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Rencontrer: to find oneself, to collide, before and in front

RENCONTRES

Speaking of *rencontres*, of meetings or encounters, it is difficult not to think of the 2003 conference at Sussex University, *Encounters with Derrida*, where I first heard from Nicholas Royle that Jacques Derrida was gravely ill.¹ How does one speak about what is beside or against, at once beside *and* against, after the death of Jacques Derrida?

To meet Derrida, if such a thing is possible, with the question of the *contre*, I think of finding myself sitting beside Samuel Weber in late 1992 in Derrida's seminar in Paris with a dog-eared copy of *Glas* in front of me, and only realising that it was Samuel Weber after he passed along the book that we all had to write our signatures in before a meeting with Derrida could begin. To meet Derrida *in the institution*, we had to sign our name, make a collective signature, a countersignature, and leave a trace to get things started.

I also find myself thinking of the last time I saw Jacques Derrida. In late March 1994 I was walking on the Rue Soufflot, crossing the philosopher's road, the Rue Victor Cousin, when I was almost hit by a car. I looked up and saw the driver: it was Jacques Derrida. Meetings are dangerous. Accidents can always happen.

SE TROUVER

Writing in 2003 of the archives of Hélène Cixous – which, like all archives, cannot avoid the *mal d'archive* of being a part that is greater than the whole that would encompass it, a trace that cannot be reduced either to a subject or to a monument – Derrida evokes a certain genius that ‘perhaps consists always in *finding oneself* [*se trouver*], not only in finding one’s *self*, in discovering or inventing oneself, in falling or falling back on oneself, but in *finding oneself*, as much through events in a quasi random way here or there, in the place of the other, as the other in place of the other’ (my emphasis).²

To meet is *to find oneself* ‘in the place of the other’. Without the other coming upon me by chance, philosophy could not begin. As Socrates says: ‘I was going from the Academy straight to the Lyceum ... when ... I fell in with Hippothales’; ‘I went down yesterday to the Piraeus with Glaucon ... at that instant Polemarchus the son of Cephalus chanced to catch sight of us’; ‘My dear Phaedrus, whence come you, and whither are you going?’³

But after Plato, Derrida asks in a paper from 1982, ‘What are my chances of reaching my addressees, whether I calculate and prepare a *meeting place* ... or whether I hope *to fall upon* them by chance?’⁴ Derrida adds here that he is underlining the word *rencontre*, and that is what I would like to do today: to underline the word *rencontre* and to what see what are my chances and the mischances that give me no chance.⁵

To meet, Derrida suggested, is to find oneself *finding* (*se trouver trouver*) what has never been found before, what can *only* be found in the way *and* out in front (*contra*), ‘as if it found itself there, on the path, by chance’.⁶ No meeting without the *contra*.

HEURTER

Rencontre has retained two quite different meanings – two meanings that are at once conforming and contesting – to meet, to come upon, to encounter by chance *and* to meet in conflict, to collide, to fight a duel.⁷

In the *rencontre* – the meeting *or* the duel – there is a blow, a hit, a strike, a collision. I am turning the corner and by chance I run into the other, the other runs into me: contact is made. The speeds are always either too fast or too slow to stop me running headlong, *sans cap*, into the other.⁸ The meeting always starts with a blow.

From his introduction to *The Origin of Geometry* (1962) to *On Touching – Jean-Luc Nancy* (1992-2000) Derrida was preoccupied with Aristotle's *De Anima, On the Soul*, reading the great treatise on the *diaphanous* as the unseen origin of seeing, as the structure of the *not x but the possibility of x* which the Idea in the Kantian sense plays in phenomenology, and perhaps making the case for a new “history” of the senses: *plus de cinq* (no more five, more than five, never five-in-one). Aristotle argued that there could be no sound without a *blow*: a thing ‘must be struck with a sudden sharp blow, if it is to sound’ (419b). The Greek ear is a wondrous machine: an internal buffer that regulates the sharp blows from the outside. At the same time, as Derrida points out, it is a membrane that *cannot stop* vibrating and registering ‘the blows from the outside’.⁹

