Introduction

Embodied in the documentation whereby Britain accepted the League of Nations mandate for Palestine in 1922 were clauses facilitating Jewish immigration to the country. The Palestinians were hostile to Jewish immigration and settlement, resulting in recurring bouts of violence in the 1920s and early 1930s as the Arabs attacked Jewish settlers and the British authorities. Jewish immigration peaked in 1936, the year that the Palestinians began a full-scale, nationwide revolt. The spark for the uprising was an attack on 15 April 1936 on a convoy of taxis on the Nablus to Tulkarm road in which the assailants murdered two Jewish passengers.¹ Portrayed in the press as an act of Arab banditry, the assault was possibly the result of specific targeting of Jews by Arab ‘Islamic patriots,’ followers of the late Shaykh Izz al-Din al-Qassam, killed by British police in 1935.² At the funeral for one of the dead Jews in Tel Aviv, there was rioting; at the same time, gunmen shot two Arab workers sleeping in a hut in a revenge attack. An Arab general strike and revolt ensued that lasted till October 1936 when British diplomatic efforts channelled through the rulers of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Transjordan and Yemen led to a ceasefire during which a Commission headed by Lord Peel came to Palestine to determine the territory’s future. The Arabs’ rejection of Peel’s conclusion in 1937 to partition Palestine led to a second phase of the revolt from September 1937 to late 1939 when the violence finally petered out with the approaching war in Europe. For long stretches of the revolt, especially its second phase after 1937, the British lost control of swathes of Palestine, including most major towns and, for about five days in October 1938, the Old City of Jerusalem. The rebels attacked Jewish settlers in Palestine but as the
revolt was an attempt to divert British policy, they also targeted British soldiers, colonial officials, police officers and Palestinians working for the mandate government. To suppress the revolt, the British launched an intense and prolonged imperial policing operation in aid of the civil authority – or, as we would say today, a counter-insurgency campaign, a term that became fashionable after 1945 – that involved at its height in 1938 an immense force built around two army divisions numbering some 25,000 servicemen.

How humane were the British authorities in their response to the revolt? Did the British operate within the rule of law, and did servicemen avoid what today would be called human rights abuses? Were the British comparatively enlightened in suppressing the revolt compared to, say, other European powers operating in similar conditions? These are topical questions, not least as the military history literature on counter-insurgency emphasises British success in this sphere, the ‘hearts and minds’ aspect to British counter-insurgency, and British ‘exceptionalism’ in which British armed forces – ‘generally more scrupulous than most’ – worked within the rule of law, avoiding the abuses against non-combatants that supposedly characterised other colonial and post-colonial powers. ‘No country which relies on the law of the land to regulate the lives of its citizens can afford to see that law flouted by its own government, even in an insurgency situation. In other words everything done by a government and its agents in combating insurgency must be legal,’ was the conclusion of a leading British soldier that expressed the ideal of the British ‘way’ in counter-insurgency, and an issue discussed in Sir Robert Thompson’s influential *Defeating Communist Insurgency* (1966). More recently, Caroline Elkins in her examination of Britain’s suppression of the ‘Mau Mau’ revolt in Kenya in the 1950s wrote (ironically):

> Decades had been spent constructing Britain’s imperial image, and that image contrasted sharply with the brutal behavior of other European empires in Africa. King Leopold’s bloody rule in the Congo, the German directed genocide of the Herero in
South-West Africa, and France’s disgrace in Algeria – the British reputedly avoided all of these excesses because, simply, it was British to do so.\(^6\)

This was also the view of senior British military commanders in Palestine at the time, one of whom remarked to a colleague, ‘If the Germans were in occupation in Haifa we’d not have any bloody trouble from the Arabs.’\(^7\) The defence of the British is that where abuses occurred these were exceptional aberrations, rather than examples of systematic or systemic abuse, a point well articulated by Thomas Mockaitis:

...relatively few cases of documented abuse occurred and these were usually the work of local forces lacking the traditional discipline of the army....Even if allowance is made for the possibility that excesses might have occurred, the sparsity of reported cases over a twenty-year period suggests that on the whole the British behaved with commendable restraint....The British generally did not tolerate anyone taking the law into their own hands. Isolated incidents of ill-treatment no doubt occurred, but these were never the result of official policy. Allegations of misconduct were usually investigated and abuses stopped.\(^8\)

The literature – in Arabic,\(^9\) English\(^10\) and Hebrew\(^11\) – on the Arab revolt in particular is exiguous and skates over the issue of the conduct of soldiers in the field, excepting some of the Arabic-language volumes, which record contemporaneous accounts of British brutality. While the Arabic material is the most extensive, it is dated, rarely uses British sources and is often printed primary material. Meanwhile, the Hebrew literature focuses either on the internal dynamics within the Palestinian community or Zionist military training in this period, as opposed to any abuses committed by British troops, Yuval Arnon-Ohanna and Hillel Cohen’s books being good examples of examinations of intra-Arab relations.\(^12\)
Simeon Shoul’s recent English-language doctoral thesis on British imperial policing recognised this gap, arguing that ‘there has been to date a general reliance…. that the British employed minimal force. Where this is gainsaid, and brutality alleged, there are only partial attempts to quantify the force employed….There has been a persistent failure to dig into the experience of many people “on the ground,” an accompanying over-reliance on official sources.’

Shoul is right; the methodological challenge when examining the conduct of British armed forces in Palestine is finding the evidence of abuse from soldiers and officials who were reluctant to leave a record of abuses against non-combatants. It is not straightforward discerning systematic patterns of abuse as, for both perpetrator and victim in such situations, so often, ‘You don’t want to remember the bad stuff’, which is thus hidden away or forgotten. Britain’s target in the Arab revolt were, in the main, illiterate, poor Palestinian peasants whose suffering usually went unreported. This was an opaque war when it came to wrongdoing, worth bearing in mind when one considers the argument that British forces behaved properly, and that any abuses were exceptions. But one can measure whether abuse was in some way systemic, using, in this case, the legal system as one’s rule. It is here that one sees, quite quickly, that the British legal system provided a theoretical basis – or, more precisely, codification and authorization – for a certain level of abuse in practice.

