CLIMATE CHANGE, MORAL PANIC, AND CIVILIZATION: On the Development of Global Warming as a Social Problem

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by

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Declaration

The following publications have been produced as a direct or indirect result of the research discussed in this thesis:

**Books:**

**Journal Papers:**
2. **Rohloff, A.** (under review). Moral panics as civilising and decivilising processes? A comparative discussion

**Papers in Edited Books:**

**Other Publications:**
Abstract

This study combines moral panic with the figurational sociology of Norbert Elias to explore how climate change has developed as a social problem. The central argument is that, through combining the short-term focus of moral panic with the long-term focus of Elias, we can examine the interplay between planned and unplanned developments in both the perception and reality of climate change.

The first part of the research consisted of discourse analysis of a variety of different texts from 1800 to the present. These were used to explore the long-term development of climate change as emerging from an ecological civilizing process. The second stage of the research related these developments to moral panics, arguing that the emergence of climate change can only be understood by exploring the interplay between long-term processes and short-term campaigns.

The third part of the research explored these historical developments at the individual level, examining the notion of individual ecological civilizing processes. 15 semi-structured interviews were undertaken with climate change ‘activists’ and ‘non-activists’, comparing how their biographical developments related to ecological civilizing processes and moral panics.

The final part of the research compared climate change with five other empirical examples of moral panics, to explore the civilizing and decivilizing processes and civilizing offensives that occur before, during, and after the panics. The central aim was to demonstrate the complexity of moral panics, and to aid in the reformulation of the concepts of moral panic and decivilization.
Through a synthesis of Elias and moral panic, as applied to the example of climate change, this study aimed to: critically assess the development of climate change; to reassess the concept of decivilization and the relation between civilizing processes and offensives; and to reformulate the concept of moral panic, including suggesting how moral panic research ought to be undertaken.
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Chapter One

Introduction

This thesis explores two main areas of research: (1) the relation between moral panic and figurational sociology, and (2) the development of climate change as a social problem. Its central aims are: to question how and to what extent moral panic remains a useful concept, and if so in what formulation; and to understand how climate change has been developing, so that we might seek to address it. My research does this by combining the concept of moral panic, along with concepts from figurational sociology, and applying these to the empirical example of climate change. These three fields of research have never been combined before (aside from in my own research1).

Initially, this research developed out of an interest in using the example of climate change to develop the concepts of moral panic and civilization; I started with concepts, with a theoretical-conceptual framework, and then looked for an empirical example. Climate change was chosen for several reasons: at the time, very little sociological research had been undertaken; it was (and still is) a highly topical example; it was a contemporary example, in that it was current; it did not seem like a perfect fit to the concepts of moral panic and decivilization, it challenged many of the assumptions associated with them, and was therefore a strong ‘test’ of the concepts.

Gradually, as the research process developed, I came to be increasingly interested in the topic of climate change for its own sake, not just for its role as a research tool to develop concepts. And so the focus shifted to exploring not just

1 BeforecommencingmyPhD,ithadalreadywrittenmyHonoursdissertationonthistopic, focusingonAlGore’scampaigninanInconvenientTruth(Rohloff,2007).Thiswastlater re-writtenforpublication(Rohloff,2011a).
how climate change has developed (providing new insights to research on climate change), but also how it might, and perhaps how it ought to develop in the future. This then lead to a desire to develop research-informed recommendations that could have implications for climate change policy, campaigns, media, and so on.

This brings us to what my central research problem and research questions are. But before I introduce them, it is necessary to provide a brief overview of climate change, moral panic, and civilization (moral panic and civilization, and Elias's work more generally, will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3).

**Climate Change**

The prospect of global climate change, as influenced by anthropogenic processes, has come to be viewed by some as an increasingly prominent 'social problem'. Climate change is a 'natural' ongoing process, with or without the presence of humans, and the greenhouse effect is necessary to sustain present life on this planet. However, research undertaken in the various sciences of climate change has demonstrated how the rapid increase in greenhouse gas emissions (including, but not limited to, CO₂) correspond to increasing overall global temperatures, and has projected that these global temperatures will go on to increase with devastating consequences for various forms of life on earth².

While the science of global climate change has been developing since before the twentieth century (Weart, [2003] 2008), it is only comparatively recently that the topic has come to be increasingly commonplace in the 'public sphere'; the last few decades, in particular, have witnessed an apparent increase in attention to the topic, with an apparent acceleration of 'popular' interest in the twenty-first century. Following a series of extreme weather events in 2005, with

² For a comprehensive introduction to climate change, anthropogenic climate change, and the consequences of this, see Houghton ([1994] 2009).
associated media coverage (see Lever-Tracy, 2008a), 2006 saw the release of the Al Gore presented documentary, *An Inconvenient Truth* (Guggenheim, 2006), which sought to educate the public about ‘global warming’ and engender a sense of urgency to address the ‘climate crisis’. Numerous popular books, guides, teaching resources, reality TV shows, movies, and other documentaries have since emerged. ‘Global warming’ clothing, Live Earth concerts, amongst other developments, all suggest that anthropogenic climate change has become at least a popular (though at times contested) social problem. This research seeks to explore how such developments have occurred, and what implications they have for halting climate change.

This research employs a long-term approach to understanding the development of global warming as a perceived social problem. It explores how different processes – natural processes, intentional campaigns and interventions, and wider social processes – may influence understandings about anthropogenic climate change and, potentially, changes in nature-society relations. Primarily, this research brings together the concept of moral panic with Norbert Elias’s theory of civilizing (and decivilizing) processes to explore how and to what extent understandings about and the governance of climate change have developed.

**Moral Panic**

The development of climate change as a perceived social problem provides an interesting case with which to ‘test’ and ‘develop’ the concept of moral panic, for it does not fit neatly with the original understanding of the concept. The term ‘moral panic’ was first taken up by Jock Young (1971a), and then more fully developed by Stanley Cohen (1972) in his famous study on the ‘Mods’ and

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3 This is not to suggest that concern about climate change has only developed since 2005. Rather, 2005 and the events that followed provide an example of a series of incidents that may have spurred acceleration in the development of concern about climate change. This research seeks to explore to what extent this may or may not have been the case at different times.
'Rockers'\(^4\). This original, or 'classic', conceptualization of moral panic describes a particular type of overreaction to a perceived social problem. As Cohen famously describes it:

Societies appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods of moral panic. A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other right-thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or (more often) resorted to; the condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates and becomes more visible. Sometimes the object of the panic is quite novel and at other times it is something which has been in existence long enough, but suddenly appears in the limelight. Sometimes the panic passes over and is forgotten, except in folklore and collective memory; at other times it has more serious and long-lasting repercussions and might produce such changes as those in legal and social policy or even in the way the society conceives itself. ([1972] 2002, p. 1; see also Critcher, 2003; Goode & Ben-Yehuda, [1994] 2009; Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke & Roberts, 1978; Thompson, 1998).

Despite Cohen’s groundbreaking study, there have been several criticisms of moral panic research, with some authors rejecting the concept altogether (for example, Hunt, 1999; Moore & Valverde, 2000; Ungar, 2001; Watney, [1987] 1997). Criticisms include: the normativity of the concept (the reaction to the perceived social problem is presumed to be irrational and innately misguided; see Hunt, 1999; Moore & Valverde, 2000); the short-term focus of much moral panic research (it has tended to focus on the processes involved within the

\(^4\)Cohen ([1972] 2002, p. xxxv) acknowledges that both he and Young probably first came across the term ‘moral panic’ in Marshall McLuhan’s *Understanding Media.*
'panic', without exploring how these relate to wider, long-term social processes; see Rohloff & Wright, 2010; Watney, [1987] 1997); problems of determinism and agency; and the relative lack of theoretical-conceptual development, of continually engaging the concept with developments in social theory5 (for example, see Hier, 2008; Rohloff & Wright, 2010). In response to some of these criticisms, increasing attention is currently being given to the theoretical and methodological development of the moral panic concept, with many recent publications discussing the concept and its adequacy (for example, see Altheide, 2009; Critcher, 2008a, 2009; David, Rohloff, Petley, & Hughes, 2011; Garland, 2008; Hier, 2008, 2011c; Jenkins, 2009; Rohloff, 2008, 2011a; Rohloff & Wright, 2010; Young, 2009). One way in which some authors are seeking to develop moral panic is through the utilisation of the Foucauldian concept of governmentality. Put simply, it involves exploring how governance (i.e. practices of government or regulation) is thought about, and how governance develops. It incorporates both governance of the self and governance of the other (Dean, [1999] 2010). In this respect, it is similar to Elias’s self-constraint and external constraint (except that, for Elias, there is a long-term shift towards increasing self-constraint relative to external constraint). Sean Hier has incorporated governmentality into his reformulation of moral panic; he conceptualises moralisation as a ‘dialectic that counterposes individualizing discourses (which call on people to take personal responsibility to manage risk, e.g. drinking responsibly) against collectivizing discourses (which represent more broadly harms to be avoided, e.g. the drunk driver)’ (Hier, 2008, p. 174). He argues that during moral panics, this dialectic shifts more towards collectivising discourses, where the focus is on the governance of the (harmful) other. This concept of governmentality, and how it relates to moral panic and civilizing processes, will be further discussed in Chapter 3.

5 Chas Critcher (2002, 2003, 2008a, 2009, 2011a) and Sean Hier (2002a, 2002b, 2003, 2008) have recently begun an attempt to address this, via their differing efforts to connect moral panic with discourse, moral regulation, and risk.
Drawing from Eliasian and other approaches, an additional aim of this research is to contribute to these debates with a reformulation of the moral panic concept. It is anticipated that, through applying the concept of moral panic to the example of global warming (a social problem that does not fit neatly with many of the assumptions of the original understanding of the moral panic concept), in combination with the original utilization of Norbert Elias’s theory of civilizing (and decivilizing) processes, I will develop a reformulation of the moral panic concept; one that begins to address many of the problems and disputes within moral panic research. Some of these disputes include: whether or not moral panics require folk devils, the relation between panic and denial, the criterion of disproportionality, the extent to which moral panics contribute to deviancy amplification and secondary deviance, and the notion of ‘good’ (as opposed to ‘bad’) moral panics. These will all be explored and developed throughout this thesis, with the aim of developing a new approach to moral panic research, one that is relevant to empirical examples across time and space.

Civilization

In, *On the Process of Civilisation* (formerly titled in English *The Civilizing Process*) ([1939] 2012), Elias explores ‘civilization’ in two very different ways. Firstly, he explores the development of the *normative* concept of ‘civilization’: the process whereby one group of people come to see themselves as more ‘civilized’ than another group of people, thereby enabling these self-identified ‘civilized’ people to commit acts that at other times would be seen as ‘uncivilized’. Indeed, the first part of Elias’ book is devoted to the ‘sociogenesis’, or development, of the normative concepts of ‘civilization’ and ‘culture’ in everyday language:

when one examines what the general function of the concept of civilisation really is...one starts with a very simple discovery: this concept expresses
the self-conscious of the West...It sums up everything in which Western society of the last two or three centuries believes itself superior to earlier societies or ‘more primitive’ contemporary ones. By this term Western society seeks to describe what constitutes its special character and what it is proud of: the level of its technology, the nature of its manners, the development of its scientific knowledge or view of the world, and much more. ([1939] 2012, p. 15)

While Elias did not want to use the term ‘civilizing process’ to refer to progress, he did seek to understand how the concept of ‘civilization’ in its everyday usage had attained these connotations of ‘progress’ and ‘self-betterment’ (as opposed to the ‘uncivilized’, and the ‘barbaric’).6

In contrast to the former normative, everyday understanding of ‘civilization’, Elias sought to develop a second, more technical and sociological understanding of ‘civilization’. And so after having explored the normative terms of ‘culture’ and ‘civilization’, Elias goes onto provide empirical examples and analyses that feed into his technical concept of civilization. In his examination of Western Europe from the Middle Ages, Elias develops his ‘central theory’7 of civilizing processes by empirically exploring the interrelationship between long-term changes in standards of behaviour and long-term changes in state-formation and other wider processes.

‘Elias’s intention is to show by the examination of empirical evidence how, factually, standards of behaviour and psychological make-up have changed in European society since the Middle Ages, and then to explain why this has

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7 Quilley & Loyal (2005) argue that Elias's process sociology can be used as a central theory to intergrate sociology, and indeed the whole of the human sciences. Conversely, Dunning & Hughes (2013, Ch.3) explore central theory in relation to grand theories and middle range theories. They argue that while Elias's central theory is similar to Merton's middle range theory, it goes beyond this via the application to a range of topics, and by developing intergration and synthesis (which Merton was opposed to).
happened.’ (Mennell, [1989] 1998, p. 30). Psychological make-up is often referred to as ‘habitus’, and it essentially means ‘that level of personality characteristics which individuals share in common with fellow members of their social groups.’ So examining manners and etiquette books (and other texts) provides a window into social habitus and its long-term transformation. From examining these texts, Elias discovers long-term changes in codes of mannerly behaviour, where manners from the medieval period were comparatively ‘simple, naïve and undifferentiated’ compared with today. Then during the Renaissance period, ‘with the structural transformation of society, with the new pattern of relationships, a change slowly comes about: the compulsion to check one’s behaviour increases.’ (Elias, cited in Mennell, [1989] 1998 p. 42) By the eighteenth century, many ‘bad’ manners that were discussed in previous centuries were now absent from etiquette books, for these proscriptions no longer need to be said as they are now internalized within people’s personality make-up. This ‘movement toward many things no longer being spoken about ran in conjunction with a movement towards moving many of the same things behind the scenes of social life.’ (Mennell, [1989] 1998, p. 43) These changes were accompanied with changes in emotions associated with these behaviours, with advancing feelings of shame and repugnance toward bodily functions.

These long-term changes are described by Elias in relation to the balance between external restraint (control by others) and self-restraint (internalized self-control) – he argues that there is an overall shift in the balance towards increasing self-restraint. And he adds that the ‘super-ego’, the inner self that forbids people to do certain things, regulates relations with others via an internalized individual self-control (Mennell, [1989] 1998, p. 105). As Elias puts it:

the displeasure towards such conduct which is thus aroused by the adult finally arises through habit, without having been induced by [the present
action of another person...Since the pressure of coercion of individual adults is allied to the pressure of example of the whole surrounding world, most children as they grow up, forget or repress relatively early the fact that their feelings of shame and embarrassment, of pleasure and displeasure, are moulded into conformity with a certain standard by external pressure and compulsion. All this appears to them as highly personal, something ‘inward’, implanted in them by nature...[I]t becomes more and more an inner automatism, the imprint of society on the inner self, the super-ego, that forbids the individual to eat in any other way than with a fork. The social standard to which the individual was first made to conform by external restraint is finally reproduced more or less smoothly within him, through a self-restraint which may operate even against his conscious wishes. (Elias, cited in Mennell, [1989] 1998, p. 44)

Elias argues that from the beginning of the Renaissance onwards, ‘feelings and affects were first transformed in the upper class, and the structure of society as a whole permitted this changed affect standard to spread slowly throughout society’, through a trickle down process via status aspirations, where people seek to distinguish themselves as members of the ‘good society’ (Elias, cited in Mennell, [1989] 1998, p.48).

Elias describes the process of the transformation of these individual personality structures as psychogenesis, and insists that we can only understand this development by looking at its relation to sociogenesis: the development of long-term broader, structural transformations (Mennell, [1989] 1998, p.50). For changes in behavior and emotion were and are necessary in order to adapt to changes in the structure of and relations in societies. Elias describes how, for example, as the function of a knight comes to be needed less and less, for people who are knights to survive or to flourish in such societies they must adapt to another way of life that is more functional and, coincidentally, more restrained (Mennell, [1989] 1998, p.60).
One important reason why these changes occurred, argues Elias, is to do with processes of state formation. This long-term process of an increasingly central single authority (the ‘state’) involves several mechanisms. There is the *monopoly mechanism*, which refers to

the gradual concentration of the means of violence and taxation (the two principle means of ruling) in the hands of a single ruler and administration in each territory; and the enlargement of the territory through competition with and elimination of neighbouring rulers. Second, the *royal mechanism*, which refers to the internal balance of social forces *within* the developing state. And third, the *transformation of ‘private’ into ‘public’ monopolies*. (Mennell, [1989] 1998, p.66)

These three processes intertwine with one another, and contribute to and are affected by changes in personality make-up. Consequently, we can see an overall shift towards increasingly less and less violence involved in conflicts between people. It is this combination of interconnected processual transformations – at the micro and the macro level, in the form of psychogenesis and sociogenesis, in processes of state formation, involving state regulation and interpersonal self-regulation and socialization – that constitute Elias’s theory of civilizing processes.

While these long-term changes were characterized by trends and counter-trends, Elias argues that we can still observe an overall long-term trend that is developing in a particular direction: towards increasing complexity. To simplify this process, temporarily ignoring the counter-trends, Elias outlines how, as a central state authority grows and gains increasing monopolization over the control of violence and taxation, and as population grows and the division of labour increases, societies become more complex, more differentiated, and so people become increasingly reliant upon one another. This increase in
interdependencies exerts pressures towards changes in behaviour, compelling people towards increased foresight and increased self-restraint (initially imposed with force by the state, with a long-term processual shift towards self-imposed constraint). However, these processes were constantly developing simultaneously with other counter-trends.

The theory of civilizing processes does not argue that violence has simply disappeared; rather, it has been transformed. For example, where face-to-face violence has come to be increasingly viewed as ‘uncivilized’, through the aid of technology we witness an increasing shift towards violence at a distance, where perpetrators increasingly become physically and emotionally distanced from victims. This is clearly depicted in Elias’s own example of the Holocaust in Nazi Germany (Elias, [1989] 1996). Some of the additional examples of ‘killing at a distance’ are to be found in the use of long-range weapons in warfare, ‘from machine-guns at a distance through to fighter aircraft and inter-continental ballistic missiles’ (Fletcher, 1997, pp. 50-51), and in transformations in the methods used for execution of those sentenced to death in the United States. This relates to the problem of ‘civilized barbarism’, which is where ‘dehumanizing violence [continues] at both an individual and collective level at the very same time that we appear to be becoming increasingly civilized’ (van Krieken, 1998, p.127).

Additionally, while violence within states becomes increasingly monopolized by a central state authority (where intra-state violence changes form), we witness an additional shift from intra- to inter-state violence. As (some) state figurations become established, they then seek to monopolize other ‘rogue’ states or territories. Historically, we can consider the internal violence (including civil wars) that occurred within places like the UK, followed by processes of colonialism, world wars, then other wars with other nations, and ‘peacekeeping missions’.
And so it is important to note that Elias did not regard his theory of civilizing processes as being unilinear or inevitable – it was not a theory of ‘progress’, neither was it a proclamation of the superiority of Western ‘civilization’ (Kilminster & Mennell, 2008, p. xiii). Elias did not use the word ‘civilizing’ in any normative sense; ‘civilization’ is used by Elias as a more detached, processual term – the dynamic process of civilization (Elias, [1939] 2012). Indeed, Elias observed that the process of civilization is ‘in a continuous conflict with countervailing decivilising processes. There is no basis for assuming that it must remain dominant’ (Elias, [1986] 2008, p. 4). It is the interplay between these processes – civilizing and decivilizing – that I wish to explore in relation to moral panic and climate change.

Stephen Mennell defines decivilizing processes as ‘regressions from earlier standards’ ([1989] 1998, p. 20), as reversals of civilizing processes (1990, p. 205). In The Germans ([[1989] 1996]) Elias explores this notion, referring to the ‘regression to barbarism’ (for example, p. 309) and the ‘decivilizing spurt’ (for example, p. 1) that facilitated the rise of the Nazi regime. Mennell (1990, p. 20) suggests that what he calls ‘true’ decivilizing processes would be marked by breaking links and shorter chains of social interdependence, associated with higher levels of danger and incalculability in everyday life, the re-emergence of violence into the public sphere and a decline in mutual identification, reduced pressures on individuals to restrain the expression of impulses (including the freer expression of aggressiveness), changes in socialization and personality formation, and increasing fantasy-content of modes of knowledge [where knowledge becomes farther removed from ‘reality’].

This is further explicated in Mennell’s table comparing civilizing and decivilizing

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8This is soon to be published with the new title of Studies on the Germans; volume 11 of The Collected Works of Norbert Elias, University College Dublin Press.
processes (see Figure 1.1).

**Figure 1.1: European Civilizing Process Compared with Possible Symptoms of Decivilizing Processes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EUROPEAN CIVILISING PROCESS</th>
<th>POSSIBLE SYMPTOMS OF DECIVILISING PROCESSES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>STRUCTURAL PROCESSES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↑ State-formation:</td>
<td>Breaking links, shorter chains of interdependence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monopolisation of means of violence and taxation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↑ Division of Labour/Social Functions/Heterogeneity</td>
<td>Homogeneity, cellular structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↑ Trade, towns, money, markets, population</td>
<td>↑ danger level, incaulability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>All interweaving to produce longer chains, denser webs of interdependence, with consequences:</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHANGES IN MANNERS/CULTURE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↑ Movement 'behind the scenes' (bodily functions etc., and violence)</td>
<td>↑ Re-emergence of violence, etc., into public sphere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↑ Diminishing contrasts, increasing variety</td>
<td>↑ mutual identification, ↑ cruelty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↑ Mutual identification (inc. ↑ cruelty to humans, animals)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHANGES IN SOCIAL HABITUS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↑ Pressures towards foresight:</td>
<td>↓ Pressures restraining expression of impulses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Psychologisation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Rationalisation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Advancing thresholds of shame and embarrassment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↑ distance between child’s and adult standards</td>
<td>↓ gap child/adult standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No zero-point in self-constraint, but becomes</td>
<td>↑ reliance on external constraints</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↑ more automatic</td>
<td>↑ impulsive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↑ more even and continuous</td>
<td>↓ uniformity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↑ more all-round, all-embracing</td>
<td>↑ exceptions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taming of aggressiveness</td>
<td>Freeer expression of aggressiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHANGES IN MODES OF KNOWLEDGE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↑ Detachment, ↓ Involvement</td>
<td>↑ Involvement, ↓ Detachment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>↓ fantasy content, ↑ ‘reality-congruence’</td>
<td>↑ fantasy content, ↓ ‘reality congruence’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Source: Mennell, 1990, p. 206]

In addition to this 'absolute' definition provided by Mennell, Elias refers to the idea that civilizing processes could give rise to decivilizing processes, or at least contribute to them – where civilizing and decivilizing processes could occur simultaneously. For example, again in relation to Germany, Elias

made the point that the monopolization of physical force by the state, through the military and the police, cuts in two directions and has a Janus-faced character, because such monopolies of force can then be all the more
effectively wielded by powerful groups within any given nation-state, as indeed they did under the Nazi regime. (van Krieken, 1998, pp. 112–3)

Elias also highlights ‘that social norms [have] an “inherently double-edged character”, since in the very process of binding some people together, they turn those people against others.’ (van Krieken, 1998, p. 113) In other words, processes of integration are accompanied with processes of disintegration. This is perhaps most evident in de Swaan’s work on compartmentalized genocide, where positive identification with an in-group and disidentification with ‘outsiders’ occur simultaneously (for example, the cases of Rwanda [de Swaan, 1997; see also de Swaan 2001]). It is this notion of integration and disintegration that I will be exploring in relation to the development of moral panics. The concept of moral panic, and the example of climate change (and other examples examined in Chapter 8), will be used to question and develop the notion of decivilizing processes and their relation to civilizing processes and offensives.

