Mapping the Present

Space and History in the Work of Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger and Michel Foucault

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

by

Stuart Elden

December 1998
Abstract

This thesis seeks to contribute to the growing literature on the theoretical issues surrounding the notions of space and place, by examining how they can be put to work in a historical study. This work is achieved through a reading of Foucault, who not only sketched a history of space, but also undertook a number of spatial histories. To understand this, and these histories, this thesis begins by reading Foucault's professed influence on history, Nietzsche, and goes on to highlight the key role that Heidegger plays in this understanding. Just as Heidegger is central to Foucault's work on history, it is suggested that the importance of space also stems from Heidegger, especially from his work in the 1930s which critically engages with Nietzsche and the Romantic poet Hölderlin. The importance of space, or more fundamentally place, becomes central to Heidegger's later work on modern technology, his rethinking of politics and the πόλις, and art.

Reading Foucault's work on history draws out the nature of his spatial language. Not only is his work replete with spatial metaphors, but he also made analyses of actual spaces. This is most evident in Foucault's two large scale historical projects – the history of madness from the Renaissance to the beginnings of psychology in *Histoire de la folie*, and the study of modern discipline in the army, hospitals, schools and prisons found in *The Birth of the Clinic, Discipline and Punish* but also in numerous shorter pieces and lectures. His two major works are re-read as spatial histories, and the standard interpretations to an extent *re-placed*, in the light of the argument developed in the previous chapters. Foucault's historical approach is often described as a history of the present: given the emphasis on space, it is here rethought as *mapping the present*. 
Contents

Acknowledgements iv
Abbreviations v
Introduction 1

Chapter One: Against Egyptianism

The Role of History 7
A Critique of Modernity 10
Spatial Metaphors and Analyses 19
The Spaces of the Eternal Return 28
Historical Sense 32

Chapter Two: Space and History in Being and Time

Introduction 35
Ontology, History and Time 36
The Space of Dasein and Equipment 42
Reading Kant Phenomenologically 44
Towards Hölderlin and Nietzsche 51

Chapter Three: In the Shadow of Nazism: Reading Hölderlin and Nietzsche

Einführung: Introduction 53
I: Hölderlin 58
The Germania and Rhine Hymns 59
The Ister Hymn 66
II: Nietzsche 70
Returning to the Augenblick 72
Space and the Body 74
Power and Perspectivism 80
Reading Nietzsche 84

Chapter Four: Applications of the Platial

The Origin of the Work of Art 88
Rethinking the Πόλις 92
The Question of Technology 101
Dwelling Poetically at the Place of the Fourfold 109
Platial Descriptions 113
Art and Space 118
Chapter Five: Towards a Spatial History

Introduction
I: A History of Limits
   Archaeology
   Genealogy
II: Mapping the Present

Chapter Six: The Spaces of Power

I: Re-placing *Madness and Civilisation*
   Leprosy, Water and Madness
   Confinement and Correction
   Observing and Classifying
   The Birth of Moral Imprisonment
II: Not Through Bentham’s Eyes
   A Torturous Sediment
   The Army, Schools, Monasteries and Factories
   The Spaces of Medicine
   The Panopticon and Panopticism

Conclusion

Appendix: Martin Heidegger, “Art and Space”

Glossary of Greek Terms

Endnotes

Bibliography
Acknowledgements

This thesis is dedicated to Colin Elden (1946-1998)

First, I owe a huge debt of thanks to Mark Neocleous, who supervised the thesis and continued to offer advice, criticism and encouragement throughout. In addition, he provided support as a colleague and friend when things professional and personal became difficult.

David Wootton and Barbara Goodwin supervised early parts of the work here, and Maurice Kogan acted as second supervisor and Director of Graduate Studies throughout. Barbara Goodwin also provided the initial encouragement to register for a PhD. I thank them all.

Bela Chatterjee read the entire manuscript, and made many useful comments.

A number of other people have been of assistance, either academic or otherwise:

Allegra Catolfi Salvoni; Joanne Reeves-Baker; Pınar Bilgin; Pete Coulson and Jane Underdown; Sharon Cowan; Elgin Diaz and Julia Garrett; Hubert Dreyfus; Béatrice Han; Michael Hughes; Jeff Jackson and Sarah Elliott; Morris Kaplan; Eleonore Kofman; Lizzi Pickton; Pierre, Geneviève, and Isabelle Prépoignot.

I also thank my colleagues in the Department of Government at Brunel University.

Finally, and certainly not least, I owe a great deal to my family – my mother Rosemary, brother Ian, and sisters Nicky and Rachel. The last couple of years have been difficult for all of us, and I am grateful to them for their support and encouragement throughout. This thesis is dedicated to my father, Colin Elden: without whose support I would never have reached this far; sadly he was unable to be here at its completion.
Abbreviations

I: Abbreviations to Works by Friedrich Nietzsche


Individual works are cited by the following code, unless otherwise stated, the reference is to the part, section and sub-section by number, rather than the page, as these are the same in all editions.


II: Abbreviations to Works by Martin Heidegger

GA  Gesamtausgabe, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975ff.


GA4  Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung, 1981.

GA5  Holzwege, 1977. References to the marginal pagination found in the original edition.


GA15  Seminare, 1986.


GA39  Hölderlins Hymnen 'Germanien' und 'Der Rhein', 1980.


GA55  Heraklit: (1) Der Anfang des abendländischen Denkens; (2) Logik: Heraklits Lehre Vom Logos, 1979.

GA65  Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), 1989.


Q  Questions, translated by various and including in the fourth volume the original protocols of the Thor and Zahringen seminars, Paris: Gallimard, Four Volumes, 1966-76.

SdU  Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität; Das Rektorat 1933-34: Tatsachen und Gedanken, edited by Herman Heidegger, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983.


The majority of texts translated from the Gesamtausgabe have the pagination of the German version at the top of the page, allowing a single page reference. Exceptions are noted above.

III: Abbreviations to Works by Michel Foucault


OD *L’Ordre du discours*, Paris: Gallimard, 1970. Translated by Rupert Swyer as “The Discourse on Language” in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (AK appendix). This will be referred to as “The Order of Discourse”; all quotations entirely retranslated.


TNP *This is Not a Pipe*, translated by James Harkess, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983.


Introduction

In recent years within the social sciences there has been a noticeable shift from questions of temporality to those of spatiality. As Frederic Jameson asks, "why should landscape be any less dramatic than the event?"\(^1\) Questions of spatiality have often been thought to be the preserve of geographers and urbanists, and there has recently been a number of attempts in these fields to critically theorise space.\(^2\) For example, Edward Soja states his aim as "the reassertion of a critical spatial perspective in contemporary social theory and analysis";\(^3\) and Derek Gregory suggests his book is a set of essays that "spiral around a common set of themes dealing with power, knowledge and spatiality".\(^4\) However, there are two principal problems with these attempts.

First, a number of these works have indulged in the intellectual pick 'n' mix prevalent in the putative genre of 'postmodernism'. In this they are too eager to seize upon any theorist who talks of space as 'one of them', conflating the work of thinkers whose understandings of space or place are quite different.\(^5\) The specific philosophical, historical, political and geographical situation of the works utilised is often ignored. However practically valuable, useful and interesting these recent studies may have been, they are often worryingly conceptually weak.

Second, whilst there has undoubtedly been a heavy bias in favour of history and time in the past, to swing too far the other way through a privileging of geography and space is no solution. Yet much of this recent work does precisely that.\(^6\) Instead, we need to think of the two together: we need to both historicise space and spatialise history. In other words, rather than solely providing an analysis of how the meaning and use of the word 'space' has changed over time — a useful analysis to be sure — we need to recognise how space, place and location are crucial determining factors — along with time and politics — in any historical study. This is the project of a spatial history.
Michel Foucault has been one of the major thinkers whose work has been seized upon by those who want to argue for the importance of space, and yet relatively little is known about his own use of space in his works. This is due to a number of reasons. First, Foucault wrote only a small number of pieces that directly addressed the question of space, and these have been the principal focus of analysis in the works cited above. Other than the incessant emphasis on the Panopticon, the most oft-cited work of Foucault’s on space is a lecture given to architects in 1967, but only published just before his death. This lecture is entitled “Of Other Spaces”, and introduces the notion of heterotopias. This work is of undoubted interest, but it offers a history of the concept of space, and then proceeds to discuss and analyse many spaces of our modern world. It is important to note that this piece is the exception rather than the rule. The norm for Foucault is to use space not merely as another area analysed, but as a central part of the approach itself. Second, his historical works, which are, I suggest, spatial through and through, have been incompletely understood, at least in the English speaking world. This is partly due to the fact that a complete translation of Histoire de la folie and much of the important material Foucault produced in the early 70s relating to the project of discipline have never appeared in English. Third, and perhaps most important, Foucault’s intellectual heritage has been treated only partially.

Yet from the madhouses of Histoire de la folie, the hospitals of The Birth of the Clinic and the Rio lectures on the history of medicine, and the plague town, army camp and prisons of Discipline and Punish, Foucault always seemed to take into account the spatial elements of the historical question he was addressing. What was the theoretical basis for such an awareness and how, if at all, was it anticipated in the work of those he claimed as influences? In essence then, this thesis provides an answer to the question “why are Foucault’s historical studies so spatially aware?”

Foucault’s historical works fall, on his own designation, into archaeological and genealogical phases. Explicitly in the second, but implicitly in the first, his work was framed by a reading of Nietzsche. Nietzsche’s understanding of power, the notion of genealogy, and the continued emphasis on Nietzsche in Foucault’s
works has led many critics to examine the Nietzsche/Foucault relation at length. This thesis therefore begins by examining the work of Nietzsche, especially on history, and teasing out the elements within his work that address the question of space. Such an examination is useful in a number of ways, but most importantly it shows that Nietzsche alone could not have provided Foucault with the necessary conceptual apparatus to shape his approach. Because the influence of Nietzsche cannot explain the importance of space to Foucault, a number of issues arise that raise problems about the standard interpretation of Foucault. Why is Discipline and Punish framed as a history of the present? Is there a link between Foucault’s understanding of the distinction between connaissance and savoir and the later notion of historical ontology? What is the theoretical base of his discussions of technology and the dispositif? Why, too, are his historical studies so overtly spatialised?

The answer to such questions is found – following a remark Foucault makes in a late interview, but arguably following a trend noticeable throughout his career – in an examination of the work of Heidegger. Heidegger’s influence on Foucault is relatively rarely noted, and where it has been, it is approached in ways that are not helpful in resolving the critical issues identified here. Crucially, Heidegger’s work on space has received limited treatment, and little at all of this has been in terms of his influence on Foucault. Indeed, arguably the question of the Heidegger/Foucault relationship has been addressed poorly overall. This thesis argues that the principal influence on Foucault is not Nietzsche, but Heidegger, and that often where Nietzsche is important he is being read through Heidegger’s interpretation of him.

In order to show how Heidegger’s work informed and shaped that of Foucault, it is necessary to provide an analysis of Heidegger’s career as a whole. If Foucault has been badly served by cultural critics eager to get their hands on his theoretical ‘toolkit’, Heidegger’s work on space and place has suffered through simplistic, partial, politically blind, ideologically loaded, or philosophically insubstantial readings. As Heidegger was only too aware, his work was perhaps best characterised as a ‘path’ [Weg], and on the key issues of space and history his work certainly went through a number of changes. It is possible to provide a
picture of Heidegger’s path through the works he published in his lifetime – to which Foucault would have had access – but this path becomes much clearer and more involved if the lecture courses published in the Gesamtausgabe since 1975 are taken into account.

As well as showing the role Heidegger’s thought plays in influencing Foucault, the exposition of Heidegger’s work also makes a number of claims about his own development. Concerning the putative Kehre [turn], I suggest that the privilege accorded to time in Being and Time is corrected in Heidegger’s later works, and that the ontology of Dasein is historicised to become a historical ontology. These changes – changes that may well have been apparent much earlier if Heidegger had published Division III of Part One and Part Two of Being and Time – are the true meaning of the Kehre. On the issue of space, it is clear from Being and Time that Heidegger wants to rethink it as the resolutely non-Cartesian place. The shift from the use of Platz to Ort – both words translated here as ‘place’ – is important in understanding this issue. In some of his later works Heidegger suggests that ‘space’ can be thought more originally from this understanding of ‘place’.

The thesis also accords due emphasis to the political element in Heidegger’s philosophy. Rather than separate the man from the thought or merely dismiss him as a thinker, moves which have tended to dog discussions of Heidegger’s Nazism, I follow a number of recent studies in examining the importance of the political to his thought. The relationship of the political and the spatial is examined in particular detail, particularly through a discussion of Heidegger’s rethinking of the πόλις. Such a reading allows us new perspective on Heidegger’s retreat from his Nazi allegiance. Heidegger’s readings of Kant, Nietzsche and Hölderlin are also examined closely – the last of which is particularly dependent on lecture course material.

Having spent this time on an exegesis of the work of Nietzsche and Heidegger, the thesis is then able to discuss Foucault’s work on history and space from a much stronger basis. Showing the influence of Heidegger in these areas situates Foucault’s work in a much broader intellectual context than is usually recognised. This is not simply a case of asking “where did he get that from?”
which, as Heidegger suggests, stems "from a shopkeeper’s mentality" (GA26, 54). Rather, concepts of Foucault’s such as the connaissance/savoir distinction, ontology, dispositif, technologies, the history of the present, space, knowledge and power become much clearer – and therefore more useful – if viewed through a Heideggerian lens. In this reading, the notion of genealogy is recast as a historical ontology, which is framed as a critique of the present. In Foucault’s work, this Heideggerian notion is described as a history of the present. In this thesis, with the emphasis on the important of space, it is re-described as a mapping of the present. Such a mapping of the present is a spatial history, rather than a history of space.

The concept of dispositif, which I argue to be a translation and utilisation of Heidegger’s Ge-stell, highlights an important point: language. Throughout this thesis Nietzsche, Heidegger and Foucault’s works are referenced back to the original language. In some instances this is not merely desirable but essential – crucial texts of both Heidegger and Foucault are not yet available in English. Where English translations do exist, they have been utilised, though have often been modified, to ensure readability, consistency, and to allow emphasis on the spatial language used. As the dispositif/Ge-stell point illustrates, several of the issues raised within this thesis are the direct result of due attention to the language used in the original texts: several of the problems in existing secondary material are due to the absence of this attention.

With this enriched understanding of Foucault’s intellectual heritage we are in a better position to understand his historical studies, because as well as being more attentive to their theoretical foundations, we can better see the role of space within them. To demonstrate this, the final chapter re-reads two of Foucault’s most celebrated historical studies – the history of madness, and the history of the disciplined society. The first of these histories is known to the English reader as Madness and Civilisation which, as we shall see, is a greatly edited version of the French original Histoire de la folie. As Colin Gordon has pointed out, a number of problems arise from this editing. Re-reading Histoire de la folie shows the range of the early Foucault’s concerns, and allows us insight into how space has been used politically in relation to the mad, showing the exclusion, ordering,
moralisation and confinement which were brought to bear on their situation. The second history is *Discipline and Punish*, the central text in a much wider project which encompasses *The Birth of the Clinic* and a number of shorter pieces, lectures and courses at the Collège de France. Re-reading *Discipline and Punish* within this wider project allows us to see that the model for the disciplinary society is not punishment, as is usually thought, but the interrelation of a number of mechanisms, notably those of the army and medicine. Such a reading enables us to shift the emphasis of spatial analysis away from the Panopticon, and to recognise the importance of space in a number of other areas.

In re-reading these histories from the perspective of the spatial question, the thesis is able to demonstrate the theoretical insights of the previous chapters in a practical setting. In both histories we see the relation between conceptualisations of space and their practical applications; how space and time work together within a historical study; the way understandings of space have changed over time; and how space is fundamental to any exercise of power. Space is inherently political, politics is inherently spatial. In addition, through this practical demonstration, the final chapter provides a reinterpretation of two justly famous and much referenced texts.

The assertion of space within social theory must not be at the expense of the importance of time and history. In addition, the theorisation of space must be philosophically substantial, politically informed, and critically aware. Whilst we can profitably learn from a history of the concept of space, just as we can from a history of the concept of time,\(^1\) to simply undertake this history is, paradoxically, and contrary to the avowed intent of geographers, to continue the modernist occlusion of space. Space simply becomes another term to be historically examined. Rather, we need to *spatialise history*, to inject an awareness of space into all historical studies, to critically examine the power relations at play in the ways space is effected and effects. Understanding the way Nietzsche and Heidegger shaped Foucault’s historical approach shows this notion of a spatial history to be immanent to Foucault’s major works. Foucault’s work can therefore be thought of – and potentially employed – as a *mapping of the present*. 
Chapter One
Against Egyptianism

The Role of History

Nietzsche’s first published work was a history, a study of Greek tragedy. Though in his later thought many of its ideas were revised, when The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music was first published in 1871 it caused shock waves through the academic discipline of philology. One of the reasons for this was the lack of conformity to accepted academic standards – the book has no footnotes and no Greek quotations. Another reason was the blurring of academic boundaries – Nietzsche was trained as a philologist, but the book was saturated with thoughts appropriated from Schopenhauer, Hegel and Kant, though again not acknowledged in standard ways. Finally the book was clearly intended to serve a purpose beyond an understanding of Greek tragedy. All of these together led to severe criticism.¹

Nietzsche’s analysis is important and challenging. His distinction between the Apollinian and Dionysian elements of tragedy shows the darker, irrational side of Greek culture in tandem with the more usually recognised rational, ordered side.² This analysis of tragedy takes up the first fifteen sections of the book, and original drafts finished here.³ The next ten sections continue the argument by relating the historical study to conditions in the contemporary period. Nietzsche draws parallels between Greece in the era of the Persian wars and the newly formed German Reich, suggesting that the social conditions of Greece at this time were key in the formation of tragedy as an art-form, in particular the works of Sophocles and Aeschylus. He sees much the same formative influences in the work of Richard Wagner, a close friend at the time.

Nietzsche suggests that Greece at the time of the Persian wars was in great danger, both because of the military struggle and Apollinian militarism and because of the rise of the Dionysian cult. Tragedy provided an aesthetic way of
mediating between these two conflicting things. It is argued that Germany in the early 1870s was in a parallel position. The military threat was the Franco-Prussian war, which Nietzsche himself was involved in, the Paris Commune and the International raised the prospect of "mob rule" on a level that appalled Nietzsche. Wagner – having been a revolutionary in 1848, and being now a supporter of German nationalism – was able to act as a mediating force between these two dangers, and his music-drama could play a similar aesthetic role to that which tragedy had played in Greece. Wagner is the German Aeschylus who should be used for the benefit of the new state.

Nietzsche felt that the final sections of the book had spoilt it (GT Attempt, 6), but as the book stands it provides an excellent example of how Nietzsche used history. For Nietzsche, history is not capable of objectivity, and where this is aimed for often great harm results. Instead, history has to be subjective, and therefore the historian needs to be aware of the uses to which their work is being put. This is the topic of the second of Nietzsche’s Untimely Meditations, a set of essays written immediately after The Birth of Tragedy. In the preface to this work, Nietzsche provides a succinct summary of how he sees the use of historical study:

For I do not know what meaning classical philology would have for our time if not to have an untimely effect within it, that is, to act against the time and so have an effect on the time, to the advantage, it is to be hoped, of a coming time (UB II, Preface).

In other words, Nietzsche is aware that studying the past allows us to affect the present, and through this, the future. This much was clear from The Birth of Tragedy. Nietzsche sees that there is something fundamentally wrong with the present, that there may be things in the past that may be of interest and illumination, and that knowing these things may be useful to change both how we see the present, and the future. Nietzsche’s diagnosis of the cultural malaise of his own time – exacerbated by the threat of war and the Paris Commune – can be cured by seeing how Greece dealt with a parallel problem. Wagner’s music-dramas can, once reinterpreted in a particular way, provide future benefit.
The *Untimely Meditation* suggests that history is a necessary part of men’s lives. Unlike the animal, who forgets and is therefore able to live unhistorically, what distinguishes man is that he remembers. Man lives with a sense of time, he remains attached to the past like a chain. The fleeting moment, though it flashes by, can return as a “spectre” to haunt a later moment. Man therefore has a need of history, but we need to be careful to ensure that it is used to the best advantage of life. This involves a number of balances. First, we must learn that if we remember everything we would never act. Some degree of unhistorical living is necessary (UB II, 1).\(^4\) Nietzsche then distinguishes between three types of history – the monumental, the antiquarian and the critical. As far as humans are active and striving, they have need of monumental history; where they preserve and admire, antiquarian; and where they suffer and are in need of liberation, critical (UB II, 2).

Monumental history is the kind of history needed by someone who aspires to greatness. Nietzsche suggests that by looking back into the past one can see what might be capable again in the future, because what was once possible can be possible again. The question arises as to what difference there is between a monumental past and a mythical fiction? In order to serve its ends, the monumental approach has to generalise and be selective. A dominance of this mode of history would be dangerous because of the fear that some things might be forgotten, and because this mode deceives by analogies, because things will not be the same again (UB II, 2). Antiquarian history is for use by those who preserve and revere; who give thanks for their existence by acknowledging their debt to the past. However, like monumental history, antiquarian history has its problems. It has a tendency to inflate the past, runs the risk of nostalgia and is possibly not entirely critical. Without some critical perspective there is the danger that all is equally revered – without selection – and that the new is despised in relation to the past. Nietzsche suggests that this could mean that life is no longer preserved but is mummified (UB II, 3). The antiquarian and the monumental thus both complement and contradict each other: one takes the spirit from the past in order to elevate the future; whilst the other praises heritage.
To accompany these modes of history Nietzsche thinks that man “must have the strength, and use it from time to time, to shatter and dissolve something to enable him to live”. As he would repeatedly stress in his later work, he who wishes to create must first destroy. This is the critical attitude to the past (UB II, 3). It is clear from this early essay that Nietzsche sees the three modes of history as all having their particular context. He suggests that much harm is caused by thoughtless transplanting of the modes. Out of their native soil they will grow as weeds (UB II, 2). At the start of the essay Nietzsche had quoted from Goethe: “Moreover I hate anything which merely instructs me without increasing or directly enlivening [beleben] my activity” (UB II, Preface). Nietzsche uses this quotation to suggest that we need history, but for life [Leben] and action, in order to serve life, rather than for narrow, scholarly, scientific goals. Given the choice of life ruling over knowledge, over science, or knowledge ruling over life, we should chose life, for any knowledge which destroys life would also have destroyed itself: knowledge presupposes life (UB II, 4).

A Critique of Modernity

Nietzsche describes his project as a critique of modernity (EH 10, 2) and it is clear from the project outlined in the *Untimely Meditations* that he sees his work having an affect on the present. However, as Nietzsche recognises in some of his later work, at this early stage he was trapped within certain philosophical frameworks. In his early, Wagnerian, period Nietzsche was influenced greatly by Schopenhauer, and largely accepted Schopenhauer’s reworking of Kant in response to Hegel. Nietzsche later realises that ideas which are at odds with Kant and Schopenhauer cannot be expressed in terms of their formulas (GT Attempt, 6). In order to fully find his feet as a thinker, Nietzsche needs to free himself from Wagner, Schopenhauer and the Kantian traces that still remain in his work.

The distancing of Nietzsche’s later work from Wagner and Schopenhauer is relatively well known, and need not detain us here. The critique of Kant is far more complex, and has important implications for the argument in this thesis. A central passage to understanding the difference between Nietzsche and Kant’s
perspective is found in Nietzsche's commentary on the fundamental question of Kant's first *Critique*: "how are synthetic *a priori* judgements possible?" Kant's search for an answer to this question is his reply to Hume's scepticism: synthetic *a priori* knowledge allows the foundation of a mathematical system, science to proceed by means of experiment, and the establishment of a ground for an ethics. Kant answers this question by suggesting that though experience is a necessary condition for knowledge, it is not a sufficient condition for knowledge. For any knowledge which is not merely an explication of the meaning of something already known — analytic knowledge — some synthesis of experience and reason is necessary. Kant puts this famously as "thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts, blind". Nietzsche suggests that Kant's answer to the question "how are synthetic *a priori* judgements possible" is "by faculty of a faculty [Vermöge eines Vermögens]". These faculties — Kant's perceptual manifold and the categories — continue into his moral thought, with the "discovery" of the categorical imperative. Nietzsche suggests that this is not really an answer, or an explanation, but rather a repetition of the question. It has parallels, he suggests, with the doctor in Molière's play: opium induces sleep "because it contains a sleepy faculty whose nature it is to put the senses to sleep". Nietzsche suggests such replies should remain in comedy, and that therefore we should replace the Kantian question "how are synthetic *a priori* judgements possible?" by the question "why is belief in such judgements necessary?" (JGB 11). This question is, I suggest, the key to understanding the genealogical approach of Nietzsche's later work. It will equally inform the work of Foucault, and his investigation of the historical *a priori*. For what Nietzsche, Heidegger and Foucault share is a realisation that the structures of knowledge that are taken as absolutes at a particular time are contingent, and that they must be examined historically.

This is a question of fundamental importance for Nietzsche because of the search for values to fill the void left by the death of God, so as to avoid nihilism. The first statement of God's death in Nietzsche's work comes in 1882 (FW 108), and in this he is claiming nothing new, as Hegel had already made this point in 1802. Nietzsche, however, goes a stage further and brings into question all the other assumptions that have been made because of a belief in his existence. "We
have killed him — you and I” says Nietzsche’s madman, and those that have
“wiped away the entire horizon” (FW 125) must now “vanquish his shadow too”
(FW 108). For Christians God is the source of value, and so, Nietzsche claims, it
follows that with no God, there are no God-given values.

However, it is not just Christians who have taken God-given values as their
values. Even “pale atheists... still believe in truth” (GM III, 24), taking things
at face-value, and unquestionably falling into the Christian mode. As Camus
says, “take our moral philosophers, for instance, so serious, loving their neighbours
and all the rest — nothing distinguishes them from Christians, except that they don’t
preach in churches”. The problem, according to Nietzsche, is that “moral
judgements agree with religious ones in believing in realities which are not
realities” (GD 7, 1). It is not simply morality that is tied up with belief in God.
Nietzsche suggests that a number of other things – reason, language, truth and
logic – are all closely interlinked with theology. The words at the beginning of
John’s Gospel show this: “In the beginning was the Word [λόγος], and the word
was with God and the word was God... the word became flesh and made his
dwelling among us”. If the word, λόγος, is God, then we need to think carefully
how terms are dependent on this. Our linguistic structure causes us to think in a
set of pre-ordained ways – for example providing a belief in a subject – and the
linguistic tradition invented at an early stage in our development still holds sway:
“I am afraid we are not rid of God because we still have faith in grammar” (GD
3, 5; see BGE 20).

“‘Progress’ is merely a modern idea” (A 4), states Nietzsche, as he criticises
“transcendental and teleological forms of discourse”. Not only belief in God
can create an imaginary teleology: a history with purpose, or design. For
Nietzsche there can be no ‘purpose’ in history, and no Hegelian notion of
inevitable progress either. For Nietzsche, without a “revaluation of values” the
world is heading for nihilism, and he suspects such theories of “mollifying the
fears of the craven”. He is also particularly scathing about some of the claims
made in such histories: “German historiography, for example, is convinced that
Rome represented despotism and that the Germanic tribes brought the spirit of
freedom into the world. What difference is there between this conviction and a
Nietzsche therefore realises that the declaration that God is dead – by which he means that belief in the Christian God has become unbelievable (FW 343) – is itself not enough: “in former times, one sought to prove that there is no God – today one indicates how the belief that there is a God could arise and how this belief acquired its weight and importance” (M 95). This, essentially, is why Nietzsche puts emphasis on history, and specifically what he develops as the genealogical approach. What needs to be examined, he argues, is how beliefs and ideas arose, and how they developed. These beliefs are historically and culturally situated, and can only be examined within their specific context. Nietzsche’s main area of examination with the genealogical approach is morality, and he spends a great deal of time examining how various moral “norms” became accepted. Nietzsche argues how customs/mores [Sitte] relate to morality [Sittlichkeit] (M 9), and throughout his career claims that “there are altogether no moral facts” (GD 7, 1), “there are no moral phenomena, only moral interpretation of phenomena” (JGB 108), meaning that all moralities are essentially historically and culturally relative. Nietzsche denies the idea that there are absolute values. Nietzsche does not dismiss the notion of truth entirely. He recognises that “there are many kinds of ‘truths’, and consequently there is no truth” (WM 540). This is a plural notion of truth. Certain things are taken as ‘true’ at a given time, within a given context, time and place. They may be part of a system that is internally consistent, and can seem to be undisputed – even a priori – truths, but Nietzsche suggests that they are historical, and his work denies the certainty of absolutes.

‘Truth’: this, according to my way of thinking, does not necessarily denote the antithesis of error, but in the most fundamental cases only the posture of various errors in relation to one another... An assumption that is irrefutable – why should it for that reason be ‘true’? The proposition may perhaps outrage logicians, who posit their limitations as the limitations of things:
but I long ago declared war on this optimism of logicians (WM 535).

Clearly this is not to say that the values, morals, and judgements of an age are unimportant. “A tablet of the good hangs over every people” (Z I, 15), but it is the fourth great error of man that he invents “ever new tables of goods and always accepts them for a time as eternal and unconditional” (FW 115). Nietzsche argues that morality has not remained static throughout time, but that within its age it is treated as an absolute, as if it had remained static. Essentially, “truths are illusions which one has forgotten are illusions” (KSA I, 880-1; PT 84). The excuse, as Nietzsche sees it, that values and morals are God-given, is no longer tenable: God cannot be truth. Man creates his own meaning, his own values, his own concepts of good and evil. As Nietzsche says, “they did not take it, they did not find it, nor did it come to them as a voice from heaven. Only man placed values in things to preserve himself – he alone created a meaning for thing, a human meaning. Therefore he calls himself ‘man’, which means: the esteemer” (Z I, 15).

Moral judgements are therefore never to be taken literally: so understood, they always contain mere absurdity. Semiotically, however, they remain invaluable: they reveal, at least for those who know, the most valuable realities of cultures and inwardnesses which did not know enough to ‘understand’ themselves. Morality is mere sign language, mere symptomatology: one must know what it is all about to be able to profit from it (GD 7, 1).

This is a complicated passage, and there is much to take from it. Semiotics, as well as meaning the study of signs, also means the study of the symptoms of disease. Nietzsche pursues this disease/cure metaphor throughout his work, and his use of medical terminology is revealing both for the approach, and for showcasing the parallels between his own illnesses and those of modernity. As early as 1873 Nietzsche was seeing the curative powers of good historical and philosophical study when he started, though later abandoned, a treatise entitled The Philosopher as Cultural Physician [Arzt der Kultur] (KSA VII, 545ff; PT 69-76;
see also FW Preface), and throughout his career he used the German word *Heilmittellehre*, meaning healing through learning, specifically history. Nietzsche’s *On the Future of our Education Institutions* lectures recognise the dual disease and cure potential of education. It is also perhaps worth remembering that one of the alternative and unused sub-titles for *Twilight of the Idols* was “a moral code for physicians.”

Arthur Danto has called *On the Genealogy of Morality* “a medical book: etiological, diagnostic, therapeutic, prognostic.” Etiology is the philosophy, or study, of causation – the first step in any genealogical approach to a subject, where the emergence and descent of the phenomena being studied are traced. Those “judgements, judgements of value concerning life, for it or against it” that could never be “true” can, nonetheless, “have value only as symptoms” (GD 2, 2). After a full diagnosis, an analysis to gain understanding and perspective, the therapeutic stage can begin. Nietzsche’s prognostications can not be adequately be detailed here – though they are well documented – but are essentially the doctrines that accompany that of the Übermensch. For Nietzsche, the therapeutic and prognostic (a very wilful prognosis) go hand in hand, though this is not necessarily so. Indeed Nietzsche tacitly warns this: his cures may be difficult to swallow. While for Hollingdale Nietzsche’s “effect was curative, like an electrical storm that breaks up the cloud and bad weather which has caused it”, the passage of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* that this clearly refers to carries just such a warning: “behold, I am a herald of the lightning and a heavy drop from the cloud; but this lightning is called Übermensch” (Z Prologue, 4).

Returning to the passage above on morality, it is clear that the language used can reveal a large amount about the morality itself: things that are not obvious at a first glance. This justifies the etymology used in *On the Genealogy of Morality*, where Nietzsche traces the original meaning of the term ‘good’ to noble and aristocratic and ‘bad’ to ignoble and plebeian (GM I, 4). An etymological study can reveal important things, because, as Nietzsche explains, man did not conceive that he was simply giving things a name (any name), but that he was injecting a meaning into them through language by giving them a particular name.
The significance of language for the evolution of culture lies in this, that mankind set up in language a separate world beside the other world, a place it took to be so firmly set that, standing upon it, it could lift the rest of the world off its hinges and make itself master of it... The sculptor of language [Sprachbildner] was not so modest as to believe that he was only giving things designations, he conceived rather that with words he was expressing supreme knowledge of things (MAM 11).

The sculptor of language, because of his immodesty, has opened up a whole field of study, which Nietzsche, trained as a classical philologist, is only too willing to explore. The Greek and Latin roots of many contemporary European words can reveal much about their meaning, as there is a tendency to forget that words have a sense beyond their particular designation. Nietzsche speaks of the “linguistic danger to spiritual freedom – every word is a prejudice” (WS 55), and another central part of his studies is the use to which language and truth are put, as part of a system of dominance.

Such an analysis can be drawn out of one of Nietzsche’s most remarkable passages, “How the ‘True World’ Finally Became a Fable” in Twilight of the Idols. In a six stage summary, Nietzsche traces the history of the appearance/reality distinction through Platonism, Christianity, Kantianism and his own thought. In the first stage, the true world is seen to be attainable by the sage, the philosopher-kings of Plato’s Republic. This is because the last stage of knowledge is the knowledge of goodness, so those who attain knowledge of the real world are the ideal legislators. In the second stage, this Platonic idea is made Christian. The true world is unattainable in this life, but is promised for the sinner who repents, for the pious, virtuous man in the afterlife. This has led to the pre-eminent position of the priest, as he has determined the concepts of “true” and “untrue” (A 12) and because he preaches the “supreme law” that should be followed, a set of rules to live a life to. For absolution, the priest teaches that “God forgives those who repent” – in plain language: those who submit to the priest (A 26). The third stage looks at Kant, and suggests that there has been effectively no change. The true world – noumena, the thing-in-itself – is
unattainable, unknowable, but, suggests Nietzsche, is still thought of. As it is thought it can act as a consolation, an obligation, and an imperative – the categorical imperative. So, though the true world is unknowable it still affects our lives.28

What is clear from these initial stages is that Nietzsche realises the political and moral implications that come from the structures of knowledge in existence at the time. Other relations of concepts of thought to those of power are also common. As Nietzsche says, “knowledge works as a tool of power. Hence it is plain that it increases with every increase of power” (WM 480). An example is found in the analysis of the second essay of On the Genealogy of Morality, where Nietzsche shows how the concepts of guilt, responsibility and punishment developed. Importantly the notions of punishment and responsibility – which depends on a notion of freedom – developed separately. “Men were considered ‘free’... so that they might become guilty” (GD 6, 7). This creation of free will was made by the ruling classes in order to justify punishment (WS 9), in order to secure their own position.29

The problem with circumventing these structures of knowledge, and the concomitant power relations they entail, is that we also necessarily think within a tradition, we cannot think alone. Independent thought is necessarily a challenge, and therefore a danger, to the status quo. Nietzsche makes the point that the education institutions of his time no longer teach how to think. He claims that thinking (and writing) is a skill to be learned like dancing, talking of the “delicate shudder which light feet in spiritual matters send into every muscle!” (GD 8, 7). R.J. Hollingdale tellingly calls Nietzsche’s works “a unique course in thinking”,30 and in many ways this is how his books best function: “for one cannot subtract dancing in every form from a noble education – to be able to dance with one’s feet, with concepts, with words... with the pen too” (GD 8, 7). For Nietzsche then, we have reached a stage where not only are there problems with the present, but it is in the nature of those problems that we have lost the ability to solve them.
From what Nietzsche has already said, it follows that if we create our values, we are thus free to create new ones: we are free to choose our values. However, for any revaluation of values, the ground must be cleared, which is why Nietzsche realises that “whoever must be a creator always annihilates” (Z I, 15). And, from this destruction, Nietzsche sees the recovery from nihilism: “one can speak of spring as long as one has had a winter to precede it”. Genealogy is this “curative science” and, as was shown in The Birth of Tragedy, we may find the cure in previous more healthy times. The times which Nietzsche says that we must look at are the “tremendous eras of ‘morality of mores’ which precede ‘world history’”, as they are the “actual and decisive eras of history which determined the character of mankind” (M 18). Nietzsche calls the Greece of Homer until that of Socrates a “healthy culture”, as opposed to our “unhealthy modernity”. Greece is important because of what they achieved, by organising what Nietzsche calls the “chaos of foreign ... forms and concepts” (UB II, 10). The parallels of building a new out of the modernist descent into nihilism are clear, as are the links Nietzsche makes to the German state. Socrates is looked at as an example of a sea-change in thought. Nietzsche sees Socrates as a fundamental challenge to the established order in Ancient Greece, for the worse Nietzsche thinks, which led to the setting up of a new order in its place: one that Nietzsche feels is still very important today.

The other main period that Nietzsche looks at closely is pre and post Christianity. As well as being a genealogical study of Christianity The Antichrist also looks at the Jewish precedent. As with Socrates, Nietzsche sees that what was achieved by Christ (or St Paul) was a massive revolt against the established system: in this case the Jewish Torah (law). As Nietzsche says, the “god on the cross promised a revaluation of all the values of antiquity” (JGB 46). Again, what was established in its place has had an enormous impact on the world in the last two thousand years. Nietzsche argues that we must look closely at these “actual and decisive eras”, and learn from them rather than emulate them – history should not merely be “a storage room for costumes” (JGB 223). He recognises that this is almost impossible, but this is where the alternatives are, where we can observe ourselves better (M 18).
Nietzsche, though condemning the substance of their teaching, was fully aware of the success of the approach that Christ and Socrates had taken, and of their lasting impact. In *Ecce Homo*, his autobiography, Nietzsche calls himself a “turning point in history”, the implication being that his revaluation will make him, like Socrates and Christ/St. Paul, a key person in the development of morals.\(^3\) Indeed, retrospectively, he claims this to have been his project all along: “*The Birth of Tragedy* was my first revaluation of all values” (GD 10, 5). He realises that this will bring him condemnation and vilification – “behold the believers of all faiths! Whom do they hate most? The man who breaks their tables of values, the breaker, the lawbreaker; yet he is the creator” (Z Prologue, 9) – but relishes the opportunity.

So what is to be made from this (deliberate) tangling of diagnosis and cure? Nietzsche certainly had his own agenda, which was specifically why he developed the notion of a genealogy of ideas and ideals. Whilst I would not suggest that Nietzsche developed this approach as one he thought could be pulled from his books and applied elsewhere, I would suggest that this is what can be done, albeit with caution. That said, Nietzsche’s distrust of systems generally, and his absence of a systematic elaboration of a “genealogical method” specifically, alert any potential genealogist of one clear danger. There can be no set order of actions, no fail-safe checklist of directives, no genealogy by numbers. Rather, there is perhaps an approach, or perhaps, in a true Nietzschean manner, a style. This style would be one endlessly adaptive to the subject and the context: “these are the services history is capable of performing for life; every man and every people requires, in accordance with its goals, energies and needs, a certain kind of knowledge of the past” (UB II, 4).\(^3\)

**Spatial Metaphors and Analyses**

Until now my argument has looked at the role of history in Nietzsche’s work. This section will give attention to the use of space in his work, both as metaphor and analysis. It is noticeable that in Nietzsche’s works spatial metaphors are often used to designate different moralities, different systems of thought, different ways of being.\(^4\) For example in *The Antichrist*, Nietzsche makes such an analysis of the nature of truth: “Truth and the faith that something is true: two
completely separate realms of interest – almost diametrically opposite realms – they are reached by utterly different paths” (A 23). Throughout his work he makes references to the “morality of [an] environment” (JGB 186), bordered by boundary stones\(^3\) to mark out the territory, a “labyrinth of ‘fixed ideas’” (GM II, 22). Concepts are divided by “rigid mathematical lines”, like a “templum” (a delimited, often religiously sanctified, space or area), or a “columbarium” (a Roman vault with niches for funeral urns). Similarly, we can visualise a beehive of concepts, or a spider’s web (KSA I, 881ff; PT 85ff). Nietzsche also talks of the philosopher’s (Kant’s) urge towards “classifications... tables of categories” (FW 348). Nietzsche’s “revaluation of values” is dedicated to “toppling boundary markers” (FW 4), as “one digs up morality when one digs up boundary stones” (WS 285), whilst his genealogical studies, as a necessary prelude to this philosophy of the future, serve to map them out. This can help us break out from the prisons of our convictions (A 54). Nietzsche’s own philosophy, especially as seen in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, is clearly seen by him in this light, as a spatial inclusion/exclusion: “I draw circles around me and sacred boundaries; fewer and fewer men climb with me on ever higher mountains” (Z III, 12, 19).

To move outside of these boundaries, Nietzsche uses two main metaphors. The first is that of flight, the conquest of space – new seas, mountains, wildernesses.\(^3\) “He who will one day teach men to fly will have moved all boundary stones” (Z III, 11, 2), says Nietzsche, and he makes several references to flight, to birds, in his works. One of the key passages is found at the end of Daybreak, where he talks of “brave birds which fly out into the distance”, who “somewhere or other will be unable to go on and will perch on a mast or a bare cliff-face”. However, there remains “an immense open space before them”, they have not “flown as far as one could fly”. Nietzsche closes this book with the promise that “other birds will fly farther!” (M 575). Flight is clearly linked here with the thought patterns of the original thinker, able to think outside the boundaries he is enclosed within.\(^3\) For a great thinker, the ability to move outside the boundary stones, to move outside the system, must be based on the experience of the system they are within: “anybody who has built a ‘new heaven’, only mustered the power he needed through his own hell” (GM III, 10).
The other spatial metaphor used is that of excavation. *On The Genealogy Of Morality* can be read as a digging down below moral systems; while others are content with building structures on the ground (M Preface, 3), Nietzsche excavates below to uncover the underpinning foundations. His preface to *Daybreak* shows this clearly: “in this book you will discover a ‘subterranean man’ at work, one who tunnels and mines and undermines” (M Preface, 1). Foucault would later call this excavation of the foundations of a system an archaeology. Psychologically the excavation metaphor also holds, as consciousness is merely a surface (EH 2, 9; see also JGB 230; 289), and shows the influence that Nietzsche would later have on Freud: “it is a painful and dangerous undertaking... to tunnel into oneself and to force one’s way down into the shaft of one’s being by the nearest path” (UB III, 1). Nietzsche sees in the figure of Luther another who looked beneath the surface into himself, saying he remained “an honest miner’s son”, who, shut up in a monastery, lacking “other depths and ‘mineshafts’ descended into himself and bored out terrible dark galleries” (M 88). Nietzsche also applies this subterranean reading to the German soul (JGB 244).

But Nietzsche does not solely use spatial language and metaphors. There are a number of spatial analyses in his work, which, though certainly not proving anything as clear cut as a method for dealing with spatial questions, certainly provide some initial hints and suggestions. The divide between a spatial analysis and metaphor is perhaps well-bridged by how Nietzsche uses the idea of community in a spatial way. Nietzsche’s main argument about community is related to his ideas about morality, as he argues that “to be moral, to act in accordance with custom, to be ethical means to practice obedience towards a law or tradition established from of old” (MAM 96; see also M 9). Traditions and customs are “above all directed at the preservation of a community, a people” (MAM 96). Community is, of course, an exclusion as well as an inclusion, a segregation. Transgressing the community’s rules (Nietzsche uses the comparison of a debtor and creditor) leads to the transgressor being “cast out” (GM II, 9), leading to *Elend*, the common German word for misery, but which literally means ‘other country’, banishment, exile. Space here functions both as
metaphor and fact: the community often has both actual, physical boundaries, and more figurative boundaries of custom and morality.

Kant’s theories of the *a priori* nature of space and time are Nietzsche’s starting points for the philosophical basis of his work on space. Briefly, Kant thought that space and time were intuitions that we have, prior to experience, that serve to shape how we perceive and structure the world, how we experience things. In *The Birth of Tragedy* Nietzsche praises Kant for showing that these conceptions make what we perceive (phenomenon) appear to be the “sole and highest reality”, when there is actually no proof that this is the true nature of things (GT 18). Indeed, in *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche argues that we have built an imaginary world of “lines, planes, bodies, atoms, divisible time spans, divisible spaces”, in order that we can exist in this world built around our image, around how we perceive things (FW 112; see FW 121; WM 487). Tested consistently, says Nietzsche, these perceptions are logically false (MAM 18), and in places, especially in his notes (see WM 515; 516; 530; 553ff), he begins to pick apart the notions behind these constructs. However, these notes are sketchy at best, and this critique is pursued more effectively in Heidegger’s work. At the very least we can take from Nietzsche an awareness that if we perceive everything as existing within time and space, because we can only perceive things in these terms, an analysis of how time and space have been used becomes important, indeed essential.

Some of Nietzsche’s most interesting spatial analyses are found in his ideas about architecture. Nietzsche feels that we “no longer understand architecture”, and are missing the insights into it that we used to have: “everything in a Greek or Christian building originally signified something, and indeed something of a higher order of things: this feeling of inexhaustible significance lay about the building like a magical veil” (MAM 218). Reading buildings provides a valuable understanding of our “cultural architecture” (MAM 276; see also UB II, 3), and indeed Nietzsche sees that “the architect has always been under the spell of power. His buildings are supposed to render pride visible, and the victory over gravity, the will to power. Architecture is a kind of eloquence of power in forms – now persuading, even flattering, now only commanding. The highest feeling of
power and sureness finds expression in a *grand style*" (GD 9, 11). Like so much else in a Nietzschean analysis, architecture is an exhibition of a will to power at work. Understanding the power relations behind a building — the construction and use of space — can provide useful observations about the culture it is situated within.

The most sustained example of an analysis of the spatial properties of architecture is found in *The Birth of Tragedy*, when Nietzsche provides an insightful reading of the Greek theatre. Nietzsche argues that the "public of spectators as we know it was unknown to the Greeks", rather than the division into boxes or levels of seats of more contemporary theatres, there was a terraced structure of concentric arcs, without hierarchical division. This seating area, known as the *theatron* (seeing place) was sometimes cut into the side of a hill — like "a lonely valley in the mountains" — cutting out outside distractions and focusing attention on the *orchestra* (dancing place) — "at bottom there was no opposition between public and chorus". This structure made it possible for the public to “overlook [Übersehen]” the spectacle, in both senses of the word — to survey, and to be oblivious to the outside world. “The architecture of the scene [the backdrop]” was a “splendid frame” in which the action was revealed. Such an arrangement made the “men of culture” in the audience much closer — physically, culturally and psychologically — to the symbolism of the performance, and is part of the entire Greek attitude to tragedy and life (GT 8).

Nietzsche’s attitudes to the theatre are anticipated somewhat by Wagner’s expectations of the “artwork of the future”, where he expects the public to forget “the confines of the auditorium”, so that it “lives and breathes now only in the artwork which seems to it life itself”. Wagner’s Bayreuth project, which built a theatre around a Greek design, was, in its initial stages, the subject of praise from Nietzsche (see UB IV, 9), but the actual Bayreuth festival, where the famous Ring cycle was performed for the first time complete, singularly failed to live up to expectations. It is interesting to note the way in which Nietzsche uses space in his attack on Wagner after Bayreuth. The section entitled “On The Flies Of The Marketplace” in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* has clear links with the festival, with the countryside and solitude of Sils-Maria (where Nietzsche often lived)
contrasting with the marketplace of Bayreuth: "Where solitude ceases the marketplace begins; and where the marketplace begins the noise of the great actors and the buzzing of the poisonous flies begins too" (Z I, 12). Later in the same work Nietzsche/Zarathustra pointedly tells the crowd: "I do not love your festivals either: I found too many actors there, and the spectators, too, often behaved like actors" (Z I, 16).

Nietzsche's developing contempt for the masses led him against the idea of the theatre as cultural spectacle, describing it as a cruder measure than art itself: "Wagner, too, did not change anything in this respect: Bayreuth is large-scale opera – and not even good opera. – The theatre is a form of demolatry [worship of the people] in matters of taste; the theatre is a revolt of the masses, a plebiscite against good taste" (FWa Postscript; see also GS 368). However, the Bayreuth theatre is regularly described as having the best acoustics in the world, and other spatial/architectural features of the building are also praised. One famous example is the hidden orchestra - no visual distraction, and no orchestra pit to distance the audience from the dramatic action – but it also makes it impossible to locate the source of the sound. Clearly, the use of space, both in Athens and Bayreuth, had social consequences and, most evidently in the latter case, exhibited the signs of a will to power at work.

Religious buildings are also open to such an analysis, and Nietzsche talks of "enclosed domains to which divine right denied entry except under certain conditions: in the first instance these were simply areas of ground, inasmuch as certain places were not to be stepped upon by the feet of the uninitiated, who were seized with fear and trembling when they approached them". This exclusion is then extended by religion to other things, for example to sex, which becomes a "privilege and adytum [innermost chamber of a temple, where oracles are developed] of maturity", from which "the gaze of youth must for its own advantage be directed away". In this passage, Nietzsche links the ideas of 'shame' and 'mystery', saying that the Arabic word for chamber is 'harem', meaning both sanctuary and the forecourt of a mosque (literally forbidden place), as well as having the sexual connotations (MAM 100).
Given Nietzsche's lifelong engagement with the Christian religion, it is not surprising that he offers some thoughts on the spaces of churches. Some comments are similar to others he makes on aspects of the religion, dismissive and hardly worthy of serious attention, such as “one should not go to church if one wants to breath pure air” (JGB 30), but others are more substantial. Nietzsche argues that the architecture of the churches symbolically relates to the faith of the religion, with “stairways of repentance”, “sweet-smelling caves” with “falsified light” and “musty air”, where “the soul is not allowed to soar to its height” (Z II, 4). The symbolism of height within a church could clearly be expanded upon – for example the pulpit, the altar, kneeling and standing.

Nietzsche also associates the Christian religion with darkness, nooks and corners, “an underworld kingdom, a hospital, a souterrain kingdom, a ghetto kingdom” (A 17), which he links both to the church itself – “the breath of the architecture, which, as the abode of a divinity, reaches up into obscurity, in the dark spaces of which the divinity may at any moment make evident his dreaded presence” (MAM 130) – and to the teachings of the religion – “public acts are precluded; the hiding-place, the darkened room, is Christian. The body is despised, hygiene repudiated as sensuality” (A 21). Nietzsche continually makes references to the Christian religion’s despising of the body and of drives and passions, arguing that it often demands the extirpation, the covering, the hiding of the passions. Indeed, for Nietzsche, only the destruction of these buildings, and what they stand for, is enough, looking for a time “when the pure sky again looks through broken ceilings and down upon grass and red poppies near broken walls” (Z II, 4), as he does “not see how we could remain content with such buildings even if they were stripped of their churchly purposes. The language spoken by these buildings is far too rhetorical and unfree, reminding us that they are houses of God and ostentatious monuments of some supramundane intercourse” (FW 280).

This last quoted passage shows that Nietzsche realises that for his own “philosophy of the future”, new buildings must be built, space must be used in new ways. “Quiet and wide, expansive places for reflection” are missing from our cities, “buildings and sites that would altogether give expression to the sublimity of thoughtfulness and of stepping aside” (FW 280). This reading of a town, of buildings, is well shown when Nietzsche comments on the town of
Genoa. The region, for Nietzsche, is "studded with the images of bold and autocratic human beings. They have lived and wished to live on: that is what they are telling me with their houses, built and adorned to last for centuries and not for a fleeting hour", he sees "violence and conquest" in the eyes of the builders. The "whole region is overgrown with this magnificent, insatiable selfishness of the lust for possessions and spoils" and each "conquered his homeland for himself by overwhelming it with his architectural ideas and refashioning it into a house that was a feast for his eyes" (FW 291). A similar attitude is found when Nietzsche contrasts "quiet, aristocratic Turin" with "a small German town... [a] pinched and flattened, cowardly world" and "a German big city – this built-up vice where nothing grows, where everything, good or bad, is imported" (EH 2, 8).

The figure of solitude is much used in Nietzsche's works, partly at least because he spent so much time alone. In On The Genealogy Of Morality, Nietzsche talks of finding "deserts" to withdraw to, to become a hermit in, in order to think in solitude. These deserts need not be "Syrian... a stage desert", mountains, "even a room in some crowded, run-of-the-mill hotel" can be a desert, can be "desolate enough". Nietzsche compares the Temple of Artemis, where Heraclitus withdrew to think, with what he calls his "nicest study", the "Piazza di San Marco" (GM III, 8). Lars Gustafsson reads this as a place where Nietzsche is almost inviting us "to come and see him"55, but this misses the point that though this is a large public square in Venice56, undoubtedly busy and full of people, Nietzsche values its anonymity. The point is surely that the spatial characteristics of this square are conducive to Nietzsche's thoughts, that one can be alone even when other people are around. However, it is not solely man-made space that can be read in this way,57 as natural space also serves to shape: "In the writings of a hermit one always also hears something of the echo of the desolate regions, something of the whispered tones and the furtive look of solitude" (JGB 289).

Kant conceptualises the objects "outside us" as being in space,58 but there is also surely a space "inside us" in a non-metaphorical and non-mental sense: the space of the body is something that has been written about in some detail in recent years.59 Some of Nietzsche's thoughts on this subject rely on nineteenth century physiology,60 and can lead him to several of his most ill-judged passages (see for
example M 241), but there are still some potentially useful ideas to be found. Nietzsche sees it as an important advance of the nineteenth century that "more and more decisively the question concerning the health of the body [Leibes] is put ahead of that of 'the soul' (WM 117; see also WM 491; 532; Z I, 4; and Z III, 10), and as well as berating philosophers for their lack of historical sense, he also attacks them for their neglect of the body (GD 3, 1), and of physiology (WM 408).

"Taking a large view", Nietzsche wonders if "philosophy has not been merely an interpretation of the body [Leibes] and a misunderstanding of the body", and he looks to the day when "a philosophical physician" will read the "symptoms of the body" (FW Preface, 2), as his own work in this area clearly does not go this far.61 "We can analyse our body spatially", says Nietzsche (WM 676), and this can lead us to understanding our senses 'inside' and 'outside' (WM 500), and, the inference is drawn, of the culture we are within. In two of Nietzsche's notes, he sketches some ideas about the body as a "political structure [Herrschaftsgebilde]" (WM 660) "in which the most distant and most recent past of all organic development again becomes living and corporeal, through which and over and beyond which a tremendous inaudible stream seems to flow" (WM 659).

Another point relates to the (Aristotelian) unities of time, place and dramatic action that Nietzsche praises the French dramatists for (MAM 221). Thus Spoke Zarathustra clearly shows Nietzsche's own best achievement of this, particularly the fourth part, and Nietzsche occasionally relates some of his ideas to a particular temporal and spatial situation, for example that of the eternal return in August 1881: "it was penned on a sheet with the notation underneath, '6000 feet beyond man and time'. That day I was walking through the woods along the lake of Silvaplana; at a powerful pyramidal rock not far from Surlei I stopped. It was then that this idea came to me" (EH 9, 1). Throughout Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche sets up "antithetical spatial images",62 height and depth, mountain and sea, and the important bifurcation of over and under, unter and über, that can be traced throughout the work.63 As Hollinrake and Luke have pointed out, these spatial (dramatic) conceptions often mirror the philosophical content of
Zarathustra's teachings, for example the tightrope walker between two towers (dramatic) with the idea of man as a bridge "between beast and Übermensch" (Z Prologue, 3-6). Whilst the dramatic unities can serve to enhance the philosophical content of this particular work, they have also led to both Nietzsche's dismissal as a poetic figure rather than a philosopher, and his confused reception by those that do try to appreciate his work.