The legal system

Legally, British soldiers fighting internal insurgents conducted themselves as an aid to the civil power, an issue articulated at the time by Major-General Sir Charles Gwynn and Colonel H. J. Simson, building on the earlier work of Captain C. E. Callwell. The King’s Regulations (re-issued, 1935, with a section entitled ‘Duties in Aid of the Civil Power’, largely relating to troops’ conduct in the UK) and the 1929 Manual of Military Law bound soldiers of all rank, the latter a bulky hard-back volume updating the Army Discipline and
Regulation Act (1879) and Army Act (1881), and whose key points appeared in abridged form in pocket-sized paper-back pamphlets such as Notes on Imperial Policing, 1934 and the 1937 Duties in the Aid of the Civil Power that officers could take with them on operations. The 1929 manual was precise on how soldiers should conduct themselves, forbidding, for instance, stealing from and maltreatment of civilians. The 1929 regulations stated that a soldier was also a citizen and subject to civil as well as military law, and that an ‘act which constitutes an offence if committed by a civilian is none the less an offence if committed by a soldier,’ but it also provided a legal framework for shooting rioters and allowed for ‘collective punishments’ and ‘retribution,’ both loosely defined terms in the 1929 volume and both of which are relevant to what happened in Palestine. This policy was not new. Callwell’s turn-of-the-century work cited above explicitly justified reprisals and punitive actions against civilians, and the practise of British counter-insurgency methods before and after Palestine routinely included such measures, including in Ireland during its war of independence (1919-21).

Neither the 1929 volume nor the subsequent 1934 and 1937 pamphlets provided any concrete definition for what constituted collective punishment and reprisals, thereby giving field commanders considerable leeway when it came to interpreting the rules. The law for soldiers was clear: they should use collective punishment and retribution as a last resort and, if possible, that they should avoid needless civilian suffering and any offence towards religion, race or class, but the 1929 law clearly stated that where coercion was required or where terrorism needed to be checked collective punishment and reprisals, which will ‘inflict suffering upon innocent individuals,’ were ‘indispensable as a last resource.’ As the law stated, ‘The existence of an armed insurrection would justify the use of any degree of force necessary effectually to meet and cope with the insurrection.’ In Palestine, in 1924-25, the British had formalised the principle of collective punishment in the Collective Responsibility and Punishment Ordinances, building on the
idea that Palestinian village life was a collective ‘social system based on mutual protection rather than justice,’ a view in some measure endorsed by arrangements such as the collective rural faz’a (alarm) security system whereby certain villages would help one another in times of crisis. The British updated these ordinances in 1936 with the Collective Fines Ordinance, these local regulations being compatible with the personal instructions for soldiers detailed above.

While civil proceedings against servicemen for individual offences during any military operations were theoretically possible, a strict reading of the military law in force with its broad acceptance of group punishment and reprisal action meant that tough action was within the law. Where theft, brutality and assault occurred, unlawful under the ‘civil’ element of the law governing conduct, soldiers had little to fear from disciplinary action as, ‘Complaints about military were frequent, lawsuits rarer, and successful lawsuits almost unheard of….in the colonies the military had a freer hand than in Britain, and restraint of excessive violence was far lighter.’ Victims could take out civil proceedings but before 1947 and the Crown Proceedings Act the Crown was immune from prosecution so these would have to be against individual soldiers and the victim would have to prove that the soldiers involved were acting beyond their lawful operational orders. This was not practicable, especially when soldiers had no identifying personal number or sign. One Arab claimed that soldier ‘number 65’ had beaten him, unaware that all the men from that unit, the York and Lancaster Regiment, formerly the 65th Foot, carried this number on the left side of their helmets. Moreover, the establishment of military courts and regulations in Palestine after September 1936 which could ‘not be challenged by the ordinary civil courts’ made any such appeal almost impossible to succeed. This author has found only one successful prosecution of servicemen in Palestine, of four British police officers who blatantly executed an Arab prisoner in the street in October 1938, witnessed by a number of non-British
European residents whose complaints led to a prosecution, minimal sentences for the police officers, and reduced on appeal.

British forces in the 1930s were bound not just by their own military law but also by international conventions such as those at Geneva (1864, 1906, 1925 and 1929; all superseded by the Geneva conventions of 1949) and the Hague (1899 and 1907). While the fourth convention of the 1949 Geneva conventions dealt specifically with the protection of civilians, the international laws in place in 1936 dealt in the main with the conduct of war and the treatment of prisoners-of-war (POWs) rather than the maltreatment of civilians. Britain classified the Arab revolt as an internal insurrection and not an international war and so denied POW status to Arab fighters. Thus, it treated captured Arab guerrillas as civilian criminals subject to the ordinary civil law modified by any conditions of martial law, such as the death penalty for carrying ammunition or a firearm, and for whom international law did not apply. Anyone found with arms or ammunition, except for government-issued licensed shotguns rationed out to compliant village mukhtars (headmen), was liable for the death penalty, an anomalous position in a country where rural villagers had rifles for hunting and personal protection. One old man with no criminal record received a sentence of ten years for having three rounds in a coffee pot – which the police could easily have planted during their search – a sentence reduced on appeal to four years. The British during the revolt were careful to put captured suspects before the courts, before hanging, sentencing or acquitting them. Later on in the revolt, quickly convened military courts passed rapid judgement – and justice soon followed, the convicted went very quickly to the gallows – but there was always the veneer of legal respectability.

While British forces in Palestine during the revolt operated as an aid to the civil power, conditions in the country approached martial law, a situation that further eased civil limits on soldiers’ behaviour as under a martial law regime ‘acts might be carried out which would normally be illegal.’ The British never instituted full (or ‘real’) martial law in
Palestine but in a series of Orders in Council and Emergency Regulations, 1936-37, they issued ‘statutory’ martial law, a stage between semi-military rule under civil powers and full martial law under military powers, and one in which the army and not the civil High Commissioner had the upper hand.\textsuperscript{27} The British by the 1930s had ruled out full martial law in situations of ‘sub-wars,’ excepting in the most extreme cases, the reference here usually being to the ‘Indian Mutiny’ of 1857, but after the Arab capture of the Old City of Jerusalem in October 1938, the army effectively took over Jerusalem and then all of Palestine. In fact, since late 1937, the army had been in charge with the ‘full power of search and arrest, independent of the police, and the right to shoot and kill any man attempting to escape search or ignoring challenges. Grenades may be used during searches of caves, wells, etc. Since November [1937] co-operating aircraft have been “bombed-up,” and pilots instructed to machine gun or bomb “armed parties”\textsuperscript{28}. There was \textit{de facto} if not \textit{de jure} martial law from late 1937 or early 1938. To be fair, the British never removed civil authority in Palestine from the decision-making process, but by 1938 the High Commissioner tempered rather than directed the actions of British armed forces and when Sir Arthur Wauchope, the High Commissioner in place for the first phase of the revolt, looked for a political solution to the revolt and challenged army efforts to institute martial law, he antagonised the armed forces who thought him too lenient and referred to him as ‘washout’ and ‘ga-ga.’\textsuperscript{29} In March 1938, the Colonial Office replaced him with the more compliant Sir Harold MacMichael.

