 by Arabs in a battle at the Jewish settlement of Tel Hai. However, while the Jews made the most of Trumpeldor's death and mobilised it for the cause of Jewish self-defence and for the Zionist struggle for a Jewish state, the response from the Palestinian elite nationalist leadership to al-Qassam's death was 'underwhelming'.¹²⁶

Palestinians were divided between a populist rebel willing to die for their cause and an elite, notable leadership willing to ignore him and his appeal to ordinary people. Al-Qassam had demanded armed struggle of the Palestinians, proclaiming from the pulpit, 'You are a people of rabbits who are afraid of death and scaffolds and engaged in prattle. You must know that nothing will save us but our arms'.¹²⁷ The Palestinian nationalist *Istiqlal* (Independence) Party founder Akram Zu'aytir excoriated the elite leadership following al-Qassam's death, questioning on 22 November 1935, 'Why did the nation stand on one side regarding the death of al-Qassam' while the mainstream leadership 'stood on the other? Why did you not attend the funeral?

Where were the goodwill messages from the Grand Mufti [Hajj Amin al-Huasayni], from Raghib al-Nashashibi ... and Husayn al-Khalidi?¹²⁸ The British echoed Zu'aytir and criticised Palestinian political elites as an effendi class there to control rather than represent the people and 'entirely without courage and will follow any movement that promises a material gain to themselves'.¹²⁹ Mark Sanagan reinforces this view in his account of al-Qassam's death where he puts sharply the case against the notable leadership:

The Palestinian leaders were frightened that al-Qassam's revolt was the beginning of a populist nationalist movement that would no longer look to the traditional leadership who derived power from membership in the notable class or an important family. This was borne out a week later, when the five heads of the Arab parties met with High Commissioner Arthur Wauchope. They made what reads like a last-ditch attempt to convince the Mandate authorities to concede something concrete that might legitimize their leadership in the eyes of a discontent population ... There was good reason for the traditional leadership and the Mandate authorities to be concerned. Al-Qassam's unique blend of a populist syncretic Islam coupled with his charismatic activities made his death a significant moment in the development of Palestinian Nationalism.¹³⁰

Al-Qawuqji and al-Qassam stood for something, not just themselves. Later Palestinian activists such as the Marxist Ghassan Kanafani – killed by a car bomb in Beirut in 1972, allegedly by Israeli agents – saw al-Qassam's potential and highlighted his appeal to the masses as a charismatic populist leader who had exposed the reactionary traditional leadership, and whose slogan to 'die as martyrs' was revolutionary in a 'Guevarist' sense; he was the 'initiator of an advanced revolutionary focus', and wanted to build rebel base areas as a precursor to revolt.¹³¹ Al-Qassam was undoubtedly a revolutionary with 'clear political and military aims', and his movement a 'complete novelty' in how it encompassed lower strata of Palestinian society and gave expression to their discontent.¹³² But he was an Islamic revolutionary and comparable to the Latin American Marxist Che Guevara in that both men excited people for a political cause, and security forces thus saw them as existential threats and so hunted them down and killed them.¹³³ Al-Qassam had 'clearly touched a deep chord in the popular imagination, and was much more closely in tune with Palestinian sentiment than was the elite leadership', in the words of a contemporary Palestinian academic.¹³⁴

Hajj Amin by contrast rejected a call from al-Qassam to coordinate resistance as conditions were 'not yet ripe', and only the poor supported al-Qassam and attended his funeral: 'The leaders adopted an indifferent attitude, which they soon realized was a mistake. For the killing of al-Qassam was an occurrence of outstanding significance'.¹³⁵ The Palestinians were split between Qassamites who wanted jihad-led armed combat and political-religious mobilization of

the peasantry, but who had lost their leader, and elite nationalist notable leaders who believed in political negotiation with the British and peaceful demonstration, and who invoked religion only when it might help the nationalist cause.¹³⁶ The Palestine Communist Party never bridged the gap, instead preferring to link up with the left wing of the *Istiqlal* Party and to leave the fighting to others. The populist Islamism of al-Qassam tinged with rural-style socialism was more influential than communism in the 1930s. Only later in the 1960s did Palestinian nationalists in the Palestine Liberation Organisation adopt Marxist and Maoist slogans.¹³⁷

The British-led punishment of Palestine in the 1930s had profound consequences. It shattered the Palestinian community for the existential war of 1948 with Israel. The British Army had inadvertently done the Jews' work for them, defeating one of the main enemy forces that the Arabs could array against Israel in 1948, and before the war had even started. This helps to explain the weakness of Palestinian resistance in 1948 and their reliance on the neighbouring, self-aggrandising armies of Egypt, Iraq, Syria and Transjordan. The lessons here for the Hamas-led popular resistance of today to Israel are obvious, for in each example, then and now, we see insurgents attempting to establish local and central processes of insurgency, and in both cases failing to overwhelm the power of the state with the power of the people.