The Spaces of the Eternal Return

The eternal return is the key teaching of Zarathustra, and the key message of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. Within the work it functions as an important dramatic device, and the narrative is shaped around Zarathustra's thoughts, doubts and teaching of this message. In Nietzsche's work as a whole the eternal return is mentioned in several places, the most important in *The Gay Science* (FW 341), where it appears as a test to be thought through, and though in some of his notes of the 1880s Nietzsche attempts a scientific proof (see WM 1053ff), it certainly functions best as a dramatic idea, a test of a life and its living, through which it links with other key ideas of Nietzsche's, such as the Übermensch, the will to power, amor fati, and the revaluation of all values.

Zarathustra's first problem with his "abysmal thought" is that any thought of the eternal return must involve the return of the small man, the rabble, which causes the nausea he struggles to fight for the next two parts. Zarathustra's own life with its attendant problems (and we are surely not mistaken if we read Nietzsche's own sufferings in parallel) is not the thing he is unable to affirm, but the return of the mediocre is (Z II, 6). This inability to fully affirm prevents Zarathustra from expounding the doctrine, forcing him into silence (Z II, 20), and retreat to the cave and solitude. Here he confesses that he is aware of the thought: "I know it, but do not want to say it!" He knows the name of his "awesome mistress", but this is a name as yet unsaid, and unknown to the reader (Z II, 22).

In Part Three, Zarathustra struggles to come to terms with his thought, a thought he calls his "ultimate peak", his "hardest path" and "loneliest walk". The eternal return is first presented by Zarathustra in the form of a riddle, a "vision of the
loneliest”. In this riddle, Zarathustra is walking up a mountain path, “not cheered by herb or shrub”, with his archenemy the spirit of gravity, in the form of a dwarf, sitting on him, weighing him down. Zarathustra climbs slowly, making his assent, praising courage, which he says can slay “even death itself, for it says, ‘Was that life? Well then! Once more!’” (Z III, 2, 1). Just as Zarathustra is about to present the riddle, his abysmal thought, the dwarf jumps from his shoulders, freeing Zarathustra from the weight. The key spatial element of this teaching is now revealed, a gateway, with two faces, where two paths meet, two long lanes which no one has ever followed to the end, both stretching onwards for an eternity. The name of the gateway is inscribed above it: “Moment”. This English translation loses many of the overtones of the German word used by Nietzsche, *Augenblick*. This word, a compound of *das Auge*, eye, and *der Blick*, glance, was used by Martin Luther in his translation of the Bible into German, in Paul’s first letter to the Corinthians: “we will all be changed – in a flash, in the twinkling of an eye [*Augenblick*], at the last trumpet”.

The usage of this word by Nietzsche lends a visual hint to the temporal that is missing in the English, but which is perhaps better preserved in the word *instant* (used in the French translation), which, deriving from the Latin *instare* (to be present), has at least a distant echo of the double meaning of present, the temporal and spatial signifier. Throughout what follows, where moment is used, the key visual nature of this term should not be forgotten.

Zarathustra then asks whether it is possible for these two paths to contradict each other eternally, and berates the dwarf for his answer, which though essentially correct for the doctrine (that “all truth is crooked, time itself is a circle”) is without the weight and difficulty that Zarathustra attaches to it. Zarathustra suggests that all has passed along these paths before – the dwarf, the gateway, himself, and, restating *The Gay Science* (FW 341), the slow spider in the moonlight – will do so again and again for all eternity. Zarathustra at this point starts speaking ever more softly, and suddenly encounters a return from his own past, a howling dog that he remembers from his childhood, which swiftly changes into a scene that dramatises Zarathustra’s nausea at this idea, a shepherd gagging on a heavy black snake.
Whilst this thought is essentially temporal,\textsuperscript{71} though better utilised as a theoretical test of the self-affirmation of the \textit{Übermensch},\textsuperscript{72} the message is also couched in both dramatic and spatial terms. Dramatically, as we have seen, Zarathustra has struggled with the thought of the eternal return for the entire first three parts, and it is only at the very end of the third, when, overcoming his nausea, he is able to speak of his love for the third of the figurative women found in the work, Eternity. In the penultimate chapter of the third part, Zarathustra meets Life, who realises he must leave her soon, but Zarathustra whispers into her ear something to which she replies, “you know that, O Zarathustra? Nobody knows that”. It is clear that Zarathustra has informed her that he knows the \textit{truth} of the eternal return. For Zarathustra, “life was dearer to me than all my wisdom ever was” (Z III, 15, 2), but now both Life and Wisdom must be left behind, as Zarathustra embraces his awesome mistress: “For I love you, O eternity!” (Z III, 16, 1). This cry is repeated seven times, in a dramatic recapitulation of the return. In the fourth part Zarathustra discovers that his final trial is pity.

As a work as a whole, \textit{Thus Spoke Zarathustra} is structured around a spatial return, a circle, with the key high point being Zarathustra’s cave and the mountains, and the low point being the depths of mankind in the town. The spatial return is mirrored in the metaphor of the sun, and in a dramatic restatement of dialogue. In the Prologue, Zarathustra’s descent to the town follows his speech to the sun, as that morning “he rose with the dawn” and “stepped before the sun”. In order to talk to men, Zarathustra must, like the sun, “go under”, set \textit{[t{"u}rgethein]}\textsuperscript{73} (Z Prologue, 1). Zarathustra then goes down to the forest, and from there to the town. At the dead of night he leaves the town, returns to a forest, and then sleeps under a tree until “not only dawn passed over his face but the morning too” (Z Prologue, 9). The Prologue ends with Zarathustra declaring his goal as “the sun stood at high noon”, at which point he sees his animals from the mountains overhead. Then Zarathustra again begins to “go under”. At the end of the first part, Zarathustra returns back to the mountains himself, speaking to his followers of “the great noon when man stands in the middle of his way between beast and \textit{Übermensch} and celebrates his way to the evening at his highest hope: for it is the way to a new morning” (Z I, 22, 3). What we have here is a \textit{spatial} return – mountains, forest, town, forest,
mountains—paralleled by the rising, setting and rising to high noon of the sun. Finally, Zarathustra, setting like the sun, goes down to man once again.

A similar, yet larger, spatial return, takes place in the book as a whole, specifically in the second and third parts. At the beginning of the second part Zarathustra is back in his cave, withdrawn from men, "like a sower who has scattered his seed". He stays here, we are told, for several months and years, before he tells his animals that his "impatient love overflows in rivers, downward towards sunrise and sunset. From silent mountains and thunderstorms of suffering my soul rushes into valleys" (Z II, 1). Zarathustra is then absent from his cave and mountains for the whole of the second part of the book, towards the end of this part he realises he must return, but as he is a long way from home, having dwelt in the blessed isles, he spends most of the third part undertaking this journey.

Zarathustra returns from the blessed isles to the mainland, but does not proceed directly back to his mountains and cave, but takes a winding and circuitous path, encountering various people, an indirect route for which he realises the end, likening himself to a "river that flows, winding and twisting, back to its source [Quelle]!" (Z III, 5). It would appear that Zarathustra realises this spatial return before he can cope with the thought of the eternal return. On his way back, Zarathustra comes to the gate of a great city, and then reaches the town known as The Motley Cow, in which he had spent time earlier, where he realises he has "only two more days to go to reach his cave... his soul jubilated continually because of the nearness of his return home". This return is completed in the chapter actually entitled 'The Return Home'. While in his cave, Zarathustra again cannot face the thought of the eternal return, until his animals tell him of the importance of this doctrine, and his own role in it: "For your animals know well, O Zarathustra, who you are and must become: behold, you are the teacher of the eternal return— that is your destiny" (Z III, 13, 2). It is after this spatial return, and his overcoming of the nausea, that Zarathustra declares his love for eternity.
The fourth part again shows a similar return, as Zarathustra descends from his cave and meets various people, who then gather at his cave waiting for him to join them. The final chapter, ‘The Sign’, is both a recapitulation of the theme of the Fourth Part, Zarathustra’s struggle with pity, and as a restatement of key themes from earlier neatly serves to tie up the work as a whole. Zarathustra is back in the mountains, and leaves his cave, “glowing and strong as a morning sun that comes out of dark mountains”. He then speaks to the sun “as he had said once before”, in the Prologue. Thus the chapter returns both to the Prologue, and in its final lines returns to its own start, as Zarathustra once more leaves his cave, “glowing and strong as a morning sun that comes out of dark mountains” (Z IV, 20).

**Historical Sense**

Philosophers and historians contemporary to Nietzsche should be condemned for their “lack of historical sense... their Egyptianism. They think that they show respect for a subject when they de-historicise it, sub specie aeterni – when they turn it into a Mummy. All that philosophers have handled for thousands of years have been concept-Mummies; nothing real escaped their grasp alive. When these honourable idolaters of concepts worship something, they kill it and stuff it; they threaten the life of everything they worship” (GD 3, I). Nietzsche sees that, as yet, historical sense is still both “virtue and disease”, capable of conferring an advantage or a disadvantage to life; as a method it is still “poor and cold”. However Nietzsche feels that the future development of this sense is possible, and that the benefits may be substantial. “If this seed should be given a few centuries and more, it might ultimately become a marvellous growth... that might make our old earth more agreeable to live on” (FW 337; see UB II). On which uses it may be put to confer an advantage, Nietzsche is not short of suggestions.

Care must clearly be exercised, for there is no certain transformation of one stage into another, and the descent of ideas may be unclear. To look in the past for something in the form it is now found in the present may be an error. “Every conviction has its history, its preliminary forms, its trials and errors: it becomes a
conviction after not having been one for a long time, and after scarcely having been one for an even longer time" (A 55). The genealogist must continually see things in both the specific and the wider context: not ripping the roots from the soil, but also not forgetting that histories, too, have a history, and that another time’s perception of its history may be very different from our perception of it. Also, any study is necessarily incomplete. Nietzsche recognises that it is not just the large events and the key personalities of the past that are important, and is aware of the potential effects of even the smallest thing. He talks of the “the great effects of the smallest thing: It is similar to that stunted vegetation which gradually reduces the Alps to dust” (PT 13). Strong calls Nietzsche’s method “a form of human archaeology, an analysis of the particular ‘soil’ from which these problems have sprung”, and this must be coupled with seeing how these ideas have changed, how they have been used, and how they have been accepted. That said, history should not be seen a straight line, with events, concepts and values continually evolving. Nor, should history be seen as inevitable or purposeful: “in a genealogical understanding, there is no automatic logic to the evolution of a set of events”.

We must realise our limitations: “our usual imprecise mode of observation takes a group of phenomena as one and calls it a fact: between this fact and another fact it imagines in addition an empty space, it isolates every fact. In reality, however, all our doing and knowing is not a succession of facts and empty spaces but a continuous flux” (WS 11). If we cannot hope to know every detail of this “flux”, we are surely better to realise it than not, and that any perception we make is necessarily our perception. This does not mean that there is no worth in a genealogical study, or that there is no point in attempting it, though it should be stressed that any genealogical study is a genealogical study, with an emphasis on the indefinite article. This last point not withstanding, as has been argued, “the aim of Nietzsche’s genealogy is finally not a relativism but a ‘revaluation of all values’. This clearly presupposes the possibility of judging some values to be better than others”. The genealogical approach does not direct the genealogist to bland, relativistic loquacity, but enables them, like Nietzsche, to prognosticate, and finally to change: “to be physicians here, to be inexorable
here, to wield the scalpel here – that is our part, that is our love of man, that is how we are philosophers” (A 7).

This chapter has shown the Nietzschean approach to the question of history, and grouped together his scattered thoughts on the issue of space. It demonstrates that though he discusses space, he does not develop his insights clearly: the metaphors used and analyses made are not substantial or coherent enough. Given that, as we shall see, space is central to Foucault’s work, this means that Nietzsche alone could not have provided Foucault with the tools he so clearly uses in his historical studies. The standard reading of Foucault is that he picks up on this Nietzschean approach in what he calls archaeology and later genealogy, but such a reading is deficient in a number of ways. Why does Foucault suggest his work is a history of the present, what is the basis for his distinction between connaissance and savoir, and from where does he develop his discussions of technology and the dispositif? Why, too, are his historical studies so overtly spatialised? In Chapters Five and Six I will argue that Foucault’s insights have been misunderstood because of a lack of background knowledge. This is particularly true of Foucault’s major historical studies (examined in Chapter Six). The current chapter has pushed the Nietzschean influence as far as the texts will allow, and yet a number of fundamental questions remain unanswered. The key to some of the answers will be found – as Foucault himself intimates – in a detailed examination of Heidegger.
Chapter Two
Space and History in *Being and Time*

Introduction

The fundamental questions identified at the end of the last chapter require answers. The general point being made is that while Nietzsche’s influence on Foucault is of great importance, there are a number of central issues in Foucault’s work that cannot be explained solely with reference to Nietzsche and Foucault’s appropriation of his ideas. Towards the end of his life, in an interview, Foucault suggested that “Heidegger has always been for me the essential philosopher... My whole philosophical development was determined by my reading of Heidegger. But I recognise that Nietzsche prevailed over him... Nietzsche by himself said nothing to me. Whereas Nietzsche and Heidegger – that was the philosophical shock!” (DE IV, 703; PPC 250) Commenting on this remark, Scott suggests that “Nietzsche, not Heidegger, defines the horizon from which Foucault most often takes his departure. Heidegger’s influence is apparent throughout Foucault’s writing, but it is found in a more Nietzschean context”.¹ It is a central claim of this thesis that the reverse is closer to the real picture. What role then does Heidegger – and in particular his reading of Nietzsche – play in the shaping of the importance of space in Foucault’s historical approach?

In order to answer this question, the following three chapters focus on the work of Heidegger. As well as illuminating the debt owed to Heidegger by Foucault they make a number of claims about Heidegger’s own work. This chapter looks at the process that led to the publication of *Being and Time* and examines the working out in lecture courses of parts of unpublished divisions. The chapter ends at the turn of the 1920s into the 30s – a crucial time for Heidegger both philosophically and politically. Chapter Three picks up the story at this point, outlining the philosophical points at stake in the Rectorship and its aftermath, concentrating on the key readings of Nietzsche and Hölderlin – two central figures in Heidegger’s own development and important in terms of the argument here concerning his influence on Foucault. Chapter Four then looks at a number
of issues in Heidegger’s work – art, technology, poetic dwelling and the πόλις – which showcase the application of the theoretical insights into space, place and history traced in the preceding two chapters.

The current chapter therefore looks at the work of the 1920s, of which until recently Being and Time, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics and odd lectures were the only texts available. The incompleteness of Being and Time – only two of a projected six divisions were published – and the fact that it appeared after more than a decade of silence on Heidegger’s part, has always caused difficulties in understanding its importance and situating its insights. With the publication of Heidegger’s lecture courses in the Gesamtausgabe and the coming to light of some other pieces a number of issues become much clearer. At the same time a number of complications arise. The lecture courses develop material originally scheduled for the unpublished divisions, situate Heidegger in relation to the tradition of phenomenology in greater detail, and provide closer analysis of key figures in his development, notably Kant. Most of the material covered in this chapter was produced while Heidegger was lecturing at the University of Marburg, the significance of which will be remarked upon below. Recently, the wider context of the genesis of Being and Time has been discussed in great detail in Kisiel’s pathbreaking work, and this study is indebted to it. However, regarding the issues of space and history, some elucidation is still required.

Ontology, History and Time

Husserlian phenomenology was basically ahistorical, perhaps because of Husserl’s background in mathematics and logic. For Heidegger however, as Krell has argued, the history of philosophy was an “essential counterweight to phenomenology”: whereas Husserl had once remarked that he had “forgotten about history”, Heidegger never did. In Being and Time Heidegger makes some comments indicating the importance of the historical project, though, as shall be seen, his later work suggests that here he did not go far enough. The basic issues at stake can be seen if the distinction Heidegger makes between ontic and ontological knowledge is examined. Ontic knowledge is knowledge pertaining to the distinctive nature of beings as such, whereas ontological knowledge is the
basis of which any such theory (of ontic knowledge) could be constructed, the a priori conditions for the possibility of such sciences. Heidegger's own exercise as fundamental ontology deals with the conditions of possibility not just of the ontic sciences, but also of the ontologies that precede and found them. This is the question of being (GA 2, 11; see GA 26, 195-202).

A glimpse of the possibility this insight allows is found in Heidegger's discussion of Newton.

To say that before Newton his laws were neither true nor false, cannot signify that before him there were no such beings as have been uncovered and pointed out by those laws. Through Newton the laws became true; and with them, beings became accessible in themselves to Dasein. Once beings have been uncovered, they show themselves precisely as beings which beforehand already were. Such uncovering is the kind of being which belongs to 'truth'. That there are 'eternal truths' will not be adequately proved until someone has succeeded in demonstrating that Dasein has been and will be for all eternity. As long as such a proof is still outstanding, this principle remains a fanciful contention which does not gain in legitimacy from having philosophers commonly 'believe' it. "Because the kind of being that is essential to truth is of the character of Dasein, all truth is relative to Dasein's being (GA 2, 227)."

From this, it is clear that Dasein and truth are fundamentally linked, that truth is context dependent. This does not mean that truth is only what an individual thinks, but that truth only has a context dependent on the existence of Dasein (GA 3, 281-2). Any eternal truths must rest on an eternal immutability to Dasein. It clearly follows from this that if being changes, or is historicised, so too is truth. It has been remarked by some critics that Heidegger does indeed, in Being and Time, suggest such an immutability to Dasein, examining it and its structures as if they were true eternally. Such critics sometimes point to a shift in the later Heidegger towards an understanding of historical nature of being, of Dasein, which would, following the quotation and explication here, lead to a historicising
of truth. The ontic/ontological distinction – especially when historicised – is one that Foucault would go on to elaborate and utilise in the difference between connaissance and savoir in The Archaeology of Knowledge, where he examined what he called the "historical a priori."

The idea of the history of being does not appear as an explicit theme until later works, though it would appear that the second part would have covered some of this area. However, in Being and Time Heidegger does offer some thoughts on history. These theses are developed in the second division of the work, and are designed for an examination of the historical nature of existence. Lest there be confusion between what Heidegger does in Being and Time, and what I will argue he does later, the following point should be considered. In Being and Time, Heidegger attempts to understand the structures of Dasein, among which is the sense of history. In his later works, Heidegger historicises these very structures; in the specific case effectively historicising the sense of history. If in Being and Time Heidegger attempts an ontology of history (for which the ground must be Dasein rather than historiography), in his later work he attempts a history of ontology. This radical shift is central to the influence he was to have on Foucault.

The model of history that Heidegger utilises is that of Nietzsche in the second Untimely Meditation, "On the Uses and Disadvantages of Historiography for Life". This is the only passage of Being and Time that treats Nietzsche at any length, a point that shall be returned to. Nietzsche, says Heidegger, "distinguished three kinds of historiography – the monumental, the antiquarian, and the critical – without explicitly pointing out the necessity of this triad or the ground of its unity" (GA2, 396). In fact, though his later genealogical approach is arguably a fusion of these three types of historiography, Nietzsche never explicitly states that the three should be conflated. Given Heidegger's purpose, this joining together is of key importance. "The threefold character of historiography [Historie] is adumbrated in the historicality [Geschichtlichkeit] of Dasein... [which] enables us to understand to what extent these three possibilities must be united factically and concretely in any historiography which is authentic [eigentliche]" (GA2, 396). It is important to note the distinction Heidegger draws between Historie and Geschichte. Historie is, for Heidegger,
the writing of history, the discipline; *Geschichte* is history as it actually happens [*geschehen*], the events.¹¹

Heidegger reads these three types of historiography as having distinct attitudes to time. The antiquarian approach orientates itself to the past, the having been; the monumental to the future; and the critical to the present. It is the reading of the last of these that Heidegger departs from Nietzsche, for Nietzsche used the critical approach as an orientation to the *past*.¹² As far back as 1922 Heidegger had suggested this: “The critique of history is always only the critique of the present” (PIA 4). He explains: “Dasein temporalises itself in the way the future and having been are united in the present... As authentic, the historiography which is both monumental and antiquarian is necessarily a critique of the ‘present’. Authentic historicality is the foundation for the possibility of uniting these three ways of historiography” (GA2, 397).¹³ These three temporal dimensions come together, as will be examined later, in the reading of the Nietzschean moment [*Augenblick*].¹⁴ Given this, it is surprising that in *Being and Time* Heidegger does not either mention Nietzsche in his discussion of the moment, or make the linkage clearer. It is only in his lectures of the 1930s that he brings these critical themes into the open, and links them to space.

Understanding Heidegger’s use of the three types of historiography helps to explain his comments earlier in *Being and Time*. At one point he writes “thus ‘the past’ has a remarkable double meaning; the past belongs irretrievably to an earlier time; it belonged to the events of that time; and in spite of that, it can still be present-at-hand ‘now’ – for instance, the remains of a Greek temple. With the temple, a ‘bit of the past’ is still ‘in the present’” (GA2, 378).¹⁵ For the historical structure of Dasein, it is therefore clear that the past is ‘present’ in the present, a claim Foucault would make many times in his writings. For our present purpose it is worth bearing in mind that Heidegger tends to assimilate the meanings of two German words for presence, both that which means the presence of someone in a place or at an occasion [*Anwesenheit*], and presence in the temporal sense [*Gegenwart*] (GA24, 305ff).¹⁶ Heidegger makes this idea of presence clearer in the following passage, which highlights a point Foucault would later elaborate in his reading of Nietzsche: “What we next have in mind with the term ‘history’ is
not so much 'the past' in the sense of that which is past, but rather *derivation* [Herkunft] from such a past. Anything that 'has a history' stands in the context of a becoming. In such becoming, 'development' is sometimes a rise, sometimes a fall... Here 'history' signifies a 'context' of events and 'effects', which draws on through 'the past', the 'present', and the 'future'. On this view, the past has no special priority" (GA2, 378-9).

Although Heidegger's remarks in *Being and Time* are generally limited to the historicality of Dasein, at times he does hint at the direction of his thought to come. Dreyfus has suggested that the sketchy and hurried nature of Division Two should be attributed to the rush in which it was appended to the more polished first division: this may explain its partial nature.17 Heidegger suggests that "what is *primarily* historical is Dasein. That which is *secondarily* historical, however, is what we encounter within-the-world... also the environing *nature* as the 'very soil of history'" (GA2, 381).18 Usually the comments on the more general nature of history are those that directly relate the history of things to their use in reading the history of Dasein, such as the following example: "Remains, monuments, and records that are still present-at-hand, are possible 'material' for the concrete disclosure of the Dasein which has-been-there" (GA2, 394). At one point Heidegger remarks, "equipment and work – for instance, books – have their 'fates [Schicksal]'; buildings and institutions have their history. And even nature is historical. It is *not* historical, to be sure, in so far as we speak of 'natural history'; but nature is historical as a countryside, as an area that has been colonised or exploited, as a battlefield, or as the site of a cult [Kultstätte]'" (GA2, 388).19 In some ways then, rather than being the soil of history, nature might be tentatively designated as the site of history, a claim that will be discussed in Chapters Three and Four.

In *Being and Time* Heidegger briefly discusses the notion of the moment [Augenblick],20 which would come to assume central importance in the Nietzsche lectures. In this text however, the notion is not developed in great detail, and, at least on the surface, seems to owe more to Kierkegaard.21 The moment is linked to the existential situation [Situation] which Heidegger defines thus: "The existential attributes of any possible resolute Dasein include the items
constitutive for an existential phenomenon which we call a *situation*... [in which] there is an overtone of a signification that is spatial" (GA2, 299). Heidegger uses the German *Situation* to mean a temporal/spatial 'there', and opposes it to the solely spatial *Lage* [position] (see PIA 10). Each situation is a *place* in time and space, where existentially Dasein has acted authentically: "When resolute, Dasein has brought itself back from falling, and has done so precisely in order to be more authentically 'there' in the 'moment of vision' *[Augenblick]* as regards the situation which has been disclosed" (GA2, 328).

Regardless of the existential baggage that was later marginalised in his work, these two concepts provide an initial glimpse of what Heidegger, and certainly Michel Foucault, went on to do: the putting into practice of the understanding of the dimensions of time and space concurrently.

One of the intended divisions of *Being and Time* was to be a critique of the Aristotelian notion of time (GA2, 40). Though it has never appeared, there are occasional hints of what it may have included, and indeed *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* discusses some of this area. The Aristotelian view of time was "as a succession, as a 'flowing stream' of 'nows', as 'the course of time'" (GA2, 421-2). Instead of this temporal sequence, of the now-no-longer, the now, and the not-yet-now (GA24, 348-9), we must, following Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche on history, see the dimensions of past, present and future together, in terms of the authentic 'moment' (see GA29/30, 226). It is notable that whilst Heidegger praises Kierkegaard's concept of the moment, his main complaint is that it is equated with the now in the common sense (GA2, 338niii; GA24, 408). Heidegger's development of this idea is far too inchoate in what was published of *Being and Time*, and even in the later *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* and *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, but again there are several hints of where it may lead. It will be suggested that it is in Heidegger's extended reading of Nietzsche in the later 1930s and beyond that these ideas come to greater fruition, and that this formulation becomes clearer: "When historicality is authentic, it understands history as the 'return' *[Wiederkehr]* of the possible, and knows that a possibility will recur only if existence is open for it fatefully, in a moment, in resolute repetition" (GA2, 391-2).
The Space of Dasein and Equipment

It is not difficult to immediately find clues that would appear to show the spatiality of Heidegger’s thought. Right from his earliest works, he uses the German word *Dasein*, which, as a noun, means ‘existence’, but which also, as a verb, means ‘to be there’. If this word is broken apart, or is, as Heidegger often does, hyphenated to *Da-sein*, it literally means ‘there-being’, ‘being-there’. It has regularly been translated as the latter of these in English, and in French has often been rendered as the equivalent *être-là*, most famously in the works of Sartre.  

Contemporaneous to this use of the word is another of Heidegger’s important terms, *In-der-Welt-Sein*, ‘being-in-the-world’. A privileging of the spatial over the existential overtones of the preposition in this phrase would seem to underline the importance of space and place in Heidegger’s early works. However, such a reading of these terms would be both too simplistic, and in certain respects inaccurate. Indeed, as will be shown, Heidegger’s early works often appear to go out of their way to condemn such ideas. Understanding the Heideggerian attitude to space is a more difficult and delicate task.

Early in *Being and Time* Heidegger makes it quite clear that a spatial reading of several of his key terms is not the primary sense intended. For example, on the term being-in-the-world, Heidegger asks specifically “what is meant by ‘being-in’?” (GA2, 53). In contrast to the spatial being in [Sein in], such as we might conceive of the water ‘in’ the glass, or the garment ‘in’ the cupboard, Heidegger sets up the “existential” being-in [in-Sein]: “Being-in is thus the formal existential expression for the being of Dasein, which has being-in-the-world as its essential state” (GA2, 54; see GA20, 211-3). Heidegger goes on to suggest that this does not deny every kind of spatiality to Dasein, but that an understanding of being-in-space is only possible after an understanding of being-in-the-world as an essential structure of Dasein (GA2, 56). A similar distinction is made some pages later, around the concept of environment [Umwelt]: “The spatial character which incontestably belongs to any environment can be clarified only in terms of the structure of worldhood” (GA2, 66).

As Heidegger believes that “Dasein does not fill up a bit of space as a real thing
or item of equipment would” (GA2, 368), the spatiality of Dasein is not a primary characteristic. Even its spatiality in a secondary way is not what would ordinarily be termed spatial, and does not, compared to other analyses of Heidegger’s, much further the purpose here. That which Dasein encounters – things, locations and equipment [Zeug] – have, on the other hand, very important spatial characteristics. Many of Heidegger’s most interesting and perceptive comments on the first two of these three are found in his work of the 1930s and later, but his meditation on the last, equipment, begins in Being and Time. Heidegger explains that equipment “always is in terms of [aus] its belonging to other equipment: writing equipment, pen, ink, paper, blotting pad, table, lamp, furniture, windows, door, room” (GA2, 68). He continues, “what we encounter as closest to us... is the room; and we encounter it not as something ‘between four walls’ in a geometrical spatial sense, but as equipment for dwelling [Wohnzeug]” (GA2, 68; see GA24, 414). Another example perhaps upsets our customary notions: “When, for instance, a man wears a pair of spectacles which are so close to him distantly that they are ‘sitting on his nose’, they are environmentally more remote from him than the picture on the opposite wall... Equipment for seeing... has what we have designated as the inconspicuousness of the proximally ready-to-hand” (GA2, 107).

This highlights an important point: for Heidegger, we encounter things in space in a way that stands in opposition to Descartes’ view. Heidegger’s thoughts on the spatiality of the ready-to-hand suggest that our encounters with equipment are not primarily determined by geometry and measurable distance, but by the more prosaic notions of closeness or nearness [Nähe], de-distancing [Entfernung] and directionality [Ausrichtung]. “The ‘above’ is what is ‘on the ceiling’; the ‘below’ is what is ‘on the floor’; the ‘behind’ is what is ‘at the door’; all “wheres” are discovered and circumspectively interpreted as we go our ways in everyday dealings; they are not ascertained and catalogued by the observational measurement of space” (GA2, 103). What Heidegger has given here is a more common-sense understanding of how we relate to space. As he notes, “space is neither in the subject nor is the world in space” (GA2, 111). Space is encountered in everyday life, and lived in, not encountered in geometrically measurable forms and shapes. It is part of the structure of our
being-in-the-world. Blackham has provided a useful example, linking this thought on space to that of a temporal history: "The brake is on the wheel which is on the road which joins the places... the hoe has been made and will be used for hoeing and is at present lying there in the tool-shed". As with Heidegger’s thoughts on using equipment and coping with life, he believes that standard investigations begin at the level of abstraction, rather than at the level of everyday action. Just as he believes that we encounter the hammer only as a hammer if there is a problem with it, we encounter the room or space geometrically only when something is wrong, when we purposively think it in that way (see GA2, 109, 361-2; GA24, 231ff).

All of this links to his thoughts on place [Platz]. Heidegger suggests that all things have their place, but that often "the region [Gegend] of a place does not become accessible explicitly as such a region until one fails to find something in its place" (GA2, 104). Our coping with space in life is therefore essential, but is usually understood at a level removed from the everyday. When Heidegger starts to relate these thoughts on equipment to the structure of being-in-the-world, he again uses these everyday notions: "We say that to go over yonder is a good walk, a stone’s throw, or ‘as long as it takes to smoke a pipe’" (GA2, 105).

Heidegger also extends his consideration to nature, a point he will return to in his later work on technology. "Nature is not to be understood as that which is just present-at-hand, nor as the power of nature. The wood is a timber forest, the mountain a rock quarry; the river water-power, the wind is wind ‘in the sails’. As the ‘environment’ is discovered, the ‘nature’ thus discovered is encountered too" (GA2, 70). Several of these key ideas are developed in Heidegger’s important later essays.

Reading Kant Phenomenologically

In his genealogy of Being and Time, Kisiel suggests that the 1924 lecture and manuscript The Concept of Time was directed to the question ‘what is history?’ and was indebted to Dilthey; the summer semester course of 1925, History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena was directed to the question ‘what is being?’ and was Husserlian; and the published version of Being and Time asked ‘what is
time? Kisiel called this the kaiological (from the Greek καιρός – right time, opportunity, crisis, moment), or Kantian version. What is the relationship of Heidegger to Kant, especially round the questions of ontology, history, time and space?

It should immediately be noted that Heidegger's reading of Kant does not claim to be a piece of neutral and objective scholarship, but a reading designed to illuminate his own project. He makes two important remarks on this point. In 1928 he tells his students that "when some years ago I studied the Critique of Pure Reason anew and read it, as it were, against the background of Husserl's phenomenology, the scales fell from my eyes; and Kant became for me an essential confirmation of the accuracy of the path which I took in my search" (GA25, 431). Some years later, in response to critiques of his Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, he admitted "it may not be good Kant, but it is awfully good Heidegger". These two accounts jar slightly, but the overall intent is quite clear: a phenomenological reading of Kant, and in particular of the Critique of Pure Reason, can further the early Heidegger’s project. We might note in passing here that the same intent is later applied to Nietzsche and Hölderlin, a point to which I return below.

There are two central issues that I wish to examine in Heidegger’s reading of Kant. The first is that Heidegger sees Kant as recognising the ontic/ontological distinction; the second is the role of space and time, and in particular the privileging of time over space. First then, it will be recalled that ontic knowledge is knowledge pertaining to particular beings, ontological knowledge is the condition of possibility for such ontic knowledge. Ontological knowledge is the a priori conditions for ontic knowledge, it concerns being rather than beings, and is the major concern of the early Heidegger, especially in Being and Time. The predominant strain of Kant interpretation in Heidegger's time was the neo-Kantianism of the Marburg school, which argued that the Critique of Pure Reason was a work of epistemology. This view, put forward by Cohen, Rickert and Natorp, amongst others, held sway from the late 19th and early 20th century. Heidegger – lecturing at Marburg – tackles this interpretation head on: the Critique of Pure Reason is a theory of knowledge, but it is not a theory of ontic
knowledge (i.e. experience) but rather of **ontological knowledge** – transcendental philosophy, ontology (GA3, 17; GA24, 180-1; GA25, 186).\(^{36}\) Ontic knowledge (of beings) must conform to ontological foundations (being). This is the real meaning of Kant’s Copernican revolution, that instead of our knowledge conforming to objects, objects must conform to our knowledge (GA25, 55-6).\(^{37}\)

What was for Kant the examination of the transcendental possibility of experience, becomes in Heidegger’s terms an examination of the ontological possibility of the ontic. Heidegger continues, “with the problem of transcendence, a ‘theory of knowledge’ is not set in place of metaphysics, but rather the inner possibility of ontology is questioned” (GA3, 16-7). Ontology is seen as the laying of the ground for metaphysics as a whole (GA3, 124-5; see GA29/30, 306). This interpretation has a number of effects, and forms the basis for Heidegger’s reading of Kant throughout his career. For example, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, as in other places, Kant demolished the proofs for an existence of god, arguing that being was not a real predicate. Heidegger draws a conclusion from this wholly in keeping with his wider interpretation: “Being, as being possible, being actual, being necessary, is not, to be sure, a real (ontic) predicate, but it is a transcendental (ontological) predicate” (GA9, 294). In other words, in order for something to be something, it must first be. Being in general is the condition of possibility for being in particular.

What is particularly important in this discussion though is that Heidegger’s reading of the ontic/ontological distinction runs almost parallel to Kant’s discussion of synthetic *a priori* knowledge. The central question of the *Critique of Pure Reason* was “how are synthetic *a priori* judgements possible?” the central question of *Being and Time* could be rephrased as “how is ontological knowledge possible?”\(^{38}\) Synthetic *a priori* knowledge is possible on the basis of the original synthetic unity of the pure productive power of imagination, on the basis of temporality. As temporality is the basic constitution of human Dasein, humans have the possibility of having a pure understanding of being. The understanding of being in general (i.e. ontological knowledge) is possible on the basis of the temporality of Dasein (GA25, 424-5).\(^{39}\) In Kant, as in *Being and Time*, this is a radically ahistorical question. In Nietzsche – who asks not how
synthetic a priori knowledge is possible, but why is it necessary (JGB 11) – and the later Heidegger, this question, the problem of metaphysics, or the question of being (GA3, 249), is posed historically.

Heidegger again explicitly distances himself from the Marburg school in his reading of the Transcendental Aesthetic. The prevalent interpretation, characterised by Natorp, is that the placing of the Transcendental Aesthetic at the beginning of the Critique is a “well-meant mistake”, giving, as it does, priority to time and space over the categories. Natorp wants, Heidegger suggests, to dissolve the Transcendental Aesthetic into the Transcendental Logic, to rethink time and space as categories (GA25, 122). In contrast Heidegger does not wish to dissolve the Transcendental Logic into the Transcendental Aesthetic, but to examine the relation between the two: something Kant was not able to do. Heidegger continues, pointing to his interpretation: “what the Transcendental Aesthetic deals with is not simply turned off in Transcendental Logic... rather, the Transcendental Logic takes up what the Transcendental Aesthetic deals with as a necessary foundation and a central clue. From a purely external perspective this shows itself in the fact that the time which is interpreted in the Transcendental Aesthetic in a preliminary fashion functions in all the crucial sections of the Transcendental Logic – and indeed as something fundamental” (GA25, 79). What is central here is that not only does Heidegger read Kant as providing the ontological foundation of the Transcendental Logic in the Transcendental Aesthetic, he sees the examination of time in the latter as the fundamental clue to the former.

It is worth thinking this through in some detail. Reading the problematic of synthetic a priori knowledge as the question of an ontological foundation leads Heidegger to reinterpret the Transcendental Aesthetic in an important way. For Heidegger, “the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ has as its task to set forth the ontological αἰσθήσις [aisthesis – perception] which makes it possible ‘to disclose a priori’ the being of beings” (GA3, 51). The two elements of the Transcendental Aesthetic, time and space, are, in Kantian terms, the principles to which all objects we perceive must conform. Space and time are the horizon within which we encounter all things: experience must take a spatio-temporal
form. Heidegger explains the implications of this by suggesting that the employment of space (and time) as pure intuition is transcendental, because space is understood as being constitutive for the enabling of a pure *a priori* knowledge with respect to things themselves. In this usage space is ‘transcendental’, which means that it is ideal and not real. “Therefore the Transcendental Aesthetic investigates such intuitions which, as pure intuitions, first make possible the empirical intuition of what is spatially and temporally present-at-hand” (GA25, 187-8). The transcendental makes possible the experience of present-at-hand objects.

Now, for Heidegger, although Kant opens up this fundamentally important avenue he remains trapped in the conceptions of modern thought. Kant is, in certain key respects, Cartesian (GA2, 24, 204). Previous sections of this chapter have shown how Heidegger was keen for time to be thought more originally than as a now-point, and for space to be thought otherwise than by extension. Yet Kant remains in this position. As Heidegger notes, in the *Groundwork for the Metaphysic of Morals* Kant suggests “the idea of a twofold metaphysics: a metaphysics of nature and a metaphysics of morals”. ⁴² Heidegger interprets these as an ontology of *res extensa* and an ontology of *res cogitans*” (GA24, 197-8) — precisely the Cartesian formulation Heidegger is trying to escape, through a rethinking of space without a basis in extension, and through a rethinking of Dasein that is not reducible to a subject (see GA20, 237ff, 322). There therefore arises a central distinction between Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant and Kant himself. To take the example of time, in Kant we intuit through time, in Heidegger temporality is the basic constitution of that which intuits (GA25, 368). We might expect this, given the title of *Being and Time*, and the fact that, for Heidegger, ‘and’ often functions as a copula.⁴³ Heidegger explains, “Dasein, conceived in its most extreme possibility of being, is time itself, not in time” (CT 13-4). This is well illustrated in a remark Heidegger made in *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*: “perhaps it is precisely time which is the *a priori* of the I [Ich] – time, to be sure, in a more original sense than Kant was able to conceive it” (GA24, 206).⁴⁴
In the Transcendental Aesthetic Kant discusses time and space in turn, only to accord priority of time over space. In *Being and Time* Heidegger argues that the "temporality of being-in-the-world thus emerges, and it turns out, at the same time, to be the foundation for the specific spatiality of Dasein" (GA2, 335). To what extent are these two positions linked? In the *Critique*, Kant argues that space is the formal condition of the physical. In order to encounter beings other than ourselves, we must have outer intuition – an experience of the outside. Therefore space is the pure form of outer intuition. However, in order to experience the outside, we must first be able to experience: we must be able to be self-aware. Self-awareness is in no way spatial, for Kant, but is rather a sequence of states – representations, volitions and moods. This shows that time is crucial, and time is both the formal condition of the psychical, and the pure form of inner intuition. Kant continues from this that "time is the formal a priori condition of all appearances whatsoever". It follows from this, Heidegger suggests, that "time has a pre-eminence over space" (GA3, 48-9; GA25, 145ff).

As Heidegger recognises, it is not immediately apparent why this should be so. As he notes, "already in the Transcendental Aesthetic there comes to light a peculiar priority of time over space. And in subsequent and more decisive sections of the *Critique* time emerges again and again at the centre piece of the transcendental, *viz.* ontological, problematic" (GA25, 111-2). Heidegger reads this problematic in a way that certainly furthers his own project, if not Kant scholarship generally. Time is not a feature of physical objects in an immediate sense, but when represented to us, they become temporal in a mediated way. Because then both the external world and the internal world are dependent on the temporality of the perceiver, time is the formal condition of outer, spatial appearances, and therefore has priority over space (GA25, 148).

This hierarchical ranking is continued throughout Heidegger's early work. We can now perhaps understand Heidegger's suggestion that "Dasein's spatiality is 'embraced' by temporality in the sense of being existentially founded upon it... [but this] is also different from the priority of time over space in Kant's sense" (GA2, 367). For Kant time has priority over space as it is the formal requirement for the experience of all objects; for Heidegger temporality is the basic
constitution of Dasein and therefore spatiality is founded upon it. Heidegger claims that this does not mean that space is deduced from, or dissolved into, time (GA2, 367). Whilst this is perhaps in itself true, it is not revealed in Being and Time how this is the case.\(^{47}\) Indeed, Heidegger suggests in History of the Concept of Time that he has thought the notions of de-distancing, region and orientation in a way that suffices “in relation to what we need for time and the analysis of time” (GA20, 322). It is possible that had Heidegger been more interested in space itself in his early career, he would have made good this claim. However, on the evidence of his early work, Heidegger has perpetuated the primacy of time over space found in, amongst others, Kant.\(^{48}\) It is worth noting that the section this claim is made in is one that Heidegger would refute in later life (see ZSD 24; TB 23) – a point discussed in Chapter Four – and that in several places in Being and Time Heidegger warns against founding time on space, even when it appears that time is measured by movement in space, by, for example, observation of the sun or shadow clocks (GA2, 412ff; see CT 18).

Throughout his early work, Heidegger uses the notion of time as the point of departure for his analyses. In Being and Time, for example, the analyses of being-toward-death, the attunement Angst, falling prey, understanding and discourse are fundamentally temporal analyses (see GA2, 335ff). In the 1929/30 lecture course The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, where Heidegger provides an analysis of the fundamental attunement of boredom, this too takes its departure from an analysis of time. This is perhaps not surprising given that the German word for boredom is Langeweile, which literally means ‘long-while’.\(^{49}\) Whilst I would not wish to suggest that these analyses should have been made from the point of view of space, it is notable that Heidegger continually concentrates on the temporality of Dasein.\(^{50}\)

It is also worth noting, though there are exceptions, that Being and Time is concerned almost exclusively with Dasein, and moreover Dasein as an ahistorical idea. In his later works Heidegger encompasses other areas and realises the history of being. It is in these works particularly that are central to understanding Foucault. Glimpses of his later work can be seen in his thoughts on the duality of the situation and the moment, and the hint that they may be linked to the study of
history. However, in his thoughts on the spatiality of equipment, Heidegger does set up some important distinctions, specifically with the Cartesian notion of space. Descartes' view of space was that it should be seen as mathematical, geometric, viewed in terms of spatial location, measurable by co-ordinates. On the other hand, Heidegger realises that for the living of space — space as actually experienced — notions of near/far or close/distant are more practical and better reflect life. However, Heidegger's neglect of the important question of the body is well known: another point he aims to address later in his work.

Towards Hölderlin and Nietzsche

*Being and Time* is still the foundation of Heidegger's entire oeuvre, though it is but a fragment of the intended whole, and is, as even Heidegger would come to accept, radically flawed in certain respects. One of the missing divisions was entitled "Time and Being", and was intended to discuss time in relation to being as a whole, not simply to Dasein. Villela Petit has even suggested that this section would also have dealt with "the third term that the dyad being and time had, in a certain manner obscured, namely space". Whatever, it is certain that Heidegger's later writings in this area differed in certain key respects from what had gone before. It will be suggested that the later Heidegger, from the mid 1930s on, is far more sympathetic in his treatment of space. For, despite his attempts to explain otherwise, in *Being and Time* Heidegger remains overtly Kantian in his belief in the inherent primacy of time over space.

At the very end of the year *Being and Time* was published, Heidegger replied to a letter from Rudolf Bultmann.

My work is directed toward a radicalisation of ancient ontology and at the same time toward a universal structuring of this ontology in relation to the region of history. The fundament of this problematic is developed by starting from the 'subject', properly understood as the human Dasein, so that with the radicalising of this approach the true motives of German idealism may likewise come into their own. Augustine, Luther, Kierkegaard are philosophically essential for the
cultivation of a more radical understanding-of-Dasein, Dilthey for a radical interpretation of the ‘historical world’, Aristotle and scholasticism for the strict formulation of certain ontological problems. All this in a methodology guided by the idea of a scientific philosophy as it has been grounded by Husserl, not without the influence of the logical investigations and philosophy of science of H. Rickert and E. Lask. 54

The correspondence with Bultmann is of marginal use, as Kisiel notes, as it was a response to loaded questions about how an encyclopaedia article on Heidegger might run. What is interesting is less the choice of names – Bultmann had mentioned most in the original letter – than those left out: notably, contra Kisiel, Nietzsche. 55 In Being and Time it is notable that there are minimal references to Nietzsche. Compared to Kant and Aristotle, who both receive over thirty direct references, Nietzsche is only referred to three times, and only one of these references is of any substance. 56 Not mentioned at all is Hölderlin. 57

Yet not only does Heidegger turn to Nietzsche and Hölderlin in such detail – six courses on the thinker, three courses on the poet, and one entitled “Thinking and Poeticising” – but most of the thinkers seemingly so influential in the years leading up to Being and Time are rarely discussed after it. After the summer semester 1931 Aristotle is never the subject of a course again, there are no more courses on religion, and Heidegger ceases to describe himself as a phenomenologist. 58 There is only one course on Kant, Die Frage nach dem Ding. Instead the principal thinkers Heidegger discusses – other than Nietzsche and Hölderlin – are the pre-Socratics – Anaximander, Parmenides and Heraclitus. In terms of the themes so far discussed, it is only when Heidegger devotes several years to reading, thinking and writing about Nietzsche and Hölderlin that his thoughts develop and clarify. Crucially the ontology is no longer universal in relation to the region of history, but is itself historicised as a historical ontology. This means that the de-struction [Destruktion] of the tradition is no longer pursued with temporality as the clue – which implicitly allowed the predominance of time over space – but historically, which allows for a fundamental rethinking of the time/place, relation. 59
Chapter Three

In the Shadow of Nazism:
Reading Hölderlin and Nietzsche

Einführung: Introduction

The 1930s are the years where Heidegger’s life and thought are most radically altered. They see his turn [Kehre] around from the published Being and Time; the beginning of his lengthy encounters with Nietzsche and the poet Hölderlin, several important lecture courses and texts – some of which have only been recently published – and, certainly not least, his involvement with the Nazi movement. Heidegger became Rector of Freiburg University in April 1933, and resigned in early 1934. The facts of his tenure are now relatively well known (he himself called it his “greatest act of stupidity” [die grösste Dummheit]), and in the last few years have occasioned a number of articles and books detailing the case against him. The “Heidegger controversy” has sometimes been used as a way of avoiding the difficult and important task of engaging with Heidegger. This is not to absolve Heidegger from blame, nor to suggest that his thought and his practice are sufficiently divorced that we can condemn the man and applaud his writings; far from it. As Janicaud suggests, to maintain our previous faith and admiration, on the one hand, or to dismiss Heidegger out of hand are false options. What must be done is to examine how the political intrudes in the thought.

For the purpose here, it is most important to see how Heidegger’s political thought relates to his ideas of history, and centrally, space. It has been suggested in the previous chapter that Heidegger’s attitudes to space in Being and Time undergo a fundamental change in his later thought. In situating that change it must be ascertained whether the change is in tandem with his political thought, entirely divorced from it, or a reaction to it. The place to begin would appear to be the 1935 lecture course An Introduction to Metaphysics. Three initial themes present themselves for consideration within this course: Heidegger’s reaction to
the use and abuse of Nietzsche at the time of the lectures, and to Nazi philosophy as a whole; the importance of the historical to the study of being, and not merely as a part within it; and the increasing importance of early Greek thought, with the implications this has for the understanding of space. I shall briefly sketch out the issues involved in each of these, before moving on to the central task of the chapter, Heidegger’s readings of Hölderlin and Nietzsche.

It is within this course that Heidegger first starts to engage with Nietzsche’s thought at length. Heidegger was at this time following a common trend, as the philosopher of the “superman” and the will to power appeared, on a cursory reading, to lend himself ideally to the National Socialist movement. Heidegger was desperately keen to avoid being seen as part of the same trend. Indeed as shall be seen, he would later claim that his work on Nietzsche was a confrontation with Nazism. Nietzsche was, for Heidegger, able to withstand the pressures of poor interpretation: “Even now [in 1935] this philosophy holds its ground against all the crude importunities of the scribblers who cluster round him more numerous with each passing day. And so far there seems to be no end in sight to this abuse of Nietzsche’s work. In speaking here of Nietzsche, we mean to have nothing to do with all that...” (GA40, 39; IM 36). This was written barely a year after Heidegger’s attempt to den Führer zu führen – to lead the leader, to head the philosophical movement heading National Socialism – had collapsed with his resignation as Rector. We are surely not mistaken if we note the German title of this course – Einführung in die Metaphysik – certainly a leading into metaphysics, but is it a leading from National Socialism or to its true heart?

Heidegger’s own answer would appear to lie in the words that he speaks towards the end of the lecture course: “The works that are being peddled about nowadays as the philosophy of National Socialism but have nothing whatever to do with the inner truth and greatness of this movement (namely the encounter between global technology and modern man) – have all been written by men fishing in the troubled waters of ‘values’ and ‘totalities’” (GA40, 208; IM 199). It would seem that Heidegger is claiming that Nazi philosophy is not merely flawed, but has gone away from the true core of what, he believes, the movement should be
about. Perhaps this is merely Heidegger's *Angst* at losing out in the battle for intellectual supremacy, or perhaps he genuinely believed that a movement was needed that would confront the problems and possibilities of the "encounter between global technology and modern man". To claim that the remainder of Heidegger's work is an examination of this encounter would not be an inaccurate description. On the other hand, this quotation is seized upon by some commentators because, if we follow Heidegger's note (GA40, XI; IM xi), we see that "matter in parentheses was written while I was reworking the text". It is only later (and not in 1935) that Heidegger clarifies what he means or, to put it less kindly, explains an incriminating remark. If one thing counts more against Heidegger than his actions 1933-34, it is his lies, evasions and reworkings of his own history after that date.

In *An Introduction to Metaphysics* there is the first clearly evident use of the historical approach I have argued is implicit in *Being and Time*. Whereas there history was a structure of Dasein, one that could be examined ontologically, now the question of being is itself historicised, becoming the *history* of being, or a historical ontology. National Socialism has proved to be not the solution to the problems facing man, but rather their culmination. The problematic of nihilism "manifests itself with increasing clarity under the political form of fascism" (HC 65; see GA6.2, 33n). How did this happen? As Heidegger states, "we maintain that this preliminary question [about being] and with it the fundamental question of metaphysics are historical questions through and through" (GA40, 46; IM 43). He then suggests that even men's relation to history is itself historical: an example of the historicising of the (in *Being and Time*) ahistorical structures of Dasein. With his regular references to the etymology of key terms, the historical references to the Greek beginnings, and the more oblique allusions to tracing a path of thought, Heidegger allows this historicising to pervade this and practically all future work. Once again there is a reference to the concurrent nature of the dimensions of time, joining together in the study of history: "History as happening [*Geschichte als Geschelen*] is an acting and being acted upon which pass through the *present*, which are determined from out of the future, and which take over the past" (GA40, 48; IM 44). The importance of the historical for Heidegger's purpose is shown when he sets out his aim of the
present study: “1. The determination of the essence of man is never an answer but essentially a question... 2. The asking of this question is historical in the fundamental sense that this questioning first creates history” (GA40, 149-52; IM 140-3).”

In Being and Time Heidegger argues for the importance of presence. In this later work he sets up an opposition between being as presence and being as substance. The former is, he argues, the correct understanding of the Greek παρουσία, which is usually translated as the latter. The German word for presence, Anwesen, “also designates an estate or homestead” (GA40, 65; IM 61). What we have here is another break with the Cartesian and indeed the modern tradition. Heidegger consistently argues that the translation of Greek thought into Latin has had serious consequences for the understanding of what the ancients intended (for example GA40, 15-6; IM 13; GA5, 13; BW, 149; VA 50ff; QCT 165ff; GA5, 303; EGT 19). Most European languages are, because of their descent from Latin, inextricably linked to this misunderstanding, which has coloured the entirety of modern philosophy. German, because of its non-Latinate roots, is however perhaps able to avoid the problems that other languages fall into: Heidegger believes it to be, along with the Greek, “at once the most powerful and spiritual of all languages” (GA40, 61; IM 57). Heidegger even argues that “in the Greek language what is said is at the same time in an excellent way what it is called”, alone among languages it is νόημα (WiP, 44/5; GA5, 313; EGT 28). Throughout much of his later work, Heidegger will go back to original texts, often dispensing with accepted translations, seeking to think back to the Greek terms, and to provide more “accurate” renditions.

There are two interesting discussions related to this point in An Introduction to Metaphysics. In the first, Heidegger argues, through an examination of Plato’s Timaeus, that there has been a fundamental shift in notions of spatial location and place. Heidegger begins by suggesting that “the Greeks had no word for ‘space’. This is no accident; for they experienced the spatial on the basis not of extension but of place [Ort] (τόπος), they experienced it as χώρα, which signifies neither place nor space but that which is occupied by what stands there” (GA40, 71; IM 66). The whole Cartesian approach to space is founded upon this notion of
bodies extended in space, but Heidegger here suggests that this concept was not found in early Greek thought: rather there was a conception of space that is far closer to the notions Heidegger suggested in *Being and Time*. The Greek understanding of place is far closer to experiential than mathematical. Heidegger goes on to suggest that the shift from τόπος and χώρα to a ‘space’ [*Raum*] defined by extension was initiated by Platonic philosophy, because of its interpretation of being as ὄν (GA40, 71; IM 66; see GA55, 335-6; WhD 174; WCT 227). 14

The second important discussion of place occurs later, this time in an analysis of Sophocles’ *Antigone*. Heidegger focuses particularly on line 370, “ὡς τόπος ἀπολίς”, a line which hinges on the Greek word πόλις, which is translated in a standard English version as “city”. 15 Heidegger suggests that this does not capture the full meaning: “Πόλις means, rather, the site [*die Stätte*], the there [Da], wherein and as which historical Da-sein is. The πόλις is the historical site [Geschichtsstätte], the there in which, out of which, and for which history happens [Geschichte geschieht]” (GA40, 161; IM 151-2). These brief remarks are greatly developed in courses on Hölderlin and Parmenides, and are discussed at length in Chapter Four.

This brief outline of this lecture course has therefore introduced us to several themes that will be important in our understanding of Heidegger’s later work. It has especially highlighted four important things: Heidegger’s disenchantment with Nazism; his wish to save Nietzsche from his interpretation at the hands of this movement, in order to prepare the ground for his own reading of him; his growing understanding of the importance of the historical approach he had developed for understanding Dasein’s historicity to his actual project; and a return to early Greek thought in order to see how and where things and ideas have changed. It is in this Greek thought that Heidegger finds much that supports the way he wishes to go forward. For my purposes this is especially true concerning place/space, and this important notion of “historical site”. He is not alone in this. Two fundamentally important figures paved the way. As Heidegger himself says, Nietzsche “understood the great time of the beginning of the entire
Greek Dasein in a way that was surpassed only by Hölderlin” (GA40, 135; IM 126).

I Hölderlin

In Heidegger’s lifetime, the principle source for his reading of Hölderlin was the book Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung [Commentaries on Hölderlin’s Poetry] which was continually updated to include new pieces on the poet. Other essays appeared in the collections Holzwege, Vorträge und Aufsätze, and Unterwegs zur Sprache. Heidegger also delivered three courses on Hölderlin at the University of Freiburg which have appeared in the Gesamtausgabe posthumously. The first, given in the Winter Semester of 1934-35 was dedicated to the hymns ‘Germania’ and ‘The Rhine’; the second, given in the Winter Semester of 1941-42, looked at the ‘Remembrance’ hymn; and the final course, given in the Summer Semester of 1942, examined ‘The Ister’ hymn and Sophocles’ Antigone.