Through exploring the relationship between civilizing/decivilizing processes and moral panics, this research will begin to explore the role of knowledge in decivilizing processes (including the monopolization, democratization, and the technization of the dissemination of knowledge). Research on civilizing processes, and decivilizing processes in particular, has tended to focus on the relative state monopolization (or lack thereof) of the means of violence, as is evident with the title of Jonathan Fletcher’s (1997) introductory text on Elias: Violence and Civilization. In turn, in examining the concept of moral panic in relation to the development of understandings about anthropogenic climate change, this research also aims to contribute to debates about the relation of decivilizing processes to civilizing processes, as well as the interplay between intentional civilizing offensives and unintentional civilizing processes9 (the

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9While civilizing offensives have largely been conceptualized as intentional and civilizing processes as unintentional, this is not necessarily the case. Elias refers to civilizing processes as
latter, another area which has received little explicit attention; see Dunning & Sheard, [1979] 2005, p. 280). (These areas of Elias's research, and of figurational sociology more generally, will be further discussed in more detail in Chapters 3 and 4.)

Civilizing offensive is a term that appears to have first been used by Dutch sociologists in the 1980s, and is derived from the work of Elias (for example, see Mitzman, 1987; Verrips, 1987). It refers to intentional campaigns that attempt to change the manners and morals of a group of people. In exploring civilizing processes, Elias largely focuses on long-term unplanned developments – although people act intentionally, he argues that the course of human history was (and is) by and large the unintended outcomes of intentional actions. In other words, people's planned actions have many unintended consequences. However, critics of Elias, and those seeking to develop Elias's work, argue that the area of civilizing offensives is relatively neglected (for example, van Krieken, 1990). As such, in this thesis I will be exploring how long-term changes in relations with and perceptions of 'nature' and 'the environment' relate to more short-term intentional campaigns to change people's behaviour with regards to climate change.

This interplay between offensives and processes, between the planned and the unplanned, is useful to think about when considering the possibility of ecological civilizing processes. Aarts et al. refer to the process of 'ecologization' as 'the development of what came to be called "environmental awareness"', encompassing 'attempts to keep the nature of human activity and the numbers of human species within constraints considered "ecologically acceptable"'. It 'strives for optimum welfare within ecological constraints' (Aarts, Schmidt & Spier, 1995, pp. 1247–8). In their analysis of various campaigning groups'
attempts to change people’s behaviour toward more ‘ecological self-control’, Aarts et al. found that ‘[a]lthough sounding the alarm is a necessary component of efforts to stimulate ecological awareness, positively phrased campaigns to stimulate specific moderation are likely to be more successful than alarmist approaches...’ (Aarts, Schmidt & Spier, 1995, pp. 1248). Here, Aarts et al. appear to be exploring the intended and unintended consequences of ecological civilizing offensives. In this thesis, I will be using the concept of moral panic and the related concept of denial to explore the relation between panic and denial in climate change campaigns (or ecological civilizing offensives). I will also examine how long-term civilizing processes have perhaps unintentionally contributed to ecological civilizing processes.

Aarts et al. additionally explore the role of status aspirations in the relative appeal of ecological self-control, in refraining from consumption. They argue that compared with other forms of consumption, ecological associations have relatively low status appeal, but that under certain conditions this status appeal may be strengthened (Aarts, Schmidt & Spier, 1995). Taking this notion of status aspiration, in this thesis I will additionally explore how and the extent to which various current climate change campaigns attempt to appeal to status aspirations, and the degree to which the everyday practices of climate change activists and non-activists relate to these.

This concept of ecological civilizing processes, while looked upon as a necessary development for the continuity of humans, is contested. For example, as Quilley (2011, p. 85) argues: ‘Unfortunately an ecological civilizing process and the inculcation of much more demanding standards of habitual self-restraint, though possible, seems unlikely’. Quilley may or may not be accurate in his prognosis of the future, but for the purposes of this thesis I will be focusing on a much more limited outlook. Rather than exploring the extent to which ecological civilizing processes may be occurring at a fast enough rate and be widespread enough to address anthropogenic climate change, I will instead be
exploring how and the extent to which ecological civilizing processes have been occurring on the back of a broader civilizing process, and how ecological civilizing offensives feed into and are fed by these processes.

Within this notion of ecological civilizing processes I also aim to explore the different levels of civilizing processes. First, is the personal, individual civilizing process that occurs from birth to death; what is commonly referred to as socialization, enculturation, personality formation, and so forth – ‘Whatever it is called, this individual lifetime learning process is closely bound up with processes of biological maturation’ (Mennell [1989] 1998, p. 200). To explore these individual civilizing processes, I will interview a mixture of people who are and who are not involved in climate change ‘activism’.

The second level of civilizing processes is explored by Elias through his analysis of table manners, behaviour when at court, and so forth. While these also involve social-psychological transformations, they occur at a slower pace than individual civilizing processes (Mennell [1989] 1998, p. 200). To examine this level, I will analyze a series of texts from the past 200 years, in a manner similar to Elias.

The third level occurs on a much longer time-scale, focusing on humanity as a whole. It connects middle range civilizing processes (such as those explore in On the Process of Civilization) with much longer, much more gradual civilizing processes, all of which feed into one another (Mennell [1989] 1998, p. 201). This level will not be looked at to such an extent in this thesis, but it is important to keep in mind how such long-term civilizing processes relate to the long-term development of the use of fire (Goudsblom, 1992), and how this in turn relates to the emergence of anthropogenic climate change.

Central Research Problem and Research Questions
To achieve the aims discussed above, and to explore the central research problem of how anthropogenic climate change has developed as a perceived social problem, this research will investigate the following questions:

1. How have ideas about ‘nature’ and the ‘environment’ developed over time?
2. How and to what extent has the governance of climate change developed over time?
3. How do these developments relate to wider social processes?
4. How do these developments relate to changes in the production and dissemination of knowledge?

These four research questions will all be explored in relation to two central hypotheses:

1. The development of concern about climate change is part of a broader, long-term ecological civilizing process.
2. The development of concern about climate change is part of a broader moral panic about climate change.

Additional questions that I will be exploring in this thesis relate to moral panic:

1. How and to what extent has the concept of moral panic developed?
2. How and to what extent is it still a useful concept?
3. If it is relatively useful, how and to what extent does it need to be reformulated?

Finally, this exploration of moral panic, and of climate change, will be used to critically interrogate the concepts of civilizing processes, decivilizing processes, and civilizing offensives. The research findings will also be used to develop conclusions that may inform policy, campaigns, and media representations of climate change.
I am aware that there are other approaches beyond Elias and moral panic that could have been of value to this research. However, I did not have time or space to utilize these. Furthermore, an aim of this research is to test Elias, which is why I have predominantly focused on figurational sociology (along with moral panic). Future research could utilize these other approaches. Additionally, there are areas specifically related to climate change, green politics, and the ‘environment’ which I am aware of but did not have time to cover. These include such things as corporate politics, government policy, intergovernmental relations, and many more. Again, such topics can be explored in later research.

Theoretical-Conceptual Background: Moral Panic and Civilization

Drawing from the work of Norbert Elias and the figurational approach to research, this thesis builds on the original concept of moral panic, and on the recent moral panic and moral regulation contributions of Alan Hunt (1999, 2003, 2011), Sean Hier (2002a, 2008) and Chas Critcher (2009). My aim is to assess some of the main assumptions of moral panic research and, specifically, to elaborate on the developmental research of Hunt, Hier and Critcher, all of who conceptualize volatile panic episodes in relation to long-term, wider social processes. The focus on developmental and relational research in this thesis differs to much moral panic research, in that the latter its typically characterized by a short-term focus on the moral panic event, while neglecting how the panic develops, where it comes from, and how it is related to more long-term processes.

I will argue that the aim to conceptualize moral panics as short-term episodes that emerge from long-term moralization processes can be enhanced by incorporating the work of Norbert Elias. I am not arguing that we should

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10 The concept of moralization itself will be scrutinized in a subsequent piece of research, when I explore it in relation to the development and usage of moral panic, moral regulation, and civilizing processes. In that same research, alternative concepts such as problematization, responsibilization, and ethicalization will also be explored.
develop a strictly ‘Eliasian’ approach to moral panic at the expense of all the other very important work that has been undertaken in this field (most recently, focusing on the work of Foucault, governmentality and moral regulation). Rather, I wish to explore how and to what extent Elias’s work is of value to emerging and more traditional moral panic research.

The work of Norbert Elias has been little mentioned in the same context as moral panic, which on one level is surprising (as I will discuss later, the ‘figurational approach’ of Elias and, in particular, the concepts of civilizing processes, decivilizing processes, and civilizing offensives, have much in common with moral panic analyses, albeit there are fundamental differences as well). The first coinciding of Elias and moral panic began in the 1980s with Eric Dunning et al.’s work on football hooliganism (for example, see: Dunning, Murphy & Williams (1986, 1988, pp. 10, 77–8, 134–5, 141, 145–6, 151–2, 241–2); Dunning & Sheard ([1979] 2005, p. 234); Murphy, Dunning & Williams (1988); Murphy, Williams & Dunning (1990)). However, this early work did not attempt to develop a synthesis of Elias and moral panic; rather, these figurational studies on football hooliganism merely mentioned the term ‘moral panic’ in passing, referring to the media’s amplification (or deamplification) of incidences of football hooliganism, and the perceived inappropriate reaction by policy makers.

We can find traces of Elias in recent work on moral panic (for example, see Hier, 2002a, p. 324), which draws upon Alan Hunt’s work on moral regulation (Hunt, 1999) along with the works of Mitchell Dean ([1999] 2010) and Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer ([1985] 1991). This suggests that the field of moral panic studies would be compatible with some of the arguments in this thesis. While largely rejecting the concept of moral panic, Hunt utilizes both Elias and Foucault to explore historical projects of moral regulation (campaigns that others might classify as moral panics). In his analysis, Hunt explores how moral regulatory projects work to both govern others and govern the self. Sean Hier
has since taken up Hunt’s analysis and applied it to moral panics, arguing that moral panics are volatile episodes of these everyday regulatory projects, where the focus shifts from ethical self governance to the governance of ‘dangerous’ others (Hier, 2002a, 2002b, 2003, 2008). Chas Critcher (2008a, 2009) has now also joined the debate, albeit with some disagreement as to the extent to which we can apply the concept of moral regulation to moral panic.

This thesis’ theoretical framework argues for four main methodological shifts in the focus of moral panic research: (1) exploring panics in relation to wider long-term and short-term processes; (2) exploring the contradictory, countervailing processes that occur before, during and after panics, thereby exploring the complexity of panics; (3) exploring empirical examples that do not fit the ‘classic’ model of a moral panic, as this forces us to question many of the assumptions about moral panic, including the normative presupposition; (4) establishing a mode of research that does not entail a normative, debunking presupposition that the reaction, or ‘panic’, is inappropriate (although research can still be informative in this regard, as will be discussed in Chapters 3 and 4).

To achieve these shifts in focus for moral panic research, this thesis will largely (though not exclusively) be drawing from Norbert Elias’s theory of civilizing processes, and the figurational approach to research.

In terms of research approach, Elias’s work offers several insights to moral panic. His processual/relational approach to research provides the means to avoid the trap of using moral panic as merely a descriptive or taxonomic tool. Asking questions that focus on how and to what extent a possible moral panic has come to pass, provides greater insight than merely asking is a particular example a moral panic. Elias’s practice of viewing problems from a long-term perspective has additional value, for it allows us to explore how and to what extent various long-term processes are feeding into a moral panic, affecting the panic, and thereby provides us with a greater understanding about the processes involved, leading to a greater chance that researchers will be able to
successfully intervene and direct panics. This is further enhanced by Elias’s adoption of historical and comparative methods, one of the reasons why there are historical and comparative chapters in this thesis. These ‘values’ of a figurational approach to moral panic research will be further explicated in Chapters 3 and 4. For now, let us return to the theoretical-conceptual synthesis of moral panic and civilizing processes.

Civilizing Processes

Following on from the first part of On the Process of Civilisation, ‘On the Sociogenesis of the Concepts of “Civilisation” and “Culture”’, Elias ([1939] 2012) explores how the development of the concept of ‘civility’ played out in notions of what constituted ‘civilized’ behaviour. He examines these changes in standards of behaviour by analyzing etiquette books and other documents, beginning with Erasmus’s 1530 publication, ‘On Civility in Boys’. Throughout his analysis of these etiquette books, Elias traces an overall pattern of gradual changes in standards of behaviour relating to everyday interactions (e.g., behaviour at the table, blowing one’s nose, toileting practices). These books illustrate, for Elias, behaviour that was deemed to be acceptable, or ‘civilized’, as well as behaviour that was seen as unacceptable, or ‘uncivilized’. Elias observes that, over time, certain behaviours that were seen to be more ‘animalistic’ (such as bodily functions) came to be associated with shame and disgust and were increasingly ‘shifted behind the scenes’. At the same time, the regulation of these and other behaviours came increasingly to be regulated by self-control rather than external force; what Elias calls ‘the social constraint towards self-constraint’.

In relation to state-formation and other wider social processes, Elias traces how competition between various groups of people, with associated conflict between these groups, culminated in the establishment of a monopoly of one group and the eventual formation of a state. This process of state-formation brought with it changes in the way people were connected with one another, leading
eventually to greater integration and greater interdependence between people, which brings with it changes in relations between people. As Elias puts it, as people become more reliant upon one another via increasing differentiation and increasing interdependence,

...more and more people must attune their conduct to that of others, the web of actions must be organised more and more strictly and accurately, if each individual action is to fulfill its social functions. Individuals are compelled to regulate their conduct in an increasingly differentiated, more even and more stable manner (Elias, [1939] 2012, p. 406).

This process, Elias argues, is in part dependent upon a gradual stabilization of a central state authority, with an associated state monopolization over the forces of violence and taxation. These processes, Elias argues, contribute towards a notion of stability, where dangers come to be perceived as fewer and, when they do occur, as more predictable (that is, where dangers are known, and so life becomes less uncertain). Elias offers the example of ‘When a monopoly of force is formed, pacified social spaces are created which are normally free from acts of violence’ (Elias, [1939] 2012, p. 408). When violence does occur, it is often either hidden ‘behind the scenes’ or legitimated in some way by the state.

To summarize, Elias’s theory of civilizing processes holds that, as a central state authority grows and gains increasing monopolization over the control of violence and taxation, people come to be increasingly integrated and interdependent with one another. These changes in wider social processes affect and are affected by changes in behaviour, with an overall direction towards increasing foresight, mutual identification and increased self-restraint, thus contributing to more even, stable behaviours and relations between people. In later works, Elias further examines how these changes were intertwined with gradual changes in modes of knowledge, from 'magico-
mythical' knowledge towards increasingly ‘reality-congruent’ knowledge\textsuperscript{11} (Elias, [1987] 2007).

While this exposition is largely divorced form empirical examples, it is important to acknowledge that Elias developed these theories in relation to empirical observations. And he further built upon these with additional empirical observations, employing historical and comparative methods. And to reiterate a point made earlier in this chapter, it is important to highlight that Elias did not regard these processes as unilinear or inevitable: X does not lead to Y, even though this simplified exposition may provide readers with this misperception. They are not simplified laws, and every empirical example differs, has its own degree of uniqueness. The concept of decivilizing process (along with informalization and other concepts to be explored in Chapter 3) is one of the ways researchers have attempted to explain away simplified misconceptions about Elias’s theory of civilizing processes.

Decivilizing Processes

Building on Elias’s work, Stephen Mennell has developed some ‘possible symptoms of decivilizing’; put simply, ‘Decivilizing processes are what happens when civilizing processes go into reverse’ (Mennell, 1990, p. 205; see also Fletcher, 1997). One of these potential ‘reversals’ that Mennell elaborates on is ‘a rise in the level of danger and a fall in its calculability’ (Mennell, 1990, p. 215). As Elias argues:

The armour of civilised conduct would crumble very rapidly if, through a change in society, the degree of insecurity that existed earlier were to break in upon us again, and if danger became as incalculable as it once was. Corresponding fears would soon burst the limits set to them today (Elias, [1939] 2012, p. 576).

\textsuperscript{11} It is important to highlight that this shift from ‘magico-mythical’ to ‘reality-congruent’ knowledge, like other processual shifts that Elias traces, is never absolute.
In other words, as danger becomes increasingly incalculable, so too people’s behaviour changes accordingly—it is perhaps more conducive for your survival if, where there is a great deal of uncertainty surrounding potential danger, you tend to err on the side of caution in relations with the ‘social’ and the ‘natural’ world (for example, the ‘fight or flight’ response).

Stephen Mennell observes that there often exists the perception today that we are living in a more violent world. He refers to Geoffrey Pearson’s historical study that illustrates the periodic commonality of such ‘fears of escalating violence, moral decline, and the destruction of “the British way of life”’ (Mennell, 1990, p. 214). Here, Mennell critiques the idea that this qualifies as a decivilizing process, stressing that an actual increase in violence may not necessarily be occurring (aside from periodic short-term increases)12. But perhaps merely the perception of an increase in violence may affect the development of other decivilizing trends, as may be the case with some moral panics.

Another possible symptom of decivilizing processes that Mennell suggests relates to ‘changes in modes of knowledge’:

During times of social crisis – military defeats, political revolutions, rampant inflation, soaring unemployment, separately or in combination – fears rise because control of social events has declined. Rising fears make it still more difficult to control events. That makes people still more susceptible to wish fantasies about means of alleviating the situation (Mennell, 1990, p. 216).

In other words, there occurs a shift back from ‘reality congruent’ to increasingly ‘magico-mythical’ knowledge.

These changes may then potentially coincide with changes in behaviour, where certain acts that were formerly seen as ‘uncivilized’ or barbaric’ become increasingly more acceptable, where there may occur a shift away from violence ‘behind the scenes’ back to the reemergence of violence in the public sphere, where mutual identification between people (or particular groups of people) decreases (Mennell, 1990). A classic example of this is Elias’s own study of Nazi Germany in The Germans (Elias, [1989] 1996). Although, as Mennell observes, these decivilizing trends were only partial reversals; the extermination of the Jews still had to be kept ‘behind the scenes’ to a certain extent, suggesting that there was still a degree of mutual identification with the Jews (Mennell, 1990).

Approaches to decivilizing processes will be more critically explored in Chapters 3, 8 and 9. In this chapter, I have merely introduced decivilizing processes so that we might see how it relates to moral panics.

*Moral Panics as Decivilizing Processes?*

As already mentioned, decivilizing processes may occur where there is a weakening of the state, for example, in the aftermath of social or natural crises. However, with moral panics, there need not be an *actual* weakening, only a *perceived* weakening. This could include the perception that governmental regulations, and the enforcement of those regulations, are failing to control a particular perceived problem; or, conversely, that individuals are failing to regulate their own behaviour and therefore there is a need for a stronger external force (from either within or outside ‘the state’\(^\text{13}\)) to ‘control’ these ‘uncontrollable’ deviants.

Moral panics may further assist with the monopolization of the means of violence by the state. Terming certain behaviours and people as social

\(^{13}\) This could either come from ‘official’ authorities, such as those of ‘the state’, or non-state groups, such as social movement or reform groups, vigilante groups, ‘terrorist’ groups, etc.
problems, and mobilizing or sponsoring panics about these social problems, may assist in developing public consent for increasing legislation, thereby spreading the scope of the state’s monopolization over violence. For example, this type of development can be seen in the work of Hall et al. (1978), where they argue that the ‘mugging’ panic was utilized by the government to legitimate an increasingly more coercive state.

A further indicator of decivilizing processes is the increase in the level of danger posed, as well as an increasing incalculability of danger; that is, where danger becomes more prominent and increasingly difficult to predict. In the case of moral panics, it could be argued that the ‘exaggeration and distortion’ of reporting on phenomena (reporting of both past events and potential future risks) have contributed to a sense that we now live in an increasingly dangerous society, where the occurrence of dangers is perceived to be difficult to predict.

Rather than regarding moral panics as a complete decivilizing process, we can see how perceived increase in danger, and/or perceived failure of central state authority to protect its citizens from perceived dangers, may be enough to bring about partial decivilizing processes, similar to those outlined above. If a particular issue (danger or threat) becomes highlighted and mass communicated (for example, via the media), fears may increase and danger may come to be perceived as increasingly incalculable with regard to the given issue. In turn, ‘folk devils’ may develop (though the demonization of them, and the categorization of them as folk devils, may be contested). During this process, folk devils may come to be increasingly dehumanized and come to be seen as the dangerous ‘uncivilized’ other, thereby enabling the use of more ‘cruel’ measures that would, under other conditions, be deemed ‘uncivilized’. In the haste to address the given issue, solutions may be proposed that are not necessarily well informed, and may not function adequately to address the given issue; indeed, they may have the unintended consequence of contributing to the problem. In addition, in attempts to alleviate the perceived problem, the
state, or even citizens themselves, may draw upon more violent, ‘uncivilized’ measures in an attempt to try to contain the problem; for example, the development of new laws that may override certain civil liberties, or the development of vigilantism (Rohloff, 2008).

However, while the above may apply to some cases that have been classified as moral panics, I wish to argue that it is not simply the case that all moral panics are merely decivilizing processes. Indeed, as Elias himself would no doubt have argued, civilizing and decivilizing processes (and thereby, moral panics), are much more complex than this. Potentially, civilizing processes may contribute to the emergence of moral panics, and moral panics may, in turn, feed back into civilizing processes. It is here that we need a shift in the focus of moral panic research in order to attend to the complexity of moral panics.

**Civilizing Offensives: Towards a Dialectical Understanding of Moral Panic and (De)civilization**

In his discussion of the complexity of civilizing and decivilizing processes, Robert van Krieken (1998, 1999) draws upon the concept of civilizing offensives. Civilizing offensives have been defined as ‘deliberate (but not necessarily successful) attempts by people who consider themselves to be “civilized” to “improve” the manners and morals of people whom they considered to be “less civilized” or “barbaric”’ (Dunning & Sheard, [1979] 2005, p. 280). In this way, ‘civilizing offensives’ bear a strong resemblance to those moral regulation campaigns that are analyzed by Alan Hunt in *Governing Morals* (1999), which, in turn, bear some resemblances to what others have termed ‘moral panics’ (as well as processes that Howard Becker ([1963] 1991) earlier termed ‘moral crusades’ by ‘moral entrepreneurs’).