In *On Touching* Derrida evokes the blows and caresses which exceed the untouchable *soul* as the origin of the senses, of everything that is touched or touches. For Aristotle, touch is an ‘exactness of discrimination’, the pure difference – the intuition – of touching (421a).¹⁰ For Derrida, it is always a matter of a *gap*, of the spacing of a gap – of *and* as contact. When it comes to the blows of the chance encounter, there is always a gap – a gap that moves.¹¹

Perhaps the resonance of the *contre* in *rencontre* is found in the gaps and blows, in the unavoidable duel of proximity, the *polemos* of the *Ent-fernung*.¹²

‘But how many of us are there?’¹³ *Littré* defines the duel as an unpremeditated single combat between two living men. For Derrida, from the start, there will always be more than two and he will question both the inevitable fraternity of this chance encounter and the assumption that it is only the living who can duel.¹⁴ There is always the desire for the perfect duel: ‘no one would ever encounter anyone, I would finally be alone with you’.¹⁵

From the start, in the formality of the pre-arranged – and always still surprising – duel, there are the seconds, the doubles who supplement the principal combatants, who carry – *tragen* – not only the challenge, but also the body and the name of the duellist.¹⁶ As an act of friendship, of love perhaps: always as an unavoidable and impossible mourning.¹⁷ And Derrida cannot stop dreaming of, cannot stop mourning, the blinding duel between fathers and sons.¹⁸

And Yaakov was left alone—

Now a man wrestled with him until the coming of the dawn. ...

Then he said:

Let me go,

for dawn has come up!

But Yaakov said:

I will not let you go

Unless you bless me.¹⁹

Since at least Cervantes – or perhaps Jacob – literature has been wrestling with angels, caught up in the chance encounter, the imaginary duel, the duel with the imaginary. In ‘Thoughts for the Times on War and Death’ (1915) – no doubt a good title for many of the

papers in this conference – Freud argued that in the midst of war we tend to ‘reconcile ourselves with death’ through the fictions of death: ‘we die in the person of a given hero, yet we survive him, and are ready again with the next hero just as safely’.²⁰ For Derrida, *la vie la mort* or *la survivance* is the finitude of a meeting or duel that remains *irreconcilable*, that keeps taking us – without rest – ‘before and beyond the opposition between living and dying’.²¹

Like the secret that can only be a secret if you tell someone you have a secret, the duel needs witnesses.²² It is a strange meeting: a chance encounter with all the seeming preparations of seconds and witnesses. One can see this in *Romeo and Juliet*, a work that Derrida described as ‘the *mise-en-scène* of all duels’.²³ Benvolio warns Mercutio, ‘the Capels are abroad / And if we meet we shall not scape a brawl’.²⁴ Benvolio and Mercutio are prepared, and yet the duel remains an event that cannot be planned. There is perhaps, since Shakespeare or after Derrida, an economy of the meeting, of the duel: it is the economy of a proximity, of a bringing or coming close than cannot be separated from the contingency of the chance encounter, of running into the other.²⁵

Benvolio begins the scene of the duel with the possibility of the chance meeting (‘if we meet we shall not scape a brawl’) and, from the *other* side, Tybalt will say to his companions, ‘Follow me close’.²⁶ The chance of proximity, of proximity as chance would be a gathering that cannot re-collect itself and cannot be equated with the Heideggerian *Versammlung*.²⁷ This strange economy of a kind closeness that relies on the chance encounter can be seen in the introduction to Nicholas Royle’s recent illuminating book on Shakespeare. ‘The seven words I have singled out for *close* reading,’ he writes, ‘are likewise not uniquely special words that sum up Shakespeare’s work. I happened upon them, in some respects, by *chance*’ (my emphasis).²⁸

We meet, close, but so different; we duel, not too kill, but only to draw first blood.²⁹ But when we *make* words, the worst can always happen:

TYBALT: A word with one of you.