A number of important aspects of Heidegger’s work become much clearer in the light of this reading, though the emphasis here is largely on the issue of space, or rather place. Heidegger describes his Commentaries as having their place in the dialogue between thought [Denken] and poetry [Dichten] (GA4, 7). As is evident from his later work, he sees thought and poetry, thinkers and poets, as having a close and special relationship. Though Heidegger discusses other poets – George, Rilke, Trakl, Hebel – Hölderlin is the only one he treats at such length, and the one he certainly takes the most interest in.

It would be amiss to neglect the political context of these lectures. It is notable that the lecture courses given between the summer semester of 1932 and the summer semester of 1934 have not yet appeared in the Gesamtausgabe, so Hölderlins Hymnen ‘Germania’ und ‘Der Rhein’ is the first course delivered after the Rectorship that is available. All of the Hölderlin lectures post-date the explicit political career, but they are all written by a card-carrying Nazi, as he remained in the party until 1945. Various links become evident: the visit to Karl
Löwith in Italy in 1936 was to deliver the lecture ‘Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry’, found in Commentaries, and criticised in the Hitler Youth magazine Wille und Macht [Will and Power].\textsuperscript{21} As Löwith remarked to Karl Jaspers, “what the essential nature of this poetry has to do with the swastika is hard to see”. It seems that Löwith felt there was nothing in common, but on this trip Heidegger famously wore a swastika badge.\textsuperscript{22} We should also note that the publication of the first edition of Commentaries came on the heels of the publication of an NSDAP edition of Hölderlin for the troops on the front. Similarly Heidegger’s final lecture as full professor in 1945 – before his ban from teaching under the Denazification laws – was on Hölderlin.\textsuperscript{23} Remarks in the lectures on Hölderlin regularly mention the wider political events in Germany and the world. In these texts we must hear the distant roar of battle; we are forced to confront the political in the thought.

The Germania and Rhine hymns

Heidegger’s first course looks at the hymn ‘Germania’, and, in its second half, ‘The Rhine’, one of Hölderlin’s many hymns to rivers. Though Heidegger considers Hölderlin’s poetry, he does not simply see him as a poet. Indeed he suggests that he “is one of our greatest, one of the most rich prospects as thinker, because he is our greatest poet” (GA39, 6). The engagement with the poetry opens up many avenues of thought. Right from the beginning of the course it is clear that Heidegger sees in Hölderlin an understanding of being that avoids many of the modern pitfalls.

One considers Hölderlin ‘historiographically’ and one is unaware of what is essential, the fact that his work – which has not yet found its time-space – has already overcome our historiographical fuss [historisches Getue] and has founded the beginning of another history [Geschichte], that history which starts with the struggle [Kampf] deciding the arrival or flight of the gods (GA39, 1).

This is, of course, the distinction suggested in Being and Time between history

59
[Geschichte] and historiography [Historie], parallel to that between experiential and clock-time. This is regularly emphasised in Heidegger’s reading of Hölderlin. Heidegger argues that the standard understandings of time are totally insufficient for mastering the poetically thought experience of time in Hölderlin (GA39, 55ff). Such a critique is made clearer in the 1939 lecture on the poem “As on a holiday...” Here, Heidegger focuses on the first line of the third strophe — “But now day breaks! [Jet statt tagts]”. He suggests that the ‘Now’ is clearly Hölderlin’s time, but that it needs to be understood in a different way to standard understandings of time: “Such a time can never be dated, and is never measurable in numbers of years or the division of centuries”. This time is historical not historiographical (GA4, 75-6).

‘Germania’ is a hymn to the German homeland — Heidegger’s discussion therefore also looks at the spatial aspects of the poetry. Here too he finds the problem of relying on the modern understanding, in this case geography: “the earth of the homeland is not simply a space delimited by exterior frontiers, a natural region, a locality [Örtlichkeit] destined to be a scene for this and that to take place. The earth which is the homeland is readied for the gods” (GA39, 104). Later Heidegger warns against allowing this space to be thought of as a storeroom [Abstellraum] (GA39, 108). What Heidegger is suggesting is that Hölderlin’s poetry, and his conception of historical time and of the homeland are more poetic, more experiential, than those of modern metaphysics. This can be designated the lived: “The poet moulds something... which is ‘lived’ [erlebt] in his interior and exterior world, a so-called ‘Experience’ [Erlebnis]” (GA39, 26).

However, the attitude of Being and Time remains, as the passages on space are relatively rare, and the spatial characteristics of the homeland are not considered as important as those on historical fate [Geschick]. Time and space need to be thought differently, and there is a linking of these two characteristics — “neither place spatially [Ort räumlich] nor time temporally [Zeit zeitlich] understood in the habitual sense” (GA39, 141) — but the hierarchical ranking still remains. Indeed, at one point Heidegger shows that he has not departed from the attitude of Being and Time, citing §§65ff as his exposure of the essential constitution of originary temporality (GA39, 109).
Such an attitude is, to an extent, amended in the second part of the course. To make the transition, Heidegger asks what Hölderlin means by the "waters of my homeland" in line four of the 'Germania' hymn. He suggests that ordinary poets sing of forests and meadows, streams and shrubs, mountains and sky. Why then does Hölderlin's late poetry speak so often of rivers – 'At the source of the Danube', 'The Rhine', 'The Ister', etc? These poems, suggests Heidegger, have an intimate relationship with the 'Germania' hymn (GA39, 90-1). It is for this reason that this course moves from a consideration of the 'Germania' hymn to 'The Rhine'. The first is the general topic, the second a particular aspect of it (GA39, 137-8). This leaves us in no doubt that the later lectures on 'The Ister' also fall within this general project.

In the first part of the course Heidegger had quoted a couple of lines from Hölderlin, lines he would continue to quote throughout his entire engagement with the poet. The lines come from a poem known by its first line, 'In lovely blueness…'

Voll Verdienst, doch dichterisch, wohnet der Mensch auf dieser Erde.

Full of acquirements, but poetically, man dwells on this earth.

These lines pinpoint the entire project at stake here. Heidegger suggests that the opening words mean that "what man works at and pursues, is through his own endeavours earned and deserved". The line hinges on the next word: "But" – says Hölderlin in sharp antithesis – all this does not touch the essence of his dwelling on the earth, all this does not reach the foundation of human existence: The latter is fundamentally 'poetic'… To 'dwell poetically' means: to stand in the presence of the gods and to be involved in the proximity of the essence of things" (GA4, 42; EB 306). Therefore, as Bernstein has noted, in Hölderlin Heidegger finds "a contrast between a dwelling place and an abstract space". Space is characterised as Cartesian; place as experiential, lived: it is to be understood poetically.
In ‘The Rhine’ hymn, Heidegger immediately notices that the first strophe of the poem indicates a place, rather than a time (GA39, 167-8). This seems to prefigure an increased stress on the spatial, or rather the *platial*. In these works Heidegger tends to use the word *Ort* and its compounds *örtlich*, *Ortschaft* and *Örtlichkeit*. *Ort* had been rarely used in *Being and Time*, where *Raum* [space] and *Platz* [place] had been used instead. Such a change seems to be initiated in the lectures on Hölderlin, where Heidegger seems to designate ‘space’ as conforming to Cartesian notions, and to replace it with a more originary understanding of ‘place’.  

In *Being and Time*, as noted in the previous chapter, the remarks on place were largely confined to the place of equipment, for which the word *Platz* is appropriate; when the discussion has moved onto the place of humans, the word *Ort* is used. *Ort* can be variously translated as ‘place’ or ‘locale’; its compounds usually as ‘local’ or ‘locality’. There is something to be said for working with ‘place’ and ‘placing’, coining the neologism ‘platial’ to reflect its use in adjectival forms. This is perhaps particularly apt given the Latin roots of ‘local’, but the Greek roots of ‘place’. Local also gives rise to the misunderstanding that the term is about scale.

The rivers in Hölderlin’s poems do not simply have their own place, but also make the places around them. We must not think of the rivers as symbols or images for something else, “they are themselves in question, and with them the earth of the homeland [*die heimatliche Erde*]” (GA39, 195). This shows the link between ‘Germania’ and the river poetry. In Heidegger’s reading of Hölderlin, “the river… founds the country [*das Land*] as a country, the homeland for the people” (GA39, 259). The links between the founding power of the river, the spatial characteristics it delivers and the notion of poetic dwelling are well illustrated in the following passage:

The river now founds [*schafft jetzt*] in the country a characterised space [*geprägten Raum*] and a delimited place [*Ort*] of settlement, of communication, [*giving*] to the people a developable [*bebaubares*] country which guarantees their immediate Dasein. The river [*Der Strom*] is not a watercourse [*ein Gewässer*] which passes by the place of men, it is its streaming [*Strömen*], as
country-developing [als landbildendes], which founds the possibility of establishing the dwelling of men (GA39, 264).

It was seen in the earlier part of the course that Heidegger found problems with the standard modern understandings of time and space. In the second part of the course, and in a later essay, he elaborates this in more detail. It is well known that Heidegger felt that the pre-Socratics had understood being in a more fundamental way, and he sees Nietzsche and Hölderlin as being two thinkers who paved the way for this recognition (see GA40, 135; IM 126; and GA39, 269). A particular example of this affinity comes when Heidegger discusses Hölderlin’s use of the word ‘nature’ [Natur]. Both English and German come from the Latin natura, which is in Greek φύσις. Heidegger suggests that the translation of φύσις by natura immediately transfers in later elements and replaces the originary meaning with something alien (GA40, 15-6; IM 13-4). "Φύσις, φύση signifies growth [Wachsturm]... Hölderlin’s word ‘nature’ poetises its essence from the basis of the truth reserved for the initial word: φύσις... In the word ‘nature’, Hölderlin poetises the other..." (GA4, 56-7).

In this criticism of the modern view of nature, Heidegger is laying the foundation for his later questioning of modern technology. He suggests that because the “metaphysical sense of nature, natura, φύσις, in the originary nominative force of the word [in der uranfänglichen Nennkraft des Wortes], is already an essential [wesentliche] interpretation of being, it has little to do with the sciences of nature” (GA39, 195). This is an example of how his later thought recognises the historical aspects of the question of being. Rather than the attitude of Being and Time, which tended to set universal conditions, the later works realise that this is a historical problem. We must therefore leave behind the standard representations of nature: “Earth and homeland are understood in a historical sense. The river is historic” (GA39, 196).

It must be remembered that this is a course delivered only a few months after Heidegger had resigned as Rector. Throughout the course there is a stress on the national character and words that cannot fail to carry political overtones in mid 1930s Germany – people [Volk], homeland, soil [Boden], earth. That said,
towards the end of the course he criticises the "contemporary snivelling about national character, blood and soil" (GA39, 254). The tension in the course is illustrated in the conclusion to a 1939 lecture: "Hölderlin's word calls the Holy and also names a unique time-space [Zeit-Raum]... This word, is, however, still unheard, and is stored in the Western German language" (GA4, 77). Here we have a statement both of the philosophical project – the possibility of a different understanding of time and space – and of its potential political overtones – the uniqueness of the German. If the Rectorship address was a politicising of the philosophy of Being and Time, in these lectures we find a philosophising of the Rectorship's politics. In particular, Dasein is now taken to refer to a Volk, rather than an individual (GA39, 8; see SdU; HC).

Heidegger cannot fail to realise that the political situation he was lecturing within – even without his own political involvement – charges the language he uses. For someone so attentive to the use of particular words it defies belief that he was not aware of this. His remembrance of Norbert von Hellingrath, editor of Hölderlin's works, who fell at the age of 28 at Verdun in 1916 (GA39, 9) has noticeable echoes of the praise of the war-dead found in mainstream Nazi discourse. His evocation of Hölderlin as "the poet of the poet and of poetry" and "the poet of the Germans" (GA39, 214), even when he suggests that the latter should be understood "not as subjective genitive, but as objective genitive: the poet who has poetised the Germans" (GA39, 220), is understood as a political project: to make Hölderlin a "power in the history of our people [die Macht in der Geschichte unseres Volkes]" (GA39, 214). In the discussion of the 'Germania' hymn poet and thinker are joined by State-Creator as the three creative forms of the historical Dasein of a people (GA39, 51; 144). These cannot fail to stress the nationalist and political overtones of the course.

However uncomfortable Heidegger's nationalism is, he does engage in criticism of the uses it is being put to in contemporary interpretations of Hölderlin. Hölderlin himself was made, like Nietzsche, part of the mythologised pantheon of Nazism. In his work was found elements of the leadership principle, division of the German race from others and recurrent references to the fatherland. However, as Megill notes, Heidegger "did not take up this aspect of the
Hölderlin myth: his attachment was not to the mighty fatherland but to the more intimate and personal native region, not to the *Vaterland*, but the *Heimat* [home, homeland]. Instead he emphasises the notion of Hölderlin as seer and prophet").

Heidegger suggests that the ‘patriotic’ element [*das Vaterländische*] is that which is emphasised, but argues that this is one strand [*Inhalt*] among others, and that the praise of Greece and the apparent censure of the German could equally be emphasised (GA39, 224). He is unequivocal in his critique of the racist, biologising aspects attached to contemporary German nationalism. Heidegger’s nationalism is cultural and linguistic, praising the landscape of the Black Forest and the poetry of Hölderlin; it is not the same as the race-based nationalism of Alfred Rosenberg. This trades on Heidegger’s important lectures on biology in 1929/30, published as *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*. This lecture course shows that accusations of vitalism, biologism and scientific racism cannot be applied to Heidegger. In the Hölderlin course, Heidegger quotes Kolbenheyer’s 1932 pronouncement that “poetry is a necessary biological function of the people”, and sarcastically remarks that “the same observation is as true for digestion: that too is a necessary biological function” (GA39, 27).

Heidegger’s failure as Rector seems to be attributed not to an error of his judgement, but to a failure on the part of the movement as a whole. Heidegger sees his Hölderlin and Nietzsche lectures as a “confrontation with National Socialism”. It is worth making two remarks on this. First, the word Heidegger uses for confrontation is *Auseinandersetzung*, which is literally *Aus-einandersetzung*, a setting apart from one another. Second, the decisive political situation still exists, yet Heidegger thinks the movement misguided as to its true aims: the reassertion of the national and cultural aspects; the confrontation with global technology (GA40, 208; IM 199). Heidegger’s letter to the Academic Rectorate of Albert-Ludwig University is useful here: “I thought that Hitler, after taking responsibility in 1933 for the whole people, would venture to extricate himself from the Party and its doctrine... This conviction was an error that I recognised from the events of 30 June 1934 [the Night of the Long Knives]. I, of course, had intervened in 1933 to say yes to the national and the social... the social and the national, as I saw them, were not essentially tied to a biologist and racist ideology”. Heidegger however, ends this course with a dangerously
prophetic call to arms: "The hour of our history has struck" (GA39, 294).

The Ister hymn

It was to be six years before Heidegger returned to lecturing on Hölderlin. But, as we have seen, he wrote a number of shorter essays, some of which were published in the intervening years. Other courses, notably An Introduction to Metaphysics, and the Nietzsche courses discussed in the next section, furthered the overall project at stake here: more so than the second course on the poet, which discussed the 'Remembrance' hymn (GA52). The third course, however, both broadens and deepens the understanding developed in the first. In this course Heidegger again looks at a 'river hymn', one that Hölderlin himself never published, that was given the title 'The Ister' (the Danube [die Donau]) by von Hellingrath (GA53, 2). 'The Ister' begins with what Heidegger describes as a calling [ein Ruf]: "Now come, fire!" (GA53, 5). Once again Heidegger suggests that Hölderlin's 'Now' cannot be grasped 'historiographically' and that it cannot be related to historical dates of well-known historical events: "No calendrical date can be given for the 'Now' of his poetry". However, though the poem begins with a 'Now', in line 15 there also follows the naming of a 'Here': "Here; however, we wish to build" (GA53, 8-9).

Before I examine the way in which the 'Now' and the 'Here' work together, which is an important element of this course, it is worth devoting a little more space to the discussion of place, an understanding that is enriched here. From both 'The Rhine' hymn, and now from 'The Ister' hymn, Heidegger suggests that we learn that "the rivers are a distinctive and significant place [Ort] at which humans [der Mensch], though not only humans, find their dwelling place [Wohnstatt]" (GA53, 12). The river determines the dwelling place of humans upon the earth, but this dwelling is not to be understood as the possession of accommodation and housing. Whilst such things are indeed dwelling, they do not fulfil or ground its essence: "Dwelling takes on an abode and is an abiding in such an abode, specifically that of humans upon this earth". The crucial thing pertaining to the abode is its place, and the placing of the place [die Ortschaft des Ortes]. Therefore, "the river 'is' the placing that pervades the abode of humans
upon the earth, determines them to where they belong and where they are homely [heimish]" (GA53, 23). As Heidegger later notes, "the river does not merely grant the place [Ort], in the sense of the mere place [bloßen Platzes], that is occupied by humans in their dwelling. The place is intrinsic to the river itself. The river itself dwells" (GA53, 41).

Heidegger suggests that Hölderlin’s other poetry emphasises the ‘Now’, a moment [Augenblick], but that in this poem “equal intonation” is given to the ‘Here’. Slightly further on he suggests that the river “abandons the Now”, by which he means not that space is prioritised over time, but that the time does not remain static, it “passes into what is bygone, or into what lies in the future” (GA53, 16). This helps us to understand the sense of the following passage:

The river is simultaneously vanishing and full of intimation in a double sense. What is proper to the river is thus the essential fullness of a journey. The river is a journey in a singular and consummate way. We name the consummate essence of the journey [Wanderung] a journeying [Wanderschaft], corresponding to the placing [Ortschaft] of the place [Ort]. The river is the journeying... Becoming homely and dwelling upon this earth are of an-other essence. We may approach it in giving thought to the essence of the rivers. The river is the place for dwelling. The river is the journeying of becoming homely. To put it more clearly: the river is that very place that is attained in and through the journeying (GA53, 35-6).

What is obvious here is that not only has the prioritisation of time over space been abandoned, but space and time – as placing and journeying – are understood as an “originary unity... the one belongs to the other”. Journeying has resonances of space as well as time; place, in the sense of an abiding, is also temporal. In order to understand them, there is a temptation to look back to the unity of space and time, understood in their modern sense. It is this temptation that Heidegger tries to avoid. The reason for this is linked up to one of the major themes in the later Heidegger: the question of technology. As Heidegger suggests, “via our
calculations and machinery, we have such convincing power over its ‘spaces’ and ‘times’ that the space of our planet is shrinking and the annual seasons and years of human life are being condensed into diminutive numerical values for the purposes of our calculative planning far in advance” (GA53, 46-7). In these terms, space is understood as coordinates – x, y, z – and if the spatial element is understood as being in motion, changing its location through time, the fourth co-ordinate, one-dimensional time – t – is added (GA53, 47-8). These coordinates, which Western philosophy, modern science and technology have used to designate the unity of time and space, allow the exploitation of the world. They are considered to be so clear that to further explain them, to question them, is looked at as a worthless pursuit. There is therefore a great temptation to reduce place and journey back to this understanding. To avoid this is Heidegger’s aim (GA53, 50).

Heidegger is not successful in this aim, but lays the foundation for one of the major projects of his later thought: the overcoming of metaphysics. First Heidegger questions whether time and space are objective – gigantic containers in which all positions (spatial and temporal) are accommodated. If so, he asks, *where* is space – the container? And, *when* is time – the container? “Or is space itself to be found nowhere, and time itself not to be found at any time? So long as we continue to think space and time as appearing within a space and time, we are not yet thinking space itself or time itself”. Second, Heidegger asks if time and space are subjective. He suggests that if people fight wars over space – a comment than cannot fail to have resonance in 1942 with the talk of *Lebensraum* and the Russian campaign – space is unlikely to be something they subjectively imagine. Heidegger is therefore reluctant to see them as subjective – as constructs. Time and space are something that “cannot be accommodated within the schema of ‘either objective’ – ‘or subjective’. And in that case the unity of space and time cannot consist in space and time being thought together in the representational activity of the thinking subject either, as is the custom”. Therefore, resorting to space and time to understand placing and journeying does not help, as “that which is meant to shed light here is itself obscure” (GA53, 55-6).45
Heidegger’s conclusion is that neither time or space in Hölderlin’s hymnal poetry – which post 1799 “is not concerned with symbolic images at all” – can be understood by metaphysics, or by the metaphysical doctrine of art – aesthetics (GA53, 20-1). Why then do we turn to metaphysics at all, “why are we even becoming involved in these representations [Vorstellungen] of space and time that have prevailed now for two thousand years?” The answer is that we cannot free ourselves overnight, and “simply because only an explicit look at the commonplace representations of space and time and their metaphysical (rather than historiographical) provenance permits us initially to become attentive to that other than Hölderlin poetizes. In poetizing the rivers, Hölderlin thinks his way into the essential realm of placing and journeying” (GA53, 58). Heidegger concedes that Hölderlin himself never speaks of placing and journeying, but suggests that it could be “that the essential origin of space and time lies concealed in what we are attempting to think in a unitary manner in the names placing and journeying” (GA53, 58-9):

Between the spatio-temporal [raumzeitlich] grasping that extends toward world domination and the movement of settlement subservient to such domination on the one side, and humans coming to be at home via journeying and placing on the other, there presumably prevails a covert relation whose historical essence we do not know (GA53, 60).

The river hymns of Hölderlin help in Heidegger’s attempt to provide a non-metaphysical understanding of time-space. Time is not understood in terms of calendrical dates, it is understood as the passage, as the journeying of becoming homely. Space is not understood in terms of Cartesian co-ordinates, extension or, indeed, space, but in terms of locale or place. Neither of these understandings can truly be said to have overcome metaphysics, but the project certainly takes its departure from this point.

Heidegger’s reading of Hölderlin therefore opens up a number of the paths in his later thought. The project of overcoming metaphysics, the questioning concerning technology, and poetic dwelling all become clearer and more
developed if we follow the confrontation between thinker and poet. The later essays on technology suggest that man is attempting to dominate, to challenge nature, partly because man has lost sight of what it means to dwell poetically. The modern understanding of time and space is fit only for world domination. To find a way to overcome metaphysics is the later Heidegger’s project: to avoid the nihilism. More broadly, Heidegger’s reading of Hölderlin’s poetry provides us – in the concepts of journey and place – with a new understanding of temporal and spatial relations. Geography and historiography are no use for understanding these concepts: they are deaf to the other than Hölderlin poetises. As Dominique Janicaud has noted, we need to use instead the notions of historicity and topology.46

II Nietzsche

Heidegger’s Nietzsche is pivotal in this thesis’ articulation of the influence of these two figures on the work of Foucault. As has been seen, Nietzsche has been an absent presence throughout much of Heidegger’s work, but it is only in the mid 1930s that the confrontation is drawn into the open. It is not quite right to suggest, as Megill does, that this confrontation is when Heidegger begins to take Nietzsche seriously,47 but it is certainly when the seriousness becomes most evident. My reading will therefore trace a path through what Derrida has called “the plenums and lacunas, projections and indentations, of a certain Heideggerian landscape”, bearing in mind the admonition that “the arguments of Heidegger’s grande livre [Nietzsche] are much less simple than is generally admitted”.48

In 1961, Heidegger considered that his Nietzsche volumes provided a view of the path of thought that his work had taken from 1930 to the ‘Letter on Humanism’ (1947), whereas the Commentaries on Hölderlin’s Poetry “shed only indirect light on that path” (GA6.1, xii; N I, xi). The previous section has shown how indirect light provides some illumination, but though since this date several other texts have been brought into the open, Nietzsche remains of central importance. Heidegger also argued that these collected texts clearly showed his own divergence from Nazism: “Beginning in 1936 I embarked on a series of courses
and lectures on Nietzsche which lasted until 1945 and which represented... a
declaration of spiritual resistance. In truth it is unjust to assimilate Nietzsche to
National Socialism... Perhaps it should also be asked: is it unjust to assimilate
Nietzsche to National Socialism? Several points of reference for the discussion of
this question can be found in Nietzsche, but space precludes a full treatment of all
of these. As Derrida suggests, these collected lectures and texts on Nietzsche are
“supposed to withdraw him from any biologicist, zoologicist, or vitalistic
reappropriation. The strategy of interpretation is also a politics”.

The other main obstacle to any reading of this text is the common charge against
Heidegger about his method of interpretation. Heidegger is variously accused of
wilful misinterpretation, reading with “violence”, and of dealing only with
selected texts, particularly privileging the Nachlaß material. On this last charge,
let the following stand as an all-too-common example: “Heidegger, deliberately
ignoring of the texts written by Nietzsche himself, chose the resulting book [from
the collation of Nietzsche’s notebooks], The Will to Power, as the primary object
of interpretation”. It will be seen that these charges are themselves problematic.
Regarding the indictment of misinterpretation, Heidegger has this to say to critics
of his “method of exegesis”: “Which interpretation is the true one, the one which
simply takes over a perspective into which it has fallen, because this perspective,
this line of sight, presents itself as familiar and self-evident; or the interpretation
which questions the customary perspective from top to bottom, because
conceivably – and indeed actually – this line of sight does not lead to what is in
need of being seen” (GA40, 184-5; IM 176). The validity or invalidity of
Heidegger’s reading will be seen throughout the discussion of this text. As a final
point of introduction, it could also be noted that if there is violence on
Heidegger’s part in his reading of Nietzsche it would also appear that reading
Nietzsche was an event of considerable intellectual violence to Heidegger.
Gadamer has remarked that Heidegger used to tell people that “Nietzsche had
destroyed him, had devastated his experience as thinker”. My reading of the
Nietzsche volumes will focus on four major points – the moment, space, the
body, power and perspectivism – and one more minor point – the reading itself.
Returning to the Augenblick

I suggested in the reading of Being and Time that the Nietzschean moment, Augenblick, was central to the fusion of the temporal, the spatial and the historical. In the Nietzsche lectures, particularly the second lecture course – The Eternal Return of the Same – Heidegger elaborates and deepens his reading substantially. His main source for the reading is the chapter in Thus Spoke Zarathustra entitled “On the Vision and the Riddle”. Heidegger asks, “what sort of vision, then, does the riddle which Zarathustra tells have? Again we must pay heed to the way he tells it, to the where and when and to whom, if we are to examine the what aright” (GA6.1, 258; N II, 38). Aside from the reference to the importance of the temporal and spatial location of the saying, Heidegger has shown that the dramatic situation within the work as a whole is important. The riddle is told aboard ship, at sea, to the crew and two days into the voyage. Having set the scene, Heidegger looks at the riddle itself, where Zarathustra is climbing a mountain with a dwarf upon his shoulders: “In his narrative of the ascent two regions of an essential imagery converge – and, in fact, Nietzsche’s transposition of thought into sensuous imagery always haunts these two realms: the sea and the mountain heights” (GA6.1, 259; N II, 39). As Zarathustra reaches the top of the mountain path, the dwarf jumps from his shoulders, and he describes the gateway. “With the description of the image of the gateway Zarathustra brings the riddle to vision” (GA6.1, 260; N II, 40).

In the chapter in Thus Spoke Zarathustra it is not immediately clear why the dwarf has not grasped the riddle when he says “All that is straight lies... time itself is a circle”. It appears that he has succinctly said what at this point Zarathustra cannot. However, Heidegger convincingly argues that the usual reading of Nietzsche/Zarathustra’s eternal return is close to the dwarf’s understanding – too easy, and, in essential respects, wrong. To simply look at the moment, the gateway, from the outside is not to understand the fundamental issue, which can only become clear to “one who does not remain a spectator but is himself the moment, performing actions directed towards the future and at the same time accepting and affirming the past” (GA6.1, 277; N II, 56). Heidegger suggests that if the eternal return is thought at the basic level – that “everything...
returns in a circle” then it is perhaps sheer delusion: but that this is not Nietzsche’s thought. He suggests that we must think the eternal return in terms of the moment, and in terms of overcoming nihilism (GA6.1, 400; N II, 182-3).

Whoever stands in the moment is turned both ways: for him past and future run up against one another. Whoever stands in the moment lets what runs counter to itself come to collision... But the dwarf keeps to the outside, perches on the periphery... That is what is peculiar [Eigentliche] to, and hardest to bear in, the doctrine of the eternal return – that eternity is in the moment, that the moment is not the fleeting now, not an instant [Moment] of time whizzing by a spectator, but the collision of future and past (GA6.1, 277; N II, 56-7).

Now it has been seen from the understanding that Heidegger gives to Nietzsche’s three modes of historical inquiry that the past, present and future should not be seen separately, but together. It can now be seen how this links to the concept of the moment. The moment, Augenblick, the eye-glance, is the place, the gateway, where these three dimensions come together. The authentic individual performs actions directed toward the future but remembers the past: “We define the ‘moment’ as that in which future and past affront one another, in which future and past are decisively accomplished and consummated by humans themselves, inasmuch as humans occupy the point [Stelle] of their collision and are themselves that collision” (GA6.1, 318; N II, 98). Likewise, history too must orientate itself toward the future with reference to the past, by becoming, just as the Augenblick is the authentic present, a history of the present.

Heidegger’s reading of the eternal return is perhaps the highpoint of his lectures on Nietzsche, but he does not fully explicate the thought of Thus Spoke Zarathustra. As I have tried to show in Chapter One, the eternal return is clearly, and importantly, spatial. There I remarked both upon the importance of the spatial return of the book as a whole and on the movement of the sun. Heidegger wholly neglects the first of these, but does show an awareness of the second. At one point he quotes Nietzsche: “In every ring of human existence in general there
is always an hour when the mightiest thought emerges... the thought of the eternal return of all things. It is each time, the hour of *midday* for humanity”, and then adds his own commentary: “We know what Nietzsche means by this word *midday*: the moment of the shortest shadow, when fore-noon and after-noon, past and future, meet in one. Their meeting-place is the moment of supreme unity for all temporal things in utterly magnificent transfiguration... it is the moment of eternity” (GA6.1, 359-60; N II, 139-40). Heidegger later notes how the second part of Nietzsche’s riddle, that of the howling dog, takes place at midnight – “the most remote time from midday... it is the full moon that is shining here; it too is a light, but a merely borrowed light, the most pallid reflection of actual illumination, a diaphanous ghost of light” (GA6.1, 394; N II, 177). This discussion of Heidegger’s discussion closes with his recognition of the symbolism of the eternal return:

The eagle soars in vast circles in the air. The circling is an image of eternal return... The serpent hangs suspended from the eagle, coiled around his throat. Again, the coils of the serpent, wound in rings about the eagle’s throat, are symbolic of the ring of eternal return. Moreover, the serpent winds itself about the one who wends his way in great circles in the sky – a proprietary and essential, yet for us still obscure, tangle of coils... circling in a ring, coiling in a circle (GA6.1, 265-6; N II, 46).

**Space and the Body**

Though there are moments of insight such as those outlined above, at other points Heidegger seems to neglect the importance of space within Nietzsche’s work. Though, as argued in Chapter One, the articulation of space in Nietzsche is unsystematic, a detailed reading of his work provides many useful insights. That said, within Heidegger’s *Nietzsche*, the anti-Cartesian project is enriched in a number of ways. The following passage of Heidegger’s showcases the neglect: “Zarathustra begins the episode ‘On the Great Longing’ with the words: ‘O my soul, I taught you to say ‘Today’ like ‘One Day’ and ‘Formerly’, I taught you to dance your round-dance beyond every Here and There and Yonder’. The three
words ‘Today’, ‘One Day’ and ‘Formerly’ are capitalised and placed in quotation marks. They designate the fundamental features of time... ‘One Day’ and ‘Formerly’, future and past, are like ‘Today’... today is like what is past and what is to come. All three phases of time merge in a single identity, as the same in one single present, a perpetual ‘now’” (VA 105; N II, 218). What is perhaps worthy of note is that Heidegger only explicates the first half of the quoted passage. Whilst he has made clear his reading of Nietzsche on time, why does he not explicitly remark on the fact that the Here, There and Yonder are the fundamental features of space?

In the Nietzsche volumes Heidegger makes the link between the Cartesian view of space as extension, criticised, as has been shown, in Being and Time, and the wider Cartesian method.

The certitude of the principle cogito sum (ego ens cogitans) determines the essence of all knowledge and everything knowable; that is, of mathesis; hence, of the mathematical... The mathematically accessible, what can be securely reckoned in a being that humans themselves are not, in lifeless nature, is extension (the spatial), extensio, which includes both space and time. Descartes, however, equates extensio and spatium. In that way, the nonhuman realm of finite beings, ‘nature’, is conceived as res extensia. Behind this characterisation of the objectivity of the nature stands the principle expressed in the cogito sum: Being is representedness [Vorgestelltheit] (GA 6.2, 145-6; N IV, 116).

Heidegger has spent a number of pages within the text criticising various aspects of the cogito, as did Nietzsche before him, and it appears, given the problems he has identified with this thought, that he wishes to discard it and its results. It has been shown, and it will become clearer in the discussion of later essays, that Heidegger wishes to respond to space experientially rather than geometrically. Undermining the cogito ergo sum and with it the opposition between res cogitans and res extensia clearly furthers this purpose. Moreover, Heidegger continues to suggest that though interpreting nature as res extensia is one-sided and
unsatisfactory, when thought and measured metaphysically “it is the first resolute step through which modern machine technology, and along with it the modern world and modern mankind, become metaphysically possible for the first time”. Now Heidegger’s meditations on technology will show the enormous problems with this, but Nietzsche (and one is tempted to insert, for different reasons, Nazism) is not a solution but a continuation of this, for only the Over-man [Übermensch] is “appropriate to an absolute ‘machine economy’” (GA6.2, 146; N IV, 116-7; see GA54, 66-7).

Abandoning the geometric, the Cartesian, does not resign us to disorder, or to chaos. In a discussion of Nietzsche on schematising a chaos, Heidegger gives the following practical example: “If we simply look around, knowingly, here, in the lecture hall, on the street, in the forest, and elsewhere, do we, knowing and taking notice, encounter ‘chaos’? Do we not rather find an ordered, articulated region out of which objects that pertain to one another stand over against us in a surveyable, handy, available and measurable way?” Heidegger continues to suggest, through reading Nietzsche on this point, that our “regulating forms are imposed... by our ‘practical needs’. Thus practical behaviour, the praxis of life, not ‘theoretical’ re-presentation is the attitude from which the knowing mode of behaviour arises and is determined” (GA6.1, 501; N III, 72). Now this may help to make clear a remark Heidegger made in the previous lecture course: “Space is therefore an imaginary, imaginative bit of imagery, formed by force and the relations of force themselves. Which forces and relations of force it is that instigate the formation of space, that is to say, the self-formation of a representation of space, and how they do so, Nietzsche does not say... Nevertheless, with this remark Nietzsche is on the trail of an essential nexus, one that he never thought through, however, and never mastered” (GA6.1, 309-10; N II, 89). Of course, as shall be seen later, the interrelations of space and force, or power, are central to Foucault’s work.

However Heidegger still has this to say: “How is this [i.e. Nietzsche’s thought on space] all bound up with time, which is usually designated together with space. In contrast to the imaginary character of space, time is actual. It is also – in contrast to the bounded character of space – unbounded, infinite...” There are
certainly problems with this. There seem to be difficulties with understanding time as actual, unbounded and infinite, and this would seem to contradict some of what Heidegger has already argued. Though we may indeed wish to agree with Heidegger’s opinion that “viewed as a whole, Nietzsche’s meditations of space and time are quite meagre” (GA6.1, 310; N II, 90), it is perhaps not unjust to suggest that Heidegger neglects some of the points I raised in Chapter One. Though Heidegger finds Nietzsche invaluable in his de-struction of the tradition, on the critical notion of space and place he appears to owe more to Hölderlin.

One area where Nietzsche’s thought is arguably more advanced than Heidegger’s is that of the understanding of the body. During the Zollikon seminar, Medard Boss reminds Heidegger of Sartre’s criticism that Being and Time contained only six lines on the body. The response is simply that it was the hardest problem to solve, and that he did not know how to say any more. Nietzsche however did deal with the body, often in unpublished notes, but also in some sections of Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Heidegger never appears to discuss the body in anything like requisite detail in his publications, although these seminars at Zollikon may be the best source. William Richardson suggests that the thoughts on the body here cry out for comparison with the work of Merleau-Ponty. There is not the space here to elaborate the material in this work, instead some sketching of the contours of Heidegger’s thoughts on Nietzsche and the body will have to suffice.

I have already noted that Heidegger was intent on rescuing Nietzsche from the crudely reductionist reading that found traits of biologism and racism in his works. This reading finds its sources in several places in Nietzsche. The readings of the blond beast and the overman as biologically racist models have been convincingly destroyed in recent scholarship, and so need not detain us here. An area that is perhaps more problematic is that of the body. If Nietzsche wishes to pursue a vitalist line, can he do so without being reduced to the Nazi reading? Heidegger understands these problems in looking at Nietzsche on the body.

We cannot deny that the things physiology grapples with – particular bodily states [bestimmte Leibzustände], changes in internal secretions, muscle flexions, occurrences in the nervous
system — are also proper to affects, passions, and feelings. But we also have to ask whether all these bodily states and the body itself are grasped in a metaphysically adequate way, so that one may without further ado borrow material from physiology and biology, as Nietzsche, to his own detriment, so often did. The one fundamental point to realise here is that no result of any science can ever be applied immediately to philosophy (GA6.1, 41-2; N I, 45).59

Heidegger’s understanding of the body does not conform to the Cartesian mind/body dualism. It was shown in Being and Time that Dasein did not take up a bit of space like a thing did. Dasein is not a body, and its spatiality is understood in fundamentally different ways. Heidegger tries to explain: “Bodily being does not mean that the soul is burdened by a hulk we call the body. In feeling oneself to be, the body is already contained in advance in that self, in such a way that the body in its bodily state permeates the self. We do not ‘have’ a body in the way we carry a knife in a sheath. Neither is the body [Leib] a body [Körper] that merely accompanies us and which we can establish, expressly or not, as also present-at-hand. We do not ‘have’ a body [Leib]; rather, we ‘are’ bodily [leiblich]” (GA6.1, 99; N I, 98-9). Heidegger understands the body not as a noun, as an object, but as an adjectival state or even a verb, to body. This idea is expressed in one of the later lecture courses: “Life lives in that it bodies forth [Das Leben lebt, indem es leibt]. We know by now perhaps a great deal — almost more than we can encompass — about what we call the body [Leibkörper], without having seriously thought about what bodying [Leiben] is” (GA6.1, 509; N III, 79).

These lines hint at the notion that as beings-in-the-world we are bodily — that embodiment mediates our existence. Such ideas would indeed be developed in the work of Merleau-Ponty.60 Heidegger then suggests the sense in which the body can be seen as power. “‘Body’ is the name for that configuration of will to power in which the latter is always immediately accessible, because it is always within the province of the human identified as ‘subject’” (GA6.2, 270; N III, 223). Now this does not appear to further the purpose of understanding the body
as space, as a site of history, shaped by forces, as Nietzsche seemed to begin. However, Heidegger argues that Nietzsche’s thought of will to power was “ontological rather than biological” (GA6.2, 278; N III, 231), an attitude that is aimed at disputing the reading of Nazi ideologues. This adds support to his earlier formulation of the difference between der Körper and der Leib, two German words that are close to synonyms and are both translated by the English body. Der Körper is closer to the understanding of body as mass, and is used for animals and humans. Der Leib is used only for humans, and can mean body in a less tangible way. The following passage seems to link these ideas into a more useful formulation.

The bodying of life is nothing separate by itself, encapsulated in the ‘body’ [Körper] in which the body [Leib] can appear to us; the body [Leib] is transmission and passage at the same time. Through this body flows a stream of life of which we feel but a small and fleeting portion, in accordance with the receptivity of the momentary state of the body. Our body itself is admitted into this stream of life, floating in it, and is carried off and snatched away by this stream or else pushed to the banks... Nietzsche declared often enough in his later years that the body must be made the guideline of observation not only of humans but of the world (GA6.1, 509; N III, 79-80).

This perhaps advances us further in the understanding that Nietzsche gives to the body, in that we should see the body in historical – transmission and passage – terms. Foucault’s major essay on Nietzsche will elaborate some of these ideas. Heidegger does not fully support Nietzsche however, as he quotes The Will to Power paragraphs 489 and 491, and argues that though Nietzsche founds his thought on the body and not on the ‘I’, he is still fundamentally following Descartes. This is because “the body is to be placed first ‘methodologically’. It is a question of method... That the body is to be placed first methodologically means that we must think more clearly and comprehensibly and still more adroitly than Descartes, but to do so wholly and solely in his sense. The method is decisive” (GA6.2, 165-6; N IV, 133). This provides a good example of how
Heidegger's later work on Nietzsche (these particular lectures date from 1940) sees him as the last thinker of metaphysics, reversing several key points, but still from within a metaphysical framework. Whether Heidegger is any more able to escape from metaphysics is a much-debated point.

Power and Perspectivism

"What a revelation it was for the mass of people who were unfamiliar with actual thinking and its rich history when two decades ago, in 1918, Oswald Spengler announced that he was the first to discover that every age and every civilisation has its own world view! Yet it was nothing more than a very deft and clever popularisation of the thoughts and questions on which others long before him had ruminated far more profoundly. Nietzsche was the most recent of these" (GA6.1, 321; N II, 101). With these words, Heidegger links Nietzsche to the philosophical tradition – the reference to Spengler's appropriation, and the suggestion that Nietzsche is the most recent profound rumination – and suggests an attitude that was to become important in some of his own works, and absolutely central to the work of Foucault on the episteme, most obviously in The Order of Things. This historical understanding of understanding links to important ideas such as the space of possibilities and to earlier Heideggerian concepts such as the difference between ontic and ontological knowledge. The key issues at stake are those of power and perspectivism.

By the time of the Nietzsche lectures Heidegger has realised that his own project of "de-struction [Destruktion], like 'phenomenology' and all hermeneutical-transcendental questions, has not yet been thought in terms of the history of being" (GA6.2, 378; EP 15), and that, fundamentally, though these critical approaches can be useful, these must be used alongside that of history. "History is the history of being [Die Geschichte ist Geschichte des Seins]" (GA6.2, 20; N III, 182) says Heidegger, and much of his later work is taken up in an investigation of the history of philosophy, that in many ways, like Hegel, though with clearly divergent results, becomes a meditation on the philosophy of history. In the third lecture course on Nietzsche, Heidegger reaches the stage it was suggested was implicit in his formulation of the import of Newtonian
physics: “In its own being, therefore, truth is historicised” (GA6.2, 231; N III, 187). Truth is now seen as historical, as plural. There is no one truth, but this does not preclude the possibility of truths. Dreyfus has called this plural realism.\(^\text{64}\) Within this formulation of history and truth, Heidegger also sees the central importance of Nietzsche’s idea of power: “In the sense of Nietzsche’s interpretation of history, the question asks, what configuration of the will to power was at work here?” (GA6.2, 102; N IV, 75). So, questions must be asked bearing in mind the historical dimension, and considering the power relations at stake.

This is shown not only in Heidegger’s thoughts on Nietzsche, but also in the separate lecture from the same time entitled “The Age of the World Picture”. In the Nietzsche lectures, Heidegger makes the link: “Science, for example, knowledge in general, is a configuration of will to power. Thoughtful reflection... about knowledge – and science in particular – must make visible what will to power is” (GA6.1, 443; N III, 19), and some pages later, “the essence of knowledge, that is, the essence of truth, must be defined in terms of the will to power” (GA6.1, 448; N III, 24). These formulations are ones that Foucault later elaborates, and in Chapter Five I shall argue that Foucault’s understanding of the Nietzschean concept of power/knowledge is impossible without the mediation of Heidegger. These thoughts on power and history provide a link into the thought that underpins them: that of perspectivism. “Is there anything at all like an observation of history that is not one-sided but omniscinded? Must not every particular present always examine and interpret the past in terms of its own horizon? Won’t its historiographical knowledge be more ‘alive’ the more decisively the given horizon of that particular present is taken as a guide?” (GA6.2, 97; N IV, 71).

In a reading of a passage in The Gay Science (374), Heidegger argues that Nietzsche “achieves waxing clarity concerning the fact that humans always think within the confines of their little ‘corner’ of the world, their tiny angle of space-time” (GA6.1, 338; N II, 117). Nietzsche argues that we cannot see round our own corner, and Heidegger elaborates this and other scattered remarks on perspectivism in some of the most useful passages of his lectures. “Nietzsche
thinks tacitly as follows: All thinking in categories, all nascent thinking in schemata, that is, in accordance with rules, is "perspectival" (GA6.1, 532; N III, 102). Will to power itself is perspectival, and as every being occurs essentially as will to power it too is perspectival. The "will to power is in its innermost essence a perspectival reckoning with the conditions of its possibility, conditions that in itself posits as such. Will to power is in itself value positing" (GA6.2, 244; N III, 199). Heidegger's example of perspectivism is powerfully simple, and is often emulated in descriptions of this idea.

Assuming that we frequently come across a lone tree outside on a meadow slope, a particular birch, the manifold of colours, shades, light, atmosphere has a different character according to the time of day and year, and also according to the changing perspective of our perception, our distance and our mood; and yet it is always this 'identical' birch (GA6.1, 525; N III, 95).

Several of these ideas are put to practical use in the contemporaneous essay "The Age of the World Picture". The following passage shows the main thrust of Heidegger's argument.

When we use the word 'science' [Wissenschaft] today, it means something essentially different from the doctrina and scientia of the Middle Ages, and also from the Greek ἐπιστήμη. Greek science was never exact, precisely because, in keeping with its essence, it could not be exact and did not need to be exact. Hence it makes no sense whatever to suppose that modern science is more exact than that of antiquity. Neither can we say that the Galilean doctrine of free-falling bodies [Körper] is true and that Aristotle's teaching, that light bodies strive upward, is false; for the Greek understanding... rests upon a different interpretation of beings and hence conditions a correspondingly different kind of seeing and questioning of natural events. No one would presume to maintain that Shakespeare's poetry is more advanced than that of Aeschylus (GA5, 70-1; QCT 117).
Whilst arguing that different conceptions of what we now call “science” have existed over time, and that we could trace these changes historically, Heidegger warns us as to how such an investigation would have to run. “If we want to grasp the essence of modern science, we must first free ourselves from the habit of comparing the new science with the old solely in terms of degree, from the point of view of progress” (GA5, 71; QCT 117-8). Teleology is out, but a revised Nietzschean genealogy would be more successful. As Krell notes, the investigation of boredom in *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* is not *Kulturdiagnostik*, phenomenology or fundamental ontology, but close to genealogy than anything else. Given the suggestions propounded in the previous chapter I suggest that it is historical ontology, a term almost synonymous with genealogy. Indeed, in *Being and Time*, Heidegger talks of the “ontological task of constructing a non deductive genealogy of the different possible ways of being” (GA2, 11). We have seen how the ideas of power and perspectivism would be important.

Heidegger considers the modern view of the world: “When we reflect on the modern age, we are questioning the modern world picture [Weltbild]. We characterise the latter by throwing it into relief over against the medieval and ancient world pictures” (GA5, 81; QCT 128). However, medieval and ancient world pictures are modern inventions reimposed on those ages, as it is only in the modern age [der Neuzeit] that the world is conquered and conceived of as a picture. Heidegger suggests that this view occurs at the same time that man is conceived of as a *subiectum* and that therefore “observation and teaching about the world change into a doctrine of man, into anthropology” (GA5, 86; QCT 133). This is of course a reference to philosophy after Descartes. Heidegger continues, “it is no wonder that humanism first arises where the world first becomes picture. It would have been just as impossible for a humanism to have gained currency in the great age of the Greeks as it would have been to have had anything like a world picture in that age” (GA5, 86; QCT 133).

Such a view links to what Dreyfus has called plural realism, a belief that suggests, *contra* Kuhn, that different conceptions within science across time are not all false, but all true. This belief suggests that there is no one truth, but that
there are, usually across different times and spaces, various truths. Dreyfus elaborates: “One can reject the claim that there is a correct description of reality and still hold that there can be many correct descriptions, including a correct causal description of objectified physical nature”. This belief is shown in one of Heidegger’s examples: “Each historical age is not only great in a distinctive way in contrast to others; it also has, in each instance, its own concept of greatness” (GA5, 88; QCT 135). The idea of plural realism, though the name is Dreyfus’ invention, is clearly found in the works of the later Heidegger, and before him, in Nietzsche. In several of his works Foucault takes up these ideas. In The Order of Things, Foucault particularly develops this notion that the subject, humanism and anthropology are concepts of the modern age, and famously argues that they may well be nearing their end.67

Reading Nietzsche

This discussion of the four points of the moment, space, the body, and power and perspectivism are the main themes that will be taken from this reading of Nietzsche. However, as has been stated above, the manner of this reading is itself considered by some to be problematic. Often accusations of textual impropriety are thrown at Heidegger, in that he neglects the published corpus and uses the notes of The Will to Power. The charge is then extended to say that Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche would be impossible if he did not utilise this non-work. It has been argued above that the Heideggerian reading has fundamentally enriched our understanding of Nietzsche, and, crucially, forms the basis of the use Foucault was to put him to: this reading is not one that should be abandoned for the charges that are levelled against it, because these charges are, in themselves, problematic. Krell considers that the second lecture course, ‘The Eternal Return of the Same’, provides material to help us consider these accusations as “it shows us a Heidegger who reads Thus Spoke Zarathustra and other Nietzschean texts in a way that some recent commentators have insisted Heidegger never reads, is never able to read... [and] it enables us to assess the strengths and weaknesses of Heidegger’s extensive but not uncritical use of the Nietzschean Nachläß...”68

Heidegger cannot, and should not, be excused from the charge that he uses
Nietzsche's notes. He does, and he does so frequently. This is part because of his, perhaps tendentious, belief that "every great thinker always thinks one jump more originally than he directly speaks. Our interpretation must therefore try to say what is unsaid by him" (GA6.1, 136; N I, 134; GA6.2, 442-3; EP 77-8).\(^69\) To this end he believes that Nietzsche sketches out ideas in his notebooks that he was reluctant to work up for publication. These notebooks therefore become very important for an understanding. From a slightly different angle it can also be considered that in his notebooks Nietzsche writes in a far more traditionally philosophical manner, without the stylistic embellishments and dramatic play of his published works. This means that his notebooks sometimes provide a clearer picture of what is said elsewhere. There are therefore legitimate reasons for using the unpublished notes, providing that they are always acknowledged as such. Heidegger does so, and, far more than recent commentators, explains why he turns to the notes.\(^70\)

For a picture of the eternal return Heidegger argues that the published passages of *The Gay Science*, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, and *Beyond Good and Evil* are insufficient: "If our knowledge were limited to what Nietzsche himself published, we could never learn what Nietzsche knew perfectly well, what he carefully prepared and continually thought through, yet withheld. Only an insight [Einblick] into the Nachlaß in Nietzsche's own hand will provide a clearer picture" (GA6.1, 235; N II, 15). However, this does not mean that the answer lies without difficulty in *The Will to Power*. In the previous lecture course Heidegger had remarked that "insight into these important connections is quite difficult on the basis of the book *The Will to Power* as it lies before us in its present form, since the textual fragments assembled here have been removed from a great number of manuscripts written during the years 1882 to 1888. An altogether different picture results from the examination of Nietzsche's original manuscripts" (GA6.1, 204-5; N I, 202). Later, Heidegger again returns to this theme: "Today there lies before the public a book with the title *The Will to Power*. This book is not a 'work' of Nietzsche's. Nevertheless it contains only what Nietzsche himself wrote down... Of course, the present book *The Will to Power* does not reproduce the thought-path of Nietzsche's will to power... But the book is sufficient as the basis for an attempt to follow this thought-path and
to think Nietzsche’s sole thought in the course of this path. Nevertheless, we have to free ourselves from the outset and throughout from the order imposed on the book” (GA6.1, 436-7; N III, 13).

Heidegger criticises *The Will to Power*’s philological merit, its structure, and its critical apparatus. He claims that a reading of Nietzsche’s notes should “avoid mixing up passages from very different periods – which is what the book now available does” (GA6.1, 437; N III, 13-4). He criticises the “pointless confusion of the editor’s textual arrangement” (GA6.2, 35; N IV, 13). He does not see it as a legitimate book, and is sceptically cautious about the process by which it came to become one. “A portion of [notes], but only a scattered, arbitrarily and randomly selected portion, were later collected into the book that after Nietzsche’s death was pasted together from his Nachlaß and that is known as *The Will to Power*... In this fabricated ‘book’, thoughts from entirely different periods of time and from wholly divergent levels and aspects of a question are capriciously and mindlessly juxtaposed and intermingled. True, everything published in this ‘book’ is Nietzsche’s, but he never thought it like that” (GA6.2, 34; N IV, 11). Why then does Heidegger utilise *The Will to Power*? The reason that Heidegger uses this text is strikingly simple. When the Nietzsche volumes are read it should be borne in mind that we are reading transcripts of lectures that Heidegger gave at Freiburg. *The Will to Power* is the text that he suggested that his students should purchase, to give them a sample of the Nietzschean Nachlaß (GA6.1, 8; N I, 10). Given the problems of finding a useable version of the collected works, and the unrealistic nature of expecting students to buy or read it anyway, *The Will to Power*, flaws and all, is the obvious choice.

It is important to note that under the shadow of Nazism Heidegger reads two thinkers who have been appropriated by the movement and openly contests much of the official line. Notably, the biologistic, racist appropriations are contested continually. It is simply inaccurate to suggest that Heidegger turns to these thinkers because of a sympathy with Nazism, or in spite of Nazism. Rather he turns to them because of Nazism, precisely in order to contest their readings, because, as a thinker, this is the best way of showing his “spiritual resistance”. I
will give a similar interpretation of Heidegger’s rethinking of the πόλις in the following chapter, which challenges the notion of the political prevalent in Nazism: one he himself seemed to support in the Rectoral Address. As Hannah Arendt suggests, “Heidegger himself corrected his ‘error’ more quickly and more radically than many of those who later sat in judgement over him – he took considerably greater risks than were usual in German literary and university life during that period”. 71

Heidegger’s later work is the product of the twists and turns of the paths of thought he has followed since Being and Time. The whole picture comes into view, but all the pieces have been at least glimpsed in the readings of Hölderlin and Nietzsche. It has been shown how Heidegger’s work provides the basis for an understanding of history that dispenses with the linearity of time, but which sees the dimensions of past, present and future collide in the gateway of the moment. This makes any history necessarily a critique of the present. And it has been suggested that this history is one that takes a far greater interest in the spatial, as opposed to the merely temporal. Through a reading of early Greek thought, Heidegger has convincingly shown up the deficiencies of seeing space in terms of extension, as Descartes does, and has with waxing clarity moved from an understanding of space experientially to dwelling in place poetically. This last notion is particularly evident in the work of the later Heidegger. Following Greek thought, Heidegger has suggested avoiding of the concept of space, which is so tied up with ὀδὸς and extension, and has argued a return to the notion of place, τόπος, Ort. Such a reading, and a rethinking of the time/space relation is particularly evident in the Hölderlin lectures. This has led Janicaud to suggest the duality of topology and historicity, a dyad I would suggest can be condensed into the Anglicised neologism platial history. The following chapter will examine how Heidegger puts this notion into practice.
Chapter Four

Applications of the Platial

This chapter shifts from the chronological approach employed in the previous two chapters, to a more thematic discussion. The theoretical insights which have been traced from *Being and Time* through the readings of Kant, Hölderlin, and Nietzsche can now be used to illuminate the later Heidegger's concerns. The issues of place and history are central to many of the pieces Heidegger would produce: they are evident in one text of the 1930s, *The Origin of the Work of Art*, and in various ways are utilised in essays and lectures of the 1940s and beyond. These pieces cover many topics, but recurrent themes include the question of language, the confrontation with technology, the meaning of the word πόλις, and the notion of the fourfold, which Heidegger adapts and elaborates from Hölderlin. The question of language itself has only tangential relevance to the purpose here, but in various ways the content of the essays on language and certainly those on technology, the πόλις and the fourfold relate to the main themes of place and history. Many of the essays under consideration in this part date from the period after the end of the second world war, when Heidegger was banned from teaching by the occupying Allies. The ban remained in place until 1951, at which point Heidegger resumed courses at Freiburg. Given the range of Heidegger’s interests, and the fact that I am now moving to a thematic approach, an exhaustive treatment is not possible. Those texts that will be considered however provide a picture of Heidegger’s later concerns, and demonstrate the applications to which he puts his theoretical insights.