Notes

1. Staniland, *Networks of Rebellion*, 6.
2. Parsons, *The Commander*.
3. Elkins, *Legacy of Violence*, *passim*.
4. Dorsetshire Regiment, Narrative of Events, Nablus, September 10–11, 1936 in 88/367, Shelf C4, Box 3, The Keep Military Museum, Dorchester, Dorset (KMM).
5. Internal Document from the PM's Office from the Class of Stateworkers who deal with Minorities, Documents from Arab Gangs, 1936–39, report dated 4 September 1938, Printed in Jerusalem in 1958, 80/58P/14, pp. 10–11, Haganah Archive Tel Aviv (HA); Captured and Translated Arabic Material with Commentary, p. 12, Wingate Papers, Microfilm M2313, British Library (BL).
6. Qasimiyya, *Filastin fi-Mudhakkirat al-Qawuqji*, vol. ii, 21–2, 27–30.
7. Letter, Battershill to Sir John Shuckburgh, November 21, 1937, Battershill Papers, MSS. Brit. Emp. S. 467, Box 10, File 3, Weston Library Oxford (WL).
8. Khalidi and Suweyd, *Al-Qadiyya al-Filastiniyya*, 235.
9. See note 6 above.
10. Anon., "'Sub-War' in Palestine," *Yorkshire Post* (October 24, 1938).
11. Qasimiyya, *Filastin fi-Mudhakkirat al-Qawuqji*, vol. ii, 21–2, 27–30; and See also Kabha, "Courts of the Palestinian Arab Revolt."
12. *Ibid.*
13. Qasimiyya, *Filastin fi-Mudhakkirat al-Qawuqji*, vol. ii, 36; and Simson, *British Rule and Rebellion*, 279.
14. An Aeroplane brought down by the Arabs, Photograph Album, Tulloch Papers, Mss. Brit. Emp. S. 477, Files 7 and 8, Box 2, WL.

15. Notebook [photocopied] of Handwritten Pages [of a daily journal], pp. 1–89, n.d. [1936–37], p. 80, Qawuqji Papers, Institute for Palestine Studies (IPS), Beirut.
16. Packer, 4493/02, p. 16, Imperial War Museum Sound Archive (IWMSA); and Myers, “An Arab ‘Mouse Trap,’” 552.
17. Horne, *A Job Well Done*, 223; and Author interview, Ted Horne, September 9, 2006 (and subsequent correspondence).
18. Dorsetshire Regiment, Situation Report 32, 16th Infantry Brigade, Nablus, October 31, 1936, 88/353, Shelf C4, Box 3, KMM. *Mabsut* also means “flat surface.”
19. Dorsetshire Regiment, Situation Report 30 by BIO, 16th Infantry Brigade, Nablus, October 28, 1936, 88/353, Shelf C4, Box 3, KMM.
20. Qasimiyya, *Filastin fi-Mudhakkirat al-Qawuqji*, vol. ii, 23–34; Document entitled memorandum number 7 issued by General Command of Arab Revolt in Southern Syrian (signed Qawuqji as GOC [General Officer Commanding]) regarding the victory at the battle of Jaba,’ September 23–24, 1936 in Qasimiyya, *Mudhakkirat Fawzi al-Qawuqji*, 575–76; Supplement document to memorandum number 7 issued by General Command of Arab Revolt in Southern Syrian (signed Qawuqji as GOC) regarding the victory at the battle of Jaba,’ September 23–24, 1936, dated 27 September 1936 in Qasimiyya, *Mudhakkirat Fawzi al-Qawuqji*, 577.
21. Hughes, *Britain’s Pacification*, 375–84.
22. “Dedicated to Fawzi,” 199.
23. Porath, *The Palestinian Arab National Movement*, 186.
24. *Ibid.*, 189.
25. Nevo, “Palestinian-Arab Violent Activity,” 177; Swedenburg, *Memories of Revolt*, 85–6; and Nevo, *King Abdallah and Palestine*, 32, 38–39.
26. Qasimiyya, *Filastin fi-Mudhakkirat al-Qawuqji*, vol. ii, 38–9; and Nevo, *King Abdallah and Palestine*, 32, 38–9.
27. Qasimiyya, *Filastin fi-Mudhakkirat al-Qawuqji*, vol. ii, 39.
28. Parsons, “Soldiering for Arab Nationalism,” 42.
29. Darwaza, *Mudhakkirat Muhammad ‘Izzat Darwaza*, vol. ii, 245.
30. Parsons, “Soldiering for Arab Nationalism,” 44.
31. Porath, *The Palestinian Arab National Movement*, 191; Parsons, *The Commander*, 117; Eshed, *Reuven Shiloah*, 23–4; and Zaslani in *Who’s Who of Palestine Jewish Politicians and Personalities*, Jerusalem 1944, CID HQ Political Reference Library, Catling Papers, MSS. Medit. S. 20, File 4, WL. The *Air Force List* for December 1937 details Domvile (sometimes Domville) as posted to Iraq from September 9, 1937.
32. Parsons, *The Commander*, 117, 173.
33. *Ibid.*, 192.
34. Mao Tse-tung, *Strategic Problems*, 7–8, 29–30, 36–39; and Asprey, “Guerrilla Warfare,” vol. xxix, 689–93.
35. Summary of Intelligence, Palestine and Transjordan, September 9, 1938, by Wing Commander Ritchie at GHQ [18/38], CO 732/81/9, National Archives UK (TNA).
36. Monthly Administrative report for July 1938, Galilee and Acre District, August 2, 1938, by A/DC K. W. Blackburne, Blackburne Papers, MSS. Brit. Emp. S. 460, Box 3, File 2, WL.