Before the empirical discussion of military actions in the field, it is worth making some brief comment on terminology. In the examination that follows, can we distinguish between, say, ‘brutality’, ‘abuse’, ‘torture’ and ‘atrocities’, terms that are often used interchangeably? The language employed is significant. For instance, in 1991 one senior British officer objected to the BBC’s use of ‘brutality’ when describing British army actions in Palestine, suggesting ‘determination’ as a substitute, the BBC countering with an offer of ‘harshness’\textsuperscript{30}. The (British) dictionary definition of ‘atrocities’ raises the issue of ‘moral
reference’: an act of ‘savage enormity, horrible or heinous wickedness, an atrocious deed, an act of extreme cruelty and heinousness with no moral reference’. 31 For the Americans, such an act is ‘outrageously wicked, criminal, vile or cruel, heinous, horrible’. 32 Such definitions could also apply to torture or extreme brutality. It is hard to describe, grade and delineate awful acts and this should be borne in mind in what follows.

Counter-insurgency: reprisals and punitive actions

The legal framework of reprisals and collective punishments directed British troops went they went on operations after April 1936. Punishment in the form of the destruction of Arab property across urban and rural areas of Palestine was central to British military repression after 1936, the countryside being badly hit although there were some egregious house demolitions in urban areas. Destruction and vandalism became a systematic, systemic part of British counter-insurgency operations during the revolt, and justified by the legal measures in force at the time. With the destruction, soldiers looted properties, something not officially sanctioned, indeed officers often tried to stop the men pilfering. Alongside the blowing up of houses – often the most impressive ones in the village – and the smashing up of Arab villagers’ homes, there were ‘reprisals’ in the form of heavy collective fines, forced labour and punitive village occupations by government forces for which villagers bore the cost. One Arab rebel noted that the British army was unable to ‘strike’ the fighters so it had to resort to ‘revenge’ and ‘collective punishment’. 33 Using air support, radio communications, intelligence, collaborators and mobile columns, the British improved their tactics against the rebel bands, but they never were able to defeat an elusive enemy in open battle in rough terrain so they adopted a two-pronged military approach, targeting enemy fighters and the civilians on whom they relied for support. The level of damage varied depending on time, place and the regiment involved, but it could be very severe. In 1940, after the revolt was over, John Briance, a police officer who became the head of the Criminal Investigation
Department (CID) in Palestine, witnessed the ‘burn scars’ of the West Yorkshire Regiment at the village of Bayt Rima, north-west of Ramallah, ‘A disgrace to the British name,’ an incident also referred to by a British doctor in Palestine at the time. Abuses went unreported as the British heavily censored the Palestinian Arabic-language newspapers, while commanders such as Major-General Bernard Montgomery in northern Palestine banished newspaper reporters so that his men could carry on their work untroubled by the media.

During army searches, soldiers would surround a village – usually before dawn so that they could catch any suspects before they fled – the men and women then divided off, held apart from the houses, often in wired ‘cages,’ while soldiers searched and often destroyed everything, burnt grain, and poured olive oil over household food and effects. The men meanwhile were ‘screened’ by passing hooded or hidden Arab informers who would nod when a ‘suspect’ was found, or by British officials checking their papers against lists of suspects. If the army was not on a reprisal operation but was following up an intelligence lead and looking for a suspect or hidden weapons, any destruction was incidental to the searching of properties – troops also used primitive metal detectors on such operations. However, on such operations, brutality against villagers could occur as the army tried to extract from them intelligence on the whereabouts of hidden weapons caches or suspects, as happened at the village of Halhul in 1939. In some cases, the brutality would then extend to the vandalism of property as a means of gaining information. The level of destruction varied, the army using the excuse of weapons searches to justify any damage if there were complaints. Army engineers would also demolish houses or groups of houses.

The destruction of property was alien behaviour for soldiers but they did the job with gusto, once prompted. The officer tasked with checking on destruction in one village reprimanded a corporal who left intact a beautiful cabinet full of glasses; the officer then destroyed the cabinet and its contents. The British designated some searches as ‘punitive,’
as one private recalled, ‘Oh yes, punitive. You smashed wardrobes with plates, glass mirrors in and furniture, anything you could see you smashed.’ The local District Officer told Colonel J. S. S. Gratton, then a subaltern with the Hampshire Regiment, that the unit’s search of Safad (Zefat) was a punitive raid, and so they could

….knock the place about. And it’s very alien to a chap like you or me to go in and break the chair and kick chatty in with all the oil in and mixed it in with the bedclothes and break all the windows and everything. You don’t feel like doing it. And I remember the adjutant coming in and saying, ‘You are not doing your stuff. They’re perfectly intact all those houses you’ve just searched. This is what you’ve got to do.’ And he picked up a pick helve and sort of burst everything. I said, ‘Right OK,’ so I got hold of the soldiers and said, ‘this is what you’ve got to do,’ you know. And I don’t think they liked it much but once they’d started on it you couldn’t stop them. And you’d never seen such devastation.40

In such operations, away from officers’ view, looting or the taking of ‘souvenirs’ was inevitable, and periodic personal searches of men by NCOs under officers’ orders failed to stop the problem of endemic petty thieving. Looting was not official policy, as a special order to the two battalions tasked with re-taking the Old City of Jerusalem in October 1938 from the rebels reveals: ‘Any attempts, even the most minor, at looting, scrounging or souveniring by individual troops or police will be rigorously suppressed.’41

The largest single act of destruction came on 16 June 1936 in the Arab city of Jaffa when the British blew up between 220 and 240 buildings,42 ostensibly to improve health and sanitation, cutting pathways through Jaffa’s old city with 200-300 lbs gelignite charges43 that allowed military access and control. By this act – headlined in al-Difa’ [The Defence] as ‘goodbye, goodbye, old Jaffa, the army has exploded you’ – the British made homeless up to
6,000 Palestinians, most of whom were left destitute, having been told by air-dropped leaflet on the morning of 16 June to vacate their homes by 21.00 hrs on the same day. Some families were left with nothing, not even a change of clothes. Such callous vandalism shocked the British Chief Justice in Palestine, Sir Michael McDonnell, who frankly condemned the action, for which he was dismissed; the Arabs with glee printed up 10,000 copies of the court’s critical conclusions for public distribution. Unable to express their opposition to the destruction of Jaffa, the Palestinian press resorted to sarcasm, reporting how the ‘operation of making the city [Jaffa] more beautiful is carried out through boxes of dynamite.’ Particularly recalcitrant villages would be entirely demolished, reduced to ‘mangled masonry,’ as happened to the village of Mi’ar north of Acre in October 1938. On other occasions, the British used sea mines from the battleship HMS Malaya to destroy houses. Sometimes the charges laid were so large that neighbouring houses came down or flying debris hit watching bystanders. British troops even made Palestinians demolish their own houses, brick-by-brick.