**The Origin of the Work of Art**

*The Origin of the Work of Art* is one of Heidegger's most famous and important works. Originally delivered as a Freiburg lecture in late 1935, it was repeated in Zürich in January 1936, and expanded through the course of that year to its full form, which was given in three parts in November and December, in Frankfurt am Main. This was the text that appeared in the collection *Holzwege*. After some
changes, and the addition of the Epilogue and the 1956 Addendum, the text was republished as a book in itself in 1960.\footnote{1} It is therefore obvious that this text, which straddles many times and places, bridges the entirety of the work being considered in this section.\footnote{2} Indeed, I believe that it serves as a particularly apposite example of how these ideas can be and are put into practice. It also opens up a number of themes that are considered in the later Heidegger’s more “poetic” work. Early in the first lecture, Heidegger sets out his aim of looking to conceptualise what the origin [Ursprung] of a work of art is. Instead of taking the usual, and perhaps obvious, route of claiming that the artist is the origin of the work of art, or the reverse route of claiming that the artist only becomes an artist as a result of the work, Heidegger suggests that both “artist and work are each of them by virtue of a third thing, which is prior to both, namely, that which also gives artist and work of art their names – art” (GA5, 7; BW 143).

Heidegger makes it clear that his investigation is neither abstract or confined to pictorial art: “Works of art are familiar to everyone. Architectural and sculptural works can be seen installed in public places [Plätzen], in churches, and in dwellings” (GA5, 8; BW 145). This balancing of the various forms of artworks is shown throughout Heidegger’s later works, where the plastic arts, which in German includes architecture, are given a ranking equal to the more traditional art-forms of literature and painting. Only music seems to be lacking from Heidegger’s consideration.\footnote{3} It is immediately recognised that any question of art is by its nature historical, especially one that looks at the problematic “origin”. Heidegger suggests that “art is historical, and as historical it is the creative preserving of truth in the work... Art is history in the essential sense that it grounds history... To originate something by a leap, to bring something into being from out of its essential source in a founding leap – this is what the word ‘origin’ [Ursprung, literally primal leap] means” (GA5, 64; BW 202). As with much of Heidegger’s work of this period, there is an important question of truth, and truth, as has been seen, is historicised: “Can truth happen [geschehen] at all and thus be historical [geschichtlich]? Yet truth, people say, is something timeless and super-temporal” (GA5, 27; BW 163). There is also an understanding of the spatial implications of the work of art, in part due to the consideration of form: “The self-contained block of granite is something material
in a definite if unshapely form. Form means here the spatial place distribution and arrangement of the material parts [Form meint heir die räumlich örtliche Verteilung und Anordnung der Stoffteile], resulting in a particular outline [Umriss], namely that of a block” (GA5, 17; BW 154). These implications come to the fore in two of the most important passages in Heidegger’s study.

Heidegger sets out to describe a piece of equipment, his example being a pair of peasant shoes, particularly as they appear in a painting by Van Gogh, “without any philosophical theory” (GA5, 22; BW 158). He is being disingenuous here, for, if the argument so far is believed, he is putting into practice his ideas of place and history. Heidegger begins by stating the basic impressions we immediately have of the shoes: the material they are made from, how they are stitched together, their general purpose and the differences that will arise regarding their particular purpose. Heidegger has already hinted at the direction he will take in his analysis of the shoes and the painting in a remark in An Introduction to Metaphysics. He is interested in the nature of being that arises in that visual scene, a question of time and space, history and place: “A painting by Van Gogh. A pair of rough peasant shoes, nothing else. Actually the painting represents nothing. But as to what is in that picture, you are immediately alone with it as though you yourself were making your way wearily home with your hoe on a late autumn evening after the last potato fires have died down” (GA40, 38; IM 35). In The Origin of the Work of Art Heidegger elaborates his theme:

“From the dark opening of the worn insides of the shoes the toilsome tread of the worker stares forth. In the stiffly rugged heaviness of the shoes there is the accumulated tenacity of her slow trudge through the far-spreading and ever-uniform furrows of the field swept by a raw wind. On the leather lie the dampness and richness of the soil. Under the soles stretches the loneliness of the field-path as evening falls. In the shoes vibrates the silent call of the earth, its quiet gift of the ripening grain and its unexpected self-refusal in the fallow desolation of the wintry field... This equipment belongs to the earth, and is protected in the world of the peasant woman. From out of this protected belonging the
equipment itself rises to its resting-within-itself” (GA5, 22-3; BW 159-60).

There are few passages in Heidegger that so clearly show the duality of place and history. This fictive story that Heidegger has created may read more into the painting than should be seen, but it is very much a story in which the spatial dimension is important. As well as providing a useful example of how we cope with equipment in everyday life, it exhibits elements of what Chapter Three tentatively called a platial history. This remains, whether we believe Heidegger or not. Meyer Schapiro, in an essay entitled “The Still Life as Personal Object” contests Heidegger’s reading of Van Gogh’s picture, as he claims that the shoes are not those of a peasant but those of a city dweller, perhaps even Van Gogh’s own shoes from his time in Paris.4 Maybe, maybe not... does it matter? Would there be any fundamental difference if Heidegger had eulogised the painting as a vibrant representation of the world of the man in the city, walking the streets, between the buildings, through the rain and the polluted skies? This too would be a possible fictive history, an interpretation of a painting that “represents nothing”. However the importance of the particular reading that Heidegger makes is suggested by Derrida, and following him Bernstein. They argue that it is significant that, writing in 1935-36, Heidegger should opt for a reading that emphasises the importance of soil, earth. “Heidegger’s attribution of the shoes to the peasant woman in part licences Heidegger’s ideologically loaded description of the shoes, with its embarrassing, heavily coded, ‘poetics of the soil’, the earth, ground. Derrida sights in this language of soil, earth, ground a still active desire for restitution operative in Heidegger despite, and in the midst of, his critique of the subject”.5

A few pages later, Heidegger applies the same treatment to the Greek temple, a more obviously spatial art-work.6

“A building, a Greek temple, portrays nothing. It simply stands there in the middle of the rock-cleft valley. The building encloses the figure of the god, and in this concealment lets it stand out into the holy precinct through the open portico. By means of the
temple, the god is present in the temple. This presence of the god is in itself the extension and delimitation of the precinct as a holy precinct... Standing there, the building rests on the rocky ground. This resting of the work draws up out of the rock the obscurity of that rock's bulky yet spontaneous support. Standing there, the building holds its ground against the storm raging above it and so first makes the storm itself manifest in its violence... The Greeks early called this emerging and rising in itself and in all things ἄκορα. It illuminates also that on which and in which man bases his dwelling. We call this ground the earth” (GA5, 30-1; BW 167-8).

Rather than simply seeing the temple as a political or religious structure, Heidegger also sees the importance of the use of space and place, which will come to the fore in the discussion of the πόλις in the following section. However, Heidegger’s attitude to the idea of origins is also open to question, as his praising of the pre-Socratic beginnings sets him up for the damning charge of conservative nostalgia, something that is still evident in his attitude to technology which dominates several later pieces. Along with the language of earth and soil this may well be the enduring legacy in Heidegger’s works of his links with Nazism. Heidegger’s explanation of how he sees the problematic term comes right at the start of the piece, and colours all that follows: “Origin here means that from which and by which something is what it is and as it is. What something is, as it is, we call its essence. The origin of something is the descent [Herkunft] of its essence” (GA5, 7; BW 143). This notion of “origin” within the historical approach that Heidegger adapts from Nietzsche, is one which Foucault will depart from.

Re-thinking the ἴλιος

This notion of the origin is a potential problem in The Origin of the Work of Art, in the Hölderlin lectures, and will return as a spectre to haunt other later texts of Heidegger’s. Hölderlin himself is said to have remarked that “nothing is dearer to me than the things that are as old as the world itself”, and there appears to be in
Heidegger’s work a desire to return to an original, rural state (though see WhD 53-4; WCT 23). In one remark in a 1943 piece on Hölderlin, commenting on the poem ‘Homecoming’, Heidegger suggests that “homecoming is the return into the proximity of the origin [Ursprung]... then must not the return home consist chiefly, and perhaps for a long time, in getting to know this mystery, or even first of all in learning how to get to know it” (GA4, 23-4; EB 278-9; see GA53, 202). Heidegger’s analyses of equipment, of dwelling and building can perhaps all be related to this notion of the origin, one that runs close to the idea of nostalgia. It has been suggested that the 1934-35 lectures are more open to accusations of nostalgia than the later work on Hölderlin, but the rural was clearly a very important element in Heidegger’s own life – witness his refusal to move to Berlin for a teaching post in the 1930s, and his eulogising of his Black Forest existence.

Whilst an element of rural nostalgia is found in Heidegger’s work, and perhaps increasingly in the later pieces which further develop the notion of poetic dwelling and introduce the concept of the fourfold [das Geviert] of earth, sky, gods and mortals, Heidegger does make a series of important remarks which show the importance of place in areas other than the rural. Throughout his career, Heidegger stressed that looking at the fundamental concepts of Greek thought with our modern eyes was sometimes dangerous. He argues that a fundamental change had been made in the transition from the Greek to the Latin language (GA40, 15-16; IM 13; GA54, 63-4). For example, using our modern understanding of logic could not shed light on the Greek concept of λόγος; that of ethics could not describe the realm of ηθος; and physics was no use in understanding φύσις. And, perhaps especially, Heidegger made us think of the original meaning of μεταφορικά – τα μετα τα φωςικά – and used this to point out the problems of the accepted sense of metaphysics (see GA29/30, 55ff; GA9, 15; GA40; IM). It comes as no surprise then that Heidegger also challenges our understanding of politics by rethinking the notion of πόλεις. Indeed, Heidegger suggests the πόλεις was for the Greeks that which was absolutely worthy of question, and yet for the modern mind the ‘political’ is unquestioned: not in terms of its content, but in terms of its essence (GA53, 117-8). To question the political then, through a rethinking of the πόλεις, is to send us nearer the Greeks.
One of the reasons that Heidegger wants to rethink the πόλις, and through it the notion of the political, is to explicitly distance himself both from the attitude of the time and from his own political involvement. It is notable that *Being and Time* does not discuss the πόλις, the state, or politics. There are only a couple of passing references to the state and to politics in the entire work. However, as has been suggested, the Rectoral Address was a politicising of the earlier philosophy and the first lecture course on Hölderlin a philosophising of these politics. In bringing his thought to the political arena, Heidegger is greatly influenced by Plato’s Πολιτεία [known in English as *Republic*], with its call for philosopher-kings or rulers. Heidegger’s important treatment of this text is found in the Winter Semester course of 1931-32, *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit: Zu Platons Höhlengleichnis und Theätet*, as well as in the Rectoral Address itself.

In the lecture course Heidegger makes the following remark:

Concerning the ‘state’ [*Staat*] (in this way we translate πόλις, not quite adequately), and the question of its inner possibility, according to Plato what prevails as the highest principle is that the proper guardians [*eigentlichen Wächter*] of the being-with-another of humans, in the oneness of the πόλις, must be philosophical humans. This does not mean that Professors of philosophy should become chancellors of the Reich [*Reichskanzler*], but that philosophers must become φύλαχες, guardians. The domination of the state and its ordering must be guided through by philosophical humans who, on the basis of the deepest and widest, freely questioning knowledge, bring the measure and rule, and open the routes of decision (GA34, 100).

Philosophers are seen here as guardians, guides to the conduct of the state, those who can lead the leader, *den Führer zu führen*. Although Heidegger hints at its inadequacy, he translates πόλις as *Staat*, and uses a word that cannot fail to have nationalistic overtones: *Reichskanzler*. This attitude – here suggested as an interpretation of Plato – is given concrete expression when Heidegger takes over the Rectorship. It is notable that throughout the Rectoral Address Heidegger uses
the word ‘state’, never explicitly linking it to the word πόλις, but never denying this is the reference intended. The first line of the Address suggests that “assuming the Rectorship means committing oneself to leading [Führung] this university spiritually and intellectually [geistigen]” (SdU 9; HC 29).

This leading calls for a new kind of questioning, one which will “ground knowledge [Wissenschaft] once again directly in the fruitfulness and blessing of all the world-shaping forces of man’s historical Dasein, such as: nature, history, language; Volk, custom [Sitte], state; poetry, thought, belief; sickness, madness, death; law, economy, technology” (SdU 13-14; HC 33). Heidegger appropriates Ernst Jünger’s concepts of ‘military service’ and ‘labour service’, and sets up the idea of ‘knowledge service’. In his key work *Der Arbeiter* [The Worker] Jünger likens the worker to the soldier, and opposes them to the security-seeking bourgeoisie. Indeed, Wolin suggests that Heidegger’s ‘option’ for National Socialism was based on the supposition that it was the way toward the society of workers proposed by Jünger. Heidegger sees the role of the university as ‘knowledge service’, part designed to prepare men for the other two services: “Because the statesman and the teacher, the doctor and the judge, the pastor and the master builder lead the Volk in its Dasein as a Volk and a state [volklich-staatliche Dasein führen] and watch over this existence in its essential relations to the world-shaping forces of human being and keep it focused, these professions and the education for them are entrusted to the knowledge service” (SdU 16; HC 35).

Heidegger’s first rethinking of the πόλις appears in *An Introduction to Metaphysics* two years later. It would seem that the most obvious route to understand the concept of the πόλις would be to return to the central texts of Ancient Greek philosophy on politics – Plato’s Πολιτεία and Aristotle’s Επιστήμη Πολιτική [The Politics] – or to political texts, histories or documents. Instead, Heidegger looks at Sophocles’ tragedy Antigone, and particularly at the second chorus. The discussion of πόλις forms part of an analysis of the nature of man as revealed in this choral ode. There are three remarkable lines for Heidegger. The first (line 333-4) describes man as “το δεινότατον” – the strangest, uncanniest [das Unheimlichste] of all beings, and the second (line
360) sees man as “παντοπόρος απορος” – “underway in all directions, on the way to nothing”. Heidegger explains that πόρος means “passage through..., transition to..., route [Bahn]”. Man is everywhere a path for being, but is therefore flung out of all paths, essentially homeless, unfamiliar. As Heidegger notes, the παντοπόρος απορος clearly contains an interpretation of δεινότατον (GA40, 157-61; IM 148-52). We might also note that the notion of a path was very important for Heidegger – he called two of his most important collections Wegmarken [Pathmarks] and Holzwege [Woodpaths – the type of paths that lead, but not necessarily anywhere in particular] and just before his death asked for his collected writings to be known as “Paths – not Works [Wege, nicht Werke]”.

Heidegger then focuses on line 370, which begins “ψυσπολις ἀπολις” – translated in a standard English version as “he and his city rise high – but the city casts out”. The line has a similar construction to παντοπόρος απορος, but instead of speaking of the path it speaks of the place where these paths meet, the πόλις, from which ‘political’ is derived, and which is usually translated as ‘city’ [Stadt] or ‘city-state’ [Stadtstaat]. Heidegger suggests that this does not capture the full meaning: πόλις is so familiar to us through the words ‘politics’ and ‘political’ that we no longer see it as worthy of question. “Πόλις means, rather, the site [die Stätte], the there [Da], wherein and as which historical Da-sein is. The πόλις is the historical site [Geschichtsstätte], the there in which, out of which, and for which history happens [Geschichte geschieht]” (GA40, 161; IM 151-2). To this site and scene of history belong the gods, the temples, the priests, the festivals, the games, the poets, the thinkers, the ruler [Herrscher], the council of elders, the assembly of the people, the army and the fleet. All of these do not first belong to the πόλις or are political through a relationship with a statesman, but through their being constitute the πόλις. This is why man is both ψυσπολις – rising high above the site – and ἀπολις – without site. The historical site is the result of man’s creation: without them it is nothing, without it they are nothing (GA40, 161-2; IM 152-3). In the first instance then, πόλις means the historical site of Dasein, of human existence. The πόλις is the site or place where history happens: the πόλις is essentially situated and, rather than being spatial, is platial. Only afterwards does πόλις take on its political meaning.
These remarks have, however, remained unclear and incomplete, that is until the publication of the lectures in the *Gesamtausgabe* on Hölderlin, and pre-Socratic thinkers such as Heraclitus and Parmenides. The lecture course on Hölderlin’s hymn ‘The Ister’, delivered in 1942, is the next interpretation. Once again the source is the choral ode from *Antigone*, and Heidegger again picks the same three lines for analysis, along with one which speaks of the ἐστία [hearth]. In his discussion of τὸ δεῖνὸν as *das Unheimliche* Heidegger accepts that in ‘philological’ terms, the translation is ‘wrong’. It can only be seen as justified, even necessary, on the basis of an interpretation. The points concerning this particular translation need not concern us here, but the general remarks are worth bearing in mind. Heidegger reminds us that we get our knowledge of words in a foreign language from a dictionary, which is based on a preceding interpretation of linguistic concepts. A dictionary can give us pointers as to how to understand a word, but it is never an absolute authority to which we are bound. All translating must be an interpreting. Heidegger closes: “this interim remark about the essence of translating is meant to recall that the difficulty of a translation is never merely a technical issue but concerns the relation of humans to the essence of the word and to the worthiness of language. Tell me what you think of translation, and I will tell you who you are” (GA53, 74-5).

Heidegger sees πόρος as “the passage or the passage through to something” and πόλις as a particular realm of πόρος: “one field in which the latter emphatically comes to pass”. Heidegger suggests that the contemporary interpretation is that everything in Greek thought is politically determined. This, he suggests, is a mistake, but one which is being put to the cause of National Socialism. Heidegger argues that it is evident that “the ‘political’ is that which belongs to the πόλις and can therefore be determined only in terms of the πόλις. Yet the converse is precisely not the case”. If the political derives from the πόλις, then we cannot use our understanding of the political to explain the πόλις: “The πόλις cannot be determined ‘politically’. The πόλις, and precisely it, is therefore not a ‘political’ concept” (GA53, 98-9).

Alternatives to seeing it as political would include seeing the πόλις as ‘state’, or as ‘city’, but Heidegger argues that the first leads us to relate it to modern state
formations; the second is distinguished from village only because it is 'stately', again leading to confusion. Instead, "perhaps the πόλις is that realm and place around which everything question-worthy and uncanny [Unheimliche] turns in an exceptional sense. The πόλις is πόλος, that is, the pole, the swirl or vortex [Wirbel] in which and around which everything turns" (GA53, 100). The πόλις is therefore "neither merely state [Staat], nor merely city [Stadt], rather in the first instance it is properly 'the stead' ['die Statt']: the site [die Stätte] of the abode of human history". The essential thing about the πόλις therefore is this site of abode: which means that the political "in the originary and in the derivative sense, lies in its being the open site of that fitting destining [Schickung – related to Geschichte, history] from out of which all human relations toward beings... are determined" (GA53, 101-2). To be political means to be at the site of history.

Heidegger takes this forward by asking us to question two of the most famous pronouncements in Greek thought. The first is Aristotle's formulation of the human being as "ζωον πολιτικόν",24 which is usually "translated in a superficial way" as political animal, entity, or being. 25 But as Heidegger has argued, the πόλις is determined through its relationship to human beings, and therefore man - is that being capable of belonging to the πόλις (GA53, 102-3). The second is the suggestion in Plato's Republic that either philosophers should become rulers, or the rulers philosophers, or there will be no end of trouble for the πόλις.26 Heidegger argues that Plato does not mean that philosophers should assume the business of the state, because the πόλις is not the 'state'; nor should rulers "'busy themselves' with 'philosophy', as though it were something like collecting beetles". Instead, Heidegger argues, Plato's statement means that the πόλις – as the site of abode of human history – is best served by philosophers, who stand in the radiance and light of being. This does not mean that everything is determined in terms of the political, or that the political has priority. "The doctrine of the unconditional priority of the political on the one hand, and on the other hand the conception of the πόλις as the ground that is worthy of question and as the site of beings, are separated from one another by an abyss". Neither Greek nor contemporary political thought (by which Heidegger means National Socialism, whose historical singularity is stressed) are served by their conflation (GA53, 105-7). There would therefore seem to be a distancing from the attitude of the
Rectoral Address when Heidegger offered his services to National Socialism and the state as a philosopher, to complement the Führer's role as ruler.\(^\text{27}\)

The lines "παντοπόρος απορος" — underway in all directions, on the way to nothing — and "Ψυζολις ἀπολις" — towering high above the site, forfeiting the site — show, Heidegger suggests, what is so "το δεσινον", Unheimliche, uncanny, in human beings. And yet das Unheimliche, the uncanny, is not to be understood in terms of an impression of fear or terror which humans instil in others, but to be conceived in terms of das Un-heimische, the un-homely, "namely that unhomely that is the fundamental trait of human abode in the midst of beings" (GA53, 113-4). The 'un' of unhomely is not merely a negative — the duality of παντοπόρος απορος and 'Ψυζολις ἀπολις show this. Heidegger explicitly links man's being unhomely to the πόλις, which is not some isolated realm — the so-called 'political' — within a wider realm of πόρος, but "the site within whose expansive realm every πόρος moves" (GA53, 110-1). This is a reversal of the earlier definition, and a progression from that of An Introduction to Metaphysics, but Heidegger is quick to counter that it allows the belief that everything is political. Rather, all human activity that is historical has "the πόλις as its site, as the place to which it belongs" (GA53, 117). Everything that is historical, is therefore explicitly situated, platial.

For modern eyes, the 'political' is the way in which history is accomplished, and as such is itself unquestioned. Heidegger suggests that the failure to question the 'political' belongs with its totality. The totality of the political is not simply based on the arbitrary wilfulness of dictators, but in the metaphysical essence of modern actuality in general. This metaphysical essence is, of course, fundamentally different from the way in which the Greek world was historical. The 'political' is unquestioned, yet the πόλις was for the Greeks that which was altogether worthy of question (GA53, 117-8). Rethinking the πόλις therefore leads us explicitly to question the 'political', to historicise it, to situate it.

In the following semester, in a course on Parmenides, Heidegger returns again to a discussion of the πόλις.\(^\text{28}\) Again Heidegger suggests that we think the Greek πόλις and the 'political' in a totally un-Greek fashion. Much of the discussion
replicates that from ʻThe Ister’ course, something we might expect given their proximity. In this course however, he suggests explicitly that we think the ‘political’ as Romans, as since the time of the Imperium, the word ‘political’ [πολιτικόν] has been thought imperially. The only thing left of Greek in the word political is its sound (GA54, 63-7). Plato’s dialogue on the essence [Wesen] of the πόλις (GA9, 109) is called the Πολιτεία, which is rendered as res publica [public business] by the Romans, Der Staat in modern German, Republic in modern English.29 Earlier in the course Heidegger had distinguished between the Greek ἀλήθεια, the Roman rectitudo, and the modern notion of truth. ἀλήθεια should not be thought of as ‘truth’ [Wahrheit] but as ‘non-concealment’ [Unverborgenheit].30 He suggests that there is a similar distinction to be drawn between the πόλις, the res publica and the state. This is no surprise, he suggests, given that the essence of the Greek πόλις is grounded in the essence of ἀλήθεια. The πόλις, as the πόλος, the pole, is the site of the non-concealment of beings in general (GA54, 132-3).

This detailed reading of Heidegger’s remarks on the πόλις is important both in terms of his overall development and the implications it might have.31 In the Hölderlin lectures Heidegger thinks the notions of space and time through the notions of placing and journeying as we saw in Chapter Three; in these discussions he rethinks them through the notions of site and history. On the charge of rural nostalgia, it is worth noting, in distinction to this emphasis, that the discussion of the πολιτεία is much wider than simply the rural, even if we bear in mind Heidegger’s admonition not to translate πόλις as city.

Second, and perhaps most interestingly – but certainly most speculatively – is the potential for rethinking the political that this discussion provides. We will recall that Heidegger suggested that “the ‘political’ is that which belongs to the πόλις and can therefore be determined only in terms of the πόλις. Yet the converse is precisely not the case” (GA53, 98-9). We could not use our understanding of the political to explain the πολιτεία, but, as the political derives from the πόλις, we can use our understanding of πόλις to rethink the political.32 This would enable an explicit distancing from the modern – in Heidegger’s time, as well as perhaps in our own – Schmittian, notion of the political. Carl Schmitt, the Nazi jurist we
know Heidegger to have read, develops an understanding of the political predicated on the friend/enemy distinction. In Schmitt’s understanding, “the concept of the state presupposes the concept of the political”.33 Such an understanding risks confusing the political with the polemical, πόλις with πόλεμος, a word that links closely to πολέμιος, the enemy.34 Indeed in a 1933 letter to Schmitt, thanking him for a copy of The Concept of the Political, Heidegger suggested that he was “in the middle of πόλεμος and all literary projects must take second place”.35 In distinction to Schmitt, and with Heidegger’s rethinking, we can suggest that the concept of the political presupposes the concept of the πόλις. Rethinking the notion of the political therefore distances Heidegger from his own political involvement of the Rectorship period. We might call this his retreating from/re-treating of the political.36 This issue will be picked up on in the discussion of technology in the following section. Leading on from this, what implications are there in seeing the ‘political’ in terms of its situatedness or platial elements? What potential is there for rethinking the notions involved in political theory and practice – especially those relating to regional and international politics? Such questions must remain unanswered here, but are perhaps the pathmarks for future thought.

The Question of Technology

What does Heidegger understand by technology? Starting with the word itself, he suggests that it derives from the Greek Τεχνικόν, which means “that which belongs to τέχνη... τέχνη is the name not only for the activities and skills of the craftsman but also for the arts of the mind and the fine arts... the word τέχνη is linked with the word επιστήμη. Both words are terms for knowing in the widest sense” (VA 16; BW 318). This should be borne in mind throughout this reading of Heidegger’s readings, although Heidegger’s discussions centre around what we would normally understand by technology. This is because technology in the modern sense is a particular attitude towards what is, and what constitutes knowledge. The piece The Question of Technology was first delivered as a lecture on December 1st 1949, and was originally called “Das Ge-stell”, “The Enframing”. This lecture was part of a series of four, under the general title “Einblick in das, was ist”, “Insight into that which is”. The other lectures were
"The Turning", "The Thing", and "The Danger". Heidegger explains the general title thus: "Insight into that which is – thus do we name the sudden flash of the truth of being into truthless being" (GA79, 75; QCT 47). These lectures aim for an understanding, a questioning, of the state of affairs in the modern world. There is a fundamental shift, a turn, in man’s relations with technology, a turn that Nietzsche and Nazism were both, albeit for different reasons, unable to comprehend.

Krell has pointed out the importance of the wording of the general title for these lectures: "Only the flash of an eye can apprehend such an impending turn: Einblick is surely related to what Heidegger has earlier called Augenblick. The thinker’s task is to train his eye on that possible momentary turning, enabling the technological hazard to turn into a kind of rescue". Heidegger himself makes much of the links between the words he uses in these pieces: "To flash [blitzen], in terms both of its word and its matter, is ‘to glance’ [blicken]. In the glance and as that flash, the essence, the coming to presence, of being enters into its own emitting of light... The in-turning that is the flash of the truth of being is the insight [Einkehr des Blitzes der Wahrheit des Seyns ist Einblick]" (GA79, 74; QCT 45). Bearing in mind everything that is behind Heidegger’s notion of the Augenblick, it is clear that these lectures aim to use the new understanding of history, and of place, to shed light on the issues of technology and poetic dwelling. Platial histories, or certainly descriptions, are evident in these lectures. Given the contemporary relevance of the topic, they can equally be seen as critiques, even histories, of the present.

Heidegger’s analysis of technology looks at how technological apparatus have changed over time, and, more specifically, how their attitude toward nature has altered. His examples are polarised between those belonging to a rural existence and those of a more modern age. "A radar station is of course less simple than a weather vane... And certainly a sawmill in a secluded valley of the Black Forest is a primitive means compared with the hydroelectric plant on the Rhine River" (VA 10; BW 312). It is suggested that modern technology unlocks the potential of nature to be a source of power that can be extracted and stored. Heidegger refutes the claim that this is what the old windmill did: "No. Its sails do indeed
turn in the wind; they are left entirely to the wind’s blowing. But the windmill does not unlock energy from the air currents in order to store it” (VA 18; BW 320). This change over time is one that is particularly evident when the changes in place and landscape are examined. In our modern age “a tract of land is challenged in the hauling out of coal and ore. The earth now reveals itself as a coal mining district, the soil as the site of mineral deposits [Erzlagerstätte]” (VA 18; BW 320).

This concept of ‘challenging’ or ‘setting upon’ is found again when Heidegger argues that “the work of the peasant does not challenge the soil of the field”. By this Heidegger means that the peasant works with the field, using it naturally. In contrast, the modern mode of agriculture “sets upon [stellt] nature. It sets upon it in the sense of challenging it. Agriculture is now a motorised food industry” (VA 18; BW 320). The use of machines, chemical fertilisers and similar are unnatural ways of working upon the field, not working with it. In consequence, “nature becomes a gigantic gasoline station, an energy source for modern technology and industry” (G 18; DT 50). The opposition that Heidegger finds is made particularly clear when he makes an examination of the Rhine river. Heidegger compares the old wooden bridge over the Rhine with the new hydroelectric plant. Whereas the bridge was built into the river, now the river is damned up into the power plant. The river has now become a “water-power supplier”, which derives its essence from the power-plant. “In order that we may even remotely consider the monstrousness that reigns here, let us ponder for a moment the contrast that is spoken by the two titles: ‘The Rhine’, as damned up into the power works, and ‘The Rhine’, as uttered by the art-work in Hölderlin’s hymn by that name. But, it will be replied, the Rhine is still a river in the landscape, is it not? Perhaps. But how? In no other way than as an object on call for inspection by a tour group ordered there by the vacation industry” (VA 19-20; BW 321).

Nature has become standing-reserve [Bestand], a designation that means something more than merely stock. This, argues Heidegger, is a fundamental shift from the previous attitude to nature, found, of course, in the rural setting. But even this is changing irrevocably. “The forester who measures the felled timber in the woods and who to all appearances walks the forest path in the same
way his grandfather did is today ordered by the industry that produces commercial woods, whether he knows it or not”. His work is subordinate to the demand for cellulose, for paper, which is then turned into newspapers and magazines which “set public opinion to swallowing what is printed” (VA 21-2; BW 323). There is even talk of the idea of human resources, although man is never merely standing-reserve, as it is man, in part, that drives technology forward. However Heidegger cautions against simply seeing man as leading technology: “It seems time and time again as though technology were a means in the hands of man. But, in truth, it is the essence of man that is now being ordered forth to lend a hand to the essence of technology” (GA79, 68; QCT 37). The question of technology is not simply and purely technical, but is something that shapes the whole attitude of our age, “not only upon man, but also upon all beings, nature and history” (ID 34/98).

Now such an understanding of technology would be one thing, but if we consult the transcript of “Das Ge-stell”, rather than the version published as “The Question of Technology”, we find that the text has been edited. The published version suggests that the modern mode of agriculture “sets upon nature. It sets upon it in the sense of challenging it. Agriculture is now a motorised food industry” (VA 18; BW 320). In the transcript published in the Gesamtausgabe Heidegger continues to compare the role of technology in modern agriculture with events on a wider world stage: “Agriculture is now a motorised food industry, the same thing in its essence [im Wesen das Selbe] as the production of corpses in the gas chambers and extermination camps, the same thing as blockades and the reduction of countries to famine, the same thing as the production of hydrogen bombs” (GA79, 27). Lacoue-Labarthe has described this remark as “scandalous and lamentably inadequate”, something it clearly is, given Heidegger’s compliance with the Nazi regime in its nascent years, but it should not merely be the cause for accusations. I am aware that I am on dangerous ground because a reading of this passage that does not it condemn outright could be seen as a tacit acceptance, but it is worth thinking a little more about it.
In terms of the four examples Heidegger gives – the motorised food industry; the gas chambers and extermination camps; the blockades and the hydrogen bomb – what they, on his terms, have in common is the essence of technology. The essence of modern agriculture is something entirely apart from agriculture – it is the Ge-stell that frames agriculture, that of modern technology, the modern ethos. In Heidegger’s terms this is the inevitable result of the world made picture, the Cartesian objectification of the world. What Heidegger fails to realise – and this is the scandal, the inadequacy – is that there is something essentially different between agriculture and the Holocaust. What many of his critics fail to realise is what that difference is. This is exhibited most obviously in de Beistegui’s book *Heidegger and the Political*. He suggests that the thinking of the Holocaust in the same terms as the hydrogen bomb or the Berlin blockade is the problem. Does not, he suggests, the Holocaust force “thinking outside of itself”. 43

This absence, or indeed failure, is particularly obvious in de Beistegui’s work because his is a book expressly dealing with the political, and yet what links the last three examples is a particular concept of the political. As was noted in the discussion of the πόλεις earlier in this chapter, Heidegger suggests that the failure to question the ‘political’ belongs with its totality. He suggests that the totality of the political is not simply based on the arbitrary willfulness of dictators, but in the metaphysical essence of modern actuality in general (GA53, 117-8). The modern concept of the political is, like the modern attitude to technology, not merely a regionalised, historically limited event, but one that has its essence in modern ways of being. The gas chambers and extermination camps, the blockades and the hydrogen bomb all exhibit the political thinking of the friend/enemy distinction. There is clearly something in Heidegger’s critique of the political that aims at Schmitt, yet notably de Beistegui’s book contains no reference to Schmitt. With the potential of modern technology a friend/enemy problem can now be resolved in a way as distinct from previous solutions as modern agriculture is from the peasant in the field. 44

It was noted above that Heidegger’s understanding of modern technology rests upon his understanding of Ge-stell. This was a word that appeared in *The Origin of the Work of Art*, where he suggest that the figure [*Gestalt*] of the work of art
needed to be understood “in terms of the particular setting [Stellen] and Ge-stell as which the work occurs when it sets itself up and sets itself forth” (GA5, 52; BW 189). In German, Stelle, -n is a word with a range of meanings, including place, position, department, and passage in a book; similarly Gestell means stand, rack, frame, framework, and chassis, amongst other things. The verb stellen means to set upon, to challenge – as in the way modern technology sets upon [stellt] nature – but also producing and presenting [Her- und Dar-stellen]. The prefix Ge- means bringing together – Gebirg, mountain range; Gebiß, set of teeth; Gemüt, disposition, i.e. a gathering of feelings – therefore, in Heidegger’s usage, Ge-stell does not only mean the support or frame around something, but the bringing together of the setting, the en-framing (VA, 23-4; BW 324-6; GA79, 26-7, 32-5). As will be suggested in the following chapter, Foucault’s important notion of dispositif – as the ensemble of discourses and practices of a given era – is closely related to this concept.

Such an understanding leads to Heidegger’s radical claim that the essence of technology is before, and not a consequence of, the scientific revolution: a claim he makes by opposing historiographical chronology [historische Zeitrechnung] to history. “For historiographical chronology, modern physical science begins in the seventeenth century. In contrast, machine-power technology develops only in the second half of the eighteenth century. But modern technology, which for chronological reckoning is the later, is, from the point of view of the essence holding sway within it, historically earlier” (VA 26; BW 327). This is because the modern physical theory of nature prepares the way not simply for technology but for the essence of modern technology, which is not in itself technological, but is a way of seeing things as calculable, mathematical, extended and therefore controllable (see also WhD 155; WCT 135-6). This claim will not be further examined here, but it is worth noting the similarity to some of Foucault’s claims about historical development. The Question of Technology itself will be left at this point, in order to discuss the influence of Ernst Jünger on Heidegger’s attitudes to technology. This also provides the space for a recapitulation of some of the more problematic and intertwining themes from the previous discussions of Heidegger and Nazism.
We have seen how in his Rectoral Address Heidegger had taken Jünger’s concepts of ‘military service’ and ‘labour service’, and linked them to the idea of ‘knowledge service’. However, as has been seen, Heidegger does turn away from this. Similarly, though around 1933 he does seem to support Jünger, by the mid 1930s he is distancing himself from Jünger’s attitudes on, amongst other things, technology. Jünger believed that the way out of nihilism was a whole-hearted embrace of technology, which would lead us deep into nihilism, but then out the other side. There are noticeable parallels with some of Nietzsche’s thought on the subject. In the later volumes of Nietzsche, Heidegger is critical of Nietzsche’s attitude to nihilism, suggesting that it is thought nihilistically. Similar accusations could be made of Jünger and Nazism.

It is instructive to compare the following two passages from Der Arbeiter with the analysis in The Question of Technology, discussed above. “There is no region left that has not yet been chained by streets and railways, by cables and wires, by airlines and fairways”, “the field that is ploughed by machines and fertilised by nitrogen produced in factories is no longer the same field”. The parallels are clear, and the immediate reaction might be to suggest Heidegger is appropriating Jünger’s ideas. Whilst an influence is there, and Heidegger accepts this (GA9, 219), this does not mean to say that the influence is without dispute. Where Jünger praises and wishes to embrace technology, Heidegger, already in the mid 1930s, more clearly in the later Nietzsche lectures and certainly by 1949, has purged his work of any trace of this. Heidegger’s attitude to technology is far more critical. In the 1950s, Heidegger and Jünger exchanged articles in Festschriften for each other’s sixtieth birthdays; Jünger’s entitled Über die Linie, Heidegger’s Über ‘Die Linie’. Jünger’s article looks at the nihilistic consequences of technological domination, implicitly criticising his own ideas of the 1930s. Heidegger explains that Jünger’s über signifies “across, trans, μετά” (GA9, 214). Jünger is therefore concerned with the passage over the line of nihilism, with the consequence of passing through nihilism: Across the Line.

In contrast, by introducing the quotation marks, Heidegger liberates the über from the line. His interpretation of über is in terms of de, πεπλ. His treatment is “of the line itself, of the zone of self-consummating nihilism” (GA9, 214):
Concerning ‘The Line’. Like Nietzsche, suggests Heidegger, Jünger is taking a medical approach: “prognosis, diagnosis, therapy” (GA9, 215). Heidegger suggests that a cure is not possible for the essence of nihilism, only for the results and symptoms: “The essence of nihilism is neither healable nor unhealable: It is the heal-less, and yet, as such, a unique pointer into health” (GA9, 216). For this reason Heidegger offers his piece as an explanation that “seeks an encounter with the medical assessment of the situation that you [Jünger] have provided. You look and cross over the line; I simply look at the line you have represented”. As has been seen, Jünger’s earlier work believed that it could, like Nietzsche believed he could, overcome nihilism by nihilism: “The Worker belongs in the phase of ‘active nihilism’ (Nietzsche)” (GA9, 217). The later Jünger seems to recognise that this approach is shot down in flames: “Total mobilisation has entered a stage which is even more threatening than what has gone before”.

Heidegger’s approach, once again, tends toward the descriptive rather than, as Jünger’s does, towards the prescriptive, and notably uses spatial terms to clarify the difference:

In the article Across the Line you give an Ortbeschreibung [a description of the place/platial description] of nihilism and an estimation of the situation [Lage] and of the possibility of man’s movement in respect to the place [Ort] described and designated by the image of the line. A topography of nihilism, of its process and of its overcoming is certainly needed. Yet the topography must be preceded by a topology: the discussion of that place [Ortes] which gathers being and nothingness into their essence, determines the essence of nihilism, and thus makes known the paths on which the ways of a possible overcoming of nihilism are indicated (GA9, 240).

If topology is understood as the study of the limit, and topography as the writing of place, Heidegger’s intent becomes clearer. Whereas Jünger is looking over the line, Heidegger is concerned with the line, the demarcation, a delineation. This
does not mean Heidegger holds out no hope. He is fond of quoting the following lines of Hölderlin:

But where danger is, grows
The saving power also52

Heidegger expressly sees this in terms of technology, a point he makes several times in his works. “Thus the essential unfolding of technology harbours in itself what we least suspect, the possible rise of the saving power” (VA 36; BW 337). Though he is deeply sceptical about the advances of technology, Heidegger, contrary to how his critics have often characterised him, suggests that outright rejection is absurd. Instead, Heidegger suggests that we must give it a trial. “For all of us, the arrangements, devices and machinery of the technological world are to a greater or lesser extent indispensable. It would be foolish to attack the technological world blindly. It would be short-sighted to condemn it as the work of the devil. We depend on technical devices; they even challenge us to ever greater advances”. What is important is to work with technology, but not surrender ourselves to it, so that affects our inner and real core. Heidegger suggests that this ‘yes’ and ‘no’ is best summarised as releasement toward things [Die Gelassenheit zu den Dingen] (G 22-3; DT 53-4; see ID 40/105). Unlike the early Jünger he neither sees technology as a solution, nor looks to a new mode of thought over the line. What we have to do is understand and think: where there is danger, there is the potential of salvation; where there is power there lies the means of its resistance. This leads Heidegger to one of his most famous formulations: “The closer we come to the danger, the more brightly do the paths into the saving power begin to shine and the more questioning we become. For questioning is the piety of thought” (VA 40; BW 341).

Dwelling Poetically at the Place of the Fourfold

In his consideration of the German Poet Johann Peter Hebel, Heidegger declares that “man ‘dwells’, if he dwells, in the words of Hölderlin, ‘poetically... upon this earth” (GA13, 147; HFH 98). It has been argued that the model of poetic dwelling is very close to the anti-Cartesian understanding of space begun in
Being and Time. Perhaps now a return to an etymological formulation found in this early work can be properly understood: "'In' is derived from 'innan' - 'to reside' [wohnen], 'habitar', 'to dwell'... The expression 'bin' is connected with 'bei', and so 'ich bin' ['I am'] means in its turn 'I reside' or 'dwell alongside' the world" (GA2, 54). The formulation, whilst now clear, was anything but in Being and Time, where the spatiality of being was sacrificed to the wish to ground existence on temporality, and to derive spatiality from temporality. The shift in understanding has been outlined throughout these chapters. 53 As an example, it is worth considering Heidegger's discussion of fragment 119 of Heraclitus: "ηθος ανθρώπω δαίμων".

This is usually translated, 'A man's character is his daimon' [Jonathan Barnes has it as 'is his fate']. This translation thinks in a modern way, not a Greek one. ηθος means abode, dwelling place. The word names the open region in which man dwells. The open region of his abode allows what pertains to man's essence, and what is thus arriving resides in nearness to him, to appear. The abode of man contains and preserves the advent of what belongs to man in his essence. According to Heraclitus's phrase this is δαίμων, the god. The fragment says: Man dwells, insofar as he is man, in the nearness of god (GA9, 185). 54

It is worth noting the fact that the notion of dwelling that Heidegger wishes to reintroduce is found (at least by Heidegger) in Greek thought. This of course links back to Heidegger's praise of Hölderlin and Nietzsche for understanding the great age of Greek beginnings. Heidegger goes on to suggest that ηθος is found in the word ethics, and that therefore ethics ponders the abode of man. The truth of being is therefore an original ethics, but first an ontology (GA9, 186-7). The understanding of moral or ethical systems in metaphorically spatial terms is, as explored in the other chapters of this thesis, evident in the works of both Foucault and Nietzsche.

However, the notion of poetic dwelling is not intended to be, at least not primarily, metaphorical. This therefore begs the question as to where does man
dwell poetically? The lines of Hölderlin already quoted suggest “on the earth”, something which Heidegger suggests counters the accusation that poetic dwelling is in the realm of fantasy. That said, I have already cautioned against the idea of earth alone. The answer is found in many of Heidegger’s pieces, such as in the following passage: “If the verb ‘to dwell’ is thought broadly and essentially enough, it designates to us the manner in which man, upon the earth and beneath the sky, completes the passage from birth to death” (GA13, 138-9; HFH 93). Man dwells poetically at the place of the fourfold. What this means is made clear if the lines of Hölderlin that Heidegger is so fond of quoting (“poetically man dwells”) are returned to their true context:

As long as kindliness [Freundlichkeit], which is pure, remains in his heart not unhappily a man may compare himself with the god [Gottheit]. Is God unknown? Is he manifest as the sky [Himmel]? This rather I believe. It is the measure of man. Full of acquirements, but poetically, man dwells on this earth.

These lines are absolutely key, and are worth repeating, with added emphasis to four words.

“As long as kindliness, which is pure, remains in his heart not unhappily a man may compare himself with the god. Is God unknown? Is he manifest as the sky? This rather I believe. It is the measure of man. Full of acquirements, but poetically, man dwells on this earth”.

These four words, man, god, sky and earth are the constituent parts of the fourfold, the gathering of the four [Geviert]. Therefore, man’s dwelling poetically on the earth is also under the sky, before the gods, and with other men: “On the earth’ already means ‘under the sky’. Both of these also mean ‘remaining before the gods’, and include a ‘belonging to men’s being with one another’. By a originary oneness the four – earth and sky, gods and mortals – belong together in one... The simple oneness of the four we call the fourfold. Mortals are in the fourfold by dwelling” (VA 143; BW 351-2). Heidegger has
now clearly shown the site, the place of poetic dwelling. This site or place is the
truth of being, and the fundamental links between the different thoughts in
Heidegger’s work seem to come together. Heidegger claims that “we have
thought the truth of being in the worlding of world as the mirror play [spiegel-
spiel] of the fourfold of sky and earth, mortals and gods” (GA79, 174; QCT 45).

If the above argument is followed, it can be seen that the history of being must
work in tandem with the notion of poetic dwelling. This is made clear in the
essay on Jünger discussed earlier. It will be remembered that Heidegger is
debating with Jünger on the notion of nihilism. Here, instead of opposing being
to nothingness, the void, nihilism, Heidegger instead effaces the word itself. This
is because Heidegger argues that “a thoughtful glance ahead [Vorblieck] into this
realm can only write ‘being’ as being. The drawing of these crossed lines initially
has only a preventative role, namely, that of preventing the almost ineradicable
habit of representing ‘being’ only as something standing somewhere on its own
that then on occasion first comes face-to-face with humans” (GA9, 238-9). The
purpose of this peculiar typographical device is not difficult to understand. “The
symbol of crossing through [Durchkreuzung] cannot, however, be the merely
negative sign of crossing out [Durchstreichung]. It points, rather, toward the four
regions of the fourfold [Geviert] and of their gathering at the place of crossing
through [Ort der Durchkreuzung]” (GA9, 239). The place of intersection is
and therefore any history of being must take into account the crossed lines
of poetic dwelling, of platial significance. Krell has schematised this as
follows: 57

Within these four-crossed lines, at their intersection, man dwells, poetically.
Despite Krell’s worry that “Heidegger’s preoccupation with ‘the holy’ is indeed
discomforting”, 58 and despite the fact a potentially romantic reading of the
fourfold (i.e. anti-technology) might be apparent, 59 there is something of
fundamental value in what Heidegger is suggesting here. I am not suggesting that histories should henceforth take notice of the fourfold in quite the same way that Heidegger suggests, but that they can feed on the insight this reading of Hölderlin allows. Foucault, for example, is heavily indebted to the way Heidegger has fused the concepts of history and space, and yet he never discusses the prison, the hospital or the plague town in terms of the gods, man, sky and earth.

In writing these potentially platial descriptions Heidegger discusses the idea of measure taking. "The dwelling of humans depends on an upward-looking measure-taking of the dimension, in which the sky belongs just as much as the earth. This measure-taking not only takes the measure of the earth, γη, and accordingly it is no mere geo-metry. Just as little does it take the measure of heaven [Himmel], οὐρανός, for itself. Measure-taking gauges the between, which brings the two, heaven and earth, to one another. This measure-taking has its own μέτρον, and thus its own metric" (VA 190; PLT 221). Once again it is not a question of understanding space in Cartesian terms, not a simple earth-measuring, geo-metry, just as it is not simply a geo-graphy, or earth-writing. To lead into the examination of the platial descriptions in Heidegger's later work, it is worth considering Heidegger's approving quotation of Hölderlin's 1804 letter to von Seckendorf: "At present I am especially occupied with the fable, the poetic view of history, and the architectonics of skies, especially of our nation's, so far as it differs from the Greek".

Platial Descriptions

Having gained these insights, Heidegger undertakes some studies that could be seen as platial. However, important though the historical is to these pieces, it would be pushing credulity to describe them as histories. What instead they do is examine, though with a historical backdrop, the significance of space, place and location. Indeed, throughout Heidegger's later works the importance of space and place is evident, turning up in some unusual places. For example, in an essay entitled "Language", Heidegger discusses Georg Trakl's poem "A Winter Evening". His commentary is especially of interest when he looks at the line
"Pain has turned the threshold to stone", the second line of the third stanza: "The threshold is the ground-beam that bears the doorway as a whole. It sustains the middle in which the two, the outside and the inside, penetrate each other. The threshold bears the between..." (GA12, 24; PLT 204). This understanding of the threshold as a place of transition is recurrent in several places in Foucault’s work. But in the context of this chapter, and to draw together some of the strands, the focus will be on three places: the bridge in “Building Dwelling Thinking”; the jug in “The Thing”; and, in a return to an earlier theme, a discussion of art and space.

Heidegger’s lecture “Building Dwelling Thinking” is geared toward investigating two questions. First, “what is the relationship between place [Ort] and space?”, and second “what is the relationship between man and space?” (VA 149; BW 357). As with many of his later essays, Heidegger uses etymology to penetrate the words. He begins by looking at the word space itself: “What the word for space, Raum, designates is said by its ancient meaning. Raum, Rum, means a Platz that is freed for settlement and lodging”. Space is freed, liberated, for a purpose. “A space is something that has been made room for [Eingeräumtes], something that has been freed, namely within a boundary, Greek πέρας. A boundary is not that at which something stops but, as the Greeks recognised, the boundary is that from which something begins its essential unfolding. That is why the concept is that of the ὀρίζων, that is boundary [Grenze]”. A freed space within a boundary, a threshold. Heidegger continues: “Space is in essence that for which room has been made, that which is let into its bounds” (VA 149; BW 356). There is an important, if slight, shift in Heidegger’s overall argument here. Rather than place being opposed to space, understood as Cartesian, Heidegger is suggesting that space can be rethought through its relation to place, in order to return us to a more originary understanding. Such an attitude is clearly evident in the late lecture “Art and Space”, dealt with in detail in the final section of this chapter. To further his purpose here Heidegger decides to examine something that has been built, a built thing, and to assess how this relates to space and place. The example for Heidegger’s reflection is a bridge:
The bridge... does not just connect banks \([\text{Ufer}]\) that are already present-at-hand. The banks emerge as banks only as the bridge crosses the stream. The bridge expressly causes them to lie across from each other. One side is set off against the other by the bridge. Nor do the banks stretch along the stream as indifferent border strips of the dry land. With the banks, the bridge brings to the stream the one and the other expanse of the landscape lying behind them \([\text{Uferlandschaft}]\). It brings stream and bank and land into each other's neighbourhood... Bridges initiate in many ways. The city bridge leads from the precincts of the castle to the cathedral square; the river bridge near the country town brings wagons and horse teams to the surrounding villages. The old stone bridge's humble brook crossing gives to the harvest wagon its passage \([\text{Weg}]\) from the fields into the village and carries the lumber cart from the field path to the road. The \textit{Autobahn} bridge is tied into the network of long-distance traffic, paced and calculated for maximum yield (VA 146-7; BW 354).

The investigation of the question of technology showed that there Heidegger opposed the bridge in its relationship with nature to the hydroelectric plant. Both are related to the river, but in fundamentally different ways. The bridge Heidegger has in mind here is a site for the fourfold: “To be sure, the bridge is a thing of its own kind; for it gathers the fourfold in such a way that it allows a \textit{site} [\text{Stätte}] for it. But only something \textit{that is itself a place} [\text{Ort}] can make space \textit{einräumen} for a site. The place is not already present-at-hand before the bridge... Accordingly, \textit{spaces receive their essential being from places and not 'from' space} [Demnach empfängen die Räume ihr Wesen aus Orten und nicht aus «dem» Raum]” (VA 148-9; BW 355-6). The bridge is such a place. It can therefore, as such a thing, function to situate “a space into which earth and sky, gods and mortals are admitted” (VA 149; BW 357).62

This all links back into the project outlined above, of finding a more truthful way of characterising man's relationship with, and perception of, space. Heidegger suggests that we should pay heed to the relations between places and spaces,
especially as these come together in buildings. Space should not be seen as
something “over and above” men, because inherent in the concept of man is that
of dwelling. Instead of the abstracting Cartesianism, Heidegger suggests space as
locales, places. Numerical magnitudes can never be the “ground of the essence of
spaces and places” (VA 150; BW 358). Heidegger explains: “Man’s relation to
places, and through places to spaces, inheres in his dwelling. The relationship
between man and space is none other than dwelling, thought essentially” (VA
152; BW 359). “Because building produces things as places, it is closer to the
essence of spaces and to the essential descent ‘of’ space than any geometry and
mathematics. Building puts up places that make space for the site of the fourfold”
(VA 153; BW 360). Having attained this insight, Heidegger comes back to the
purpose for his talk, the housing crisis in Germany. As with many of his essays
of this period – the work on technology and the πολιτικάς are striking examples – this
is a critique of the present. Building is not simply architecture or construction,
but a letting dwell. Heidegger suggests that Germany is not just facing a crisis of
housing, but of dwelling and thinking too (VA 156; BW 363).63

Indeed, Heidegger thinks that the crisis of thinking is perhaps the greatest crisis
facing mankind: “Most thought-provoking in our thought-provoking time is that
we are still not thinking” (WhD 3; WCT 6). As a concluding comment to the
remarks on this essay, it is worth noting that understanding the German word
bauen, to build, enables us to understand better Heidegger’s notion – already
there in Being and Time, of Destruktion. This has been continually rendered as
‘de-struction’. Like the English destruction, Destruktion derives from the Latin
destruere, to pull down, literally de-struere, to un-build. To translate Destruktion
as ‘destruction’ emphasises the violence rather than the de-structuring. Violence
may well be a part, but it is a violence of excavation, unbuilding rather than
obliteration. Nietzsche, Foucault and Derrida (who most obviously borrows and
creatively translates this term as deconstruction) all undertake this project in
various ways. As Heidegger himself clarifies: “De-struction does not mean
destroying [Zerstören] but unbuilding [Abbauen], liquidating [Abtragen], putting
to one side the merely historical assertions about the history of philosophy” (WiP
70-2/71-3; see Q IV, 426).
Heidegger’s discussion in the lecture “The Thing”, part of the “Insight” series, begins by discussing the way the modern world is making all distances in time and space shrink. Now we can reach the other side of the world over-night, hear news as it happens across the world, watch speeded up footage of a plant growing and see sites from ancient history on film. But, as has been shown, Heidegger does not always equate shortness of distance with nearness. Via a brief passage that suggests that the atom bomb is the culmination of man’s attitude to science, Heidegger claims that so far man has “given no more thought to the thing as a thing than he has to nearness”. Just as the bridge served as the example of a built thing, Van Gogh’s painting was a representative work of art, and the shoes he painted an example of equipment, Heidegger this time chooses a jug to stand as his case-study: “The jug is a thing. What is the jug?” (VA 158; PLT 166)

The jug is a holding vessel, something that holds. The holding is done by the base and sides, and the jug can be held itself by its handle. The jug is made by the potter from the earth. “The jug’s thingness resides in its being as vessel. We become aware of the vessel’s holding nature when we fill the jug”. But, asks Heidegger, what does filling the jug mean? We fill the jug, which can hold, and which does so by the base and sides. This does not mean that we fill the base and sides, but rather pour between the sides and over the bottom. We therefore, rather than filling anything of the jug, we fill the emptiness of the jug. “The emptiness, the void [die Leere], is what does the vessel’s holding. The empty space, this nothing of the jug, is what the jug is as the holding vessel”. It follows from this that the potter who “forms sides and bottom on his wheel” does not strictly speaking make the jug, rather, he shapes the void (VA 161; PLT 169).