Robert van Krieken argues ‘for a more dialectical understanding of social relations and historical development, one which grasps the often contradictory character of social life’ (van Krieken, 1998, p. 132). Here, van Krieken is arguing
that processes of civilization themselves can give rise to decivilizing trends in
the form of 'civilized barbarism'; where civilizing and decivilizing are 'opposed
sides of the same processes of social development' (van Krieken, 1998, p. 164),
and are present at the same time as each other rather than being mutually
exclusive processes. To illustrate this point, he draws upon the example of the
'stolen generations' in Australia. In their project to 'civilize' indigenous
Australian children, Europeans forcibly removed the aboriginal children from
their homes and families, in an attempt to make the aboriginal children more
like European children (i.e., to 'civilize' them). This project took the form of a
'civilizing offensive', and was carried out in the name of civilization. Civilizing
processes were present, with the exception that mutual identification was
limited between Europeans and the indigenous population. However, there was
still a degree of mutual identification; the 'stolen generations' were integrated
amongst the Europeans, rather than obliterated (although other aborigines
were killed), and it is important to highlight that this civilizing offensive was
carried out in philanthropic terms; as an attempt to improve (as they saw it) the
lives of the aboriginals (van Krieken, 1999).

However, van Krieken's and others' usage of the term decivilizing, while
sometimes used alongside civilizing, is still conceptualized as a reversal of
civilizing, and in that way represents a dichotomy. Throughout this thesis, I will
instead suggest that they need to be conceptualized in terms of degrees, degrees
of civilizing and decivilizing – rather than this is a decivilizing process, and that
is a civilizing process. This will be further explored in Chapters 3, 8 and 9.

Van Krieken's arguments are still useful, for while 'civilizing offensives' can be
comparable with projects of moral regulation (and, by extension, episodes of
moral panic), they may involve within them a fusion of civilizing and decivilizing
trends. If we combine this idea of a civilizing offensive involving a fusion of
civilizing and decivilizing trends, and then apply it to the concept of moral panic,
we can then use this to develop a more encompassing concept of moral panic,
one that takes account of the complex (civilizing and decivilizing) processes that intertwine before, during and after a moral panic, thereby overcoming the dichotomous, normative conceptualization of moral panics as being either ‘bad’ or ‘good’ panics (on the idea of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ panics, see Cohen, [1972] 2002, pp. xxxi-xxxv; see also Hunt, 2011, for a critique). One potential way to overcome this normative dichotomy is by integrating some of the aspects of figurational research with moral panic research, which will be further discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. In Chapter 8, I will further develop this through comparing several different empirical examples in order to demonstrate the complex interplay of civilizing and decivilizing processes and civilizing offensives.

As we have already seen, via the concepts of civilizing and decivilizing processes and civilizing offensives, moral panic and figurational research also share an interest in exploring changes in the regulation of behaviour – both regulation of the self and regulation of the other. However, there are also several existing points of departure. Rather than viewing these differences in research approaches as problems, in Chapters 3 and 4 I will discuss how these points of departure can be utilized to further develop moral panic research and to attend to some of the recent criticisms and debates surrounding moral panic.

_Moral Panics as Civilizing and Decivilizing Processes: The Example of Climate Change_

A figurational approach to moral panic research might involve exploring the interplay between long-term regulatory processes (moral regulation, or civilizing and decivilizing processes) and short-term campaigns (moral panics). This could involve the study of how various processes have been gradually developing in the long-term, including changes in standards of behaviour, changes in the communication of knowledge, changes in state-formation, changes in social and self-regulation, changing power relations between people. This could then be combined with an exploration of various short-term campaigns (instances of moral panics), and how these short-term campaigns
relate to more gradual wider social processes. Such a focus on long-term developmental research could then provide us with a greater insight into the complex processes that develop in relation to moral panics.

As an example, let us consider the topic of this thesis: climate change. There has already been some figurational research that has argued that the development of ecological sensibilities could be seen as a type of civilizing process (Quilley, 2009b; Schmidt, 1993). Moral panic research has also been undertaken on the topic of global warming, where, it is argued that global warming campaigns constitute ‘social scares’ (a concept derived from moral panics) (Ungar, 1992, 1995). One could also argue, perhaps, that certain outcomes of processes of civilization have given rise to decivilizing consequences, in the form of excess capitalism and overconsumption, to the relative detriment of the environment and social life as a whole (see Ampudia de Haro, 2008). Potentially, campaigns surrounding climate change could be utilized as civilizing offensives, or moral panics, to bring about a civilizing ‘spurt’. However, these campaigns could also, potentially, bring with them decivilizing disintegrative processes; for example, via the development of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ behaviours into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ people (this is already happening, to a certain extent, with some animal rights and environmental activists who prioritize animal/environmental rights over the rights of ‘other un-eco-friendly’ people; where increasing mutual identification with other animals and the environment, goes hand-in-hand with decreasing mutual identification with other people) (for example, see Quilley, 2009b, p. 133). So, potentially, moral panics over climate change could be regarded as both civilizing and decivilizing processes.

Moral panics are highly complex processes. To further tap into the complexity of moral panics, it is necessary to abandon some of the former dichotomous thinking regarding moral panics, as it limits our perception about what moral panics might be and what they might entail. Such dichotomies include: moral/risk, rational/irrational, ‘good’/’bad’, intentional/unintentional and
civilizing/decivilizing (these will be further explored in Chapters 3 and 4). Through collapsing these dichotomies, and expanding the scope of moral panic research to other types of examples, as well as longer time frames of analysis, we can gain a greater insight into how moral panics develop and how they relate to more long-term processes.

**Timeframes: The Relation between Processes, Offensives and Panics**

To understand how these various developments relate to one another, it is necessary to consider the timeframes involved in each concept. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, civilizing processes occur at different levels – at the level of the individual, at the level of mid-range societal transformations, and at the level of humanity as a whole. The latter two developments occur over centuries and millennia. The first – individual civilizing processes – occurs over decades, during one’s own lifetime. All of these three processual developments are regarded by Elias as largely unintended developments (unintended consequences of intentional actions). But how do decivilizing processes, civilizing offensives and moral panics relate to these timeframes? If we consider the case of Germany, Elias ([1989] 1996) shows how long-term developments throughout the history of Germany and its relation to other nation-states gave rise to a civilizing spurt – in short, we can think about a long-term, gradual decivilizing process giving rise to a short-term accelerated decivilizing process (or spurt). Similarly, civilizing offensives, which consist of intentional attempts to induce change, might also result in a ‘spurt’ of one sort or another. If some moral panics are akin to some civilizing offensives, it is possible that offensives/panics may bring about a civilizing and/or decivilizing spurt. The question remains to what extent the personality make-ups associated with these ‘spurts’ become internalized (and if so how long this takes), or rejected.

The example of *Jamie’s School Dinners* is useful to consider for illustrating these timeframes. Long-term developments in humanity as a whole (except for a minority of small tribes, amongst others) – in the form of agriculture,
technology, global trade, and so forth – have resulted in rapid changes in the types and quantities of food that are available for us to consume. These socio-cultural developments have accelerated at a much faster pace than biological developments. Mid-range societal transformations have included the development of increasing moderation in consumption and, with regards to the case of food and eating, in the ‘civilizing of appetite’ (1987). At the individual level, children are taught table manners, and what is considered appropriate to eat, and where and when to eat it, in their specific households. Some patterns of eating and types of food, however, are considered by some to be unhealthier and less nutritious than others. And so there is a constant relation between those habits learnt within the household and those behavioural standards developing outside of the household (with the two feeding into one another). With the increasing concern about obesity, we have witnessed many campaigns – what might be called civilizing offensives, perhaps moral panics – about food, eating and obesity. One such campaign was instigated by Jamie Oliver, celebrity chef in the UK, transformed into moral entrepreneur in the. 2005 TV series *Jamie’s School Dinners*. This show consisted of an attempt by Oliver to improve the nutritional standards of food that was provided to children at school, in their canteens. Following this intervention, Oliver met with the Prime Minister, a petition was submitted to parliament, and various methods of regulation were instilled. However, criticisms of Oliver’s campaign soon surfaced, with allegations that students were rejecting the new, healthier school dinners (Clark, 2009), and with revelations that parents were passing ‘junk’ food through school fences to their children (Weaver, 2006). And so the extent to which such intentional campaigns to rapidly change people’s eating habits are effective is perhaps mixed. From at least the media reaction it seems that there was at least a certain amount of initial resistance by some – a rejection of the campaign, of the new food standards. However, without a detailed analysis, following up with students who were involved in the intervention, it is unclear whether and to what extent some children’s eating habits were modified, and how internalized these new habits have become. Such questions will be
explored in this thesis in relation to the example of climate change and ecological civilizing processes.

Chapter Outlines

In the rest of this thesis, I further develop the themes explored in this Introduction. These can be grouped into three main parts.

In Chapter 2, I provide an overview of the various literatures on climate change, drawing upon these different disciplines to contribute to syntheses in later chapters, as well as highlighting how my research is unique and fills a large gap within climate change research. The climate change literature then leads into a critical discussion of theories of social change in Chapter 3. Here, I define terms and concepts that are to be used throughout the thesis, and interrogate both moral panic and figurational approaches with other sociological approaches, in order to refine and develop my own approach to social problems. My approach to the research is further explicated in Chapter 4, where I discuss my ‘methodology’ and the methods I employed in various stages of the research process. The aim of this chapter is to clarify my approach to moral panic research, which will be even further developed in the conclusion of this thesis.

Chapters 5 and 6 primarily utilize historical documentary analysis to explore how and to what extent climate change relates to the development of ecological civilizing processes (Chapter 5) and moral panics (Chapter 6), to the interplay of long-term and short-term processes. These two chapters are then connected to the following chapter (Chapter 7), which discusses the interviews I undertook, comparing climate change ‘activists’ with ‘non-activists’14. In Chapter 7, I relate participants’ individual accounts to those arguments and observations that were made in the two preceding chapters, exploring the interrelation between social and psychic developments.

14 These terms – ‘activist’ and ‘non-activist’ – are explained in Chapter 4.
Chapter 8 consists of a comparative analysis, with the aim of comparing climate change with several other empirical examples to further flesh out the relation between civilizing and decivilizing processes, moral panics, and civilizing offenses. I compare several case studies – alcohol, climate change, (illegal) drugs, eating/obesity, terrorism, and tobacco – all of which have been explored separately from a figurational and a moral panic approach. The purpose of the chapter is to critically, comparatively explore the concepts of moral panic, civilizing processes, decivilizing processes, and civilizing offensives. This feeds into a broader interrogation with the concept of moral panic, the concept of decivilizing processes, and the relation between civilizing offensives and civilizing processes – these are further developed in the Conclusion (Chapter 9). In the final chapter, I then go on to explicate how the research in this thesis has informed understandings about climate change. I outline how, based on this research, I think moral panic should be conceptualized and how moral panic research should be undertaken in the future. This is followed by a similar discussion about the relation between civilizing offensives and civilizing processes, and the conceptualization of decivilizing processes.
Chapter Two

Literature Review: Part One:
On Climate Change, ‘Nature’, and the ‘Environment’

Introduction

While there has been much written about climate change in the sub-discipline of environmental sociology, as well as literature on the public understanding of the science of global warming, there has not been a lot of mainstream sociological literature on climate change (see also Lever-Tracy, 2008a). It is only very recently that global warming has just begun to be attended to. Articles were published in the British Journal of Sociology in 2008 (Urry, 2008a), in Current Sociology in 2008 and 2009 (Brechin, 2008; Leahy, 2008; Lever-Tracy, 2008a, 2008b; Redclift, 2009; Yearley, 2009), and in a special issue of Theory, Culture and Society in 2010 (Szerszynski & Urry, 2010). Books were published in 2009 (Beck, 2009; Giddens, 2009), 2010 (Lever-Tracy, 2010), and 2011 (Lever-Tracy, 2011; Urry, 2011). In 2010, the ASA published conference proceedings from a workshop on sociological perspectives on global climate change (Nagel, Dietz, & Broadbent, 2010), and the BSA held a Presidential Event on ‘How to Put “Society” into Climate Change’ (BSA Postgraduate Forum, 2010)\(^\text{15}\) – this was closely followed by the formation of the BSA Climate Change Study Group, and their launch event in January 2011. Indeed, this emerging sociological interest in climate change is perhaps a reflection of the more general interest in climate change; the development of global warming as an increasingly popular social problem, as mentioned in the previous chapter.

\(^{15}\) Held at the British Library on Monday 8 February 2010, speakers included John Urry, Elizabeth Shove, Tim Jackson, Alan Warde, and Brian Wynne.
In accordance with some of these recent publications, an aim of this review of the literature is to suggest how anthropogenic climate change can be approached from disciplines other than environmental sociology, and other than the public understanding of science. While both these disciplines have provided useful insights, they have their limitations in that they have theoretical, methodological or empirical focuses that concentrate on certain things while neglecting others (as with any approach to research). And so the overall purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate gaps within the research, and how those gaps will be addressed by this thesis (which will employ some of the literature discussed here).

For this first of two literature review chapters, what has already been written on climate change, along with other literature that relates, will be artificially broken up into several groups. The first section focuses on exploring the sudden changes that may be necessary to address human impact on climate change, drawing from eco-Marxist and complexity theory approaches. The next few sections explore the gradual changes that are occurring and/or that may occur, including ecological modernization work on the greening of production, consumption and lifestyles, as well as literature on ecological civilizing processes. The public understanding of the science of climate change, encompassing media representations of climate change, is discussed in the following sections. The final section of the chapter explores 'climate change denial', focusing primarily on the role of emotions and psychoanalysis in understanding how some people increasingly avoid the topic of climate change, and the unpleasant emotions associated with it. The areas of literature explored here are not restricted to sociological analyses; some of the same concepts employed by social scientists are to be found in popular works and in the media. Indeed, in some cases perhaps, some of these sociological analyses may have been informed by popular ideas about anthropogenic climate change.

16 Environmental sociology can be defined as a sub-discipline of sociology that attempts to integrate biological and ecological sciences into sociological theory, thereby attending to the interdependence between humans and ecosystems (see Sutton, 2004).
In the second literature review chapter (Chapter 3), I will critically examine different theories and concepts that have been used in relation to climate change, moral panics, or civilizing processes. This critical review of the literature on social processes and social change in Chapter 3 will be used to refine my own theoretical conceptual methodological approach to this research, which will be explicated in Chapter 4. For now, let us return to the literature on climate change, ‘nature’, and the ‘environment’, with an examination of eco-Marxist approaches.

**Eco-Marxism and a Relatively Static Capitalism**

Perhaps one of the more critical (environmental) sociological positions is that of eco-Marxism, or the neo-Marxist Treadmill of Production perspective, which takes its lead from Allan Schnaiberg’s analysis of the ‘treadmill’ of production. In *The Environment: From Surplus to Scarcity*, Schnaiberg (1980) explores the cooperative and competitive relationships between capital, labour, and states. For the cooperative relationships, both capital and labour contribute to production, and to consumption – capital aims to maximize consumption for profit; labour seeks to maximize consumption, for example, for wellbeing and perceived increased happiness (Schnaiberg, 1980, p. 210).

Schnaiberg and his colleagues later argue, ‘economic criteria remain at the foundation of decision making about the design, performance and evaluation of production and consumption’ (Schnaiberg, Pellow, & Weinberg, 2002, p. 16, original emphasis). This primacy of economic influences over all others, leads Schnaiberg and other eco-Marxists to the conclusion that the ‘treadmill of production’ must be reversed, and can only be done so by the education of labour; making them realize that they do not need or want a ‘comfortable life’. This must then be combined with a ‘sufficient political support for production apart from the treadmill’ (Schnaiberg, 1980, p. 249), from a different form of
capitalism, or something else altogether.

Combined with James O'Connor’s ‘second contradiction of capitalism’ (O'Connor, 1996, 1998) – expanding forces of production with finite conditions of production – this leads some eco-Marxists to argue that capitalism is not sustainable. The search for ‘absolute’ sustainability leads them to the conclusion that, to address climate change, radical reorganization of social life, including capitalism, is required (Lever-Tracy, 2008a; Mol & Spaargaren, 2005).17

While this approach draws attention to the structural changes that might be necessary to address climate change (and other ecological issues associated with capitalism), and so diverting attention away from neoliberal approaches to climate change (such as those that focus on individualistic changes made by individual consumers), it does have its limitations. One problem with this approach is that it characterizes capitalism as being relatively static and unchanging (excluding, of course, its ever-expanding forces of production). As we will see in the section on ecological modernization (and other more optimistic approaches), this is perhaps not an accurate conceptualization; capitalism, like everything else, adapts and changes as relations between social processes, and between social and natural processes, change. It assumes that concern about climate change, and other changes, will not effect significant changes in capitalism.

Additionally, the focus on economic causes of climate change reduces the problem to a single cause, while neglecting to explore the various other (non-economic) processes that contribute to climate change. While it is important to highlight and address these economic factors, they are only part of the puzzle – all cannot be reduced to economic causes.

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17 See also the ‘Ecosocialist Manifesto’ on the Capitalism Nature Socialism website: cnsjournal.org/manifesto.html
Complexity Theory and Tipping Points: ‘Switching’ to a Post-Carbon Future

In his recent work on climate change (utilizing complexity theory), John Urry (2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2009b, 2010, 2011) has incorporated some aspects of eco-Marxism – notably, the argument that capitalism is inherently unsustainable. He uses the example of the car ‘system’ to illustrate his arguments. This ‘system’ consists of ‘networks’ and ‘flows’ between the ‘components’ of cars, technology, people (drivers, passengers, pedestrians), signs, symbols, cultures, objects and so on, which together form a ‘locked in’ system.

He describes these locked-in systems, such as the use of cars or the QWERTY keyboard, as difficult to change or reverse (akin to eco-Marxist arguments about capitalism). Only with a particular combination of many small changes and interactions between components in the system, can the system reach a ‘tipping point’, at which time the system may suddenly ‘switch’ (and then become ‘locked in’ to a different trajectory), rather than change in a gradual linear way (he gives the examples of a liquid suddenly ‘switching’ to a gas and of small temperature increases suddenly producing global heating). This seems to suggest rapid change, followed by stasis.

Such a conceptualization focuses on the sudden (or apparently sudden) changes that occur, to the relative neglect of gradual change. In this way, Urry appears to contradict himself: he talks about systems being ‘locked in’ to a particular trajectory, yet at the same time he argues that all systems are dynamic and processual and generate emergent contradictions, especially through feedback loop mechanisms. Interestingly, his focus seems to be only on the negative side of these contradictions and feedback loops – how they gradually contribute to climate change, etc. Yet he argues that, to address global warming, we need ‘a massive reorganisation of social life, nothing more and nothing less’ (Urry,
2008b, Climate Change and Peak Oil section, para. 13). But even then, he argues that the ‘fateful’ twentieth century, with its development of ‘high carbon forms of life’, has ‘massively constrained the future possibilities of life on Earth’ (Urry, 2009a, p. 9).

These arguments about ‘tipping points’ in particular, describe a specific type of social change – that of continuity, followed by discontinuity, of ‘ruptures’ similar to those described by Thomas Kuhn ([1962] 1970) in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. This relates to debates about gradual versus sudden change, and intentional versus unintentional developments. I will return to these debates, and to Urry’s complexity theory approach, in Chapter 3.

One possible criticism about Urry’s arguments relates to his utilization of disciplines outside of the social sciences, of direct applications of theory from the physical sciences to the social sciences, such as the idea of a chaos point, without perhaps a critical assessment as to whether or not such concepts can be applied in this exact way to social sciences (for example, see Newton, 2003). It does not follow that those natural processes are the same as social processes, much as Urry may want to transcend the divide between the physical and the social sciences, between nature and society (see Urry, 2003, p. 18, in Mol & Spaargaren, 2005, p. 100).

There appears to be an underlying moralistic element to Urry’s latest work on climate change. He argues that the late twentieth century has been characterized by a capitalism of excess, where ‘there is only pleasure no guilt’ – the only ‘guilt is not to consume to the ‘limit’’ (Urry, 2008b, Excess Capitalism section, paras. 5 & 7). Drawing from a recent newspaper article by Giddens (2007), Urry conceptualizes the past as characterized by ‘disciplined excess’, where such institutions as the family, school, and so on, confined and disciplined to regulate consumption. These ‘societies of discipline’, he argues, have shifted towards ‘societies of control’, where increased freedom (from ‘sites
of confinement’) has gone hand in hand with ‘freedom to become “addicted”, to be emotionally and/or physically dependent upon certain products of global capitalism’ (Urry, 2008b, Excess Capitalism section, para. 6). Dubai is Urry’s example of a capitalism of excess in societies of control. In Dubai, he argues, the focus is on ‘overconsumption, prostitution, drink and gambling where guilt is not to consume to the “limit”’…’ (Urry, 2008b, Excess Capitalism section, para. 7). However, this focus on ‘overconsumption’ ignores other trends that may be occurring in opposite directions, towards decreasing consumption, towards self-control of consumption levels. (This will be looked at in the next section, in relation to ecological modernization and ecological civilizing processes.) It also appears to be a departure from previous research by Urry, which suggested that consumers do feel guilt about their consumption and its impact on the environment (see Macnaghten & Urry, 1998). And, indeed, this thesis will demonstrate this in Chapter 7, where I explore how both activists and non-activists express the guilt they feel over their consumption and lifestyle.

This usage of complexity and ‘tipping points’ has not been restricted to social (and natural) sciences, it is also used (in reference to climate change) by the media and by global warming campaigners, including popular books on climate change. References to ‘tipping points’ include the ‘point of no return’; that is, once a ‘tipping point’ is reached, it will be too late to act on climate change, with different predictions as to whether or not we have reached, or are approaching, a tipping point. Tipping points are also used as the point at which people act on climate change – a tipping point of knowledge (for example, see Walsh, 2007, October 12th). This popular usage of the terms is similar in some ways to that of Urry’s, and demonstrates the transference of ideas between academia and popular culture (not necessarily that one is influencing the other, but rather that academics are part of the same world as those who write in popular media, and have some of the same influences).

Both academic and popular usages of ‘tipping points’ have some similarities
with moral panic (though I do not wish to suggest that these publications are representative of a moral panic in the popular, or even the original understanding of the term). Certainly with some of Urry's work, we get the sense that the past, low carbon ‘societies of discipline’, are better than the present, high carbon ‘societies of control’ (and also the possible futures, see Urry, 2010, 2011). In the apparent shift from external control to self-control, Urry appears to see the latter as failing to regulate consumption. Thus, as with moral panics, campaigners and academics are arguing that something drastic must be done now before it is too late (before the tipping point is reached). Indeed, the dramatic nature of such films and documentaries as *The Day After Tomorrow* and *An Inconvenient Truth* (both of which Urry refers to), perhaps exaggerate the sudden change in climate that may result (or they at least focus on worst case scenarios). This application of complexity theory to climate change, like the eco-Marxist perspective, argues that current developments in the governance of climate change are not sufficient to address the problem.

In this way, the eco-Marxist and complexity approaches, along with those of global warming campaigners, suggest that individuals, corporations, governments, and so on, have not put in place changes to adjust adequately nature-society relations to decrease the human impact on climate change. And so, perhaps like those campaigners during moral panics, they believe that drastic, sudden change is required to avert the climate crisis.