37. Summary of Intelligence, Pales tine and Transjordan, September 9, 1938, by Wing Commander Ritchie at GHQ [18/38], CO 732/81/9, TNA.
38. Summary of Intelligence, Palestine and Transjordan, September 23, 1938, by Wing Commander Ritchie at GHQ [19/38], CO 732/81/9, TNA.
39. Ibid.
40. Staniland, *Networks of Rebellion*, 47–8.
41. Summary of Intelligence, Palestine and Transjordan, December 16, 1938, by Wing Commander Ritchie at GHQ [25/38], CO 732/81/10, TNA.
42. Rebel Statement to DC Jerusalem, Attachment to CID Intelligence Summary, Jerusalem, No. 50/39, July 20, 1939, 47/89, HA.
43. For force structures see Tauber, “The Army of Sacred Jihad.”
44. Parsons, “Soldiering for Arab Nationalism,” 39–40.
45. Thomas, *Empires of Intelligence*, 247.
46. Arnon-Ohanna, *Falahim ba-Mered ha-'Aravi*, 90–1, 109.
47. Peters, *Islam and Colonialism*, 99, 102.
48. Ibid., 103.
49. Peters, *Islam and Colonialism*, 103; Matthews, *Confronting an Empire*, 245; Shurrab, ‘Izz ad-Din al-Qassam, 267–8; and Sanagan, “Lightning through the Clouds.”
50. Karmi, *In Search of Fatima*, 9–10.
51. Pollack, *Arabs at War*, 3–4; and Porter. *Military Orientalism*, passim.
52. Bredin, 4550/05, p. 17, IWMSA.
53. Atkinson, *The Dorsetshire Regiment*, 186.
54. Gratton, 4506/03, pp. 20–21, 32, IWMSA.
55. Grove, 4510/03, p. 11, IWMSA.
56. Duff, *Bailing with a Teaspoon*, 30; Bierman and Smith, *Fire in the Night*, 63; Alwyn Holmes in Ziegler, *Fighting Men's Lives*, 288; and Crookenden, 16,395/7, IWMSA.
57. Norman, 4629/02, pp. 8–9, IWMSA.
58. Edwards, 10,317/5, p. 13, IWMSA; Crookenden, 16,395/7, IWMSA; Letter, Brig R. Montagu-Jones to Tom Steel (Thames TV), October 12, 1976, Lever Arch File Letters, Thames TV Material on “Palestine: Promises, Rebellion and Abdication” (1977–78), Imperial War Museum Film Archive; Gen Sir N. M. Ritchie, Palestine Retrospective, p. 1, KO LIB 285, King's Own Royal Regiment Museum, Lancaster.
59. Dill to Deverell (CIGS, London), November 10, 1936, Dill Papers, 2/9, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives (LHCMA).
60. Printed Security Pamphlet, Notes on Tactical Lessons of the Palestine Rebellion 1936 (Jerusalem HQ, 1937), Wheeler Papers, LHCMA.
61. Kabha, *The Palestinian People*, 15; CID, Jerusalem, Periodical Appreciation Summary 73/38, October 18, 1938, L/PS/12/3343: Political Situation – Police Summaries, India Office Records (IOR), BL.
62. Kabha, *The Palestinian People*, 15.
63. el-Khazen, *La Grande Révolte*, 283.
64. Arnon-Ohanna, *Falahim ba-Mered ha-'Aravi*, 73.
65. Kanafani, *Palestine*, 18–21.
66. Jacobson and Naor, *Oriental Neighbors*, 63–4.
67. Summary of DIS from July 5, 1936, Jerusalem, dated July 7, 1936, Arab Office and Intelligence: 8/GENERAL/39, HA.