Of course, modern science will tell us that there is no void in the jug, but that it is filled with air, and that pouring anything else into the jug merely displaces what is already there. Heidegger does not dispute that this scientific view is correct, but he does argue that it tells us little about the jug. This is because “science always encounters only what its kind of representation has admitted beforehand as an object possible for science” (VA 162; PLT 170). This is what Heidegger was arguing back in Being and Time, that usual theories relate to things at a level
abstracted from everyday action. The ontological foundation of modern science acts to limit the ontic phenomena it is able to experience and to encompass. Science can give us an interpretation, which can even be correct, but it does not help in understanding the jug. We can place a stone on a balance, but this merely brings its heaviness into the form of a calculated weight, the weight's burden has escaped us (GA5, 35; BW 172). Similarly, Kant's thing-in-itself means "an object that is no object for us" because it is thought apart from the human encounter of it (VA 169; PLT 177; see GA41).

Although Heidegger does not mention it, there has also been a subtle revision of his view in Being and Time on the idea of 'in', for now it is significant that the gift, the wine, is 'in' the jug. For Heidegger believes it is important that the character of the jug consists "in the gift of the outpouring" (VA 164; PLT 172). This thing, in its place, in its context, holding the gift, is another site for the fourfold of gods, men, sky and earth: "In the gift of the outpouring earth and sky, gods and mortals dwell together all at once" (VA 165-6; PLT 173). Heidegger continues, and makes clearer the spatial implications: "What is gathered in the gift gathers itself in appropriatively staying the fourfold. This manifold-simple gathering is the jug's essence. Our language denotes what a gathering is by an ancient word. That word is: thing. the jug's essence is the pure, giving gathering of the one-fold fourfold into a single stay. The jug essences as a thing" (VA 166; PLT 174). Just as we use the hammer, and experience space, we must look at the jug in a way akin to poetic dwelling. To understand the jug as a jug we must avoid the abstraction of modern science.

Art and Space

One of Heidegger's very last pieces is a lecture entitled "Art and Space", published in 1969. It picks up several of the themes about space that have been discussed in these chapters, and therefore serves well to summarise the argument. It also leads us into the arguments concerning Foucault in the following chapters. It is very precise in its use of certain key terms, a fact obscured in part by the existing English translation. (For this reason a new translation is included as an appendix to this thesis: it contains the pagination of GA13 in brackets in the
text.) It was shown in the discussion of the bridge that Heidegger thought that a space is something that has been made room for, something that has been freed, namely within a boundary. This idea is found in a few places within his work, notably when he looks at elements of the rural existence. In one example he talks of the cabinet-maker's apprentice learning to "answer and respond... to all the different kinds of wood and to the shapes slumbering within wood... this relationship to wood is what maintains the whole craft" (WhD 50; WCT 14-5). In another example, Heidegger speaks of the idea of a pathway: a recurrent theme in his work. "To clear a way [Einen Weg bahnen] – for instance across a snow-covered field – is still today in the Alemannic-Swabian dialect called wegen [waying]. This transitive verb means to form a way, giving shape to it and keeping it in shape" (GA12, 249; WL 129-30). We will remember the titles of Holzwege and Wegmarken. A path through the woods may need to be cleared before it can be seen.

It seems to be the same with sculpture, the art-form that is the basis for the "Art and Space" lecture. Heidegger begins by suggesting that even those remarks of his that are uttered as assertions are actually questions, but it seems as if what he is doing is gradually exposing the flaws in some of his initial formulations of the question of sculpture, and that the path of thought is becoming increasingly clear. At the outset, Heidegger suggests that "sculpted forms [Die plastischen Gebilde] are bodies [Körper]. Their mass, consisting of different materials, is variously fashioned. The fashioning happens by limitation through an inclusionary and exclusionary limit. Through this, space comes into play; occupied by the sculpted form as a closed, breached and empty volume". This seems fair enough, and perhaps a usual initial reaction. Then Heidegger remarks that "art and scientific technology consider and treat space toward various purposes in various ways" (GA13, 204). This much has been made clear in his opposition of experiential and mathematical space. Heidegger rehearses that argument again here, suggesting that "physically-technologically ordered space, however it may be determined" should not be held "as the sole true space". This is due to the fact that this view of space, of uniform extension, determined by Galileo and Newton, is the correlate of modern European subjectivity (GA13, 205) – i.e. of Descartes. The question of history is central.
However Heidegger then outlines what appear to be the three spaces involved in an understanding of sculpture: “Space, within which the sculptured form can be met as a present-at-hand object; space, which encloses the volume of the figure; space, which persists between volumes”. Even if calculative measurement cannot be applied to artistic figures, asks Heidegger, are these three spaces still not merely derivative of physical-technological space? For an answer to the question of the propriety [Eigenes] of space, Heidegger returns to language – so often the preoccupation of his late essays. In ‘space’ [Raum], the word ‘making space’ [Räumen] is spoken. “This means: clearing out [roden], to make free from wilderness. Making space brings forth the free, the openness for the settling and dwelling of humans” (GA13, 206). This much has been seen in the essays that looked at the idea of poetic dwelling. As Heidegger then goes on to suggest, “making space is, thought in its propriety, the release [Freigabe] of places [Orten]” (GA13, 206).

Shifting the emphasis onto place recalls the insights of the essays on the jug and the bridge. These places are important to humans in terms of a home, in terms of the gods, in terms of dwelling. We are reminded that “place always opens a region, in which it gathers things in their belonging together” (GA13, 207), and that we must “learn to recognise that things themselves are places, and not only occupy a place”. This notion of place is now, as before, opposed to technological, Cartesian space: “Place is not found within a pre-given space, such as that of physico-technological space. The later unfolds only through the reigning of places of a region”. What this enables is the potential for rethinking the notion of space otherwise than extension. Although in these chapters I have often introduced an opposition between space and place, this is in order to distance myself from space understood as extension. Here – as in “Building Dwelling Thinking” – Heidegger collapses the terms back together, by hinting at their originary bond. As shall be suggested in the following chapter, the French espace holds this association with place better than the English 'space'.

Returning to the subject of the lecture, Heidegger suggests that the initial direction of the piece was misguided, as “the interplay of art and space must be thought out of the experience of place and region”. Where art is sculpture, there
is “no occupying of space. Sculpture would have no confrontation [Auseinandersetzung] with space”, instead “sculpture would be the embodiment of places” (GA13, 208). In thinking of sculpture we should abandon the idea of volume, “the signification of which is only as old as modern technological natural science”, which would make sculpture “an embodying bringing-into-the-work of places... the embodiment of the truth of being in its work of instituting places” (GA13, 209). The link to the truth of being, which has been seen to be an inherently historical question, makes the suggestion complete. Place is historical: history is platial.

In a 1958 essay on language, Heidegger again returns to the rural, and argues that two farmsteads an hour apart can have greater neighbourhood than two townhouses. Nearness is not outside and independent of space and time, but it does not depend on space and time as parameters (GA12, 198-9; WL 103). Understanding space and time in a non-mathematically calculated way is precisely what Heidegger has been shown to do throughout these three chapters. Struggling for a way to express what he means, Heidegger resorts to creating new verbs: time times, space spaces. “Space: makes space for placing and places, vacates them and at the same time gives them free for all things and receives what is simultaneous as space-time”. This notion of space-time brings to completion the path that Heidegger has been walking. The Kantian primacy of time is gone; time is resolutely non-Aristotelian; the understanding of space by extension is discarded. Timing and spacing [Zeitigend einräumend] “move the time-play-space of the encounter of the four world regions: earth and sky, gods and man – the world play” (GA12, 201-2; WL 106). This is clarified in the lecture “Time and Being”. As has been shown, Heidegger wishes to conceive of time not in terms of the now but of the Moment, in terms of presencing. Here, he suggests that presencing “opens up what we call time-space”. Time-space does not mean the distance between two points in time, it is not a time-span, but the “openness which opens up in the mutual self-extending of futural approach, past and present. This openness exclusively and primarily provides the space in which space as we usually know it can unfold” (ZSD 14-15; TB 14; see GA41, 16).
These three chapters have attempted to trace the trajectory of the concepts of history and space through the works of Heidegger, in order to illuminate both Heidegger's own work, and to demonstrate his influence on Foucault. In one of his very last works, published in 1969, Heidegger concedes that "the attempt in Being and Time, section 70, to derive the spatiality of Dasein from temporality is untenable" (ZSD 24; TB 23). These chapters have shown how and why Heidegger came to realise this. The consequences of this realisation are readily apparent in the work of Michel Foucault, whose own path of thought had begun at the time of this lecture. Following that path leads into the territory of the final two chapters of this thesis.
Chapter Five
Towards a Spatial History

Introduction

Foucault was never keen for his work to be analysed as a method, a theory, or worse, as a system, but suggested that those interested in his work should do genealogies, as he had done. But whilst Foucault felt that his work provided a set of conceptual tools, a toolbox (DE III, 427; P/K 145) for use by others, these tools have sometimes been used uncritically, without due attendance to their theoretical underpinnings. It is a principal claim of this thesis that to understand how to use Foucault’s work it is necessary to understand its theoretical background, and, therefore, his intellectual heritage.

When Foucault’s influences are examined the standard procedure is to make reference to his rejection of parts of Marxism, debate the charge of structuralism, and make a nod toward Nietzsche – especially on the points of the historical approach and the understanding of power. Sometimes a passing gesture is made to the influence of Bachelard and Canguilhem. However, as was noted at the beginning of Chapter Two, in putatively his last interview Foucault made an important comment:

Heidegger has always been for me the essential philosopher. I began by reading Hegel, then Marx, and I set out to read Heidegger in 1951 or 1952; then in 1952 or 1953... I read Nietzsche... My entire philosophical development was determined by my reading of Heidegger. I nevertheless recognise that Nietzsche outweighed him [l’a emporté]... It is probable that if I had not read Heidegger, I would not have read Nietzsche. I had tried to read Nietzsche in the fifties but Nietzsche alone said nothing to me – whereas Nietzsche and Heidegger: that was a philosophical shock! (DE IV, 703; PPC 250)
Foucault's other references to Heidegger are very brief, and hardly amount to anything. Yet he suggests that his entire philosophical development was determined by Heidegger, and that reading him was central to his understanding of Nietzsche. The reason why Foucault hardly ever mentions Heidegger is, he suggests, that one "should have a small number of authors with whom one thinks, with whom one works, but about whom one does not write" (DE IV, 703; PPC 250).

It is perhaps understandable that Foucault's lack of reference to Heidegger should be paralleled in the secondary literature, but a detailed reading of both authors shows how deep the influence runs. My contention is that it is very difficult to properly understand Foucault's work -- or, at least, some parts of it -- without understanding the influence of Heidegger. Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow -- in a book endorsed by Foucault -- trace the influence of Heidegger on the early Foucault, but see a distance between them in Foucault's later work; other commentators make remarks such as this:

Heidegger's influence on Foucault is immense and crucial to an understanding of his work, but the Heideggerian influence on Foucault is mediated by Foucault's understanding of Nietzsche.

This chapter makes the claim that the reverse of this is actually the case -- that Nietzsche's influence on Foucault is indeed immense, but that it is continually mediated by Heidegger, and Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche. This is, of course, closer to what Foucault -- in the remarks above -- actually said.

Foucault read Heidegger in the original German, and we can therefore be sure that in the early 50s he had access to a range of Heidegger's most important texts -- *Being and Time, Letter on Humanism, Holzwege, Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung, Vorträge und Aufsätze* -- and though the *Nietzsche* volumes were not published until 1961, important essays which anticipated their contents were found in earlier collections. A number of parallels between Heidegger and Foucault immediately present themselves -- most of which cannot be adequately treated here. As Miller has noted, Heidegger's *Kant and the Problem of*
Metaphysics implicitly informs Foucault's second thesis on Kant's Anthropology; The Order of Things relies on Heidegger's critique of humanism; and The Archaeology of Knowledge looks at the anonymous domain where "one" - Heidegger's das Man - speaks. Similarly, Derrida notes the association between the analysis of death in The Birth of the Clinic and in Heidegger's work. It would also be interesting to see how important Heidegger's understanding of care [Sorge] and concern [besorgen] is for Foucault's later work on the care/concern [souci] of the self, and how Heidegger's reading of Greek thought relates to Foucault's readings of antiquity. However, this thesis is concerned primarily with Foucault's historical and spatial approaches.

In terms of the historical approach Nietzsche is usually looked at as the principal influence, but this chapter argues that certain key points - the present, power, technology and dispositif - are prefigured by arguments of Heidegger's. Foucault's spatial analyses have been regularly cited in recent work - especially in urban studies and geography - and along with Lefebvre he is one of the key theoretical models in this work. However, the understanding of Foucault's work has often been patchy or partial, and is often used to either reinvigorate geography or to provide a history of space. In this thesis, the aim is to provide a theoretical approach towards a spatial history. This chapter suggests that this is indeed what Foucault does, and that his understanding of space, and his use of a spatialised history, is conditioned by his reading of Nietzsche and, most importantly, Heidegger.

This chapter therefore looks at Foucault's works in the light of the discussion of Nietzsche and Heidegger established in earlier chapters. It deals with the theoretical formulations of Foucault's work, with emphasis on his methodological works, looking at his historical approach, and the role of space within it. The following chapter utilises the insights gained from these analyses to recast the readings of two of Foucault's most important studies: Histoire de la folie; and the genealogy of modern discipline in hospitals, schools, the army and prisons found in The Birth of the Clinic, Discipline and Punish and numerous shorter pieces.
A History of Limits

The preface to Foucault’s first major work, *Folie et déraison: Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique*, tried to set out some methodological concerns. Foucault argues that what he is writing is a “history of limits [*limites*]” (DE I, 161), a history of boundaries. His research examines a realm “where what is in question is the limits rather than the identity of a culture” (DE I, 161; MC xiii). Each limit-experience – an experience, such as madness, which inhabits the frontiers of our culture – “marks a limit which signifies, at the same time, an original division” (DE I, 161). This interest in the limits of experience – of transgression, of the crossing of boundaries, of the mapping of uncharted space, of the path between the known and the unknown – works on two main levels, the level of the imaginary and the level of the real. Foucault stresses that he undertakes his inquiry “under the sun of the great Nietzschean search” (DE I, 162), and the link to the approach of *The Birth of Tragedy* is clear throughout. In an interview around the same time he also indicates the influence of the historian of religions, Georges Dumézil. Dumézil is important because of his understanding of structure, of social segregation and exclusion. In *Histoire de la folie* Foucault is interested in seeing how the physical divide of segregation and exclusion interrelates with the experience of madness, with science and rationalist philosophy (DE I, 168; FL 8). This relationship of the real and the imaginary – of the practical and the theoretical – underpins his studies throughout.

The language that Foucault uses in works of his archaeological period – *Histoire de la folie, The Birth of the Clinic, The Order of Things, The Archaeology of Knowledge* – is often overtly spatialised, making use of terms such as limit, boundary, transgression, and threshold. In its understanding of the conceptualisation of knowledge – of discourse and *episteme* – it bears comparison with the spatialised conceptions of Nietzsche and Heidegger. The particular terms that Foucault uses are also found in his contemporaneous essays on literature – mainly in the journal *Critique* – on figures such as Bataille, Blanchot, Hölderlin and Flaubert. As a particular example of the links between
his literary and historical work, it is instructive to compare the books The Birth of the Clinic and Raymond Roussel, both published in May 1963. The opening line of the former — “This book is about space, about language, and about death: it is a question of the gaze” (NC v; BC ix) — could easily stand as a description of the latter (see RR 209; DL 166).

What is important about Foucault’s use of overtly spatialised language is that it enables him to free his histories from the teleological bias of alternative accounts. By conceiving of historical periods or epochs as bounded areas, he is able to investigate their limits or thresholds, and trace the potential of transgression, or egress. Foucault is occasionally described, therefore, as a thinker of discontinuity, in that he tries to locate abrupt shifts, or ‘breaks’ in the history of thought. Instead, Foucault argues that he recognises what appear to be obvious breaks, but tries to analyse how the shift occurred. For example, The Birth of the Clinic is concerned with less than half a century, but it is “one of those periods that mark an ineradicable chronological threshold” (NC 199; BC 195). The work of Bayle seems like a “hilarious object of folklore”, whereas Pomme’s work, even if it contains errors, is “nevertheless part of the same type of knowledge as our own” (PPC 100; see DE III, 142-4; FR 53-5). His work is therefore a critical operation to investigate this, aiming:

To establish limits, where the history of thought, in its traditional form, gave itself an indefinite space... I would like to substitute the notion that the discourses are limited practical domains which have their boundaries [frontières – borders/frontiers], their rules of formation, their conditions of existence... to which one can affix thresholds, and assign conditions of birth and disappearance (DE I, 683-4; FL 41)

Similarly he conceives of madness and reason, sickness and health in spatial terms, and then examines the groups that inhabit the liminal areas. I will return to the analyses of actual spaces below, but first it is worth dwelling on Foucault’s use of spatialised language in his work on history, designated by two main rubrics – archaeology and genealogy.
Archaeology

Foucault uses the word archaeology in a number of early works, and it at first appears, as Sheridan suggests, to be almost just an alternative to 'history' as a means of distinguishing his approach. Over the course of his work in the 1960s it becomes a central concept in his work. Foucault's choice of the term 'archaeology', however, immediately invites misunderstanding. It is neither the search for an origin - in Greek arche - nor does it relate to geological excavation. Foucault claims that he is justified by "the right of words - which is not that of the philologists" in using the term archaeology to describe his researches, as they examine the archive: "Archaeology describes discourses as practices specified in the element of the archive" (AS 173; AK 131). In the sense he understands his research it is closer to being an archiveology.

Foucault describes the archive as "the general system of the formation and transformation of statements [énoncés]" (AS 171; AK 130). An énoncé is a technical or formal statement, made within a particular discipline - Linnaeus' Genera Plantarum is made up of énoncés, the forms of a verb in a book of Latin grammar are énoncés, as are algebraic formulae (AS 109; AK 82). The énoncé is neither the same kind of unit as a sentence, a proposition, or a speech-act, nor is it the same as a material object. It is "neither entirely linguistic, nor exclusively material... it is caught up in a logical, grammatical, locutory nexus" (AS 114-5; AK 86). This last definition is important, as the rules of discourse function in a similar way to those of logic and grammar. Just as in ordinary speech we need to obey the rules of grammar and logic, within a technical conversation we have to situate our énoncés within the rules of the discourse. "An énoncé belongs to a discursive formation as a sentence belongs to a text, and a proposition to a deductive whole" (AS 152; AK 116). The énoncés actually permissible at any given time are only a fraction of those logically and grammatically possible: the discursive formulation of the subject also acts as a limit. This is why, for example, Bayle makes sense to us today, whilst Pomme "speaks to us in the language of fantasy" (NC v-vi; BC ix-x); why Borges' "certain Chinese Encyclopaedia" provokes such laughter (M&C 7; OT xv).
For an *énoncé* to be accepted within a discipline – even before it can be pronounced true or false – it must “fulfil complex and serious demands”, it must be, in Canguilhem’s phrase, “within the true” (OD 35-6; AK 224). This is an important point, as it proves that a discourse conditions the possibility of all *énoncés* – whether they are true or false. We cannot judge Pomme’s *énoncé* as true or false, it fails at a lower level than that, it is simply ‘fantasy’. This becomes clearer in Foucault’s discussion of the “positivity of a discourse” which “characterises its unity throughout time... it defines a limited space of communication... positivity plays the role of what might be called the *historical a priori*” (AS 166-7; AK 126-7). Foucault accepts that juxtaposing these two words produces a “rather startling effect”, as the standard understanding of *a priori* is that it is ahistorical, absolute. Foucault’s term does not simply mean that the *a priori* is also endowed with a history, rather he is introducing a notion of pluralism into the history of ideas, in that there have been several *a priori* structures in various disciplines, that conditioned possibilities in those subjects.  

This bears definite comparison with the understanding of the history of science found in Nietzsche and Heidegger, discussed in Chapter Three. Foucault’s understanding of the historical *a priori* does not function as “a condition of validity for judgements, but a condition of reality for *énoncés*” (AS 167-9; AK 128).

In *The Birth of the Clinic* Foucault examines the area of physical illness, and argues that there has been a shift in how things have been seen. Today, medicine is generally accepted to be based upon clear, objective, scientific knowledge: the body and diseases seen with an unblemished empirical eye. However, it has not always been so, and medicine is not based on pure experience free of interpretation, but is structured by a set of beliefs relative to the period, a grid of *a priori* conceptions. For the nineteenth century physician the patient (their age, sex, and personal history) got in the way of the disease – this interference has to be bypassed, through the abstraction of the gaze [le regard]. *The Birth of the Clinic* is therefore the archaeology of this ‘medical gaze’.

In *The Order of Things* this understanding is put to work across a sweep of disciplines, examining the knowledges of life, language and wealth through three
broad historical periods, which Foucault calls *epistemes*. Interestingly, he finds examples of the shift from one *episteme* to another in literary works. Between the Renaissance and the Classical epoch, Don Quixote's adventures "form the boundary [tracent la limite]: they mark the end of the old interplay between resemblance and signs and contain the beginnings of new relations" (M&C 60; OT 46). The birth of modern culture is found in the work of the Marquis de Sade, especially in *Justine* and *Juliette* (M&C 222; OT 210). The archaeological analysis allows Foucault to trace the change in these knowledges, examining how the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had general grammar, natural history and the analysis of wealth; whilst the nineteenth century had philology, biology and political economy:

Archaeology, addressing itself to the general space of knowledge, to its configurations, and to the mode of being of the things that appear in it, defines systems of simultaneity, as well as the series of mutations necessary and sufficient to circumscribe the threshold of a new positivity (M&C 14; OT xxiii).

The use of spatial language throughout these works is pronounced. Rather than conceive of historical changes as a linear development, Foucault suggests that the "domain of the modern *episteme* should be represented rather as a volume of space open in three dimensions... [an] epistemological trihedron" (M&C 358; OT 346-7). These examinations lead Foucault to one of his most celebrated formulations, suggesting that "man is an invention of recent date. And one perhaps nearing its end".

If those arrangements [dispositions] were to disappear as they appeared, if some event of which we can at the moment do no more than sense the possibility... were to cause them to crumble, as the ground of Classical thought did, at the end of the eighteenth century, then one can certainly wager that man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge [limite] of the sea (M&C 398; OT 387).
Some key issues arise from Foucault's archaeological period: does his analysis of *epistemes* constitute a global study, and is he able to escape the problem of subjectivity; and are his studies structuralist? On these points Foucault was unequivocal. He suggests that archaeological analysis is always limited and regional: "Far from wishing to reveal general forms, archaeology tries to outline particular configurations" (AS 206; AK 157). Whilst it is true that most of his studies do look at limited areas – historically and geographically bounded – at times he does try to make the broad sweep. *The Birth of the Clinic*, looking at medicine, for about fifty years, and at the French example, is arguably a more successful study than *The Order of Things*, which studies three areas, across almost four hundred years, and across the Western world. Whilst Foucault denied this, the comparative study in the latter work set him up for refutation by counter-examples that did not follow the same epistemic shifts.

Foucault suggests that "instead of exploring the consciousness/knowledge (*connaissance*)/science axis (which cannot escape subjectivity), archaeology explores the discursive practice/knowledge (*savoir*)/science axis" (AS 239; AK 183). It is clear that a distinction between *connaissance* and *savoir* is essential, though they are both usually translated as ‘knowledge’ in English. To explain his understanding of these terms, Foucault adds a note to the English edition: "By *connaissance* I mean the relation of the subject to the object and the formal rules that govern it. *Savoir* refers to the conditions that are necessary in a particular period for this or that type of object to be given to *connaissance* and for this or that enunciation to be formulated" (AK 15n). This understanding is close to the distinction Heidegger makes between ontic and ontological knowledge in *Being and Time*. For Heidegger, the question of Being is an ontological question, which aims "at ascertaining the *a priori* conditions... for the possibility of the sciences which examine entities" – ontic knowledge (GA2, 11). What is important is that Foucault historicises this ontology – thereby refusing to set universal conditions – something that Heidegger only does in his later works.

Foucault was often thought of as a structuralist, especially with regard to his works of the 1960s. By the late 60s he was distancing himself from the movement, but had earlier certainly utilised its language, and, in a revealing
interview given in Tunisia had accepted the label, clarifying how he understood and used its tools (DE I, 580-4). But in the 1970 foreword to the English edition of *The Order of Things*, he berates "certain half-witted 'commentators' [who] persist in labelling me a 'structuralist'. I have been unable to get it into their tiny minds that I have used none of the methods, concepts, or key terms that characterise structuralist analysis" (DE II, 13; OT xiv). This is clearly protesting too much. As Neocleous notes, there are clear similarities between Foucault and the structuralists over the question of agency, which links to a common anti-humanism. The ethnology of Lévi-Strauss and the psychoanalysis of Lacan are praised in *The Order of Things* for dissolving man (M&C 385ff; OT 373ff; see also AS 22-3; AK 12-3); Foucault's debt to the work of Althusser, and their common heritage in Bachelard, Canguilhem and Heidegger showcase other links. Similarly Foucault shares with the structuralists an appreciation of the work of Saussure, especially evident in the language used in *The Birth of the Clinic* - something he later admits to as a problem (AS 27; AK 16). Rather than accept his passage from structuralism to something else - sometimes termed poststructuralism - Foucault attempts to cover his tracks, revising *The Birth of the Clinic* in 1972, and purging it of structuralist language. James Miller suggests that the use of this jargon was largely cosmetic, as the "buzzwords were easily jettisoned in 1972, without touching the book's central argument". However, the argument built on structuralist foundations remains untouched: perhaps only the language of structuralism was jettisoned.

Despite Foucault's repeated denials, his archaeological approach owes much to the French intellectual scene of the 1960s - though it differs in two central respects. The first is that while most structuralists marginalised history, preferring atemporal structures, Foucault was from the outset a historian (see DE III, 144-5; FR 56; AS 25; AK 15). Second - and a point that will be returned to - while Foucault shared with the structuralists a predilection for spatial metaphors, he alone continually paired them with analyses of actual spaces. His histories were not merely spatial in the language they used, or in the metaphors of knowledge they developed, but were also histories of spaces, and attendant to the spaces of history.
Genealogy

The events of 1968 seem to have had a major effect on Foucault. No longer did he concentrate on the workings of language, of discursive practices, but he returned to the examination of particular disciplines and their internal shifts, as he had in *Histoire de la folie*. Foucault only rarely uses the terms carefully elaborated in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* again. Hacking suggests that his “obsession with words was too fragile too stand”, though arguably the theoretical apparatus elaborated simply fell into the background. The crucial text in examining the change is Foucault’s inaugural lecture at the *Collège de France, L’Ordre du discours*. In this text we find a burgeoning interest in the uses made of discursive practices, particularly their relation to non-discursive practices, rather than their internal workings. Foucault has become increasingly interested in political questions: “history has constantly impressed upon us that discourse is no mere verbalisation of struggles and systems of domination, but is for what, and by what one struggles, the power *[pouvoir]* which one aims to seize” (OD 12; AK 216). Foucault’s work now looks increasingly at practices, and their necessary power relations: what he calls the “the social appropriation of discourse” (OD 45; AK 226-7).

Foucault conceives of the historical *a priori* as a grid [*grille*] structuring possibilities at a given time. In *L’Ordre du discours*, setting out his programme for future work he suggests that, in our time, the “regions where the grid is the most constricting [resserrée], where the danger spots multiply, are the regions of sexuality and of politics: as if discourse, far from being a transparent or neutral element where sexuality is disarmed and politics pacified, is one of those places where they exercise, in a privileged manner, some of their most formidable powers [puissances]” (OD 11; AK 216). Later in the same piece he gives the example of education, suggesting it is “a political means of sustaining or modifying the appropriation of discourse, with the knowledge and the powers it carries with it... following the lines which are marked by distances, oppositions and social struggle” (OD 45-6; AK 227).
Foucault looks at these questions of politics, sexuality and education in later works, suggesting that now he is making genealogical studies. With the adoption of the term ‘genealogy’ Foucault becomes more explicitly Nietzschean. Such an influence had always been acknowledged, but is now brought to the fore. In the 1961 preface to Histoire de la folie Foucault had likened his study to Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy; he gave a paper to a colloquium in 1964 entitled “Nietzsche, Freud, Marx”, where he clearly identified with the first of these thinkers (DE I, 564-79); and in 1967 he had suggested that his “archaeology owes more to the Nietzschean genealogy than to structuralism properly called” (DE I, 599; FL 31). In this period he had also been involved in the French publication of Nietzsche’s Complete Works (see DE I, 549-52, 561-4). Nietzsche was central to Foucault’s attempt to go beyond Hegel, Marx and (Kantian) humanism: “It was Nietzsche, in any case, who burned for us, even before we were born, the intermingled promises of the dialectic and anthropology” (M&C 275; OT 263). This Nietzschean influence becomes especially pronounced in the 1971 key essay, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” – one of Foucault’s central theoretical pieces. 

Genealogy is grey, meticulous, and patiently documentary. It operates on a field of entangled and confused parchments, that have been scratched over and recopied many times... Genealogy, consequently, requires patience and a knowledge of details, and it depends on a vast accumulation of source material (DE II, 136; FR 76-7).

A number of points arise for discussion. The question of origins has been remarked upon before, in the discussion of Heidegger and his readings of art and Hölderlin. Returning to the original German of Nietzsche’s texts, Foucault suggests that we need to be attentive to the number of different words Nietzsche used that are usually translated as ‘origin’ [origine]. The words Foucault singles out for treatment are Ursprung, Herkunft and Entstehung (DE II, 137ff; FR 77ff). Nietzsche, at least in his later works, carefully distinguishes between his use of Ursprung and the other two words. Foucault argues that Herkunft and Entstehung better capture the true objective of genealogy, and that translating them as
‘origin’ misses Nietzsche’s point. He therefore suggests new translations: “Herkunft is the equivalent of stock or descent [provenance]... Entstehung designates emergence, the moment of arising” (DE II, 140-3; FR 80-3). This distancing from the philosophy of origins – Ursprungphilosophie – was also shown in archaeology being of the archive not of the arche. As well as encouraging textual fidelity in our reading of Nietzsche, Foucault is also carefully distancing himself from the nostalgic, romantic excesses of Heidegger (see DE I, 372; FL 97).

Crucially, Foucault also sees the domain of Herkunft as concerned with the body, and therefore picks up on Nietzsche’s discussions in this area – neglected in Heidegger:

The body is the inscribed surface of events (marked by language and dissolved by ideas), the locus of a dissociated self (adopting the illusion of a substantial unity), and a volume in perpetual disintegration (DE II, 143; FR 83).

Whilst the body received some treatment in Foucault’s earlier works – notably in The Birth of the Clinic – it is in Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality that this study becomes intensified. These discussions are examined in the second section of the following chapter. This interest in the body is also found in Nietzsche’s historical sense which, as Foucault remarks, “has more in common with medicine than philosophy... its task is to become a curative science” (DE II, 149; FR 90), a remark that is developed out of Nietzsche’s understanding of history as a pharmacology. This orientation of history toward the present – a historical diagnosis to cure a current illness – is evidenced in Foucault’s intention to write a history of the present, a point that will be discussed at length in the next section.

Though genealogy is sometimes seen as a replacement for archaeology, it is better to see the two as existing together, as two halves of a complementary approach. Archaeology looks at truth as “a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation, and operation of énoncés”, whilst genealogy
sees truth as “linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extends it” (DE III, 160; FR 74).

This shows that, for Foucault, knowledge and power are linked and dependent on each other, but not that they are synonymous: “the exercise of power perpetually creates knowledge and, conversely, knowledge constantly induces effects of power” (DE II 752; P/K 52).

This obviously bears comparison with Nietzsche – “knowledge works as a tool of power. Hence it is plain that it increases with every increase of power” (WP 480) – and with Heidegger’s discussion of this point in Nietzsche. The relation between the knowledge/power dyad is examined in detail in Foucault’s future works, though he does realise that this has been the case all along: “When I think back now, I ask myself what else it was that I was talking about, in Madness and Civilisation or The Birth of the Clinic, but power? Yet I’m perfectly aware that I scarcely ever used the word and never had such a field of analyses at my disposal” (DE III, 146; FR 57).

Reading Nietzsche on power gives Foucault some key insights. As he points out in an interview, this concept of power is critically important: “it was Nietzsche who specified the power relation as the general focus... of philosophical discourse – whereas for Marx it was the productive relationship” (DE II 753; P/K 53). But Foucault’s understanding of power is not the same as standard understandings.

Three points need to be made. First, power is often looked at in opposition to authority, with legitimacy as the distinction. For example, in Machiavelli the Prince seizes power, but needs to gain legitimate authority in order to perpetuate his rule. Foucault suggests that we need to abandon a conception of power rooted in constitution and sovereignty, in juridical terms – the view of the right. As Foucault puts it in an oft-cited sentence: “We need to cut off the king’s head: in political theory that has still to be done” (DE III, 150; FR 63; see VS 117; WK 88-9). Similarly we must abandon the Marxist understanding of power, where it is posed “only in terms of the state apparatus” (DE III, 146; FR 57). Power must be understood as being exercised rather than possessed, and consequently as diffused throughout the social body rather than coming from above.
Foucault locates the change in the second of these two areas in the eighteenth century, which “invented... a synaptic regime of power, a regime of its exercise within the social body, rather than from above it” (DE II, 741; P/K 39). Walzer calls Foucault a “power pluralist” because of his emphasis on the workings of power from diverse places, and at different levels. The fact that power permeates society necessitates the use of a “microanalysis” to examine its workings at the level of the quotidien, looking at savoir de gens – popular knowledge in the sense of particular, local, regional knowledge, rather than general, commonsense, knowledge (DE II, 164; P/K 82). However, Foucault has sometimes been criticised for concentrating too much on the microphysics of power, and neglecting the wider picture. His retort is that he accepts that the wider picture should be looked at, but argues that the microphysics has previously been neglected, and that he is attempting to redress the balance somewhat. He sees this micro-level as essential in any attempt at change: “nothing in society will be changed if the mechanisms of power that function outside, below and alongside the State apparatuses, on a much more minute and everyday level, are not also changed” (DE II, 757-8; P/K 59-60).

The third key point in understanding Foucault on power is shown by his use of the French word pouvoir. This is the word he uses to translate Nietzsche’s Macht, a word normally translated in French as puissance. Macht is related to the German machen, which has the sense of creative power, of making. In using the French word pouvoir – which as a verb means ‘to be able’ – Foucault attempts to capture both this creative, productive sense, rather than merely the forceful, repressive sense. He suggests that “we must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it ‘excludes’, it ‘represses’, it ‘censors’, it ‘abstracts’, it ‘masks’, it ‘conceals’. In fact power produces; it produces the real; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth” (SP 227; DP 194). Rather than following the model of Reich, Foucault follows the model he finds in Nietzsche (DE III, 172; P/K 91). He suggests that power is everywhere, not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere (VS 122; WK 93), and that power entails resistance – that resistance is a relation of power (VS 125; WK 95). Instead of resistance being understood as freedom, or emancipation from power, it is better thought of as empowerment. It is for this
reason that Foucault talks of relationships of power, of tactics and strategies, of power as a game, with ordered rules and exchanges.

Foucault’s conception of power has been criticised for failing to allow any possibility for resistance, a criticism that merely misunderstands him, or, more seriously, for not providing any normative frame that allows an answer to the question “why resist?” It is harder to defend Foucault on this charge. Following Heidegger and Nietzsche, Foucault’s understanding of power makes his analyses perspectivist rather than relativist, in that he attempts to see the bias, the power relations, inherent in interpretations, examining “the place from which they look, the moment where they are” (DE II, 150; FR 90). Similarly, he realises his own work is bound up within the constraints of his time and place (DE II, 720; FL 149). Why, however, we should aim to undermine and examine others’ interpretations, and perhaps replace them with our own is not always clear. Foucault evades this question with the answer “one makes war to win, not because it is just” (DE III, 503). Another fair criticism is that though in theory Foucault suggested power was productive as well as repressive, “in practice he tended to reproduce a negative conception of discipline”. This criticism is somewhat addressed in The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self, where the individual’s self-constituting power is examined in detail.

The understanding of power that Foucault develops from his reading of Nietzsche also occasions a shift in his use of metaphor. Rather than the literary terms used in his earlier works, he shifts to a more militaristic tone. In his later works we can indeed hear “the distant roar of battle” (SP 360; DP 308):

"I think the reason we decided to publish all these documents was to draw a map, so to speak, of those struggles, to reconstruct these confrontations and battles, to rediscover the play of those discourses as weapons, as instruments of attack and defence in the relations of power and knowledge (MPR 17; IPR xi)."

Rhetorically, Foucault asks that “if power is properly speaking the way in which relations of forces are deployed and given concrete expression... should we not
analyse it primarily in terms of combat, conflict, and war?" (DE III, 171; P/K 90). This leads him to his reversal of Clausewitz's famous dictum, suggesting that "politics is war pursued by other means" (VS 123; WK 93 see DE III, 171-2; P/K 90-1).

Foucault argues that it is important to look at relations of war, conflict and struggle, stressing that these are not merely metaphors but actually found in reality (DE III, 471). Indeed, he questions the lack of attention paid by Marxists - though he exempts Marx and Trotsky somewhat - to what constitutes struggle [lutte] when they talk of class struggle (DE III, 310-11; P/K 208; see also DE III, 206; FL 239-40). The emphasis, it would seem, is on 'class' rather than 'struggle'.

It will be shown in the rereading of Discipline and Punish how Foucault analyses the army and the figures of warfare as constitutive elements in the genealogy of modern punitive society. But, for the purpose here, it is important to note that his spatial metaphors often have a military tone in his more political later work. This is shown particularly in his interview with the geographers at the Hérodote journal, where he suggests that the metaphors they claim are geographical are actually political, juridical, administrative and military. The military link is not surprising, concede his interlocutors, given that geography grew up in the shadow of the military (DE III, 32-4; P/K 68-70).

In the extended treatment given to Discipline and Punish in section two of the next chapter many of these issues around power will be contextualised. For the moment though, it is worth treating two key terms in Foucault's later work in more detail. These terms are technology and dispositif. Foucault uses the word technology in a number of places, talking of technologies of power, of government and of the self. Occasionally he refers to them as 'arts' instead - both terms being renderings of the Greek techne. For example, in his discussion of the notion of 'discipline', he suggests that it should not be identified with an institution or with an apparatus; "it is a type of power, a modality for its exercise, comprising a whole set of instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of application, targets; it is a 'physics' or an 'anatomy' of power, a technology" (SP 251; DP 215). Similarly in his work on governmentality he discusses the means
of policing a society as a particular technology of power, a technology of government (see DE III, 635ff; FE 97ff).

A useful hint as to how Foucault understands this term is found in an interview when he was asked whether he considered architecture as a ‘natural science’ or a ‘dubious science’. Foucault suggested that he is more interested in architecture as a *techne* – “a practical rationality governed by a conscious goal”. He accepts that the disadvantage of the word *techne* is its relation to ‘technology’, but suggests that technology should not simply be thought of as technologies of wood, fire or electricity, but also of government (DE IV, 285; FR 255-6; see DE III, 515). He understands *techne* as a ‘practice’, as a ‘savoir-faire’ (UP 73; UsP 62). Such an understanding is related to that of the later Heidegger. As Heidegger says, “τέχνη is the name not only for the activities and skills of the craftsman but also for the arts of the mind and the fine arts... the word τέχνη is linked with the word ἐπιστήμη. Both words are terms for knowing in the widest sense” (VA 16; BW 318). In Heidegger, however, most of his discussions of technology focus on what we would commonly understand by the term; in Foucault the term is used in its enriched sense.

In the second and third volumes of *The History of Sexuality*, Foucault uses this notion in his understanding of the practices of the self in antiquity. In *The Use of Pleasure* he examines the three great arts of self-conduct, the three major technologies of the self – dietics, economics and erotics (US 275; UsP 251). In the second of these areas he looks at Xenophon’s *Oeconomicus*, a treatise on married life, looking at its rational practices – thought of as knowledges [*epistēmē*] or arts/techniques [*technē*] (UP 169; UsP 152). In this, domestic art – or the government of a household – is looked at in the same way as the political or military art – as all three are involved in ruling others (UP 171; UsP 154). In the third volume, looking at the notion of *heautou epimeleisthai, cura sui* – the care of, or concern for, the self [*le souci de soi*] – Foucault sees these three arts as coming together in a wider “art of existence – the *technē tou biou*” (SS 57-8; CS 43). Foucault suggests that this concern with the self is a development from the time when man was pressed by needs.
The techniques and skills (technai and epistēmai) made it possible for him to escape from these pressures and to provide for himself in a better fashion. People learned to weave garments and build houses. Now as the work of the weaver is to the use of animal skins, and as the art of architecture is to caves for shelter, the love of boys is to intercourse with women. The latter, in early times, was necessary in order that the race [espèce] might not disappear (SS 249; CS 216).

This needs to be compared to the suggestion in *The Will to Knowledge* that the nineteenth century saw a shift from the act of sodomy to the specification of the homosexual (VS 58-9; WK 42-3) – or more widely, the constitution of the self, or the subject. In these later works Foucault seems to tie the possibility of a technology of the self to a number of times and places. What becomes more important than historical development is a number of other factors – the space where it happens, the growth of urban society (RC 137), a surplus of leisure time, and therefore a concern for well-being rather than just survival.56

These technologies should not be analysed in isolation, but need to be located in the context in which they develop – what Foucault terms a dispositif. In Foucault’s use this term defies translation – although ‘construct’, ‘deployment’, ‘apparatus’ and ‘grid of intelligibility’ are sometimes used.57 Although Foucault uses the related term disposition in some of his earlier works – “the grammatical arrangements [dispositions] of a language are the a priori of what can be expressed in it” (M&C 311; OT 297) – the term dispositif is first used in *Discipline and Punish*, and comes to the fore in *The Will to Knowledge*. What Foucault means by this term is clarified in a 1977 interview, when he described it as “a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific énoncés, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions”. What needs to be examined is the system of relations between these elements, the nature of their connections and their strategic functions (DE III, 298-9; P/K 194-5). The notion of the episteme developed in *The Order of Things* is now seen as “a specifically discursive dispositif, whereas the dispositif in its general form is
both discursive and non-discursive” (DE III, 301; P/K 197) – a theoretical reformulation paralleled in the shift from analysis of knowledge to the dyad power/knowledge.

Foucault’s notion of dispositif is clearly related to Heidegger’s understanding of Ge-stell, which is usually translated as ‘enframing’. In French the standard translation is Arraisonnement, though it has been suggested that Dis-positif is possible. Given the links between Foucault and Heidegger’s understanding of technology and the roles they give to dispositif and Gestell it seems that Foucault is taking forward Heidegger’s term. As Dean notes, “technologies of government, techniques of the self and of living, spiritual exercises, systems of manners and habits, should be analysed not simply as instruments but as part of a frame (a Ge-stell, in Heidegger’s sense)”. Dean, however, does not suggest that Foucault’s conception of dispositif is precisely this frame.

In The Will to Knowledge Foucault discusses the dispositif of sexuality (VS 99ff, WK 75ff). This sees sex as falling within this general dispositif, framed by practices and discourses such as biology, morality, government and mechanisms of confession. This understanding is deepened in the introduction to The Use of Pleasure – where Foucault suggests that knowledge, rules and norms, and individual conduct all form part of the experience of sexuality (UP 9-10; UsP 3-4). It is also clearly evident in the texts surrounding the case of Herculine Barbin – where the biological theories of sexuality, the juridical conceptions of the individual and the modern forms of administrative control dictate the need for the hermaphrodite to have one ‘true sex’ (DE IV, 116-7; HB viii) – and that of Pierre Rivière. To examine this experience of sexuality, Foucault suggests we need to look at the “correlation between fields of knowledge, types of normativity and forms of subjectivity in a particular culture” (UP 10; UsP 4). He suggests that he has shown how to examine the first two of these axes, with the analysis of discursive practices in his archaeological studies, and the analysis of relations and technologies of power in his genealogical works. What needs to be done now is to examine the technologies of the self that constitute the subject (UP 10-2; UsP 4-6). For this purpose, Foucault sees the models of archaeology and genealogy put to work together: “this analysis of desiring man is situated at
the point where an archaeology of problematisations and a genealogy of practices of the self intersect” (UP 19; UsP 13).61

II Mapping the Present

Like Nietzsche, Foucault is opposed to some kinds of history, and demands the need for a historical sense. Likewise he is opposed to the tendency toward ‘Egyptianism’ – of dehistoricising, or of tearing things from their true context. There are two potential situations. Either the historical sense is mastered by a “suprahistorical point of view, metaphysics can bend it to its own purpose, and, by aligning it to the demands of objective science, it can impose its own ‘Egyptianism’”, or, by refusing the certainty of absolutes, “the historical sense can evade metaphysics and become a privileged instrument of genealogy” (DE II, 146-7; FR 87). Genealogy was for Nietzsche a critical history, it was untimely, in the sense that it was “acting counter to our time and thereby acting on our time and, let us hope, for the benefit of a time to come” (UB II, Preface). Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche on history, found in Division Two of Being and Time, made some fundamental points concerning the three modalities of history that Nietzsche discussed in the second Untimely Meditation. These points are central to understanding Foucault’s reading of Nietzsche.

In a sense, genealogy returns to the three modalities of history that Nietzsche recognised in 1874. It returns to them in spite of the objections that Nietzsche raised in the name of the affirmative and creative powers of life. But they are metamorphosed: the veneration of monuments becomes parody; the respect for ancient continuities becomes systematic dissociation; the critique of the injustices of the past by a truth held by men in the present becomes the destruction of the man who maintains knowledge [connaissance] by the injustice proper to the will to knowledge [savoir] (DE II, 156; FR 97).
Like Heidegger, Foucault sees the three modalities working together, and he follows Heidegger's shift in orientating the critical to the present, rather than the past. Nietzsche's critical history became for Heidegger a critique of the present, a critique which was historicised in Heidegger's later works. For Foucault it becomes a history of the present (SP 40; DP 31).

Though Foucault only describes his project in these terms in *Discipline and Punish*, it is clear that it applies to all his work. As he describes his early works: "it is a question of presenting a critique of our own time, based upon retrospective analyses" (DE II, 183; FL 68).

I consider myself as a journalist, insofar as what interests me is the present [*l'actualité*]... Philosophy, until Nietzsche, had eternity for its *raison d'être*. The first philosopher-journalist was Nietzsche. He introduced the today [*l'aujourd'hui*] into the field of philosophy. Before, the philosopher knew time and eternity, but Nietzsche was obsessed by the present... If we want to be masters of our future we must pose fundamentally the question of the today. That is why, for me, philosophy is a type of radical journalism (DE II, 434; see also DE III, 266; FL 222).

Such a critique, or history, of our own time, of the present, is exemplified in the advent of the death of man in *The Order of Things*, the history of the modern subject pursued in *The History of Sexuality*, and in his engagement in debates over psychiatry, penal reform, homosexuality and various other issues. It also lends an explicitly political tone to his work. Some of the most direct links to present-day issues are found in his interviews and journalism, whereas the analyses in his books tend to end around the middle of the nineteenth century. The attitude to the present is also the topic of Foucault's reflections on Kant's essay "What is Enlightenment?"

In reading Kant, Foucault returns to the original German. The opening line of Kant's text reads: "Enlightenment [*Aufklärung*] is the exit [*Ausgang*] of man from his self-imposed immaturity [*Unmündigkeit*]." It is important, contends
Foucault, that Kant defines Aufklärung as “an Ausgang, an ‘exit’, a ‘way out’” (DE IV, 564; FR 34), a way out of the present to the future. This present is our immaturity, mentally, spiritually and physically, and Aufklärung will lead us into a new maturity, a modernity. This “point of departure... the attitude to modernity” (DE IV, 568; FR 38) needs clarification. Foucault concedes that “modernity is often spoken of as an epoch, or at least as a set of features characteristic of an epoch; situated on a calendar”, but wonders “whether we may not envisage modernity rather as an attitude than as a period of history... a bit, no doubt, like what the Greeks called an ēthos” (DE IV, 568; FR 39). This ēthos is conceived as “a permanent critique of our historical being [être]... consisting in a critique of what we are saying, thinking and doing, through a historical ontology of ourselves” (DE IV, 571-4; FR 42-5; see DE IV, 618; FR 351). 67

Foucault therefore suggests that Kant founds two great traditions in philosophy. One of these is the project found in the Critiques, where he looks for the conditions of true knowledge, and asks the question “what is man?”, the second is found in “What is Enlightenment?” The former was criticised by Foucault in the secondary thesis and The Order of Things, but Foucault finds the second more interesting, characterising it as “an ontology of the present, an ontology of ourselves”. This is the tradition Foucault allies himself with (DE IV, 687-8; PPC 95), and these two ontologies clearly delineate the research he pursued in the last years of his life. Though this notion of historical ontology is clearly related to Heidegger’s project in his later works, 68 and ties to the notion of a history of the present, there is also clearly a shift from Foucault’s earlier position, where he tended to conceive of periods, and epochs. 69 Kant uses the word Unmündigkeit for “immaturity”, the self-imposed state he claims Enlightenment provides an exit from. This German noun is formed from the adjective unmündig, which literally means under-age, and its use is interesting because escaping from immaturity allows the time to achieve the status of being a self-constituting age. For Foucault, the Aufklärung is the first period that names itself (DE IV, 681-2; PPC 89), and asks the fundamental question “what is our present?” Interestingly, it appears that Foucault realises that the notion of period is a tool of hindsight, as Couzens Hoy has put it: “periodisation... is itself a modernist tool”. 70
Reading Foucault in this way underlines the continuity that runs throughout his work. The notion of an ontology of the present is clearly linked to the general project of a history of limits. Speaking of the ethos he sees develop out of the Enlightenment, he conceives it as a limit-attitude:

We have to move beyond the outside-inside alternative; we have to be at the frontiers. Criticism indeed consists of analysing and reflecting upon limits... The point, in brief, is to transform the critique conducted in the form of a necessary limitation into a practical critique that takes the form of a possible crossing [franchissement – clearing]... this criticism is not transcendental, and its goal is not that of making a metaphysics possible: it is genealogical in its design, and archaeological in its method (DE IV, 574; FR 45-6). 71

However, to read Foucault in this way is to continue the standard interpretation of him as a historian. In terms of the role of space, all it does is recognise what a 1967 interviewer called his “predilection for spatial metaphors” (DE I, 599; FL 31). It was noted as a point of divergence from structuralism that Foucault also made analyses of actual spaces in his historical studies. As Flynn has remarked, “Foucault’s spatialised thinking extends far beyond his well-known use of spatial metaphors to include the use of lists, tables, geometrical configurations and illustrations”. However, Flynn’s treatment only looks at two of Foucault’s examples – Velasquez’s ‘Las Meninas’ in The Order of Things, and Bentham’s Panopticon in Discipline and Punish. 72 Foucault’s spatial thinking, and his spatial histories, extend far beyond this.

In his recent Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference, David Harvey takes issue with the current trend for producing ‘cognitive maps’ in politics, art and the humanities. He cites the recent books Mapping the West European Left, Mapping Ideology and Locating Culture, and suggests that this trend “unfortunately evades the problem that mapping requires a map and that maps are typically totalising, usually two-dimensional, Cartesian, and very undialectical devices”. 73 Yet I think that Foucault’s work can perhaps be
subsumed under the designation not simply of writing a history of the present, but of *mapping* [repérage] the present.\textsuperscript{74}

Foucault uses the word *repérage* in a number of places, some of which are noted in this and the following chapter. The term is especially used in *The Birth of the Clinic*. Similarly *The Archaeology of Knowledge* concerns itself with "the mapping [réparage] of discursive formations" (AS 152; AK 116); its aim is to "map [réparer] the space" which made earlier investigations possible (AS/AK jacket). *Repérage* is a military term, meaning location, landmark or point on a map. The related verb *repérer* means to locate or discover. In translations they are often rendered as 'mapping' and 'to map'. It is interesting that, in Foucault's early studies, this is the main military term used, and thereby prefigures his later metaphorical shift – providing another thread of continuity through his career.

It should be remembered that a map is for use, not to fully describe the terrain. Borges' oft-cited fable about the awkwardness of an exact map on the scale of 1:1 is worth remembering here.\textsuperscript{75} Foucault's maps are not merely cognitive, but make use of the notions of site, space, place and location in both figurative and actual senses. Following Nietzsche and Heidegger, Foucault points out the important role that space plays in our history, and orientates this history toward the service of the present. In Chapter Two it was noted that Heidegger's understanding of the present, of presence, is a conflation of the two German words *Gegenwart* and *Anwesenheit* – temporal and spatial presence (see GA24, 305ff). (It is worth noting that in Binswanger's *Dream and Existence* Foucault translated Heidegger's *Dasein* as *présence*.) It was also argued above that the three dimensions of time, which as Heidegger showed relate to Nietzsche's three modes of history, come together in the *Augenblick* – the Moment. This gateway – the present – is where future and past collide. Just as the individual in the *Augenblick* must act, so too must history orientate itself toward the future with reference to the past: a *history of the present*.

The spatial links in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, the dual meaning of present, the word *Augenblick*, and the spatial site of the gateway, make it unsurprising that there is a role for space in this history. But the equal importance given to time
and space in Heidegger’s later works – thought as journeying and placing, and as historical site – make it essential that this history of the present must also be spatially aware: mapping the present. Indeed, Foucault once described himself as a “cartographer” (DE II, 725), a designation that, despite Harvey’s misgivings, seems particularly apt. Foucault’s mappings are far from totalising, perhaps best seen as sketchmaps, approximations toward, signposts. They highlight key features, outline contours, and provide an orientation. Far from being two-dimensional, these maps work with both space and time, but are not Cartesian in their abstraction; rather, they work on the level of lived experience.

Foucault’s work on space has received relatively little critical attention. Where it is analysed critics tend to either seize the Panopticon as the most apposite example or rely on Foucault’s interviews and a 1967 lecture. The issues around the Panopticon receive sustained treatment in the next chapter, and need not detain us here. But the focus on a number of short pieces – “Space, Knowledge, Power”, “Questions on Geography” and “Of Other Spaces” – whilst understandable in that they are the most explicit discussions, discounts the places where Foucault makes his most useful analyses.76 The best way to understand what Foucault is doing is to look at his studies in context, which will be done in the extended treatment given to Histoire de la folie and his study of modern discipline in the next chapter.77

In 1967 Foucault delivered a lecture to a group of architects, but only allowed the lecture notes to be published shortly before his death.78 With the exception of the passage on the Panopticon, this piece has received more treatment than any of his other works on space. Though it is a fascinating piece, there is one central problem with it, or at least with its perception. This is that this piece is the closest Foucault ever comes to writing a history of space, or spaces, something he later suggested as a possible future project (DE III, 192; FL 228). Whilst this indeed would be a valuable study, in critical appropriations of Foucault this history of space is often given precedence over the spatial histories of his more major works. This is a point that will be returned to below.
However, Foucault’s history of space is not without interest. Starting with the Middle Ages, Foucault suggests that at this time there was an “ensemble of places [lieux]” – sacred and profane places; protected and open, exposed places; urban and rural places. He calls this medieval space – “the space of localisation”. This understanding was disrupted by Galileo, who constituted an infinite and infinitely open space, thus dissolving the place of a thing by seeing it as only a point in its movement: “starting with Galileo and the seventeenth century, extension was substituted for localisation”. In more recent times Foucault suggests that the understanding of space on the basis of extension has been replaced by the notion of site [emplacement]. “The site is defined by relations of proximity [voisonage] between points or elements”. The most concrete question that arises from this understanding of place [place] or site is that of demography:

This problem of the human site/living space [l’emplacement humain] is not simply that of knowing whether there will be enough space [place] for men in the world – a problem that is certainly quite important – but also that of knowing what relations of proximity, what type of storage, circulation, mapping [repérage], and classification of human elements should be adopted in a given situation in order to achieve a given end. Our epoch is one in which space takes for us the form of relations among sites (DE IV, 752-4; OOS 22-3).