**Ecological Modernization and an Intentional Restructuring of Capitalism**

In counter to the above positions, which argue that sudden substantial change is necessary to address climate change, several approaches have begun to explore how the regulation of consumption may already be occurring. In an attempt to move beyond the central focus on the state for the formal regulation of consumption, the concept of *citizen-consumers* has been used by Ecological Modernization scholars to explore the role of individuals in relation to states,
markets, and lifestyles in the greening of consumption (Spaargaren & Mol, 2008).

Citizen-consumers, as ecological citizens, demand environmental security and, at the same time, have a responsibility to contribute towards greater security (Spaargaren & Mol, 2008). However, the global nature of some environmental problems creates the requirement for international ecological citizenship. Spaargaren and Mol (2008) note that the increasing development of international political (e.g. Greenpeace) and governmental (e.g. the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)) organizations increases public environmental awareness and pressure for environmental governance. In their capacity as ‘ecological citizens’, there has been some focus on the need to consciously instill some form of ‘global citizenship’, where people come to have ‘some concept of duty towards and sense of belonging to, not just their locality, but humanity or nature and the planet as a whole’ (Macnaghten & Urry, 1998, p. 152). However, this greening of consumption focuses on deliberate, conscious attempts to affect changes in people’s understandings of nature-society relations, with a concomitant change in their behaviour. As I will suggest later (in the section on ecological civilizing processes, and in Chapter 5), unplanned processes, that are not primarily the outcome of intentional campaigns, may also affect changes in nature-society relations and in consumption.

At another level, environmental labeling (or ‘eco-labeling’) provides ‘responsible’ citizen-consumers (and -producers) with the identifiers for political consumerism (Spaargaren & Mol, 2008), and globally organized boycotts of products and corporations can, in some situations, create the financial need for corporations to (at least appear to) become more ‘socially responsible’ (for example, Friends of the Earth campaigns against CFC products and the Greenpeace organized consumer boycott of Shell over the intended sinking of Brent Spar (see Macnaghten & Urry, 1998, pp. 56, 68-69)). Indeed,
this pressure, from both boycotts and market pressures as other competing companies ‘go green’, may affect the increasing visibility of ‘the environment’ in corporations’ branding and advertising, and in their policies and strategies. For example, BP’s rebranding from ‘British Petroleum’ to ‘Beyond Petroleum’, their logo change from the shield to a green and yellow flower, and their vocal investment in alternative energy and stance on climate change (although this was all ‘lost’ following the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico). Prior to the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, this contrasted with the much criticized ExxonMobil, but interestingly even they now have an ‘environment’ section on their website and (at least appear to) have begun to adopt a precautionary stance regarding climate change18.

These developments – eco-labeling, re-branding, and so on – exemplify more wider changes in production-consumption; developments that, contra the eco-Marxist and complexity approaches discussed earlier, appear to suggest that capitalism does develop, react and adapt over time, as the development of ‘neat capitalism’ (Rojek, 2007) illustrates. Using the terminology of eco-Marxists, ‘neat capitalism’ occurs where labour (individuals) works with capital (corporations; the market), rather than the state, to try and improve the environment.

However, such neat capitalist companies, with their appeals to ecological citizenship and political consumerism, are to a certain extent only appearing to be green. There exists an inherent conflict within these companies, and not just in terms of profit versus the environment. Some of those mentioned above, such as BP and ExxonMobil, deliver a product that further contributes to climate change and other ecological issues. 19 Subsidizing research into alternative energies, for example, does not change the fact that the burning of fossil fuels creates greenhouse gasses that contribute to global warming. And so ‘green’ is

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18 exxonmobil.com/Corporate/safety_climate.aspx
19 One could argue that this is not just the case for energy companies, but for all companies because production and consumption in general produces carbon (and other) emissions.
used as a branding device to make companies appear to be less ‘bad’ than others, and to make consumers feel better by buying those products (or using those services) that seem on the surface to be greener alternatives. Paradoxically, the emotional reassurance associated with ‘buying green’ may lessen the likelihood that someone will engage in other means to try to change broader social, structural factors that might be necessary to alleviate climate change and other ecological issues.

Philip Sutton argues that green consumerism is reliant upon an ‘environmentally enlightened’ population to be able to identify mere ‘greenwash’ (Sutton, 2004, pp. 138-139). Perhaps this is why there has been such a development of websites and books that allegedly demonstrate the ‘real’ versus the ‘false’ ‘green’ credentials of corporations.

The socially responsible notion to ‘care for the self’ and to ‘care for the other’ in neat capitalism (Rojek, 2007) may not be the only motivating factor for green consumerism. Indeed, McCormick (in Macnaghten & Urry, 1998, p. 60) notes how, throughout the late 1980s (at a time when the first guides to living green emerged), green consumerism ‘became one of the most fashionable concepts in public life, shared by media, supermarkets, political parties, and industry’. More recently, with the 2006 release of An Inconvenient Truth (Guggenheim, 2006), with its calls for self-governance of consumption, and Al Gore’s continuing campaign to educate the public about climate change (for example, see Haag, 2007), we can once again witness the rise of green consumerism as a popular status. In 2006, Vanity Fair published the first of their annual ‘Green Issues’; guides on how to live green have had a recent upsurge, some of them directly linked to global warming; phrases such as ‘green is the new black’, and guides with titles like ‘how to live green in style’ further suggest that green consumerism is about more than being ‘socially responsible’.
In 2008, the Oprah Winfrey Show held an Oprah’s Earth Day Event\textsuperscript{20} on ‘going green’, with ‘eco-celebrities’ and campaigners Julia Roberts, Sandra Bullock, Al Gore, and \textit{Gorgeously Green} author Sophie Uliano (Oprah also has a ‘going green’ section on her website\textsuperscript{21}). Following Schmidt (1993), the focus on eco-celebrities could possibly be seen to fulfill the function of lifestyles to aspire to. For example, Boykoff and Goodman (2009) note how, since 2005, there has been a rapid increase in newspaper coverage of celebrities and climate change, which has included a focus on celebrities as ‘heroic individuals’ seeking ‘conspicuous redemption’ through ‘eco-friendly’ actions such as the purchasing of ‘green goods’ (Boykoff & Goodman, 2009). Yet, at the same time, ‘eco-celebrities’ are criticized when their lifestyles ‘deviate’ from their ‘eco-friendly’ messages. And so celebrities actions may be played out in the media as ‘good’ and ‘bad’ behaviour; that is, behaviour to emulate or not to emulate (‘dos’ and ‘don’ts’). This may aid in the development of ecological sensibilities, but again the focus on individual behavior to the relative neglect of structural processes may serve as a distraction away from more significant and necessary changes to alleviate climate change.

\textbf{Ecological Civilizing Processes}

At another level, the ‘popular’ status that Green and other ‘socially responsible’ products have attained may mean that status aspirations also play a part in the greening of consumption. For example, Schmidt (1993) notes that, despite trends such as those introduced earlier regarding ‘excess-capitalism’ (Urry, 2008b), or the ‘attraction of potency’ with ‘new capitalism’ (Sennett, 2006), there have also been other counter-trends in consumption in general, towards increasing self-restraint, contributing towards trends of consuming less. Importantly, Schmidt adds, these trends begin with the more ‘civilized’ groups, and then ‘trickle down’ to other groups via status aspirations (see also Aarts, 20\textsuperscript{oprah.com/showinfo/Oprahs-Earth-Day-Event_3} 21\textsuperscript{oprah.com/packages/going-green}}
Schmidt, & Spier, 1995; Vlek, 1995). Such developments (along with the
development of environmentalism in general) – the overall process of
‘ecologization’ – could be conceived of as a civilizing process, as an ecological
that such processes are unlikely to occur at a rapid rate, given the gradual
changes in sociogenesis and psychogenesis an ecological civilizing process
would entail. Therefore, to ‘test’ the idea of ‘ecological civilizing processes’, it is
important to carry out an analysis that covers a long period of time (over
several generations). Therefore, in this thesis I will be exploring primarily
developments over the past two hundred years.

Civilizing processes have already begun to be explored in relation to climate
change. In their report, Toward a Morality of Moderation, Aarts et al.
hypothesized that long-term trends in changes of behaviour towards increasing
moderation – including body size, number of offspring, tobacco consumption,
driving, flying – are occurring as part of unplanned civilizing processes and are
not the intentional outcome of environmentalist movements (in the case of
climate change) or moralistic rhetoric (Aarts, Goudsblom, Schmidt, & Spier,
1995). While the results of their study were largely negative in relation to
climate change – suggesting that these developments towards increasing
moderation are not yet widespread in relation to climate change – their
hypothesis that such developments may occur is worth investigation, although
it may be that intentional interventions do play a role in these developments.
Their research was also carried out between 1990 and 1995; many
developments have occurred since then, including the apparent increasing
popularity of climate change as a social problem.

In On the Process of Civilisation, Elias briefly refers to changes in understandings
about ‘nature’ and the ‘environment’. He argues that, as ‘nature’ – forests,
meadows, mountains – gradually came to be less dangerous (as populations
grew and came to be increasingly pacified), so too people's perceptions of
nature gradually changed towards one of beauty and pleasure (instead of danger); the aestheticization of nature (see Elias, [1939] 2012, pp. 461–2). Sutton (2004) further develops this by arguing that there has occurred long-term changes in what constitutes a ‘civilized’ relationship between ‘nature’ and ‘society’, and how these developments, along with the development of environmentalism, might be comparable with civilizing processes. For example, ‘ecological identifications’ may be indicative of expanding mutual identification (Sutton, 2007, p. 45).

We can explore how these suggested long-term developments may relate to campaigns to change behaviour in response to climate change; that is, where ecological civilizing processes might be occurring, but are either not perceived to be occurring or not rapidly enough to counter the perceived problem. For example, Al Gore’s global warming campaign, widely disseminated in the documentary *An Inconvenient Truth* (Guggenheim, 2006), calls for changes that could already be occurring as part of civilizing processes, such as: increasing self-restraint regarding consumption; increasing foresight and recognition of interdependencies between humans and ‘the environment’; increasing mutual identification with ‘the environment’ (see Rohloff, 2011a). It is a bit presumptuous to dismiss these intentional ‘civilizing campaigns’ as irrelevant. Rather, it is worth exploring the interplay between these intentional campaigns and more long-term, unplanned developments (such as civilizing processes).

Stephen Quilley (2009b) has begun to explore such an interplay, by examining Aldo Leopold’s writings on ‘The Land Ethic’ in relation to the development of ecological civilizing processes. Quilley argues that Leopold’s essay, which was first published in 1949, bears some similarities to etiquette manuals – as a treatise to try and bring about changes in attitudes, including the development of an environmental ethic. Sharing similarities with the etiquette books Elias examined, Leopold’s work included writings on: ‘processes of distinction and social pressure as conduits for the diffusion of the land ethic’; and ‘the prospect
of conservation and ecology transforming the “foundations of conduct” (Quilley, 2009b, p. 127). In this way, Quilley begins to explore how environmentalist writings – intentional attempts to change attitudes – may relate to ecological civilizing processes: ‘Ethical reform and political activism are revealed as moments in an ongoing process of psychogenesis—the molding of the personality structure in tandem with a wider transformation of society’ (Quilley, 2009b, p. 132). While only examining the writings of Leopold, Quilley’s argument does suggest that one should not ignore the writings of reformers in the development of ecological civilizing processes and, by extension, the development of global warming as a perceived social problem.

Quilley’s analysis of Leopold’s writing points towards an informalization of manners regarding the environment – ‘The Land Ethic’ is a more reflexive essay about how nature-society relations ought to be, without explicit prescriptions on how one should behave. However, an important question remains unanswered: as these texts, directed at imparting ideals, are being written, what is being written in (the more general) etiquette/manners books? What references, if any, are there to nature-society relations in etiquette/manners books, and in other documents, and how and to what extent have the content of these changed over time? Such questions will be explored in this thesis, in Chapters 5 and 6, where I examine the changing discourses in a wide variety of texts.

**Climate Change and the Public Understanding of Science**

An existing area of research has focused on climate change and the media, including many publications in the journals *Public Understanding of Science* and *Science Communication*. This area of research has included several focuses, such as: how climate change has been mediated, and how it ought to be effectively communicated; how climate change is represented in the media and what factors influence this; what the function is or should be of the media in
communicating climate change and bringing about changes; how the media is perceived by viewers (in relation to climate change); and what other factors (other than the media) may influence people’s perceptions about the science of climate change, and to what extent it is a social problem that they will both be concerned about and act on.

Several studies have analyzed the media coverage of climate change in different countries, highlighting variations in media coverage both between and within different countries. Olausson’s (2009) study on the Swedish press explored ‘framing contests’ between three Swedish newspapers. Overall, Olausson found general frames rather than contesting frames. The collective action frame of mitigation as a transnational responsibility occurred where media reporting of international summits and other events framed climate change as a transnational concern, and where industrialized countries were deemed to be responsible for mitigation. Interestingly, this frame contained a ‘us’ and ‘them’ divide between Europe and the USA – those who were perceived to be taking the issue seriously and acting responsibly, and those who were not (respectively). Conversely, ‘the collective action frame of adaptation as a national and local responsibility’ places responsibility at the local and national level, rather than at an international or global level. While all of this is interesting, it is limited in that it only looks at newspaper articles. However, there now exists such a variety of media on climate change, from reality TV shows, films and documentaries, to podcasts, iPhone applications, and websites. Discourses and frames within these different media may vary considerably to those within newspapers. Therefore, for the research for this thesis I am examining a wide variety of media (this will be further explicated in Chapter 4).

An additional frame in Olausson’s (2009) research, ‘the frame of certainty’, stands in contrast to studies on media coverage in other countries. In Sweden, so it seems from this study, the newspaper media frame climate change science
as a certain social problem that is anthropogenic, and that is already having direct, immediate consequences.

In contrast with the Swedish press's 'frame of certainty', several studies from other countries suggest that media coverage of climate change is framed in quite a contrasting way. Max Boykoff has carried out several analyses of newspaper and television news coverage of climate change in the United States and other countries (Boykoff, 2007a, 2007b, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c; Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004; Boykoff & Boykoff, 2007; Boykoff & Mansfield, 2008; Boykoff & Roberts, 2007). He identifies a trend for the media to report 'both sides of the story', which can give credence to minority, or fringe, claims (Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004). Thus we may witness a disparity between what experts claim amongst themselves and how their claims are then represented to the public. For example, although Oreskes's (2004) analysis of peer-reviewed journal articles on 'global climate change' found no study that disagreed with the apparent scientific consensus, Boykoff and Boykoff's (2004) analysis of US newspaper articles on global warming found the journalists employing a 'balancing' style that, they argue, misrepresented the science and contributed to misunderstandings about global warming. For example, how the 'balanced', 'equal-time' style of reporting in US newspapers, has contributed to biases in reporting (Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004), suggesting there is more of a debate within the scientific community than what the apparent scientific consensus in peer-reviewed science journals indicates (Oreskes, 2004).

This suggests several possible implications for considering moral panic in relation to climate change. Firstly, the notion that the discourse about climate change is contested within the media, suggests a need to try to establish a dominant discourse through various campaigns, campaigns that might be called moral panics (Rohloff, 2011a). Second, it provides an insight into the power relations that are at play in relation to (potential) moral panics, thereby assisting with a rethinking about how we conceptualize moral panic and how
we practice moral panic research. Third, the variation within the media suggests that dominant discourses are not always present, and that there is the possibility to contest some moral panics, as per McRobbie and Thornton (1995).

Interestingly, in a later study, comparing several US and UK newspapers, Boykoff found a shift in this style of reporting, with less of an emphasis on ‘balancing’ (and thereby more representative of the climate change science) (Boykoff, 2007a). This suggests the need to explore long-term developments in the discourses surrounding climate change, and moral panics more broadly. It also suggests a shift in the way climate change is conceived beyond the news media. Perhaps, it is a sign that climate change is becoming a more established phenomenon, as the creation of the term ‘climate change denier’, with its allusions to holocaust denial, suggests.

During such media contestations over the ‘reality’ of climate change, ‘moral panics’ (or something similar) may develop as an attempt to establish a dominant discourse over the extent of climate change and what should be done about it. Thus far, only one other researcher, Sheldon Ungar (1992, 1995, 2001, 2011), has utilized moral panic to explore global warming. However, excluding his recent chapter in Moral Panic and the Politics of Anxiety (Hier, 2011c), these studies were carried out in the late twentieth century and are thus not up to date with recent developments. His research also does not consist of long-term, developmental research of the sort that I wish to utilize for my research. Ungar did, however, develop a reformulation of the moral panic concept: he removed the necessity (but not the possibility) of two moral panic criteria – disproportionality and folk devils – and then re-termed these ‘moral panics’ over ‘real-world events’ (such as hurricanes, heat waves, nuclear disasters) as ‘social scares’. In part, Ungar develops this reformulation via the inclusion of Beck’s work on the ‘risk society’; Beck has some points of overlap, but also points of departure, with Elias’s writings on knowledge and civilization – this
comparison between Beck and Elias will be explored in Chapter 3, where I will also critically discuss moral panic in more detail.

Concern about the accurate communication of climate change science could be predicated upon an assumption of a knowledge deficit model. Early approaches to the communication of science took a ‘knowledge deficit’ approach; where it was assumed that the communication about science to a relatively ignorant public would translate directly into concern and action. However, there have been several alternative models that have emerged in critique of the knowledge deficit model, such as: the contextual model, the lay-expertise model, and the public engagement model (Kahlor & Rosenthal, 2009). There have been several pieces of research that have also criticized the model, such as Whitmarsh’s.

In criticism of the knowledge deficit model, Whitmarsh recently utilized a UK survey study that investigated the public understanding of climate change and global warming. She concludes that, paradoxically, skepticism or uncertainty about climate change appears to be influenced by greater rather than less scientific knowledge (Whitmarsh, 2009), thereby negating the knowledge-deficit model approach. Whitmarsh also concludes that there should be a distinction drawn between ‘public understanding’ and ‘engagement’; where the former refers to communicating the science, and the latter engaging concern and action. Whitmarsh’s research found that respondents tended to devolve responsibility for causes of climate change, and for mitigation and adaptation, towards international organizations (dissociating themselves). However, Whitmarsh’s results were derived from survey data; it would be interesting to compare how her findings would compare with those from in depth interviews. The data are now also several years old (the research was undertaken for her PhD, which was awarded in 2005). Given the developments in climate change campaigns, it will be interesting to see to what extent this may have changed in 5 or so years. It is also worth exploring how some people come to devolve
responsibility and how others, who are also concerned about climate change, do not. This question will be explored here in this thesis, through interviews.

Other UK survey research suggests that there exists a gap between awareness about climate change and engagement with activities that may mitigate climate change. Ockwell, Whitmarsh, & O’Neill, (2009) found that while survey findings suggested that people had high levels of awareness about what lifestyle changes would contribute to a smaller carbon footprint, results demonstrated low levels of actual behaviour change accompanying the awareness. This confirms the critique of the knowledge deficit model – where it is not sufficient to just provide people with information to effect behavioural changes. To combat this gap, Ockwell et al. discuss various grassroots initiatives that appear to have had some success in engaging some people; they argue that these initiatives could facilitate civic engagement with climate change and, thereby, public acceptance of a more flexible regulation. Their research, however, does not provide much in the way of guidelines as to how to achieve such ambitious aims.

An additional model, the reinforcing spirals model (see Slater 2007), combines both the media effects approach with an active, selective, audience to produce a model of a dynamic, interactive process. Zhao (2009) has applied the reinforcing spirals model to climate change, ‘to investigate the mutual influence between individuals’ media use and their global warming perceptions’ (p.715), and to explore how this might relate to future searching out of information about climate change. Using survey data, Zhao concludes from the results that types of media use varied amongst different groups; for example, with people of different age groups utilizing different formats of media (the implication being, that communication must cover a variety of formats). Zhao also confirms the hypothesis that perceived knowledge and concern about climate change would contribute to future information seeking about climate change; where actors are conceptualized as active information seekers. However, this research does not tell us about the interaction amongst the audience, or between the audience and
other people. The interaction is focused on the individual viewer and the media. And while it begins to explore changes in behaviour over time – future information seeking behaviour – it tells us little about the biographical journey whereby people, over time, come to have particular opinions about climate change, etc.

Some research has explored the role of emotions, in particular fear, in media coverage of climate change. In a study undertaken in the UK, O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole (2009) explored the effect of fear in engagement about climate change. As they outline, many climate change campaigns, imagery, and media coverage, have utilized fear and a ‘language of alarmism’ (p.358). O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole utilize Witte’s (1992) typology of a ‘fear appeal’, which consists of three parts: (1) the existence of the threat (that is, how risky it is perceived to be, and whether it is a personal risk); (2) the emotion of fear; and (3) the perceived efficacy of the proposed response (including aspects of self-efficacy; to what extent the individual feels like they can make a difference). They used semi-structured interviews, Q-sorting images and focus groups to explore perceptions about climate change. Their results found that most participants had rather negative outlooks about the future of climate change. ‘Many [participants] specifically talked about feeling fearful, depressed, scared, or distressed at the thought of climate change’ (O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009, p. 369). They found that fear contributed to a feeling that climate change is a far away issue (either far in the future, or happening elsewhere), concluding that the global fearful imagery, in order to be engaging, needed to be connected to everyday spatial and temporal issues. In addition, the role of fear also served to contribute to a feeling of ‘fatalism’, thereby contributing to a sense that there was nothing that could be done, leading to disengagement with climate change. So while participants were largely concerned about climate change, the role of fear appeared to contribute to a lack of engagement.

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22 Q-sorting is a method used in psychology to assess participants’ viewpoint – in this case, their viewpoint of climate change media images.
Conversely, the study found that those images that were found to be empowering – the local personal images – did not get participants attention in the same way; so while those images were empowering, they were regarded as being less important. They conclude with the suggestion that perhaps fear appeals may be utilized to hook an audience, but they must be combined with other messages that provide a sense of self-efficacy. Otherwise, the authors warn, fear may lead to denial, apathy and avoidance. However, the question remains why some people who are exposed to the same images go on to feel a greater sense of self-efficacy and take part in climate change campaigns. To further explore this issue, I will explore how ‘active’ campaigners come to develop this sense of self-efficacy in comparison with others who (to a greater or lesser extent) do not and what they think of the different media and campaigns.

‘Climate Change Denial’ and ‘Climate Skeptics’

Particularly in the United States, there has been a concern with ‘environmental scepticism’ and, in particular, with the linkage between skepticism about climate change and conservative think tanks (CTTs). Jacques, Dunlap and Freeman (2008) carried out an analysis of 141 environmentally sceptical books that were published between 1972 and 2005. They found that over 92% of the books published since 1992 can be linked to CTTs (mostly in the US). They conclude that ‘environmental skeptics are not, as they portray themselves, independent and objective analysts. Rather they are predominantly agents of CTTs, and their success in promoting skepticism about environmental problems stems from their affiliation with these politically powerful institutions’ (p.351). However, some of these links are merely that the CTT published the book. This does not necessarily mean that the author has been corrupted by the CTT. Given the growing disgust that is directed at so-called skeptics or deniers, it may merely be the case that other publishers would merely refuse to publish such
books, for fear of being associated with ‘climate change denial’. An analysis of the content of these publications, compared with other content produced by CTTs, would provide great insights. This would demarcate the various different degrees of skepticism that have been communicated, and how and to what extent they relate to conservative discourses. Unfortunately, while I had intended to do this, there was not time or space to undertake that analysis in this thesis.

