THE PARTY EVOLUTION FRAMEWORK: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO EXAMINING THE DEVELOPMENT OF PARTY COMMUNICATIONS AND CAMPAIGNS

A Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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April 2010
Abstract

Existing theories of party organisation, and political communication and marketing, address the issue of party evolution and electoral behaviour from opposing and largely one-dimensional angles. The purpose of this thesis is to develop a more integrated perspective to party campaigning that goes beyond the traditional approaches of party behaviour and present the relationship between intra-party organisation and campaign evolution in a new light. The party evolution approach is an alternative conceptual framework of party campaigning, which integrates the classic approaches of party organisation with the modern accounts of political communication and marketing while taking into consideration the institutional and ideological constraints of political parties. The main aim is to bridge the worlds of marketing and politics by offering a distinct perspective that integrates elements of a party’s innate political identity and readdressing the notion of party communications professionalisation within the wider context of party evolution process. To this end, the employment of consumer marketing techniques and approaches in party campaigning is not considered a means to the end of electoral success but an integrated element of the party’s evolving identity. The intention is that the Party Evolution Framework be used as a tool for comparative analysis. The holistic and integrated scope of the framework is likely to qualify its application to a cross-section of democracies, regardless of their party and electoral systems, campaign regulations, and historical, socio-economic and political landscape. To this end, the present thesis illustrates the use of the party evolution framework in two largely contrasting contexts; British and Greek politics.
Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I would like to express my sincerest gratitude to my supervisor, Prof. Justin Fisher who has supported me throughout the various stages of my thesis with his patience, understanding and useful suggestions whilst allowing me the room to work in my own way. His continuous encouragement and guidance as well as his belief in my work enabled me to complete this thesis.

I would like to thank the staff at Karamanlis Foundation, the Centre for Political Research and Communications (KPEE) in Athens, and the Labour History Archive and Study Centre (LHASC) for their assistance.

I am mostly indebted to Mr. Antonis Stamatakos who introduced me to a number of New Democracy party cadres. Moreover, I would like to thank all my interviewees for their willingness to help me and especially, Mr. Athanassios Davakis, Dimitrios Kontos and Takis Starogiannis who answered all my questions without hesitation.

I am especially, indebted to my family for their love and support. I heartily thank my father and brother for their continuous support throughout all my studies at university. I am deeply grateful to my husband, Andreas, for his patience, invaluable support and understanding that helped me to keep my thesis – and my life - in perspective. And most importantly, my main dept of gratitude is owed to my mother, who offered me encouragement and helped me to overcome my doubts during the dark days when my self-belief was low and it seemed that the thesis would never be completed. As a token of my thanks, it is to my mother that I dedicate this thesis.

Lastly, I offer my regards to all of those who supported me in any respect during the completion of this project.
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Abbreviations

BSP  British Socialist Party
CCD  Campaigns and Communications Directorate
CLP  Constituency Labour Party
CMT  Campaign Management Team
CSC  Campaign Strategy Committee
EP   European Parliament
ILP  Independent Labour party
LRC  Labour Representation Committee
MP   Member of Parliament
ND   New Democracy
NCL  National Council of Labour
NEC  National Executive Committee
NJC  National Joint Council
NPF  National Policy Forum
OMOV One Member One Vote
PASOK Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement
PEB  Party Election Broadcast
PEF  Party Evolution Framework
PLP  Parliamentary Labour Party
SCA  Shadow Communications Agency
SDP  Social Democratic Party
TUC  Trade Union Congress
Introduction

A Framework of Analysis

The development of electioneering has become the ground for a substantial debate across political communication and marketing research, leading to an abundance of studies on party electoral behaviour. The early 1960s signalled an interest in the field of political communications as a means of analysis of party campaigning. However, in the last two decades there has been a shift of emphasis from the modes of communication to the tools, techniques of promotion and strategic understanding of party and voter electoral behaviour. Within that context, the evolution of the cross-disciplinary area of political marketing has been used as a ‘tool of analysis of party and voter behaviour’ in an attempt to identify ‘new ways of understanding modern politics’, to delineate the use of ‘strategic options and behaviour of parties’ and to give an insight into how the modern ways of ‘political salesmanship’ differ from the old ones (Scammell, 1999: 718–719). Political marketing approaches deliberate the changes and transformations that have taken place within society and indicate the ways parties assimilate these new developments. Therefore, as has been highlighted in several studies (e.g. Collins and Butler, 1996; Lees-Marshment, 2001a, 2001b; Scammell, 1999; Wring, 1996), modern political communication campaigns are highly influenced and ultimately, determined by their political marketing elements.

There is a plentiful literature on both political communications and marketing that provides a coherent framework for analysing the changing nature of political campaigning. Existing political marketing theories engage in ‘rethinking political party behaviour’ (Lilleker and Lees-Marshment, 2005) but merely within the narrow context of employment of consumer marketing techniques and approaches into party campaigning as a means to the end of electoral success. However, political communications and marketing models present incomplete examples of party behaviour because they fail to address adequately the issue of internal party organisational development and its effect on campaigning. Moreover, they tend to consider party member behaviour as predefined and fixed and whilst they address changes in the environment within which parties operate, treat parties as unitary and unconstrained actors. As a result, they fail to identify the parties as living, dynamic organisations characterised by intense intra-party relationships and distinct political cultures. Nevertheless, some earlier research on party organisation and electoral behaviour focused either on the adaptation of intra-party mechanisms to party competitiveness (Muller and Steininger, 1994) or on the integration of specific party attributes into the professionalisation process of campaigning in an attempt to explain
why parties embrace new campaign styles through the combination of the internal and external events that might ‘force’ parties to change (Gibson and Rommelle, 2001). Such an approach is more party centred and goes a step further than the previous accounts of professional campaigning but is once more focused on predefined party traits as prerequisites to specific reactions to external events.

Drawing upon the existing theories of party organisation, and political marketing and communications, the purpose of this research project is to go beyond the traditional approaches of party behaviour and present the relationship between intra-party organisation and campaign evolution in a new light. By identifying the stages in the development of a party’s approach to electioneering and defining the process of professionalisation at political and electoral terms, the present research aims to demonstrate that the employment of marketing techniques and communications strategies are inextricably linked to the internal character of political parties. As will be indicated in more detail during the course of this thesis, the purpose is to ‘rethink the process of evolution of party behaviour’ in relation to internal and external, organisational and ideological, formal and informal dynamics and challenges to which office-seeking parties have to respond in order to survive politically and electorally. To this end, the present research suggests a conceptual framework that moves beyond the traditional approaches and presents an integrated approach for the examination of party electoral behaviour with regard to each party’s unique inherent characteristics. In particular, it identifies communications professionalisation and campaign modernisation with regard to a party’s inherent political identity as this has developed through a long-term process of political consolidation and institutionalisation.

The Party Evolution Framework is a three-stage comparative framework that offers an alternative approach to party campaigning through the cohesive study of what are considered the core elements of the framework; institutionalisation, adaptation and professionalisation. In essence, the distinctiveness of the framework rests on two main considerations. First, the evolution framework draws upon the existing theories and offers a theoretical synthesis able to fill in the gap between political marketing and organisational theories and thus, bridge the worlds of marketing and politics. Second, the framework goes beyond the theoretical synthesis and offers a distinct perspective on the study of party campaigning that integrates elements of a party’s innate political identity in an attempt to readdress the notion of party communications professionalisation within the wider context of party evolution process. To this end, the party evolution framework addresses the developments in party campaigning by taking into consideration the institutional and ideological constraints of parties. Political parties are not unitary actors but living dynamic organisations susceptible to
internal and external events; as such each party’s professionalisation and campaign development ought to be examined within different contexts that embrace the distinct culture and functions of parties. To run an effective communications campaign through the casual adoption of marketing tools and seeming responsiveness to the demands of the market is a relatively easy task to achieve and would most likely lead to electoral success; but the development into a professionalised political organisation entails elements of internal renewal and reinvention through a long-term process of reform and change that is affected by, but also has an impact on the formal and informal principles, values, rules and traditions that define party behaviour. Within that context, campaign professionalisation comprises not a practice of electioneering but an integrated element of the party’s evolving identity. The latter sought to explain why some parties have managed to respond to the challenge and build an electoral and political hegemony while other office-seeking parties are engaged into a long process of introversion, striving to reinvent themselves.

Another important factor that should be taken into account when examining party behaviour within a long-term perspective of party development is the uniqueness of a political organisation that prevents it from falling within the strict lines of the existing ideal party type models but that intersects the strictly defined lines of these models. To this end, the complex nature of parties ought to be taken into account when addressing either their political or electoral behaviour over time. In essence, the complex and hybrid nature of parties could likely be considered one of the pre-defined characteristics of party formation, as most office-seeking parties in their attempt to win the votes of the electorate and successfully adapt to the changing landscape within which operate could develop a pattern of unconventional – in relation to the ideal classic models of party types - characteristics, functions and modes of conduct. Overall, the main focus here is not on the parties’ short-term adaptation of sophisticated marketing tools and temporary electoral success but on the long-term aspects of party evolution. The analysis that follows goes beyond specific campaign timeframes and the extent of an election victory but dissects the effectiveness of campaign professionalisation as an integral part of party evolution process.

The intention is that the Party Evolution Framework can be used as a tool for comparative analysis. The holistic and integrated scope of the framework is likely to qualify its application to a cross-section of democracies, regardless of their party and electoral systems, campaign regulations, and historical, socio-economic and political landscape. To this end, the present thesis illustrates the use of the party evolution framework in two largely contrasting contexts; British and Greek politics. In detail, the case studies chosen to evaluate the applicability of the framework are the British
Labour party and the general election campaign of 1997 and the Greek New Democracy party and the national election of 2004. Overall, the two case studies are drawn from highly contrasting political systems, with distinct histories, traditions, political mentality, culture and ethos. Most importantly, and in sharp contrast with the British long-established democratic tradition as a sovereign unified state, Greece is considered a new democracy, as the third Hellenic Republic was established in 1974. Moreover, the modern historical and political culture of the country includes a series of independence and bitter civil wars, and successive coup d’états, which have inextricably marked the mentality of the population and the structures of the political landscape. And whilst the historical and political background of the two parties under examination could deter the possibility of developing a comparative framework for analysis, in actual fact, the level of institutional distinctiveness offers a robust context for testing the applicability and evaluating the success of the framework.

Therefore, building upon existing knowledge of British and Greek politics and observing the ways in which the incumbent (at the time that this project was conceived) political parties succeeded in returning to power, the thesis aims to address the process to their electoral predominance through a political science perspective. Moreover, it should be noted that, apart from the abovementioned differing contexts, a combination of unexpected and surprising similarities between the two cases, could also justify this seemingly awkward comparison. More specifically, prior to their electoral success both parties experienced a remarkable development relative to the professional resources invested in their election campaigning (mid-1980s for Labour, mid-1990s for New Democracy). Also, both parties had spent a long period in opposition tarnished by internal divisions and conflicts; that is, eighteen years for the Labour party and almost twenty years (with a short three-year long governmental parenthesis) for New Democracy. In British and Greek cases, the credibility of the political system within which Labour and New Democracy operated was damaged by the disclosure of a series of governmental scandals and accusations of ‘sleaze’ made against MPs. As a result, the governing parties in both countries had lost their appeal to a large segment of the electorate. Most importantly, incumbent parties (the Conservatives in Britain, PASOK in Greece) had lost their renowned advantage of economic competence against their challengers. Furthermore, both parties run their successful campaigns under the leadership of newly elected ‘young’ politicians, willing to unite, redesign and mainly, reposition their parties and respond to the demands and challenges of a new era of politics and whose profile was not worn out by their involvement to everyday politics or scandals. Finally, both parties operated within a broad two-party system, rendering their return to power more straightforward, due to the limited number of practical choices available to the electorate desiring change and
a new party in government. Within that context the comparison between the two cases is encouraged despite the striking differences between political systems and party organisations. However, it should be borne in mind that whilst the underlying similarities of office-seeking political parties denote their electoral tenacity, their distinct cultures – political identities - and internal mechanisms discourage convergence even in cases when the same tools and techniques are used for electoral purposes.

Methodology

As already mentioned, the present research intends to present an alternative conceptual framework of party campaigning, which integrates the classic approaches of party organisation with the modern accounts of political communication and marketing, and then, to empirically assess the utility of the framework as a tool of comparison applied to two profoundly different political parties, from two very different contexts - Britain and Greece. To this end, initially the construction of the framework was drawn upon the existing theories of party development, organisation and campaigning. Overall, the conceptualisation of the Party Evolution Framework is derived from a wide range of literature utilising material from the classic models of party formation, development, organisation and behaviour of Maurice Duverger (1954), Angelo Panebianco (1988), Otto Kirchheimer (1966), Richard Katz and Peter Mair (1995), and Anthony Downs (1957), the political marketing model of Jennifer Lees-Marshment (2001) and the communications and campaign professionalism frameworks of Pippa Norris (2002), Farrell and Webb (2000) focusing on the development of national campaigns and the local (constituency) level models of Denver and Hands (2002) and Fisher and Denver (2008). These models are critically approached and used as tools underpinning the characteristics of the three-stage typology of the party evolution framework. To this end, the present research project explores the potential of theoretical synthesis in order to address the lacuna of the existing literature.

The present work builds upon the tradition of qualitative comparative analysis as a means for testing theoretical statements and assessing the validity of their interpretations (e.g. King et al, 1994) while paying attention to historical-empirical detail (e.g. Moore, 1966) as means to analyse the trajectory of party progression in relation to the uniqueness and distinctiveness of political parties. Drawing analogies with previous studies on political campaigning and party professionalisation (Farrell and Webb, 2000; Lees-Maarshment, 2001; Norris, 2002; Fisher and Denver, 2008), the
main goal of the thesis is to test the utility of the evolution framework as a basis for comparison and assess its validity as an analytical but also explanatory tool of comparative politics. Therefore, the evolution framework is a three-stage heuristic device, a form of preliminary analysis that facilitates our understanding of the process by which office-seeking political parties evolve into ‘encompassing professionalised’ political entities. The party evolution framework is essentially designed to capture changes in party campaigning and professionalisation even under different contextual environments.

To this end, two main qualifications apply to the selection of the two particular case studies. First, at an inter-systemic level the use of this framework is illustrated in the British and Greek contexts, which as mentioned above, have profound political and institutional differences (mature vs. new democracy, majoritarian vs. proportional electoral system etc.). Second, two profoundly different and even diametrically opposed political parties in terms of their organisational, ideological and historical background are selected to provide the basis for comparison. However, despite the explicit dissimilarities of the two case studies, it is important to note that they did demonstrate a number of unexpected political similarities particularly, with regard to the electoral environment within which the two parties had to operate, their campaign resources and strategies. Overall, then, the application of the framework across different contextual and institutional environments provides a robust empirical testing and demonstrates that its principles can be applied to a cross-section of democracies regardless of their party and electoral systems, campaign regulations and political, socio-economic and historical backgrounds. Moreover, the rigorous testing of the framework in two diametrically different political parties suggests its potential to capture changes in the developmental process of political parties and to provide better ways to analyse party progression. Therefore, it should be emphasised that the main aim of the thesis is to assess the utility of the evolution framework as a heuristic tool of comparison to understand variation between political parties rather than providing an explicit body of comparative research within the conventional context of hypothesised relationships of comparative methodology. That is, the two political parties are not directly compared or factually contested but their systemic analysis through the criteria of the evolution framework serves as a means to demonstrate the validity of the framework.

The empirical evaluation of the framework rests mainly on secondary analysis from a wide variety of resources, which critically assesses the available evidence, elucidates the characteristics and extent of change and provides a holistic reassessment of the widespread views on party professionalisation. To this end, both primary and
secondary sources are used. These include the use of statistical data from polls, and in particular in the British case data from the British Election Study (BES) and the Gallup Political and Economic Index; newspaper articles, which as a result of limited available sources and data in the Greek case, provide a valuable source of information; party published and unpublished documents, most specifically from the Labour History Archive and Study Centre and the Karamanlis Foundation; a variety of Journal articles, which are either widely available or accessed via the publication’s archives; and obviously, a vast majority of related books and e-books, biographies and memoirs, websites, TV documentaries, news bulletins and programmes. The scarcity of sources with regard to the New Democracy party was resolved by the conduct of a number of formal personal interviews with local party delegates and elite cadres and informal discussion with academics that had previously conducted research on New Democracy. Further primary sources were used such as political advertisements, press releases, manifestos, and in the Greek case, the 2000 and 2004 televised leadership debates. The main difficulties encountered in the course of data collection and analysis related to the Greek case study. Due to the culture of secrecy that characterises New Democracy a fairly limited amount of data was available (the party has no official archive) while elite party members and consultants were unwilling to be interviewed and/or provide a more insightful account of various events. Nonetheless, given the unavailability of systematic research on the party of New Democracy and most specifically, the lack of any form of cohesive analysis of the party’s campaigning and communications progression, the findings of the thesis provide a significant contribution to the analysis of the Greek conservative party in particular, while in general, they can be used as the groundwork for a more detailed examination of the Greek political and party system.

Overall, as Lees-Marshment (2001b: 6) argues the topic of party behaviour is ‘too broad and too complex to be amenable to statistical verification’ and hardly fits with ‘a particular methodology and approach’ that favours the use of hard especially the cases of intra-party relationships that are difficult to prove statistically. The scope of the research is not intended to produce a new set of data or completely deviate from past research. On the contrary, it aims through the analysis of the available data, to re-evaluate the context of analysis of party campaign professionalisation, re-assess the determinants of party behaviour and re-address the method of study of political campaigning by integrating in it the notion and process of a cohesive party evolution approach.
The Structure of the Thesis

The thesis has nine chapters. Six of these focus on the analysis of the two case studies and their interpretation through the Party Evolution Framework, while the penultimate chapter sets the evidence of the research within a comparative perspective. However, before focusing on the empirical testing of the framework, Chapter one considers the theoretical framework upon which the research is based. The existing theories on party organisation and political communication and marketing are evaluated and their deficiencies are addressed, while the three-stage framework of the Party Evolution Framework is thoroughly defined.

The main analysis begins in Chapter two, which is the first of a three-part examination of the Labour party. Following the pattern outlined in the party evolution typology, the chapter reviews the historical, organisational, ideological, political and electoral characteristics that have defined Labour's identity since the party's inception, in a detailed and systematic approach that falls within the context of Stages I and II of the framework. Ideological factionalism, policy-orientation and government practices, organisational development and key party institutions, constitutional provisions, but also values, rules and unwritten principles, intra-party relationships and power distribution are the issues that are thoroughly addressed and examined. The main aim at this first stage is to study Labour's inherent characteristics, formal and informal in nature, and identify the mainstream tendencies of Labour's behaviour and development that led to the party’s renowned 1997 election campaign. Chapter three then looks in more detail at the party's communications and campaigning. The chapter considers Labour's campaign modernisation and examines the long-term process of internal structural changes that laid the basis for the inception of New Labour. The 1987 and 1992 election campaigns under Kinnock are reviewed before turning to the Blair era and the detailed analysis of the 1997 election campaign. The focus here is on analysing New Labour in the context of the third stage of the party evolution framework and thus, to dissect the process of the party’s professionalisation (electoral element) in relation to its inherent adaptive capacity (political in nature) to the challenges of its environment.

Chapter four completes the discussion by providing an integrated account of the development of the Labour party through the interpretation of its evolution over time within the context of the Party Evolution Framework. The character and unique identity of the party defined in relation to historical and political events that conditioned party change over time, are the key components of Labour's evolution and New Labour’s success. The purpose here is to show that New Labour emerged out
of Labour’s innate ideological and organisational flexibility, emphasise the continuity elements embodied in the launch of Blair’s project and indicate the reasons why Labour and New Labour simply represent different phases in the developing character of the Labour party. To this end, Labour’s communications professionalisation is not a means to an end but developed into an integral element of Labour’s political identity and as such marks the party’s evolution process.

Chapters five, six and seven look at New Democracy. Following the abovementioned pattern of analysis, chapter five provides a detailed analysis of the historical, ideological and organisational characteristics of the party while evaluating its internal dynamics and shifts in the power positions of the party hierarchy. The chapter reviews the historical and political trajectory of the party and identifies its origins, genetic characteristics, consolidation phase and institutionalisation, and reviews its internal development from the early year’s of its formation up to the 2004 general election campaign. The aim of the chapter is to comprehensively examine New Democracy’s development over time and in conjunction with the findings of chapter six to fill the gap of the under-researched area of New Democracy’s political and electoral dynamics. Therefore, having examined the historical trajectory of the party’s founding principles, ideological redirection and organisational development the discussion in Chapter six focuses on the communications and campaigning development of the party within the wider context of the newly established Greek democracy. Initially, the chapter addresses the modes of and changes in campaigning in the country in the aftermath of the restoration of democracy, covering the periods of 1980s up to early 1990s before looking in detail at Karamanlis’ (junior) leadership and the process of the party’s communications modernisation that led to the 2004 landslide victory. The party’s adaptation and professionalisation levels are defined and analysed. Finally, chapter seven discusses the character of the 2004 version of New Democracy through the comprehensive assessment of all those elements that contributed to evolution of the party. The chapter expounds on the findings of the two previous chapters and within the context of the evolution framework provides an integrated account on the reasons why New Democracy’s project towards professionalisation, while electorally effective, failed in political terms.

Having completed the empirical analysis of the two case studies, chapter eight offers a comparative perspective. Despite the differing and opposing character of the two parties derived from the distinct socio-economic, political as well as ideological and cultural environments within which they operated, both developed into vote-maximising, office-seeking political formations and their survival was based – amongst other factors – on their leaders’ and members’ drive to get elected in office. The latter
played a crucial role for both parties’ ability to adapt and reinvent themselves. Within that context of implicit similarities and explicit differences, the applicability of the Party Evolution Framework is tested. Finally, an overall account of the thesis’ argument is provided in Chapter nine that completes this research project.
Chapter 1

Theoretical Framework

1.1 Introduction

In order to explain and understand party behaviour, it is important to consider its past and internal constraints. Anthony Downs (1957, pp. 122-3) for example, argues that ideology prevents a party from ‘leaping’ over ‘the heads of its neighbours’ by restricting its room for movement, while John May (1973) suggests that radical party members restrict the actions of the party leadership. In fact, in order to work out the role of the party’s organisational structure and its reaction to the stimuli of its external environment, one has to take into account the conditions of a party’s formative stage, its evolution and transformation over the years and the conditions under which this transformation took place. Elements of transformation and reorganisation that go to the level of re-branding are vital characteristics of modern political parties and these parties’ organisational evolutions have to be considered in the changing environmental context of each era. The aim of this analysis is twofold:

- First, to identify the stages in the development of parties’ approaches to electioneering through an integrated framework, which will place emphasis on party organisational strategic change; that is, to what extent party electoral strategies have evolved over time in accordance with their organisational and ideological development.

- Second, to develop a party evolution typology, which will be used as the basis for comparison between the British and Greek parties under examination.

The use of communication techniques, either with the employment of professionals or the recruitment of parties’ own members in relation to their available resources dates back to the first stages of party formation. As Wring argues ‘[…] marketing activities and thinking have informed party development from the advent of mass democracy at the beginning of this century’ (1996: 102). To this end, professional advertising and image consciousness form integral parts of party evolution. Therefore, the strategic development of a political party could be considered parallel to the party’s institutionalisation process; both have evolved simultaneously as both are vital processes for the survival and electoral success of a party. Furthermore, electioneering has changed dramatically in recent times, coinciding with the transformation of party organisation and behaviour. In other words, as Katz and Mair argue, each type of party tends to generate the conditions for its own opposition, leading inevitably to its downfall and thus, transformation ‘[…] in much the same way as the elite parties created the social and political conditions for the emergence and success of mass
parties, and as the mass parties, in turn, created the conditions for the emergence and success of catch-all parties, and as the catch-all party led to the conditions that generated the cartel party, so the more recent success of the cartel inevitably generates its own opposition’ (1995: 24).

**Political Marketing and Communication**

To date, there has been an abundance of studies on political campaigning and the development of electioneering. Political electoral activity has been extensively examined and analysed from various angles of the political communication and marketing fields. Originally, the development of new modes of election campaigning was linked to the Americanisation hypothesis, which provided the ground for the comparative study of modern election campaigns (Negrine and Papathanassopoulos, 1996). The next stage in the political communications approach was to focus on qualitative changes leading to the ‘modernisation’ and then ‘professionalisation’ of political campaigning which entailed the use of marketing techniques as the core element of the campaign process at national and local levels (Franklin, 1994; Mancini and Swanson, 1996; Farrell, 1996; Scammell, 1995; Kavanagh, 1995; Blumler and Kavanagh, 1999; Norris et al, 1999; Farrell and Schmitt-Beck, 2002; Norris, 2002; Denver and Hands, 2002; Fisher and Denver, 2008).

However, while campaign studies consider developments in society and changes of the media system to be the main factors shaping the evolution of electioneering, political marketing approaches emphasise the influence that the adoption of new communications and marketing techniques have on political parties and politicians and on the electoral outcome. Studies of electoral marketing are focused on the applicability of marketing concepts and techniques to parties and their activities as a means to explain their competitive position in the electoral competition (O’Shaughnessy, 1990; Butler and Collins, 1994). Detailed analysis of campaign behaviour has led to the development of various models centred on the analysis of the political marketplace and the position of parties within it (Collins and Butler, 1996; Harrop, 1990; Newman, 1999), or the development and management of the strategic planning of party behaviour formulated in ‘process’ and ‘phase’ models (Sharma, 1976; Newman, 1994; Wring, 1996; Farrell and Wortmann, 1987; Niffenegger, 1989; Lees-Marshment, 2001a, 2001b). Nonetheless, as has been highlighted in several

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1 ‘Modernisation’ accounts argue that the activities of political parties have been ‘professionalised’ however politicians are still more concerned with the substance of politics rather than the image (Kavanagh, 1995). The ultimate change refers to the ‘professionalised’ attitude of politicians and signals the final stage of ‘professionalisation’ of electioneering.
studies (eg. Scammell, 1999; Lees-Marshment, 2001a, 2001b; Collins and Butler, 1996; Wring, 1996) the political marketing school considers modern political communication campaigns to be highly influenced and, ultimately, determined by their political marketing elements.

**A New Context of Analysis**

Drawing upon the existing theories of party organisation and political communication and marketing models, the framework introduced here addresses three main considerations. First, it provides a theoretical synthesis of the two approaches in order to fill in the gap between the two, examine their relationship under a new light and define the extent of change of party electoral strategies in direct relation to party organisational evolution and change. The framework goes further than the cross-disciplinary accounts of political marketing on party behaviour and the changing nature of political campaigning by acknowledging that political parties are living movements and as such all elements of their character and identity ought to be taken into account without temporal, structural, or ideological constraints. Second, while the existing political marketing theories have approached the development of electioneering from a marketing driven perspective, marrying marketing to politics, focusing on the application of marketing concepts and techniques to parties/candidates and their electoral activities and thus, addressing the ways that parties respond to the challenges of their environment (electorate demands) with a marketing orientation (O’Shaughnessy, 1990; Butler and Collins, 1994; Lees-Marshment, 2001a, 2001b), the current framework deliberates on the application of politics to the outcomes of political marketing. That is, using the integration and mixing of literatures as a starting point, it addresses changes in party campaigning and the extensive professionalisation and marketisation of office-seeking political parties in relation to the inherent political attributes of parties that go beyond the short-term examination of party electoral behaviour and campaigning. The evolution framework, therefore considers the ways that parties professionalise their campaigns by recognising the dynamic interaction of endogenous and exogenous institutional factors. Most importantly, however, the evolution approach moves beyond the professionalisation and/or marketisation of campaigning to consider party political professionalisation, which implies more than the mere implementation of a highly professionalised campaign; rather focusing on Panebianco’s (1988) definition of professionalisation, which – amongst others - focuses on changes in intra-party characteristics (such as organisation and ethos), the evolution framework approaches ‘party professionalisation’ as an inherent trait of a party’s political identity; party development into a political professional organisation.
To this end, party political evolution is considered contingent to all elements that have affected party behaviour at all levels (internal, external, electoral) and stages of party life. Therefore, party evolution integrates the historical, organisational, ideological, electoral and behavioural trajectory of a political party, and the extent to which these have affected or have been affected by its relations with its external environment. Most importantly, the framework seeks to provide a ‘rational’ response to the partial and incomplete approach of political marketing models to changing party behaviour mainly because they fail to address the impact of internal party organisational dynamics and its effects on campaigning, and as a consequence disregard the Downsian notion of ‘leapfrogging’. To this end, the evolution approach provides an integrated approach to the process of change and increased professionalisation of party electioneering through the comprehensive examination of intra-party dynamics and distinct political culture of each party, features that prevent party leapfrogging and confine party movement to the boundaries of their distinct identity traits. In short, the framework identifies the changing nature of party electoral development and dissects the high degree of party professionalisation as a process of adaptation to rather than mere adoption of marketing and communication principles and techniques.

Within that context, the Party Evolution Framework aims to explain the ways in which a party’s formative characteristics and organisational structure affect the process of its professionalisation. In short, the framework identifies to what extent the implementation of sophisticated marketing techniques that form the party’s electoral behaviour is related to the party’s historical, ideological and organizational past. Moreover, contrary to the political marketing models, which explain party alteration in relation to the demands and nature of their market, the evolution framework attempts to explain party electoral behaviour with regard to the special conditions of intra-party dynamics. Party evolution is examined through an all-encompassing three-stage framework (Figure 1.1). Stage I, the stage of institutionalisation, refers to party formation and party institutionalisation, the argument being that the ways parties behave in all phases of their existence are rooted in the very early years of their formation. Stage II, the stage of organisation of electioneering and adaptation, includes party organization and party types, mainly exploring and identifying the historical context of intra-party evolution and behaviour. The systemic analysis of party progression over time allows for the thorough examination and evaluation of the inherent elements as well as extraneous factors, which can influence party behaviour in the short term, and to identify the characteristics of party adaptation in the long-term. Finally, Stage III, the stage of encompassing professionalisation, considers parties as election campaign communicators, analysing the election campaign attributes of a political party in order to identify changes in a party’s communications operation and
to establish its relative degrees of professionalisation and adaptation in relation to intra-party institutional and ideological constraints. The concept of ‘encompassing professionalisation’ used to describe the third stage of the framework, is associated with the process of evolution of political parties to campaign professionals, on the one hand, and to professionalised political organisations, on the other, as a means to develop our understanding of the comprehensive, largely embracing context embedded in the party evolution approach. Within that context, the understanding of the nature of professionalisation is based on two mutually dependent interpretations/classifications. The first draws upon the literature on political campaigning, elections and communications (Scammell, 1995; Farrell, 1996; Farrell and Webb, 2000; Norris, 2002; Fisher and Denver, 2008), which pays attention to the extensive use of professional consultants, media advisors, communication and marketing tools and strategies as the main indicators of professionalisation (even within differing contexts, e.g. temporal, thematic, technological etc.). The second is provided by Panebianco who acknowledges the important role played by professionals but at the same time, pays considerable attention to the ‘organisational consequences’ comported with professionalisation (1988: 264). That is, professionalisation is inextricably linked with intra-party dynamics and changes in party organisation that in turn, can affect the culture and ethos of the organisation. To this end, Panebianco treats the issue of professionalisation within a wider interpretive context of ‘professionalisation of party organisations’ rather than just party campaigning. Therefore, in adopting these two approaches to examining the extent and nature of professionalisation of political party campaigns as an imperative element of party progression, the party evolution framework moves beyond the strictly defined ‘marketisation’ of political communication and campaigning. Indeed, the market-orientation of a political party is considered to be one of the integral parts of professionalisation, which extends to party organisation, bureaucracy, operation, leadership and membership, policy and ideology.

The rest of this chapter sets out in detail the theoretical context of the three stages of the party evolution framework, which is used throughout this thesis as a main form of preliminary analysis to dissect the impact of constant intra-party changes and interpret party professionalisation and election campaign effectiveness. The analysis at each stage focuses on the detailed examination of the wider range of existing accounts - on party formation and transformation, organisation models, campaigning, political marketing and communication - setting the context for the further integration of party behaviour and providing the ground on interpreting party evolution. This study takes a critical approach to existing theories, identifies their shortcomings and deficiencies and seeks to ensure that party behaviour is addressed in a coherent, integrated mode
that takes into account the institutional constraints of party organisation as well as the distinct culture and ethos of each political party. The professionalisation of party campaigning is the end of a long process of adaptation and not the outcome of hasty adoption of marketing tools and techniques.

**Figure 1.1: Party Evolution Framework**

![Figure 1.1: Party Evolution Framework](image)

1.2 Party Evolution Framework

*Stage I: Institutionalisation*

*Party Institutionalisation and Models of Party Formation*

Classical Weberian sociology emphasises the importance of the founding moment of institutions. The way an institution is formed determines and conditions its life, organisation, operation and behaviour even decades later. The organisation goes through a number of minor and major changes, and evolves in relation to the different socio-economic and political conditions of the environment in which it operates. In fact, this process of change and transformation is a mandatory condition for party survival and electoral success. At the same time, the formation stage and the characteristics a party inherits from this formative process are crucial to its development as these elements form a party’s indelible mark. To this end, historical dimension and experience constitute integral parts of the organisational analysis of parties, or as Duverger argues ‘it is the whole life of the party which bears the mark of its origin’ (1964: xxxv).
Studies on institutionalisation, that is, the process by which parties ‘solidify’ (Panebianco, 1988), are based on the abovementioned framework of organisational analysis, giving emphasis on the importance of a party’s founding moment. Party development theory has evolved significantly over the years. Yet, one of the most important and influential contributions to the study of party formation and transformation remains Maurice Duverger’s work, ‘Political Parties’ (1964). Duverger identified two models of party development; internally and externally generated parties. Both internally and externally generated parties follow a three-step process of development. First, groups of people with the same interests are formed. Second, local electoral committees are created in the electorate. Third, a connection between the two is established. The initial fundamental difference though, lies in the first stage of this pattern; internally generated parties are formed by parliamentarians, while externally generated parties by non-political organisations (i.e. trade unions). Nonetheless, the creation of both organisational networks resulted from universal suffrage and increased political participation.

In addition, Duverger linked institutionalisation with ideology and with the general articulation of the party; that is, the degree of party centralisation or decentralisation is viewed as a consequence of party structure. In order to make it more precise, the system of articulation is measured (weak or strong) and identified either as vertical or horizontal. A vertical link joins ‘two bodies subordinate the one to the other’ in such a way as to prevent any ‘development within the party of schisms, factions, or opposition’ (1964: 47-9). That is, the different branches are separated from one another and have no established relationships amongst themselves. Their communication takes place through the central body, as no direct contact is possible. This system maintains ‘unity, homogeneity and continuity within the party’ and characterises parties with strong articulation (Ibid). Contrariwise, the horizontal link, which usually characterises parties with weak articulation ‘joins two bodies on the same level’ allowing for the direct contact between corresponding units. In short, this system allows different branches to establish close relationships amongst themselves, downgrading the role of the centre as the main point of contact. Within this general context, Duverger pointed out that leftist parties are likely to be vertically linked and with strong articulation, elements leading to a high degree of dependency between their factions.

2 In a similar line of reasoning, Neumann (1956: 395-421) distinguishes the in-group from the out-group, the ‘haves’ from the ‘have-nots’ in politics, which lead to the classification of parties as party of patronage and party of principles. However, this division addresses a two-party system characterised by a clear-cut political competition.
At the same time, there is no evidence to directly relate vertical linkage with decentralisation or horizontal linkage with centralisation (Duverger, 1964: 52-60). As Duverger argued ‘vertical and horizontal links define ways of coordinating the basic elements of which the party is made up; centralisation and decentralisation define the way which power is distributed amongst the different levels of leadership’ (Ibid: 52). And whilst there are no implicitly defined factors that lead parties to adopt a specific system of organisation, party history and the first steps of party formation and organisation play a vital role in the centralised or decentralised articulation of a party. Within this line of reasoning, parties of parliamentary origin tend to be more decentralised than parties of extra-parliamentary origin. Therefore, following the above observations, it is made clear that an externally generated party is likely to be more centralised than an internally generated one. That is, the centre plays a vital role in the communication amongst the local offices by being their main point contact. Moreover, externally generated parties were also associated with leftist ideology\(^3\). Duverger addresses political parties ‘not [as] a community but a collection of communities, a union of small groups dispersed throughout the country and linked by co-ordinated institutions’ (Duverger, 1964: 17). The Durvergerian distinction between mass and cadre parties assumes that parties are pre-defined and well-defined social groups, used as means for participation in politics. Membership is fundamental prerequisite for the rise of a mass party while cadre parties ought to follow a parallel model of development otherwise they would perish (Ibid.: xxvii).

However, it should be stressed that the latter is a highly debatable contention (Katz and Mair, 1995). While it is rather evident that elite parties had to transform in order to survive, the extent and nature of their transformation has not necessarily followed the mass party example. In fact, cadre parties sought to develop a numerically broad electoral membership, but their organisational principles, operation and strategic focus was entirely different to a mass party organisation. To this end, Duverger’s distinction between mass and cadre parties is a starting point providing a comprehensive and reasonable account on the creation and internal workings of political parties but fails to adequately address changes in the organisation, ideology and thus, operation of political parties (Ware, 1987: 6). And while the line of reasoning upon which the Party Evolution Framework is built explicitly asserts Durverger’s argument that ‘it is the whole life of the party which bears the mark of its origins’, the evolution approach contests the static character that he attributes to a party. In fact, as is argued change and adaptation are imperative preconditions for a party’s electoral and political

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\(^3\) It is important to emphasise that although left-wing parties tend to be externally generated with vertical links and strong articulation and are likely to be more centralised than the internally generated parties, no direct cause and effect relationship has been established.
survival; the only contestable issue relates to the extent of party adaptation and change.

 Panebianco: Organisational Development and Institutionalisation

The issue of party development and change has been more thoroughly addressed by Panebianco (1988) who acknowledged the importance of party origin but also addressed internal party organisation and operation in relation to the external and internal changes to which parties have to respond. He viewed the party as ‘a structure in motion, which evolves over time, reacting to external changes and to the changing environments in which it functions’ (1988: 49). Yet, the most important feature of the life and functioning of a party is its founding moment, which constitutes the ‘mark’ of the party. Therefore, Panebianco’s model focuses on the historical uniqueness of each party’s genetic model (1988: 50-53). Three main factors define each party’s genetic model. Following to some limited extent Duverger’s approach on party formation, he identified that a party’s composition, formation and development takes place either by territorial penetration or diffusion. The former results ‘when the centre controls, stimulates or directs the development of the periphery’ while the latter occurs ‘when development results from spontaneous germination’ (Ibid: 50).

Within that context, territorial penetration leads to the creation of parties with strong internal cohesion as the ‘centre’ is formed by an already dominant group of national leaders. Contrariwise, parties that develop through diffusion lack a cohesive leadership group and the existence of various different local groups struggling for power limits central party coordination and greatly affects intra-party unity.

The second factor is the presence or absence of an ‘external’ sponsor. When the external sponsor exists, the party leadership is loyal primarily to the sponsor and only secondarily to the party. Therefore, the ‘external’ sponsor is the leadership’s source of legitimation, leading to the sponsor controlling the party elite. Finally the third factor relates to the presence or absence of a charismatic leader at the time of party formation. To this end, party inception is directly related to one leader with ‘pure’ charisma and power to impose ‘himself as the undisputed founder, conceiver, and interpreter of a set of political symbols, which become inseparable from this person’ (Panebianco, 1988: 52). However, in the case that the charisma is ‘situational’, it is not the leader’s imposing charismatic personality that makes the people so subordinate to his presence but the existence of external conditions of social stress renders the leader perceived as exceptionally qualified. In both cases though, the leader and founder of the party has the power to impose his decisions on and control ‘his’ party.
Nevertheless, leaders, charismatic or not, play a crucial role in the life and functioning of parties.

Following the above discussion, two points ought to be addressed. First, there is a substantial difference between Duverger’s internally and externally generated parties, and Panebianco’s model of territorial penetration and diffusion. That is, the penetration/diffusion distinction goes beyond the pre-defined boundaries set out by Duverger’s model and thus, can characterise any type of party regardless of their ideology and time of formation. Second, Panebianco accepts the existence of a ‘mixed’ type of organisational development; that is, a party developed through diffusion can evolve, unite and form a strong national organisation (penetration) (Panebianco, 1988: 51).

In relation to party development, the identification of a party’s genetic model is crucial to the assessment of the party’s process and degree of institutionalisation. For Panebianco institutionalisation is ‘the process by which an organisation incorporates its founders’ values and aims’ (Panebianco, 1988: 53), and parties ought to institutionalise in order to survive. Therefore, the degree of a party’s institutionalisation leads to two ideal party types; strong vs. weak institutionalised parties. The overall level of institutionalisation is defined by two prime factors; first, by the conditions of party formation and second, the type of a party’s genetic model. Therefore, a party can be identified by the degree of its institutionalisation and placed along an institutionalisation continuum. However, as discussed later in the analysis, Panebianco’s institutionalisation process fails to take into account external elements that are able to affect parties not only at the time of their formation but throughout their entire life, conditioning their development, adaptation and survival.

The degree of institutionalisation can be measured in two scales; autonomy, which refers to a party’s relationship with its external environment, and systemicity, which reflects the degree of party internal structural coherence. Considering that an organisation’s operation is dependent on internally produced resources and resource exchange Panebianco points out, ‘a position of autonomy is reached when the organisation can directly control exchange processes with its environment. [It] is dependent when its indispensable resources are in part controlled by other organisations’ (1988: 55). To this end, the more autonomous a party is, the more defined are its boundaries - ‘closed’ model - while a high degree of dependency leads to undefined boundaries - ‘open’ model. Moreover, a party with a high degree of systemness is characterised by a great deal of interdependency and homogeneity between its internal subgroups, while the control of resources and the exchange
process is directly controlled by the ‘centre’. On the other hand, a low degree of
systemness indicates that subgroups are to a great extent autonomous and
heterogeneous, able to control their own resources and function independently from
the ‘centre’. Following the above, a ‘strong’ party with a high degree of
institutionalisation has more defences against environmental challenges, as all
resources and decisions are centrally controlled, but at the same time, it can be
vulnerable to external crises, as if one part of the organisation is negatively affected all
other subgroups are also affected. However, a ‘weak’ institution with a low level of
institutionalisation is less vulnerable to the external environmental changes due to the
autonomous existence and function of its subgroups. A weakly institutionalised party
can experience and survive various transformations throughout its life.

The major arguments up to now are primarily based on the ideal type distinction of
‘strong’ and ‘weak’ institutions. However, parties can be placed at any position along
the institutionalisation continuum. On the whole, there are five indicators that
illustrate a party’s degree of institutionalisation. The first is the degree of development
of the central extra-parliamentary organisation. A highly institutionalised party has a
strong central bureaucracy and strong national apparatus, while a weak institution has
an embryonic, even non-existent central apparatus. The second indicator is the degree
of homogeneity of organisational structures of the same hierarchical level. That is, the
highly institutionalised parties have local associations, which are homogeneously
organised at national level.

At the other extreme, a weak institution’s local associations have entirely different
organisational structures. The third indicator relates to party finance. A highly
institutionalised party has a plurality of resources and a regular revenue system, while
a weak institution is based on diverse resources and a less continuous flow of funds.
Fourth, party relations with external collateral organisations also play a significant
role. The more highly institutionalised the party the more control it can exercise on its
external organisations. A weakly institutionalised party either lacks and/or has
precarious and weak collateral organisations or the party is totally dependent on
external organisations. Finally, the fifth indicator refers to the degree of
correspondence between a party’s statutory norms and its actual power structure.
Therefore, if the party is strongly institutionalised the dominant coalition centres on
the formally recognised leader and thus, the degree of correspondence is high. On the
contrary, in the case of weakly institutionalised parties, the dominant coalition consists
of a number of local and informal leaders. Panebianco’s three-phase model of party
development is summarised in Table 1.1. The institutionalisation index is an attempt
to integrate all elements that affect party formation (genesis), institutionalisation and
development, into a comprehensive framework, which I will be using for measuring the degree of institutionalisation of the Labour and New Democracy parties.
Table 1.1: *Institutionalisation Index*

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To summarise, we have discussed two main approaches to party origins as addressed by Duverger and Panebianco. Both offer a reasonable - and relative to the scope and context of the present research\(^4\) - interpretation to party inception considering the endogenous and exogenous factors at the time of party formation. At the same time, both accounts have deficiencies amenable to address. As discussed Duverger offers a less flexible to party development interpretation, while Panebianco’s does not address the role of external events to party’s institutionalisation. Nonetheless, the evolution framework follows Panebianco’s line of reasoning that a party’s formative traits (genetic model) and the process and degree of its institutionalisation condition its organisation, functions and even its survival. Therefore, party behaviour over time is conditioned by a number of interrelated factors. On the whole, the present study integrates the formation and development of parties into examination of party campaign and communications evolution. That said, it should be borne in mind that the distinct nature of a party’s origin defines its unique character and political identity throughout its life, marks party behaviour and most importantly, qualifies party responsiveness and adaptation.

\[\textit{Stage II: Organisation of Electioneering and Adaptation}\]

\[\textit{Party Organisation Theory and Party Types}\]

Having identified the factors that define party origin and institutionalisation, Stage II focuses on the identification of party type in relation to its organisational structure. Internal party organisation and party behaviour are dependent not only on each other but are also affected by the external socio-economic and political context within which parties operate and develop. As a consequence, all models of party organisation seek to explain organisational forms and changes in a historical context

\(^4\) Lipset and Rokkan (1967) examined party formation within the wider context of party systems. They identified the formation of parties as the political expression of various social cleavages developed over time and defined party competition as the outcome of these social and historical cleavages. They did not analyse in depth either the internal management or the organisational functioning of parties. Therefore, they failed to address questions on how parties manage to survive the various social, cultural and economic changes that take place over the years and how they keep up and renew their core masses of support among the population, issues, which are considered vital to the present study. At the same time, they argued that a party’s character is not easy to change once it is established and entrenched even if the system undergoes significant variations (Lipset and Rokan, 1967: 30). Another perspective is given by Sartori (1968) who also dealt with the maintenance of party systems but emphasised the role of parties on political conflicts, and the party control on societal conflicts mainly through the control over the public agenda. He argued that parties and party systems change only if they lose control of their role as agenda-setters (Sartori, 1968). Nonetheless, both theories fall outside the context of party development examined in the present study and thus, are not integrated into the analysis.
Maor, 1997: 93). The extensive study of the interaction between party leaders and members and the series of trade-offs that take place between leaders and activists on intra-party distribution of power and control, has led to the emergence of three (plus one) major organisation models: the mass party (Duverger, 1964), which is used as a reference point for all other models to consider; the electoral-professional party (Epstein, 1967; Panebianco, 1988); and the catch-all party (Kirchheimer, 1966). In addition looking into party organisational modes from rather different perspective, Katz and Mair (1995) identified the cartel party, which stresses the relationship between the political parties and the state rather than society. In this context, the party operates as a broker between the civil society and the state defending the policies of the state to the public (Ibid: 13).

Fisher (2003) has identified a more generalised distinction between the theoretical approaches to party organisation, which is based on two main types. The first incorporates theories of party composition, which focus mainly on the composition of party membership and second, theories of electoral competition, which explain how parties re-organise in order to maximise their electoral benefits (Fisher, 2003: 142-145). The main advocates of party composition theories are Maurice Duverger (1954) and Kaare Strom (1990), who focused their analysis on ideological grounds, emphasising the existence of a striking contrast between left- and right-wing parties; Duverger identified this contrast as relative to the way parties are formed (cadre and mass parties) while for Strom emphasis was on the way parties operate in electoral and financial terms (capital and non-capital parties). On the other hand, electoral competition theories propagate that old traditional and cleavage-based party identification has declined and parties seek the support of various ideological groups within society. Therefore, parties ought to develop a vote-maximising attitude focusing on how to win elections. These frameworks of analysis include Kirchheimer’s (1966) ‘catch-all’ party, Epstein’s (1967) ‘electoral’ party and Katz and Mair’s (1995) ‘cartel’ party models. In addition, Panebianco (1988) acknowledged the emergence of ‘electoral-professional’ party as a response to the declining mass-bureaucratic party model (Panebianco, 1988). This is the framework upon which I have based the examination of party identity at the second Stage of the evolution framework. The integration of such a broad range of theoretical accounts into my framework is for mainly practical reasons; that is, hardly any political organisation falls within the boundaries set out by the existing ideal party type models. In reality, parties cut across the lines of these ideal types, mostly as a result of externally driven factors (e.g. impact of their environment) and either integrate features from other – even opposite in theory – types and/or develop another ‘party type’. The latter
however, as the present research claims, is highly dependent on the attributes and characteristics that parties have developed since their formative years.

*Party Composition*

In his classic work on political parties, Maurice Duverger (1954) identified two types of parties, cadre and mass parties, indicating that the distinction between the two ‘*is not based upon their dimensions, upon the number of their members: the difference involved is not one of size but of structure*’ (1964: 63). It is a truism that all parties need members in order to operate and survive. However, the argument centres on the role and influence of members on party functions. To this end, cadre parties are internally generated, top-down elitist parties. They existed as loose parliamentary groupings of relatively independent individuals in Parliament prior to the extension of suffrage when there was no need for them to appeal to the mass public. Their operation was based on a group of notables who prepared for elections, and conducted their own campaign. The candidates, who were normally influential persons, relied mainly on their own resources and efforts to win election in office. Therefore, personality, status and individual quality was ‘*the most important factor: extent of prestige, skill in technique, size of fortune*’ (Ibid: 64). It was the quality rather than the quantity of members that made a difference. Therefore, cadre parties had neither desire nor electoral need to seek a large membership. And on ideological terms, this type of party is most commonly associated with the right.

By contrast, Duverger regarded that left-wing political organisations were formed on the basis of *mass parties*. A mass party is a nationwide organisation with a bottom-up structure. Mass parties resulted from the extension of suffrage and the need of the newly formed organisations to recruit a large membership as a means of political and electoral invigoration. Moreover, as Duverger indicated, mass-branch parties aimed at the political education and ideological indoctrination of the newly enfranchised and mainly working class voters. Political education was considered of vital importance for their development as party control and representation derived from their membership base. In particular, mass parties – due to their left-wing political origin – had no or extremely limited financial backing from external organisations, as did cadre parties, and therefore were financially dependent on membership subscriptions. Furthermore, the role of the members extended to political recruitment during election periods, as party activists played a vital role in the conduct of election campaigns. Moreover, Duverger placed the origins of the mass party in a highly defined and polarised society, whereby political parties are the
principal agencies of citizens’ political participation, while representing specific pre-
defined groups in society (Katz and Mair, 1995). A mass party ought to integrate a
wide membership with identical societal and economic experiences and common
ideological background. Therefore, contrary to the cadre party model, the mass party
is based on quantity rather than quality. However, in a strictly historical context,
Duverger recognised that ‘the concept of membership is a result of the evolution
which led from the cadre party to the mass party’, considering the development of
the mass party as the natural extension of the cadre party (1964: 63). He regarded
that the cadre party ought to recruit a large membership not for financial or
organisational support but as the only way to survive the electoral competition.
Nonetheless, Duverger’s contention of cadre parties’ inevitable transformation into
mass parties is highly debatable. In fact, over time elite/cadre parties incorporated
certain characteristics of the mass party model but complete transformation was
unfeasible, as this would encompass a total break with their roots – culture, ethos
and normative background.

Kaare Strom (1990) followed Duverger’s reasoning on the organisational
differentiation of left- and right-wing parties, but focused his argument on the
relationship of party organisation and behaviour, and the resources available to
parties. Considering parties not as unitary and unconstrained actors but as ‘complex
organisations that impose various constraints on the behaviour of their leaders’, he
emphasised the mechanism of exchange between party activists and leaders (Strom,
1990: 569). He argued that the interrelationship between the two is based on a
continuous trade-off; the leadership seeks ways to ensure activists’ mobilisation and
contribution to party electoral campaigning, while activists seek reassurance that the
leaders will keep their promises when in office. Strom’s model is based on the
conception of office-seeking parties, led by entrepreneurial politicians who seek the
benefits of their role through electoral success and the use of extensive organisational
and leadership skills. Furthermore, Strom differentiated between capital- and labour-
intensive parties (1990: 575). The former are wealthy parties, which have the funds
to employ professional labour and conduct sophisticated campaigns - campaign
advisers, advertising agencies, extensive use of technology and the media and
generally, the employment of people who are paid for their services and have no
further say within the party. On the other hand labour-intensive parties cannot
afford to hire professional labour, and therefore, rely on party members and activists
for support. Since activists do not require direct monetary compensation, and they
are more policy- and/or office-motivated, leaders tend to offer them purposive
incentives. Therefore, party leaders offer activists policy promises, which can be
delivered only if the party is elected in office. In that way, members can be directly involved in policy-making, forcing leaders to make concessions, which could occasionally lead to inefficient party behaviour and even electoral failure (Strom, 1990: 578).

To a great extent, Strom’s conception of party organisation and behaviour was influenced by the Downsian rational choice theory of competitive party behaviour (Downs, 1957). The Downsian spatial model explains party behaviour and interprets voting and electoral competition by applying the principle of economic rationality to politics and assuming that parties and voters are rational self-interest motivated decision-makers. To this end, he identified parties as vote-seekers, office-seekers and policy-seekers. All three models are based on the assumption that party leaders are rational agents whose actions within the party are constrained by the institutional environments in which they have to operate. Moreover, Downs suggested that rationality leads to efficiency. Therefore, every rational party leader seeks to achieve his political goal, which is to maximise his party’s political support for the purpose of being elected in government. To this, parties behave not only as vote-seekers but also as vote-maximisers. Within that context, party ideological positioning is not static but dynamic in order to respond to voters’ preferences, the distribution of which converges upon the centre - of the left-right ideological continuum – forcing parties to move towards the centre and thus, each other – the political version of Hotelling’s model (Downs, 1957: 118). That said, it should be borne in mind that political parties ‘cannot move ideologically past each other’ but ‘ideological movement is restricted to horizontal progress at most up to – and never beyond – the nearest party on the side’ (Downs, 1957: 122-123). It is the intra-party dynamics, ‘integrity and responsibility’ according to Downs but also the inherent characteristics and a party’s identity and trajectory as the party evolution approach seeks to demonstrate, that ‘create [this] relative immobility’ (Ibid.). And as it will be discussed later, these factors are usually underestimated and even disregarded by political marketing models.

**Electoral Competition**

The theoretical framework of the electoral competition type accounts considers a party’s organisational development to be strongly related to the social structure and socio-cultural and economic changes that take place in the environment within which it operates. As a general rule the ‘social structure of a nation helps to mould the character of political parties at crucial developmental stages’ (Epstein, 1967: 27). Within the same context, changes in the social character of a nation can be reflected
in a party’s organisation and behaviour. Therefore, issues of party de-alignment, decline of social class voting and the de-ideologisation of the political life that followed the socio-economic changes over the years inevitably had an impact on party character and behaviour. That is, political parties continued to behave rationally and thus, to retain an office-seeking strategy, but in order to succeed they had to move on from the ‘closed’ and ‘limited in scope’ organisational structures of the cadre and mass parties and develop into more flexible organisations able to appeal to a less class-defined and partisan electorate.

Following this line of reasoning, Epstein’s (1967) analysis of party organisation focused on the distinction between electoral and non-electoral parties. According to this differentiation parties that are mainly focused on their ideological concerns and merely want to promote their product without any modifications are the ‘non-electoral’ parties. Usually, these are left-wing parties with an ideologically strong grassroots base but not large enough to provide wide electoral gains. On the contrary, vote-maximising and office-seeking parties fall into the ‘electoral’ model category. Overall, the electoral party model emphasises the parties’ efforts to respond to the gradual movement of public opinion (Epstein, 1967). To this end, their electoral strategy is based on extensive polling in order to identify the demands and wants of the electorate (‘what people want’) and defined by a process of adaptation to public demands.

The various socio-economic (new middle-class) and technological (mass media) changes that took place in Western Europe after the Second World War had multiple effects on party organisation and behaviour. The erosion of social boundaries resulting from the economic growth and rising living standards influenced the voters’ perceptions of parties and led to the gradual partisan de-alignment. In particular, technological developments and the development of mass media as the main source of political information allowed, on the one hand, party leaders to directly communicate with and appeal to the electorate at large and on the other hand, led voters to behave more as consumers than active supporters of a political party. In view of the above observations, Kirchheimer (1966) identified the emergence of a new party type, the ‘catch-all’ party model. The appearance and spread of the catch-all party overlapped with the advent of ‘de-ideologisation’. Strong ideological ties tended to limit the potential of parties to appeal to a wider electorate and as a result, parties ought to change their electoral and strategic priorities (Ibid: 186-7). According to Kirchheimer, the catch-all party encompasses the strengthening of party leadership and the downgrading of the role and activities of individual members.
Party management becomes more centralised and leader controlled and the focus is on the election of the leader rather than the formation of the party policy agenda. Candidate selection plays a vital role in the electoral fortunes of the party and party image becomes the focal point of a party’s political brand. As a consequence, policy decisions are mainly taken by the leadership, as popular control of the party diminishes. The recruitment and mobilisation of members is no more emphasised or required. Membership loyalty diminishes and thus, is not enough to swing results. Moreover, the voters are free-floating and uncommitted ready to support the party that can accommodate their preferences. Within that context, catch-all parties have adapted their behaviour in such a way so as to accommodate the preferences of the electorate at large. As voters have moved away from the extreme ends of the ideological spectrum towards the centre, so did the parties, which have become more centre-oriented. From this perspective, parties are subject to changes in the electoral behaviour of voters and their role becomes parallel to that of a major brand. Therefore, parties that manage to rebrand to a ‘household name’ that the voters can trust have a great advantage over the rest. In other words, parties follow a process of transformation in accordance to the changing voting patterns rather than vice versa.

Following Kirchheimer’s catch-all theory, and taking as a point of reference and comparison Duverger’s mass party, Panebianco offered a detailed analysis of party transformation - still triggered by the changes in socio-economic conditions and contemporary electioneering - by examining the connection between party activities and their internal organisation (Panebianco, 1988). Based on the hypothesis that changes in the organisational culture and structure of parties imply changes in their activity and behaviour, he identified two ideal party types; the mass bureaucratic and the electoral-professional parties (Ibid). The former refers to the mass party both in terms of internal organisation and structure and the crucial role played by party bureaucracy within the wider internal democratic context.

Contrariwise, the development of the electoral-professional party was triggered by external stimuli – as in the case of the catch-all party, but emphasises intra-party organisational changes as a result of the opening of the party to the professionals who replaced the party bureaucrats. Therefore, the increasing professionalisation of parties resulted in a number of organisational reforms altering the party’s character and behaviour. According to Panebianco the main problem of the electoral professional party is its increased professionalisation. The central role within the party is taken over by professionals, who have no ties with the electorate and with whom the voters are no longer able to identify. Therefore, the party’s ties with its
electorate weaken. As a matter of fact the party-members relationship of dependence disappears as the party pays more attention to its relations with interest groups. Generally, the electoral-professional party displays the same electoral behaviour as the catch-all party. However, despite the social changes and the technological developments, which influenced all types of the ‘new’, ‘transformed’ parties Panebianco argued that the extent of a party’s transformation to an electoral-professional party depends on two variables. The first one is the degree of its institutionalisation – transformation is easier and faster when the degree of institutionalisation is low - and the second is the level of fragmentation of the party system (as described by Kirchheimer, 1966). In short, internal organisational changes are stimulated by exogenous and endogenous factors, but as will be discussed later, are defined within a context of barriers set by the party’s inherent characteristics (culture, ethos, formal powers and informal influence).

The discussion so far points out that party organisation theories have been evolved and classified based on the relationship between the political parties and the civil society. As Katz and Mair (1995) pointed out the mass party was set up as the ideal model, ‘tied to a conception of democracy’ against which everything else could be compared and judged. Moreover, they reasoned that the mass party as well as the catch-all and electoral party models imply a linear process of party development, which leads to an end-point (Ibid.: 6). Therefore, Katz and Mair (1995) attempted to supersede the shortcomings of the existing models and contended that ‘the development of parties in western democracies has been reflective of a dialectical process in which each new party type generates a reaction that stimulates further development [...]’ (Ibid). As a consequence, each party type can be understood as one stage on a continuing process of development. Furthermore, they argued that party development is not solely based on the parties’ relations with the civil society but also on their relationship with the state. The ties between political parties and the state have become stronger in the post-industrial societies leading to an interdependent relationship between the two. Within this context, Katz and Mair (1995) identified a new party type, the ‘cartel party’.

The cartel party focuses on the relationship between parties and the state, and especially on party dependence on the state for financial support. The focus on this relationship lies on party ability to shape the ‘rules of the game’ in order to meet their own interests. Party membership is not homogeneous but rather consists of a wide variety of individuals who become members on the basis of policy agreement with the party rather than social identity and ideology. Therefore, membership plays
the role of a ‘resource base’ for intra-party power distribution. The main focus of the cartel parties lies on party immediate electoral success rather than efficiency. The low levels of membership are not enough for parties to survive electorally and financially, and thus, parties look to the state for resources. In other words, parties take advantage of their position as governors and lawmakers and manipulate the state. Therefore, the state becomes the main financial and material provider of parties. Winning or losing an election is not a matter of party policy objectives or within the rational theory context, a matter of prestige and power of party leadership. It makes a ‘good deal of difference to [party’s] sheer survival, since the resources for its sustenance now come […] from the state (Katz and Mair, 1995: 16). Therefore, the set of ‘governing parties’ under the fear of losing their vested interests, form a cartel, in which all parties manipulate the state, share its resources and survive. Within this context, it is very difficult for new parties to emerge and seriously challenge the predominant existing group of parties. Policy-wise cartel parties tend to associate with a wide range of issues and cooperation with opposite parties and interest groups is asserted.

Finally, it should be emphasised that one party type does not replace another type or that all parties have developed according to these specific standards. Nor it is appropriate to say that all parties fall within the exact lines of the abovementioned models. Rather, all party types coexist and interact with each other. In fact, a party may have been organised and developed in such ways that it bears characteristics of all or most of the party types. As mentioned, it is vital for parties to evolve and transform over time in order to survive electorally. The transformation that each party undergoes depends on various internal and external factors. The process and degree of party transformation, that is, the procedures that are followed and the kind of changes that occur within the structural and behavioural context of a party relate to the party’s internal functions and organisation. At the same time, changes in the external environment of sociological, cultural and economic nature, could in turn affect the ways parties choose to adapt in order to appeal to the changing, new breed of the electorate. In theory, parties in order to secure their election in office respond to challenges, by redefining their relationship with the civil society and the state. An elite party, thus, transforms to a mass party, which in turn develops to a catch-all party and then to a cartel party. In practice, party development and organisation do not strictly fit to these defined boundaries of the abovementioned models. As this study examines in the next chapter, parties do evolve and respond to changes through processes of reorganisation and rebranding, but these changes are conditioned and constrained by the traits of each party’s inherent formative
character. For example, an elite party can develop some of the characteristics of a mass party in terms of organisation, but in practice it still retains the independence of the parliamentary party, which is one of the main identity elements of elite parties (Katz and Mair, 1995: 12).

**Stage III: Encompassing Professionalisation**

**Party as Election Campaign Communicator**

Up to now, the analysis of party formation, organisation, adaptation and change has rested on the party relationship with the civil society and state. Parties operate either as an integral part (elite party), as a bridge (mass party and catch-all party), or even as a broker between the state and civil society (cartel party). Adaptation, change and to some extent, transformation is considered the rational response of office-seeking parties to a rapidly changing environment. Stage III of the Party Evolution Framework builds upon the modern theories of political communication and marketing and addresses party electoral behaviour within the context of professionalisation, which is closely related to party attributes as indicated in Stage II and adaptation that is inextricably linked to party inherent characteristics as dissected in Stage I. To this end, the framework relates party evolution to three main elements: institutionalisation, adaptation and professionalisation.

As already mentioned major changes in the socio-economic and political landscape of electioneering affected the ideological and to a lesser extent the institutional roots of parties, which in order to survive electorally had to reform their organisation, reposition their policies and reinvigorate their messages. In particular, they were obliged to respond to the new breed of de-ideologised voters and depict the new political and economic realm. However, the real challenge for office-seeking parties was to compete and win the votes of the same group of median voters. Therefore, the ways that they communicate their messages, promote their policies and image, and conduct their campaign tend to play a crucial role in their electoral fortunes and define their political development. To this end, political communication and marketing have become an integral part of electioneering of parties adopting a vote-maximising and office-seeking approach (see: Franklin, 1994; Kavanagh, 1995; Scarrow, 1995; Lees-Marshment, 2001a). The way that parties conduct election campaigns and also, the effects that elections have on parties depend on various factors. As Farrell and Webb argued, there is a ‘symbiotic relationship between parties and elections’ (2000: 101). Parties behave as rational actors who aim at
winning elections, and in order to do so they adjust to the tendencies of their environment by employing new campaign technologies, professionalising their organisation and repositioning ideologically in order to design an attractive to the voters, product. To this end, parties design their product based on the needs and wants of the voters (Lees-Marshment, 2001a, 2001b). At the same time, the implementation of campaigning is based on the degree of their professionalisation, which is dependent on their internal organisational structure, functions, and adaptive capacity.

As already mentioned, there is a plethora of studies on campaign professionalisation focusing either on the implementation of strategic communication techniques and / or the implementation of marketing concepts and activities in politics. The models that provide the appropriate framework for the present analysis are drawn from the literature on political communications, (Norris, 2002; Farrell and Webb, 2000), political marketing, (Lees-Marshment, 2001a; 2001b), and local campaigning (Denver and Hands, 2002; Fisher and Denver, 2008). It should be noted however, that these models are used within the wider context of the party evolution analysis as indicators to corroborate party campaign change and professionalisation and not as definite measures of party transformation.

Norris addressed changes in campaign communication as ‘an evolutionary process of modernisation’, which becomes gradually linked to the process of transformation of the environment within which parties operate (2002: 134). Therefore, changes in the media and the electorate provide the necessary framework and act as the driving force for party campaign development, which occurred in three phases; pre-modern, modern and post-modern (Table 1.2). In this theoretical framework, pre-modern campaigning, that characterises the period from the mid-nineteenth century to the 1950s, is understood as a locally organised and oriented, decentralised, relatively short and ad-hoc campaign. Campaign organisation and coordination at the national level is decided by party leaders while at the constituency level it is predominantly based on the efforts of the local party members and party agents (labour-intensive). Great emphasis is laid on the direct, face-to-face contact with party supporters through the traditional activities of public rallies, branch party meetings, canvassing and whistle-stop leadership tours. Moreover, parties rely upon the partisan press as their main source of mediated communication with the public, while radio broadcasts, posters and pamphlets are also widely used. To this end, the main aim of party organisation is to mobilise and activate a highly partisan electorate (Norris, 2002: 135-137).
Modern campaigns developed from the early 1950s to the mid-1980s and reflect the socio-economic and technological changes that marked that period. The shift in campaigning is characterised by the centrally coordinated and increasingly professionalised organisation of a nationally focused long-term campaign. Party staff is replaced by paid advisors and consultants specialising in media, communications, polling and marketing, who engage in regular opinion polling to record the views of a highly detached and less partisan electorate.

Table 1.2: Typology of Evolution of Campaign Communications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre-modern (Mid-19thC to 1950s)</th>
<th>Modern (Early 1960s to late 1990s)</th>
<th>Post-modern (1990s+)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Campaign organisation</strong></td>
<td>Local and decentralised party volunteers</td>
<td>Nationally coordinated with greater professionalisation</td>
<td>Nationally coordinated but decentralised operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Preparations</strong></td>
<td>Short-term, ad-hoc</td>
<td>Long campaign</td>
<td>Permanent campaign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Central Coordination</strong></td>
<td>Party leaders</td>
<td>Central party headquarters, more specialist advisors</td>
<td>Special party campaign units and more professional consultants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Feedback</strong></td>
<td>Local canvassing and party meetings</td>
<td>Occasional opinion polls</td>
<td>Regular opinion polls plus focus groups and interactive websites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Media</strong></td>
<td>Partisan press, local posters and pamphlets, radio broadcasts</td>
<td>Television broadcasts through main evening news, targeted direct mail</td>
<td>TV narrowcasting, direct and mediated websites, email, online discussion groups intranets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Campaign Events</strong></td>
<td>Local public meetings, whistle-stop leadership tours</td>
<td>News management, daily press conferences, controlled photo-ops</td>
<td>Extension of news management to routine politics and government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Costs</strong></td>
<td>Low budget</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>Higher costs for professional consultants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Electorate</strong></td>
<td>Stable social and partisan alignments</td>
<td>Social and partisan dealignment</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


However, the major development in the modern era of campaigning was the role and extensive use of television, which has marked the move to mediated and more ‘personalised’ campaigning. Therefore, the role of the leader becomes increasingly important as s/he is the focal point of a campaign based on leadership tours, staged press conferences and controlled photo opportunities in order to dominate the nightly news bulletins. Moreover, the use of paid professionals, direct mail, advertising and polling has ‘led to rising costs and the shift from labour-intensive towards more capital-intensive campaigns’ (Ibid.: 137-139). Finally, the post-modern campaign, characterising the period from the 1990s onwards, is understood as the
culmination of campaign modernisation characterised by the predominance of professionals on the organisation, coordination and control of campaign operations, which are increasingly characterised by a modern form of decentralisation (local activity controlled by the centre). Parties have moved to permanent campaigning, which takes place within a highly fragmented, complex, incoherent and rapidly changing media environment. To this end, media management (and spinning) becomes the focal point of the campaign professionals, who rely on the continuous feedback provided by extensive quantitative and qualitative research (polls and focus groups) to design their strategy. As Norris indicated the *post-modern* phase of campaigning is not a rigid form of campaign development as parties in their process of modernisation is possible to portray features that array from the *pre-modern* to *post-modern* campaigning. Nonetheless, the last phase of modernisation ‘represent the future direction of political campaigning’ (Norris, 2002: 140).

Farrell and Webb in their analysis of campaign changes over time developed a three-stage comparative professionalisation framework, built upon three main areas: technical, resource, and thematic changes (2000: 103-28; Table 1.3). Their analysis considers changes at systemic and party levels and stresses that the delivery of the message is more important than the mechanics of the campaign. In addition, they argued that changes in these three areas are likely to mostly affect the organisation of political parties during an election campaign period and beyond.

The first stage of campaigning considers the ‘traditional’ ways of campaigning characterised by the lack of advanced communication techniques and resources; rather campaigning is based on the voluntary participation of party members and activists at the local level. The message, which is mainly ideological and policy oriented as it is addressed to a partisan audience, is communicated with ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ use of the media - party press, posters, newspaper advertisements and coverage, mass rallies and canvassing. Consultants are used to a rather limited extent and their role is secondary and general as the campaign is organised and run by politicians and party staff. The party leader participates in public rallies and whistle-stop tours in order to help the efforts of constituency candidates and members. Therefore, the strategic focus of the campaign is on mobilisation rather than persuasion. This first stage of campaigning has the characteristics of propaganda as it is an ‘one-directional’ and ‘manipulative’ communication process, aiming at passive audiences (Wring, 1996: 102).
Farrell and Webb suggested that technological innovations characterise the second stage of campaigning. The arrival of television radically changed the way parties conduct their campaign and communicate their messages. First, they lay more emphasis on the preparation of the campaign, which is at this stage centred on the ‘specialist campaign committees’. Professional consultants and advisers play an important role in the preparation and implementation of the campaign but politicians are still in charge of the final outcome. The use of media as the main means of communication allows parties to access a wider audience but also forces leaders and candidates to pay extra attention to their image and posture, rendering media...
training into an essential part of campaign organisation.

Indirect modes of communication such as TV debates, press conferences and ‘pseudo-events’ are used as means to promote the image of the leader and party - rather than policy programme. At the same time, the use of television reinforces the nationalisation of campaigning and thus, the concentration of power and resources on the centre. The role of local parties and activists diminishes over time. Party leaders are able to appeal to the whole nation without travelling around the country or participating in local public meetings. There is a single campaign message, formulated to target not one social group but the wider electorate that is less partisan and class-defined and thus, amenable to the messages of all parties. Politics becomes a matter of policy issues rather than ideology. Therefore, based on the belief that public opinion is malleable, parties try to ‘sell’ their concept to the voters. And whilst parties adopt marketing techniques, as the use opinion polls and surveys to test their target ‘market’, and find out what the voters want, their end campaign strategy focuses on selling their product. That is, campaign communication aims at convincing the electorate to ‘buy’ what they are ‘selling’, regardless of what the voters really want.

Finally, the third stage of campaign professionalisation is characterised by further technological developments in the area of telecommunications, marked by the arrival of cable and satellite television, and the internet. These new mechanisms incorporated into the campaigning, give parties unlimited access to the media not only during an election period, but all the time rendering party campaigning to a permanent process. As a result, politicians are no longer able to control party campaigning and thus, professional consultants and agencies permeate into all levels of party organisation and are the leader’s closest advisors. The campaign revolves around the leader and his/her personality rather than the party. Simultaneously, parties make extensive use of a greater range of market intelligence techniques in an attempt to identify voter concerns and thus, address them. Campaign messages are designed to target specific categories of voters, or else ‘narrowcasting’ by adapting the message to the voters’ needs. Contrary to the previous stage, it is the party message that is malleable rather than the voters. To this end, ‘preference accommodation’ is extremely important in the formulation of policies and rebranding of the party/product. However, as Farrell and Webb argued, the latter tactic might put party credibility in danger if the party fails to deliver its policy promises while in office; nonetheless, party credibility and government record do not fall into the three-stage framework.
The issue of governmental delivery is, to some extent, discussed by Lees-Marshment (2001a, 2001b). Contrary to the communications oriented approaches of Norris and Farrell and Webb, she addressed the question of party behaviour from a political marketing perspective, using core marketing concepts in order to identify and define the ways that parties alter their behaviour in order to ‘increase their chances of achieving their goal of winning general elections’ (Lees-Marshment, 2001a: 695). To this end, her model is based on the application of the marketing orientations of product, sales and market, into the context of party campaign behaviour and party organisation in general. It is argued that parties ‘alter aspects of their behaviour, including policy, membership, leadership and organisational structure, to suit the nature and demands of the market’ (Ibid). The Lees-Marshment model deals with the study of organisational behaviour from a firm marketing perspective.

Therefore, Lees-Marshment identified three main types of parties according to their activities; product, sales and market-oriented parties (Table 1.4). A product-oriented party relies on its ideology and values it believes in. Based on the assumption that the voters will realise that its ideas are the right ones it expects to gain their vote. However, even when it fails electorally a product-oriented party is not amenable to change. Contrariwise, a sales-oriented party pays more attention on selling its ideas to the electorate. As the product-oriented party, it has a pre-determined product design which is not willing to alter. This type of party employs market intelligence to identify the voters’ opinion on party policies, and then employs the latest advertising and communication techniques in order to persuade them that they want ‘what it offers’. In contrast, the market-oriented party is designed to answer the concerns of the voters and satisfy their needs and wants. The use of market intelligence is vital to its existence as it plays a crucial role in the design of the product. Therefore, the product responds to the demands of the voters as it is rebranded merely on what people want. However, Lees-Marshment noted that a market-oriented party’s success resets on the delivery of the product designed. That is, the market-oriented party is not merely appealing to voters ‘product’, but it ought to ensure that when in office, it can deliver its promises. If not, the voters will be dissatisfied and the party will lose their support. At the same time, Lees-Marshment suggested that the party has to consider the views of party membership, as party members should accept the final product. In short, a market-oriented party has to design a product that will satisfy the

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3 The Lees-Marshment approach is described in the literature as a ‘model’ (and that is the term used in the present analysis) though given its use and nature, it could be more accurately defined as a ‘framework’.
voters’ concerns, will be acceptable to the party members and deliverable in government (Lees-Marshment, 2001a: 696-7).

**Table 1.4: The Marketing Process for Product, Sales, and Market-Oriented Parties**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product-Oriented party</th>
<th>Sales-Oriented party</th>
<th>Market-Oriented party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stage 1: Product design</td>
<td>Stage 1: Product design</td>
<td>Stage 1: Market intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 2: Communication</td>
<td>Stage 2: Market intelligence</td>
<td>Stage 2: Product design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 3: Campaign</td>
<td>Stage 3: Communication</td>
<td>Stage 3: Product adjustment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 4: Election</td>
<td>Stage 4: Campaign</td>
<td>Stage 4: Implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 5: Delivery</td>
<td>Stage 5: Election</td>
<td>Stage 5: Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 6: Delivery</td>
<td>Stage 6: Delivery</td>
<td>Stage 6: Campaign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Stage 7: Election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Stage 8: Delivery</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The marketing process for each of the abovementioned type of parties consists of a number of stages, some of which are common to all three types. As illustrated in Table 1.4, the standard political marketing process includes five stages, which are followed by all parties regardless of their organisation. Therefore, the stages of product design, communication, campaign, election and delivery are common to product, sales and market-oriented parties. What differentiates sales- from product-oriented parties rests on the implementation of market intelligence techniques, as a tool to measure public opinion and identify the group of voters to target in order to sell their product. Voter identification follows the party product design stage (stage 2) and it is mainly used as an information channel to target the ‘right’ group of voters. In contrast, a market-oriented party follows a different process to the design of party
product and behaviour. As illustrated in the Lees-Marshment model, market intelligence is the first step of a market-oriented party, which is focused on designing its product (stage 2) based on the results of market research in an attempt to respond to public demands. Because party members are important the product has to be approved by or sold to them as well, even if some adjustments have to be made (stage 3) as party members participate to the implementation phase (stage 4). However, all parties, but especially the market-oriented party ought to consider the delivery stage as if the party fails to deliver its promises in office, it would sustain great losses in the long term.

The Lees-Marshment model provides a deep insight to the relationship of party politics and marketing but the extent to which the model offers a cohesive approach to the examination of party organisation, or new elements in addition to the Farrell and Webb three-stage campaigning framework, is debatable. A sales-oriented party corresponds to the catch-all and electoral-professional party types, a product-oriented party has the characteristics of a mass party\(^6\) while a cartel party has those of a market-oriented party. In addition, the Lees-Marshment model fails to consider the institutional constraints that define a party’s identity as innate elements of intra-party organisation behaviour cannot be fully accounted for by marketing concepts. The use of marketing techniques as a way of identifying and targeting the right group of voters, and the implementation of sophisticated and strategically designed campaigns can explain the ways the political message is conveyed but to what extent these can change the character of politics and the substance of parties is debatable. It goes without saying that there are clear parallels between the selling of politicians and the selling of certain products, but as O’Shaughnessy argued political marketing rests on the notion of exchange relationships, which have a long term perspective, are voter oriented and have mutual benefits for all involved (2002: xiii). In comparison to the Farrell and Webb framework of campaign professionalisation, Lees-Marshment examined party behaviour under the concept of marketing, while Farrell and Webb focused on how modern campaigns are fought, examining changes both at systematic and party levels. Moreover, they laid special emphasis on the deliberate passing of the party message by taking into account but not overstating, the technological developments that have influenced the course of electoral campaigning over the years.

\(^6\) It has to be noted that Lees-Marshment argues that a mass party could be market-oriented. This argument is based on the reasoning that at the time of its dominance and with the use of the limited resources it had at its disposal, a mass party undertook informal intelligence research among its supporters, and focused on promoting the interests and demands of the social class it represented. This argumentation however, has inaccuracies especially when we take into account the social and cultural circumstances, and the ideological background that influenced the emergence of the mass parties.
However, the analysis of campaign modernisation and identification of party professionalisation would be incomplete without considering changes in local campaigns. As the previous models identified the members’ input is extremely significant to the effectiveness of party communications due to the decentralised character of modern campaigning (Norris’ *post-modern* campaign, Farrell and Webb’s *Stage III*). Changes in local campaigning have been documented by two conceptual frameworks. Denver and Hands (2002) developed a two-phase framework of constituency campaign analysis by using the *Fordism* and *post-Fordism* distinction to describe local campaign developments. *Fordism* ‘refers essentially to mass production’ in local campaigning that characterised the period between the 1950s and 1980s, and mainly depicts the classic mobilising campaign that was planned and organised locally by the election agent. *Post-Fordism*, on the other end, ‘involves flexible specialisation and niche marketing’, tools that are used to identify voter demands and then adjust the product accordingly. Thus the extensive use of the latest campaign techniques (use of personal computers, direct mail, telephone canvassing) have changed the nature of campaign organisation at the local level, rendered constituency campaign planning more complex and enhanced the need for professional and highly qualified staff. Moreover, there is a significant change in the involvement of the centre in local campaign planning, organisation as well as implementation and in particular in those areas that the centre identifies as target seats (Denver and Hands, 2002: 109-119). Nonetheless, Denver and Hands drew upon the Norris categorisation in order to explain qualitative changes at the constituency level campaigning and while capturing aspects of the campaign modernisation process that characterised the *post-Fordist* categorisation, the framework failed to cohesively address all the dimensions of campaigning. The latter issues have been addressed by the Fisher and Denver (2008) framework of district campaigning. Drawing upon the Farrell and Webb typology of campaign professionalism, they introduced a three-stage framework of district level campaign development to identify, evaluate and compare changes in local level campaigns (Table 1.5). First, technical developments refer to the process of campaign preparation and planning and the use of technology as a campaign tool in addition to (or instead of) traditional campaign techniques. Second, resource changes are identified by the degree of centralisation / decentralisation of local campaigning, the shift from voluntary activity to professional staff and finally, the feedback techniques used to monitor party support. Third, thematic developments refer to the extent of the involvement of the party leadership to constituency campaigns and the shift from mobilising supporters to targeting specific individual voters (Fisher and Denver,
Nonetheless, both frameworks of district-level campaigning identify changes that took place locally and serve as essential indicators for the identification of the degree of party professionalisation as this is examined within the context of the Party Evolution Framework.

**Table 1.5: Three stages in the development of district-level election campaigning**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage 1</th>
<th>Stage 2</th>
<th>Stage 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Technical</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Short-term campaign preparations.</td>
<td>• Long-term preparations including specialist campaign committee at centre.</td>
<td>• Permanent campaign with specialist campaign department at centre.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sporadic use of technology. Campaigning is largely traditional and labour intensive.</td>
<td>• Technology widely used alongside traditional campaign techniques.</td>
<td>• Technology replaces traditional campaign techniques.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Resource</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Decentralised with little standardisation.</td>
<td>• Centralised and standardised.</td>
<td>• Decentralisation of operation with central scrutiny.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Voluntary activity and use of traditional party bureaucracy.</td>
<td>• Voluntary workers directed by party professionals.</td>
<td>• Professional staff on short-term contracts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Impressionistic feedback based mainly on canvassing.</td>
<td>• More scientific sources of feedback, including opinion polls.</td>
<td>• Greater range of polling techniques making greater use of feedback.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Thematic</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Whistle-stop tours by party leaders.</td>
<td>• Tours by party leaders focused on target seats.</td>
<td>• Party leaders concerned only with target seats.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Focus on mobilising the vote of supporters.</td>
<td>• Mobilising voters across all categories.</td>
<td>• District campaigns become more important than the national campaign.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Targeting of individual voters.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In view of the above discussion, there are two points worth noting in relation to the planning and running of an effective political campaign. First, one of the major objectives of political campaigns is to deliver party messages to the electorate and thus, reinforce or change voter perceptions and preferences. Therefore, political actors give emphasis to the formulation of a coherent message, which through the extensive use of communication and marketing techniques will mobilise support, persuade citizens of its correctness and inform them about party activities.
Nonetheless, the delivery of the party message is at the core of every successful election campaign. Second, communication is an integral part of campaigning. As Denton and Woodward put it ‘the crucial factor that makes communication ‘political’ is not the source of a message, but its content and purpose’ (Denton, and Woodward, 1990: 11). However, it should be taken into account, that the effectiveness of a political message is explicitly associated not only with the intentions of the sender but mostly, the ability of the receiver to decode the particular message. And whilst political messages are well managed and ‘packaged’ in advance so as to draw a clear and simple meaning, they are subject to the extensive commentary of the mass media, which are the powerful intermediaries between politicians and the electorate. As a result, the interdependent relationship between politics and media has significant implications on the running and success of political campaigns. It is also worth noting that the various resources that are invested into political campaigns as well as the intensity of a campaign are based on the complexity or not of the message. That is, the greater the changes that a party has undergone in order to win more votes, the more concentrated and rigorous its campaign should be in order to convince the electorate that it changed. The distinct character of the two parties analysed in the later chapters provide a rigorous context upon which to test the Party Evolution Framework.

1.3 Conclusion

Studies of electioneering and political campaigning have demonstrated that party electoral behaviour has advanced over time in relation to the wider context within which parties operate. Party organisation theories have documented intra-party changes in hierarchy and power balance, party functions, objectives, principles and electoral attitudes. And whilst party organisation and campaign development have been closely related, modern political marketing and communications theories have failed to systematically consider the impact of party organisational attributes on its electoral behaviour. In an attempt to address this lacuna and provide a cohesive account of party development, I suggest a conceptual framework of party evolution, which integrates all these conditions, exogenous and endogenous influencing the way parties develop their electoral attributes. To this end, the framework set out in the present analysis results from the thorough consideration of party behaviour and the extent to which this has been comprehensively addressed by the existing political marketing and communication theories. The party evolution approach is a comparative framework that allows for the examination of party campaigning and
level of party professionalisation from the distinct and cohesive context of party development. The framework follows the assumption that the ways the parties behave in all phases of their existence are rooted to the very early years of their formation and therefore, party activities even during the tense period of an election campaign can be analysed and understood when placed into a historical context. In short, this perspective allows for an integrated approach to party change in relation to their political and electoral behaviour and most importantly, encompasses all elements that condition party change and/or transformation and foremost define party evolution.

The Party Evolution Framework is built upon a three-stage typology, each stage incorporating existing theories on party organisation and electioneering as indicators of party behaviour while addressing the mainstream contexts within which parties develop. The first Stage draws upon Duverger’s and Panebianco’s theories of party formation and institutionalisation in order to identify and define a party’s formative elements (‘mark’ of its origins) and early development. Considering the deficiencies of the existing approaches, Stage I of the evolution framework moves beyond the classic models of interpretation. Contrary to Duverger’s static approach to party organisation, parties are addressed as dynamic organisations, living movements in a constant process of change and transformation that provide the basis for their survival and electoral dynamic. And whilst acknowledging Panebianco’s institutionalisation process as essential to a party’s existence, the evolution framework focuses on the external influences that mark party institutionalisation and have a significant impact on the moulding of the party’s character and identity.

The second Stage of the framework considers the various party types that have been identified over the years and reflect on the relationship between internal party organisation and party electoral behaviour. Overall, five different party types are taken into consideration; Duverger’s mass party, Epstein’s electoral party, Kirchheimer’s catch-all party, Panebianco’s electoral-professional party and Katz and Mair’s cartel party. The latter is the only party organisation model, which focuses on the relationship between party and state, while the rest emphasise the relationship and trade-offs between party leadership, members and activists. Given that these party organisation models are ideal types, the analysis documents party change and allows for the development of characteristics that cut across the lines of the classic ideal party types while allowing parties to become more or less amenable to the challenges of their environment. In fact, the evolution approach expounds that it is these characteristics that define the nature and scope of party evolution and allow for
office-seeking parties to adjust rather than merely adapt to the changing landscape.

Finally, Stage III addresses party campaigning and professionalisation and establishes changes in party campaigns in relation to the characteristics that a party has developed over the first two stages; that is, the extent of party professionalisation is dependent on a party’s political identity. Models of political communications (Norris, Farrell and Webb) and marketing (Lees-Marshalment) at the national level, but also at the local level campaigning (Denver and Hands, Fisher and Denver) are examined and utilised as indicators to party campaign modernisation and professionalisation. However two further elements are examined with regard to the ways the existing models approach party electioneering. First, all models fail to take into account the distinct political culture of different parties. They tend to address party members’ behaviour as predefined and fixed and thus, treat parties as unified political formations holding internal party behaviour constant while focusing on externally driven changes. Second, in particular the political marketing models treat parties as unitary actors with an explicit office-seeking approach that respond to the electorate’s demands in order to get elected in office, and clearly disregard the institutional constraints that prevent parties from ‘leapfrogging’. Contrariwise, the only constraints considered to hinder party success relate to the delivery of policy promises (see Lees-Marshalment model, stage 8).

Therefore, the Party Evolution Framework seeks to address the deficiencies of the existing approaches by offering a cohesive account of party professionalisation via the examination of all factors and traits that affect party development. Following Panebianco’s (1988) loose interpretation of the notion of ‘professionalisation, the evolution approach addresses party professionalisation as a process the outcome of which is clearly dependent on a party’s internal characteristics, its functions and the way it responds to external and internal challenges over time, and mostly on the inherent features of the party’s culture and ethos that can either enhance or constrain certain aspects of party behaviour. The extent to which a party is able to adapt to the changing conditions of its landscape is vital to its further development. In short, the context of the evolution typology is summarised in three highly interrelated and interdependent conditions; institutionalisation, adaptation, professionalisation. These provide the framework of party evolution in explaining party behaviour (electoral and political) by taking into account all aspects and processes of a party’s political, electoral, and organisational trajectory. It is therefore these three qualifications that provide the necessary pattern of linkage between the three stages of the framework. While drawing upon the existing accounts of party
formation, organisation and campaigning, each stage allows for the re-evaluation of party identity and character beyond the constraints of the ideal types. To this end, the extent to which a party can evolve to a professional political organisation is determined by the features and characteristics identified in each stage and not by the ‘ideal’ type (e.g. mass party, electoral-professional, cartel etc.). The degree of party institutionalisation has an impact on a party’s adaptive capacity and as a result to the nature and level of party political professionalisation. That is, the degree of institutionalisation affects the extent to which a party can evolve to a political professional organisation but not its transition to the third stage of the framework. The evolution approach, therefore argues that the degree of institutionalisation can have a direct impact on the degree of party professionalisation but has no impact on the transition to professionalization, as the latter is additionally affected by a number of externally driven factors (electoral competition, role of media, political culture etc). As a result of their nature, vote-maximising, office-seeking parties respond to the challenges of their electoral environment by adopting professional and marketing strategies for their electoral advancement. The main difference, however, rests on whether they adapt as organisations to the new environment within which they operate by renewing their political, organisational even institutional characteristics or merely adopt professional communications and marketing strategies for short-term electoral gains.

As Panebianco (1988) argues, institutionalisation is an imperative condition for a party’s survival over time; parties that do not institutionalise dissolve. From this point forward, the degree of institutionalisation plays a significant role in party development. Within that context, the party evolution approach builds upon the existing theoretical considerations to qualify the relationship of the three stages. Therefore, parties with low degrees of institutionalisation are more flexible and amenable to changes, become more internally adaptive and responsive to the endogenous and exogenous challenges and can develop a higher degree of ‘encompassing’ professionalisation. By contrast, parties with high degree of institutionalisation are less flexible and adaptive and even less willing and able to introduce deep, structural changes; the process of transition of these parties to the third stage is defined by their low adaptive capacity and low degree of ‘encompassing’ professionalisation. In fact, these parties are able to develop to market-oriented organisations (responding to the external environment by adopting marketing and communications strategies and techniques for electoral purposes) but due to their rigid nature fail to professionalise as political organisations.
The following chapters illustrate the use of the Party Evolution Framework in comparative context between the British and Greek political landscape. The differing nature of the parties under examination provides a rigid background for testing the framework and shedding a new light to the communications advancement of the two parties. Overall, the aim of discussion is twofold. First, to identify the various stages of development of the two parties over time in their attempt to survive within a rapidly changing political and socio-economic context. Second, to set the basis for the analysis of the communications operation, electoral behaviour and ‘encompassing professionalisation’ of the two parties at the election campaign periods of 1997 in Britain and 2004 in Greece.
Chapter 2
The British Labour Party: Organisation and Development

2.1 Introduction:

‘Across the nation, across class, across political boundaries, the Labour party is once again able to represent all the British People [...] I want them [voters] to know us, our identity, our character as a party, and change is an important part of that [...] Parties that do not change die, and this party is a living movement not an historical monument [...] We have not changed to forget our principles, but to fulfil them, not to lose our identity but to keep our relevance’ (Tony Blair, 1994a).

In 1994, just a few months after his election to the party leadership Tony Blair addressed the Labour party members at the Annual Conference and expounded his vision of what soon was to become the ‘New Labour’ party. However, these statements express something more than the changes of the 1990s. They depict the history of the Labour party in terms of ideology and organisation; they describe the changes that Labour had to undergo in order to remain electable, to gain and regain the support of the voters but most importantly, to survive the challenges – conflicts and tensions – that beset the party throughout its history. Since the very early days of its formation, Labour has advanced from a pressure group representing the interests of the unions in parliament, to a working-class party representing the interests of all workers ‘by hands or by brain’ and lately, to a national party appealing to the British people ‘across class, across political boundaries’. Either from a historical or a political perspective, the journey of the Labour party has been marked by a series of remarkable and subversive events in the process of the party’s continuous struggle for political survival and electoral power. A long journey that started with Keir Hardie’s vision of a socialist revolution, which never materialised, and extends to Tony Blair’s modernisation revolution, the outcome of which is still being evaluated.

This chapter examines the development of the Labour party from the very early days of its formation up to the 1997 general election. Within the context of the party evolution approach, the main aim of the analysis is to identify the origins of the Labour party, delineate the particular conditions and characteristics of its formation years, and critically approach the evolution of the party (behaviour) over the years. For this purpose the chapter is divided into three parts. The first seeks to dissect the Labour party in its formative years. This is an examination of the origins and the evolution of Labour from the late 1880s to the 1918 Constitution. The second part attempts to delineate the ideological and organisational development of the party from
1918 until 1997 and also examines the party’s record in government. The third and final part focuses on identifying the process and degree of Labour’s institutionalisation (Stage I) and also its organisational type and electoral identity (Stage II) at the time of its formation. Moreover, given the fundamental constitutional, organisational and ideological reforms of the 1980s and 1990s that led to Labour’s renewal as New Labour (under the Smith and mainly, Blair leaderships), the party’s institutionalisation character is re-assessed and Labour’s political identity redefined. To this end, the Party Evolution Framework provides the conceptual framework for the in-dept examination of the party’s development through change and adaptation.

2.2 The Evolution of the Labour Party: A Historical Account

Origins of the Labour Party, 1880-1906

The origins of the British Labour party trace back to the last decades of the 19th century. In fact, it was the enfranchisement of the working class population under the Reform Acts of 1867 and 1884 and the increased need to organise the new breed of working-class voters that led to the creation of the first pure labour political organisations and the development of the socialist movement/socialist societies. The Labour Representation League (1869) and the Labour Electoral Association (1884) were the first adequately organised bodies of the labour movement, which endeavoured to muster the working class electoral dynamic to an independent parliamentary force. However, these organisations failed to win the electoral and financial support of the working class leaders and did not survive (Pelling, 1965; Phillips, 1992). At the same time, the first socialist groups appeared but their activity, leverage as well as electoral appeal to the working class were extremely limited. The most prominent of these societies, the Social Democratic Federation (SDF), the Fabian Society and the Socialist League were formed in the 1880s and grew to become the main advocates of the socialist ideas within the Labour movement over the years.