Foucault’s exposition here clearly puts him in the same field as Heidegger. Their understandings are not entirely identical, but there is clearly a degree of similarity. Like Heidegger, Foucault suggests that the modern era inaugurated an understanding of space in terms of extension – Heidegger attributes it to Descartes, Foucault to Galileo – and both suggest that a different understanding is now possible. In the chapters above it was argued that in Heidegger’s later thinking there was an increased importance given to space, and that his understanding of space, or place, was resolutely non-Cartesian. This entailed space being understood not in terms of extension or mathematical co-ordinates, but in terms of lived experience, nearness and farness, locale and situation. In
Foucault’s work such an understanding is found in his most explicitly Heideggerian piece, the introduction to Binswanger’s *Dream and Existence*:

In lived experience, at its original level, space is not presented as the geometric structure of simultaneity. This type of space, within which the natural sciences deploy objective phenomena in their coherence, is only constituted by way of a genesis... Before being geometric or even geographic, space presents itself first and foremost as scene or landscape [*paysage*]... lived space [*l’espacè vecu*] (DE I, 101-2; DIE 60).

Whilst Heidegger, suggests that we need to move from ‘space’ to ‘place’, with a recognition that we can re-think the former through the latter, Foucault uses the terms *place*, *lieu*, *espace* and *emplacement* almost interchangeably – though the understanding of how the meanings attached to these terms have changed is implicit. We should also consider that the French word *espace* has a wider range of meanings than ‘space’. In English some of the other meanings might be translated as area, zone, or territory – or even place. With most of Foucault’s histories looking at periods between the mid-seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, it is not surprising that he finds the spaces of these analyses to be those of the period of extension – classification, segmentation, order, and exclusion.

In this piece, however, he is looking at the spaces of our own era, and perhaps this is why the piece has been so popular with contemporary commentators. Here Foucault does understand space as the relation between sites. He suggests that we could look at “the set of relations by which a given site can be defined... sites of transportation... sites of temporary relaxation... closed or semi-closed sites of rest”, but centres his analysis on particular sites – ones which both link with and contradict other sites (DE III, 755; OOS 23-4). Foucault divides these sites along the lines of a division he suggested in *The Order of Things*:

*Utopias* afford consolation: although they have no real place there is nevertheless a fantastic, untroubled region in which they are able to unfold; they open up cities with vast avenues, superbly
planted gardens, countries where life is easy, even though the road to them is chimerical. Heterotopias are disturbing, probably because they secretly undermine language, because they make it impossible to name this and that, because they shatter or tangle common names, because they destroy 'syntax' in advance, and not only the syntax with which we construct sentences but also that less apparent syntax which causes words and things (next to and opposite one another) to 'hold together' (M&C 9; OT xviii).

Utopias are, literally, 'happy-places' or 'no-places'; heterotopias 'other-places'. In *The Order of Things* heterotopia had described Borges' Chinese Encyclopaedia; a similar understanding is found in Foucault's work on the Belgian painter René Magritte. Here too Foucault examines what might be called 'heterotopias', or, as James Harkess suggests, visual non sequiturs. In The Order of Things heterotopia had described Borges' Chinese Encyclopaedia; a similar understanding is found in Foucault's work on the Belgian painter René Magritte. Here too Foucault examines what might be called 'heterotopias', or, as James Harkess suggests, visual non sequiturs. Where Kandinsky and Klee used abstraction to undermine representative realism, with colours, lines and shapes, Magritte used everyday objects – pipes, bowler hats, candles, shoes, paintings, windows and mirrors. Discussing Magritte's famous painting of a pipe with the words "Ceci n'est pas une pipe" below it, Foucault suggests that the common place *[lieu commun]* has disappeared (DE I, 643; TNP 31). As a later comment makes clear, this is an elaborate pun. Magritte effaces the common place of language and art by creating a heterotopia of the everyday rather than a non-place (a utopia) of abstraction (DE I, 646; TNP 41), but, in doing so, he disrupts the commonplace, the everyday – bottles become carrots, paintings fuse with landscapes, mirrors reflect what they conceal, and shoes develop toes.

In the lecture "Of Other Spaces" Foucault more directly opposes utopias – "sites with no real place *[lieu]" – to heterotopias, which he now defines as a place that does exist, a "counter-site, a kind of effectively enacted utopia" (DE IV, 755; OOS 24). Foucault elaborates and discusses a number of different heterotopias – suggesting crisis heterotopias as the boarding school or the honeymoon hotel; heterotopias of deviation such as rest homes, psychiatric hospitals and prisons; the cemetery; theatres, cinemas, gardens and carpets; museums and libraries – accumulations of time, and, in contrast, sites of fleeting time – travelling
fairgrounds, vacation villages; and various others, including Muslim hammans, Scandinavian saunas, motel rooms, brothels, boats and colonies (DE IV, 756-62; OOS, 24-6). All this is undoubtedly interesting, but it needs to be understood in context. If we examine Foucault’s major works, we see that his histories are not merely ones in which space is yet another area analysed, but have space as a central part of the approach itself. In other words, rather than merely writing histories of space, Foucault is writing spatial histories. These spatial histories make use of many of the historical tools examined in the previous section of this chapter, but also use space itself as a critical tool of analysis.\(^\text{82}\)

In one of the best general discussions of Foucault and space, Chris Philo suggests that “the spatial relations discussed throughout Foucault’s histories of social otherness can best be understood not as formal geometries, but as substantive geographies”. Philo argues that Foucault runs the risk of seeming to simply inject a “geometric turn” into his histories, “effectively elevating an abstract sense of space above a concrete sense of place”, but suggests that the emphasis on specificities evades this difficulty. His examples draw on *Madness and Civilisation* and *Discipline and Punish*, arguing that they showcase what he terms a “‘truly’ postmodern geography” (in opposition to Soja’s reliance on a ‘geometric imaginary’).\(^\text{83}\) What Philo misses, and this seems to be due to his neglect of Foucault’s theoretical background, is that in the majority of Foucault’s studies, the understanding of the complex relationship between the real and the imaginary, the practical and the theoretical, between power and knowledge, is put to work, and this is true of space as well. Indeed, like Heidegger before him, and Lefebvre around the same time, Foucault understands both of these to be merely parts of a greater whole – the lived experience. Even in *The Order of Things*, the historical study that seems most focused on knowledge alone, and removed from practical experience, Foucault suggests that the spatial ‘metaphors’ found within are often not of his own invention but ones he was “studying as objects... spatial techniques, not metaphors” (DE IV, 284; FR 254). Another example is found in his analysis of architecture, where he examines its theoretical formulations, its practical applications, and the power relations it entails. Architecture is understood as a *techne*, and forms part of a *dispositif*. This needs to be remembered in our re-readings of Foucault’s histories, in their
recastings as spatial histories. If the guiding light of Foucault’s historical researches is, following Nietzsche, the role of power, we would do well to bear the following in mind: “Space is fundamental in any form of communal life; *space is fundamental in any exercise of power*” (DE IV, 282; FR 252; emphasis added).
Chapter Six

The Spaces of Power

Space is fundamental in any exercise of power. It is well known that power is central to Foucault’s work, and that it is a fundamental focus of his historical studies. How then does space figure in these histories? In order to look at this, this final chapter re-reads two of Foucault’s historical studies from the perspective of the suggestion that space is fundamental in any exercise of power. In the first part I look at Histoire de la folie, known to the English speaking world as Madness and Civilisation. The spatial elements of this work – along with much interesting detail in other areas – become much clearer with a reading of the unabridged French text. This part therefore seeks to re-place Madness and Civilisation, showing what could be called Foucault’s re-placing of the history of madness. In the second part I examine Discipline and Punish within the wider context of Foucault’s work on medicine and the disciplinary society generally, in order to show that the emphasis on the prison, and particularly the Panopticon, is misleading, particularly on the issue of how space is used as a mechanism of power.

I Re-placing Madness and Civilisation

Colin Gordon’s important call for the reading of the un-abridged French original of Histoire de la folie, rather than the English translation Madness and Civilisation has provoked serious critical attention. This is to be welcomed. Gordon argues that if the full French text is read several of the criticisms of Foucault’s work will be seen to be misplaced. Some of the responses to his article have argued that the full text would rather reinforce the accusations of sloppy scholarship, reliance on literature and art instead of historical fact, and the extension of French examples to the European picture. My concern is not with these issues: several other people are better placed to debate such counts. But taking Gordon’s mandate seriously, this section seeks to re-read Histoire de la
folie, and in doing so, by being attentive to the role of space, re-place the reading of Madness and Civilisation.

For such an important text, both indispensable for an understanding of Foucault, and central to work since the late 60s on mental illness, it is surprising that the oft-promised full translation has yet to appear. The original French edition, essentially Foucault’s doctoral thesis, was published in 1961 as *Folie et déraison*, and an abridged version appeared in the non-academic *10/18* series three years later. Both editions went out of print, and in 1972 a second edition, with a new preface and two appendices was published in Gallimard’s *Bibliothèque des Sciences Humaines*; this text was then reprinted – without the appendices – in the cheaper *Tel* series. The English translation – unlike the German or the Italian – is of the abridged *10/18* version, with some additions from the 1961 original. Only about 45% of the French original and its attendant notes, references and annexes is therefore available to the English reader, and, as Gordon has pointed out, this has led to a less than fair reading of Foucault’s work. No French commentator could have got away with only reading the *10/18* version. What the English reader has is a translation of a skilfully edited version of this text, but one that is intended for the general reader.

To understand Foucault’s intent it is obviously necessary to work with the original, unedited, text. Reading this shows that not only have whole chapters been omitted from the translated version, but that sections from those chapters which have been retained are also missing. Foucault’s treatment of issues around space is immediately obvious even from the truncated version, but a detailed reading shows how deep this vein runs through his work. As Colin Gordon has argued, Foucault’s book is often reduced to “the compass of three or four striking tableaux: the medieval insane messing around in boats; the carceral monolith of the Great Internment; unreason treated as animality; the spurious emancipation of moral treatment”. What this section seeks to do is to examine both those “striking tableaux” and the less-often mentioned passages of *Histoire de la folie* which exhibit elements of a spatial history. Many of these passages greatly prefigure the work of the later Foucault, setting up conceptual apparatus used in *The Birth of the Clinic, The Order of Things* and *Discipline and Punish*. 

155
Leprosy, Water and Madness

The opening words of Foucault’s book are well known: “At the end of the Middle Ages, leprosy disappeared from the Western World. In the margins of the community, at the gates of cities, there stretched wastelands which sickness had ceased to haunt but had left sterile and long uninhabitable” (HF 13; MC 3). These words – as with the beginnings of so many of Foucault’s books – provide both an evocative image and establish a backdrop to later events. The lazaret houses became empty, but the values and images attached to the figure of the leper, notably the meaning of their exclusion, remained (HF 15-6; MC 6). These places of exclusion, and the formulas attached to them, would, Foucault argues, be reused two or three centuries later. The rigorous division between the lepers and the rest of the population – a division of social exclusion but spiritual reintegration – would be repeated for another marginal group (HF 16; MC 7).

The group Foucault has in mind is, of course, the mad, and in the edited text the next image is of the appearance of the ship of fools. But in the original text, Foucault warns of getting ahead of the argument [Mais n’anticipons pas], and argues that before the mad take this position, “a new leper is born, who takes the place of the first” (HF 16-7). These “new lepers” are the venereally diseased, who inhabit a “moral space of exclusion”, one they would come to share with the mad (HF 18).

The use of the venereally diseased as a bridge is important, for it is only with them that the idea of moral exclusion is established. Like the lepers they are socially excluded, unlike them there is no spiritual integration. This part of Foucault’s book has received sustained criticism, particularly from H.C. Erik Midelfort. Midelfort argues that Foucault over-emphasises the link between lazarettos and mad-houses, and suggests that medieval hospitals and monasteries are more important precursors. He argues that Foucault sees the treatment of lepers as only negative – “a monolithic image of rejection” – and cites recent studies that show that the real attitude was more nuanced, a mixture of “fear and pity”. Midelfort also suggests that the middle link established is dropped in the edited text because “perhaps Foucault no longer felt that venereal disease was strictly parallel to leprosy and madness”. These points are difficult to sustain, as
Foucault does look at the role of other precursors (HF 405-6), and the relative importance of these different institutions is moot. It should also be noted that Foucault’s understanding of the attitude to leprosy is considerably more subtle than simple exclusion (see, for example, HF 16; MC 7). Midelfort’s suggestion that the 1964 edits are revisions needs no response other than to suggest a reading of the new edition of 1972, where the main text is effectively unaltered.

The pages on the ship of fools are amongst the most discussed of Foucault’s book, and once again, he sets up a vignette: “Something new appears in the imaginary landscape of the Renaissance; soon it will occupy a privileged place there: it is the ship of fools, a strange ‘drunken boat’ which glides along the calm rivers of the Rhine and the Flemish canals” (HF 18; MC 7). It is important to stress that Foucault notes the appearance of the ship on the imaginary landscape: the significance of the ship is as an image, one that appears in the painting of Bosch and the words of Brant, symbolic of the attitude to the mad. Foucault talks of other ships that appeared in literary compositions of the time, but then counters, “but of all these fantastic [roman esques] or satirical vessels, the Narrenschiff is the only one which had a real existence, because they existed, these boats which brought their foolish cargo from one town to another” (HF 19; MC 8). Foucault’s exact point is unclear, and he has been criticised here for elaborating an argument from sketchy documentary facts, but he seems to be suggesting that the imaginary constructs have partners – if not exact – in the real. At the time, Foucault suggests, madmen simply had a wandering existence. They were driven outside the limits of towns, expelled, sometimes by boat, sometimes to wander in the open countryside.

Madmen were not invariably expelled – some were hospitalised – and there were sometimes towns where they gathered. These included the places of pilgrimage, shrines [lieux de pêlerinage], but also places like Nuremberg where the mad were simply thrown in prison (HF 20; MC 9-10). The village of Gheel is singled out for mention, a place of pilgrimage that developed into a place of exclusion, where “interest in concern [souci] and in exclusion coincide: madmen were confined in the holy locus of a miracle [l’espace sacré du miracle]” (HF 21; MC 10). Treatment of the mad is therefore shown to be erratic – sometimes tolerant,
sometimes exclusionary, sometimes hospitable. There is no regimented model, no overall plan. The literary model is one that emphasises passage and displacement; what is similarly evident in practice is that the mad are often in transition – moving from town to town, to wastelands, to shrines. The ambiguity implicit in Foucault’s now celebrated sentence – “les fous alors avaient une existence facilement errante” (HF 19; MC 8) – may even help to showcase this irregular approach; though I would suggest that the most problematic word is the last, rather than the penultimate. Errant, like the English word, has the sense both of wandering and of irregularity, as well as the more direct connotation of erring from the path of reason. The English and French both have their etymological roots in the Latin errare – to wander, to err. The sentence could be translated as “At that time, the mad easily had an errant existence”.

Symbolically, if not actually, water and the passage of the ships across it play important roles. Foucault characterises the madman as a restless prisoner of the passage, of the transition, figuratively and actually caught between two places: “the madman is entrusted to the river with a thousand arms, to the sea of a thousand routes, to this great uncertainty outside of everything. He is imprisoned in the middle of the most free, the most open of routes: bound fast at the infinite crossroads. He is the Passenger par excellence...”. The land to which he is travelling is unknown, but as soon as he reaches it, so to is the land from which he came, “he has his truth and his homeland only in that fruitless expanse between two countries that cannot belong to him”. Understanding all of this enables us to better make sense of Foucault’s description of the madman’s voyage “across a half-real, half-imaginary geography”. The literary and attitudinal constructs loosely parallel the actual treatment. This treatment is one which inhabits the boundary between care and fear, “the madman’s liminal position on the horizon of the medieval concern [soisci]”. It is therefore fitting that the mad are often confined within the city gates, a prisoner of the very threshold, kept at the point of passage, in the interior of the exterior, and vice versa (HF 22; MC 11).
Confinement and Correction

If the place of the mad was, in the medieval period, one continually open to question, a restless, transitional location, in the classical age it became fixed and immobile. “It will never again be that fugitive and absolute limit. Behold it moored now, made fast among things and men. Retained and maintained. No longer a ship but a hospital”. A restructuring of social space, to a hospital, where confinement replaces embarkation (HF 53; MC 35-6). Foucault argues that from the middle of the seventeenth century, madness is linked with the notion of confinement, and confinement is established as the natural abode [lieu naturel] of madness (HF 59; MC 39). This actual treatment of madness has parallels, Foucault suggests, in the binary divide between reason and unreason in René Descartes’ Meditations.

In the Meditations Descartes tries to ascertain things that are true, things of which there can be no doubt. To this end, he decides to doubt everything, until he can be sure of something, and then from this position reconstruct the basis of knowledge. This is the method known as Cartesian doubt. Descartes suggests that there are three possibilities that might cause him to be misled: that he might be mad; that he might be dreaming, and that an “evil genius” might be tricking him.13 Having thought through these three possibilities, Descartes resolves that, whatever else, he cannot doubt that he is thinking, and, he argues, it follows from this that “the statement ‘I am, I exist’ is necessarily true every time it is uttered by me or conceived in my mind”.14

Foucault argues that though Descartes counts the possibility that he is mad as a potential area of doubt, he does not afford it the same significance that he does to the possibility that he is dreaming, or that he is being deceived: “Descartes does not evade the danger of madness in the same way that he gets round the possibility of dreaming or of error” (HF 56), and, again, “in the economy of doubt, there is a fundamental imbalance between madness on the one side, and dream and error on the other” (HF 57). Foucault sees in Descartes’ text a dismissal that is tantamount to exclusion. When Descartes asks “how could one deny that these hands and that my whole body exist?”, his only possibility, as he
sees it, is that he could be “insane”, like those “whose brains are so impaired by a stubborn vapour from a black bile that they continually insist... that they are gourds, or that they are made of glass”. Next comes the sentence that Foucault claims is so important: “but they are all demented [amentes], and I would appear no less extravagant [demens] if I were to take their conduct as a model for myself”.15

This dismissal, for Foucault, is in contrast with the treatment Descartes gives to the other two possibilities – the deceit and the dream. Descartes believes that even if he is being deceived he is still thinking, for being misled into thinking that one is thinking is still thinking, and dreams can only be a reflection of things that exist, just as “bizarre and unusual forms” created by painters are based on things that are true.16 Indeed, for Foucault, this reading of Descartes would seem to suggest that the mad, “the demented” are not only denied the thought, the reason, they are denied existence, if not entirely, certainly as equals.17 This denial can be seen as legitimating the “dividing practices” that came into play at a similar time to Descartes’ text. Meditations was published in 1641, and Foucault sees the creation of the Hôpital Général in 1656 as a key development in the exclusion of the mad from society. “Madness was excluded, leaving no trace, no scar on the surface of thought” (HF 156). Essentially, reason, in its situation in this text, and from then on, ruthlessly proclaims itself apart from madness or unreason; a divide Foucault claims was not evident before. For example, though the Greeks had a relationship to something they called ‘ὑβρίς [hubris], the Greek logos “had no contrary” (DE I, 160; MC xiii). In other words, the poles of ‘ὑβρίς and logos co-existed, there was not the epistemological bifurcation of the either/or.

Foucault argues that the new houses of confinement were very often established in “the same walls of the ancient lazarus houses”, and suggests that, just as “the lazarus house did not have a medical meaning; a good many other functions were active in the act of banishment which reopened these cursed places” (HF 64). A new social sensibility suddenly isolated a new group to take the place of the lepers, an act “which by tracing the locus [espace] of confinement, conferred upon it its power of segregation and provided a new homeland for madness” (HF
Understanding the Cartesian divide along with the division of confinement explains in part “the mode in which madness was perceived [perçue], and experienced [vécue], by the classical age” (HF 67; MC 46). The fusion of imaginary and real attitudes – especially in the symbolic and actual use of space – is particularly evident here. The classical age sees the birth of an attitude, a sensibility which had “drawn a line and raised a threshold” between reason and unreason (HF 90-1; MC 64). This is marked in the action of exclusion and in the thought of Descartes: the asylum replaced the lazar house both in the “geography of haunted places” and in the “landscape of the moral universe” (HF 84; MC 57).

The insane were often confined along with the poor [les pauvres], in a moral punishment of poverty. What is essential here, as was the case with the venereally diseased, is the ethical valorisation. The poor are divided into the good and bad, and well before being seen as objects of knowledge or of pity, are treated as moral subjects (HF 70-3). A shift becomes apparent, madness is now an issue of social, rather than religious, concern. It is a problem for “police”, concerned with the order of individuals in the city. Foucault then contrasts the new situation with that which came before: “They err [erre]... but it is no longer on the path of a strange pilgrimage: they disturb the ordering [ordonnance] of social space” (HF 74). Foucault locates a shift in the bourgeois conscience regarding the urban question, suggesting that by the seventeenth century there was a dream of organised and moral city, which necessitated the negative organisation of the walls of confinement, prisons of moral order. Confinement is both a metaphysics of government and a politics of religion: “police” is the civil equivalent of religion for the edification of cities (HF 87-90; MC 61-3). Madness “began to rank among the problems of the city” (HF 90; MC 64).

This concern leads to le monde correctionaire. Correctionaire is a word that defies summary translation, as it covers such meanings as correction, proof-reading, marking, and punishment. What Foucault would call the disciplinary society in Discipline and Punish is clearly anticipated in the arguments here. The opening of the Hôpital Général is an epitome of a trend where “internment played not only a negative role of exclusion, but also the positive role of
organisation" (HF 96). It was a “social mechanism” (HF 92) for the control of the city, for the establishment of a homogenous world (HF 97). The venereally diseased and the insane were held in the same place of enclosure, stigmatised and punished. “By inventing, within the imaginary geometry of its morality, the space of internment, the classical epoch came to find at the same time a homeland [patrie] and a place of shared redemption from sins against flesh and errors against reason” (HF 100). This divide is one that Foucault thinks especially evident in our own time. He suggests that in all cultures and at all times there has been a system of constraint toward sex, but that we are remarkable for having such a strict divide between reason and unreason, health and sickness, and normal and abnormal (HF 103).

Within these places of confinement, the mad were treated in varying ways. Some had places in hospitals and almost had a medical status, whilst others were effectively in prison. These two institutions were often confused, partly because the mad were indiscriminately distributed between both (HF 127-9; EM 3-5). Internment and hospitalisation were two ways of treating the insane, but – contra the standard reading of Foucault – there is not an abrupt transition from one to the other, but rather a “chronological slippage”, where the hospital became drawn toward the model of confinement, with assimilation following (HF 137-8; EM 11). Within the division of thought, Foucault argues that there is similar confusion, in that the homo natura is posited as a given, prior to all experience of madness, but is, in fact, a creation, born out of a invention of opposition (HF 147; EM 19). This is an initial glimpse of Foucault’s arguments in later works, where he discusses the historicality of the a priori, and the invention of the same by the opposition to the other. The madman is now seen as responsible, ethically condemned, and is designated “as the Other, as the Stranger, as the Excluded One” (HF 148-9; EM 20).

Observing and Classifying

“There is there, before the gaze [le regard], someone who is indisputably mad, someone who is obviously mad” (HF 184). The rigorous division of the early years of the classical age is perpetuated by the use of two mechanisms:
classification and observation. A new distance is established between the mad, and the subject who pronounces them mad, which is no longer simply the Cartesian void of "I am not them", but is a more elaborate divide (HF 199). Foucault suggests that the great concern of the classifiers of the eighteenth century was to transform the disorders of illness into something akin to the order of plants. The organisation of botany could be used to classify pathology, the project of a garden of species belonged to the "wisdom of divine forethought" (HF 206-7). Once again the organisation of thought has a mirror in the organisation of action, the organisation of species [espèces] maps directly onto the organisation of space [espace], the social structures replicate the structures of knowledge [savoir] (HF 223), a theme Foucault later elaborates in The Order of Things.

The parallel with biology is also important in the transfer of elements of the ethical to the corporal. Whilst Cartesian dualism had established a strict divide between the body and the mind or soul, a new shift to locating mental disorders in physical space allowed the treatment of madness as a disease of the body rather than of the soul. The body, specifically the brain, became an object of the medical gaze. Passion – a mode of illness – causes the circulation, the dispersion and the concentration of the spirits "according to a spatial design which licences the trace of the object in the brain and its image in the soul... forming in the body a kind of geometric figure of passion" (HF 245; MC 87). A disease of the soul has, crucially, no place, and cannot be seen, observed, subjected to the normalising gaze. Placing it in the observable brain enabled a whole host of new approaches. The corporal space is as ethical as it is organic; the seat of the corporal soul is the brain (HF 270-1). Foucault uses as a particular example hysteria, which was located within the space of the body: "in the coherence of its organic values and its moral values" (HF 302; MC 143).  

Foucault looks at the work of Thomas Sydenham, whose Observationes medicae was published in 1676. Sydenham's reputation is based on his notion that observation was a more useful medical tool than speculation. But Foucault refuses to see this as a scientific, neutral advance. "This 'interior body' which Sydenham tried to penetrate with 'the eyes of the mind' was not the objective
body available to the dull gaze of a neutralised observation; it was the site where a certain manner of imagining the body and of deciphering its internal movements combined with a certain manner of investing it with moral values" (HF 308; MC 150). Madness is slowly becoming 'treatable', or at least open to medical perception. But this shift is only possible with an attendant shift toward the subject responsible, defining a moral space of responsibility. In this space established, of physical and moral dimensions, "madness will never again be able to speak the language of unreason... it will be entirely enclosed in a pathology" (HF 358-9; MC 196-7).

At the same time, the attitude to the houses of confinement also began to change. Rather than people being afraid of confinement itself, or those confined within, they began to be afraid of its effects, of the disease spreading from these prisons and mad-houses – "a fear formulated in medical terms but animated, basically, by a moral myth" (HF 375; MC 202). Continuing the parallel with the lazaretos, Foucault claims that the fear was no longer of the place of exclusion, but of leprosy itself confronting the town: "a terrible ulcer on the body politic".20 "All those forms of unreason which had replaced leprosy in the geography of evil, and which had been banished into the remotest social distance, now became a visible leprosy and offered their running sores to the promiscuity of men". The evil, with its attendant fear of contagion, which the classical age had attempted to confine, was transgressing the carefully established boundaries between reason and madness, and threatening the barrier between health and illness – "a mélange combining the dread of unreason and the old spectres of disease" (HF 377-8; MC 205).

The result of this new fear is the introduction of a new series of structures of organisation in the places of confinement: "a new exclusion in the interior of the old" (HF 406). Foucault suggests that the introduction of a medical figure – *homo medicus* – into the world of confinement is not as an arbiter between crime and madness, evil and illness, but as a guardian to protect others from the emanating danger (HF 378; MC 205). The aim was to purify these spaces through organisation. What this resulted in was the separation of the mad from the others confined in the same loci. This happened on both the theoretical and
practical level, slowly, through “imperceptible slippage within structures”, or by “moments [instants] of violent crisis”. The mad were gradually isolated, and the monotony, the homogeneity, of insanity was divided into rudimentary species: Foucault suggests that “no medical advance, no humanitarian approach was responsible”. Rather, it was a direct result of confinement (HF 418; MC 224). The separation of the mad from other prisoners, the ill or the poor was a result of a number of changes. It is suggested that “an abyss yawns in the middle of confinement; a void which isolates madness... the presence of the mad appears as an injustice; but for others” (HF 422; MC 228). Poverty, for example, is now seen as an economic phenomenon, the poor are now treated in two separate aspects: as a problem of poverty and as a population. To confine was looked at as a gross error and an economic mistake (HF 428-30; MC 229-32).

Instead of being imprisoned within its homogeneity, madness was now freed, “free for a perception which individualised it, free for the recognition of its unique features and for all the operations that would finally give it its status as an object” (HF 440; MC 234). The old space of internment, now reduced and limited, and a medical space formed elsewhere become confused; the twin mechanisms of classification and observation become entwined. Foucault suggest that “another structure is established between madness and those who recognise it, survey it and judge it, a new connection, neutralised, apparently purified from all complicity, which is the order of the objective gaze [le regard]” (HF 446). This objectifying, individualising gaze marks a contrast between “the old space of exclusion, homogeneous, uniform, rigorously limited”, and the fragmented, polymorphous, social space of assistance, segmented “in accordance with the psychological and moral forms of devotion” (HF 447).

Within this entirely restructured social space, madness still takes its place. Foucault’s example is that of Brissot, who drew up the plan of a perfect house of correction, “in accordance with a geometric rigor which is at the same time architectural and moral. Each fragment of space took the symbolic values of a socially meticulous hell” (HF 448-9). But this exclusion of the mad now took on another meaning, “it no longer marked the great caesura between reason and unreason, on the ultimate limits of society; but within the group itself it was laid
out like a line between sentiments and duties – between pity and horror, between assistance and security” (HF 453). The practice of confinement and the mechanisms of observation and classification concur. What is important is that this transformation of the house of confinement into an asylum is not achieved by the progressive introduction of medicine, but through an internal restructuring of space (HF 457).

The Birth of Moral Imprisonment

Sadism, a phenomenon that bears the name of an individual man, was born of confinement, and it is therefore no accident that “Sade’s entire œuvre is dominated by the imagery of the Fortress, the Cell, the Cellar, the Convent, the inaccessible Island which thus form, as it were, the natural habitat of unreason”. Nor is it an accident, “that all the fantastic literature of madness and horror, which is contemporary with Sade’s œuvre, takes place, preferentially, in the strongholds of confinement... in the very places where unreason had been reduced to silence” (HF 381-2; MC 210). Foucault suggests that the architecture of confinement, the enclosed natures of the places of imprisonment, affected Sade in such a way as to direct his creative output, the state of his mind. The power of environment, locale, over mind was one of the insights of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. It was suggested that the mad would respond in different ways to differing external stimuli: their abode was clearly central.

Such indeed was the view of Samuel Tuke: “It does not require much acquaintance with the character of lunatics, to perceive in how great a degree, the prevention of abuses, and the compatibility of comfort with security, must depend on the construction of their abodes”.21 The York Retreat, founded by Tuke’s father William, was based on just such a calculation: “A place in which the unhappy might obtain a refuge – a quiet haven in which the shattered bark might find a means of reparation or of safety”.22 Foucault argues that the Retreat still functions as an instrument of segregation, but it was a segregation of moral and religious dimensions, one that sought to create a milieu similar to that of the Quaker community. Madness was not cured but controlled, mainly by placing the
individual in a situation where they were in moral debate with themselves, "in a perpetual anxiety, ceaselessly threatened by Law and Transgression [Faute]" (HF 502-3; MC 243-5).

The power of space, and concomitantly, the importance of the spaces of power, was recognised by those involved in the early nineteenth century in the design of asylums. Samuel Tuke's *Practical Hints* are symptomatic. Tuke suggests four aims for architectural design: the separation of male and female patients; the separation of patients by state of mind; a design that allowed easy and constant surveillance; and a design that allowed the patients a voluntary change of place and scenery, compatible with security. Within the actual geography of the Retreat, there was also the precedent of moving people around the Retreat, to other rooms or buildings depending on their behaviour and social class. The use of architecture and surroundings is clearly central, a point noted in Erving Goffman's thoughts on total institutions (published the same year as *Histoire de la folie*): "Their encompassing or total character is symbolised by the barrier to social intercourse with the outside and to departure that is often built right into the physical plant, such as locked doors, high walls, barbed wire, cliffs, water; forests, or moors". Whilst Tuke hoped to remove the visible barriers, the internal space was carefully controlled, and indeed, the very name Retreat signals its distance from the outside community.

Within the Retreat, overt physical constraints were removed, so as to lend an air of freedom to the surroundings. Rooms were structured so that the apparent autonomy of the patients was greater than the actual – false handles on certain doors, with some spaces forbidden; custodial features were minimised, such as the muffling of bolts, and the use of cast iron frames around windows to remove the need for bars. Although the design was based on William Tuke's original idea of an "architecture of compassion", Foucault sees a more sinister intent. The ostensible freedom of the individual actually placed them within a system of self-restraint, with the potential threat of guilt (HF 507; MC 250). The notion of judgement becomes paramount, with the individual objectified for scrutiny by the other, both through the mechanism of work and that of observation [le regard] (HF 505; MC 247). For Foucault what this initiates is a system of "moral
imprisonment”, with the individual disciplining themselves and subject to the judgement of the normalising gaze, “more genuinely confined than he could have been in a dungeon and chains, a prisoner of nothing but himself” (HF 516; MC 261). The observation, the clinical gaze, becomes a tool in the hands of a new personage in the Asylum, the keeper [la surveillant], who intervenes in the lives of the mad without recourse to instruments of constraint, but who simply operates with the use of observation and language. Crucially the keeper introduces a presence “from the other side”, representing both the authority that confines and the reason that judges (HF 508; MC 251).

The name of Tuke is often coupled with that of Philippe Pinel, who wrote on the situation of the mad, and famously released them from their chains in Bicêtre. At least, so goes the story. As Gordon has pointed out, for Foucault the important thing about this tale is not its historical veracity – something which has be rightly questioned – but its impact as a founding gesture. This impact is not something that can be doubted: the apocryphal tale is taken as a fundamental shift to a more humane treatment of the insane. Foucault is therefore interested in how this story affects the theoretical discourse at the time. Like Tuke, Pinel’s intervention is one that replaces physical with moral constraint. As Foucault suggests, “the asylum is a religious domain without religion, a domain of pure morality, of ethical uniformity”. Whereas before the house of confinement was a “foreign country”, limited and separated like the lazaret house, as an asylum it now represents “the great continuity of social morality” (HF 513; MC 257). The previously uniform space of exclusion was medically fragmented into a polymorphous garden of species, but in moral terms this shift introduced a “homogeneous rule”, extended to all those who would tend to escape from it. “In one and the same movement, the asylum becomes, in Pinel’s hands, and instrument of moral uniformity and of social denunciation” (HF 514; MC 258).

Foucault suggests that though both Pinel and Tuke effected a moral transformation with their patients, the situations are not entirely congruent. At the Retreat, religious segregation was used for the purposes of moral purification. For Pinel, the operation ensured an continuity of ethics between the world of madness and the world of reason. This act of social segregation allowed the
bourgeois morality of the outside to posit itself as an effective norm, and therefore permitted it to be imposed upon all forms of insanity as an absolute law (HF 515; MC 258). Pinel’s importance also lies in the nosography of disease that he formulated. Although he was not the first author to attempt a classification of mental derangements, his *Nosographie philosophique* and *Traité médico-philosophique*, both published in the years of the Revolution, were enormously influential. The changes in treatment of various illnesses “did not only signify a reorganisation of nosological space, but, beneath the medical concepts, the presence and the operation of a new structure of experience” (HF 547). The system of classifications therefore reflects the effort to impose system and order upon the variations of vital phenomena, but also often has parallels in the physical situation of the patients, with different diseases located in different locations, as with Brissot.

The other aspect of the twofold mechanism of the classical age, observation, is also an important part of Pinel’s work. Once more, he is contrasted with the Retreat. There, though the mad were observed, and knew they were being observed, madness had only an indirect apprehension of itself, it lacked an immediate grasp of its own character. With Pinel, on the contrary, Foucault suggests that “observation operated only within the space defined by madness, without surface or exterior limits. Madness would see itself, would be seen by itself – pure spectacle and absolute subject” (HF 517; MC 262). Pinel suggested that he relied “entirely on observation”, a practical (and medical) device that allowed a moral and normalising dimension to intrude: “This theme is very important for the psychiatry of the nineteenth century: madness imprisons man in objectivity” (HF 542).

This objectivity, this moral divide, produces a new dialectic, one that is forever renewed, between the Same and the Other. The shift is one such that “the madman is no longer the insane in the divided space of classical unreason; he is the mental patient [aliène] of the modern form of illness” (HF 546-7). But whilst some would see this as the dispassionate advance of pure medicine, Foucault argues that the doctor takes a “preponderant place within the asylum” by essence of his position, rather than his training. His presence converts the old house of
I

confinement into a medical space, but his intervention is not made by virtue of a medical skill, but by the power of morality: "It is not as a scientist [savant] that homo medicus has authority in the asylum, but as a wise man [sage]... as a juridical and moral guarantee, not in the name of science" (HF 523-4). What is key though is that the doctors think that they can make judgements by virtue of their scientific knowledge. Foucault therefore suggests that despite the restructuring of space on both the level of the real and the imaginary, the divide remains. Instead of the simply physical division, there is "that gigantic moral imprisonment which we are in the habit of calling, doubtless by antiphrasis, the liberation of the insane by Pinel and Tuke" (HF 530; MC 278).

Before the explicit formulation of much of his critical apparatus, Foucault’s Histoire de la folie showcased many details of a spatially aware historical approach. This history of madness looks at the way space has been used in relation to the mad, tracing the patterns of exclusion, ordering, moralisation and confinement which were brought to bear on their situation, altering their perception. Foucault shows an awareness of the way in which conceptions of space — theoretical, medical, moral, and philosophical — often relate to the exercise of power over the mad.

II  Not Through Bentham’s Eyes

The same point concerning the importance of space to the exercise of power can be made for the disciplinary project. Since its publication in 1975, Discipline and Punish has been read as a historical investigation of the prison, especially within French history. The book begins by contrasting the explosive torture of the regicide Damiens with the regime of the House of young prisoners — "a public execution [un supplice] and a time-table" (SP 14; DP 7). But much of the book is not about the punishment of criminals. Indeed, the majority of the text does not speak of the prison, but the standard reading of it certainly emphasises those parts that do. Just as Colin Gordon has argued that Histoire de la folie is often reduced to “three or four striking tableaux”, we could argue that the same is
done to *Discipline and Punish* – the torture of Damiens and the House of young prisoners, the Panopticon, and the Carceral Archipelago.

As the following reading makes clear, the research presented in *Discipline and Punish* is part of a much wider project, one that occupied Foucault for much of his life. This is a research project that picks up on themes initially explored in *Histoire de la folie*, is developed in *The Birth of the Clinic* and dominates the research of the 1970s. This project is what I will call the policing of society. The concept of police is one to which Foucault returns again and again in his major works. However, the comments in these works are frequently made in passing, and it is not always clear in what way he is using the concept. Support for his use of the concept has to be gleaned from remarks in lectures, essays and conference papers, as well as from the wider discussion of the term in Europe in the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries.

Foucault suggests that from the beginning of the seventeenth century there appeared a number of treatises concerning the government of territory. At their core these texts argued that for a state to be well organised it should extend over its entire territory a system of policing as tight and efficient as that found in cities. By police it is clear that Foucault means more than a uniformed force for the prevention and detection of crime. Rather, the concept is one which is concerned with a far more general set of regulations embodying a type of rationality to ensure good government. This meant that the term extended far beyond the juridical: it was involved in education, welfare, assuring urban supplies and the correct standards necessary for handicrafts and commerce; the pricing of daily necessities, maintaining hygiene and health, fostering good working relations, and extended to the ways in which the city should be provided with street-lighting, bridges, adornment and splendour. The police would therefore oversee a range of activities – religion, morality, health, supplies, roads, highways and town buildings, public safety, the liberal arts, trade, factories, manservants and factory workers, and the poor (DE IV 272-4; FR 241-2; DE IV 153-60; PPC 77-83). “Police is the ensemble of mechanisms serving to ensure order, the properly channelled growth of wealth and the conditions of preservation of health ‘in general’” (DE III, 17; FR 277).
When Foucault discusses Louis Turquet de Mayenne’s *La Monarchie aristodémocratique* (1611) he notes that there are four boards of police – two concerned with people in the positive and negative aspects of life, and two concerned with things, the first looking at commodities and manufactured goods and the second overseeing space and territory: private property, manorial rights, roads, rivers and public buildings (DE IV 154-5; PPC 77-8). Similarly the discussion of von Justi’s manual *Elements of Police* notes that it begins with a study of territory (DE IV, 158-9; PPC 81-2). Foucault notes that this theme is frequently referred to in texts of this period: “architecture and urbanism occupy a place of considerable importance”. This is a development from works of the sixteenth century (DE IV, 270-1; FR 239-40). Foucault is interested in cameralism and *Polizeiwissenschaft* because of this notion of police, which, because it is concerned in very general ways with principles of order, security and discipline, can be used to understand the notion of power. What is of interest here is how the understanding of the control of space is central to police. Such a theme is developed in many of Foucault’s studies of this time, and understanding how the themes of police and space interlink sheds light on Foucault’s conception of power, which he suggests has space as a central component.

In tandem with this it is worth discussing the subtitle of the book: the birth of the prison. *Discipline and Punish* is clearly about issues concerned with the penal, but also about something much wider. Early in the book Foucault makes it clear that his project is to write the “history of the modern soul” (SP 30; DP 23), and a few pages later he is even more explicit: “The history of this ‘micro-physics’ of the punitive power would then be a genealogy or an element in a genealogy of the modern ‘soul’” (SP 38; DP 29). Foucault then suggests that the “soul is the prison of the body”, and that he “would like to write the history of *this* prison, with all the political investments of the body that it gathers in its closed architecture” (SP 38-9; DP 30-1; emphasis added). *This prison, not the* prison. The shift from the definite article to the particular appears to have been lost on most commentators. Quite clearly Foucault is explaining that the birth of the prison is about the birth of the *soul*.38
Recasting *Discipline and Punish* within this wider context opens up a number of themes for discussion. First, the most viable model for the disciplined society is not the prison, but the army. Second, shifting the emphasis away from the prison allows us to better understand Foucault’s remarks about schools, monasteries, hospitals and factories. These too are instruments in the birth of the modern soul and in the policing of society. Third, if the soul is the prison of the body, and the body is not simply understood in the singular, but as the social body, we gain insights into Foucault’s remarks about the control of the population — *bodies in plural*. Fourth, we can note in passing how Foucault sees the links between man, the human sciences and the notion of the subject — an analysis which builds on the work of *The Order of Things* and is developed in *The History of Sexuality*. Fifth, implicit in the preceding, and important for the overall emphasis of this thesis, we can be attentive to questions of space in the disciplined society without solely restricting ourselves to the Panopticon.

It is this last issue that this reading most seriously wishes to take issue with. Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon is treated in a striking passage, and Foucault did help in its rediscovery, but it takes up only a few pages of the text. Many have taken it not only as the most apposite example of the new method of surveillance-led control, but also as the model for many of the others. If *Madness and Civilisation* has been reduced to three or four tableaux, *Discipline and Punish* is often simplified to just one. Pasquale Pasquino suggests this to Foucault in a 1978 interview with him. Foucault replies:

> In reference to the reduction of my analyses to that simplistic figure which is the metaphor of the Panopticon... let us compare what they attribute to me with what I have said; and here it is easy to show that the analyses of power which I have made cannot at all be reduced to this figure...” (DE III, 628; FL 257)

Instead of a reading which pays due attention to the place the Panopticon plays within the overall argument, all-too-often the world Foucault describes is seen through Bentham’s eyes. There is much more than that here.
Before I look at the wider genealogy it is worth re-reading *Discipline and Punish* from the question of punishment. This is because noting the basic error that is made in many readings helps to contextualise the other research. Foucault’s understanding of *supplice* is both judicial and political – it is one of a number of rituals by which power is manifested (SP 58-9; DP 47-8). Its manifestation of military might is important in its role as public spectacle: “A whole military machine surrounded the *supplice*: cavalry of the watch, archers, guardsmen, soldiers” (SP 61; DP 50). The ceremonies of *supplice* are visual displays of power, the marks of the sovereign are left in prominent places: “Pillories, gallows and scaffolds were erected in public squares or by the roadside; sometimes the corpses of the executed persons [des suppliciés] were displayed for several days near the scenes of their crimes. Not only must people know [sachent], they must see [voient] with their own eyes” (SP 70; DP 58).

Penal reformers – Foucault quotes de Mably – wished for a form of punishment that touched the soul rather than the body (SP 24; DP 16). Rather than simply destroy the body of the condemned, a gentle way in punishment could be found, one that took on several non-juridical elements, so to make the punishment not solely legal: “We punish, but this is a way of saying that we wish to obtain a cure” (SP 30; DP 22). “There must be no more spectacular, but useless [*mutiles*] penalties” (SP 128; DP 109) – punishment must be ordered, organised and thoughtful. Just as the garden of species had proved a model for the understanding of the mad, it could also be used for a taxonomy of crimes: “One sought to constitute a Linnaeus of crimes and punishments…” (SP 118; DP 99).

Regarding the new phase of punishment discussed by Beccaria, Bentham and Brissot, Foucault talks of four possible types of punishment. The first he finds expressed in the affirmation: “You have broken the social pact, you no longer belong to the social body, you have put yourself outside of the space of legality; we expel you from the social space where that legality functioned”. This is the punishment of exile, banishment and deportation. The second is also a species of exclusion, but its mechanism is not of material deportation, of transfer outside
the social body, but isolation in the midst of moral space, of public opinion. Punishment at the level of scandal, shame, humiliation. The transgression [faute] is made public, the individual is held up for public condemnation. The third is that of forced labour, of reparation for social injury, making amends in a way useful for the State or the society, a compensation. The fourth is the penalty of talion, making the punishment correspond to the crime – killing those who kill, taking the goods of those who steal (DE II, 589-90).

In the reformers’ dream the object of punishment is “no longer the body, with the ritual play of excessive pains, spectacular brandings [marques éclatantes] in the ritual of supplices; it is the mind or rather a play of representations and signs circulating discreetly but necessarily and evidently in the minds of all” (SP 120; DP 101). Punishment needs to be constantly visible, a learning curve for the population as a whole, “a school rather than a festival; an ever-open book rather than a ceremony... The spectators must be able to consult at each moment the permanent lexicon of crime and punishment. Let us conceive of places of punishment as a Garden of the Laws that families would visit on Sundays” (SP 131-2; DP 111).

This, then, is how one must imagine the punitive city. At the crossroads, in the gardens, at the side of roads being repaired or bridges built, in workshops open to all, in the depths of mines that may be visited, will be hundreds of tiny theatres of punishment... The great terrifying ritual of the supplices gives way, day after day, street after street, to this serious theatre, with its multifarious and persuasive scenes. (SP 133; DP 113)

However – and this is a point that is sometimes missed – this didn’t actually happen, at least not for long. Foucault argues that deportation disappeared fairly quickly, mechanisms of scandal were never arrived at in practice, forced labour was generally a symbolic punishment and equivalence was thought of as archaic. Instead another mode of punishment comes to the fore – one that Brissot and Beccaria had barely mentioned – imprisonment, which arose suddenly at the beginning of the 19th century as an institution (DE II, 591-2). There are therefore
three moments to the change examined in *Discipline and Punish*. The first is the one based on the old monarchical law – a punishment directed at the body. “The other two both refer to a preventive, utilitarian, corrective conception of a right to punish that belongs to society as a whole; but they are very different from one another at the level of the mechanisms they envisage” (SP 154; DP 130). The problem arises in looking at what kind of punishment could strike the soul without touching the body: “What would a non-corporal punishment be?” Even prison causes some physical pain or privation. Foucault therefore suggests that modern forms of punishment retain “a ‘torturous’ sediment [*un fond «suppliciant»]*” (SP 23; DP 16).

The third moment in this history of punishment “put to work procedures for the dressage of bodies” (SP 155; DP 131) – it used the mind to affect the body, and vice versa. This is what Foucault means by suggesting that the soul is the prison of the body. To show these three moments, he sets up a series of triads: “The sovereign and his force, the social body, the administrative apparatus. Mark, sign, trace... The tortured body, the soul with its manipulated representations, the body subjected to training... three series of elements that characterise the three mechanisms... three technologies of power” (SP 155; DP 131). The key question in *Discipline and Punish* is not so much why the sovereign and his force was replaced, but why was the third adopted in preference to the second. Why did the administrative apparatus replace the social body, why did the enclosed place of reform get chosen over the punitive city, “why did the physical exercise of punishment (which is not *supplice*) replace, with the prison that is its institutional support, the social play of the signs of punishment and the chattering [*bavarde*] festival that circulated them?” (SP 154-5; DP 130-1)

In his answer to these questions Foucault suggests that four themes should be borne in mind. Punishment should be thought of both as “a complex social function” and “a political tactic”, the technology of power should be made “the very principle both of the humanisation of the penal system and of the knowledge of man”, and we should “try to discover whether this entry of the soul onto the scene of penal justice ... is not the effect of a transformation of the way in which the body itself is invested in power relations” (SP 31-2; DP 23-4). This
last claim is particularly worth pursuing. How does a spatialised history help us to understand the changes in power/body relations – especially in non-penal institutions?

The Army, Schools, Monasteries, Factories

Foucault’s discussion of the army, schools, monasteries and factories serves a dual purpose. First they provide many of the techniques later adopted in the modern prison; second they show how bodies were trained in a variety of ways, leading to the development of the modern soul. In the emphasis on the prison these examples are often passed by, though as Neocleous notes “if there is one institution that Foucault uses as his model it is the military rather than the prison”. The example of the military, and the use of military metaphors, is certainly key to Foucault’s work. His emphasis on strategies, tactics and battle shows this, as does his remark in conversation with the geographers of Hérodote that many of his spatial metaphors are taken from military discourse (DE III, 32-4). It is noteworthy that the first two chapters of the section entitled “Discipline” both heavily rely on the military model, and hardly mention criminal law. In looking at the roots of disciplinary methods, Foucault suggests that many had long been in existence, and in a note he states that though his examples in these two chapters are drawn from the military, medicine, education and industry – note the lack of the penal – he could equally have taken them from colonisation, slavery and child rearing (SP 166n1; DP 314n1).

Foucault’s understanding of discipline is that it begins at the same time that “an art of the human body was born... discipline is a political anatomy of detail”. This is why it needs to be interrogated with a “micro-physics” of power (SP 162-3; DP 137-9). The use of detail, of minute regulations, the exacting gaze of the inspections, the continual supervision in schools, barracks, hospitals and workshops provide the political dream of “docile bodies”. “From such trifles”, suggests Foucault, “the man of modern humanism was born” (SP 165-6; DP 140-1). What is important about these new mechanisms of power is that they introduce the notion of the norm. This norm – although probably a retrospective invention defined as much by what it is not as by what it is – allows “the shading
of individual differences” (SP 216; DP 184) – a potential polarisation. Behaviour and ability can be regulated according to an established standard. This is especially found in the examination, which “combines the techniques of an observing hierarchy and those of a normalising judgement”, and is found in both schools and hospitals (SP 217-9; DP 185-7).

Foucault suggest four arts of discipline: distribution within space; the control of activity – timetables, rhythms, dressage; the use of exercises; the articulation and combination of forces. The first is the most important for the purpose here – indeed as Foucault states, “discipline is above all an analysis of space” (DE III, 515). Foucault subdivides this into four techniques. Enclosure [clôture] is the first of these, “the protected place of disciplinary monotony”. Obvious examples include the confinement of paupers and beggars, but Foucault also talks of boarding schools, based on the monastic model, barracks and certain factories. But he suggests that enclosure alone is not sufficient, and a further subdivision, or partitioning [quadrillage] is needed – “each individual has his own place; and each place its individual... discipline organises an analytical space”. Its model is “an old architectural and religious method”, the monastic cell – discipline is cellular. The partitions in dormitories serve this purpose (see VS 37; WK 27-8). These subdivided places are designated with particular purposes – Foucault calls these functional sites. This allows places to be coded, or recoded and used for new purposes, such as the lazarettos reused as venereal hospitals and madhouses in Histoire de la folie, but also for the spatial distribution of diseases in hospitals, especially military and naval ones. Finally these enclosed, partitioned, and coded sites are placed in a classification, a rank. Foucault gives examples of the class, drawing out its parallels with the mechanisms of the army.

These spaces are both real – they suggest the disposition of buildings, rooms and furniture – and ideal – they enable characterisations, assessments, hierarchies. They function as ‘tableaux vivantes’, much as the project of the garden of species had organised the mad, and the nosology of disease had the clinic, they capture men in real and imaginary classifications – “the table was both a technique of power and a procedure of knowledge”. A pairing of real and imaginary spaces – “tactics, the spatial ordering of men; taxonomy, the disciplinary space of natural
beings; the economic table, the regulated movement of wealth” (SP 166-75; DP 141-9)

Foucault also looks at the ideal model of the military camp – “The old, traditional square plan was considerably refined in innumerable new projects [schémas]. The geometry of the paths, the number and distribution of the tents, the orientation of their entrances, the disposition of files and ranks were exactly defined; the network of gazes that supervised one another was laid down... The camp is the diagram of a power that acts by means of general visibility”. As Foucault points out, the model of the camp or its underlying principle was found in urban development, working-class housing estates, hospitals, asylums, prisons, schools. A shift has been made from the architecture of visual excess – palaces or churches – or that designed to observe the outside – fortresses – to that which allows internal control (SP 201-2; DP 171-2; DE III, 192; FL 228). It is also worth noting that though these models have primarily an internal function, occasionally they exercise “a role of external surveillance, developing around themselves a whole margin of lateral controls”, in the way that schools train children and supervise parents (SP 246; DP 211). Similarly the areas surrounding institutions of this sort are obviously shaped by them – garrison towns, the environs of prisons, ports, etc.44

It is important to note that procedures for the control of space in one realm were often used in others. For example, the links between the spatial organisation of architecture and the organisation of bodies is clearly found in Foucault’s description of the medal struck to commemorate Louis XIV’s first military review in 1666 (SP plate 2; DP plate 1). “In the background is a piece of classical architecture. The columns of the palace extend those formed by the ranks of men and the erect rifles, just as the paving no doubt extends the lines of the exercise... The order of the architecture... imposes its rules and its geometry on the disciplined men on the ground. The columns of power” (SP 221; DP 188). Foucault also explicitly links the mechanisms used for tabulating the results of examinations – examinations that enabled both the individualising of specific features and a calculation of differences within a population – with those of the
examination itself: "small techniques of notation, of registration, of constituting files, of arranging facts in columns and tables" (SP 223; DP 190).

It is somewhat of a mystery as to why the standard reception of Foucault has ignored so much of this text. This is especially so for those who wish to look at his work on space. The military camp, the naval hospital, the monastic cell are all examples of spatial analyses – albeit less striking than the Panopticon.45

The Spaces of Medicine

It was suggested above the Foucault’s work in Discipline and Punish needs to be examined in the context of the wider research project he was engaged in the 60s and 70s. As with so many of his major themes, this wider project picked up on themes discussed in Histoire de la folie. The research was continued in The Birth of the Clinic, and was pursued in Collège de France courses and occasional essays and lectures elsewhere. Much of this work is not translated into English, and has only recently become available in French. Foucault begins the first chapter of The Birth of the Clinic with a passage that serves as a succinct summary of how his histories are spatialised and how space is historicised. He suggests that for us, now, the human body defines the space of origin and distribution of disease, a familiar geometry, an anatomical atlas. But, he counters, "this order of the solid, visible body is only one way in which one spatialises disease. Without doubt neither the first, nor the most fundamental. There have been, and will be, other distributions of illness". Some of these other distributions will not necessarily rely on Euclidean anatomy, on classical geometry. The model that seems the norm to us is a “historical, temporary datum” (NC 1; BC 3).

In the eighteenth century medicine organised diseases on the basis of species – the Nosologie of Sauvages, the Nosographie of Pinel – and treated localisation in the organism as a subsidiary problem (NC 2-3; BC 4-5). The disease is defined by its place in a family, secondarily by its seat in an organism: “the organs are the concrete supports of the disease; they never constitute its indispensable conditions” (NC 9; BC 10). Foucault suggests that this location in a family and a
body are the primary and secondary forms of spatialisation. The tertiary spatialisation is “all the gestures by which, in a given society, a disease is circumscribed, medically invested, isolated, divided up into closed, privileged regions, or distributed throughout cure centres, arranged in the most favourable way”. It is the place of political struggles, economic constraints, and social confrontations. It is here that the changes that led to a reformulation of medical knowledge occurred (NC 14-5; BC 16). We have here space of imaginary classifications, space of corporal reality, and space of social order.