Moving beyond CTTs and the debunking of ‘climate change denial’, Mike Hulme ([2009] 2011) looks instead at individual and societal reactions to climate change in order to understand the ‘reasons why we disagree about climate change’. Highlighting the increasing variability of what different people believe, and what matters most to different people, suggests the need to explore different approaches to climate change engagement, utilizing different media and other sources of engagement in different ways. Before we can make suggestions about how these things should be developed, however, it is necessary to first explore how they have already been developing. This will be done in Chapters 5 and 6.

Adding to this line of research, Norgaard (2006, 2011) explores how the desire to avoid unpleasant or clashing emotions contributes to emotion management and the avoidance of climate change; in other words, the denial of climate change in the form of ‘not seeing’ and ‘not knowing’ – a form of implicatory denial (also see Cohen, 2001). From ethnographic research undertaken in Norway, Norgaard demonstrates how the emotion norms within the community clashed with those induced by climate change (fear, helplessness, guilt). To manage those clashes, then, required residents to avoid thinking about climate change, which contributed to a lack of climate change activism. She found that people would deflect responsibility for climate change onto others, or they would turn their attention to something else. This form of denial at the individual level will be explored in this thesis, in Chapter 7. What I am
particularly interested in is how some people come to avoid climate change more than others; how some people come to be more involved in climate change activism, thereby confronting these emotions, more than others.

A related publication is Michael Rustin's chapter on climate change and psychoanalysis (Rustin, 2013). He explores not only the development of denial, and how it relates to unconscious desires, but also the relation between denial and morally outraged responses to denial. Such contributions from psychoanalysis can be incredibly insightful to moral panic studies, and to exploring the relation between various players involved in moral panics. After all, moral panic has within its core an inherent contribution from Freudian psychoanalysis (Garland, 2008).

**Conclusion**

Throughout this review of some of the literature on climate change and environmental sociology, I have identified several gaps in the research that I will explore in this thesis, and other gaps that I will be explore in subsequent research. I have demonstrated how some of the existing research in environmental sociology and on climate change relates to moral panic and to Elias's theory of civilizing processes. These theories and concepts, along with some of the debates I have introduced here, will be taken up in the next chapter, Chapter 3.
Chapter Three

Literature Review: Part Two:
Theories of Social Processes and Social Change

Introduction

This chapter reviews literature on social processes and social change, in order to explore the theories and concepts that can be used in relation to climate change, moral panics, and/or civilizing processes. This review has several purposes: (1) to provide definitions of the theories and concepts that will be used throughout this thesis, for readers who are unfamiliar with any of them; (2) to discuss critically different approaches to social processes and social change in order to draw out core debates within the literature, debates which will be explored throughout this thesis; (3) to highlight some of the limitations with existing concepts and theories, since one of the aims of this thesis is to critically assess and reformulate the concept of moral panic, and the relation between civilizing and decivilizing processes and civilizing offensives; (4) to demonstrate how different theories and approaches compare and contrast, to facilitate dialogue between them and to allow them to inform one another; and (5) to utilize this literature to further refine my own theoretical conceptual methodological approach to this research.

I have broken up this chapter into thematic sections based on the theories or concepts I will be discussing, rather than the purposes outlined above. In the first part of this chapter, I will provide a detailed, critical overview of the theories and concepts of Norbert Elias that I will be using throughout this thesis. I will then go on to do the same with moral panic, looking critically at different approaches to panic. I will then go on to examine denial and the role of
emotions in moral panic. Following on from this, I will compare Elias (and moral panic) with several other theorists and approaches, including Foucault, Beck, complexity theory, and practice theory. To enable these comparisons between Elias and others, it is first necessary to provide a more detailed exposition of some of his work.

**Norbert Elias: The Civilizing Process**

For Elias's ([1939] 2012) most famous publication, *On the Process of Civilisation*, he began his research by making observations from various texts. These included manners and etiquette books, paintings, poetry, amongst others. He explored the relation between these texts, looking for differences between them – what was present in some texts and then left out in subsequent ones; was not present in texts, and then was added to subsequent ones. In this way, he traced the emergence and disappearance of concern with certain behaviours, inferring how people's standards of behaviour were changing over time. He therefore presented his analysis in time series, clearly demonstrating these appearances and disappearances, along with changes in the way things were presented – how things were said. Through tracing these changes in behaviour, Elias illustrated the development of particular emotional or psychic structures, what he termed *psychogenesis*.

Several other processes occurring simultaneously influenced psychogenesis (or psychic development), and these processes, in turn, were influenced by psychogenesis. Various figurations at different times influenced the spread of new behavioural standards. This included royal and aristocratic courts (Elias, [1939] 2012, [1969] 2006), and still includes any other social figuration that is regarded as ‘good society’. These model setting centres effectively disperse ideals for how one should behave, for those who are not part of this figuration but want to ascend and become one of the ‘good society’.
Elias uses the term *figuration* as a means to overcome the problem of the structure agency dichotomy that arises when talking about individuals and society. Elias instead uses the term figuration to describe a network of interdependent people, in any form of grouping (e.g. a university figuration, a family figuration, and so on) (Elias, [1970] 2012). He utilizes the example of a dance, to illustrate how the term figuration overcomes some of the problems with the term society:

One can certainly speak of ‘dance’ in general, but no one will imagine a dance as a structure outside the individual or as a mere abstraction. The same dance figurations can certainly be danced by different people; but without a plurality of reciprocally oriented and dependent individuals, there is no dance. Like every other social figuration, a dance figuration is relatively independent of the specific individuals forming it here and now, but not of individuals as such. (Elias, [1939] 2012, p. 526).

These more individual developments associated with psychogenesis and status aspirations (aspiring to be a member of the ‘good society’), went hand in hand with broader, structural, societal developments; the latter, Elias termed *sociogenesis*. In *On the Process of Civilisation* in particular, he explored how sociogenetic developments of the formation of states through elimination contests between smaller groupings, and the subsequent state monopolization over violence and taxation, effected, and was affected by, psychogenetic developments. As states became increasingly larger, with individuals becoming increasingly interdependent and therefore increasingly reliant upon one another, so too they developed increasing mutual identification with one another, and developed increasingly more stable emotional controls that were more predictable, thus facilitating increasingly productive relations between increasing numbers of people. This also coincided with an increasing shift from external constraint to self-restraint, from external social controls to internalised self-controls.
Initially, this involved an increasing *formalization* of standards of behaviour, with increasing rules on how one should behave, and the development of manners and etiquette books. From the beginning of the twentieth century, however, this process of formalization came to be increasingly overshadowed by processes of *informalization*, where modes of conduct that were formerly forbidden have increasingly become tolerated and approved (Wouters, 1977, p. 439). Such things that would formerly have been frowned upon, but in the twentieth century were becoming increasingly accepted, include: using less formal greetings (e.g. calling people by their first name); wearing clothing that exposes more of the body; talking with other people more openly about sexual experiences, menstruation, and other bodily functions. Rather than merely representing a relaxation in social and self-controls, informalization instead brings with it an increasing demand on individuals to exercise increasing self-restraint. For example, relaxations on what constitutes appropriate sexual behaviour, while constituting a lessening of external controls and some self-controls, goes hand in hand with an increasing self-control to ensure that individuals do not overstep the more lenient and differentiated standard of today. Thus, the self-control of these young people, at least as far as sexuality is concerned, has so much increased that they today *are able* to a greater extent to think about expressing or repressing sexual urges and emotions. They have become more conscious of social and individual possibilities and restrictions...and this heightened consciousness enables them more than their parents and grandparents to restrain *and* express their impulses and emotions. This might indicate a higher level of consciousness and possibly also a higher level of self-controls (Wouters, 1977, p. 447).
And so informalization is about a balance between restraining and expressing, with this balancing act requiring *increasing* self-control (to get the balance right) and increasing reflexivity.

These various developments discussed thus far encompass what Elias means by the term *civilizing process*; the long-term development of sociogenetic and psychogenetic processes, where changes at the individual level, and changes at the social or societal level are inextricably intertwined. Elias contrasts this technical definition of civilizing *process*, with the normative, everyday usage of the term *civilization*. Normatively, ‘civilization’ is used to denote superiority to those who are deemed to be less civilized, ‘uncivilized’, ‘primitive’, or ‘barbaric’. It has also been used as a static thing, to refer to ‘civilizations’, or to those ‘material and technical aspects of society’ (Goudsblom, 2006, p. 292).

It is important to reiterate that Elias did not regard developments in civilizing processes as being unilinear. This point will be returned to in a later section of this chapter, when I discuss the notion of *decivilizing* processes.

Elias is most known for his book *On the Process of Civilisation*, but his writings extend far beyond this, covering such topics as sport and leisure, dying, time, knowledge, technology, and much more. Before we go on to explore the application of Elias's research to natural processes and ecological issues, let us first examine what Elias had to say about what might be called ‘epistemological’ issues.

**Sociology of Knowledge versus Philosophy of Knowledge**

In contrast to the dominant modes of doing sociological research that are in some textbooks – of following a philosophical approach to dictate how research should be done – Elias instead argued that sociology must develop its own sociology of knowledge, its own approach to research design that is, itself,

His concept of *involvement-detachment* was key to overcoming several static dichotomies in the social sciences, chief among these were: subjective or objective, involved or detached, irrational or rational. Elias argues that one could never be completely involved or completely detached; instead, we can only speak of degrees of detachment and involvement.

As far as one can see, the very existence of ordered group life depends on the interplay in [people's] thoughts and actions of impulses in both directions, those that involve and those that detach keeping each other in check. They may clash and struggle for dominance or compromise and form alloys of many different shades and kinds... (Elias, 1956, p. 226).

These alloys and blends of involvement-detachment are constantly in flux, and a greater degree of one does not always correspond to a lesser degree of the other.

In trying to advance the development of sociology as a discipline, Elias argues that it needs to become more like the more highly developed sciences (such as the natural sciences), not in method, but in the valuations that are involved in the research. He differentiates between *autonomous valuations* and *heteronomous valuations*. The former refers to those values that are developed within and for the discipline, whereas the latter refers to values that intrude from ‘outside’ the discipline (Elias, [1987] 2007, pp. 72-73). Dunning and Hughes (2013, p. 131) elaborate on this distinction by characterising autonomous valuations as ‘a commitment to understanding the world as it is and as it has developed’, whereas heteronomous valuations ‘instead privilege the world as we want it to be, or, indeed, don’t want it to be’. Through attempting to
avoid the intrusion of heteronomous valuations into research, Elias argued that one was more likely to contribute to research that has a greater degree of reality congruence (that is, where it is increasingly more likely to approximate reality\textsuperscript{23}).

And so we can begin to see how reality congruence – the degree to which something corresponds with (though never equates to) reality – relates to the concept of value congruence\textsuperscript{24} (and value bias). As Elias argues, the kinds of values that are employed or influence research affect the quality of the research – the degree of potential reality-congruence (for a discussion of the relation between reality congruence and value congruence, see Dunning & Hughes, 2013).

While Elias encouraged his students to research areas they felt passionate about, that they were relatively involved in (Dunning & Hughes, 2013), he also urged them to exercise an increase in detachment – a detour via detachment – in order to produce increasingly knowledge with a greater degree of reality-congruence. Kilminster argues that during the process of research, involvement should instead be devoted to a form of involved detachment, where the researcher channels the ‘kind of passion normally associated with political and religious beliefs...into the pursuit of a kind of detached sociological knowledge that transcends the one-sidedness of involved viewpoints of society.’ (Kilminster, 2007, p. 123) Kilminster goes on to state how researchers practising this form of involved detachment go to a form of secondary involvement:

\textsuperscript{23} Reality, as with every process that Elias explores, is dynamic, not static – it is always changing as relations between and within things change. Therefore, once can never ‘know’ reality, for it is always changing; one can only ever aim to develop knowledge that is more (rather than less) reality-congruent. Additionally, one can never ‘stand outside’ to view reality, to know whether one has achieved ‘absolute reality’, for reality is not separate from the self, just as ‘society’ is not separate from ‘individuals’.

\textsuperscript{24} The term ‘value congruence’ is developed by Dunning & Hughes (2013).
Sociologists embracing such greater detachment in their enquiries themselves become secondarily involved in that activity and take pleasure from the comprehensive understanding made possible by the standpoint and to relish its potentialities. But for others in society to become secondarily involved in the comprehensive understanding of a certain kind of detached sociology is dependent upon the state of social tension that generates fears and hence the further involvements that hinder it (Kilminster, 2007, p. 123).

The above is characterised by Kilminster as being chiefly about secondary sociological involvement to facilitate the development of the discipline, rather than secondary political involvement to inform social issues of the day. However, as will be discussed in Chapter 4, this complete abandoning of political interests and concerns is not conducive with Elias’s arguments, nor is it desirable for the development of sociology and the human sciences more generally. Many discoveries would or may not have been made were it not for secondary political involvement. And, indeed, if we avoid the ‘impact’ sociological research can have through engaging with policy, user groups, practitioners, the media, and so on, we are endangering the future of sociology as a discipline – policy makers, journalists and other practitioners must have something to work with; why do we not provide them with our own knowledge that potentially has a greater degree of reality congruence?

**Eliasian Approaches to Natural Processes and Ecological Issues**

An additional concept Elias discusses is the triad of controls. In *What is Sociology?*, Elias refers to the relationship between control over natural processes, social processes, and psychic processes:

> Among the universal features of society is the *triad of basic controls*. The stage of development attained by a society can be ascertained:
1 by the extent of its control-chances over non-human complexes of events – that is, control over what are normally called ‘natural events’
2 by the extent of its control-chances over interpersonal relationships – that is, over what are usually called ‘social relationships’
3 by the extent to which each of its members has control over himself as an individual – for, however dependent he may always be on others, he has learned from infancy to control himself to a greater or lesser degree. (Elias, [1970] 2012, p. 151)

He argues that each component of this ‘triad’ is interdependent with the other. And while he suggests that an overall trend towards greater control can be discerned, not all of these levels of control develop at the same rate; for example, he argues that increasing control over natural processes occurs at a much faster rate than control over social processes (as reflected in the stage of development of the various sciences associated with these processes – the ‘natural’ sciences versus the ‘social’ sciences).

For the purposes of this thesis, one of the most interesting points Elias makes about the triad of controls, is that:

the less amenable a particular sphere of events is to human control, the more emotional will be people’s thinking about it; and the more emotional and fantasy-laden their ideas, the less capable will they be of constructing more accurate models of these nexuses, and thus of gaining greater control over them. (Elias, [1970] 2012, p. 152)

Applying this to moral panic, and to climate change, we can suggest that the greater the perception that things are ‘out of control’ or ‘beyond control’, the more likely it is that there will be increasing emotional involvement, with proposed solutions that may have more unintended than intended consequences. Potentially, this may further contribute to the problem, rather
than alleviating it. It is therefore important to consider the relationship between these three levels of control.

Furthermore, Sutton (2004, pp. 176-182) argues that the notion of the triad of controls, and Elias’s sociological approach more generally, can be usefully applied to develop a sociology of the environment, thus overcoming divides between realist and social constructionist approaches. Importantly, as Sutton demonstrates, Elias’s conceptualisation of power relations necessitates an understanding of society-nature relations as being one of degrees, where one never completely subjugates or dominates the other. As Sutton argues, this allows us to move beyond environmentalist claims about ‘saving the planet’ from an ‘ecological crisis’. However, humans do exert influence over the direction of natural processes, and so one must look at the development of climate change in terms of the interplay between natural, social and psychic processes. Furthermore, discourses of ‘crisis’ and ‘saving the planet’ might still be functional, in an intended way, but they must be analysed critically to assess the extent to which they will have more intended than unintended consequences.

One application of the triad of controls to research is Goudsblom’s research on Fire and Civilization (1992), where he traces the development of the control and use of fire. Goudsblom clearly illustrates how the triad of controls also corresponds to what he terms a ‘triad of dependencies’, where, for example, ‘as the human capacity to control fire has increased, so has people’s inclination to depend upon social arrangements guaranteeing its regular availability and minimizing the hazards it involves’ (Goudsblom, 1992, p. 10, original emphasis). He goes on to discuss some of the unintended consequences of the development of fire use, such as increasing population, increasing use of natural resources, and increasing pollution (Goudsblom, 1992, pp. 209-215). Such unintended developments are important to consider when exploring how ecological civilizing processes relate to counter trends or unintended developments that
have contributed to increasing anthropogenic climate change. These will be explored in Chapter 5.

Following Aarts et al. (1995; see also Schmidt, 1993), Stephen Quilley (2004, 2009a, 2009b) introduces the concept of an ecological civilizing process. Here, he is referring to the sociogenetic and psychogenetic transformations associated with the development of an increasingly more ecological relationship with and awareness of the biosphere. Looking at the examples of littering and recycling (Quilley, 2009a), and such seminal texts as Aldo Leopold’s ‘The Land Ethic’ (Quilley, 2009b), Quilley demonstrates how calls for changes in conduct and the actual development of changing standards of behaviour regarding the environment correspond with developments associated with civilizing processes; for example, how identification with other humans has increased and expanded to include non-human nature (Quilley, 2009b). In this thesis, I will expand upon Quilley’s research in this area by exploring how and to what extent ecological civilizing processes in the long term relate to the emergence of concern about anthropogenic climate change.

**Decivilizing Processes**

As mentioned earlier, civilizing processes – whether they be ecological or not – entail the potential, according to some, of decivilizing processes. Several authors have developed Elias’s initial ideas about decivilizing, including Mennell who provides a table (reproduced here) comparing the European civilizing process, as explored by Elias, with possible symptoms of decivilizing processes (see Figure 3.1 below). This table clearly demonstrates Mennell’s conceptualisation of decivilizing processes as reversals of civilizing processes.
Jonathan Fletcher has further elaborated on this by providing ‘three main criteria of decivilization’: (1) ‘a shift in the balance between constraints by others and self-restraint in favour of constraints by others’; (2) ‘the development of a social standard of behaviour and feeling which generates the emergence of a less even, all-round, stable and differentiated pattern of self-restraint’; and (3) ‘a contraction in the scope of mutual identification between
constituent groups and individuals’ (Fletcher, 1997, p. 83). He adds that such developments of decivilization are more likely to occur where there is:

- a decrease in the (state) control of the monopoly of violence, a fragmentation of social ties and a shortening of chains of commercial, emotional and cognitive interdependence. It is also likely that such societies would be characterized by: a rise in the levels of fear, insecurity, danger and incalculability; the re-emergence of violence into the public sphere; growing inequality or heightening of tensions in the balance of power between constituent groups; a decrease in the distance between the standards of adults and children; a freer expression of aggressiveness and an increase in cruelty; an increase in impulsiveness; an increase in involved forms of thinking with their concomitantly high fantasy content and a decrease in detached forms of thought with an accompanying decrease in the ‘reality-congruence’ of concepts (Fletcher, 1997, pp. 83-84).

Despite that the above implies a reversal of civilizing processes, Fletcher is quick to clarify this by arguing that, due to the learned aspects involved in civilizing processes – the changes in behaviour and social relations that people learn throughout their lifetime – these processes cannot be completely reversed, as such, for people do not simply forget what they have learnt. So, like Mennell, Fletcher conceptualises decivilizing processes as reversals, but only as partial reversals.

In his research on punishment, John Pratt has added to this in exploring possible decivilizing processes as they relate to recent developments in punitiveness in some western countries. Rather, than involving simply reversals, Pratt (2005, p. 260) suggests that instead ‘we are likely to see the emergence of new practices, behaviours, and cultural values that represent a fusion of these influences rather than the exclusive ascendancy of one or the
other'; in other words, a fusion of civilizing and decivilizing trends, rather than
the dominance of civilizing processes or decivilizing processes. Using the
example of Nazi Germany, he demonstrates how civilizing and decivilizing
processes occurred in tandem. He combines the arguments of Elias and Fletcher
on the decivilizing processes that culminated in the holocaust, with Fletcher’s
argument that these decivilizing trends were put into effect through civilizing
trends such as a systematic, state control over the means of violence, with long
chains of interdependence, and where many people were only a part of the
process that culminated in the systematic extermination of individuals. He then
goes on to relate how different civilizing trends combine with different
decivilizing trends in the development of the new punitiveness. In relation to
the ‘war on terror’ in Britain, these themes of partial decivilizing, and of a fusion
of civilizing and decivilizing are taken up by Vertigans (2010). He argues also
that counter-terror strategies, and current public reactions to terrorism, are
indicative of an interweaving of civilizing and decivilizing trends.

In a different way, de Swaan (2001) seeks to overcome the problem of the
relation between civilizing and decivilizing processes by introducing the
concept of dyscivilization. This refers to compartmentalised decivilizing
processes, where decivilizing occurs in a sequestered area that is hidden from
the rest of the population; where disidentification and cruelty is directed only at
a designated group; where the rest of society maintains conditions of civilizing
processes. In other words, decivilizing is spatially compartmentalised within a
broader civilizing process. Such a concept is useful to consider when thinking
about how and why some folk devils during some moral panics are treated in
such a radically different way to others.

This is similar in some ways to how Robert van Krieken relates civilizing
processes to decivilizing processes. He argues that these two processes
‘interpenetrate each other so that, under certain circumstances, societies are
“barbaric” precisely in their movement towards increasing civilization’ (van
Krieken, 1999, p. 297). Using the example of the ‘stolen generations’ in Australia to illustrate this – where, in the pursuit of ‘civilization’, and as civilizing processes themselves were developing, some aboriginal children were forcibly removed from their families in order to ‘civilize’ them to become more like the European colonists – he demonstrates how civilizing processes were occurring, but that a part of this involved decivilizing trends directed towards aboriginal people. Van Krieken terms this campaign to ‘civilize’ the indigenous aboriginals as a civilizing offensive, a concept that is particularly useful to consider when thinking about the relation between civilizing and decivilizing processes, and also how moral panics relate to these processes.

Moral panics can be regarded as a type of civilizing offensive. While moral panics may not always invoke discourses of civilization and civilizing, there is the underlying theme within them to influence the behaviour and the morals of particular groups of people, or to at least protect from those who are deemed to be ‘immoral’ and ‘dangerous’ (similar to how civilizing offensives might aim to protect the ‘civilized’ from the ‘uncivilized’). And while, as van Krieken demonstrates, civilizing offensives involve civilized barbarism – a fusion of civilizing and decivilizing – so too moral panics may involve a fusion of these trends. This will be most explicitly demonstrated in Chapter 8, where I comparatively explore how civilizing and decivilising processes and civilizing offensives relate to a selection of moral panic case studies.