Notwithstanding the growing electoral power of the newly enfranchised working class, the labour movement failed to advance its political standing and achieve direct and independent representation in parliament. The explanation for this appears to be twofold. First, in organisational terms, the trade unions, which were the main representatives of the working class interests, had consigned their interests into their alliance with the Liberal party and were reluctant towards any attempt that would jeopardise this limited in scope but substantial for their political representation, alliance. The few labour representatives in parliament were elected with the support of
the Liberal party and despite their status as a distinct group within the Liberal parliamentary party, which had the right to ‘dissociate themselves from the Liberal Party’ on labour related questions’ (Phillips, 1992: 5; Beer, 1982: 111), in essence, their political survival was dependent on the wishes and demands of the Liberal leadership. It should be noted that on the whole, this conventionally known as ‘Lib-Lab’ alliance represented a significant hindrance to the inception of an independent labour movement as many prominent trade union leaders felt the pull of liberalism (Moore, 1978: 8). In fact, the Lib-Labs played an important role in the British political life until the late 1910s when the Labour party managed to develop a distinctive philosophy and organisation, and acquired its own independent political dynamic. Second, from a socio-economic point of view, the growth of industry and the improvement of the real wages and living conditions of the working class that took place during that period, combined with tangible benefits of the social policy of the Disraeli administration, rendered the working class voters sympathetic towards the existing political parties, and mainly, the Liberal party (Pelling, 1965: 6-7). Within a context of social and economic development as a result of laissez-faire capitalism, the working class was suspicious about whether the collective ideals could immediately benefit the people who were really in need (Moore, 1978: 12, 17). Therefore, the Socialist movement that had started to develop in the other European countries had no real representation (no actual ground to grow) in Britain, as it met no practical ends (Pelling, 1965; Thorpe, 2001: 7). The political apathy and suspicion of the working class towards socialist ideals was maintained and partially reinforced by the absence of a distinct and powerful labour political organisation.

However, the most important step towards an independent labour political organisation took place in 1893 with the formation of the Independent Labour Party (ILP). The ILP emerged as a new socialist party less radical than its predecessors, which was set out to promote an independent ‘labour alliance’ between the trade unions and the socialists (Phillips, 1992: 5-6; Moore, 1978). According to Keir Hardie, the pioneer

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1 The British working class was substantially better off as a class given the comparative prosperity of the country, as they were not hit by the ‘Great Depression’ as it happened in other countries.

2 In essence, socialism in Britain never acquired the widespread popularity that the movement enjoyed in other European countries, such as in Germany or Italy (Pelling, 1965). As a result, the major advance of the working class political militancy came when the economic structure of laissez-faire was in decay.

3 Given the party’s dependency on the trade unions its organisation was based on the TUC model of a national committee and a number of (semi-) autonomous local branches (Pelling, 1965; 115-124: Moore, 1978; 51-52), while constitutional authority rested to the Annual Party Conference. Notwithstanding the delegate’s initial rejection of any mention of socialism in the party’s name, the programme included a motion for ‘collective ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange’ while the proposed political reforms called for an ‘extension of electoral rights and democratisation of the system of government’ (Moore, 1978: 51).
behind the ILP movement, the outcome of such an alliance would be an independent working class party, which would be committed to the principles of socialism but with a more practical approach. It is indicative and mostly important for the development of the labour’s pragmatic approach that the ILP leadership adhered to a practical than a theoretical political approach as a means to an end (Pelling, 1965: 118). Therefore, they sought initially to win the support of the Trade Unions and not of the socialist societies whose political strength in numbers and popularity was insignificant (Ibid). As expected, the socialist groups were particularly hostile to such an approach but nonetheless, sent delegates to attend the ILP’s foundation Conference. The SDF did not want to cooperate with ILP on the grounds that the new party compromised its socialist values, while the Fabians believed that they could gain more by permeating the Liberal party than by affiliating to the ILP (Moore, 1978: 50-51). It is not surprising, therefore, that the Zeitgeist and conflict mentality that created divisions and characterised the labour movement in the very early days of its development continue to comprise one of the main intra-party characteristics of the Labour party even a century after its formation. As it is discussed in further detail at a later stage, the different founding components within the party have played a major role throughout its history by providing the main driving force for the successes but also failures of Labour over time.

However, financial difficulties and organisational inadequacies, but mostly, the internal opposition from both socialists and liberals, prevented ILP from standing up to the high expectations of its founders. In terms of organisation, the movement lacked the homogeneity a political party should display, while at the same time it was not clear whether the ILP was to be developed as a federation or centralised party (Pelling, 1965: 148-150). The local branches were in full control of the local policy, organisation and finance making the party a ‘collection of virtually autonomous bodies’ (Pelling, 1965: 155: Moore, 1978: 52-56). In electoral terms, the by-election successes of the labour candidates led to the misjudgement and misinterpretation of the national strength of the organisation and created high expectations, which the party failed to meet at the 1895 election as it failed to elect a single candidate in Parliament. Nonetheless, the ILP managed to increase its electoral support and emerge as the strongest of the socialist organisations but most importantly, it mobilised the labour voters and won the respect of the Liberal party as an appreciable opponent. However, the poor electoral result and the sharp internal debate over the ILP alliance with the SDF caused a severe setback to the party’s development; the membership rates dropped substantially as the party lost one third of its members, leaving it in a bad state on the eve of the new century (Moore, 1978: 54-56).
Overall, it has to be recognised that the ILP was the first serious attempt for the establishment of an independent labour political party in Britain and its influence was evident in the formation of the LRC / Labour Party, in organisational and ideological terms. The ILP was the first socialist-driven independent political organisation with the characteristics of a political party (organisation, constitution, programme). And whilst Keir Hardie’s vision of a ‘Labour Alliance’ was not successful at the time, as he lacked the full support of the majority of trade unions and socialist societies, he definitely put the basis for the political development of the labour movement in Britain. Generally speaking, the socio-economic and political conditions were favourable for the inception of a labour party. The ‘new unionism’ and its influence on the TUC, the extension of the franchise and the growth of the labour vote created favourable conditions for independent political action. However, the rivalries among the three main representatives of the socialist movement (SDF, Fabians, ILP), had divided the working class. Moreover, the existence of the Lib-Labs and the suspicion of the trade union leadership towards any independent political activity hindered all efforts in the creation and growth of an independent working class party (Taylor, 2000).

The Formation of the Labour Representation Committee (LRC)

The major breakthrough for the creation of an independent parliamentary labour party came at the end of the nineteenth century and under the auspices of the trade union leadership. The Labour Representation Committee (LRC) was formally established in 1900 to promote, coordinate and secure labour’s direct representation in Westminster. It was the result of a TUC initiative to summon a special conference of trade unions, co-operative societies and socialist bodies, which despite their ideological and political diversity sought to cooperate in order to enhance their collective as well sectional interests in the most effective way (Moore, 1978: 68; Beer, 1982: 113-4; Pelling and Reid, 1996: 7). It should be stressed however, that the trade union’s initiative to further their political independence was rooted in explicitly externally driven events and was not the result of a collectively expressed request for independent parliamentary representation. To this end, LRC’s inception was an act of coercion and self-defence on the one hand, and compromise on the other. In fact, as it will be demonstrated later in this chapter, the issues of diversity, compromise and conflict of interests were the most important formative elements of Labour’s character and comprised vital reference points to the party’s development over time.

The end of the nineteenth century found the labour movement under threat. Trade unionism had suffered serious setbacks, which threatened its economic and legal
status while the socialist societies, which strove to increase their political and electoral appeal, had realised that only through a broader cooperation with the unions would have been able to achieve parliamentary representation. There were various reasons that either directly or indirectly, led to the acknowledgement that the only practical way for the labour movement to safeguard its interests was through independent parliamentary representation. At first, the structural changes and increasing mechanisation of the fast growing industrial sector caused widespread unease with regard to the future of the working class population. At the same time, the employers had hardened their attitude towards unionism and especially, against the new unions. In a deliberate attempt to counterattack the establishment of trade unionism as well as to limit the power of the movement, employers in various industries formed associations and federations aiming at promoting their interests at Westminster\(^4\) (Moore, 1978: 69; Pelling and Reid, 1996: 5-6). However, the most significant challenge that the trade union leadership had to face rested on the employers’ attempts to undermine the unions’ legal status. A series of lawsuits that came before the courts delivered some controversial decisions, whereby no clear conclusion on the rights of the trade unions could be drawn making the legal position of the unions to look highly dubious. The decisions, which were considered political in character, challenged the very existence and survival of the unions as they questioned the liability of the union funds and their right to picketing\(^5\).

Within such a hostile environment, created by both the employers and the judiciary, the trade union leaders started to look at better and more organised methods of support to strengthen their movement organisationally, financially and politically. Therefore, it was not long before trade union officials started to realise the merits and the potential of an independent labour movement able to promote and support the labour interests in parliament (Moore, 1978: 72; Pelling and Reid, 1996: 6-7; Thorpe, 2001: 2-3). This attitude was further reinforced by the gradual weakening of Lib-Labism and the realisation that the Liberal Party had no longer been able and/or willing to openly support the causes of the working class (Moore, 1978: 73; Phillips, 1992: 9; Thorpe, 2001: 3). However, it would be inaccurate to say that trade union and working class voters disavowed liberalism, and wholeheartedly supported the idea

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\(^4\) The best examples come from the boot and shoe industry and the engineering employers who had two very well organised associations. In fact, in the 1890s both associations as a response to the workers’ strike, declared lock-outs which lasted for several weeks and resulted in the defeat of the trade unions. Moreover, the shipping employers initiated the establishment of the National Free Labour Association in 1893, which was utilised as a source of blackleg labour (Moore, 1978: 69).

\(^5\) The issue of picketing arose through the case of Lyons v Wilkins, where the judge initially argued that it was 'illegal to persuade someone to take part in a strike' (Moore, 1978: 72). Although the decision was upheld on appeal, the cases of Quinn v Leatham and the Taff Vale Case that followed a few years later decided against picketing.
of an independent labour party. In fact, a significant part of trade unionists still believed that their interests could be better promoted through the Liberals and the Lib-Labism, and tried to use the independent labour action as a means to increase their bargaining pressure on the Liberal party. And whilst these events did not radically change the trade unions’ attitude towards political independence neither ‘revolutionised class and production relations’ (Thorpe, 2001: 4), they allowed Keir Hardie to seize the opportunity and hasten the materialisation of his vision of a ‘labour alliance’ (Moore, 1978:74-78).

It has been argued in the earlier analysis of the theoretical framework used for the present research, that the endogenous and exogenous characteristics of the early stages of a party’s formation condition its political behaviour and evolution. Therefore, the external events that led to the formation of the LRC and the internal structure and power dynamics that were developed at the time of its inception have to a great extent qualified Labour’s heterogeneous nature and hybrid character. In its initial form, the LRC was a federation rather than a political party. It was the outcome of the cooperation between four politically distinct groupings (Fabians, ILP, SDF and trade unions), which formed an independent alliance principled to act on behalf of labour and aimed to secure an increased number of labour representatives in the next Parliament (Moore, 1978: 74-78). As a result, diversity and conflict of interests were evident from the outset as the four main affiliated bodies had distinct views with regard to the ideological and organisational development of the LRC. On the one end of the political spectrum, the socialist groups, and especially the SDF, called for the creation of a socialist party based on Marxist ideals. At the other end of the spectrum were the union officials, who were more cautious and conservative, and envisaged the establishment a body controlled by the TUC Parliamentary Committee and open to cooperation with the Liberals. Half way between, the ILP and Keir Hardie advocated the creation of a completely independent labour party, opposed radical socialism and cooperation with the Liberals but were ready to compromise in favour of independent labour representation. In the end, the balance of power leaned towards the ILP group, which succeeded in electing more candidates that any other affiliated body in the LRC’s executive committee, while the elected secretary, Ramsey MacDonald, was also an ILP nominee (Moore, 1978: 76-77).

As a consequence of the above, it is important to outline two crucial factors relative to the early existence of the Labour party. First, the formation of the LRC/Labour Party in 1900 was not a ‘birth but a marriage’ (Pelling and Reid, 1996: 4). That is, the inception of the Labour Party, which came to change the existing political structure in Britain, was not the result of a growing socialist working class ‘revolution’. In fact,
socialism played a rather controversial role in the development of the Labour party. Contrariwise, the formation of the LRC is better qualified as a new chapter in the struggle of the trade union movement for equal labour representation (Thorpe, 2001: 8). The working class in Britain, as this was represented by the trade unions, had loosen its relationship with the Liberals but was not willing to break all ties with them. As a result, the formation of the Labour party was not the outcome of a class war; it was a ‘marriage’, based on consensus and compromise, which was strongly advocated by the politically weak socialist groupings but its success was heavily based on the electoral dynamic of the affiliated trade unions. Second, it should be borne in mind that the initial success of the LRC was based on externally driven factors; the loosening of the trade union – Liberal ties and the former’s legal liability that forced even the most hostile to any form of political independence to change their stance. Thus, the formation of the party that altered the balance of power of the British political realm was deliberated on the vision of a handful of labour and socialist leaders and a series of circumstantial events.

*The first years, 1900-1906*

The first years of the LRC’s life were marked by two crucial events, which tested the alliance’s enduring nature while played a major role in the survival and further development of the organisation. First, a number of legal decisions on the trade unions’ legal status and most importantly, on their right to strike (Taff Vale case), put the principle of unionism in jeopardy and challenged the very survival of the unions. Therefore, the unions had once again come under attack and the union leaders, even the most sceptical ones, were convinced that they had to organise themselves for political action. Prompted by the secretary of the LRC, Ramsay McDonald, they realised the significant role that an independent political organisation as the LRC, could play in defending their interests against the industry employers (Moore, 1978: 85). As a result, many unions decided to join the LRC whose membership had grown substantially by 1902, from 65 to 127 affiliated trade unions (Phillips, 1992: 12; Moore, 1978: 86).

The second significant development that mostly bore on the political and electoral fortunes of the LRC was Liberal/LRC pact, a mutual agreement for electoral cooperation, which came into effect in the 1906 general election. Having realised the gradual but substantial growth of the LRC’s political appeal and the potential

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*In fact, by 1906 only the miner’s remained committed to liberalism; finally, they did join the Labour party in 1909.*
implications that the rise of labour movement could have on the Liberal party’s electoral fortunes, Gladstone responded to MacDonald’s call for cooperation at the next election (Moore, 1978: 93-4; Pelling and Reid, 1996: 12). The Liberal/LRC pact called for independent LRC candidates in thirty constituencies and in return LRC should support the Liberal candidates in areas where it had some influence. Internal opposition did arise, mainly from the Scottish local organisations, but Gladstone and MacDonald focused on the wider political and electoral gains of their cooperation (increased parliamentary representation of the LRC, returning in office for the Liberals). At the 1906 general election the pact was put to the test with positive results for both parties vindicating the initiative of the two leaders. The Liberals won the election while the LRC won 30 seats in parliament and a total share of the vote of 5.9 percent, translated in 329,748 votes (Moore, 1978: 100-2; Phillips, 1992: 14). Moreover, the LRC managed to win almost all straight fights against the Conservatives, indicating that the party had its own support independently from the Liberals. Overall, the LRC had an unprecedented - for a Labour party – success but it did not suddenly emerge as a major party; rather MacDonald's deliberations and the actual election result indicated that the new political organisation could develop into something more than a pressure group adhered to the Liberal party.

However, it should be stressed that despite the organisation’s membership growth and electoral uplift, the LRC ought to overcome a number of problems in order to consolidate its party status. In fact, in the early 1900s, LRC was a weak and impoverished organisation without a political programme and most importantly, politically divided. It had a limited political appeal compared to the actual electoral power of the working class population, lacked funds, proper administrative and political organisation, had no programme and no commitment to any socialist policies, whilst the SDF withdrew from the alliance soon after its inception (Thorpe, 2001: 8-9; Moore, 1978: 77). As a result, the organisation’s electoral performance in the 1900 election was very poor (managed to run 15 and elect only 2 MP), while the Lib-Lab group remained strong within parliament with 8 MPs, hindering the efforts of the LRC representatives to be regarded as the main representatives of labour (Pelling and Reid, 1996: 10). However, the political as well as organisational developments of the 1901-1906 period underpinned LRC’s development and put the basis for the inception and the later consolidation of the Labour party. As future events demonstrated the Labour party had the basic infrastructure in order to take advantage of the events that were to follow, and emerge as a national political force in the aftermath of WWI.
Consolidation of the Labour Party, 1906-1918

In the aftermath of the 1906 election the independent labour movement seemed to have witnessed an unprecedented political and electoral advance. In policy terms, the – renamed at the first parliamentary group meeting – Labour party presented an active and (semi-) independent front within Parliament, by taking up and fighting issues that were important to the working-class constituencies. In fact, the Trade Unions Act of 1906, which restored the union’s right to strike was based on a bill drafted by the Labour party in association with the TUC (Phillips, 1992: 17). In electoral terms, by 1909 Labour had succeeded in winning three by-election seats, raising the party delegates’ ambitions of PLP’s ability to develop into a prominent and mostly independent force. However, it soon became evident that the Labour party was unable to demonstrate a fighting front and have a highly effective presence within Westminster without cooperating with and/or following the agenda of the Liberal government. The factors contributing to Labour’s apparent inability to develop a fully independent parliamentary presence resulted from a number of internal as well as external difficulties that the party ought to face and overcome. On the one hand, the nature of the PLP group, consisting of committed socialists and liberal-friendly trade unionists, with diverse views and attitudes on how to represent the alliance’s interests, was inherently problematic and open to conflicts (Adelman, 1996: 38-39). Moreover, the lack of cohesion in the party itself resulted in indiscipline, mutual suspicion and disagreement among party MPs. The problem was further intensified with the affiliation of the miners’ union to the Labour Party and the accession of the miners’ group of MPs in the PLP in 1909. And whilst the PLP group was significantly reinforced - the total Labour MPs rose to forty-five the newcomers’ Lib-Lab tendencies exacerbated the divisions of the parliamentary group. On the other hand, the background of the new Labour MPs conditioned the party’s parliamentary effectiveness. That is, apart from a few outstanding leaders, most of the PLP members were of working class origin, mainly unqualified, uninterested in and ignorant of policies outside the scope of their direct interests, lacked professional training and administrative experience (Pelling and Reid, 1961: 17). Therefore, the Labour party was unable to produce satisfactory alternative policies to issues of the wider debate agenda or even to the 1909 social reforms of the Liberal government. Within such a context, the PLP could do little more than follow the government policies. As a result, the rank and file members who expected much more in return from their

7 It should be noted that the Labour party had no leader but a Chairman of the parliamentary party. The Chairman election of 1906 was a very close contest between the trade union and socialist candidates; in the end the socialist Keir Hardie was elected by one vote (the vote of MacDonald who voted in the third round of the election) showing the importance of cleavages within the PLP. The party had no official leader until 1922.
parliamentary branch were disappointed in the deliberations of their parliamentary representatives so as to consider that parliamentary activity could ‘harm’ their causes (Phillips, 1992: 18).

In actual fact, the parliamentary activity was openly challenged as harmful for the causes of socialism by two separate, revolutionary socialist movements. The first was set up by a group of radical ILP socialists, whose campaign aimed at overthrowing the Lib-Labs from the party, ending the ‘Labour Alliance’ and committing the party to socialism and propagandist politics\(^8\) (Phillips, 1992: 18). ‘Syndicalism’ was the second movement at the time, which was a union initiative opting for ‘direct action’ instead of parliamentary action; that is, to win control of the economy by industrial action and not by parliamentary politics. Nonetheless, both were minority groups that failed to challenge the survival of the party.

Whilst at the parliamentary level Labour seemed to be in a desperately weak position, the organisational structure of the party at the local level was developing at a fast pace. In fact, the outbreak of war in 1914 found the extra-parliamentary Labour organisation in a fairly strong and healthy position. Membership of local bodies (LRCs and Labour Parties) had grown considerably as was the support and accession of trade unions and socialist societies. By 1915, there were eighty-five affiliated trades councils and seventy-three local Labour parties. Trade union membership had almost doubled during that period from 900,000 in 1906 to over of 1.5 million in 1914 in spite of the shortcomings created by the Osborne Judgement (Pelling and Reid, 1996: 28). The affiliated membership of socialist societies had almost doubled, from 17,000 to 33,000 including members from ILP and the Fabian Society, while BSP had applied to rejoin Labour. In essence, the party’s local organisational development provided Labour with the necessary means and impetus not only to survive during the interwar years but also to develop a much sounder and robust political position. However, albeit the party’s impressive organisational growth, it is significant to note that in 1914 Labour was still at an infant stage of development, acting more as a pressure group to the Liberal government lacking the identity of a national political party ‘with aspirations of governing the country’ (Beer, 1982: 113). It had established an independent but federal in nature organisational network but it had not fully developed into a national party and its electoral prospects were in considerable doubt.

Notwithstanding the progress that Labour achieved over that period, the formative factious nature of the party was evident at all levels of party activity threatening its

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\(^8\) In fact, the group left the Labour party and joined SDF establishing the British Socialist Party (BSP), the predecessor of the Communist Party of Great Britain.
unity and evolution. Overall, four main sharp disputes emerged at the top of the labour movement and led to the development of opposite strains (Thorpe, 2001: 27-31; Adelman, 1996: 46-49; Pelling and Reid, 1996: 32-36; Moore, 1978: 136-161). The first source of dispute within the party related to Britain’s military intervention in the war. Although initially the movement as a whole opposed intervention when Britain’s entry into the war became a plausible - and publicly acceptable - reality, the party was no longer able to present a unified front. The ILP and socialist leaders adopted a firm anti-war attitude while the majority of the MPs felt compelled to support the war effort (Pelling and Reid, 1996: 32-33; Adelman, 1996: 46). The second dispute was over the issue of military conscription. The Labour leadership that participated in Asquith’s coalition government chose to support the government on the realistic terms that by remaining in the cabinet could oppose any attempts for industrial conscription, despite internal opposition from a group of party MPs (Ibid: 29; Moore, 1978: 139). The third significant event that divided the Labour party was over the entry into Lloyd George’s coalition government in 1916. The decision to join the coalition government was overwhelmingly taken at a ‘patriotic’ party Conference on the ground that Labour had a lot to gain from participating in government. Moreover, Lloyd George in an attempt to win the support and conciliate the views within the PLP had offered much better terms to the labour leaders. Therefore, Henderson was offered a place in the inner war Cabinet, the ministries of Labour and Pensions were given labour MPs, while Lloyd George committed to a number of ‘collectivist’ measures such as the state control of the mines and shipping, food rationing, and the promise not to introduce industrial conscription (Thorpe, 2001: 29; Adelman, 1996: 48; Pelling and Reid, 1996: 35-36; Moore, 1978: 141). The final division within the party was on the participation or not of Labour delegates in a meeting of European Socialists in Stockholm with the presence of German socialists. And while Henderson was in favour of sending Labour delegates to the conference, the NEC rejected the attendance to the meeting on the grounds that they did not want to meet and/or cooperate with German socialists. In the end, the solution was given by the War Cabinet, which refused to issue passports to Labour delegates who wanted to attend the meeting (Thorpe, 2001: 30).

In the end, the Labour party was able to maintain its underlying unity despite the strongly divisive tensions. Three are the main reasons that explain the party’s tenacity over the inter-war years. First, the formation of the War Emergency Workers’ National Committee (WEC) provided the main point of contact and platform of compromise and consensus, between pro and anti-war advocates, including representatives from the trade unions, socialist societies, co-opted members, and supporters and opponents of the war. Although initially, its main purpose was to defend the interests of the working-class against the economic and social side-effects.
of the war and especially unemployment (Moore, 1978: 152), it developed into a ‘think tank’ on the effective running of the war and on the organisational development of the Labour party (Adelman, 1996: 46-47). Second, Labour had a strong institutional framework, which played a vital role in the maintaining party unity. Party policies were decided by the annual conference and implemented by the NEC and PLP, a process that provided all bodies within the movement with some ground for discussion. Third, it should be borne in mind that the economic and social conditions of the post-war period benefited the Labour movement and at the same time, discouraged any serious attempt for defection. On the one hand, Labour had become the main political representative of the trade unions, the membership of which increased dramatically during the war and thus, boosted party organisational development both in terms of members and finances. On the other side, the collectivist policies that were introduced by the coalition government gave the public the chance to familiarise with the role of state in society and demonstrated the potential benefits of a shift from private to public ownership. Moreover, further awareness was raised to the fact that state control could threaten the interests of the working-class if it was in the wrong hands (Thorpe, 2001: 34-36). Under the circumstances, Labour sought to guarantee the positive role of the state.

In short, the development of the labour movement essentially vindicated that the weaknesses and divisions of the party were more apparent rather than real. Taking into account the different factions that comprise Labour, the existence of diverse views within the party was not a surprise. In particular, if considering that most of the conflicts at the time were born out of either conviction or political opportunism, which have comprised two of the major elements of Labour’s political character. That is, the party leadership had developed a more realistic approach to the party’s response to the political challenges that it had to face in order not to damage and isolate the Labour party, while the socialists’ arguments were mainly based on normative principles (Thorpe, 1996: 27-28). Nonetheless, the formative elements of Labour’s inception proved robust and stronger than any of the factional strains that developed over time. Therefore, it is the ethos of the Labour party that had provided the link that has kept the party united and facilitated its evolution - organisational and ideological - and survival over time.

In essence, it was the events of the interwar years that played a crucial role in Labour’s political transformation. While at the outbreak of war in 1914 Labour had been the smallest parliamentary group, increasingly marginalized and unable to stand on the salient political issues of the era but rather lurking in the shadows of the Liberals, by 1922 it emerged as the main opposition party with a leader ‘who looked like a
potential Prime Minister’ (Thorpe, 2001: 27,47). Labour had built a wide and well organised membership base, had endorsed an improved and detailed constitution and produced a new comprehensive political programme – Labour and the New Social Order is analysed in detail at the next section - which appealed not only to working class voters but to the wider electorate. And whilst Labour did not manage to profit electorally in 1918, four years later at the 1922 election Labour took 29.3 percent of the total share of the vote and elected 142 MPs, emerging as the main opposition party in parliament and an alternative government to the Conservatives. Furthermore, the participation of the Labour party in the Coalition governments gave its leaders their first experience of ministerial office and government politics. Moreover, the social and economic conditions of the interwar years allowed Labour to gain significant political and electoral advances, especially against the Liberal party, which was divided and with a decreasing electoral support. The role of the state to the welfare of the British people manifested through policies of state control of mines and shipping, and the food rationing, familiarised them with the scope and workings of an interventionist state rendering them more susceptible to the prospect of nationalisation and collectivism. To this end, the socialist ideas as these were expressed by the Labour party found a much more prosperous ground to grow (Phillips, 1992: 28). Finally, it should be noted that the impressive changes that took place within the Labour party over that period marked the party’s consolidation process, entrenched Labour’s formative traits and underpinned all these characteristics that provided the basis upon which the party’s institutionalisation process was based. Within that context, the end of the 1910s marked Labour’s consolidation as a major political force in Britain.

Up to this point, the analysis has sought to give a detailed account of the roots of the Labour party based on the historical and political background of the movement. The initiative for the formation of an independent labour organisation dates back to the mid-end 19th century. However, all the attempts that were made during these years failed as the trade unions, which were the main representatives of the working-class, were not willing to support independent parliamentary action. Being represented at Westminster by their delegates, who nonetheless, acted under the auspices of the Liberal party - the old ‘Lib-Labs’ – the unions believed that they had nothing to gain from an independent labour party. As a result, despite the increasing electoral power of the working-class, this boost was not translated in political gains for the labour movement. Within the same socio-economic and political context, the rise of socialism in Britain was limited, as the working-class had a cautious approach to any form of collectivism. In fact, the socialist movement in Britain was never developed into a mainstream political force as in other European countries, and to this end, Labour
never became the main vehicle of ideological indoctrination or the mere political representative of the British working class. Nonetheless, it should be stressed that socialism was an important part to the formation of the Labour party. And whilst Labour could not be characterised as ever being a pure socialist party, socialists had always been a significant faction within the party. Besides the Labour Alliance, which was formed as the mainstream independent political movement of labour, manifested a practical approach to socialism. To what extent this practical approach evolved to the so-called ‘labourism’ is analysed in the following section.

2.3 Ideology and Organisation: From ‘Old’ to ‘New’ Labour

In 1918 two major developments put their indelible mark to the political life of the Labour party. The first was the adoption of the party’s new Constitution and the second was the acceptance of the party’s policy programme, drafted by the Fabian socialist Sidney Webb and entitled Labour and the New Social Order. The 1918 Constitution gave the Labour party, for the first time in its history, the character of a national party, with set organisational and ideological objectives while the new policy programme outlined the party’s first ever statement aims and policy goals (Jones, 2000: 293). Although the discussions and the debates that led to the adoption of the constitution were focused on the party’s organisational structure, the most significant and revolutionary reforms of the constitution referred to the ideological orientation of Labour. However, as a result of the trade union leadership’s fear of losing control of the party to the socialists, they placed more emphasis on drafting the structural provisions and electoral procedures than on the development of a clear Labour doctrine and policy objectives. In fact, the latter seemed of secondary importance to the trade union leadership (McKibbin, 1974: 97). This is for the simple reason that having secured a dominant position in the party’s national executive, the trade unions were willing to accept a more ‘socialist’ ideological identity for Labour. Therefore, it could be argued that both the new Constitution and policy programme of 1918 marked a shift away from ‘radical Liberalism’ towards a more ‘comprehensive approach of Socialism’ (Jones, 2000: 293-4).

The purpose of this section is first, to present a comprehensive analysis of the organisational structure of the Labour party through the detailed analysis of the party’s development from a federal organisation to a national mass party; and second to examine Labour’s ideological characteristics as these were manifested in the Constitution, various manifestos and the party’s policy record of government. The role of the trade unions and socialist factions within the party is also examined in order to
delineate the role and scope of internal cohesion to Labour’s political and electoral evolution throughout the years. Intra-party relationships that are developed through formal and informal ways of conduct, underlying political forces that have led to organisational reforms and ideological repositioning and mainly, the shifts in the balance of power and the role that internal dynamics have played in the operation and management of Labour, are the main points of the present analysis as they constitute crucial factors to Labour’s evolution.

**Ideological Background of the Labour party: Socialism**

The roots of the ideological orientation of the British Labour party could be explicitly traced to socialism. However, although socialism has played a crucial role in the ideological development of Labour, it would be inaccurate to characterise Labour as an implicitly traditional socialist party. The conditions of the party's formation have formalised a diverse ideological background, which includes socialist ideas that spread from extreme-left to the more moderate centre-right, as well as radical liberal ideals and even, in the case of policy implementation, a more conservative outlook. To this end, Labour’s ideological context since 1918, when the party’s first concise doctrinal account was published, fall within the lines of social democracy and/or democratic socialism rather than traditional socialism. This diverse ideological background has led to the emergence of factions within the party, and has affected Labour’s evolution over time. As it will be discussed later in this chapter, all stages of Labour’s development from its formation and subsequent institutionalisation phase to the party’s current ideological repositioning as well as organisational renewal bear the characteristics of this diversity.

Before continuing with the analysis of Labour’s ideological development, it is, perhaps, worth pausing for a bit in order to briefly review the nature and range of strands of the socialist thought that had a bearing on Labour’s ideological identity. Socialism as a mainstream doctrine and political movement was developed in the first decades of the nineteenth century, and throughout the years has been advocated ardently by a large number of intellectual and political leaders. The plurality of the socialist doctrine has been illustrated by a wide spectrum of strands ranging from ‘utopian’ and ‘scientific’ to social democracy and democratic socialism, each of which also incorporated a variety of ‘revisionist’ accounts relative to the economic conditions of each period. In broad terms, Utopian socialism, amongst the main advocates of which were the ‘conscious’ Robert Owen (1771-1858), the technocratic Saint-Simon (1760-1825) and the communitarianist Fourier (1772-1837), deliberated on speculative arguments of what
socialism as an ideal and practice should achieve rather than on how it should achieve it” (Fisher, 1996: 81). Contrariwise, ‘scientific’ socialism as expressed by Marx and Engels, gave a purport and end to the socialist thought and transformed it to a doctrine of ‘practical affairs’ (Taylor, 1908: 62). In fact, Marx (1818-1883) was the father of militant socialism, considering revolution as the only option open to the working-class to promote its interests. For Marx, change in society was inevitable; socialism was to come as a transitional phase, between capitalism, which was bound to fail, and ultimately, full economic and social communism (Taylor, 1908: 57-66: Femia, 1999: 104-108). And whilst these thinkers are very different in conventional terms, they did share the belief that socialism was the only way to reform society. They all advocated that the only way for a radical improvement was the abolition of the private ownership and its replacement with collective or public ownership, which would include the nationalisation of all means of production, distribution and exchange (Taylor, 1908: 10-11). However, the main ground of their disagreement rested on the strategy and means used for achieving those aims – the abolition of private monopoly. As a result, a major rupture emerged within socialism, in the end of the nineteenth century, between the followers of revolutionary Marxism and the - more moderate - ‘reformists’. The latter acknowledged the need of a reform to be achieved within the institutional confines of the democratic state, while the former preached the need of a revolution that would overthrow the state (Fisher, 1996: 81). What is indicative of the Labour party’s identity is that it has managed to accommodate almost all the major strands of socialism under the roof of democratic socialism. This ‘mosaic’ of socialist views has led to significant conflicts and disagreements over the party’s socialist goals but has also reinforced Labour’s ideological flexibility, as it will be demonstrated later in this thesis.

Nevertheless, Labour’s version of socialism has been substantially influenced by the Fabian society, which did not only play a key role in the development of the party’s ideological philosophy and its transition from radicalism to socialism but also comprised a distinctive group of thought within the socialist movement, setting

* Robert Owen through his models of factory life expressed his conception that reform can only be achieved through social and political change. That is, the economic freedom of the people was mostly related to ‘organisation of industry and commerce by the people, instead of their masters’ (Taylor, 1908: 26). He belongs to the group of ‘Utopian’ socialists because he thought that moral, mental and political education was the main means for social progress rather than political action. Saint-Simon viewed the state as the ‘highest form of business organisation’ and thus, that the only way for the government to be run efficiently was for it to be under the rule of scientific officials –the ‘wise’ men. However, his system was bound to fail in practice as he failed to propose a method on putting the right man in the right place (Taylor, 1908: 28-33). Fourier visualised the unit of organisation in a socialist state to take the form of ‘phalanges’, whose operational structure would provide the framework of human society. Such a framework would be efficient so as to safeguard both the ‘need of personal liberty and also of the safety with which it may be granted without bringing the social edifice to ruin’ (Ibid: 34-40).
‘English socialism upon precise and narrow English premises of thought’ (Lewis, 1953: 443). The philosophical foundations of the Fabians could be traced back to Utilitarianism, Positivism and classical liberalism of the early nineteenth century\textsuperscript{10} (Taylor and Cook, 1980: 4; Bevir, 2002: 217-228; Taylor, 1908: 74-82; Mack, 1955: 76-88). They belonged to the reformist camp of socialism, underlying the democratic changes in society. Furthermore, the Fabians expounded a practical form of socialism based on compromise rather than conflict, on implementation of policies rather than principle, on collective rather than individual conscience and on an ethical rather than economic form of socialism as a way to change society. Although they shared the Marxian belief that socialism was the inevitable outcome of social evolution, they rejected Marx’s disregard of any ‘honourable relationship between means and ends’ (Lewis, 1952: 445), advocating that radical changes in society should come through the use of the existing institutions and constitutional means. For the Fabians socialism was an inevitable but gradual process, which would materialise through a method of instalments and ultimately grow out of a reformed – not demolished - capitalist system through a process of municipalisation and nationalisation. Therefore, the realisation of such reforms should lead to the elimination - and not abolition – of the privately owned means of production and the establishment of public/community ownership of the means of production (Milburn, 1958: 320). According to Sidney Webb, the leading Fabian theorist and pioneer of Labour’s early socialist identity, ‘socialism was the outcome of a gradual change of thought in economics, ethics and politics’ (Wright, 1999: 87).

In general, the Fabians have played a key role in the development of Labour’s ideological identity since the very early days of the party’s formation. Sidney Webb was the leading mind behind one of the most significant and determinant programmes in Labour’s history, the 1918 Labour and the New Social Order, which officially defined Labour as a ‘socialist’ political party. To this end, the Fabian socialist strand has affected Labour’s ideological inception but most importantly, has defined Labour’s ideological evolution over time by providing a more pragmatic framework upon which Labour leader’s have been based so as to face the challenges of a changing socio-economic environment.

\textsuperscript{10} The gradual adaptive process of the social evolution, as expressed by the Fabians, was rooted on the Darwinian evolution. Influenced by Social Darwinism they believed society to be an organism, whose whole was more than the sum of its parts, and whose evolution should take place gradually, according to a ‘piecemeal social engineering’ (Mack, 1955). These ideas were in 1905 adopted and analysed by MacDonald in Socialism and Society. Within the same context, while Webb’s turn to collectivism was influenced by the positivist economics and in particular, Mill, the development of his collective ideas followed the contemporary strands of thought of social Darwinism and idealism. As a result, Webb broke its ties with the Utilitarians, but the initial influence of the movement, did mark some aspects of the Fabian thought (Bevir, 2002: 220).
The most comprehensive and concise account of Labour’s ideology, which has also marked the party’s identity, appeared in the party’s 1918 Constitution and policy programme, entitled *Labour and the New Social Order*. These documents determined Labour’s future development in both organisational and ideological terms. The main aim of Arthur Henderson and Sidney Webb, who drafted the 1918 Constitution, was to transform the party from a federation bound to the fortunes of its affiliated societies to a national party able to stand as a completely independent political force in British politics (Cole, 1948: 45). What they aimed at and ultimately, managed to achieve was reviving the Labour party organisationally, ideologically and electorally. According to Henderson’s beliefs as the end of the war was approaching the time was right for Labour to set down the ‘principles for which it stood nationally and internationally, politically and economically, without the fear of splitting up an infant party (Williams, 1950: 276). In fact, the groundwork was already in place and thus, the ideas included in the 1918 Constitution and programme, were not novel. Both documents incorporated the principal ideas of British socialism from the 1880s. Moreover, the principles and objectives underlined in both documents reflected the fusion of diverse interests that were amalgamated within the party (Taylor, 1980: 9). The Constitution had four main provisions; the individual membership of the party, the establishment of local parties (with the concurrent amalgamation of trades councils with existing parties), the election of the NEC by the whole conference and finally, the socialist objective (McKibbin, 1974: 94). Therefore, it is rather apparent that the main focus of the new Constitution was based on the re-building of organisation machine but the inclusion of the socialist objective, even limited in scope, had a great impact upon and ultimately, shaped the ideological identity of the party throughout its history.

The socialist objective of the Labour party was contained in a brief statement outlining Labour’s general aims (‘Party Objects’). The renowned Clause IV committed the party ‘to secure for the workers by hand or by brain the full fruits of their industry, and the most equitable distribution thereof that may be possible, upon the basis of the common ownership of the means of production and the best obtainable system of popular administration and control of each industry and service’ (Labour Party Constitution, 1918, Section 3(d)). Clause IV affected the fortunes of the Labour party in several ways. First, it indicated a fundamental change in Labour’s ideology towards socialism (or according to some accounts democratic socialism or even ‘labourism’) and confirmed Labour’s break with Liberalism - and the Lib-Labs (McKibbin, 1974: 96; Beer, 1982; 140; Miliband, 1972: 61; Adelman, 1996: 51). In similar terms, it vindicated the party’s ideological conversion to ‘the comprehensive ideology of
socialism’ with the ultimate aim of creating a new social order or a new civilisation, ‘the Socialist Commonwealth’ (Beer, 1982: 140, 126). Second, it pointed out the direction of the party’s policy programme and offered the electorate a ‘new’ and distinct doctrine (McKibbin, 1974: 96). Furthermore, Clause IV set out the means of Labour’s socialism; public or collective ownership of the means of production combined with a more advanced role of the state. Finally, as McKibbin states, Clause IV because of its vagueness and ambiguity provided an umbrella function for the party itself, protecting the unity of a highly fragmented political organisation, while at the same time, furthering its electoral gains (1974: 97). That is, as a result of the collectivist policies of the war period an important section of the middle class had converged to socialism, a circumstance that the party wanted to take advantage of, by implanting into the constitution a form of socialism that would not repel the rising professional bourgeoisie. In short, it could be argued that the socialist objective in its vague and flexible formula attributed Labour the character of a party, which was ‘all things to all men’ (Adelman, 1996: 51). Moreover, it transformed Labour from a mere working-class party and trade union representative to a ‘classless party’ with an appeal to ‘all producers whether by hand or by brain’ (Williams, 1950: 283).

Furthermore the socialist objective provided the basis upon which the party’s policy programme Labour and the New Social Order: A Report on Reconstruction was formed. Although the programme was drafted by the Fabian Sidney Webb, in essence it was a detailed ratification of the resolutions and policies that were worked out at the TUC’s annual meetings and the 1917 party Conference (Pelling and Reid, 1996: 40). That is also the reason why the programme was endorsed without major objections at the June 1918 party Conference. On the whole, the 1918 policy programme was the first comprehensive statement of policy aims of the Labour party, which embodied an ambitious and also ambiguous range of policy objectives and proposals for the post-war economic and social reconstruction of Britain. Whereas economic reconstruction was the ultimate aim, it was formalised that this could not be achieved without a ‘systematic and comprehensive plan for […] immediate social rebuilding’ (Labour party, 1918: 5). That is, for Labour the reconstruction of society was the cornerstone of economic and industrial evolution. To this end, all the proposed activities promulgated the formation of a new ‘House’ of society, which in turn rested on the common foundation of the Democratic Control of Society and included four main pillars: the universal enforcement of national minimum, the democratic control of industry, the revolution in national finance and the surplus of wealth for the common good (Ibid).
Within the lines of the four pillars, Labour addressed in detail the means to be used in order to secure the interests of ‘every member of the community’. What was really interesting and once again demonstrated the ‘cautiousness’ of the party towards ‘socialism’, was the statement that the party’s aim to secure ‘the requisites for healthy life and worthy citizenship’ is ‘in no sense a class proposal’. Therefore, the party’s appeal was by no means limited to the working-class and the trade unionists. It is evident that Labour’s leadership had acknowledged that the party’s gradual transformation to an office-seeking party presupposed the broadening of its electoral base. In general terms, the programme committed Labour to the introduction of a minimum wage as well as full employment for all adult workers, and the extension of state unemployment insurance and raise of the weekly benefit, the extension of women’s employment rights, the resettlement of the de-mobilised and discharged workers, the improvement of education and the raising of the school-leaving age to 16. Moreover, the programme called for the immediate nationalisation of land, railways, mines, canals, harbours, roads, posts and telegraphs, coal and electricity. It should be stressed that for tactical purposes, the words ‘nationalisation’ and/or ‘socialisation’ were avoided and replaced by the broader and more flexible term ‘public ownership’ (Cole, 1948: 57). In terms of finance, the programme called for a drastic change in the system of taxation, and proposed progressive taxation based on the ability to pay plus a capital levy to be charged on property and the surplus wealth for the purposes of paying off the national debt. Finally, the surplus accumulated would be used for the increase of national expenditure on social reforms in housing, education, health. Other proposals included the restoration of the pre-war civil rights, further political reform, stronger local government while at the international level, Labour promoted international cooperation, which should take the form of an ‘Alliance of Free Nations’.

In general terms, the new programme expounded the preservation of the extended wartime state followed by the public ownership of land and the immediate nationalisation of key industries such as the railways, mines and coal and electricity. At the same time, it was an affirmation of Labour’s conversion to a form of socialism whereby common ownership and piecemeal collectivism ought to develop in a capitalist society (Miliband, 1972: 62). Therefore, the manifesto policy proposals embraced a diverse range of policies whilst reinforced the ‘socialist’ character of the post-war Labour party. It was radical programme, different from the others, which formed the basis for Labour’s policy development for the next thirty years. Yet, it was perceived as an essentially cautious programme, aiming only at preserving collectivism that developed during the war and satisfying the demands of the working-class (Thorpe, 2001: 39). However, it should be noted that the policy programme was
formed within the wartime collectivist climate and as such, it became a product of its time (Jones, 2000: 293). And whilst some left-wing critics have argued that, at the time, Labour could afford to be more radical, their argument was confuted by the state of internal party affairs and the dominant role of the trade unions within the party machine (Thorpe, 2001: 40).

In view of the above, it is rather evident that with the adoption of the 1918 Constitution and programme, the Labour party developed a distinct political identity, became the ‘most consistent advocate of state action’ and also deepened its ties with the working-class people and attracted the new ‘socialists’ of the middle class (Miliband, 1972: 62). Concurrently, the significance of the 1918 programme lied on the well-defined provision of the interests of the distinct intra-party groups. Moreover, it is worth noting that while the constitution had apparently committed Labour to socialism, this cannot be regarded as an intra-party victory for the socialists. As McKibbin argues, the apparent concession made on behalf of the trade unions, which ultimately, tolerated the adoption of ‘socialism’ as the party’s mainstream ideology, was in favour of the trade unions (1974: 100). The reasons why the union leaders accepted the socialist objective rested on three main factors; first, the unions themselves were advocates of collectivism and nationalisation of specific industries; second, they wanted to indulge the Fabians, and finally, in essence, union delegates did not believe that it mattered\textsuperscript{11}. Their main concern lied on the distribution of power within the organisation. In the end, the unions succeeded in gaining control of the NEC and dominating the party hierarchy (Ibid: 102). Overall, it could be argued that the 1918 Constitution and policy statement marked Labour’s consolidation to a nationally organised and ideologically revived political party. At the same time, the scope and nature of both documents reflected the characteristics of Labour’s formative years; that is, the vagueness and ambiguity that were rooted in Labour’s fragmented organisation and diversity of opinion of its founding members. Labour’s inception was a marriage of convenience and compromise, something that was explicitly depicted in the party’s consolidation and institutionalisation processes.

\textsuperscript{11} In the aftermath of the war the trade unions emerged strengthened and willing to play a more important role in the political activity of the Labour party rather than ‘embark upon militant courses’. In the meantime, and due to the wartime conditions the leaders of the trade union movement were much more ready than ever before to ‘accept a mainly notional commitment’ to socialism (Miliband, 1972: 60).
Nevertheless, the belief that the adoption of the 1918 Constitution and policy objectives had finally qualified Labour as the mainstream socialist party in Britain was no more than theoretical. In fact, Labour’s practical conversion to socialism was neither smooth nor straightforward; rather, it took twenty-seven years for the party to form a government committed to a socialist objective. This dilatory progression resulted from a number of endogenous and exogenous factors that influenced Labour’s ideological positioning and policy orientation but also defined the intra-party balance of power. To this end, the 1920s were marked by two Labour electoral wins that led to the first ever Labour - minority –governments, a soft but rather important first break with the party’s formal ‘socialist’ identity, and the consolidation of the Labour’s pragmatism and political flexibility. Notwithstanding the nature of the coalition governments with the Liberals who had no intention to accept a socialist programme, it was MacDonald’s cautiousness towards the ‘left’ and his preference for a vague and ambitious governmental programme rather than proposals that would commit the party to specific and unchallenged socialist goals, that have marked the first years of Labour’s political dominance. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the main aim of the party leadership at the time had been to persuade the electorate that above all, Labour was a party ‘fit to govern’ (Cole, 1979: 206).

Within such a context, the Labour governments of 1923-4 and 1929-30 were of major importance for the party’s development and the events that took place at the time played a major role in the party’s process of institutionalisation, as will be demonstrated later in this thesis. In 1923, Labour won 191 seats and formed a minority government. In general terms, the first Labour government achieved little in addressing the real problems of the country and even less in implementing any of its socialist goals. The government survived for a few months and its only major legislative accomplishment was the Wheatley Housing Act. Although Labour had propagated socialism as the only way to tackle the problems of mass unemployment and poverty, the Labour government did not introduce direct socialist measures nor produced any tangible proposals for addressing the major social problems. In fact, in spite of the promises of the 1918 programme the leadership did nothing to distinguish itself from the Liberals (Chadwick, 2000: 332).

However, and despite the leadership’s cautious stance towards radical policy reforms, this could not be considered the main reason for the government’s poor record. On the one hand, the electoral success was unexpected for the Labour party leadership, which was not prepared to govern the country (Williams, 1950: 300). As a result, the
Labour government ought to overcome a range of political and administrative weaknesses. First, the lack of capable and experienced delegates was an important hindrance to the formation and operation of the Cabinet. Second, the Labour government was a minority one, dependent on the Liberal party that was unwilling to support any radical policies. Therefore, Labour leadership had to face a major dilemma; either to produce a socialist programme and thus, challenge the Liberals to vote against it and lose the chance to lead the government, or to carry through a moderate programme of social reform and compromise with the Liberals (Williams, 1950: 303-4). Third, the party promoted Free Trade and therefore, made it difficult to provide for schemes, which could deal with the rapidly rising unemployment (Adelman, 1996: 58). Fourth, the international focus of MacDonald on establishing good relations with Russia worsened the already aggravated position of the party and ultimately, led to its downfall. Finally, the ideological vagueness of Labour’s policy statements had hindered Labour from developing concrete plans on how ‘socialism’ was going to be implemented (Thorpe, 2001: 51). In view of the above, it came as no surprise that the Labour leaders chose to act on ‘what is possible’ rather than ‘what is desirable’. In ideological terms the party failed to overcome its internal conflicting structures but in practical terms, Labour succeeded in implementing the leaders’ ultimate goal to establish itself as at the national level as a strong electoral contender and mainly, to persuade the electoral of its competence to govern the country.

Therefore, it is rather apparent that in practice Labour’s ideological positioning was consistent with the leadership’s adherence to a ‘sentimental and insipid brand of rhetorical socialism’ based on gradual and strictly constitutional action upon which a collective and reformist type of socialism would be drawn; the state was considered to be the main agent of social and economic change (Shaw, 1996: 6; Taylor, 1980: 12-13). The party was reluctant towards practical socialism and had formally rejected direct industrial action for political purposes. In fact, political gradualism was to be complemented by industrial gradualism. Hence, with the exception of the demonstrations against British intervention to the Polish-Russian conflict, that Labour leaders considered a ‘national’ rather than ‘socialist’ cause, the leadership was cautious and moderate to any form of industrial militancy and even declined to support the unions’ General Strike in 1926 as they considered it a threat to the party’s constitutional status (Thorpe, 2001: 54; Cook and Taylor, 1980: 14). On the one hand, this was a significant decision that led to the unions’ defeat and unconditional surrender to the government’s demands while discredited the idea of direct action and accelerated the rightward drift of the Labour party (Thorpe, 2001: 55). On the other hand, however, this further aggravated the already intense relations between the unions and the party.
Labour’s second concise policy statement emerged in 1928 with the publication of the new party programme, *Labour and the Nation*, which was indicative of the party’s ideological stagnation at the time (Thorpe, 2001: 56). The programme was a combination of comprehensive but somewhat vague and long-term socialist goals that was directly influenced by internal and external factors. Thus, it responded to the political, economic and social events that took place in the 1920s and affected the fortunes of the Labour party (Chadwick, 2000: 334). But most importantly, it reflected intra-party changes and mainly, the shift in the balance of power in favour of the leader. The rupture with the trade unions in addition to the electoral successes of Labour, allowed MacDonald to control the party – even unofficially and indirectly – and its ideological and policy orientation. As expected, the new programme added little substance to the party’s compromised and vague ideological standpoint. It mainly advocated a consensual form of socialism, which embraced the concerns of the left and right voices within the party. From the standpoint of a national ‘socialist’ party, Labour appealed to ‘all who share in the labour which is the lot of mankind’ regardless of class, occupation, and wealth, to embrace the doctrine of practical socialism (Labour party, 1928: 5-6). This ‘socialist’ call across class lines once again let the radicals disgruntled within the party but the subsequent unexpected electoral victory put internal conflicts to a halt for the time being. Thus, it appeared that in electoral terms the ideological vagueness and ‘classless’ approach of Labour’s programme had once more paid off\(^{12}\).

By way of contrast, in policy terms, the new programme presented a more comprehensive account of policies aiming to introduce significant changes that would supposedly lead Britain to a new era of prosperity and tolerable livelihood for the mass of the population (Labour party, 1928: 13). By advocating the idea of radical reforms through a ‘peaceful revolution’, the 1928 programme put forward a set of long-term policies within the spirit of ‘gradualism’, which, given the economic and political realities at the time, were very difficult to implement. The repeal of the Trade Unions Act, the development of industry and trade mainly through reorganisation and readjustment, and of the agricultural sector, the improvement of the living conditions of the unemployed and pensioners, the provision of social services and the extension of the school-leaving age to 15 with the provision of maintenance allowances were

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\(^{12}\) MacDonald was soon challenged. Intra-party opposition re-emerged in the form of the Cook-Maxton manifesto, initiated and drafted by various ILP leaders who were dissatisfied with the consensual form of socialism that the party promoted (Cole, 1979: 211). Instead, they advocated a more radical rhetoric calling for an ‘end to compromise and the launching of a new period of class struggle’ (Thorpe, 2001: 59). The second attempt came in the form of the Mosley manifesto in 1930, which was a scheme for economic revival but this was also rejected by the party.
amongst the promising measures of the programme (Labour party, 1928). However, due to the deterioration of the international economy, which had a direct effect on British finance and trade, these measures had to be dropped soon after the 1929 election. In fact, by 1931 Labour had transformed from the party of full employment and welfare to a government that was ready to introduce cuts in unemployment benefits and public spending. This was not just a change of policy but also a fundamental shift in the party’s mainstream principles.

The extent of the economic and political crisis was such that the government was unable to handle the situation. The intense disagreements among Labour ministers led to the cabinet’s split and the only option that the administration was left with was to resign (Thorpe, 2001: 62-68). Nonetheless, what the Labour party was not in a position to face, MacDonald did. Instead of resigning MacDonald formed the ‘National Government’ with the participation of Labour, Conservative and Liberal ministers. MacDonald’s decision was considered a betrayal; the national executive expelled MacDonald and his colleagues from the party, elected Henderson as titular leader and opposed firmly the coalition government (Thorpe, 2001: 68; Cook and Taylor, 1980: 14; Pelling and Reid, 1996: 65-67). But even in opposition Labour was unable to offer practical alternatives to government policies. In a way, the party was facing and paying for the deficiencies of its policy programme, which lacked short-term, robust policy initiatives. The proposals were comprehensive but lacked of prioritisation and temporal specificity (Thorpe, 2001: 57-58).

MacDonald’s defection shattered the Labour party and the gloomy election results of 1931 illustrated the real dangers that the party had to face. On the one hand, the internal upheaval demonstrated the serious shortcomings of Labour’s ideological foundations, its woolly thinking in terms of practical politics and mainly, showed the disastrous effects of the concentration of power in the hands of the leader. Having built its political identity entirely on the leader’s philosophy and political status, the aftermath of MacDonaldism revealed issues of ideological deficiency, vagueness and ambiguity. The party was in a very difficult position and even faced the danger of dissolution as the radical left-wing echelons and foremost the ILP, were putting pressure on Labour leadership to adopt a hard line socialist philosophy as a response to MacDonaldism. This was a sharp ideological dispute, which ended with the disaffiliation of the ILP in 1932.

While in opposition Labour engaged in re-organising and redefining its ideological identity and political credibility following a process of deliberation, compromise and consensus and preparing the party’s imminent return to power. The conviction that
the party would have to be in office at any cost – usually, by compromising its principles and ethos - was finally, abandoned by the leadership (Taylor, 1980: 14). However, the image of a party in shambles was more apparent than real. In fact, despite the political developments, the party’s organisation was in a very good state with an increasing individual membership rate and flourishing finances, a strong indication that the party’s grassroots had not been disgruntled by the events at the top (Thorpe, 2001: 72). To this end, party organisation constituted the stronghold of Labour’s unity and starting point of its ideological reinvention. As Cole argues, especially in the countryside there was ‘a vigorous and consistent Labour force’, which considered MacDonald as the scapegoat ‘for its own shortcomings in political and economic thought’ (1979: 219).

The fundamental change within the party derived from two sets of events. First, the TUC and the extra-parliamentary party took over the party’s fortunes, organisationally but also in terms of policy-making. Second, the party swung to the left as a response to the unavailing gradualism of the past. In an attempt to preserve the unity of the party the trade unions initiated a change in the constitution in order to be able to exert more power within Labour. This led to the reorganisation of the National Joint Council (NJC) - National Council of Labour (NCL) in 1934 - with an in-built trade union majority and hence, its total control by the TUC (Thorpe, 2001: 74). The innovation, which enhanced the position and control of trade unions, was that the NCL and the National Executive came to define Labour’s policy decisions and the party’s programmatic statements and plans for legislation (Adelman, 1996: 77; Pelling and Reid, 1996: 70). The influence of the NCL was very important during the 1930s as it was constantly meeting and issuing statements on policy decisions, which formed the basis of Labour’s published programmes and the legislation of the Labour government of 1945 (Adelman, 1996: 77). The shift of the balance of power from the leadership to the trade unions and the constant control of parliamentary party from the TUC was the direct effect of the deep distrust the extra-parliamentary party had of the Labour leadership. This was also demonstrated by the selection of leaders (Henderson, George Lansbury) and the limitation of their powers to that of chief party spokesmen (Pelling and Reid, 1996: 71-73). Therefore, the major shift in the Labour party’s policy was initiated within this changing organisational context.

Moreover, the aftermath of the Labour government’s collapse signalled the beginning of an era of socialist rhetoric. Paradoxically, the disaffiliation of the ILP in 1932, which by then had evolved to an extremist group, led to the formation of the Socialist League and the strengthening of the left within Labour. The League, which was founded by ‘old’ ILPers, was gradually developed into a ‘party within a party’ and its
aim was to advocate radicalism within the context of loyalty to the Labour party leadership (Thorpe, 2001: 72-73; Chadwick, 2000: 338). The Socialist League played a very important role in the development of the socialist thought but also to the survival of the party as a whole. The League gave the left-wing leaders the opportunity to express, define and develop their ideas within the ideological boundaries of the labour movement by keeping most parts of the ‘left’ united and therefore, preserving the unity of the Labour party. In essence, its existence preserved the balance of the doctrinal foundations of the Labour party that would have been heavily shattered after the secession of the ILP, which signalled the end of a very successful, thirty-year old association. That said, it should be borne in mind, that ideological diversity had been a main component of Labour’s survival and development; despite the intra-party conflicts and disputes have risen over time, the balance of the party’s electoral success has been reflected on the degree of compromise between the main strands of thought. Ultimately, this is what happened in the 1930s and led to the party’s return to power in 1945. However, it should also be stressed that in the end the shift to the left was contained and the moderate right-wing socialists finally prevailed13.

However, the most imminent problem that Labour had to face was the lack of policy. It was obvious that fundamental changes should be introduced in order for the party to be able to return to power. Contrary to the vague and unrealistic socialist rhetoric of the past, the emphasis was now placed on a realistic assessment of the situation and the development of a coherent approach with specific and detailed set of policies. The formulation of the new programme was the outcome of the cooperation between right-wing politicians (Herbert Morrison, Hugh Dalton, Ernest Bevin who, nonetheless, had a ‘Fabian’ background) and specialist advisors and financial experts (Ernest Durbin, Hugh Gaitskell, Douglas Jay, all disciples of Keynes), who were sympathetic to the Labour party and willing to offer their knowledge of British financial institutions and economic policy14 (Shaw, 1996: 9; Thorpe, 2001: 74). The main aim of this broad collaboration was to ensure that the party’s proposals were ‘carefully thought-out and well-researched’ (Shaw, 1996: 9). Under these circumstances, as Durbin argues ‘the establishment of an informed professional group of financial and economic experts had greatly increased the party’s competence to handle overall economic policy and its flexibility to meet new situations’ (1985: 262). Their task was to provide viable answers for the immediate problems of economic

13 In fact, the Socialist League dissolved in 1937, following the launch of the ‘Unity Campaign’ (cooperation with the Communists while supporting their application for affiliation to the Labour party) and the dispute that this caused within the ranks of the Labour party. In the end, the League members decided to secede their organisation rather than being expelled from the party (Thorpe, 2001: 84).
14 All were members of economic groups of the left such as the New Fabian Research Bureau and the XYZ Club. In the 1940s all served the Attlee administration in various posts.
decay, mass unemployment, depression, poverty and social deprivation. The need for ‘practical socialism’ with feasible and tangible benefits for the people was to come not through the condemnation of the faults of capitalism alone but by providing a socialist alternative to economic questions of productivity, output, even unemployment (Shaw, 1996: 10). And subsequently, these economic policy plans, which comprised elements of collectivism in the form of public ownership, Keynesianism, mixed economy, social welfare, even state control and above all, greater policy planning, became the official party policy and the basis of Labour’s programmatic statements.

Hence, Labour’s quest for a new political identity materialised in the form of two main policy programmes in the 1930s, For Socialism and Peace (1934) and Labour’s Immediate Programme (1937). The former was published in a period when the Labour was party attempting to ‘launch’ a new political identity and break every link with the past of MacDonaldism. To this end, the new policy document included definite and coherent objectives, made specific commitments to planning and nationalisation while restating many of the objectives of the previous documents. Great emphasis was placed on centralised planning with the state as the main player while the role of other agencies was downplayed (Thorpe, 2001: 76; Laybourn, 2000: 64; Cook and Taylor, 1980: 16). In fact, Labour entirely adopted Morrison’s model of ‘public corporation’ in which the nationalised industries should be run by a government appointed board of professional managers, which would enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy, operate within business lines but be accountable to parliament (Shaw, 1996: 11; Thorpe, 2001: 76). The representation of members of any other agency (including the trade unions) in the board was excluded. In general, the 1934 policy document emphasised the party’s commitment to nationalisation and public control of ‘the primary industries and services as a foundation step, including the banking system, transport, coal and power, water supply, iron and steel and other key industries’ (Labour party, 1934: 6). But its most important contribution to Labour’s ideological identity was the introduction of socialist planning, as ‘the one sane alternative which is left’ and which comprised the bedrock for the Labour’s policy statements (Ibid: 14). Furthermore, it is also worth noting that socialism was for the first time ‘given a key position in the party’s appeals to the electorate’, signalling a considerable change in the party moderate wing’s stance and their acceptance of the vision of ‘democratic socialism’ as typified by Durbin (Pelling and Reid, 1996: 72; Cook and Taylor, 1980: 16).

All these proposals and objectives were integrated thoroughly into the party’s 1938 policy statement, entitled Labour’s Immediate Programme. Falling within the lines of the previous policy statement in reinforcing the party’s socialist determination, the
new programme offered a more tangible and considerably well-thought and researched account of what a Labour government could be able to achieve in a single five-year term in office (Thorpe, 2001: 86; Cook and Taylor, 1980: 17). Although it reiterated some of the policy objectives of earlier statements, its major difference with the earlier accounts was that the formulation of the proposed policy initiatives were based on concrete plans and offered viable answers to the economic problems. Once again, planning comprised the basis of Labour’s policies, which included the set up of a National Investment Board to manage investments into key industries in the public interest and the nationalisation of the Bank of England. Furthermore, it committed Labour to a programme of nationalisation, which was less extensive than the previous one, as it excluded the nationalisation commercial banks but rather focused on the ‘commanding heights’ (energy and transport). Moreover, the ‘Socialist Commonwealth’ was defined as the party’s aim for peace and democracy (Labour party, 1937: 2). In terms of social policy, the main objectives were the improvement of the working conditions through the introduction of a 40-hour week and paid holidays, the extension of the health services, the rise of school leaving age to 16 and the promotion of higher pensions. The extension of state control was the principled objective for the achievement of social welfare but this was carefully put within the context of a Keynesian direction. In short, it could be argued that Labour’s Immediate Programme was the accumulative outcome of the party’s attempt to re-launch its ideological identity and rebuild Labour’s image of governmental competence. Therefore, it is no surprise that it incorporated the most concise and detailed objectives of every Labour programmatic statement to the time, and as such it comprised the foundation upon which the 1945 Attlee government was based. In terms of ideology, it reinforced the principle of socialism while establishing a direct relationship between party principles and policies (Cook and Taylor, 1980: 17). It was a programme that put an end to Labour’s quest for a socialist (even within a moderate context) identity and provided the practical platform upon which socialist objectives could be applied in Britain

By the end of the 1930s, planning and state control constituted the main elements of Labour’s ideological framework, leading to Labour’s transformation into the ‘statist party of the post-war period’ (Thorpe, 2001: 77; Laybourn, 2000: 65). To an extent, the notion of economic planning in the form of rational control of the economic life

15 There are conflicting accounts on the practical significance of the new programme and the party’s policy ‘rebirth’ in the 1930s. As Booth argues Labour did make considerable steps towards more viable economic policies, but he strongly disagrees with Elizabeth Durbin’s view. In fact, he argues that the 1930 policy programmes were the continuity of the earlier ones and included some of the same naïve and utopian economic policy objectives of Labour and the New Social Order and Labour and the Nation (Booth, 1996: 1-26).
was always a part of socialism (Shaw, 1996: 11). Still, the imprecise and vague meaning of the notion of planning rendered it to a political asset not only for left-wing but all parties across the political spectrum regardless of their ideological position, as related policy implementation could be based on a set of diverse approaches. Within such a vague context, Labour promoted its own approach to ‘socialist planning’ by emphasising nationalisation and central direction. To this end, planning through the ‘use of a strong central authority’ would lead to re-balance the shortcomings of the free market by generating economic activity, improving industrial performance and thus, respond to the problem of mass unemployment (Shaw, 1996: 12; Thorpe, 2001: 77). At the very least, planning appeared to offer answers to the problems that the unregulated capitalism was unable to solve (Booth, 1996: 14). In addition, the formulation of Labour’s practical socialism that was developed around ‘planning’ was underpinned by the fact that the party’s collectivist thinking had also elements of Keynesianism. The paradox of the 1930s in relation to Labour’s deliberations to re-shape its policies and re-invent its lost credibility rested on the party’s parallel adoption of Keynesian and socialist principles - in the form of moderate democratic socialism, which nonetheless provided the main framework of Labour’s ideological evolution and electoral revival throughout the years.

As it has been already mentioned above, despite the initial left-wing revival within Labour in the early 1930s, the shift to the left never fully materialised. For one reason, the Marxist left failed to provide practical solutions to the demands of the trade unionists and convince them of the tangibility of its principles and proposals. The second major reason relates to the party and trade union leaders’ moderate and cautious ideological stance (Cook and Taylor, 1980: 15). Given that by 1931, the party was under the direct control of the TUC, the predominance of the left as a major internal political force was no more than theoretical. And whilst the influence of Marxism should not be entirely overlooked, the party’s ideological evolution at the time had fallen within the lines of democratic socialism, and most specifically, Evan Durbin’s account of democratic socialism as presented in his book The Politics of Democratic Socialism, considered the pioneer of ‘revisionism’ in the 1930s and 1950s. Durbin was a fervent advocate of the democratic method and rejected the Marxist analysis of class and capitalism. In his analysis of the importance of democracy, he argued that democracy and socialism are implicitly linked and that socialism could only be achieved through the democratic method. For Durbin, ‘in so far as we are democratic we are already, in some degree, socialist’ (Durbin, 1965: 271). His interpretation of the changes in the class structure within capitalist democracies proved the Marxist analysis of the elimination of the intermediate classes ‘substantially wrong’ and on the contrary argued that ‘they have flourished and abounded’ (Ibid:
In fact, due to various technological, educational and socio-economic reasons the intermediate classes had not only increased in numbers but they had been transformed so that there was a conversion of interests and mentality emanating mainly, from their rise to power\(^\text{16}\) (Ibid: 133). Moreover, he demonstrated that these developments were the outcome of changes that occurred in the institutional structure of capitalism and included among others the growth of collective bargaining and the stiffening of the labour market, the development of social services, and the rapid spread of state control (Ibid). As far as capitalism is concerned, Durbin once again rejected the idea that the capitalist system was coming to an end but instead it was expanding and thriving (Durbin, 1965: 86). Durbin’s interpretation of ‘democratic socialism’ emphasised the fundamental differences between Marxism and the democratic socialist thought and put the basis for the development of a concise and less blurred ideological strand, which comprised another stepping stone to the development of Labour’s identity.

Although the formulation of Labour’s programmatic statements comprised the core characteristic of the party’s progress in the 1930s and early 1940s, it is as equally crucial to review the party’s response to the events of the Second World War, especially whilst considering that Labour’s attitude towards and perception of war had always created internal disputes and disunity. In fact, the events that took place in Europe over the decade and mainly, the spread of fascism, once again divided the Labourites. On the one hand, there were the left-wingers and the Socialist League who in the name of ‘war on fascism’ were in favour of Labour’s cooperation with the Communists and even supported their affiliation. On the other side, the party leadership was opposing the latter’s affiliation and cooperation on both ideological and long-term electoral grounds. As expected, the radicals were once again defeated while the Socialist League was dissolved and its leader and initiator of the ‘Unity Campaign’ Sir Stafford Cripps was expelled from Labour in 1939\(^\text{17}\). However, despite the apparent lack of homogeneity and ideological consistency on the war issue, the outbreak of war in 1939 found the party leaders united against a common enemy and supported the British declaration of war on Germany while unanimously agreeing on an electoral truce. And despite their initial refusal to participate in a coalition government under Chamberlain, they joined the coalition under the leadership of Winston Churchill. The participation of Labour leaders and top officials in governmental affairs gave the party

\(^{16}\) That is, the proletariat has been converted into a class with the mentality and interests of petit bourgeoisie, while the grand bourgeoisie has been divided into three groups within the lines of the technical necessities of the institution of limited liability (Durbin, 1965: 133-4)

\(^{17}\) The ‘United Campaign’ as well as the friendly approach and willingness to cooperate with the Communists, which resulted to the dissolution of the Socialist League and thus, the elimination of radicals, reinforced the position of the right-wingers in the party, who by then had managed to control party management and policy-making procedures.
a fresh impetus. At the same time and as it was the case during the First World War the wartime lessons of more public control, collectivism and egalitarianism provided Labour with an enormous of opportunity to boost its own policy objectives (Adelman, 1996: 82-89; Thorpe, 2001: 89-103). Furthermore, the outstanding record of the Labour ministers suggested that it was a party of government, with officials able to handle major government issues in an effective and competent way. In essence, by the end of the war Labour emerged more powerful than ever before while having fully recovered from the events of 1931. As a result of Labour’s successful self-reinvention, the party won a landslide victory at the 1945 election and formed a majority government for the first time in its history.

1945-1983: Revisionism - A step closer to a ‘new’ Labour Party

There are contentious arguments with regard to the legacy of the 1945-1951 Attlee governments. Overall and despite the adversary financial landscape at the time, Labour ministers were determined to promote a series of considerable reforms consistent with the party’s socialist programme. In fact, Francis Williams argues that it was these socialist principles, which not only put the ‘essential foundations of a new order of society’ but also provided the ‘revolutionary change in economic and industrial life’ in order for Britain to ‘survive in conditions of peculiar difficulty’ (1950: 359-368). In ‘socialist’ terms, the government delivered exactly what it had promised its electors in its manifesto. It carried out an extensive legislative programme of nationalisation and public corporation establishments, which included the Bank of England, electricity and gas, railway and canals, road haulage, cable and wireless, civil aviation and coal and steel. In social policy, the government introduced a series of welfare reforms that not only improved the day-to-day lives of the people but also led to the creation of a more ‘just and equal society’ (Williams, 1950: 370). The school-leaving age was increased to 15, state scholarships to universities more than doubled while government grants increased and the payment of fees in all primary and secondary local authority schools was abolished. In terms of social security, the National Insurance Act introduced a flat rate national insurance contribution that would cover for sickness and unemployment benefits, pensions and even funeral

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The nationalisation process progressed quite smoothly as the government faced no considerable parliamentary opposition even from Churchill and the Conservative Party. However, major difficulties emerged in the case of coal and steel legislation, which divided the cabinet before it was finally passed but with the provision that the legislation would come into effect after the next general election (Thorpe, 2001: 108). The controversy emerged because of the ministers’ doubts on the effectiveness of nationalisation in general, and mainly, in the particular case of the steel industry, which was running efficiently in private hands (Ibid: 108-9; Pelling and Reid, 1996: 89-90).
benefits. However, the greatest achievement of the Government was the National Health System (NHS), which administered the control of hospital to regional boards and introduced free access to medical services for all (Thorpe, 2001: 112; Pelling and Reid, 199; Williams, 1950; Jefferys, 2000).

Moreover, the government’s economic planning was designed in such a way so as to favour the working class, the people who had suffered more from the war. Amid the financial adversaries that the government had to cope with, it retained the rationing system and the food subsidies in order to secure equality in the distribution of basic foods and abate the living costs of households. Moreover, progressive taxation was applied and regional development constituted a major priority so as to avoid high unemployment levels (Jefferys, 2000: 76; Williams, 1950: 371). On housing however, the government record is less successful due to the limited development that took place with regard to the growing population. At the international level the Labour government dealt with the Commonwealth and Empire states and one of its most significant achievements in that field was the creation of new states in Asia (Pellling and Reid, 1996: 93). However, bearing in mind that foreign affairs has always been a sensitive policy area for the Labour party, which has led to sharp conflicts and divisions, the government was not in a position to make formidable progress. Finally, two main points should be raised in relation to the record of the Attlee administrations. First, the social and economic reforms that were put forward and were in absolute accordance with the party’s socialist objectives changed the pattern and structure of the British society. Indeed, these reforms or ‘social revolution’ as called at the time, did lead to the emergence of a new social profile in the country (Williams, 1950: 373; Rubinstein, 1979: 226). Second, all these reforms took place within the first two years of the governmental term as from 1947 onwards the government had to face severe economic and financial difficulties, which ultimately led to the fall of the second Attlee government in 1951.

Therefore, the legacy of the Attlee governments has been assessed in relatively conflicting ways and various contexts. First, there are those who approached the government record as highly positive, mostly on the grounds of the aforementioned social reforms. In essence, they argued that the government ‘carried out the spirit of what its supporters voted for in 1945’ and nobody could blame it for it (Cole, 1948: 465). Secondly, there were the right-wing critics who believed that the government introduced too much socialism (Jefferys, 2000: 78-79). The argument is that the emphasis on welfare reforms as well as economic policies in favour of the working classes had hindered the regeneration of the industry and rapid economic revival of the country. Finally, there were the left-wing critics who constituted the strongest
faction within the Labour party. For them the 1945 Labour government failed to materialise a ‘peaceful socialist revolution’ in the sense of a ‘shift in power relations between social classes’ and as a result, betrayed the ‘socialist idealism’ and wasted a significant opportunity (Rubinstein, 1979: 226; Jefferys, 2000: 78). Their criticisms targeted all governmental decisions including the social and welfare reforms as well as the economic and financial policies and the planned economy (Rubinstein, 1979: 227-231). They were also able to exert considerable pressure upon the government at parliamentary (rebellions) and extra-parliamentary levels (local party activity) in order to steer government policy legislation towards a more radical socialist perspective. In fact, it was the campaign of the Labour left that led to the nationalisation of the coal and steel industry. Nevertheless, nationalisation was another policy area of severe criticism from the radical left, who focused their critique on the form of nationalisation, the public ownership and its inefficiency in redistributing the balance of power within industries (Thorpe, 2001: 109; Rubinstein, 1979: 228). In essence, their main concern was that the reforms that the government put forward were too cautious and modest for a socialist party; a somewhat disillusioned approach of socialism. However, the influence of the left on government decision-making was not as vigorous as it appeared or was expected to be but without their consistent pressure the government might ‘have taken fewer steps towards socialism than it did’ (Rubinstein, 1979: 234).

Before continuing with the analysis of the two main ideological factions that were developed and dominated the party for the most of the subsequent two decades, the revisionists and fundamentalists, it is crucial to consider the ideological framework upon which the 1945-51 governments were based. That is so for the simple reason that the assessment of policy-making within a specifically defined ideological context provides a useful basis on which to build our understanding of the successes and failures of the Labour government and the future events and developments that took place within the party. As already noted earlier in this chapter, the traditional Labour interpretation of socialism is pluralistic and multi-dimensional. That is, Labour’s socialism in all the forms it has taken over time, has lacked a solid core doctrinal point of reference. Contrariwise, it is the ‘synthesis of a variety of distinct traditions’ and strands of thought on the one hand, and the ethos of its people on the other (Francis, 1997: 14-15. 226; Drucker, 1979). Some of these traditions played a considerable role in the formulation of the party’s ideas while some where of limited significance. At the same time, this diversity has served the party both as a source of weakness and of

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19 At the time the official left-wing movement was organised under the ‘Keep Left’ and the ‘Socialist Fellowship’ groups, none of which managed to survive as a separate faction within Labour.
strength, provoking disunity in its ranks but also electoral diachronism and ideological evolution. Within that context, four main traditions formulated Labour’s socialism in the Attlee years; Marxism, which was the least significant in practical terms; Fabianism, as it was portrayed through the government’s gradual approach to social justice and equality; socialist planning as the socialist response to capitalist production; and finally ethical socialism, which encouraged the development of the moral will of the people (Francis, 1979: 15-18). These four traditions provided the core principles of the moral – material dialectic upon which governmental policies and activities were based. To this end, Labour’s socialist outlook entailed a combination of technocratic and ethical traditions (Fielding, 1992). That is, the achievement of socialism embraced structural reforms that would lead to the improvement of material conditions but mostly, it required moral will and individual change. The emphasis on socialist values was therefore, attributed to the fundamental transformation of the people’s way of life and their willingness to work for the common good (Ibid: 141-149). However, what the party misinterpreted was first, that the public attitude in the post war era was cynical and individualistic as a result of the war austerity and second, that in 1945 the people did not vote for Labour because they had suddenly converted to socialism but because of their desire for the social reforms that the Labour party had promised to implement if elected in office (Cole, 1948: 465; Williams, 1950: 358). Finally, two further significant points should be raised. First, it is crucial to consider that the ideological background and policy programme that the Labour government implemented during the 1940s had both been elaborated and formulated in the pre-war era (‘red decade’ of the 1930s) when the social and economic conditions were considerably different. Second, Labour’s policies in the 1945-51 period, were not exclusively determined by ideological considerations but they were greatly influenced by the economic and financial constraints of the post war period (Francis, 1979: 6-7).

Therefore, Labour’s 1945 governmental record was as socialist as it could get, driven not merely from the party’s normative policy orientation but also from the wider political landscape, which was mature enough to accept a somewhat left ascendancy. In strictly electoral terms, in 1945 Labour did not sell its ‘product’ to the electorate; the special conditions of the war period did and Labour leaders implement what the people had already demanded. As will be discussed later in this thesis, these characteristics have played a vital role in the ideological positioning and evolution of the Labour party’s identity over time because despite the strong ideological context besetting this particular era, they provide explicit indicators of Labour’s pragmatic approach while illustrating the amplitude of Labour’s doctrinal background.
The electoral defeat of 1951 ended the internal ideological consensus between the government and the left and signalled the beginning of a poisonous and intense internal conflict. In the advent of the 1950s the Labour party had to face the serious challenge of defining a renewed ideological and policy-making framework. Therefore, the main question for Labour was ‘where to go next’ (Taylor, 1980: 18). On the one hand, by 1947 the first Attlee government had already fulfilled its socialist purpose through an extensive programme of nationalisation and social welfare. Simultaneously, the first signs of internal ideological division had surfaced as a result of both the economic difficulties and the government’s lack of prospect and means to deal with it, and the growing diversity of opinions expressed by party officials and government delegates over the future of socialist planning and public ownership. Having acknowledged the defects and inadequacies of public ownership as a form of nationalisation - inefficiency of industries, centralisation, and bureaucracy – party ministers were hesitant as to how far nationalisation should and could go and under what new form (Pelling and Reid, 1996: 89; Thorpe, 2001: 109). This hesitancy over the extent and form of nationalisation was reinforced by the mobilisation of the centre-right wing of the party, which even doubted the actual need for further nationalisation. As a result the last years of Labour’s administration (1948-51) were marked by the emergence of two rival attitudes towards public ownership; the ‘fundamentalists’ and the ‘consolidators’. The former group, represented by Aneurin Bevan one of the pioneers of the government’s welfare reform, considered the completed government programme being the first stage of a socialised society and thus, further nationalisation was imperative. On the contrary, ‘consolidationism’ defended the government record on nationalisation but rejected further nationalisation projects on the grounds that the government ought to focus on developing the existing nationalised industries and rendering them more efficient (Jones, 1996: 27-28; Drucker, 1979: 44). Nonetheless, they developed a more pragmatic outlook on policy-making and rejected nationalisation for its own sake. This initial diversity of opinions developed into an intense internal conflict that marked a period of ‘bitterness and intolerance’ and led the party to a ‘civil war’ that left Labour in a state of semi-disintegration whilst signalled its ‘prolonged and steep decline’ for almost thirty years (Jefferys, 1993:35-37).

The peak of Labour’s internal disunity and discord came with the 1951 election defeat and the advent of ‘revisionism’, which challenged the ideas not only of both ‘fundamentalists’ and ‘consolidators’ but also the mainstream party ideology by disputing the epitome of Labour’s socialist identity; Clause IV of the party’s constitution. Revisionism was developed as a distinct doctrinal approach as an alternative to the ‘failures’ and inadequacies of the Attlee administrations, the
positions of the left and at the policy-making end as a response to the economic and social changes that occurred in the British society as a consequence of the implementation of the party’s 1945 programme (Drucker, 1979). The main advocate of the revisionist thought, Anthony Crosland argued that since capitalism has been transformed since 1945 Labour ought to revise its socialist objectives in order to effectively respond to the new reality. In other words, the transformation of capitalism rendered inadequate the previous framework of socialist thinking and thus, Labour had to pass over the backward-looking ideology of the pre-war period and respond to the challenges of a changing society. In his book, *The Future of Socialism*, he rejected the Marxist analysis developed in the Labour party in the 1930s as ‘doggedly anti-doctrinal’ and insisted that the ‘guidebooks of the past must now be thrown away’ because they have ‘been outmoded by changes in economic or sociological thought’ (Crosland, 1964: 1, 43). In his view, Labour’s renewed ideological priorities ought to focus on the new economic reality of a mixed economy as a way to advance social amelioration, and on the ethical values of socialism centred in the principle of social equality. For Crosland, socialism had transcended the phase of control and ownership of the means of production and focused on a new ethical dimension that gave emphasis to ideals and values. However, he did not entirely exclude public ownership and nationalisation but acknowledged that some of the means that were previously used for the implementation of the ‘socialist first principles’ could still be used as the ‘means that are suitable in one generation should be equally suitable to the next’ (Ibid: 44). However, public ownership was seen as one of the means for the promotion of economic growth but not the end in itself. Changes in the structure of industry were substantial but the role of the state should be more selective and accurate in order to fulfil its purpose: to raise production efficiency levels and reduce inequality of wealth.

Crosland’s empirical outlook provided the framework of Labour’s revisionist project, which dominated party ideological orientation during the Gaitskell years (1956-1963) and as a consequence, was endorsed by the 1957 policy programme *Industry and Society*. Gaitskell’s revisionism challenged the traditional Labour view of socialism in two main axes. The central aim of all arguments was that in order for Labour to come into terms with the new socio-economic changes the party ought to reappraise and to an extent entirely rebrand its socialist principles (Francis, 1997: 227). Within that context, they aimed to review the existing policy directions and re-interpret the socialist doctrine in relation to the new environment within which the party had to operate (Jones, 1996: 29). Hence, revisionists repudiated the traditional view that socialism was directly identified with nationalisation and public ownership and questioned the need for further party commitment to public ownership. Therefore, the
ownership of the means of production was not the central and key factor of a socialised society (Drucker, 1979: 47). At the same time, revisionism presented a distinctive ethical interpretation of socialism based on values and ideals such as personal liberty, social welfare and social equality and to a lesser extent, cooperative principle (Jones, 1996: 35). Ethical socialism saw men as citizens and consumers and not workers (Drucker, 1979: 45). In those terms, revisionism underplayed public ownership to a secondary status; it was just a means among others used for the accomplishment of socialist values (Jones, 1996: 27). The end was the principle of equality; equality before the law and political equality and mostly, equality of opportunity (Drucker, 1979: 48-49; Jefferys, 1993: 46). As a result, revisionists overtook the mainstream Labour thinking, rejected the traditional doctrinal status of public ownership while they emphasised the ethical purpose of socialism (Jones, 1996: 37-8). Taking into consideration the socio-economic conditions of the period and Labour's political and electoral fortunes – nationalisation had rendered the party unpopular among the voters – this was a pragmatic and rational approach. To transform Labour into a forward-looking party with clear and comprehensive policy aims and values; that is, an electorally competitive party. To this end, they strongly believed that the party’s electoral fortunes were seriously hampered by its commitment – even in theory - to further nationalisation (Drucker, 1979: 47). In essence, revisionists promulgated and furthered the leadership’s commitment (as expressed by MacDonald) to render Labour to a competent and electable office-seeking party.

Once again, the 1959 election defeat deepened the division between the two ideological strands and led to a (short) period of poisonous and intense conflict. On the one hand, the traditionalists blamed the electoral defeat on the leadership’s revisionist approach and argued that the new (centre-) right-wing image of the party had alienated its supporters. On the other hand, the revisionists believed that their policy programme was not ‘right-wing’ enough in order to win the new breed of the electorate. In fact, they believed that the party’s commitment to nationalisation had confused the voters and damaged the electoral popularity of Labour. This view was underpinned by a series of studies that demonstrated that the issue of public ownership was an electoral viability for Labour as nationalisation had become ‘unpopular’ among the British voters (Jones, 1996: 46-53). The definite schism within the party came in 1959 with Gaitskell’s contentious and far-reaching campaign to rewrite Clause IV of the party’s Constitution, the party’s statement of aims (Marquand, 1991: 125). This was a direct challenge to the traditionalist base, which resulted in Gaitskell’s setback and final defeat. Despite the theoretical and practical rationality behind Gaitskell’s argument and his will to ‘modernise’ the party the timing
was inappropriate and Labour members were neither willing nor prepared to support such a fundamental and revolutionary change. In fact, one could argue that such a change was not even necessary at the time as the role and scope of nationalisation had been underplayed in all policy statements of the 1950s.

Most importantly, Clause IV was not just a policy aim; it was an ‘article of faith’ and a statement of mythic significance for the party (Jones, 1996:62). Its ambiguity and controversial nature left it open to misunderstanding and misinterpretation but it should be borne in mind that its ambiguous nature rendered Labour flexible and adaptive to the challenges of each era and safeguarded the party’s survival. The incorporation of Clause IV in the constitution in 1918 provided the link that held all the ‘pieces’ (alliance of diverse parts) of the party together. Clause IV encapsulated the ethos rather than the doctrine of Labour. It linked the present with the past and incorporated the experience and culture of the ‘old’ working class providing a sense of belonging to party members. Therefore, Gaitskell initiated a ‘battle of symbols’ and not policies (Marquand, 1991: 133). As a result, Gaitskell’s proposals were considered an insensitive attack on Labour’s identity and were greatly opposed by the vast majority of the party (Jefferys, 1993: 51). In fact, Gaitskell was accused by the left of failing to understand the history of the Labour movement while at the same time, giving great attention to the wider electorate’s will (Marquand, 1991: 134). Nonetheless, two main issues have to be considered with regard to Gaitskell’s battle to revise Clause IV and ‘modernise’ the party. First, that revisionism was not as widespread in the party as it was thought to be and secondly, that despite his defeat Gaitskell was a visionary in that Labour’s problem was not in its policies but in its image. And it took the party almost thirty years and six different leaders to acknowledge that a radical ‘re-branding’ was the only way to transform the party’s electoral vitality.

In the aftermath of the dispute Clause IV was not amended but remained practically obsolete while the party leadership developed a spirit of compromise (Taylor, 1980: 22). This was depicted in Labour’s policy statement *Signposts for the Sixties* (1961), which provided a neutral, ‘scientific’ interpretation of change by combining revisionist ideals with traditional socialist values of public ownership and planning (Taylor, 1980: 23). The policy programme, which was characterised as ‘revisionism in a new guise’ entailed a revisionist ‘pragmatic and instrumental view of public ownership’ as well as a socialist inspired approach to the changes and problems of contemporary society (Jones, 1996: 68). It did so by restoring public ownership in Labour policy and strategy through its expansion to more industries, and by reaffirming the central role of economic planning for maintaining the already acquired and developing new social reforms. In addition, this vision of a future society, which combined the best of both
‘approaches’, emphasised the application of science to industry as the main feature of the new technologically driven era. To this end, the ‘scientific revolution’ was the principle upon which the main theoretical framework for extending public ownership was based. Moreover, education was regarded as the main prerequisite to socialist advancement and technological progress (Taylor, 1980: 23). The reconciliatory and compromising tone of the statement was also asserted on the fact that while it strongly criticised private industry it considered the development of an ‘enlarged public sector alongside an intact private sector’ (Jones, 1996: 70). Therefore, the main objective of the document was to modernise Labour’s image by offering an updated approach of the traditional socialist values and remodelling them so as to fit in a changing society. By fostering elements from both the traditional left and revisionism *Signposts for the Sixties* provided the basis for a broad consensus on domestic policy. This consensus – an ideological truce - emerged with the acceptance of the ‘scientific revolution’ as the bridge between left and right, and was further reinforced by the party’s desire for electoral success (Jones, 1996: 75). At the same time, it should be taken into account that for revisionism to survive and continue to retain a dominant ideological status within the party its positions had to be modified and compromised under the revival and reaffirmation of the traditional socialist ideals.

The rise of Harold Wilson to the party leadership consolidated the process of ideological consensus but it did not eliminate the deep-rooted divisions in the party. Although Wilson opposed Gaitskell during the 1950s and was regarded as a ‘man of the left’, he shared many of the of revisionist ideas (Thorpe, 2001: 141; Marquand, 1991: 155). He supported the collectivist view that a greater degree of state intervention was necessary to secure higher growth levels but he did not believe that extensive nationalisation was the only way forward. Based on the 1960 and 1961 policy statements he promoted a coherent set of political ideas based on the application of ‘scientific innovations and technological change to industrial and social life’ within the context of economic planning as the means of modernising and revitalising a socialist economy (Coates, 1975: 98; Thorpe, 2001: 148; Jones, 1996: 77). Therefore, his approach to social equality and economic growth, which emphasised the application of science in industry as well as the essential need for Labour’s modernisation in accordance with social change, was perceived as an adaptation of the revisionist message not in content but in emphasis. In essence, Wilson’s ‘technocratic version’ of socialism embraced a socialist rhetoric, which appeared convincing and promising to traditional socialists, while his pragmatic approach and government strategy was revisionist in nature (no extension of public ownership, no change in the structure of the economy, high social expenditure, reorganisation of education). Nevertheless, Wilson’s practical emphasis on ‘scientific
revolution’ and the party’s electoral successes in 1964 and 1966 provided the grounds for the prolongation of the short-term reconciliation between the two rival doctrinal camps. For the time being, Labour managed to by-pass its internal fierce doctrinal and policy disputes and appeal to the electorate as a united, modernised, progressive, and mostly, classless party.

Labour’s sound and highly optimistic - but nonetheless theoretical - political strategy was not translated into governmental practice rendering the government highly accountable for failing to fulfil its pre-election promises. The Wilson administrations’ legacy in the areas of economic management, social policy and foreign affairs was overall negative, despite some early advances in the fields of taxation, social welfare and a slight increase in productivity. According to some accounts, it was actually ‘appalling and did not stand comparison with the […] achievements of the Attlee government’ (Coates, 1975: 115). The fact that Wilson had promised much more than he was able to deliver, had raised public expectations and as a consequence rendered the failures of his governments even greater than they actually were. High inflation rates, mass unemployment, spending cuts, statutory wage freeze, heavy deflation and finally, forced devaluation of sterling, defeat over and collapse of most of the social and economic measures that the government put forward and a number of austerity packages through the six years – National Plan, inadequate education and housing policies, industrial relations legislation, secret deal with USA and support for the Vietnam War, temporising moves over the issue of Rhodesia, EC application - were some of the issues that the government dealt with - actually mishandled - at a great political cost. Furthermore, notwithstanding the covered but still in essence ‘revisionist’ agenda of Wilson, in practice Labour failed to acknowledge and thus, adapt to the new economic, social and political conditions that had been created. So it came as no surprise the fact that the Wilson governments could not face up to and deal with the new issues on the political agenda. The constitutional reform, the resurgence of nationalism in Scotland and Wales, the situation in Northern Ireland and further socio-economic issues such as immigration and race, gender and youth were some of the wide areas that the Labour government ought to deal with but was not prepared to respond to. In fact, due to the lack of a coherent policy and misguided strategy toward the new agenda the government resorted to panic measures – Commonwealth Immigrants Act, deployment of British troops in Northern Ireland, disregard towards women’s and young people’s issues - and implemented policies contrary to the tradition, moral, culture and ethos of the Labour party, essentially generating deep-rooted and long-term problems for the future leaders to handle (Thorpe, 2001: 158-163).
As a consequence, it appears rather evident that the party left its supporters disgruntled, put at great risk its relations with the trade unions and disappointed the wider base of the electorate. The 1964 and 1966 Wilson governments harmed the party’s electoral fortunes to a greater degree than anticipated at the time. And whilst Labour still won two further election battles in the 1970s and returned to power for four more years, the deepening of the intra-party left-right division that had been brewed over the years had created a smouldering discontent that soon manifested itself in the form of extremism leading to the late 1970s left-wing ascendancy and the years of Bennite radicalism. As the party’s historical and political trajectory has demonstrated, Labour, by following the path of reinvention after a period of internal divisions that were partially driven by discontent towards the Labour government in office, chose to renew and rebrand the party image. However, this shift in the balance of power towards the (hard) left led Labour to a period of mismanagement and electoral disarray. There are various accounts on the reasons and the extent of the party’s transformation over that period. What however should be borne in mind is that in their attempt to render Labour a pure left-wing, socialist party, the leaders of the left disregarded major elements of the party’s identity, as the analysis of Labour through the Party Evolution Framework will demonstrated in later chapters.

Nevertheless, the internal ideological truce did not last and the beginning of the 1970s signalled the revival of the struggle between the leftist and rightist factions leading to the party’s division ‘beyond repair’ (Marquand, 1991: 156). The first half of the 1970s witnessed an unprecedented shift to the left and a sweeping repudiation of the revisionist social democratic principles, which were reinforced by the alliance between the left and trade unions that consequently, led to the increased number of left wing NEC delegates (Jones, 1996: 88-95; Shaw, 1996: 111). This swing to the left was clearly illustrated in the party’s policy statement Labour’s Programme 1973, which marked the revival of traditional socialist ideals - in a contemporary form - as the only plausible response to the economic malaise of the country and clearly reaffirmed the decisive break with centre-right principles and tactics. Driven by the assumption that the failure of the 1960s Labour governments resulted from its detachment from socialism and its relative adherence to an ineffective reformism, the 1973 programme asserted Labour’s traditional commitment to public ownership and economic planning (Jones, 1996: 89-91; Marquand, 1991: 156). It implicitly stated that ‘we are a democratic socialist Party and proud of it’ while restated Labour’s socialist objective for a fundamental shift in power relations in favour of the working class people (Labour party, 1973: 7). Furthermore, it included proposals for a more direct and highly interventionist form of economic management through the substantial expansion of public ownership into a number of leading British industries and manufacturing firms.
including shipbuilding and financial institutions, docks, and the North Sea Oil. The National Enterprise Board and Planning Agreements comprised the key instruments of implementation of this new form of public-private relationship and economic management (Jones, 1996: 90-93; Shaw, 1996: 113; Taylor, 1980: 25). In terms of industrial relations, the ‘Social Contract’ between workers and a Labour government provided the means towards industrial democracy.