MERCUITO: And but one word with one of us? Couple it with something: make it a word and a blow.³⁰

In the violence of the duel, there always needs to be more than ‘one word’, and words alone are not enough. Make a neologism, Mercutio taunts, join the one word ‘with something’: make it two, make something monstrous, make ‘it a word and a blow’: a word that hits, that strikes – a word like *rencontre*.

When Derrida recalls the date – this very day, this singular date, that *gives* itself to the chance of another day, to any and every day – when he first met Cixous, de Man, Hillis Miller, Blanchot or Gadamer, we cannot know if these *rencontres* were meetings *or* duels, if they were blows *or* caresses.³¹

Meetings *and* duels, blows *and* caresses, with the living *and* the dead. Recalling his meetings with Blanchot, which first started in May 1968 with a discussion over their ethical and political differences, Derrida writes, ‘the silences, the necessary respiration of ellipsis and discretion, during these interviews, were also, as far as I remember, the blessed time, without the least interruption, the unbroken time of a smile, a trusting and benevolent waiting’.³²

DIS-INTEREST

‘The Prince expressly hath / Forbid this bandying in Verona streets’, Romeo pleads, a sword thrust away from Tybalt killing Mercutio.³³ The private duel is always before the law, it cannot avoid becoming *public*. Benvolio warns: ‘We talk here in the public haunt of

men. / Either withdraw into some private place ... or depart. Here all eyes gaze upon us’.

Mercutio replies: ‘Men’s eyes were made to look, and let them gaze’.³⁴

Some eighteen years after *Romeo and Juliet*, Francis Bacon would address the problem of ‘private duels’ in *The Charge touching duels* (1614). As the Attorney General, Bacon is acting ‘by his Majesty’s direction’ to make the case against private duels.³⁵ For Bacon, it is a question not only of duels, but of a private violence, of the violence of the private: when ‘private men begin once to presume to give law to themselves, and to right their own wrongs, no man can foresee the dangers and inconveniencies that may arise and multiply thereupon’.³⁶ This is the hyperbole of an untamed and unreclaimed private violence that Hobbes will later evoke to launch what Derrida called the phantasm of an indivisible sovereignty.³⁷

For Bacon, the private duel has the *power* to threaten the king himself: ‘it may grow from quarrels to banding, and from banding to trooping, and so to tumult and commotion’. From *one* chance encounter, from *one* unique collision of proximity and chance, the public space, the sovereign power and the state itself could collapse. At stake is the law itself. Private duels ‘expressly gives the law an affront, as if there were two laws’.³⁸

In *The Metaphysics of Morals* (1797), Kant accords a similar power to the duel. A duel is a public return to a state of nature governed by a sense of honour, which is valued more than life itself.³⁹ For Kant, the duel creates a gap between the people’s subjective sense of justice and the state’s objective claim to public justice. The state can neither execute the duellist (and deny honour), nor can it condone an unlawful killing. The duel *suspends* the right of the sovereign power to punish crimes with the death penalty. One kind of honour suspends another since, as Derrida points out, it is precisely the propriety of a *sacrifice* above and beyond life that gives the death penalty its sovereign right.⁴⁰ The duel threatens the death penalty, the sovereignty of sacrifice which, as Derrida argues, becomes the transcendental *possibility* of the law.⁴¹