68. Police/DIS Report entitled Jerusalem Information, dated July 21, 1936, Arab Office and Intelligence: 8/GENERAL/39, HA.
69. August 15, 1936, Shai Intelligence Reports: 8/GENERAL/40, p. 36, HA.
70. Haganah Report, n.d. [August 1936], Shai Intelligence Reports: 8/GENERAL/40, p. 253, HA.
71. Memorandum on Palestine Disturbances, August-September 1936, US Consul General Palestine to State Department, October 9, 1936, 867N.00/407 [Reel M#1037/2], National Archives and Records Administration (NARA II), USA.
72. Matthews, *Confronting an Empire*, 233–35.
73. Kanafani, "Thawrat 1936–1939 fi Filastin," 62–3; and Khalidi, *Palestinian Identity*, 115.
74. US Consul General Palestine to State Department, September 19, 1931, 867N.00/122 [Reel M#1037/1], NARA II. The British seem to have wounded Fakhri Maraka in 1936 and taken him prisoner.
75. Budeiri, *The Palestine Communist Party*, 97, 119; and Ismael, *The Communist Movement in the Arab World*, 63.
76. Diary, October 8, 1938, in Ricks, *Turbulent Times*, 236.
77. Porath, *The Palestinian Arab National Movement*, 244.
78. *Ibid.*, 193.
79. Arnon-Ohanna, *Falahim ba-Mered ha-'Aravi*, 26; and Robson, *Colonialism and Christianity*, 151.
80. Kanafani, "Thawrat 1936–1939 fi Filastin," 67–69; and Kimmerling and Migdal, *The Palestinian People*, 106–08.
81. Miller, *Government and Society in Rural Palestine*, 125.
82. *Ibid.*, 122.
83. *Ibid.*, 121–38.
84. Swedenburg, "The Palestinian Peasant as National Signifier," 18–30; Radai, "The Rise and Fall of the Palestinian-Arab Middle Class," 487–506; and Matthews, *Confronting an Empire*, 251.
85. Cohen, *Army of Shadows*, 79.
86. Khalidi, *Palestinian Identity*, 26–7; and Khalidi, "The Palestinians and 1948."
87. Arab Revolt in Palestine Photograph Album 1938, American Colony Hotel Archive, Jerusalem. The American Colony Hotel's archive differs to the Vester Palestine collection at the Library of Congress in Washington, DC.
88. Arnon-Ohanna, *Herev mi-Bayit*, 284.
89. Karmi, *In Search of Fatima*, 10.
90. Mao Tse-tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, 17, 45, 67.
91. *Ibid.*, 44.
92. Thomas, *Empires of Intelligence*, 249.
93. Report by Gen Haining, Hostile Propaganda in Palestine, December 1, 1938, FO 371/21869, p. 169, TNA.
94. Notes by Ted Horne, "This is the Story of Fawzi Kauwakji," lodged with Middle East Centre, St Antony's College Oxford in 2016. See also Parsons, *The Commander*, 165–67; and Eyal, "The Arab Revolt," 26.
95. Darwaza, *Mudhakkirat Muhammad 'Izzat Darwaza*, vol. ii, 237–45.
96. Dorsetshire Regiment, Situation Report 20 by BIO, 16th Inf Bde, Nablus, October 17–18, 1936, 88/353, Shelf C4, Box 3, KMM.