Following a search and cordon of Safad by the Hampshire Regiment, the senior police officer, Sir Charles Tegart, noted simply and euphemistically that the soldiers ‘did their work thoroughly,’ adding that local villagers had little sympathy, feeling that the townsfolk of Safad now ‘know what has been happening to us.’ Hilda Wilson, a British school teacher in Palestine, concluded that the reason for soldiers’ destructiveness was because they were ‘bored stiff’ and had no social amenities, compounded by the alienation that they felt serving far from home:

Soldiers are traditionally careless of other people’s property….so what can be expected when they find themselves in a distant country among people who, they are told, are the ‘enemy.’ I remember one occasion when the troops were giving me a lift from Ramallah to Ain Sinia [properly ‘Ayn Sinya], and while sitting in the foremost
lorry of the procession, waiting in Ramallah’s main street, I heard a sergeant further
down the line instructing men on what they were to do when they reached their
destination. They were to cordon the village, and then proceed to drive the people out
of their houses on to the hillside. I shall never forget the ferocity he put into that word
‘drive.’

Trapped between the hammer of rebel operations and the anvil of the British army,
Arab peasants demanded army protection from the depredations of the rebels while also
complaining about servicemen’s behaviour. In June 1936, Muslim religious leaders wrote
to the High Commissioner detailing how police officers on operations ‘stamped’ on things,
destroyed everything, ‘smashed doors, mirrors, tables, chairs wardrobes, glass, porcelain’
and ripped women’s clothing and bed linen. Soldiers mixed in margarine and oil with
foodstuffs, they trampled on ‘holy books,’ and they destroyed wooded kitchen utensils, as
well as glasses, clocks, smoking pipes and basins. In the same month, another protest
complained about police and soldiers hitting innocent people, insulting their dignity, stealing
items and destroying furniture, goods and provisions. As one rebel recounted, servicemen,

Searched houses, each one by itself, in a way that was sabotaging on purpose, and
they looted some of the assets of the houses, and burnt some other houses, and
destroyed provisions/goods. After putting flour, wheat, rice, sugar and others
together, they added all the olive oil or petrol they could find. And in every search
operation they destroyed a number of houses of the village and damaged others. They
also put signs on other houses to destroy them in the future if there are any incidents
near the village, even if that incident is only cutting telephone wires.
Britain’s heavy-handed military methods alongside rebel demands combined to weaken, perhaps shatter, Palestinian rural village society, creating in the process lawlessness, hunger and social dislocation. This was unjust collective punishment for a collective society unused to justice. The collective fines imposed were a heavy burden for poor Palestinian villagers, especially when the army also took away all the livestock, smashed up properties, imposed long curfews and police posts, blew up houses and detained some or all of the menfolk in distant detention camps. Rebels also fined (or robbed) villages for non-compliance with the revolt, £P1000 in one case, £P10-100 per household in another.\textsuperscript{57} If villagers were unable to pay collective fines, they paid them in produce: ‘As usual police were called to do the dirty work, collecting chickens, eggs and grain from each family and taking them to Haifa for sale.’\textsuperscript{58}

Police activity went beyond the forced requisitioning of produce, as when the police went to a village after rebels had killed some ‘wogs,’ at which point they indulged in indiscriminate violence against villagers not rebels. ‘By the time we arrived of course they had vanished into the blue but we had orders to decimate the whole place which we did, all animals and grain and food were destroyed and the sheikh and all his hangers on beaten up with rifle butts. There will be quite a number of funerals their [sic] I should imagine.’\textsuperscript{59}

When the police received a report that rebels had blocked the road with trenches and roadblocks near the village of Shafa ‘Amr, they went to investigate. ‘The local inhabitants protested that they had been compelled to do this sabotage by rebel gangs, but this excuse did not relieve them from a fine of £[P]700,’ and they had to repair the road.\textsuperscript{60} For villagers, £P700 was a considerable sum of money to find. By comparison, in the late 1930s a British police officer of constable rank earned a basic pay of £P11 rising to £P18 for an Assistant Inspector a month ‘all found,’ an attractive wage that drew police recruits to Palestine. Fines varied but could be as high as £P5,000 and they had to be paid promptly in cash or in the form of produce such as animals, eggs and cereals; in the village of a-Tira (or
Taybe/Tayyiba, the transliteration from Arabic to Hebrew to English is unclear), peasants responded to a fine of £P2,000 by picking up what they could carry and leaving. Villagers were in permanent debt as village mukhtars attempted to gather fines from their villagers who often had no livestock, no menfolk and no food. The rationale for fines was at times bizarre, with the authorities fining villages for forest fires in the summer months, the assumption being that local peasants must have started these maliciously. Certain villagers were also required to produce bonds of up to £P100 and additional sureties to ensure their good behaviour. Failure to pay could result in imprisonment.

While the British improved their methods of tracking rebels, the impact of military operations on villages changed little during the revolt. When rebels killed an RAF officer in an ambush twelve miles south of Haifa on 18 February 1938, badly wounding a British woman passenger, the British brought up a tracker dog, specially imported from South Africa, and the dog picked up the scent:

The trail was expected to lead up the Wadi Mughar to the bad village of Igzim [in literary Arabic Ijzim], and B Company, less one platoon, under Major Clay was detailed as dog escort. The fourth platoon was given the task of rounding up 2,300 goats and 200 sheep for confiscation as a punishment on the inhabitants of the area in which the crime was committed. The dog quickly took up the trail and moved up the Wadi Mughar to Igzim, where it ‘marked’ a house on the northern end of the village. It was then taken back to the coast road and put onto another clue, again tracking back to the same village, but to a house opposite the first one. When searched, however, the owners of both houses were absent. The whole village was then cordoned and searched, while reports were sent to Brigade Headquarters in Haifa on the result of the dog’s tracking. Later in the morning orders were received to demolish the two houses marked by the dogs….
A policeman present at Igzim/Ijzim, Sydney Burr, recalled the brutality of the ‘search,’ one that was so tough as to prompt a complaint about army behaviour from the Anglican mission in Palestine. The use of Doberman tracker dogs specially brought in from South Africa gave a spurious exactitude to an operational method that relied on villagers doing the work of the British army, suppressing the rebels on pain of the collective punishment and reprisals that would inevitably ensue if there were any rebel actions in the local area. Critics alleged that tracker dogs always picked out some suspect on parade; on another occasion, the dog followed a scent after a robbery to a distant village, leading the police to an old blind man, and then barked at him proving that he was the robber. Once the tracker dog had marked a Palestinian or a dwelling, the police invariably ‘found’ some bullets to confirm guilt, and the courts then took over with hanging the ultimate penalty for the possession of even one round.