**Moral Panic**

As outlined in Chapter 1, moral panics have typically been defined as overreactions to perceived social problems. As Cohen describes it in *Folk Devils and Moral Panics*:

> Societies appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods of moral panic. A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to
become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other right-thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or (more often) resorted to; the condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates and becomes more visible….Sometimes the panic passes over and is forgotten…at other times it has more serious and long-lasting repercussions and might produce such changes as those in legal and social policy or even in the way the society conceives itself (Cohen, [1972] 2002, p. 1).

As Nachman Ben-Yehuda (2009, p. 1) observes, the concept of moral panic ‘has benefited from several theoretical innovations’, including initially, in the work of Cohen and others, symbolic interactionism (SI) and labelling theory. This early influence of SI is important for, as Goudsblom illustrates in Sociology in the Balance (1977), SI approaches share many similarities with figurational approaches to theory, concepts and empirical research. This suggests that moral panic research, or at least the research from the likes of Cohen, would be compatible with a synthesis with Eliasian theories and concepts.

Symbolic interactionism greatly influenced a substantial proportion of moral panic research that has utilised a constructionist approach to the study of social problems (Best, 2011). That line of research focuses on exploring how and why particular claims get made and who is involved in the claims making process (Best, [1995] 2009). It explores the relations between the people involved in the claims and the claims making, rather than focusing on assessing/alleviating the social problem about which the claims are being made. In this respect, it is only a partial approach, for it does not explore the interplay between how the ‘reality’ of problems is developing and how the ‘construction’ of them is developing; that is, how they effect and are affected by one another. Through
synthesising moral panic with Elias, we can begin to overcome this problem of the objective/subjective divide, as I will suggest in the following chapter.

A more recent development has employed the arguments of Ulrich Beck’s ‘risk society’ thesis to moral panic. Shelly Ungar argues that moral panic is no longer sufficient to consider exploring the development of social problems associated with the risk society; specifically, those surrounding ‘real world events’ that are unintended outcomes of the risk society. He attempts to integrate natural processes into his approach to research, for example by exploring how ‘real’ weather events influence the reception of climate change as a social problem (Ungar, 1992).

In contrast with earlier models of moral panic, Ungar argues that a ‘risk society’ (Beck, 1992) perspective brings a new dynamic to the creation of folk devils and the issue of disproportionality (Ungar, 2001). Potential risk society ‘accidents’ (that may lead to moral panics or social scares) do not necessarily involve clearly identifiable targets for blame – the fault may be more institutional rather than with an identified deviant group. Thus, instead of ‘classic’ moral panics (where the public are drawn together in their mutual hatred towards evil folk devils), risk society accidents and scares ‘tend to create “corrosive communities” as the different actors try to deny their culpability’ (Ungar, 2001, p. 284). Instead of creating certain ‘us’ and ‘them’ cohesive groups – of bringing people together in uncertain times – they give rise to uncertainty, doubt and a decrease in trust. That is, they expose the fallibility of these longer chains of interdependence, but do not provide any object with which to direct the accompanying anxieties. As a result, there may be no violence (state or public) directed at a folk devil (as may have been the case with ‘classic’ moral panics).

Through looking at failed panics/scares, such as the greenhouse scare of the summer of 1988, Ungar (2001) examines how their success or failure is dependent upon external factors that are beyond claims-makers’ control, such
as: dramatic real-world events; the timing of the claims-making; the receptivity of the audience; and the diffusion of claims. This relates back to how we conceive of the relation between intended and unintended consequences in the development (or non-development) of moral panics.

One of the most important recent contributions to the development of the concept of moral panic comes from the synthesis of Foucault, governmentality, moral regulation, discourse and risk. This began primarily in the work of Sean Hier and, more recently, Chas Critcher. Hier (2002a, 2008) draws upon the sociologies of governance and risk to situate panics as short-term volatile regulatory episodes occurring within more routine practices of moral regulation. These episodes of ‘volatile moralization’ occur where grievance over a past event (such as the death of a child) becomes associated with future risk from dangerous, risky others. During such episodes, the responsibility for individual management/avoidance of risk is temporarily displaced to responsibility of the ‘other’. Here, the other is seen to be as responsible for both past grievance and future risk as they are considered to be inadequately regulating their behaviour. This allows for exploring the interplay between developments that occur before moral panics, as well as those that occur during panics. An important point of departure in Hier’s work is his emphasis on moral panics (volatile episodes of moral regulation) as being rational. However, like the notion of a ‘good’ moral panic, conceptualizing moral panics as rational is useful to aid us in thinking beyond limited understandings, but it is still merely the other side of a normative dichotomy (irrational versus rational, bad versus good). In this way Elias’s work is useful in helping us to think beyond these dichotomies and instead explore the degrees and blends of various different relations and processes involved in moral panics.

Moral panic may be linked with current campaigns about climate change in the following way. Some campaigners have implicitly or explicitly attributed recent natural disasters to climate change. Grievances over these past events are then
used as indicative of future disasters, future risks that will occur in greater frequency and severity, if something is not done to regulate everyone’s behaviour. In contrast with Hier’s conceptualization, and much moral panic research, it is not as if there is a dangerous, risky other that can be avoided, controlled or regulated; we are all seen to be failing at the project of regulating our consumption. And so we witness the development of various calls for intentional interventions aimed at regulating consumption, both formally, at the level of the state, and informally, at the level of the individual (the latter, encouraged by the proliferation of guides – books and television programmes – on how to live green and stop global warming) (see Rohloff, 2011a).

**Informalization, Reformalization and Moral Panic**

While not exploring moral panics or nature-society relations, Cas Wouters (2004) has compared changes in manners and emotions from the fifteenth to the twenty first century. He describes how the regulating of behaviours has changed over time, where, up until the end of the nineteenth century, there occurred a long-term process of formalization, where ‘more and more aspects of behaviour were subjected to increasingly strict and detailed regulations that were partly formalized as laws and partly as manners’ (Wouters, 2004, p. 204). This went hand in hand with the development ‘of a type of personality with a rather stringent mode of self-regulation and a rather rigid conscience, functioning more or less as a “second nature”’ (Wouters, 2004, pp. 193-194). In contrast with this, during the twentieth century there occurred a process of informalization, where there occurred a relaxation of some of these rules, and others came to be less formal and less specific. Informalization occurred alongside the development of a ‘third nature’, which Wouters describes as:

...a balance between...‘second-nature’ self-regulation and a more reflexive and flexible one....The term refers to a level of consciousness and calculation in which all types of constraints and possibilities are taken into
account. It is a rise to a new level of reflexive civilization... (Wouters, 1998, p. 139).

More recently, the emergence of books and guides in response to the ‘climate crisis’ perhaps points towards a partial phase of reformalization (Wouters, 2007), where the ideals (of the likes of Leopold) are still present, but there is a shift towards increasing prescriptions – what behaviour to do, and what not to do, to ‘save the planet’ and ‘stop global warming’. It is almost as if the potential future crises from climate change have engendered a sense that changes in behaviour regarding the environment have not been occurring at a fast enough rate (or they have gone into ‘reverse’). And so this perceived social crisis has brought about a phase of reformalization, where (some) nature-society relations are written down in the form of guides containing prescriptions and prohibitions. But at the same time, the way these green guides are written, it is as if they are appealing to a 'third-nature personality'; reflexive and self-regulating. Therefore, it is not as if the process of informalization has gone into reverse, as such.

We can now begin to see how moral panic may be used to understand how climate change has developed as a perceived social problem. There are many potential examples of reformalizing phases in response to informalizing that have been explored through a moral panic framework; for example, reactions to new media and to sex and violence in the media, and reactions to marijuana smokers (and ‘youth’ in general) in the 1960s. It is worth noting that some episodes of ‘moral panic’ involve looking back to a ‘golden age’ in the past, where ‘social stability and strong moral discipline acted as a deterrent to delinquency and disorder’ (McRobbie & Thornton, 1995, p. 561; see also Thompson, 1998, p. 4); in contrast, the ‘present’ is viewed as one of continual moral decline, where right and wrong are no longer certain and so a return to rules and regulations are deemed necessary. And so the ideas mentioned earlier, where an idealized past is compared with today's 'societies of excess', of
‘overconsumption’ are perceived as being indicative of a failure in more informal, self-controls, and so we need more specific guidelines on how to live.

As with manners books, as examined by Elias ([1939] 2012) in relation to civilizing processes, and self-help books, as examined by Rimke (2000) and others in relation to Foucault’s concept of governmentality, guides to living green may be viewed as both reflecting and contributing to changes in standards of behaviour regarding nature-society relations. This shift towards self-governance of climate change may also reflect a wider informalizing of governance, and can then be explored in relation to calls to return to more formal means of governance, such as those measures of social control enacted by state authorities. So in addition to exploring the relationship between green guides and civilizing processes, we could (in future research) contrast this with other ‘crises’ and the differing degree of measures that have been enacted as a result, be they formal or informal. This could then be looked at in relation to the relative closeness or distance between campaigners and those who are the target of such campaigns. This returns us to the concept of moral panic and its relationship to long-term changes in regulation, in particular, to Hier’s conceptualization of moral panic as volatile moral regulation and the question of the degree of ‘volatility’ of such episodes.

The conceptual incorporation of moral panic into long-term projects of moral regulation creates additional space for the incorporation of Elias’s civilizing and decivilizing processes. Hier’s notion of moral panics occurring during crises of the governing of morals can be comparable, in some ways, to short-term decivilizing processes. However, in the context of anthropogenic climate change, moral panics could, potentially, contribute to ecological civilizing processes. Thus, the interplay between civilizing and decivilizing trends during such processes that could be termed moral panics, and how these relate to broader social processes, could inform understandings about civilizing and decivilizing processes.
**Decivilizing Processes, Civilizing Offensives and Moral Panics**

As mentioned in Chapter 1, I have already begun to synthesize parts of Elias’s work (and of those who use Elias) with the concept of moral panic. I initially argued that moral panics are a type of partial decivilizing process (Rohloff, 2008). However, that argument was based upon considering a limited number of case studies (of other people’s empirical research). As I began to consider a wider variety of empirical examples including climate change, it became apparent that moral panics were much more complex than this and, indeed, the relation between civilizing and decivilizing processes is more complex than this. I therefore went on to suggest that moral panics are a type of civilizing offensive that may involve a blend of civilizing and decivilizing processes (Rohloff, 2011a, 2011b). And so in this thesis I will explore, test and develop this theoretical conceptual synthesis in relation to the example of climate change, and to additional examples in the comparative analysis in Chapter 8.

**Panic and Denial**

A few authors have hinted toward a relationship between moral panic and denial. Michael Welch (2004) has written on both in relation to terrorism (moral panics about terrorism, and denial about the human rights violations directed against those who are suspected of being involved in terrorism). He sees panic and denial as being conceptual opposites, the former in the direction of overreaction, the latter underreaction (Welch, 2007). Similarly, Garland sees moral panic and denial as two opposing poles within the study of social reaction (Garland, 2008). Cohen himself suggests that ‘good’ moral panics might be deliberately engineered to overcome the denial of atrocities (Cohen, 2001, [1972] 2002, 2011). In contrast, I wish to also explore the possibility of how moral panics themselves can contribute to denial. With the example of climate change, we have allegations (beyond academia) of ‘climate change denial’, yet
we also have allegations of moral panic. And, as introduced in the previous chapter, the work of Norgaard (2006, 2011) and O’Neill and Nicholson-Cole (2009) on emotions and climate change suggests that fear and other undesirable emotions that may be present in claims and campaigns associated with moral panic can lead to denial. And so it is important to consider these potential unintended consequences of moral panics. This brings us to the role of emotions in moral panic research.

**Emotions and Panic**

Other than conceptualizing panics as irrational, there has been little in the way of research to explore the emotions involved in panics. Both Cohen and Young have alluded to this, however, in looking at how various actors involved in panics enjoy the spectacle and/or experience feelings of ressentiment towards those who are seen to be rule breakers (Young, 2009). But not much has been done beyond this. This is perhaps not surprising, given that the sociology of emotions is a relatively young area of research. Kevin Walby and Dale Spencer (2011) have begun to contribute to this area. They argue that moral panic research should explore emotions in the following ways: ‘by empirically investigating what emotions do25, how emotions align certain communities against others, and how emotions move people towards certain (sometimes violent) actions against others whose actions pose alleged harms’ (Walby & Spencer, 2011, p. 104). They add that one criticism of moral panic research is its over-reliance on the analysis of media (Walby & Spencer, 2011, p. 105). As such, in this thesis, as well as carrying out an analysis of a wide variety of documentary evidence beyond the news media, I will also explore individual experiences through semi-structured interviews, enabling the potential for an exploration of the emotions involved during panics.

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25 One criticism of Walby and Spencer is that the way they write about emotions devolves them from people, conceptualizing emotions as separate things that act on their own.
Elias and Foucault

As demonstrated in the work of Critcher, Hier and others, much of the Foucauldian literature on moral panics shares many commonalities with the small amount of figurational research on moral panics (the latter, mostly consisting solely of my own research). This sparked an initial interest for me to compare Elias and Foucault throughout this research. In addition, several researchers have written on the relation between Elias and Foucault already (for example, see Dunning & Hughes, 2013; Hughes, 2010; Smith, 1999, 2001; van Krieken, 1990), but not in relation to either moral panics or the ‘environment’ (least of all climate change). In comparing Elias and Foucault, this thesis highlights commonalities, points of departure, and contributes to dialogue between these two areas of research.

Rather than devoting space here to providing an exposition of these existing comparisons, I wish to instead introduce several areas to which I will return in Chapter 8. I am primarily interested in utilising Foucault in this thesis in the form of his apparent or alleged focus on epistemic ruptures, of sudden changes, of continuity followed by discontinuity. As mentioned in the previous chapter, which I will return to below, this focus on rapid change, akin to punctuated equilibrium, stands in contrast to Elias’s predominant focus on more gradual change. It therefore provides a useful interrogation of Elias’s work, to consider these different approaches when exploring empirical examples. Another useful comparison is between Elias and Beck. In contrast to Foucault, from what I am aware no comparison with Beck has been done before.

Elias and Beck: Knowledge, Science, Risk and Civilization

In World at Risk (2009), Ulrich Beck brings together his earlier ideas about risk, reflexive modernization and cosmopolitanism to explore the current different examples of financial crises, terrorism and climate change. While
acknowledging that the past was characterized by greater uncertainties and dangers associated with illness, violence and other threats, Beck argues that these need to be discerned from the more recent developments associated with the anticipation of future threats that, he claims, are ‘often a product of the success of civilization’ (Beck, 2009, p. 4). The attempt to anticipate future threats, the forecasting of risks, corresponds with an increasing foresight – increasingly looking further into the future at the possibility of potential catastrophes and adjusting behaviour in accordance with these risks – and is in this way conducive with Elias’s writings on knowledge and civilization. However, there are several points of departure. Beck argues that catastrophes, and risk (the anticipation of catastrophes), are often an outcome of civilization; for example, climate change as an unanticipated outcome of the success of industrialization. Whereas Elias argues that the dangers that seem to be produced by science – such as the possibilities of nuclear and chemical warfare – are not a product of science, as such, but are instead related to the power relations between the different rival groups (Elias, [1987] 2007).

In relation to the potential dangers of technology, Elias refers to the tandem processes of technization and civilization; the development of different tools requires increasing levels of foresight and detachment, yet at the same time the utilization of those tools requires increasing self-regulation – the exercising of self-restraint – in an attempt to gain increasing control over the possible outcomes of the usage of technology. Elias provides the example of a civilizing process that interacted with the technological development of the motorcar. While not a unilinear process, the interplay of technization and civilization involved decivilizing spurts: ‘[the development of the motor car] revealed previously undreamt-of possibilities and, at the same time, unforeseen dangers…Viewed in terms of the theoretical concept of civilisation, the motor vehicle had two faces’ (Elias, [1995] 2008, p. 66). So, Elias does allow for the possible outcome of unintended, unforeseen dangers (a view echoed by Goudsblom (1992), when he discusses the unforeseen outcomes of the control
Indeed, Beck also notes that technology is a ‘double-edged sword’, which can lead to both ‘chance and danger’.

Yet while Elias draws attention to the unintended outcomes of civilization, Beck seems to argue that these unforeseen outcomes are increasing, with the realization that, as the sciences have developed, we have come to increasingly realize that the more we know, the more we do not know. This brings into question Elias’s argument of developing more ‘reality congruent’ knowledge, but perhaps not. The awareness of this not-knowing is perhaps more conducive to decreasing the ‘fantasy content’ of knowledge, as, if we follow Beck’s argument, it brings us closer to the ‘reality’ of how little we know. However, at times Beck verges more towards the idea that knowledge leads to increasing dangers:

World risk society is a non-knowledge society in a very precise sense. In contrast to the premodern era, it cannot be overcome by more and better knowledge, more and better science; rather precisely the opposite holds: it is the product of more and better science (Beck, 2009, p. 115).

In contrast, Elias does not argue that knowledge alone can contribute to levels of danger; it is a combination of many part-processes. While Beck does examine this, in part, via his discussion of how crises may or may not lead to enforced cosmopolitanism, one gets the sense that he sees knowledge and technology as inherently dangerous and in need of control. But perhaps this is not too dissimilar to Goudsblom’s (1992) discussion of fire and civilization and Elias’s of technization and civilization (1995), where increasing technology requires increasing self-control.

Beck argues that risks –potential future catastrophes – are uncertain and, therefore, it is difficult to make a judgment about perceptions of risk; it is difficult to discern between ‘hysteria and fear mongering’ and ‘appropriate fear
and precaution’ (Beck, 2009, p. 12). This argument problematizes judgments about dis/proportionality of the reactions to social problems in moral panic research, a topic that will be explored in this thesis.

In addition, Beck points towards how the increasing democratization of knowledge has enabled the continual questioning of science and technology; indeed, the democratization of claims to knowledge has assisted the development of the side effects of industrialization. Not only does this contribute to declining ‘ontological security’ (according to Beck and Giddens, at least) – where states, sciences and economies are perceived to be failing to provide security – but it also creates space for increasingly competing and countering claims, thereby further contributing to uncertainty about potential catastrophes.

Beck’s argument for opening up scientific debates to the public raises some questions over the relative autonomy of science that may be compromised as a result. But to what extent are the public equipped to make such judgments? Reactions to numerous developments in science, including vaccines, the Large Hadron Collider, Evolution, to name but a few, suggest that if the public were to play a role, there needs to be more development in the area of science communication and consultation with the public. Furthermore, this ‘reflexivity’ that Beck speaks of does not appear to be applied equally to all spheres. It seems that there is more distrust of some areas – such as sciences, big corporations – with the opposite occurring with other areas; for example, ‘natural’ and ‘alternative’ therapies. Indeed, Beck notes how ‘no new medicine can be hailed without listing the associated known and unknown risks’ (2009, p. 60), but this level of scrutiny does not apply to ‘alternative’ medicines to the same degree.

Beck argues that these global risks, as they affect everyone, are in contrast to violent conflicts of the past – between ‘us’ and ‘them’. However, these risks
could also, potentially, produce outsiders, such as the person/organization that does not regulate their behaviour in accordance with the potential risk. And so the 'irresponsible' may come to be regarded as 'dangerous'. Beck argues that, as new incalculable risks occur with growing interdependence and increasing complexity, it becomes increasingly more difficult to determine a single cause of a catastrophe, or to predict them. But he does also acknowledge that some people still try to assign blame, particularly when this risk becomes individualized. This is partly addressed by Beck, when he discusses the risks of terrorism and smoking and how they may contribute to further divisions. We can perhaps see the potential for this with campaigns about other behaviours that are viewed as being not only dangerous to the self, but also to the rest of us. Perhaps some behaviours associated with ‘non-eco-friendly’ lifestyles may come to be viewed as such, and thus, via status aspirations and other pressures, contribute to changes in behaviours.

Beck argues that this decrease in trust in institutions, along with the perceived inability of institutions to ‘define or control risks in a rational way’, has contributed to the emergence of the individual management of risk via ‘responsible’ consumerism. This relates to earlier developments discussed, such as the development of ‘green’ consumerism, as well as the more recent emergence of guides on how to ‘live green’. This is exemplified in the creation of the individual carbon calculator, where one can measure one’s carbon footprint and get advice on how to decrease their individual footprint. Beck argues that with this reductionism of ecological crisis, there is a danger of coming up with only a technocratic answer to how we can mobilize and redefine modernity (Beck, 2008). He adds against this ‘don’t to this’ (limiting) discourse, that this individualized approach to global warming is not enough – the problem is too big and requires not just the involvement of states, but of ‘global alliances between states and businesses’ (2009, p. 62). He adds that events such as Hurricane Katrina highlight the limitations of individual responsibility, as not everyone has the means to ‘care for the self’.
Beck appears to focus on the integrative possibilities for world risks. He argues that when risks are perceived as being ‘omnipresent, three reactions are possible: denial, apathy, or transformation’ (Beck, 2009, p. 48). For the latter, the transformation he refers to is the ‘cosmopolitan moment’ of ‘world risk society’. Interestingly, despite a brief mention of it when discussing terrorism, for the most part Beck ignores the disintegrative possibilities accompanying world risks. Thus, while Elias tends to focus on ‘double-binds’ and ‘decivilizing processes’ in times of crisis, Beck is perhaps more optimistic and sees catastrophes as moments where new beginnings can occur (though this perhaps has something to do with the different examples each of them have explored, thereby highlighting the need for a comparative analysis). Taken together, Beck and Elias can perhaps be used to highlight a ‘dialectical understanding’ (van Krieken, 1998) of the ambivalent (Burkitt, 1996) processes of civilization (see also van Krieken, 1999).

For Beck, the ‘cosmopolitan moment’ refers to an unintended enforced development, where people increasingly come to be living and cooperating together, and sharing the world with others who, in the past, they might have excluded. It is a process whereby the formerly excluded come to be increasingly included in a continual process whereby the increasing interdependence of nations means that helping the other helps the self (Beck, 2009, Ch. 3). Thus, it shares many similarities with Elias’s idea of civilization, including increased interdependence contributing to increased mutual identification. Although this process may create further tensions, where groups come to be increasingly excluded if the risk or catastrophe that could bring about this ‘cosmopolitan moment’ can be blamed on a particular group of people. Indeed, Beck hints towards this possibility in his discussion of the reactions to terrorism.

This comparison between Beck and Elias, with references to climate change and moral panics, further assists with a critical assessment of Elias’s theories and
concepts, and in conceiving of the relation between knowledge, moral panic and decivilizing processes.

**Knowledge, Panic and Decivilization**

As mentioned earlier, the role of knowledge in decivilizing processes has also been underdeveloped, yet it is especially relevant to moral panic, given the focus on the role of the media in moral panics, where the exaggeration and distortion of events in the media (Cohen, [1972] 2002), or, conversely, the deamplification of events (Murphy et al., 1988), may affect understandings about social problems and the development of moral panics. This is particularly pertinent to anthropogenic climate change, where the public understanding of the science, and the media representation of the science, has been widely discussed. Developments in disparities between representations of climate change in academic literature and popular media could perhaps be related to wider social processes, namely, to changes in the production and the dissemination of knowledge.