The 1973 policy statement comprised the basis upon which the 1974 election manifesto *Let Us Work Together* was formed. The manifesto did include proposals for a substantial extension of public ownership into fields such as shipbuilding and ship-repairing, aircraft production, the ports and land but due to the strong opposition from Wilson and the social democratic right, it excluded the radical socialist aim of achieving a fundamental shift in power and wealth within society (Jones, 1996: 93). Nonetheless, the programme indicated a clear breach with the principles of the mixed economy of the post-war years, and by accepting it, it seemed that the Labour leadership and the social-democratic right had conceded to the growing strength of the left, marking a period of ‘revisionist retreat’. It should be noted however, that at the time the right was divided over the European issue, a division, from which the left derived great benefit (Shaw, 1996: 115).

The unexpected return in office gave the opportunity to Wilson and the revisionist social democratic leadership to underplay the leftward dynamic within the party by diluting the socialist radical proposals with the promotion and implementation of moderate policy legislation. At the government level the left policy priorities and the interventionist strategy of the party’s election manifesto were in practice gradually dismissed and reinstated under the context of a right leadership committed to the benefits of the mixed economy (Shaw, 1996: 122-125). Intriguingly, given the poor economic conditions, the government passed a number of social measures in favour of the poorest and most vulnerable groups in society

20 These included pension increases, child benefits payable to the mother (instead of the father as was previously the case), new benefits for the disabled and infirm, the introduction of a new employment legislation for the protection of rights of the workers including pregnant women and short-time and part-time workers and a more equal NHS system (Shaw, 1996: 157). Nonetheless, in the face of rising unemployment and public spending cuts these social gains were underplayed especially, from 1975 onwards when the government abandoned its central revisionist goal of equality through economic growth and high public expenditure. With hindsight, the leadership’s strategic commitment to the social democratic project and Keynesian mixed economy collapsed under the strains of an extensive and deep financial crisis reinforcing the left-wing sentiment within the party and further discrediting the revisionist social democratic principles. As a result, the

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social democrats found themselves marginalized and on the defensive while the left extended its influence ideologically, politically and organisationally (Jones, 1996: 102-106).

This shift in the balance of power was explicitly depicted in the party policy statements and election manifestos. The *Labour's Programme 1976* policy statement reaffirmed the further policy shift to the hard left as it presented a detailed programme for the ‘extension of public ownership into banking, insurance, and leading companies in every key sector of industry’ (Jones, 1996: 102). Despite the revisionists’ efforts mainly, through Crosland, to revive and restate their aims there was no ground for support as the party had realigned with the left. In the face of these events the party re-entered a period of sharp and dangerous confrontation, which included issues of internal party democracy and organisation and eventually, led to the secession of four leading social-democrats - David Owen, Shirley Williams, Bill Rogers, Roy Jenkins – who founded the Social Democratic Party (SDP) in 1981. Their defection came just after Michael Foot’s election as party leader on the grounds that the party was moving too far to the left. The ‘Gang of Four’ had the support of thirty Labour MPs as the majority of the parliamentary right adhered to the party ethos of loyalty to Labourism, and decided to stay and fight their cause until ‘victory could be achieved’ (Thorpe, 2001: 193).

The period from 1979 to 1983 marked the culmination of left-wing ascendancy (1980 Conference) but also the beginning of the steady decline of the radical left (1981 Conference). In the first place, the 1979 electoral defeat to the Conservatives and Margaret Thatcher found the party once again divided on the direction it should take. And whilst Callaghan attempted to keep the party united and foremost, to defend the right-wing fortunes of the PLP, the advent of the 1980s found Labour leaning heavily towards the left. This internal power shift was formalised through a number of fundamental constitutional changes aimed to the intra-party redistribution of power through the limitation of the powers and independence of the leadership and the parliamentary party (Minkin, 1991; Shaw, 1994: 15-23; Jones, 1996: 109-110;). In line with the activists’ desire to democratise the party by ascertaining their power, the left-wing leaders managed to pass two significant resolutions on the mandatory reselection of MPs and the establishment of the electoral college, with the support of the trade union block votes. This exceptional ‘coalition’, however, was the outcome of the trade union leaders’ disappointment at Callaghan’s record in government and
wanted to send a message to the leadership by supporting the left as a tactical rather than substantive move.\footnote{Moreover, the deep and continuous economic recession had reinforced the view among radical party activists that capitalism was ‘on the verge of collapse’ (Thorpe, 2001: 188-190). Therefore, the leftward leaning of both unionists and party activists seemed at the time, as the most appropriate way forward.}

As a consequence of the leftward shift of NEC and Party Conference the party’s 1982 policy statement *Labour’s Programme 1982* depicted Labour’s endorsement of fundamentalism by strongly advocating the expansion of public ownership to new industries such as electronics, pharmaceuticals, health equipment and building material and the renationalisation of all privatised, under the Thatcher government, industries (Jones, 1996: 110-111; Shaw, 1996: 166). Furthermore, the 1983 election manifesto *A New Hope for Britain* - a reprint of the 1982 policy statement - committed the party to massive public ownership, control and planning, renationalisation of privatised industries, unilateral nuclear disarmament, withdrawal from the European Community, closing down of the US bases and the abolition of the House of Lords (Labour party, 1983). It was a thoroughly left-wing manifesto, which in essence, had no plausible chance of being implemented while harmed immensely the electoral fortunes of Labour. From that perspective, it was colourfully described by Gerald Kaufman, as ‘the longest suicide note in history’. The reasons why the party chose to adopt such a hopeless policy programme can be considered as tactical and calculative. After all, the 1983 defeat and the overwhelming election of Neil Kinnock to the leadership bespoke the shallowness of left-wing radicalism in the party, signalled the revival of the right while entrenching the organisational and doctrinal transformation of Labour. Even though the project of a renewal and transformation was based on a slow and gradual process, the extensive redesigning of the Labour party – that led to its successful and highly effective reinvigoration - had just begun.

1983 - 1997: Towards New Labour – Made the Change but did it Meet the Challenge?\footnote{This part briefly outlines the major developments that took place over the 1983-1997 period, within the context of the discussion of Labour’s development. A more detailed analysis on Kinnock and Blair follows on the next Chapter. What should be emphasised however is that the use of the term ‘New Labour’ throughout the thesis, refers to the latest stage of the party’s evolution and adoption of a renewed identity under the leadership of Tony Blair.}

Neil Kinnock inherited a party that had to overcome very significant difficulties not least from the bitter civil war that had exhausted the party and the electoral threat of the Liberal-Social Democratic Alliance. Kinnock had also to face a government, which was determined to overthrow the post-war social democratic consensus, decrease the
role of the state and constrain the powers of the unions. The Thatcher government had directly challenged the legacy of the post-war Labour governments, attacked what Labour stood for, whilst increasing its popularity among the electorate for doing so. In addition, the miners’ strike created a further rupture by highlighting once again the divisions within the party and reaffirming the problematic relationship with the unions (Smith and Spear, 1992: 10). Therefore, the new leader realised that in order to make the party electable again ‘there would have to be profound changes in the policies and in the organisation of the Labour party – not simply as ends in themselves but also as contributions to a change in the mentality of the Labour party’ (cited in Jones, 1996: 113). There was an immediate need for radical changes in order for Labour to regain its internal unity, redefine its ideological identity and formulate policies that responded to the electorate’s demands. To this end, the first step of the leadership was to take over the party by asserting control of the NEC and its policy subcommittees, the PLP and the Conference, while reorganising the national headquarters in a way that gave the leader more control over policy initiation and party activity as well as party presentation and campaigning (Smith and Spear, 1992: 9). Furthermore, he alienated the hard left within the party by following a lengthy process of expulsion of Militant members at national and local levels and implemented a series of constitutional reforms that reduced the powers of party activists. Therefore, the left-wing group that remained within the party had no alternative but to keep quiet and follow the leadership (Thorpe, 2001: 205).

In terms of policy, the most radical proposals of the 1983 programme were dropped and the party fought the 1987 general election with a more moderate and certainly, more right-wing policy programme than in the last two elections. The 1987 manifesto *Britain will Win* prioritised measures to reduce unemployment by one million in two years and maintain the NHS and public education. It downplayed the issue of nationalisation by proposing ‘social ownership’ rather than the renationalisation of major utilities while once again confirming the party’s commitment to unilateral nuclear disarmament. To a certain extent, the 1987 manifesto confirmed Labour’s gradual adjustment to the social and economic changes of the 1980s and reaffirmed the leadership’s commitment to change but also it was characterised by comprise and ambiguity, lacked coherence in important issues such as Labour’s position on Britain’s role in the EC or on taxation policy and spending promises (Thorpe, 2001: 205; Smith and Spear, 1992: 10; Jones, 1996: 119). Furthermore, the areas of foreign and defence policy comprised Labour’s vulnerable point as the party commitment to unilateralism was highly unpopular among the electorate (Miller et al., 1988: 117-125; Pelling and Reid, 1996: 177). In essence, the ambiguity and wooliness of the manifesto demonstrated the fact that the policy changes were – and ought to be - piecemeal and
constrained. Despite Kinnock’s determination to implement change at all levels the problems that he had to face in the early years of his leadership at internal and external levels constrained his ability to impose radical changes and forced him to proceed with great caution. Nevertheless, the most noteworthy fact of the 1987 election was Labour’s professionally organised and effective election campaign (Butler and Kavanagh, 1988; Hewitt and Mandelson, 1989; Gould et al., 1989; Webb, 1992b). However, this was not enough to win the election for Labour to reduce the Conservative majority. In the aftermath of the defeat the Labour leadership was more decisive than ever to continue with a fundamental policy review, at a time when the left was further marginalized after the Benn-Heffer substantial defeat when they decided to challenge Kinnock in 1988.

To a degree, the 1987 electoral defeat had a number of benefits for Labour as the unexpected scale of it shocked its members and leadership so as to proceed to the fundamental reforms that Labour was in desperate need of. Therefore, Kinnock introduced further policy reforms within the context of party’s Policy Review, a project that altered Labour’s ideological direction, widened its electoral appeal and mostly, defined the principles upon which - Blair’s - New Labour was built. The review process lasted two years and the final Policy Review documents were presented at and approved by the 1989 Party Conference while comprising the framework upon which the party’s new policy statement *Meet the Challenge, Make the Change* was based (1989). In short, the Policy Review was Labour’s – initial - response to the endogenous changes and exogenous challenges that the party had to face. It was prompted by the three consecutive electoral defeats, the failure of the left, the crisis of social democracy and the long-term process of modernisation that Kinnock had already put in place. Moreover, it was a response to the changed social and economic conditions, which Thatcherism had created and within which a British government ought to function (Smith and Spear, 1992: 14-19). As a result, the Policy review was a rigorous attempt ‘to develop policies that did not repeat the mistakes of the 1970s and which would be more popular than those of the 1980s’ (Ibid: 17).

Nevertheless, the extent to which the party’s policy and ideological direction was transformed in the late 1980s is debatable. It is unquestionable that Labour policy did shift to the centre right and in comparison with the party’s ideological positioning in the early 1980s, there was a remarkable swing. In many areas, such as the economy, defence and foreign affairs, the policy transformation was complete. On the economy, Labour moved away from any form of nationalisation (or renationalisation), while accepting and emphasising the role of the market to provide economic growth and increase wealth and equality for all. The main focus, thus, of the economic policy
moved on the ‘supply-side’ side of socialism where the state’s role is regulatory; that is, state assistance and intervention to be used merely to correct the failure of the market (Smith and Spear, 1992). Furthermore, the Policy Review committed Labour to accept some aspects of the Thatcherite agenda, such as the sale of council houses, the trade union reform and the priority of containing inflation above limiting unemployment while containing public expenditure and rejecting incomes policy (Ibid: 23). On the area of defence and foreign affairs, the Policy Review ruled out the unilateralist and isolationist position of the left, and replaced it with a commitment to the EC, which was reinforced after Delors speech at the TUC 1988 conference, a sympathetic view of the United States and acceptance of multilateral disarmament (Smith and Spear, 1992). Labour did not aim to abolish Britain’s nuclear programme but it did not intend to increase it either. It should be taken into account, though, that the new policy framework was entirely novel. On the contrary, there was a degree of continuity and consistency with revisionism mostly, on market and capitalism, economic growth, freedom and social justice. Nevertheless, the 1989 Policy Review developed a post-Keynesian revisionism prompted by the party’s experience of the 1970s government failure (Smith and Spear, 1992). The most substantial policy innovations rested on the issues of the ‘new agenda’ and post-materialism, dealing with environmental policy, women’s policy and constitutional reform.

As a result of the Policy Review Labour (re)built a more moderate but most importantly, a more modern and electorally appealing image that rendered the party a serious contender for government. In fact, prior to the 1992 general election Labour had managed to take the lead in the polls raising the leadership’s expectations for an electoral win (see Chapter 3). The Labour manifesto entitled *Time to Get Britain Working Again* was based on the party’s earlier policy statement and reflected the party’s ideological repositioning and renewed image. To this end, it promoted the Labour’s new agenda issues, including devolution and a ministry for women, while adhering to increased public investment in housing, public transport and education. The election outcome however, has once again disappointing for the party, which suffered its fourth consecutive electoral defeat. In the aftermath of the defeat, Kinnock resigned and John Smith was elected leader with a sweeping majority. Smith continued Kinnock’s reforms both at policy and organisational levels (but not the communications transformation, as it will be later discussed). During the two years of his leadership he mainly focused on healing the rifts in the party that had started developing under Kinnock, strengthening the ties with local organisations while consolidating the policy reforms and adopting the OMOV for candidate selection, all women shortlists and establishing the Nation Policy Forum - NPF (Thorpe, 2001: 216-219; Pelling and Reid, 1996: 187). After his sudden death in 1994, he was succeeded
by Tony Blair one of the youngest members of the modernisers’ group in the party, who continued and advanced the scope and nature of Kinnock’s and Smith reforms, reinvigorated Labour and revolutionised its campaigning, leading Labour to the landslide victory of 1997.

Blair inherited a party that was on the verge of success; Labour’s traditional appearance in both ideological and organisational terms had dramatically changed while the party’s communications machine had been radically transformed. At the same time, Labour was united, the left had been marginalised and the balance of power had shifted towards the leadership. At the same time, Blair went even further and managed to renew, reposition (further to the centre-right), rebrand Labour and launch a ‘new’ Labour party with a wide electoral appeal. Considering the events that led to the 1997 overwhelming victory, Tony Blair had succeeding to an extent to ‘own’ the party. His leadership style enhanced by the use of vigorous campaign rhetoric aimed both at the wider electorate and the party loyal increased his status as leader of the opposition but foremost, as potential Prime Minister. Indeed, Blair accelerated the modernisation of the party but the main focus of the leadership’s activity rendered on the communication of the image of the New Labour party. The issue was not merely, the extent to which Labour had changed but how to effectively communicate this change to the electorate. The main aim was to convey the message of what New Labour stood for; first, the new party was different from the Conservatives and second, from the parochial left of the ‘old’ Labour. To this end the first, highly symbolic step was the abolition of the old Clause IV. Initially, attempted by Gaitskell in 1959 the parochial bur traditional objective that committed Labour at least in principle to nationalisation was successfully reformed under Blair - though not without some internal opposition. However, the inefficiency of his left-wing opponents combined with the organisational reforms that limited the power of the party activists while practically, enhancing the power and authority of the leader over the party, the new version of Clause IV was approved by the NEC and the special Conference23 organised on the matter. The constitutional change was regarded as a break with the past and this sent a clear message to the electorate that Blair’s Labour was a ‘new’, competent and fit to govern party.

23 The revised Clause IV states: ‘The Labour Party is a democratic socialist party. It believes that by the strength of our common endeavour we achieve more than we achieve alone, so as to create for each of us the means to realise our true potential and for all of us a community in which power, wealth and opportunity are in the hands of the many, not the few, where the rights we enjoy reflect the duties we owe, and where we live together, freely, in a spirit of solidarity, tolerance and respect’ (Labour party Rule Book, Clause IV (1)).
In terms of policy, Blair shifted Labour further to the right. On the one hand, this rightward shift was prompted by Blair’s own ideological positioning on ethical socialism. According to Blair Labour ought to embrace the ethical conception of socialism, based on values such as ‘common good, rights and responsibilities, and an organic society in which individuals can flourish only by working together’ (Carter, 2003: 189-190). In terms of economic policy, this assumed a clear break with the past view that public interest equates with public ownership (Blair, 1992: 32). The new framework of public interest could only be possible only through the cooperation of the market and the state. In fact, Blair argued as early as 1992 that ‘the public interest demands action by government to ensure a fully competitive market to prevent monopoly and encourage choice’ (1991: 33). Hence, the old, left-wing driven battle between the market and the state had no place in a new modernised society. On the other hand, however, great emphasis was placed on the electorate’s wants. The main policy framework that was already moulded by Kinnock and Smith was further enhanced so as to eliminate any elements that could alienate the voters and hinder the party’s electoral success. Within that context, the party’s electoral programme was a response to the challenges of the political context within which Labour had to operate in order to win the next general election (Thorpe, 2001: 229). This was in accordance with Blair’s view that for the process of change to be effective and successful, it ought to derive from the ideas and wants of the people of the ‘Middle England’. For that purpose, qualitative research based on focus groups was used in order to get an insight and capture the public’s perspective on potential policies and in turn, adopt or reject them24 (Gould, 1998: 326-329). As a result, Labour fought the 1997 general election with a manifesto, which reflected Blair’s and New Labour’s modern social democratic principles, devised under the light of public relations research and communications approaches. Because Britain Deserves Better was a document that was partially formulated and approved by the people for the people25. To an extent, it could be argued that Blair’s first years of leadership depicted the culmination of revisionism. The abolition or what Jack Straw called the ‘refreshment’ of Clause IV in 1995 vindicated the long-established view of the need for modernisation in principle and in practice.

24 In fact, focus groups served the party in two ways; in monitoring public opinion on certain policies and responding to the demands to the electorate. As Gould notes, people were sceptical about politics but they were very pleased – astonished in cases – to hear that Tony Blair cared about what they think (1998: 328).

25 A more detailed analysis of the Blair years and the 1997 election is presented in the next chapter.
Up to now, the focus of the analysis has been on the detailed examination of the historical and ideological trajectory of Labour seeking to establish all these elements, characteristics and identity traits that have affected the political evolution of the party over time. On the one hand, Labour’s identity had been marked by traits inherent to the bodies that formed the ‘Labour Alliance’ and had to some degree determined the fate of Labour’s development. On the other hand, the characteristics that did to a great extent influence, even entirely conditioned Labour’s identity, were those that the party itself developed over time and especially, over the intense periods of internal crises. To this end, Labour progressed from a pressure group in parliament to an office-seeking party, from a promiscuous organisation to a nationally organised party and most importantly, from having an ideology that reflected the ends of the Liberals to establishing a robust – though wide - ideological basis. At the same time, Labour’s character was defined and its culture and ethos consolidated. Thus, the inception of New Labour could be addressed within the wider context of Labour’s development as a rational step to the party’s evolution. The next step of the study is to incorporate these diverse features into the integrated framework of the party evolution approach and provide a holistic account of Labour’s ideological evolution without being thwarted by temporal, historical and/or political considerations. The organisational development and dynamics of party operation, and Labour’s campaigning transformation, which are discussed in the following paragraphs and chapter respectively, provide the remainder two important platforms of the PEM, which allow Labour’s systematic and thorough interpretation.

2.4 Party Organisation: Structure and Power

The organisation and internal structure of the Labour party reflected the conditions of its origin and purpose of formation. Labour was formed out of necessity; it was from the start a marriage of coercion and convenience for safeguarding the interests of the working class in general, and of the trade unions in particular within Parliament. Contrariwise to the organisational characteristics of the Conservative and the Liberal parties, which created their extra-parliamentary organs as vote-maximising agencies to serve and to support the party in parliament, Labour presented an exact opposite case; the extra-parliamentary organs formed the Labour party (McKenzie, 1964: 9-13). Their purpose was to ‘extend the [working class] movement into parliament’ and not to establish a new political party within the conventions and rules of the governmental system (McKenzie, 1964: 13). This stance was embodied in the constitution of the LRC, which provided the groundwork of the party’s development.
In the early years of its formation Labour operated upon a framework of pluralistic democracy combining the political and organisational actions of various groups. It was a party of compromise that operated without having endorsed a binding doctrinal or structural frame (Beer, 1982: 116-123). As a result, Labour’s organisation remained at an infant stage, considerably fragmented and financially problematic. At the national level the organisation was set up around the Executive Committee - comprised of 12 members and an unpaid secretary but without a proper office provision. The committee was an ‘independent and outside body’ which run in parallel with the TUC but was not controlled by the Conference (McKenzie, 1964: 464; Moore, 1978: 84). At the constituency level, there was no uniform system of organisation and the operation of local agencies rested on the hands of the organisations and groups of the affiliated societies. As a result, there was no nationally developed organisation, coordinated under the auspices of the central party and thus, independent and autonomous. Moreover, membership was possible only through trade unions and affiliated societies, as individual membership was not allowed. Considering the extra-parliamentary organisation of the Conservatives and the Liberals, Labour’s mechanisms were not corresponding to a national party organisation. Despite its increased mass membership, up to 1918 Labour could scarcely be described as a national party; in terms of both structure and operation it remained an ‘alliance’ between trade unions and socialist societies (McKenzie, 1964:455-475: McLean, 1980: 35), while in political terms, it acted as a parliamentary pressure group aiming to bridge the gap between trade unionists and the Liberal party.

Labour’s organisational and decision-making framework was set up in the 1918 Constitution, which marked Labour’s transformation into a national organisation with branches across the country (Fielding, 2003: 19). But most importantly, it established the framework upon which the distribution of power within the party was based. The first formal written Constitution of the Labour party resulted from Henderson’s desire to rebuild the foundations of the party through the ‘re-organisation of the Party with a view to a wider extension of membership, the strengthening and development of local parties in the constituencies, together with the promotion of a larger number of candidates, and the suggestion that a party programme be adopted (cited in McKibbin, 1974: 94). Within that context, the structure and functioning at the local level was underpinned through the establishment of constituency labour parties (CLPs), the amalgamation of trade councils with existing ones and the introduction of individual membership (Clause 2: Membership; McKibbin, 1974:94). The federal character of the organisation was retained but the activities and operations of the local organisations were put under the auspices of the NEC and the Annual Conference. Moreover, the Constitution extended and reformed the Executive. The system of ‘reserved places’
was abolished and the new Executive consisted of a total of 23 members; 13 from affiliated organisations, 5 representatives from local labour parties, 4 women and the Treasurer (Clause 6: The National Executive). The most important change related to the election of the Executive as the Constitution provided the members to be elected by the entire Conference, enhancing in that way the powers of the trade unions, which voted as a unit – the ‘block vote’, and thus, putting the executive control of the party into their hands (McKenzie, 1964: 477-478). It also provided that the party policy programme be decided by the NEC and the Conference, while parliamentary candidates were required to adhere to the proposals of the manifesto (Clause 4: Party Programme; Clause 7: Parliamentary Candidates). In terms of policy and decision-making the Constitution reaffirmed and also amplified the power and control of the Annual Conference, which became Labour’s sovereign body.

The fact that the 1918 Constitution was subject to very few significant changes and reforms until the 1980s has rendered it into a considerable reference point when discussing Labour’s organisational evolution. Therefore, considering the 1918 Constitution as the backbone of Labour’s organisation the remainder of the second part of the chapter examines the functioning and structural development of intra-party institutions while acknowledging the role that the underlying dynamics have played on the internal distribution and shifts in the balance of power over the years. Hence, the main focus rests on the systematic analysis of the decision-making procedures through the detailed examination of key areas of activity that characterised the transition from the ‘Old’ – politically parochial - to ‘New’ - electorally popular – Labour party. Within that context, the examination of intra-party dynamics is driven by the consideration of the role of the three main organs of Labour’s incentive structure; the Annual Conference, the leadership, and the trade unions. The interaction of these bodies as well as the constitutional and practical distribution of power between them has conditioned the workings of the party across all the three levels of its structure (national, regional and local). Furthermore, the activity of these bodies had a direct effect on policy-making and mass membership, which has in turn played a vital role in the party’s electoral advances. In other words, the political fortunes of the Labour party have been, and remain, directly related to the shifts in the balance of power between the key institutional actors of the decision-making process.
The Annual Conference

The constitutional framework of the Annual Party Conference was set up in 1918. Various provisions in the constitution asserted the sovereign role of the Annual Conference. Clause 5(1) clearly stated that ‘the work of the Party shall be under the direction and control of the Party Conference’. Moreover, its dominant role in policy-making was declared in Clause 4(a) explaining that ‘it shall be the duty of the Party Conference to decide, from time to time, what specific proposals of legislative, financial, or administrative reform shall receive the general support of the party, and be promoted, as occasion may present itself, by the National Executive Committee and the Parliamentary Labour party’. It continued that ‘no such proposal shall be made definitely part of the General Programme of the Party unless it has been adopted by the Conference by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the votes recorded on a card vote’. With regard to the duties of the parliamentary party in relation to the Conference, it was noted that ‘it shall be the duty of every Parliamentary representative of the Party to be guided by the decision of the meetings of such Parliamentary representatives, with a view to giving effect to the decisions of the Party Conference as to the General Programme of the Party’ (Clause 4(c)). Therefore, it is quite clear that the constitution affirmed the notion of the Annual Conference’s sovereignty, which reflected the party’s egalitarian principles while reinforcing the notion of intra-party democracy upon which Labour had founded its distinct organisational identity (Minkin, 1980).

As a consequence, the constitutional provisions had also strengthened the Conference’s status in relation to the interplay of power distribution within the party. However, it should be emphasised that the latitude and ambiguity of the provisions’ interpretation allowed for a degree of flexibility to the extent of independence and autonomy attributed both to the NEC, the party leadership and the PLP. In fact, as will be demonstrated later while dissecting Labour within the context of the Party Evolution Framework, this ambiguity on the practical interpretation of the provisions has played a crucial role in the development of Labour’s internal operation and over time has defined the party’s conduct of affairs and its relations with its external environment. On the one hand, there were accounts which grossly exaggerated the role of the Conference, as Attlee’s conception of it as the ‘final authority of the Labour party’ and a ‘parliament of the movement’ which ‘lays down the policy of the party, and issues instructions which must be carried out the Executive, the affiliated organisations, and its representatives in Parliament and on local authorities’ (cited in McKenzie, 1964: 485). To this end, the NEC and the PLP ought to be fully accountable to and under the direct control of the Conference. In fact, this tendentious democratic
view of the Labour party organisation and functioning has raised serious criticisms and even accusations – Churchill’s argument in 1945 - about the flexibility, independence and overall accountability of a Labour government subject to the control of the extra-parliamentary party (Minkin, 1680: 22). On the other hand, in practical terms the balance of intra-party authority was not as straightforward; in fact, the provisions offered a no more than theoretical perspective. In terms of policy-making, the Constitution provided that the PLP should ‘give effect as far as may be practicable to the principles from time to time approved by the Party Conference’ (Clause 3(c)), allowing for the discretion of the PLP to decide the ‘practicability’ of policies and thus, offering a great degree of autonomy to the parliamentary party.

Furthermore, the Conference procedures and voting system reaffirmed the powers of the NEC and trade unions in the party decision-making process. First, Conference debates were under the control of the NEC members who opened and closed each debate while advising ‘the floor’ on what course of action to take. Moreover, NEC delegates had no time limit for their speeches while other participants were limited to five minutes (McKenzie, 1964: 496-500). Second, the voting system and mostly, the use of the ‘block vote’ ensured the domination of trade unions over decisions taken at the Conference but also over the election of the NEC members. In short, the trade union leadership had the voting powers to direct the party and redefine the boundaries of intra-party authority. In that sense, minority arguments and individual members had extremely limited powers in the decision-making process (McKenzie, 1964: 486 –506). Finally, whilst the election manifesto policies ought to be drawn upon the resolutions of the party programme, the final decision on its formulation was in the hands of the NEC and the party leadership. In other words, Conference decisions were not binding to the extent to which the constitution appeared to imply. In fact, this broadly and impalpably defined relationship between party institutions has resulted to inherent tensions and the emergence of bitter power struggles throughout the life of the party.

In a broader sense, the extent of the Conference’s dominance over the NEC and PLP has been relative to the distinct endogenous and exogenous circumstances and conditions of each period. The balance of power has been shifted as a corollary of a number of internally and externally driven changes that affected the party organisationally, ideologically as well as politically and electorally. Labour’s governmental experience and record, the stance and the personal style of each leader, and the trade union’s relationship with the party leadership were some of the factors that have influenced the distribution of power within the party and thus, affected the Conference leverage in it (Minkin, 1980). To this end, Conference authority has been
underplayed when the party was in government while its dominant role revitalised every time Labour returned into opposition (McKenzie, 1964: 513). It was no surprise that the role and authority of the Conference had been greatly challenged and undermined in the 1920s under the leadership of MacDonald. The combination of governmental power and a charismatic and appealing leader contributed to the transformation of the Conference to an amenable, submissive to the will of the leadership, political institution (Minkin, 1980: 12-17). In fact, that period played a crucial role in Labour's evolution, marking a general change of attitude that altered the substance of the relationship between the extra-parliamentary party and the PLP. And whilst the events that followed in the 1930s reinstated the Conference’s status leading all subsequent leaders to formally acknowledge Conference authority in theory and to an extent, in practice – the 1945 government record on nationalisation resulted from the 1937 policy programme that the Conference had endorsed – the fundamental shift in the balance of power under the MacDonald leadership had marked Labour’s further development. As will be discussed below, the nature and culture of the Labour leaders’ authority and status has been greatly conditioned by exogenous factors and most importantly, by prime ministerial powers.

Moreover, over time the leadership and ‘the platform’ found new and more effective ways of controlling the decisions of ‘the floor’; the support and cooperation of the large trade unions their block votes. To this end, Labour leaders supported Conference decisions by practically controlling them; as long as the Conference voted in favour of the leadership’s resolutions, there was little incentive for the leaders to question its power and authority26 (Minkin, 1980: 26, 273). And if they did, as in the case of Gaitskell in 1960-1, he firstly ensured that he had the support of the majority of the PLP but most importantly, the support of the trade unions. Gaitskell and his revisionist group suffered a major defeat vote on unilaterism at the 1960 Conference but they openly defied the decision and engaged in an intra-party campaign to secure its reversal (Minkin, 1980: 280). Formally, Gaitskell was the first leader to openly challenge the authority and supremacy of the Conference by ‘fighting a Conference decision in order to reverse it’ (Minkin, 1980: 288). In the 1960s and 1970s Conference authority was in decline and in defiance but still under the control of the trade union block vote. In fact, the Wilson governments had continually ignored the decisions of the Conference while the latter gradually adopted a more left-wing stance. In fact, this leftward shift created a number of problems to the Callaghan, and to some extent Foot leaderships, who were forced to advocate the radical left-wing policies

26 During the 1950s and with the support of the trade unions the platform had only been defeated once in twelve consecutive conferences, inspiring McKenzie to describe the unions as the ‘Praetorian Guard’ of the movement (McKenzie, 1964).
imposed by the Conference (Fielding, 2003: 126). Therefore, the ascendancy of the left was practically formalised with the constitutional reforms of 1979 that led to the temporary strengthening of the powers of the extra-parliamentary party. To that end, the Conference voted for the automatic reselection of MPs, the majority of whom came from the left at the time, and for the creation of an electoral college for leadership elections. The democratisation of the party as advocated by the left had temporarily led to the restitution of Conference sovereignty in practical rather than theoretical terms, but had also initiated the process of fundamental reforms that led to the indirect but substantial increase of the leaderships authority and informal demise of the role of the Conference as the ultimate decision-making body of Labour.

The conflict over the formal and practical role of the Conference constituted one of the main issues that Labour had to face. The causes have changed over time – factionalism, government policy promises and delivery, role of trade unions, right and left-wing majorities - but the actual problem remained unaffected; the relationship and distribution of power between the main decision-making organs. In essence, their relationship was one of bargaining and control, the extent and outcome of which was based on their available resources (Quinn, 2004: 71-76). However, this bargaining entailed the danger of tensions and conflicts and thus, of disunity that on various occasions damaged the party’s electoral appeal. And it has been evident that in terms of electoral strategy and style the leadership and PLP were more receptive to the messages and demands of the wider electorate than the party activists (May, 1973). From this perspective, on becoming leader in 1983 Kinnock’s main aim was the introduction of reforms that could give the leadership more autonomy on decision-making and narrow its accountability to the extra-parliamentary party. For this reason, steps were taken in order to increase the influence of the PLP leadership; first, by altering some of the procedural elements of the Conference in order to give a more prominent role in the shadow ministers and second, to marginalise the conference’s role in policy-making by establishing a number of committees and new bodies responsible for the initiation of policy proposals (Quinn, 2004: 76-79, 82-84). Not surprisingly, throughout the years the Conference lost its role as the main ground for debating resolutions and deciding upon policy provisions. Under Blair, Conference authority was downgraded even further with the introduction of membership referendums in 1995 and 1996, on Clause IV and the election manifesto. In both cases, the leadership bypassed the Conference by formally giving more powers to the individual members while in practice, shifting the balance of power towards the centre (Quinn, 2004: 94-96).
Constitutionally, the annual Conference has always been the party’s authoritative decision-making body (Russell, 2005: 190). In practice, its authority rests with the extra-parliamentary party, but its dominance over the parliamentary wings of Labour is highly debatable. The party hierarchy and distribution of power has been inextricably linked to the bargaining of the main extra-parliamentary bodies and the PLP leadership. This process of power redistribution was founded on two main patterns; Labour in government and Labour in opposition (Kavanagh, 1998: 33). As noted above, while in opposition the Conference regained a more prominent role in the functioning of the party. However, as history has showed, this revival was only temporary and the sovereignty of the body was never utterly enforced. While in government, the decisions taken at the Conference were frequently ignored by the leaders. Nonetheless, considering the structural and procedural nature of the Conference, Labour’s democratic character and overall unity depended on the course of action of the trade unions. Unions have regularly played the role of the arbitrator by mostly supporting the leadership’s moderate decisions and balancing the radical views within the party.

However, the major change in the power structure that took place under the leaderships of Kinnock, Smith and Blair disregarded the dual pattern of power relationships and reconfirmed McKenzie’s ‘iron law of oligarchy’ by shifting the power in the party ‘in one direction only’ (McKenzie, 1964: 16; Kavanagh, 1998: 35). The reform packages that were implemented over this period marked a new era in the ‘dynamics of the party conference’ – especially the changes in the composition of the conference and the shift in trade union vote – and redefined ‘conference management’ (Russell, 2005: 190-211). The shift in power balance imputed to the early days of Kinnock’s accession to the leadership with the downgrading of the role of the NEC in policy making and the development of a system of committees directly under the control of and accountable to the leader, advanced under Smith with the introduction of OMOV and culminated under Blair with the endorsement of Partnership in Power in 1997, which directly affected the agenda-setting context of the conference rendering it more amenable – however, under certain conditions - to the leadership (Russell, 2005: 141-146, 200-205). In fact, it could be argued that to an extent the Conference has been transformed to a supporting mechanism to the leadership’s causes and a media orientated ‘theatrical event’ while Labour has developed into a leadership-centred party (Kavanagh, 1998: 37-38, 39). As far as intra-party democracy

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27 It should be stressed that the initial fundamental reforms that transformed the role of the conference were implemented by the left in the very early 1980s.
28 Although Partnership in Power came into effect in the aftermath of the 1997 election campaign and thus it falls outside the scope of the present analysis, a more detailed account of its content is given in Chapter 4.
is concerned, the extent to which it has been strengthened or limited with the downgrading of the conference’s authority is debatable on the grounds of how democratic and representative was the Conference before Kinnock and Blair. The block vote, the bond of the union leaders with the PLP leadership and the actual influence of the NEC on the decisions taken by ‘the floor’ had already attained the democratic character of Labour. Finally, it should be stressed that the shift in the balance of power to a leadership controlled conference is highly ‘conditional on the consent on the conference itself’, as Russell had acutely argued (2005: 211).

The role of the Trade Unions

The trade unions have been the focal point of Labour’s inception and over time have developed into major players in the party’s operation and development and undoubtedly, the relationship between the unions and party leadership has been considered an inherent characteristic of Labour’s evolution. In fact, considering Labour’s formative process, it appears rather uncontroversial that Labour was described as the ‘child of trade union movement’ or as more characteristically Ernest Bevin argued ‘Labour came out of the bowels of the TUC’ (Harrison, 1960: 11; Minkin, 1991: 3). Nevertheless, the party – union relationship was never straightforward and consistent; contrariwise, the very nature of the party’s formation rendered it complex, tentative, irregular but also binding, inherently ambivalent and multi-dimensional. Formally over time this relationship has been characterised either as ‘symbiotic, intense, at times tragic, but essentially indissoluble’, or as an ‘instrumental transaction’ - the unions provided financial, organisational and electoral support in exchange for political protection in parliament and power and votes within the party, or finally, as a morally oriented partnership of ‘common loyalty and a deeply felt commitment to a wider entity and purpose – the Labour Movement’ (Minkin, 1991: 3-5). Whilst each of the three descriptions has addressed the union-party relationship from a different perspective, combined they provide a typified pattern, which seeks to explain the erratic nature of the power relations within the party.

Overall, the issue of the internal distribution of power and control has been subject to two main interpretations. First, there was the assertion that the unions control the party. This view was easily explained given that ‘the structure and procedure, and financial base of the Labour party indicate[d] a degree of integration with and dependence on the TUs’ (cited in Fenley, 1980: 51). Indeed, the unions had been the underlying power behind and the backbone of Labour’s organisational, electoral and
financial development (Fenley, 1980: 55). Second, there was the assertion that the unions, despite their ostensibly overwhelming organisational power, were confined to a passive and submissive role within a party where the oligarchy of the PLP leadership was in total control. However, as Minkin noted, these two polar models of power distribution tended to underestimate the real powers of each counterpart and thus, misinterpret their relationship (1991: 395-96). In fact, the trade unions’ role must be assessed within the context of the unions’ internal characteristics and traditions and the extent to which these have either adapted or conveyed to the rest of the party as a result of a process of interaction and interdependence.

Before continuing with the examination of the power dynamics and the degree to which these have affected the organisational and electoral development of Labour, it is important to consider the formal and informal framework of the party-union relationship. Although the unions had assumed the constitutional power to control even ‘run’ the party (block vote, financial resources), union leaders have never fully exercised it but instead the major policy-making decisions were left in the hands of politicians (Harrison, 1960: 336; Minkin, 1991). Overall, there are two main reasons for the unions strikingly limited role in the party’s political procedures. First, the trade unions had a ‘deep rooted ambivalence towards ‘politics’’, which was mainly based on their distrust of the state and tradition of independence and self-reliance over industrial affairs (Minkin, 1991: 7). The union leaders also considered abstinence of political action as a means of self-protection against internal conflict and disunity (Minkin, 1991: 7-8). And whilst the unions were never fully isolated from politics, they acted on the belief that politics ought to be left to politicians (Harrison, 1960: 13). Second, the party-union relationship was defined by ‘unwritten rules and protocol’, which provided a network of mutual restraint, a characteristic that deeply affected Labour’s ethos (Minkin, 1991: xiii, 26-27). This framework of contact derived from the trade unions’ fundamental values of freedom, democracy, unity, and solidarity and the working principle of priority, which regulated union activity within the ‘political wing’ (Minkin, 1991: 26-40). Furthermore, these values were based on a number of unwritten rules on understandings and obligations, which regulated the relationship and introduced a feature of self-control. This was a legacy of precedents and guidelines that was consolidated during the interwar years and the union leaders chose to pass it down to the next generations, safeguarding in that way both the unions and the party (Minkin, 1991: 45). Nevertheless, their informal character these rules have played a major role in safeguarding the party-union relationship and thus, the survival of Labour while presenting a platform of compromise and consensus when conflicts arose. Another significant feature of the unions’ approach towards the party was that
the unions never attempted to constitutionally define or formalise their values and rules although they had the power to proceed with such an act.

However, this seemingly well-founded and balanced perception of the unions’ distinct role and behaviour did not eliminate intra-party problems and conflicts. Labour’s inception was based on adversary conditions as the pattern of affiliation brewed inherent problems and constraints. It should be borne in mind that Labour was regarded as the ‘political arm’ of the trade unions that would enhance their industrial interests within parliament but without affecting the industrial wing of the movement. Therefore, since the early days of the party’s formation the unions were concerned with retaining their organisational autonomy, prioritising industrial as opposed to political methods and unwilling to take up formal political roles (Fenley, 1980: 55-60). To this end, the political wing of the party was dominated by the PLP whose distinct role was defined in the 1907 ‘conscience clause’. As a result of the unions’ sensitivity over their autonomy and independence, two distinct centres were developed within the alliance; the party and the TUC, which despite their relative degree of autonomy were extremely intertwined. Minkin demonstrated that the party and the TUC ought to overcome four problem areas in order to sustain in practice a ‘unified momentum’ and achieve a ‘substantial harmony’ in their relationship (1991: 9). First, there ought to be a high degree of ideological agreement between the industrial and political leaderships. And whilst ideological unity was a difficult task to achieve in an alliance of various strands of socialist thought, the union and parliamentary leaders advocated more moderate ideological approaches and to this end, there was a degree of unity between them. Second, there ought to be a degree of agreement on the satisfaction of the unions’ interests. It should be stressed though that as a result of the party’s ties with the unions Labour had always been more receptive to their demands (compared with the Conservatives) but the party never assumed a trade unionist doctrinal identity. However, the general perception of the party as an ‘agency’ of the unions’ industrial wing had risen the expectations of the union activists and the failure of the successive Labour governments in the 1960s and 1970s to accommodate their demands and interests created tensions and strains on the partnership and rendered the working relationship highly problematic. Third, there ought to be an element of social affinity between the union and party leaderships. Over the years the solid social background - working class -that had defined Labour’s formation had begun to dilute as more and more middle class intellectuals were elected in parliament while the number of the trade union sponsored candidates decreased. Therefore, it was in the hands of the leaderships to minimise the tensions and potential conflicts that could result from the increasingly heterogeneous social mosaic of the labour movement. Finally, there ought to be a degree of compatibility of the strategic actions of the party.
with the unions. This was evidently a hard task to achieve as the two main institutions
had different purposes to accomplish. Industrial action was not possible to comply
with political moderation while a government’s aim to accommodate the interests of
the electorate as a whole could easily underplay and reject the unions’ demands. The
balance was found on the mutual understanding and common goal of electoral
success. From this perspective, the TUC could provide the party with a broad working
class electorate base while the party was expected to adopt and implement some of the
unions’ demands.

The ascendancy of the unions has rested on two principal and constitutionally defined
sources of power; the system of block voting at the annual Conference and Labour’s
financial dependency on the political levy. The numerical supremacy of corporate over
individual membership had been amplified under the system of block voting, which
allowed the unions to vote en bloc, that is, to ‘cast the total vote to which they are
entitled in a single unit’ while each union’s vote depended on the number of affiliated
members (McKenzie, 1964: 503). Until the early 1990s the union block-vote
accounted for 90 percent of the conference votes while half of those votes were
collectively controlled by four (Quinn, 2004: 79). The reforms that introduced in the
aftermath of the 1992 electoral defeat reduced the voting share of the affiliated
organisations to 70 percent and the 1996 reform decreased it further to 50 percent.
Moreover, at the 1993 Conference it was decided that the unions could split their vote
with a maximum of one delegate per 5000 levy-payers (Quinn, 2004: 80-81).

However, the new system of ‘one-delegate-one-vote’ (ODOV) did not dilute the
unions’ voting power and the support of large unions remained extremely important
for the party leadership in controlling policy-making. Another significant factor
indicative of the unions’ predominance in the party rested on their financial
contribution. Historically, the trade unions provided the bulk of funding base of the
Labour party through affiliation fees, special campaign donations and candidate
sponsorships. In the early days of the Labour party official party candidates were
considered only those who had the support of the affiliated organisations (Minkin,
1991: 241). The sponsorship of MPs was actually legitimised in 1933 under the
Hastings Agreement (revised in 1979) condition that a trade union ought not to pay
more than 80 percent of the maximum election expenses while defining the fund paid
by the unions to the constituency parties for organisation and registration expenses,
agent salaries, superannuation and statutory payments (Minkin, 1991: 243). Until the
early 1990s and the rapid increase in individual donations within the wider context of
Labour’s modernisation, the unions comprised the main financial contributor to
Labour. In 1957 almost 55 percent of the party’s total income derived from union
contributions, while in the late 1970s this figure rose to over 60 percent (Harrison,
The party was more heavily dependent on the unions’ contributions over the periods of general elections as 95 percent of the national General Election Fund was provided by the unions (Minkin, 1991: 509). Given the extent of the financial contribution as well as other resources that the unions made available to the party, such as personnel, offices and organisation networks, the Labour party was considerably dependent on the unions.

Considering the financial and organisational ascendancy of the unions on the one hand, and their constitutionally defined authority on the other, it could be assumed that the unions formally ‘owned’ the Labour party - at least that they did until the early 1990s. However, appearances can be misleading and Labour’s political trajectory has shown that reality has regularly been different from the perceived truths. As already noted, the most fundamental element of the union-party relationship has been the network of ‘rules and values’ upon which their conduct was based. On the one hand, this informal arrangement has led to tensions and conflicts. This was the case in 1959 when the revisionists challenged the traditional union principles of democracy and freedom and as a consequence faced fierce opposition from the trade unions. Moreover, the intra-party democracy crisis in the aftermath of the 1979 electoral defeat and the unions’ cooperation with the party brought to the surface long-standing inherent tensions and problems. The ‘great alliance’ was resented not only from the existing political parties, which considered the unions’ political action a threat to the establishment but also from the left-wing strand of the Labour party, which considered the unions’ labourism as an obstacle to the advance of socialism. Notwithstanding the various internally and externally generated difficulties, the split of the party was avoided due to the boundaries and constraints that were developed since the early days of the party’s inception and defined the way of conduct of both the union and party leaderships (Minkin, 1991). On the other hand, these constraints to the relationship paradoxically allowed for a degree of flexibility for both the TUC and PLP leaders, and freedom for the development both of political and industrial interests.

What is indicative of the party-union relationship is that the unions, despite their constitutional ascendancy over policy making, never attempted to exert control over the NEC or the parliamentary leadership by threatening to or actually imposing financial sanctions on the party. The leadership was never free of pressures but the

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29 In 1992 the union’s contribution fell to 66 percent but given the wave of changes that were taking place in the party, this was still a very large amount. The reforms that were introduced under the Trade Union Act 1984, did not hinder the affiliated unions’ contributions to the Labour party as it was initially regarded, but on the contrary it legitimatised union contributions as the main source of income for the Labour party (Fisher, 1992).
unions were reluctant to take over the party even in cases that their own interests were at stake. As has been pointed out the character of the union-party relationship was multi-dimensional covering all aspects of the party’s functioning and within that context the role of the union leaders, was influential but never controlling (Minkin, 1991: 623-628). Finally, in order to fully understand the intra-party power relations two further issues have to be considered. First, the party’s electoral fortunes have been a significant factor, which affected the intra-party power distribution; that is, whether the party was in opposition or into office. As already noted above, the main aim of the union leadership has been the election of Labour into office in order to promote the interests of the industrial wing and the working class in general. It has also been noted that the failure of the Labour governments to implement policies favourable to the unions had created conflicts and put strains on their relationship. At the same time, while the party was in opposition there was a tendency to automatically accept the unions’ demands while avoiding to criticise their actions. This in turn, resulted in very high expectations on behalf of the unions when Labour was in office and when these high expectations did not materialise the unions were deeply disenchanted with the party leadership (Harrison, 1960: 343). In general, the close connection of the trade unions and the Labour party is complex, peculiar and greatly controversial. The main paradox of this relationship was that the reality has regularly been very different from the formally defined constitutional principles. Labour’s management has been rested on the underlying dynamics that the ‘informal’ principles and values had conditioned.

The Leader

The position of Labour party Leader has always been a very significant one as it carries enormous powers in intra-party affairs, such as patronage and decision making, but most importantly, in policy making when the party is in government. In practice, the inherent powers conferred to party leaders by the British system of government and Labour’s own ethos of loyalty to its leaders, have provided all Labour leaders with a great degree of authority. And when combined with a strong personality, popular acceptance, and electoral success then the leader enjoyed a great degree of autonomy and independence at least at an informal level. However, the Labour party did not formally have a leader until 1922. In the early years of the party’s formation and as a result of the small number of Labour MPs elected in parliament there seemed to be no need for the election of a presiding officer, while in the period up to 1922 a PLP elected representative had ‘the group responsibility for coordinating the work of Labour MPs and speaking on their behalf’ (McKenzie, 1964: 301). The person chosen for this task was elected in an annual basis and was recognised as the ‘Chairman’ of
the PLP. His duty was to officially represent the parliamentary party as a spokesperson inside and outside parliament and to promote their collective views and decisions. Within the context of intra-party democracy it was considered highly undemocratic to allow a single individual the status and privileges of ‘leader’. In principle, the Chairman and entire party were under the control of the annual party Conference. Perceptions of the role of the leader changed under the second MacDonald leadership in 1922 when Labour emerged as the second party in parliament. Therefore, in 1922 MacDonald was elected ‘Chairman and Leader’ while in 1923 he was registered as the ‘Leader of the Parliamentary Labour party’ (McKenzie, 1964: 306-307). When MacDonald became Prime Minister (in 1924 and 1929) he acted, as any other leader of the older parties would have done; he took the responsibility of appointing the members of the cabinet without consulting any of the party organs or making any effort to ‘secure the formal approval either of his senior colleagues or of the parliamentary party’. At the same time, there was no attempt by anyone in the party to intervene in MacDonald’s premiership allowing him to become a very dominant and prominent figure among all Labour ranks. The party had accepted that their leader had to act with respect to the ‘usual constitutional practice’ of the British system of government, which gave the PM a great amount of freedom in decision-making (McKenzie, 1964: 308).

MacDonald’s leadership style and his subsequent ‘betrayal’ in 1931 affected the relationship of the leader and the party but not to the extent that the extra-parliamentary party would have wished to. On the one hand, MacDonald’s leadership was decisive in the evolution of the concept of the ‘leader’ within the party. As McKenzie points out ‘by accepting all of the customary parliamentary practices with regard to both the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, the Labour party moved in one great stride towards the full acceptance of the leadership principle which has been operative throughout the modern history of the Conservative and Liberal Parties’ (1964: 309). Under these circumstances, the Labour leader established his political ascendancy over his colleagues, enhanced his authority and eliminated his subversion to external controls, a form of power that was never confounded ever since. On the other hand, the events of 1931 created a widespread demand throughout the extra-parliamentary party that the leader should be under the effective control of the party. Nonetheless, despite the various resolutions that were introduced in order to control and hold the leaders accountable for their actions while reducing their power and

30 During his first chairmanship term between 1911 and 1914 McDonald had already demonstrated an autocratic and autonomous way of conduct but the circumstances were not appropriate so as to establish himself as a national party leader. The formation of the first minority government in 1924 elevated the status of the Labour leader inside the party, an opportunity that was strongly exploited by MacDonald who managed to dominate the party.
authority over the PLP and the party, little was actually done. The safeguards that were in principle, introduced were ignored by Attlee as soon as the party returned in government in 1945. Unquestionably, there were procedures of consultation that were followed, the conference preserved its role as the sovereign body of the Labour party and the executive role of the NEC remained important, but the party leader when in office was able to elicit the support of his colleagues within and outside parliament. Moreover, the rank and file members accepted that the Prime Minister and his government were not to be held accountable by the extra-parliamentary party for their governance. To this end, an ethos of loyalty to the leaders was developed, which marked Labour’s identity throughout the years and to a great extent affected intra-party affairs (Drucker, 1979). It is indicative that a Labour leader was never challenged nor forced out by the extra-parliamentary party.

One of the most significant elements that defined the role of a Labour party leader has been on his personal character and style as well as his perceptions on the form and role of leadership – including his shortcomings and merits. A second important element has been the leader’s electoral popularity and success. Most importantly though Labour leaders’ predominance has been defined by their ability to access institutional resources and benefit from the process of resource exchanges. Therefore, based on principles the core executive model (Dunleavy and Rhodes, 1990; Rhodes, 1995; Smith, 1999), it could be argued that Labour leaders’ predominance has been inextricably linked to their standing within the wider British political environment on the one hand, and their intra-party authority on the other (Heffernan, 2003). However, as already discussed, it is indicative of the Labour party that the first party leader ‘emerged’ as a response to externally driven events, rather than being purposely elected to fulfil internal party demands. As a result, Labour leaders’ constitutional powers were increasingly constrained while their authority depended on their prime ministerial authority and influence, personal attributes and status, and the relationships that they had developed with the various party actors and institutions. That said, while in government the party leader had enormous powers and authority, which the party within or outside parliament was very difficult to challenge. Therefore, the way each leader chose to – or was forced to – operate was affected by endogenous and exogenous networks of influence. Yet the outcomes of this interdependent relationship were greatly influenced by the personal attributes - skills and abilities, reputation and popularity, and tactics that each leader chose to develop. Most importantly, Labour leaders’ predominance had been relative to their anticipated political and electoral success and their potential prime minister status (Heffernan, 2003). Gaitskell’s example in the 1950 has aptly demonstrated that in the
prospect of an election victory even the greatest ideological opponents did reconcile
behind the leader.

Nonetheless, another important factor that has affected the role of the Labour leader
refers to the ethos of the Labour party, which advocated a strong loyalty to the leader
even in the case that the leadership was not characterised as a successful one
(Drucker, 1979). However, the party’s attitude towards the leader has been in
constant flux and so did the leader’s attitude towards the party. As already noted, the
leader could always find ways and use a variety of devices to bargain and thus
preserve the support of the unions and as a result to control the conference. Especially
when in government, the leadership and the PLP in general have always been more
autonomous and independent than in opposition, as they were able to use the
resources of the state to their advantage without having to depend on the party’s
resources for accomplishing their goals (in government or within the party).
Consequently, the balance of power could be easily shifted in favour of the leader,
either informally or as it will be demonstrated later in this thesis, in more formal ways.
This has been an ever-present characteristic of Labour resulting from the resources
available to the leader but also the traditional respect and support of the party base to
its leader.

In general, the Labour party has demonstrated reluctance in changing leaders even
after an election defeat. But every time a new leader emerged his leadership
responded to the distinct conditions of each period. In the mid-1930s Attlee’s modest,
low profile and highly consultative leadership was a response to the autocratic manner
of MacDonald. As a Prime Minister in 1945 Attlee did take advantage of and exercised
the powers that accompanied the Prime Minister’s office but his moderate and
unassuming personal style underplayed the enormous concentration of authority he
was less diplomatic in his approach to the leader’s role, consistently failed to anticipate
the reactions of the party base and was criticised for failing to understand the ethos
and history of the movement, especially after his campaign for the reform of Clause IV
(Marquand, 1991). On many occasions, his decisions split rather than reconciled the
party. However, he did manage to survive one of the most severe and acute crises in
Labour’s history and if it was not for his sudden death in 1963 he was soon to become
Prime Minister. His successor Harold Wilson has been held responsible for the
disastrous legacy of the 1964-70 and 1974 Labour governments. Despite his left-wing
origin – he was one of Gaitskell’s main rivals and challenged his leadership in 1960
but without success – Wilson sought to adopt a conciliatory strategy. Nonetheless, his
policy initiatives did not only damage the party’s credibility but also shattered the
unity of the party by breaking the party’s relations with the unions. By the time Wilson left the party leadership in 1976 the party had entered another vicious cycle of division and split. But this time the main force of change was the left and not the right. As for Kinnock, Smith and Blair, they were the main forces behind the party’s modernisation. In particular, Kinnock and to a degree Smith, introduced reforms that changed Labour’s ideological and structural basis and transformed the party’s communications machine (mainly, Kinnock). Furthermore, Blair went a step further into consolidating these reforms, revolutionising the party campaigning and developing – through successful rebranding - Labour’s electoral identity to a New Labour party. However, what all leaders had in common lies on their refusal to be bound by Conference decisions and to be held accountable for their actions in parliament to the extra parliamentary party.

**The Membership**

Finally, the mass membership is another significant characteristic of Labour’s organisation and has played a significant part to foundation of its intra-party democracy. Given the circumstances and the nature of the party’s genesis, not surprisingly, Labour had always demonstrated a numerically formidable mass membership base comprised of the members of its affiliated bodies as well as individual members. The preservation and expansion of the party’s membership constituted a major aspect of the party’s development. On the one hand, until recently party membership was a vital financial resource as member fees provided a regular income to the party (affiliation membership fees). On the other hand, Labour never managed to create a large active and influential base of individual members as the party had been heavily relied upon the numerically greater and effortless recruitment of affiliated membership (Ware, 1987: 146; Webb, 2000: 199-200). Nonetheless, despite the unorthodox character of Labour’s mass membership most particularly when compared with other major European left-wing parties, the (indirect) participation of party members to the decision-making processes (Conference votes were allocated on the basis of each affiliated body’s number of members) constituted the basis for the party’s internal democracy, a feature that distinguished Labour from its opponents. This notion of internal democracy was underpinned in the 1990s with the introduction of national membership and mainly the extension of democratic rights to individual members in the areas of candidate and leadership selection (Webb, 2000: 207-208). Under Blair individual membership only reached a peak of 405,000 members (Table 2.3), while the old form of delegatory democracy was substituted by plebiscitarian democracy and direct participation of individual party members to the
decision-making procedures. And regardless of the reasons or motives behind Blair’s decision to ballot individual members on Clause IV and the party programme, and whether the reforms served the leadership’s attempts for more autonomy (Mair, 1994: 16; Webb, 2000: 206-208), he completed the move of the party away from the long established tradition of delegatory democracy to participatory democracy (see Chapter 3 for more details). That said, it should also be borne in mind that the role of the members has always been considered of vital significance as they contribute to the party’s development, operation, political survival and electoral success in a number of ways (Seyd and Whiteley, 1992; 2002). And as it discussed later in the thesis within the context of Labour’s evolution, the party’s transformation and the inception of New Labour (under Blair) did follow a pattern of change that the members of Labour’s electoral base had initiated.

2.5 Discussion

The third part of this chapter dissects the mainstream ideological and organisational features of the Labour party as the basis for examining Labour’s political identity. The analysis is developed upon the first two stages of the party evolution typology and identifies the prominent characteristics of the Labour party defined in relation to its genetic model and degree of institutionalisation in the first stages of the party’s formation while addressing the impact of this dynamic relationship on the party’s further evolution. The process and degree of Labour’s institutionalisation has unquestionably conditioned the party’s internal life in terms of organisation, distribution of power and ideology, and has marked its political and electoral progress for decades. However, since the mid-1980s sweeping changes have taken place within the Labour party, which have ultimately led to its transformation to a modern and professional political organisation that the Blair leadership identified as New Labour. Considering the ideological but most importantly, the organisational changes of the late 1980s and 1990s it could be possible to argue that New Labour emerged from a second phase of institutionalisation. Indeed, Panebianco stressed that a party – either weakly or strongly institutionalised – is not ‘necessarily condemned to always remain the same’ while radical changes take place (1988: 63). Nevertheless, in order to address the question whether New Labour has undergone a process of ‘re-institutionalisation’, the specific characteristics of its ‘birth’ have to be considered while re-evaluating the degree of its institutionalisation. Is New Labour a strongly institutionalised political party? And to this end, was the break with the party’s past activity simply symbolic rather than substantial? The analysis of Labour through the
Party Evolution Framework addresses these questions and offers an alternative interpretation of Labour’s evolution.

**Stage I: ‘National’ Externally legitimised Party with a Low Degree of Institutionalisation**

As has been thoroughly discussed, Labour emerged from an alliance between the organisationally strong trade unions and the numerically weak but intellectually powerful socialist societies. Within that context, the party developed as the unions’ political arm and remained as such for the most part of its life while the socialist societies and in particular the ILP and the Fabians, pioneered the party’s ideological and organisational consolidation. Hence, the political heritage of the Labour party comprises of a mosaic of values, traditions, rules and principles. Moreover, internal organisational difficulties, financial problems and electoral misfortunes during the first years of the party’s inception created adverse conditions hindering it from developing a distinct political identity and thus, impeding its transition from a federal organisation to a political party. Though the relationship and interaction of these two prominent groups has shed light on the party’s genetic model characteristics and organisational development.

Panebianco’s examination of Labour’s genetic model and its influence on the party’s organisational development asserts ‘why it was destined to remain the unions’ political arm, externally sponsored and weakly institutionalised’ (1988: 89). In fact, Labour’s genetic model was dominated by two major characteristics. First, the party’s diffusional development; Labour’s formation was the outcome of the cooperation between trade unions and socialist societies, which had already established organisational structures and ideological directions. Therefore, Labour’s organisational structure originated in the local associations of its affiliated bodies the composition and structure of which was highly heterogeneous. Furthermore, these local associations enjoyed a high degree of autonomy from the centre. The party’s central organisation was inadequate and heavily dependent on the financial contribution and the organisational resources of the trade unions. At the same time, the lack of a coherent ideological framework was reflected on Labour’s weak cohesion and factionalism. The formative character of the party entailed a ‘left/right’ division, which split the party into several splinter groups threatening its survival.

Second, Labour was an externally legitimised party, as the trade unions had comprised the leadership’s source of legitimation for almost ninety years. Trade unions provided
the party members, money, resources in terms of personnel and infrastructure, and sponsored parliamentary candidates. And whilst the PLP group retained its autonomy Labour's development was based on the continuous bargaining and compromise between the party and union leaderships. The existence of a dominant external sponsor had substantially affected the role of the party leadership. In fact, it led to the lack of a leader as it took almost twenty years for the Labour party to formally elect its first leader. In principle, the powers of the party leader were restrained and constitutionally the leader was accountable to the party conference. In practice however, the leader's predominance derived informally from the constitutional practice of the British system of government. It was not until MacDonald’s second term as party leader that the role of the leader was constitutionalised.

As a result, for the first two decades of its life, Labour was a highly heterogeneous organisation in terms of structure and ideology, with weak central party machinery and considerable financial difficulties. The 1918 organisational and ideological reform consolidated the Labour party and established the basis for its institutionalisation. First, it formalised its ‘composite and federal character’ (Panebianco, 1988: 91). Second, the dominant position of the trade unions within Labour’s organisation was consolidated and the relationship between the unions and the parliamentary party was constitutionally defined. As a result, the trade unions’ voting and financial powers allowed them to control the party’s organisation and decision-making procedures while the PLP and its leadership enjoyed a considerable degree of autonomy. In practice, as long as the parliamentary party assumed the support of the trade unions then the PLP group dominated in intra-party affairs. Third, the Constitution allowed for the development of a national party organisation and introduced direct individual membership in addition to the collective membership. Therefore, the 1918 reforms entrenched the party’s idiosyncrasy (culture and traditional values), which remained unaltered for almost a century, and initiated the process of the party's institutionalisation. A process that lasted for more than a decade and led to a weakly institutionalised organisation. Considering Labour's weakly institutionalised character Panebianco focused on three aspects: the party’s finances, the weakness of its bureaucratic structures and finally, the method of parliamentary selection. The analysis of these factors vindicated the party’s low degree of institutionalisation in relation to its genetic model’s characteristics.

On the whole, Panebianco’s reasoning of Labour’s institutionalisation has underpinned the party’s inception and rise in opposition, development through diffusion as well as its externally legitimised character. Furthermore, it is unquestionable that the first signs of Labour’s institutionalisation came with the
organisational and ideological reforms of 1918. However, while Panebianco acutely defined Labour’s genetic model characteristics the fact that his examination of the institutionalisation process failed to take into account the wider context of the party’s early development limited the scope of analysis of the party’s evolution and restricted the identification of the factors that have played a major role in the development of the party’s unique identity and also the alliance’s survival and transformation over time. For that reason, this study has sought to evaluate the genetic characteristics of the Labour party and its institutionalisation process from a broader perspective to include the unusual political context within which the party operated in the first years of its formation. Moreover, while focusing on Panebianco’s empirical analysis this study goes a step further and examines the ‘regeneration’ of the Labour party in the 1990s within the context of ‘re-institutionalisation’. Therefore, in this way, it is possible to test the hypothesis that if the low degree of institutionalisation allows for the organisational and ideological regeneration of a party, then this regeneration could create a party with different institutionalisation characteristics forming a strongly institutionalised organisation.

The low degree of the Labour’s institutionalisation is more evident while examining the various aspects of the party’s organisational development in relation to its genetic model characteristics. This relationship is summarised in Table 2.1, which is a detailed examination of Labour’s degree of institutionalisation in relation to its intra-party organisational characteristics as these were evolved while the process of institutionalisation was under way. It is these characteristics and unique features that give an organisation its mark. Therefore, diffusional development and external legitimation are natural consequences of the party’s birth from pre-existing organisations and its dependency on them for the most part of his history. However, even before the beginning of the party’s long process of institutionalisation Labour developed characteristics of a ‘mixed’ type of organisational development. That is, although its genetic model’s character is merely diffusional the attempts of Henderson and MacDonald to create a uniform organisational structure – despite the practical difficulties they had to face – in the late 1910s, provided the party with the framework for its further ‘nationally’ based organisational development. Therefore, whilst Labour’s formative organisational structure was the alliance of distinct local associations, its development was based on penetration.

Regardless of the regular internally and externally driven changes Labour was born with a very low degree of autonomy and remained as such. The party was not only dependent on the trade unions for funding and resources; the voting power of the unions rendered Labour’s policy-making procedures under the total control of the
former. In practice, the Labour’s operation laid upon the leadership-union relationship. Considering the highly heterogeneous organisational structure, high degree of dependency on its ‘sponsors’ and autonomy of the local party associations, Labour had a low degree of systemness, which also favoured weak institutionalisation. As for the sub-group of the five indicators of institutionalisation, as Table 2.1 shows, Labour was a weakly institutionalised party. In detail, the party had a very weak central apparatus, a heterogeneous but most importantly autonomous organisational structure, was financially insecure as a result of its increased dependency on the unions’ political levies and sponsoring of candidates, while the party’s dominant coalition was not formally recognised. As a consequence, Labour’s weak institutionalisation is considered the natural corollary of the weak relationships at the different levels of the party’s activities. Furthermore, another important factor that reaffirmed Labour’s low level of institutionalisation related to the significance of the values, principles and traditions that defined intra-party relationships and power distribution. In practice, the party’s operation was based on the considerable deviation from the formal and constitutionally defined principles both organisationally and ideologically. The balance within the party had always been connected to the social and economic context within which it had to operate and mostly, whether it was in government or in opposition.

Table 2.1 Labour Party - Genetic Model and Institutionalisation Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GENETIC MODEL: TERRITORIAL DIFFUSION / ‘MIXED’ TYPE - Externally legitimised</th>
<th>DEGREE OF INSTITUTIONALISATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUTONOMY</td>
<td>Weak → Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYSTEMNESS</td>
<td>Weak → Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Apparatus</td>
<td>Weak → Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homogeneity of organisational structures</td>
<td>Weak → Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Resources</td>
<td>Weak → Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations with external Organisations</td>
<td>Weak → Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominant Coalition structure</td>
<td>Weak → Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXTERNALLY LEGITIMISED/UNIONS</td>
<td>YES → Weak</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The party’s development was governed by the abovementioned characteristics for most of its history. However, the reforms that took place in the late 1980s and mainly, in the 1990s did not only lead to Labour’s reinvigoration but also impinged on the
party's degree of institutionalisation. The party underwent radical changes, which affected various aspects of its autonomy and systemicity. New Labour was no longer utterly dependent on the trade unions in terms of finances and resources and the unions lost their voting powers at the annual conference. While the role of the local parties has remained very important (local party activists are vital for the party’s election campaigns), New Labour is organised and controlled by the centre, while the predominance of the leader is rather apparent at all levels of party activity. Reforms, which targeted the party-union relations, the introduction of OMOV procedure, the reorganisation of national headquarters in a way that gave the leadership more control over the party machine and foremost, the recruitment of individual members at a national rather than local level have significantly influenced the internal power structure and in turn, the party’s relations with its external environment. Nowadays the party enjoys a much higher degree of autonomy than ever before, as it is no longer under the control of the trade unions. The increase in the degree of autonomy has also reflected a higher degree of systemness, as power control concentrated in the hands of the leadership. Moreover, the party possesses a developed central apparatus, its revenue derives from a plurality of sources and it is less dependent on the unions. Therefore, as Table 2.2 shows, Labour’s modernisation induced an incremental advance in its degree of institutionalisation. New Labour has moved a step further in the institutionalisation axis (Figure 2.1).

Table 2.2 ‘NEW’ Labour - Institutionalisation Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GENETIC MODEL: TERRITORIAL DIFFUSION / ‘MIXED’ TYPE</th>
<th>DEGREE OF INSTITUTIONALISATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AUTONOMY</strong></td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SYSTEMNESS</strong></td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Central Apparatus</strong></td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Homogeneity of organisational structures</strong></td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Financial Resources</strong></td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relations with external Organisations</strong></td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dominant Coalition structure</strong></td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EXTERNALLY LEGITIMISED/UNIONS</strong></td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As a consequence of the changes introduced at the organisational level the characteristics that influenced the Labour’s degree of institutionalisation have altered
transforming to some extent elements of its character. However, it is important to note that the features that constituted the party’s genetic model have affected the nature and scope of the reforms. The Labour party was modernised, the power relations within the party changed considerably, the party was reorganised but it did not suddenly, become a homogeneous, unified political organisation with a dominant leadership able to exert total control over its environment. Factionalism has been an inherent characteristic of the Labour party and a feature that cannot be easily eliminated or controlled. To this end, the extent of the party’s transformation remains to be seen and mostly, to be tested over the years.

Figure 2.1 Degree of Institutionalisation Index: Labour / New Labour

![Figure 2.1 Degree of Institutionalisation Index: Labour / New Labour](image)

**Stage II: Mass party with an Electoral-Professional Approach**

Having identified the genetic model of the Labour party and the degree of its institutionalisation and taking into account intra-party changes that occurred as a result of major structural reforms, Stage II of the Party Evolution Framework identifies Labour’s party type and political identity. Following the typology used in chapter one

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31 The degree of institutionalisation index is an additive scale, built upon the results of Tables 2 and 3. Based on Panebianco’s theory of institutionalisation, Tables 2 and 3 show the results of the empirical analysis of Labour’s formative characteristics and genetic model attributes, while Figure 1 depicts the numerical interpretation of the institutionalisation process. The degree of institutionalisation index has been calculated with the use of indicators (1=low, 2=low/medium, 3= medium, 4=medium/high, 5= high) relative to the importance of each of the characteristics; the factors that determine a party’s genetic model (diffusion/penetration, external sponsor, charisma) and two main dimensions (autonomy and systemicity) have been multiplied by two.
for the definition of a party’s type, Labour will be analysed initially within the context of party composition (intra-party organisation) and subsequently of electoral competition (electoral behaviour).

Following the Durvergerian distinction of mass and cadre party types, Labour could be defined within a broader and somewhat unconventional context, as a mass party (1954). In fact, it falls into the category of ‘indirect’ parties (1954: 65). And whilst some aspects of Labour’s organisation and management had been consistent with the mass party conception, in practice Labour never developed into a classic example of and ‘authentic’ mass party following in the steps of left-wing and/or socialist European parties (Webb, 2000: 199-201). As discussed, Labour was an externally generated party with a hybrid organisational structure. The party had a numerically wide affiliated membership but a small individual membership base (Table 2.3). In fact, until the 1990s, Labour had never fully engaged into the direct recruitment of a mass individual membership either on ideological or political grounds (Ware, 1987: 146; Webb, 2000: 200). On the one hand, it should be stressed that the 1918 provision for individual membership transformed Labour into a nationwide organisation. However, the restrictions applied to the qualifications of individual members as a measure of safeguarding the political and numerical supremacy of the collective members thwarted the development of an ideologically and politically active mass membership. On the other hand, the party-(affiliated) members link was of ‘no true political enrolment and no personal pledge to the party’, which also affected profoundly the development of a genuine mass-party system (Duverger, 1954: 65). Furthermore, the changing pattern of collective membership affected the structural dynamics of the party as well as its financial strength. The ‘contracting-in’ and ‘contracting-out’ decisions had greatly influenced collective membership rates, indicating once again the weak link between Labour and trade union party members. As Table 2.3 shows, while ‘contracting-out’ rules were in place party membership decreased substantially indicating that the majority of affiliated members were supporters of Labour by inertia rather than conviction (McLean, 1980: 36). It should be noted however, that the role of the members at the local level has been substantial to the electoral success of the party. Over the last years and within the wider context of the highly professionalised and technologically driven electoral campaigns, the active participation of members in campaigning and fundraising has proved vital to the party’s electoral performance (Seyd, 1999: 386; Denver et al., 2003; Whiteley, and Seyd, 2003; Fisher et al., 2006).

In organisational terms, throughout its history has been based on the organisational and financial support of the trade unions that provided the means for the party’s electoral and political survival. To this end, the unions’ financial endorsement of
Labour working-class candidates had been the main means – at least in the early years of the party's inception - of Labour's parliamentary representation. Therefore, in financial terms the Labour party developed attributes of and operated as a mass party (Duverger, 1954: 65). Moreover, another element of Labour's 'mass' identity has been its internal democratic character. Formally, the conference has been – and to an extent remains - sovereign in determining party policy and holding executive decisions accountable to the extra-parliamentary party. Therefore, members and in particular party activists were given the opportunity to directly affect policy- and decision-making processes. However, individual members assumed greater powers in the party's decision-making procedures with the introduction of OMOV and the balloting of members for the selection of parliamentary candidates and party personnel. Under Blair the party moved from delegatory to participatory democracy; in practical terms, the new leader set a plebiscitarian form of leadership and balloted members in the cases of Clause IV and the party programme. However, the paradox in New Labour's case is that the extension of the rights of individual members coincided with the reinforcement of the powers of the leader, the high centralisation of party operation and further weakening of the traditional barriers of control and accountability – conference, NEC (Webb, 2000: 208; Mair, 1994:16; Russell, 2005)

Table 2.3: Labour Party Membership (selected years)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Individual Membership</th>
<th>Trade Union Membership</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>455,450</td>
<td>469,311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,960,409</td>
<td>3,013,129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4,317,537</td>
<td>4,359,807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,120,149</td>
<td>3,155,911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>214,970</td>
<td>2,025,139</td>
<td>2,239,169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>371,607</td>
<td>1,906,269</td>
<td>2,277,877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>487,047</td>
<td>2,510,369</td>
<td>3,098,416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>608,487</td>
<td>4,386,074</td>
<td>5,004,561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>1,014,524</td>
<td>5,071,935</td>
<td>6,086,459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>830,116</td>
<td>5,502,001</td>
<td>6,332,117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>691,889</td>
<td>5,787,467</td>
<td>6,479,356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>666,091</td>
<td>6,511,179</td>
<td>7,177,270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>297,364</td>
<td>5,778,184</td>
<td>6,075,548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>288,829</td>
<td>5,564,477</td>
<td>5,853,306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>311,152</td>
<td>4,923,592</td>
<td>5,234,744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>279,542</td>
<td>4,820,000</td>
<td>5,099,542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>266,000</td>
<td>4,033,000</td>
<td>4,299,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>405,000</td>
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Whilst the party's early constitutional traits indicated an 'unorthodox' class-oriented, mass-membership political party, the reality was rather different, a fact depicted on the analysis of its electoral characteristics that led to a somewhat inexplicit image. The
trends identified in the party’s behaviour do not fit within a specific type but integrate a number of characteristics from various classic models. As already noted above, the initial purpose of the LRC/Labour party to act as a pressure group within parliament and merely to promote and safeguard the interests of the trade unions was reconsidered as soon as the party’s electoral appeal increased, indicating that Labour could develop into a principal player in the British political system. As a result, the party leadership seized the opportunity and devised a strategy to extend the party's electoral support beyond class boundaries. It should be stressed that Labour’s electoral development was significantly affected by the consequences of the changing external environment as well as the important intra-party structural re-organisation. Therefore, within the context of Kirchheimer’s analysis of political parties, the mass organisation of the party made up the first step to the party’s gradual transformation to a ‘catch-all’ party. Labour’s appeal to different social groups became apparent in the 1918 policy programme and even in the party’s main socialist objective Clause IV. Furthermore, over time the initiation of moderate and more conservative objectives by the leadership, the various attempts for ‘de-ideologisation’ and the party’s detachment from the economic principles of socialism, the steady membership decline in the 1950s and the party’s no attempt to reverse it, and even the trade unions’ acceptance of the fact that a Labour government is a government for all the British people and thus, they had to compromise some of their demands were some of the factors indicating Labour’s gradual transition to a party of government with an initially, moderate catch-all strategy.

Moreover, if considered within Panebianco’s ideal party typology, then Labour was transformed from a mass bureaucratic party to an electoral-professional party (Webb, 1992a). Initially, Labour was a bureaucratic party with a numerically mass membership, a leadership operating within the context of the party-union cooperation and financially dependent on the unions’ political levy and to a lesser extent, members fees. However, the role of ideology as a tool for electoral support was limited; as discussed the party electoral base was never socialist in nature. These features allowed Labour to develop over time an electoral-professional party identity. In the late 1980s and 1990s the party leadership transformed party communications by advancing the role of professional consultants and media experts, while through a number of structural reforms decreasing the role and power of the unions and in parallel increasing the powers and authority of the party leader. The trade unions are not the sole source of financial support for Labour – though still a significant one – and the role of members is crucial at local campaigning. New Labour’s landslide victory emanated – to an extent - from the broad appeal and popularity of Tony Blair, the renewed image and rebranding of the party and whilst New Labour’s ideological
repositioning and right-wing shift allayed the electorate’s distrust of Labour’s competence to govern the country, the role of ideology as an electoral asset was limited (see Chapters 3 and 4).

To this end the Party Evolution Framework sets Labour’s electoral evolution to New Labour within the broader context of the party’s ideological, organisational and political development. Therefore, the features that Labour inherited, adopted or developed over time, allowed Labour to develop into a flexible, adaptive and amenable to external and internal challenges organisation. These were reinforced by the vote-maximising and office-seeking attitude that the party developed in the very early stages of its institutionalisation process. To this end, Labour’s transformation to an electoral-professional party was encouraged and reinforced by a series of internal and external events that deeply affected Labour’s operation but most importantly, the inherent adaptive capacity of Labour’s character. As analysed in the Stage I, Labour as a weakly institutionalised party was more amenable to change, something that has constituted a very significant element in the party’s development. At the same time, the low degree of fragmentation of the British party system in relation to the increased electoral power of Labour were important factors to the party’s regeneration. Moreover, in addition to the intra-party dynamics that led to New Labour’s inception, the social, economic and political changes at the time played an important role in reinforcing the party’s search for a new identity and safeguarding Labour’s detachment from the ‘ghosts’ of its past.

2.6 Conclusion

It has been stressed that Labour’s formative phase is a significant platform upon which the party’s development ought to be addressed. Labour’s inception was a marriage of coercion and compromise between affiliated bodies with the same ends but different means, at the high cost of internal conflicts and divisions. As a consequence of the diverse traditions of the affiliated bodies, Labour inherited a variety of characteristics, many of which adopted in the process of developing its own political, organisational and ideological identity. In short, Labour’s character reflected a ‘mosaic’ of values, principles and traditions, which comprised the informal framework upon which the survival of the party was based. And whilst the party’s early development was slow and fragmented and despite a series of adversities Labour’s consolidation resulted to a national political party with a comprehensive and detailed policy programme, set organisation and ideological objectives, an increased mass membership and a leadership able to safeguard Labour’s political and electoral fortunes. Furthermore,
Labour’s institutionalisation process was highly dependent on various external to the party conditions. Nonetheless, Labour’s low degree of institutionalisation allowed the party a high degree of amenability to overcome the significant internal crises over time and the ability to reinvent and redefine its political identity while transforming its electoral behaviour. Therefore, whilst Labour was formed as a mass (bureaucratic) party but with strong oligarchic tendencies over time was developed an identity that consisted an amalgam of catch-all and electoral-professional characteristics.

In ideological terms, Labour never developed into a wholeheartedly socialist party despite the adoption of the party’s ‘socialist’ objective in 1918. Socialism did influence the development of various ideological strands that developed within Labour and which led to long periods of conflicts and confrontations. In fact, these internal divisions and the battle between the right and left on ideological direction and control are considered prominent and perennial traits of Labour’s evolution process. Shifts in the balance of power and control were regularly the outcome of these conflicts and in many occasions defined Labour’s political status and electoral standing. This was the case in the 1930s and 1970s and the party’s shift towards radical left-wing philosophies while on the contrary, in the 1950s and 1980s the right-wing revisionists and modernisers openly challenged and eliminated the left (Taylor, 1980: 19). While in government, Labour adopted a more pragmatic approach while de-emphasising its socialist objective. With the exception of the 1945-51 Wilson governments Labour administrations were forced to implement policies opposite to the party’s mainstream principles of full employment and welfare by cutting public spending and benefits, and creating conditions of mass unemployment. And despite the party’s electoral setbacks and the electorate’s disenchantment with the party, Labour always succeeded in renewing itself and returning in office.

In terms of organisation, Labour’s well-structured organisational base has provided the stronghold of the party’s unity and secured its survival over time. Constitutionally, structured on the conference’s sovereignty the party’s main objective was to safeguard its intra-party democracy. In reality, however, the intra-party balance of power and control was based on a constant game of power relations between the trade unions and the parliamentary leadership. The fact that there was always a great degree of dependency on trade unions conditioned the degree of freedom and the activities of the party leaders. Within that context, the intensive bargaining between the two leaderships has led to some controversial policy decisions over the years and to the creation of tensions and conflicts in cases that party leaders failed to promote the interests of the unions and deliver their promises while in office. It has been a notable pattern that while in opposition the party leadership tended to support the demands of
the unions but while in government the failure and/or refusal of labour prime ministers to adequately respond to the interests of the unions if in contrast with the rest of the population, created tensions and conflicts.

Nonetheless, one of the major features in Labour’s development referred to the divergence between formal and informal nature of intra-party relationships. Labour can be looked at from two somewhat opposing angles. In principle, the party has functioned within well-defined constitutional boundaries. In practice, the interaction among its institutions has been based on values, traditions and informal rules characterised by less rigid boundaries that provided the party machine with a great degree of flexibility. As a result, it should be borne in mind that the scope of crises within the party was more apparent than real. Throughout its history, Labour has faced the possibility of disintegration twice (1930s and early 1980s) while facing a number of other less severe but acute divisions especially over ideological direction. And whilst it is unquestionable that ideological divisions had created intense problems, it should also be stressed that Labour’s political revival has been impinged on the party’s diversity as well as on its adaptive capacity.

Viewed within the context of its historical development the emergence of New Labour under the leadership of Tony Blair, was the outcome of a remarkable but nonetheless, unsurprising process of reinvigoration driven by the party’s ability and flexibility to respond to endogenous and exogenous challenges. Given Labour’s trajectory it is no surprise that it managed to rebuild and regenerate itself from its own ashes. And most importantly, that it managed to adapt to and benefit from the social and economic as well as political circumstances of the wider political landscape. As discussed in terms of organisation and ideology New Labour was merely the culmination of the right-wing advocates’ perennial efforts to modernise the party. To this end, the next chapter focuses on the systematic examination of Labour’s process of communications transformation from the early days of Kinnock’s leadership to the 1997 election campaign under Blair. The analysis of Labour’s communications development – that reached a peak in 1997 – constitutes the final stage of analysis of Labour’s evolution within the context of the Party Evolution Framework.
Chapter 3

The Labour party: Communications and Campaigning

3.1 Introduction

As the previous chapter demonstrated Labour’s character is defined through a series of changes and transformations. The formation, rise, institutionalisation and further electoral consolidation of Labour was induced by a series of exogenous as well as endogenous events, which were reflected in the early bipolar character of the party and influenced its ideological as well as organisational evolution, on the one hand, while marked its unique political identity and distinctive character, on the other. The latter is evident in Labour’s comparison with its European ‘socialist’ sister parties. Labour’s development to ‘New’ Labour was based on a gradual, staged process that lasted for almost a century; Labour’s transformation over time was not superficial or merely communications driven. And while the ends – the normative background - remained broadly the same the means used were moulded according to the context within which the party had to operate. Therefore, alongside the features that cemented the internal character of the party, what Drucker (1979) has identified as Labour’s ‘doctrine and ethos’, a further characteristic should be added: the party’s ability to survive summarised by its organisational and ideological fermentation. And despite the lack of any major constitutional reforms for almost eighty years, the 1980s constitute the start of a profound reconsideration of the party’s traditional roots. For the first time in its history, the descendants of revisionists, the current advocates of ‘modernisation’, had managed to formulate and enforce radical reforms to the long-standing constitution of the party. While the left-wing factions took the first major steps towards reform in 1979, the actual rebuilding of Labour started in 1983 under the leadership of Neil Kinnock. In spite of his left-wing background Kinnock initiated changes that promoted the modernisation of the party’s internal structures and electoral appeal.

A further important issue to consider when examining the Labour party is the distinction that is evident at all levels of the party’s mechanisms between symbolism and substance; between theory and practice, between means used and ends advocated. It should be noted that this distinction is particularly important to the evaluation of Labour’s evolution over the years, as it provides one of the major elements of analysis of the Party Evolution Framework. Within that context, ‘new’ Labour depicts the formalisation of the practical operation of the party and of the power and autonomy that the leadership already enjoyed. Issues such as the sovereignty of the Conference, the accountability of the leader and the PLP to the conference, and the control of the
party from the trade unions were reconsidered. In fact, internal party relations were put in a completely new context. And although that the driving force behind the changes was the empowerment of the leadership and the circumscription of the powers of the left, the reforms sought to make Labour more democratic through the promotion of participatory democracy. At the same time, the leader became accountable to the wider base of the party membership marking a substantial shift from the ‘old’ Labour modes of intra-party democracy.

The chapter focuses on the analysis of the 1997 official election campaign of the Labour party whilst examining the long-term process of reforms and changes that laid the groundwork for the creation of Tony Blair’s New Labour. To this end, the first part of the chapter discusses the first stage of Labour’s modernisation, from 1983 to 1992, under the leadership of Neil Kinnock through the examination of the 1987 and 1992 election campaigns. Emphasis is given to changes in communications and campaigning that combined with a series of policy and organisational reforms moulded a new era for Labour. Nonetheless, these were not enough for the party to win the 1992 election. The second part of the chapter, aims at examining the 1997 election campaign in detail. However, before continuing to the specifics of the campaign, there is a discussion of the elements of Tony Blair’s legacy from the first three years of his leadership that led to New Labour’s 1997 electoral landslide. Though major reforms were already in place by the time Blair took over the leadership, he played a major role in accelerating the process of modernisation of the party and mainly, in changing public perceptions on Labour’s credibility and competence to govern the country. Blair and his advisers revolutionised the – already transformed - political communications of the Labour party and rebranded it to New Labour. Finally, part three puts New Labour and the 1997 election campaign into the context of Stage III of the Party Evolution Framework and examines the professionalisation of the party’s campaign in relation to the adaptive capacity of its internal organisational structures.

3.2 Modernising Labour’s Campaigning and Communications

This first part of the chapter examines the transformation of Labour’s communications apparatus and analyses the extent to which the party’s modernisation entailed the professionalisation of campaigning. It should be borne in mind that the groundwork for the successful employment of the 1997 campaign was led ten years earlier under the leadership of Neil Kinnock. Labour’s 1987 campaign did not win the election for the party, but it was widely claimed to be ‘one of the most effective pieces of disciplined communication of modern British Politics’ (Hewitt and Mandelson, 1989:
Therefore, before continuing with the detailed analysis of the 1997 campaign, it appears rather appropriate to consider the changes in the party’s communications structure and how these affected innovations in its campaign planning and strategy.

**Modernising Labour’s Communications – The Kinnock Years**

The 1983 electoral defeat revealed the dire position that the Labour party had fallen into. The party’s electoral power had been reduced to 28 percent of the share of the vote, the party’s lowest share since 1918, whereas Labour’s status as the only viable alternative opposition to the Conservatives had been threatened by the Alliance. Given the state of ideological and organisational disarray that the party was in when the election was called, the defeat came as no surprise. The party adopted one of the most left-wing manifestos of its history that under the poor and ineffective leadership of the mostly unpopular and weak Michael Foot, who, being reluctant towards any form of polling, advertising and professional campaigning and thus, unwilling to adapt to the modern, televised form of campaigning, alienated the electorate; not even Labour identifiers believed that Labour was competent enough to govern (Kellner, 1985; Butler and Kavanagh, 1984: 141-142). Moreover, Labour’s campaign was lacking in preparation, organisation, resources and strategy; campaign preparations were belated with party officials demonstrating resentment towards the advice of professional consultants, while the campaign itself was mostly based on the improvisation of party delegates (Butler and Kavanagh, 1984: 56-65, 82-123). As indicated in the Guardian, Labour’s campaign was ‘ill-prepared, disorganised, uncoordinated and incoherent, destitute of any central themes or thought-out communications strategy’ (cited in Shaw, 1994: 26), an argument vindicated by Labour officials admitting that the 1983 campaign was ‘one of the worst led, most unprofessional campaigns of our history’ (Hewitt and Mandelson, 1989: 49). This profound inability of Labour to respond to the demands of modern campaigning in a period when the Conservatives led a highly professional and sophisticated campaign inevitably aggravated the extent of Labour’s losses¹. The aftermath of the election found Labour in desperate need of reform but nonetheless, determined to fight back (Grant, 1986: 83).

The modernisation of the party’s communications and campaigning began with the election of Neil Kinnock, just after Labour’s rout on the 1983 election. Although to an

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¹ During the official campaign, Labour’s share of the vote decreased by 6 percentage points, from 34 to 28 percent. That is, over the period of 1979-1983 Labour’s share of the vote fell by 10 percentage points indicating a long-term decline in the party’s electoral fortunes (Kellner, 1985; Butler and Kavanagh, 1984).
extent the reasons of Labour’s 1983 defeat had been primarily political, the parochialism in the party’s campaigning activities unveiled its organisational, ideological and communications weaknesses that were in desperate need of change (Kellner, 1985). When Kinnock was elected the party lacked a rigid communications structure. The responsibility for campaigning was divided between different departments and sections at Walworth Road, each of which had different strategic priorities and press contacts. Formal authority and control over the campaign was also divided between the leader’s office, the NEC and the Shadow Cabinet, hampering the already functionally volatile cooperation of the party communications machinery (Shaw, 1994: 55; Kellner 1985: 72-73). Given the disarray of the party’s communications, it is no surprise that Kinnock’s priority was to build the basic core of the party’s communications structure around the leader’s office in an attempt to tackle the serious problems of campaign management and control. The process of Labour’s communications modernisation started with the establishment of the Campaign Strategy Committee (CSC) in October 1983, which soon became the sovereign decision-making body for campaign organisation, opinion research and the party’s political broadcasts. The CSC consisted of representatives of the NEC, the PLP, Shadow Cabinet and trade unions and officially was responsible to the NEC. In fact, the control that the CSC had over the party’s campaign issues and the fact that in practice, the committee was only answerable to Kinnock allowed the Labour leader, at least in the early days of his leadership to by-pass the NEC until the Executive was more to his liking (Butler and Kavanagh, 1988: 50). Eventually, the CSC emerged not only as the main driving force behind the party’s communications modernisation but played a substantial role in the remodelling of party organisation and policy development; a clear indication of Kinnock’s objective to initiate reforms based on the party’s electoral and campaigning priorities (Webb, 1992a: 269). The Campaign Management Team (CMT) – formerly known as the General Secretary’s Committee/General Election Planning Group (GEPG), was a smaller group whose membership consisted of close to Kinnock advisors. It was an unofficial, in-house body with the task of detailed planning and managing the everyday running of the campaign (Webb, 1992: 270; Butler and Kavanagh, 1988: 60). Due to its unofficial character, the CMT was not responsible to any of the party’s institutions but reported directly to the leader, allowing Kinnock to control the planning of the campaign strategy.

The reorganisation continued with the establishment of two further bodies crucial for the party’s electoral fortunes; the Campaigns and Communications Directorate (CCD) and the Shadow Communications Agency (SCA). The CCD was established in 1985 and became a major centre of campaign and communications decision-making and control in the 1990s. Furthermore, the appointment of Peter Mandelson, a TV
producer, as the CCD’s director did not only professionalise the party’s campaign planning and status but as history has shown, revolutionised the party’s ‘publicity image and [its] campaigning verve’ (Hughes and Wintour, 1990: 15). The SCA was born out of Philip Gould’s recommendation to bring together a voluntary group of professional advisors from advertising, broadcasting and marketing\(^2\). The group of ‘secretive but influential image-maker’s’ had the responsibility ‘to draft strategy, conduct and interpret research, produce advertising and campaign themes, and provide other communications support as necessary’ (Hughes and Wintour, 1990: 48, 51). The SCA under the coordination of Phillip Gould who, with his associate Deborah Mattinson, were the only paid consultants, played a vital role in the revival of Labour’s electoral image in the 1987 election and later on, in the formulation of the party’s policy review. Finally, another notable feature of the headquarters’ reorganisation was the increase in the number of staff in the leader’s office, including communication professionals who cooperated closely with the CCD and SCA\(^3\).

All the initiatives taken by the leadership towards the reorganisation of the party’s campaigning and communications structure indicated a radical shift in Labour’s approach to electioneering: the planning and control of the party’s campaign moved from the hands of politicians, unionists and party bureaucrats to the professionals, marking the onset of the party’s professionalisation (Webb, 1992b: 50). Also, the shift in the balance of power yielded a significant shift to the party’s aims and objectives. Labour had to become electable again but for doing so, it ought not only to change but also to persuade the public that it had changed. Therefore, for the first time for almost twenty years, Labour’s communications targeted the wider electorate base and not only the party members. And that could not have been achieved without the presence of experts in communications and advertising, and quantitative and qualitative public opinion research. Under Kinnock, the transformation of Labour’s communications and campaigning ‘assumed new significance and became entangled with policy-making and intra-party relations’ (Quinn, 2004: 163).

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\(^2\) In his book ‘The Unfinished Revolution’ Gould comments that SCA was recommended as a ‘front organisation for BMP’, the advertising company, which for commercial reasons was unable to do Labour’s advertising (1998: 315).

\(^3\) The personnel in the leader’s office was increased under Kinnock to 12 members - from 5 under Foot – while the number rose to 20 under Blair (Minkin, 1992: 417, n. 19).
The 1987 Campaign

In essence, the preparation of the 1987 election campaign was initiated by Partricia Hewitt in 1985, who acknowledged the need for early planning and completion of all campaign schedules, strategic development, manifesto scripts, election broadcasts, advertisements, leaflets and financial programmes, by March 1987 (Butler and Kavanagh, 1988: 60; Webb, 1992a: 275). Therefore, early planning and the structural ‘upgrading’ of the party’s communications comprised the foundation upon which the sound 1987 campaign was built. A very well-thought-out, well-organised and disciplined campaign, centrally planned and controlled by a team of professional strategists and based on the extensive use of the media, the latest telecommunication technology and the systematic use of opinion polling. More importantly, it denoted Labour’s attempt to ‘sell’ its product to the electorate in the best way possible.