The authorities punished villages because they were the nearest to an incident or because they thought that a particular village was pro-rebel – a ‘bad’ as opposed to a ‘good’ village, phrases that appear with regularity in the British files. In one operation, police dogs led troops to a house in the village of Naim (presumably Na’ima, Nain or Bani Na‘im) in which police officers found two Arabs ‘of known bad character.’ They told the owner of the house that unless he gave the police the information that they required, they would destroy his house. After imposing a collective fine of £P50 on the village mukhtars, the British withdrew to return several days later, whereupon they loaded up grain on lorries to the value of £P50 and made the villagers and the owner of the house carry 200 lbs of explosives up the village to blow the house. The authorities then collected the inhabitants on the edge of the village to watch the explosion. The British triaged villages, destroying Muslim Arab villages while leaving intact neighbouring Druze villages that they viewed as anti-revolt. As one police officer recalled, ‘The Druze are always friendly and pleased to see the police and hate the Arabs like poison. They are a much cleaner and better looking race.
and are supposed to be descendants from the English and French crusaders.\textsuperscript{69} Soldiers reported that they had little trouble from the Druze and Christian Arabs of Palestine, especially around the predominantly Christian town of Nazareth.\textsuperscript{70} As the \textit{Hampshire Regimental Journal} described it: ‘We might mention Mughar is a Christian Arab village and not in such bad odour with the authorities as some villages, and consequently this time was not searched….The Druse are a friendly people and our relations with them have been most cordial.’\textsuperscript{71} Yet, the authorities fined the Christians of Nazareth and destroyed houses in 1939 after a rebel raid, despite the local Christian clergy protesting their loyalty to the government. ‘The terrorists will be glad that the fine has been imposed. Notices were said to have been left in the streets calling the people of Nazareth traitors’ noted the Anglican clergy.\textsuperscript{72} The sorting of villages was based on weak intelligence, as police officers’ letters home show: ‘It is very difficult to catch the culprits as there is absolutely no information to work on and you can receive no support from the population in the villages. You may follow the police dogs into one village and upon this vague clue you may smash the village and burn it down but the next night the wires are cut in another part of the road – and so it goes on.’\textsuperscript{73}

A British doctor in Hebron during the revolt, Elliot Forster, recalled the effect of living under sustained British military occupation. Accustomed to local life, Forster worked in Hebron’s St Luke’s Hospital and held surgeries in outlying villages. He lived through periods of intense military operations as the army and police fought local guerrillas. The rule of law collapsed as troops ran amok, shooting Arabs at random simply because they were in what was, in effect, a ‘free-fire’ combat zone. While some officers tried to restrain the men, local Arabs moved about Hebron and the surrounding countryside in fear of their lives, not from rebel actions but because of the violence meted out by marauding troops and police. ‘Anyone who sees the army nowadays runs like a hare – I do myself!’ wrote Forster.\textsuperscript{74} In engagements with rebels, the army would shoot Arabs near the battle zone, even when these were old men and boys tending their flocks. Forster daily treated local people brought in to
his hospital with gunshot wounds. Candid as to when he was treating a real rebel, most of the time he was tending gunshot wounds inflicted by trigger-happy British troops. He includes a well-documented account of policemen executing in broad daylight in October 1938 an Arab suspect travelling in a police vehicle through the Manshiya district of Jaffa, an outrage witnessed by non-British European residents, and repeated examples of troops robbing Arabs of money, including young children who were relieved of their pocket money. The execution witnessed by non-British Europeans did lead to an investigation and charging of four police officers – who received minimal sentences reduced on appeal – but this was a unique case of servicemen being brought to justice. In October 1938, troops even robbed the Anglican Archdeacon of Jerusalem, maltreating in the process the Arab boy that the cleric had left to look after his affairs.

For the soldiers, their activities in Palestine were unremarkable, their job being ‘to bash anybody on the head who broke the law, and if he didn’t want to be bashed on the head then he had to be shot. It may sound brutal but in fact it was a reasonably nice, simple objective and the soldiers understood it.’ Regimental histories and contemporary regimental journals did little to hide the reprisals, destruction and collective fines, recording how villages were ‘beaten up,’ homes burnt and men detained in cages ‘on orders from above’ because of rebel activity nearby. While euphemisms would be used – ‘the search was drastic enough to shake the villagers’ – regimental journals would cheerily and sportily describe the trashing of a village, as with the Essex Regiment at the ‘sack’ (obvious pun intended) of Sakhnin, 25-26 December 1937, with physical force that stopped short of outright torture or blatant wanton destruction, or these were not reported. The repeated complaints about the reprisals made to the mandate authorities by Arab petitioners and the Anglican clergy in Palestine, supported by first-hand evidence, met with denials and promises to investigate.
Unofficial brutality

Beyond the official policies designed to break the resolve of the Palestinian peasantry, there were also unofficial acts of brutality committed by rank-and-file servicemen. While these do not form part of the story of official reprisal and collective punishment, they contributed to terrorising ordinary Palestinian civilians, and officers operating in the field with the men sometimes sanctioned or simply accepted a level of casual brutality by their men. While the ad hoc outrages committed by servicemen were in some measure the soldiers’ revenge against attacks and a means of defeating the rebels, a willingness to inflict suffering on others played its part in what happened. As the commanding officer of the Essex Regiment noted at the end of 1937, punitive search operations against Arab villages were ‘enjoyed by all ranks.’

For instance, it was common British army practice to make local Arabs ride with military convoys to prevent mine attacks. Often, soldiers carried them or tied them to the bonnets of lorries, or put the hostages on small flatbeds on the front of trains, all to prevent mining or sniping attacks. ‘The naughty boys who we had in the cages in these camps’ were put in vehicles in front of the convoy for the ‘deterrent effect,’ as one British officer put it. The army told the Arabs that they would shoot any of them who tried to run away. On the lorries, some soldiers would brake hard at the end of a journey and then casually drive over the Arab who had tumbled from the bonnet, killing or maiming him, as Arthur Lane, a Manchester Regiment private candidly recalled:

….when you’d finished your duty you would come away nothing had happened no bombs or anything and the driver would switch his wheel back and to make the truck waver and the poor wog on the front would roll off into the deck. Well if he was lucky he’d get away with a broken leg but if he was unlucky the truck behind coming up behind would hit him. But nobody bothered to pick up the bits they were left. You
know we were there we were the masters we were the bosses and whatever we did was right….Well you know you don’t want him anymore. He’s fulfilled his job. And that’s when Bill Usher [the commanding officer] said that it had to stop because before long they’d be running out of bloody rebels to sit on the bonnet.86

British troops also left Arab wounded on the battlefield to die87 and maltreated Arab fighters taken in battle, so much so that the rebels tried to remove their wounded or dead from the field of battle.88 Lane, the soldier with the Manchester Regiment, was in a clash with guerrillas in which several British soldiers had died and he provides a graphic, disturbing account detailing what happened to the Arab prisoners captured after the fire-fight and who were taken back to the military camp and tied to a post,

….they were in a state and they were really knocked about….whoever had done it when they got them on the wagons to bring them back to camp the lads had beat them up, set about them….[the interviewer asks him with what]….Anything. Anything they could find. Rifle butts, bayonets, scabbard bayonets, fists, boots, whatever.