The ordered garden of species can only work in theory, as social reality complicates the picture: “Like civilisation, the hospital is an artificial locus [lieu] in which the transplanted disease runs the risk of losing its essential identity”. The individuated disease comes into contact with a number of other diseases, the hospital is an “unkempt garden where the species cross-breed”, and there is also the problem which doctors call prison or hospital fever. No hospital disease is a pure disease, therefore the family is the natural and desired locus of disease (NC 15-6; BC 17). In the classifier’s abstraction, we can see an echo of that practised by Cartesian geometry: “For the classifiers, the fundamental act of medical knowledge was the establishment of a location [reperage]: a symptom was situated within a disease, a disease in a specific ensemble, and this ensemble in a general plan of the pathological world” (NC 29; BC 29).

After the Revolution, however, the clinic – the teaching hospital and clinical medicine – takes precedence over the family. This emergence – in its overall arrangement [disposition] – is due to a number of changes, many of which are spatial. There is a change in the understanding of corporal space, from two-dimensional tissue, to the mass of the organ, with its “internal surface”; a shift from a botany of symptoms to a grammar of signs; and symptoms are now located in the space of the body, rather than grouped into a single logical figure. A shift in the spaces of medicine; but space is still a central part of the analysis. The doctor’s question changes from “what is the matter with you?” to “where does it hurt?” (NC xiv; BC xviii).
Two key points are found in the new understanding of disease: the notion of the gaze [le regard] and the importance of the physical body – especially open to examination in death. Foucault quotes Bichat’s suggestion to his pupils – “Open up a few corpses: you will dissipate at once the darkness that observation alone could not dissipate” (NC 149; BC 146) – suggesting that this allows a greater knowledge of the disease: “From the point of view of death, disease has a land, a mappable [reperable] territory, a subterranean, but secure place where its kinships and its consequences are formed; local values define its forms” (NC 151; BC 149). Foucault suggests that our epoch is one “that marks the suzerainty of the gaze” (NC 2; BC 4). Of course, the analysis of the living body has to presuppose much that cannot be seen:

Disease exists in space before it exists for sight. The disappearance of the two great a priori classes of nosology, opened up for medicine an entirely spatial field of investigation, determined throughout by these local values. It is curious to observe that this absolute spatialisation of medical experience is due not to the definitive integration of normal and pathological anatomy, but to the first effort to define a physiology of the morbid phenomenon (NC 192; BC 188).

Therefore, in The Birth of the Clinic, Foucault shows how spatial analyses help to map out the beginning of the modern episteme: “Since 1816, the doctor’s eye has been able to confront a sick organism. The historical and concrete a priori of the modern medical gaze was finally constituted” (NC 197; BC 192).

But The Birth of the Clinic is somewhat light in its analysis of social space. In The Archaeology of Knowledge Foucault recognises this deficiency, suggesting that “we must also describe the institutional sites [emplacements] from which the doctor makes his discourse, and from which this discourse derives its legitimate source and point of application (its specific objects and instruments of verification)”. The hospital is “a place of constant, coded, systematic observation... constituting a quantifiable field of frequencies”; private practice offers “a field of less certain, lacunary, and far less numerable observations, but
which sometimes facilitates observations that are more far-reaching in their effects, with a better knowledge of the background and environment”; and there are the research sites of the laboratory, “an autonomous place, long distinct from the hospital”, and the library or “documentary field”. Foucault goes on to suggest that the relative importance and impact of these sites has changed. (AS 69-71; AK 51-2).

Foucault’s research in this area was the topic of his 1973-4 seminar at the Collège de France, which studied “the history of the institution and the architecture of the hospital in the eighteenth century” (RC 69). The results of this research were published in a volume entitled Généalogie des équipements de normalisation in 1976, and reissued as Les machines à guérir [Curing Machines] in 1979. Foucault’s introduction to this work – “The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century” – and the three conference papers given to the Institute of Social Medicine in Rio de Janeiro in October 1974 help to patch together his thoughts in this area. The research looks at the development of hospitalisation and its mechanisms in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, and at the establishment of plans to make a study of habitat and all that surrounds it: waste collection, means of transport, and public resources which allow the functioning of everyday life, particularly in the urban environment (DE III, 208).

Foucault suggests that social medicine is developed in France along with the expansion of urban structures. There are various interesting analyses. One suggests that the birth of cemeteries, on the edges of towns, with individual graves, is not due to Christianity, and a respect for the dead, but a politico-medico concern for the living and the contagion that the old graves brought. A similar move was made with abattoirs. There is also a greater control of movement – not just of people, but of things and elements, principally water and air. This includes a look at the development of sewers, where the underground [le sous-sol] was controlled by the authorities, even when the space above was privately owned (DE III, 219-21). Medicine undertakes the “control of urban space in general ... The city with its principal spatial variables appears as a medicalisable object” (DE III, 22; FR 282). A variant on the French model is found in Germany, with the development of the concept of Medizinischepolizei,
the medical police, which appeared in 1764 (DE III, 212), and in England, where the principal aim is the health of the work force. Foucault suggests that in this period "urban topographies" were undertaken, which can outline the principles of an urban policy. This is in contrast to topographies of regions, which can only recommend corrections and compensations to matters such as climate and geology that are outside of human control (DE III, 22; FR 282).

Foucault also discusses the "spatial adaptation of the hospital, and in particular its adaptation to the urban space in which it is located". This works on two levels: the situation of the hospital within the larger community – should it be large and encompassing, perhaps outside the town, where the risk of contagion is limited, or should there be a number of smaller hospitals spread throughout the community – and the internal space of the hospital itself, where the hospital is turned into a "curing machine" (DE III, 26; FR 286-7). Before the eighteenth century the hospital was essentially an institution for the assistance of the poor, an institution of separation and exclusion, the place where one went to die (DE III, 511). The model for the 'medicalisation' of the hospital was not the civil hospital, but the naval hospital, such as those in London, Marseilles and La Rochelle. Some of the mechanisms developed out of the treatment of epidemics and the use of quarantine, some from the new means of discipline found in the army (DE III, 513-4). It is obvious that the models Foucault uses in his earlier work to show the development of medicine – the army, monasteries, slavery, schools, the Roman legion – are also those that shape the prison (DE III, 515).47

Foucault suggests that the "question of the hospital at the end of the eighteenth century was fundamentally a question of space". This is evidenced in a number of areas. Examples include the locale of the hospital, where its situation had to conform to the sanitary controls of the town – the dangerous miasmas, contaminated air, and dirty water; the individuation of patient space, with the single beds, as opposed to the 'lit dortoir' in which six slept, and the screens [draps] placed around the beds; and the constitution of a modifiable environment, with changeable temperature and air cooling. All of these showed the attempt to make the hospital not simply the place of the cure, but also an instrument of the cure itself: "the space of the hospital is medicalised in its
The Panopticon and Panopticism

It is surprising that the spatial analyses of the military, schools, monasteries and hospitals are neglected, but even more so that the chapter where Foucault introduces the Panopticon is given a partial reading. At the beginning of the chapter two methods of dealing with diseases, leprosy and the plague, are contrasted. These had earlier been examined in the second of the Rio medicine lectures (DE III, 517-8). Foucault suggests that whilst “the leper gave rise to rituals of exclusion... the plague gave rise to disciplinary diagrams” (SP 231; DP 198). These disciplinary diagrams [schémas disciplinaires] are shown in a plague town, where there is a strict spatial partitioning, careful surveillance, detailed inspection and order. This way of dealing with disease is not “a massive, binary division between one set of people and another”, it is rather one that involves “multiple separations, individualising distributions, an organisation in depth of surveillance and control, an intensification and a ramification of power” (SP 231; DP 198). Foucault goes on to link these two models with their political/social counterparts: “the leper and his separation; the plague and its segmentations. The first is marked; the second analysed and distributed. The exile of the leper and the arrest of the plague do not bring with them the same political dream. The first is that of a pure community, the second that of a disciplined society” (SP 231-2; DP 198): the military model of organised discipline replaces the religious model of exclusion (DE III, 218).

As Foucault points out, the leper is the symbolic figure, the real figures were often beggars, madmen and criminals; the plague similarly stands as a symbol of how “all forms of confusion and disorder” were dealt with from the late eighteenth century (SP 232; DP 199). The opposition of the leper and the plague, as opposed to that of torture and the timetable, is less frequently utilised or
commented on in a Foucauldian study. What is important about the use of these examples is that Foucault suggests that the former use of power, the exclusion, has the organisational grid of the treatment of the plague victim superimposed on top of it, providing a model for the growth of the disciplined surveillance society – “treat ‘lepers’ as ‘plague victims’, project the subtle segmentations of discipline onto the confused space of internment” (SP 232; DP 199). Instead of the exclusion without control of banishment, what Bender has called “liminal boundedness... a reign of randomness and licence with the precinct of confinement”, the space of exclusion is now rigidly regimented and controlled. “All the mechanisms of power which, even today, are disposed around the abnormal individual, to brand him and to alter him, are composed of those two forms from which they distinctly derive. Bentham’s Panopticon is the architectural figure of this composition” (SP 233; DP 199-200).

Before I discuss the Panopticon itself it is worth dwelling on the mechanism of the plague town. Foucault suggests in a number of places that in the early nineteenth century there was a shift towards what he calls bio-politics, where the methods of dealing with populations within territories are modified in certain ways. These include the building up of profiles, increasing knowledge through monitoring and surveillance, and control through discipline. There is a move towards prevention and regulation, within sites of exclusion clearly, but, by extension, this control is expanded to take in the whole society. Foucault’s understanding of populations as “bodies in plural” perhaps, as Eckermann remarks, provides a defence against the charge of critics like Rorty and Taylor that Foucault’s project is “apolitical”, as it would seem that conceiving of bodies en masse is an inherently political exercise. In this period, governments deal not just with a territory and the individuals or a “people” within, but with a an “economic and political problem” – population (VS 35-6; WK 25).

It is into this understanding that we must insert the Panopticon. What is important in Foucault’s analysis is that there are two poles in the new mode of power. One is the mode of discipline, perhaps in enclosed institutions; the other is the understanding of bio-power, of control of populations. These controls are facilitated by police or governmentality. As Foucault notes, the Panopticon “is a
form of architecture, of course, but it is above all a form of government. It is a way for mind to exercise power over mind” (DE II, 437). Rather than see the rise of disciplinary mechanisms as the result of the birth of the prison, we should look at the emergence of the prison from the rise in general discipline and policing.

In this section’s call for an end to seeing Foucault’s text through Bentham’s eyes the important role of Bentham himself could easily be neglected.\textsuperscript{54} I have suggested that we need to be attentive to the place in the text where the Panopticon appears – as the architectural figure of the convergence of the mechanisms for dealing with lepers and plague victims; as a product of a number of disciplinary themes. The Panopticon is an exceptional example, certainly, of the uses of power and space, but it is the culmination of a variety of technologies of power rather than their beginning. And yet Foucault designates the disciplinary society under the general rubric of panopticism. To understand this we need to be attentive to what Foucault actually says. Why does Foucault suggest that “Bentham is more important for our society than Kant or Hegel” (DE II, 594), that “our society is much more Benthamite than Beccarian” (DE II, 729), and that Bentham is the “Christopher Columbus of politics” (DE III, 466)?\textsuperscript{55}

Such comments make sense if we cease thinking of the Panopticon simply as a prison. Foucault notes its polyvalency – reforming prisoners, treating patients, instructing schoolchildren, confining the insane, supervising workers, putting beggars and idlers to work – and suggests that Bentham takes the penitentiary house as his prime example because it “has many different functions to fulfil – safe custody, confinement, solitude, forced labour and instruction” (SP 239, 240n; DP 205-6).\textsuperscript{56} Foucault tellingly makes the remark that in Bentham’s scheme, “police, the French invention which immediately fascinated all European governments, is the twin of the Panopticon” (DE II, 729). Indeed, Bentham himself saw the Panopticon as having two branches: the prisoner branch and the pauper branch.\textsuperscript{57} The prison is one piece of this general panopticism – this new form of police, of government. “It is there, in the general panopticism of society that one must place the birth of the prison” (DE II, 438).
I would therefore contend that in looking at the role of Bentham in *Discipline and Punish*, we need to look at panopticism, rather than the Panopticon. The former, although it bears a Benthamite designation, is much older than the 1791 text. Panopticism provides a way of “dispensing with the need for the Prince. Panopticism is the general principle of a new ‘political anatomy’ whose object and end are not the relations of sovereignty but the relations of discipline” (SP 243; DP 208). Foucault suggests that there are two images of discipline – the discipline-blockade, and the discipline-mechanism. The first of these is the enclosed institution, on the edges of society, turned inwards, the second is a functional device [dispositif] that makes the exercise of power more effective and enables subtle coercion of the society; a schema of exceptional discipline, and a generalised surveillance. The latter of these Foucault designates “panopticism” (SP 244; DP 209), the former is surely exemplified by the Panopticon.

We can best understand the birth of the prison from the general rise of what is designated panopticism, rather than the reverse. Foucault makes the obvious point that the prison was not born within these codes, that it had existed for centuries before it became part of a penal system, but that its basic principle – the “deprivation of liberty” – became the penalty *par excellence* in the new society which so valued its freedoms (SP 267-8; DP 231-2). Given that it is the culmination of trends found in military and scholastic discourse, it is indeed not surprising “that the cellular prison, with its regular chronologies, forced labour, its authorities of surveillance and registration, its experts in normality, who continue and multiply the functions of the judge, should have become the modern instrument of penalty... that prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, which all resemble prisons” (SP 264; DP 227-8). In these terms, suggests Foucault, the prison is “a rather strict barracks, a school without leniency, a dark workshop, but not qualitatively different” (SP 269; DP 233). Rather than other institutions being a diluted form of the prison, the prison is the general trend in its most extreme form, with no gaps, no limits: “it carries to their greatest intensity all the procedures to be found in the other disciplinary dispositifs” (SP 273; DP 236).
We can now respond to the charge that Bentham’s Panopticon is not a good description of “real life” in 19th Century prisons. Foucault suggests that if he had wanted to describe “real life” in the prisons, he would not have gone back to Bentham (DE IV, 28-9; FE 81). Bentham’s work is important as a theoretician’s schema, because “he describes, in the utopia of a general system, particular mechanisms that really exist” (DE III, 207; FL 240).

The fact that it [the Panopticon] should have given rise, even in our own time, to so many variations, projected or realised, is evidence of the imaginary intensity that it has possessed for almost two hundred years. But the Panopticon must not be understood as a dream building: it is the diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form; its functioning, abstracted from any obstacle, resistance or friction, must be represented as a pure architectural and optical system: it is in fact a figure of political technology that may and must be detached from any specific use (SP 239; DP 205).

In his 1972-3 Collège de France course résumé, Foucault provided a succinct summary of the themes in this research project. Understanding how the parts of the research fit together enable a wider reading of this than simply one that looks at the mechanisms of punishment and the establishment of the prison.

A new optics, first: an organ of surveillance generalised and constant; all must be observed, seen, transmitted: organisation of a police; institution of a system of archives (with individual files), establishment of a panopticism.

A new mechanics: isolation and regrouping of individuals; localisation of bodies; optimal utilisation of forces; control and improvement of productivity; in short, the putting into place of a complete discipline of life, time and energies.

A new physiology: definition of norms, exclusion and rejection of those who do not conform, mechanisms for their restoration by
We can now respond to the charge that Bentham’s Panopticon is not a good description of “real life” in 19th Century prisons. Foucault suggests that if he had wanted to describe “real life” in the prisons, he would not have gone back to Bentham (DE IV, 28-9; FE 81). Bentham’s work is important as a theoretician’s schema, because “he describes, in the utopia of a general system, particular mechanisms that really exist” (DE III, 207; FL 240).

The fact that it [the Panopticon] should have given rise, even in our own time, to so many variations, projected or realised, is evidence of the imaginary intensity that it has possessed for almost two hundred years. But the Panopticon must not be understood as a dream building: it is the diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form; its functioning, abstracted from any obstacle, resistance or friction, must be represented as a pure architectural and optical system: it is in fact a figure of political technology that may and must be detached from any specific use (SP 239; DP 205).

In his 1972-3 Collège de France course résumé, Foucault provided a succinct summary of the themes in this research project. Understanding how the parts of the research fit together enable a wider reading of this than simply one that looks at the mechanisms of punishment and the establishment of the prison.

A new optics, first: an organ of surveillance generalised and constant; all must be observed, seen, transmitted: organisation of a police; institution of a system of archives (with individual files), establishment of a panopticism.

A new mechanics: isolation and regrouping of individuals; localisation of bodies; optimal utilisation of forces; control and improvement of productivity; in short, the putting into place of a complete discipline of life, time and energies.

A new physiology: definition of norms, exclusion and rejection of those who do not conform, mechanisms for their restoration by
corrective interventions which are in an ambiguous manner therapeutic and punitive.

Panopticism, discipline and normalisation schematically characterise this new hold [prise] of power over the body, which was put in place in the 19th Century. And the psychological subject which appears at this moment... is only the reverse side [l'envers] of this process of subjectification [assujettissement]. The psychological subject is born at the point of conjunction of power and the body: it is an effect of a certain "political physics" (RC 49-50).

What Discipline and Punish shows is how the supplice of the eighteenth century is replaced by the disciplinary dispositif of the nineteenth century: a dispositif that encompasses technologies of power that produce a docile body, a knowable "soul", and a subjectification of the individual (SP 308, 345; DP 264, 295). Being attentive to the meaning of the book’s subtitle leads to two main realisations: first that the birth of the actual prison is enmeshed within the birth of the figurative prison, within the genealogy of the modern subject, an insight that better explains the change in penal practice; and second it allows us to see this genealogy as the main scope of the book. This genealogy of the modern soul and of the policing of urban space – two themes that are closely linked – is not simply pursued in Discipline and Punish, but is also the subject matter of other research. It is also further pursued in The History of Sexuality series. Realising all of this enables us to better understand the larger project – to be attentive to the role of Bentham certainly – but not to see the world and the text solely through his eyes.
Conclusion

In his *Thirdspace*, Edward Soja suggests that there remains to be written a study which looks at the role of space in some of the key thinkers of the Western tradition. He mentions Foucault, Heidegger, and Nietzsche – amongst many others – but suggests that “what would severely hinder such an archaeology, however, is the almost complete absence of a secondary literature that explicitly and perceptively addresses the problematic relation between historicality and spatiality presumed to be embedded in these sources”. Edward Casey’s *The Fate of Place* satisfies Soja’s request to an extent, though the emphasis is, as the title suggests, on place rather than space, and not on history at all. In addition, as I have suggested, it suffers from a number of flaws in its attention to Heidegger and his treatment of Foucault is minimal.

Postmodernism, whatever the merits or difficulties attached to this problematic term, has often provided a smokescreen for dubious scholarship. If we are to critically explore the importance of space and its role within a historical study we must ensure that the tools we use function adequately. The research behind this thesis began as an attempt to write a history of HIV and AIDS in Britain, focusing on the spatial issues involved. For a number of reasons, the theoretical framework to be employed was drawn from Foucault. In working on Foucault and space it quickly became apparent that there was a dearth of adequate material. Key questions remained unanswered, fundamental texts were left obscure, and intellectual genealogies were inadequately explored. This thesis has sought answers to some of these questions, examine these texts, and trace these genealogies.

In terms of Foucault’s own work I have argued that Foucault’s historical studies are spatial through and through, and that this is the fundamental legacy of his work to those interested in the question of space – rather than the two figures to which so much study has been given: the Panopticon and heterotopias. Understanding how space is fundamental to the use of power and to historical
research into the exercise of power allows us to recast Foucault’s work not just as a history of the present, but as a mapping of the present. This orientation of a historical study to the present, rather than the past, is a theme I find common to Nietzsche, Heidegger and Foucault – and is framed by their responses to the Kantian question “how are synthetic a priori judgements possible?” Taking Nietzsche’s response “why is belief in such judgements necessary?” as a guiding principle within his genealogical approach, and seeing how Heidegger’s response to Kant is crucial to understanding the shift between the published and the unpublished divisions of Being and Time (the Kehre) and to the development of historical ontology, I have recast Foucault’s historical approach as a historical ontology. Like Heidegger – and in, for example The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche – this is a history framed as a history of the present. Noting how Foucault’s connaissance/savoir distinction parallels Heidegger’s ontic/ontological difference allows us to see both the continuity between archaeology and genealogy and between two of this century’s foremost thinkers.

This link, crucial though it is, is but one area of many where I suggest Heidegger is important in understanding what Foucault is doing. Other important issues – dispositif, technologies and the question of power/knowledge – become clearer from a Heideggerian perspective. Perhaps most importantly though, the crucial work Nietzsche began in sketch form, and Heidegger elaborated in careful studies throughout his career, pave the way for Foucault’s treatment of questions of space and time together in his spatial histories. The modernist marginalisation of space and prioritisation of time is abandoned with a carefully developed analysis of how they function together. As the final chapter has demonstrated, they are best seen at work not in abstract theorising, but in practical application. Both during his life and increasingly after his death a number of Foucauldian studies – genealogies or histories of the present – have been written in a wide range of fields. It is to be hoped this thesis will help to continue this trend, with the theoretically enriched tools of historical ontology and mapping the present.

Just as Nietzschean genealogy does not provide all the answers needed for these tools, the paradigm of Marxism does not – on its own – provide the basis for a historical and geographical materialism. The key thinker to be examined in this
regard is Henri Lefebvre, who is the focus of my immediate post-doctoral work. Lefebvre's stated influences - Hegel, Marx and Nietzsche - are throughout his career used in dialogue with and criticism of Heidegger. As David Harvey suggests, important work is to be done on combining the insights of Marx and Heidegger on the question of space. This is precisely what Lefebvre does. A number of other important recent thinkers - Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, and Jacques Derrida, amongst others - have contributed to this debate. Sympathy to their complicated and diverse intellectual backgrounds precludes cursory treatment here, though especially in Derrida's case, they have occasionally been marshalled as secondary sources.

Soja's aim of reasserting space within critical social theory requires, in his own words, continued work:

The reassertion of space in critical social theory - and in critical political praxis - will depend upon a continued deconstruction of a still occlusive historicism and many additional voyages of exploration into the heterotopias of contemporary postmodern geographies.

This work however must not be at the expense of a critical interrogation of history itself, and it must not ignore the specific situation of the thinkers marshalled to its cause. Above all, it must be philosophically and theoretically sound. In seeking to avoid these pitfalls, this thesis contributes to that aim.

London - Colchester - Chamonix Mt. Blanc - Bath - München
October 1994 - November 1998
Appendix
Martin Heidegger, “Art and Space”
Translated by Stuart Elden


[203] ‘When one thinks greatly by oneself, one finds much wisdom inscribed in language. It is not likely that one brings it all oneself; but that much wisdom lies therein, such as there is in proverbs’.

G. Chr. Lichtenberg

Δοκεῖ δὲ μέγα τι εἶναι καὶ χαλεπόν ληφθῆναι ο τόπος.

‘It appears to be something of great importance and difficult to understand, the topos’ – i.e. place-space [Ort-Raum].

Aristotle, Physics, Book IV

[204] The remarks concerning art, space and their interplay remain questions, even when they are spoken in the form of assertions. These remarks are limited to the plastic arts, and within them to sculpture. Sculpted forms [Die plastischen Gebilde]¹ are bodies [Körper].² Their mass, consisting of diverse materials, is variously fashioned. The fashioning happens by limitation through an inclusionary and exclusionary limit. Through this, space comes into play;
occupied by the sculpted form as a closed, breached and empty volume. A well
known state of affairs, and yet enigmatic.

The sculpted body embodies something. Does it embody space? Is sculpture an
occupation of space, a controlling of space? Does sculpture correspond with the
technico-scientific conquest of space?

As art, certainly, sculpture is a confrontation [Auseinandersetzung] with artistic
space. Art and scientific technology consider and treat space toward various
purposes in various ways.

But does space remain the same? Is it not this space which received its first
determination from Galileo and Newton? Space – this uniform extension, which
is not distinguished at any point [Stelle], which is equivalent in all directions, but
which is not perceptible through the senses?

Space – which in the meantime provokes modern man, increasingly and
obstinately, to its final and absolute domination?
Does not modern plastic art follow this domination, insofar as it understands
itself as a confrontation [205] with space? Does it not thus find this confirmed in
its timely character?

But can physically-technically ordered space, however it may be determined, be
taken as the sole true space? Compared to it, are all the other defined spaces –
artistic space, the space of everyday dealings and intercourse – only subjectively
conditioned primitive forms and transformations of a sole objective cosmic
space?

But how is this, when the objectivity of objective world space remains
unquestionably the correlate of the subjectivity of a consciousness foreign to
other times which preceded the modern European age?
Even when we recognise the diversity of the spatial experiences of previous ages,
do we thereby gain an insight into the propriety [Eigentümliche] of space? The
question, what space as space is, is not even asked, let alone answered. It remains
undecided in what way space is, and whether being in general can be attributed to it.

Space – does it belong to the original phenomena [Urphänomenon] of which contact with, according to a word of Goethe, makes men overcome by an awe to the point of anxiety [Angst]? For behind space, it will appear, nothing more is given which it could be traced back to. Before it, nothing else is given to return to. The propriety of space must be given only from itself. Can its propriety still be said?

The necessity of such a question demands from us an admission:
[206] So long as the propriety of space is not experienced, talk of artistic space remains obscure. The way that space carries through the work of art, remains, in the meantime, in uncertainty.

Space, within which the sculpted form can be met as a present-at-hand object [vorhandener Gegenstand]; space, which encloses the volume of the figure; space, which persists between volumes – are these three spaces in the unity of their interplay not merely derived from one physico-technical space; even if arithmetical measurement cannot be allowed to apply to artistic figures?

Once it is agreed that art is the bringing-into-the-work of truth, and that truth signifies the non-concealment [Unverborgenheit] of being, must not then true space, that which uncovers its proper [Eigenstes] nature, begin to give the measure in the work of the plastic arts?

Still, how can we find the propriety of space? There is an emergency route, which is admittedly narrow and hazardous. We will attempt to listen to language. Of what does it speak in the word space [Raum]? Within it speaks making space [Räumen]. This means: clearing out [roden], to make free from wilderness. Making space brings forth the free, the openness for the settling and dwelling of humans.

Making space is, thought in its propriety [Eigenes], the release [Freigabe] of places [Orten] to which the destiny of humans who dwell turn, in the fortune of their home, or in the misfortune of their homelessness, or in the indifference to
the two. Making space is the release of places where a god appears, the places from where the gods have disappeared, the places where the appearance of the godly tarries long. Making space brings forth in each case, the placing [Ortschaft] prepared for dwelling. [207] Profane spaces are only the privation of often very remote sacred spaces. Making space is the release of places.

In making space a destiny [Geschehen] speaks and at once conceals itself. This character of making space is all too easily overlooked. And when it is seen, it remains difficult to determine, at least while physico-technical space is taken as the space to which all spatial determinations must, in advance, adhere.

How does making space happen? Is it not a space making [Einräumen], and this again in the dual sense of allowing and arranging? First, a space making admits something. It lets openness hold sway, which, among others, allows the appearance of present things to which the dwelling of humans finds itself consigned.

On the other hand, a space making prepares for things the potentiality to belong to their relevant where [Wohin] and, from this, to each other.

In this twofold space making the granting of places happens. The character of this happening is such a granting. But what is place, if its propriety must be determined from the guide of releasing space making?

Place always opens a region [Gegend], in which it gathers things in their belonging together.

In the place plays the gathering in the sense of the releasing salvaging of things in their region.

And the region? The older form of the word sounds 'regioning [die Gegnet]'. It names the free expanse. Through it, the openness is urged to allow each thing to merge in its resting in itself. This means, at the same time [208] retaining, the gathering of things in their belonging together.

The question arises: are places first and only the result and the consequence of space making? Or does space making take its propriety from the reign of gathering places? If this is right, we must look for the propriety of making space
in the foundation [*Gründung*] of placing, and must think placing as the interplay of places.

We must then pay attention to the fact that, and how, this play receives its departure from the belonging together of things in the region's free expanse. We must learn to recognise that things themselves are places, and not only occupy a place.

In this case, we would be obliged for a long time to accept a disturbing [*befremdenden*] state of affairs:

Place is not found within a pre-given space, such as that of physico-technical space. The latter unfolds only through the reigning of places of a region.

The interplay of art and space must be thought out of the experience of place and region. Art as sculpture: no occupying of space. Sculpture would have no confrontation with space.

Sculpture would be the embodiment of places which, preserving and opening a region, keep something free gathered around them granting the tarrying of all things and a dwelling for men amongst things.

[209] If it is thus, what becomes of the volume of the sculpted forms, each embodying place? Presumably it [volume] will no longer delimit spaces from one another, in which surfaces surround an inner as opposed to an outer. That which named by the word volume must lose its name, of which the signification is only as old as modern technological natural science.

The place finding and place forming characteristics of sculptured embodiment would first remain nameless.

And what would become of the emptiness of space? Often it would appear only to be a lack. Emptiness is thereby held to be failure to fill a cavity or an interstice [*Hohl- und Zwischenräumen*].
Yet presumably emptiness is closely linked to the propriety of place, and thereby no failure, but a bringing-forth.

Once again, language can give us a clue. In the verb ‘to empty [leeren]’ speaks the word ‘[Lesen] harvest’, taken in the originary sense of the gathering which reigns in place.

To empty a glass means, to gather that which can contain into its having been freed.

To empty the collected fruit from a basket means, to prepare the place for them.

Emptiness is not nothing. Neither is it a lack. In sculptural embodiment emptiness plays in the manner of a searching-designing instituting of places.

The preceding remarks certainly do not go far enough in showing with sufficient clarity the propriety of sculpture as a kind of plastic art. Sculpture: an embodying bringing-into-the-work of places, and with them an opening of regions for a possible dwelling for man, and the possible tarrying of the things that surround and concern them.

[210] Sculpture: the embodiment of the truth of being in its work of instituting places.

Already a cautious insight into the propriety of this art causes the feeling that truth, as non-concealment of being, is not necessarily dependent on embodiment.

As Goethe said: ‘It is not always necessary that that which is true embody itself: it is enough that it hovers about spiritually and evokes harmony; if it floats through the air like the serene and friendly sound of a bell’.
Glossary of Greek Terms

This glossary has been included to aid those with little or no knowledge of the Greek alphabet. Greek letters have been used throughout this thesis, especially in the Heidegger chapters, in accordance with Heidegger's own usage, and the norm in Heidegger scholarship. Whilst this makes the text harder, Heidegger's point is that to transliterate into Latin letters can lead us to equate the words with their modern, rather than Greek understanding. This glossary, which first transliterates, and then provides various translations, is useful in rendering the terms more accessible, but should therefore be used in tandem with the main text, and with caution.

αἰσθησις - aisthesis - perception
αλήθεια - aletheia - truth, non-concealment, Unverborgenheit
ανθρώπος - anthropos - human being, person, man
γη - ge - land, earth, ground
δαίμων - daimon - fate, character, god, deity
δείνα, δεινόν - deina, deinon - strange, uncanny, Unheimliche
δεινότατον - deinotaton - the strangest, uncanniest [das Unheimlichste] of all beings
επιστήμη - episteme - understanding, knowledge
επιστήμη πολιτική - episteme politike - political knowledge, Aristotle's treatise The Politics
'Eστία - hestia - hearth
Εχθρός - ekhthros - personal, private enemy
ζωον πολιτικὸν - zoon politikon - political animal or creature, being whose nature is to live in the πόλις
ηθος - ethos - ethos, custom, domain, abode, dwelling place
ιδέα - idea - form, shape, type
καιρός - kairos - right time, opportunity, crisis, moment
λόγος - logos - word, reason, logic
μέτα - meta - beyond, after, meta
μεταφυσικά – metaphysika – metaphysics
μέτρον – metron – measure
'ορισμός – horismos – horizon, boundary
ουρανός – ouranos – sky, heaven, Himmel
παντοπόρος απορος – pantoporos aporos – underway in all directions, on the way to nothing
πάντα – panta – all
παρουσία – parousia – substance, presence
πέρας – peras – end, boundary
περί – peri – of, about, concerning
πολέμιος – polemios – hostile, enemy
πόλεμος – polemos – war
πόλις – polis – city, city-state, state, site, Stätte
πολιτεία – politeia – constitution, of the πόλις
πολιτικόν – politikon – political, of the πόλις
πόλος – polos – pole, swirl, vortex
πόρος – poros – passage, route, way
ta meta ta φυσικά – ta meta ta physika – beyond physics
tεχνικόν – tekhnikon – that which belongs to τέχνη
tέχνη – tekhnē [techne] – craft, art, technique, technology
tόπος – topos – place, Platz, Ort
'υψιπόλις άπολις – hypsipolis apolis – rising high above the πόλις, cast out from the πόλις
'υβρις – hubris – aggression, violence
φυλακής – phylakes – guard, guardian
φύσις – physis – nature, physics
χώρα – khora – land, country, receptacle, place
Endnotes

The first time a text is mentioned the full reference is given; subsequent references are in an abbreviated form. Full references will be found in the Bibliography.

Notes to the Introduction


3 Soja, Postmodern Geographies, p. 1.

4 Gregory, Geographical Imaginations, p. xi.

5 On this criticism, see Henri Lefebvre, La Production de l'espace, Paris: Anthropos, 1974; translated by Donald Nicolson-Smith as The Production of Space, Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 3-4. Doreen Massey, “Politics and Space/Time”, in New Left Review, No 192, Nov/Dec 1992, p. 66. Lefebvre suggests that Foucault fails to explain what he means by space, a claim that will be disputed throughout this thesis.

6 This is, for example, a common criticism of Soja. See, for example, Eleonore Kofman & Elizabeth Lebas, “Lost in Transposition – Time, Space and the City”, in Henri Lefebvre, Writings on Cities, translated and


Throughout this thesis, Greek words often appear without transliteration. This is because, as Heidegger suggests, to transliterate to Latin letters risks understanding these words in a modern, rather than Greek way. For an explanation of the words themselves, see the Glossary of Greek Words at the end of the thesis.


Notes to Chapter One


See Friedrich Nietzsche, Socrates und die griechische Tragödie: Ursprüngliche Fassung der Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik, München: Beck, 1933; and Nachgelassene Schriften in KSA I.


On this see also PT 14, where Nietzsche suggests that historiography and the natural sciences were needed in the Middle Ages – knowledge to

6 Such a reading is particularly evident in GT and the early notes in KSA I & VII; PT.

7 The key texts for the distancing include “Schopenhauer as Educator” (UB III); “Richard Wagner in Bayreuth” (UB IV); and particularly Human, All Too Human. See also KSA VIII; “Selected Aphorisms from Nietzsche’s Retrospect of his Years of Friendship with Wagner (Summer 1878)”, in CW III. In the case of Wagner, critiques include his links with the emerging German Reich (EH 2, 5; FWa 11), his embrace of Christianity (for example the Parsifal opera), his anti-Semitism, and the pandering to the masses that Nietzsche found in the Bayreuth festival. See especially FWa and the 1888 collection of relevant passages, Nietzsche Contra Wagner, KSA VI; translated by Walter Kaufmann in The Portable Nietzsche, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1954. On the relationship see Theodor Adorno, In Search of Wagner, translated by Rodney Livingstone, London: NLB, 1984; Dietrich Fischer-Dieskau, Wagner and Nietzsche, translated by Joachim Neugroschel, New York: The Seabury Press, 1974; Roger Hollinrake, Nietzsche, Wagner, and the Philosophy of Pessimism, London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1982; and Cosima Wagner, Diaries: An Abridgement, edited by Geoffrey Skelton, London: Pimlico, 1994.


9 Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft; Critique of Pure Reason, A50/B74.

10 See also JGB 4, where Nietzsche suggests that the falsest judgements (which include the synthetic a priori) are however necessary, as without them man could not live. It seems clear though that Nietzsche realises that more – historical – investigation is needed.


12 Kaufmann’s translation On the Genealogy of Morals, New York: Vintage, 1967, has “still have faith in truth”. The religious overtones are clear in both of the alternatives.


18 Allan Bloom, Giants and Dwarfs: Essays 1960-1990, New York: Touchstone, 1991, p. 330, credits Nietzsche as being the first to use values in this modern sense, saying that before we would have used good and evil more readily. In relation to this see also Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature, Cambridge MASS: Harvard University Press, 1985.

19 Realising this allows us to avoid the relativist trap that some seem to welcome. See for example, Babette E. Babich, “Nietzsche and the Condition of Postmodern Thought: Post-Nietzschean Postmodernism”, in Clayton Koelb (ed.), Nietzsche as Postmodernist: Essays Pro and Contra, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990, p. 264: “As Nietzsche has taunted us, taught us, there is, ultimately, no one truth but this truth that there is no one truth”. For a useful discussion of some of the issues that arise from this – though with a tendency to characterise disparate thinkers under the nomenclature ‘postmodern’ – see Ted Sadler, “The Postmodern Politicisation of Nietzsche”, in Patton (ed.), Nietzsche, Feminism and Political Theory.

20 The temporal and cultural relations of good and evil can also be found in Fyodor Dostoyevsky, The Devils, translated by David Magarshack, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971 [1871]. Whether Nietzsche read this particular book of Dostoyevsky’s is unknown, though he certainly knew some of his work. See R.J. Hollingdale’s “Glossary of Names” in his translation of Twilight of the Idols and The Anti-Christ, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968, p. 202; and more generally, Lev Shestov, Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy and Nietzsche, translated by B. Martin & S. Roberts, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1969. Nietzsche first read Dostoyevsky in 1887, and whilst after this date he made more overt references to his work (for example the use of the term ‘idiot’, and the use of the French word souterrain instead of the German – he read Dostoyevsky in French translation), the similarities before this date are coincidental and show ideas these two figures developed in isolation. For Nietzsche’s discovery of Dostoyevsky, see GD 9, 45; the letter to Franz Overbeck (Nizza, 23 February 1887), in The Portable Nietzsche, pp. 454-5; and the one to Peter Gast (Nice, 7 March 1887), in Peter Fuss and Harry Shapiro, (eds.), Nietzsche: A Self Portrait From His Letters, Cambridge, MASS: Harvard University Press, 1971, pp. 97-8.
R.J. Hollingdale's translation has "evaluator" instead of "esteemer", which on the surface appears to be a better translation, showing the link between the values and the evaluations. See Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968. However this link is not in the German original, where the two words are Werthe and Schätzende. For this, and a number of other reasons, I have preferred Kaufmann's translation of the text.


Hollingdale, Introduction to Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 29.

It is perhaps worth mentioning that Nietzsche did not conceive of his studies as being German specific, but as being European. He often used French words, wrote and lived in Italy and Switzerland, and tried to deny his German roots by claiming to be descended from Polish aristocracy (EH 1, 3).


Though the first two essays of the Genealogy demonstrate the genealogical approach very well, their content is so well-known that a recapitulation is unnecessary. For an exposition, see Keith Ansell-Pearson, An Introduction to Nietzsche as a Political Thinker, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994; Ross Poole, "Nietzsche: The Subject of Morality", in Radical Philosophy, No 54, Spring 1990; Arthur C. Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher, New York: Macmillan, 1965; and for a more provocative reading, Owen, Nietzsche, Politics and Modernity. See Peter Berkowitz, Nietzsche: The Ethics of an Immoralist, Cambridge, MASS: Harvard University Press, 1995 for a sustained critique.
Hollingdale, Introduction to *Twilight of the Idols* and *The Anti-Christ*, p. 7.


There are countless references to this figure. In GT 9, Apollo, who Nietzsche contrasts with Dionysus, is the god of boundaries.


This bears comparison with the work of Dostoyevsky, for example in *Notes from the Underground*, translated by Jane Kentish, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.


Martin Luther was actually the son of a miner. The parallels between Luther, Nietzsche, and indeed Heidegger, are worthy of further exploration. In one regard, see David B. Allison, “Have I Been Understood?”, in Schacht (ed.), *Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality*. Allison argues that Nietzsche takes the rhetorical device of *aposiopesis*, “a becoming silent... a rhetorical halt, a narrative arrest or incompleteness, by which a speaker seems unwilling or unable to say anything – but, while the idea is literally unexpressed, it is clearly perceived” (p. 460). The absence implies a presence, as the reader “must fill in the lacuna of discourse become silent” (p. 464). Allison believes that Nietzsche borrows this literary device from Luther, in two examples: the “spiritual assault” of Luther’s “this you have to decide within yourself, for your life is at stake” (M 82), and in Luther’s famous words at the Diet of Worms “here I stand, I cannot do otherwise” (often cited by Nietzsche, see for example GM III, 22). For Allison, “aposiopesis is an especially effective figure, since it forces the reader, the auditor, to supply additional cognitive, emotional and semantic material to complete what was initially
written or spoken... [it] is incomplete in a dramatically temporal fashion” (p. 463). Bernd Magnus has pointed out that Nietzsche’s aphorisms function in similar way, leaving the reader to work on Nietzsche’s ideas, to develop them. Aphorisms, he suggests, “atomise”, “divide, mark off”, showing the etymology to be from the Greek *aphorizein*, to define, divide, from *apo* – from, and *horizein* – to bound, *horos*, a boundary. See Bernd Magnus, “Deification of the Commonplace: Twilight of the Idols”, in Solomon & Higgins, (eds.), *Reading Nietzsche*, pp. 157, 178. On Luther generally, see Julius Köstlin, *Life of Luther*, London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1883; Roland Bainton, *Here I Stand: Martin Luther*, Oxford: Lion Publishing, 1983.


GM II, 9, translator’s note. In GM II, 10, Nietzsche shows how a community which grows in power no longer casts out the wrongdoer, but “shields” them within it, and develops a penal law.


Nietzsche often uses the German word *Bildung* for culture, instead of the more common *Kultur*. Bilden means to shape or mould as well as to educate, *das Bild* is picture or image. *Die bildende Kunst*, the plastic arts, includes painting and architecture.


Translator’s note to GT 8, p. 63.


However, see Umberto Eco, “The End Is at Hand”, in *Misreadings*, translated by William Weaver, London: Picador, 1993, especially pp. 106ff, for a satirical diatribe against the theatre of ancient Greece in much the same vein.


See also GM I, 10, where the man of *ressentiment* has a mind which "loves dark corners, secret paths and back-doors". The Christian religion is, for Nietzsche, the defining example of *ressentiment*.

See, for example, WM 226: "They despised the body: they left it out of their account: more, they treated it as an enemy. It was their delusion to believe that one could carry a 'beautiful soul' about in a cadaverous abortion..." This critique is elaborated in the section on the body in this chapter.

In FW 7, written in 1882, Nietzsche anticipates how things might turn out, when he writes "science has not yet built its cyclopic buildings; but the time for that, too, will come".

Lars Gustafsson, "Dr Nietzsche's Office Hours Are Between 10 And 12 AM", in Solomon & Higgins (eds.), *Reading Nietzsche*, p. 184.

Translator's note to GM III, 8.

There are interesting parallels to draw with Dostoyevsky's remarks about the Crystal Palace in *Notes From The Underground*, especially pp. 26, 33, 35. For many Russian Utopians, including most importantly Chernyshevsky, the Crystal Palace was an image of their dream of an earthly paradise. Dostoyevsky calls it an "anthill", seeing the dangerous implications of its utilitarian scheme. See John Carroll, *Break-out from the Crystal Palace*, London & Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974, especially pp. 148-9.

Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft; Critique of Pure Reason*, A21/B35.

For a good introduction to these ideas see Chris Shilling, *The Body and Social Theory*, London: Sage, 1993.

Nietzsche occasionally links physiology with history. See GD 9, 44.

I am not unaware that this discussion relies largely on notes unpublished by Nietzsche himself. As so often with Nietzsche, his thought seems to function largely as opening up new areas for study and questioning, rather than closing the debate.


See also the summation of Nietzsche's aim in FWa 6: "To elevate [erheben] men one has to be sublime [erhaben] oneself". On imagery in Nietzsche see Luce Irigaray, *Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche*, 209.

64 Hollinrake, Nietzsche, Wagner, p. 108; Luke, “Nietzsche and the Imagery of Height”. See also Chapter 7 of J. Hillis Miller, Topographies, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995, which begins by promising to discuss the places of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, but digresses into a discussion of rhetoric and parable.

65 ‘Eternal return’ translates both ewige Wiederkunft and ewige Wiederkehr. Nietzsche uses both terms, as do Löwith and Heidegger. There seems no essential point of difference between them.


70 See Hollingdale’s note to his translation of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 341n25.


For the difficulties of translating the word, one of the several important words in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* that plays on the use of *unter* and *über*, see Kaufmann’s note on p115. Kaufmann’s “go under” is, as he admits, not perfect, but it is surely better than the French *le declin*, decline.

See also the notes toward an unwritten *Untimely Meditation* called “Wir Philologen”, KSA VIII, “We Philologists”, CW IV.


**Notes to Chapter Two**


For an early hint of this, see GA24, 407-8.

Heidegger’s marginal notes to *Being and Time* suggest that he sees “what is past” as “what preceded beforehand and now still remains” (GA2, 378n).


Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World*. This is the reason why Dreyfus’ text only looks at the first division of *Being and Time* in detail.

On the restrictive scope of Heidegger’s early thoughts on history, see Calvin O. Schrag, “Phenomenology, Ontology and History in the Philosophy of Heidegger”, in Joseph J. Kockelmans (ed.),

This would seem to be contradicted by a remark in the later essay “On The Essence of Truth”: “Only the ek-sistent human is historical. ‘Nature’ has no history” (GA9, 85).

‘Moment’, or ‘moment of vision’, is the translation of Augenblick Macquarrie and Robinson give in Being and Time, Stambaugh uses ‘moment’, suggesting ‘moment of vision’ has mystical connotations (p. xvi). Hofstader uses ‘instant’ in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. Though ‘instant’ has much to recommend it, and is probably, on balance, the closest English equivalent that does not resort to a phrase or a neologism, I have stuck to ‘moment’ throughout, as it is more commonly used in the secondary literature and other translations, notably Krell’s of the Nietzsche volumes. This term and its translation is discussed in more detail in Chapter One.


Following Kisiel’s detective work with the manuscripts in The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time, it is clear that the existential language which permeates Being and Time was a very late addition to the drafting (p. 7). Kisiel argues that Heidegger’s aversion to existentialist terminology was part due to his dislike of the Kierkegaardism in vogue in theological circles, especially at Lutheran Marburg, where Heidegger taught between 1923 and 1928 (p. 316). His critical distance from Jaspers may have also paid a role. Kisiel criticises the Ausgabe letzter Hand [edition out of the last hand] principle behind the Gesamtausgabe which, on Heidegger’s suggestion, published the versions of the lecture courses existing at the time of publication, marginal notes, emendations and all, rather than the text delivered at the time. The existential language of GA20 (Summer Semester 1925) all derives from the jottings Heidegger made in the margin of Simon Moser’s stenographic typescript – probably when Heidegger was revising sections of this course for incorporation into Being and Time (see p394). Kisiel suggests, finally, that “in the matter of a single month [March 1926], the particular conceptual decisions that are to follow from this central concept of Existenz are made, superficially transforming Being and Time into a book inaugurating Existenzphilosophie. But that is a remote by-product of the effort and, over the years, an increasingly obfuscating one, from Heidegger’s perspective” (p. 419). Heidegger’s marginal notes to Being and Time (see GA 2, 12n, 436n) and certainly the Letter on Humanism (GA9) demonstrate how keen he was to distance himself from the movement.
23 In a number of places Heidegger criticises the standard understands of time, for example: “Yet does time consist of hours, minutes, and seconds? Or are there not merely measures in which we entrap it, something we do because, as inhabitants of the earth, we move upon this planet in a particular relation to the sun” (GA29/30, 147).

24 Werner Marx has convincingly argued that Heidegger’s attitude to space in *Being and Time* is linked to this reading of Aristotle. He suggests that Aristotle’s time as a point on a line is viewed from the view of space, being partly dependant on space (see CT 18). Marx argues that “Heidegger will try to understand space as dependent on time and, later, as of equal rank with time, whereby of course the essence of time is comprehended in non-Aristotelian fashion”. The later Heideggerian notion of “time-space” is very different from the Aristotelian “now-here”. See his *Heidegger and the Tradition*, pp. 27-9.

25 Similarly he is critical of Kant’s understanding of time for the same reason. Kant founds ontology on time, not understood as original temporality, but as the traditional and ordinary understanding of time. See GA25, 341ff, 426. This is a central theme of Heidegger’s Kant interpretation, discussed later in this chapter.

26 See Jean-Paul Sartre, *L’être et le néant: Essai d’ontologie phénoménologique*, Paris: Gallimard, 1943; translated by Hazel E. Barnes as *Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology*, London: Routledge, 1958. For the case for translating the term in this way, see Brice R. Wachterhauser, “Introduction: History and Language in Understanding”, in his *Hermeneutics and Modern Philosophy*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986, pp. 20-1; for the case against, see Edo Pivčević, *Husserl and Phenomenology*, London: Hutchinson University Library, 1970, p. 110: “Dasein has in fact been translated by ‘being-there’, but this is such an ugly and misleading construction that it is better avoided”. Arthur Danto has pointed out that a reading of either être-là or Dasein “implies not merely a location but a deixis”, as the context of their utterance provides the context of their reference. See his *Sartre*, Glasgow: Fontana, 1975, p. 93. An useful discussion is found in the Albert Hofstader, “Translator’s Appendix: A Note on the Da and Dasein”, in *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, p. 333-7. We should note the late Heidegger’s discussion of this: “In French, Dasein is translated as être-là, for example by Sartre. But with this, everything that was gained as a new position in *Being and Time* is lost. Are human beings there, like a chair?... Dasein does not mean being there and being here [Dort- und Hiersein]” (GA15, 206; Hk 126).

27 This showcases the problems faced by Edward Soja, when he suggests that “all excursions into Thirdspace begin with this ontological restructuring, with the presupposition that being-in-the-world, Heidegger’s Dasein, Sartre’s être-là, is existentially definable as being simultaneously historical, social, and spatial”. See *Thirdspace*, p. 73. Soja’s slightly more detailed treatment is found in his earlier *Postmodern...
Geographies, pp. 133-7, but here too he shows his lack of knowledge of Heidegger, relying largely on Joseph Fell, Heidegger and Sartre: An Essay on Being and Place, New York: Columbia University Press, 1979, taking Sartre as a better interpreter of Heidegger than Heidegger, and neglecting or misrepresenting several key issues.


For a discussion of some the issues that arise from this, see Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, pp. 130ff. Important discussions of space in Heidegger are found in Villela-Petit, “Heidegger’s Conception of Space”; Casey, The Fate of Place; and Didier Franck, Heidegger et le problème de l’espace, Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1986. Franck’s is the most extensive treatment on Heidegger and space, though he perhaps overlooks the differences between the early and later Heidegger, and neglects much of the material available in the Gesamtausgabe. Casey’s chapter on Heidegger raises a number of important issues, but also has a number of problems. He makes no real distinction between Heidegger’s use of Platz and Ort, makes only passing reference to political questions, neglects some key texts, subscribes to a problematic notion of the ‘turn’, and tends to conflate the notion of ‘place’ as a metaphor (the topology of being, see Q IV, 433) with the analysis of place. Perhaps most unfortunately, he uses Heidegger’s “space is split up into places” (GA2, 104) as a motto for his entire work, which Heidegger later refutes (GA2, 104n). See particularly, p. 340.


Heidegger’s examples in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology are tailored to the situation of the lecture course: “Sitting here in the auditorium, we do not in fact apprehend walls – not unless we are getting bored. Nevertheless, the walls are already present even before we think of them as objects”; “When we enter here through the door, we do not apprehend the seats, and the same holds for the door-knob. Nevertheless, they are there in this peculiar way: we go by them circumspectly, avoid them circumspectly, stumble against them, and the like. Stairs, corridors, windows, chair and bench, blackboard, and much more are not given thematically. We say that an equipmental contexture environs us” (GA24,
In *Being and Time* Heidegger suggests that “bare space is still veiled over. Space has been split up into places [Plätze]” (GA2, 104). In his marginal notes he writes “No, rather a proprietary and not split up unity of places!” (GA2, 104n). This is a peculiar claim, and one that is not at all clear, especially as there is no date given for the marginalia. As Chapter Three will show, it is when Heidegger thinks through the notion of τόπος as Ort rather than Platz that he begins to elucidate this concept in detail. And, as discussed in Chapter Four, in the lectures “Building Dwelling Thinking” and “Art and Space” Heidegger rethinks the space/place relation.

Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time*, pp. 313, 423. Kisiel argues that the dominant question of progressive drafts always has the other two lurking in the background. Though it cannot be pursued here, we might note that the figures of Husserl and Dilthey play important roles in the published version of *Being and Time*.


See Daniel O. Dahlstrom, “Heidegger’s Kant Courses at Marburg”, in Kisiel & van Buren (eds.), *Reading Heidegger From the Start*. This is hinted at in GA2, 10-11.

Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft; Critique of Pure Reason*, Bxvi. This disagreement with neo-Kantianism is the subject of the “Davos Disputation between Ernst Cassirer and Martin Heidegger” (GA3, 274-96); the movement is outlined in “On the History of the Philosophical Chair since 1866” (GA3, 304-11).
Heidegger recognises that as “ontology has for its fundamental discipline the analytic of the Dasein... ontology cannot be established in a purely ontological manner. Its possibility is referred back to a being, that is, to something ontical – the Dasein. Ontology has an ontical foundation” (GA24, 26).


*Kritik der reinen Vernunft; Critique of Pure Reason*, A34/B50.

See Villela-Petit, “Heidegger’s Conception of Space”, p. 120.

A similar claim is made in GA41, 16: “That we name time first, that we say Zeitraum and not Raumzeit, should indicate that in this question time plays a special role. This does not mean, however, that space is derived from time or in second place to it”.


“The unitary essence of boredom in the sense of the unitary structure of the two moments must therefore be sought in time after all. Not merely in time in general and universally, however, not only in time as we know it, but in the manner and way in which we stand with respect to the time that is familiar, in the manner and way in which this time stands into our Dasein and in which our Dasein itself is temporal. Boredom springs from the temporality of Dasein” (GA29/30, 191).

Villela-Petit, “Heidegger’s Conception of Space”, p. 127, does however suggest that these analyses should have been made from the point of view.


As Heidegger admits late in life, “the body phenomenon is the most difficult problem” (GA 15, 236; Hk 146).

Villela-Petit, “Heidegger’s Conception of Space”, p. 117.


See Rainer A. Bast & Heinrich P. Delfosse, *Handbuch zum Textstudium von Martin Heideggers ‘Sein und Zeit’. Band 1: Stellenindizes; Philologisch-Kritischer Apparat*, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: frommann-holzboog, 1979, where Nietzsche does not feature in the bibliographic references. However, Krell has suggested that, “however rarely cited in *Being and Time*, Nietzsche may well be the regnant genius of that work”. See *Intimations of Mortality*, p. 128; and Taminiaux, *Heidegger and the Project of Fundamental Ontology*, Chapter 6.

Heidegger certainly read Hölderlin early in his life, but whether he was at that stage inspirational in his philosophy is debatable.

Though right at the end of the 1973 seminar in Zähringen Heidegger says “the thinking that is demanded here is what I call tautological thinking. This is the originary sense of phenomenology” (Q IV, 487).