The planning of the campaign was based on four key features. First, greater emphasis was given to public opinion research, in terms of frequency as well as practices of polling (Webb, 1992a: 275). In addition to quantitative research that was carried by MORI since 1970, Philip Gould conducted over 200 qualitative group discussions for the party before and during the campaign. Focus group findings came to supplement MORI’s statistics by offering a more qualitative approach to the examination of the electorate’s preferences and attitudes, while comprised the basis for the party’s communications strategy (Gould et al., 1989: 72-3). Second, great emphasis was also placed on the use of the media and especially, on the role of television in the everyday conduct of the campaign (Butler and Kavanagh, 1988: 60). Taking into consideration the impact of all-day television coverage, each campaign day was carefully planned in advance and with great detail; the theme of the day was introduced by the daily press conference and on occasions, was supported by the publication of a leaflet and/or a party political broadcast, while the leader as well as key campaigners engaged into photo opportunities, campaign visits, speeches and TV appearances (Hewitt and Mandelson, 1989: 52; Hughes and Wintour, 1990: 22-3). Immense significance was also given to the locations of the campaign visits that were carefully researched in advance in order to link to the theme of the day and to encapsulate the positive and bright side of Britain that Labour aimed at being associated with. Moreover, the traditional routine of the leader’s morning London press conferences was abandoned; Kinnock held regional conferences while Bryan Gould and Roy Hattersley were charged with the London press briefing (Butler and Kavanagh, 1988:61). Furthermore, Labour strategists planned and run a single-minded and coordinated advertising campaign focused on the issues the party had a strong hold in an attempt to influence and if possible, to set the electoral agenda (Gould et al., 1989: 73).
Drawing upon the party’s main message *The Country is Crying out for Change*, Labour based its campaign on an emotional/social message while at the same time attacking the Conservatives on privatisation, unemployment, health and education.

Third, the 1987 campaign was not only planned but also strictly controlled and coordinated centrally by the ‘A team’ of advisers and strategists at the party’s headquarters. A series of meetings were conducted every day in order for senior party officials to get the latest information on polling, the media and the party’s own feedback, decide on the plans and strategy of the day, brief the leader and the press conference team, and later in the evening review the situation and ensure that things go according to plan and ultimately, confirm the plans for the next day (Butler and Kavanagh, 1988: 90-91; Hughes and Wintour, 1990: 24-25). The use of the latest technology on computers and telecommunications provided Labour strategists with the means to brief daily all candidates and key campaigners and mostly, to oversee the coordination of the main issues debated on each day of the campaign at the constituency level. Hence, Labour had taken its first steps to campaign centralisation.

The final noteworthy feature of the 1987 Labour strategy was the attempt to reconstruct the party image and enhance the credibility of the leader. Based on the electoral triangle, policy/issues, party and leadership, Labour strategists organised a campaign that highlighted the areas where Labour was strong (social issues, namely, jobs, health, education, crime, pensions), played down its weaknesses (defence, taxation) but foremost, emphasised that Labour was united, credible and once again electable. To this end, Labour sought to show that it was a modern, social democratic party and mostly, that the left-wing voices had been eliminated and the party was represented by one single voice – the leader’s (Webb, 1992b: 54). Nonetheless, in terms of policy and party image, Labour had major problems to overcome as the party was still perceived disunited (Table 3.1) and was lacking well behind the Conservatives on the issues of law and order, defence, taxation and economic competence (Miller et al., 1988: 117-125). On leadership, Kinnock had earned the respect from his party and the electorate and thus, was regarded by Labour strategists as ‘the most effective exponent of the values and hope offered by Labour’ (Hewitt and Mandelson, 1989: 52-3). Kinnock was the major asset of the party and became the central focus of the campaign, which was ‘presidential’ in character. To a great extent, Labour’s positive campaign effects ought to be attributed to the improvement of its leader’s image (Miller et al., 1989). By personalising the campaign, Labour strategists succeeded in not only improving the image of their own leader and party, but also highlighting Margaret Thatcher’s perceived unpopularity (Shaw, 1994: 77).
The 1987 election was vital for Labour. Given the extent of the 1979 and 1983 electoral defeats and the serious internal problems the party had to overcome, the 1987 election was regarded as a ‘make-or-break’ election; had the party failed to meet the challenge then its decline would have been terminal (Butler and Kavanagh, 1988: 72). As a result, the objectives of the campaign were based on pragmatic grounds and reflected Labour’s real expectations and strengths. Within reason, nobody at Walworth Road, not even Kinnock expected that Labour could win the election. By contrast, the primary objective was the party to win the battle of the opposition. That is, to emerge as the only alternative party of opposition and thus, push the SDP and Liberal Alliance to a poor third place (Hewitt and Mandelson, 1989: 50). A major goal upon which a substantial part of the party’s campaign strategy was built. The polls conducted prior to the beginning of the official campaign had showed that Labour was at a very weak position and many feared that the party would be pushed into third place behind the Alliance (Gould et al., 1989: 74). Labour’s response to these speculations was twofold; the first week of the campaign signalled a fast, dynamic start and vital turning point on the electorate’s perception of Labour and its leader, while for the final week Labour strategists having tactical voting in mind, had planned an open appeal to Alliance voters to join Labour so as to get the Conservatives out (Hewitt and Mandelson, 1989: 54). Having succeeded in facing the Alliance, Labour strategists aimed to project and ‘sell’ Labour’s social policies and values and communicate that Labour was ready for government. Within that context, Labour with a meticulously planned campaign strategy, aimed at dominating or at least influencing the election agenda by promoting the issues of health, education, unemployment and quality of life on which the party scored highly in the polls.

The end of the campaign however, was marked by the disappointing election result and the party’s third consecutive electoral defeat. Labour had failed to substantially increase its share of the vote (30.8 from 27.6 percent in 1983) but it had nonetheless, cemented itself as the principal opposition party. Notwithstanding the party’s failure in the polls, the outcome was not indicative of the effectiveness of Labour’s campaign. In essence, the latter has to be examined in relation to the party’s strategic objectives and to the extent that these were implemented. First, the initial impetus of Labour’s campaign allowed it to win the battle of the opposition, which was one of the party’s major strategic objectives. At the end of the campaign Labour had managed to win the support of almost two thirds of the undecided voters whose inclination was between Labour and Alliance (Miller et al., 1989: 114-5). Labour took a significant lead in the

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4 In actual fact, the appeal aimed at relegating the power of the Alliance as if Labour wanted to get the Conservatives out, then the only option under the circumstances would have been to cooperate with the Alliance and not put all of its forces into breaking it (Webb, 1992a: 276-77).
first week of the campaign that had being gradually built up until election day. Within the same context, the presidential character that Labour strategists wanted to attribute to their campaign was exceedingly effective. This was made clear in the first week of the campaign by the stunning appeal of the party’s election broadcast, known as the Chariots of Fire, which was explicitly devoted to Kinnock’s leadership qualities and personality. Such was the success of the PEB that Kinnock’s personal rating increased by 19 percent in the polls overnight (Hughes and Wintour, 1990: 26-27). As Mandelson acknowledged later on, the Chariots of Fire PEB had been ‘the most effective piece of political communication in recent political history’ (Ibid: 27). An opinion shared by 36 percent of the electorate who said the Labour had the best PEBs (Butler and Kavanagh, 1988: 155). And although it was not enough to win the election for Labour, it significantly affected the people’s perceptions of the Labour party and its leader. Moreover, the Labour campaign was really effective in projecting the image of unity (Table 3.1). It is indicative that while at the outset of the campaign Labour’s score on unity was lower than that of the Alliance, by the end of the campaign it had overtaken the Alliance on unity and credibility (Miller et al., 1989: 116-7, 120-5). In contrast, Labour did not succeed in dominating or even influencing the campaign agenda; Labour’s strong lead on the issues of unemployment, health and education was overshadowed by the issues of defence, taxation and economic competence and Labour’s weakness and inability to offer credible alternatives to the Conservative policies (Miller et al., 1989: 117-20).

The major problem of Labour’s campaign, as was later acknowledged, rested on the fact that the party’s entire communications edifice fell apart in the last week of the campaign. Partly due to the inexperience and weariness of Kinnock’s team but most importantly, due to the party’s vulnerability or even inadequacy on defence and taxation, the final week of the campaign was a free ride for the Conservatives. Firstly, when the Conservatives cleverly attacked Labour on defence the party’s disciplined front started to break. Initially, Kinnock trapped himself in a TV interview with David Frost into answering a speculative question about what a non-nuclear Britain would do if invaded by Russia. Kinnock’s inconsistent and ill-considered response was heavily exploited by the Conservatives and the tabloids, allowing the Conservatives to re-launch their campaign with what was acclaimed to be the most memorable advertisement of the campaign: a soldier with his hands in the air and the slogan ‘Labour’s Defence Policy’ (Hughes and Wintour, 1990: 28-9: Butler and Kavanagh, 1988: 103). Inevitably this was a serious setback in Labour’s campaign that was soon followed by a Conservative attack on economic competence. Taxation dominated the agenda and the row over Labour’s policy of lifting the ceiling of national insurance contributions as well as the party’s senior politicians inconsistencies on what the
policy actually meant, reinforced the voters’ perceptions of Labour’s incompetence on the economy and damaged Labour’s well-run up to that point, campaign (Hughes and Wintour, 1990: 32-34). Labour hit back with advertisements on health, education and pensions two days before the election and on election day it ran the ‘Final Check list’ advertisement that according to Gould, made a favourable impact on the voters but failed to convince them to vote for Labour (Gould et al., 1989: 81-86).

Undoubtedly the 1987 election was marked by Labour’s communications transformation compared to the party’s 1983 campaigning. In fact, in 1983 Labour had disregarded all these aspects of campaigning that modernised – even radicalised – the 1987 campaign. There is little doubt that the 1983 campaign was a disaster; Labour’s ‘worst ever election campaign’ at an electoral race that the Tories had fought ‘their best-ever’ one (Grant, 1986: 82). First, the 1983 campaign lacked in structure, personnel and resources. The Campaign Committee responsible for the planning and implementation of the campaign was inexperienced and too large to function efficiently (Kellner, 1985: 72-73). As a result, the planning of the campaign started too late and was characterised by major delays in decision-making (Butler and Kavanagh, 1984: 56-65; Grant, 1986: 83-84). Second, this organisational inadequacy was furthered by Labour’s traditional suspicion of political communication and marketing techniques, such as polling and advertising that prevented party officials from understanding the electorate’s negative reactions towards the party (Grant, 1986). The third major problem, which to an extent derived from the party’s negative attitude towards opinion research, had to do with the party’s manifesto and its programmatic policy proposals. The manifesto – the longest produced by a modern political party – failed to address the concerns and needs of the electorate, and therefore, could not provide the party with valid and consistent campaign themes. On the contrary, it contained fatal ambiguities that inflamed the voters’ negative predispositions towards the party (Kellner, 1985: 68-71). Fourth, Labour’s campaign was characterised by a complete lack of professionalism and strategy at every level of the party’s communications, ranging from intra-party coordination to relations with the media and the physical setting of the party’s daily press conferences (Butler and Kavanagh, 1984: 82-123; Kellner, 1985: 74). Finally, the major disadvantage of the 1983 campaign related to the leader himself. It was not only the fact that Foot was highly unpopular but also he was utterly unwilling (or unable due to his poor eyesight) to adhere to the demands of the media, nonetheless, to change his image (Webb, 1992a: 268-69; Kellner, 1985: 74-75; Butler and Kavanagh, 1988: 48). Most importantly, however, he failed to manage and discipline the party organisation. The inadequacies in structure and failures of the party’s communications machine could be acutely illustrated when considering that Labour’s 1983 campaign planning was based on a
strategy that was designed for pre-election purposes (Butler and Kavanagh, 1984: 57; Grant, 1986: 86).

Generally speaking in 1983 Labour was not fit to fight an election race both in organisational and ideological terms. On the contrary, just four years later, Labour run an effective, well-organised and strategically coordinated, disciplined and highly professional election campaign. And in spite of a number of pitfalls the newly appointed media strategists and consultants achieved something that in 1983 was inconceivable; to gradually change the culture of the Labour party. By relying on opinion research, Labour strategists formulated a campaign on the grounds of the electorate’s demands distancing the party from the old, parochial and unpopular image of the early 1980s. In 1987 Labour won the battle of the opposition but failed to significantly reduce the electoral power of the Conservatives. As Hewitt and Mandelson noted, ‘Labour won the campaign but it could not win the election for us’ (1989: 54). For many analysts of the time, the 1987 campaign had laid the groundwork for the Labour party to win the next general election. Nevertheless, as history showed, the wounds of the party were so deep that it took Labour another ten years in opposition and a series of profound ideological and organisational reforms to win an election. Labour’s communications transformation of 1987 led to the party’s revival as the indisputable opposition party. But even the exceptional advertising of an unpopular and/or ‘faulty’ product proved inadequate to lead the party to an electoral victory; not even to threaten the Conservative parliamentary majority. The 1987 campaign was professional but lacked on what Labour was perceived to be strong – on policy. Moreover, it had failed to strengthen its ‘arguments’ and strategy objectives by winning the support of the media and especially, the press. Finally, Labour continued to be haunted by the ghosts of the past. As demonstrated in Chapter 2 in the analysis of the first two stages of the evolution framework, Labour’s operation as a political party but also as a political organisation was entrenched over the years following certain patterns of behaviour rooted in the party’s formative phases. To this end, the evolution of the party to a professional political entity required a number of externally driven but mainly, internally generated turnovers. The rise of Kinnock to the party leadership and the reforms he introduced created new forms of conduct in terms of campaigning, inconsistent with the party’s ethos and culture. Undoubtedly, the party’s trajectory towards professionalisation was confirmed through a series of internal organisational reforms aiming at strengthening the forces of change within the party, that is, the leadership and their entourage.
Table 3.1: Party Unity (1987 – 1994)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>LABOUR PARTY</th>
<th>CONSERVATIVE PARTY</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>United</td>
<td>Divided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>29</td>
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<td>Dec</td>
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<tr>
<td>1987</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>61</td>
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<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>63</td>
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<td>Mar</td>
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<td>75</td>
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<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
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<tr>
<td>1992</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
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<td>Feb</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>51</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
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<td>Apr</td>
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<td>Jun</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>32</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


The 1992 Campaign

The aftermath of the 1987 election found Labour in a process of organisational reform and policy modernisation. Taking into account the significant socio-economic changes of the 1980s, Kinnock distanced Labour from left-wing radicalism and removed from the party’s manifesto all the unpopular policies on defence, Europe, the economy and trade unionism. Concurrently, through projects such as ‘Labour listens’ the party leadership focused on improving Labour’s popularity by promoting the image of a party united and ‘caring’ (Newton, 1993: 131). In essence, Labour attempted to modernise its ‘product’ by responding to the voters’ demands. In political marketing terms, the party sought to move from a sales-oriented campaign to a limited market-oriented approach (Lees-Marshment, 2001: 147-179). At the same time, a well planned and executed communications strategy ensured the adequate presentation and communication of the new image of Labour to the electorate.
For Labour the groundwork for the planning of the 1992 election campaign was laid in the aftermath of the 1987 defeat. Philip Gould presented an election review - an election post-mortem based on polling and demographic data - to the NEC entitled Labour and Britain in the 1990s, which indicated the party’s electoral weaknesses and set out a future strategy. The review showed that Labour’s major weaknesses were its poor image, weak leadership and unpopular policies. Moreover, even in cases of the party’s social policies that were popular among the public, this popularity was not translated into votes, as the electorate did not trust Labour to govern the country (Gould, 1998a: 83-90; Butler and Kavanagh, 1992: 46). Hence, the Policy Review was considered an important stepping-stone to Labour’s ideological repositioning but its scope and nature were regarded limited and cautious. According to Gould, ‘the policy review was fundamentally a missed opportunity for which we paid a heavy price in 1992. Labour was changing too little too slowly’ (1988: 90). That is mainly, because the party was too hesitant to radically address its weaknesses.

Nonetheless, the strategy of Labour’s 1992 campaign was built upon two main goals; first, to eloquently communicate Labour’s modernised policies via which the party would establish an image of competence and second, to improve Kinnock’s popularity ratings that were considerably lower than the overall popularity of the Labour party and evidently well behind John Major (Table 3.2 and Table 3.5). Given that in 1987 Kinnock’s appeal was one of Labour’s main campaign assets his unpopularity in 1992 was a negative factor but not entirely startling. That is, in 1992 Kinnock had to face the moderate and ‘caring’ John Major and not the austere and detached Thatcher. Also, despite his immense influence on Labour’s organisational and ideological modernisation Kinnock failed to adequately communicate his leadership standing to the electorate (Brown, 1992: 546-548). In fact, Kinnock’s appeal was in a continuous decline and his image was thought to repel instead of attracting potential Labour voters (Brown, 1992: 548; Crewe and King, 1994: 130). To this end, party strategists sought ways not only to improve Kinnock’s image but mostly, to minimise the negative impact of the leader’s unpopularity on the campaign by scheduling a much more active role for the high profile front-benchers and thus, avoid engaging in a ‘presidential’ campaign⁵. The latter however, was a difficult task to achieve as the

⁵ A poll published by MORI in September 1991 showed that only 57 percent of Labour supporters were satisfied with Kinnock - in fact 40 percent of the electorate regarded Kinnock as ‘the main obstacle’ for voting Labour - and had John Smith taken over, Labour would have had a 10 percent lead over the Conservatives (Brown, 1992: 548; Heffernan and Marqusee, 1992: 303). Needless to say that Kinnock’s ratings were substantially lower compared to Major on who would make the best Prime Minister (Table 3.2), while Major outscored Kinnock on image and other particular qualities (Brown, 1992: 560). Kinnock’s ratings were slightly
Conservatives ran a leader oriented campaign, advancing Major’s profile as a competent prime minister while degrading Kinnock’s competence to run the country (Newton, 1993: 149). And although the leaders’ net effects were not electorally decisive in 1992, as Crewe and King (1994) demonstrated, by the end of the 1992 election campaign Kinnock had been widely considered to be the weak link in Labour’s campaign and ‘the ultimate barrier to electoral victory’ (Butler and Kavanagh, 1992: 257).

**Table 3.2: The Best Prime Minister**
*Question: Who would make the best Prime Minister? (%)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Quarter</th>
<th>Thatcher</th>
<th>Kinnock</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Sep</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dec</td>
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<td>Apr</td>
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<td>May*</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Major</th>
<th>Kinnock</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>42</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Year | Mar*  | 39 | 27 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1994</th>
<th>Major</th>
<th>Blair</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>15</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct</td>
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<td>Nov</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>44</td>
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</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1997</th>
<th>Major</th>
<th>Blair</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Mar</td>
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<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>41</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The uncertainty over the election date led Labour strategists to plan and launch in January 1992 a pre-election campaign in order to improve the party’s competence image and to narrow the gap with the Conservatives. The pre-election campaign was structured around a main message, ‘It’s time for a change, it’s time for Labour’ and covered three positive themes: ‘Made in Britain’, which was unveiled in January and was the latest updated and repackaged version of the Policy Review, stressed Labour’s industrial policy; ‘Modernisation not Privatisation’ promoted Labour’s plans on public services by improving the NHS and education system and ‘Opportunity for Britain’ advanced the party’s new and fairer system of taxes to tackle poverty and create opportunities for all (Shaw, 1994: 139). The negative campaigning was focused on attacking the government’s record on the economy and John Major’s competence to handle the economic recession; ‘this is a Major recession’ had become one of the main party slogans (Heffernan and Marquesee, 1922: 305). At the same time, the issue of health was to be overplayed by Labour once the party had a comfortable lead on the subject over the Conservatives (Table 3.3). Ultimately, the pre-election campaign was to culminate with the announcement of the ‘Shadow budget’ (Butler and Kavanagh, 1992: 88-9). However, most of the themes were underplayed and the pre-election efforts were not successful for Labour. Although by the end of January Labour had a lead of 6 percent in the opinion polls, when the election day was announced in March it was neck and neck with the Conservatives. Most importantly, the Conservative party outscored Labour on almost all economic (taxation, inflation) and non-economic issues (defence, law and order, Europe), whereas people did not trust Labour to run the country in the middle of an economic crisis (Newton, 1993: 135). It is notable that

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.3: The Best Party To Handle Specific Problems: Labour Lead (%)</th>
<th>compared to the Conservative Party ratings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1987</strong></td>
<td><strong>1991</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jan</strong></td>
<td><strong>Mar</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NHS</strong></td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Pensions</strong></td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unions / Industrial Disputes</strong></td>
<td>-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Law and Order</strong></td>
<td>-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Europe</strong></td>
<td>-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unemployment</strong></td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Taxation</strong></td>
<td>-9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

at the outset of the campaign, on the question of economic competence 43 percent considered the Conservatives under John Major could handle the problem best compared to only 31 percent who thought that Labour under Kinnock could handle the economic recession (Table 3.4).

Table 3.4: Economic Competence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>Labour</th>
<th>Party Lead</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May</td>
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<td>Dec</td>
<td>44</td>
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<td>1992</td>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>43</td>
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<td>Feb</td>
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<td>Mar</td>
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<td>Apr</td>
<td>48</td>
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<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>23</td>
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<td>22</td>
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<td>Mar</td>
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<td>1997</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>31</td>
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Labour’s official campaign, launched by Kinnock on March 12th at a London press conference, was orchestrated around five main themes, which were advanced by posters and PEBs. The first two ‘Save the National Health Service’ and ‘Increase Pensions and Child Benefits’ focused on the party’s main battleground, social/caring issues. ‘Remember the recession and the poll tax’ was an offensive attack on the Conservative party and its leader, ‘Modernisation not Privatisation’ advanced Labour’s industrial policies while ‘Time for Labour’ conveyed a more positive message signalling the end of Conservative rule and the beginning of a new era under Labour. Also five election broadcasts were produced in support of the party’s main themes. The only discord took place in the final week of the campaign when in a conference on

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6 The campaign themes were divided into three categories; positive themes were designed to highlight Labour’s strengths and convey constructive messages on the party’s credibility and competence; attack themes promoted the policy areas where the government had a negative record and people were disenchanted and finally, defensive themes were designed to respond to the Conservatives’ attacks and minimise Labour’s vulnerabilities (Shaw, 1994: 129).
constitutional issues and electoral reform Kinnock openly endorsed Proportional Representation (PR) without consulting the comprehensive report from the Labour party on the argument (Plant working party). An internal dispute arose and Kinnock was forced to retract his statement a few days later by arguing that he had to wait for the Plant working party to report (Butler and Kavanagh, 1992: 128-9). This change in Labour’s agenda with the introduction of the issue of electoral reform took place at the ‘worst moment in terms of [the party’s] credibility’ (Shaw, 1994: 143). However, this was not the only shortcoming of the Labour agenda. In fact, by the time the official campaign began Labour had already lost one of its most crucial campaign cards; to place the blame for economic recession on the government. Contrariwise, at the outset of the campaign Labour was on the defensive as the Conservatives had launched a successful attack on Labour’s economic policies by breeding fears among the electorate that they would be worse off under a Labour government – mainly due to tax increases. Labour’s response rested on the presentation of the ‘Shadow Budget’ by John Smith, in an attempt to set out in detail the party’s economic policy and play down the negative Conservative campaign as well as public perceptions over the party’s economic credibility and competence to govern. But foremost, Labour strategists aimed at taking advantage of the professionally designed and presented budget rather than the actual policies. A well-planned press conference and photo opportunity of Smith and his colleagues outside the Treasury was staged in order to build up the party’s responsible and competent image and communicate widely that Labour is a government-in-waiting. But while Smith had a personality advantage over Lamont, which was evident in their debates, and was more trusted than the Chancellor the negative public perceptions of Labour’s economic competence drove voters to doubt about the credibility and achievability of Labour’s budget proposals.

In general, the 1992 election campaign was narrow in scope as the economic recession dominated all other issues (Butler and Kavanagh, 1992: 110). Newton described it as ‘the missing issues’ campaign (1993: 1478). Given that the policy differences of the two major parties were in principle rather than substance due to Labour’s right-wing turn, the battle was on the issues of competence and credibility. On that ground Labour mainly due to its history had to fight an unequal battle. As Butler and Kavanagh pointed out ‘any suggestion of a financial crisis was more likely to frighten voters into voting Conservative, even if the Conservatives were to blame’ (1992: 106). In fact, the late swing observed at the end of the campaign partially due to voters’

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7 On early January the Conservatives unveiled the ‘Labour Tax Bombshell’ poster campaign, followed by the ‘Labour’s Double Whammy’ poster that ‘informed’ the electorate in two short statements what they would get under a Labour government; 1. more taxes, 2. higher prices (Butler and Kavanagh, 1992: 84). The success of the Conservatives’ attack on Labour was confirmed by polls showing that 62 percent of the electorate believed that taxes would be increased if Labour won the election (Heffernan and Marqusee, 1992: 309).
fears of a Labour government, was decisive in giving the Conservative party a parliamentary majority (Clifford and Heath, 1994: 7-23).

In 1992 Labour fought a well-organised and disciplined campaign with most of the senior campaigners complying with the advice and directions of strategists. Overall, the party fought the campaign it had planned and for that reason the outcome was consistent and disciplined at least in terms of strategy. Nonetheless, two main events stigmatised Labour’s campaign, which in the aftermath of the election were considered significant setbacks in the party’s electoral fortunes8 (Butler and Kavanagh, 1992: 247-268; Berry, 1992; Clifford and Heath, 1994). The first setback arose when Labour strategists least expected it. On March 24 Labour launched an election broadcast on health, which was considered to be the strongest party theme. The so-called ‘Jennifer’s ear’ broadcast became one of the major highlights of the election period but for all the wrong reasons. Instead of focusing on the problem of NHS underfunding, the story backfired on Labour when the argument was centred on a row over leakage from Labour’s office to the press and over ethics9. As a result, Labour failed to take advantage of its poll lead on the issue of health, and instead came out of the debate with further wounds on its already damaged ‘fit for government’ and ‘competence’ image10. The second event that backfired on Labour electorally was the Sheffield Rally held on April 2 and originally designed to give Labour a boost in the last week of the campaign; that is, to give a confidence boost to Labour voters as well as to show the party’s electoral dynamic. However, the result was a public relations disaster when overwhelmed by Labour’s poll lead, an overoptimistic Kinnock went on the stage while shouting to the crowd ‘You’re all ri(ght), you’re all ri(ght)’. And although he gave a great speech, the shot of his opening line was shown repeatedly on TV causing negative reactions and as Dennis Skinner later remarked ‘had destroyed in ten seconds eight years practice by Mr Kinnock at being a statesman’ (cited in Butler and Kavanagh, 1992: 256).

8 Another significant incidence that had a negative impact on the party’s competence and unity profile was the ‘Luigi incident’. On answering a question on Labour’s policy on National Insurance contributions, Kinnock expressed a different view from the one originally advocated by John Smith and Margaret Beckett and constituted the party’s official policy line. Though in policy terms the damage was contained, the party’s weaknesses were once again exposed hindering the ongoing communications efforts to improve the poor image of the party and increase its credibility ratings in the polls. ‘Labour’s Tax Shambles’ was the main front-page headline demonstrating the party’s policy vulnerability and its lack of credibility (Shaw, 1994: 137).

9 Although child actresses were used and the broadcast was not supposed to present real children’s cases, the Labour party acknowledged that these were real examples and then, Kinnock’s press secretary, Julie Hall, revealed that the little girl’s name was Jennifer. Eventually, journalists found out the real identity of the child and her family.

10 The Tory press seized the opportunity and attacked the Labour party with headlines such as ‘ARE LIARS FIT TO GOVERN?’ (Sun) and ‘THE BIG LIE’ (Express) (Butler and Kavanagh, 1992: 203).
At a time when Labour had managed to find ‘substance’ in its modernised policy review, lost the control over its ‘image’, that is the communication verve that characterised the 1987 campaign. The 1992 campaign was once again well planned but lacked strategic leadership11. As Gould contended the blurred line of responsibility and power between staff/strategists and politicians had caused problems in the communication at the top of the party. The campaign machine worked but it was inflexible and as such vulnerable to the attacks of the opposition parties. Nevertheless, the party’s campaign was relatively successful but not effective12. It was characterised by a number of unforeseen setbacks on issues that the party promoted as its strengths. Strategically, the 1992 campaign was formulated around Labour’s clear advantages, the social/caring issues. Labour’s communications team had in advance acknowledged the weaknesses of the party and promoted strategies to overcome the obstacles blocking Labour’s electoral revival. In organisational and ideological terms Labour had made some significant steps forward to meet the needs of the electorate. However, the party’s transformation was neither as deep-rooted nor as radical as Philip Gould and the senior communications team had advocated. Taking aside the limited but decisive moving internal disputes over policy, in 1992 Labour campaigners had to deal with the distinct electoral circumstances that had been created by the change in the Conservative leadership and the severe economic recession the country was in as well as a ruthlessly hostile press and a sympathetic but not ready to trust a Labour government electorate. For a long period even before the election was called, the polls indicated that the next election would lead to a hung parliament with the Conservatives as the largest party. Nobody expected the extent of the Conservative victory – nor the Conservatives themselves for that matter.

The 1992 election may remain a puzzle with many layers but the main question in terms of campaigning is whether the Conservatives won the election or whether Labour lost it (Newton, 1993: 129). The real puzzle lies on how Labour, which was widely acknowledged to have implemented a better campaign than the Conservative party suffered a late swing towards the Conservatives. A late swing that was decisive in giving the Conservatives a majority in parliament (Clifford and Heath, 1994:7-23). As for the media, the press did play a decisive role mainly, against Labour but their

11 The absence of Peter Mandelson (nominated for the safe Labour seat of Hartlepool) and Patricia Hewitt (appointed director of the Institute of Public Policy Research) who were amongst the pioneers of the 1987 communications transformation was significant. Especially, Peter Mandelson had been the main link of communication between the leader, SCA and senior politicians and thus, his departure weakened internal communication.
12 A NOP poll showed that 30 percent of the electorate thought that Labour run a better campaign than the Conservatives (18 percent) and the Liberal Democrats (25 percent) (Butler and Kavanagh, 1993: 249).
impact was long-term (Harrop and Scammell, 1992: 180-210), whilst the broadcasting media offered more favourable circumstances for Labour in 1992 than at any other election in the past (Semetko, Scammell, and Nossiter, 1994: 25-37). In general the Tory press was very harsh on Kinnock, especially, the Sun. From this perspective Kinnock was not overly unjustified when he blamed the Tory press for the Conservative victory, neither was the Sun that took credit for the electoral win by claiming that IT WAS SUN WOT WON IT. However, what could Labour have done more in order to win the election? Inevitably, for Labour to win the election it had to persuade the voters on its competence and for that matter it had to challenge not the governing party and its leader but Labour’s history itself. To an extent Labour lost because it did not overcome itself; the party was not ready or fit to govern and people sensed that. The reason for the late swing away from Labour? Fear. ‘Fear both of a Labour government and a hung parliament’ drove voters away from the ‘caring’ party as Butler and Kavanagh accurately noted (1992).

The 1987 and 1992 election campaigns depict the tremendous transformation of Labour’s communications and campaigning in terms of organisation, strategy formulation, planning and implementation. The high level of professionalism and increased reliance on market intelligence for the formulation and execution of strategy were unprecedented in the party’s history, and especially, in 1987 caught friends and foes by surprise. The party’s campaigns won the hearts of the public but they were not enough to win their votes; they were successful but not effective. Nonetheless, they provided the framework upon which Labour’s 1997 landslide was built. The 1987 election campaign was the first step of a rigid transformation. Strategically and organisationally the election campaign was overly successful and to a great extent effective as the main objective was met (opposition battle). In 1992 Labour had a more eloquent policy programme and thus, a much better product to ‘sell’ to the electorate, but the strategy as well as the communication of the campaign fell short of that of 1987. The long-campaign did ‘expose Labour’s policies and exhaust’ the party’s communications machine (Butler and Kavanagh, 1992: 82). And although by 1992 the party machine was already in place and ready to respond to the increased demands of the new campaign, in essence, the 1992 campaign brought to the surface the drawbacks and inadequacies of the centrally based communications machine. The major shortcoming lied on the lack of efficient communication and control of the campaign machine itself. Internal divisions and tensions due to the problematic

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13 There was a personal attack on Kinnock by the majority of the Tory press with front page titles such as DARE WE REALLY TRUST THIS MAN (Express), WILL KINNOCK EVER TELL THE TRUTH? (Sun), QUIT BRITAIN IF KINNOCK WINS (Sun), IF KINNOCK WINS TODAY WILL THE LAST PERSON IN BRITAIN PLEASE TURN OUT THE LIGHTS (Sun).
relationship between senior staff and politicians led the ‘campaign machine that had been brilliant in 1987 and strong in 1990 [to] weaken almost to breaking point; the campaign team was riven with suspicion; [...] lines of command were confused and the leader of the party was isolated from his own campaign team’ (Gould, 1998a: 113-114). Therefore, partly due to the fact that by 1992 Labour’s tactics were well-known and thus, no-one was taken by surprise with the professionalism of the party’s campaign and partly, due to the internal upheaval on the role and power of the consultants at Milbank Tower, the communications machine in 1992 caused some rifts in the running of the campaign compared to the outstanding performance of 1987 (Berry, 1992).

It is indicative that over ten years, Labour’s campaigning had evolved from a product-oriented in 1983, to a sales-oriented in 1987 and finally, to a cautious market-oriented strategy (Lees-Marshment, 2001). The respective terminology under the Norris framework for the 1992 campaign would correspond to ‘modern’ campaigning, while under Farrell and Webb’s framework of professionalisation, Labour was at a stage two level. These are indicative of the change that Labour’s campaigning went through over a short period of time. Moreover, they emphasise the extensiveness of the changes that the party adopted under the Blair leadership from 1994 to 1997.
TABLE 3.5: Which Party Would You Support?
Question: If there were a general election tomorrow which party would you vote for/support?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>Labour</th>
<th>Liberals</th>
<th>Cons Lead</th>
<th>Lab Lead</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Jan 14-20</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>23.5</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Feb 11-16</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>34.25</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mar 19-23</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>Apr 8-13</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>12.5</td>
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<td>May 8-13</td>
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<td>30</td>
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<td>May 19-20</td>
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<td>May 26/27</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8.5</td>
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<td>Jun 2/3</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>36.5</td>
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<td>Jun 8-9</td>
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<td>23.5</td>
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<td><strong>30.8</strong></td>
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<td>Jan 8-13</td>
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<td>37.5</td>
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<td>Jan 21-28</td>
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<td>39.5</td>
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<td>Feb 5-11</td>
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<td>37.5</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Feb 19-25</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>0.5</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Feb 26- Mar 2</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>38.5</td>
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<td>Mar 17-18</td>
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<td>Mar 24/25</td>
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<td>Mar 31/Apr 1</td>
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<td>Apr 2/3</td>
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<td>Apr 7/8</td>
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<td><strong>April 9:</strong></td>
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<td>1997</td>
<td>Jan 11-15</td>
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<td>48</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>Jan 30 – Feb 4</td>
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<td>45</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14.5</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Feb 28 – Mar 4</td>
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<td>24.5</td>
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<td>Mar 26 – Apr 2</td>
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<td>Apr 5-7</td>
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<td>Apr 9-12</td>
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<td>Apr 12-15</td>
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The second part of the chapter discusses the further changes in communications and campaigning that took place under the leadership of Tony Blair and led to the party's unprecedented victory in 1997. Being one of the ‘modernisers’ and strongly believing that in order for Labour to have a chance to recover and win an election, the party had to endorse further changes in its structure and ethos, Tony Blair implemented a number of reforms in a very short time. His belief that ‘[Labour] would only win again when [it] had changed completely’ became the mantra of modernisation of the Labour party (cited in Gould, 1998a: 186). He managed to renew, reposition and re-brand the party; he ‘launched’ New Labour and revived Labour’s credibility and competence in the minds of the British electorate. Taking into consideration the examination of Labour’s development so far within the context of the party evolution framework, it is worth noticing that these reforms and change of conduct in Labour’s internal operation and approach to electioneering have been triggered and inextricably influenced by the enduring characteristics of the party’s political identity, while simultaneously, because of their radical nature, the Blairite reforms have marked one of the most important phases in Labour’s evolution.

_The Blair years, 1994-1997_

When Blair became party leader he had a ‘crystal clear idea of the direction in which he wanted the party to move’ and a ‘ruthless will’ to complete the project of modernisation of the party within the context that Kinnock had inaugurated (Shaw, 1996: 195-6). The project of modernisation and reform under Blair can be considered on the basis of three main categories: structural changes, ideology, and communications. The details of these reforms and how these affected the internal character of the party have been examined and analysed under the Stages I and II of the party evolution framework in the previous chapter. The main aim at this point is to address the ‘Blair project’ in relation to the electoral strategy implemented by the leadership in the road to the 1997 general election. For Blair, the main impetus behind Labour’s reforms was electoral victory; whether a ‘neurotic anxiety’ or ‘obsession’ as Seldon characterised Blair’s insistence on winning the next election, for Tony Blair electoral victory was the only way to save the Labour party and ‘not to blow [Labour’s] place in history’ (Seldon, 2004: 237; Fielding, 1997: 30).

It is crucially important to note that when Tony Blair rose to the leadership of the Labour party, the most significant reforms were already in place. Whether planned, designed or negotiated, according to Russell’s argument, the Labour party that Tony
Blair inherited was already deep into the process of transformation to a ‘new’ model party (2005). In substantive terms, therefore, Labour was already in the process of eradicating its links with - the electorally damaging - past traditions. What Blair’s leadership offered Labour was a compound of permanent, highly concentrated emphasis on symbolic changes and a rapid adaptation to the new social, economic and cultural realities of Britain (Shaw, 1996: 193-205). Blair might not have been the pioneer of Labour’s transformation but he definitely defined the party’s communications revolution. Being a highly effective communicator with leadership qualities, it was no surprise that Blair’s reform agenda propagated the communications platform of the ‘break with the past’ and the birth of something ‘new’, freed from the demons and weights of the ‘old’. Labour had to win the trust and confidence of the electorate by changing their perceptions of the party’s competence to govern and by reassuring them that ‘it would not overtax, overspend and overborrow’ on the one hand, while banishing the detrimental effects of the party-union link on the other (Shaw, 1996: 198). In symbolic terms, ‘New’ Labour was born out of the shambles of parochialism in order to accommodate and serve the preferences of ‘middle England’, while offering the ‘heartlands’ the chance to return to power after four consecutive electoral defeats.

Blair was determined to build on the changes of Kinnock but he was also convinced that the party was in need of more fundamental reforms, had it to win the next general election. Contrary to Smith, who believed that the 1992 defeat was due to contingent factors such as the leader’s unpopularity and presentation while the party’s policies were not to blame, Blair believed that Labour’s successive failures proved that the party had not changed enough so as to accommodate the needs and expectations of a new more middle class and individualistic society

14 (Fielding, 1997: 24; Butler and Kavanagh, 1997: 47). Blair was impatient to build a ‘new’ party that would become the party of all people and dismiss its image as the party of the working class, trade unions and the poor and disadvantaged of society. Within that context, the first step of Blair’s modernisation project was to ‘eradicate all aspects of party doctrine and ethos, of policies and strategies, that were of the past’ (Seyd, 1998: 51). Nonetheless, the seemingly radical project that Blair endorsed was not unsubstantiated. A study of political attitudes in the South of England – entitled, Southern Discomfort - that was

14 Smith was more consensual than Kinnock and an advocate of the ‘one more heave’ strategy. He was circumspect about the further reform of the party’s policy agenda and unwilling to continue the modernisation programme initiated by Kinnock. Moreover, he relegated the role of professional advisers who under Kinnock had increased powers at the top decision-making ranks of the party. Labour’s lead in the polls allowed Smith to have a more relax attitude towards the project of modernisation. Nonetheless, the ‘modernisers’ within the party became agitated with Smith’s passive approach, which they believed, hindered the process of modernisation that the party was desperately needed in order to win the electorate’s support.
published by the Fabian society, immediately after the 1992 election confirmed what the party’s research had already identified prior to the election in regard to Labour’s appeal to the median voter. According to the study the party’s target voters in the region, the ‘waverers’ while dissatisfied with the Conservative government, did not vote Labour because they distrusted the Labour party to run the economy. They believed that a Labour government would hold people back, and ‘clobber’ people who want to ‘get on’ in life. From this perspective, voters felt that they had ‘grown out’ of Labour and voting for the party was not ‘in their interests’. Furthermore, they rejected Labour’s core values particularly, equality of income and equality for all, which they considered as an example of hypocrisy, and saw Labour’s image as unappealing, ‘old fashioned’ and weak, tied to trade union interests. And although they perceived Labour as ‘caring and fair’, having the best policies on health and education, in the end ‘they could not bring themselves to vote Labour, because they feared it might make things worse’ (Radice, 1992). Within such a context, Labour was destined to go on losing unless the party responded to the concerns of voters. To this end, the party ought to radically change its structure, ethos, and image. Given Jenkins’ judgement that in 1992 ‘Labour lost because it was Labour’, the party had to reinvent itself, ‘become a new Labour party’ (Radice, 1992). Therefore, the findings of the Southern Discomfort report on the attitudes of ‘waverers’ laid the groundwork upon which the party’s targeting strategy was based. As a consequence, having accepted the Fabian findings, Blair moved on to the creation of a ‘New’ Labour party, with new policies, new constitution, new image and a new electoral base, which would correspond to the new generation of Labour voters. In that sense, Blair attempted to entrench a new culture within the party. Significantly, the ‘new’ party ought not only to be built but also to be ‘ruthlessly’ communicated to the voters.

Blair’s main objectives were clear from the beginning. The manner and scope of his modernisation agenda were greatly defined by his own personality and status within the party. A main priority of this agenda was to remove all these elements that made the party unelectable and related to public perceptions of what Labour stood for. The past and everything that linked Labour with it had to be eradicated. The ‘Old’ Labour party tied to the themes of redistribution and public ownership, high taxation and public spending, which had very close ties with and granted increased powers to trade

\[15\] Taking into account the socio-economic and political changes that took place over the last three decades, Labour had just to win over the supporters of the party, who had improved their standard of living and moved from the traditional working-class to the middle-class; to an extent Labour followed the upward lead of its supporters.

\[16\] An important point has to be raised with regard to Blair’s New Labour. While the current analysis acknowledges the ‘newness’ of Blair’s Labour for communication and electoral purposes, the main argument of the study is that Blair did not ‘create’ a ‘new’ party but rather reinvigorated the Labour party of the pre-Bennite period (see Chapter 4 for a detailed account of the argument).
unions over industrial and economic policies was outworn. Instead, ‘New’ Labour endorsed the values of community, fairness and opportunity, personal responsibility, social justice, and free market with a sense of social responsibility. ‘New’ Labour no longer regarded public spending and borrowing ‘as the means to resolve economic and social problems’ and placed more emphasis on the fight against inflation (Seyd, 1998: 61). Overall, Blair accepted the essentials of the Thatcherite agenda not only in the economic policy but also to other areas such as crime, law and order, and incorporated them into the party’s policy. Most importantly, New Labour distanced itself from the trade unions, which were treated on the basis of ‘fairness not favours’, as any other pressure group (Fielding, 1997: 26). The internal reforms that limited the unions’ role in the party’s decision-making process validated the arguments of New Labour. Furthermore, New Labour loosened its explicit financial links to the trade unions by encouraging private funding. As Table 3.6 shows, there was a substantial increase in the party’s income received from private donations, which rose from £3.5m in 1992 to £14.5m in 1997. At the same time, there was a decline (though not substantial), in the affiliation fees. Another important characteristic of New Labour was the sharp increase in individual party membership, which by the time of the 1997 election reached 420,000 (Table 2.3). However, it is should be stressed that the type and nature of membership was different as the new members were more middle class and less active. They were willing to pay their membership fee, which contributed to the party’s income but not to actively participate to campaigning and mobilisation17. Nevertheless, the large membership gave Labour the character of a modern mass party, while Blair’s initiatives to ballot individual members on Clause IV and the draft manifesto offered the party a plebiscitary form of leadership (Kavanagh, 1997: 534-35).

The most exceptionally communicated ideological input of Blair’s leadership up to the 1997 general election was the revision of Clause IV in 1995. Taking over at a time when the party had moved to the right, he accelerated the pace of ideological reform by revising Clause IV of the party’s constitution, which had committed (at least in theory as the so far analysis of party evolution framework’s Stages I and II has demonstrated) the party to common ownership. This was mainly a symbolic rather than a substantive move but nonetheless, highly important so as to transform the image of the party and win the middle class voters – those who did not trust Labour and Kinnock in 1987 and 1992. The revision of Clause IV had a twofold effect for

17 In their study on the 1997 Labour’s grassroots campaign Whiteley and Seyd (1998) have shown that the ‘Blair members’ were less active than traditional members, and characterised as ‘credit-card members’ willing to pay out their commitment to the party. However, as the same study documented the new members were not only less active but also less likely to donate money; a finding that contrasts to what is generally believed about the new type of members’ financial contributions.
Labour. First, it broke the party’s ideological ties with its radical left-wing past and provided the platform for the inauguration of New Labour. By revising Clause IV Labour abandoned its ‘old’ collectivist image and managed to change the public’s perception over the party’s competence, economic and political. Second, the process that was followed for the acceptance of the new Clause showed the public that New Labour had also broken its ties with the trade unions. In the battle between the leader and the trade unions, that represented the ‘Old’, Blair was not only determined to ‘stand up’ to the union power but also to ‘out-face’ the old union barons (Shaw, 1996: 200). Under the mostly sympathetic and in cases overwhelmingly supportive coverage of the press, Blair consolidated his leadership power and control over the party while the ideas of ‘New’ Labour were entrenched and endorsed by the public. The aftermath of the 1995 special Conference on Clause IV was a triumph for Blair as it consolidated New Labour’s ‘launch’.

**TABLE 3.6: The Labour Party’s Total Annual Income (£M)**

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<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subscriptions</strong></td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Affiliation Fees</strong></td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Donations</strong></td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>24.1</td>
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In general, Blair inherited a party at the verge of success. Not only in electoral terms as Labour had a lead in the polls but in organisational terms as well. The organisational reform of 1993 prepared the party not only for the election of Tony Blair but also for its transformation to New Labour. OMOV had been applied to parliamentary candidate selection, the electoral college had been revised and the ballot of thirds was used for the leader election, the creation of NPF had shifted the power of policy-making in favour of the leadership and the PLP and to a great extent undermined the role and sovereignty of the Annual Conference while the role and influence of the trade unions was confined more than ever before in the party’s history. Nonetheless, Blair continued the series of fundamental reforms in an attempt to safeguard the shift in the balance of power towards the leadership while finalising the transition to ‘participatory’ democracy within the party. As Fielding points out, Blair forwarded a radical change to the party’s constitution out of fear of a possible future conflict between a right government and the left, including activists and unions (2003: 129). In fact, the completion of policy-making reforms came a few months after Labour’s
1997 electoral win, when the Conference endorsed Partnership in Power, a set of proposals drafted by the party’s General Secretary, Tom Sawyer (Ibid: 130).

Although the new process of policy-making as this was laid out in Partnership in Power came into effect a year after the general election of 1997 and thus, it is not under the direct framework of analysis of this research project, it is nonetheless, worthwhile to mention the basic points of the reform. Besides these are indicative of Blair’s impact on the organisational and policy-making mechanisms within the party. The Partnership in Power document comprised the new framework of power centralisation and a membership that was participatory but unassuming and supportive of the leadership. The first document for consultation by the NEC entitled ‘Labour into power: a framework for partnership’ was published in January 1997, a few months before the general election. The timing was crucial as it allowed Blair and his campaign strategists to build further on the image of New Labour. The forthcoming changes in the structure of the party gave substance to the image and operation of the renewed Labour party, convincing the electorate that Labour was in effect a ‘new’ party.

Partnership in Power entailed proposals on ‘policy-making, party conference, the NEC and a healthy party’ (Labour Party, 1997a). The proposals aimed at phasing out the traditional way of policy-making, developing the existing experimental framework – the systematic approach of NPF was considered a success – and establishing the appropriate structures and processes so as the next Labour government’s relations with the party would be in the form of a partnership; a partnership based on trust, mutual support and effective two-way communication (Labour Party, 1997a: 2). Within that context, the proposals were built around three main areas; first, a new policy-making platform was set out, which was based on a two-years long, rolling programme of policy development to culminate with decision-making at the party Conference; second, important changes were introduced into the Conference decision-making processes as well as on the composition of the NEC; and third, great attention was paid to the creation of a large, active and representative membership. Overall, the Partnership enhanced the leader’s control over the party and marked New Labour’s further detachment from the legacy of the Old Labour party. It gave further policy-making powers to members while further curtailing the powers of Conference and NEC. The new ‘culture’ that developed within the party ought to minimise the conflicts between leadership and members, as it would be based on a ‘genuine’ partnership between them.
In the field of communications, Blair’s most important output during the first years of his leadership rendered to the creation of the ‘myth of ‘new’ Labour’ through the dramatisation of the party’s long and multi-leved transformation (Russell, 2005: 251; Fielding, 2003: 100-101). Blair epitomised everything the ‘new’ party stood for and successfully communicated the outcome of the gradual and piecemeal reform project through the tactical orchestration of symbolic changes. Great emphasis was given to the communication of the ‘new’ party image, a project formulated and tightly controlled by the leader and his ‘inner circle’. Under Blair, Labour’s communications and campaign strategy was once in the hands of the people who had been closely associated with the party’s communications revolution in 1987 and 1992, Peter Mandelson and Philip Gould. Blair’s Press Secretary and former journalist Alastair Campbell completed the team, which with Blair himself and Gordon Brown constituted the party’s communications hierarchy, managing and controlling New Labour’s image and relations with the media18 (Fielding, 1997: 27). The recall of Mandelson and Gould signalled the return to the extensive use of market intelligence. Indeed, under Blair polling and qualitative research mainly in the form of ‘focus groups’ were extensively used and even came to dictate Labour’s electoral strategy (Fielding, 1997: 25). During the three years before the election Gould conducted 300 focus groups, while over the six and a half weeks of the election campaign he conducted around 70 (Wring, 2005: 145).

Within the context of renewal and change a new campaign and media centre was established at Millbank Tower, close to Westminster, which consisted the main headquarters of the party’s campaign team. Millbank was the centre from where the party’s campaigning was deployed. A Rapid Rebuttal Unit was set up to handle the attacks of the opposition and increase the flexibility of the campaign and a number of task-forces were specialising in contacting voters in the 90 constituencies that the party had identified as ‘key seats’. Labour, through the implementation of a highly sophisticated strategy plan code-named ‘Operation Victory’, endowed heavily to contact voters in these areas as these identified as ‘switchers’ made up the basis of the party’s electoral victory (Butler and Kavanagh, 1997: 59). The work of the rebuttal unit was made more efficient with Excalibur EFS (electronic filing software), a computerised database that allowed the party to respond almost immediately to Conservative claims and neutralise attacks within the same ‘news cycle’. This gave a great advantage to Labour especially, during the short-term election campaign, to overtake the Conservatives. Furthermore, it became a ‘symbol of Labour’s

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18 Other prominent figures were Tom Sawyer, the chief of staff, Margaret McDonagh, the head of the campaigns unit and later General Election Coordinator (after Fraser Kemp’s resignation in 1996), Joy Johnson, Director of Campaigns and Communications who left a few months before the election campaign.
professionalisation’ (Butler and Kavanagh, 1997: 59). It is worth noting that the formulation of New Labour’s communications strategy and the immense focus on image and message was strongly influenced by Clinton’s presidential Campaigns of 1992 and 1996. In fact, some critiques went as far as claiming that there was a ‘Clintonisation’ of Labour (Butler and Kavanagh, 1997: 57; Gould, 1998a: 161-182).

In short, Blair did not ‘create’ the Labour party that won the 1997 election with a landslide. Whilst capitalising on the organisational and ideological changes that his predecessors had introduced, Blair re-branded the Labour product as ‘new’, distanced it from the ‘evils’ of the past, eloquently launched the ‘new’ image of Labour to the electorate and restored the party’s electoral fortunes. The reforms that Kinnock and Smith (OMOV) had introduced, had increased the leadership’s power to ‘manage’, even control, the party mechanism allowing Blair to promulgate further changes into the structure and ethos of Labour. He tactically communicated the changes and reforms that were already in place since the mid-1980s and propagated in the best possible way that Labour had broken its ties with the past. The increased media focus on both the strategically implemented running of ‘his’ party and on his personality, and style of leadership helped the creation of a highly tenable party image. Moreover, the articulate communications machine played a crucial role in managing not only Labour’s electoral strategy but also by keeping everyone ‘on message’ avoided inconsistencies and possible conflicts, contributing to the presentation of a united behind the leader ‘new’ Labour party. While in substance Labour had changed in the 1980s, the symbolic transformation of the party under Blair was what led it, initially, to the 1997 electoral landslide and also to two more consecutive electoral victories in 2001 and 2005. Blair’s New Labour became the cornerstone of the most electorally successful period in the party’s history.

*The 1997 Election Campaign*

As was the case in 1987 and 1992 for the Conservatives Labour won the election by default. What nobody could predict was the scale of Labour’s victory. In fact, there were fears of a hung parliament with Labour as the largest party. Given the shock of the 1992 defeat even the Labour leaders could not anticipate the scale of their electoral victory and were sceptical on the effect that New Labour had on the electorate (Gould, 1998a). However, the scale of electoral victory was not the only remarkable aspect of the 1997 Labour party. The way that this was accomplished, the party’s election campaign attracted a great amount of interest. The preparation and organisation of the campaign, the centralisation and control of the politicians’
activities and the professionalism of the party’s campaign machine were unprecedented. If the 1987 election campaign comprised ‘one of the most effective pieces of disciplined communication’, in 1997 New Labour run the most sophisticated campaign of its history. To this end Peter Mandelson described the publicity operation at Millbank Centre as the ‘finest, most professional campaigning machine that Labour has ever created’ (cited in Jones, 1997: 12). And this time the party did not only win the battle of the campaign but the election as well. The fact is however, that the 1997 campaign was not the outcome of an overly innovative process. Many of the tactics were borrowed from the 1992 and 1996 successful campaigns of Clinton’s Democratic party in the US (Gould, 1998a). Moreover, most of the operational groundwork was already laid in 1987 and 1992. The 1997 election campaign was the product of a gradual process of internal reforms and external influences, which combined with the intense and rapid pace of change under Blair’s leadership, set out the template of contemporary campaigning in most parts of the western world. In terms of party development, the 1997 election campaign consolidated Labour as a ‘Campaign Communicator’ party signalling Labour’s trajectory to the third stage of the Party Evolution Framework, and thus, confirming its communications transformation and professionalisation.

There are many approaches describing and examining the campaign processes and emphasising the high degree of professionalism in campaign management. The majority of these focus on the various stages of the development of political campaigning dividing these phases in thematic and/or sequential developments (Farrell and Bowler, 1992; Farrell and Webb, 2000; Norris, 2002; Lees-Marshment, 2001). These approaches are analysed in detail in Chapter 1 (theoretical framework) of this thesis. Although none of these frameworks are directly used for the analysis of the 1997 Labour election campaign at this stage, aspects of these are borrowed for the examination of the campaign, which is based on two main levels. The first one refers to the internal structure and processes that have a bearing on the organisation, preparation, control and implementation of the campaign. In a more in depth analysis, this also includes the campaign machine, campaign objectives and messages and campaign communication. The second level of analysis considers a wider aspect of the electoral context of the campaign, focusing mainly, on the mass media, especially, on the press and on the battle for the campaign agenda. In short, the first level of examination of the 1997 campaign focuses on the setting up and running of the campaign while the second level acknowledges the external factors that could affect the party’s campaign style and mode.
As already noted above, Blair reorganised and revived the strategic communications team that had served under Kinnock but had been marginalized during Smith’s leadership. The intense preparation of the election campaign started almost eighteen months before May 1997 when the party’s campaign and communications headquarters moved to Millbank Tower. During the election campaign more than 300 staff were based at Millbank headquarters, comprising the twelve different task-forces that executed the different aspects of a very well-planned and managed campaign (Gould, 1998a: 303, 309). The campaign team, consisted of Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, Peter Mandelson, Philip Gould, Alastair Campbell, Jonathan Powell, Anji Hunter and Margaret McDonagh, as well as the party staff, consultants and politicians who surrounded them, had already done all the preparatory work needed so as the Labour election machine from the leader to the last campaigner on the ground would work in pristine order. Two were the main reference points within Millbank: the ‘war room’ and the ‘war book’. Both comprised the heart and soul of the campaign being vital elements to the shape, execution, cohesiveness and foremost, effectiveness of New Labour’s campaign apparatus. The campaigning was structured in a central ‘war room’ (a concept originating in Clinton’s 1992 campaign), an open plan office, in which all campaign personnel and campaign operations were based. The concentration of all campaign operations in a physical space facilitated interpersonal communication, promoted a sense of community and gave the campaign process the necessary cohesion to work properly and effectively (Wring, 2005: 145; Gould, 1998a: 299). In the middle of the room, there was the ‘campaign hub’, a collection of desks reserved for the campaign hierarchy and the Rapid Rebuttal Unit, while Excalibur was located in a separate room for security reasons (Gould, 1998a: 300-301). The security was so strict at Millbank and no journalists were allowed access to the second and third floors where the ‘war room’ and Tony Blair’s office were based (Butler and Kavanagh, 1997: 95).

The second important element of the campaign strategy was the ‘war book’. It was the ‘strategic anchor’ of New Labour’s campaigning as it embraced all vital information for the preparation and execution of the campaign (Gould, 1998a: 309). The ‘war book’ contained a detailed account of both Labour’s and Conservatives strengths and

Tony Blair was directly involved in the day-by-day affairs of the campaign and determined the party line, while Gordon Brown had the political control of the campaign and Peter Mandelson was in charge of Millbank. Moreover, Derry Irvine, Stan Greenberg (pollster from the ‘Clinton’ campaign team), Peter Hyman, Brian Wilson, David Bradshaw (prepared material for the press), Mathew Taylor (head of policy), Charlie Wheelan, Greg Cook (party polling), Alan Barnard were some of the other central figures of the New Labour campaigning organisation.
weaknesses, identified the competitive positions of both parties and attempted to ‘map out’ and anticipate the likely Conservative campaign plan. More importantly, it set out Labour’s campaign in detail; presented the ‘three anchors’ – Remind, Reassure, Reward – and included the party’s final dividing lines – leadership not drift, for the many not for the few, the future not the past – as well as the campaign message – Enough is Enough: Britain Deserves Better – and the party’s ‘offers to the electorate’. The target audience was identified, analysed and asserted in five main groups, which included swing voters (the party’s key group and primary focus), women, first-time voters, the party’s historic base (the DE) and the key group of marginals (‘Operation Victory’). Finally, the ‘war book’ contained an extensive campaign grid20 (which for security reasons was not filled) and a summary of New Labour’s pledges (Gould, 1998a: 311-313). Substantially, the ‘war book’ underpinned the effectiveness of the party’s campaign and the cohesiveness of the ‘electoral project’. Surprisingly, however, when the Conservatives leaked the war book to the press on the sixth week of the election campaign, the event did not harm the Labour campaign. It just focused once again the attention to the high levels of professionalism of the election campaign.

As in 1987 and 1992, the 1997 campaign followed a well-planned routine of meetings, press conferences, photo-opportunities and briefings. Though, in 1997 the act of ‘spinning’ was more systematic than in previous elections due mainly, to the significant changes in the media context. The Labour team at Millbank followed a 24-hour routine; the ‘Daily Brief’ was taking place at 1 a.m.; at 7 a.m. met the ‘war room’ group under Gordon Brown to preview the press conference that was due for 8:30 a.m. and reassert the agenda for the day. The press conference began with a video clip and the campaign’s theme music from the D:Ream ‘Things can only get better’ then the brief statements of the party’s theme of the day were read (and distributed to the journalists) followed by 20 minutes of questions (Butler and Kavanagh, 1997: 92-94). Other meetings followed throughout the day to assess the parties’ press conferences and review the findings of polls, focus groups and the feedback from key seats (Butler and Kavanagh, 1997: 92). Tony Blair travelled around the country to visit key constituencies and appear to the local media21. It is noteworthy that Blair and/or senior figures of the Labour leadership visited every one of the party’s target seats; as Fisher and Denver (2008) showed the ‘mean number of visits was an astonishing 6.7’

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20 The grid was one of the main operational elements of the campaign. For Gould it comprised the ‘heart of the election campaign’ (1998: 335). Outlined in the form of a timetable, it combined the strategic and message imperatives as well as the logistics in just one piece of paper. And although the grid details were continuously changing this sort of flexibility gave the campaign the necessary cohesion, shape and effectiveness.

21 Blair’s tour included three coaches, one for him and his team and the other two for the press. Moreover, each one of the buses had a painted slogan on it, which in sequence read: ‘Leading Britain…..’, ‘Into the Future…’, ‘… with Tony Blair’ (Gould, 1998a: 357).
for the Labour party well ahead of both the Conservatives (4.5) and the Liberal Democrats (2.9)(Table 3.11).

When the six-week official campaign opened the Labour party’s main objective was to defend the substantial lead of nearly 20 percent that it had built over the last three years (Kavanagh, 1997: 538; Norris et al., 1999: 35). As a result, the main aim was not to win new voters by turning to extreme ways of campaigning but to defend the very positive image that had managed to build under the leadership of Tony Blair. Having learnt the bitter lessons of the past and especially, of the 1992 election defeat, Blair and his advisers preferred to implement a ‘protective strategy’ focusing more on Labour’s positive image while moderately attacking the government’s record. Labour’s strategy aimed to reassure the voters, who considered Labour as ‘potentially unsafe’, that the party is ‘safe’; and for this purpose a strategy of ‘relentless reassurance’ was implemented before and during the election campaign (Gould, 1998a: 258-9). In general, the 1997 election campaign had no extremes. While the opinions polls gave a clear lead to the Labour party, early election estimates (including estimates of opinion pollsters and pundits, as well as the betting markets) gave a blurred picture of the electoral reality, ranging from a Conservative majority, a hung parliament and a Labour majority of no more than 110 (Norris, 1997: 512; Rosenbaum, 1999). In fact, the actual election outcome of a Labour majority of 177 took everyone by surprise. As Rosenbaum indicated while the betting industry succeeded in estimating the parties’ share of the vote, at a remarkable better spread than the pundits, the differential national swing (including high levels of tactical voting) thwarted all estimates by grasping the actual Labour majority.

At the outset of the official campaign Labour had already established clear ideas of its themes, messages and target voters. The five pledges, which had been initially published in the party’s early manifesto ‘New Life for Britain’ in 1996, became the centrepiece of the election campaign (Box 3.1). As a response to the relentless negative campaigning of the Tories, Labour decided to go positive and stay on that track for as long as possible (Gould, 1998b: 9-10). The main campaign theme ‘Britain deserves better’ had a twofold effect; first, no matter how strong the economy appeared to be, the theme retained its validity and second, it conveyed the message of hope that things would get much better under a Labour government. Everything reflected the ‘war book’s’ concerns and planning and as a result, was built around it. Labour’s main aim was to communicate its ‘new’ product to ‘middle England’ and

22 All messages corresponded to Tony Blair’s opening statement in the party manifesto: *Our case is simple: that Britain can and must be better - better schools, better hospitals, better ways of tackling crime, of building a modern welfare state, of equipping ourselves for a new world economy* (Labour Party, 1997).
‘switchers’, to those people who had previously voted for the Conservative party but felt betrayed and were not represented by the Tories any longer. Having eradicated the ‘ghosts’ of its past (tax, unions, economic competence) Labour focused on communicating its strong programme on health, education and tax. Having adopted policies that responded to the concerns and demands of ‘middle England’ voters, Labour engaged in reassuring the electorate on its competence and communicating the party’s messages rather than fighting to sell its policies, adopting in that way a market-oriented approach (Lees-Marshment, 2001: 192-195).

**BOX 3.1: New Labour’s Early Pledges**

1. *Cut class sizes to 30 or under for 5, 6, and 7 year-olds* by using money from assisted places scheme
2. *Fast-track punishment for persistent young offenders* by halving the time from arrest to sentencing
3. *Cut NHS waiting lists by treating and extra 100,000 patients* as a first step by releasing £100 million saved from NHS red tape
4. *Get 250,000 under-25 year-olds off benefit and into work* by using money from a windfall levy on the privatised utilities
5. *Set tough rules for government spending and borrowing; ensure low inflation; strengthen the economy* so that interest rates are as low as possible


**BOX 3.2: New Labour’s ‘Contract With The People’**

*Over the five years of a Labour government:*

1. *Education will be our number one priority, and we will increase the share of national income spent on education as we decrease it on the bills on economic and social failure*
2. *There will be no increase in the basic top rates of income tax*
3. *We will provide stable economic growth with low inflation, and promote dynamic and competitive business and industry at home and abroad*
4. *We will get 250,000 young unemployed off benefit and into work*
5. *We will rebuild the NHS, reducing spending on administration and increasing spending on patient care*
6. *We will be tough on crime and tough on the causes of crime, and halve the time it takes persistent juvenile offenders to come to court*
7. *We will help build strong families and strong communities, and lay the foundations of a modern welfare state in pensions and community care*
8. *We will safeguard our environment, and develop an integrated transport policy to fight congestion and pollution*
9. *We will clean up politics, decentralise political power throughout the United Kingdom and put the funding of political parties on a proper and accountable basis*
10. *We will give Britain the leadership in Europe which Britain and Europe need*

Labour’s advertising during the official campaign period reflected the party’s positive philosophy. Even when a negative message was launched then it was counterbalanced with a positive one. The posters that were produced used vivid, bright colours and played two lines; ‘New Labour, New Britain’ and the main campaign theme ‘Britain Deserves Better’. In fact, the last poster of the campaign had a picture of Blair with the line ‘Vote Today. Because Britain Deserves Better’ (Gould, 1998a: 319). The second main theme of the poster campaign referred to the pledges. In very well-orchestrated photo-opportunity moments, many of these bright coloured pledge posters were actually launched by Tony Blair during the campaign in what they called the ‘field of dreams’. ‘More Jobs for Young People’, ‘Young Offenders Will be Punished’, ‘Income Tax Rates Will not Rise’ were some these posters, aiming to overturn the negative tone of the election that the Conservatives had introduced (Williams, 1997).

During the election campaign the Labour party produced five PEBs. The first one was business oriented and its launch coincided with the launch of the party’s business manifesto, on April 10. The broadcast set out a positive message, reassuring the business community that Labour is ‘a party that business can do business with’ (Gould, 1998a: 322). The second election broadcast was launched on April 15 and it was the famous ‘bulldog’ broadcast. There were images of ‘Fitz’ the bulldog within a black and white sequence that were intercepted by pictures of Tony Blair meeting world leaders and talking about his hopes and dreams for Britain, how Britain could become better under a strong leadership. Britishness, patriotism as well as education and the NHS were raised by Blair who claimed that ‘Britain can be Better’. The third election broadcast, on April 21, was the most successful one. It was based on ‘fear’, on how dangerous the Conservatives would be if elected for a fifth term but the humorous way in which it was presented allowed the party to run one of its most negative advertisements without alienating or irritating the public. There was no speech in the broadcast only commentary in the form of captions; rather there was the soundtrack of ‘Land of Hope and Glory’ played over images from the Conservative conference while shots of everyday people living in the real world and facing serious problems in hospitals, nursing homes, in the streets, in schools were counter-played with the joyful, arrogant and rather unflattering images of Conservative politicians.

The fourth broadcast was concentrated on Blair. It portrayed Tony Blair signing a poster, playing tennis, visiting a hospital and talking to children in a school. These scenes were complemented by scenes of Tony Blair in a car, a train and his home kitchen where presented an honest, down to earth account of himself (acknowledging

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23The broadcast, which consisted of two parts, presented the comments of business people such as Anmita Roddick, Terence Conran and Gerry Robinson asserting the importance of business and reassuring the public of Labour’s and Gordon Brown’s economic competence.
that his father was a Tory), and his ideas. Finally, the fifth broadcast was launched three days before polling day, on April 28. Focusing once again on ‘fear’ of a fifth Conservative term in government, it featured a father and a daughter who had to wait for treatment on a broken hand in hospital for hours. The message of the film, reinforced through images of how the girl’s life would be affected in a negative way under a Conservative government, focused on encouraging voters to go out and vote for Labour. The end of the broadcast relayed Labour voting with a positive message.

The major electoral asset of New Labour, as it became evident over the unusually long - six and a half weeks - campaign, was its leader. Tony Blair was the first Labour leader after almost two decades who was leading the polls on leader popularity and competence. As shown in Table 3.2 Blair’s ratings were way ahead of John Major’s on the best Prime Minister question, a lead that Blair got in the aftermath of his leadership election, held and broadened up to the election day despite the fact that he was regarded as inexperienced and too young. These data are of particular importance as perceptions of leader personality played a central role in the 1997 election campaign, which signalled a shift of significance from the ideological lines of party competition to the personalities and qualities of the leaders. To this end, Blair won the election for Labour rather than vice versa. As Seymour-Ure accurately indicated ‘if Major was part of the Conservatives’ problem, Blair was part of the Labour’s solution’ (1998: 131). Blair’s personality and communications attributes won him high rates of approval within the electorate and the media. It was therefore, no surprise that the Sun on the day after the election was announced declared its support for Blair and not for Labour. Moreover, Tony Blair was a ‘relentless campaigner’ (Butler and Kavanagh, 1997: 63). He run an exceptional and strongly media focused campaign in the run up to party leadership and engaged Labour to a ‘permanent electioneering operation’ (Seyd, 1998: 53-55; Butler and Kavanagh, 1997: 63). He was really close to the operations at Millbank and as expected of him, he was the ‘ultimate campaign director and central bearer of the party’s message’ (Butler and Kavanagh, 1997: 91). Furthermore, as the campaign progressed, Tony Blair ‘found himself’; he was much more confident and spontaneous, and did not hesitate when his microphone failed to give up his notes, move to the front of the platform and talk to his audience in a spontaneous and old-fashioned way (Butler and Kavanagh, 1997: 94; Williams, 1997; Gould, 1998a: 372). He also sought and managed to gain the support of most of the press, which offered positive comments and approval of Blair’s professional skills and personality traits, mainly, focusing on his vision, passion, energy and toughness as a
Labour leader (Seymour-Ure, 1998). In fact, these contemporary accounts on Blair’s personal impact on the party’s popularity and electoral fortunes have been vindicated ten years later. As a recent study by Denver and Fisher acknowledges ‘Labour’s success under Blair was arguably more to do with the man himself than with ideological or policy positioning’ (2009: 38). To this end, Labour’s electoral revival and resilience constitute one of Blair’s major achievements that have defined his legacy.

The centralisation and elitism of the campaign management did not undermine nor weaken constituency campaigning; instead it emphasised the momentum of local campaigning by focusing a great deal of resources and effort to the targeted seats. In the autumn of 1995, Labour launched a highly sophisticated targeting strategy plan, codenamed ‘Operation Victory’, which as Denver and Hands noted ‘rewrote the rules’ of constituency election campaigning (1998: 76). Party officials in Millbank drew up a list of 90 marginal seats, which Labour needed to win on a swing of 6 percent or less, in order to get a majority (Fielding, 1997: 29). These seats became the focus of the party’s campaigning at both national and local levels; centrally, a task force was set up at Millbank headquarters to coordinate and monitor the campaign in the key seats, whilst all key marginals were provided with full time campaign agents paid for by central funds (Denver, Hands and Henig, 1998: 177). At the same time, party members in ‘safe’ and/or ‘hopeless’ constituencies were requested to concentrate their activities on their neighbouring target seats, while the assistance of trade unions was also coordinated and organised by the centre with the appointment of union coordinators in all key seats. The central element of the ‘Operation Victory’ strategy was the pre-election campaign work, which involved a mass telephone ‘voter identification’ operation (Denver et al., 2003: 543). The previously known process of telephone canvassing was organised at a more modernised, sophisticated and highly professional level that gave a tremendous advantage to Labour strategists to target their key voters efficiently and effectively during the campaign period. Based on a script-cum-questionnaire, the responses of electors were systematically recorded and classified into predefined categories such as ‘reliable Labour’, ‘weak Labour’, ‘undecided’ etc. The two most important target groups for Labour strategists were the

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24 Blair enjoyed an unusually high popularity. As Gallup polls showed his approval ratings rocketed by 58 percent in August 1994 to 70 percent in April 1997 (King et al., 2001: 217-218).

25 Various studies have shown that constituency campaigning has increased in importance in the 1990s, a view that the major political parties came to share and as a result, concentrate a great deal of their resources, money and personnel to local campaigning. Local agents found a new role in the process of local campaigning (Fisher, Denver and Hands, 2006a), which had moved to the general use of modern techniques of marketing intelligence, high-tech equipment and flexible specialisation (Denver and Hands, 2002).

26 However, the national targeting strategy of resources’ re-allocation to key marginal seats had limited success as only 9 of the total of 28 percent of party activists who were asked to work in another constituency, did so (Whiteley and Seyd, 1998:197-198).
‘switchers’ and ‘first-time voters’. This information was then passed to Millbank from where computer mailings of leaflets and tailor-made messages and letters were sent to the different groups of voters. Overall, constituency campaigning played a central role in Labour’s electoral strategy and as surveys in key seats revealed, the mobilisation of local members was particularly important in Labour’s electoral performance in 1997 (Denver and Hands, 1998; Denver et al., 2003; Whiteley, and Seyd, 2003).

However, it is worth noting that the effectiveness of local campaigning was strongly related to the increased involvement of Labour’s central communications team in local activities. The close monitoring and control of local campaigners by Millbank, the continuous feedback of information through daily briefs as well as the recruitment of professional agents to coordinate and run local party campaigning led to a highly disciplined, well-executed and professional campaign; moreover, Labour demonstrated its ‘unity’ as everybody stayed ‘on message’ with the leader. It is notable that by the time the official campaign began, Labour local parties had already laid the groundwork for electoral mobilisation on polling day. As indicated by Denver, Hands and Henig (1998), 84 percent of Labour’s target seats had completed the most substantial work of ‘voter identification’ before the start of the official campaign, demonstrating the effectiveness of Labour’s impeccable campaigning machine. Hence, the well-organised and implemented ‘Operation Victory’ led Labour to a landslide, indicating that in an increasingly mediated environment the direct link between citizens and parties remains a safe mode of approach in order to mobilise support, rendering the impact of local campaigning on the vote highly important.

Labour’s manifesto *New Labour Because Britain Deserves Better* was launched on April 3. The cover featured a photograph of Tony Blair, vindicating the role of the leader in New Labour’s character and trajectory. The content of the manifesto was based on the earlier version *New Labour New Life for Britain*, which was launched in 1996 after being put to a plebiscite of its members. The five pledges (Box 1) that were included in the earlier version were expanded to a ten-point ‘Contract’ with the people (Box 2), included in the first pages of the 1997 manifesto (Labour party, 1997; Gould, 1998a: 360). The manifesto promises fell within the context of the party’s communications strategy. They were characterised by prudence, a pragmatic view on what the party would be able to achieve when elected in government, and by a very carefully designed strategy, to respond to the demands of the wider base of the

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27 These included an eve-of-poll letter reminding voters to turn out to vote the next day, a short video demonstrating how easy it is to vote for first-time voters and more targeted policy information to ‘switchers’ who were also contacted by the local candidate (Whiteley and Seyd, 1998: 194; Denver, Hands and Henig, 1998: 179).
electorate. The issues of health, education, youth crime, unemployment, and fiscal prudence were complemented by the party’s commitment to major constitutional reform, the introduction of minimum wage, and a windfall tax on the recently nationalised utilities. Labour’s manifesto received positive responses; once again the party leadership had managed to address the public’s most important demands and to reassure voters of the competence, credibility and prudence of a Labour government. The direct and honest way, under which the ‘contract’ was communicated so as to hold the party accountable if the promises were not fulfilled at the end of the government’s term, accurately served Labour’s campaign targets.

Electoral Context: The Role of the Media

Given the awkward relationship between the media, mostly the press, and the Labour party that had been developed over the years, one of Blair’s top priorities was to reconstruct the bridges with the most influential but strongly hostile to Labour, ‘Tory press’, and especially, with the Murdoch conglomerate. The outcome of Millbank’s deliberations was remarkable; Blair, Campbell and Mandelson did not only manage to ‘soften’ the ‘Tory’ press attitude towards New Labour but to shift their allegiances in supporting or at least, cheerleading Blair and/or Labour. At the outset of the campaign six out of ten national dailies and five out of nine Sunday editions, delivering more than 60 percent in circulation terms had endorsed New Labour (Table 3.7).

A variety of factors contributed to making the 1997 election to be considered a historic watershed. First, Labour’s landslide marked an unprecedented voter swing of more than 10 percent, vindicating New Labour’s successful transformation to meet the challenges of the times. Second, the 1997 election was characterised by a sweeping partisan realignment in the press - and the outset of a dealignment procedure (Norris, 1998). As already mentioned, Blair and his media advisers got much more than they hoped for in 1997; a gradual detachment of the Tory press from the Conservative party and a conditional but significant shift of support to New Labour. However, it should be borne in mind that, on the whole, the change in press loyalties was the end of a process that had started in the early 1990s and rested on a variety of factors, including changes in media ownership as well as in the attitudes and interests of the proprietors, which led to the creation of an autonomous ‘media logic’ freed from traditional partisanship; the tabloidisation of the press as a means to increase circulation; the disillusionment with the - highly unpopular - Conservative government; the papers’ attempt to follow rather than lead the public opinion; and foremost, their willingness to back the winner (Norris, 1998: 120, 124; McKie, 1998: 117-119; Deacon, 1998: 129; Seymour-Ure, 1997: 587-588; Wring, 1997: 82).
The Sun’s headline ‘THE SUN BACKS BLAIR’ at the outset of the campaign was accurately acknowledged to be the biggest news of the campaign (Butler and Kavanagh, 1997: 83). In a sense, it cultivated the way forward for other ‘converts’ to openly endorse Labour over the six-week campaign period. Fundamentally, based on the mantra ‘Give change a chance’ the Sun provided essential support to Blair but not the Labour party, whilst a closer look to the editorials of the paper indicated a goodwill and an open mind towards Blair’s New Labour but also reservations and reluctance to whether Old Labour had been completely transformed (Deacon et al. 1998: 142; McKie, 1998: 118-119; Seymour-Ure, 1997: 593). More importantly, the Sun repeatedly stressed and kept a firm position on the core – mainly, conservative – values that the paper considered important, indicating that it was Labour that had changed and not the paper’s values (Deacon et al. 1998: 148). The Sun’s lead was followed by the News of the World, which backed New Labour in its last edition before polling day, despite its highly critical stance on Labour during the campaigning. The Daily Star also backed Blair, by declaring ‘THERE’S TONY ONE WAY TO GO’ while expressing concerns on the issues of the unions, taxation, and Europe (Wring, 1997: 76; Deacon et al. 1998). As expected, the Mirror, Sunday Mirror and People remained loyal to Labour, declared themselves to be the party’s true supporter and
focused their coverage on traditional Labour issues (NHS, education etc) and on attacking and criticising the Conservatives (McKie, 1998: 122). Moreover, the Daily Mail, Express, and the Daily Telegraph remained pro-Conservative. Finally, among the broadsheets the Guardian, Observer, Independent, Independent On Sunday and Financial Times endorsed the Labour party while the Daily Telegraph, Sunday Telegraph and Sunday Times, supported the Conservatives. Only The Times did not declare allegiance to any particular party but supported individual Euro-sceptic candidates (Table 9). Overall, the shift in the newspapers’ allegiance to Labour may not have played the most crucial role in the election outcome and the party’s landslide victory but nonetheless, amplified Labour’s positive appeal to a much wider base of voters. However, it is should be stressed that this support was not unconditional; press editorial opinion was not reversed but only shifted towards Blair and/or the Labour party28 (Deacon et al., 1998: 147).

The battle for the campaign agenda was fierce and all main actors involved, Labour, the Conservatives and the media, fought to win it, each for different reasons29. In general, there was a broad consensus between the broadcasting media and the press on the issues that dominated the agenda over the six weeks of the official campaign, notwithstanding that if examined in a more detailed manner, there were variations on the focus, interest, style and the degree of salience attributed to the issues reported in the press and television as well as among newspapers (Deacon et al. 1998: 139; Harris et al. 1999). From an aggregate perspective, however, there was not much diversity in the media agenda. The 1997 election was about ‘sleaze’, Europe and mostly, the campaign conduct – including party internal politics and party leaders who were the focal point of the campaign, which was by far the most covered issue in the news, special election TV and radio programmes, newspaper front pages and editorials (Harris et al., 1999; Deacon et al., 1998; Seymour-Ure, 1997; Harrison, 1997; Wring, 1997; Goddard et al, 1998). Other prominent issues included policies on education, health, pensions and welfare, taxation and economy, the unions and constitutional reform (Ibid). However, despite the high degree of importance that voters attributed to social issues, these received very little coverage by the media and were almost ignored by newspaper editorials (Seymour-Ure, 1997: 595).

28 The partisan realignment in the press that took place in 1997 was definitely one of the major elements of the campaign. Nonetheless, as various studies have demonstrated when put into context, there was only one straight conversion from Conservatives to Labour; the Sun. The rest of the ‘converts’ provided differing levels of support and commitment to the Labour party, mainly cheerleading the leader and preparing the nation for the inevitable change in government and following a more central and moderate profile (Deacon et al., 1998: 146-147; McKie, 1998; Seymour-Ure, 1997: 588-589).

29 The 1997 election was not a ‘position-issue’ election but a ‘valence-issue’ one as was the case in 1992 (Newton, 1993: 135). Therefore, neither Labour nor the Conservatives were able to set the agenda but just to compete on the issues of competence and credibility.
In some rather controversial way, the electoral context in 1997 was overwhelmed by the shift in allegiances of the national press, which in effect, became the most notable development of the election campaign. The election marked an unprecedented partisan dealignment, which signalled the end of the so-called ‘Tory press’ partnership with the Conservative party and marked the beginning of a new era in the media-party relationship, in which partisanship played an important but rather secondary role. Nevertheless, two main issues have to be considered for this new alignment. First, many academics expressed serious doubts about the attributes of loyalty swing in the press and mostly, with regard to its manner and scope. That is, whether this was a ‘change for the change’s sake’ and therefore, with short-term effects (Seymour-Ure, 1997:606-607). The reasons that led to the shift in support and transformed the balance of coverage in 1997 in favour of Labour were far from solid and this had an effect on Labour’s internal communications development during the campaign. On the one hand, Labour had the support of the press but this was conditional and cautionary (Deacon et al. 1998: 148). The cheerleading of Blair’s leadership credentials did not eradicate the fears of ‘old’ Labour’s revival; they trusted and supported Blair but raised doubts about the left-wing elements that in spite of the party’s renewal still existed within Labour. On the other hand, the Labour leadership had learnt its lessons from 1992 and kept a low profile attitude towards the opinion polls and the overwhelming lead of more than 20 percent given to Labour. For Labour to win the election two factors were crucial; the mobilisation of the party’s voters and supporters and the continuous ‘spinning’ of the media; the latter tactic concentrated mainly on manipulating the press to not publish stories that could hurt the party’s image rather than to position the party’s main messages and to set the agenda.

Two further points need to be considered in regard to New Labour’s 1997 campaign. First, despite the meticulously planned and executed campaign, it would be inaccurate to claim that gaffes and/or mistakes were not made. New Labour’s campaign came under extreme pressure on at least three occasions over the six weeks of the official campaign. In the second week Labour was on the defensive on a debate over party-unions relations, then in early April the party had a ‘wobbly’ week when Tony Blair in an interview with ‘Scotsman’ made an embarrassing ‘parish council’ remark over the powers of a Scottish Parliament, and a few days later there was confusion over the privatisation of the air-traffic control service. A final tremble was in week six when a ‘Guardian’ poll suggested that Labour’s lead had been reduced to 5 percent while the party’s leads on economic competence and Europe were slashed (Gould, 1998a: 376). This caused an initial concern in the Labour team but soon a private poll showing a 17 percent lead came to eliminate any doubts about the Labour victory. Second, the 1997
election campaign was the most professional but also it was relatively the most expensive to the time. The total campaign expenditure of the Labour party at national (and local) level rocketed to £26m from £11.2 in 1992 (Table 3.8). As Table 3.9 shows, the highest campaign investment was on traditional forms of campaigning – rallies, events, campaign tours, polling etc – which absorbed 48.2 percent of the total campaign expenditure (£15.5m). The next largest sum (£7m) went on advertising and mostly, on posters. A total of £4.8m corresponding to 28.4 percent of the campaign budget was spent on posters, depicting once again Labour’s emphasis on poster boards.

For newspaper advertising Labour spent £900,000 but the figure does not include the almost £1m, which was spent by UNISON in support for Labour (Butler and Kavanagh, 1997: 242; Powell, 1998: 31-35). Finally, as expected due to strict regulation on TV advertising, a relatively low £600,000 was spent on the production of PEBs.

**TABLE 3.8: The Labour Party’s General Election Expenditure Since 1983 (£)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Per cent increase</th>
<th>At 1997 prices £m</th>
<th>At constant prices £m</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983-97</td>
<td>+550</td>
<td></td>
<td>+22.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**TABLE 3.9: Type Of Campaign Expenditure: Labour (£m)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>£m</th>
<th>percent of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>48.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tony Blair, while describing ‘his kind of Britain’, broadly referred to the dividing lines his leadership and his project of modernisation of the Labour party was built upon; reality and theory, potential and performance, means and ends (Blair, 1996: ix-xii). His leadership took the party further forward than Kinnock and Smith. By 1997 Labour was New Labour, had a new constitution, a new detailed policy agenda, more members than for a generation, a modern relationship with the unions and OMOV was used for the election of candidates (Ibid.: xi). Furthermore, the popularity of the leader combined with a meticulously planned and executed communications strategy, formulated by a highly professional team of pollsters, media consultants, party officials and senior politicians provided a solid framework upon which Labour was based to convey the message of change; change for Labour and change for Britain. New Labour was perceived as a party freed from its past; moreover, it was a highly professionalised party, a communications organisation that run an efficient and highly effective campaign. As will be demonstrated in the next part of this chapter, New Labour had been transformed to a market-oriented party, had enhanced its innate adaptive capacity and had portrayed a highly professionalised electoral and political identity (encompassing professionalisation), which prompted it to operate as an election campaign communicator (Party Evolution Framework, Stage III). Most importantly, the Millbank machine had managed to win the support of their main rivals up to 1994; the Tory Press. Almost half of the papers that had previously supported the Conservative party declared a shift in their allegiance at the outset of or during the election campaign. And though, the impact of the press was not substantial on the actual election outcome, it gave the party a morale boost and provided the fundamental platform upon which the Labour campaign was structured.

3.4 Discussion

Having already examined the details of New Labour’s 1997 election campaign, emphasis is currently given to the characteristics defining New Labour’s behaviour as an Election Campaign Communicator, within the context of Stage III of the Party Evolution Framework. As already argued in chapter one, a party’s evolution to an election campaign communicator, is defined by two main elements; the party’s degree of professionalisation, which depicts party communications transformation and the degree of adaptation that refers to party organisational/structural transformation and ideological repositioning. Furthermore, the theoretical framework entails that the professionalisation and adaptation criteria are contingent, highly interrelated and interdependent and changes in the elements that characterise one of the two lead to further changes to the other. The relationship between the two as well as their relative
degrees can influence the effectiveness of an election campaign but more importantly the election outcome.

**Stage III: Labour as Election Campaign Communicator**

Various studies have documented the transformation of Labour’s electioneering either by analysing the level of the party’s campaign communications professionalism and/or by classifying its transformation as a clear example of political marketing. Indeed, the evolution of the Labour party both in terms of organisation and campaigning provides a wide range of angles to both perspectives to resonate with. In political marketing terms, New Labour can widely fall within the JLM design of a Market-Oriented party. The extensive use of market intelligence for the product design, a tightly planned, well-organised and promptly executed campaign designed by professional media advisors and communications strategists, and implemented mainly, around the leader, formed the political marketing framework upon which the party sought to be built. The campaign communications context of Labour has been also overly examined and analysed. Three frameworks are used for the purpose of the present analysis, all of which indicate New Labour’s high level of professionalisation. Two of these focus on the national campaign while the third one reflects the changes in constituency campaigning that by 1997 had started to play an important role in the overall strategy of the party.

In the Norris typology of the evolution of campaign communications, defined by a shift from pre-modern, to modern, and post-modern campaigning, the 1997 general election marked the beginning of the post-modern era. Within that context, the identification of the changes in Labour’s campaign organisation can be explained as ‘an evolutionary process of modernisation’ that interrelates with the evolution in the wider electoral landscape. In turn, the electoral context is directly defined by changes in the media and the electorate, while indirectly, remains dependent on mediating conditions that characterise the socio-economic and political framework in different post-industrial societies (Norris, 2002). The ‘permanent campaign’ that started with Tony Blair’s election in 1994, the centralisation of campaign operations around the leader and a group of high profile professional advisors whose status and role in the campaign became equal and in cases even more prominent than that of politicians, the increased interest on local campaigning activities, which were centrally coordinated

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30 The Lees-Marshment model is used in my analysis as a general framework to illustrate the high degree of professionalism that New Labour employed at all levels of its operation up to the 1997 election. To this end, the transition of the party from a sales- to a market-orientation is an indicator of Labour’s transformation rather than the epitome of Labour’s identity.
and controlled, the extensive use of and continuous feedback from opinion polls and focus groups, the ruthless targeting of ‘swing voters’, the increased role of ‘spinning’ and Labour’s success in gaining the support of a new breed of press that was more autonomous and less partisan, are some of the qualifications that indicate New Labour’s response to the rapidly changing, fragmented news environment and to the changing patterns of voter behaviour. The shift to a new era of campaigning is further qualified by the increased costs of the campaign. As Table 3.8 shows, there was a 135 percent increase in the party’s election expenditure compared with the 1992 election, and an overall 550 percent increase since 1983. Either as a response and/or reaction to the modernisation process rooted in the technological and political environment or to any other internal or external conditions, Labour’s campaigning in 1997 exemplified the sophistication and professionalism of a party devoted to electoral victory.

From a more party-oriented perspective Farrell and Webb (2000) explain the professionalisation of political campaigning by paying more attention to the internal, organisational changes with regard to campaign practices; that is, the development of campaigning is framed into three stages, which are subdivided into three main areas of campaign changes: technical, resources and thematic (Farrell, 1996; Farrell and Webb, 2000; Schmitt-Beck and Farrell, 2002). Overall, the characteristics of the 1997 Labour campaign indicate that the party’s campaign organisation fits in to the third stage of professionalisation - corresponding in most ways to the Norris post-modern ‘phase’. The long-lasting, though unsuccessful negotiations for the leaders’ debate, the resources allocated for the creation of the Millbank media centre and the rebuttal unit, the fragmentation of campaign operations within a strongly centralised, controlled and leader oriented organisation are characteristics of the 1997 campaign that explicitly illustrate New Labour’s professionalism. Furthermore, the role of the ‘inner circle’ of the leader’s advisors became in charge not only of the campaign but also of policy-initiating undermining the role of party official bodies in various occasions (for example, the role of NEC as ‘partner’, the use of Conference for communications rather than substantial policy-making purposes). The campaign messages targeted specific group of voters while some initiatives were taken in order not to alienate the party’s loyal supporters and activists. Once again there is a focus on local campaigning and on the individual contact with the key voters - the party’s target group - but almost all local activities are coordinated by Millbank with the use of the latest technology.

As already stressed, one of the main characteristics of high professionalisation and sophistication is the revival of local campaigning as an integral part of the wider national campaign. And as expected the professionalism and specialisation of national
campaigning has expanded to the local level. As discussed, the professionalisation of
campaigning has been documented by two conceptual frameworks. First,
Denver and Hands (2002) have developed a framework of two phases, the Fordist and
post-Fordist forms of campaigning, which draws upon Norris’ typology in an attempt
to explain qualitative changes in campaigning at constituency level. Second, a
conceptual framework of district/local campaigning derived from the Farrell and Webb
framework of campaign professionalisation has been developed by Fisher and Denver
(2008). Either approach when applied to the 1997 Labour campaign falls into the
same conclusion; that Labour’s 1997 election campaigning was a characteristic case of
the transformation in local campaigning both in terms of centralisation of control and
use of new methods and techniques moving away from the traditional local
campaigning of the pre-1990 period. ‘Operation Victory’ designates the sophistication
of the organisation of local campaigning, while the mode, scope and effectiveness of
the ‘voter identification’ project suggest the advancement in constituency campaign
techniques. Furthermore, the importance attributed to local campaigning, especially
with regard to key seats was even more apparent with the involvement of the leader;
Tony Blair’s main activity during the campaign was to visit all target seats (Table 3.11).
The gradual growth in the level of central involvement in and control of constituency
campaigning is illustrated in Table 3.10, which in a way provides the quantitative
interpretation of ‘Operation Victory’ (Fisher and Denver, 2008). Most specifically, in
1997 Labour’s score of central involvement in target seats is significantly greater than
in other seat types, vindicating the thorough organisation and implementation of
‘Operation Victory’. Consequently, the professionalisation of the national campaign
was conveyed via central control and coordination to the constituencies and as a
result, local campaigning became an integral part of the national campaign strategy.
The outcome of this shift was twofold; first, the role of the centre as the essence of
communications management and decision-making was entrenched and second, local
parties found the resources and the means to engage into more sophisticated and
effective forms of campaigning.

Following the above analysis it is evident that the 1997 Labour campaign was highly
professionalised at national and local levels. Labour made use of all the latest
techniques of market intelligence (post-election surveys, quantitative and qualitative
research), and based the design of its ‘new’ product on these findings. The 1997
election was fought by New Labour, a reformed party not only in terms of
communications and style but also in substance. New Labour was not only a
reassessment of the ‘old’ structure and the ethos but it entailed a renewed
organisation and modernised ideology with a new constitution and eloquently
reviewed policy proposals. Strong leadership, centralisation of decision-making and
planning, discipline, professionalism at all levels and among the party staff (from party employees to external advisors and strategists), an extended membership, a ‘new’ name (though this was never acknowledged so as not to alienate the grassroots) but substantially, a new form of ‘Blairite’ centre-left radicalism comprised the characteristics of a modern professionally designed and communicated party.