There was one poor sod there he was I would imagine my age actually and I’d heard people say in the past that you could take your eye out and have it cleaned and put it back and I always believed it but it’s not so because this lad’s eye was hanging down on his lip, on his cheek. The whole eye had been knocked out and it was hanging down and there was blood dripping on his face.

When asked why the soldiers had done this, Lane replied simply, ‘Same as any soldier. I don’t care whether he’s English, German, Japanese or what. He’s the victor he’s the boss and you accept the treatment that he gives you. I don’t care what you say. That was repeated to me later [the Japanese took Lane prisoner in 1942]. But it’s even today. There’s a beast in
every man I don’t care who he is. You can say the biggest queen or queer that you come across but there’s a beast in him somewhere and in a situation like that it comes out.”

Lane then described how the men destroyed their own tents, an act that the commanding officer allowed so that his men could let off steam, but in this trashing of their own camp the soldiers left untouched the Arab detainees. One sergeant – described by Lane as deranged – led the Arab captives to the armoury to show them all the weapons there and spoke to them in English, which the Arabs did not seem to understand. He was on the point of letting the Arabs go free through the gates of the camp when an officer stopped him. Then before the army sent the Arabs to Acre jail, the soldiers took them around the back and any lads who were doing nothing at the time we all gathered round and stood and formed two lines of men with pick axes, pick axe helves, some with bayonets, scabbards you know with a bayonet inside, some with rifles, whatever was there, tent mallets, tent pegs. And the rebels were sent one at a time through this what do you call it? Gauntlet and they were belted and bashed until they got to the other end. Now any that could run when they got to the other end went straight into the police meat wagon and they were sent down to Acre. Any that died they went into the other meat wagon and they were dumped at one of the villages on the outside.

These excesses were soldiers’ response to rebels wounding or killing comrades in battles, with any prisoners, local village or villagers becoming the target for a revenge attack, something that Arabic sources also note. But British accounts also detail soldiers bayoneting innocent Arabs and Arab fighters in battle being machine gunned en masse by men from the Royal Ulster and West Kent regiments as they came out to surrender near Jenin. ‘At one time the Ulsters and West Kents caught about 60 of them [Arab guerrillas] in a valley and as they walked out with their arms up mowed them down with machine guns. I
inspected them afterwards and most of them were boys between 16 and 20 from Syria….No news of course is given to the newspapers, so what you read in the papers is just enough to allay public uneasiness in England."93 There is also the question of the methods used by Orde Wingate’s ‘Special Night Squads’ that mixed British servicemen with Zionist fighters and pitted them against the Arabs in Galilee – ‘extreme and cruel’ noted one colonial official, Sir Hugh Foot, a force that tortured, whipped, executed and abused Arabs according to another source – but is a subject beyond the scope of this article.94

Police and prisons

The brutality of the Palestine police95 and prison service had some official sanction. Sir Charles Tegart, a senior police officer ‘headhunted’ from India, authorised the establishment of torture centres, known euphemistically as ‘Arab Investigation Centres,’ where suspects got the ‘third degree’ until they ‘spilled the beans,’ a major one in a Jewish quarter of West Jerusalem was only closed after colonial officials such as Edward Keith-Roach complained to the High Commissioner.96 Interrogators used what we now know as the ‘waterboarding’ torture at these centres.97 Keith-Roach, to his credit, raised the issue that the ‘questionable practises’ carried out by CID officers on suspects were counter-productive both in terms of the information gathered and the effect on local people’s confidence in the police.98 For the Anglican Archdeacon in Palestine, police abuses were the cause of the violence rather than a response to it.99 He wrote to the Mandate Chief Secretary in June 1936 detailing the daily complaints from Arabs of beatings at the hands of rampaging police officers, concluding with an account of a constable who was reprimanded for bringing in a suspect unharmed – ‘definitely ordered to duff them up’ was the police order.100

The letters home of Palestine policeman Sydney Burr provide an explicit personal account of police brutality – ‘it is the only way with these people.’101 Extra-judicial executions, torture, beatings and general violence were commonplace for the British
Palestine police officers with whom Burr worked during the Arab revolt. Burr discusses the ‘third degree’ dished out to Arab suspect along with general beatings and trashing of Arab shops and houses in almost every letter home. Much of the brutality was casual and wantonly destructive, described by the police and soldiers in terms akin to a good, fair fight – rebel ‘hunting is still the great sport’ – enjoyed by all concerned.¹⁰² Most came in the form of beatings in the street rather than in sinister torture centres, but the effects could be severe, something than can be overlooked in the sporting-style descriptions given in many memoirs: ‘it was a good fair fight with plenty of bottles and knives flying about. They are greatly helped by their womenfolk who specialise in dropping family utensils such as mangles and bedsteads out of the window on our unfortunate heads.’¹⁰³ Thus, another British police officer, Douglas Duff, recalled the effects of a rifle-butt beating delivered by a colleague to an Arab in the 1920s:

….our attitude was that of Britons of the Diamond Jubilee era, to us all non-Europeans were ‘wogs,’ and Western non-Britons only slightly more worthy. When one of the Nablus detachment produced an old cigarette tin containing the brains of a man whose skull he had splintered with his rifle butt….I felt physically sick….the sight of that grog-blossomed face of the gendarme with his can half-full of human brains proudly brandishing his smashed rifle-butt as proof of his prowess, altered something inside of me; people who owned skins other than pink Western ones became human beings.¹⁰⁴

Duff put it simply when talking about a Muslim Palestinian crowd disturbance in 1922: ‘Had our Arabic been better we might have sympathised with them; though I doubt it, for most of us were so infected by the sense of our own superiority over “lesser breeds” that we scarcely regarded these people as human.’¹⁰⁵ Police officers in vehicles would try to
knock down Arabs, ‘as running over an Arab is the same as a dog in England except we do not report it.’ Moreover, in the early life of the Palestine police, many recruits were ex-‘Black and Tans’ and ‘Auxiliaries’ from the Irish War of Independence (1919-21) and so came with experience of that brutal conflict, imbuing the force with a tough ethos when it came to policing the country. ‘For a time I was seriously troubled at the “Black and Tan” methods of the police, of which I had overwhelming evidence,’ wrote the Anglican Archdeacon in Jerusalem to his secretary. The toughness was, at times, amusing, as when Burr received a handkerchief from home, forcing him to write back, ‘I am afraid I will not be able to use it here, the old Black and Tans who were the beginning of this force do not look upon such effeminate apparel in a kindly light. They think the force is going to the dogs as it is. It is because of the soft ways that are creeping into the police that the Arabs are so defiant.’ There was also some fascist influence within the police force, the authorities having to issue orders forbidding the practice of men giving each other the Nazi salute in public. On another occasion, Jews complained when a riot squad in Tel Aviv appeared with swastikas painted on their short riot shields. British police officers saw their service as akin to serving in the French Foreign Legion, many making explicit reference to this – ‘a British Foreign Legion. With the faults as well’ – and some seem to have acted accordingly.