97. Memorandum No. 17, October 20, 1936, by General Command of Arab Revolt in South Syria and Palestine, addressing the Palestinian people after the strike has stopped and waiting for the outcome of the negotiation and waiting also for the organisation of the revolutionary regions in Qasimiyya, *Mudhakkirat Fawzi al-Qawuqji*, 578–9.
98. Memorandum No. 18, October 22, 1936 that Fawzi issued in response to Arab kings' call for ending the strike and revolt ["after stopping the fighting" in another header] in Qasimiyya, *Mudhakkirat Fawzi al-Qawuqji*, 580.
99. Qasimiyya, *Mudhakkirat Fawzi al-Qawuqji*, 582–3.
100. Qasimiyya, *Filastin fi-Mudhakkirat al-Qawuqji*, vol. ii, 56–59.
101. Zu'aytir, *Al-Haraka al-Wataniya al-Filastiniyya*, 221ff.
102. Photocopied handwritten notebook/journal (pp. 90–171) [almost certainly by al-Qawuqji and now a bundle of sheets of paper], n.d. [but 1936], pp. 133ff, al-Qawuqji Papers, IPS, Beirut.
103. Dorsetshire Regiment, Situation Report 29 by BIO, 16th Infantry Brigade, Nablus, October 27, 1936, 88/353, Shelf C4, Box 3, KMM.
104. *Ça Ira*, 109, 112.
105. Dove, 4463/03, p. 29, IWMSA; and Nevo, *King Abdallah and Palestine*, 34.
106. Minister Resident and US Consul General Iraq to State Department, November 18, 1936, 867N.00/422 [Reel M#1037/2], NARA II.
107. CID, Jerusalem, Periodical Appreciation Summary 18/36, November 7, 1936, L/PS/12/3343: Political Situation – Police Summaries, IOR, BL.
108. There is no officer with such a name in the TJFF section of the *Palestine Civil Service List 1937* (Jerusalem: Government Printing Press, 1937), 258.
109. From a diary of a clerk at H3, November 4–5, 1936, S25/3033–124, Central Zionist Archive Jerusalem; and Gelber, *Jewish-Transjordanian Relations*, 99.
110. Captured and Translated Arabic Material with Commentary, pp. 15–16, Wingate Paper, Microfilm M2313, BL.
111. Correspondence, Laila Parson to Author, June 26, 2016.
112. Qasimiyya, *Mudhakkirat Fawzi al-Qawuqji*, 253–4.
113. Ibid.
114. Gratton, 4506/03, pp. 29–30, IWMSA.
115. Thomas, 4545/04, p. 32, IWMSA.
116. Simson, *British Rule and Rebellion*, 294–96.
117. Arnon-Ohanna, *Falahim ba-Mered ha-'Aravi*, 75ff; and Captured and Translated Arabic Material with Commentary, p. 17, Wingate Paper, Microfilm M2313, BL.
118. Letter, Wauchope to Battershill, September 26, 1937, Battershill Papers, MSS. Brit. Emp. S. 467, Box 10, File 4, WL.
119. Appreciation, October 14–15, 1937, Wavell to Haining (DMO, London), Palestine, 1937–38 Volume, Papers of Lord Wavell in joint custody of Owen Humphrys.
120. Letter, Battershill to Wauchope, October 10, 1937, Battershill Papers, MSS. Brit. Emp. S. 467, Box 10, File 4, WL.
121. Brig Evetts quoted in *A Quarter of My Century* by Dudley Clarke, p. 551, Clarke Papers, 99/2/1–3: DW/8, Imperial War Museum Documents (IWMD).
122. Deputy Inspector General A. J. Kingsley-Heath of the Palestine police.
123. Typed Memoir, *Pieces of War*, p. 44, Simonds Papers, 08/46/1, IWMD.
124. Appendix: Explanatory Notes, Captured and Translated Arabic Material with Commentary, p. 157, Wingate Papers, Microfilm M2313, BL.

125. Lynn, *Battle, passim*.
126. Sanagan, "Teacher, Preacher, Soldier," 347.
127. In Hoffman, *Anonymous Soldiers*, 47.
128. In Sanagan, "Teacher, Preacher, Soldier," 347. All three men cited were notable Palestinian leaders, Husayn al-Khalidi leading the Palestinian Reform Party and later sitting on the AHC.
129. Nazareth Town, Political, Agitators, Gang Leaders and Terrorists, Palestine Police Force: Report from Tiberias: M/4212/8, ISA; Summary of Intelligence, Palestine and Transjordan, 4 November 1938, by Wing Commander Ritchie at GHQ [22/38], CO 732/81/10, TNA.
130. Sanagan, "Teacher, Preacher, Soldier," 348–9.
131. Kanafani, *Palestine*, 15.
132. Porath, *The Palestinian Arab National Movement*, 137; and Peters, *Islam and Colonialism*, 97.
133. Sanagan, "Teacher, Preacher, Soldier, Martyr," 346–7.
134. Khalidi, *Palestinian Identity*, 189. Nephew to Husayn al-Khalidi of the Palestinian Reform Party.
135. Kanafani, *Palestine*, 15–6.
136. Peters, *Islam and Colonialism*, 98, 103.
137. See the web materials at <https://learnpalestine.qeh.ox.ac.uk/learn> (Accessed July 7, 2026).

Acknowledgement

The author acknowledges the support of the US Marine Corps University Foundation in the writing of this article.

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CRedit: **Matthew Hughes**: Writing – original draft.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

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