**TABLE 3.10: Central Involvement In Constituency Campaigning**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1992</th>
<th>1997</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Labour</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Held not target</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>121</td>
<td><strong>150</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not held not target</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conservative</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Held not target</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not held not target</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Liberal Democrats</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Held not target</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not held not target</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Index calculated as the scores for each constituency on the basis of a Principal Component Analysis. Scores have been adjusted to give a mean of 100. Figures calculated for English seats only. * Too few cases for analysis


**TABLE 3.11: Visits To Constituencies By Senior Party Figures (%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1992</th>
<th>1997</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Labour</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Held not target</td>
<td>28 (0.7)</td>
<td>22 (0.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>87 (3.8)</td>
<td><strong>100 (6.7)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not held not target</td>
<td>24 (0.6)</td>
<td>31 (0.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conservative</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Held not target</td>
<td>52 (1.1)</td>
<td>45 (1.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>98 (4.7)</td>
<td>98 (4.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not held not target</td>
<td>60 (1.7)</td>
<td>69 (1.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Liberal Democrats</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Held not target</td>
<td>* (*)</td>
<td>* (*)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>73 (2.0)</td>
<td>90 (2.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not held not target</td>
<td>22 (0.4)</td>
<td>19 (0.3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The percentages show the proportion of constituencies that received a leadership visit. Figures in parenthesis represent the mean number of visits by party leadership figures. * Too few cases for analysis

At the same time, one of the major characteristics of Labour, which was also vital for the launch of New Labour, was the adaptive form of its organisation. The high degree of adaptation of the party renders two qualifications. An oversimplified explanation reflects the desire of all party supporters including the traditional left-wing members to see the party in government after 18 years in opposition. This drive was adequate so as to permit the leadership to ‘manipulate’ the party’s structure and ethos. The second important argument refers to the significant organisational changes that took place over a number of years under Kinnock, Smith and Blair and led to the renewal of the party’s traditional structure and organisation. The introduction of OMOV, the diminution of the unions power in the decision-making processes, the new policy-making processes and the creation of NPF that shifted the balance of power in favour of the leadership and the PLP, and the downgrading of the role of the Annual Conference – still the sovereign body of the party – created a suppler in the wishes of the leadership organisation and at the same time, a more inflexible though more democratic policy-making structure. Both developments enhanced the control of the central party over the wider party organisation, providing a straightforward decision-making platform (around the leadership) that allowed a higher degree of adjustment to the external changes. Subsequently, these instrumental changes rendered New Labour more adaptive to the socio-economic and political changes of its environment, more adaptive to the needs and wants of the electorate, more adaptive to the needs and wishes of the leadership and mostly, set the ground for the party’s campaign communications revolution. Overall, the 1997 election campaign marked the transformation of Labour’s electoral campaigning as a result of the party’s organisational renewal. The latter changes are particularly important for the development of the party in the post-Blair era; the fundamental nature of the reforms may not be able to safeguard the party’s fourth consecutive electoral win and the government’s popularity but due to their deep-rooted nature they could be able to safeguard New Labour’s mild transition to Labour.

New Labour through the Party Evolution Approach: An Outline

In the context of the theoretical discussion of this thesis, it has been already argued that the evolution approach provides an integrated framework for the thorough and comprehensive examination of party development through the systematic analysis of a party’s formation and institutionalisation, organisational and ideological character, and its political and electoral behaviour over time. This detailed, temporal outlook on party operation and behaviour is significant for the identification of a party’s unique traits
and characteristics that have defined the formation as well as development of its political identity. Within that context the previous chapter focused on the early phases of Labour’s inception, consolidation and finally, institutionalisation, its organisational and ideological background (Stage I) in order to identify the underlying dynamics, internal and external, that comprised the unique ‘mark’ of the Labour party, while the further examination of the party’s development through the political and electoral challenges of its environment (Stage II) led to the identification and assessment of Labour’s political identity. Therefore, the above considerations and findings, and the analysis of the empirical material on Labour’s campaigning approach (Stage III) provide the fundamental platform upon which to build our understanding of Labour’s political evolution. These points are more thoroughly addressed in the following chapter that deals with the interpretation of the Labour party through the Party Evolution Framework. However, there are two main issues that could be stressed at this point regarding Labour’s communications and campaigning development in relation to its past performance.

First, it is unquestionable that by 1997 New Labour had been developed into the epitome of the modern, professional, classless and non-ideological but pragmatic western European political party, while still retaining a social democratic identity, and as such it comprised an example for its sister parties in Europe. The main issue however, refers to the degree of ‘newness’ of New Labour. In fact, the 1987, 1992 and 1997 campaigns analysed above demonstrated that Labour did utterly transform its communications and campaigning, especially when compared with the party’s 1983 performance. However, one should take into account that the modernisation and professionalisation of Labour’s campaigning was a gradual process that lasted for almost twelve years. It should also be stressed that this transformation was not the outcome of any sort of revolution within the party (although that fundamental organisational changes did take place), but derived from and was facilitated by Labour’s increased adaptive capacity, a significant element of the party’s identity since the early days of its existence. Therefore, New Labour was not ‘created’ as a different political entity from Labour. In essence, it provided the communications backbone for Labour’s re-branding. Second, the process of modernisation and professionalisation of Labour’s campaigning should be considered as integral parts of the party’s evolution. That is, being a dynamic organisation Labour has always adopted but also adapted to a series of omnipresent endogenous and exogenous challenges in order to survive politically and progress electorally. To this end, Labour’s professionalism has not replaced substance. On the contrary, as the evolution approach aims to demonstrate, it has comprised an integral component of the party’s contemporary identity and character without threatening or eradicating Labour’s political past; rather all current
developments (electoral, ideological or organisational) are triggered from and are contingent on the characteristics that Labour developed throughout its historical and political trajectory.

3.5 Conclusion

The Labour party that fought and won the 1997 election was the product of a long-term process of organisational modernisation, ideological repositioning and communications transformation. Notwithstanding the controversy of the statement in itself, New Labour’s inception may have been attributed to the series of organisational reforms and ideological redesign of the Kinnock years but in essence, the materialisation of Blair’s project is actually rooted in the fundamental constitutional reforms and the process of ‘democratisation’ instigated by the left dominated party leadership of the pre-1983 period. And whilst the leftwing ascendancy led the party to electoral and political banishment and years in opposition, they essentially overturned Labour’s constitutional culture, clearing the way – in practical not normative terms – for the radical changes that followed. Nonetheless, the political and communications project of New Labour was built upon the controversies, deficiencies and failures of the rather infamous Old Labour. To this end, the dichotomy of Old/New Labour, which is thoroughly discussed later in this thesis, constitutes a significant part to the party’s trajectory and provides a useful basis on which to build our understanding of Labour’s evolution process as this is qualified by the Party Evolution Framework.

Undoubtedly, Labour’s rout in 1983 and the disastrous electoral and political position that the party was in, are considered the starting point for the party’s radical renovation. Kinnock’s ascendency to the party leadership marked the complete restructuring of the party’s campaign machine under the direct control of the leader and his in-house team of professional consultants, media advisors and opinion poll experts. Labour’s communications transformation was so extensive and radical that the party’s 1987 campaign was regarded at the time, as the peak of Labour’s campaign professionalism and management. Nevertheless, the 1987 election result was disappointing for Labour, which won the battle of the opposition but failed to substantially increase its share of the vote. Furthermore, the 1992 election found Labour at the same unsatisfactory position; once again, Labour had run a successful but not electorally effective campaign. Therefore, in the aftermath of the unexpected electoral defeat Labour was in a state of shock and at a crossroads; for the left of the party the Kinnock project of modernisation had failed and thus, Labour ought to return to its socialist roots. Contrariwise for the modernisers the party lost the election
because it had not changed enough so as to win the electorate’s support and trust. Ultimately, the latter approach prevailed.

Blair’s election to the party leadership in 1994 advanced the process of modernisation that was already in motion. While Kinnock had transformed the party, Blair revolutionised it. The Blair project was radical in manner and scope and endorsed changes in the image and substance, structure and ethos of Labour in an attempt to create a new party. And there lies Blairism’s – at least electoral – success. While Kinnock had tried to reconcile the traditional commitments of the party with the aspirations of a changed society, Blair took a more decisive step forward by detaching the party from its past. The ‘Old’ and ‘New’ connotations virtually depicted the distinction between parochialism – represented by the left voices within Labour – and modernisation in practice. Moreover, a meticulously planned and thoroughly executed communications campaign ensured that Blair’s New Labour was efficiently communicated to the electorate. The party had a new constitution, new policies, new internal structures, a new image and nothing or hardly anything linked it to the left-dominated party of the early 1980s. Blair’s New Labour ‘led from the centre but it was profoundly radical in the changes it promises’; in essence, Blair repositioned the party on the radical centre. That said, it should be borne in mind that the radical element referred mainly, to the changes in the Labour party and not to the policies that the party endorsed. The latter were safe choices that would not alienate the party’s target voters. As for intra-party radicalism, this was set to address the concerns of the party’s traditional voters.

The 1997 Labour landslide could be attributed to a series of factors. Generally speaking, the official election campaign was considered to have reinforced existing attitudes, at least at national level, rather than changing electoral loyalties and defining the election outcome. In essence, it comprised the culmination of a permanent form of campaigning, which had started as early as 1994 and most importantly, signalled the rebirth of local campaigning, which set out to be a major asset to Labour’s landslide. During the six-week campaign Labour took advantage of the opportunities provided by the shift in the press allegiance, the unusually high popularity of Tony Blair, the failure of the opposition to rise to the standards of modern campaigning (mostly, with regard to the thematic developments of the campaign) and foremost, the thoroughly executed strategy of its communications team. The 1997 Labour campaign bore the characteristics of a highly professional and sophisticated communications and marketing model. Either at the national or local level, the formulation, planning and execution of the campaign vindicated the party’s high degree of professionalisation. This combined with the high degree of adaptation
resulted from the internal organisational and structural reforms that preceded the election, qualified the effectiveness of the 1997 campaign.

A more detailed analysis of the degree of ‘encompassing’ professionalisation and adaptation follows in chapter 4. By considering the elements of the Labour party’s historical background, organisational and ideological, as well as the changes that led to New Labour and by defining the ‘identity’ of the ‘new’ party, a more thorough examination of the transformation of Labour is discussed. Focusing on the ever-present and highly addressed question of what is new about New Labour, it is argued that Tony Blair did not break the party’s link with its past but rather ‘manipulated’ the party’s inheritance (ambiguity and pragmatism) and created an electable and popular version of Labour to meet the challenges of the ‘new times’.
Chapter 4

Interpreting the Labour Party through the Party Evolution Framework

4.1 Introduction

In the two earlier chapters the focus of the research has been upon the detailed examination of Labour’s formation, consolidation and institutionalisation, organisational and ideological development, communications and electoral evolution, which provide the features of the periodic renewal and reappraisal of the Labour party. This systematic analysis of the internally driven as well as the externally originated factors that have characterised Labour’s political trajectory has provided the source for an integrated approach and interpretation of Labour’s evolution over time, within the context of the Party Evolution Framework. The three-stage approach has laid the conceptual framework for identifying the character and unique identity of the Labour party with an eye on historical as well as political events and assessing the political and electoral evolution of the party through its responsive and adaptive capacity to the challenges of its environment. To this end, the rise of Tony Blair to the party leadership and the launch of ‘New Labour’ are considered within the broader context of the party’s political progression.

A large number of studies have been focused on the analysis of New Labour covering almost all perspectives of ‘newness’ and ‘identity’ of the party. The transition from Old to New Labour, the process of the party’s modernisation and reinvention, its repositioning and rebranding, have produced a great number of thorough and comprehensive reviews over the last fifteen years. In the early 2000s Ludlam (2000) and Allender (2001) attempted to put into perspective the literature on New Labour by identifying and classifying the arguments on the ‘interpretation’ of the ‘New’ Labour party. While acknowledging the variety of attitudes towards the interpretation of what is ‘new’ about New Labour, both provided an account of the novelty of the party that won the 1997 general election with a landslide, either by focusing on the external and internal causal factors that led to the creation of New Labour (Allender, 2001), or predicking on the multi-dimensional view of New Labour’s modernisation project within a normative and partisan context (Ludlam, 2000). Within that context, the literature on New Labour is divided into a number of categories as well as subcategories including, the ‘new Labourites’, ‘third way’, ‘Thatcherism’ and beyond, opposition from the Labour left, ‘revisionism revised’, illustrating the conflicting arguments that have beset the development of New Labour. Most importantly, to a greater extent these perspectives depict the multi-dimensional character of what became known as ‘New Labour’ under Tony Blair’s leadership.
Taking into account the historical analysis as well as the contemporary qualification of the Labour party characteristics that were presented in the previous chapters, I consider that the essence of the arguments on New Labour can be rendered into three main - possibly, oversimplified but broadly comprehensive, categories. The first one addresses the reinvention of Labour as a break with the party’s traditional roots by arguing that New Labour’s policies are closer to Thatcherism rather than Old Labour; a view that is keenly adhered by left-wing Labour advocates, who mainly, opposed Blair’s modernisation (Barrett-Brown and Coates, 1996; Hay, 1999; Panitch and Leys, 1997; Driver and Martell, 1998; Heffernan, 2001). The second perspective acknowledges and possibly exaggerates the role of marketing techniques and of ‘spinning’ as the main driving force behind the ‘newness’ of an old party – presentation over policies, style over substance (Franklin, 1998; Bayley, 1998; Jones, 1999; Fairclough, 2000). And finally, the third one asserts that there is ‘continuity’ between Old and New Labour, in essence contesting the argument that New Labour has been ripped from its roots (Coates, 1996; Bale, 1999; Rubinstein, 2000; Fielding, 2003; Russell, 2005). As already stated, there are a number of published studies that have already examined New Labour’s relationship with its roots and the extent of ‘newness’ and novelty of the party. However, the reference as a main point of comparison, to Old Labour is in most cases nebulous and temporally constrained due to the lack of clear identification of what constitutes Old Labour.

The purpose of the present chapter is concerned with New Labour’s (a party identity adopted under the Blair leadership) formation and electoral behaviour through the detailed consideration of the party’s ideological and organisational trajectory since the very early days of Labour’s formation up until May 1st 1997 and the party’s successful completion of a cycle of internal development, ideological rethinking, communications transformation, professionalisation and electoral reinvention. The first part of the analysis refers to the dichotomy of Old/New Labour in an attempt to contextualize the division before acknowledging the extent of Labour’s reinvention. Nonetheless, it needs to be indicated that the main focus of the discussion lies on the underlying forces, the unofficial lines of behaviour and the ‘ethos’ that characterised Labour’s heterogeneous nature. Falling within the lines of the approach of ‘continuity’ rather than break with the past, the three stages of the Party Evolution Framework aim to assert that New Labour was the outcome of the culmination of a series of internally as well as externally driven activities; ‘New’ Labour was a ‘party in waiting’.
4.2 From Old to New Labour – Reconsidering the past, Revolutionising the present

Before continuing further the analysis of Labour’s character and trajectory within the context of the evolution framework, it should be noted that the study of New Labour is viable and rigorously conditioned by the political and/or strategic importance of Old Labour. That is, New Labour exists merely because of Old Labour (Shaw, 1996: 206). The modernisation project was a reaction to internal and external changes and hence, this is eloquently defined by the party’s developing character. However, the characterisation of what Old/New Labour is about bears a question. For modernisers, there is the ‘Old’ Labour, which had to be demolished in the conscience of voters and upon which the ‘New’ Labour party had to be built. To this end, New Labour’s alternative implied the existence of an ‘Old’ Labour party, which again is incredibly misleading with regard to the party’s political past. Is Old/New Labour dichotomy based on normative terms or are temporal considerations are taking into account? Overall, Labour comprises the backbone of ‘New’ Labour while ‘Old’ Labour provided Blair and the modernisers within the party, with the viable means needed to create the ends of Labour’s renewal, modernisation and electoral success. Therefore, the modernisers did not create a new party; they renewed and updated the Labour party of the post-war period within the standards and aims of the social, economic and political context that had been developed over the 1980s and early 1990s. Most importantly, they updated the values of Labour so as to render the party once again electable, a tactic that was adopted several times in the past (Attlee, Wilson). And it is the nature and underlying dynamics of Labour itself that provided the impetus for the reinvigoration of the party to New Labour.

Therefore, as all different interpretations of the nature of New Labour are merely based on the contrast with Old Labour, it is important to identify Old Labour; is Old Labour referring to post-war Labour of the 1950s and 1960s and the administrations of Attlee and Wilson? Or is it referring to the earlier Labour party of MacDonald and Snowden? Or is it referring to the left dominated party and the strain of socialism of the ‘Bennite’ left of the late 1970s and early 1980s? Which one of these three phases characterises the heart and soul of the traditional Labour party? The answer is all of them, as each one comprises an important part of the history as well as the political development of Labour. And at the same time, this kind of development within the party entrenches the framework of Labour’s reinvention and transition to New Labour. In a generalised context, Blair’s project aimed at the creation – or re-launch – of a ‘new’ party, to meet the needs of the ‘new’ times while achieving ‘old’ ends but with the use of ‘new’ means. Therefore, according to the modernisers the dichotomy of Old/New Labour represented the means but not the ends; the values of the Labour
party remained unchanged comprising the connecting bond between the rhetoric of ‘New and Old’. Nevertheless, the interpretation the ‘new labourites’ attributed to what they called Old Labour party, is hugely misleading as it either disregards (deliberately for communications purposes) important elements of Labour’s trajectory or attempts to redefine aspects of the Labour tradition (such as the role of the bipolar character of the party’s organisation and its impact on the predominant identity of the party).

New Labour capitalised on Bennite radicalism and the ‘tabloidisation’ of the radical left identity of the party during the late 1970s and early 1980s in a deliberate and communicationally orchestrated attempt to build on the ‘ill-informed prejudices of wavering Conservative voters’ and highlight that the party had fundamentally and irreversibly changed (Fielding, 2003: 3-4; Shaw, 1996: 217). Without a holistic examination but rather a superficial identification of the trends that characterised Labour as a political entity modernisers built upon the weaknesses of the Labour party, rethought the principles of British social democracy upon the framework of the European social democratic parties and distanced New Labour from the legacy of the party’s wasted years (Coates, 1996). Based on the rhetoric of modernisation and change in contrast to the traditionalism of high taxation, trade unions and strikes, public ownership and planning, the modernisers amplified the contrast between New Labour and the past of the party to serve their strategic and electoral needs. Hence, ‘Old’ Labour was an unpopular, parochial, unelectable political party, controlled by the unions, the radical left and party activists, who nonetheless, formed an unrepresentative part of the broader party membership and foremost of the British electorate, tied to the ‘Winter of Discontent’ and the perceptions of incompetence and lack of credibility, and with a highly disenchanted – and reduced - electoral base. In the contrary, ‘New’ Labour was a modernised, fully reformed party, which had learned from the mistakes of the past and discarded the burdens that held the party unelectable. However, as Shaw argues this view of Old Labour is a misleading, stereotyped concept that not only distorts reality but rather attempts to recreate it (1996: 218). The detachment of New Labour from practices and policies of the past is one thing, but the rejection or misconception of Labour’s place in history does no justice to the contemporary ‘version’ of the party either. This compromised and depreciated account of the political character of Old Labour was an extremely effective electoral asset in communications terms for the party in the 1990s, but it is vaguely representative of Labour as a dominant political force of the 20th century Britain.

However, it is not ‘Old’ Labour as defined by the modernisers that New Labour’s roots can be traced back to. The nature of New Labour is better understood when placed in context to the development of the Labour party of the pre- and post-war periods
contrariwise to the short, mostly unrepresentative period of ‘Bennite’ aberration, upon which the modernisers’ Old Labour rhetoric is focused. Most importantly, the post-war Labour governments offer a comprehensible account of the values and policies of Labour, which are in turn, essential for the assessment of any sort of novelty of New Labour. In fact, there are many studies that keenly argue that New Labour is nothing but a modernised and updated version of the post-war Labour party (Coates, 1996; Fielding, 2003; Rubinstein, 2000; Bale, 1999; Smith, 1994; Quinn, 2005; Russell, 2005). David Coates in particular, stresses that such are the strong electoral and governmental ‘underlying continuities’ in Labour's politics that New Labour has followed and is actually constrained by them. This perspective that New Labour is ‘just’ Labour is rooted in the complex political reality that has characterised Labour’s governmental and oppositional past with regard to the ‘relationship between thought and action’ (Bale, 1999: 197; Rubinstein, 2000: 164). First, all previous Labour governments shifted their policies to the right while in office and thus, failed to sustain their initial policy stance (Coates, 1996: 65-66). Second, the party leadership has always been less ideologically constrained than the rest of the party and able to adjust their activities to suit the particular requirements of time and society by taking decisions on pragmatic rather than normative grounds (Rubinstein, 2000: 161). Third, Labour has always been a social democratic party as is New Labour (Randall and Sloam, 2009). In policy terms, planning and intervention were never fully incorporated into any Labour government’s economic strategy; all Labour administrations sought the cooperation of the market and the private sector and based the implementation of their socialist objectives (equality, social justice, liberty, full employment) on the successes of the market. Public ownership and the role of the unions in government decision-making were also exaggerated; in both accounts, Labour governments have based their policies on pragmatic terms – to save jobs and industries (Shaw, 1996). The complexity of Labour’s economic policy lies on the fact that Labour tried to run and reform the system simultaneously and as a result, its policies were more right-wing than its manifesto promises (Coates, 1975; Coates, 1996).

The rhetoric and nature of ‘Bennite’ radicalism was extensively used by the modernisers as it acutely represented New Labour’s strategic break with the past. The Bennite aberration entrenched Labour’s ‘capture’ by the extremist fringe of the party’s left activists, which, regardless of constituting a minor and overly unrepresentative part of the wider party membership, managed to dominate the party by thwarting the party’s internal power structure. Under the direction of Tony Benn, the right of the party was discredited while major reforms aiming at the party’s ‘democratisation’ through the activists’ tighter control of the leadership led to structural changes. Mandelson’s harsh approach to Tony Benn’s encounters is indicative of the negative feeling of the modernisers’ towards the ascendancy of the left. In particular, Mandelson tacitly accuses Tony Benn of dividing Labour when he argues that driven by his belief that ‘the main obstacle to the achievement of radical socialism was the feebleness of will among his leadership colleagues’ Tony Benn ‘systematically fed suspicions of leadership betrayal among party activists, distorting the motives and misrepresenting the actions of the Labour government so as to increase support for his brand of centralised socialism’ (2002: 213-14).
This periodic reappraisal of policy preferences and governmental policy implementation is subtly indicated by Labour’s oscillation on the left-right ideological scale. Based on the content analysis data of post-war party manifestos published by the Comparative Manifestos Project (CPM), (Budge et al, 2001), Figure 4.1 shows the scope of Labour’s ideological movement as this is reflected on the party policy preferences over time, while Figure 4.2 provide an outline of the party’s policy stands on the areas of planned economy, market economy and welfare. Notwithstanding Labour’s unquestionable ideological shift to the centre that was culminated just prior to the 1997 election (Figure 4.1), an overall look to the party’s policy stands provides tangible evidence that New Labour’s move towards the right was very cautious and within the lines of the party’s past policy preferences (Figure 4.2). Fourth, Blair acknowledges that New Labour has been based on the values of ‘Old’ Labour; the main difference lies on the means to be used in order to achieve the old social democratic ends of equality, community, social justice on the footsteps of Crosland’s revisionism. The difference between the two approaches lies on the qualitative interpretation of values; for Blair it is equality of opportunity while for Crosland it is equality of income; Blair’s thinking is based on moral grounds while Crosland’s revisionism was structured around economic terms. Blair is an advocate of ethical socialism. He has also been a leader who takes his decisions on pragmatic rather than strictly normative grounds, a feature that he shares with his predecessors since the very early days of MacDonald’s leadership. While the ends remained the same, the means employed by social democrats had to be modified in order to take into account the broader economic, social and political developments. To this end, Blair’s New Labour was the response to the ‘New times’ following in a much more successful way, the steps of Attlee, Gaitskell, Wilson and Callaghan and the sort of inevitable ‘gradualness’ (paraphrased from its original meaning and scope) that characterised the party (Rustin, 1989). Finally, in strictly campaigning and electoral terms, the appeal to middle class is not new means for Labour. Since the adoption of the 1918 constitution Labour’s aim was to represent the interests of the society as a whole and not be the sole advocate of one class (see analysis in Chapter 2 for more details).

So what is the character of New Labour? It is interesting the fact that Blair (1994b; 1995) as well as Mandelson (2002) emphasise the party’s ties and continuities with the past. In the words of Tony Blair (1994b, 1995), New Labour ‘is a modern party living in an age of change’; a party proud of its beliefs and principles of the past; a

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2 However, it should be stressed that the ‘modernisers’ had the tendency to overestimate the ‘Old’ Labour version of radicalism and far left policy failures as a result to either oversimplify or even falsify Labour’s history. Mandelson’s reference of the ‘unions entrenched constitutional position’ as an ‘accident of history’ is indicative of the philosophy behind New Labour (2002: 26). Therefore, in strategic terms, Labour’s history was sacrificed on the altar of electoral success.
party that has changed but not in order to forget its principles, but to ‘fulfil them, not to lose its identity but to keep its relevance’. Blair has also emphasised that New Labour broke the ‘traditional dividing lines between right and left’ and redefined the ‘radical left-of-centre for the new millennium’, introducing a ‘new way of politics’ and a ‘new agenda’ based on change and modernisation. To this end, New Labour is freed of the dogma and normative bias of the past but remains a keen advocate of the past values; for New Labour is not the ends that have changed but the means of achieving them that had to be in tune with the ‘new times’ and the needs and aspirations of the people (Coates, 2000: 8). Blair’s New Labour was founded on the four pillars of ‘opportunity, responsibility, justice and trust’, directly linked to a ‘strong and stable economy’. Moreover, Blair had continuously stressed that New Labour is the advocate of a ‘partnership economy’; that is, a ‘dynamic market economy based on partnership between government and industry, between employer and employee, and between public and private sector’. Simultaneously, New Labour believes in and gives great emphasis on society and the building of strong communities, on solidarity and cooperation, on partnership in all levels of social and economic life as vital prerequisites for the achievement of a common purpose. Within that context, Blair’s discourse continued on emphasising New Labour’s priority of a ‘dynamic economy’, of a ‘thriving private sector’ that would work in the public interest and provide the basis for equality of opportunity, social justice and strong communities. Interestingly enough, Blair committed New Labour to full employment but distanced it further from any form of public ownership; for New Labour government needs to take a lead in maintaining a ‘high and stable level of employment’ by conquering the ‘weaknesses of the economy’. Blair’s New Labour is committed to ‘welfare-to-work’ through training and education and not to uncontrolled public spending on benefits and high taxation for financing the public services. Hence, Blair was keen to indicate that New Labour adheres responsibility and opportunity through fairness and justice; a fairer tax system and strong public services, policies that are ‘tough on crime and tough on the causes of crime’, and especially, youth crime, respect for law and order, strong families and communities and most importantly, an educational system that would provide opportunities to all for a better life. For Blair, New Labour is a ‘social-ist’ party, based on the long-established values and aims of socialism but updated to suit the needs of the modern world. This shift however, does not indicate, according to Blair, that New Labour has occupied the ground of the Conservatives or became a Thatcherite party; New Labour just ‘reclaimed and reoccupied the ground that it should never ever have vacated’. That is, it is not New Labour that has broken its ties with the past but rather the ‘Old’ Labour that had lost its way and had confused means with ends (Blair, 1995).
However, this perspective is contrasted by some Labour politicians and political scientists who stress that New Labour has broken all its ties with the past; that is, not only the means but the ends have changed or in a more moderate way, have been diluted. Recently, Tony Benn commented that New Labour is a ‘Thatcherite party’; in fact, he acknowledged New Labour to be Thatcher’s ‘greatest achievement’ (The Independent on Sunday, 22/2/2009). This is definitely an extreme view on the nature of New Labour but it nonetheless, depicts not only the negativity and implicit
resentment of the left towards Blair’s modernisation project but a series of arguments on the roots and character of New Labour that contrast the continuity approach and question New Labour’s adherence to social democracy. On the one hand, the ‘modernisation thesis’ suggests that Labour’s transformation and modernisation was imperative and actually, long overdue and was facilitated by and finally, realised within the context of Thatcherism (Hay, 1994; Smith, 1994). Taking the argument a step further, an ‘accommodationist’ approach or the politics of ‘catch-up’ stresses New Labour’s detachment from its traditional values and objectives, structures and policies and the acceptance of the Conservatives’ neo-liberal agenda; this accommodation of the established institutions of thought of Thatcherism, led according to Hay to a new consensus in politics, to a Thatcherite settlement1 (1994: 101). On the other hand, Driver and Martell (1998) argue that indeed, New Labour marked a clear and decisive break with its past in policies and values but without accommodating Thatcherism; instead, New Labour reacted to Thatcherism and moved beyond it. Therefore, New Labour is neither equated with a better version of Crosland’s revisionism nor with Thatcherism Mark II. New Labour leaves behind Old Labour, accepts some of the most important aspects of the Thatcherite economic and fiscal agenda and by acknowledging Thatcherism as the starting rather than the end point, moves beyond it to a new agenda that marries economic growth with communitarianism (Driver and Martell, 1998: 158-173). Finally, in more moderate context, Gould (1998) offers another ‘middle-way’ perspective on New Labour’s creation. This view places ‘Blairism’, that is Tony Blair’s political project at the centre of development of New Labour’s ‘new’ political identity. Community, national renewal and new dividing lines comprised the framework of Tony Blair’s approach to reassert progressive politics and establish a Third Way. That is a ‘new way’ that breaks its ties with the old left-right divisions and develops beyond them both (Gould, 1998: 232-8, 244-5). In the case of Labour the only remaining dividing line was between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ party; an imperative remainder to the electorate of the scope and length of the party’s

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1 These arguments are based on the assumption that New Labour has abandoned its roots and socialist background in order to move to the centre ground, accommodate the interests of the electorate within an already established right-wing political agenda and most importantly, enhance its electoral support. The background of this assumption is twofold; on the one hand, it asserts the ‘post-Fordist’ and ‘New Times’ thesis suggesting that Labour had to ‘adapt itself unduly to certain Thatcherite assumptions’ in order to survive within the new social and economic context that Thatcherism has created (Rustin, 1989). On the other hand, there is the perspective that complements Rustin’s ‘thinness of Labour’s culture’ argument, by suggesting that Labour is a party with deep-rooted constraints and flaws (Coates, 1975; Miliband, 1972; Coates, 1996) and that is the reason of all Labour’s policy shift to the right while in power. This view is complemented by Elliot arguing that ‘Labour is not now – and never has been – a socialist party. Throughout its history it has comprised a coalition of social reformers and reformists socialists … whether among parliamentarians, trade unionists or individual members’ (1993: xi). Further to Labour’s lack of a ‘socialist’ identity, New Labour has rejected the social democracy and the revisionism of the 1950s and 1960s in favour of ‘Thatcherite revisionism’ (Smith, 1994: 708).
modernisation and implicit change. This perspective is strategically created as it offers a definitely more ‘media- and voter-friendly’ account of the nature of the New Labour party but it also highlights the party’s significant shift to the centre and to a more right-wing agenda.

Given the broad scale of changes that the Labour party was subjected to under the Kinnock, Smith and Blair leaderships, New Labour came to distance itself from the continuity of Labour politics. In a sense, the notion of novelty and the break-up with the past was justified due to the ideological and structural reforms that had taken place within the party on the one hand, and the watershed of externally driven factors that influenced this process of renewal and modernisation, on the other. In reality, when put into perspective New Labour could be considered as anything but a ‘new’ party. As the staged analysis of the Party Evolution Framework has demonstrated, a closer look to Labour’s historical development and its long-established intrinsic characteristics indicates that Blair’s project was the rational response to Labour’s historical pursue of power. Henceforth, it has been widely acknowledged by the majority of New Labour researchers, that in order to understand the defining features and originality of New Labour, we need to place it in its historical context; as Fielding comments to ‘historicize’ New Labour within the context of its internal ideological and organisational character as well as its electoral performance and policy orientations (2003: 2). My argument, which is presented in the next part of this chapter, follows this line of reasoning and based on the evolution framework’s integrated approach, advances it by including the internal underlying forces, the particular and inclusive characteristics that give a party its unique identity and denote its internal dynamics, character and trajectory.

4.3 Party Evolution Framework: Remodelling Labour, Redefining ‘New Labour’

The previous chapters on the Labour party offer a detailed analysis of the party’s formation phase, the process of its institutionalisation, its ideological, organisational development, electoral behaviour and evolution. The three stages of the framework provide an alternative framework for the examination and assessment of the features of Labour in an attempt to depict the nature of New Labour and to evaluate the extent of its novelty and originality. Within that context, the Party Evolution Framework identifies the underlying forces and internal characteristics, rationalising that Labour’s transformation was an implicit and explicit response to Labour’s evolution as a party of government. All parties are subject to change over the years and those that resist change do not survive electorally; the difference in the manner, scope and scale of the
changes are compatible to the nature and distinct characteristics of each party; that is, the established characteristics that relate to the special conditions of each party's genetic model and institutionalisation phase. In the case of Labour, the dichotomy of Old/New Labour does not proclaim either the creation or birth of a 'new' political party under Tony Blair, nor the reinvention of a hidden aspect of Labour; these are not two different – even with continuities and common characteristics – political parties but rather represent different phases in the developing character of the Labour party. The second phase of institutionalisation or re-institutionalisation that is closely related to – but not dependent on - ‘New Labour’ provides an auxiliary outlook on the party’s flexible and adaptive character. Subsequently, the study interprets New Labour as another step (incrementally significant one) in the evolutionary process of Labour, which began in 1900 with the formation of LRC. To this end, two factors need to be indicated; first, the communications and campaigning professionalisation are regarded as an integral characteristic of the identity of ‘New Labour’; and second, changes in political campaigning are considered within the wider context of the party’s ‘reinvention’. In short, the three stages of the party evolution framework place Labour’s development into context drawing upon the organisational, ideological and electoral characteristics of the party as well as its ethos and political identity on the one hand, and the intra-party dynamics as these were defined by the party’s constitution and unwritten rules of conduct among the various institutions within the party. To this end, the three main aspects of the approach are considered below:

First, the context of Labour’s formation provides the main framework of analysis and interpretation of the party’s development over the years as well as its increased levels of flexibility. Labour’s formative characteristics indicated an organisation that was developed through diffusion, externally legitimated and weakly institutionalised (Stage I). The Labour party was a highly heterogeneous organisation with a low degree of autonomy but high dependence on external ‘sponsors’ (trade unions). Nonetheless, this ideological heterogeneity as well as the low degree of the party’s institutionalisation allowed for the party’s survival over the years; first, because a weakly institutionalised party can be more flexible and amenable to changes; second, because of the diverse ideological views (from extreme left to centre-right) that were incorporated into Labour’s ideology, the party could adapt more easily to external demands (social or political). It needs to be reminded here that both the ‘Old’ Labour party of the late 1970s and early 1980s, and Blair’s New Labour, each based their doctrinal points of reference to one of the traditions of Labour’s socialism (the former

4 The re-institutionalisation phase of the 1980s drove Labour to the development of a number of new organisational characteristics, which are able to condition and/or shape the party’s future behaviour (for example, the internal way of conduct of an electoral defeat).
on Marxism, the latter on ethical socialism. The nature and scope of Labour’s political identity and electoral development has also been influenced by the party’s amenability to change. Although the early genetic features of Labour indicate a class-based, mass-membership party a further look into the party’s behaviour demonstrate that as early as 1918 Labour had adopted a ‘catch-all’ party approach that defined its identity (Stage II). Subsequently, its transformation to an electoral-professional party in the mid-1980s was to be regarded as an unsurprising, further step to the party’s evolution. In terms of organisation, the late 1980s and early 1990s saw Labour undertaking a major organisational reform that transformed the party’s long established structures and power balance by downgrading the role of the Conference in policy-making and limiting the voting and decision-making powers of the trade unions while shifting policy-making powers in favour of the leadership and the PLP. And while the party’s weak institutionalisation features rendered the intra-party relationships more flexible and adaptable to the challenges of each period, the shift in the balance of power towards the leadership as a result of the organisational transformation increased the party’s adaptability to the externally driven changes of electioneering. The outcome of such an adjustment was the transformation of the party’s communications and campaigning, and the high degree of professionalisation of its campaign machine. Elements in the party’s legacy including its ethos and structure, ideology and organisation as well as the unwritten rules and values that have conditioned internal party relationships have been influenced right from the very early years of Labour’s life by the features of its genetic model and weakly institutionalised character. The party’s trajectory justifies its reinvigoration in the context of New Labour with all the characteristics of ideological continuity and organisational changes that this ‘new’ party incorporates. And while the implementation of Blair’s project (‘creation’ of New Labour) is regarded as the culmination of a process of intra-party control and power shift, New Labour itself signifies that the party had learned from the mistakes of the past and within the context of the ‘new times’ – social, political, economic and technological/communication developments – has put this knowledge into practice.

Second, throughout its history Labour has demonstrated a number of recurring themes with regard to intra-party relationships and behaviour. The conditions of its formation, the nascent problem of factionalism as well as its bipolar structure created a number of problems, which are ever present in Labour’s historical references. There is an ever present division of interests and conflict over mainly, ideological grounds dominating intra party relationships; compromise and consensus formed the basis for the party’s survival in the 1930s, 1950s, and 1980s and comprised the backbone of unity when times demanded it. Furthermore, there always was either a reconciliatory and compromising (1960s) or a moderate and cautious (1990s) tone in the party’s
statements and programmes with the exception of the five years of ‘Bennite’ aberration. The main aim of the former period was to silence the opposition while Blair aimed at avoiding disgruntling the party’s voters. Renewal and modernisation were also important elements in the party’s search for a new political identity and in particular after an electoral defeat. It is also important to indicate that in the 1930s the Labour leadership wanted to break every link with the past of MacDonalism. And in every occasion, the party’s renewal seemed to materialise mainly through the abolition of the past and the re-launch of another version of Labour (1930s, 1950s, 1980s and of course New Labour). As a result, it is within that context that Blair (and Kinnock before him to a lesser extent) based the formulation and implementation of New Labour’s project. One important distinction between Blair and the past leaderships, especially the revisionists, was that when Blair became leader he did not have to face the traditional socialists of the left to the same degree, as this group had been marginalized and/or eradicated. Finally, the means and ends always played a major role in the party’s policy-making and governmental decision-making.

Third, considering the history of Labour, two main points come to our attention. First, underneath the ‘spinning’ image of New Labour lies the overdue and long-awaited evolution of a party that was formed as a vote-maximising and office-seeking party. Labour was never a party of principle but a ‘classless’ political party appealing to all ‘producers by hand or by brain’. However, the intense diversity of interests within the party, accelerated possibly by the bipolar character of Labour, has rendered the party’s reaction incommensurate to the demands and wants of the people it aimed at representing on many occasions. The intense conflict between the left and right over ideology and control halted attempts towards change and condemned Labour to long periods in opposition. Second, the whole history of Labour is dominated by mirror-image sequence of events; the right-wing turn of the MacDonald administrations; the re-launch and rebuilding of the party’s new identity in the 1930s; the defeat of 1951 and the search for a new identity; the 1959 electoral defeat and the intense conflict between the left – who blamed revisionism and opted for a return to radical socialist policies – and the revisionists – who argued that the party had not changed enough (a rather familiar debate). Furthermore, the 1960s saw two Labour administrations with an unsuccessful governmental record while the 1970s marked the end of the post-war consensus; the radical left-wing turn of Labour resulted in the party’s disrepute and long-term electoral failure. Finally, the 1980s signalled another period of internal rethinking and reinvigoration followed by the 1992 electoral defeat and the ‘replay’ of the 1959 dispute between the left and right of the party (though in a more moderate form). Nevertheless, as history showed by 1992 Labour had learned from its mistakes and the modernisation of the party was not halted but rather furthered. In a strictly
historical sense, Blair and the modernisers implemented the ‘unfinished’ revolution of Gaitskell and the revisionists almost three decades later.

New Labour is regarded as the ‘descendant’ (updated version) of a political party that has based its survival and electoral success on its inherent characteristics of change and transformation. Labour was formed as an office-seeking party and that is, what Blair and the modernisers achieved; to win three consecutive elections and consolidate Labour as the party of government. Has New Labour been ripped from its roots as some critics fervently argue? Of course, New Labour has little in common when compared to the early political organisation of Labour. But what one has to consider is that the Labour party, which was formed at the beginning of the 20th century, had no further reason for existence. The so-called roots of the party, the members and supporters of the early Labour party no longer exist. One major aspect that has to be taken into account when examining the transition from ‘Old’ to ‘New’ Labour is that the people considered to be the party’s traditional supporters had changed. The working class changed first, and then Labour followed an already established pattern. After all, Labour was formed in order to represent certain interests; firstly, it was the unions’ political arm, then the political representative of the working class, and soon appealed to ‘all producers by hand or by brain’; an appeal extended to the ‘one nation’ just prior to the 1997 general election. What the historical traces of the party’s evolution demonstrate is a continuation rather than a steep and unprecedented change. The party was not ripped from its roots as some argue but instead followed a pattern that was established since the very first day of Labour's formation. Labour emerged as an office-seeking party since 1918. This is notable from all the party’s aspects; its weak institutionalisation, its ideological factionalism, the means and ends as well as the theory and practice that beset the party since the early days of its formation. To argue that New Labour has abandoned its supporters is inaccurate; instead Labour followed its supporters. The minority of the so-called traditional supporters, who felt betrayed, were mainly far left voters, who were never fully incorporated by the party (Labour had already distanced itself from various left-wing groups since the second half of the 20th century).

Furthermore, has New Labour’s increased professionalism in communications and campaigning replaced substance and policy, diluting the image of the Labour party? Styling and presentation have become an integral part in each party fighting for office. The novelty of political marketing and communications, the intensive use of media, advertising and qualitative and quantitative opinion polling techniques have developed to an essential characteristic of party evolution in the way that ideological and structural changes mark the internal life of a party organisation.
Professionalisation is not merely a technicality for parties to win elections – it could be considered as a dominant component of their contemporary identity. And that is what the party evolution approach is intended to demonstrate – the continuation in a party’s development, which in turn is inextricably linked with the manner and scope of party formation. As already stated in this thesis, the formation and further institutionalisation characteristics of a political party qualify for the further development of the party’s political identity and electoral behaviour over the years; the changes that take place in a way triggered from and consistent with party history, which exerts an influence on party behaviour beyond the normative and structural levels.

Blair’s project was not a ‘New’ Labour party; rather it was the Labour party of the past with a different organisational structure that gives more power to the leadership rather than to the blocs of party activists and trade unions (though their constitutional role remains important); the series of internal organisational reforms have allowed the leadership to take control of the party’s policies and ideological direction in an unprecedented manner for the party’s history. These changes suggested the end of the bipolar structure and operation of the party by putting practice into theory; that is, unofficial practices were institutionalised. As a result, the growth in the leadership’s decision-making powers has shifted the balance of power within the party and has rendered Labour’s reaction to the external stimulus (political and social) much more intense and ‘professional’. New Labour is more manageable and adaptive to the demands of electoral competition (external factors), but less responsive to the demands of its grassroots (despite the advent of plebiscitarian democracy and the latter’s greater input into policy-making in a formal sense); this kind of qualitative change has allowed for the high degree of the party’s professionalisation and communications transformation, two elements that played a major role in the formulation and running of a highly effective political campaign and an overwhelming electoral outcome.

Ultimately, Labour was a party formed to represent the interests of the people of Britain, a ‘classless’ party with alternative to the Conservatives’ policies (that was not a socialist but a rather pragmatic approach). New Labour is the 21st century of version of Labour; still appealing to ‘one nation’ voters whose interests were not met by the Conservative policies; New Labour takes into account the wants of the people, and aims to follow rather than change or reform the established institutions. New Labour promised to run the country better than the Conservatives not in a completely different way. And most importantly, New Labour emerged out of Labour’s innate ideological and organisational flexibility and desire to win office at any cost.
(MacDonald). Even the most radical activists of the party after a long period in 
opposition became more manageable and made further compromises in order to make 
it easier for Labour to be elected again – they want Labour in office rather than in 
opposition, taking the role of a permanent pressure group in parliament. The question 
that still requires an answer concerns the future of New Labour in the post-Blair era 
that has just begun. Has New Labour marked a watershed change in the party’s 
history? Or is it regarded as another phase in the party’s historical trajectory? And 
most importantly, what was the importance of Blair himself (and not ‘Blairism’ as 
Denver and Fisher (2009) acutely indicate) to New Labour’s ‘inception’ and electoral 
success? Undoubtedly, the birth of New Labour and the 1997 electoral landslide 
(followed by the 2001 and 2005 electoral wins) has marked the most electorally 
successful period in the party’s history. Blair enhanced the modernisation project of 
Kinnock and Smith and succeeded in renewing Labour. At the same time, his personal 
political appeal and unusually high popularity advanced New Labour’s electoral 
fortunes (Denver and Fisher, 2009), transformed Labour to an enduring party of 
government and provided the framework upon which (New) Labour could create its 
own governmental hegemony. In terms of policy, New Labour has not managed to 
change or reform Britain in the way that the 1945 government did – rather, the late 
20th century consensus was introduced by the Thatcherite/neo-liberal policies. Instead, 
it has managed to reassert its governmental credibility and build a wide electoral base 
(though that the latest polls show that this is diminishing). Overall, the staged 
approach of the Party Evolution Framework provided a thorough analysis of Labour’s 
power dynamics and a comprehensive account of the party’s political and electoral 
development. This detailed examination provided the key components to the 
interpretation of Labour’s evolution and New Labour’s success. At the risk of 
generalisation, it could be suggested that these keys of the past might be used to shed 
some light on the ‘pathways’ of Labour’s immediate future. Hence, if Labour loses the 
next general election, there is little doubt that an internal upheaval will follow. It is 
possible that the party will try to find its ‘identity’ and redefine itself. The conflicts 
might not be so bitter as in the past due to the weakening of the left-wing factions in 
the party (externally driven factors such as the collapse of communism have attributed 
to that not only the internal organisational changes) and the apathy of the vast 
majority of party members; but also due to the re-institutionalisation of Labour (Stage 
I) and its move to the ‘institutionalisation’ continuum (Figure 2.1). However, 
following the trajectory of the party and its character, which might have been 
reshaped over the years but haven’t been diluted nor radically transformed, Labour 
will possibly once again attempt its ‘rebirth’ and its new place in history.
5.1 Introduction

The study of Greek right-wing political parties is a neglected area of research. In fact, the amount of research on the Greek New Democracy party since the early years of its formation in 1974 until today is relatively limited. One of the main reasons lies in the very nature of the party that is characterised by a great degree of introversion and reluctance to give significant information on its internal activities and actions (Lyrintzis, 1984: 99). In particular, this culture that has characterised all right wing political formations, which have dominated the Greek political landscape for most of the twentieth century and tend to be extremely reluctant to expose themselves to outside scrutiny either with regard to their governmental policies and principles or their internal organisation and functions. Therefore, there is a lack of significant empirical data and information concerning the inner life and activities of the Greek right.

New Democracy’s inception signalled a new era for Greek conservative politics. Despite the predominance of the right for over a century, New Democracy was the first right-wing political formation that managed to survive the loss of its founder and develop characteristics and functions of a ‘popular’ party. However, it should be taken into account that New Democracy’s inception was characterised by extremely unusual political conditions, which in addition to the elements that the party had inherited by its right-wing predecessors proved to be significant barriers to the party’s natural development. Therefore, a series of endogenous and exogenous events affected the party that was formed by a Prime Minister to assist him in governing the country; in the early days of its formation New Democracy was a force towards the democratisation of the state and capitalised heavily on the widespread feeling of uncertainty and insecurity reminiscent of the junta regime. However, as a result of the party’s government-driven priorities, New Democracy failed to substantially project a consistent internal organisation and ideological orientation. The strategies of clientelism and personification that led the party to victory in the first place, accounted for its heavy defeat a few years later. To this end, it could be argued that initially New Democracy failed to institutionalise the mechanisms and procedures that could link the party to its electoral base and thus, guarantee its effectiveness as a political force. On the other hand, as the history showed New Democracy managed not only to survive over time and maintain its status as one of the two major government parties in the country, but also to win an impressive victory in 2004.
This chapter aims to address the lacuna on New Democracy research by offering a thorough analysis of the party’s historical, organisational and ideological characteristics while evaluating its internal dynamics and shifts in power positions of the party hierarchy. Within the context of the Party Evolution Framework, the initial purpose is to identify the party origins, expound on the particular conditions that influenced the party’s early behaviour, delineate the traits and characteristics that defined the party character and critically assess the process evolution of New Democracy in terms of its electoral and political behaviour. To this end the chapter is divided into three parts. The first part documents the political history that led to the formation of New Democracy. Considering the forces that led to the party’s formation and the political origins of the party personnel, it becomes rather apparent that New Democracy’s character had to some extent formed before the actual establishment of the party. The second part seeks to account for the ideological and organisational development of New Democracy from the early years of its formation in 1974 up to the party’s impressive electoral victory in 2004. The third and final part focuses on the analysis of New Democracy in the context of the first two stages of the Party Evolution Framework. The party’s genetic model characteristics, the dynamics that led to and the actual process of institutionalisation are identified in Stage I, while the party’s organisational characteristics and electoral identity are defined within the wider context of the party’s development. To this end, the party evolution typology allows for the thorough examination of New Democracy’s development over time and cohesive approach that seeks to fill the gap in the research on New Democracy’s political and electoral nature.

5.2 The Legacy of the ‘Old Right’: A Historical Reference to New Democracy’s Origins

The Post-war Years (1949-1967): Consolidation of ‘the Right’

The interwar years in Greece were characterised by the bitter division between the monarchists/loyalists, who supported constitutional monarchy and the republicans, who opted for a republic. This deep-rooted political division that continued to characterise Greek public life in the post-war years was exacerbated by the civil war that followed the Nazi occupation and lasted until 1949. In the aftermath of the war, the victors, the so-called Ethnikofrones (nationally-minded), enjoyed military and

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1 The Civil War was fought between the ‘Communists’ and the ‘National Forces’; the Communists suffered an “unconditional defeat and were thereupon condemned to political ostracism and social proscription” (Pappas, 1999; p. 3).
political predominance controlling the Greek political realm and state (Pappas, 1999: p.3). The newly established political and socio-economic group included the whole sphere of the conservative movement, from the extreme- to the centre-right and became known as the “Right” (“he Dexia”). In fact, the ‘Right’ as a movement did not exist before the war but its emergence signalled the political consolidation of conservatism and led to the creation of a ‘Rightist state’, which excluded the left (Elephantis, 1991: 51). It is worth mentioning, that a large part of the ‘Right’ consisted of monarchists. Indeed, the Greek political life in the post-war period was characterised by the interdependent relationship between the governing party and monarchy and in particular the latter’s direct involvement into party and government internal affairs.

Before continuing with the discussion of the political formations that preceded and had an impact on New Democracy’s inception, it is worth pointing out some of the characteristics of the Greek ‘Right’, which continue to comprise a ‘haunting’ element of New Democracy’s culture, that is widely used by the left-wing parties in a communications and electorally opportunistic way. In fact, the term ‘the Right’ denotes two political entities: the state of the Right and the right-wing party. The former represents the anti-communist state apparatus that developed in the end of the civil war, while the latter refers to the right-wing party (or parties), which grew out of the civil war and dominated the political scene. The rightist state consisted of three main components; the state bureaucracy, the Crown/Palace that enjoyed a high degree of institutional autonomy and the army. Having achieved an unconditional victory against the communists, the armed forces became the most significant associate of the ‘Right’, safeguarding its interests from the communist threat and ensuring its political predominance. Therefore, the army enjoyed a high degree of institutional as well as factual autonomy. Although that these units in reality represent different political groups, the inability of right-wing political parties to develop into organisations autonomous from the state combined with the paternalistic attitude of the rightist state towards these parties, created the long-lived perception of the ‘Right’ as a whole (Pappas, 1999; 3). As a consequence, the ‘Right’ acquired a very negative, “derogatory and even blasphemous connotation’ for most part of the Greek population and in particular the left-wing and communist voters. This is mainly, due to the hatred of the civil war and the anti-communist propaganda that followed and

As an example, in 1955 the then Prime Minister and founder of the party of Ellinikos Synagermos (Greek Rally) Papagos died. Before his death, he appointed S. Stephanopoulos as his successor to the party leadership. However, King George in an arbitrary way gave a mandate to the then minister of Transport and Public Works, Konstantinos Karamanlis despite the reaction of the party’s parliamentary group.
resulted in the exclusion of communists from open politics, violence and persecutions of the dissidents.3

The ideological and to a relative degree, organisational traits of New Democracy are inexorably linked to the political and historical foundations of its predecessors. In fact, the ancestry of the modern conservative party goes back to the 1920s ‘People’s Party’ \textit{[Laiko Komma]}, which was at the forefront of the monarchist movement. As all political parties at the time – with the exception of the Communist party - it was an unorganised ‘personal party’ lacking coherent ideology and policies. In reality, party ideology stemmed from the logic of direct opposition to all principles and policies that its main rival for office proposed. The lack of any form of grassroots organisation was substituted by patron-client relationships between local political candidates and the electorate, and the charisma and appeal of the party leader and founder. In particular, the party consisted of prominent politicians who were mostly driven by the quest for power and considered the party a ‘convenient vehicle’ for their activities (Loulis, 1981; pp. 49-50, Lyrintzis, 1984; p.100; Katsoudas, 1987: 86). The (lack of) organisational structure of the People’s Party was typical of the Greek political factions at the time but most importantly, has characterised all right-wing parties ever since. As Loulis noted, the party organisation was solely based on the local politician himself (1984; p. 50). Local party branches were non-existent and the mobilisation of supporters extremely limited. Voting loyalties were strictly based on ‘clientelistic’ relations developed between local politicians and voters. Thus, “the party’s vote was a return on services the local politician had rendered to his ‘clients’, not an indication of support of the party” (Ibid). For that reason if a prominent politician decided to leave the party for whatever reason then his ‘clients’ would follow, allowing him to retain his political power and therefore, negotiate his position before joining a new political party. Within the same context, the electorate tended to identify with the party leader, who was usually a charismatic and prominent figure. The leader communicated with the masses either directly through open public rallies or indirectly through local politicians. As a result, the closer the relationship between the leader and the local politician the higher the latter’s position in the party rank.

The People’s Party was dissolved after its poor electoral performance in the 1950 and 1951 elections, and the defection of 27 MPs (Karamanlis, the founder of ND, was

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3 At the time, both the state and the right-wing party were built and acted upon an anti-communist ideology. An example of the extent of this relentless struggle against the communists was the ‘certificate of national probity’. This was a certificate that all those who dealt with the public sector were required to sign in order to prove their anti-communist sentiments, i.e. to declare that they were not communists.
amongst them). The party’s successor within the conservative camp was “Greek Rally” [\textit{Hellinikos Synagermos}] founded in 1951 by Alexandros Papagos, a former Field Marshall. In the 1952 and 1955 elections, the Greek Rally managed to win landslide victories signalling a long period of right-wing rule in the country that ended in 1963. As expected, most of the former members of People’s Party joined Greek Rally. Papagos’ death in 1955 signalled the end of the party as his successor Konstantinos Karamanlis in an attempt to enhance his authority dissolved the Greek Rally and founded the ‘National Radical Union’ (\textit{Ethniki Rizospastiki Kinisi – ERE})\textsuperscript{4}. And whilst Karamanlis aimed to project ERE as a new party, in reality it was another version of the Greek Rally in terms of personnel and political appeal. Nonetheless, a striking innovation laid on the formulation of an impressive party statute, with provisions suggesting a general assembly, general secretariat, and associated committees. However, none of these party organs were ever formed in practice. Karamanlis remained Prime Minister until 1963 when ERE lost the election to the Centre Union [\textit{Enossis Kentrou}], a party created by another prominent Greek political figure, Georgios Papandreou\textsuperscript{5}. In the aftermath of the election and as a result of a conflict between Karamanlis and the Palace, Karamanlis resigned from (his) party leadership and left the country. In fact, the party’s defeat in the 1963 elections marked the end of the rightist state and substantially damaged the close relationship between the monarchy and the right wing party\textsuperscript{6}. ERE as well as all other political parties were forced to dissolve in the 1967 colonels’ coup (Diamantopoulos, 1994).

Two issues should be emphasised in relation to the origins of the Greek conservative party. First, all three parties mentioned above lacked a coherent ideology. They were closely associated with the monarchy and state apparatus and suffered electorally when the monarchy’s unpopularity increased (Loulis, 1984; p.51; Katsoudas, 1987: 86-87). Even in 1974 when Karamanlis founded New Democracy and formally distanced himself and his party from the monarchy, there were still some factions

\textsuperscript{4} At the time Karamanlis did not belong to the political elite nor was the descendant of a significant political family (Clogg, 1987: p. 150). He was an outsider and had to project strong leading capabilities in order to be able to dominate the group of notables within his party.

\textsuperscript{5} Georgios Papandreou is the father of Andreas Papandreou, the founder of PASOK in 1974, which today constitutes (with New Democracy) the two main political parties in Greece. It is worth noting that the leader of PASOK today is Georgios Papandreou (junior), the son of Andreas and grandchild of the founder of Centre Union.

\textsuperscript{6} When Karamanlis returned to Greece in 1974 after the collapse of the junta regime, the King and his family who were in exile since 1967 expected that the conservative leader would call them back. Instead, Karamanlis, three months after his election in office, held a referendum asking the public whether they want the return of the King or not. The outcome of the referendum was against the return of the monarchy (69.2% voted ‘\textit{No}’ to King’s return). The leader of ND decided not to support the return of the King but to downplay the issue, taking a neutral stance, contrary to the will of some party members and the King himself. Therefore, as no party supported the return of the King at the time, the overwhelming outcome of the referendum was justified.
within New Democracy that remained closely associated with the exiled King and promulgated his return. Moreover, as discussed, the parties’ primary ideological leaning was ‘strictly oppositional’ to their opponent’s principles and thus, ‘merely opportunistic’ (Katsoudas, 1987: 87). This characteristic limited the party’s ability to create a coherent and comprehensive conservative or right-wing ideology, which would allow their survival during periods of crises (Metaxas dictatorship, German occupation). Therefore, the lack of a well-defined ideology, extensive organisation and extensive reliance on clientelist networks for the party’s electoral success, led to a weak and limited party identification. As a result, in the dictatorship period, the conservative camp had no organisational apparatus to activate as a form of resistance to the dictatorship and keep its electoral base united. It was the personality of Karamanlis that played a central role in the resurrection of the conservative camp in 1974 rather than the reinvigoration of conservatism as an ideological movement.

Secondly, right-wing parties were organisationally weak. They lacked an organised grassroots membership base, which contributed to the powers of the leader being unchecked (Loulis, 1984: 50; Katsoudas, 1987: 88). Moreover, the lack of a basic form of structural network contributed to their unproblematic dissolution in a period of crisis. In reality, the political formation remained strong as long as it was electorally successful and prominent local politicians were elected in parliament. Only then party notables and their entourage were mobilised during election periods in order to expand their clientele base through the extensive use of patron-client techniques (‘rousfeti’ politics). The latter is a tactic that is currently used by party candidates to a great extent (personal interview).

**From ERE (Post-War Right) to New Democracy: Continuity and Change**

The consolidation of tactics and practices of political opportunism became more evident in the 1970s. The return of Karamanlis to Greece after the fall of the junta regime signalled the foundation of the Third Greek Republic, which was nonetheless established upon the remains of the country’s political past. And despite the wind of ‘change’ that characterised the return of Karamanlis Greek political life was once again dominated by the post-war right-wing political actors. Within that context, New Democracy’s inception in 1974 did not mark the creation of a ‘new’ political organisation, but rather the legacy of the conservative camp dated back to the 1920s. And as the analysis of New Democracy through the Party Evolution Framework will demonstrate later in the thesis, notwithstanding Karamanlis efforts to infuse a different mentality and culture into the party, New Democracy never managed to
firmly break its ties with practices and mentality of the past; rather retained an elitist and highly conflictual character.

The creation of New Democracy by Konstantinos Karamanlis in September 1974 was perceived to be both a ‘national necessity’ and an attempt to revitalise and modernise the conservative right. It was considered ‘national necessity’ by Karamanlis himself who had personally accepted the daunting task of running the government and leading the country to democratisation; at the time, Karamanlis was the dominant figure of the party and the country. Even his entourage - closest advisors and prominent party members - had the secondary role in facilitating the leader to govern the country in ‘his own way’. Therefore, New Democracy was founded as a means, a political vehicle, which projected Karamanlis’ progressive political philosophy and allowed him to materialise his plans for the political, economic and social modernisation of the country, (Bratakos, 2002: 143; Clogg, 1987: 149). It was within this context that Karamanlis established the ideological principles of the party (nation, peace, parliamentary democracy, social justice, free economy, cultural development) and provided the framework of the party’s governmental action that was based on realism rather than strict ideological principles (Karamanlis, 1979). The fact that his successors to the party leadership disregarded the ideological framework of pragmatism has deeply affected the party’s political and electoral fortunes over time.

At the same time, Karamanlis aimed at renewing the right-wing camp but within a wider, more pragmatic and realistic context. He was aware that by 1974, ERE was not politically competitive any more. Therefore, he had to establish a ‘new’ party, freed from the dividing lines of the past, committed to the principle of democracy, representative of the interests of all Greeks so all those who “desired a political renaissance” were invited to participate in this movement for a “proud and fortunate Greece” (Founding Declaration: 4/10/1974). It was emphatically stressed that New Democracy was a ‘new political party’ or as it was more accurately described a ‘partisan camp’ and not a revised version of ERE.

It is indicative however, that at a time characterised by the dynamic rise of the progressive left movement in Greece, Karamanlis managed to reinvent the right-wing movement and form a party, which gained a large share of the vote in the 1974 elections (54%). In general, this can be attributed to three main reasons (Loulis, 1981: 57-58). First, at the time Karamanlis was considered the most capable among all Greek

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7 Karamanlis himself referred to New Democracy as a ‘political party, which is new and necessary for the country’ while arguing that ‘a national necessity imposed the creation of ND; (Karamanlis speeches, 1974, pp. 69-70).
politicians to undertake the task of the country’s democratisation. His charismatic personality was a determinant for this overwhelming acceptance. Second, during the junta period, leading members of ERE opposed the regime by issuing statements, writing articles and generally engaging in resistance activities. This kind of action allowed drawing a dividing line between the authoritarian (old/traditional Right) and democratic right. Finally, his decision to dissolve ERE and create a new party with a centre-right ideology appealed to a larger segment of the conservative camp, the traditional ‘centre’ (Ibid.).

Nonetheless, the main question raised regarding New Democracy’s formation rests on the ‘newness’ of the party. The answer lies in the examination of intra-party functions and development in the early years of its creations. To this end, the degree of renewal of the party political personnel, in particular at the highest hierarchy ought to be identified. Moreover, the party’s mainstream ideological framework - as proclaimed by Karamanlis and then formally accepted at the party’s first Congress in 1979 - ought to be defined while identifying the extent to which New Democracy succeeded in developing its distinct coherent ideological identity.

**Political Renewal: ‘New’ but still ‘Blue’ (New Ideas – Old Tactics)**

In view of Karamanlis’ aim to create a new political party freed from the authoritarian connotations of the traditional ‘Right’ and modernise the conservative camp, one should expect that New Democracy would have been not only a ‘new’ but also ‘young’ party, consisting of a new generation of politicians and bypassing the old political elites. In fact, as Karamanlis stressed ‘the old political formations were out of touch with the people’, partially due to the ‘reactions of the old-time politicians’ - the ideologically and politically outmoded political elites (Karamanlis, 1974: 69-72). However, the political reality indicated that Karamanlis ‘could not afford to pass over the old guard of conservative politicians completely’ (Pappas, 1999: 72). The explanation for this was twofold. First, the dictatorial period was too short and therefore, the old political elites were not only physically present but their electoral power remained substantially strong. Second, clientelism was a major element of the Greek political and electoral landscape. Clientelistic networks and patron-client relationships were the major variables in explaining the voters’ electoral behaviour. To this end, it could be argued that Karamanlis actions were substantially constrained by the political culture and ethos as well as the socio-economic features of the Greek population.
A closer examination of the characteristics of the political personnel, in the 1974 and 1977 national elections shows two significant and at the same time contradictory trends (Pappas, 1999: 75-102). In quantitative terms, that is, the number of new MPs without a prior political record (newcomers) at the 1974 elections, it seems that New Democracy was indeed a ‘new’ party. As Table 5.1 shows, out of the 216 elected MPs, 138 were newcomers while only 78 had been active politically in the post-war period. However, the main issue here was not about numerical supremacy. It mainly related to the fact that those old-guard politicians, who had built their political success on opportunism, clientelism, had an anachronistic and in some cases, authoritarian political mentality and lacked a national perspective. To this end, they “[…] appeared in the context of the new political environment as parochial, obsolete, and largely incapable of modernising. […] they considered the political party to which they happened to belong as little more than the vehicle for satisfying their clientelistic obligations” (Pappas, 1999: 91-92).

Table 5.1: Election Rates of the Old Guard and Newcomers of ND Deputies (1974 & 2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Re-elected /Old guard</th>
<th>Newcomers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


At the opposite end of the deputies’ spectrum were the newcomers. In actual fact, however, a substantial portion of them did not fall into the ‘new generation’ category. One quarter of the total number of the newcomers entered politics and was subsequently, elected as a result to their family’s political heritage. This category included the sons, nephews, spouses, cousins etc. who had inherited the political clienteles of their family. As a consequence of their permanent political clientele a quite important number of these new recruits displayed extraordinary levels of political durability succeeding in getting elected in consecutive elections (Pappas, 1999: 87-90). Finally, another significant element to be considered in relation to Karamanlis’ quest for renewal is on the political thinking and mentality of the new generation of politicians; that is, the extent to which these young politicians were able to portray a political conduct and behaviour different from their predecessors’ parochialism. However, as the political trajectory of New Democracy has demonstrated

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While a comparison with the 2004 personnel gives us opposite results. In the 2004 national elections and despite the party leader’s promises for a ‘new’ party, only 24 percent of the total number of New Democracy’s parliamentarians was newcomers (Table 5.1).
political opportunism and clientelism were deep-rooted features of the party’s political character.

The occupation and social status of the elected MPs was another important element to be considered in the examination of the party’s characteristics. The vast majority of MPs were lawyers and doctors, representing a high social and conservative status. As Figures 5.1 and 5.2 indicate, these were the occupations of 75.6 percent of the old guard and 62.3 percent of the newcomers. Not a surprising result, as these occupations enjoyed a high social status and respect in the Greek society, and through their interaction with the public the candidates could build up large electorate followings (Pappas, 1999: 87-90). Therefore, it is apparent that despite Karamanlis’ desire to employ ‘new, progressive and radical’ political personnel, his parliamentary team had neither the technical nor the scientific knowledge to meet these requirements (Pappas, 1999: 86). On a more general note, as indicated in Figure 5.3, lawyers and doctors continue to be the majority of New Democracy’s parliamentarians even at the present time.

**Figure 5.1: Occupational distributıon of ND MPs in 1974 (Old Guard)**

![Pie chart showing occupational distribution of ND MPs in 1974](image)


Up to now, it appears that Karamanlis could not afford - and did not wish - to disregard the demands of the old political elites and as a consequence, he had to make
compromises in various levels. However, the most significant element in the formation and later development of the party was neither the number of re-elected MPs nor their occupation. It was the distribution of power within the party. Despite Karamanlis’ abstract quest for renewal, his closest political advisors and allies came from ERE. Unquestionably loyal to the leader since the post-war years, they occupied key ministerial posts and were the point of reference of all governmental activities. Moreover, another significant feature of Karamanlis’ early governmental actions was his preference to extra-parliamentary personnel, mainly his own closest advisors, in ministerial posts rather than to trust major governmental positions to the party’s elected MPs. Therefore, the first cabinet in 1974 consisted mainly of politicians from the old guard (three of whom were not elected MPs). The reshuffle that took place in 1977 attempted a limited renewal in personnel, with the appointment of a substantial number of newcomers to the position of undersecretaries (Ibid: 94). And whilst Karamanlis’ decisions might have been considered ‘practical’ at the time – given the political instability of the early post-junta years – his actions have defined the development of New Democracy’s character and marked the culture and way of conduct of the party’s future activities. In short, political renewal had never characterised the right-wing parties a pattern that was followed by New Democracy. As will be discussed later, the limited success of Karamanlis’ attempts for renewal still constrains the fortunes and most importantly, the evolution of the party to a modern, professional party (see chapters 6 and 7).

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9 Panagis Papaligouras, Evangelos Averoff, Georgios Rallis, and Konstantinos Papaconstantinou were the closest allies to the leader promoting unquestionably his government plans. A second group of deputies close to Karamanlis, younger in age but still belonging to the post-war ERE group, consisted of Ioannis Boutos, Costes Stephanopoulos, Ioannes Varvitsiotis and Achilleas Karamanlis. It is worth noting that all of them owned their political fortunes to their family name (Pappas, 1999: 82). Furthermore, the ones who are still alive are active members of the party until today. For example, Ioannis Varvitsiotis is an MEP, while his oldest son, Miltiades, was elected in parliament at the 2004 elections, Achilleas Karamanlis is still an MP (despite his old age), and Costes Stephanopoulos –after leaving New Democracy and forming his own party- was elected President of the Greek Republic (1996-2005).
In a relative way, it could be argued that Karamanlis renewed and reinvented the conservative party. This is particularly true, when one considers the ideological orientation of the party in relation to the extreme right. The leader refused to cooperate with politicians who had any kind of relationship with the dictatorship. Within that context, the leader drew a clear dividing line between the post-war right and New Democracy. In essence, he took small but rather ineffective steps in his attempt to break up the old alliances. Nevertheless, the prominent notables of ERE displayed extraordinary political durability and not only consolidated their position within New Democracy, but played a significant role in the internal ideological and structural development of the party over time. This group of politicians comprised the inner circle of Karamanlis and remained loyal to his doctrine – ‘Karamanlism’ – representing the current so-called group of party ‘barons’.
5.3 Ideological and Organisational Framework

From “Conservative Right” to “Radical Liberalism”

The main and most substantial difference between New Democracy and the old right-wing political groups was that New Democracy was the first conservative party to project detailed ideological principles. All New Democracy’s predecessors were characterised by ideological vagueness, bounded by ‘nation-mindedness’ and anti-communist feelings, in addition to authoritarian, paternalistic and statist policies (Alexakis, 1998: 5). The theoretical foundations of the ideological principles of New Democracy were developed by Karamanlis at the 1977 preliminary party Congress and approved by the 1979 first party Congress in Chalkidiki (Karamanlis, 1977; Karamanlis, 1979; New Democracy, 1979a). The first fundamental amendment of the party’s ideological framework took place in 1985 under the leadership of Konstantinos Mitsotakis and his policy programme entitled ‘A new Proposal of freedom’. This was an attempt to give New Democracy a neo-liberal ideological identity, shifting it away from its founder’s ideological principles and as a result created increased uneasiness within the party ranks – in particular, amongst the loyal Karamanlists. Nevertheless,
the move towards neo-liberalism was relatively short-lived and New Democracy returned to its ideological roots in 1994. This part of the chapter examines the ideological profile of New Democracy. The aim at this stage is to identify the main elements of the party’s doctrine as declared by Karamanlis while at the same time looking at the various tendencies that were developed over time and delineating the process of the party’s ideological evolution that led to New Democracy’s reinvigoration and repositioning to a modern form of ‘Karamanlism’ in 2004. For reasons of clarity, the analysis is divided into four phases; the first phase refers to the period from 1974 to 1985, the second from 1985 to 1994, the third from 1994 to 1996, and finally, the fourth includes the period from 1996 to 2004 and the party’s return in office.

**Phase One 1974-1985: “Radical Liberalism”**

From 1974 when New Democracy was elected in office until the preliminary Congress in 1977, the party’s ideological positioning was of secondary importance for the leadership, which was mainly concerned with the everyday running of government, while Karamanlis’ charisma and political prestige contributed to the party’s early electoral successes. Nevertheless, Karamanlis’ policy programme, New Democracy’s founding declaration and the provisions of the Greek Constitution – all deriving from Karamanlis’ political views, provided a generalised framework upon which the party’s ideological principles were later based (Alexakis, 1998: 7-8). Therefore, as in the case of ERE, New Democracy’s ideological identity epitomised the political philosophy and ideals of the party founder.

The party’s Founding Declaration projected the main ideological principles upon which Karamanlis wanted to build his party. Even though vague in nature this document presented the nature and scope of New Democracy’s formation, its ideals, values and objectives. At first, Karamanlis emphasised the fragile nature of Greek democracy “[...] the problems of Greek democracy have not been securely and permanently resolved“ and that the need to remain “vigilant and united under the umbrella of strong political organisations, capable to protect democracy“ as a means to avert a possible future crisis. For Karamanlis the creation of New Democracy, which was a ‘broad and living political camp’, was a ‘national cause’. New Democracy was not a mere political party but a broader partisan camp [politiki parataxis], consisting of ‘experienced and healthy’ as well as ‘new progressive and radical’ forces, in order to serve the interests of the people and the nation and safeguard the establishment of a ‘New Democracy’ in the country. Given the bitter experiences of the past, New Democracy ought to preserve and project only those practices and policies that would
benefit and promote the development of the country, disregarding the old political schisms and seeking the serve the ‘true interests of the nation’ beyond the divisive lines of the Right, Centre and Left. According to the Founding Declaration the party’s major objective in office laid on rapid economic development, through the close cooperation between private and public sectors. In practical terms, however Karamanlis promoted the establishment of an expanded public sector rather than safeguarding a free market. Finally, the leader laid great emphasis on the party’s European orientation; ‘Greece is not only entitled but also can secure its distinguished place and the well being of its people in Europe, where it belongs […]’ (New Democracy, 1974).

These principles were reiterated in the country’s 1975 Constitution, a document that overall implemented the political thinking of the Prime Minister. It included the basic civil rights of equality under the law, freedom of expression, the right to private property and private economic initiative. However, the role of the state remained highly interventionist and dominant. In the economic sector in particular the initiatives and interests of the state had been given precedence over the private economic interests, as a means to create balance between economic freedom and social justice. As explicitly stated in the Constitution ‘the state programmes and coordinates the county’s economic activity for the establishment of social justice and protection of the public interest, and works to secure the economic development of all sectors of the national economy’ (Quoted in Alexakis, 1998: 9). On the one hand, the Constitution illustrated Karamanlis’ pragmatic approach but on the other hand, it could be considered an early but clear case of New Democracy’s chronic deficiency of linking the party’s ideological framework and programme to its practices in office - a significant characteristic that, as discussed later, has defined intra-party activity and development for most of New Democracy’s political life.

New Democracy’s early attempts to develop an articulate ideological framework suffered from two major defects (Alexakis, 1998: 10). First, the party principles were characterised by a ‘considerable ideological vagueness’, which encouraged paternalism and rendered the leader over-powerful (Loulis, 1981). Second, the economic policy of the first Karamanlis government created a ‘pseudo-progressive ideological and socio-economic approach’ as the role of the state was profoundly interventionist (Ibid.). Nonetheless, as a result of internally driven but also externally created forces – mostly

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10 This remark for the European orientation of the country and a later statement made by Karamanlis that ‘Greece belongs to the west’ led to the most famous parliamentary debate of all times in Greece between Karamanlis and the leader of PASOK, Andreas Papandreou who replied that ‘Greece belongs to Greeks’. The latter became one of the main slogans of PASOK during the 1980s.
PASOK’s ideological and electoral appeal – in 1979, Karamanlis defined New Democracy’s ideology in six main principles. He described it as ‘Radical Liberalism’\(^{11}\), which was ‘lying between traditional liberalism and democratic socialism’ (Katsoudas, 1987: 97). As Karamanlis – once again vaguely - claimed this political philosophy ‘has the basic aim of bringing together all Greeks with the purpose of building a democracy founded on respect for national independence and on government by the people [...]’ (Karamanlis, 1979: 16-23).

First, Karamanlis declared that ND believed ‘in the national ideal’. In other words, the nation is considered the natural framework of individual life, and nothing and nobody is worthy enough to stand and/or function outside it. Within that context, New Democracy promised to safeguard the Greek nation’s territorial integrity and national independence as the main prerequisites to democracy. Second, New Democracy believed in ‘the peaceful coexistence of people’, opposing all kinds of violence and intervention in other countries. Karamanlis stressed once more, his belief (and subsequently the party’s belief) that Greece belonged to and should be a part of the western world. In fact, he considered that Greece’s integration in the EEC would benefit the economic and cultural development of the country, safeguard the newly founded democratic institutions and reinforce its national defence. It should be stressed that the party’s adherence to Europe and the West was perceived to be an ideological principle that determined its political nature. At the same time, however, New Democracy did not wish to identify with any group of parties in the European Parliament considering the divisions of ‘left’ ‘right’, and ‘centre’ obsolete (Katsoudas, 1987: 95).

Third, New Democracy ‘believe[d] in Parliamentary Democracy’ and more specifically, in a democracy ‘capable of effectively defending liberty and the progress of the social whole [...] combine[ing] freedom with order and order with social justice’. To this end, the party stood firmly against all forms of totalitarianism, communism and any from of dictatorship that would abuse individual freedom. Most importantly, it was stressed that New Democracy did not represent a particular class but ‘those who follow it and who come for all classes of the Greek people, for all of whom it is working’. In that sense, New Democracy represented the interests of the whole nation and for that

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\(^{11}\) Despite Karamanlis’ definition of ‘Radical Liberalism’, there was a great degree of confusion amongst the leading members of the party. Some thought of it as ‘centrist socialism’ and others as a form of libertarianism (Clogg, 1987: 155). This confusion was justified due to the vagueness and inconsistency of the term itself. In fact, ND never full-heartedly implemented a qualified version of liberalism. On the contrary, Karamanlis’ priorities laid on the stabilisation of the economy through a series of nationalisations and social cohesion rather than the strengthening of the free market. In that sense, ‘radical liberalism’ was used as an ideological point of reference and not as a policy orientation (Lyrintzis, 2005: 245).
reason it ‘maintained the possibility of adopting the best solutions at any time, even the most radical ones, when these were dictated by national interest’. In fact, the latter has always been one of the major characteristics that determined party activity in office and most importantly, marked the culture, mentality and reasoning of party hierarchy.

Fourth, New Democracy ‘aimed for social justice’, as the main prerequisite to the establishment and functioning of democracy. Only then, the people would feel secure and confident about the future and therefore, not be susceptible to any kind of totalitarian propaganda. Fifth, New Democracy believed ‘in a free democratic economy’, as the main prerequisite for improving the people’s living standards. However, as Karamanlis argued this freedom ought not to be limitless but merge individual with social interest. Therefore, the state ought to intervene and balance the economic and social inequalities created by free competition, as ‘excesses in free competition threatened the foundations not only of the economic but also of the social life of a country’. Finally, the sixth principle referred to the ‘country’s cultural potential’, which included the provision of care and education. For the party, the development of intellectual and cultural values constituted the preconditions for the country’s integration to the international community, as means to preserve its national features and play an influential role within the European and broader international arena (New Democracy, 1979b).

Overall, the six principles constituted the basis of Karamanlis’ ‘Radical Liberalism’ and subsequent stance of ‘Karamanlism’, which provides the main context of the party’s ideology until today. Karamanlis’ aimed at giving the party an ideological dynamic, which would help its survival in the long term. Despite the inevitable internal reactions of the ‘old guard’, Karamanlis sought to ‘de-personalise’ the party through the development of an ideological reference that would safeguard the party’s ‘renewal’ and survival when considered necessary (Loulis, 1979: 29-30). Nonetheless, many party delegates never understood and inevitably disregarded Karamanlis’ ‘radical liberalism’ (Ibid: 39). Furthermore, it should be stressed that despite the leader’s desire to establish the first right-wing ‘party of principles’ instead of ‘party of personalities’ New Democracy’s founding declaration was characterised by vagueness and an ‘absence of ideological coherence and substance’ elements that were never fully addressed (Clogg, 1987: 156). In fact, ideological confusion was one of the main

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12 In one of his articles in the Greek Journal ‘Epikentra’, J. Loulis argued that New Democracy was the only party of principles in Greece at the time. He based his argument on the way that the new leader was elected after the resignation of Karamanlis in 1980, and the procedures that were followed. He also stressed that there was an extraordinary cooperation between the
issues constraining party development over time. Notwithstanding subsequent attempts to either to outgrow ‘radical liberalism’ or advance it, New Democracy has never managed to project a solid ideology and most importantly, to stand by it while in office. In general, it could be argued that New Democracy did not resemble to the old, traditional right-wing parties; its ideological and organisational development has been slow but steady and led to the creation of a democratically organised ‘party with principles’ (if not a party of principles).

The election of Georgios Rallis in 1980 and of Evangelos Averoff in 1981 to the party leadership did not lead to any significant changes to the party’s ideology\textsuperscript{13}. The only difference between them rested on that the former was a moderate ‘centrist’ politician while the latter, an old party strongman, was a prominent supporter of the ultra-right. Nevertheless, both were loyal to Karamanlis’ principles and accepted ‘radical liberalism’ as the undisputable and irreversible ideology of the party. Their leadership was characterised by a degree of political apathy as they failed to expound any new programmes or policies, electoral strategies or tactics, nor to elaborate convincing alternatives to PASOK’s increasingly popular policies (Alexakis, 1998: 29).


After Konstantinos Mitsotakis, a member of the broader liberal camp rose to the leadership in 1984 he endeavoured to change the ideological orientation of the party. To this end, a year later, in 1985, he presented a new ideological manifesto, entitled ‘A new proposal of Freedom’\textsuperscript{14} illustrating the set of (neo-) liberal principles that provided the party’s ideological platform in the 1985 national elections. In fact, it was argued that the 1985 manifesto provided a consistent and clearly defined ideology for centre and party grassroots and that the base had an active role in the formulation of the ideological principles of ND (Loulis, 1980).

\textsuperscript{13} During that period the party did not alter its ideological position. The only significant change was on matters of tactical consideration. Georgios Rallis was a centrist, low profile politician who adopted a consensual style of political competition. On the other hand, Evangelos Averoff was a strong supporter of the extreme right, a hardliner who adopted a conflictual approach but without electoral gains for the party. In fact, it damaged the party in two ways. First, New Democracy lost the moderate voters. Second, New Democracy appeared to return to its post-war electoral image of traditional ‘Right’ giving the opportunity to the opposition party of PASOK to take advantage of it and consolidate the schematic conflict of ‘Right – anti-Right’ (Nicolacopoulos, 2005: 263-5). This ideological use of history worked only in favour of PASOK.

\textsuperscript{14} This declaration was the outcome of the cooperation between a special election committee, which was set up by Mitsotakis, in order to organise the party’s strategy in the 1985 elections, and the Centre for Political Research and Education (\textit{Kentro Politikis Erewnas kai Epimorfosis – KPEE}), a private institute originating from within ND aiming at the promotion of a pluralist democratic society (Clogg, 1987: 158, Alexakis, 1998: 30-1). The members of KPEE played a vital role in both the ideological and the strategic and electoral development of the party.
New Democracy to project to the electorate (Clogg, 1987: 158). The new ideological framework was formally endorsed at the second party Congress in February 1986.

Without formally disregarding the principles of radical liberalism, the new ideological framework claimed that New Democracy was a ‘modern progressive party that is continually developing’ and thus, ought to ‘proclaim today’s ideological priorities’ (New Democracy, 1985). It also stressed that the party’s main objective remained the ‘strengthening of democracy’ and the ‘extension of freedom’ and illustrated freedom as the overriding principle of the party’s ideological position. At the same time, New Democracy with its liberal principles could guarantee the socio-economic renewal that the country was in desperate need of, as it has done in the past. Yet, in an attempt to keep the balance within the party and eliminate the possibility of confrontation with the Karamanlist group, the new ideological declaration included quotations of the speeches that Karamanlis had delivered at the preliminary and first party Congresses. Moreover, the first two lines of the new manifesto categorically stated that ‘New Democracy is, and always will be, unequivocally dedicated to [Karamanlis’ six ideological] principles’ of radical liberalism.

At the start, the new ideological proposal stressed the importance of ‘greater individual freedom’ while eliminating the role of the state. The state ought to protect the individual from the arbitrariness of other people, but the main issue was the individuals’ protection from the arbitrariness of the state. To this end, New Democracy’s argument emphasised that past policies had led to the growth of a centralised, bureaucratic and arbitrary state, which instead of protecting the interests of the citizens, had led to their ‘weakening and marginalisation’. Therefore, New Democracy rejected such an all-powerful and autocratic state and believed that the state ought to be smaller and controlled by democratic legitimacy. New Democracy wanted a state totally independent from political parties, limited state intervention in the economy, independent justice, a strong parliament, independent and pluralistic mass media and independent and unfettered trade unionism. Only under those circumstances, it was argued, the citizens would be able to develop into independent and autonomous personalities and become freer and more responsible.

Moreover the ‘New Proposal of Freedom’ stressed the importance of ‘liberal principles’. It was argued that party freedom was the overriding ideal, the highest political aim, but freedom ought to be concomitant of equality of opportunity, social justice and order. As the same time, redistribution of wealth could be achieved in an economically developed environment where ‘each citizen should partake of the national product in proportion to his contribution to its creation’. Within that context,
social justice was linked to liberalism, ‘because liberalism [fought] every privilege and [sought] just the recognition of the abilities of every man’. Once again, it was noted that New Democracy believed in the rule of law and the clear division of powers between the state and legal system and that government ought to protect the interests of all Greeks. Moreover, New Democracy stressed the importance of law and order that rested above not against freedom, was a prerequisite to freedom, liberated people and above was provided by a liberal system of government.

In economic terms, the new ideological manifesto stressed the significance of a free economy and private property as essential qualifications to political freedom and individual autonomy and independence. It argued that in the cases that free economy and private property had been replaced by state control then ‘civil liberties have been violated, society has withered and economic development has been retarded’. Moreover, the party statement conditioned that free economy was democratic if it developed outside the state’s control and private property was linked to freedom. Therefore, every citizen should be allowed to private property and not be penalised (in any way or form) in their attempt to achieve that goal. Nevertheless, this neo-liberal approach did not utterly exclude the role of the state in the economy. In fact, the state ought to encourage and reassure competition, prevent any kind of monopoly and offer incentives for economic development as a means to protect the economically weak population.

Finally, the last part of the proposal referred to the party’s political identity. It stated that New Democracy was both radical and liberal. However, New Democracy’s radical character did no longer responded to Karamanlis’ philosophy of the party’s ability to implement even the most radical policies if dictated by the national interest. Rather its radicalism related to the rigid modernisation of the country’s political, economic and social life. At the same time, New Democracy portrayed a liberal character advocating greater individual freedom and confidence in the abilities of the citizens as the essential preconditions for the country’s renewal. Therefore, the party leader aimed to position New Democracy not to a conservative but rather a progressive platform, favouring change in all levels. Besides for New Democracy the liberal choice was ‘par excellence progressive’. That is, the party was not bound by one-dimensional orientations but had a wider perspective to allow the development through greater autonomy and responsibility. Therefore, New Democracy proclaimed ‘change with responsibility’. Finally, it was once again emphasised that New Democracy strongly

15 The actual implementation of neo-liberalism while in government was characterised by vagueness. Despite the solid ideological foundation that for the first time the party presented, the party’s government record (1990-1993) showed that in practice, the neo-liberal manifesto was actually disregarded.
advocated a wider cooperation with the west and especially, Europe in the context of a united democratic European Community.

In fact, the new ideological declaration abandoned the principles and tactics of Karamanlis’ ‘radical liberalism’. It is indicative that while in the late 1970s prominent party delegates and defenders of Karamanlis’ political philosophy prided themselves on the fact that the ‘country’s economy had been subject to an unprecedented degree of state control, with the public sector amounting to more than 60%’ (Clogg, 1987: 157), Mitsotakis in the new policy statement reproached the overblown public sector for the negative economic conditions of ‘high inflation, bureaucracy, increasing unemployment, higher taxation and foreign debt’ and stressed that ‘the time ha[d] come to stop this decline’. And the means to this end was through the establishment of a political framework of liberal solutions, based on ‘the principles of freedom and of humanity, on equality before the law and meritocracy’. In 1989 New Democracy returned in office after eight years in opposition, however, as will be argued in the following chapter, this was mainly due to the inadequacy of PASOK to win the election rather than New Democracy’s ability to persuade the people for the party’s ideological accuracy and competence.

**Phase Three 1993 – 1996: Nothing but “Radical Liberalism”**

In 1993 and after the party’s electoral defeat, Konstantinos Mitsotakis, following the traditional pattern of replacing the leader after an electoral defeat, was forced to resign from party leader. His successor and fifth consecutive leader, Miltiadis Evert was an advocate of Karamanlism and opposed the neo-liberal principles upon which the party’s 1990-1993 governmental policies were built. At a period of internal upheaval, Evert, a representative of the younger generation and political offspring and faithful supporter of Karamanlis, was considered the person able to end factionalism and unite the party. In his electoral speech, he promised to break the ties with the past, put an end to old rivalries and renew the party by giving it a new programme and clearer ideological and strategic objectives. Furthermore, he professed a ‘peaceful revolution’, which would modernise and rejuvenate the Greek society (Bratakos, 2002: 611-2).

Evert tried to pursue a strategy representative of the majority of party members and therefore, unite the party. In particular, he laid great emphasis on the organisation and implementation of the third party Congress in April 1994, which, in a symbolic manner, took place in Chalkidiki, where fifteen years earlier Karamanlis’ radical liberalism was sanctioned as the only and undisputed ideology of New Democracy
(Alexakis, 1998: 66; Bratakos, 2002: 622). The third party Congress was built upon three main axes; ideological, programmatic and structural. On ideology, the main change rested on the re-orientation of the party’s profile to ‘nothing but radical liberalism’. At his opening speech, Evert stressed that New Democracy was the party of radical liberalism, which constituted the party’s greatest political and ideological weapon (Bratakos, 2002: 624-6). In particular, the connotation of ‘liberalism’ projected New Democracy’s political philosophy, while the ‘radical’ notion characterised the party’s way of conduct. The leader also emphasised that the major dynamic of radical liberalism was the ‘strain for continuous change and reform’ leading to pragmatic and beneficial for the citizens, policies (Ibid). In other words, Evert conditioned the party’s ideological basis under his leadership by reinvigorating the ideological principles of Konstantinos Karamanlis; a development that was regarded as a triumph of the Karamanlist faction over the (neo-) liberal group.

Nevertheless, Evert promised to bring a breath of fresh air within the party. However, as a result of mainly endogenous reasons, the ‘peaceful revolution’ that he had promised never materialised. When he was elected leader New Democracy was facing two major problems. The first related to the ideological disorientation of the party and the second to the organisational disenchantment of the party base, which was disappointed with the Mitsotakis administration. Although Evert attempted to revive the party’s organisational structure, he failed to give New Democracy a meaningful ideological orientation that would serve as a means to his end. As a matter of fact, instead of finding new ways to respond to New Democracy’s ideological inertia and leave his own stamp on the party’s ideologisation, he chose to adopt old tactics in order to get the support of the old guard as a source for his leadership authority. Furthermore, the impetuous adoption of traditional radical liberalism as New Democracy’s undisputed ideology and parallel rejection of all the previously acknowledged neo-liberal principles, led many advocates of neo-liberalism to either leave the party (Andreas Andrianopoulos) or be expelled from the party (Stephanos Manos). Therefore, it appears that during the Evert years, New Democracy emerged deeply divided and ideologically disoriented.

As a consequence, the party’s renewal and rejuvenation never materialised. Once again the erroneous mentality and strategy of the party leadership failed to transform the party into a dynamic and meaningful ideological camp. The return to radical liberalism was rather misguided, implemented at a malapropos moment, was not wholeheartedly accepted and thus, never fully integrated. As a consequence, New Democracy was led to further factionalism as the leadership tried to cut off all ties with neo-liberalism, either by degrading the role of its advocates within the party hierarchy.
or by expelling them. At the same time, the lack of a structured policy programme and the leader's moderate approach to the decisions of the current government led to serious intra-party disagreements and subjected the leader’s choices under severe scrutiny (Bratakos, 2002: 662-676). The failure of Evert's ‘peaceful revolution’ was officially confirmed in the 1996 elections; New Democracy did not only fail to increase its share of the vote but it decreased by 1.2 percent (from 39.3 in 1993 to 38.12 percent of the total vote in 1996). Overall, Evert failed to renew the party and develop a coherent ideological orientation but also drove New Democracy to empty empiricism and de-ideologisation (Alexakis, 1998: 66).

**Phase Four: 1996 – 2004: “Radical Modernisation”**

The 1996 electoral defeat led to another change in the party leadership. In 1997 at the fourth party Congress in Athens, and after a period of sharp internal conflicts and confrontations that threatened the survival of the party, New Democracy elected its sixth consecutive leader, Kostas Karamanlis, who was the nephew of the founder of the party, Konstantinos Karamanlis. Karamanlis’ (junior) election had a twofold effect. First, it confirmed the dominance of the Karamanlist group within the party. Second, it reaffirmed the party’s commitment to continue the ideological repositioning from neo-liberalism to the ‘radical liberalism’, but within a modern and updated context, incorporating all these changes able to lead New Democracy into a new era of politics. At the same time, it was widely regarded within the ranks of the party that the rise of Karamanlis (junior) to the party leadership would provide a new dynamic to New Democracy – due to his family name – and allow the party to overcome the internal divisions and disputes that had hindered its electoral fortunes for years. In fact, Karamanlis (junior) was elected leader with an overwhelming majority – 69.15 percent of the share of the vote - at the party Congress on March 1997.

Karamanlis (junior) was regarded as a moderate and composed politician, who rejected dogmatism in any form and believed in the process of dialogue and synthesis as means of political action. He was also an advocate of a humanitarian form of liberalism combined with social justice (Bratakos, 2002: 735). The expectations of the new leader were very high, as Karamanlis (junior) epitomised the widespread desire to renew, reinvigorate and modernise the centre-right and thus, lead New Democracy in office. In fact, his young age (of only 40 years) and his overwhelming endorsement from the party grassroots brought a wind of change and optimism within the party. However, the early days of Karamanlis (junior) leadership were marked by deep division and conflicts; Karamanlis, in his attempt to cement his authority and status
within the party hierarchy, fell out with the intra-party opposition group and expelled a number of high profile party delegates.

As a consequence, at the outset of his leadership, Karamanlis had to face a number of serious dilemmas. He ought to find the proper way to confront the ‘Mitsotakis faction’, which influenced a substantial number of MPs and party officials. At the same time, Karamanlis ought to find a way to communicate, cooperate with and win the support of the party ‘barons’ and mainly, the ones who endorsed his candidacy. To this end, he chose to adopt a moderate and low profile approach, which though was short-lived. Within six months of his leadership election, Karamanlis was fiercely criticised by many party cadres who doubted his leadership abilities and did not hesitate to publicly express their dissent (Bratakos, 2002:743-749; Ta Nea, 1997: 10 October). As a result, Karamanlis contended most of his critics and in an attempt to control the party and put an end to the internal conflicts, he decided to expel six prominent members from the party, including the leadership contender Giorgos Souflias, and Stephanos Manos, and Vassilis Kontogiannopoulos. He also confine Mitsotakis’ role within the party. This was a decision that created uneasiness at the various levels of the party. However, it should be noted that Karamanlis (junior), had in advance informed and got the consent of the founder of the party, Konstantinos Karamanlis¹⁶ (Ta Nea, 1998, 4 February). For a short period of time, the new leader aimed at imposing himself on the party elite and strengthening his position and authority as means to safeguard party unity. Nonetheless, Karamanlis (junior), as his predecessors, chose to compromise with rather than run against the intra-party opposition and it was not long before the majority of the expelled members were asked to rejoin the party. In fact, as it will be demonstrated later, the leader’s inability to control the party elite and eliminate the ‘personified’ factions at the top of the party, hindered New Democracy’s evolution and in relation to the party’s 2004 general election landslide harmed the party’s chances to build a political hegemony.