The insouciance of the police was such that they ‘smartened-up’ in jail a prisoner with rubber truncheons, not caring that a British clergyman who was waiting in the police station to report his car stolen witnessed this action. This ‘smartening-up’ might be the same instance recorded in the Anglican Jerusalem Mission files in which a clergyman witnessed the savage beating of a suspect whose teeth were already knocked out before he was brought in for a sustained assault by policemen and a man in civilian clothes who might have been a military intelligence officer working with the police:
A second man came in who was in plain clothes, but whom I took to be one of the British Police, and I saw him put a severe double arm lock on the man from behind, and then beat him about the head and body in what I can only describe as a brutal and callous way. Once or twice he stopped and turned to the other people in the station, and in an irresponsible and gloating manner said ‘I’m so sorry’ – ‘I’m awfully sorry.’ And then proceeded to punch the prisoner round the station again. A third man came in. He was in plain clothes, and was wearing a soft felt hat. He was, I think, British, and may have been a member of the Police Force, but I thought at the time that he was a soldier in civilian clothes….But this man also made a vicious and violent attack on the prisoner, and punched him about the head and body….I am gravely disturbed at the possibility that one of the men who was in the station, and who beat up the first person who was brought in was not a member of the police force, but a soldier – this was the man who was wearing a soft felt trilby hat….I was for two years Chaplain to a prison in England, and in the course of my duties not infrequently witnessed the methods which police and prison warders were compelled to use with men detained or serving long terms of imprisonment, and can only say what I saw on this occasion sickened me and filled me with the gravest misgivings.112

The presence of authority did little to blunt police violence, the Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem having to remonstrate with one police sergeant – ‘under the influence of drink or mentally disturbed’ – who was threatening a school boy travelling in the bishop’s car.113 Another police office remarked to the Bishop that he had orders from the High Commissioner to assault Arabs.114 When clergymen discussed these issues on the telephone, the line went dead: ‘With regard to our telephone conversation this morning I feel certain that someone was listening in and cut us off just when you were discussing with me the serious aspects of the situation in Palestine.’115
Palestinian complaints

On the receiving end, Palestinians made repeated complaints to the authorities. One young man wrote to the British detailing the treatment his father, ‘Abd al-Hamid Shuman, a bank director, had received at the hands of the police. Arrested on 20 February 1938 in Jerusalem, the British moved the father to Acre jail and then al-Mazra’a detention camp (near Acre) before he ended up back in Acre prison hospital after what he claimed were severe beatings by prison guards that left him unable to walk. There are other accounts in Arabic of suspects being tortured, of Arabs being blown to bits in vehicles after being forced along roads in which the British had placed mines, of British operatives placing huge terrorist bombs in Haifa, of detainees being left in open cages in the sun without sustenance, of men being beaten with wet ropes, ‘boxed’ and having their teeth smashed, and men having their feet burnt with oil. Those who were ‘boxed’ were beaten until they were knocked out, ‘needles’ were used on suspects, dogs were set upon Arab detainees, and British and Jewish auxiliary forces maltreated Arabs by having them hold heavy stones and then beating them when they dropped them. Guards also used bayonets on sleep-deprived men and made them wear bells around their necks and then dance.

In petitions made through the Anglican mission, Arab detainees in Palestine’s prisons protested at the extreme treatment meted out by guards. Prisoners jumped to their deaths from high windows to escape their captors, had their testicles tied with cord, were tortured with strips of wood with nails in, had wire tightened around their big toes, hair was torn from their faces and heads, special instruments were used to pull out fingernails, red hot skewers were used on detainees, prisoners were sodomised, boiling oil was used on prisoners as were intoxicants, there were electric shocks, water was funnelled into suspects’ stomachs and there were mock executions. As one British resident in Palestine concluded, ‘after the murder [on 26 September 1937 by Arab gunmen] of Mr [Lewis] Andrews [Assistant District
Commissioner in Galilee] the police asked permission to use torture to the prisoners to extract information and that permission was granted from the Colonial Office. Several of the leading police officers in Jerusalem refused to countenance it. One of them has since left the country.¹²⁰ The Arabs claimed that CID officers subjected suspects to such severe beatings that they made false confessions. Thus, ‘in order to extract from him a fabricated admission, and as a result of this method [severe inquisitorial proceedings and beating] he was compelled under stress and force and in order to overcome such an atrocious method against his body and spirit to admit that he gave to other terrorists one time – bomb, two bombs and a revolver.’¹²¹

**Conclusion**

The first part of this article has opened up a debate on British counter-insurgency, one that will be developed further in the second part to this essay, to be published in the next issue of *JSAHR*, in which there will be further examples of harsh British actions in Palestine, along with a conclusion assessing the place of Britain’s repression of the Arab revolt in the wider context of counter-insurgency in the twentieth century.

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¹ *al-Jami’a al-Islamiyya [The Islamic Community] (Jaffa), 16 April 1936 records three killed.*


7 Conversation, Lt-Gen A. Wavell to Brig J. Evetts, in P. C. Munn, 4503, tape 3, Imperial War Museum Sound Archive.


13 Shoul, ‘Soldiers, Riots and Aid to the Civil Power,’ p. 10. See also S. Shoul, ‘Soldiers, Riot Control and Aid to the Civil Power in India, Egypt and Palestine, 1919-39,’ *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* 36/346 (Summer 2008), pp. 120-139.


(War Office, 30 Jan. 1934); War Office, By Command of the Army Council, 5 August 1937, Duties in the Aid of the Civil Power (War Office, 1937).

17 Manual of Military Law, 1929, p. 103.


22 Shoul, ‘Soldiers, Riots and Aid to the Civil Power,’ pp. 18-19.


25 El Abd Abu Shabaan of Nazareth, Free Translation of a Letter in Arabic Received from a Reliable Friend in Nazareth, 27 Feb. 1938 in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 66, File 3, MEC.