Following Kisiel’s work, it is possible to suggest that this was the initial direction Heidegger was pursuing, and that *Being and Time* was a side move undertaken and then abandoned. The initial project, as outlined in the Aristotle book introduction certainly suggests as much: “For philosophical research, the de-structive confrontation [Auseinandersetzung] with philosophy’s history is not merely an annex for the purposes of illustrating how things were earlier... [it] is rather the authentic path upon which the present must encounter itself in its own basic movements” (PIA 20-1). In distinction to the suggestion at the end of the introduction to *Being and Time*, which stated that Part Two would contain “a phenomenological de-struction of the history of ontology with the problematic of temporality as our clue” (GA2, 39), towards the end of the actually published book, Heidegger talks of the “historiographical de-struction of the history of philosophy” to follow (GA2, 392). Given that Part Two was never published it is impossible to know what Heidegger would have achieved in it.
Notes to Chapter Three

The Kehre is one of the most disputed areas of Heidegger scholarship. Krell provides a useful summary of the key issues in Chapter 6 of his Intimations of Mortality. He suggests three contexts for the Kehre: an impending turn in Western history concerning the technological era; the turn from Being and Time to Time and Being – i.e. the shift from the analysis of Dasein in particular to being in general that should have been found in the third division of Being and Time but that Heidegger was unable to think clearly at that time; a biographical turn introduced by Heidegger scholars to understand the development of his thought. Krell is critical of the developmentalist aspects associated with the third of these, but concedes that Heidegger’s path of thought is far from one dimensional or uni-directional. My reading of this issue is that Heidegger’s work after the first two divisions of Being and Time is precisely to articulate the turn to Time and Being, but that this path of thought takes far longer than expected, and necessitates a rethinking of key notions. The historical de-struction of the tradition – envisioned before but not performed in Being and Time (see the final note to Chapter Two above) – takes place not simply through Aristotle, Descartes and Kant, but also through the pre-Socratics, Hölderlin and Nietzsche. Such a path of thought requires a rethinking notably of the issue of space and place; the role of history in the study of being; and the notion of the political. As Krell notes, Heidegger remarked in 1953/54 that in Being and Time “perhaps I ventured too far too soon” (GA12, 93; OWL 7). Krell suggests that the work afterwards is “a catching up that actually moves backward” (p. 111). Such a reading gels with Kisiel’s genealogy of Being and Time, and with Heidegger’s remark in the “Letter to Richardson” that “the thinking of the Kehre results from the fact that I stayed with the matter-for-thought [of] Being and Time, i.e. by inquiring into that perspective which already in Being and Time (p. 39) was designated as ‘Time and Being’” (LR xvi/xvii). Bruce V. Foltz, Inhabiting the Earth: Heidegger, Environmental Ethics, and the Metaphysics of Nature, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1995, p. 33n2 argues that the Kehre is not at issue in the topics he discusses. However later in the same note he suggests that the shift in Heidegger’s treatment of nature is due to his reading of Hölderlin. As shall be shown, this is one of the key issues at stake here.

Quoted by Heinrich W. Petzet, Preface to Martin Heidegger & Erhart Kästner, Briefwechsel, Frankfurt am Main: Insel, 1986, p. 10.

The basic documents are available in HC, which also includes a number of critical pieces. Also useful is the selection of articles in the “Symposium on Heidegger and Nazism”, edited by Arnold I. Davidson, in Critical Inquiry, No 15, Winter 1989. The recent furore was initiated by Victor Farias, Heidegger and Nazism, translated by Paul Burrell & Gabriel R. Ricci, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989; though

This approach is greatly shaped by the work of Dominique Janicaud, *The Shadow of That Thought: Heidegger and the Question of Politics*, translated by Michael Gendre, Evanston IL: Northwestern University Press, 1996. See also Pierre Bourdieu, *The Political Ontology of Martin Heidegger*, translated by Peter Collier, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988; and Julian Young, *Heidegger, Philosophy, Nazism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. A useful representation of this case is Derrida’s “Heidegger: The Philosopher’s Hell”, a text which was included in the first edition of the Wolin collection as an unauthorised translation, which has been removed from later editions. This interview now appears in Jacques Derrida, *Points... Interviews, 1974-1994*, edited by Elizabeth Weir, translated by Peggy Kamuf & Others, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995, retranslated, and with a detailed explanation of why Derrida objected to its original English publication. In the interview, Derrida argues that Heidegger’s thought cannot simply be reduced to “that of some Nazi ideologue”, and that “for more than half a century, no rigorous philosopher has been able to avoid an ‘explanation’ with [explication avec] Heidegger (p. 182). The French word explication, together with its verbal form expliquer, has a number of potential translations in English, among them explanation, discussion, argument and analysis, but can also, particularly in a later context in this same interview (p. 183) mean the more direct ‘having it out with’ or ‘confrontation’. It bears comparison with Heidegger’s repeated use of the word Auseinandersetzung.


This reading of the German word was suggested, in a slightly different context, by Derrida’s *Of Spirit*, pp. 42ff.

In this context see Heidegger’s interview “Only a God Can Save Us”, HC 104, where he claims that the parenthetical remark was present in the original manuscript but not read as he “was convinced that [his] audience were understanding [him] correctly”. See also Jürgen Habermas, “Martin Heidegger: On the Publication of the Lectures of 1935”, in HC.

Walter Biemel, *Martin Heidegger*, translated by J. L. Mehta, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977, p. 28, provides a useful note to this: “The customary separation of systematic and historical modes of inquiry became untenable, for the systematic method of inquiry can be grasped only in the context of history, being itself always historically conditioned”.

Heidegger points out elsewhere that wesan, derived from Sein, to be, means to dwell, to sojourn (GA40, 76; IM 72).


In GA54, 174; 209-10 Heidegger discusses τόνως in slightly more detail, and suggests that it should be translated as place [Ort] not space.


"Kehre is the 'turn' of space (dissimulated place) 'into' place, which it originally and always is", in Heidegger and Sartre, p. 204. On space and place in Greece generally, and the change from religious, qualitative, differentiated space to homogenous geometric space, see Chapter 3 of Jean Pierre Vernant, Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs, Paris: François Maspero, 2e édition, 1969.


For some of the reasons for this see Ott, Martin Heidegger, p. 14.

They are due to appear as GA35, 36, 37 and 38. Heidegger was on academic leave for the winter semester of 1932-33.

Heidegger, “Only a God Can Save Us”, p. 102. See also, Karl Löwith, "My Last Meeting with Heidegger in Rome, 1936", in HC.
Ott, Martin Heidegger, pp. 133-4. Löwith's postcard to Jaspers is quoted from the personal papers of the latter in the German Literary Archive in Marbach.

Ott, Martin Heidegger, p. 305.


On the role of time in Heidegger's reading of Hölderlin, see the dispute between Richard Rorty and Michael Murray. Rorty, in “Overcoming the Tradition: Heidegger and Dewey”, in Murray (ed.), Heidegger and Modern Philosophy, p. 251, argues that “there is no indication that Heidegger thinks that poetry has a history. Less crudely put, there is no indication that Heidegger thinks that the historicity of being can be seen in poetry”. Murray’s response, in “Heidegger’s Hermeneutic Reading of Hölderlin: The Signs of Time”, in The Eighteenth Century, Vol 21 No 1, 1980, convincingly shows this to be an error.

On this part of the course see Arthur Grugan, “Heidegger on Hölderlin’s Der Rhein: Some External Considerations”, in Philosophy Today, Vol 39 No 1, Spring 1995.

On place and locale in Hölderlin more generally, though without reference to Heidegger, see David J. Constantine, The Significance of Locality in the Poetry of Friedrich Hölderlin, London: The Modern Humanities Research Association, 1979. Constantine suggests that place need not interest a poet, that many make no use of it, but it was important for Hölderlin, especially in his later work. He argues that Hölderlin celebrates rather than describes the places in his poetry.

See particularly, “Bauen Wohnen Denken”, “Das Ding” and “Dichterist Wohnet der Mensch” in VA; “Building Dwelling Thinking”, “The Thing”, and “...Poetically Man Dwells...”, in PLT.


Miller, Topographies, p. 242 suggests that by the time of “Building Dwelling Thinking”, “Heidegger’s thinking about space or ensparing has changed little, if at all, [from Being and Time] except in dropping the emphasis on falling”. I would suggest that there is a fundamental change, the occlusion of which mars Miller’s otherwise important discussion.

On this, see Schuwer, “Nature and the Holy”. 

223
For a discussion on the topic of blood, soil and earth, see Karsten Harries, "Heidegger as Political Thinker", in Murray (ed.), Heidegger and Modern Philosophy. The conclusion (p. 324) is that Heidegger “came to see that his hope had been in vain and misguided, that the Nazi’s Blut und Boden had little in common with Hölderlin’s Erde. This recognition forced Heidegger to reinterpret the nature of their leadership”. It does not necessarily follow that Heidegger’s use of earth and soil in his analyses is a move following Nazism, but it is certainly a dangerous political manoeuvre. The concept of earth – important in “On the Origin of the Work of Art” and later works – develops from the work on Hölderlin. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, edited and translated by David E. Linge, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976, p. 217. Theodor W. Adorno, The Jargon of Authenticity [Eigentlichkeit], translated by Knut Tarnowski & Frederic Will, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973, p. 85, sees Hölderlin as the “secret model” for the jargon of authenticity.

See for example, Heidegger’s own address of May 26th 1933 on Albert Leo Schlageter in “Political Texts, 1933-34”, HC 40-2. On this issue see also GA39, 72-3.

See the ‘Letter on Humanism’ for a more detailed discussion of the reason for this (GA9, 314; BW 218).

In the discussion of ‘The Rhine’ Heidegger suggests that no Dasein is purely poetic, thinking or acting, but that we must think them together (GA39, 184-5). For a discussion of these issues see Janicaud, The Shadow of That Thought, pp. 99-100. Some important themes are also discussed in Jacques Derrida, “Heidegger’s Ear: Philopolemology (Geschlecht IV)”, in Sallis (ed.), Reading Heidegger, 1993.

Megill, Prophets of Extremity, p. 172. See GA9, 337-8; BW 241 for Heidegger’s explicit distancing from the patriotic and nationalist overtones to Heimat.


See Otto Pöggeler, “Heidegger’s Political Self-Understanding”, HC 203.


See Dominique Janicaud, “The ‘Overcoming’ of Metaphysics in the Hölderlin Lectures”, in Sallis (ed.), *Reading Heidegger*. Though Janicaud provides much useful detail, and is correct to see a shift between the first lecture course and the later two regarding the attitude to metaphysics (a shift from an attempt at a replacement to an overcoming) he neglects the differences between the attitudes to space and time, claiming that the project of a poetic dwelling is common to both.

In the 1927 course *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, Heidegger makes a very similar point about time. See GA24, 361.


Derrida, *Of Spirit*, p. 73.


“Thus decision straddles the threshold of the Nietzschean gateway called ‘moment’ or ‘flash of an eye’, *Augenblick*. David Farrell Krell, “Introduction to the Paperback Edition”, N I, xv. Amazingly, given that she wrote in 1965 and only used the available English translations (i.e.
Being and Time, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, and the original The Joyful Wisdom, without the benefit of the Nietzsche volumes), Donna Gene Hayes, in “Nietzsche’s Eternal Recurrence: A Prelude to Heidegger”, in Journal of Existentialism, Vol VI, No 22, Winter 1965/66, perceives many of the links between Heidegger and Nietzsche around this key issue. She understands the implications for temporality, hints at those for history and suggests an interesting parallel between the three kinds of historical approaches and the lion, camel and child in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, but does not, as Guignon, “History and Commitment in the Early Heidegger”, does, link the historical approaches and temporal dimensions, nor does she show, as I am trying to do, the importance of space in and to this thought.

55 Given the hijacking of the Übermensch by Nazism, one could read this as a not-so-thinly-veiled critique of the movement.


58 One of the more useful, and critical, contributions to this debate is Krell’s “Introduction to the Paperback Edition”.

59 The main lecture course where Heidegger finds the results of an ontic science (in this case biology) important for his ontological project is GA29/30.


61 See also Q IV, 410.

62 The third lecture course on Nietzsche, delivered in 1939, two years after the second, is where this perspective first becomes apparent.


64 Dreyfus, Being-in-the-World, p. 278ff and passim. Dreyfus suggests that certain readings of Nietzsche, such as that of Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature, also find this understanding there.


The *Letter on Humanism* – addressed to a Frenchman, Jean Beaufret (see Q III, 129-30) – was particularly important in France, as it helped a generation (including Foucault and Derrida) to read Heidegger yet distance themselves from Sartre. For a commentary on this, see Jean Beaufret, "Heidegger Seen From France", in Edward G. Ballard & Charles E. Scott (eds.), *Martin Heidegger in Europe and America*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973. In Germany the situation was somewhat different, see Jürgen Habermas, "Jürgen Habermas on the Legacy of Jean-Paul Sartre: Conducted by Richard Wolin", in *Political Theory*, Vol 20 No 3, August 1992.


Krell suggests in his analysis that perhaps Heidegger could not speak of all his thoughts on Nietzsche. N II, 269.

On the problems of the Nietzschean Nachlaß, particularly with reference to Heidegger's reading of it, see also Derrida's famous discussion of the "I have forgotten my umbrella" fragment, in *Spurs/Eperons*, pp. 122ff.


Notes to Chapter Four

Bibliographical information taken from David Farrell Krell's introduction to this piece in BW 140-2, and Heidegger's own note in GA5, 344; PLT xxiii-iv.

Jacques Taminiaux, through a close reading of the three versions of the lecture situates the *Kehre* within this period. It seems unlikely, however, that the *Kehre* is a result of the meditation on art. See "The Origin of 'The Origin of the Work of Art'", in Sallis (ed.), *Reading Heidegger*. A useful discussion of this essay and its relation to other works, is found in Harold Alderman, "The Work of Art and Other Things", in Ballard & Scott (eds.), *Martin Heidegger*. 227
3 The main exception is found in NI, 85ff. See also GA10, 70-2; PR 47-8; "Memorial Address" in G; DT. On this, see Béatrice Han, “Au-delà de la métaphysique et de la subjectivité: Musique et Stimmung”, in Les Études philosophiques, No 4, 1997.


5 Bernstein, The Fate of Art, p. 142. Derrida suggests that the location is important, as Schapiro’s essay appeared in a volume dedicated to Kurt Goldstein, who had first introduced Schapiro to Heidegger’s work (see Schapiro, “The Still Life as Personal Object”, p. 203n1). Goldstein fled Nazi Germany for a number of reasons which, Derrida suggests, may not have been entirely foreign to the “pathos of the ‘call of the earth’, of the Feldweg or the Holzwege”. Derrida agrees with Schapiro that “nothing in the painting proves that they are peasant shoes”, but concludes that there is no evidence to swing the case either way. Supporting Heidegger, he suggests the rural, earthy ideology of the soil Heidegger is accused of projecting would not have been alien to Van Gogh. See The Truth in Painting, pp. 272-3, 345, 362, 367. Foltz again, this time implicitly, defends Heidegger, using the idea of earth as a link to deep ecology. Foltz, Inhabiting the Earth.

6 R.J. Hall, “Heidegger and the Space of Art”, in Journal of Existentialism, Vol VIII No 29, Fall 1967, uses this passage as a springboard into an interesting, though limited, discussion of some of the themes that will be picked up later in this piece.


8 Andrej Warminski, Reading in Interpretation: Hölderlin, Hegel, Heidegger, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987, p. 67. Foltz, Inhabiting the Earth, p. x, does not consider that the return to the rural is an example of nostalgia, and uses this as an opportunity to berate “recent French philosophers” for not having much “to say about the natural environment or about the world outside of large cities in general”.

10 As Miller, *Topographies*, p. 253, notes, "Building Dwelling Thinking" fails to address the fact that the housing shortage which gives the essay its impetus and contemporaneity is primarily urban and the result of the bombing of German cities by the Allies. The only hint of this is found when Heidegger suggests that "the proper plight of dwelling is indeed older than the world wars with their destruction" (VA 156; BW 363). There is therefore a double lacuna: political and platial.


12 See, for example, GA29/30, 36ff; "Logos (Heraklit, Fragment 50)" in VA; "Logos (Heraclitus, Fragment B50)", in EGT; "Brief über den Humanismus"; "Letter on Humanism", GA9, 184ff; "Von Wesen und Begriff der Φύσις. Aristotelos, Physik B, 1"; "On the Being and Conception of Φύσις in Aristotle's Physics B, 1" in GA9.


16 Wolin, in HC 121.


18 Michel Haar notes in passing that the Greek does not contain δενύων or
The Greek word παντα is one of the central terms discussed in Martin Heidegger & Eugen Fink, "Heraklit", in GA15; Hk. See John Sallis & Kenneth Maly (eds.), Heraclitean Fragments: A Companion Volume to the Heidegger/Fink Seminar on Heraclitus, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1980.

See the untitled forward to Holzwege (GA5): “Wood is an old name for forest. In the wood are paths, most of which suddenly become impassable and end in an overgrown copse. They are called woodpaths. They all lead their own way but in the same forest. It often appears that one is the same as the other. Yet it only appears so. Woodmen and forest rangers know the paths. They know what it means to be on a woodpath”.

This stress on place rather than space does not mean that I adhere to the reading of de Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political. Although generally a very useful discussion of Heidegger’s reading of the πόλες, de Beistegui suggests that the difference between space and place is that between the ontic and the ontological, that “the difference between space and place lies in the fact that the place refers to the very possibility from out of which anything like a constituted social, economic and political space might arise” (p. 143). Rather, as is clear throughout Heidegger’s career, place is that which is a more originary, lived, understanding; space (founded on extension) an abstraction. Drawing on the discussion of Plato’s Timaeus, we might suggest that χώρα – which Heidegger suggests might mean “that which abstracts itself from every particular, that which withdraws, and in such a way precisely admits and ‘makes place’ [Platz macht] for something else” (GA40, 71; IM 66) – is the ontological foundation. See also “Der Kunst und der Raum”, in GA13. Another useful general reading of Heidegger’s discussion of the πόλες is found in Ward, Heidegger’s Political Thinking.

See Aristotle, The Politics, translated by T.A. Sinclair, revised and represented by Trevor S. Sanders, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981, 1253a. Sanders’ note (p. 59n14) is that πολιτικόν ζωὸν should be seen as “who lives/whose nature is to live in a polis”.

See GA54, 100-1 for a discussion of why ‘animal’ is a poor translation of ζωὸν. For the wider context, see GA29/30 and Krell, Daimon Life.
Plato, *Republic*, 473c.

To the earlier discussion, GA34, 100, cited above, compare also GA6.1, 168-9, N 1, 166, which is closer to that found in the Holderlin lecture. It would appear therefore that by 1935-6 — with *An Introduction to Metaphysics* and the first Nietzsche course, that the retreat(ment) has begun. That said, Taminiaux, *Heidegger and the Project of Fundamental Ontology*, pp. 134-5, sees things somewhat differently. He suggests that there is no indication that Heidegger abandoned the Platonism of the Rectoral Address. A similar argument is made by Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, *La fiction du politique: Heidegger, l’art et la politique*, Paris: Christian Bourgois) 1987. In distinction I would suggest that the Platonism may remain, but Heidegger’s interpretation of it changes, as does his use of the word πόλις, leading to his retreat from the political, at least in its modern sense.


This is a theme found throughout Heidegger’s work. As well as the whole of GA54, see, for example, “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit”; “On the Essence of Truth” in GA9, and GA34

We might note that in their 1966/67 seminar, Heidegger lets Fink’s translation of πόλις in Heraclitus’ Fragment 114 as Stadt go without note. See GA15, 47; Hk 25.

As Heidegger notes in GA6.1, 168; N 1, 165, in a discussion of Plato’s Πολιτεία, “we can call Plato’s inquiry into art political to the extent that it arises in connection with πολιτεία; but we have to know, and then say, what ‘political’ is supposed to mean. If we are to grasp Plato’s teaching concerning art as ‘political’, we should understand that word solely in accordace with the concept of the essence of the πόλις that emerges from the dialogue itself”.


Indeed, Schmitt recognises as much, distinguishing between the public enemy (πολέμιος) and the private one (χθρόνος), a distinction he claims

35 Martin Heidegger to Carl Schmitt, 22 August 1933, English/German version, in *Telos*, No 72, 1987, p. 132.


37 “The Thing” will be considered in the next section.


39 Bernstein has criticised Heidegger’s attitude to equipment (he specifically means in *Being and Time* and *The Origin of the Work of Art*), by claiming that we relate to hydroelectric dams or assembly line robots in a different way to how we relate to hammers and shoes: “the essence of equipment has changed”. This essay of Heidegger’s seems to provide the corrective needed. See *The Fate of Art*, p. 133.

40 Harold Alredman, “Heidegger’s Critique of Science and Technology”, in Murray (ed.), *Heidegger and Modern Philosophy*, pp. 46-7, provides a useful example. Alredman quotes an advertising slogan: “Nature creates ore deposits. Anaconda creates mines”, and comments “the advertisement further states that ores are not much good until someone uses them; with this use they become natural resources. Thus we have from within contemporary technology a partial recognition of its own nature”.

41 See also Heidegger’s letter to Herbert Marcuse, of January 20th 1948: “To the serious legitimate charges that you express about a regime that murdered millions of Jews, that made terror into an everyday phenomenon, and that turned everything that pertains to the ideas of spirit, freedom, and truth into its bloody opposite’, I can merely add that if instead of ‘Jews’ you had written ‘East Germans’ [i.e., Germans of the eastern territories], then the same holds true for one of the allies, with the difference that everything that has occurred since 1945 has become public knowledge, while the bloody terror of the Nazis in point of fact had been
kept a secret from the German people”. “An Exchange of Letters: Herbert Marcuse and Martin Heidegger”, in HC 163. Heidegger’s seemingly continual need to suggest comparable crimes on the part of others – here the allies’ treatment of Eastern Germans, in the key passage discussed from “Das Ge-stell” the hydrogen bombs of the superpowers, the blockade by the Russians, in the lecture “Die Gefahr”, the famine in China (GA79, 56) – which Wolin likens to the common strategy of the Adenauer years (HC 158-9), betrays the fact that here, more than anywhere else, Heidegger engages in criticism: “serious legitimate charges... bloody terror of the Nazis”. One can almost hear the strain to admit even this little. The other important part of this letter is Heidegger’s admission of his own guilt: “You are entirely correct that I failed to provide a public, readily comprehensible counter-declaration [to the Rectoral Address, after his resignation]; it would have been the end of both me and my family. On this point, Jaspers said: that we remain alive is our guilt” (p. 163). See Heidegger, Correspondance avec Karl Jaspers. As Safranski, Martin Heidegger, p. 413-4, notes, Heidegger’s understanding of technology and the holocaust bears comparison with that of Theodor Adorno in Negative Dialectics, translated by E. B. Ashton, London: Routledge, 1973. On these remarks, see Young, Heidegger, Philosophy, Nazism, Chapter 6.

The passage is cited and criticised by Lacoue-Labarthe, La fiction du politique, pp. 58ff; and his discussion has been the starting point for reflections by many others. See for example Krell, Daimon Life, pp. 138ff; Jancaud, The Shadow of That Thought, Chapter 6; de Beistegui, Heidegger and the Political, pp. 153-7. See also, for a fascinating discussion, William V. Spanos, Heidegger and Criticism: Retrieving the Cultural Politics of Destruction, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993, Chapter 6.

On this see Harries, “Heidegger as Political Thinker”, especially p. 323: “Heidegger’s retreat from politics is inseparable from his characterisation of the essence of technology”.


On this see also Krell, “Analysis”, N IV, 286ff.


VA 32; BW 333; GA79, 72; QCT 42; Hölderlin, “Patmos”, in *Selected Verse*, p. 203.

See Marjorie Grene, “Landscape”, in Ronald Bruzina & Bruce Wilshire (eds.), *Phenomenology: Dialogues and Bridges*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1982, where she notes the lack of discussion of spatiality in *Being and Time*, but suggests that as the work on the fourfold is concerned with being rather than Dasein it is unable to fill the lacuna.


Hölderlin, “In lovely blueness...”, *Selected Verse*, pp. 245-6.
Krell, “Analysis”, N IV, 289. See Fell, Heidegger and Sartre, p. 222, for an alternative schema, that incorporates the fourfold, and space, time, world and play into a round.

Krell, Intimations of Mortality, p. 141.

On this see, David Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity: Hegel, Heidegger and After, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986, pp. 189ff. Kolb concludes that though the romantic reading is appealing, it would be a mistake. He suggests that Heidegger is offering a different way of dealing with the modern world.

Friedrich Hölderlin, letter to Leo von Seckendorf, March 12, 1804 (Hellingrath V², p. 333), quoted in VA 196; PLT 227.

A useful discussion of this – though as I have noted in Chapter Three, marred by a lack of realisation of the shifting attitude to space – is found in Chapter 9 of Miller, Topographies.

Both Hofstadter’s English translation, and the French version translated by André Préau in Essais et Conférences, Paris: Gallimard, 1958, are slightly confusing. I have revised the translation carefully, consistently rendering Raum as space, Stätte as site, and Ort as place. This is in accordance with my practice in this thesis as a whole.

Several of these themes are picked up in “Hebel – Der Hausfreund”, in GA13; HFH.

As noted in the French translation, this line did not feature in the original version, published in L’Endurance de la pensée: Pour saluer Jean Beaufret, Paris: Plon, 1968. It is unclear as to whether it was present when the lecture was delivered in 1962. See Q IV, p. 224n. Robert J. Dostal, “Time and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger”, in Charles Guignon (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 165, suggests that “what Heidegger means by this largely unexplained comment is not entirely clear”. Dostal recognises the radical implications of this comment, and how it would entail “substantial revision” of the earlier Heidegger’s project. He closes: “it is hard to envision what shape an ontology based as much on spatiality as temporality would take. Perhaps the later Heidegger is attempting this in some way or another”.

Notes to Chapter Five


Jacques Derrida, “«Être juste avec Freud »”, in Michel Delorme (dir.), *Penser la folie: Essais sur Michel Foucault*, Paris: Galilée, 1992, p. 180n, suggests that “this blank silence... the spacing of these omissions... is anything but the empty and inoperative sign of an absence”. This is a useful corrective to Derrida’s earlier claim that “Heidegger was almost never named by Foucault, who in any case never confronted him and, if one may say so, never explained himself on his relationship to him”. See Jacques Derrida, “Introduction: Desistance”, in Lacoue-Labarthe, *Typography*. 


This also sets up a critical distance from Habermas’s reading, which suggests that “Nietzsche’s motif of a critique of reason reached Foucault


9 It is worth noting that Foucault read Heidegger again in 1963 (DE I, 25) and that he clearly knew Heidegger’s *Nietzsche* by 1966 (DE I, 551); that he was taught by Jean Beaufret, the recipient of Heidegger’s *Letter on Humanism*, and a noted Heideggerian; and worked on the translation of Ludwig Binswanger’s *Dream and Existence*, a work informed by Heideggerian *Daseinanalyse*, meeting with Binswanger and discussing Heidegger in the process. See Eribon, *Michel Foucault*, p. 30-1.

10 Miller, *The Passion of Michel Foucault*, pp. 138, 418n48; 50; 159.


13 For some interesting comments on the notion of the limit, and its role in Foucault’s thought, see Clare O’Farrell, *Foucault: Historian or Philosopher?* Houndmills: Macmillan, 1989. O’Farrell also recognises the influence of Heidegger in this idea, and the importance for Foucault of Heidegger’s *Nietzsche*.

14 In the original preface, Foucault suggested that his intent was to write a history, “not of psychiatry, but of madness itself”, but then he swiftly suggests that this is a “doubly impossible task” (DE I, 164). Whilst he has
been criticised by Jacques Derrida, "Cogito and the History of Madness", in Writing and Difference, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978, for attempting this impossible task, Foucault is clear that he is really writing the history of "that other form of madness", by which men confine their neighbours (DE I, 159; MC xi). He undertakes this by making a study of the "economic, political, ideological, and institutional conditions according to which the segregation of the insane was effected during the Classical period" (DE II, 223; "Monstrosities in Criticism", in Peter Burke (ed.), Critical Essays on Michel Foucault, Aldershot: Scolar Press, 1992, p. 99). This study of the links between discourse and practice prefigures its explicit formulation and the later dyad of power/knowledge.


On Bataille, Blanchot, Hölderlin, and Flaubert see, respectively, "A Preface to Transgression" (DE I 233-250; LCP 29-52); "The Thought from Outside" (DE I 518-39; MB); "The Father’s ‘No’" (DE I 189-203; LCP 68-86); and "Fantasia of the Library" (DE I 293-325; LCP 87-109). See also Raymond Roussel, "Theatrum Philosphicum" (DE II, 75-99; LCP 165-196); "Le language de l’espace" (DE I, 407-12) and "Language to Infinity" (DE I 250-61; LCP 53-67). It has been suggested by Pierre Macherey, "Présentation" (RR xiii), that if Bataille brought Foucault to Nietzsche, "it was certainly Blanchot who led Foucault to Heidegger, by means of his rumination on poetry and language" (see DE IV, 437; PPC 24). See Bataille, On Nietzsche; and Maurice Blanchot, The Space of Literature, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982.

Miller, The Passion of Michel Foucault, p. 130, suggests it was on the same day; Macey, The Lives of Michel Foucault, p. 129, the same month; the Chronology in Dits et écrits a month apart (DE I, 25).

Miller, The Passion of Michel Foucault, p. 130; Eribon, Michel Foucault, p. 152.

"Transgression is an action which involves the limit, that narrow zone of a line where it displays the flash [l'éclair – lightning] of its passage, but perhaps also its entire trajectory, even its origin; it is likely that transgression has its entire space in the line it crosses" (DE I, 236; LCP 33-4). See Jon Simons, Foucault and the Political, London: Routledge, 1995.


On this period of Foucault’s thought, see Deleuze, “A New Archivist”, in *Foucault*.


“It is understandable in these conditions that we should distinguish carefully between scientific domains and archaeological territories… Archaeological territories may extend to ‘literary’ or ‘philosophical’ texts, as well as scientific ones. Knowledge is to be found not only in demonstrations, it can also be found in fiction, reflection, narratives, institutional regulations, and political decisions” (AS 239; AK 183-4).

“By truth I do not mean the ensemble of truths which are to be discovered and accepted, but rather the ensemble of rules according to which one can separate the true from the false, and attach to the true the specific effects of power” (DE III, 159; FR 74).


See Foucault's comment that “structuralism does not entail a denial of time; it does involve a certain manner of dealing with what we call time and what we call history” (DE IV 752; OOS 22), and his admission that he is trying to introduce structural analysis into the history of ideas (DE I, 583).


It should be noted that whilst most commentators see this as a crucial essay for understanding Foucault, Mitchell Dean, *Critical and Effective Histories: Foucault's Methods and Historical Sociology*, London: Routledge, 1994, p. 14, suggests that we should remember that it is about Nietzsche, and that we should not necessarily equate it with Foucault. It is however, I suggest, clear from Foucault’s genealogical studies – as he calls them – that the essay is part of a program of future work.

For example, see the opening line of the second paragraph of the preface to *On the Genealogy of Morality*. The original German is “Meine Gedanken über die Herkunft unserar moralischen Vorurtheile”; the Kaufmann/Hollingdale translation renders it “My ideas on the origin of our moral prejudices”; a standard French translation has “Mes idées sur l’origine de nos préjugés moraux”; the English translation by Diethe is “My thoughts on the descent of our moral prejudices”. See KSA V, 248,


Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, p. 249, sees this rejection of Ursprungphilosophie as a point of difference between Foucault, and Heidegger and Derrida.

A different conception is provided by Philip Barker, Michel Foucault: Subversions of the Subject, New York & London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993, p. 71; and Owen, Maturity and Modernity, p. 151, who see archaeology as concentrating on the synchronic, genealogy on the diachronic.

In the interview “Critical Theory/Intellectual History” (DE IV, 454-5; PPC 43), Foucault points out that if knowledge simply equalled power (as some critics would have him saying), then he would not have spent so much time examining their relation.


It would seem that the target here is particularly Louis Althusser, as shown in his Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, translated by Ben Brewster, London: NLB, 1971.


Especially damaging for the overall purpose here is Henri Lefebvre’s criticism in The Survival of Capitalism: Reproduction of the Relations of Production, translated by Frank Bryant, London: Allison & Busby, 1976,
p. 116, that the concentration on marginal/peripheral groups in some studies (the allusion is clearly to Foucault) "neglects the centres and centrality; it neglects the global". Gregory, *Geographical Imaginations*, p. 365, suggests that this "comprehensively missed Foucault's point", but Foucault's response shows this is not entirely accurate. A balance is needed, and when setting out the project of a history of spaces, Foucault indeed talked of extension from "from the grand strategies of geopolitics to the little tactics of the habitat" (DE III, 192; FL 228). Sensitive to questions of space, Edward W. Said provides some of the best work on extending the scope of Foucault's work from the micro to the macro level. See his *Orientalism and Culture and Imperialism*; and Michael Sprinker (ed.), *Edward Said: A Critical Reader*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1992.


The French translation (of a text originally published in Italian) has the second as Clausewitz's hypothesis. As will be shown later, the hypothesis is clearly a reversal of Clausewitz, and therefore I have preferred the reading of it as Nietzsche's hypothesis.

On the spatial side, Gregory, *Geographical Imaginations*, p. 276, sees this as a particular problem: "Foucault's analysis does not lead as directly as Lefebvre's to a 'politics of space', however, and one of the most controversial areas of his work is the limited support it seems to afford for any kind of resistance".


See also Michel Foucault, “About the Beginning of the Hermeneutics of the Self: Two Lectures at Dartmouth”, in *Political Theory*, Vol 21 No 2, May 1993, p. 204, where Foucault admits his earlier emphasis on domination as a problem.

See also the 1975-6 *Collège de France* course, «Il faut défendre la société», éd. par Mauro Bertani et Allesandro Fontana, Paris: Gallimard/Seuil, 1997, where Foucault analyses the models of war in peace.


Though as Barry Smart, *Michel Foucault*, London: Routledge, 1988, p. 134, points out, his own definitions are often vague.


This point is developed out of a conversation with Morris Kaplan. See also Barry Hindess, *Discourses of Power: From Hobbes to Foucault*, London: Routledge, 1996, pp. 114-5, where he links Heidegger and
Foucault on the essence of technology – constituting a human individual endowed with “soul, consciousness, guilt, remorse” etc.

The first two terms are used in *The Will to Knowledge*, the central chapter of which is called “The Dispositif of Sexuality”; “apparatus” is used in *Power/Knowledge*; “grid of intelligibility” is the suggestion of Dreyfus & Rabinow, *Michel Foucault*. For a brief comment, see Halperin, *Saint Foucault*, pp. 189-90n6.

For the former, see Heidegger, *Essais et Conférences*, p. 26(&n); for the latter, see Jünger, “Le Travailleur planétaire”, p. 150n2.


See also the unpaginated insert found in *L’Usage des plaisirs* and *Le Souci de soi*.


As was noted in Chapters Two and Three, Heidegger’s historicising of the sense of history is a crucial shift in his later work. A similar point is made by Paul Bové, *In the Wake of Theory*, Hanover: Wesleyan University Press, 1992, p. 21, though he sees this as a problem.

David Couzens Hoy, “Introduction” to *A Critical Reader*, p. 6, makes the connection between Nietzsche and Foucault, but, like others, does not see Heidegger as the crucial link in the chain.

Deleuze, *Foucault*, p. 115.


In this, and other works of the time (dating back at least as far as 1978), Foucault increasingly identifies himself with a lineage of thought he traces back to the Enlightenment. Making use of Canguilhem’s expression, he sees Enlightenment as “our most ‘present past’ [actuel passé]” (DE IV, 37).

On the question of ontology in Foucault, with some of the links to Heidegger, see Béatrice Han, *L'ontologie manquée de Michel Foucault*, Grenoble: Jérôme Millon, 1998.

Some have characterised Foucault as making a radical break with his previous ideas (especially centred around the relation to Kant); others, as I am trying to do, find a more nuanced shift. For the former view, see Ian Hacking, “Self-Improvement”, in Hoy (ed.), *A Critical Reader*, p. 238; Jürgen Habermas, “Taking Aim at the Heart of the Present: On Foucault’s Lecture on Kant’s What is Enlightenment?”, in Michael Kelly (ed.), *Critique and Power: Recasting the Foucault/Habermas Debate*, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994, p. 150; Christopher Norris, “What is Enlightenment?: Kant According to Foucault”, in Gutting (ed.), *Cambridge Companion*, pp. 170, 186. For the latter view, see James W. Bernauer & Michael Mahon, “The Ethics of Michel Foucault”, in Gutting (ed.), *Cambridge Companion*, p. 152; Barbara Becker-Cantarino, “Foucault on Kant: Deconstructing the Enlightenment?”, in Sara Friedrichsmeyer & Barbara Becker-Cantarino (eds.), *The Enlightenment and its Legacy*, Bonn: Bouvier, 1990; and Colin Gordon, “Question, Ethos, Event: Foucault on Kant and Enlightenment”, in *Economy and Society*, Vol 15 No 1, February 1986. The shift is often situated around the critical engagement between Foucault and Habermas. On this see, particularly, Kelly (ed.), *Critique and Power*.


As Dean, *Critical and Effective Histories*, p. 20, suggests, “the general context for a consideration of genealogy and archaeology is, then, a third term which they both serve, that of a history of the present”. In this context, see also Patrick Baert, “Foucault’s History of the Present as Self-Referential Knowledge Acquisition”, in *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, Vol 24 No 6, November 1998.

73 David Harvey, Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference, Oxford: Blackwell, 1996, p. 4. See, for example, Slavoj Žižek (ed.), Mapping Ideology, London: Verso, 1994, which seem to use the 'mapping' as a label and nothing more. On the defence of 'map' as a metaphor and more than a metaphor, see Gregory, Geographical Imaginations, p. 217.

74 Foucault's use of spatial metaphors occasionally leads others to make remarks of this nature. For example, George Steiner, "The Order of Things", in Burke (ed.), Critical Essays on Michel Foucault, p. 85: "one wonders whether 'topology' would not have been more apt than 'archaeology'."


76 See Soja, Postmodern Geographies, p. 16, where he suggests that Foucault's "most explicit and revealing observations on the relative significance of space and time, however, appear not in his major published works but almost innocuously in his lectures and, after some coaxing interrogation, in two revealing interviews". In his later Thirdspace, p. 154, Soja again treats "Of Other Spaces" as Foucault's central spatial contribution, though he recognises the dangers in this.

77 Soja, Postmodern Geographies, p. 19, rightly suggests that "Foucault's spatialisation took on a more demonstrative rather than declarative stance", a statement which makes Soja's attempts to synthesise Foucault's declarations rather than showcase his demonstrations all the more frustrating. As Gregory, Geographical Imaginations, p. 297, notes, Soja's approach also snaps the links between Foucault's pronouncements on space and his genealogy of the subject, a problem I attempt to avoid through the contextual readings of Foucault's spatial histories.

78 Several changes and interpolations have been made to the translation of this piece, in order to clarify Foucault's point. This translation is especially confusing when it translates localisation as 'emplacement' and emplacement as site; a problem that seems to haunt many critical expositions of this piece. See, for example, Soja, Thirdspace, p. 156.


80 See the translator's notes TNP 61n5, 62n14. On Magritte in general, see Marcel Paquet, Magritte, Koln: Taschen, 1994. Foucault's comments on art generally show a strong spatial awareness. See, for example, the commentary on Velasquez (M&C 19-31; OT 3-16) and "Le Force de fuir" (DE II, 401-5). There is not the space here to discuss this further.

This is at least part of the reason why ‘mapping the present’ is a useful term for describing Foucault’s work. Gregory, *Geographical Imaginations*, p. 359, reads Lefebvre’s history of space as a history of the present – indeed in many ways it is – but only rarely does Lefebvre do what Foucault does and undertake a spatial history, a mapping of the present.


Notes to Chapter Six


3 Reading the full text truly gives the lie to Peter Sedgwick’s suggestion that “the full text has many important passages but these are not crucial to Foucault’s argument”. *Psycho Politics*, London: Pluto, 1982, p. 272n16.
This sets up a distance from Major-Poetzl, *Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Western Culture*, p. 134, where she suggests that *Histoire de la folie* has "only a limited sense of spatial relationships", suggesting that a more radical break is only found in *The Birth of the Clinic* and later works. Far more in tune with my attempt here is Serres valuable "The Geometry of the Incommunicable: Madness", only recently translated into English, which emphasises Foucault's language and the concomitant spatial analyses in this work.


The English translation has "the mad then led an easy wandering existence", a translation Gordon suggests is simply wrong, *facilement* being an adverb rather than an adjective: easily, not easy. For Gordon, the sentence should read "the existence of the mad at that time could easily be a wandering one" ("*Histoire de la folie*, p. 17). A useful discussion of this is found in Allan Megill, "Foucault, Ambiguity, and the Rhetoric of Historiography", in *History of the Human Sciences*, Vol 3, No 3, pp. 344-7. Anthony Pugh, the putative translator of the (forthcoming) full English version, suggests "the mad may well have led a wandering life at that time". Pugh, "Foucault, Rhetoric and Translation", in Still & Velody (eds.), *Rewriting the History of Madness*, p. 139.
The real and imaginary role of water within madness is further discussed in “L’eau et la folie” (DE I, 268-272).


As Barker, *Michel Foucault*, p. 107, notes, St. Augustine’s foundation of thought – *credо ut intelligаm* – takes into account the point of dreams and illusion, making him similar to Descartes (p. 209n92). However, St. Augustine crucially does not mention the possibility of madness, a point neglected by Barker. It would seem then that Descartes’ introduction of madness as a source of doubt is as important as its subsequent dismissal.

Descartes, *Meditationes* p183; *Meditations*, p. 61.


This reading of Descartes is critiqued by Derrida in “Cogito and the History of Madness”. Derrida suggests that “the sense of Foucault’s entire project can be pinpointed in this reading of Descartes”, but argues that it is a “naïve” reading (pp. 32, 61). Derrida does not read Descartes’ “but they are all demented” as dismissive and divisive, but argues that it can be read in the same way that Foucault claims Descartes deals with the other two misleading possibilities. Just as the possibility of dreaming or deceit did not preclude the possibility of thinking, and, indeed, actually helped to prove it, Derrida argues that the possibility of madness too proves the validity of thought. As he puts it, “even if my thoughts are completely mad”, I am still thinking: “the Cogito is valid even for the maddest madman” (pp. 55, 58). Having claimed this, Derrida is in a position to criticise the inference that Foucault draws from Descartes: it requires “neither the exclusion nor the circumventing of madness. Descartes never interns madness...” (p. 55) Foucault responded to parts of Derrida’s critique in “Mon corps, ce papier, ce feu” (DE II, 245-268), and implicitly in other works, notably *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. On this debate see Roy Boyne, *Foucault and Derrida: The Other Side of Reason*, London: Unwin Hyman, 1988; D’Amico “Text and Context”; Peter Flaherty, “(Con)textual Contest: Derrida and Foucault on Madness and the Cartesian Subject”, in *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, Vol 16 No 1, March 1986 and, more generally, Christopher Norris, *Derrida*, London: Fontana, 1987; Edward W. Said, *The World, The Text, The Critic*, London: Faber & Faber, 1984. Derrida replies to some of Foucault’s points in “«Être juste avec Freud »”.

The importance of vision only really becomes clear when the original French is returned to. The word translated as ‘observation’ in *Madness and Civilisation* is regard, usually rendered as ‘gaze’ in Foucault’s books. Whilst both translations are accurate, noting the French shows how this

---

19 See also Scull, *Museums of Madness*, pp. 159-60.


Donnelly, Managing the Mind, p. 40. It should be noted that this was not always the case. See Samuel Tuke, Practical Hints, pp. 11, 17: “It will be found necessary to separate them, rather according to the degree, than the species or the duration of the disease”.

Quoted in Riese, The Legacy of Philippe Pinel, p. 154.

Foucault explicitly states that he is only looking at the birth of the prison in the French penal system (SP 40n; DP 309n3), although the implicit suggestion is that some of his ideas would serve as a model for other countries. Foucault has been criticised for suggesting that the shift from torture to imprisonment is a European model, but it is clear from his 1972-3 course at the Collège de France that he only sees this as appropriate for French history. At the beginning of the course outline, a distinction is made between “four grand forms of punitive strategies”; banishment, compensation, branding or other corporal punishment, and imprisonment. Having suggested these four strategies, he goes on to talk about how France shifted from the third to the fourth, a process he elaborates in more detail in Discipline and Punish. It is clear from this outline, if it were not already evident in his better known work, that on this point Foucault was making no claims for universality. See “La société punitive” (RC 29-51).

The French word supplice is usually translated as ‘torture’, but so too is torture. What is important about Foucault’s use of supplice and related words is that it refers to the public spectacle of torture – such as that of Damiens. Alan Sheridan remarks that “no single English word will cover the full range of the French”, and therefore translates as ‘torture’, ‘public execution’ or ‘scaffold’ (Translator’s Note in DP). To avoid confusion I have usually retained the French word.


Foucault suggests that the French police and the German Polizei have this meaning, but that the English police “is something very different” (DE IV, 820; TS 153). I think that it has been convincingly demonstrated that the English were, albeit somewhat later, using the same understanding. See Leon Radzinowicz, A History of English Criminal Law and its Administration from 1750, London: Stevens & Sons, Five Volumes, 1948-86, particularly volume III; Mark Neocleous, “Policing and Pin-making: Adam Smith, Police and the State of Prosperity”, in Policing and Society, forthcoming, 1998.
There are interesting parallels to be drawn between Foucault’s understanding of this term and that of Hegel. See G.W.F. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, edited by Allen W. Wood, translated by H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, §§236, 239-48; and for a discussion, Mark Neocleous & Stuart Elden, “‘The Police Includes Everything’: Foucault, Hegel and the Police Concept”, forthcoming. In seeing governmentality as a virtual synonym of police I am setting myself up in opposition to Nikolas Rose’s suggestion, “Government, Authority and Expertise in Advanced Liberalism”, in *Economy and Society*, Vol 22 No 3, 1993, p. 289, that “governmentality, for Foucault, is specified in opposition to a notion of police”. As Foucault himself says, “I do not think that one can fail to relate this search for an art of government to mercantilism and Cameralism” (DE III, 648; FE 96). On Foucault and police within the context of power generally, see Hindess, *Discourses of Power*, pp. 118ff. For discussions of governmentality, see, amongst others, the essays in FE and Barry Hindess, “Politics and Governmentality”, in *Economy and Society*, Vol 26 No 2, May 1997.


See for example, David Stewart, “Why Foucault?”, in Smart (ed.), *Michel Foucault (2) Critical Assessments*, Vol VII, p. 95, who suggests that Foucault utilises two general schemes – panopticism and heterotopias – in his work on space. Felix Driver, “Geography and Power: The Work of Michel Foucault”, in Burke (ed.), *Critical Essays on Michel Foucault*, talks at length of the Panopticon, but suggests that we should also look at the passage on the Mettray colony.

The English translation of this paragraph is somewhat dubious, not in the choice of words, but in the slip made in the alteration of the punctuation, such that a less-than-wholly attentive reader may miss Foucault’s point.

Neocleous, *Administering Civil Society*, p. 61. See also pp. 83-6, and his “‘Perpetual War, or ‘War and War Again’: Schmitt, Foucault, Fascism”.

Foucault suggests that the poles of right and wrong, and good and sin map onto those of the normal and the pathological (SP 232-3; DP 199). See Canguilhem, *On the Normal and the Pathological*, p. 149: “the abnormal, whilst logically second, is existentially first”. On the rise of
statistics (the description of states), see Ian Hacking, “How should we do the History of Statistics”, in FE.


Bentham suggests that the prison be “located in the neighbourhood of a great metropolis, the place which contains assembled the greatest number of men, including those who most need to have displayed before their eyes the punishment of crime”, Théorie des Peines et des Récompenses, p. 203, quoted in Pasquale Pasquino, “Criminology: the Birth of a Special Knowledge” (FE 240). See also Jeremy Bentham, The Rationale of Punishment, London: Robert Heward, 1830, p. 353.

Details of the English translation perhaps help to explain the imbalance. In the French text thirty plates are included, showing a range of disciplinary diagrams and scenes – hospitals, schools, colleges, a menagerie, a number on the army, and several of penitentiaries. The English text cuts these down to merely ten, of which only one is of a military scene, none are of hospitals or schools, and the majority are of the prison.


In an 1977 interview, published as the preface to the French edition of Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon, Foucault suggests that the themes that struck him in the literature on prisons had previously seemed important in his study of hospital architecture (DE III, 190; FL 226).

On Foucault and diagrams generally see Deleuze, Foucault, especially the chapter entitled “A New Cartographer”, and his “What is a dispositif?”, in Armstrong (ed.), Michel Foucault Philosopher. Foucault describes himself as a cartographer in “Sur la sellette” (DE II, 725).

The model is used by Rabinow, French Modern, pp. 34ff, to relate to the 1832 cholera epidemic in Paris. See also Thomas Osborne, “Security and Vitality: Drains, Liberalism and Power in the Nineteenth Century”, in Barry, et. al. (eds.), Foucault and Political Reason. For two fictional accounts of the plague, but with a clear picture of the grid that Foucault uses as a model, see Daniel Defoe, Journal of the Plague Year: Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1966, especially pp. 57ff, with a commentary

50 A notable exception is found in Sarah Nettleton's work on dentistry – *Power, Pain and Dentistry*, Buckingham, Open University Press, 1992, and "Inventing Mouths: Disciplinary Power and Dentistry", in Jones & Porter (eds.), *Reassessing Foucault*. Nettleton uses the two concepts as existing in parallel: either the exclusion (of a hospital) or the ordered community (of the public health movement, notably dentistry). Another interesting analysis, again examining how the two concepts work in parallel, and complement each other, is found in Milchman and Rosenberg's study of Nazi Germany. The Final Solution is an example of the exclusion principle, and Milchman and Rosenberg argue that the disciplinary model is evidenced in the domestic politics of the Nazi regime. See Milchman & Rosenberg, "Michel Foucault, Auschwitz and Modernity".

51 Bender, *Imagining the Penitentiary*, p. 44.


53 For Foucault, the "political significance of the problem of sex is due to the fact that sex is located at the point of intersection of the discipline of the body and the control of the population" (DE III, 153; FR 67). See also VS 191-2; WK 145.

Foucault’s reading of Bentham is discussed in Terence Ball’s introduction, and Ball’s Reappraising Political Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.

In Discipline and Punish Foucault describes panopticism as “a sort of ‘easy when you think of it’ [‘œuf de Colomb’] in the political sphere” (SP 240; DP 206).


I will usually leave dispositif untranslated.

Foucault suggests that the Enlightenment, “which discovered the liberties, also invented the disciplines” (SP 258; DP 222), something it drew from the Romans, in their Republicanism and their military schema. (SP 171-2; DP 146).


Many critics contend that as the Panopticon was “never built”, it was “a failure”, and cannot stand as a viable exemplar. See, for example, Semple, “Foucault and Bentham”, p. 111; Roy Porter, “Battery
Bentham”, in The Times Literary Supplement, No 4726, October 29th 1993; Anne Crowther “Penal Peepshow: Bentham’s Prison that never was”, in The Times Literary Supplement, No 4847, February 23rd 1996; Ball, Reappraising Political Theory, p. 160. Paul Q. Hirst, “Power/Knowledge – Constructed Space and the Subject”, in Richard Fardon (ed.), Power & Knowledge: Anthropological and Sociological Approaches, Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1985, p. 188, similarly suggests that it was not built, but argues that this does not invalidate it as an example. It is necessary to set the matter straight. Simply regarding its potential as a prison, the Panopticon was characterised by two points – its architectural design, and the system of private contract that Bentham envisaged. The reason it was not built in its exact form in Britain was mainly because the control aspects of the design could not be separated from the financial ones. Prisons that existed before were usually privately run, and Bentham looked to continue this, but he was out of date in this area, as there was a crucial shift toward the state taking over the control of administration. John Howard, author of two important works on enclosed institutions in Europe, was one of the first to suggest that the county, rather than the prisoner, should pay the fees. See his State of the Prisons in England and Wales, Warrington: 1778, and An Account of the Principal Lazarettos in Europe, Warrington: William Eyres, 1789. See also Evans, The Fabrication of Virtue, p. 10. For an analysis of the rise of the prison that is more attentive to the shifts in state power see Michael Ignatieff, A Just Measure of Pain: The Penitentiary in the Industrial Revolution 1750-1850, London: Macmillan, 1978. The neglect of the state seems to be a more serious charge than one which suggests that the shift in penal practice is determined by economic changes. The classic case for this is made by Georg Rusche & Otto Kirchheirner, Punishment and Social Structure, New York: Russell & Russell, 1968. See also Melossi & Pavarini, The Prison and the Factory; and Theodor W. Adorno & Max Horkheimer, The Dialectic of Enlightenment, translated by J. Cumming, London: Allen Lane, 1973. For a discussion of the problems in these analyses, see David Garland, Punishment and Modern Society: A Study in Social Theory, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990, especially pp. 83-110; and Poster, Foucault, Marxism and History.

However, the Millbank penitentiary and Pentonville were both heavily influenced by Bentham’s work, for all the botched nature of these institutions, such as the many blind spots. Outside of Britain, Panopticons were built. Norman Johnston has provided a survey of some of the other penitentiaries based on Bentham’s plan, citing one built in Spain in 1852, three in Holland in the 1880s, the Stateville penitentiary in Illinois, the notorious Cuban Isle of Pines in 1926, and as recently as 1952 the Badajoz Provincial Prison in Spain. Norman Johnston, The Human Cage: A Brief History of Prison Architecture, New York: Walker and Company, 1973, p. 20. See also Norval Morris, “The Contemporary Prison: 1965-Present”, in Norval Morris & David J. Rothman (eds.), The Oxford History of the Prison, New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. Indeed in Discipline and Punish Foucault suggests various variants of the basic
design – its strict form, semi-circle, cross-plan, the star shape (SP 290; DP 250) – and in the French text refers the reader to nine of the plates for examples (SP 290n4; see SP plates 18-26; DP plates 4-6).

Notes to the Conclusion


2. The key text on the influences is Henri Lefebvre, *Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche ou le royaume des ombres*, Paris-Tournoi: Casterman, 1975. For the combination, see notably *La Production de l’espace; The Production of Space*.


Notes to the Appendix

1. *Gebilde* is more usually object or structure, but the prefix Ge-, so important to Heidegger, means bringing together (see for example Gebirge, mountain range; Gemüt, disposition; Gestell, enframing); bilden is to form. *Gebilde* literally means then the bringing together of the form.

2. The German language has two words for body, *der Körper* and *der Leib*, two words that are close to synonyms and are both translated by the English ‘body’. *Der Körper* is closer to the understanding of body as mass, and is used for animals and humans. *Der Leib* is used only for humans, and can mean body in a less tangible way.

3. This and related words are of great importance to the later Heidegger, developing from his important treatise of the 1930s, unpublished in his lifetime, GA65.

4. Heidegger argues throughout his career that αλήθεια, usually translated as ‘truth’ [*Wahrheit*], must be understood as non-concealment. See, for example, “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit”; “On the Essence of Truth” in GA9; GA34; GA54.

5. This is normally translated as locality; but the final lecture course on
Hölderlin speaks of the placing of the place [*die Ortschaft des Ortes*]. The English translation speaks of the ‘locality of the locale’, which loses the meaning of the original. See GA53, 23. This is discussed in Chapter Three above.

6 This word is related to *die Geschichte*, history; *das Schicksal*, fate or destiny; *geschehen*, to happen, etc.

7 As a noun *Lesen* means harvest, reading, lection, gathering, collection; the verb *lesen* means to read, to gather or to collect.
Bibliography


Aristotle, *The Politics*, translated by T.A. Sinclair, revised and represented by


Crowther, Anne, “Penal Peepshow: Bentham’s Prison that never was”, in *The Times Literary Supplement*, No 4847, February 23rd 1996.


Eribon, Didier, Michel Foucault, translated by Betsy Wing, London: Faber and Faber, 1993.


Flaherty, Peter, “(Con)textual Contest: Derrida and Foucault on Madness and the Cartesian Subject”, in Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol 16 No 1, March 1986.


Foucault, Michel, This is Not a Pipe, translated by James Harkess, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983.


271


Han, Béatrice, L'ontologie manquée de Michel Foucault, Grenoble: Jérôme Millon, 1998.


Heidegger, Martin, *Questions*, translated by various and including in the fourth volume the original protocols of the Thor and Zahringen seminars, Paris: Gallimard, Four Volumes, 1966-76.


Heidegger, Martin, "Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristotles (Anzeige
der hermeneutischen Situation).”, in Dilthey-Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Geschichte der Geisteswissenschaften, Bd. 6, 1989.


Köstlin, Julius, Life of Luther, London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1883.


Neocleous, Mark & Elden, Stuart, “‘The Police Includes Everything’: Foucault, Hegel and the Police Concept”, forthcoming.

283


Poole, Ross, “Nietzsche: The Subject of Morality”, *Radical Philosophy*, No 54, Spring 1990.