With reference to the party’s ideology, the first years of the Karamanlis leadership were characterised by ideological stagnation. In a generalised context, the formal ideological framework was based on the principles of ‘radical liberalism’. However, the party’s major ideological advance took place at the 2000 party Conference on ‘Values

¹⁶ It has to be mentioned that Konstantinos Karamanlis had characterised his relationship with Mitsotakis as ‘cold and unpleasant’ (Ta Nea, 1997, 14 May). In fact, this conflict dated back in the early 1950s when Karamanlis was a government minister. However, it is made clear that within the party there were two major personified factions; Karamanlists and Mitsotakists. Many argued that the conflict between the two (families as this was developed over the years) could be characterised as a vendetta (Ta Nea, 1998, 5 February).
and Principles". And whilst New Democracy members reconfirmed ‘radical liberalism’ as the party’s ideological identity, the main principles were reframed to respond to the problems of a changing society within the post-EMU era. This resulted to the formulation of a modernised and up-to-date version of ‘radical liberalism’, which included eight main ideological principles.

To this end, New Democracy’s philosophy was expressed by ‘liberalism’ while its reformist and modernising character by ‘radical’. The party’s main aim was to respond effectively to the ‘current social challenges for the renewal of political formations’ through the use of ‘selective synthesis of ideas and persons’. New Democracy was the party of Radical Modernisation. Moreover, it was stated that New Democracy was the only party able to respond to the problems of the citizens because it was the only Greek political party whose actions and behaviour, positions and methods were ‘radical’, that is, free of ‘reservations and dogmatisms, willing for constant renewal and reform with the public and national interest always in mind’ (New Democracy, 2007).

The cornerstones of New Democracy’s ideology remained the human being and the nation. It was once again clearly stated that the party aimed at the ‘people’s happiness in a state of freedom and equality’, within which each individual could develop into an active citizen with power and authority. Any form of discrimination was excluded and rejected; everyone has the right to equality and the right to be different. Moreover, it was restated that New Democracy believed in the concept of the nation as ‘the basic framework of human life and activity’, providing the predetermined framework within which individuals could develop ‘morally, politically and culturally’. National independence, unity and solidarity combined with a dynamic and pioneering educational system and to a broader extent, the mobilisation of the ecumenical Hellenism would put the basis for the survival of the Greek spirit, civilisation and nation. At the same time, it was also stressed that New Democracy was the advocate of a ‘united Europe and nations living together in peace’. For New Democracy different nations ought to coexist peacefully and contribute to international cooperation. It goes without any further saying that New Democracy continued to strongly argue that Greece’s place was in the European Union. Moreover, New Democracy believed in the ‘democratic system and sovereignty of the people’. Freedom of religion, parliamentary democracy, respect for the majority

17 The Conference took place while the election campaign period of 2000 was under way. To this end, it was a mediated and communications orientated event but regardless of the campaign elements, the members consolidated the ideological changes that Karamanlis wished to introduce. A more detailed analysis of the scope and nature of New Democracy’s modern ideological identity is presented in chapter 6.
principle, rule of law, minority and human rights, and belief in the role of justice constituted the fundamental positions of the party.

Social justice was, and still remains, one of cornerstones of ‘radical liberalism’. For New Democracy social justice within a free society postulated the existence of equal opportunities and meritocracy, social coherence, and equal requirements and responsibilities both by the individual and the state. Furthermore, the provision of social benefits for current and future generations is regarded as a fundamental prerequisite for the quality of life of the people and as a result, these should be guaranteed by the state. New Democracy considered economic development a main prerequisite for quality of life. In other words, economic development was linked to the people’s living standards while the latter it was seen as dependent on the quality of life and personal development. For that reason, New Democracy promoted the notion of a ‘human state’, resulting from the cooperation of the state and private sectors. Nevertheless, the new ideological philosophy thought privatisation as necessary but not a means in itself; instead it should be used for the benefit of society. The role of the state regarded as supervisory and regulatory and not entrepreneurial. Therefore, state actions ought to serve and benefit the citizens, and provide guidance and support to the individual. However, in order for the above principles to be implemented, New Democracy acutely stressed the need for radical reforms that would reinvent and modernise the state structures. The later was attainable through a ‘peaceful revolution’ with ‘respect to the democratic processes without hesitation or fatalism’.

In general, the fundamental aim of the ideological principles was to safeguard the party and build a clear ideological orientation. New Democracy was formed as an office-seeking party and as such its ultimate aim was to win elections. The ideological principles consolidated at the 2000 Conference on ‘Values and Principles’ provide the context of the party’s political programme. And whilst New Democracy lost the 2000 national election, in ideological terms the leadership had laid the groundwork, which led to the party’s 2004 landslide victory. The outcome of these deliberations was the middle ground project, which illustrated the party’s ideological repositioning, while marking New Democracy’s communications renewal, strategic reinvention and political reinvigoration. In short, Karamanlis did not manage to win over his intra-party critics but he succeeded in providing New Democracy with the political and ideological orientation that the party was in desperate need of. Finally, it should be noted that the aim of the present chapter is to provide a detailed account of the doctrinal development of the party over time; the detailed account on the extent to
which New Democracy managed to utilise these principles for electoral or political purposes, is presented in chapter 6.

General Ideological Tendencies within New Democracy

Having reached the current point of analysis, it is quite important to briefly review the context leading to the unfavourable circumstances that almost all party leaders and in particular, Evert and Karamanlis (junior) had to face as a result of intense intra-party opposition. Nevertheless, the events that took place in the 1990s and led to bitter intra-party conflicts and confrontations could be addressed from two diverse angles. First, the main dividing line rested on the issue of ideological predominance. New Democracy’s ideological profile and the context within which it was adjusted over time verified the existence of factions and splinter groups within its ranks, engaged in a constant struggle for power (Alexakis, 1998: 6-7). In addition to the existence of these internal dissenting tendencies, it should be borne in mind that New Democracy was a party of notables (its formative characteristics, as analysed later in this chapter, illustrate the party’s strong elements of elitism). The personality and political power of party cadres, combined with a culture of nepotism and clientelism, have played a vital role in the functions and evolution of the party. Within that context, the most prominent party notables, the cadres who were thought to control or even ‘own’ rather than belong to the party, formed alliances in order to promote their ideological views but most importantly, safeguard and enhance their position in the party’s hierarchy. Hence, intra-party fermentation developed into a customary characteristic of New Democracy’s identity, conditioning the party’s political behaviour and electoral fortunes.

Considering the diverse ideological perspectives developed over the party’s thirty years history, one can identify four mainstream ideological tendencies within New Democracy, ranking from the centre (-left) to the ultra-right. And whilst New Democracy has never formally vindicated the different tenets within the party (Alexakis, 1998: 47), many party delegates have acknowledged the development of ideological disagreements and conflicts and have even reaffirmed their support for one of the groups. In the early years of the party’s formation, two main tendencies were identified; the old ERE members and the ‘newcomers’ (Bakogiannis, 1977: 125). It should be noted though that during the 1970s it was Karamanlis who utterly controlled the fortunes of the party and therefore, nobody sought to oppose the decisions of the leader formally or informally, on ideological or personal basis. Nevertheless, this early division was later developed into four distinct and clearly
defined tendencies. To this end, New Democracy’s ideological platform is a mosaic consisting of the traditional right or Karamanlism, ultra-right, neo-conservatism and finally, neo-liberalism. The last two ideological tendencies emerged in the aftermath of Mitsotakis rise to the party leadership in 1984 and comprised main reference points to the development and consolidation of the party’s ideological identity\(^\text{18}\).

The first and mostly resilient faction has been the traditional right that has the imprint of the party founder Konstantinos Karamanlis. This has been the strongest tendency within the party with many loyal advocates throughout the party’s life. This group includes all those who continue to support Karamanlis’ form of ‘radical liberalism’. The second echelon within New Democracy included the supporters of the ultra-right and those who favoured the return of the King (Alexakis, 1998: 49). This tendency initially led to the creation of the splinter party of National Front that fought the 1977 election but gradually in the early 1980s the dissenting members rejoined New Democracy. Averoff was the only party leader who belonged to this group of hardliners. In the mid-1980s under the leadership of Mitsotakis the party moved to neo-conservatism and adopted neo-liberal ideas, shifting its ideological beliefs from social justice to personal economic freedom and from state intervention in the economy to private initiative (Ibid: 50). For most of this period and until the elections of 1989 and 1990 the party branded as ‘liberal’. Within the context of the broader liberal camp two opposing factions emerged; the neo-conservative and neo-liberal groups. In fact, the latter was considered a side effect of neo-conservatism flourishing over the same period. The members of the neo-conservative group were proponents of party’s ideological shift towards the centre through the adoption of neo-liberal principles (Alexakis, 1998: 49-50; Bratakos, 2002:397-398). While they acknowledged the state’s inefficiency as an entrepreneur and exalted the virtues of private initiative, they aimed at the ‘modernisation’ rather than ‘radical reform’ of the existing system by adopting economic liberal arguments. That is, they approached economic liberalism with a ‘conservative’ perspective with regard to institutions and practices. These ideas were portrayed in the party’s manifesto ‘A New Proposal for Freedom’, which formally amended the party’s ideological balance. On the other hand, the advocates of neo-liberalism argued for the complete disentanglement of the state from the economy, projecting Margaret Thatcher’s policies as the model to follow. They opted therefore to portray New Democracy as a radically neo-liberal political party, promoting radical economic reforms. It is worth noting though, that the most prominent advocates of

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\(^{18}\) When Mitsotakis rose to the leadership, New Democracy gradually shifted its ideological priorities from the principles of ‘radical liberalism’ to a set of more liberal ideas. Mitsotakis was a fierce advocate of liberalism mainly as a result of his political background as a leading member of the Liberal Party in the 1950s (Bratakos, 2002:3378-384).
neo-liberalism, such as Stephanos Manos and Andreas Andrianopoulos have currently been expelled from the party.

For many analysts New Democracy is considered a ‘coalition’ or ‘confederacy’ of parties. Yet, for some leading party members this ideological diversity has provided New Democracy with a significant dynamic. New Democracy is regarded as the party that has the ability to unite the various tendencies and political tenets that flourish within its rank. However, for some critics this diversity of opinions and ideological stances has been the weakest link of the party that is presented divided and disorganised to the electorate (Papachristos, 24/2/1998: N10). Also, nobody could disregard that in various occasions this diversity of opinions has led to open public conflicts between leading party delegates, events that have harmed the party politically and electorally. However, it should be borne in mind that the latter features are indicative of New Democracy’s identity; divisions and intra-party diversity of opinions that are declared publicly, have characterised the party’s behaviour throughout its history. The conduct of the party delegates has been closely related to the character that New Democracy inherited but also developed in the early years of its existence, consolidation and later institutionalisation. To this end, a closer but mainly cohesive look at New Democracy’s functions, formal and informal rules of conduct – as offered by the Party Evolution Framework – over time, clearly indicates that party behaviour characterised by disobedience and disorder, upheavals, divisions and conflicts driven by personal ambitions, is explicitly linked to New Democracy’s innate traits, the culture, ethos and mentality of the party. That is, the culture, nature and scope of the party functions allow delegates to develop attitudes that to a great extent harm the party.

Overall, New Democracy has presented an ostensibly united front on three occasions. In the 1970s it was the strong personality of Karamanlis that did not allow disunity and public divisions while in the late 1980s and 1990s the prospect of an electoral win after eight years in opposition brought together the various factions under the leaderships of Mitsotakis and Karamanlis (junior) respectively. Today, a social-liberal tendency with strong links to radical liberalism is considered to dominate the party. And whilst at first Karamanlis (junior) seemed to be able to change the long-established negative tradition of party disunity and disorder, recent events demonstrate that his unwillingness to radically change elements of the party’s conflictual culture, have led New Democracy into another deep crisis. On September 2nd 2009, the Prime Minister, Karamanlis (junior) was forced to call a snap election, mainly due to his inability to control the rebels within his party and control the pressure of internal opposition. As will be discussed later in the thesis, the problems
that New Democracy has to face do not derive from the development of ideological factions but rest on the struggle for power and authority between a few prominent party cadres.

5.4 The Internal Organisation: From Theory to Practice

As discussed in the first part of this chapter, the post-war parties in Greece were ‘personal parties’, centred on a network of notables and defined by organisational weakness, lack of internal democracy, a clientelistic mentality and ideological vagueness. In fact, these were political formations dependent on the charismatic leader and local bosses or kommataxes, who prolonged clientelism between the party elite and electoral base. Therefore, while examining the organisational development of New Democracy, it should be considered that the party is a direct descendant of such personal and bourgeois parties. As will be discussed later, in essence, New Democracy’s genetic traits and charismatic character indicated that the context within which the party was formed, was defined by a highly elitist and personalised culture. Nevertheless, and despite internal intricacies, Karamanlis aimed at creating the appropriate conditions so as for the party to be able to develop an internally structured organisation, wide membership base and democratically operated mechanism, able to allow New Democracy to evolve to an organisationally strong party and gradually ‘reject’ its ‘charismatic’ heritage. Karamanlis had realised the imperative need for change in the political attitudes of the parties, as a result of the changing political landscape of the 1970s, which was characterised by increased politicisation and ideologisation. And whilst charismatic leadership was initially an essential element to party formation and early cohesion, in order for a party to survive, it ought to develop a democratically organised structure (Strategies, 1979: 42).

To this end, Karamanlis established New Democracy aiming ‘to create a strong political force, which would prevent the fragmentation of the country’s political forces […] and would create a new political environment that in turn could prevent the comeback to the mentality and practices of the past’ (Karamanlis, 1974: 71). Having acknowledged that it was not possible to transform a traditional ‘personal party’ to a ‘party of principles’ in a short period of time and without widespread discontent from the party cadres, he chose to formulate a set of ideological principles but mainly, constitutional provisions that promoted and advanced the organisational development (at least at an initial theoretical level) of New Democracy while at the same time, protecting the role and powers of the leadership. For Karamanlis party organisation became a goal in itself; his purpose was to create an organisational dynamic to reinforce and uphold his
political philosophy, eliminate his potential opponents, but most importantly to facilitate party institutionalisation and ensure that New Democracy would survive his political retirement. Nevertheless, it took quite a few years for New Democracy to develop an internally democratic organisation. In fact, it could be argued that most of the organisational reforms that took place over time were no more than theoretical. However, it is unquestionable that overall, the Greek political parties have succeeded in evolving to autonomous organised bodies, developing from loose political formations of opportunistic and elitist nature to strongly institutionalised democratic parties.

Organisational Developments 1974-1979

Notwithstanding Karamanlis’ intentions New Democracy’s organisational development was rather inefficient and did not live up to the expectations of its members. The first formal party organs appeared in 1975 as a result of Karamanlis’ decision to create the Administrative and the Executive Committees. Nevertheless, the members of the two centrally based committees, whose role was not clarified, were close political friends and loyal to Karamanlis eliminating potential disputes and disagreements that could hinder the leader’s priorities (Pappas, 1999: 114). In essence, the committees’ role was decorative indicating the party’s amateurish approach to its organisational growth. The lack of experience, the leader’s intention to practically keep the party under his direct control and the leadership’s priority on governmental rather than partisan affairs were considered of the most significant reasons for New Democracy’s organisational stagnation in the early years of the party’s formation.

The first promising breakthrough took place at the 1977 Chalkidiki preliminary Congress. The Congress was attended by 1751 party members including government ministers, parliamentary members, party candidates and general secretaries of ministries (New Democracy, 1979a: 12). It was the first time in Greece that a right-wing party had organised such an event, and this caused a tremendous political stir (Pappas, 1999: 114). Based on the party’s first preliminary charter – the organisational statute produced in 1974 under the auspices of Karamanlis (Misahlidis, 1979: 30) - the 1977 Congress formulated and ratified the second preliminary party statute, which was the final draft of the official statute ratified at the first regular party Congress in 1979. In more detail, the preliminary charter established three interrelated tiers of organisation (see Appendix); first, the Central Party Organisation which consisted of the General Assembly (later renamed Party Congress), party leader, and Administrative and Economic committees; second, the Regional Organisation
developed within the context of the electoral districts and finally, the Local party Offices, created at the local level and included boroughs, districts, parishes etc (Article 2, Second Preliminary Statute in Diamantopoulos, 1994: 55). Moreover, it is worth mentioning that the 1977 statute replaced the old party emblem (a portrait of Karamanlis) with the initials ‘ND’ within a circle (article 1).

In 1979 two years after the preliminary Congress, the New Democracy leadership organised the party’s first regular party Congress. The party’s electoral defeat at the 1978 local elections had demonstrated the inefficiency of the party base and indicated the imperative need for ideological and organisational changes. The 1979 Conference was regarded as an attempt to mobilise the party members on the one hand, and refine the party’s ideological framework, on the other.\(^\text{19}\) In total 830 delegates participated in the Conference, representing all levels of party organisation (Bratatakos, 2002: 267-8). At the Conference the first Statute of New Democracy was ratified. It included 18 articles and some major and revolutionary for the political culture of the party cadres, provisions.

First, there was a deliberate attempt to undermine the personality cult of the party leader while promoting New Democracy as a strong and independent – from personal attributes - entity (Pappas, 1999: 126; Strateges, 1979: 44). Hence, the head of the party was acknowledged as the ‘president’ of New Democracy and not ‘leader’ while providing for the position of ‘deputy president’ (article 6). Moreover, the party emblem was once again replaced by a hand firmly holding a lit torch in a circle (article 1). However, the most significant variance was the provision stating that future party presidents ought to be elected by the parliamentary group by a simple majority and not by the party Congress. As a consequence, the parliamentary group was formally recognised as (one of the) most powerful party organs, in addition to the president, party conference, and administrative and executive committees (article 2). This shift in the balance of power was perceived to be necessary for the effective running of the party. It was argued that the leader ought to have the support and cooperation of the parliamentary group in order to promote his ideas and policies (Strateges, 1979: 44). Nonetheless, at the same time this was considered a major step back in the democratic development and organisation of the party. In fact, as New Democracy’s trajectory has demonstrated this shift in the balance of power, marked the party’s identity and evolutionary process as it rendered the leader dependent on the political demands and

\(^{19}\) As already mentioned, New Democracy did not have a clear ideological background, a fact that affected the party’s organisational efforts. That is in an increasingly ideologised era New Democracy could not increase its electoral appeal without a clear ideological orientation. A clearly defined framework of the values and principles that the party stood for was an imperative precondition for the creation of a democratically organised ‘mass’ party, as Karamanlis desired.
personal ambitions of the parliamentary members. However, the party Congress was formally regarded as the party's highest authority, but its responsibilities and powers were substantially circumscribed to the ratification of the party's political programme (but without policy-making powers), the election of the extra-parliamentary members of the administrative committee, the monitoring of the actions of the administrative committee, and voting on statute changes (Pappas, 2002: 127; Bratakos, 2002: 268-9). In essence, the Congress' powers were no more than theoretical in terms of actual decision-and policy-making activities.

Most importantly, the main issue in regard to New Democracy's organisational development rested on the effectiveness (or mainly the lack of it) of the functions of the party structure. The extent to which the party organisational base was effective can be examined in quantitative and qualitative terms. The latter refers to the articulation of the party and creation of a strong and well-defined extra-parliamentary organisation at central and regional levels. It also relates to intra-party power distribution and degree of dependency among the party organisational tiers. On the other hand, the quantitative analysis relates to the actual organisational growth of the party mechanism both in terms of local party branches and resources, and members. In fact, a detailed analysis of the membership is offered in the following part of this chapter that examines the party’s institutionalisation process.

Overall, the party statute provided the theoretical context of New Democracy's organisational development but in practice the democratic organisation of a party consisting of notables and a significant number of local strongmen was rather difficult to achieve. Yet, Karamanlis had anticipated these difficulties and planned for the gradual implementation of the Statute provisions (Strateges, 1979: 42). Moreover, the president of New Democracy's youth organisation (ON Ned) had argued in 1979 that the party was facing two major organisational impediments (New Democracy, 1979a: 25). First, many young people participated in the party's electoral campaign but they were not interested in formally joining the party organisation. Second, there was a shortage of experienced delegates capable to promote party membership amongst the young party supporters. He also stated that by 1979 they had managed to establish 64 (plus 4 de novo) fully staffed offices in the region of Attiki and 102 (plus 22 de novo) in the rest of the country (Ibid: 26). As for the organisational development of the party as a whole the official party figures showed an impressive growth during the first five years. As Table 5.2 indicates in just three years the party membership rose from

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20 The degree of organisational development of New Democracy in qualitative terms will be discussed in more detail in the following part of this document as this is closely related to the degree of institutionalisation of the party.
20,000 in 1976 to 150,000 in 1979, while over the same period ONNED counted 50,000 members. The numerical increase in membership rates could be considered very impressive for various reasons. First, at the New Democracy was a party-in-government and the main priorities of the leader and Prime Minister laid on his legacy as a national rather than party leader (Alexakis, 2001a; 39-47; Loulis, 2007: 214-218). Second, as discussed, New Democracy lacked a coherent ideological orientation - especially, compared with the socialist party of PASOK and its strong organisational and ideological background. In fact, as already argued New Democracy’s strongest asset at the time was its charismatic leader, something that proved to be a significant liability to the party’s evolution in the aftermath of the founder’s political retirement. Finally, a substantial number of old time politicians (mainly members of ER) and regional strongmen felt threatened from the development of a strong party organisation as such a development would limit their personal influence in their local strongholds.

Table 5.2: Organisational Growth of ND (selected years)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Members</td>
<td>20000</td>
<td>150000</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>220000</td>
<td>400000</td>
<td>450000</td>
<td>383000</td>
<td>350000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Committees</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>3500</td>
<td>3500</td>
<td>3500</td>
<td>No data available</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


However, in terms of efficiency the extent to which this impressive numerical growth correlated with a respective qualitative growth ought to be further examined. Unfortunately, there are no available data from that period to indicate to what extent party members played a significant role in and actively participated in party activities; ranging from formal and informal gatherings and events to mobilisation and canvassing during election campaign periods. Nevertheless, in view of the above discussion it is possible to draw some rather interesting inferences.

First, Karamanlis’ desire to build a democratically organised party freed from the deficiencies of the past right-wing (and on occasion authoritarian) parties, had limited

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21 It should be noted that there are no official party data on membership rates, nationally or locally, and thus, the numbers are based on estimates mainly, derived from personal interviews with party delegates, and not from official party records.

22 One of the major problems is the lack of official party information due to the secretive nature of the right-wing party and the lack of an official party archive (due to economic reasons as it was argued). At the same time, the local party offices are very poorly equipped due to the lack of funding from the central office (personal interview).
success in practical terms. New Democracy developed into a typical ruling party that, like its predecessors (ERE, Popular Party) used the resources of the state in order to stay in power. Second, the significant role of the old time political elites in the party’s hierarchy prevented the complete break with the past and slowed the pace of the party’s democratic organisational development. Karamanlis set out the main organisational framework upon which the party structure should be based, but its implementation was seriously undermined by the predominant oligarchic mentalities. Third, New Democracy’s electoral defeat in the 1981 general election re-emphasised the shortcomings of party organisation and the lack of a mass mobilisation operation capable to effectively project the government’s campaign at the local level. In fact, it has been argued that the party’s organisation at the time was almost non-existent, contributing to New Democracy’s electoral debacle as the party’s total share of the vote decreased by six percent\(^3\) (Bratakos, 2002: 313-5, 344).

**Organisational Developments 1980 - 1993**

The party’s 1981 electoral defeat marked the onset of a period of impressive intra-party developments (some of a rather controversial nature). The beginning of the 1980s found New Democracy missing all the relative advantages the party had enjoyed in office since its inception days. The party was for the first time in its history in opposition and thus, the dependency of the party’s dominance on the uncontrolled allocation of state resources, which New Democracy had fully enjoyed all these years had broken. Therefore, New Democracy could no longer rely on clientelism and the politics of ‘rousleti’ in order to enhance and/or keep its electoral base. Most importantly, Karamanlis’ retirement from the party leadership revived the long lasting divisions, political hostilities and personal antagonisms so far contained under Karamanlis’ authority. The party was disunited, structurally weak centrally and at grassroots level, organisationally ineffective and ideologically disoriented and confused. Moreover, New Democracy’s fortunes were strongly challenged by PASOK’s impressive political and electoral growth and the popularity of its charismatic leader, Andreas Papandreou. It took New Democracy another four years in order to develop a well-organised membership base able to effectively mobilise support for the party (Pappas, 2002: 177).

In the early 1980s the leadership’s attempts to build a rigid organisation were either fragmented and slow or practically ineffective as the process of restructuring was

\(^3\) The 1981 electoral defeat left the party in shambles. Most party members were disenchanted with the party and unwilling to continue their membership activities.
merely related to the appointment of new committee members. However, by the mid-1980s, the leadership implemented significant structural and operational changes and created the necessary conditions leading to the party’s organisation resurgence. A first decisive step was taken in 1982 under the leadership of Averoff with the establishment of the Central Committee for Regional Organisation (KEPO) aiming at the coordination and mobilisation of the local branches. The centre was also restructured with the formation of the Political Council and the ‘Committee for Information, Ideology and Programme’ focusing on improving the communication amongst all levels of the party’s organisation. Most importantly, the party redefined its ties with the trade unions by backing a number of delegates at the unions’ elections, a decision that strengthened New Democracy’s presence within the union movement (personal interview). Furthermore, the party established a locally based network of women’s organisations enhancing its appeal among the various women’s groups in a period when the feminist movement was flourishing in the country. Finally, ONNED was given the appropriate resources and motives to reorganise its membership base and mobilise large groups of students and young professionals around the country. During the period 1981-1984 ONNED’s local branches increased from 101 in 1981 to 252 in 1984 and its membership from 5,000 in 1981 to 115,000 in 1984. Moreover, as Table 5.2 shows by 1983 the party’s total membership rate had grown to 220, 000 while the number of local committees had quadrupled to 2,000. Moreover, 2,000 affiliated agricultural associations were established around the country, while more than 100 New Democracy clubs were created in Europe, USA, Australia and Canada (Bratakos, 2002: 348). In strictly quantitative terms, this growth is remarkable as it took place in a period when the party was on political and electoral disarray. In qualitative terms, New Democracy’s organisational advancement was less impressive as no steps were taken towards the democratic operation of the party. The party Congress, scheduled for every other year according to the statute, (article 4) did not convene for at least seven years while internal local elections were not held.

In 1984, the new leader Konstantinos Mitsotakis continued to prioritise the further enhancement of the party’s organisational structure. The 1985 electoral defeat had once again created uneasiness and concern within the party. The leader was under scrutiny and openly challenged while internal conflicts and divisions re-emerged. In an attempt to strengthen his position and boost his authority within the party, Mitsotakis decided to radically re-establish the party organisation and transform New Democracy into a modern mass party based on the German Christian Democratic party model. To this end, a first significant step was taken with establishment of the Democratic Independent Movement of Workers (DAKE), a body that still constitutes New Democracy’s mainstream trade union branch (Bratakos, 2002: 440). However, in
terms of intra-party power balance, a crucial innovation was the ability of the parliamentary party to elect six of the members in the Political Council. For the leadership, this was regarded as an attempt for renewal from within the party’s leading ranks (Ibid: 441). In practice, however, this decision further increased the controlling powers of the parliamentary group and consolidated the tendencies of intra-party hegemony on behalf of the most prominent ‘families’ within New Democracy. Therefore, instead of shifting in the development of a more democratic intra-party operation, New Democracy moved backwards to the reinforcement of the enduring elitist and hegemonic tendencies (see Chapter 7 for a thorough analysis).

Formally, a number of statutory and organisational reforms were ratified at the second Party Congress in 1986. In essence, the 1986 amended party statute created a bipolar structure of Central and Regional organisations. The Central organisation included the party Congress, New Democracy’s elected president, parliamentary group, the Central and Executive Committees, the Central Disciplinary Council and the Central Financial Committee. The Regional organisation was divided into Local, Provincial and Prefectural branches (see Appendix). In total four articles defined the characteristics of the party membership and expounded on members’ rights and obligations (articles 3-6). Furthermore, Article 12 provided for the party Congress convention in every three years instead of two and upon the decision of the Central Committee. Within the same context, the organisation of the so-called National Conference (less formal than the Congress and more issue-or policy focused) was on the discretion of the party leader/president to call once per year. The leaders’ election process was also altered. The news statute provided for the party president to be elected by a special body consisting of the parliamentary group and representatives of the prefectural organisations (one from each electoral district). It has to be noted that the 1986 party statute was a very detailed and well-structured document. It entrenched the theoretical framework of New Democracy’s development into a democratic party of principles and formed the basis for its organisational revival (Bratakos, 2002: 452-6). In fact, the 1986 party statute has been the context upon which the party’s current (2004) statute has been based.

The second significant step towards New Democracy’s organisational modernisation was the implementation of the party organisation plan. This included provisions for the effective functions of the horizontal and vertical intra-party linkages, providing for the implementation of democratic principles (majority rule) at all levels of the party’s organisation, the balanced allocation of powers amongst various party organs, the creation of an articulate way of communication and coordination of the central party and regional and departmental organisations, which allowed the former to control and
evaluate the actions of the grassroots branches and finally, the setting up of rules of personal responsibility of individuals with departmental powers (Bratakos, 2002: 461). Overall, the new organisational framework comprised the backbone of the leadership’s political strategy to enhance the party’s electoral appeal and strengthen the party – members link. Nonetheless, what it should be borne in mind when examining New Democracy’s evolution, is that most of the reforms, ideological and organisational, and changes, in campaigning and communications, that have taken place over time were no more than theoretical; that is, on paper New Democracy has been a democratically organised, well-structured and united popular party but in practice the party identity has been marked by significant flaws and deficiencies that haunt the party for over thirty years, as the party evolution approach indicates.

Overall, and despite New Democracy’s electoral defeat in 1985 the abovementioned reforms had given the party a new political and electoral dynamic. In addition, the highly polarised political environment incentivised New Democracy supporters not only to join the party but mainly participate into the party mechanism. By 1991, party membership had increased to 450,000 in the 3,500 local committees. Nevertheless, the period 1990-1993 signalled the end of the ‘golden age’ of New Democracy’s organisational transformation. In the aftermath of the party’s electoral win in 1990 and over New Democracy’s time in office, the leadership disregarded the party grassroots leading to their disenchantment and disappointment with the government and the party (personal interview). Moreover, while in office the leadership allocated governmental posts to the most prominent and experienced local party delegates weakening the organisational structure and operation of the base (Bratakos, 2002: 588-9). As a result, the bitter divisions, conflicts and disagreements of the past re-emerged and incrementally intensified in the aftermath of New Democracy’s heavy electoral defeat in 1993.

Organisational Developments 1994 – 2004

In the aftermath of the 1993 electoral defeat, the party organisation was in shambles. The new party leader Miltiades Evert attempted to revive the local organisations but most of the party members were disgruntled with the party leadership and unwilling to participate. Moreover, New Democracy had to face a huge debt of 4.7 billion drachmas (13.8m euros). As a result, the bitter divisions, conflicts and disagreements of the past re-emerged and incrementally intensified in the aftermath of New Democracy’s heavy electoral defeat in 1993.

24 For example, ONNED one of the most significant tiers in the party organisation network that provided for a substantial number of members, counted only 40,000 members (from 130,000 in 1986).
mechanisms, in 1994 Evert decided to call for the third party Congress, which once again addressed the issue of constitutional amendment as the participating delegates were asked to ratify the new statute. Therefore, the amended document included provisions on the declaration of the party’s organisational and administrative principles, the establishment of new party committees such as the Council of Meritocracy for the assessment and utilisation of cadres (article 27), the Council of Presidents of the Prefectural Administrative Committee (NODE) (article 26), and the Disciplinary Council (article 24). Moreover, the statute called for the formation of a scientific centre, the Institute for Democracy – which later renamed to Konstantinos Karamanlis Institute for Democracy (article 31). Also, there was an increase in the number of conference delegates while the number of women delegates increased to one fifth of the total number of representatives at all party levels. Most importantly, the new organisation chart established a number of party Secretariats on Party Organisation, Unionism Activities, Agricultural Affairs, Women Affairs, Culture Initiative, and Political Strategy and Policy Planning, which by 2004 had developed into the party’s main communications and campaigning decision-making body. The Secretariats were part of the central party organisation and in charge of the organisation and operational development, direction and coordination of their respective regional policy jurisdictions. Finally, a number of party parliamentary committees were also established to act as ‘shadow policy committees’ to the respective permanent parliamentary committees (Bratakos, 2002: 628, 637).

Unfortunately, due to the lack of an official (even unofficial) archive, there are no data available on the size and nature of the party organisation at the time. However, taking into account, the disenchanted membership and the party’s electoral debacle in 1993, membership is likely to have decreased considerably following the pattern of other western democracies (Fisher, 2000; Fisher, Denver and Hands, 2006b).

The fourth party Congress was convened in 1997, to elect the new party leader and the members of the Central Committee. As discussed above, the constitutional provision called for the leader to be elected by a special body of delegates but prior to the election, the four leadership contestants agreed to amend the provision so as the leader to be elected by the Congress. A further amendment rendered the leader of the party accountable to the Congress (at least in theory) as the leader’s position could be challenged following a proposal signed by at least one-third of the total number of delegates or 50 percent of the total number of members of the parliamentary party. It was also decided that the Regular Congress would convene every three years, with the option of postponement up to one year by the Central Committee (Bratakos, 2002: 731).
In the following years up to 2004 general election no substantial organisational developments took place. The party’s main objective was to win the forthcoming national elections, and it managed to do so in 2004. The fifth party Congress in 2001 had a limited impact on the party’s organisation as only minor reforms were introduced. The main focus at the 2001 Congress was on intra-party divisions, but also on consensus and compromise on behalf of the leader who a year earlier had asked for the return of some of the prominent members of the intra-party opposition that he had expelled a few years earlier. Under the pretext of party unity, the leader in a strategically driven move asked his main opponent and fierce critic of his actions, Giorgos Souflias, to re-join the party. It has to be noted that in addition to the party’s regular Congress the leader could call for the convention of special conferences on various issues. In fact, under Karamanlis’ (junior) leadership a number of special conferences took place, but these fall within the wider context of his leadership and communications framework of the 2004 election campaign and thus, are analysed in the following chapter. The sixth and seventh party Congresses took place in 2004 and 2007 respectively. Within an enthusiastic atmosphere due to the party’s recent electoral win, the 2004 Congress introduced some further structural reforms and reduced the number of the local branches, rendering the party more centralised than ever before (see Appendix; Eleftheros Typos, 2007, 27 February: 12).

Throughout the years one of the main aims of the party has been to create a dynamic and effective organisation, able to promote New Democracy’s social and political profile and thus, attract more members. However, with the exception of the late 1980s characterised by an increased and massive mobilisation, the organisational trajectory of the party has been defined by stagnation and inertia (Eleftheros Typos, 2007, 27 February: 12). The growth in membership and number of local branches ought not to be considered directly proportional to the decrease in clientelistic relationships (Pappas, 1999: 175). Clientelism has always been one of the most important and electorally decisive features of Greek politics. Even today, MPs and local candidates have their constituency offices open to the public and staffed with individuals in charge of registering the ‘personal favours’ and demands the voters are asking from their MP (personal interview). As one – currently retired - leading party member stated, the intra-party network of clientelism was so strong that during the 1990-1993 New Democracy administration he worked within the central party offices as

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25 Clientelism constitutes a constant variable in Greek politics with negative effects in all aspects of socio-political and economic life (Papastoririou, 2004: 313-4). The only thing that changes is the way of practice. As already mentioned, many New Democracy delegates vested their power on their clientelistic network in order to enhance their position within the party. On the other hand PASOK during the 1980s used clientelistic practices as a way to consolidate its position in power. It did not only continue but also institutionalised a form of ‘bureaucratic clientelism’ (Lyrintzis, 1984: Papadopoulos, 1989: 65).
responsible for allocating ‘favours’ \([\text{rousleti}]\) to party loyalists. In fact, his job was to coordinate and allocate ‘with meritocracy’ the various favours that the party was in a position of offer to the MPs and their electorate (personal interview). The most remarkable thing is that this process was taking place during a period when the party organisation was flourishing (early 1990s). The organisation and mobilisation of the party members in the late 1980’s gave the party a remarkable dynamism and effectiveness. During the 1989 and 1990 electoral campaign periods party members actively participated in constituency campaigning, through mobilising, canvassing, delivering leaflets, billposting etc. However, New Democracy was not a mass party and never managed to evolve to one. The increase in the party membership was an end in itself; the leadership never practically promoted the development of a democratic organisation. Instead the numerically large membership served the strategic objectives of the centre especially, during election periods. Clientelism remained a main motive for party support within the ranks of New Democracy as the disenfranchised from the Mitsotakis administration, membership demonstrated (personal interview).

5.5 Discussion: New Democracy through the Party Evolution Framework

As previously discussed, the socio-economic and political development in the post-war Greece (civil-war, threat of communism, culture of clientelism and nepotism) prevented the development of democratic mass parties. The main aim of the winners of the civil war, the ‘Right’, had been their political predominance and organisation of the state rather than the formation and organisation of democratic parties. In essence, these were no political parties but, rather underdeveloped political camps, which survived as a result of their charismatic leaders and the extensive use of state power resources and control, rendering the role of the state to the focal point of their political activities. However, in the late 1970s significant changes took place with regard to party formation and development. The post-junta political parties developed into structured and organised entities, which played a significant role in the democratisation and political stability of the country. The last part of the chapter draws upon the main characteristics of the historical, political, organisation and ideological trajectory of New Democracy in order to identify the party’s genetic model and processes of consolidation and institutionalisation (Stage I) while defining the party’s political identity through its development over time (Stage II). The main aim of this discussion is to contextualise the party of New Democracy before proceeding to the interpretation of its political evolution.
Stage I: Charismatic Party with a Relatively High Degree of Institutionalisation

As already discussed, New Democracy was formed in 1974, two months prior to the first democratic elections after the seven-year period of authoritarianism, and contributed to the establishment of democratic rule in the country. The party’s founder and leader Konstantinos Karamanlis, Prime Minister at the time of the party’s formation, was a prominent political figure who had played a significant role in the country’s post-war political landscape. At the same time, his cabinet members were prominent party notables who had also built their political career in the post-war period (members of ERE in the 1950s and early 1960s). Therefore, although New Democracy wished to portray the image of a ‘new’ political organisation, in essence, the party was run by the old right-wing political elites. Moreover, as the second part of this analysis demonstrated New Democracy’s political heritage derived from the right-wing political formations of the interwar and post-war periods (People’s Party, Greek Rally, ERE). As a result, some the party’s genetic model characteristics are pre-dated and thus, should be traced back to the smouldering ‘continuity from the old organisation(s) to the new one’ (Panebianco, 1988: 114).

Drawing upon Panebianco’s indicators of party formation and development (Institutionalisation Index, Table 1.2) five are the mainstream characteristics of the party’s origins and culture are identified and addressed. First, New Democracy’s genetic model was characterised by a charismatic origin; New Democracy was born out of the charisma of its founder as its predecessor ERE had been. In fact, both parties were established by the same leader – Konstantinos Karamanlis - while he was an incumbent Prime Minister (1956 and 1974 respectively). As a result, New Democracy’s inception is considered a means to serve Karamanlis’ political philosophy and governing of the country. Therefore, it is rather evident that the party initially existed through the leader. In reality, the leader was the personification of the party and the use of Karamanlis’ photograph as New Democracy’s emblem is a rather strong indicator for that.

Second, New Democracy’s inception came through government and the party was formed and organised to govern the country – New Democracy’s win at the forthcoming elections was a foregone conclusion. The slogan that dominated the 1974 election was ‘Karamanlis or the tanks’, illustrating the political mentality at the time and predisposing the party’s landslide electoral victory. Third, there was no party organisation or bureaucratic structure and the party operation was centred on the dominant figure of the leader and his closest allies. The various party posts were redefined at the leader’s discretion, who had the total control of ‘his’ party. Fourth, in
the first years of New Democracy’s formation two main tendencies developed within
the party. On the one hand, there was the ‘old guard’ of ERE politicians, and on the
other, the newcomers, representing a younger generation of delegates. The two groups
struggled not for intra-party dominance - Karamanlis was never challenged - but for
entering into Karamanlis inner-circle of political advisors. Nevertheless, internal
divisions were not openly manifested and the party presented a highly cohesive image,
under the control of the leader. Finally, after the leader’s retirement, New Democracy
managed to institutionalise to a relatively high degree. This has been increasingly
important to the party’s development as very few charismatic parties manage to
objectify the charisma of the leader and succeed in developing an extensive and
structured organisational base. It is indicative in New Democracy’s case that it was the
leader who initiated the process of routinisation of his charisma. Table 5.3 presents an
attempt to examine the extent to which New Democracy displayed the characteristics
of charismatic parties, in relation to the level of intra-party functions. The undisputed
predominance of the leader, lack of bureaucratic structure, highly centralised
organisation as well as the historical uniqueness of the party and the ‘revolutionary’
character of the leader’s activities are some of the elements indicating New
Democracy’s sound charismatic origin. Moreover, it should be emphasised that New
Democracy has been one of the few charismatic parties that managed to
institutionalise and objectify their ‘charismatic’ nature.

On the face of it, considering the party’s strong charismatic character, New Democracy
should have developed to a weakly institutionalised party or even dissolved. However,
the development of a party ought to be considered and analysed taken into account
not only the characteristics of its genetic model, but also all these factors that
constituted the party’s ‘environments’ (Panebianco, 1988: 148). In the case of New
Democracy the factors that favoured the party’s weak institutionalisation were
counterbalanced by the unusual political conditions at the time, the nature of party
opposition, and the scope of its electoral defeat and also, the founder himself. The
interaction of the internally and externally driven factors served as a natural
counterbalance to New Democracy’s evolution and led to the party’s consolidation and
institutionalisation.
### Table 5.3: Characteristics of a Charismatic Party: New Democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisational Characteristics</th>
<th>NEW DEMOCRACY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cohesive dominant coalition loyal to the leader</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited bureaucratic characteristics</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralised organisation</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existence of groups with undefined and uncertain boundaries</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Revolutionary’ nature of charisma</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutionalisation through objectification or routinisation</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, as already discussed in Chapter one, the understanding of this interaction presupposes the examination of party formation, consolidation and process of institutionalisation from a broader perspective. New Democracy’s genetic model characteristics and its internal organisation and development are summarised in Table 5.4, which demonstrates the interrelationship between party organisation and its respective degree of institutionalisation. Therefore, in a broader sense, New Democracy has been developed through territorial penetration (taking into account that the leader’s retirement signalled the process of institutionalisation). It was founded and controlled by the leader and his ‘entourage’, conditions that produced a dominant ‘centre’, which controlled and directed the development of the periphery. Furthermore, the strong and patronising personality of the leader favoured the party’s strong internal cohesion while the absence of an external sponsor (there was no need for one) favoured ‘internal’ legitimation deriving, at least initially from the leader and his Prime Ministerial status. As already mentioned, internal legitimation and territorial penetration can usually lead to strong institutionalisation, while charisma favours weak institutionalisation. Yet although New Democracy was undeniably a charismatic party, the first two factors counterbalanced the charisma.

Moreover, New Democracy’s lack of autonomy derives from two main reasons. First, as a government party New Democracy had extensively relied on the state and bureaucratic structure for resources and power. Second, the lack of a mass organisation rendered the party dependent on the clientelistic networks of delegates and local bosses. Therefore, to a great degree New Democracy benefited from the state resources in order to allocate favours to its voters. As has been already mentioned, this tactic was followed by all right-wing parties in government. In fact, electoral defeat and the loss of state resources control were two of the reasons that led these parties to dissolve.
systemness, which favoured strong institutionalisation. In short, the five indicators of institutionalisation as presented in Table 5.4, demonstrate that New Democracy developed to a highly institutionalised party. It had a strong central apparatus, homogeneity amongst its organisational structures (all controlled by the centre), regular revenues from the state, control over its external organisations and a strong leader who overly dominated the party apparatus operated.

New Democracy emerged as a parliamentary party and has retained this characteristic until today. The party’s entered its process of consolidation while in government and concurrently to the consolidation of democracy in Greece (1974 – 1981). Over that period the consolidated but not yet institutionalised parliamentary party established the theoretical framework of its organisational and structural development. Though New Democracy has never been a mass party, it had managed build a numerically strong membership base - from 20,000 in 1976 to 150,000 in 1979, to organise its first Congress with the participation of 1,500 elected delegates and become the first non-communist party to organise such an event. But besides the tactical and strategic purposes served by the Congress, the decision to enhance the powers of the parliamentary group, which became the body responsible to elect the party leader, was decisive for the development of the intra-party dynamics and balance of power within New Democracy.

In the very early years of its formation, New Democracy was a highly centralised and disciplined organisation, with a very powerful parliamentary group and a very weak extra-parliamentary base. However, notwithstanding the leader’s undisputable power, it should be borne in mind that there was a relationship of increased interdependence between the leader and the prominent party cadres. That is, the lack of an organised based had rendered the leader dependent on the political powerful local bosses and groups of notables for electoral support. Therefore, the prominent political notables promoted their personal ambitions through their allegiance to New Democracy and loyalty to Karamanlis, while Karamanlis had to win the votes of their supporters in order to get elected in office. This interdependency served the aims of both sides but at least initially, hindered the development of the party organisation at the local level.
New Democracy's organisational evolution is related to three main events. First, Karamanlis promoted the development of New Democracy to political entity independent of his charismatic personality and second, the electoral defeats in the 1978 local and 1981 national elections and the organisational development of the party's main rival, PASOK, left New Democracy without an option. Karamanlis' decision to retire from the party leadership and get elected to the position of President of the State was another crucial factor. In the aftermath of Karamanlis' leadership, New Democracy had two options; either to dissolve or move forward and develop into an autonomous political entity. The second option presupposed the development of a broad organisational base and a large membership. In fact, as Table 5.2 shows, in the late 1980s New Democracy increased its membership to the highest levels, 450,000 members in 1991 without counting the members of the youth organisations, and became one of the most numerically strong right-wing parties in Europe (with the exception of the Conservative party in the UK and the CDP in Italy).

The process of objectification of Karamanlis' charisma was initiated by the leader himself. First, in 1977 he replaced the party emblem with the party initials 'ND' (instead of his photograph). Organisational changes were also introduced promoting a more democratically organised structure while the declaration of the party's ideological principles attributed to New Democracy a distinct political character. In fact, it was the first time that a Greek right-wing party had an ideology. In a further
attempt to place the party above personalities, formally the party was run by a ‘president’ and not a ‘leader’. Nevertheless, the most significant event was Karamanlis election to the state presidency. His detachment from the party, and the smooth succession in the party leadership prompted the party’s institutionalisation process. New Democracy survived the departure of its founder, a harsh electoral defeat and the loss of governmental power. All these factors explain the consolidation, institutionalisation and therefore, survival of the party over time. In particular, considering that in the aftermath of Karamanlis retirement, the party had to face serious internal challenges as a result of factionalism and sharp internal conflicts and confrontations. And whilst this ‘pluralism’ of opinions within the party is still regarded as positive by a number of party officials, it should be noted that New Democracy had only managed to win an election when the conflicts were minimised and the party presented a united image. Overall, as the party’s historical discourse shows in the last thirty years, New Democracy institutionalised to a considerable level and – to a limited extent - developed the necessary defences to respond to the internal and external changes that took place.

Stage II: Cadre Party with a Catch-all Strategy

Based on Duvergerian distinction between cadre and mass parties, New Democracy is considered a cadre party. It was an internally generated, government party with a strong parliamentary group, and an even stronger and autocratic leader surrounded by prominent and politically powerful notables. In the first years of its formation the party’s operation and electoral successes were based on this group of notables (either parliamentarians or local bosses) who relied on their clientelistic networks to win election in office. In fact, clientelism and personification are two factors that continue to play a dominant role in intra-party affairs. Nonetheless, Karamanlis’s priority was to set all the necessary conditions in motion that would transform New Democracy into a democratic mass party (in practice a rather difficult task).

One way to achieve this purpose was through the vertical organisational development and extensive recruitment of members. In fact, taken into account the conditions under which New Democracy had managed to win the 1974 and 1977 elections, the party had no loyal supporters; the vast majority of the voters trusted Karamanlis but not New Democracy (Loulis, 2007; Alexakis, 2001a). As mentioned, the development of an organisational structure was the result of a number of initiatives taken by the central office as early as 1975 while by 1979 New Democracy had managed to substantially increase its membership base to 150,000 (Table 5.3). However, the
remarkable increase in membership numbers was not indicative of New Democracy’s development to a democratic or mass party. As Duverger (1964) argued, a mass party is not defined only by the number of its members; it is not an issue of size but of structure as well. Therefore, organisational development presupposes strong party machinery, able to mobilise the support of large as well as active memberships. In view of the discussion that took place in the previous section, the organisational support of the party in the 1981 national election was inadequate and highly ineffective (it can also be considered as one of the reasons why the party lost the election). In fact, party organisation was almost non-existent.

Major steps were taken in the 1980s when the party not only increased its membership to remarkable levels for a right-wing party and the size of the population, but also succeeded in effectively utilising and putting into motion all the resources available at the local level. However, the control and representation of the party was still coming from the top, from the party elite. To this end, party mobilisation base took place horizontally. The aim was not to make the party more democratic but to recruit more members and thus, mobilise more voters. Nonetheless, the membership fees represented a relatively moderate part of the party’s finances and only at the local level. Therefore, New Democracy never depended on its members for financial support. Rather its resources came from state funding and private contributions of prominent and wealthy party ‘friends’. At the same time, as already mentioned, it should be borne in mind that the parliamentary group maintained its power to elect and therefore, control the leader to a great extent. As a result, it could be argued that the organisational development aimed solely at the survival of the party within a highly polarised political landscape. This became evident in the 1990s when the party torn by internal divisions at the top, failed to engage into a process of recruitment of new members or re-approach the large section of the disenchanted members. In fact, nowadays the local branches have extremely limited resources and mainly, their role is to follow the directions of the leadership (personal interview). In essence, New Democracy was born and remained a cadre party, under the ultimate control of the political elite. To this end, the relationship between the party leadership and activists is one-dimensional. Formally, party members have increased powers (through the Congress). However, New Democracy’s management and operation is directed by informal ways of conduct and mainly, the wishes of the leadership. Therefore, in practice, party activists were never in a position to ‘threaten’ the leadership. Even in the extreme case, that party unionists disagreed with the leadership, in view of an
electoral win there was always a final agreement. Moreover, the leadership is not dependent on the party base but on the ‘secret’ deals that take place amongst the party elite (see Chapter 7 for a detailed analysis). As a result and given the clientelist relations that have developed and always played a major role in intra-party relations, the party elite influences and controls the party base.

In terms of New Democracy’s electoral identity, over time the party has demonstrated an incoherent behaviour. Notwithstanding New Democracy’s direct link to ERE, which was clearly a right-wing, conservative party, Karamanlis denounced the relationship between the two parties and declared New Democracy as the party representing the interests of the whole of the Greek population and safeguarding security and stability after many years of political turmoil. Within that context, New Democracy was considered (by its founder) ‘above’ all other political organisations. Within that context, New Democracy developed a catch-all approach. However, as the party’s electoral legitimation derived from the leader and its electoral fortunes were directly related to Karamanlis’ actions, at the time of Karamanlis’ retirement there was a considerable drop in the party’s share of the vote. Nonetheless, despite the ‘safe’ option of a ‘catch-all’ approach that Karamanlis adopted, he failed to acknowledge the changing political landscape. Therefore, while New Democracy was organised as a non-ideologically bounded catch-all party, there was a wave of increased ideologification and polarisation in the Greek society. To this end, in the 1980s the party leaderships repositioned the party within rigidly defined ideological lines.

However, given the limitations of the ideal type models and the unique conditions of party formation and development, it is quite misleading to strictly categorise a political party within certain lines. By and large, New Democracy was created as a catch-all party, but its development and organisation have borne the characteristics of a cartel party, especially when considering the party-state relationship. Following the above analysis, it appears rather evident that New Democracy has been a vote-maximising, office-seeking party, explicitly aiming at electoral benefits. At the same time, given the paradox between electoral promises and actual government performance, government delivery and efficiency have been second to electoral victory (Allison and Nicolaidis, 1997). Yet, all Greek parties are state funded, and thus, the party sought not to rely on its members for financial support marginalising their role into settling internal power struggles and legitimising the leadership’s decisions. Most importantly, parties have always been dependent on state resources and therefore, when elected in office try to

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27 Serious disagreements are usually taking place when governmental policies are at stake. When the party is in opposition, the main aim of both sides is to win the next election and thus, disagreements and conflicts are kept to a minimum.
manipulate state resources in order to meet their interests. As expected, the manipulation of the state mechanisms to favour party interests has been a permanent phenomenon regardless of which party is in power. By controlling 85 percent of the total share of the vote, New Democracy and PASOK have the same ‘interests’ to preserve while in office. Therefore, regardless of the strategic needs of the party, New Democracy developed into and retains most of the characteristics of a cartel party.

Up to now, there has been an effort to analyse and discuss the party of New Democracy within the context of the first and second stages of the Party Evolution Framework. The main aim has been to identity the party’s formative characteristics, its internal and external factors of its consolidation phase, the process and degree of its institutionalisation and thus, to define the mainstream traits of New Democracy’s identity. This detailed examination allows the contextualisation of the party and the interpretation of its evolution within a thorough cohesive framework. The examination of New Democracy within the context of the third and final stage that follows in the next chapter, addresses in more detail the electoral behaviour of the party and the process and extent to its professionalisation. What should be borne in mind however is that the latter is inextricably linked with the characteristics that the party developed over time.

5.6. Conclusion

New Democracy is a rather exceptional case study. The party’s inception was the outcome of a series of interrelated political and social factors and personal ambitions of the party’s founder. The collapse of the seven-year dictatorship signalled the outset of a new but somewhat turbulent political era for the country, which lacked of any form of democratic apparatus. Therefore, the return of Karamanlis in government was regarded not as a political but a national act, and the leader and prime minister at the time, as a ‘statesman’ trusted to lead the country to democratisation. Within that context, Karamanlis, being already in the premiership, founded New Democracy as a means to his personal ambitions and a vehicle to serve the restoration of democracy in the country. To this end, New Democracy’s genesis was marked by two main factors; first, the party was not formed out of already established democratic institutions – as is the case in most developed western democracies – but on the contrary, became the agency for the creation of democratic institutions. Second, the founder’s predominance in the party and government benefited New Democracy’s electorally in the short-term but at the same time, hindered the process of a gradual transition to a modern democratic political party. As a consequence, these two crucial factors marked
the party’s formative stage and as it will be discussed below, defined the development of its political and electoral character over time.

In strictly partisan terms, New Democracy was the fourth consecutive political party representing the Greek conservative camp. And despite Karamanlis’ desire to create a novel political camp and break all ties with the past and the right-left divisions, New Democracy’s political and ideological heritage derived from the interwar People’s Party and the post-war parties of Greek Rally and ERE. Karamanlis’ active role as a cabinet minister and leader to the pre-dictatorial right but mostly, the recruitment of prominent party cadres to major posts within New Democracy thwarted the party by developing a new political identity. In fact, in the aftermath of Karamanlis’ retirement New Democracy not only adopted but also consolidated many of the characteristics of the post-war right culture. Nonetheless, and contrary to the tradition of the right-wing parties, New Democracy succeeded in surviving the retirement of its leader and follow a process of routinisation and objectification of his charisma, consolidate and institutionalise. Moreover, the party developed an ideological framework, organisational structure and moved to the recruitment of a large number of members. In theory, New Democracy had an exemplary organisation and a solid ideological background. However, in reality, the party maintained its elitist character and ideological vagueness that had characterised its predecessors.

In the early years of its formation, New Democracy’s electoral success was a corollary of the charisma, personal political philosophy and credibility and status of Karamanlis. Party identification was limited as the vast majority of the electorate identified with the vision of Karamanlis but was apprehensive about the party’s competence and credibility (Alexakis, 2001; Loulis, 2007: 209-238). Internally, Karamanlis was the undisputed leader of the party but simultaneously, his electoral success to a considerable extent, depended on the clientelistic networks of prominent party cadres. In fact, and as it is demonstrated below, this element of leader-party cadre dependency has been developed into a dominant characteristic of intra-party behaviour, as the prominent party notables have a considerable autonomy within the party and on various occasions are in a position to control the decisions of the leader (Alexakis, 2001: 114). The latest developments within the party provide the most recent and exemplified example. It has been widely argued by the press and even New Democracy delegates, that Karamanlis (junior) the current party leader and incumbent Prime Minister, was forced to call a snap general election as a result of internally driven demands by two of the most prominent cabinet members - and contestants for the party leadership position in the aftermath of the party’s almost
certain electoral debacle (To Vima, 2009, 2 September; Eleftherotypia, 2009, 3 September; To Vima, 2009, 16 September).

The following chapter addresses New Democracy’s latest attempt for electoral revival by drawing upon the inherent characteristics of the party as these were presented above and analysed through the first two stages of the Party Evolution Framework. In fact, the 2004 general election campaign signalled the party’s revival that led to a landslide victory. Initially, the 2004 version of the party had all these elements that would allow New Democracy to build a political hegemony. In fact, many argued that the party had turned a new leaf and had at last, broken its ties with the past. The reality however, proved completely different. Five years later, New Democracy failed in government, and is on the verge of disintegration, deeply divided, with a disgruntled membership based, tarnished by a series of economic scandals and facing an electoral debacle. However, as I argue below these developments should not come as a surprise as a thorough analysis of the party through the evolution framework indicates.
Chapter 6

New Democracy: Communications and Campaigning

6.1 Introduction

As discussed in the previous chapter New Democracy is likely considered an exceptional case of party evolution, especially as it rose in an environment particularly hostile to political party development (the social, cultural and political landscape of Greece). Nonetheless, the party survived the challenges of the times and by 2004 re-emerged as the predominant force in Greek electoral politics. Therefore, based on the core elements of the party’s character as these were defined by Stage I and II of the Party Evolution Framework, the main intention here is to analyse and dissect New Democracy’s course of activities to the 2004 general election campaign, explore in detail the features and novelties of the communications campaign, and within the context of the third stage of the party evolution framework identify the extent and effectiveness of the party’s ‘encompassing professionalisation’ process. These are the core elements underpinning the interpretation of the party’s trajectory through a distinct integrated approach, which as it will be demonstrated in the following chapter, is able to implicitly elucidate the reasons for the 2004 project’s timely success, but most importantly its failure.

In March 2004, New Democracy under the leadership of Kostas Karamanlis (junior) returned to power after eleven consecutive years in opposition. In fact, the conservative party, which was founded thirty years earlier by one of the most charismatic political personalities of modern Greek political history, as a party of government, evolved as the major party of opposition. From 1981 to 2004, New Democracy lost five electoral battles to its main political rival, the socialist party of PASOK, and remained in opposition for almost two decades. The reasons that kept New Democracy from office for such a long time are mainly endogenous in nature. The party suffered from ideological and organisational deficiencies, which were closely related to inadequate leadership. Since the departure of its founder in 1980 and up to 1997, New Democracy had four different leaders, each one of whom attempted to take the party to different and sometimes slightly conflicting ideological directions while manipulating the party organisation and mechanisms for achieving personal ambitions. Most importantly, none of them succeeded in outscoring in popularity the leader of PASOK, Andreas Papandreou. Instead, New Democracy was continuously tarnished by internal ideological disputes and bitter conflicts. In the cases of Rallis and Averoff, the ideological reorientation of the party to the right with the absorption of a group of pre-junta extreme right-wing politicians distanced New Democracy from the
centre; this was a highly unfortunate political shift that haunted the party’s electoral fortunes for almost two decades. The aftermath of the 1996 election found the party in shambles; New Democracy was ideologically disorientated, organisationally demoralised and with an unsuccessful, extremely moderate and cautious leader who had failed to unite the party.

When Karamanlis was elected leader in 1997 the party’s fortunes took a decisive turn. The renewal of the party was the ultimate goal of the new leader. At first, he was determined to put an end to the perennial internal disunity, a very difficult task to achieve without clashing with the prominent, powerful and influential cadres within the party, the so-called ‘barons’, while minimising the risk of dissension and splits or even a break-up. For that purpose, he did not hesitate to expel from the party several high-ranking figures, including the defeated contender to the party leadership contest, Georgios Souflias and two of the most outspoken advocates of neo-liberalism. However, as Karamanlis shortly realised, it was rather impossible to unite internal party factions that had existed since the institutionalisation of the party and even comprised elements of its identity, as explained earlier in this thesis. On the other hand, the reorientation of the party’s priorities in the context of electoral victory was a much plausible and achievable goal. Therefore, the pretext of unity for the sake of electoral success brought the expelled Georgios Souflias (Karamanlis’ main contender) back to the party in 2000. Within that context, Karamanlis had to keep the balance between the distinct factions, while promoting the programmatic changes and repositioning New Democracy as the main centripetal political force relieved from the burden of the historical ‘Right’ nuances. Despite initial drawbacks, failures and delays Karamanlis finally succeeded in renewing the party’s ideology, internal structure and organisation but, most importantly, its image and electoral strategy. The 2000 general election marked the communications modernisation of the party, while in 2004 the successful campaign strategy led to a landslide electoral victory.

The chapter is divided into three main sections. The first provides a brief overview of the particular characteristics of Greek political campaigning in the 1970s and 1980s. After briefly referring to the ‘pre-modern’ modes of campaigning at the time, a short analysis of the political, social and media setting within which the party operated and evolved, is provided. These comprise the exogenous factors that have incrementally influenced the development of campaigning in Greece and thus, comprise an integral part of party political communication evolution. The second part examines the ‘Karamanlis’ years’ and how the ideological, organisational and communications changes that he implemented, led to the electoral renewal of New Democracy. The 2000 campaign is taken into account as this provided the basis for the New
Democracy’s communications strategy and framework for the 2004 electoral victory. In the few weeks of the 2000 election campaign, party strategists succeeded in altering the image of the party, a task that previous leaders had failed to achieve for over twenty years. This is followed by a detailed examination of the 2004 election campaign. Finally, the third part of this chapter focuses on the analysis of the third stage of the Party Evolution Framework, so as to examine New Democracy’s degree of communications professionalisation, within the framework's ‘encompassing professionalisation’ context and the extent to which the party has managed to transform its political and electoral culture.

6.2 Political Campaigning Asserted

The practice of political communication and marketing in Greece has evolved enormously since the restoration of democracy and the first elections of ‘metapolitefsi’ in 1974. The deregulation and privatisation of broadcasting media led to the explosion in the number of privately-own television channels in the early 1990s, which altered the way parties communicated with the electorate by placing the media at the centre of political campaigning (Papathanassopoulos, 2000). This shift to a television-centred form of campaigning in conjunction with the process of de-ideologisation (the blurring of ideological distinctions) and de-politicisation, and the loosening in party support had a significant bearing on the way parties conducted their campaigns (Loulis, 1999: 20; Spourdalakis, 2003: 55). There was a fundamental move from the traditional forms of campaigning of personal contact, public mass rallies and the system of patronage and clientelism towards a novel, ‘mediated’ form of communication, where party members and supporters became passive recipients of political messages. This loss of direct contact with the party grassroots had a number of side effects as well. Party membership declined substantially between 1985 and 1995; according to some accounts the decline reached 42 percent¹ (Papathanassopoulos, 2000) while simultaneously party campaign expenses rose to a very high level. It is indicative that in 2000 New Democracy only spent 3.4 billion drachmas (around 10m euros) in media advertising (Table 6.1). What is significant to note is that all these changes preceded the setting up of a regulatory framework on party finances and spending², on media operation and ownership and on the content of political advertisements and/or broadcasts in general (Yannas, 2002: 72). Therefore, the development of political

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¹ Membership did decline but due to the lack of official data there is no accurate estimation of the decrease in the number of party members.
² Greek parties are state funded for their electoral and operational expenses and up to 2002 when a new legal framework on party funding was set up, political parties and candidates could receive and spend unlimited private funds.

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communication and marketing, and the modernisation of campaigning in Greece took place within a rather ‘unprofessional’ and lawless framework that has deeply affected the process of party evolution to communications professionalisation. The latter point is thoroughly analysed under the context of the party evolution framework in the third part of this chapter.

Political Communication In the ‘Pre-modern’ Era: The years of ‘Innocence’

In a period when most of the western liberal democratic states had already moved towards new forms of political campaigning, the Greek parties were still attached to the methods of communication of the early 19th century. Since the establishment of the modern Greek state until the early 1990s, the main form of campaigning in Greece was the public rallies in major cities, extensive use of posters, banners and loudspeakers, personal contact of candidates with their constituents and mainly, the consolidated system of patronage and clientelism. In particular, the latter’s prevalence as a main form of electioneering is a common feature in most southern European ‘new’ democracies, including Italy, Spain, and Portugal, characterised by traditional hierarchical social structures, and autocratic, patrimonial institutions (Hallin and Papathanassopoulos, 2002). More remarkable however, is the case of Ireland, which despite being ‘one of the most stable and enduring liberal democratic states in Europe’, is characterised by high levels of clientelism and patronage – as well as corporatism and corruption (Collins, 2004: 606). In fact, Irish and Greek political conduct present striking similarities in terms of folklore, customs and culture. The actual form of clientelistic politics, the clientelistic behaviour and mentality of party grassroots, the electoral system that encourages competition amongst fellow party nominees, the personal links of candidates with the voters but also the social and economic constraints and consolidated mentality of an electorate that has ‘legitimised’ political clientelism and party favours, are indicative characteristics in both countries (Garvin, 1976; Lyrintzis, 1984; Collins, 2004; Hallin and Papathanassopoulos, 2002).

As expected in terms of local campaigning, clientelistic politics had been the focal point of party/candidate campaign strategy. The practice of ‘rousfeti’, a term that refers to political favours to voters, the most common of which was finding them jobs in the public sector, formed the focal point of the relationship between candidates and...
voters. In a wider context, this patron-client relationship that had developed since the establishment of the Greek republic in the early 19th century, infused the political culture of voters and was linked to the growth of party membership, rendering the parties to ‘legitimate dispensers of jobs in the public sector’ (Sotiropoulos, 1993: 53). This tactic was further advanced by the nature of the political contest that is very competitive among local candidates (the electoral system is a form of proportional representation with open local lists) who would do anything in order to win votes. Therefore, in order to gain the support and loyalty of voters, candidates attempted to develop a more ‘personal’ relationship with them; the most common practice for this purpose was the ‘koumparia’, indicating the candidate becoming the best man to his voter’s wedding or godfather to his child (I Kathimerini, 2000, 20 February: 11). Furthermore, candidates participated in a number of local social events (including sport games, weddings, funerals, evening balls and other social gatherings), visited every small village in their district and sent personalised letters and greeting cards to their supporters. Also, each candidate’s campaign ended with the traditional campaign speech that usually took place in the setting of his/her electoral office or a theatre even a sports hall. Needless to say, despite the ‘amateurism’ of the campaigning, the main precondition of electoral success was the financial standing of the candidate; the more money a candidate had to spend, the more votes he was able to ‘buy’ (Xairetakis, 2008: 32).

At the national level, the most dominant form of campaigning was the organisation of mass rallies. Such was the emphasis that was given to these rallies that attendance was regarded as a ‘sure indicator of likely electoral success’ (Clogg, 1987: 89). The mass rallies were held at the central square of the city, usually the capital of each prefecture, and the adjoining streets. The most prominent mass rallies were the ones organised in Athens (Syntagma square) and Thessaloniki (Aristotelous square) as they received extensive television coverage from the two state-owned broadcasting media. In the 1981 election, 70 percent of the total television coverage that was allocated to the parties was given to the coverage of these rallies, which were stage-managed for the TV cameras (Clogg, 1987: 89; Yannas, 2002: 73). Party officials, members as well as volunteers were involved in the preparation of the rallies and the mobilisation of party supporters. And as the main aim of parties was to show that their rally was more successful than their opponent’s, party officials guaranteed that busloads of thousands of supporters were brought into the city to participate in the rally. It is indicative that both parties and in particular PASOK due to its mass party organisation in the early 1980s, referred to the concentration of supporters on rallies as ‘seas of people’ ['laothalasses']. The speeches given by the party leader were fiery, overwhelmed with
fanaticism and tension, full of slogans and on occasion, insults to the opposition party and/or leader. The electoral competition was bipolar (‘clash of two worlds’), based on the schematic conflict ‘Right - anti-Right’ (Nicolacopoulos, 2005: 265).

The only form of political advertising that was available at the time was the use of posters, banners, painted slogans, newspaper advertisements and leaflets. Teams of party members were engaged in the frenetic activity of ‘poster wars’, in which rival groups of poster stickers were fighting ‘not only to display the poster of their party but also to cover up those of their rivals’ (Clogg, 1987: 89). This kind of activity took place during the night and/or the early hours of the morning and occasionally, the clash between the groups became violent, polarising the climate of fanaticism even further. Inevitably, such activities transformed rural and urban Greece into an enormous billboard of posters and painted slogans. The electoral battle was accompanied by the continuous noise of the loudspeakers outside the electoral centres of parties and candidates that blared out slogans, campaign themes and pop music throughout the day (Clogg, 1987: 113). These sorts of activities of noise, litter and environmental pollution constituted the main characteristics of campaigning in the 1980s. And despite the lack of modern professionalism in the organisation and implementation of campaigns, parties threw enormous amount of money into the campaign. In 1985 New Democracy spent 29.9m drachmas in real terms (0.97m euros), of which 59.5 and 39.5 percent were spent on newspaper and magazine advertising respectively, and only 1% on posters (Table 6.1). And although posters were the focal point of campaigning the low cost of their production in conjunction with the volunteer work of party members, rendered it to a very low cost campaign activity. The campaigns in the 1980s were extremely labour-intensive thanks to the large party membership as well as the polarisation of the political climate during the period.

The slogans used in the 1980s comprise a vivid representation of the political context of the era. They depict the ideological confrontation between (centre)-left and right and are indicative of the personalities of the leaders and the campaign strategies of the parties. Concurrently, they comprised the leaders’ main political discourse. Some of the most memorable slogans were: ‘Give me a great majority to give you a great Greece’ (Karamanlis, 1974), ‘Karamanlis or the tanks’, (ND, 1974), ‘Greeks have a rendezvous with history’ (Papandreou, 1981), ‘Never again the Right’ and ‘Vote PASOK to prevent a return to the Right’ (Papandreou, 1984), ‘Allagi’ [Change], which was the main slogan of PASOK in 1981 became the determinant of the party’s identity. Most of those were slogans-songs that the Greek voters used in order to show their great expectations and superiority of their party (I Kathimerini, 2000). One of the most memorable slogans during the 1980s, which integrated the populist current of the period was Papandreou’s instigation towards his finance minister ‘to give everything to the people’ (Tsovola dosta ola’).

By the election of 1990, the advertising expenditure was raised to 364.4m drachmas (1.8m euros) with 83.9 percent of which allocated to radio and television advertising (Table 6.1).
Table 6.1: ND Advertising Expenditure during Election Years (in real terms: million drachmas –Euros)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election year</th>
<th>Newspapers + Magazines</th>
<th>Radio</th>
<th>Television</th>
<th>Posters</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>29.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.087)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.88)</td>
<td>(0.97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0039)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0039)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>248.7</td>
<td>82.1</td>
<td>423.7</td>
<td>364.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.73)</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(1.24)</td>
<td>(1.8)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>136.8</td>
<td>168.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.41)</td>
<td>(0.5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>107.7</td>
<td>307.6</td>
<td>3818.9</td>
<td>138</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
<td>(0.9)</td>
<td>(11.21)</td>
<td>(0.4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>143.6</td>
<td>275.2</td>
<td>1787.5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.42)</td>
<td>(0.8)</td>
<td>(5.25)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>433.8</td>
<td>115.5</td>
<td>2173.3</td>
<td>682.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.27)</td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
<td>(6.38)</td>
<td>(2.0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1836.4</td>
<td>144.9</td>
<td>2945.5</td>
<td>1203.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.4)</td>
<td>(0.42)</td>
<td>(8.64)</td>
<td>(3.53)</td>
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As one might expect, the campaigns of the two major parties were highly conflictual in character. The campaign strategy aimed at the creation and preservation of intense polarisation among the supporters. Characteristic of the period had been the existence of ‘green’ (PASOK) and ‘blue’ (ND) ‘kafenia’ (coffee shops); the ‘green’ ones were called ‘the powers of light’ while the ‘blue’ were ‘the powers of dark’ (Pappas, 2001: 75). Partisanship and ideological divisions remained the dominant features of the Greek political realm as party officials capitalised on the electorate’s experiences of the past (civil war, the veneful Right, etc.). Within that context, polarisation served the shift to a dominant two-party system, with PASOK and New Democracy using for their own advantage the ‘dramatization’ of the electoral battle while limiting the success of smaller parties (Papadopoulos, 1989: 62-63). In fact, polarisation as a strategy was initially introduced by PASOK, as a tool to ‘maintain its dominant position in the political system’ (Nicolacopoulos, 2005: 265) and comprised the party’s main communication strategy for the years to come. The tactical use of the dated cleavages, which in actual fact, were purely historical, advanced the party’s electoral fortunes vis-à-vis New Democracy and the traditional left (Spourdalakis and Tassis, 2006: 509). And although New Democracy under the leadership of Karamanlis (senior) had adopted a more moderate approach in order to bridge past differences rather than create new cleavages, his successors continued the tactic of conflict and polarisation that harmed the party in electoral as well as political terms. A noteworthy feature of the era was the ‘mud-slinging’ ['laspologia'], which either officially or unofficially (mainly, through the press), was ruthless and targeted specifically at the
leaders. It was a ‘primitive’ form of negative advertising that nonetheless, exceeded all moral limits. The paradox is that when in the early 1990s the parties (mainly New Democracy) adopted negative advertising, the tactic was broadly rejected by the electorate (Ta Nea, 2000, 29 February).

Subsequently, the second main reference of the campaign strategy was populism. Lacking in specific policy proposals in a period when the country was facing severe economic difficulties and given the social structure of the Greek society (a fast developing middle-class), a populist discourse, characterised by vagueness and contradictory policies, served the electoral interests of the main parties. In fact, populism was not only articulated as an electoral tactic to win votes, but furthermore, a populist discourse drove the party logic of governance (Lyrintzis, 1987). It is important to observe, however, in the 1980s PASOK dominated all levels of political life. Most importantly, as is discussed in detail later in this chapter, New Democracy followed the steps of its rival and adopted a defensive strategy that hindered the party’s development. The irony is that in terms of campaign methods, New Democracy was the first party to enlist consultants and advertising firms to organise its campaign. However, it should be noted that from 1986 onwards New Democracy acknowledged that the use of history for ideological polarisation solely benefited PASOK and thus, attempted to adopt the moderate approach of ‘national reconciliation’ (Nicolacopoulos, 1990: 212-213).

Overall, during the period under examination, the campaign organisation was centrally controlled and coordinated on an ad-hoc basis. In fact, the preparation as well as the implementation of the national campaign was left in the hands of the party leader and his closest political advisers. However, due to the dominant personality of the leaders (Karamanlis, Pappandreou and Mitsotakis, though the latter did not have the charisma of the other two), the campaigns were ‘presidential’ in character; people

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* The concept of populism is used within the particular context of the election campaign strategy and style, as an exemplification of the rhetorical style expressed by the political leaders - in their attempt to create and then exploit a highly polarised electorate – and deployed by the media at the time. However, several studies addressing the performance, political practice and legacy of PASOK, the Greek socialist party, which mostly benefited by resorting to populist logic and discourse, have attempted to address (and even re-define) the Greek ‘version’ of populism as a political phenomenon - on the basis of Laclau’s conceptualisation, in terms of ideology and/or as a mode of political incorporation (Lyrintzis, 1983, 1987; Mouzelis, 1986). From this perspective, Lyrintzis argues that ‘PASOK [under the leadership of a charismatic leader] succeeded in mobilising a popular struggle, aimed at the construction of a new hegemony, through a discourse which presented the social and political space as divided into two opposing fields’ (1987: 671). In fact, Lyrintzis acknowledges the electoral strategic purpose of the PASOK leader to create a hegemonic discourse and the sentiment of ‘popular struggle’ to the party’s followers as a means to the party’s electoral advancement. As discussed in the present analysis, the political and campaign discourse in the 1980s followed PASOK’s ‘populist culture’ of the ‘under-privileged’ against the ‘privileged’ or else of the conflict between the (traditional – evil) Right and the anti-Right (represented by the progressive Left).
voted for Papandreou’s PASOK and Karamanlis’ New Democracy. The running of the campaign during the formal election campaign period, was highly decentralised, coordinated and controlled by local candidates and implemented by party activists who provided the main network of communication within the party. The contact with the voters was based on informal and personalised frameworks, a well-established system of patronage that had the ability to set the agenda for the party and mobilise supporters (Papathanassopoulos, 2000: 50). Inevitably, in a ‘pre-modern’ setting of political campaigning the use of professionals was extremely limited. Nevertheless, given its disadvantageous electoral position at the 1984 European Parliament elections, New Democracy employed the British firm Saatchi and Saatchi that had run the Conservative party’s 1979 campaign, to advise on the party’s electoral strategy (Clogg, 1987: 96). However, the party strategy was ultimately, based on the negative and rather ineffective campaign of 1981 and failed to alter New Democracy’s electoral fortunes. A year later, in the 1985 national election, New Democracy asked for the advice of professional consultants from the USA. The change in the party’s ideological direction to neo-liberalism and the image of New Democracy as the liberal camp was indisputably attributed to the advice of the professionals (Clogg, 1987: 109). Furthermore, the parties were keen to recruit media experts to stage-manage their central mass rallies in Athens and Thessaloniki for TV coverage. Finally, and as one might expect a very limited amount of resources was directed to opinion polls and qualitative analysis of voter preferences. Despite the fact that after the restoration of democracy in 1974, opinion polling in Greece had been systematically developed, the party leaders as well as the media did not trust the polls and disregarded the results (Nicolacopoulos, 2003: 199-200). In fact, the emergence of opinion polling as a useful political tool for the parties took place in the 1990s, while their use achieved record levels in the aftermath of the 2000 election, when public and private polling became an inextricable part of the Greek political life (Mavris, 2003).

Following the above brief remarks on the early years of political communication and campaigning in the newly established Greek democracy, it is rather evident that the late 1970s and 1980s encompassed characteristics of a ‘pre-modern’ phase of campaigning on the Norris typology and/or the first stage of professionalisation on the Farrell-Webb model (Norris, 2002; Farrell and Webb, 2000). Two points are worth mentioning here, though. The first refers to the non-existent regulatory framework of political campaigning in Greece that allowed for the emergence of behaviour that hindered the early stages of modernisation of party communications. The second main issue relates to the integral characteristics of party campaigning evolution. Considering the social and wider political and ideological changes of the 1990s, it is worth focusing on the changes that the party of New Democracy had to implement in order to
modernise its communications mechanism and practices. However, as the analysis of the party within the evolution framework indicates, the party failed to ‘modernise’ or update its culture. Overall, the modernisation and professionalism of the 2004 election campaign was the culmination of a long process of adaptation to and adoption of a series of communication and marketing techniques that altered the ways that parties thought about their campaigns.

Political Campaigning in the 1990s: ‘Modernisation’ through ‘Americanisation’

The modernisation of political campaigning in Greece deployed by the two main parties of government (New Democracy and PASOK) was concomitant to the external developments that characterised Greek social and political life. The early 1990s signalled the beginning of a new era in the country’s political realm, which affected the process of party evolution and the practice of electoral politics. The traditional and in cases primitive, ways of campaigning that were described above were gradually replaced by professional forms of political communication techniques and marketing tools. The transition to professional electioneering was a cumulative process of adaptation and adoption (Negrine, 1996: 153); initially, this process could be described as an uncritical and passive adoption of techniques imported by the USA presidential elections. However, at a later stage, a gradual adaptation of these tools and strategies to the folklore and ethos of the national political culture was recorded. Nonetheless, the shift in the nature of political communication in Greece has been meticulously associated with the new socio-economic and political framework within which the parties had to operate. To this end, the analysis considers the modernisation process of campaigning in Greece around three main axes. First, the developments in the media, and especially the deregulation of the Greek audiovisual industry, rendered television initially into a significant medium of communication between politicians and voters and soon after into a major political actor (Papathanassopoulos, 2000; Yannas, 2002: 68-75). The impact of television on Greek politics reached extreme lengths because of the lack of a regulatory framework to safeguard the relationship between politics and media. As a result, initially ‘parties and candidates were free to purchase airtime as they could afford’ (Samaras and Papathanassopoulos, 2006). Second, the mid-1990s witnessed the end of ‘charisma’ in politics as the new breed of political leaders lacked the appeal of their predecessors. They lacked the rhetorical skills of Papandreou or Karamanlis (senior) and therefore, had to find alternative more congenial forms of campaigning (Featherstone, 2005: 227). They were also unwilling to follow in the footsteps of their predecessors both in terms of policy and strategy and became much more amenable to the novelties of modern communications and political marketing.
Finally, the third crucial factor to the process of campaign modernisation related to the de-ideologisation and de-polarisation of politics. This blurring of the ever-present ideological distinctions between right and left in relation to the socio-economic changes of the early 1990s led to partisan de-alignment and a significant increase in the number of undecided and volatile voters (Nicolaopoulos, 2005). In this new environment the parties had to find new forms of communication with grassroots voters while at the same time appealing to the general electorate. Taking into account the above observations, the process of modernisation in the 1990s is examined briefly through the innovations of New Democracy’s campaign practices at the 1990, 1993 and 1996 general elections before the rise of Karamanlis (junior) to the party leadership. That is for the simple reason that the changes that occurred during this period provided the groundwork for the party’s communications reinvention of the 2000s, and played a vital role in the process of the party’s level of encompassing professionalisation that is one of the core elements of analysis of the Party Evolution Framework.

Following in the footsteps of other right-wing/conservative parties in Europe (i.e. the British Conservative party), New Democracy had always been keen to enlist professionals to engage into the party’s campaigning and deal with the issues of advertising and image. This trend was reinforced in the 1990s when the advent of private television altered the political communication landscape. The shift in the nature of communications from personal to televised conduct of campaigning forced the party leadership to adjust to the needs of television campaigning under the supervision of media experts and consultants. The majority of these experts were American and West European rather than Greek and their cooperation with the party was a highly preserved secret. New Democracy had employed the services of American consultant and image-maker Joseph Glick since 1985 in order to ‘update’ the image of its leader Costas Mitsotakis (To Vima, 1993, 19 September). However, the extent to which the presence of those – mostly incognito – experts had an impact on the strategy of the party in addition to the image, still remain unclear (Papathanassopoulos, 2000: 52). Further to the introduction of private television to electioneering, the 1990 election was marked by a significant de-alignment of the electorate unprecedented in the Greek electoral tradition\(^7\) (Nicolaopoulos, 1990: 214-231). The major task of the party thus, was not only to re-align its electoral base but mostly, to appeal to a changing electorate. The new challenge was addressed through

\(^7\) The trend first appeared in 1986 and was reinforced after the two consecutive elections of 1989. The coalition government of ND and Synaspismos (the communist coalition at the time) advanced the pace of de-alignment as the traditional boundaries of the left and right as well as the ever-present since the civil war, ‘hatred’ that characterised this relationship diminished significantly. To this end, the coalition of the ‘left-wing forces’ against the ‘Right’ broke (Nicolaopoulos, 1990).
the use of market mechanisms. In 1990 New Democracy invested the largest part of its advertising budget to television commercials. As Table 6.1 demonstrates New Democracy spent 168.8m drachmas (0.5m euros) in televised political advertising spots, which corresponds to 46.3 percent of the party’s total advertising budget. Considering that the respective sum devoted to television advertising by PASOK over the same period was 7.9m drachmas (0.023m euros), that is, 3.9 percent of its total advertising budget, it could be easily estimated the extent of the party’s investment on televised advertising. Another innovation that was initiated at the time by New Democracy – and soon copied by the opposition parties - was the manipulation and ‘control’ of the news bulletins of the increased number of local private radio stations (To Vima, 1990, 4 March). To this end, news bulletins, interviews with party officials and the leader’s speeches were recorded in advance at the party’s headquarters in Rigillis and then forwarded to local radio stations more than willing to serve the party’s interests. Finally, another important feature of the 1990 campaign was the hesitant but rather popular use of opinion polls by the parties (private polls) and the media (public polls) (Mavris, 2003: 212). Nonetheless, senior political figures remained distrustful and did not consider opinion polls as useful tools for the formation of the party’s electoral strategy (Trigka, 1990). In fact, the polling industry had to wait until the 1996 election in order to consolidate its role into the Greek electioneering as an integral and indubitable part of the political reality. Overall, New Democracy’s 1990 campaign was successful and ‘left an indelible mark on the history of Greek campaigning’ (Papathanassopoulos, 2000: 53). The incorporation of the latest market techniques however, was the practical outcome of the party’s main strategic goal to win a majority in parliament after two consecutive elections that had led to unstable coalitions (in June and November 1989). Within that context, the employment of media consultants and professionals to advice on the use of new media tools was the ultimate but mostly, successful tactic of the party. These first steps towards campaign modernisation were widely endorsed and regarded as New Democracy’s major weapon for winning the 1990 election (Papathanassopoulos, 2000: 53). Nonetheless, as it is argued in the present thesis, the party’s campaign modernisation was based on the mere adoption of tools and techniques; in fact, New Democracy failed to adapt to the changing communications environment because it failed to reform internally.

The stride to campaign professionalism is indissolubly related to the extensive use of television and mostly, of political advertising spots. The real explosion in the number of political advertising spots or ‘polispots’ took place in the 1993 election. The result, however, was negative as was the entire campaign strategy for New Democracy. The governing party entered the 1993 campaign in a dire position. The minister of Foreign
Affairs, Antonis Samaras had founded a splinter party with the support of a considerable number of New Democracy MPs. As a result, the government lost its parliamentary majority and the Prime Minister was forced to call an early election. Furthermore, the government’s popularity was at extremely low levels even among its own supporters who were disappointed by New Democracy’s ‘non-existent’ record in government\(^8\) (Loulis, 1995: 342-392). The preparation of the campaign started in the aftermath of the government’s collapse. The campaign team consisted mainly of senior party officials and was controlled by the leader who was in charge of the planning and strategy. The most prominent members of the team were Tzannis Tzannetakis(former Prime Minister at the first coalition government of 1989) who coordinated intra-party communications, Lefteris Kousoulis who was the prime minister’s special advisor and responsible for planning the campaign, Kostas Pylarinou the party Director and Georgios Flessas an opinion pollster (Ta Nea, 1993, 15 September). However, New Democracy followed its previous tactics and employed US consultants to advice on the preparation and implementation of its campaign. Therefore, the real driving force behind the party’s campaign strategy as well as the image of the leader was Clinton’s former campaign consultant, James Carville and his associate Mary Matalin, Bush’s senior former adviser who after the campaign joined forces with Carville\(^9\) (Ta Nea, 1993, 18 October). Carville cooperated closely with Mitsotakis at a personal level as he ‘trained’ the leader on how to give speeches in front of the cameras but also was the mastermind behind the party’s strategy (Ta Nea, 1993, 18 October; To Vima, 1993, 26 September). The strategy planned was conflictual based on negative advertising, personal scathing attacks on the leader of the opposition in reference to his health problems and thus, his fitness to govern, and extreme levels of scare-mongering – Mitsotakis went so far as to argue that there may be a war with Turkey (Ta Nea, 1993, 19 October; Ta Nea, 1993, 2 November). Nonetheless, the strategy was not always welcomed by the party’s campaign team who in various occasions disagreed with Mitsotakis insistence to follow the advice of his American consultants (Ta Nea, 1993, 19 October).

During the campaign, both parties adopted a negative offensive strategy, aiming at the dismissal of their opponent rather than the presentation of their programmatic statements. This was depicted in the campaign messages. New Democracy’s main slogan was ‘Greece is not turning back’ while PASOK contended ‘At last, End’. In fact, neither party could offer specific policy proposals; instead their political promises were

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\(^8\) A poll conducted in November 1992 showed that only 51 percent of ND’s voters would trust the party for another term in government (Loulis, 1995: 358).

\(^9\) ND paid one million dollars to employ James Carville and his team however, the party never admitted the presence at and role of the American consultants in its headquarters (Ta Nea, 1993, 18 October).
vague and ambiguous. For the first time, there was a wide use of television advertising; however, the main campaign asset was still the mass rallies (Loulis, 1995: 411; Papathanassopoulos, 2002: 79). New Democracy had employed four different advertising agencies, BBDO, Leo Burnett, Bold and McCann Erikson, to plan and implement the party’s advertising campaign, which included televised spots, newspaper advertisements and posters (Ta Nea, 1993, 15 September). As Table 6.1 shows New Democracy spent 3818,9m drachmas (11.21m euros) on television advertising, which counted for 87.4 percent of its total advertising budget (the relative numbers for PASOK were 3585,6m drachmas (10.5m euros) and 84.6. Over the four weeks of the campaign period New Democracy aired 1.489 ‘polispots’, most of which in the last week of the campaign (Papathanassopoulos, 2002: 71); moreover, 65 percent of the television advertising spots attacked PASOK and its leader (Samaras, 2008a: 187).

Overall, the party’s campaign turned out to be extremely negative as well as ineffective. The government’s record was perceived by the public to be overly unsuccessful and by the time the election was announced public opinion trends were already formed. Furthermore, the ineffectiveness of the campaign this was reinforced by the wrong strategy choices of the party campaign team (Ta Nea, 1993, 21 October; Loulis, 1995: 414-9). First, the main part of the campaign was deployed around the leader, whose unpopularity harmed the party electorally. Second, the party adopted an anti-PASOK strategy, as the main axis of is campaign due to the negative image of the government and the low credibility of the opposition party. However, the attacks on PASOK were so extreme that were perceived as hilarious from the public and thus, failed to convince the voters. Finally, despite the government’s attempts to promote its record, public opinion polls showed that not even New Democracy supporters believed that the party had a positive governmental record - only 56.5 percent thought that the government did a good job (Loulis, 1995: 415). In short, the 1993 election battle became the choice of the least evil. New Democracy’s image was so wounded that no campaign strategy could reverse the hostile feeling of the electorate toward the party – voters just wanted New Democracy out of government regardless of who was going to win the election (at present, sixteen years later, New Democracy is at the same deplorable situation, facing an electoral rout). As a result, New Democracy did not only lose the election but its vote share fell to 39.3 percent from 46.89 percent three years earlier. As far as the campaign is concerned, elements of modernisation had been introduced but the outcome was disappointing. Greek parties went to extremes and adopted the worst of American campaigning (negative advertising, offensive and morally dubious attacks on opposition politicians) something that technically did modernise the campaigning process (high quality TV spots) but overall, degraded the
political realm (Loulis, 1995: 418-419). Characterisations such as ‘dirty politics’ and ‘black propaganda’ were frequently used by the press to indicate the viciousness of the political battle (Ta Nea, 1993, 18 September).

The general election of 1996 marked a new era in Greek politics. On the one hand, the modernisation of communications and the dominant role of television on the structure and course of the election campaign became legitimised, novel features of campaigning (leaders’ debates) replaced to some extent the old styles (mass rallies) and practices of communication and marketing were regulated (Papathanassopoulos, 2000: 53-54). Furthermore, the systemic use of opinion polling – for the first time in Greece - denoted the change in the attitude of parties towards the use of polls; six national opinion polls were conducted over the four weeks of the election campaign and five private channels presented their privately-funded exit polls the night of the election (Mavris, 2003: 212-213). On the other hand, as discussed, the 1996 election signalled the end of ‘charisma’ in the Greek political realm, as the leaders and/or founders of New Democracy and PASOK, were not present in the election battle for the first time after the restoration of democracy. The two main rivals, Miltiadis Evert for New Democracy and Kostas Simitis for PASOK, lacked the rhetorical skills, personality and status of the previous leaders. Having left the distinctive and impassioned practices of the past behind, however, the 1996 campaign saw the emergence of a new style of campaigning that was the most moderate and professional at the time. Moreover, by 1996 political pragmatism came to gradually replace ideological fanaticism as the main criterion to vote in a period of national economic crisis and an extensive electoral volatility was recorded (Nicolacopoulos, 2005: 276; To Vima 1996, 15 September). The issue of competence and fitness to govern became the main political focus of the campaign (Featherstone, 2005: 236). Also, the election campaign period was extremely short and lasted for only 26 days (Aug 23rd – Sep 21st) – the constitutionally defined period is four weeks.

Preparation for the September 1996 election for New Democracy started three months earlier with the establishment of the Central Election Campaign Committee, which consisted of 37 members (To Vima, 1996, 22 September). Nonetheless, due to the inflexibility of such a crowded committee to operate efficiently, the decision-making was laid in the hands of a team of close to the leader party officials and experts. As in 1993 Tzannis Tzanetakis was responsible for the coordination of the campaign, while

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10 It should be clarified that according to the Constitution parliamentary elections take place every four years and have to be held within thirty days from the dissolution of parliament, proclaimed by presidential decree (Article 53 par. 1 and article 41 of the Constitution). However, seeking a fresh mandate the newly elected (after Papandreou’s death) president of PASOK, Kostas Simitis called an early general election for September 22n, 1996.
the other members of the committee were close associates of the leader, Miltiadis Evert, and senior political figures of the party. The campaign team, thus, consisted of Prokopis Pavlopoulos, who had served as a former advisor to the founder of the party, Konstantinos Karamanlis, Giannis Andrianos, the Press Office deputy director, and Panos Loukakos, responsible for the political planning of New Democracy. Furthermore, the party’s Director Ioannis Bartholomeos and the secretary of the party organisation Lefteris Zagoritis had taken on the task of mobilising the grassroots. The planning and implementation of the party’s political communication strategy was delegated to two advertising companies, ‘Bold’ and ‘Spot Thomson’ while the polling agency ‘Alco’ handled the party’s quantitative research (To Vima, 1996, 8 September; To Vima, 1996, 22 September). The novel feature of the 1996 election campaign laid on the absence of foreign political consultants in the leader’s campaign team. In fact, when the election was officially called, Tzanetakis called for Joseph Glick, the focus group specialist and close advisor to the former party leader since 1985, in order to find ways to improve the new leader’s image but Evert had no intention to cooperate with him and thus, Glick was forced to resign a month later (To Vima, 1996, 8 September). One of Greece’s most prominent political advisors, John Loulis participated in the planning and implementation of the party’s communication strategy, something that was never, though, officially confirmed by the party (To Vima, 1996, 22 September). Ultimately, formal authority and control of the campaign rested on the party leader.