For Bacon things were somewhat simpler. The ‘State’, he argues must ‘abolish’ private duels and by convincing the would-be duellists that even one singular private duel is an ‘insult against the King’s power and authority ... he shall see the law and rule of State *disinterest* him of a vain and unnecessary hazard’.⁴² Bacon uses the word *disinterest* here as a verb: to rid or divest of interest. The OED also suggests that this is the first instance of the word *disinterest* in English. In *response* to the private duel, Bacon *makes* a word and a blow.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth century *disinterest* becomes the concept *par excellence* for trying to resolve the *duel* between the public and the private. In *What is Enlightenment?* (1784) Kant transforms the tradition of *disinterest* by arguing that to serve the interests of the state and *in* the state is a *private* use of reason. By insisting that the *public* use of reason exceeds the borders of the state, Kant *internationalises* *disinterest*.⁴³ However, in the 1790s when it comes to his own public-private duel with the king, Kant ends up secreting away, encrypting this international *disinterest*, holding it back for another, brighter day.⁴⁴ The international (the more than public) becomes a secret and, as Derrida warned in the context of the university, the institution must also resist the temptation to claim a propriety over what exceeds the state, to foreclose the more than private.⁴⁵ This *international* *disinterest*, Derrida suggested, also becomes the very possibility of abolishing the death penalty that Kant had equated with the unassailable equality of justice and a state-run categorical imperative.⁴⁶

If there is a *disinterest* in Derrida’s work, after Kant, after Nietzsche and after Lévinas, it is a *disinterest* that *begins* with interest: as I *take* an interest – in the impossible – I am *taken away* from myself, by and for the other. Speaking in 1975, Derrida said, ‘when I write ‘what interests me’, I am designating not only an *object* of interest, but the place that *I am in the middle of*, and precisely this place that I cannot exceed’.⁴⁷ I find myself, I am found, by chance in the collision of a public-private meeting, and I am *dis*-interested. Perhaps this is

the possibility of a kind of a countering-institution, or at least the mad ‘dream of an *other* institution’.⁴⁸

As Derrida noted, within the institution his own work was defined as disinterested research and, at the same time, had to contend with a violent and ‘voracious interest’ both in and outside of the academic institution.⁴⁹ Derrida suggested that a countering-institution would, on the one hand, have to exceed the traditional concept of disinterest and challenge the interests behind claims to *disinterest* and, on the other hand, reinhabit this tradition by identifying, reducing and resisting voracious *interests*. A countering institution would have to *take* an interest, a decisive and responsible interest *from* the impossible, a *dis-interest* that would leave it, as Simon Morgan-Wortham has suggested, ‘a bit mad’.⁵⁰

AVANT ET DEVANT

Since at least ‘Violence and Metaphysics’ (1964) Derrida was preoccupied with the *contre* in *rencontre*. For Lévinas, the encounter with the absolutely other is the *absolute* encounter. It is ‘*the* encounter’, Derrida notes, and ‘the only way out’. The encounter is absolutely unforeseeable, absolutely unanticipatable. But absolute difference is never the ‘way out’, if there is ever a ‘way out’. Derrida writes: ‘doubtless this encounter of the unforeseeable *itself* is the only possible opening of time, the only pure future, the only pure expenditure *beyond* history as economy. But this future, this beyond, is not another time, a day after history. It is *present* at the heart of experience. Present not as a total presence but as a *trace*’.⁵¹ Derrida never stopped talking about the present (with a trace), about the urgency of the here and now: the meeting is always imminent.⁵²

I find myself – I never stop finding myself – in a chance encounter, in the strange collision of proximity and chance that gives itself to *another* meeting, a meeting that is always before

me *and* in front of me, *avant et devant*, at once behind *and* ahead of me.⁵³ The meeting has started: it is too late and I can only start again – with the other:

it's all the same to me ... everything unforeseen that might happen, arrive, every encounter [*rencontre*]

and me, I run, I am going to encounter you [*je vais à ta rencontre*] without hoping for anything that is not strictly chance – and fortuitously encountered [*rencontre*]. ... Toward this fortuitously encountered encounter [*cette rencontre de rencontre*], I make my way backwards ... You have closed my eyes, and my eyes closed I go to encounter you, to the encounter of you [*je vais à ta rencontre, à la rencontre de toi*] ... *Je vais à ta rencontre*, this is all that I know in myself, but also that I will never catch up, that you will never arrive at me.⁵⁴

NOTES

¹ This article was originally delivered as a paper at delivered at the ‘Counter Movements: Institutions of Difference’ Conference on the work of Jacques Derrida, held at Portsmouth University 24-25 July 2006.