26 Shoul, ‘Soldiers, Riots and Aid to the Civil Power,’ p. 18.

27 Simson, British Rule, pp. 96ff, 103.


29 Letter, Burr to Parents, 24 Feb. 1938, Burr papers, 88/8/1, I[mperial] W[ar] M[useum] [Department of] D[ocuments]; The Disturbances of 1936 – Cause and Effect (General Political No. 5), US Consulate General to State Department, 6 June 1936, signed Leland


34 Diary, 13 Dec. 1940, Briance papers, in possession of Mrs Prunella Briance; Diary, 14 May 1939, Forster papers, GB 165-0109, pp. 119-20, M[iddle] E[ast] C[entre, St Antony’s College Oxford].


36 For an account of a village search, see Diary of School Year in Palestine, 1938-39, by H. M. Wilson, about 31,000 words, Wilson papers, GB 165-0302, pp. 36ff, MEC; also the correspondence and pictures in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 61, File 3, MEC.


39 F. Howbrook, 4619, p. 2, IWMSA.

40 Col J. S. S. Gratton, 4506, pp. 14-15, IWMSA.

41 Special Order by Brig I. C. Grant, CO, 20th Infantry Brigade, Oct. 1938 in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 61, File 4, MEC.


Filastin [Palestine] (Jaffa), 19 June 1936.


Filastin, 19 June 1936.


Letter, Burr to Parents, 9 Sept. 1938, Burr papers, 88/8/1, IWMD.


Diary, 22 Jan. 1938, Tegart papers, GB 165-0281, Box 4, MEC.

Diary, Wilson papers, GB 165-0302, pp. 28-29, MEC.

Report dated 5 May 1939, 10 pages in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 62, File 1, p. 3, MEC.

Memorandum of Protest from the Religious Scholars to the HC about the Police Aggression against Mosques and Houses, 1 June 1936 in Zua’ytir, Watha’iq al-Haraka, p. 436.


Abu Gharbiyah, Fi Khidamm al-nidal, p. 60.


Palmer, ‘Second Battalion,’ p. 100. At this time, £1P was equivalent to £1 UK sterling.


Disturbances of 1936: Events from May 6 to May 16, Report by US Consulate-General in Jerusalem, signed by C. G. Leland Morris, 16 May, sent to State Department, 867N.00/292, NARA II.


Letter, Burr to Parents, 24 Feb. 1938, Burr papers, 88/8/1, IWMD; J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 61, File 3, MEC and material in ibid., Box 66, File 2.

Request for Intercession, Abdulla Family by Attorney for Convicts, 7 July 1938 in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 66, File 3, p. 3, MEC. On the unreliability of dogs as trackers, see also Request for Intercession, Abdulla Family, by Attorney for Convicts, 7 July 1938, p. 3 in ibid.


Ibid.

72 Bishop’s Visit to Nazareth, 4 May 1939 in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 62, File 1, MEC.

73 Letter, Briance to Mother, 8 Jan. 1937, Briance papers, in possession of Mrs Prunella Briance.

74 Diary, Forster papers, GB 165-0109, p. 74, MEC.

75 Diary, Forster papers, GB 165-0109, pp. 6, 74-5, 78ff, 105, MEC.

76 Manshiya Exploits by the Three British Policemen in Mufti during the Night of the 23-24 Oct. 1938 in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 66, File 2, MEC; J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 66, File 5, MEC.

77 Diary, Forster papers, GB 165-0109, p. 74, MEC.

78 Maj-Gen H. E. N. Bredin, 4550, p. 10, IWMSA.


82 See the correspondence in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 61, File 3, MEC.


84 G. A. Shepperd, 4597, p. 64, IWMSA. Quote from Woods, 23846, IWMSA.

85 Woods, 23846, IWMSA.

86 A. Lane, 10295, p. 18, IWMSA.

87 F. Howbrook, 4619, pp. 35-6, IWMSA.

88 Letter, P. Cleaver [Palestine police] to Aunt, 10 Feb. 1937, Cleaver papers, GB 165-0358, MEC.

89 A. Lane, 10295, pp. 23ff, IWMSA.

90 Ibid., pp. 26-7.


93 Letter, Burr to Parents, Mar. 1938 [date pencilled in], Burr papers, 88/8/1, IWMD.


95 An examination of the conduct of the British Palestine police is included in this article – under the general heading of ‘armed forces’ – as the police were often ex-servicemen, were equipped with army weapons, were trained by army drill sergeants and fought alongside the army under military command.


98 Typed two-page document by Edward Keith-Roach, untitled or dated, at the end of which is added pencilled comment, Keith-Roach papers, in possession of Mrs Christabel Ames-Lewis.

99 Letter, Archdeacon to Stanley Baldwin, 16 July 1936, J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 61, File 1, MEC.

100 Letter, Archdeacon to Chief Secretary, 2 June 1936, in ibid.

101 Letter, Burr to parents, n.d., Burr papers, 88/8/1, IWMD.

102 ‘A Gunner’s Impression of the Frontier,’ *Quis Separabit* 10/1 (May 1939), p. 45.

103 Letter, Burr to Parents, 22 Apr. 1938, Burr papers, 88/8/1, IWMD.

105 Ibid., p. 36.

106 Letter, Burr to Alex, n.d. [Dec. 1937], Burr papers, 88/8/1, IWMD.

107 Letter, Stewart to J. G. Matthew, 9 June 1936, J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 61, File 1, MEC.

108 Letter, Burr to Parents, n.d. [Apr. 1937], Burr papers, 88/8/1, IWMD.

109 Letter, Burr to Jill, n.d., Burr papers, 88/8/1, IWMD.

110 Alexander Ternen, 10720, p. 18, IWMSA.

111 Letter, Burr to Father, n.d. [Dec. 1937], Burr papers, 88/8/1, IWMD. See also the correspondence on police abuses in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 61, File 3, MEC.

112 David Irving (Anglican Chaplain, Haifa) to the Lord Bishop in Jerusalem (Graham Brown), 29 Dec. 1937 in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 65, File 5, pp. 21-23, 29ff, MEC.

113 Note by George Francis Graham Brown, Bishop in Jerusalem, 19 April 1939 in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 62, File 1, MEC.

114 Bishop in Jerusalem to Major Wainwright (Palestine Police), 18 April 1938 in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 65, File 5, p. 95, MEC


The Alleged Ill-treatment of Prisoners by Frances Newton (sent to the Howard League for Penal Reform), 15 April 1938 in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 65, File 5, p. 94, MEC.

Statement of Mutah Said Lababidi of Hama, Syria, Resident of Jerusalem in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 66, File 4, p. 1, MEC.