As in the previous two occasions New Democracy’s campaign was built around the party’s advertising spots. In fact, the 1996 campaign officially started for New Democracy with the projection of the first of a series of spots, which focused on the party’s policy proposals. In total, New Democracy spent 1787.5m drachmas (5.25m euros) on television advertising spots, which corresponded to 80 percent of its total advertising budget (Table 6.1). On the other hand, the respective sum spent by PASOK was 4100.7m drachmas (12.34m euros), that is more than double than New Democracy’s. Given that New Democracy always led the way to campaign modernisation, it is rather surprising that in 1996 the party decided to spend half the amount of money than in 1993. There are two main explanations for this. The first one argues that the party was facing financial difficulties (Kefalogiannis, 1996). The second explanation contended mainly by the opposition was that nobody in New Democracy believed that the party was able to win the election and their main aim had been to keep the 1993 vote share and close the gap with PASOK (Ta Nea, 1996, 30 August). Overall, the party’s television advertising campaign was once again negative in nature, as 60 percent of the 1365 spots aired during the election period were negative; furthermore, 88 percent of these focused on the personality of the
opposition leader\(^{11}\) (Papathanassopoulos, 2002: 71; Samaras, 2008a: 188, 200). The advertising campaign was structured on the main message ‘It’s time for work’, which however, was an unfortunate choice without considerable appeal to an electorate that thought working as health hazardous\(^{12}\) (Kefalogiannis, 1996: 13). The advertisements attacking the opposition leader projected the message ‘Can we trust him?’.

The campaign strategy was built on four main points. First, great emphasis was given to the defamation of the opposition leader whom they accused of being untrustworthy and unfit to govern the country. Second, New Democracy targeted the low-wage earners and pensioners who were mostly hit by the government’s economic policy. However, yet again the focus of the message was on the government’s economic austerity programme rather than on New Democracy’s policy proposals. Third, a television advertising spot of the Prime Minister, Kostas Simitis, thanking the United States for averting a Greek-Turkey military conflict while on the background the image of Turk soldiers raising their flag at the Greek skerry of Imia, projected throughout the whole campaign period. Finally, a comparison between the ministerial legacies of the two leaders prior to their ascendancy to party leadership was used in order to demonstrate that Simitis failed as a minister and therefore, he could not be trusted as prime minister (Ta Nea, 1996, 30 August). A closer examination of the party’s strategy tactics is indicative of the problems that New Democracy was facing; ideologically, New Democracy had lost its identity and was unable to offer convincing alternative policy proposals while at the same time, the party was disunited and the leader was unable to control the various factions competing for intra-party power (see chapter 5 for more details). At the same time, the modernisation of communications rendered mainly onto the use of the latest technological innovations and candidate image-making\(^{13}\) while the systematic use of marketing tools like qualitative opinion research was ignored. As Kefalogiannis (1996) indicated one of New Democracy’s strategic mistakes was that the party leadership failed to take into account the social transformation that had taken place over the previous years under the consecutive PASOK governments\(^{14}\).

\(^{11}\) PASOK’s respective percentage of negative advertising was only 15 and 21 percent (Papathanassopoulos, 2002: 71; Samaras, 2008a: 188, 200).

\(^{12}\) Based on an opinion poll conducted in 1993 at European level, 67 percent of Greeks believed that working was health hazardous while the respective mean percentage of the other European states was 22 percent (Kefalogiannis, 1996: 13).

\(^{13}\) The most prominent and ‘telegenic’ party figures were systematically media-trained in order to improve their style and image in front of the television camera. Also, they were provided with Q&A notes and tapes in order to stay ‘on message’ (Ta Nea, 1996, 7 September).

\(^{14}\) The Greek social structure was transformed with the emergence of a new middle-class. As in the case of Labour in the late 1980s, ND failed to follow the needs and wants of this new group of voters who were not ideologically attached to any political party and thus, constituted a more volatile group of voters (Loulis, 1995).
As far as campaign modernisation is concerned three novel features characterised the 1996 elections. First, there was the introduction of televised debates between senior party members but most importantly, on September 13\textsuperscript{th} the first leaders’ debate took place. As one might expect, a tough bargaining preceded the debate between the representatives of both parties over the format of the debate as well as the questions addressed to the two leaders\textsuperscript{15} (Papathanassopoulos, 2000: 55). As expected the debate was the main event of the campaign and assessments and analyses on who won or lost the battle of the debate conquered the news the following days. The second important innovation of the 1996 campaign was the considerable decline in the number of mass rallies held by the two parties. In fact, New Democracy’s leader decided on replacing the Athens mass rally that was scheduled to take place three days prior to the election day, with a press conference (Ta Nea, 1996, 18 September). Finally, the 1996 election campaign was held within a newly applied framework of broadcasting regulation, which however, was based on the decisions of a special bipartisan committee (I Kathimerini, 2000, 16 February). Given the anarchy that had characterised the televised coverage of the parties and candidates on previous elections, the committee aimed at securing equal time and access on television for all candidates and parties, without upsetting the ratings of private channels (Papathanassopoulos, 2000: 54). Subsequently, it was decided that every party would ‘receive 7.5 hours of free coverage on state channels and 5.5 hours on private channels’ – extremely high when compared with the UK - something that was never applied in practice due to the objection of the private television broadcasters (Ibid.). Nonetheless, this was recorded as the first attempt to regulate the broadcast political communication in a period that television legitimised as a political actor of its own.

This brief outlook on the campaigning characteristics in Greece through the analysis of the three election campaigns of the early- to mid-1990s is indicative of the modernisation (and to a lesser extent professionalisation) of campaigning in the country. Political parties had to adapt to the new media-led political environment by adopting new, more professional and modern ways of campaigning and communication; a process that had initially, been closely related to the growth of televised political advertising. Therefore, during the 1990s political advertising consolidated as the main form of political communication. Parties spent (even overspent) the largest part of their budget on 30 to 60 second spots as a way to put their messages across to the electorate. The main downfall however, is that both parties devoted all their efforts on the defamation of their opponent through the

\textsuperscript{15}The debate broadcasted live from the state television and lasted ninety minutes. Both leaders answered twelve questions asked by a team of journalists but they were not allowed to address each other. The time frame available was set to two minutes per question.
extensive use of negative advertising indicating a trend towards ‘Americanisation’ (Negrine and Papathanassopoulos, 1996; Mancini and Swanson, 1996) rather than modernisation of Greek campaigning. Nevertheless, each election from 1990 to 1996 saw the introduction of novel features of campaigning; the first televised political advertisements in 1990 and their explosion in number three years later, while in 1996 the style of the campaign became much more televised and much less populist, but most importantly, the traditional feature of political campaigning, the mass rallies lost their political ‘prestige’ to the televised leader debate. Ultimately, an important point that should be noted, is that the changing nature of political campaigning in Greece did not fall within partisan lines; both major parties developed the same strategies over the same period of time because they were forced to adapt in order to survive within the new environment that they operated. As a result, the changes were not deep-rooted and deliberate but rather superficial and ad-hoc, a characteristic confirmed by the theoretical framework later in the chapter. The overall communications transformation as was the case of the Labour party in the 1990s for example, was attempted but never completed, as the analysis of the 2000 and 2004 election campaigns will demonstrate.

### 6.3 Professionalisation and Electoral Success

**Challenges and Prospects**

In the aftermath of the 1996 general election New Democracy found itself in a deplorable situation. In electoral terms, the party suffered its fourth electoral defeat in the last fifteen years. Moreover, its electoral power had been reduced further to 38 percent of the share of the vote (Table 6.2) and in areas that were traditionally dominated by the right (upper middle class urban areas of Athens and Thessaloniki) the party’s share fell by 10-20 percent while there was a respective swing to PASOK (Kefalogiannis, 1996: 12). In organisational terms, New Democracy had failed once again to mobilise and re-align its grassroots despite the organisational reforms that were introduced in the period of 1993-96. As already thoroughly analysed in the previous chapter, Evert, the party leader at the time, failed to revive the party after the disappointing period of the 1990-93 New Democracy administration and the party’s rout at the 1993 election; but most importantly, he lacked the drive to put an end to the perennial disunity that had harmed the party on so many occasions in the past. It is indicative that in the aftermath of the election, a poll showed that 74.5 percent of New Democracy voters were dissatisfied with Evert as party leader (Lampropoulos, 1996: 68). When the early 1996 election was called, New Democracy was not
prepared neither organisationally nor ideologically to fight an election and the communications upgrade that was attempted was inadequate and rather trivially executed unable to alter the electoral fortunes of the party. Most importantly, by focusing solely on the intra-party power struggle between the current and former leaders and their entourage, New Democracy leadership failed to anticipate the shift in the electorate’s attitudes on the one hand, and the changes in PASOK’s policies and strategy on the other (Bratakos, 2002: 681). As a result, New Democracy was unable to promote a policy programme that responded to the new social and economic context within which the new government had to operate. The long period of internal crisis and the continuous clashes for power at the leadership level had rendered the party to an introvert political organisation, highly disunited and thus, unable to respond to the challenges and expectations of the voters. Most importantly, the ferocious civil war that the leadership had started, by the end of 1996 had shifted to grassroots organisations, indicating the extent of the party’s decay (Bratakos, 2002: 704).

### Table 6.2: Election Results: 1974-2004 (%)

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<td>38.61</td>
<td>46.88</td>
<td>41.49</td>
<td>43.79</td>
<td>40.55</td>
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### The Karamanlis Years: 1997 - 2004

As a result, when Karamanlis rose to the leadership in March 1997, the party was in a dire position. The 1996 electoral defeat had re-opened old wounds and created new ones. New Democracy had lost its ideological orientation and political standing, and the image and credibility of the leadership had been seriously damaged by the omnipresent viciousness and struggle for power. Most importantly, however, the party had lost ‘its spirit of fundamental unity’ (Giannakou – Koutsikou, 1996: 9). The atmosphere was acutely defined by a prominent party official, who argued that ‘today, the various factions and groups within New Democracy, encouraged by personal ambitions … the incompetence of most party cadres, the selfish pursuits of part of the leader’s entourage, and the lack of steady ideological direction, are not far from a real break into at least two camps: one liberal and the other conservative (traditional right)’ (quoted in Pappas and Dinas, 2006: 480-481). The state of ‘de-composition’ that the party was in, was confirmed by other prominent figures who feared that the break-up of the party was either unavoidable or even necessary for the survival of the
right-wing camp. The former party leader Georgios Rallis argued that the divisions are so deep that unity was not a straightforward and easy objective regardless of the intentions of the elected leader (Bratakos, 2002: 686). This observation was confirmed by Evert, who argued that at the time the party was on the verge of disintegration (Ibid: 689). Other accounts however, pointed out that party fracture should not be avoided as such an action would give a fresh impetus to the wider right-wing camp to evolve independently of the strict party lines of New Democracy that conquered the whole centre-right of the Greek political realm (Markidis, 1996). Nonetheless, the latter view was not shared by the majority of party officials and members, who by the time that the leadership election took place advocated that the unity of the party should prevail all personal and factional ambitions. To this end, a group of prominent young MPs put up Karamanlis (junior) to contest the leadership election, as an advocate of a third unifying pole between the Evert and Souflias (backed by Mitsotakis) groups (Bratakos, 2002: 714-5; personal interview). Therefore, a month before the Fourth Party Congress, Karamanlis officially announced his candidacy for president. Although he was a young and inexperienced politician, he was regarded as the incorruptible political figure able to lead the party to an election victory. Most importantly, his family name and standing (he was the nephew of the founder) ensured that he would have loyal supporters within the party and an increased appeal to the rest of the electorate. Subsequently, he had all the required potential not only to ‘save’ the party from an imminent break-up but also to revive its electoral appeal.

As already noted, Karamanlis (junior) was elected leader at a time that the party needed a strong leadership. Nevertheless, it took three years and a series of intra-party disputes and upheavals for the leader to succeed in re-aligning the party forces in pursuit of electoral victory. However, did Karamanlis succeed in uniting the party? Given the nature and the identity characteristics of New Democracy, as defined by the first two stages of the party evolution framework, one should be sceptical on the issue of unity of a party that its evolution over time has been concomitant to normative diversity and power struggles based on the overweening ambitions of the most prominent party cadres. Under the prospect of an election win that by 2000-2001 was closer than ever before, the two rival echelons were forced to compromise their ambitions and market the image of a united, renewed and mainly, competent to govern political party. Nonetheless, as history has shown, the successfully

16 Makridis’ argument resonated in two grounds. First, it was an undisputable fact that most of the prominent party figures considered their personal ambitions to be above and beyond party unity, an attitude that deteriorated the party’s political standing. Second, as a corollary of the previous account the fact that party was out of government for a very long time hindered most efforts for unity. To this end, the party’s break-up would lead to ideological clarity instead of diversity and thus, to unity (Makridis, 1996).
communicated and marketed party unity was more artificial rather than substantive. The 2004 electoral victory and Karamanlis' personal appeal to the Greek electorate silenced the internal opposition but failed to eradicate it. At times, even during the 2004 election campaign, there were party officials who publicly opposed the leader's decisions and communications strategy but due to the overwhelming appeal of Karamanlis as well as the coherent communications strategy, these voices did not damage the party's electoral fortunes. Nonetheless, they indicated the underlying problems that the leader had to overcome. Only when Karamanlis succeeded in controlling the party, he then was able to lead New Democracy to an electoral defeat.

Once in the party leadership, Karamanlis set his priorities around three basic axes all of which aimed at making New Democracy electable again. First, he aimed at modernising the organisation and communications operation of the party. Second, he sought to re-new the electorate's confidence in the leader and improve the party image. Finally, he had to give New Democracy a fresh ideological framework that would meet the challenges of the new century and most importantly, respond to the demands of the Greek citizens. Therefore, in his first post-election address, Karamanlis yearned for a 'new dawn, a new great start, a leap towards effectiveness and quality' away from the 'introversion and conflicts' of the past (cited in Bratakos, 2002: 729). However, the process of the party's renewal was very slow and indecisive as it was hindered by continuous internal disputes. It took Karamanlis three years and a series of arduous and unpopular decisions – that in cases caused a great upheaval – in order to implement the changes and reforms necessary for New Democracy to achieve its electoral goals (but not to radically reform the deficiencies of the past). In fact, as the leader became stronger vis-à-vis his internal opposition, the pace of the reforms increased (Loulis, 2004: 121).

For Karamanlis the impetus behind the organisational changes he introduced was twofold: first, he wanted to enforce party discipline, and then, to renew the party's personnel and reinforce the basic core of decision-making structures around the

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17 At present a snap election has been called and the campaign is under way. Two weeks before the election day, New Democracy faces a swing of 10 percent to PASOK and is already behind PASOK by 8 percent, while Karamanlis' popularity and fitness to govern ratings are clearly well behind Papandreou. The party is in disarray and the defeatist attitude overtakes all other efforts; the main issue concern the next day and who will succeed Karamanlis' to the leadership (data from an ALCO/ALTER poll, presented at the Alter news bulletin at 8pm –local time- September 18, 2009).
18 Party unity and organisational renewal had been amongst the top priorities of the leader and are discussed in Chapter 5. The current analysis focuses on the reforms that affected the communications and campaigning modernisation of the party.
19 Opinion polls that were conducted prior and after the September 1996 election indicated that the leader, the internal party disputes and the public perception on ND’s governmental record of 1990-3 period were the main reasons for the party’s electoral defeat (Bratakos, 2002: 705-706).
leader’s office. The latter team would also comprise the sovereign decision-making body for the party’s campaign planning and organisation. As expected the task of enforcing party discipline was much more difficult given the heterogeneity of views that had embedded in the party; the permanent public criticisms of the leader’s decisions from prominent party members thwarted Karamanlis attempts to restore the electoral credibility of New Democracy and also, challenged the authority of his leadership (Bratakos, 2002: 743-756). To this end, Karamanlis under the advice of his closest political consultants, faced the problem by expelling from the party the rebel MPs, who openly disagreed with his decisions and refused to follow the party official line in parliament. As already discussed, the fact that among the expelled members were several prominent figures such as Giorgos Souflias (Karamanlis main leadership contender), and the neo-liberal advocate and pioneer of the party’s 1985-1993 policy formulation, Stefanos Manos, caused great infighting (Bratakos, 2002: 758-759). The internal party opposition led by the former party president, Kostas Mitsotakis, attacked the party leader, while fears of an eventual break-up re-emerged (Ta Nea 1998, 5 February: 8; Ta Nea, 1998, 5 February: 9). Nonetheless, the upheaval was short-lived; the leader’s highly risky strategy had paid off and in the aftermath of the dispute, Karamanlis had succeeded in reasserting his authority over the party as well as subsiding the factionalist tensions.

As far as the organisational structure of the party is concerned, Karamanlis built upon the changes that were introduced at the party’s third Congress in 1994 under the leadership of Evert. While he did not introduce any substantial reforms nor did he attempt to restructure the party organisation, Karamanlis focused on invigorating the party mechanism by the readjustment of intra-party dynamics (Pappas and Dinas, 2006). The first objective to this end was achieved through an incremental shift in the balance of power in favour of the leader. First, Karamanlis showed his determination and suppressed intra-party opposition by expelling the dissenting voices from the party. Second, the position of the leader was further strengthened by the 1997 Congress decision that the leader could be challenged by 50 percent of the total number of MPs or one-third of the members of the Conference (Bratakos, 2002: 731). Furthermore, the past leaders prerogative to participate ex-officio in the highest party organs (Central and Executive Committees) was suspended\(^2\) (Ibid.; Pappas and Dinas, 2006: 486). Moreover, further changes in the party’s statute regarding the number and the election of conference delegates combined with Karamanlis extensive appeal

\(^2\)Initially, the decision to suspend the former leaders’ prerogative to participate to the Central and Executive Committees (unless they were elected) caused a disagreement between the supporters of the former president Kostas Mitsotakis (they argued that this decision aimed at alienating Mitsotakis) and the conference organs, but this was soon restrained (Bratakos, 2002: 732). In fact, the decision reinforced Karamanlis authority over the two committees as he had succeeded in marginalizing his main opponent and regular detractor.
to the party’s grassroots, allowed for the leader to gradually control the party organs (Central and Executive Committees) as well as the decisions of the Conference (Pappas and Dinas, 2006: 486). The leader’s next step was to renew the staff in the party’s headquarters by selecting the General Secretary and appointing the heads of the various secretariats. Among those, Michalis Liapis, was appointed head of the Political Strategy and Policy Planning Secretariat, while Andreas Lykourentzos was the deputy responsible for the party’s political strategy and Aris Spiliotopoulos became the party’s press secretary. The latter were young and promising party members, not yet elected in parliament, and close friends of Karamanlis (personal interview). These three together with a small group of communication experts and political analysts comprised a small in-house team responsible for the planning and implementation of the party’s campaigning in 2000 and 2004. As Pappas and Dinas indicate, this team ‘conducted its own surveys and produced a plethora of party propaganda material’ (2006: 489). Contrary to previous tactics of the ad-hoc appointment of consultants and media experts just a few weeks before the campaign, Karamanlis created an in-house group of communications advisers who reported directly to the leader, rendering him the sole decision-maker of the party’s policy and communications strategy, while the constitutional role of the Party Secretaries who participated in this team, allowed for the smooth communication and implementation of the leader’s decisions to the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary party groups.

Karamanlis’ second vital objective was the revival of the party image and the renewal of the image of the party leader. The latter was not a very difficult task to achieve due to his personal popularity and appeal to the party’s supporters but mainly, to the wider electoral base. Nonetheless, his triumphal leadership election at the party Conference (70 percent of the total share of the vote) indicated Karamanlis’ widespread acceptance by the party grassroots. At the same time, Karamanlis was particularly popular with the wider electorate, a fact that enhanced the overall dynamic of the image of the party leader to a great extent among the voters. It is indicative that while Evert’s popularity ratings had reached a very low level of 24 percent by March 1997, with the rise of Karamanlis to the leadership the respective percentage rose by 30 points, to 54.2 (Figure 6.2). Most importantly, Karamanlis’ popularity ratings were almost as high as the Prime Minster’s and leader of PASOK, Kostas Simitis, who was perceived as particularly popular and successful at the time - 40.3 and 42.7 percent respectively21 (Ta Nea, 1997, 22 March: 12-13). Another

21 The question asked was ‘If there were a General Election tomorrow, who would make the best Prime Minister, Mr Simitis or Mr Karamanlis?’. It should be noted that the poll conducted by VPR-C Institute took place a couple of weeks before the official election of Karamanlis at the party Congress and it is indicative of the positive attitude of the electorate towards the new ND leader.
important characteristic for the New Democracy leader was that his popularity was equally distributed among the various social strata (Ta Nea, 1997, 22 September: 12-13). Therefore, Karamanlis with his election succeeded in updating as well as strengthening the image of the party leader. This was extremely important for New Democracy given that the party’s electoral fortunes were burdened by the unpopularity of its leaders since the very early days of Karamanlis (senior) retirement. It is also indicative that the former leader, Evert, was perceived to be a major barrier to the party’s electoral success. On the contrary, Karamanlis (junior) personal appeal was considerable among the wider electorate and overwhelming among the party supporters – by January 1999, it had reached 73 percent (Ta Nea, 1999, 25 January). Subsequently, given the new dynamic that Karamanlis’ personal appeal brought to the party, New Democracy’s communications aimed at advancing Karamanlis’ image and thus, capitalising on the leader who became the party’s main electoral asset (Dinas, 2008). Given the circumstances, one could argue that after thirty years since the party’s formation New Democracy re-emerged as ‘the party of Karamanlis’.

Nonetheless, Karamanlis and his communications team had to face two main challenges. First, by capitalising on the leader’s personal high popularity ratings, they aimed at improving his image as a competent and credible alternative prime minister rather than just a popular opposition politician (Ta Nea, 1998, 8-9 November). Second, Karamanlis had to take advantage of his personal popularity in order to improve the overall image of the party (Loulis, 2004: 313). However, both tasks were extremely difficult to achieve due to endogenous as well as exogenous factors that directly affected the strategy implementation of the party’s communications team. First, Karamanlis had to overcome his own image of the young and inexperienced (never held a ministerial post) politician. As Figures 6.2 and 6.3 demonstrate, while Karamanlis was very popular among the public, the voters did not trust him to be the country’s next prime minister. For instance, in January 2000, three months before the general election, Karamanlis popularity ratings was 42.1 percent while only 26.5 percent of the electorate thought that he would make the best prime minister. Moreover, Simitis led Karamanlis by 32.1 percentage points. Hence, the second significant barrier that the New Democracy leader had to face was the incumbent prime minister’s wide acceptance and popularity. Contrary to Karamanlis, Simitis was perceived as a much more experienced, competent and credible leader. Most importantly, in order for Karamanlis to improve and thus, consolidate himself as a potential prime minister, he ought to eradicate internal opposition that undermined his leadership and authority and harmed the party image and electoral fortunes.
Figure 6.1: Party Popularity, 1997-2000

[Graph of Party Popularity from May 1997 to January 2000, with two lines representing ND and PASOK parties.]

Various Sources

Figure 6.2: Karamanlis Popularity, 1997-2000

[Graph of Karamanlis Popularity from May 1997 to January 2000, with data points and lines for different months of each year.]
As already mentioned the conflicts between the two main factions within New Democracy had haunted the party for most of the 1990s. This resulted in the party losing its political and ideological orientation but most importantly, in the disenchantment of the electorate. As Figure 6.1 shows New Democracy’s popularity ratings were at very low levels even after the election of Karamanlis in 1997. And despite the leader’s dynamic input, party ratings remained at very low levels and always well behind the respective ratings of the governing party. While looking strictly at the ratings, by the time that the election of 2000 was called, Karamanlis had not succeeded in radically changing the party image and people’s perceptions on New Democracy’s competence to govern the country; on the contrary, in various occasions the negative party dynamics had dragged Karamanlis’ popularity down. However, if one takes into account the broader political and electoral framework that had started developing since the election of Karamanlis, as well as the changes that altered the intra-party balance and relationships, it is evident that although New Democracy lost the 2000 election the party had come a long way. In the aftermath of the 2000 election Karamanlis and New Democracy had closed the gap with PASOK, while the electorate’s perceptions were gradually changing. Almost eight months after the election, Karamanlis ratings outscored the Prime Ministers in almost all categories; the leader of New Democracy was thought to be more competent to deal with the country’s major issues (Loulis, 2004: 53). Still, the closeness of the election outcome, despite disappointing for the party, was perceived as the leader’s personal victory and thus, consolidated Karamanlis domination within New Democracy (Ibid.: 33). Overall,
Karamanlis became the major asset of the party's campaigning and sole advocator of the official party policy. To this end, both the 2000 and 2004 general election campaigns were built around the personal appeal, status and integrity of the leader.

*The ‘Middle-Ground’ Project*

Nevertheless, Karamanlis most important input to the modernisation of the party was the ideological re-positioning of New Democracy through the implementation of the ‘middle ground’ project. Following the steps of the already successfully repositioned parties in the USA and Europe, the leadership of New Democracy prioritised the ideological renewal of the party as the means to reassert the party’s authority on the centre-right of the ideological spectrum and thus, to restore the party’s electoral fortunes. Therefore, drawing upon the strategies of Clinton and Blair but mostly, on the Spanish right-wing leader Aznar’s policy approach, Karamanlis designed his own ‘triangulation’ (Loulis, 1999; Loulis, 2004: 120). In line with the advice of his closest team of consultants, Karamanlis decided to redirect the party not towards the centre of the ideological continuum but beyond and above it. Focusing on the eradication of the dividing lines of the left and right (as his uncle and founder of the party had done in the 1970s), Karamanlis chose to overstep the strictly defined continuum and merge the traditional right-wing economic liberalism with a more traditional left-wing approach to social issues (Loulis, 2004: 120, 314). Within this new context, the leader aimed at capturing the volatile, centrist voters whose approach to politics was more pragmatic rather than ideological. At the same time, a party advocating economic liberalism could appeal to right-wing voters, while through moderation, pragmatism and social sensibility New Democracy was able to win the disenchanted centre-left as well as traditional leftist PASOK voters (Ibid: 121). Strategically, the repositioning of New Democracy was the most effective ideological approach of the party since its formation; in terms of communication, the renewed, increasingly moderate framework upon which the party started to build itself comprised the most effective way to appeal to the growing de-ideologised electorate. After all, as the advocate and one of Karamanlis’ most senior advisors John Loulis, denoted, the driving force of the effectiveness of triangulation had been the communications modernisation and professionalism; at the era of pragmatism, electoral battles ought to be won through the extensive use of communications rather than ideological appeal (1999: 98). To this end, the communications modernisation of the party was the required precondition for New Democracy’s ideological evolution.
The new party strategy was firstly presented by the leader at a special conference in December 1998 and since then the ‘middle ground’ approach constituted New Democracy’s main political orientation. But to what exactly did the strategy of the ‘middle ground’ refer? At his conference speech Karamanlis emphasised that ‘New Democracy is the party of the middle ground’ that ‘rejects political entrenchments, divisions and discriminations’, ‘wards off fanaticism, dogmatism, and yesterday’s rigidities’ (quoted in Pappas and Dinas, 2006: 484; Ta Nea, 1998, 14 December). He also underlined the party’s ‘opening to the entire society’ through the abolition of dividing lines, the adoption of the principles of solidarity and compassion, political morality and respect for all citizens, as well as moderation and prudence (Pappas and Dinas, 2006: 484). Overall, the framework of the new ‘middle ground’ strategy was entrenched in five pivotal principles (Bratakos, 2002: 794-5). First, great emphasis was given on the development of ‘human enterprise’ through the freedom of personal choices, initiatives and actions. The second principle stressed the importance of social solidarity and compassion. New Democracy was a strong advocate of economic liberalism but acknowledged that its success ought to be based on justice for all and protection from unfair competition. The third major principle that defined the ‘middle ground’ set the standards of political behaviour on moderation, prudence and political integrity. This new approach of political conduct marked a break with the polarisation and dogmatism of the past while signalling a new era of direct communication between the party and the electorate. As a consequence of the above, the fourth principle postulated the widest possible consent and cooperation on serious and moral grounds with respect for the citizens and political opponents. Finally, Karamanlis underlined that New Democracy had now grown beyond the dividing lines of the past – political and ideological (Karamanlis, 1998). Therefore, within a newly defined context, Karamanlis and his team designed the party’s ideological repositioning and communications renewal. As expected (due to the increased factionalism within the party), the new centripetal strategy was not accepted without some internal opposition (Bratakos, 2002: 796). To some the new strategy signified the end of the party’s traditional ideological profile, radical liberalism, and thus, expressed their discontent with the leader’s decisions. However, Karamanlis had already decided to lead the party to the ‘middle ground’ and opposition was soon silenced. The 1999 European Parliament elections served as a successful test-drive for the new strategy.

22 The 1999 EP election had taken the character of an official, nationally based public opinion poll for ND and thus, the party had aimed at assessing its strengths and weaknesses, its electoral appeal, the party grassroots level of alignment and mainly, the new party strategy of the ‘middle ground’ that Karamanlis had initially introduced in December 1998 (Bratakos, 2002: 815). Therefore, the party’s strategy focused on promoting its ideological re-launch through the promotion of a more human-oriented character of the neo-liberal approach and on emphasising the need for a series of structural changes and modernised policies. At the same time, ND placed great emphasis on the major issues that the public had to face such as unemployment, the ineffectiveness of the public
Nonetheless, it took New Democracy almost three years in order to emerge as the natural party of the ‘middle ground’. In fact, the consolidation of the ‘middle ground’ strategy took place in the aftermath of the 2000 general election at the party’s special conference on ‘Values and Principles’. At the same time, by the early 2001 the electorate’s perceptions on New Democracy’s repositioning had dramatically changed and there was an overwhelming positive response to the party’s renewal (Loulis, 2004: 125-126). By 2004, Karamanlis had succeeded in repositioning the party, updating the party image and restoring the party’s electoral fortunes.

Overall, the rise of Karamanlis to the party leadership seemed to signal the beginning of a new era of ideological reinvigoration and electoral revival for New Democracy. The personal appeal of the leader as well as his status within the party allowed for a number of changes to take place and alter aspects of New Democracy’s electoral character. These changes were gradual and meticulous but also, consistent and pragmatic. And despite the assertive intra-party opposition and the shortcomings that Karamanlis had to deal with, his project was soon to be vindicated when the party won a landslide electoral victory in 2004. The implementation of the ‘middle ground’ project repositioned New Democracy to the centre of the ideological spectrum where the founder of the party had originally positioned it, while at the same time created a third pole above the traditional left-right continuum. This gave New Democracy the opportunity to overcome the ideological barrier of the old, traditional ‘Right’ and the negative connotations of it, and appeal to the vast majority of the electorate. This also gave New Democracy an advantage to fight the 2000 election campaign. And despite the shortcomings that the leader had to face, the 2000 general election signalled the renewal of a party that three years earlier was on the verge of disintegration. While by 2004 New Democracy was the natural advocate of the ‘middle ground’, representing economic liberalism with a more pragmatic stance on social issues. Most importantly, New Democracy represented the needs and wants of a new and highly volatile, increasingly de-ideologised electorate. In strictly electoral terms, the 2004 general election win was a personal vindication for the party leader. However, a closer look into the party’s dynamics and underlying mechanisms indicate that Karamanlis as all his predecessor had chosen to compromise rather than implement radical changes that would allow the consolidation of the middle-ground project beyond the level of communications and marketing and render it vital element of the party’s political identity.

sector, taxation, crime and education (Bratakos, 2002: 811). The campaign was centred on the leader while the main party slogan was ‘New Beginning’.
The 2000 Election Campaign

The 2000 general election was the most controversial and volatile of the post-dictatorial era. The political environment, the most important national issues of the country’s entrance to the Euro zone as well as the new shape of public opinion – a change that had started in the early 1990s but was still to be consolidated – had rendered the voting habits of a large part of the electorate increasingly unpredictable. As a result, the 2000 general election portrayed some unique characteristics unknown to the Greek electoral landscape (Flessas, 2000). This was a trend depicted in all public opinion polls during the official campaign period that were unable to estimate which party would win the election (Papathanassopoulos, 2002: 86). Even on polling day exit polls failed to provide a rougher estimate; in fact, in the early hours following the close of the polls, New Democracy officials thought that their party had won the election while TV programmes broadcasted images of party activists celebrating New Democracy’s win. Therefore, within this broad nebulous electoral landscape of the large number of undecided, last minute voters, political campaigning was considered to play a considerable role in the election outcome (Vardoulakis, 2000). Subsequently, Karamanlis and his team of advisors aimed at capitalising on the volatile environment while planning and implementing a campaign that would correspond to the party’s renewed image as this was mainly depicted in New Democracy’s new ideological framework of the ‘middle ground’. Furthermore, the campaign itself was based on the epitomised principles of moderation, seriousness, unity, respect and prudence, which characterised the ‘middle ground’ approach.

When the election was called New Democracy was in a relatively advantageous position, particularly if compared with the party’s electoral fortunes in the 1993 and 1996 elections. On the one hand, four out of the six public opinion polls that were conducted over the last trimester of 1999 showed a New Democracy lead that ranged from 0.6 to 2.8 percent (Table 6.4). At the same time, New Democracy led PASOK at the 1999 EP elections by a 3.1 percent margin. On the other hand, New Democracy was lacking behind PASOK on issues of party popularity and best Prime Minister; while Karamanlis’ personal popularity ratings were high he could not outscore the popularity of the Prime Minister (Figure 6.2; Table 6.3). Therefore, while the voters indicated that they were willing to vote for ND at the forthcoming election, only 30.6 percent of the electorate believed that New Democracy would win the election; PASOK’s respective percentage was 52.4 (Ta Nea, 2000, 3 January; V.PRC poll). Most importantly, it was evident that PASOK had managed to overcome the government’s low performance records of the 1998 and early 1999 period and had already started developing an incremental dynamic able to lead the party to its electoral revival (Table
To this end, New Democracy had to greatly invest in the planning and implementation of a campaign that would entrench the positive, future oriented image that the party was in the process of developing and thus, increase the party’s credibility and competence ratings, while mildly but effectively, bringing to the surface the shortcomings of the PASOK government. This was a difficult task to plan, implement and mostly, to achieve.

Table 6.3: 2000 General Election - Best Prime Minister; Simitis-Karamanlis

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<td>Jan-00</td>
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Source: Ta Nea, 2000, 4 January

Table 6.4: 2000 General Election Voting Intentions – National Surveys of the trimester Sep – Dec 1999

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Source: Ta Nea, 2000, 3 January

Table 6.5: 2000 General Election Voting Intentions – National Surveys March 2000

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Source: Ta Nea, 2000, 24-26 March

When the PM called an early election, nobody was particularly surprised. In fact, New Democracy’s campaign preparations, at least at the leadership level, had already started since the early autumn of 1999. Given the successfully organised and

23 If the prime minister had not called an early election, the 2000 parliamentary election should have been held in September 2000 instead of April 9, 2000.
effectively implemented campaign of the June 1999 European Parliament elections, Karamanlis had no reason to change the already established in-house communications team, which consisted of his closest political friends and advisors. What is surprising, however, is that this ‘team’ consisted in practice, of two separate groups (an official and an unofficial one) of professionals and politicians, some of whom never met with each other. The only person who always participated in both groups was the party’s press secretary and Karamanlis’ closest and most trusted political advisor, Aris Spiliotopoulos. The leader’s official communications team or else the ‘morning coffee’ team consisted of the most prominent party cadres; Dora Bakoyianni, Vaggelis Meimarakis, Michalis Liapis, Prokopis Pavlopoulos and Aris Spiliotopoulos (Ta Nea, 2000, 5-6 February). The team held regular meetings - not at the party headquarters but at Karamanlis’ personal political office, located a few blocks away from Rigillis - to discuss party campaign strategy but their discussions were wrapped up in secrecy. Another peculiar characteristic of these meetings was that not everyone participated in all the meetings. That is, Karamanlis decided who, among them, was going to be present at the meeting and subsequently, nobody had an overall picture of what the leader’s plans were; a tactic that Karamanlis considered necessary so as to avoid potential leakage (Ta Nea, 2000, 5-6 February; To Vima, 2000, 13 February). However, it should be noted that while Karamanlis took notice of the team advise on various matters, he was the ultimate decision-maker of the party’s campaign strategy.

The second unofficial communications team, which was characterised as the leader’s ‘personal’ group of consultants, consisted of Aris Spiliotopoulos and John Loulis who was the chief communications consult of the leader. The team held its meetings at Karamanlis’ private residence and was considered to be the basic decision-making group of the party’s campaign planning (Ta Nea, 2000, 15 February). Close associates of the latter group were Dimitris Mavros and Giannis Kerasiotis, the directors of the advertising firm Spot Thomson that managed the party’s advertising campaign, while at a later stage, the advertiser Periklis Pileidis, a close friend of the leader was added to the team. He was mainly responsible for staging the party’s mass rallies and events; he was also the creator of the party ‘jingle’, ‘there is a better Greece and we want it’, that wrapped up the vast majority of the party’s TV spots (Ta Nea, 2000, 15 February; Ta Nea, 2000, 5-6 February). Finally, the party’s Central Election Campaign Committee that would manage the party’s broader communications planning was formed in October 1999 and during the election campaign period held daily meetings at Rigillis (I

24 This practical division of the leader’s communications advisors was rooted to the fact that John Loulis, despite his long, ad-hoc cooperation with ND, was not welcomed by the majority of the party cadres due to one of his statements in October 1999 that ND ‘was a faded product, but with a capable leader’. However, Loulis was the driving force behind ND’s successful communications campaign in the 1999 EP elections; moreover, Karamanlis was not willing to decline one of his closest personal advisors (Ta Nea, 2000, 5-6 February).
Kathimerini, 2000, 5 February). The Committee’s role focused on the organisation and coordination of the party’s campaign machine at the local level and comprised the main bridge of communication between party candidates and activists with the central party (Bratakos, 2002: 836-837). It is indicative that none of Karamanlis’ closest advisors participated in the Committee; rather the leader and his communications teams were to an extent, disengaged from the party organisation while the party grassroots had no influence on the decisions taken at the party headquarters (personal interview). In fact, structural and organisational setbacks comprised the major problems of the party’s 2000 campaign (Bratakos, 2002:869). Overall, the high level of professionalism and modernisation of the campaign rested on the leader and the party’s most prominent cadres.

Moreover, by the time the election was called New Democracy’s general campaign framework within which the party communications would operate had been already set up. Generally, two were the main issues and respective dilemmas set by the parties and left to the voters to decide upon; best Prime Minister and party fitness to govern the country. Both parties shared a considerable extent of the same centre-oriented platform as PASOK at first, and then, New Democracy had already adopted centre-oriented policies. Therefore, as both parties had repositioned themselves ideologically and re-branded as well as re-marketed themselves in political communications terms, the focus of the election battle moved from the ideologically polarised campaigning to issues of government management, credibility and competence (I Kathimerini, 2000, 12 March: 14). To this end, changing voter perceptions on Karamanlis ability to govern the country and on the New Democracy leadership team’s competence to handle both the national as well as social challenges that the country had to face ought to become the main axis of development of New Democracy’s communications strategy.

Nonetheless, to a great extent, for New Democracy the 2000 general election campaign strategy could be described as a reminiscent of the party’s 1999 European Parliament election campaign. Contrary to the party’s mainstream tradition of highly polarised campaigns, Karamanlis chose to implement a mildly oriented electoral strategy based on consensus politics, which he kept throughout the campaign despite the offensive and polarised strategy of the governing party (I Kathimerini, 2000, 29 March; I Kathimerini, 2000, 2 April). This tactic was also within the context of the positive future-oriented message that the party wanted to convey through its posters, TV spots and slogans, which were all signed with the call for a ‘new beginning’. At the same time, it reinforced the party’s developing image as the ‘calm power of the middle ground’ that Karamanlis had repeatedly proclaimed. The major aim of the
communications experts was on the one hand, to portray New Democracy as a radically renewed party that had broken its ties with the negativity of the past, while at the same time, and given the party’s ideological repositioning to the ‘middle ground’, to appeal to the wider electoral base of the centre-left and win PASOK’s disenchanted voters (I Kathimerini, 2000, 6 February: 8; I Kathimerini, 2000, 29 March: 4). The party’s second strategic goal endeavoured the re-integration into New Democracy of the political figures and splinter parties of the centre-right that had been created as a result of the vicious internal conflicts of the 1993-1997 period (Bratakos, 2002: 853; I Kathimerini, 2000, 6 February: 8). Therefore, Karamanlis shouldered the responsibility to convince Dimtris Avramopoulos (mayor of Athens), Stefanos Manos (founder of splinter party Neoliberals), Andreas Andrianopoulos and Antonis Samaras (founder of Politiki Anoiksi) to either re-join or openly declare their support for New Democracy. In the case of Antonis Samaras the leader put an immense pressure on him so as not to stand for election with his own party, Political Spring [Politiki Anoiksi], but rather to declare his support to and cooperation with New Democracy (I Kathimerini, 2000, 6 February: 8).

Another important issue that was greatly emphasised by party strategists related to party unity. New Democracy had to run its campaign as a united, future oriented party and to this end, the dissenting voices had to be eliminated; and given the recent history of the party, the implementation of such a project was difficult to achieve. At the leadership level, Karamanlis remained the undisputable decision-maker of party strategy and when disagreements arose then his response was prompt and unchallenged. At local level, the issue was resolved through consensus and compromise on behalf of the leadership; despite Karamanlis’ wish to exclude some of his critics from the candidate lists, he chose to compromise so as not to disturb the political balance that had been achieved over the last year. Finally, the communications team placed great emphasis on the party’s election slogans and image. They were aware that the time was limited for the party to alter the perceptions of the electorate and thoroughly convey their message of the ‘middle ground’ to the wider base of the median voters; thus, they focused on winning the battle of the campaign through the implementation of simple, straightforward slogans that would address the issues that the public considered important (the ‘problems of everyday life’). They wanted to enhance the party image and convey the message that ‘ND can do better than the party of Simitis’ (I Kathimerini, 2000, 6 February: 8). It

25 The main disagreements surfaced in relation to the party’s campaign and in particular, the slogans and TV spots. The so-called ‘barons’ team (traditional, old-fashioned politicians who had a long history within ND) openly expressed their dissatisfaction with the party’s communications tactics and more specifically, with the choices of the party’s press secretary Aris Spiliotopoulos (I Kathimerini, 2000, 12 March).
should also be mentioned that the Prime Minister was the focal point of New Democracy’s campaign strategy. In that way, New Democracy hoped to damage Simitis’ profile of competence and credibility while at the same time, promote Karamanlis’ profile as the human, caring, down-to-earth, young and visionary leader able to respond to the challenges of the future.

The New Democracy official campaign was launched on February 9th when Karamanlis addressed a party members gathering in Kallithea, Athens. Over the next eight weeks that preceded polling day, Karamanlis undertook the main responsibility of launching the party’s programmatic policies in his various speeches and public rallies that were organised throughout the country. The leader’s nationwide visits were adapted to the congressional meetings, which comprised the framework of the party’s special Conference on Values and Principles scheduled to take place in Athens on 17-19 March (I Kathimerini, 2000, 6 February). These congressional meetings gave the opportunity to Karamanlis to expound on the party’s policies while directly communicating with the party membership (Bratakos, 2002: 856-859).

However, the major event of the campaign was the Special Conference. The party strategists had laid great emphasis on the communications repercussions for the party’s image and Karamanlis’ credibility and competence. Although that the special Conference was initially scheduled so as to elaborate on the party’s renewed values and principles and consolidate the ‘middle ground’ approach, it was finally integrated into New Democracy’s electoral campaign to serve as a hidden asset for the party’s electoral uplift (I Kathimerini, 2000, 18 February). The Special Conference was a media-oriented event, which strictly followed the rules of visualisation; it was a spectacle that combined image, colour, sound but also ideological ramifications (Yannas, 2002: 83). On the one had, the conference was a very well organised ‘show’, as the leader of PASOK described it. Upon the entry of Karamanlis into the hall, the lights went off, the orchestra of Stamatis Spanoudakis performed on stage while TV spots from previous and current campaigns were displayed on the wall screens, one of which portrayed the founder of New Democracy, Karamanlis (senior) while he was signing the country’s entry into the European Community (EC). At the same time, the slogan ‘the time of Karamanlis has come’ was sung by the 5000 party members while Karamanlis (junior) went on stage (Yannas, 2002: 83; I Kathimerini, 2000, 18 February). Karamanlis reiterated that New Democracy was the ‘calm power of the middle ground’, the sole and original advocate of the centre-right that embraced all citizens while eradicating all dividing lines of the past (I Kathimerini, 2000, 18 February). Moreover, he denoted that New Democracy is more united than ever before, ready to fight and win the election as the ‘great liberal camp’ that embraced all
citizens and aimed to unite rather than divide the society. Karamanlis proclaimed New Democracy as the party of synthesis not of antithesis that moves above and beyond state politics (Bratakos, 2002: 863). Overall, the Special Conference allowed Karamanlis to consolidate his party as the ‘calm power’ of the middle ground with a social identity. Most importantly, the end of the Conference saw the party united under the common goal of an electoral victory (Ta Nea, 2000, 20 March; I Kathimerini, 2000, 19 March). The celebratory character of the conference combined with Karamanlis acute handling of the intra-party conflicting attitudes improved the party’s image to the wider electorate while had a reinforcement effect on its voters. And although there are no publicly available data on the actual impact of the Conference on the electorate’s voting intentions, a V.PRC opinion poll published a few days later showed that by the end of March New Democracy’s share of the vote had risen from 34.9 percent in late February to 37.3 percent. Simultaneously, the party’s grassroots alignment ratings were at a very high level of 93.8 percent (Ta Nea, 2000, 24-26 March). The party leadership was overwhelmed by the success of the Conference and in particular, by the overall attitude of unity that party cadres demonstrated. The main element of success however, rested on the fact that for the first time for over twenty years, New Democracy had organised a Conference that left behind the attitude of introversion and infighting of the past (I Kathimerini, 2000, 21 March).

New Democracy’s political advertising fell within the lines of the general campaign strategy of political moderation. The party strategists abandoned negative advertising, which had constituted the main characteristic of the previous campaigns, but rather chose to launch a series of positive and future-oriented spots and messages26. The main message of the TV spots stressed that ‘there is a better Greece and we want it’ - a ‘jingle’ performed by a (invisible) choir - while the party name was signed by the slogan ‘new beginning’. New Democracy’s advertising campaign was structured on two main axes. The first goal was to improve the image of Karamanlis as the socially sensitive leader who ‘listened’ to the people’s everyday problems and was capable of finding solutions27. Therefore, the spots used dramatisation to address the issues of

26 Whether ND ultimately engaged in negative advertising was a debatable issue. The affiliated to PASOK national newspapers accused ND party strategists of using negative advertising and ‘black propaganda’ in order to undermine the credibility of the governing party. In contrast to this view the papers supporting ND proclaimed the opposite argument.

27 The leader’s wife, Natassa Karamanlis, who was very popular among the vast majority of the electorate, played a major role in building of Karamanlis’ profile as the ‘human’, young, sociable, family-man profile of the leader (I Kathimerini, 2000, 20 February). In fact, the early extensive exposure of Karamanlis and his wife - given the Greek political communications culture and tradition - was indicative of the ‘over the top’ approach that the advisors of the leader had decided to implement; in a sense, it could be argued that they had ‘overcome’ professionalisation by trying to implement every single idea available in just one election campaign. Nonetheless, Karamanlis’
unemployment, health, education and crime, areas that Karamanlis and New Democracy had a better performance. The 30-second spots gave a racy account of the major problems that the Greek public was facing while stating that it was not realistic for a party that governs the country for almost twenty years to radically change its policies in four years. To this end, New Democracy proclaimed that Karamanlis and the party could ‘do better’; they could offer a ‘new beginning’ for everyone. All slogans and messages were chosen so as to target the working class, which was mostly affected by problems of ‘everyday life’ as well as the undecided voters (I Kathimerini, 2000, 16 February). The second aim of New Democracy’s strategy focused on castigating as unreliable the incumbent Prime Minister, Kostas Simitis, while at the same time promoting Karamanlis as the ‘anti’-Simitis, the only viable and capable but also more socially sensitive alternative to Simitis (Papathanassopoulos, 2002: 74). Karamanlis was portrayed as ‘one of us’ while Simitis was presented as the advocate of vested economic interests [Diaplekomena] (I Kathimerini, 2000, 20 February). Therefore, the majority of the spots portrayed images of everyday people (young couples, a pregnant woman, working men) who were disappointed, while at the background the voice of Simitis was heard to make promises – that he did not keep. The message of ‘new beginning’ was reinforced by the image of a new dawn and in one spot, the image of a young person switching off the TV when Simitis was giving a speech indicating that people wanted to forget the past and open a new leaf in their life (I Kathimerini, 2000, 26 March). In total, New Democracy aired 1111 TV spots during the period from March 1 to April 8 (Papathanassopoulos, 2002: 71-72). The respective cost was 2173,3m drachmas (6.38m euros) that corresponded to 63.8 percent of the party’s total advertising budget (Table 6.1). It should also be mentioned that during the 2000 campaign New Democracy implemented the latest and most advanced technological innovations for the production and launching of its campaign activities; these were applied to advertising but also the leader’s public speeches and the Special party Conference (To Vima, 2000, 13 February).

However, the most advertised communications event of the 2000 election was the leaders’ televised debate that took place on March 30. The leaders’ debate, which was introduced at the 1996 election, became a key component of Greek campaigning and comprised the focal point of the parties’ electoral strategy. The debate took place between the leaders of the two major parties in spite of the dissatisfaction of the smaller parliamentary parties and mainly, the Communist Party (KKE). As was the consultant, John Loulis, soon advised him to refrain from entertaining activities and focus only on interviews in magazines and newspapers (To Vima, 2000, 6 February).  

28 However, it was not only ND, which criticised the credibility of the Prime Minister; PASOK counterattacked during the last fifteen days of the campaign by launching a number of spots that portrayed Karamanlis as untrustworthy and unreliable. The spots closed with the slogan ‘he was wrong once again. Who are you going to trust’? (To Vima, 2000, 30 March).
case in 1996, the 2000 election debate adhered to very rigorous rules that were the outcome of the party representatives’ rough negotiations. To this end, the two leaders answered the questions of three journalists within a time frame of two minutes for each question; any form of dialogue between the leaders and between the journalists and the leaders was not allowed. The main idea behind the implementation of such strict rules, rested officially on the need to have civilised discussion; however, the main reason was that each party’s strategists and consultants wanted to stage their leader’s best performance and thus, reduce the possibility of unpleasant surprises (To Vima, 2000b, 30 March). However, the end result was based on nothing more than a series of monotonous monologues of the two leaders who repeated their electoral promises and manifesto policies (Papathanassopoulos, 2002: 62-63). Once again the high expectations of the advocates of the leaders’ debates were not met. Nevertheless, the debate of March 30 was watched by 2.3 million viewers (38.7 percent of the population), 12 percent higher than the first televised debate in 1996 (To Vima, 2000, 2 April). As expected, the debate, due to its strict format and lack of dialogue, had no winner. The next day’s headlines were totally partisan; the affiliated to PASOK newspapers argued that Simitis was the real winner of the debate while the New Democracy press stated that Karamanlis succeeded in outscoring his rival (Papathanassopoulos, 2002: 63). Only I Kathimerini declared boredom as the winner of the debate (I Kathimerini, 2000, 31 March). By contrast to the prominence of the leaders’ debate, the debates of leading party candidates comprised a daily phenomenon in Greek TV programmes, most of which were especially produced for the campaign period. The 2000 election campaigning was to a great extent, centred on the use of television as the main means of party/candidate-voter communication, at least for the high profile and ‘telegenic’ party candidates. Therefore, the regular appearance of the same candidates to the various talk-shows, round tables and panels, had led to the awkward phenomenon of ‘television pairs’ (To Vima, 2000, 13 February). This was a phenomenon that was instigated by the parties as well as the party cadres themselves, who did not accept an invitation to participate in a TV programme unless they regarded their ‘opponent’ to be at the same political stature as their own.

Overall, it could be argued that the 2000 election campaign was structured on one main theme; image management. Party strategists planned a moderate and clear-cut campaign so as to convey simple messages to the electorate and win the popular vote. The party was portrayed as the party of ‘social sensitivity’ while Karamanlis’ image rested on his down-to-earth, friendly approach that nonetheless, suited his personality but also contradicted the austere, rigid image of the Prime Minister (Yannas, 2002: 84-85). Emphasis was placed on the middle ground approach, as this was expressed
through pragmatism, political moderation, renewal and a positive view of the future. Within such a future-oriented context, the logo of the party changed from a torch to three doves (Yannas, 2002: 85). The image-oriented strategic planning was reconfirmed by the employment of Stefano Sartini, an Italian director of TV entertainment shows, who staged the party’s rallies in Thessaloniki and Athens. Nonetheless, a further innovation rested on the rally itself; the Athens mass rally took place at the Olympic Stadium instead of Syntagma Square (as the tradition demanded), and the leader’s speech was followed by a concert (I Kathimerini, 2000, 7 April). Some further significant features of New Democracy’s campaigning rested on the tactic of ‘promise everything to everyone’ (this is a widely applied strategy of vote-hunting in Greece, implemented by both major parties), the limited but incremental use of the internet, as well as the introduction of daily press briefings by the party’s press secretary (Ta Nea, 2000, 19-20 February; I Kathimerini, 2000, 29 March).

The nature and qualities of the New Democracy’s running of the 2000 election campaign indicated that the party leadership endeavoured to adapt to the changing nature of the Greek political environment and simultaneously, adopt the communications and marketing tools necessary to modernise the party image as well as its campaigning techniques. To a great extent, New Democracy succeeded in modernising its campaigning in 2000. However, did the party manage to professionalise its communications and if so, to what degree?

A closer analysis to the implementation of the party’s 2000 campaign raised some very significant shortcomings relative to the planning and execution of the communications strategy. The first drawback relates to the fragmentation of the communications operation that created three levels of decision-making; Karamanlis had the responsibility of the campaign strategy, as he was the one to take the final decisions. However, he was torn between two leading and also ‘rival’ teams; his personal team of consultants, responsible for the implementation of the campaign, the design and production of the posters, slogans and TV spots, and the official communications team of party cadres. At the same time, the Central Election Campaign Committee remained the central party’s focal point of conduct for the organisation and structural instigation of party grassroots. As a result, this fragmentation led to two main problems; first, the organisation of the party grassroots was inadequate and as a result the party machine unable to support the national campaign (Bratakos, 2002: 869). Second, the division of decision-making at the top level led to a two-tier communications machine and in various occasions, the decisions and actions of Karamanlis’ personal team were harshly criticised by the other group – the jingle and some of the TV spots created a temporary unrest during the official campaign period (I Kathimerini, 2000, 12 March;
I Kathimerini, 2000, 25-26 March). The second drawback of the campaign refers to the ‘paradox’ of putting ideas into practice. That is, despite the successfully orchestrated campaign themes, which concentrated on the issues that the government was most vulnerable to criticism, most of the spots created to convey the message failed to implement their purpose; they were one-dimensional, simplistic rather than moderate, and too ‘light’ for political advertising purposes (Bardoulakis, 2000; Pappathanassopoulos, 2002: 75; I Kathimerini, 2000, 25-26 March). Moreover, a lack of substance was particularly denoted in most spots. Although New Democracy had aimed at undermining PASOK and Simitis’ credibility through the exposure of the ineffectiveness and failure of governmental record, the party failed to portray their own programmatic policies; and when this was partially done, it was too late (Pappathanassopoulos, 2002: 75-76). Finally, it is debatable whether the audience that the spots targeted (working class/everyday people) corresponded to the group of undecided voters that the party ought to target in order to win the election (I Kathimerini, 2000, 25-26 March). Critics of the campaign had argued that in this regard New Democracy had failed to identify and effectively, address the needs of the undecided, last minute voters. Within that context, New Democracy ran a modernised campaign but fell short of running an acutely executed professionalised campaign. To this end, it demonstrated elements of a ‘modern’ type of campaign according to the Norris typology and a Stage II level of professionalisation based on Farrell and Webb’s framework, but did not completely fit into these categories. From a political marketing perspective and with reference to the Lees-Marshment model New Democracy’s 2000 campaign could be characterised as sales-oriented but build upon a market perspective at least in doctrinal terms. Moreover, in essence, as the first two stages of the party evolution framework demonstrated, New Democracy is not a party with a high degree of adaptation and thus, radical communications transformation and professionalisation would be difficult to achieve.

Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the campaign is hard to be documented. After all, the party lost its third consecutive election. However, this assumption in itself did not suffice to indicate that the party’s campaign was to fault. Contrariwise, it would have been a great surprise if New Democracy managed to win. The rivalries and introversion tendencies of the past were fresh to the memory of the public. The image and status of Karamanlis had cured a few wounds but more changes had to be implemented in order for the electorate to trust the party again. In general, already established public perceptions are difficult to overturn in a few months but rather it takes a considerable amount of time for the public to alter their political allegiances (Loulis, 1995: 420). In 2000, New Democracy succeeded in increasing its share of the vote by 5 percent compared with 1996. At the same time the aftermath of the
campaign, found Karamanlis’ leadership as well as the party’s middle ground approach consolidated in the conscience of the electorate. As history showed, the 2000 election comprised the decisive steppingstone for New Democracy’s subsequent landslide electoral victory.

The 2004 Election Campaign

Given the political and electoral climate that developed in the aftermath of the 2000 general election, New Democracy’s 2004 electoral victory was a foregone conclusion (Tables 6.6, 6.7 and 6.8 illustrate the dynamic of the party’s electoral appeal). However, what all opinion polls failed to predict was the scale of New Democracy’s win; and although that the landslide victory came as a surprise for pundits, politicians and journalists, the party’s voting share of 45 percent and its 5 percent lead over PASOK could be adequately addressed if all the factors of the 2000-2004 era were taken into account. New Democracy’s close defeat in 2000, which was signed by a successful electoral communications campaign, proved that the party had developed a political as well as electoral dynamic. This dynamic was gradually reinforced by internally and externally generated factors and events upon which New Democracy and its leader efficiently capitalised. First, the Karamanlis post-election course of action led to the legitimation of his intra-party authority while succeeded in consolidating his leadership status to the perceptions of the wider electorate (Loulis, 2004: 42). Second, the 2000 campaign succeeded in launching the party’s centripetal profile and breaking from the ties of the recent past of old tradition, parochialism and poplarism (widely used under the Mitsotakis and Evert leaderships) (personal interview). Both tendencies were encouraged by Karamanlis’ decision to call for a national Conference, which took place in June 2000. The officially declared reasons for the Conference were the approval and confirmation of the party’s new ideological framework and the renewal of New Democracy’s organisational and structural apparatus. In actual fact, Karamanlis used the Conference as a means to silence internal opposition and to entrench party unity (Loulis, 2004: 43-44). Furthermore, as the time progressed PASOK’s government faced a number of problems that rendered governmental policies highly unpopular and PASOK’s government management credibility in doubt. It is indicative that just eight months after the 2000 election, New Democracy’s poll rating were ahead of PASOK on questions of competence in the areas of health (by 3.5), unemployment (by 4.7), education (by 3.6), crime (by 7.3) and state management (by 1.7) (Loulis, 2004: 43). As a result, when New Democracy entered the 2004 general election campaign the party was in a considerably advantageous position, as it had build an electoral dynamic that PASOK seemed unable to overturn.
And although that the campaign was not critical in determining the winner, it did play a significant role in the formation of the final election outcome and New Democracy’s landslide victory (Mavris and Simeonidis, 2004: 32). In strictly electoral terms, the conditions and dynamics that New Democracy had to face prior the 2004 election are largely parallel to New Labour’s course in the 1990s. Both parties took advantage of the positive electoral and to an extent political, landscape that had been created, capitalised on the failures of the incumbent governments and successfully rebranded their electoral product. The main difference between the two parties as Chapter 8 thoroughly discusses rests on a set of intra-party political elements; that is, while both adopted communications and marketing tools and strategies, Labour’s higher adaptive capacity allowed the party to respond more successfully to the electoral demands by reforming elements of its political character while New Democracy failed to radically address and change elements of its political past.

Table 6.6: 2004 General Election – Voting Intentions (January 2004)

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<th>METRON 2004 10-14/01</th>
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Source: Eleftheros Typos, 2004, 2 February

Table 6.7: 2004 General Election – Best Government (January 2004)

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<td>41.8</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>38.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ND lead</td>
<td>-2.9</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>-3.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eleftheros Typos, 2004, 19 February

Table 6.8: 2004 General Election – Best Government (February 2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Poller</th>
<th>MRB 24/1-2/2</th>
<th>METRON 29/1-6/2</th>
<th>OPINION 2-10/2</th>
<th>MRB 4-10/2</th>
<th>ALCO 9-15/2</th>
<th>METRON 9-16/2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ND</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>39.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PASOK</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>40.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ND lead</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eleftheros Typos, 2004, 19 February
The main campaign period started on January 7, when the Prime Minister and PASOK leader announced his intentions to step down as party leader and set into motion all the necessary procedures for the election of a new party leader; an election contest took place on February 8 and George Papandreou, the then minister of Foreign Affairs was elected by one million voters throughout Greece. The national election was called for March 7. Therefore, the 2004 general election campaign was implemented on a remarkable for the Greek tradition political context; the leader of the incumbent party, who fought the campaign, was not the country’s Prime Minister. In fact, the latter, Simitis, decided to support Papandreou but quietly avoided to engage into everyday campaign politics. This unprecedented phenomenon caused an early upset at Rigillis headquarters but party officials chose not to alter the party’s main campaign framework (Eleftheros Typos, 2004, 3 February: 3; personal interview). For reasons of comparison, the examination of New Democracy’s 2004 election campaign is based on the same two-levelled framework used for the analysis of Labour’s 1997 campaign in Chapter 3; internal campaign management and general electoral context. The former analysis focuses on the examination of intra-party campaign dynamics that affected the preparation, planning, execution and management of the communications strategy, by emphasising the main campaign strategic goals, tactics and messages that were used throughout the election period. The later analysis refers to the externally driven events and issues that played a central role in the campaign process, and are mostly associated with the role of the media.

Internal Campaign Management

Broadly speaking, the 2004 election campaign fell within the general framework that was developed in 2000, both in terms of planning and implementation as well as decision-making and control. The auspicious election result in conjunction with the lead that New Democracy had gained in the polls by the early 2001 led Karamanlis and the party’s Central Committee to the decision to engage in a permanent form of campaigning. An important development was the appointment of Giorgos Souflias (Karamanlis main leadership contender, then expelled by the party and returned in 2000) as Secretary of Political Strategy and Policy Planning, responsible for drafting New Democracy’s manifesto, formulating the party’s campaign strategy in between but also during election periods and managing the implementation of the party’s strategic goals. At the same time, the so-called ‘morning coffee’ meeting at Rigillis was reshaped to an unofficial but substantially influential consultative committee of political strategy and communications\(^\text{29}\) (I Kathimerini, 2001, 17 November). In June

\(^{29}\) Members of this unofficial communications committee were the general Secretary of the Parliamentary party, D. Sioufas, the parliamentary representative, P. Pavlopoulos, the Secretary of
2001, Souflias presented the party’s renewed political discourse and oppositional line of action, while the leader as well as other prominent party MPs chose to barnstorm across the country in an attempt to further clarify and consolidate the party’s ‘new’ middle ground identity and advance their ‘governmental profile’ (I Kathimerini, 2001, 16 June; I Kathimerini, 2001, 17 June; I Kathimerini, 2003, 12 January). Furthermore, in the early spring of 2003, New Democracy started to gradually present sections of the party’s manifesto policies under the slogan of ‘state re-foundation’ (I Kathimerini, 2003, 15 February). Consequently, when the election was announced the party’s communications apparatus was already in motion. The formulation and implementation of New Democracy’s communications strategy rested on the Secretariat of Political Strategy and Policy Planning, the in-house team of party cadres whose role and importance within the party had been advanced under Karamanlis leadership. Formally, Giorgos Souflias and Thodoros Rousopoulos, the party’s press secretary shared the responsibility of the campaign management. The campaign team, which met daily at the Secretariat’s offices in Lykeiou Street, consisted of delegates from the secretariat of political strategy, the press office, media and communications consultants and delegates from the advertising companies that the party had enlisted to run its advertising campaign. The leader however, had the absolute control of decision-making and execution of the campaign strategy (Press Release published by ND; Eleftheros Typos, 2004, 10 February). However, a number of communications mistakes (i.e. economic programme ‘gaffe’) that were accredited to Souflias’ inadequate management, as well as his inability (according to his critics) to respond to the changing electoral needs following Papandreou’s election, jeopardised intra-party unity, and in particular, the relations between Souflias and Rousopoulos (To Vima, 2004, 10 February). In fact, Rousopoulos (under the auspices of Karamanlis) held a second daily meeting at Rigillis that comprised the unofficial communications team, which was under the direct control of the leader (Eleftherotypia, 2004, 10 February). Finally, the quantitative analysis of the campaign was held by the MRB polling firm while John Loulis conducted focus group based qualitative research.

the Central Committee, B. Meimarakis, the Secretary of Political Strategy and Policy Planning, G. Souflias, the press secretary Th. Rousopoulos as well as D. Bakoyiannis, M. Liapis, and S. Dimas (I Kathimerini, 2001, 17 November).

30 The formal members of the communications team were: Andrianos and Leivadas (from the press office), Sigalas and Georgiatselos (from the Secretariat). Souflias was the head of strategy planning and implementation while Rousopoulos was the communications director (Souflias statement published in Eleftheros Typos, 2004, 10 February).

31 Members of this second unofficial campaign team were (among others) the LSE professor and personal friend of Karamanlis, Christos Chadjiemmanouel, the statistician Panos Leivadas, the director of the Konstantinos Karamanlis Institute of Democracy, Konstantinos Arvanitopoulos, the press office delegate responsible for the foreign media, Christos Baltadoros, the lawyer and personal friend of Karamanlis, Dionysis Zakinthinos, the director of Karamanlis political office, Giannis Aggelou (Eleftheros Typos, 2004, 9 February; Eleftherotypia, 2004, 10 February).
As already noted above, by the time the election was called, New Democracy had already established the main framework of the party’s communications strategy, themes, messages and most importantly, the campaign’s course of action. Being able to build on the party’s re-branding as the ‘calm power’ of the middle ground, which by 2004 had consolidated in public perceptions, party strategists also focused on the endorsement of the renewed policy programme. In a broader sense, the campaign strategy of 2004 was based on the formulation of the respective strategy that almost won the 2000 election; however, this time it was more professional and well-organised. Given the close 2000 defeat, the primary electoral objective for party officials was to defend the party’s share of the vote – around 40 percent according to the polls – and the lead of 3 to 4 percent over PASOK, and second to absorb floating voters from the pool of the disenchanted left-wing supporters (personal interview). To this end, the campaign strategy was based on three main aspects. The first aim was to enhance the renewed image as the party of realism, acting beyond ideological lines and representing all societal and economic groups. Within context, New Democracy advanced a united political discourse that incorporated its neo-liberal as well as socially sensitive political discourse; the former tactic was used in order to win the votes of the business group who wished for economic development within the Euro zone, while the latter aimed at the common citizens, those of the lower economic and social strata in order to relieve their anxiety for the future but also, indicate that they could no longer rely on PASOK’s socialistic promises as these had failed (personal interview). Hence, the main message to convey was that New Democracy had been transformed to a ‘new’ moderate centrally oriented party, which regarded politics as a way to respond to the people’s concerns and solve the problems of society. Second, New Democracy’s campaign benefited from a future-oriented, positive and certainly, de-polarised approach. Therefore, the tone of campaign was moderate avoiding the ‘hard-rock’, ideologically polarised strategy that PASOK had tactically, implemented (Samaras, 2004). This ‘low-profile’ tone of the campaign raised concerns among some of the prominent party cadres, who believed that they had to attack PASOK and use the same ‘hard-rock’ strategy – a few actually, disregarded the leader and did so (Ta Nea, 2004, 17-18 January). In reality, by avoiding negativity and ideological polarisation New Democracy succeeded in detaching itself from the historical ‘Right’ and all the negative connotations this political identity instigated and thus, confirming its repositioning and enhancing its ‘middle ground’ profile. The final strategic aim of the campaign related to the role and personality of the party leaders. As already mentioned, Karamanlis remained the strongest political asset of the party (Dinas, 2008). His image incorporated attributes that the party was in desperate need to be associated with. Karamanlis appeared as the young, modern, modest, cordial, caring, citizen-friendly leader, able to connect with the public; in 2004 was also more
confident and prime-ministerial (Kassimeris, 2004: 947; Samaras, 2004). Most importantly, he served as the major instrument for the renewal and re-positioning of New Democracy and therefore, personified his party (Samaras, 2004). Nevertheless, New Democracy strategists did not run a strictly ‘presidential’ campaign and mainly, avoided the direct Karamanlis-Papandreou rivalry, a strategy that the incumbent party continuously attempted to add to the agenda. Hence, the message that strategists wanted to convey was clear; the focus was on Karamanlis and ‘his generation’ of politicians who would lead the political change of which the country was in desperate need (personal interview).

As already noted, in 2004 New Democracy refrained from negative advertising. The implementation of its strategic goals was based on clear-cut frames, which the party officials used to either promote the party’s own agenda or rebut accusations from PASOK. The campaign placed great emphasis on the needs and concerns of common people and on the party’s proposed measures to resolve the ‘problems of everyday life’. By highlighting the people’s disenchantment with the government and concentrating on the inadequacies and inefficiency of the enormous public sector, Karamanlis and his communications team seek to capitalise on the negative vote of the electorate (Samaras, 2004; Kassimeris, 2004: 947). Moreover, they indirectly drew attention to the inadequacy of the PASOK government and framed the election agenda to ND/Karamanlis vs. PASOK electoral rivalry rather to a Karamanlis vs. Papandreou competence contest (Eleftheros Typos, 2004, 3 February; Samaras, 2004). Nonetheless, the PASOK leadership contest that led to the election of Papandreou, who was very popular among the left-wing voters, shifted temporarily the agenda and public opinion in favour of PASOK (Figure 6.5). However, the shift was short-lived as New Democracy strategists by undermining the election, re-set the agenda to what they proclaimed as the ‘real’ issues of the campaign, the ones that needed ‘real’ answers (Eleftheros Typos, 2004a, 9 February: 11; personal interview).

Another significant piece of New Democracy’s campaign jigsaw was Karamanlis – personal - ‘honour’s agreement’ with the Greek people, which incorporated the forty-eight commitments of the next New Democracy government on the issues of unemployment, economic development for small businesses, health, education, tourism, pensions and social insurance, agriculture and farming etc (Eleftheros Typos, 2004b, 9 February: 4-5). Furthermore, Karamanlis ran the party campaign on a non-

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32 It should be mentioned that Papandreou led Karamanlis in the polls of ‘best prime minister’. This was mainly due to Papandreou’s ministerial experience and his successful term in office as a Foreign Affairs Minister. Nonetheless, by the end of the campaign Karamanlis succeeded in outscoring the PASOK leader (Figure 6.4).

33 The shortcomings of Papandreou’s communications strategy did also play a role on the shift of the agenda (Ta Nea, 2004, 11 March).
ideological context. He avoided using partisanship and ideological identification as parameters of the electoral battle but rather chose to engage in a normative-free discussion of realism and pragmatism; that is, issues and problems had to be addressed and solved regardless of the ends used (personal interview). Finally, the party’s communications team chose to use the frames of ‘vested interests’ and ‘regime-PASOK’ as a tool to rebut PASOK’s attacks but mainly, as a defensive strategy to Papandreou’s apologetic discourse (Samaras, 2004). Therefore, officials capitalised on PASOK’s long-term administration as well as on a number of scandals uncovered during the election campaign (Pactas amendment), and attacked (only through political statements not advertising or in the context of an official party line) PASOK’s ministers and MPs for having connections with vested interests [Diaploki] and for adopting an arrogant ‘regime-driven’ stance.

Figure 6.4: 2004 General Elections - Best Prime Minister, Karamanlis - Papandreou

The campaign objectives were accurately denoted through the themes and messages of party’s extensive media advertising campaign. The main campaign theme asserted that ‘the land needs political change’ and signed the name of the party in almost all posters, newspaper advertisements and TV spots. Secondary themes were also used either to target specific audiences or conceptualise the party’s strategic objectives. These included the call to ‘vote for those we love’, the promise of ‘new politics, better life’ and finally, the assertion that New Democracy was the party ‘for all Greeks’. Overall, the party’s advertising campaign encompassed a wide range of posters, radio spots, newspaper advertisements and TV spots. Totally, the eight outdoor posters were produced. Seven of those emphasised issues while the last one had a picture of Karamanlis on blue background featuring fractions of the Greek and EU flags and the message ‘For all Greeks’. The issue-related posters were grouped on those that included references on health, expensiveness, unemployment, education and addressed common people’s concerns featuring pictures of everyday people of all ages and signed ‘we vote for those we love’, while the ones referred on economic development, and values and principles such as meritocracy and transparency were on a ‘dark’ blue background and featured the message ‘For all Greeks’. Finally, the last poster prompted the electorate and especially, the young voters to ‘vote for political change’ on March 7.
The eleven radio spots that the party launched were also based on the themes and concept of the outdoor posters. The same strategy was followed with the theme and messages of the newspaper advertisements. The fourteen paper ads addressed common concerns (education, health etc), economic issues (small businesses, investments) and values and principles. Furthermore, an advertisement recorded the message of ONNED (party’s young organisation), a second focused on expatriate Greeks, a third was a call to the voters to vote for ‘political change’ and a fourth was a signed personal statement from Karamanlis. The last advertisement featured New Democracy’s pledges on measures to improve the citizens’ everyday life, the so-called ‘Charter of Everyday Life’. Finally, New Democracy produced thirty-three TV spots. The vast majority of those (19 out of thirty-three), which comprised the main phase of the party’s campaign, referred to specific political issues and contained the party’s covenant to address them while in government with specific policy measures, five spots used dramatisation to address political issues while the rest had references to PASOK. The latter opened with the dismantling of a green frame and the phrase ‘PASOK gave you all it had to give’. The statement ‘Greece is in need of a vision and new politics in order to progress’ was also used in some of these spots. Moreover, the spots that launched New Democracy’s campaign were less policy-oriented; they projected pictures from the most beautiful Greek landscape with the message ‘the land that we loved needs a vision’. The last phase of the TV campaign focused on Karamanlis profile projecting a vividness, decisiveness, responsibility and certainty in electoral victory. Overall, New Democracy’s advertising campaign had no negative connotations, but a positive and future-oriented approach aiming at inspiring and conveying to the public a vision for a better life. Most importantly, they successfully portrayed the image and philosophy of the renewed party; decisiveness, responsibility, commitment, and a sense of reality. On the financial cost of the party’s advertising campaign, as Table 6.1 shows, the total cost was 6130.1m drachmas (17.99m euros) while TV campaign absorbed 48 percent of the total advertising budget. It is indicative that New Democracy’s advertising expenses had almost doubled since the election of 2000.

Karamanlis was the major asset of the party’s campaign as he personified all that the ‘renewed’ New Democracy stood for and had gradually become the main agent of the party’s communication with the electorate. The leader was the major source of legitimation for the party’s political discourse and this became evident over the course of the campaign when a statement of Karamanlis was sufficient to settle disputes and misconceptions regarding his party’s policies (economic policy gaffe, social security,  

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34 Negativity, polarisation and ‘hard-rock’ politics were absent from the party’s advertising campaign. This was appreciated by the electorate that resented negative advertising (Ta Nea, 2000, 29 February). However, there were criticisms arguing that the campaign was too mild and flat for the Greek political tradition (I Kathimerini, 2004, 6 March).
infighting on communications strategy). This relationship of trust that had been developed between the leader and the electorate was underpinned by Karamanlis’ decision to barnstorm across the country (I Kathimerini, 2004, 9 February; Eleftheros Typos, 2004b, 9 February: 6). At the same time and in contrast to the 2000 strategy, party strategists prioritised the organisation of mass rallies in major Greek cities. Great emphasis was given to the rallies in Thessaloniki and in Athens; these two rallies had to be immaculately organised and staged in order to create an impression of success and victory (Ta Nea, 2004, 28-29 February). To this end, the mass rallies were stage-managed for TV coverage, while the latest electronic and visual technology was used. Furthermore, Karamanlis gave a number of interviews to the country’s most prominent journalists, two of which took place during the last week of the campaign, which was exclusively built upon Karamanlis personal appeal (following on the advertising conceptualisation of the campaign). A final ‘push’ to the advancement of Karamanlis’ profile as an internationally respected leader (an area where Papandreou as Foreign Minister led Karamanlis) came from the support of the leaders of the European Popular Party (EPP) who chose to denote their support to Karamanlis (he was elected as vice-president of the EPP) by holding their meeting in Athens instead of Brussels35 (Eleftheros Typos, 2004, 18 February). The end of the meeting found the European leaders declaring their support to Karamanlis and his party. The effective impact of the campaign on Karamanlis’ profile is indicated by the fact although Karamanlis ratings on the ‘best prime minister’ question were below Papandreou’s, as shown in Figure 6.4, Karamanlis succeeded in outscoring his opponent just three days before polling day.

In general terms and given the party’s landslide victory the 2004 campaign could be regarded as a very successful and effective political campaign. Nevertheless, New Democracy’s communications campaign was stigmatised by two major blunders and one fallacy. The first incident that raised serious reactions came about when the party’s economic policy programme was presented. A reference made in the programme that New Democracy tended to implement the social security reformation of the 1990-93 government (a very unpopular programme that had created a general upheaval within the Greek society and never materialised), resulted in the party being heavily attacked by PASOK and the minor parties, the unions and the media (Samaras, 2004; Ta Nea, 2004, 15 January). A more widespread crisis for New Democracy was avoided when Karamanlis explicitly stated that he did not intend to raise either the retirement age in the country or the workers’ contributions in state

35 The Spanish prime minister, Jose Maria Aznar, the Italian prime minister, Silvio Berlusconi, the Portuguese prime minister, Jose Baroso, were amongst the seven heads of government who publicly announced their support to Karamanlis and ND (Eleftheros Typos, 2004, 18 February; Eleftheros Typos, 2004, 20 February).
pensions (Samaras, 2004). The second ‘gaffe’ that also created negative reactions stemmed from the remarks of one of the party’s candidates who stated that the ‘ASEP’ process used for the employment of staff in the public sector should be abolished in order for ‘our (ND’s) children’ to get the jobs available (Ta Nea, 2004, 2 March). Officially, the party chose to formally ignore the issue (there was no official statement on the issue), but Karamanlis did reassure the public that New Democracy is a party for all Greeks and his government would refrain from any form of partisanship behaviour (Eleftheros Typos, 2004, 4 March: 5). The incident did not affect the party’s poll rating but the issue of ‘our children’ and/or ‘blue children’ haunted the party’s fortunes for some years afterwards. Finally, a third event that took place and was accredited to a New Democracy ‘black propaganda’ by the PASOK leadership, related to the circulation in churches around Greece of a leaflet, offensive to Papandreou with regard to his stance towards the Greek church. This incident led to a political turmoil where PASOK accused ND of producing and distributing the leaflet while ND accused PASOK as ‘agents provocateur’ (Eleftheros Typos, 2004, 4 March: 11; Eleftheros Typos, 2004, 4 March: 4-5). Another event that temporarily did affect New Democracy negatively but at the end, benefited the party electorally was instigated by Stefanos Manos and Andreas Andrianopolos (ND expelled neo-liberal cadres) cooperation with PASOK36 (Eleftheros Typos, 2004, 12 February). Nevertheless, as Figures 6.5, 6.6 and 6.7 demonstrate none of these events harmed New Democracy’s poll ratings indicating on the one hand, that the electoral dynamics had been based on the voters’ long-term political decisions, rendering PASOK’s efforts to change the electoral balance fruitless, and on the other hand, that New Democracy run a well-organised and professional campaign able of respond to the challenges that rose over the election period.

Another significant factor that needs to be taken into account when assessing New Democracy’s 2004 campaigning has to do with party unity and intra-party discipline. In terms of message and articulation, the 2004 campaign seemed to be the most discipline phase of the party as Karamanlis was in direct control of the leadership and communications teams. Nonetheless, in various occasions throughout the election period Karamanlis had to overcome internal criticisms and oppositional attitudes with regard to the formulation and running of the campaign strategy. In fact, his communications advisor and one of key strategists of Karamanlis personal communications team, John Loulis has argued that the leader had to fight two battles; one within his own party in order to implement the changes and strategic objectives for the party’s revival and the other against PASOK; the fact that he won the first one, allowed New Democracy to win the 2004 elections with a landslide (2004: 322).

36 This event caused an internal turmoil in ND but it was soon indicated that PASOK’s cooperation with the neo-liberal politicians harmed PASOK’s image instead of New Democracy’s.
Nonetheless, as already mentioned, the most significant factor to the party’s evolution process was that Karamanlis failed to entrench his authority and radically reform the party. As a result, his administration was based on compromise and failed to deliver the ‘middle ground’ project; as the detailed empirical analysis demonstrates it is no surprise that five years later the party is in exactly the same position as in 1993 – people are disappointed with Karamanlis and his government.\textsuperscript{37}

\textbf{Figure 6.6: 2004 General Elections - Election Winners}


\textsuperscript{37} As already mentioned, two year after his election in the premiership Karamanlis called for a snap election to be held in October 4, 2009. The latest polls published on Friday 18, 2009 clearly depict the deplorable position of the party. In more detail, according to the Public Issue poll, New Democracy’s share of the vote decreased by almost 6 percent since 2007 and a remarkable 10 percent since 2004, while Papandreou outscored Karamanlis in popularity for the first time since his rise to the PASOK leadership (33 to 32 percent). It is also indicative that 77 percent of the public believes that New Democracy has already lost the election (I Kathimerini, 2009, 18 September).
Electoral Context: Media and Agendas

The successful operation as well as effectiveness of New Democracy’s campaign was inextricably linked to and also affected by the wider electoral context within which the party communications strategy was implemented. The role of the mass media and in particular, the interrelationship between the media and political parties is currently examined as the major factor that provided the framework of campaign management. It has been already mentioned above, that over the last fifteen years the Greek media have gained a great degree of power over the political developments establishing themselves as powerful political actors rather than channels of political communication (Papathanassopoulos, 2000). The interplay between the media and the political party system has various characteristics and effects. Given the specifications of the theoretical framework of the evolution of communications campaigning (Stage III on professionalisation and adaptation) that the present analysis is based upon, two characteristics are examined; the agenda-setting interplay that affected the structure and content of political discourse and the context and effects of the televised leaders’ debate (visualisation and personification/presidentialism). Whilst it is not within the interest of this study to discuss the regulatory framework of campaigning it is important to note that by 2004 some sort of regulation had been
introduced on the campaign expenses of candidates (Eleftheros Typos, 2004, 13 February) and party TV advertising - in particular, in relation to the free airtime available to political parties - (Eleftheros Typos, 2004, 10 February: 11); nonetheless, as in previous elections there is no record of any kind on sanctions on the media or candidates who did not implement the law, as in practice was not possible to monitor political funding (Kotzaivatzoglou and Zotos: 2007).

The majority of the Greek press remains highly partisan, focused on promoting the interests of their affiliated party while harshly criticising the decisions and actions of their main opponent. In 2004, the total number of morning and afternoon national newspapers had risen to twenty-five daily and seventeen Sunday newspapers (according to the Athens Daily Newspaper Association), constituting an extremely large number considering the population size of the country. However, 75 percent of the total circulation size (Table 6.9) was delivered by six of the abovementioned newspapers; Eleftherotypia, Ta Nea, Ethnos and To Vima, which were affiliated to PASOK, Eleftheros Typos that pledged allegiance to New Democracy and I Kathimerini that was closer to New Democracy but its tone was much milder than the other partisan newspapers. Another important feature of the Greek political and media system has always rested on the high degree of loyalty of the press owners (some of whom have also invested in private television channels) to the party they are affiliated with. Within such a context, New Democracy had to run its campaign within a relatively ‘press hostile’ environment. In fact, in 2004 and with New Democracy’s electoral win in the offing, the PASOK press developed an extremely harsh stance towards the –then- opposition party. Nonetheless, the press had no other impact on voting behaviour rather than reinforcing existing attitudes and in particular, on inducing PASOK’s higher degree of voter alignment (Lamprinakou, 2005). What became very important however, rests on the role of the press agenda on the interplay between press, party and public agendas, and the extent of its impact on the formulation of campaign politics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6.9: National Circulation of Daily Newspapers</th>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELEFTHEROTYPIA</td>
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<tr>
<td>TA NEA</td>
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<tr>
<td>TO VIMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KATHIMERINI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETHNOS</td>
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<tr>
<td>ELEFTHEROS TYPOS</td>
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Source: EIHEA (Athens Daily Newspapers Owners’ Union)

As already mentioned, the issues that New Democracy focused its programmatic statements on related to the people’s everyday life (health, education, public sector,
pensions etc). To an extent, the formulation of the party’s campaign issue-related priorities was the outcome of thorough examination of public opinion surveys (Pappas and Dinas, 2006: 491). At the same time, John Loulis conducted a series of focus groups prior and during the campaign period offering a qualitative analysis of the wider political and electoral landscape (Loulis, 2004). Furthermore, the broader agenda-setting framework as this was shaped by the continuous interaction of the media(press)-public-party agendas was also considered as an important parameter to the campaign agenda formulation. Taking all three parameters into consideration, the closer examination of the New Democracy agenda through the comparison of the party’s manifesto as this was implemented prior to the beginning of the official campaign period and the issue-related press releases that the party issued during the official campaign period has led to two significant findings concerning the relation between New Democracy and press issue priorities\(^\text{38}\) (Lamprinakou, 2005). First, New Democracy’s pre-election issue agenda deviated considerably from the one that the party based his official campaign upon; in fact, by the end of the election campaign New Democracy had redefined its issue agendas to be consistent with the press agenda, an indication of the ex parte ND-press relationship\(^\text{39}\). Second, the correlation between New Democracy’s and public agendas prior to the election campaign was very weak; a post-election survey on the public agenda indicated a higher level of association but only in relation to the changes driven by the interaction of the press-public, press-ND, and finally, ND-public agendas. Therefore, New Democracy’s campaign strategists took into consideration the trends developed within the wider electoral context and adapted to them. To this end, New Democracy issued a large number of press releases in an attempt to respond to the issues of the campaign agenda. The fact that the party’s pre-election agenda as this was depicted in its manifesto did not correspond neither to the press nor the public agenda could be attributed to the fragmentation of the party’s communications teams and the infighting that had always characterised the party’s internal operation. The shift in the balance of power towards the leader’s communications advisors (Rousopoulos and his team) in early February marked a change in the party’s campaign politics with regards

\(^{38}\) The study is based on the analysis of the press, public and party agendas in the 2004 general election campaign. Although that the scope of the research was limited due to the narrow number of cases (4 newspapers), the circulation size, which corresponded to 55 percent of the total number of newspapers sold daily nationwide and the level of partisanship of the newspapers could manifest a clear indication of the dynamics of the interplay that had developed in relation to the agenda-setting context of the election period.

\(^{39}\) The analysis of the press agenda indicated that although there was an overall agreement between the four newspapers on the newsworthiness of stories (75 percent of all stories covered in all four newspapers corresponded to public concerns), the relative salience assigned to them is greatly dissimilar, rendering the ‘salience’ association between the different agendas weak. However, these findings could be considered indicative of the wider political landscape in Greece; high level of press partisanship (press acting as a propaganda machine), ideological convergence of two main parties (thus focusing on same issues / public’s common concerns), and press-party relationships (press absorbs a large section of state-related advertising).
to issue priorities; and given the data available this adjustment was the outcome of the party’s keenness to respond to the leading tendencies of the electoral campaign agenda as these were expressed through the press agenda. Finally, as regards the role of television on issue salience, a study of the content analysis of political talk-shows conducted by the University Institute of Applied Communication indicated that only 31 percent of the soundbites examined contained political information and issue related arguments, while 69 percent contained introductions, phatic communication and turn-taking struggles (Samaras, 2008b). Contrary to New Democracy’s advertising and daily campaign communications (press releases), which were extensively issue-oriented, television talk-shows and thus, the party candidates paid less attention to the promulgation of policies. However, it appears that although the media’s impact on the final election outcome has been disregarded, content analysis of the press showed that the newspapers did have an actual impact on the re-orientation of the party’s agenda during the final weeks of the election campaign (Lamprinakou, 2005).

The major media campaign event was the leaders’ televised debate. For a third consecutive election campaign the leaders’ debate took place ten day’s prior to polling day. The main difference from previous elections rested on the participation of the leaders of all minor parties represented in the Greek or European Parliaments. This was a suggestion forwarded by New Democracy within the context of the party’s attempt to depolarise the elections and to shift the balance of the debate from the Karamanlis-Papandreou context to party competence and credibility40 (Samaras, 2004). The format of the debate followed the strict rules of two-minute monologues of the previous ones, took place at the state television studios, lasted one hour and a half, and was simultaneously broadcasted on all private channels. Once again the bargaining between New Democracy and PASOK representatives that preceded the debate was tough but without substance; the issue of dialogue was never a priority for any of the two major parties (Eleftheros Typos, 2004, 24 February). The most important feature of the 2004 debate however, was the outcome; for the first time, there was a common agreement that the debate had an actual winner. In a post-debate question about the performance of the two leaders in the debate 47 percent of the respondents thought that Karamanlis did better; Papandreou’s respective share was 21 percent and 32 percent evaluated them both equally (Dinas, 2008: 513). The newspaper’s approach on the debate’s winners and losers was more or less expected; the New Democracy affiliated papers argued that Karamanlis clearly won the battle of issues and impression, while Papandreou failed to respond to the challenge and

40 And whilst PASOK that followed an exact opposite strategy, initially rejected the idea of minor parties participating in the debate, Papandreou later on, reversed his decision.
answer the people’s concerns (Eleftheros Typos, 2004, 27 February; I Kathimerini, 2004 27 February) while the ones affiliated to PASOK adhered to a moderate approach arguing that the debate was boring but Papandreou managed to raise to the challenge (Eleftherotypia, 2004, 27 February; Ta Nea, 2004, 27 February; To Vima, 2004, 27 February). Another factor that might be indicative of the debate’s positive impact on Karamanlis, was his subsequent lead over Papandreou in the question about the best prime minister (Figure 6.4). Nonetheless, the debated did have an effect on undecided voters and given New Democracy’s election outcome one could speculate that was partially attributed to Karamanlis debate performance (Dinas, 2008: 513).

Up to now, it has been argued that in 2000 New Democracy made a remarkable communications leap. The leader and his team(s) of communications consultants planned and ran a modernised, increasingly popular campaign, within the context of ‘modern’, ‘moderately professional’ and ‘sales’ based conceptual standards used for analysis here. Nevertheless, the impetuous adaptation to and adoption of marketing and communications techniques proved incapable of winning the election for the party. Nonetheless, it provided the groundwork for the party’s electoral landslide four years later. In 2004, New Democracy ran possibly the most – electorally - effective campaign of the party’s electoral trajectory. The planning and formulation of the campaign strategic objectives, themes and messages were comprehensive and thorough. In terms of communications, New Democracy followed the ‘middle ground’ approach and defined its image above and beyond the traditional left-right ideological continuum and thus, promoted a new ‘physiognomy’ (Loulis, 2004, 132). Simultaneously, the party by keeping a moderate approach succeeded in overcoming the trap of polarisation, and thus, distancing itself from the negative connotations of the traditional ‘Right’ and the damaging for the party, record of 1990-93 administration. Following the above analysis of party campaigning over time, it is rather evident that in 2004 New Democracy formulated and executed the most professional campaign in the party’s history. However, the question that still needs to be addressed relates to the degree of the party’s campaign professionalisation; most importantly, did New Democracy transform to a market-oriented, post-modern highly professional political party?
6.4 Discussion

Karamanlis’ election as party leader in 1997 gave a new impetus to the party’s development. The bitter internal disputes and lack of effective and mainly, decisive leadership had led New Democracy to the verge of disintegration. To this end, the new leader had a very difficult task to achieve; to end the vicious infighting and re-unite the party, and lead it to electoral victory. However, if Karamanlis aspired to achieve the later, he ought to create a united (or the illusion of a united) party. Subsequently, in the first two years of his leadership progress was slow but rather decisive. Only in the aftermath of the 2000 general election and New Democracy’s close defeat Karamanlis managed to consolidate his leadership, impose his authority and thus, set off an incremental process of changes within the party. These changes addressed the chronic deficiencies that had plagued the party for almost two decades: ineffective organisation, leadership deficit and party image (Pappas and Dinas, 2006). Concurrently, the leader renewed the party’s ideological framework and modernised the communications operation at Rigillis.

Stage III: Encompassing Professionalisation

New Democracy as Election Campaign Communicator

Up to now the analysis has addressed New Democracy’s electioneering through the examination of the characteristics of the campaigning process. This section looks more closely at New Democracy’s 2004 election campaign characteristics that defined the party’s identity as an Election Campaign Communicator. Within the context of the Party Evolution Framework (stage III), emphasis is given to two main parameters; first, the party’s degree of communications professionalisation, as part of a party’s ‘encompassing professionalisation’, and second, the party’s level of adaptation. The dynamics of the role of the interdependent relationship of the two characteristics as well as the interplay between their relative degrees on the effectiveness of the election campaign and impact on the electoral fortunes of a party have been already stressed in previous chapters. Therefore, the initial focus at this stage is on the examination of the 2004 campaign under two axes: through the classification of its political marketing orientation on the one hand, and the analysis of the level of the party’s professionalism, on the other.
In political marketing terms, New Democracy’s marketing orientation is examined under JLM’s framework of product-sales- and market oriented political parties (2001a, 2001b). The implementation of political marketing techniques at all stages of the party’s campaigning process was an integral feature of New Democracy’s centrally controlled strategy in 2004. The party enlisted professional consultants and polling firms to formally and informally conduct public opinion surveys and a series of focus groups conducted by John Loulis fed the party with the qualitative analysis of the electoral landscape. The design of the product was greatly influenced by the trends in the public opinion (ND’s repositioning, an issue oriented campaign built upon the public’s concerns). This citizen-focused renewal was further implemented by the renewal in the party’s candidate lists, changes in the formal role of the mass organisation (though the outcome of the actual impact of the mass organisation in campaigning is debatable), but most importantly, the professionalisation of the communications team that was strictly built upon and controlled by the leader comprised strong indications of the party’s market-oriented approach. In terms of product adjustment, New Democracy followed a moderate and pragmatic approach in its political advertising and official party pledges, however, once again the 2004 was characterised by an overwhelming competition of ‘promises’ between the two main parties. And although Karamanlis’ formal message urged for moderation, ‘modesty’ and ‘humility’, the leader did occasionally ‘promised everything to everyone’ (mainly in terms of substantial increases in pensions, wages, welfare and unemployment benefits) rendering ineffective the achievability and delivery process.