The increasing specialization of the production of knowledge, particularly with regard to scientific knowledge, has, according to Ungar (2000), coincided with a relative 'knowledge-ignorance paradox', where the expansion of specialized knowledge has coincided with an increase in ignorance (as specialized knowledge increases, the proportion of information one can be knowledgeable about decreases). While scientific establishments may monopolize the production of scientific knowledge, the knowledge products themselves are, in theory, not so easily monopolized (Elias, [1982] 2009, 1984); scientific establishments cannot monopolize the distribution of knowledge either. The proliferation of multiple media, allowing space for counterclaims (McRobbie & Thornton, 1995) and the fabrication of claims (Ungar, 2000), as well as the relative scientific illiteracy of non-specialists necessitating alterations to knowledge, may affect understanding about topics such as anthropogenic
climate change.

And so, the specialization of knowledge, along with the democratization of the distribution of knowledge, while potentially allowing the ‘increasing power potential’ of the governed via increasing education (Elias, 1984, pp. 277-278), may also, potentially, contribute to the democratization of multiple claims to knowledge and, thereby, increasing uncertainty about dangers. This is perhaps evident with differing understandings about the science of anthropogenic climate change. During such instances of multiple knowledge claims, moral panics may perhaps be an attempt to re-monopolize knowledge (as well as an attempt to perhaps re-formalize governance). This raises questions as to how lengthening chains of interdependence can contribute to decivilization. And so one area this thesis will explore is the role of knowledge in moral panics, and how this relates to civilizing and decivilizing processes.

**Elias and Complexity**

As mentioned in the previous chapter, John Urry’s application of complexity to sociological understandings of climate change appears to have some dissimilarities with some of Elias’s arguments about social change. However, it also has some similarities. Although Urry does not refer to Elias in these works, he does draw from Marx, particularly Marx’s idea of the contradictions (including unintended consequences) in capitalism; indeed, Urry goes so far as to refer to Marx as the first ‘complexity’ theorist (see Urry, 2009a). This usage of Marx shares similarities with the way Elias (and others) conceive of the relation between intentional action and unintended developments, Elias’s use of game models, and the relation between civilizing and decivilizing processes.

And in his recent book on *Climate Change and Society*, Urry alludes to Elias though never actually refers to him. He introduces four possible future scenarios, possible outcomes from climate change: ‘Orwellian scenario’,
‘perpetual consumerism’, ‘local sustainability’, and ‘regional warlordism’. The latter is characterized by a complete breakdown of civilization, what Norbert Elias would call a process of decivilization. Urry (2011, p. 149) writes ‘In this decivilizing energy-starved future …’ and outlines many ‘reversals’ that could be seen as examples of Elias’s symptoms of decivilizing.

However, where the two differ is on the rate of change, and how change occurs. While Elias refers at times to ‘spurts’ of civilizing or decivilizing – that is, accelerations in the development of civilizing and decivilizing processes (see Elias, [1989] 1996) – he largely conceptualizes social change as occurring at a very gradual rate, and largely as the unintended outcome of planned actions. In contrast, and as mentioned in the previous chapter, Urry argues that we become locked into different systems, and only a radical reorientation of social life can bring about a sudden ‘switch’ from the current system to a different system. This notion of system switching is in keeping with Thomas Kuhn (normal science, followed by revolution, leading to the establishment of a ‘new’ normal science, and so on), and Michel Foucault’s idea of ‘epistemic ruptures’; of continuity followed by discontinuity. This question of the rate of change, of gradual versus sudden change, will be explored throughout this thesis. Indeed, this is why in Chapter 5 I explore climate change in the long term, looking at in relation to ecological civilizing processes, and in Chapter 6 I look at it in the short-term, in relation to moral panics.

**Elias, Practice Theory and Climate Change**

One sociological approach to climate change that I have thus far failed to mention utilizes social theories of practice. In the work of Shove, Hand, Southerton and others, social practices are in some instances seen as separate from the people and the objects involved in the social practice. They focus on understanding how social practices develop, emerge, and dissipate in a relational and processual way (Shove, 2010). In looking at the examples of using
a freezer (Hand & Shove, 2007) and showering (Hand, Shove, & Southerton, 2005), making many arguments that are similar to those made by Elias. They explore the long-term development of changes in showering practices. Looking at the development in the nineteenth century of the increasing medicalization and the high status associated with cleanliness, washing and water, they make observations that are in keeping with Elias’s and others’ regarding civilizing processes and offensives (for example, see Goudsblom, 2003).

However, like Urry on complexity theory and climate change, these authors utilize practice theory to seek to understand how disjunction between dimensions of practices emerge so that they can then take advantage of these opportunities to ‘establish...a less resource intensive form of “normal practice”’ (Hand et al., 2005, para. 6.9). Indeed, the use of the phrase normal practice indicates a nod towards Kuhn’s ([1962] 1970) ‘normal science’ mentioned earlier. Yet their exploration of gradual developments similar to civilizing processes suggests that they are instead conceptualizing social processes in both ways – as gradual developments and as sudden changes. This potential combination is worth considering as it relates to climate change, and to synthesizing various approaches to social processes.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I have provided an overview of the theories and concepts developed by Elias and others that I will be referring to throughout this research. I have also given an introduction to some of the approaches to moral panic research that I have considered when developing my own theoretical conceptual methodological approach to moral panic research. Finally, I have compared Elias, and moral panic, with several other approaches to sociology, namely Foucault, Beck, Urry and complexity theory, and practice theory. In the next chapter, I will develop my approach to this research – my ‘methodology’
and my ‘methods’ – with a further critical discussion of the relation between figurational and moral panic research.
Chapter Four

Methodology\textsuperscript{26}

On first impression, combining the concept of moral panic with Norbert Elias’s theory of civilizing processes in order to explore how climate change has developed as a social problem may raise many objections and apparent contradictions. For example, the concept of moral panic is commonly associated with a perceived irrational overreaction to an exaggerated social problem. Such assumptions may lead one to judge this thesis as just an exercise in ‘climate change skepticism’, or as an example of ‘climate change denial’. Furthermore, the concept of moral panic entails within it many assumptions that, at first glance, appear incompatible with Elias’s approach. For example, the concept of moral panic entails normative assumptions, where the reaction to a perceived social problem is presupposed to be misguided and misdirected. Such a political, ideological presupposition seems at odds with Elias’s conceptualization of attempts to reduce the intrusion of heteronomous evaluations into sociological research by way of a ‘detour via detachment’.

I therefore want to begin this chapter by first addressing some of these apparent contradictions by deriving my particular theoretical-methodological approach to ‘moral panic’ research, which will be largely informed (but not dictated) by Elias’s figurational approach. I will contrast this approach to other approaches, in order to highlight some of the commonalities between different approaches to research. I will also critically reflect and question aspects of Elias’s theories and concepts by ‘testing’ them against other approaches and theories and, eventually, empirical data. Additionally, this chapter will begin to

\textsuperscript{26} Earlier versions of some of the sections from this chapter were written for a chapter in \textit{Moral Panic and the Politics of Anxiety}.
question the relevance and adequacy of the concept of moral panic; this critical assessment of ‘moral panic’ will be further developed in Chapter 8: Moral Panics as Civilizing and Decivilizing Processes: A Comparative Analysis, and Chapter 9: Conclusion.

Involvement and Detachment in Moral Panic Research: Normativity and the ‘Political Project’

The history of the moral panic concept – how it developed and in what particular context – has left a legacy of several associated assumptions about what moral panic research is, what the concept signifies, and the purpose of the concept. As Garland observes, the sociology of moral panic originated in the 1960s, at a time when the concept’s originators (Stan Cohen and Jock Young) were ‘often culturally closer to deviants than to their controllers’; moral panic thus emerged as a critique of what Cohen, Young and others ‘regarded as uninformed, intolerant, and unnecessarily repressive reactions to deviance by conservative authorities…’ (Garland, 2008, p. 19). We can see this ‘critical’, ‘political’ characteristic of moral panic research in Cohen’s own observations (in his introduction to the third edition of Folk Devils and Moral Panics):

It is obviously true that the uses of the concept to expose disproportionality and exaggeration have come from within a left liberal consensus. The empirical project is concentrated on (if not reserved for) cases where the moral outrage appears driven by conservative or reactionary forces...the point [of moral panic research] was to expose social reaction not just as over-reaction in some quantitative sense, but first, as tendentious (that is, slanted in a particular ideological direction) and second, as misplaced or displaced (that is, aimed – whether deliberately or thoughtlessly – at a target which was not the ‘real’ problem). (Cohen, [1972] 2002, p. xxxi)
It is evident, from the above extract, that there exists an assumption (or presupposition) that, with moral panic research, the particular reaction to a perceived social problem under investigation is somehow inappropriate and, therefore, wrong. To be sure, some moral panic studies have consisted of analyses of reactions to imagined social problems (as was undoubtedly the case with panics over ‘satanic ritual abuse’; see (de Young, 2004)). However, to have a concept and a mode of research that carries with it a debunking presupposition is limited in what it may achieve. It limits moral panic research to only those examples that are deemed to consist of inappropriate reactions, thereby limiting the development of the concept (Rohloff, 2011a). It extends an additional bias by assuming, prior to the research, that the reaction is inappropriate – indeed, a central aim of the research is to uncover this. Such a bias might mean that researchers neglect the various different functions that some moral panics may have. (Although this is partly beginning to be questioned through such notions as ‘good’ moral panics, which may function to overcome the denial of social problems (see Cohen, [1972] 2002, pp. xxxi–xxxv; 2011), and the idea of moral panics being ‘rational’ (see Hier, 2011a).)

In response to this problem of normativity, as well as other problems, several authors have either rejected the concept altogether, or have begun to develop a reconceptualization that attempts to overcome this normative assumption (and other limitations, such as the short-term focus on the episode of moral panic) (Hier, 2008; Rohloff & Wright, 2010). However, the attempt to remove the ‘political’ aspect of moral panic, informed in part by Foucault, has come with some criticism from others (see Critcher, 2008a, 2009). It seems that there exists a tension between those who want the concept to retain its political project, and those who want to develop a more detached approach to moral panic research that does not carry with it these normative presuppositions.

One way to overcome this apparent divide may be through the application of Norbert Elias’s reconceptualization of the problem as a balance between
'involvement' and 'detachment' (Elias, [1987] 2007). Elias was very critical of the intrusion of 'heteronomous valuations' into research, and endeavored to develop sociology into a relatively more autonomous 'science' (Elias, [1970] 2012). Normative, ideological intrusions, such as those outlined earlier by Cohen's extract, could be construed as a type of heteronomous valuation; where a researcher's identification with a particular group (in this case, the 'deviants'), combined with a political project to 'liberate' the particular group, may influence the degree to which the researcher can step back and see the development of, in this case, a 'moral panic' as being more than a short-term irrational aberration.

Even Howard Becker acknowledges that, when we inevitably take sides in social research, 'as our personal and political commitments dictate', we must 'use our theoretical and technical resources to avoid the distortions that might introduce into our work' (Becker, 1967, p. 247). He added that we must also declare our involvement in this way, stating that (if we apply his argument to the case of moral panics) we have studied the panic through the eyes of the folk devils, not through the eyes of the journalists (Becker, 1967). In this sense, Becker is acknowledging that there is no value neutral sociology, yet he is also arguing that we should strive to avoid the biases that the impact of our involvement with our research may have (see Hammersley, 2000, Ch.3).

Similarly, Elias did not advocate a 'value neutral' sociology, which is something he would have regarded as both an impossible and an undesirable task. Elias argued that one could never be completely involved or completely detached. And as sociology consisted of the study of the interdependent relations between people, a degree of involvement was desirable in order to aid in our

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27 This is similar in some ways to Baur and Ernst’s (2011) assertion, following Elias, that researchers should declare why they are asking their chosen research questions (partiality), and they should also continually reflect on how their motivations for asking those questions influence the research process, such as how they interpret or possibly distort data.

28 Although Elias (1956) did add the exceptions of small babies and perhaps insane people as being completely involved.
understanding of human relations (see Elias, 1956). While an initial ‘involvement’ in something may spark interest to investigate that particular topic, Elias ([1987] 2007) argued that this initial involvement should be accompanied by an attempt at ‘stepping back’ through a ‘detour via detachment’. The idea being that one can contribute to a more ‘reality congruent’ knowledge if one is not too constrained by the short-term aim of achieving some political goal. This does not mean that figurational sociology is apolitical, per se.

Maguire summarizes this ‘balance’ of involvement and detachment: ‘Sociologists must, therefore, be both relatively involved and detached in order to grasp the basic experience of social life – it is a question of balance. The sociologist-as-participant must be able to stand back and become the sociologist-as-observer-and-interpreter’ (Maguire, 1988, p. 190). Eric Dunning elaborates on this, arguing that, in order to achieve this balance – to be able to stand back and develop a relatively detached approach – sociologists should:

> Explore connections and regularities, structures and processes for their own sake. By attempting as dispassionately as possible to contribute to knowledge rather than to help in the achievement of some short-term goal, you will increase your chances of avoiding bias as result of personal interests or because of your membership of or identification with a particular group or groups (Dunning, 1992, p. 253).

This illustrates the difference between how I am approaching this ‘moral panic study’ of climate change, and how moral panic is typically conceived. Following Elias, I wish to understand how such developments have occurred. This does not entail a prior judgment on my part about what I might find (in terms of the ‘appropriateness’ of reactions to the ‘climate crisis’), nor does it involve any

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29 This is not to ignore the fact that I, like anyone else, have come into this research with some preconceived notions about what I might find; the key is to continually critically question and
overtly political aim. Instead, I wish to contribute to a greater understanding about how such developments have occurred over time, with the overall aim that, by contributing to knowledge, the knowledge garnered can then inform any interventions with the hope that this would contribute to the development of more ‘object adequate’ interventions that may have more intended than unintended consequences (that is, that any interventions may achieve more of what we want them to, culminating in less unwanted, unanticipated consequences (see Dunning & Hughes, 2013, Ch. 6)).

However, recent contributions have elaborated on the relationship between values, detachment and politics in figurational research, which must be taken into consideration. Stephen Dunne provides an overview of the political involvement inherent in figurational sociology (Dunne, 2009), highlighting amongst other things Elias’s utopian tale (Elias, 1984). Dunning and Hughes discuss the relationship between ‘value congruence’, ‘reality congruence’ and ‘involvement-detachment’. They argue that Elias believed that researchers ‘cannot and should not abandon their political interests and concerns’ (Dunning & Hughes, 2013, p. 158), referring to the following quote from Elias:

The problem confronting [social scientists] is not simply to discard [their more individual, political] role in favour of ... [a more detached, scientific one]. They cannot cease to take part in, and to be affected by, the social and political affairs of their group and their time. Their own participation and involvement, moreover, is itself one of the conditions for comprehending the problems they try to solve as scientists... The problems confronting those who study one or the other aspects of human groups is how to keep their two roles as participant and enquirer clearly and consistently apart, and, as a professional group to establish in their

challenge those preconceived notions so that they do not become so fixed that they drive the research too much and close it to other possibilities.
work the undisputed dominance of the latter (Elias, cited in Dunning & Hughes, 2013, p. 159).

Indeed, greater political involvement, and the intrusion of greater heteronomous evaluations (a greater degree of value congruence and a greater level of involvement), can in some instances contribute to greater degrees of reality congruence, through the searching for and discovery of social processes that, without the same degree of value congruence and involvement, would have been ignored. An example is the concept of moral panic. If it was not for the partisan research and the level of involvement characteristic in the 1960s and 1970s amongst Stan Cohen, Jock Young, Stuart Hall, and other members of the New Deviancy Conference, the concept of moral panic may have never been developed, and the approaches to research characteristic of the time, which shed light on previously neglected areas of research, may have never been utilized. Imagine how different the sociology of deviance would be without *The Drugtakers, Folk Devils and Moral Panics*, and *Policing the Crisis*, to name but a few. Political involvement and partisanship, therefore, can provide insights that might not otherwise be discovered.

This illustrates the necessity for blends of involvement and detachment, of value congruence and reality congruence. With increasing levels of informalization and ‘reflexivity’ (Kilminster, 2007), the capacity to utilize greater levels of involvement and value congruence in research, accompanied with a ‘detour via detachment’ (Elias, [1987] 2007) and ‘declared involvement’, may increase. It is in this vein that I wish to leave open the possibility for degrees of involvement in moral panic research – to retain the potential of the political project.

To summarize, throughout this research I intend to utilize the moral panic concept in a way that differs to the original, and indeed the popular, understanding of the term. I do not intend to use the concept as a debunking, skeptical term that dismisses the reaction to climate change as being an
irrational, disproportionate overreaction. Rather, I instead wish to understand how and to what extent understandings about climate change have developed in relation to the development of the phenomenon of climate change (and associated developments). Throughout, I intend to ‘critically’ examine reactions, and associated interventions, to this perceived social problem, but not with a presupposition that these reactions and interventions are necessarily misguided or misdirected. However, I do intend to eventually assess the adequacy of such interventions; that is, how and to what extent they may contribute to alleviating the potential ‘climate crisis’. This approach attends to the normative presupposition of moral panic research that has been the subject of much criticism by several authors. Yet, at the same time, it still allows the potential for a ‘political project’; where the results of this research may inform interventions that may have more intended than unintended consequences.

**An Investigation of Processes and Interdependent Relations**

Both moral panic and figurational research seek to ask questions about the processual development by which something has come to pass. For example, Elias explored how some people came to see themselves as more ‘civilized’ than others (Elias, [1939] 2012); with moral panic research, a ‘processual model’ (Critcher, 2003) is used to explore how a particular reaction to a perceived social problem has developed. Similarly, with this research I am exploring the processes that have contributed to both the development of anthropogenic climate change and the development of understandings about climate change.

The foundations of moral panic theory within symbolic interactionism and labeling theory have ingrained the concept with a focus on relations between people, including changing power relations between the ‘control culture’ and the ‘folk devils’ (Ben-Yehuda, 2009). Moral panic research sees ‘social reality’ as constantly in flux – continually contested and forever changing as relations between people change. This is similar to how Elias conceptualizes ‘social
reality’. Elias was very critical of the notion that one could discover eternal laws about social relations – static laws that are similar to those in the physical sciences. Thinking in terms of processes, relations, and development, Elias did not regard the ‘nature’ of ‘social reality’ as static and unchanging; rather he saw it as a continual process of structured development, resultant from the complex interactions between interdependent players (be they humans, other animals, etc.) (for example, see Elias, [1970] 2012).

While moral panic research has tended to focus on the social construction of reality (where the concept’s grounding in symbolic interactionism and labeling theory emphasizes deviance as a socially constructed phenomenon), there still exists an element of realism; for example, measuring the ‘real’ extent of a social problem (and to what extent the reaction was disproportionate to the action/problem), including the extent to which intervention against primary deviance contributed to secondary deviance. This stands in contrast to the mutually exclusive dichotomies that some authors of books on research design/methodology promote. Such authors argue that there are numerous dichotomies involved in research design, where researchers must carefully select which dichotomies they will follow based on their philosophical assumptions about ‘social reality’. For example, Crotty outlines what he believes to be a ‘divide’ between objectivism and subjectivism:

What would seem problematic is any attempt to be at once objectivist and constructionist (or subjectivist). On the face of it, to say that there is objective meaning and, in the same breath, to say that there is no objective meaning, certainly does appear to be contradictory...To avoid such discomfort, we will need to be consistently objectivist or consistently constructionist (or subjectivist) (Crotty, 1998, p. 15).

This extract clearly depicts the core assumption that ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ are mutually exclusive dichotomies. It presumes that either one will be
searching for true facts or one will be exploring people’s subjective interpretations or experiences. What this assumption neglects is the *interrelationship* between so-called ‘reality’ and its ‘interpretation’. Though of course, to speak of reality, and the interpretation (or construction) of reality, is to add credence to the notion that ‘object’ and ‘subject’ are separate. For example, while much moral panic research may be regarded by some as largely influenced by social constructionism (for example, see Jenkins, 1998), the criterion of disproportionality (where a reaction is deemed to be disproportionate to the ‘reality’ of the problem) necessitates a degree of ‘objectivism’ to determine the extent to which claims may be accurate. The example of moral panic therefore highlights the objectivism/subjectivism dichotomy as an unnecessary *false* dichotomy: contra Crotty, there is no need to be ‘consistently objectivist’ or ‘consistently constructionist’.

For this research, I am interested in exploring the interplay between various processes that have contributed to both the development of the phenomenon of ‘anthropogenic’ climate change and our understanding/perception of it. I am therefore interested in both\(^{30}\) questions

1. To explore processes that may have contributed to the development of anthropogenic climate change
2. To explore how and to what extent anthropogenic climate change has come to be viewed (by some) as a social problem

These two interrelated questions are being explored with the aim of contributing to knowledge about how such processes are developing – both as an object and a subject – and how ‘appropriate’ responses to this perceived social problem might be. Thus, the intention is to contribute to a more ‘reality congruent’ or ‘object-adequate’ knowledge, with the aim that the development of a more ‘reality-congruent’ knowledge may inform interventions that may have more intended than unintended consequences, which may then mean that

\(^{30}\) That is, ‘both’ types of questions that are often separated into the epistemologically dichotomous alternatives of objectivism/realism and constructionism.
we have greater directed control over the development of the interrelated natural, social and psychic processes (see Dunning & Hughes, 2013, Ch. 6 and p.196, on the ratio between intended to unintended developments, and between value congruence and reality congruence).

An important point of departure with much moral panic research is my intended focus on ‘natural’ processes as well; or, rather, the interrelationship between natural, social and psychic processes – what Elias terms the ‘triad of controls’ (Elias, [1970] 2012). As Sutton (2004) argues, through utilizing Elias’s ‘triad of controls’ in sociological research on ‘nature, self and society’, we can combine what are often separated areas of investigation into one overarching approach, which would include: ‘exploring the relationships between the natural environment, people’s self identities and the organization of social life’ (Sutton, 2004, p. 176). While moral panic research has largely neglected ‘natural processes’ (though there are exceptions, such as Ungar’s (1992, 2001) research on ‘real-world events’), this is perhaps in part due to the ideological underpinnings of moral panic, as outlined earlier with the examples derived from Cohen and Critcher. For some moral panic researchers, ‘moral’ is somehow seen as a separate sphere; for example, Kenneth Thompson argues, ‘Sometimes panics about food (e.g. the BSE scare about infected beef) or health have been confused with panics that relate directly to morals’ (Thompson, 1998, p. vii). Such arguments seem to suggest that ‘panics about food’ cannot contain a moral element (a view echoed by Cohen and Critcher); it is a question of moral panics versus risk panics (Ungar, 2001). However, others such as Hunt and Hier, disagree, arguing that risks can be moralized and that moral panics themselves involve risk discourses. A question for exploration could be why are some moral panic researchers so intent on limiting the applicability of the concept? Can this perhaps tell us something about the function of the concept for sociologists, and the motivations behind (some) moral panic research? A further shift in focus could therefore be on the sociology of the sociology of moral panic. Several important questions for investigation in this are include: Why this boxing off of
the ‘moral’? Is this similar to Marx’s reduction of all inequalities being due to the ‘economy’ (see Elias, [1971] 2009, pp. 10-11)? What is meant by ‘moral’ (as opposed to ‘ethical’)? How and to what extent have understandings about what is morality changed? What does ‘moral’ mean technically? How and to what extent do campaigns utilize ‘morality’ in their discourse and how has this changed over time? Such questions will be explored in a follow up piece of research to this thesis, where I will explore the sociology of the sociology of moral panic, or the sociogenesis of moral panic.