² Jacques Derrida, *Genèse, généalogies, genres et le génie: Les secrets de l’archive* (Paris: Galilée, 2003), 16-17. See also, Jacques Derrida, *Le monolinguisme de l’autre, ou la prothèse d’origine* (Paris: Galilée, 1996), 95-96. On the archive, see Jacques Derrida, *Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression*, trans. Eric Prenowitz (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

³ Plato, *Lysis*, in *The Dialogues of Plato*, trans. Benjamin Jowett, 5 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1892) I: 203a; *Republic*, in *The Dialogues of Plato*, trans. Benjamin Jowett, 5 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1892) III: 327a; *Phaedrus*, in *The Dialogues of Plato*, trans. Benjamin Jowett, 5 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1892) I: 227a.

⁴ Jacques Derrida, ‘Mes chances: Au rendez-vous de quelques stéréophonies épiciuriennes’, in *Psyché: inventions de l’autre*, 2 vols (Paris: Galilée, 1987-2003), II: 354.

⁵ ‘Mes chances’, 358-359, 374.

⁶ *Genèses*, 74.

⁷ Jacques Derrida, *Béliers – Les dialogue ininterrompu: entre deux infinis, le poème* (Paris: Galilée, 2003), 73.

⁸ Jacques Derrida, *H. C. pour la vie, c’est à dire ...* (Paris: Galilée, 2002).

⁹ Jacques Derrida, ‘Tympan,’ in *Margins of Philosophy*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), xv-xvi; ‘Tympan,’ in *Marges– de la philosophie* (Paris: Minuit, 2003), viii.

¹⁰ Jacques Derrida, *On Touching – Jean-Luc Nancy*, trans. Christine Irizarry (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 67-69.

¹¹ *On Touching*, 181, 229. I have attempted to address the gap that moves in *The Impossible Mourning of Jacques Derrida* (London: Continuum, 2006).

¹² On the re-translation of *Ent-fernung*, see Jacques Derrida, *Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles / Éperons: Les Styles de Nietzsche*, trans. Barabara Harlow, intro. Stefano Agosti (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979). On *polemos*, 'Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas,' in *Writing and Difference*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989); 'Heidegger's Ear: Philopolemology' (*Geschlecht IV*), in *Reading Heidegger: Commemorations*, ed. John Sallis, trans. John Leavey (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 163-218.

¹³ Jacques Derrida, *The Politics of Friendship*, trans. George Collins (London: Verso, 2005), 2.

¹⁴ *Béliers*, 14, 19-20, 72.

¹⁵ Jacques Derrida, 'Envois', in *The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 129. See also, Jacques Derrida, 'Geschlecht: différence sexuelle, différence ontologique', in *Heidegger et la question: De l'esprit et autres essais* (Paris: Champs/Flammarion, 1990), 171-72.

¹⁶ *Béliers*, 45, 67.

¹⁷ *Politics of Friendship*, 66-67; Jacques Derrida, 'Force of Law: "The Mystical Foundation of Authority"', in *Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice*, trans. Mary Quaintance, ed. Drucilla Cornell, Michael Rosenfeld, David Gray Carlson (New York: Routledge, 1992), 44.

¹⁸ Jacques Derrida, *Memoirs of the Blind: The Self-Portrait and Other Ruins*, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 16, 20-21. In a paper at Sussex University on 8 May 2006, H el ene Cixous brought this passage back to my

attention in her remarkable meditations on the dreams that she and Derrida shared over the telephone for many years.