As already noted, Karamanlis did face some internal reaction from party traditional cadres over the implementation of the communications strategy and some disputes did appear between the political and professional branches of the party’s campaign team. Nonetheless, the new image of New Democracy as the ‘calm power of the middle ground’ had consolidated in public perceptions allowing the party to effectively rebut PASOK’s ‘traditional Right in disguise’ allegations, while exploiting the shortcomings of the incumbent’s party governmental record. The successful implementation of the campaign strategy was entrenched by Karamanlis, whose decisive response to the isolated cases of internal dispute safeguarded the unity of the party at the top level. As expected, the communications strategy was tightly run and totally controlled by the campaign team(s) located at the central party headquarters. Karamanlis immaculately delivered the communications strategy of the party while his personal competence

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41 An attempt to implement the JLM market-orientation model in the Greek parties was documented by Kotzaivatzoglou and Zotos (2007). However, the general framework of analysis falls within the strict lines of the JLM model and thus, is not debated, I tend to disagree with some of analytical findings of the authors who focus on the implementation of campaigning without considering the process or dynamics of decision-making.
ratings, as ‘best prime minister’ was gradually cultivated (Figure 6.4). The election campaign was carefully planned and despite a couple of ‘gaffes’, which had no electoral impact on the party, it was well-organised and executed, leading to the party’s electoral landslide and to a swing form PASOK of 12 percent (Figure 6.8). However, New Democracy failed in delivering what it promised and as the latest opinion polls indicate the party is facing a considerable electoral setback in the next election.

*Figure 6.8: 2004 General Election – Vote Swing (Exit Poll)*

Source: Metron Analysis: Exit Poll March 7, 2004
Overall, the New Democracy 2004 general election campaign fits the majority of the market-oriented framework criteria but with a number of significant shortcomings. First, there is ample inconsistency between the product design and the delivery stage. Second, the mass organisation’s level of involvement in the campaign was weakened despite the constitutional changes that provided the grassroots with more participatory powers in decision-making, rendering the product-design phase deficient. Finally, the running of the campaign was built upon and executed with a two-tiered structure in mind (national and local) without the two being substantially interrelated. To this end, New Democracy drew very close to meeting the characteristics of a market-oriented party - whilst it is beyond doubt that is not a sales-oriented party - but has failed to actually transform to a market-oriented political party.

From a political communications perspective, the party’s campaign characteristics are addressed within the context of campaign organisation using the Norris (2002) typology while the use of the Farrell and Webb stage-oriented professionalisation framework provides a more party-focused approach. The analysis of 2004 campaign featured a number of characteristics that appeared to mark the party’s shift to the post-modern era of campaign communications. The campaign was centrally coordinated and organised, and controlled by the leadership and his closest advisors. The campaign management was also reinforced by a number of constitutionally defined new bodies and units; at the same time, informal teams of professional media
consultants and opinion pollsters were enlisted to conduct regular opinion polls, surveys and focus groups. Furthermore, a few months after the 2000 election campaign, the leader engaged in a ‘permanent form’ of campaigning. An important feature was the substantial increase in the costs of the campaign. According to the formal party financial records, New Democracy spent a total of 18.5 million euros, 21 percent of which spent on press advertising, 15 percent on public relations and communications services while an overwhelming 47 percent was paid to travel agencies for the drift of voters to the towns and villages where they were registered (National Gazette, 2004, 30 November). As already noted, the campaign was controlled and coordinated at the national level but local coordination was limited; local campaigning operation rested mainly on the activities of local candidates and to a lesser extent on local party branches that lacked the financial resources to support a locally oriented campaign (personal interview). At the same time, the mobilisation of the grassroots was limited and focused on the support of certain local candidates. In general, New Democracy’s campaign was definitely modernised and professional at least at the top level; on the one hand, the party adapted to the mediated form of campaigning, responded to the voters’ demands and addressed the trends of the new de-ideologised electorate. However, the party failed to follow a substantial top-down communications approach and integrate local campaigning into the party’s professionalised planning.

Within the context of technical, resource and thematic developments as these are expressed in the Farrell and Webb (2000) model, New Democracy’s campaign organisation has some of the attributes of the third stage of professionalisation but as in the Norris analysis, do not fulfil the whole range of criteria. Technically the party campaign was highly professional. Great emphasis was given on direct targeting, political advertising became the central focus of the campaign while the use of public relations professionals was extensive especially, at the leadership level. At the resource and thematic levels however, the party’s campaign demonstrated features that went across the lines of the three stages. The campaign communication, which was solely based on a ‘catch-all’ strategy, was marketing-oriented but also had selling elements; that is, while the formulation of the policy and the repositioning process of the party did respond to the wider electoral context and the changing demands of the electorate, the implementation process was based on selling, especially as the party did not wished to alienate its traditional supporters. Furthermore, despite the mass rallies and

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42 This is a traditional way of increasing party alignment and ensuring that party supporters turn out to vote. The party and/or candidate pay for the travel expenses of their voters. This is due to the nature of the electoral record system. All Greek citizens aged 18 are registered to vote in the town/city where their family records are held. These records are permanent and change only after a formal declaration from the voter.
the leader’s extensive tour of the country, the campaign was mediated; political talk-shows, round-tables and one-to-one interviews, as well as political advertising comprised the focal point of the campaign. Nationalisation and centralisation, employment of professionals to assist rather than substitute the politicians who remained in charge, and the large number of formal and informal quantitative and qualitative analysis were the main resource characteristics of the campaign.

As the analysis of the three frameworks demonstrates, overall, New Democracy implemented a modernised, well-organised and coordinated, professional campaign but in all three cases failed to reach a high degree of communications professionalisation, mostly with regard to issues of decentralisation and/or fragmentation of campaigning. Overall, New Democracy’s communications campaign was largely structured on two loosely related levels: the national campaign, which shows a relatively high degree of professionalisation and the local campaign that rests on the hands of local candidates with the sporadic and limited support of central party organisation, mainly in order to ‘stay on message’ (personal interview). The nature of competition due to the multi-member constituencies, the tradition of the Greek political culture, which instigates the clientelistic relationship between candidate and voters, the lack of financial resources at the local level (candidates finance their own campaigns, and local parties have very limited financial support from the centre) create a two-tiered structure upon which the party’s campaign is formed. To this end, the degree of professionalisation of local campaigning, within the context articulated by either the Fordist/Post-Fordist (Denver, 2002) framework or the Fisher and Denver (2008) typology is weak. In fact, most of the characteristics of local campaigning fall within the first stage of the Fisher and Denver framework; short-term planning, labour intensive, voluntary activity and use of traditional party bureaucracy, mobilisation of voter of supporters, feedback based on canvassing and on the candidates’ personal contact with voters, while leader visits are not target-seat focused (personal interview). A successful local campaign is extremely important for the election of candidates; but still, candidates who succeed in appearing on national television programs have an added advantage over their competitors (personal interview). Therefore, regardless of the shift toward professionalisation at the national level, campaigning at the local level has not been integrated into the modernisation project of the party. The main focus was merely on keeping the local candidates ‘in tune’ with the leader’s message through daily briefings in the form of text messages (personal interview).
New Democracy through the Party Evolution Approach: A brief Overview

Up to now, the examination of the progression of New Democracy’s campaign and the analysis of the communications operation of the party within the framework of the evolution approach have indicated that in 2004 New Democracy ran a modernised and highly effective campaign. In many respects, the campaign integrated many of the attributes of a professionalised political communications campaign. Nonetheless, the detailed examination of the campaign attributes showed that the party failed to transform to a highly professionalised and/or market-oriented party. In fact, the 2004 campaign has characteristics that cut across the defined boundaries of all existed models. The party’s degree of adaptation relates to and also, justifies New Democracy’s inadequacy to fully adapt to the requirements of ‘encompassing professionalisation’.

As already noted above, the degrees of professionalisation and adaptation are interrelated. When Karamanlis became leader, he introduced a number of changes that altered the electoral identity of the party and reversed the negative image of New Democracy. Within this context, the party did partially adapt to the political and socio-economic challenges of its environment. And although Karamanlis succeeded in formally, imposing himself on the party in the perspective of an electoral victory, he chose to tactically keep the balance between the two conflicting leadership groups, rather than impose radical changes that might have led to the party’s fracture. For New Democracy a high degree of adaptation was related not with organisational and ideological changes but with party unity at the leadership level, which in practice, was never achieved. Therefore, the inability of the leader to ‘control’ the party cadres and so-called ‘barons’ limited the degree of the party’s adaptation and played a major role in the lack of a high degree of campaign professionalisation. The latter was also concomitant to the fact that professional communication consultants were employed to advice rather than to plan and implement the party’s campaign, which rested on the hands of politicians. Hence, the disunity that characterised top-level intra-party relations and even led to the formation of two different (formal and informal) communications teams, hindered the party from fully evolving into an Election Campaign Communicator.
6.5 Conclusion

For New Democracy the 2004 electoral win was a foregone conclusion. The ideological and communications modernisation of the party in conjunction with the electorate’s tiredness of the long-term administration of the incumbent party and their generalised desire for political change (Figure 6.9), had provided the framework for the party’s electoral victory. What everyone had failed to predict, was the extent of this victory as the final result gave New Democracy a double lead over PASOK than that predicted by the opinion polls, rendering the party’s return to government to a landslide electoral success. The extent of the party’s win was remarkable if one considers that eight years earlier New Democracy was on the verge of decomposition. Vicious internal disputes between the two dominant factions had led the party into disarray and had estranged even the party’s loyal supporters. Karamanlis accession to the leadership put the basis for the gradual but also, strenuous renewal the party was in a desperate need of. To this end, Karamanlis succeeded in eliminating internal party disputes and the politics of introversion that had torn the party in the past and thus, to win the 2004 general election.

Karamanlis acknowledged that for the party to be electable again major changes ought to take place at various levels. His main focus of attention rendered on three main fronts; image of the party (unity) and of leadership, ideology and policy, communications and marketing. Given the party’s factionalist character, the first task was difficult to achieve and thus, party unity was founded on compromise and consensus between the two rival echelons. The improvement of the party’s image was strongly associated with the image of Karamanlis; in fact, the leader operated as the main instrument for his party re-branding by gradually conveying his positive attributes to the image of New Democracy. The ideological repositioning of the party was extremely successful. By 2004, New Democracy was established as the party of the ‘middle ground’, standing beyond the ideological divisions of the past and above the left-right continuum. Karamanlis followed a consistent moderate, centripetal strategy, oriented on pragmatism, social sensibility and governmental competence that were addressed to the entire society. The party’s policy implementation was focused on non-ideological issues, on the issues and problems of ‘everyday life’ that constituted the public’s main concerns. However, New Democracy’s 2004 electoral success was also partially attributed to the modernisation of the party’s communications operation. The employment of professionals to advice on the planning and formulation of the campaign, the implementation of qualitative and quantitative research into the campaigning, the shift to a ‘permanent campaign’ in the
aftermath of 2000 elections, but mostly, the leader’s direct control of the campaign strategy rendered the 2004 campaign onto the most professional and effective communications operations in the party’s electoral trajectory.

Unquestionably, Karamanlis succeeded in transforming the party’s electoral dynamic and led it to an unprecedented victory. However, did Karamanlis transform the party’s communications machine? It is rather evident that his presence reinforced the party’s professional organisation at the leadership level. The team that formed the ‘president’s men’ employed the latest methods and technological innovations in order to communicate effectively the party’s newly acquired characteristics. The main focus of the 2004 campaign rested on the leader’s confident and prime-ministerial image as well as on an issue-oriented, specifically targeted on the ‘common people’ advertising campaign. At the national level, the media-oriented campaign was professionally formulated and executed. However, there was a great degree of inconsistency between the national and local campaigns. The Central Election Campaign Committee overtook the responsibility of coordinating and supporting the organisation of local campaigning but the whole operation was rather disentangled from the planning of the national and leader-focused campaign. The party strategists failed to integrate local campaigning into the national communications operation and therefore, limited the scope of the party’s professionalisation and adaptation as the analysis of the previous section demonstrated. To this end, Karamanlis succeeded in modernising the party’s campaigning but failed to implement the radical changes that were essential for the party’s ‘encompassing professionalisation’.

Nevertheless, an important issue to consider when examining New Democracy’s campaigning and communications evolution over time is the wider Greek political and social framework that the party operates in. That is, Greece showed a distinct pace of development even in the area of communications and campaigning. The main driving force behind the modernisation of political campaigning derived from exogenous rather than endogenous to political parties factors. It was not the need of competition or catching-up with their opponent that drove New Democracy (or PASOK) to alter the way of communicating with the public; rather it was the rapid change of the communications environment emanating from the deregulation of the broadcasting media and the rise of private television channels that conquered the social, economic as well as the political evolution in Greece. Parties had to adapt to the new media by adopting new, more professional and modern ways of campaigning and communication. As a result, the modernisation of campaigning in the country did not fall within partisan lines; it was led by the empowerment of the media and most importantly, the development of television to a major political actor. Therefore, as a
result of the exogenous nature of the communications modernisation the change was not deep-rooted. As already noted New Democracy did modernise and to an extent, professionalised its campaigning but failed to radically transform its communications apparatus. Though still in government today, New Democracy faces a considerable electoral defeat in the forthcoming general election (October 4, 2009); as current poll data, presented earlier in this chapter, indicate, the party failed to deliver in government and mainly, lost its appeal to the middle ground voters, an indication of the possible ad-hoc character of the changes implemented a few years earlier.

The following chapter offers a more detailed analysis of the intrinsic characteristics of the party’s development under Karamanlis’ leadership with the further examination of its degrees of professionalisation and adaptation, and thus the party’s level of ‘encompassing professionalisation’. The aftermath of the 2004 general election led a number of pundits, journalists and communications professionals to argue that New Democracy’s victory had put the basis for the party’s long-term political and governmental ascendancy. A few accounts also attributed this assumption on the fact that Karamanlis had founded a ‘new’ New Democracy. By considering the historical trajectory of the party’s founding principles, ideological redirection and organisational development, the discussion of the next chapter focuses on the interpretation of the Karamanlis’ (junior) era, within the context of the evolutionary process of party adaptation as addressed by the Party Evolution Framework, in an attempt to demonstrate the reasons that render the abovementioned assumptions inept.
Chapter 7

Interpreting New Democracy through the Party Evolution Framework

7.1 Introduction

The previous chapters have presented a detailed analysis of the party of New Democracy within the framework of the Party Evolution Framework in a systematic attempt to identify the party’s unique traits and dominant characteristics that marked the development of the party’s political identity. These formative internal characteristics in conjunction with a number of externally driven factors, mainly socio-economic and political in nature, defined the party’s ideological advance and organisational trajectory for almost thirty years. Most importantly, they entrenched the party’s political brand and electoral behaviour especially, in the post-Karamanlis era (1980 onwards). Among all these characteristics that New Democracy either developed over the early years of its founder’s dominant and authoritative leadership or inherited from the pre-dictatorial traditional ‘Right’ via the considerable number of ex-ERE members and party cadres, the most prominent feature of New Democracy’s partisan and widely political identity centred on the decisive, paternalistic and overly imposing role of the leader in particular, and of the leadership elite in general. For the leader to convey personal attributes to his party image is indicative of any good leadership. However, as will be shown later in this chapter, the complete personification of New Democracy’s political character hindered its development and damaged its electoral appeal. In addition tendencies of parochialism, and repudiation as well as fear of anything modern and innovative that characterised the party attitude for almost twenty years, marked its evolution process, which was belated and had no natural cohesion or consistence. The ideological, organisational and communications renewal of the party was slow and gradual; but most importantly, it was hindered by the inability of the parliamentary party and the leadership to realise the rapid changes in the social and political life and thus, effectively respond to it. The culture of introversion and compromise hindered all attempts towards modernisation and radical transformation.

One of the main issues of debate that arose in the early years of the party’s formation and marked the studies on the ideological and political character of New Democracy refers to the party’s origin. Most specifically, two main tendencies have emerged in the literature regarding the political identity of the party. On the one hand, there were those who adhered that New Democracy was the political continuity of the pre-dictatorial traditional ‘Right’ and thus, the party of ERE under a new name (Katris, 1975). On the other hand, there were those who counterattacked this approach, and
argued that New Democracy was a new party that had nothing in common with ERE and mostly, with the traditional ‘Right’ (Lamprias, 1977; Kallias, 1977). However, none of this approaches depicted the political identity of the party’s formation as they included a high degree of partisanship in their documentation; the former were harsh critics of Greek conservatism while the latter were prominent supporters of Karamanlis and his political discourse and thus, applauded his efforts without any sort of critical evaluation (Alexakis, 2001b: 1-5). Nonetheless, as later studies on New Democracy demonstrated ND and ERE had been closely linked in both qualitative and quantitative terms (Pappas, 1999; Alexakis, 2001b). Given that Karamanlis was the founder of both political organisations, this could be regarded as a truism rather than a simple assumption. What is indicative however, lies on the fact that the party developed characteristics relative to the ones of the pre-dictatorial ERE in the aftermath of Karamanlis retirement from the party leadership and his appointment to the country’s presidency. As will be demonstrated later in this chapter, it was the party cadres who in the post-Karamanlis era formed the party’s right-wing ideological positioning, while in essence, re-branding the centre-right political organisation that the founder aimed at consolidating. To this end, it is true, that New Democracy adhered for the most part of the post-junta era, the mere representative of conservatism and right-wing ideology in the country, and was widely perceived as the contemporary and modern advocate of the ‘Right’. Within the same context, there are studies on New Democracy’s internal affairs and mainly, on the chronic crisis of the party and the role of conservative right (Seitanidis, 1997; Voultepsis, 2005). Finally, a series of contemporary studies on New Democracy have been focused on the examination of the party’s electoral behaviour and communications approach, through the examination of public perceptions (Louli, 1995, 2001) as well as on the modernisation of the party under the leadership of Karamanlis (junior) and the impact of the leader on the party image and electoral success (Pappas and Dinas, 2006; Dinas, 2008). Overall, there is a shortage of detailed and integrated analysis on the development of the party of New Democracy in the course of time. Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is to offer an integrated account of the party’s evolution that embraces its ideological, organisational and communications development while looking into the impact of the informal course of action and the underlying forces that have defined party behaviour over the years.

Drawing upon the discussion provided in the previous chapters, the present section focuses on interpreting the character of the 2004 New Democracy party through the assessment of all these elements that contributed to the ideological, organisational and communications evolution of the party. As has been already argued, the party that won the 2004 general election had little in common with the ‘old’ and weary party of
the 1980s and most of the 1990s. The 2004 electoral victory vindicated Karamanlis’ (junior) efforts to modernise the party, reposition and re-brand the New Democracy political ‘product’ through a process of ideological reinvention, communications professionalisation and electoral effectiveness. Whether the leader succeeded in transforming the party to the extent that he created a ‘new’ ND, is debatable and considered with great caution in the present analysis. For the reason that New Democracy’s complete transformation was extremely difficult to achieve given the party’s integral characteristics as these were defined by its formation, and process and degree of institutionalisation as well as the party’s mentality and reasoning of compromise and circumspection about anything new. The implementation of radical changes ought to have been predicated on a total break with the party’s own tradition, a task difficult for any leader to achieve. Therefore, the interpretation of the 2004 version of New Democracy follows the abovementioned line of reasoning within the context provided by the three stages of the Party Evolution Framework. The first part indicates briefly the role and deep impact of the founder, Karamanlis senior, on New Democracy’s ethos and addresses the party’s trajectory in the post-Karamanlis (senior) era, via the examination of the dominant role of leaders. The second part interprets the party’s development under the leadership of Karamanlis junior, and examines the extent to which the changes implemented at all levels led to the modernisation and profound renewal of the party. The main question to be addressed thus, relates to whether the ideological repositioning and electoral revival were enough in order for the party to overcome the deep-rooted disunity and anachronism that had tarnished it for the most part of its thirty years history.

7.2 ‘Leaders, Leaders, Leaders’: From Charisma to Ordinary Leadership

In order to identify even define the nature of the party and the level of change that characterised the reforms that led to the ‘2004 version of ND’, it is crucial to evaluate and comprehend the political character of New Democracy as this is delineated beyond the strict lines of the formal, constitutionally defined ideological and organisational principles. Once again, the focus lies on the underlying forces and unofficial lines of behaviour and party culture that circumvent the theoretical approach of party operation; rather the central point of reference lies not in the ends but the means, the practical way of conduct rather than the theoretical and constitutionally defined principles that underlined its political as well as electoral trajectory. That is, the informal course of action that defines the distribution as well as balance of power within the party’s horizontal and vertical organisational and operational structure. For New Democracy the power balance rested almost completely, in the hands of the
leader and his entourage. The leader conveyed attributes of his personality, ideological and political orientation and organisational tactics directly to the party, which was politically identified by the image of the leader. Therefore, due to this extreme personification of the party image, the strategically wrong choice of leaders in the post-Karamanlis era hurt the party in a greater degree than had been probably, anticipated at the time.

The inception of New Democracy into the Greek political scene in the early days of the change-over to democracy in 1974 was the outcome of a series of interrelated political and social factors, and of the personal ambitions and political approach of the founder of the party. There are two points worth noting in relation to New Democracy’s genesis. First, the party was born out of a twofold necessity; political stagnation due to the seven-year long dictatorship and lack of any form of democratic apparatus and personal interest as the party’s founder was already in the country’s premiership when he formed New Democracy. Second, New Democracy was established as a vehicle for development and restoration of the country’s institutions and not as a corollary of already established democratic institutions. New Democracy was founded by the Prime Minister to govern the country and thus, its existence was inadvertently linked to government. As a result of the interrelation of the party’s formative criteria, New Democracy developed a number of characteristics that differentiated its culture and ethos from other conservative western parties and have marked the course of its political and electoral development outside the rigid lines of theoretical models and frameworks of party development. The assessment of the formative traits, some of which pre-dated the 1974 inception, and institutionalisation features of the party of New Democracy within the framework of Stages I and II of the evolution framework, indicated that New Democracy was characterised by territorial penetration and internal legitimation, with a high degree of systemness but a low degree of autonomy. Moreover, the main formative element of the party was its charismatic and governmental character; the leader did not only convey his personality attributes to the party, but his image and personality comprised the political identity of New Democracy, at least for the first five years of its existence (Alexakis, 2001b; Loulis, 2007). Nonetheless, New Democracy survived the retirement of Karamanlis (senior), and succeeded in attaining a very high degree of institutionalisation (Figure 8.1). As already discussed in Chapter 5, the organisational development of the party was

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1 It should be noted that during the first years of the party’s formation, the role of local political patrons was increasingly important for the electoral success of the party. Local patrons controlled a large number of voters and thus, the party was electorally dependent on them. However, the development of vertical organisational structures in the mid-1980s played a major role in the devitalisation of the phenomenon of patronage but not its total elimination (Alexakis, 2001: 68-89).
greatly facilitated by the leader himself, who by 1979 had already started the process of objectification and routinisation of his charisma.

The most essential point to bear in mind while considering the political and electoral trajectory of New Democracy adheres to the political and personal status of Karamanlis and his legacy on the role and authority of the party leader/president. The development of New Democracy in the post-Karamanlis era was not predicated on the party’s governmental record nor ideological positioning but on the image perception that each of the leaders who succeeded Karamanlis (senior), conveyed to the party. Therefore, the interpretation of party evolution is not centred on Karamanlis’ governmental record or on his ‘statesmanship’ attributes, but strictly on his input to the organisational and structural party development; that is, his legacy on the running and control of the party as well as on the role and power of the party elite. To this end, a very significant point to be considered bears on the complex relationship that developed between Karamanlis and the party, and most importantly, on the fact that New Democracy failed to capitalise on the personality attributes and political philosophy of its leader after his transition to the state presidency. This was the result of a series of interrelated factors but mainly, due to fact that, by 1974, Karamanlis political status was above all ideological and partisan lines (Loulis, 2007: 217). In actual fact, when he returned to Greece and assumed the reins of government, his public image was perceived to be of two substances; he was a national leader, a ‘statesman’ who was trusted to fulfil the difficult task of the restoration of democracy, while at the same time, his past as well as his political presence as the country’s prime minister attributed to him a partisan essence (Loulis, 2007: 215). However, of the two essences, the one that prevailed was that of the ‘statesman’ rather than that of the party leader. Therefore, it can be stated that the 1974 and 1977 electoral wins were a personal triumph of Karamanlis and his ‘above and beyond’ partisan and ideological lines political presence (Alexakis, 2001b; Loulis, 2007: 214). And while Karamanlis succeeded in cultivating and preserving a non-partisan ‘national’ image until his death, New Democracy did not benefit in the long term from the leader’s political

2 In fact, a number of qualitative and quantitative studies have demonstrated that the ideological positioning of ND in the mid-1980s onwards corresponded to the majority of the Greek public, which by the mid-1980s and in the 1990s had developed an increased centripetal/centre-right ideological stance (Loulis, 1996; 2001). A newly developed ideological landscape, from which ND failed to profit electorally, mainly, due to its chronic leadership deficiency.

3 Karamanlis’ and ND’s governmental record of the 1974-1981 period was substantial but had no real impact on the party’s future electoral fortunes. In fact, by the mid-1980s the party leadership tactically broke away from Karamanlis’ principles and government. Therefore, Karamanlis’ record in the country’s premiership falls beyond the area of research of the present thesis, which strictly focuses on party development within the framework of all the intrinsic characteristics that defined its formation, organisational and ideological trajectory, electoral and communications/campaign development.
status and wide electoral appeal. As studies demonstrated, New Democracy was perceived by the majority of the electorate as a right-wing (in cases extreme right-wing) political party, the continuity of pre-dictatorial ERE and of the traditional ‘Right’; in short, by 1981 New Democracy was for the voters an anachronistic, parochial and weary right-wing political camp (Loulis, 2001: 212-231; Loulis, 2007: 227-228). In other words, New Democracy’s political and electoral dominance of the late 1970s resulted from the fact that Karamanlis’ personal appeal and personality attributes had overshadowed the party image.

To this end, New Democracy developed a bipolar character; on the one hand, it was the party of its leader, founded by Karamanlis and in the early years, emerged as the partisan arm of legitimation for the Karamanlis’ administration of the 1974-77 period in particular. On the other hand, Karamanlis gave New Democracy its substance and despite the integral inefficiencies of such a ‘charismatic party’, he entrenched the party’s fundamental ideological principles and organisational framework and thus, safeguarded the party’s survival in the aftermath of his retirement and also, New Democracy’s ideological and structural renewal and evolution over the years (Alexakis, 2001b: ). As a result, New Democracy depicted the traits of its leader’s personality and political culture while, Karamanlis himself comprised the bridge that linked the traditional conservative right of the pre-junta era to the development of the first modernised, democratically evolved right-wing party in the history of Greek politics. Karamanlis based on his experience anticipated that New Democracy could only survive if it developed to a party of principles while his personal ambition in conjunction with the widespread public appeal allowed him to retain his partisan ties without damaging the image of the ‘national’ leader. This complex relationship that was developed between the founder and leader of the party and New Democracy itself as a political apparatus marked the party’s early development and comprised the decisive factor of intra-party distribution of the power throughout New Democracy’s ideological and organisational trajectory.

However, the main question bears on Karamanlis’ failure to consolidate his personality attributes and positive political image to his own party. As already discussed, on the one hand, it soon became obvious that New Democracy emerged as the party of Karamanlis developing through the characteristics of the leader’s personality and political identity. It is indicative that the ideological principles and organisational framework of New Democracy represented the attributes that Karamanlis yearned to convey to the party. Concurrently, New Democracy comprised for the first years of its formation the means of Karamanlis personal political philosophy and governmental articulation. In fact, Karamanlis in the late years of his
leadership attempted to assimilate his political principles and ideas to the party, so as New Democracy to develop a political identity that would not have been merely associated with his natural presence but would provide the party with a distinct political, but not partisan or ideologically polarised, status. Therefore, it goes without any further saying that Karamanlis was the undisputed driving power of the party and the government. Indeed, his authority, total control of the ideological and organisational articulation of the party as well as his paternalistic approach towards the party and government benefited New Democracy in the short-term. On the other hand, the formation, consolidation and later institutionalisation of New Democracy within such a centralised and utterly leader-oriented context without any form of party organisation and structure, rendered the party dependent on the leadership for its political and electoral survival. The centrally oriented and elitist identity that the party developed in the early years of its life comprised the basic characteristic that hindered its development in the long term. That is, the total control that the leadership exerted on the party’s operation rendered the party’s survival in danger in many occasions due to the emergence of vicious internal conflicts and of a series of erroneous political, electoral and strategic decisions. At the same time, despite the party’s successful transition from a purely charismatic to a mass organised cadre party (at least based on the party’s constitution) that cut across the lines of party development models (see analysis of Stages I and II), and ultimately led to its survival, the ideological vagueness and organisational inadequacy, the undercurrent development of a number of factions and the dominant role of a group of party notables whose wide clientelistic relations and patronage network rendered them indispensable for the party’s electoral success, played a restrictive role in New Democracy’s evolution and modernisation. To this end, the party that lost the 1981 election was no longer the party of Karamanlis, but a right-wing party, controlled by a weary political elite - originating from ERE. Furthermore, it should also be noted that New Democracy’s consolidated political identity pointed to a strongly institutionalised and rather rigid political organisation, with a very low degree of adaptation. The latter characteristic was reinforced by the chronic smouldering fear of disintegration that led to a high level of secrecy and to a series of decisions and actions that were merely based on consensus and compromise rather on the party’s political and electoral evolution.

As a consequence, New Democracy had developed an inherent dependency on Karamanlis on the one hand, and on governmental power on the other. Therefore, when the party suffered a bitter electoral defeat in 1981 and for the first time in its history moved to the opposition, it was unable to handle the internal political crisis that laid ahead. For reasons both of organisational and leadership deficiencies as well
as lack of proper internal dynamics due to the genetic traits and institutionalisation process of the party, New Democracy was unprepared to deal with the new political and social landscape that had been already established in the country in the aftermath of the peaceful change-over. At the time the party had to face and overcome five main challenges. First, the party had failed to develop a distinct concrete ideological and political identity. Despite the ideological principles of Radical Liberalism that were outlined by Karamanlis in 1977 and then, officially sanctioned at the party’s First Congress in 1979, New Democracy lacked a coherent and broadly accepted ideological framework. Second, Karamanlis’ retirement had led to the emersion of the distinct ideological tendencies that were smouldering but had not been openly expressed as long as the party was in government. The underlying dynamic that had been developed over time, though led to the creation of factions and splinter groups (Alexakis, 2001b: 106-125). Third, the party’s organisational structure was in practice non-existent. In fact, it was after the party’s Second Congress in 1986 that New Democracy succeeded in developing a wide membership base, the corollary of a modern democratic organisational charter (Alexakis, 2001b: 225). Fourth, the party had to overcome the heavy electoral defeat of 1981. For the first time after its foundation, New Democracy was not in office and had to face not only an ascending internal crisis, but also the rising political authority of PASOK and its overly popular leader, Andreas Papandreou. Finally, New Democracy ought to overcome the leadership deficiency that Karamanlis’ departure had created. Therefore, the most important challenge for the party bore on the selection of a leader able to lead New Democracy away from the crisis that had just started overshadowing the party. With the exception of the party’s organisational development, which at least in quantitative (membership rates) and qualitative (party statute) terms was articulate and unprecedented for a conservative, right-wing party, New Democracy failed to respond to any of the abovementioned challenges. Consequently, the party was led into a long period of internal crisis, characterised by vicious disputes and conflicts over the control of the party.

In view of the analysis of the main identity traits that were consolidated in the early stages of the party’s formation as well as of the characteristics of its institutionalisation, New Democracy’s failure to respond to the challenges of the 1980s should not come as a surprise. The party’s character bore the traits of an inflexible, centrally controlled and introvert organisation. Despite its broad membership, the role of the members and party organs was secondary; the party statute was exemplary but only in theory (Alexakis, 2001b: 225). A closer look to the political trajectory of the party strongly indicates that New Democracy’s political and electoral fortunes as well as the party’s ideological and organisational development have been indissolubly linked to the
leadership and mainly, the leader who was the main advocate of the party image. An internal party trait that, as aforementioned, related to the genetic characteristics of the party and consolidated during the early years of the party’s formation and operation as a party in government and under the leadership of a dominant, charismatic and paternal figure. Each one of the five consecutive leaders that succeeded Karamanlis had consolidated the power to dominate and control the party’s structure and organisation, ideological drift, communication strategy and policy and thus, to map out the party’s electoral future. Nonetheless, the leader was informally, accountable to the party’s leadership group comprised of the party parliamentary elite; that is a group of party notables of the ‘old guard’ (ex-ERE members), which later became known as the ‘barons’ of New Democracy, whose support each leadership contender ought to win in order to get elected. As expected, the candidate who was ultimately elected represented the political ideas as well as the interests of the leadership elite. An elite with a deeply entrenched anachronistic and parochial political mentality of the 1950s and 1960s that was unable and unwilling to anticipate or respond to the newly formed political reality (Loulis, 2001: 212-229). As a consequence, the strong sense of inflexibility that formed an integral characteristic of the party’s identity (strong institutionalisation) and hindered New Democracy’s levels of adaptation was reinforced by the rigidity of the leadership, leading New Democracy not to modernisation but to a form of ‘de-modernisation’. Under the leaderships of Rallis, Averoff and Mitsotakis the party moved to the right, lost its appeal to the centrist electorate, disregarded any professional advice that was outside their line of reasoning (or liking), broke its ties with Karamanlism and rather consolidated its negative public image of the party of traditional ‘Right’ (Loulis, 2001).

A further significant trait of New Democracy’s identity, which flows from the party’s formative characteristics and has played a crucial role in the party’s evolution over time relates to the various intra-party trends that emerged at times and have led to internal unrest and even, to the creation of splinter parties. Initially, these tendencies took the form of ideological factions, as it has been argued in Chapter 5. However, given the party’s genetic characteristics and their development to the phase of institutionalisation, one main question is raised; whether a party of government formed to serve the political ambitions and philosophy of its founder and characterised by ideological vagueness (or deficiency) could be divided or even disintegrate on the basis of vicious internal conflicts of ideological origin. The answer might not be straightforward, but it is negative. The conflicts that emerged in the post-Karamanlis era were rooted on the parliamentary elite’s eagerness in the pursuit of party control. As explained earlier in this thesis, the rise of ideological tendencies within a political organisation that epitomised the modern representative of the conservative right was
the natural consequence of the party’s formation framework. In particular, when considering that with the exception of the politicians who had cooperated with the junta regime and comprised the extreme right-wing group of Greek conservatism, Karamanlis’ candidate selection criteria were merely based on experience and ministerial effectiveness⁴, it stands as a logical sequence that New Democracy would comprise a mosaic of centrist and rightist representatives. However, the distinct ideological tendencies of the party members and delegates were neither deep nor strong enough so as to lead to splinter groups and factions and even, threaten the unity of the party⁵. In fact, these tendencies were often used as temporary intra-party political alliances under the guidance of prominent party cadres wishing to enhance their role into the party hierarchy. In addition to the loose ideological culture of most of the right-wing politicians, these alliances had no clearly defined boundaries and their exponents’ loyalty was rather transient (Alexakis, 2001b: 117-126, 134). To this end, under the pretext of ideological differences, the party elite strove to control the election of the leader, selection of party delegates and candidates. The chronic crisis that beset New Democracy for almost twenty years, derived from the personal ambitions and leading prospects of the most prominent party cadres and thus, the clash between the rivalry groups was beyond and above the party’s ideological and organisational interests. As a consequence, by 1990s factionalism within the party was centred on two main groups; the Mitsotakis group and the Karamanlists. Therefore, given the party’s leader-driven culture and ethos, the group that succeeded in winning the internal leadership battle, was empowered to determine the party’s political status, influence the party’s identity and contribute to the party’s electoral progress. Nonetheless, even after the election of a new leader, the role of internal opposition, manifested by the ‘losing team’, continued to play a vital role in the course of action of the leader.

Finally, another important feature of the party of New Democracy, which can be regarded as the corollary of the party’s pre-dated traits as well as of the intra-party dynamics that developed over time regarding the underlying conduct of behaviour of the leadership, is the high level of introversion that characterised and continue to

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⁴ The fact that Karamanlis chose the experienced ‘old guard’ parliamentary members that were re-elected in 1974 to form his government played a major part to the powerful role that this political elite acquired in the aftermath of Karamanlis leadership secession.

⁵ Throughout the party’s history, three splinter parties emerged; DIANA was formed by Kostis Stefanopoulos the defeated leadership contender in 1984, POL.AN founded by the former Foreign Minister, Antonis Samaras in 1993 after his disagreement with the then Prime Minister and party leader Kostas Mitsotakis, and finally, in 2000 the extreme right-wing MP Giorgos Karatzaferis, who was elected as a ND candidate but soon became independent, founded LAOS. The common characteristic of all these splinter groups bears on the personification rather than ideologisation of their emersion. In fact, one of the main motives of the founders of these political groups was to put the ND leadership under electoral pressure (‘stealing votes from ND supporters) and thus, reinforce their status within the ranks of ND (when they returned).
shape party behaviour at all levels of its operation. Secrecy and a sense of
circumvallation on everything that concerned intra-party affairs had been one of the
basic features of New Democracy. It is indicative that the party never officially
recognised the existence of distinct ideological tendencies or groups within the party
despite the statements of various party MPs and delegates who confirmed their
allegiance to a specific tendency or in the 1990s when the fierce battle between
Mitsotakists vs. Karamanlists was under way, many MPs openly declared their support
to the one or the other groups. In fact, under the fear of disintegration the party
leadership each time chose to resort to decisions and measures based on consensus
and compromise. This was the attitude of centrist Georgios Rallis, the successor of
Karmanlis in 1980, who under the fear of disintegration decided to cooperate with the
right-wing Evagellos Averoff, a leadership coalition that shifted the party from the
centre-right to the right and marked its further ideological and electoral development.
Miltiadis Evert, who succeeded Mitsotakis in 1994, also conceded to the demands of
internal opposition (manifested by Mitsotakis and his ‘entourage’) and thus, failed to
modernise the party contrary to the expectations of the vast majority of voters. To this
end, the tactic of compromise and consensus was used in order to conceal rather than
overcome the problems that New Democracy faced. Therefore, this consensual
approach perpetuated the crisis within the party; it did not benefit the party as a
political organisation but it ensured an artificial unity on which the party cadres and
delegates capitalised for personal gains such as their re-election in parliament.

Nonetheless, it is also quite important to note the organisational and ideological
development of New Democracy and the considerable progress of the party over the
years. The details of how New Democracy advanced in the 1980s in ideological and
organisational terms are examined in chapter 5. However, as has been already argued,
the transition of New Democracy from a charismatic to a mass organised cadre party
played a secondary, rather supportive role in the party’s electoral development.
Regardless of the mass membership (one of the largest for a European right-wing
party), the party apparatus had always been constrained by the authoritative and
dominant role of the leadership. To this end, the examination of the party’s trajectory
in the post-Karamanlis era as well as the interpretation of the New Democracy party
that won a landslide victory in 2004 under the leadership of Karamanlis (junior) is
based on the characteristics that were analysed above. As will be discussed below, the
ideological re-positioning of the party in 2004 as well as Karamanlis control of the
party organs did play a role in the party’s electoral victory, but the lack of deep-rooted
radical changes upon which the ideological and organisational reforms ought to have
been based, deprived New Democracy from a long-term political and governmental
domination.
As already argued in the previous chapters, prior to the election of Karamanlis’ (junior) to the party leadership, New Democracy was in disarray. The chronic leadership crisis that had tarnished the party had reached a peak point. The outgoing leader, despite his (short-lived) re-election by the parliamentary party after the electoral defeat in 1996 was harshly criticised by internal opposition (rival leadership contester’s group), his role was subverted in every occasion while his authority had been challenged. Therefore, at the time Karamanlis (junior) rose to the leadership, the sharp confrontations and leadership battles had taken the form of an open war. As a result, the priority of the new leader was to impose himself on the party elite and thus, to cement this authority and status as an undisputed party leader. The events that preceded the 2000 election have been already discussed in detail (chapter 6, part two). The rationale in the present chapter falls within the context of an integrated interpretation of the ‘2004 version of New Democracy’ taking into account the intrinsic characteristics and underlying dynamics that determined the party’s political renewal; that is, to provide a different approach in the examination of the Greek conservative party and contextualise the forces that led it to two consecutive electoral wins (2004 and 2007), on the one hand, while identifying the reasons why this revival was significantly short-lived (current events demonstrate the failure of the ‘2004 project’). The electoral achievements of Karamanlis (junior) are comparable to those of the party founder (1974 and 1977) and ought not to be challenged. However, once again this ‘renewal’ was transient; the leader did not manage to sway the party elite into fully supporting his project of renewal and modernisation and thus, to fundamentally revive the party. That is, he failed to eradicate these deep-rooted inherent party traits that had haunted New Democracy since the early days of its formation. In other words, contrary to the great expectations of his election, Karamanlis (junior) did not alter the ‘fate’ (genetic disposition) of the party. Nonetheless, it should be stressed that given the low degree of the party’s adaptability, which is a natural corollary of the high degree of its institutionalisation, the new leader had an increasingly hard task to achieve.

According to John Loulis, a political communications expert and close (unofficial) advisor to Karamanlis (junior), the election of the young politician in 1997 marked the end of an era of wrong political, ideological, strategic and electoral decisions, introversion, defensiveness in all levels of party behaviour and extreme levels of personification of the party’s character (2001: 207-209). For Loulis, the election of Karamanlis opened a new leaf in the party’s history as it symbolised the longstanding need of the party to leap a whole generation of politicians and move to a renewed and
modernised version of itself (2001; 2007: 235). The party had to radically change and to communicate this change to the electorate in the most effective manner. In a way, to convince the public that New Democracy had left the past behind and it was a ‘new’ party. As it has been already shown, the latter task was quite successfully implemented; in 2004 New Democracy planned and executed the most professional and modernised campaign of its history, responded to the electorate’s demands and won not only their vote but also their trust. However, the former task, the radical reinvigoration of the party had a moderate success. As a consequence of the leader’s consensual approach to the demands of the party elite and the culture of compromise that prevailed once again, New Democracy’s re-branding proved to be insubstantial. In the aftermath of the 2007 general election that showed a substantial decrease in the party’s share of the vote by 3.5 percent corresponding to a considerable 365,000 votes, while by 2009 the popularity of Karamanlis had started to decrease and his party authority (even his leadership position) were under scrutiny by internal opposition.

Nevertheless, Karamanlis (junior) did reform many aspects of the New Democracy ‘brand’. Most importantly, he introduced the necessary changes in order to modernise the image of the party, convey the attributes of his positive and widely accepted personality to New Democracy and thus, to significantly alter public perceptions on New Democracy’s credibility, competence and government management. These were in fact, the essential changes that the party had longed for, for almost twenty years, and Karamanlis succeeded in implementing during the first four years of his leadership. Drawing upon the successfully implemented strategic approaches in the USA and Western Europe of ideological re-positioning (triangulation, third way), New Democracy transformed its electoral identity. By 2004 New Democracy no longer represented the ‘old’, parochial traditional ‘Right’ but had moved beyond and above the perceptions of the past; the 2004 New Democracy represented the demands of the people, of the new group of the electorate who were de-ideologised and pragmatists. The party had to follow the lead of the emerging ‘middle ground’ of voters and induce them to the party’s competence and management credentials. And policy delivery ought to comprise an essential element of the party’s modernisation project. However, with the exception of the 1974 Karamanlis (senior) government and under the exceptional circumstances of that period, New Democracy has a negative governmental record. In particular, the 1990-93 administration created a very negative precedent for the party’s image and credibility that continued to damage New Democracy for the years that followed. As a result, New Democracy in 2004 had to overcome a number of internal and external challenges and to prove that the party had changed to the degree that it was broadly communicated.
Despite the shortcomings of the ‘middle ground project’, the party that won the 2004 general election was in certain aspects, a renewed party; a ‘refreshed’ version of New Democracy that Karamanlis (senior) had founded thirty years ago. To this end, its political identity was not novel. To a great extent, the politics of pragmatism and competence that New Democracy advocated in 2004 related to the approach, and to a certain extent principles and ideas, of traditional ‘Karamanlism’; a modern and more socially sensitive approach of radical liberalism implemented via a middle ground strategy. Therefore, on the one hand, the 2004 version of New Democracy, could be regarded as the party’s response to the changed political environment characterised by a strong sense of de-ideologisation and pragmatism, induced by a long course of inertia, fear and introversion that had led New Democracy to the verge of decomposition. On the other hand, however, New Democracy’s leap to the middle-ground approach was not an innovative feature. The realistic and pragmatic approach that the party so profoundly manifested, the shift towards socialist principles as well as economic liberalism, the ‘beyond the traditional left and right divisions’ positioning and the advance of the notion of politics as a means to solve the everyday problems appeared as the re-instauration of traditional ‘Karamanlism’. The party broke its ties with the recent past (hard-right, neo-liberalism) in order to span the gap that it had been created of its formative ideological background. It should be emphasised though, that the middle-ground approach was not a blind copy of radical liberalism. It had many of the elements and ideas adhered to the party’s Founding Declaration but these had been adapted to respond to the modern day demands. Radical liberalism was empiricist in nature; the middle-ground strategy was responsive and adaptive to the demands of the public. Also, radical liberalism responded to the governmental ambitions and ends of one person, Karamanlis (senior). In 2004, New Democracy had to consign the party’s political revival not to the ambitions, skills, political status or authority of Karamanlis (junior), but to his image and widely positive electoral appeal. In 2004, Karamanlis (junior) sold the party image while in 1974 the party could only survive by promoting and selling Karamanlis (senior) political personality. The lack of experience as well as authority that characterised Karamanlis (junior) rendered the party on campaign professionalisation and communications restructure. The extensive and substantive use of modern marketing and communications techniques allowed for the creation of a responsive to the political environment party. To a certain extent, New Democracy did reinvent itself by re-approaching the party’s founding principles and by using them as a vehicle to adapt and respond to the challenges of ‘new times’.

Overall, Karamanlis renewed New Democracy, repositioned it politically (and ideologically if that is to be considered a valid characterisation in a de-ideologised environment), re-branded the ‘product’ and marketed it immaculately to the wider
political market. Concurrently, as the study of Pappas and Dinas (2006) demonstrated, he also managed to scale down the organisational, ideological and leadership chronic deficiencies (but as the present analysis argues not to eradicate them). He also might not have succeeded in eliminating entirely the influence of the party ‘barons’ and internal opposition but he did manage to marginalize their intra-party appeal and political impact. However, the leader fell short of radically transforming the party’s long-established endogenous features and mentality. Taking into account the political and historical analysis of New Democracy’s trajectory as this was qualified within the three staged context of the evolution framework, there are three main reasons that justify the fact that Karamanlis’ project did not live up to the expectations of the party members and the wider public, and all these relate to the party’s strongly consolidated identity. First, Karamanlis failed to break the party’s ties with the past. Instead of forcing the ‘old guard’ of politicians to retire and avoid interfering into New Democracy’s everyday affairs, under the pretext of the forthcoming electoral and the desire not to disturb the balance of power within the party, by 2001 the leader had chosen to compromise. Second, Karamanlis did not manage to utterly impose himself into the internal opposition group. He decided to cooperate with the prominent members within a context of consensus rather than power. And although he did portray a certain degree of decisiveness and authority in the early years of his leadership, by choosing to expel prominent party cadres who openly criticised him, under the prospect of an electoral win, he adopted a more moderate approach and gave up some of his authority. Finally, Karamanlis when he was elected leader ought to lead the party out of a chronic crisis that created a culture of dangerous confrontations but without driving it into a turmoil and probable disintegration. Considering the party’s character, the accumulation of an exceedingly great amount of power to the top and its total control by the leadership as well as New Democracy’s overall incapability to respond to internally generated challenges, and moreover, to adapt to an irregularly shifting political environment, as a result of the party’s strongly institutionalised character, the leader ought to implement a number of radical changes within a hostile and subversive context. As a result, the deep-rooted internal reforms were never implemented and thus, the communications modernisation as manifested through the ‘middle ground’ project was built upon a frail substructure. In order for Karamanlis to proceed with the radical changes that New Democracy required in order to create a governmental hegemony, he ought to reinvent, even re-create, some of the party’s identity traits; that is to substantially alter the party’s identity.

6 The return of the expelled leadership contender, Georgios Souflias, and his positioning as the Secretary of Political Strategy and Policy Planning, the party’s communications and policy formulation focal point scaled down any probable tendencies for internal upheaval, but acutely demonstrated that Karamanlis (junior) chose to compromise and keep the balance of power at the top of the party rather than clash with the party’s traditional culture.
7.4 Conclusion

Overall, the study of New Democracy’s electoral revival in 2004 has been approached by the vast majority of researchers under a very positive and optimistic light. However, it should be noted that New Democracy was neither a newly-formed political organisation nor a softly managed and meticulously organised political camp. The party was formed under exceptional circumstances, developed as a means to safeguard democracy in a recently democratised state and not out of already established institutions, and succeeded in objectifying the charisma of its founder and surviving by evolving to a strongly institutionalised party. Indeed, New Democracy demonstrated incredible survival stamina compared to other charismatic parties, but failed to evolve accordingly. By the time Karamanlis (junior) was elected to the party’s leadership, the party had already missed twenty years of development and progress. The incrementally personified character of the party in conjunction with the highly polarised and conflictual character of the Greek political and electoral landscape, had affected –mostly negatively - the political development as well as the electoral behaviour of New Democracy. The party had assimilated a culture of confrontation and internal indiscipline. As a consequence, the main focus of the leaders rested in keeping the party united by maintaining the balance among the various factions and groups within the party; nonetheless, this kind of balance was extremely difficult to achieve. Most importantly, in their attempt to compromise the different intra-party approaches, ignored the wider political environment and the needs of the vast majority of the centrally oriented electorate. The middle ground project that Karamanlis and his entourage endorsed led New Democracy to a landslide victory. However, the professional and adaptive communications approach did not suffice so as the party to enduringly win the middle ground voters and build a broad electoral base upon which it could turn to. The lack of substantive internal reforms in the pre-2004 period did not modify the mentality of confrontation and dispute, which arose as soon as the party lost its lead in the polls. As current surveys indicate, New Democracy will lose the 2009 general election and a leadership contest inevitably will take place. Given the party’s intrinsic characteristics the vicious conflicts and disputes will re-emerge leading the party to a long-time in opposition. Whether New Democracy will attempt its renewal in the short-term is disputable. As long as the party organisation has a passive and solely formal rather than active role in the decision-making procedures and operation of the party the leadership battle will perpetuate, consolidating New Democracy as a highly personified political party.
Chapter 8

A Comparative Analysis

8.1 Introduction

The central idea of this chapter is to offer an aggregate, comparatively contextualised discussion of the findings presented and analysed in the previous chapters and thus, evaluate the application of the Party Evolution Framework. To this end, the scope and rationale of this inter-party approach rests on the three stages of the framework, which constitute the backbone of the entire research project. Building upon the tradition of qualitative comparative analysis as a means for testing theoretical statements on the one hand, and previous studies of political communication and marketing on the other, the thesis aims to test the utility of the framework and assess its validity as a tool for comparative analysis. That is, the party evolution framework is used as a tool of comparison to understand variation between political parties. Within that context, the comparative context serves as a basis to designate the crucial role that the intrinsic characteristics and inherent identity traits play in the evolution of vote-maximising and office-seeking parties regardless of their origins, nature, political identity and pace of development. Then again, in this particular case the third stage of analysis on campaign planning and implementation provides a fertile ground for a more direct comparative approach, as both parties under examination were largely influenced by and adopted many of the techniques and strategies of the Clinton presidential campaigns. However, the extent to which each party adopted or adapted to the US-originated campaigning is imputed to their distinctive culture and identity. Overall, the main points of reference rest on three main characteristics; institutionalisation, adaptation and professionalisation, the contingent relationship of which is illustrated by Figures 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3. These qualifications, which define each of the three stages of the framework, are inextricably linked and their interaction over the years is to define the political and electoral development of a political party. It is, therefore, upon the context of this innate interaction and interdependence that the evolution approach is based, so as to bridge the worlds of intra-party politics, and campaigning; to bring together the classic models of party organisation and theories of political communication and marketing and therefore, offer an integrated approach of party evolution.

In general, both Labour and New Democracy have emerged as vote-maximising and office-seeking political parties. Despite their profound ideological, organisational and political differences as well as the distinct social, economic and institutional backgrounds both parties have demonstrated an incisive adaptive capacity with regard
to their electoral approach over time. The intrinsic traits of each party’s formation phase, the genetic characteristics and institutionalisation process, organisational and ideological development, formal and informal powers of influence on party management and balance structure shielded their political culture and entrenched their party identity. Notwithstanding the uniqueness of party identity and the ‘hybrid’ nature of both parties, which represent incomplete and unconventional cases of the mass and/or cadre parties, a closer analysis of the evolution of Labour and New Democracy suggests an intersection of certain attributes of the development process. To this end, both parties were prepared to embrace change. As with other western European parties, however, recent changes in both parties, which aimed at and succeeded in transforming their communications structure and strategic formulation, suggested that regardless of their inherently discrete political identities both Labour and New Democracy responded to the challenges of the ‘new’ times in a tangible and substantial way. Nonetheless, the nature and scope of their responsiveness and adaptation differed as a result of the distinct character and unique identity of each party. As a result, Labour’s renewal entailed the party’s electoral advancement and political reinvigoration in a long-term perspective, while New Democracy’s project of renewal was based on short-term electoral success, rendering the party’s transformation less effective. Party evolution is, thus, regarded as the natural outcome of a series of formal and informal proceedings at all levels of party power structure, articulated through processes of power containment and extension. That said, shifts in the balance of power lead to political re-orientation and address internally originated challenges of ideological stagnation and organisational malfunctioning through a process of reinvention and re-launch.

8.2 Discussion

Stage I. Formation and Institutionalisation: Beyond Panebianco

Panebianco’s empirical analysis of party institutionalisation provides the basic framework for the further consideration and evaluation of the genetic characteristics and institutionalisation process as the starting points of party evolution. Clearly, the Labour party was developed through diffusion and legitimised externally, characterised by a heterogeneous structure of autonomous local organisations, weak central organisation and factional tendencies; attributes that accounted for the party’s weak institutionalisation. Indeed, the formation of the Labour party was in effect the outcome of coercion and compromise between the trade unions and socialist societies. Therefore, Labour emerged as a federal organisation, directly dependent on its
affiliated institutions for financial, organisational and electoral support. In fact, the party had no direct but an indirect membership network consisting of the members of trade unions and socialist societies. As a result of this widely contingent alliance, Labour’s ideological and organisational consolidation was imputed to the heritage of its founders, and as such reflected a ‘mosaic’ of values, principles and traditions. However, it is crucial to note that prior to the offset of its institutionalisation process Labour developed a number of organisational characteristics that contradicted its genetic diffusional character. The attempts of the party leadership to create a national organisation in the late 1910s had elements of penetration, which subtly influenced the party’s further development. Notwithstanding Labour’s organisational advance the party sustained the low degrees of autonomy and systemness that had characterised its formative years. To this end, Labour’s political identity conveyed the consensual outcome of intra-party ‘power-struggle’; trade unions dominated the organisational wing of the party’s development while the socialist societies assumed the ideological facet of the party’s identity. It should also be noted that the inherent dependency of the party on the affiliated institutions was manifested in the form of sharp and dangerous internal conflicts throughout the party’s history.

However, what is indicative of Labour’s evolution process is its re-institutionalisation, which was instigated by the organisational reforms that were initiated under the Kinnock leadership and revolutionised the ‘Labour brand’ under Blair. The enhancement of the autonomy of the leadership and re-organisation of the leader’s office that led to the party’s 1990s communications transformation, changes in the party-union relationship through a number of union-targeted reforms, which ended the ‘block-vote’ and the unions’ overall control of the Conference, the new framework of policy formulation (‘rolling programme’), the new system for leadership election (electoral college), the introduction of OMOV for candidate selection and the recruitment of members at national rather than local levels altered some of the traits of Labour’s long-established, traditional genetic character. Most importantly, these reforms affected the degrees of autonomy and systemness of the party, as it has currently developed a vigorous central apparatus while its financial dependency on the trade unions has been substantially eliminated. Consequently, New Labour advanced on the institutionalisation axis (Figure 2.1). It should be noted that Labour did not transform to a strongly institutionalised party; but rather the radical character of the organisational reforms led to some major changes in the character and ethos of Labour. Under the leadership of Tony Blair, Labour was reinvented within the context of the ‘new’ times as New Labour and this renewal was reflected on the party’s character and culture. Finally, another important feature of Labour’s identity that should be borne in mind is that the formally attributed shift in the balance of power
within the party in favour of the leadership was the outcome of long-established traditions and underlying forces that pre-dated the reforms of 1980s; in fact, these were inherent elements of Labour’s federal nature.

New Democracy is a completely different case study. Its inception was the outcome of the founder’s need to create a political party in order to govern the recently democratised Greek state. As a result, New Democracy was founded as a means to serve and promote the charisma and political philosophy and principles of the leader. Therefore, in the early years of its formation, New Democracy was a charismatic party, centrally organised, controlled and managed, and without any form of democratic organisation. In fact, the party existed only in parliament and strictly operated under the control and authority of the leader. The party was not locally organised and had no membership. Rather, its vote-maximising strategy emanated from the wide appeal and ‘statesmanship’ image of the leader at national level, and the clientelistic networks and relations of patronage that the party’s candidates had already established at the local level. Nonetheless, New Democracy is one of the few charismatic European parties that did not only manage to survive their founder’s retirement but also to develop into a strongly institutionalised party. What is indicative in New Democracy’s case, are the extremely unusual political circumstances that led to the party’s creation on the one hand, as well as the peculiar social and political environment within which the party had to operate, on the other. In addition to the exogenous factors, the main traits of the party’s political culture pre-dated its inception. That is mainly due to the party’s political personnel (MPs, candidates, delegates) the majority of which were members of ERE and the pre-dictatorial traditional ‘Right’ and mostly, due to the founder’s political legacy. This group, which comprised the party’s political elite, was challenged by the ‘newcomers’ group; in fact, this conflict was never directly manifested during the Karamanlis (senior) years, but did develop into New Democracy’s major confrontation framework over the years. By the time, that the leader retired, the party’s charismatic nature had been objectified and New Democracy had a constitution that aimed at creating a mass membership organisation. Five years after the party’s formation, New Democracy had consolidated its political character but had not institutionalised.

The main question, however, is how a party with New Democracy’s formative characteristics managed not only to survive but also develop into a strongly institutionalised party. By the time the process of institutionalisation began, New Democracy had overcome its charismatic profile and in conjunction with the unusual political environment, within which it operated, developed certain characteristics that furthered its political tenacity. As a result, New Democracy was a party characterised
by territorial penetration and internal legitimisation, had a very strong and dominant centre that controlled and directed the development of the periphery, and strong internal cohesion and homogeneity. Moreover, due to the lack of a mass organised membership base and its heavy reliance on state resources and local patrons New Democracy had a very limited degree of autonomy, and a high degree of systemness. Therefore, in the aftermath of Karamanlis (senior) retirement from the party leadership, New Democracy emerged as a highly institutionalised party. The characteristics that emanated from the genetic traits and institutionalisation process played a vital role in the development of New Democracy’s culture and ethos, and entrenched the party’s political identity. As already discussed, the fact that the 2004 leadership did not manage to modify the shortcomings of the party’s formative identity, hindered to a considerable extent, New Democracy’s evolution process.

**Stage II. Organisation of Electioneering and Adaptation: Political Identity Re-asserted**

Following Duverger’s distinction of cadre and mass parties, Labour could be subtly described as a mass party; in fact, it falls into the category of ‘indirect’ parties (1954: 65). As Webb notes ‘Labour has always been a somewhat unorthodox mass party’ and as such never incisively corresponded to the classic conception of a mass party as this type of party organisation was developed in the rest of Europe (2000: 199-200). The federal character of the party’s organisation with a wide but ‘indirect’ party structure and most importantly, the collective rather than individual membership, which entailed ‘no true political enrolment and no personal pledge to the party’, affected profoundly the development of a genuine mass-party system (Duverger, 1954: 65). The link between the party and trade union party members was weak and therefore, Labour failed to develop an active mass membership. Formally, the introduction of individual membership in 1918 sought to transform the party membership nature and organisational structure but the applied restrictions to individual memberships constrained the practical growth of direct membership; it was not until the 1990s and the Blair reforms that Labour pursued a membership recruitment agenda and attained a large individual mass membership. Moreover, notwithstanding Labour’s inception as the party of the trade unions and the working-class in essence, Labour never became the main vehicle of ideological indoctrination or the mere political representative of the British working class. As early as 1918, Labour formally adhered to the representation of the interests of all workers ‘by hand or by brain’, in effect, denouncing the barriers of social classes. On the contrary, the LRC/Labour party did function as the main means of election of working-class candidates in parliament, through the financial endorsement of their candidacy. So in financial terms, the
Labour party operated within the context of a mass party system (Duverger, 1954: 65). The dominant role of trade unions largely affected the formation and organisational development of Labour; trade unions not only conveyed attributes of their structure and tradition but also grew into the main advent of power balance distribution within the party. Finally, in terms of internal democracy, Labour has always been considered as an internally democratic party. However, it was not until Blair’s rise to the party leadership that the old form of delegatory democracy substituted by plebiscitarian democracy and direct participation of individual party members to the decision-making procedures. However, it should be stressed that this extension of rights of individual members coincided with the leadership’s considerable enhancement of autonomy as well as the power and control over the party (Webb, 2000: 201-209). A paradox that is explained by the nature and allegiances of widespread individual membership (Mair, 1994: 16); but this concurrently, justifies comprehensively the scope and nature of the leadership’s reforms, which in essence, consolidated the informal party management practice of the Labour party over time.

Given the formative and institutionalisation characteristics of the Labour party, its electoral character integrated the party’s ‘hybrid’ nature. Notwithstanding Labour’s origin as the political representative of trade unions in parliament, and thus, its pressure group character in the early years of its formation, Labour had by 1918 developed into a vote-maximising political party. Therefore, the extension of the party’s political appeal and electoral support became the leadership’s main objective, which in fact, was formally declared in the party’s constitution. By the time the party’s institutionalisation process completed, Labour had developed a more pragmatic electoral strategy. Moreover, the inter-class electoral strategy was reinforced by the exogenous and endogenous developments of the post-war era. The aftermath of the Bennite aberration and subsequent revival of Labour’s political, organisational and ideological character renders the party’s electoral qualities compatible with Panebianco’s identification of the electoral-professional party (1988). The party’s communications transformation resulted in the extensive professionalisation of campaigning operations through the implementation of political marketing tools and techniques into the formulation of the party’s communications strategy and the recruitment of a considerable number of professional consultants and media advisors, pollsters and advertisers. Consequently, the traditional role of the trade unions as well as politicians within the party’s electoral apparatus was decreased, while the strategic importance of professional experts, who closely cooperate with the leader, increased. As it appears Labour has been successfully transformed over time, and managed to safeguard its electoral sustainability and political substance through a process of vigorous adaptation to various external and internal challenges. As already noted, the
party's flexibility and adaptive capacity was imputed to its weakly institutionalised character.

New Democracy’s origins on the other hand, clearly indicate a cadre party, whose founder was in fact the country’s prime minister by the time of the party’s inception. New Democracy was a parliamentary-oriented party, with no members or any form of extra-parliamentary organisation. The only form of some sort of organisational network that could be identified at the time of the party’s formation, centred on the clientelistic networks and relationships of patronage of the party’s MPs and local political ‘barons’. Following, however, in the steps of the other European cadre parties, New Democracy soon adopted an extra-parliamentary organisational structure with the creation of local party branches. In strictly numerical terms, New Democracy did create a wide membership base and on those grounds alone, could claim to have developed characteristics of a mass party. Notwithstanding the ample membership rates of the party, New Democracy never adopted a mass party philosophy. The recruitment of members served as a shield to the party’s survival in an extensively polarised political environment that overlapped with a period of tense confrontations at the top of the party. As a result, the development of a democratic mass party was never a priority for the party leadership. That is, despite the democratic form of the party’s founding declaration (written constitution), all authority resided with the leadership. To this end, the extra-parliamentary organisation and party activists never had the power to threaten or even sharply criticise the leadership’s decisions. On the contrary, the prominent party elite controlled the party activists and thus, the decisions and actions of the local branches. Therefore, New Democracy was formed as a cadre party but its development led to the creation of a ‘party of cadres’.

The party’s electoral character approximates the inexplicit image and the ‘hybrid’ development of its formative and institutionalisation phases. By the time of its formation, Karamanlis imparted a ‘catch-all’ character to the party. According to its founding declaration, New Democracy was portrayed as a party beyond and above the ideological distinctions of the past and therefore, had crossed the traditional party lines. And although Karamanlis had the image of ‘statesman’ and was perceived by the public to be above traditional politics, New Democracy was considered a right-wing political party, the continuity of the pre-dictatorial ERE. As a result, a ‘catch-all’ strategy applied by a party that was perceived to have a strong ideological identity and within a highly polarised political realm, was doomed to fail. In fact, soon after Karamanlis’ retirement from the party leadership, New Democracy did move to the right of the ideological spectrum, abandoning the ‘catch-all’ strategy of its founder. The paradox of the party’s ideological and electoral positioning in the 1980s is that
despite the electorate’s ideological shift towards more rightist policies, New Democracy failed to adequately promote its ideological and political standing, respond to the newly developed tendencies and therefore, dominate the political scene. Furthermore, New Democracy due to its origin as a government party had always portrayed the characteristics of a cartel party. Even when Karamanlis adopted a ‘catch-all’ approach, the main vote-maximising means of the party were the state resources and power. Given the circumstances of its origin as well as the nature of the Greek political culture, it appears rather evident that New Democracy developed into and still remains a cartel party. The latest reforms that took place within the party and the professionalisation of the party’s communications conveyed a number of attributes to the party’s electoral character that lead to the perception that New Democracy might become an electoral-professional party. However, as already discussed in the previous chapter the connection between party and the state in the Greek political culture is very dominant, even to the extent to define intra-party affairs.

Stage III. Encompassing Professionalisation: Adaptation and Professionalisation Re-examined

The evolution of the Labour party into an encompassing professional organisation is considered as a plausible, long expected, and in fact, overdue consequence of the party’s political trajectory and course of history. The deplorable position that the party was in, in the aftermath of the 1983 election as well as the four consecutive electoral defeats encouraged and even accelerated an upsurge of reforms throughout the party, which definitely changed the image and to a lesser extend the character of Labour. However, as has been argued in several parts of this thesis, the effectiveness of Labour’s process of reinvention and subsequently, its evolution into New Labour is imputed to two main elements; the party’s degree of professionalisation, which is directly associated to the communications transformation process and the degree of adaptation, organisational and ideological as well as operational to the challenges of a new era of politics. Moreover, the contingent nature of these two criteria in addition to the various internal and external developments that parties encounter affect the scope and scale of the evolution process and most importantly, the effectiveness of electoral strategy. The process of change and development of the Labour party that has been documented in the previous chapters demonstrated that Labour’s political identity characteristics embraced all these traits that allowed for the party’s smooth transition and extensive adaptation to an electoral-professional organisation. Therefore, the party’s susceptibility and acute responsiveness to exogenous and endogenous challenges did not only facilitate Labour’s transition to New Labour but
also facilitated the entrenchment of the party’s renewed identity. The three consecutive electoral wins and the widespread electoral support that Labour succeeded in defending over a period of almost ten years indicate the deep-rooted and innate, as well as multileveled character of New Labour’s evolution. And despite the pessimistic electoral prospect at the next general election - after thirteen years in office, a new leader and most importantly, Blair’s increased unpopularity by the time he left office as Denver and Fisher (2009) indicated, the fundamental changes that were implemented, were permanent and deep-rooted able to extensively affect the way Labour’s internal mechanisms would respond to an electoral defeat.

New Democracy, on the other hand, failed to fully evolve into an encompassing professional organisation, especially, in comparison to the Labour party. The sharp and dangerous internal leadership disputes that had tarnished the party for almost two decades led it to the verge of disintegration. This ultimate state of disarray that New Democracy was into comprised the driving force of the party’s renewal. The first and major step was the election of Karamanlis (junior) to the leadership, contrary to the longstanding anachronistic tendencies of the party’s hierarchy. The organisational and ideological reforms that took place allowed Karamanlis to impose an uncontested image of his leadership on the party apparatus and transiently safeguard his authority and status against the internal party opposition. Nonetheless, as the earlier detailed analysis of the party’s development has indicated, the leader’s failure to radically transform the longstanding deficiencies of the party’s identity, such as the utterly hierarchical, leadership-dominated and fragmented management of the party, the inactive and passive role of the organisation, and the tradition of consensus and compromise that hindered any attempts for development, affected the party’s adaptive capacity and thus, its degree of professionalisation. Most importantly, the party’s evolution has been thwarted by the deficiencies of the party’s identity. Within that context, New Democracy did run an electorally effective and professional campaign in 2004, implementing all the latest political marketing techniques and executing a thoroughly planned communications strategy but the fact that the party’s communications modernisation was not structured on a solid and deep-rooted political background, led the party to a transitory electoral success. Without radically changing some of the party’s deep-rooted character traits, New Democracy was unable to entrench the characteristics of the new political identity that it conveyed in 2004; that is, the party’s repositioning reflected a new communications rather than a political

1 The party’s 1997 campaign professionalisation was based on a series of modernisation reforms that included the organisational and ideological restructuring of the party, the overly significant constitutional reform, the ‘break’ with but also ‘reinvention’ of the party’s past traditions and ethos. Therefore, the communications revolution was rooted on a solid and profound basis, shielding the party against the dangers of internal disarray that would hinder its attempts for electoral and political revival.
identity of New Democracy, which proved highly deficient to maintain the party’s middle ground electoral base. It is indicative that at present New Democracy faces an electoral debacle, the leader is highly unpopular, the party membership is once again disenchanted and the leadership teams at the top have once again divided the party. At the moment, just five years after the remarkable 2004 electoral win, New Democracy fights an election campaign (a snap election was called for October 4th, 2009) in a deplorable position.

8.3 Campaigning and Communication: A Comparative Framework

Following the above discussion, it is evident that the two parties have differing and opposing identities. The detailed examination of the ideological and organisational characteristics and political attributes of Labour and New Democracy has demonstrated that they are two very different political parties whose inception and progress has been the outcome of a long process of events; they derived from distinct social, political and economic conditions and also, evolved within democracies with genuinely different political cultures. To this end, the two parties do not constitute directly comparable case studies. However, notwithstanding their diverse political character and trajectory both Labour and New Democracy were created and mainly, developed into vote-maximising and office-seeking political organisations. Their development over time as well as their evolution was considerably based on the respective leaderships’ drive to get elected in office. This latter feature, inherent in their political character has rendered both parties amenable to political renewal as a means to respond to electoral challenges. As a result, both parties grew attuned to the needs of their respective electoral environments and successfully adopted innovative communication and marketing techniques and also adapted to the needs of modern campaigning. Taking into account the parties’ communications renewal, campaign modernisation and thus, electoral revival, it could be argued that Labour and New Democracy developed similar patterns of electoral behaviour. Ideological re-positioning, organisational reform (though of different breadth), political re-branding and re-launch of a market/voter oriented product constituted the main elements of the parties’ political and electoral strategy. In fact, while acknowledging the distinct circumstances of their origins as well as the opposing characteristics of their identities, the parties’ campaigning strategies, in terms of formulation and implementation, demonstrated extensive similarities, rendering the scope and nature of the electoral projects parallel. That said, however, it should be emphasised that similarities at the level of planning and execution of campaign projects are not indicators of a further and deeper convergence.
Following the above observation, an essential question rises: why did such different political organisations develop –almost- identical communication campaign attributes? In fact, this is a significant point to consider with respect to the evolution framework’s line of reasoning that regards the development of party campaigning as a contingent stage in their evolution. Nonetheless, apart from the aforesaid, there is a principal consideration to bear in mind while explaining the evolving nature of Labour and New Democracy in particular, and of office-seeking political parties in general. As has been demonstrated earlier in this thesis, neither party fell completely within the strictly defined lines of the ideal models of party organisation and development, as the parties were highly influenced by exogenous factors originated by the environment within which they operated, but also by the endogenously generated motives and ambitions of their founders. For the Labour party the main drive behind its evolution was the leadership’s ambition to create a governmental political force that would represent the interests of the working people in Britain who stood beyond the narrow boundaries of working class and trade union interests. As for New Democracy, its formation was the rational outcome of its founder’s political ambitions on the one hand, and the country’s exceptional political circumstances on the other. Therefore, both parties developed into major political forces within their respective political system, a status they have retained throughout their trajectory. That is, in every election Labour and New Democracy were among the main contenders for office in the UK and Greece respectively.

Consequently, both parties had the same ends; the normative and organisational means that they used at the very early years of their formation were different but the drive to either enhance their electoral power (Labour in the early years of its formation) and/or to win the election (New Democracy) led both parties to adopt a more pragmatic stance towards their political and electoral development over time. Furthermore, the changed social and political nature of the electorate that Labour and New Democracy had to appeal to in the late 1990s and early 2000s created a less diverse and much more convergent political landscape within which the two parties had to develop their electoral behaviour. In addition, it should be stressed that both New Labour’s and New Democracy’s campaigns were greatly influenced by the innovative project of the Clinton 1992 and 1996 campaigns; the New Deal approach and triangulation strategy constituted the groundwork for both parties’ communications renewal and campaign approach.

As a consequence of the above, in essence, it comes as no surprise that the parties’ campaign projects were based on parallel electoral frameworks, which aimed at
restoring their electoral fortunes. Therefore, the strategic steps taken by the party leaderships towards that direction were similar. At the risk of oversimplification, the outstanding elements of the parties’ electoral projects are grouped into three main categories. First, both leaderships chose to ideologically re-position their parties and thus, to re-brand the political product on offer. For Labour the project was based on the reinvention of the party as ‘New’ Labour and on the ‘third way’; while New Democracy’s re-launch was structured upon the ‘middle-ground’ project. Notwithstanding their different and opposing starting points (Labour from the left and New Democracy from the right of the ideological spectrum), both parties adopted an above the centre and beyond the classic ideological concepts approach, avoiding in that way the Downsian logic of ‘leapfrogging’. Therefore, they converged on the core element of pragmatic politics, which combined economic liberalism with a socialist view on social issues. For both parties and regardless of their left- or right-wing origin, the middle ground constituted an innovative third way of political practice. To this end, New Labour governed as left-of-centre and New Democracy as right-of-centre pragmatists.

Second, both Labour and New Democracy chose the same way to ‘launch’ their new, moderate, centripetal but mostly, pragmatic ideological profile; a Special Conference, which became the focal point of the party’s public reinvigoration. In strictly communications terms, the Conference in both cases comprised a well-designed and organised public relations exercise that tested each party’s media appeal and intra-party responsiveness. In fact, the Special Conferences played a vital role in the consolidation of the parties’ new ideological identities and communications resurgence. Most importantly, these provided an immaculately staged exercise for both leaders to reinforce their intra-party appeal and to successfully, entrench their status and authority. Finally, both campaigns were heavily based on the latest technological advances as well as on the extensive use of political marketing tools and techniques. Therefore, the communications teams of both parties placed great emphasis on public opinion polls; that is on the elaboration of quantitative data and qualitative analysis of pollsters and media consultants into the planning and daily running of the campaign. As a result of the professionalisation / marketisation of the campaign, both parties successfully responded to the demands of the voters and particularly, to the new type of non-ideological, non-political and extremely pragmatic voters. The fact that the core focus of each party’s communications planning rested upon the public’s wants, perceptions and responses has been officially vindicated by both parties; Gould (2001) for the Labour party and Daskalakis for New Democracy (personal interview).
However, despite the common communications and marketing line of reasoning adopted by Labour and New Democracy their differences remain more significant and rather deep-rooted. As already discussed in the previous section, it was the opposing identities and political character that mainly explain the reasons that the New Labour project was more successful in the long-term than New Democracy’s middle-ground approach. The main divergence of the projects of the two parties was prompted by two factors. First, the nature and scope of reforms that preceded the communications transformation and/or revolution, in particular in the case of the Labour party. Second, the nature of each party’s communications planning and operation and the extent of its appeal to and tolerance by the wider party base (horizontally and vertically) played a vital role in the long-term success and efficiency of the two projects. To this end, New Democracy was never able to reinvent itself as a ‘new’ New Democracy, as per Labour’s successful strategy. The party was in need of radical reforms that were never implemented. And the organisational reforms that took place followed the lines of the previous attempts to reform New Democracy, which were no more than theoretical. For New Democracy a radical change would jeopardise the unity and even the prospect of electoral success, as the shallow changes had already by 2001 yielded increased electoral benefits for the party. So based on a safe electoral win the New Democracy leadership lacked the will and impetus to introduce further changes and thus, to reform the party. On the other hand, for Labour the thorough organisational and ideological reforms appeared to be the only way forward as the party’s communications transformation in the late 1980s was inadequate for Labour to win the election.

The mainstream features defining the divergence between the two case studies are depicted in Figures 8.1 and 8.2, which illustrate the interdependent relationship between the core elements of a party’s evolution process as these are defined by the Party Evolution Framework; institutionalisation, adaptation and professionalisation. Moreover, Figure 8.3 depicts the extent to which the dynamic relationship between the three variables has an impact on the effectiveness of a party’s communications campaign. As already discussed, the Party Evolution Framework allows the assessment of the process of professionalisation, which is considered more crucial to the effectiveness of a party’s campaigning rather than the mere adoption of successful but somewhat unfamiliar to the party marketing strategies and techniques. To this end, Figure 8.1 demonstrates the relationship between the parties’ degrees of institutionalisation and adaptation. As expected, Labour’s origins and low degree of institutionalisation have rendered the party more flexible and adaptive and thus more responsive to the challenges of its environment, while on the contrary, New Democracy’s high degree of institutionalisation has affected the adaptive capacity of
the party, which has been less amenable to changes and therefore, less receptive and responsive to internal and external shocks. Moreover, the level of each party's adaptive capacity has a direct impact on the process and degree of their professionalisation as indicated in Figure 8.2. As discussed regardless of their distinct political identities both parties run highly sophisticated and professionalised political campaigns, at least in terms of planning and implementation. Notwithstanding Labour and New Democracy's level of campaign professionalisation the effectiveness of their communications operation, as showed in Figure 8.3, differed significantly, due to the nature and scope of each party's reforms. Labour's evolution was built upon a more solid basis while New Democracy failed to cement the communications transformation of the party as a result of the lack of a rigid framework (that is substantive internal reforms) upon which these changes could be based.

8.4 Conclusion

Undoubtedly the examination of the electoral communications projects of Labour and New Democracy has demonstrated that both parties run professional, marketing-oriented communication campaigns, which, in both cases and regardless of the divergence in their actual degree of professionalisation played a considerable role in their landslide electoral victories. Indeed, the Labour 1997 and New Democracy 2004 campaign projects present a number of similarities. Hence, it could be argued that due to the time difference New Democracy has copied strategies and techniques used by Labour in 1997. Notwithstanding the fact that New Democracy officials have denied that the party copied or even followed New Labour's successful campaign planning as the basis of their own communications project, the similarities at that level are evident and consistent in terms of the rhetoric, planning and execution of the campaign. The parties' campaigning methods and techniques provide a valid point for a comparative approach. However, it should be stressed that the parallel character of the parties' campaigns denotes only a part of the party evolution process while dissembling the underlying structures of party composition, operation and management. Therefore, from a holistic perspective this approach could be considered inconsistent and fragmentary as it strictly rests on the use of political marketing tools, technological advancements and communication means and strategies. The shortcoming of this particular context is that party electoral behaviour is deciphered on a multi-level basis, upon which the professionalisation and modernisation of communications and campaigning constitute mere electoral characteristics; that is, however, contrary to the Party Evolution Framework that considers them inherent qualities of a party's identity and inextricable traits of party evolution.
Therefore, it should be borne in mind that the framework of party evolution developed as an integrated approach to fill in the gap between the classic models of party organisation and the modern theories of political communication and marketing. Most importantly, the evolution approach aims at overcoming the main deficiency of the latter theories that regard parties as unitary actors that develop their electoral behaviour based on predefined contexts of professionally designed strategic plans, by demonstrating that political parties are dynamic organisations with distinct characteristics and unique identities that play a vital role in their electoral professionalisation process. As a result, party electioneering is not considered merely a means to an end but should be addressed as an integral part of party culture and character. As a consequence, changes in the mode of campaigning correlate with the uniqueness of party identity. Professionalisation is a trait of party identity defined both at political and electoral levels, while its effectiveness derives from a continuing process of internal maturity and tenacity. To this end, party evolution is a process inherently dependent upon the interaction of internal and external factors influencing party behaviour, defined by the interaction of institutionalisation, adaptation and professionalisation and assessed by long-term effectiveness in campaigning but also party operation and structure. The Labour and New Democracy parties have provided two robust case studies of this process.
Figure 8.1: Institutionalisation – Adaptation Index

High Adaptation

Labour Party

Low Institutionalisation

New Democracy

High Institutionalisation

Low Adaptation

Figure 8.2: Professionalisation – Adaptation Index

High Adaptation

Labour Party

Low Professionalisation

New Democracy

High Professionalisation

Low Adaptation
Figure 8.3: Professionalisation – Effectiveness Index

High Professionalisation

Low Professionalisation

Low degree of Effectiveness

High degree of Effectiveness

Labour Party

New Democracy
Chapter 9
Conclusion

9.1 Party Evolution In Perspective

Existing theories of party organisation, and political communication and marketing, address the issue of party evolution and electoral behaviour from opposing and largely one-dimensional angles. Based on a theoretical framework that goes beyond the classic models of party organisation and campaigning, this thesis approaches the issue of party electoral behaviour and party professionalisation as the core derivatives of an evolutionary process of party transformation and change. Taking into consideration the past (formative stage) and internal constraints that constitute inherent elements of a party’s political character and trajectory, my primary aim has been to identify the stages of party development and present a coherent, comprehensive approach to party evolution. Therefore, taking into account the existing literature on party organisation and political communication and marketing and considering the inherent deficiencies of the latter models, the ‘Party Evolution Framework’ attempts to fill in the gap between the two approaches and present their relationship in a new light. That is, the party evolution approach addresses party electoral behaviour, campaigning and professionalisation through the integration of all elements of a party’s formative stage, organisational and ideological transformation. Most importantly, it elaborates on the endogenous underlying dynamics that condition a party’s level of change and development. That is, contrary to the existing models of communication and marketing that treat parties as unitary actors with a predefined and fixed party member behaviour, the framework explains and analyses the determinants of party behaviour by placing great emphasis on the distinct culture and ethos, and thus, unique political identity of each party. Within this line of reasoning, the evolution framework expounds on the institutional constraints of party organisation in order to determine party behaviour as a direct corollary of its political and electoral attributes.

The Party Evolution Framework is a three-stage comprehensive typology of party development, focusing on interpreting communications professionalisation and campaign modernisation with regard to a party’s inherent political identity. In other words, it argues that party development over time is affected by the formative traits and innate features of a party’s process of consolidation and institutionalisation, which in turn, have an effect on the extent of a party’s adaptive capacity and evolution effectiveness. This perception of inherent dependency is illustrated by the three-stage framework upon which the evolution approach is based. Stage (I), the stage of Institutionalisation, refers to party formation and institutionalisation, and is concerned
with party inception and institutionalisation processes and the impact the unique 
mark of a party's origin has on the development of party identity. By elaborating on 
Panebianco's empirical analysis of party institutionalisation, this first stage of analysis 
re-assesses the examination of the genetic model and institutionalisation process in 
order to incorporate the wider political context, within which parties operated and the 
intra-party organisational dynamics, which determined party short- and also, long-
term development and character. The second Stage (II) of the *organisation of 
electioneering and adaptation* focuses on party organisation and party types, 
examining the relationship between intra-party organisation and electoral behaviour. 
The way that parties are organised at the various levels of their structure, the 
distribution of power among these horizontally and vertically arranged strata 
(parliamentary and extra-parliamentary party, leadership and activists) on the one 
hand, and the party’s relationship (its levels of responsiveness and adaptability) with 
the state and the civil society, as well as the wider electoral base on the other, 
determine the development of party political identity. Therefore, party electoral 
behaviour, the ways that parties choose to respond to the electoral challenges over 
time, is dependent on the innate characteristics of a party’s political identity. Even 
when the party alters aspects of its formative character to suit the demands of the new 
times, a common and rational process for all office-seeking parties, the core traits of its 
identity define the level of its adaptation and the degree of the latter’s effectiveness. 
The final Stage (III) of *encompassing professionalisation considers parties as election 
campaign communicators* focusing on the detailed analysis of the election campaign 
attributes of a political party. The main purpose is to identify changes in a party's 
communications operation and thus, to establish its relative degree of electoral and 
political professionalisation (encompassing professionalisation). To this end, while the 
extent of organisational transformation and ideological re-positioning are defined by 
the adaptive capacity of a political party, the detailed analysis of national and local 
campaigning with the use of political communication and marketing models 
determines the level of party professionalisation. The professionalisation of a party’s 
campaign is examined in relation to the adaptation of internal party organisational 
structures. It should be emphasised that these two criteria are contingent, greatly 
interrelated and interdependent and changes in their relative degrees can affect the 
effectiveness of an election campaign. In other words, the professionalisation and 
adaptation criteria define a party’s evolution to a professional political organisation.

In essence, party evolution, as is defined by the evolution framework, is contingent on 
the three core elements of a party’s identity: institutionalisation, adaptation and 
professionalisation. It integrates all aspects of a party’s political identity as this is 
established at the very early days of party inception and the later stage of party
institutionalisation. Moreover, the evolution approach emphasises the importance of a party’s innate character, developed through a long-term process of organisational and ideological fermentation, internal and external stimuli, formal and constitutionally defined principles as well as informal rules, values and traditions that define intra-party dynamics and the leadership’s course of action. The evolution framework has attempted to expound that these characteristics constitute intrinsic parts of a party’s behavioural jigsaw of normative, organisational, political, electoral and governmental pieces. Within this context, the professionalisation of party campaigning and modernisation of communications through the recruitment of consultants and media advisors and also, the extensive use of marketing techniques and tools as core elements of party electoral activity, are inextricably linked to and constitute inherent elements of a party’s political identity and should not be regarded as causal elements of the process of electioneering. Hence, the implementation of professional modernised political campaigns is not merely the outcome of the partial adoption of innovative communications projects and marketing tools by the majority of political parties that run for office. Neither would it be accurate to consider the impressive expansion of professionalisation of party electoral behaviour as the mere adaptation of the techniques used in US elections by western European parties (process of ‘Americanisation’). In fact, as already demonstrated in this thesis through the thorough study of the Labour and New Democracy parties, the process of communications professionalisation is more crucial to the effectiveness of campaigning than the implicit adoption of successful but rather unfamiliar electoral practices.

The endorsement of the theoretical framework is based on empirical evidence derived from two case studies; the British Labour Party and the Greek New Democracy party and their national election campaigns of 1997 and 2004 respectively. The intended aim of this analysis has been twofold. First, there is a detailed discussion of the historical background and identification of the political qualifications of the two parties through the examination of their genetic characteristics and traits that defined their institutionalisation (Stage I). The systematic analysis of the parties’ formation phase, genetic characteristics and institutionalisation process as well as their organisational and ideological development over time are underpinned by the study of the formal and informal values and principles that influence the distribution of intra-party power, balance the authority and control of the various party branches on party management, and thus, mould the culture and ethos of the parties and define their political identity (Stage II). As the various stages of party development rest not only on intra-party factors but also on exogenously derived events, the changing nature of the social, economic and political environment, to which the parties continuously respond, constitute an enduring feature in the process of party evolution. Second, the focus of
the analysis shifts into the election campaigns of Labour and New Democracy and the nature of their communications evolution and political renewal over time (Stage III). The extent of campaign professionalisation is addressed in relation to the adaptive capacity of each party. The degree of adaptation, which is determined by the party character and idiosyncrasy, affects the degree of professionalisation and thus, the effectiveness of campaigning. It is indicative that the interaction and dependency of the three main evolution criteria of the framework - that is, of institutionalisation, adaptation and professionalisation – demonstrates that the professionalisation of electioneering should not be regarded as simply a means to an end, a tool for parties to win elections; rather it constitutes an inherent element of party identity and an essential step in the process of party evolution.

The use of two profoundly different political parties with differing political backgrounds provided the basis upon which the utility of the party evolution framework as a tool for comparative analysis is based. Both Labour and New Democracy are vote-maximising and office-seeking political parties, which albeit their intrinsic differences in terms of ideology, organisation, political and social background, have developed an inherent adaptive capacity (even though the degree of adaptation between the two differs). The latter characteristic has played an important role in the parties' political and electoral evolution and mainly, to their political endurance and organisational tolerance. This is for the simple reason that both parties have developed ‘hybrid’ identities; that is, they do not fall within the strict lines of the classic models of party organisation and development but rather have developed unique identities with traits that intersect in scope and nature.

In particular this is reflected on Labour's political identity, which could be regarded as unconventional for a European socialist party of the early 20th century. The bi-polar operation of the party was manifested in every aspect of Labour's operation; governmental policy vs. ideological direction, pragmatism vs. idealism, leadership vs. activists and parliamentary vs. extra-parliamentary organisation. As it has been already argued, this clash of intra-party and governmental interests has distanced Labour from the development of a tangible socialist ideological identity but has rendered it to a more pragmatic, electorally powerful political organisation. This flexibility has also allowed Labour to adapt to the internal and external challenges and be able to renew itself so as to remain a major political force in British politics. Under Blair New Labour succeeded in holding office for more than 12 years, creating its own political hegemony into the British political realm.
On the other hand, New Democracy had a different trajectory, reflected on the party’s political and electoral development, that is considered less successful than Labour’s. Internal disputes and continuous confrontations at the top party level, prevented the party from evolving in line with its political and electoral environment. New Democracy’s renewal in 2004 was the leadership’s response to a series of internal and external challenges that ought to face in order to safeguard the party’s political but foremost, electoral survival. In the late 1990s, the party was in disrepute and on the verge of disintegration, facing the most severe internal crisis in its history. The electoral revival of New Democracy was the outcome of a structured and decisive process that aimed at winning the forthcoming election. The implementation of this project was based on the adoption of already successful communications strategies through the extensive use of political marketing tools and techniques. Regardless of the inconsistent, superficial and as a result, scrappy character of the party’s reformation, New Democracy succeeded in re-branding certain elements of its electoral identity and winning a landslide electoral victory in 2004. The short-sighted approach of the project’s implementation however, deprived the party from a long-term dominance in the Greek political scene.

Overall, the very essence of the evolution framework is outlined in Figures 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3, which present in two-dimensional space the contingent relationship of the framework’s three main criteria; institutionalisation, adaptation and professionalisation. Effectiveness is the qualitative outcome that defines the relationship between the main three criteria. The interaction of the three criteria produces three main correlations. First, it suggests that the transformation of a political party is subject to its formative characteristics. That is, the level of a party’s institutionalisation as this is defined by the analysis of party genetic characteristics affects the adaptive capacity of a political party; a weakly institutionalised party is more amenable to changes due to the weakly defined relationships of its organisation whilst strong institutionalisation refers to parties with a rigid and inflexible structure and thus, less open or unwilling to changes. As is demonstrated by the institutionalisation-adaptation relationship index, Labour’s low degree of institutionalisation has rendered the party more adaptive to internal and external challenges, while the opposite applies to New Democracy. Second, the degree of a party’s professionalisation is subject to its relative adaptive capacity. The results of the Labour/New Democracy examination as indicated in terms of the professionalisation-adaptation relationship vindicate the latter claim; Labour was more resilient and adaptive, and succeeded in running a highly professionalised campaign, while New Democracy’s professionalisation level was hindered by the fact that the leader failed to implement reforms imperative for the party. Finally, the degree of professionalisation
closely relates to and influences party effectiveness in the short and long term. The former refers to the effectiveness of a specific political campaign (extent of election win) while the later addresses the effectiveness of the party evolution process. To this end, New Democracy was effective in winning a landslide victory in 2004 but this success was short-lived, contrary to the Labour party’s three consecutive electoral wins, which indicated that the process of re-branding was fundamental into the party's history. To this end, the examination of the interaction of the main criteria of party evolution provides a useful basis upon which to establish the notion of the party evolution approach.

The main aim of this thesis is to present an alternative perspective to the study of the evolution of political parties, which integrates the more traditional work on party organisation with political marketing and communication approaches. The party evolution approach provides the framework upon which this integrated approach is based. The new framework does not challenge the significance of existing theories. On the contrary, by critically assessing the deficiencies of political marketing and communication approaches, the party evolution approach indicates that there is a broader more holistic approach to the study of party evolution. To this end, the notion of party evolution is re-addressed; that is, party evolution is inherently dependent upon the interaction of the internal elements of party organisation and the external conditions of political and electoral environment that might as well influence party behaviour. Therefore, the central perspective of the framework is to identify the stages of a party’s development through the integration of all aspects of party organisational and ideological progression since the early days of party formation, the definition and assessment of party electoral character, the examination and contextualisation of communications professionalisation and modernisation, and latterly, the interpretation of party political identity. That is, to provide a cohesive account of party evolution integrating elements of party organisation and development and political marketing and communications. To this end, the two case studies provided an extensive ground for research by allowing for the assessment of the theoretical framework under broad and diverse perspectives. Two points are essential to bear in mind in relation to the evolution framework. First, the party evolution framework is applicable to vote-maximising, office-seeking political parties regardless of their origins and as such, has a positive connotation; that is, it defines parties that have undergone a process of ‘internal maturity’ and have succeeded through a process of internal renewal and reinvigoration to re-launch their political brand and return to office. Second, at the risk of generalisation, through the systematic analysis of the various stages of a party’s development over time the framework allows for the identification of certain recurring patterns of party behaviour upon which future patterns of
development could probably be based. Though, taking the latter in mind, it should be emphasised that the party evolution framework aims primarily at interpreting political parties rather than estimating likely future party behaviour.
Appendix

Diagram 5.1 *New Democracy Party Organisation (1979)*

- **CENTRAL ORGANISATION**
  - GENERAL ASSEMBLY
  - PARTY LEADER
  - FINANCIAL COMMITTEE
  - EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
  - ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE

- **REGIONAL ORGANISATION**
  - REGIONAL ASSEMBLY
  - REGIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE
  - REGIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
  - REGIONAL FINANCIAL COMMITTEE

- **LOCAL ORGANISATION**
  - LOCAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
Diagram 5.2 *New Democracy Party Organisation (1986)*

**CENTRAL ORGANISATION**
- CONGRESS
- PRESIDENT
- PARLIAMENTARY GROUP
- CENTRAL COMMITTEE
- EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
- CENTRAL DISCIPLINARY COUNCIL
- CENTRAL FINANCIAL COMMITTEE

**REGIONAL ORGANISATION**
- LOCAL
- PROVISIONAL
- PREFECTURAL

**SPECIAL FIELDS OF POLITICAL ACTION**
- NON-CONSTITUTENCY PARTY
- INTERNATIONAL PARTY ORGANISATIONS

- CENTRAL ORGANISATION
  - CENTRAL COMMITTEE
  - PARLIAMENTARY GROUP
  - PRESIDENT
  - POLITICAL COUNCIL
  - CENTRAL DISCIPLINARY COUNCIL
  - CENTRAL FINANCIAL COMMITTEE
  - SECRETARY OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE
  - SECRETARIATS
  - COUNCIL OF NODE PRESIDENTS
  - COUNCIL OF MERITOCRACY

- REGIONAL ORGANISATION
  - LOCAL
  - PREFECTORAL

- FIELDS OF POLITICAL ACTION
  - NON-CONSTITUENCY VOTER ORGANISATIONS
  - INTERNATIONAL PARTY ORGANISATIONS
  - REGIONAL COUNCILS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE DISTRICTS
Journal Publications and Presentations Arising From This Thesis

**Publications**


**Presentations**


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