¹⁹ *Genesis 32: 25-27*, in *The Five Books of Moses*, trans. Everett Fox (London: Harvill, 1995).

The text says: ‘But he said: / I will not let you go’. I have added Yaakov’s name here, to distinguish the two speakers.

²⁰ Sigmund Freud, ‘Thoughts for the Times on War and Death’, in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud*, trans. James Strachey (London: The Hogarth Press, 1962), XIV: 291.

²¹ Jacques Derrida, ‘LIVING ON. Border lines,’ in *Deconstruction and Criticism*, trans. James Hulbert (New York: Continuum, 1979), 75-176; ‘Poétique et politique de témoignage’ in *Derrida, Cahiers de l’Herne 83*, ed. Marie-Louise and Ginette Michaud (Paris: L’Herne, 2004), 522. I have attempted to trace this argument in ‘la vie la mort, la mort la vie’, in *Derrida and Disinterest* (London: Continuum, 2005), 109-125.

²² ‘Envois’, 46.

²³ Jacques Derrida, ‘Aphorism Countertime’, *Acts of Literature*, trans. Nicholas Royle, ed. Derek Attridge (London: Routledge, 1992), 422.

²⁴ William Shakespeare, *The Most Excellent and Lamentable Tragedy of Romeo and Juliet*, in *The Norton Shakespeare, Based on the Oxford Edition*, ed. Stephen Greenblatt and others (New York: Norton, 1997), 3. 1. 3.

²⁵ ‘Aphorism Countertime’, 420, 422.

²⁶ *Romeo and Juliet*, 3. 1. 34.

²⁷ Jacques Derrida, ‘Geschlecht II: Heidegger’s Hand’, in *Deconstruction and Philosophy: The Texts of Jacques Derrida*, ed. John Sallis, trans. John P. Leavey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 182; *Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question*, trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 9.

‘Heidegger’s Ear’, 187. *Das Treffen* perhaps rather than *die Begegnung*: see Jacques Derrida and Catherine Malabou, *Counterpath: Travelling with Jacques Derrida*, trans. David Wills (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 56, and *Genèses*, 75. See also, *The Politics of Friendship*, 1; Jacques Derrida, ‘Ponctuations: le temps de la thèse’, in *Du droit à la philosophie* (Paris: Galilée, 1990), 440.

²⁸ Nicholas Royle, *How to Read Shakespeare* (London: Granta, 2005), 3. See also, Nicholas Royle, *The Uncanny* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003).

²⁹ Jacques Derrida, ‘Countersignature’, in *Genet*, ed. Mairéad Hanrahan, *Paragraph 27. 2.* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004), 38.

³⁰ *Romeo and Juliet*, 3. 1. 34-36.

³¹ Jacques Derrida, *Schibboleth – pour Paul Celan* (Paris: Galilée, 1986), 23, 25-7, 35. For Derrida’s respective meetings, see: *Genèses*, 70; Jacques Derrida, ‘À Maurice Blanchot’, and ‘In memorium: de l’âme’, in *Chaque fois unique, la fin du monde*, présenté par Pascale-Anne Brault et Michael Naas (Paris: Galilée, 2003), 324-5, 102; *Béliers*, 10; Jacques Derrida, ‘Le parjure, peut-être (“brusques sautes de syntaxe”’, in *Derrida, Cahiers de l’Herne 83*, ed. Marie-Louise and Ginette Michaud (Paris: L’Herne, 2004), 579. See also, *H. C., pour la vie* (Paris: Galilée, 2002), 12.

³² ‘À Maurice Blanchot’, 326.

³³ *Romeo and Juliet*, 3. 1. 82-83.

³⁴ *Romeo and Juliet*, 3. 1. 45-49.

³⁵ Francis Bacon, *The Charge touching duels*, in *Francis Bacon: The Major Works*, ed. Brian Vickers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 304

³⁶ *The Charge touching duels*, 305.

³⁷ Jacques Derrida, ‘Provocation: Forewords,’ in *Without Alibi*, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), pp. xix-xx. See also, Jacques Derrida, ‘The

University Without Condition,' in *Without Alibi*, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 235.

³⁸ *The Charge touching duels*, 305

³⁹ Immanuel Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals*, in *Practical Philosophy*, trans. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 476-77.

⁴⁰ Jacques Derrida and Elisabeth Roudinesco, *De quoi demain ...: Dialogue* (Paris: Fayard/Galilée, 2001), 243.

⁴¹ *De quoi demain*, 229.

⁴² *The Charge touching duels*, 306-7.

⁴³ Immanuel Kant, *An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?*, in *Practical Philosophy*, trans. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 18.

⁴⁴ Immanuel Kant, *The Conflict of Faculties*, in *Religion and Rational Theology*, trans. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 239-42. See Jacques Derrida, 'Mochlos; or, The Conflict of Faculties,' in *Logomachia: The Conflict of Faculties*, ed. Richard Rand (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992), 1-34.

⁴⁵ 'The University Without Condition,' 219-20. I have attempted to trace these questions in 'The Interests of Reason' in *Derrida and Disinterest* (London: Continuum, 2005), 54-68. If there is a disinterest in Derrida's work it is a disinterest in ruins, a disinterest that begins with the imperative that an absolute distinction between the public and the private can never be made: neither in the state, nor in the university, nor in the chance meeting. On public and the private, see: 'Envois', 62, 144, 185; *Politics of Friendship*, 88.

⁴⁶ Jacques Derrida, 'Globalization, Peace, and Cosmopolitanism', in *Negotiations: Interventions and Interviews 1971-2001*, ed. and trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 385-86. See also, *De quoi demain*, 240-48.

⁴⁷ Jacques Derrida, 'Ja, or the *faux-bond* II,' in *Points: Interviews 1974-1994*, ed. Elisabeth Weber (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 67. See, for example, Jacques Derrida, *Glas*, trans. John P. Leavey Jr. and Richard Rand (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990), 3a-5a. I have attempted to trace this in 'The Ruins of Disinterest' in *Derrida and Disinterest*, 1-18.

⁴⁸ Jacques Derrida, 'La raison du plus fort (Y a-t-il des États voyous?),' in *Voyous: Deux essais sur la raison* (Paris: Galilée, 2003), 154; 'I Have a Taste for the Secret', in Jacques Derrida and Maurizio Ferraris, *A Taste for the Secret*, ed. Giacomo Donis and David Webb, trans. Giacomo Donis (London: Polity Press, 2001), 50. See also, Simon Morgan Wortham, *Counter-Institutions: Of Deconstruction* (New York: Fordham, 2006), 28-30, and my review of Wortham's book, 'Countering the With and Against', *Textual Practice* (forthcoming).

⁴⁹ Jacques Derrida, 'Afterword: Toward an Ethic of Discussion', in *Limited Inc*, trans. Samuel Weber (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988), 112.

⁵⁰ Morgan-Wortham, *Counter-Institutions: Of Deconstruction* (forthcoming).

⁵¹ 'Violence and Metaphysics', 95. Jacques Derrida, 'Edmond Jabès and the Question of the Book', in *Writing and Difference*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 74. See also 'Violence and Metaphysics' 123 (315-16 n. 44), 152-53, and 'Mes chances', 358.

⁵² Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International*, trans. Peggy Kamuf (London: Routledge, 1994), 38; *L'autre cap* (Paris: Minuit, 1991), 11-12. See also, *Counterpath*, 56.

⁵³ 'Envois', 20; *Schibboleth* 63.

⁵⁴ 'Envois', 246-47; 'Envois,' in *La carte postale: de Socrate à Freud et au-delà* (Paris: Aubier Flammarion, 2003), 264. Translation modified.