**The Interplay of Short-Term Campaigns and Long-Term Processes**

One way that moral panic research and figurational research can further develop one another is via a fusion of the two. Moral panic research varies in the degree to which it explores the long-term processes that feed into a given moral panic. As it currently stands, moral panic research tends to focus on short-term processes, to the relative neglect of how long-term processes relate to short-term episodes of moral panics (Rohloff & Wright, 2010). Some authors have criticized the concept on the basis that it does not attend to more long-term developments (and how they relate to a short-term moral panic) (Watney, [1987] 1997). When the timeframe for research is extended, the focus is often on the aftermath of the panic; not on the antecedents that fed into the panic (Critcher, 2003). A focus on the short term also implies a sort of ‘epistemic rupture’ that constitutes a revolutionary change in the way (some) people may perceive a particular social problem. In some instances, this short-term focus has also placed greater emphasis on the intentional actions of crusading reformers, to the relative neglect of more long-term unplanned developments that may influence the development of a ‘moral panic’.

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31 Although some authors, such as Hunt, Hier, and now Critcher, are beginning to address this neglect of the relationship between short-term campaigns and long-term processes via a fusion, of sorts, of moral panic with moral regulation; exploring the relationship between short-term regulatory episodes (i.e. panics) and more long-term projects of moral regulation.
In contrast, Elias (and other Eliasian influenced research) has been criticized for its relative neglect of what have been termed ‘civilizing offensives’ – deliberate attempts to bring about changes in behaviour in order to ‘civilize’ those that are deemed to be ‘uncivilized’ or less ‘civilized’ than oneself. Such a criticism may be perhaps unjust, for Elias conceptualized social development as being a combination of intended and unintended developments:

...the interweaving of the planned acts of many people results in a development of the social units they form with each other, unplanned by any of the people who brought them about. But the people who are thus bonded to each other constantly act intentionally, their intentions always arising from and directed towards the developments not planned by them...a dialectical movement between intentional and unintentional social changes (Elias, [1980] 2008, p. 32).

Even so, the concept of civilizing offensives has received comparatively less attention than that of more long-term unplanned developments associated with civilizing (and decivilizing) processes (see Dunning & Sheard, [1979] 2005, p. 280). Yet within a figurational approach, conceptually there exists the possibility to explore this relation between short-term intentional campaigns (which might include moral panics) and more long-term wider social processes. Utilizing this idea, I intend to explore the interrelation between long-term ‘blind’ social processes and short-term intentional campaigns.

**Figurational Sociology and Other Approaches to Research**

In addition to utilizing Foucault, psychoanalytic approaches to climate change, and moral panic, I had planned to continually contrast process/figurational sociology with other approaches, such as complexity, Marxism, practice theory, and the work of Beck, with the aim of these various approaches, theories and concepts to inform a synthesis of my own. However, while I did explore some of
these approaches in my review of the literature (see Chapters 2 and 3), for most of them I did not have space or time to utilize them in the interpretation of my data.

Throughout the research, I did entertain the possibility of drawing upon different approaches, of contrasting them with Elias. While my approach to this research can be located within Elias's theory of civilizing processes, and within a figurational approach to research, I wish to highlight that such an approach relates (and differs) to other approaches explored in the review of the literature. By comparing Elias's approach (and his concepts and theories) with both other people's approaches, and with my own findings in this research (and in future research), I aim continually to develop a more critical approach to the employment of Elias. I am using Elias as a guiding central theory, for the origins of this thesis began with wanting to further explore the relation between civilizing processes and moral panics. However, in this research I have only used Elias’s approach as a guide. It is in this regard that I am reluctant to call this research a ‘figurational’ study; one of my concerns being that to do so may close off valuable dialogue between figurational approaches and other approaches, and further contribute to the fragmentation of sociology as a discipline.

**Methods**

This research explores the long-term development of global warming as both an actual and a perceived social problem, covering the time period from 1800 to the present. In the first part of the analysis, I look at the emergence of concern about climate change in relation to long-term ecological civilizing processes, as well as the emergence of the phenomenon of climate change in relation to civilizing processes, as unintended outcomes of civilization. In the second part, I

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32 In contrast to the discussions of ‘central theory’ mentioned in Chapter 1, I am using ‘central theory’ here to refer to the theory that I have chosen to bring all of my research together. While I have utilized other theories in this research, Elias’s is the central theory I am using.
explore how and to what extent reactions to climate change can be seen as a type of moral panic – these two chapters combined, explore the interplay between civilizing processes and civilizing offensives, of long-term and short-term processes. In the third part of the analysis, I then relate these social processes to individual people’s experiences, practices and developments, exploring how and to what extent ecological civilizing processes are developing at the individual level. Following on from this focus on climate change, in the fourth and final part of the analysis, I undertake a comparative analysis, comparing climate change with several other possible moral panic examples in order to flesh out the complex interplay between civilizing and decivilizing processes and civilizing offensives, thereby contributing to a reformulation of these concepts and the relation between them.

**Historical Documentary Analysis Parts 1 and 2**

For the first stage of the research, I chose to begin around the time of 1800 for several reasons. Firstly, so that I could incorporate the development of changes in understandings about 'nature', and the 'environment', including the development of environmentalism, the ecological sciences, and the antecedents to climate change science. While these developments do not 'begin' in the 1800s – antecedents to environmentalism can be traced back much farther (Coates, 1998; Thomas, 1987) – several key developments did occur throughout the 1800s, including the formation of the first formal environmental organizations (Sutton, 2000). Secondly, I chose to restrict myself to go back only as far as 1800, so that I could carry out a more in-depth documentary analysis of these last two centuries; had I gone back farther, the research would have become more and more general. As I was also carrying out interviews, and a comparative analysis, it was important that I restricted the amount of time I spent on the historical documentary analysis. Thirdly, I anticipated that two centuries worth of exploration would provide me with a long enough time period to explore long-term unplanned changes in behaviour, such as those explored by Elias in *On the Process of Civilisation*. 
For the first and second parts of the research, I wanted to explore the possibility of the development of concern about climate change as being part of (1) a long-term ecological civilizing process and (2) a short-term moral panic. For the first of these two parts, I therefore undertook a ‘discourse analysis’ of primary documents dating from 1800 to the present. The type of discourse analysis I used was informed by both Eliasian and Foucauldian approaches to ‘discourse’, and cannot be associated with one particular approach to ‘discourse’. It consisted of examining how different ‘texts’ spoke about particular issues and behaviours, how and to what extent this changed over time, and how and to what extent it related to other developments that were occurring. It also explored the hidden meanings in texts – looking at more explicit and implicit meanings, and at euphemisms within the texts and how these related to other discourses.

The material I analyzed for both parts of the historical documentary analysis included: manners books (etiquette books); novels; environmentalist literature; ‘green guides’; popular science; websites; podcasts; policy documents; governmental and intergovernmental reports; campaigns; magazines; newspapers; documentaries, films; and reality-TV shows. However, as it is written up in this thesis, the second part of the analysis refers primarily to more recent texts, such as podcasts, green guides, websites, reality TV shows, and documentaries.

The majority of primary historical documentation was drawn from UK sources, though I also included some material from other countries, such as: the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, as well as multi-national material. I chose to focus on the UK, to try and provide a more in depth analysis, while also highlighting more general international trends (at least amongst some countries), with comparisons with the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. This primary data was supplemented with an analysis of several
key secondary sources that explore long-term changes in understandings about ‘nature’ and ‘the natural world’.

Throughout this part of the research, particularly as it is written up in chapter 5, I analyzed the documents as Elias did in *On the Process of Civilisation* ([1939] 2012), as time-series data. I undertook a diachronic analysis where I looked for what was and what was not present at different times, and how the *meaning* of what was present changed over time. As Dunning and Hughes (2013, p. 150) describe it, Elias likened this type of analysis to thinking about the documents as part of a filmstrip; in process together as a ‘movie’, rather than as static, isolated ‘stills’.

I went into this part of the research with a broad idea of what I was looking for: primarily, changes in understandings about ‘nature’ and ‘the environment’. However, a large part of the research consisted of discovering examples, in the form of exploratory research. For example, I was not intentionally searching for changes in understandings about what constitutes littering and why it is (now) deemed to be unacceptable. While I had the main hypotheses that I wanted to ‘test’ via empirical analysis (for example, the hypothesis that the development of ‘eco-friendly’ standards of behaviour is part of a wider ‘ecological civilizing process’; or that the development of concern about climate change can be explored as a moral panic), the specificities of such hypotheses were not finely tuned prior to the research, and therefore necessitated a combination of both ‘testing’ and ‘searching’.

Throughout the documentary analysis, I intended to explore the emergence of new standards of behaviour and new ways of thinking about things, and to then explore how these ideas and behaviours developed and changed over time to reach the present state of both concern about climate change as an *anthropogenic* social problem, as well as the contestation over the extent of the problem and what should be done about it. In relation to the contestation over
reality, I intended to also explore long-term changes in forms of media, as well as changes in the receptivity towards scientific explanations and scientific ‘experts’. This also involved analyzing documents that are ‘sceptical’ about climate change.

One of the reasons why I analyzed such a variety of documentation is because I was interested in exploring how different types of texts depict changes in understandings about ‘nature’ and ‘the environment’. For example, what one might read in a manners book from the late nineteenth century may be quite different to what one may find in a novel, which may differ to a letter in a newspaper, which may differ again to a book written by an environmentalist, or by a scientist. By analyzing such a wide variety of documentation, I also aimed to gather a representative sample of variant changes that are and were developing in different types of texts. I was also interested in the transferability between ideas from different groups, for example, the transference of concern about climate change, from scientists to the general public. Analyzing a variety of texts, written by a variety of groups of people in a variety of formats, provides us with the means to explore this transference.

The analysis of the various types of texts were presented in time sequence in Chapter 5, in order to build up a picture of how changes in standards of behaviour have been changing, and at what rate and at what frequency (that is, how widespread and how quickly). This involved intermingling different types of texts with one another, highlighting both the time period and the type of text, and situating that within more general trends in changes in communication, changes in the regulation of behaviour, and changes in the governance of social problems.

In chapter 6, the documentary analysis was presented quite differently. As the focus was less on diachronic themes (as these had been explored in the previous chapter), chapter 6 instead focused on demonstrating how and to what extent
the analysis related to moral panic themes, and then using this to re-formulate critically both the concept of moral panic and how we go about doing moral panic research. The documents analyzed here largely differ from those analyzed in a majority of moral panic research. Most moral panic research tends to focus on analysis of newspapers and other news media, public opinion polls, legislation, and political debates. For the purposes of this research, I wanted to broaden the scope of ‘moral panic media’ to include a wide variety of media from popular culture.

In both chapters 5 and 6, the documents were analyzed with a view that several may be reflecting changes in understanding, as well as attempting to persuade readers; that is, how (some of) these documents may both reflect and affect changes in understandings, and changes in behaviour.

Documents and extracts were selected in several ways. Etiquette, manners books, and ‘green guides’ were sourced from all the items I could find at the British Library and LSE. The selection of extracts within these and all the other documents was based on themes that emerged from the research process, as they broadly related to ecological civilizing processes and/or moral panics. Environmentalist literature and novels were selected from those that were most well known in environmental circles. Podcasts were stumbled across by chance, as were the magazines and websites. Documentaries, films and reality TV shows were actively searched for on the Internet, and subsequently viewed.

The advantages of documentary research includes the wide availability of the data and the cost-effectiveness of the research (Denscombe, 2007, p. 244); most of these documents I could access for free via the Internet, The British Library, and other libraries (the only costs incurred were minimal; tube rides, photocopying/printing, inter-library loans, and the occasional purchasing of books and DVDs).
Interviews

The third part of the research consisted of interviews. These were used to further test and develop the conclusions drawn from the two stages of historical documentary analysis. Primarily, I wanted to explore the following: How some people come to be involved in climate change ‘activism’ and how others, who are also concerned about climate change, do not; How and to what extent do individual ecological civilizing processes develop within a person’s life, similar to individual civilizing processes (Elias, [1939] 2012) and the individual civilizing of tobacco use (Hughes, 2003); How and to what extent are ‘eco-friendly’ and ‘eco-deviant’ behaviours being communicated, contested, appropriated; How and to what extent do perceptions about different forms of climate change regulation, including popular media, relate to the content of climate change media. These were the main initial questions I was interested in exploring; other questions emerged throughout the research process. I was particularly interested in exploring participants’ ideas about identity, practice (their everyday lifestyle), understandings about climate change and how some people come to be self-identified ‘environmentalists’ and how others do not.

As part of what I was exploring in this research included changes in behaviour, standards of behaviour and ‘habitus’ (personality make-up), interviews were more appropriate than other methods, such as questionnaires and surveys. Interviews are particularly useful to explore people’s thoughts about the topic, their behaviour, and their thoughts on the documents that have been produced to try and affect changes in understandings about the environment and changes in behaviour. Interviews are more appropriate for providing this depth of information (see Denscombe, 2007, p. 202).

The interviews were broken up into several parts. The first part of the interview included standard demographic questions. The second part of the interview focused on ‘nature’, ‘the environment’, and ‘environmentalism’, exploring participants’ early experience of and perceptions about ‘nature’, ‘the
environment’, ‘environmentalists’ and ‘environmental organizations’. The third part of the research focused on climate change, exploring participants’ knowledge about climate change, their exposure to different media representations of climate change, their perceptions and experiences of climate change media and various levels of climate change regulation, and their perceptions about their own and others’ behaviour regarding climate change.

I carried out 15 individual semi-structured face-to-face interviews with two main different groups of people: those who are involved in climate change ‘activism’ and those who are not. For the purposes of this research, I defined climate change ‘activists’ as people who are (a) actively seeking to change other people’s behaviour, and (b) involved in environmental education, campaigns or protests (all related to climate change), employed in the area of sustainability, or volunteering for climate change organizations. I chose these two separate, artificially created groups, as one of the questions I aimed to explore in the interviews was how some people come to be involved in climate change ‘activism’ and how others, who are also very concerned about climate change, do not. I had initially planned to complete a total of twenty to thirty interviews, but I found that after I had completed only eight interviews, I already had a large amount of interesting data. It was then that I decided to restrict myself to only fifteen interviews (time and space was also an issue, as I needed to leave myself enough time for my other methods and enough space for my other analyses).

There are several disadvantages of interviews that were taken into consideration when planning; for example, there was initial difficulty in recruiting some of the participants (notably, those assigned to the ‘activist’ group). I initially planned to recruit these participants from one university green society. However, despite that the membership of that society fluctuated between the 50s and the 80s, typically only five people would come along to weekly meetings, and these five were always white, British, middle class males.
This in itself was an interesting example of the gap between concern/intention and action/activism. This was when my sampling strategy changed, and I approached other environmental groups. The result was that I interviewed ‘activists’ from a variety of ages (aged from 23 to 63), and in a variety of occupations – only three of the eight activists were full-time students. For the ‘non-activist’ group, recruitment of participants was fairly easy for I came across so many people who were both interested and concerned about climate change, and were willing (and in some instances very eager) to be interviewed about it. The non-activists were aged from 25 to 39, and came from a variety of ethnic backgrounds and occupations – only four of the seven were full-time students. For full demographic details of both groups, see Appendix B.

To overcome the problem of the availability of participants, including the location of them (that is, how far I would have to travel or they would have to travel) (Denscombe, 2007, pp. 181-182), I recruited participants from London and greater London only, and travelled to their location wherever possible (so that they would not have to travel). To overcome the further disadvantage of interviews being very time consuming (in the preparation, organizing, interviewing, transcribing and analyzing (Denscombe, 2007, p. 203)), I initially intended to limit the number and length of interviews to a manageable size – 20 to 30 interviews, with a duration of 30 to 60 minutes per interview. As already mentioned, the time of each interviews subsequently became, on average, one hour and the number of interviews was further restricted to only 15.

Participants for the interviews were selected via several methods. Some of them I already knew (to a greater or less extent), and were recruited from friends and acquaintances. Others were recruited through attending meetings of environmental organizations – I declared who I was and why I was there from the beginning, and several months later approached those who had expressed interest in being interviewed. The remaining participants were recruited through sending out emails to various different environmental and climate
change groups – in some instances, recipients of my emails would then pass my email onto all the climate change ‘activists’ in their address book, some of whom would then contact me about an interview.

Informed consent was obtained from all participants. This involved providing each participant with a copy of an Information Sheet about the research (along with my contact details), as well as a Consent Form that participants all signed. Confidentiality was maintained by making the data anonymous enough so that participants cannot be readily identified. See Appendix A for copies of the approved Ethics Checklist, Information Sheet, and Consent Form.

The interviews took place in various locations: participants’ homes, participants’ universities, their places of work, in cafes, and at Brunel University. They were on average one hour long, varying from approximately forty-five minutes, to approximately two hours and forty-five minutes. Preceding the interviews, I had brief, broad discussions with participants about my research, and then after the interviews we would have more detailed discussions, during which I provided much more information about my research. The one exception to this was the participant ‘David’, who requested to ask many questions before the interview proper commenced.

The reluctance to say too much before the interviews was for several reasons. Firstly, I did not want my preconceived notions about the research to have a greater (rather than lesser) influence on how the participants responded to my questions. While the questions I asked, and the manner in which I asked them (and responded to their answers) would have influenced the participants’ narratives (and, thereby, my preconceived notions would have influenced participants’ narratives), I wanted to lessen this as much as possible.

Secondly, I did not want who I was as a person to influence too much how participants responded; I wanted to limit the extent to which participants would
take into account what their audience would think (Gubrium & Holstein, 1998). There is no doubt that some of the participants had preconceived notions about who I was, and why I was doing the research. One participant remarked, during an answer to a question, ‘I imagine because you’re doing this [research] you care about it [the environment]’ (Alexander, activist, age 30). Doing research on climate change, interviewing those who are involved in ‘activism’, it is quite likely that many of the participants held assumptions about me regarding my level of concern about climate change, my level of expertise about climate change, my lifestyle and behaviours as they relate to the environment and climate change, and my level of political involvement in climate change and the environment. These assumptions may have affected how participants answered the questions I asked. Some participants expected me to have ‘better’ answers than they had. Duncan (non-activist, age 38), when talking about what climate change is, said ‘…first of all harmful to the ozone layer – tell me how right or wrong I am on this, yeah [laughs]…’

Perry, Thurston and Green (2004) outline how a researcher’s involvement in interviewing can be beneficial, as it can help to establish trust with the interviewee, but it can also create obstacles. This may be due to a researcher’s emotional involvement steering the interview process, or to the assumptions held by the interviewee based on the researcher’s declared involvement. As I was the only researcher, I therefore chose not to declare the degree of my involvement in the research. Although a small number of participants were relatively aware of my relative involvement, as they already knew me and were relatively more aware about the research. I did not observe that this knowledge adversely affected the interviews (as compared with those interviews with participants who did not previously know me). The advantage it did provide was that I found it typically easier to interview those people who I already knew or had got to know briefly through environmental organization meetings or travel to the interview venue. Generally speaking, I found it more difficult to get participants, whom I had not had prior conversations with, to open up during
the interview. Conversations beforehand – even when they were just travelling from the train station to the participant’s house – helped to establish comfort and trust for the interview.

The interview schedule itself was an evolving document. Each time I interviewed someone, I would intend to reformulate existing questions, insert additional questions, and delete redundant questions. For the full selection of the interview schedules, please see Appendix B. I designed the interview schedule so that it could be used for both groups of participants, as I wanted to compare their individual narratives with one another, to compare the development of the two groups. The questions in the interview schedule were derived from preconceived notions of what I wanted to explore in the research, although I did attempt to use what I ‘discovered’ in the interviews along the way to further refine the questions. Similarly, when analyzing the interviews, I had several preconceived themes that I was looking for in the transcripts. However, there were additional themes that I ‘discovered’ throughout the process of interviewing, transcribing, analyzing and writing.

As I completed each interview, I transcribed them verbatim. Once all the interviews were completed and transcribed, I went through print outs of all the transcripts, one after the other, identifying themes that I was already looking for, such as those linked to ecological civilizing processes and moral panics, and identifying new ones, such as those related to psychoanalysis and emotions. I carried out a thematic analysis of the interviews, and also utilized Gubrium and Holstein’s (1998) narrative analysis to explore different levels of analysis within the same extract, via analytic bracketing.

When writing up the interviews chapter, extracts were selected on the basis of how well they demonstrated a particular point, and were often used in combination with other extracts (to show how widespread the trend was). Where one extract contradicted another, they were both included and discussed.
accordingly. There were numerous additional themes, and accompanying extracts, that I could have included in this thesis, but there was not the space to include everything. I therefore selected those extracts and themes that related most to my research questions and aims.

*Comparative Moral Panic and Figurational Analysis*

The final method of analysis in this research was a comparative analysis of various empirical examples, explored from both moral panic and figurational approaches. I had initially planned to write the one chapter as two – one chapter comparing moral panic examples, and another comparing figurational examples. But as I was developing an Eliasian informed approach to moral panic research, it made more sense to combine them in a synthesis in one chapter. The aim of the chapter was to develop a greater understanding about the various processes involved in moral panics and how they develop, and how civilizing and decivilizing processes and civilizing offensives relate to the development of different potential moral panics. The end result was to utilize this greater understanding to inform reconceptualizations of the relationship between civilizing and decivilizing processes, civilizing processes and civilizing offensives, and to inform a reformulation of both the moral panic concept and how we undertake moral panic research. While some have compared existing moral panic studies with an ‘ideal type’ model of a moral panic (Critcher, 2003) – how they think moral panics *ought* to be in a pure, absolute sense of the term – I think it is more informative to contrast and compare a variety of ‘real’ examples in order to understand the multiple ways that ‘real’ processes of moral panics develop (while Critcher (2003) did compare *real* examples of moral panics, he set these against an ideal type model of moral panic, and used them to reformulate this ideal type model). This will provide us with a more empirically informed, and potentially more ‘reality congruent’ understanding about the processes of moral panics and, thereby, helping us to reformulate a more empirically informed concept, as well as inform us about how to undertake ’moral panic research’. 
The empirical examples I chose were alcohol, climate change, (illegal) drugs, eating/obesity, terrorism, and tobacco. I chose these specific examples for several reasons. Firstly, they are some of the very few empirical examples that have been examined from both a moral panic approach and a figurational approach (separately). Although with some of the examples, such as tobacco, very little moral panic research had been undertaken. Secondly, I was interested in exploring those examples that really stretched and tested the concept of moral panic. Both terrorism and illegal drugs are well-researched areas of moral panic, but the others are currently contested and debated, or recognized as examples of ‘weak’ moral panics (the latter, in the case of alcohol). Additionally, as my interest in climate change developed throughout this research, the focus on consumption, overconsumption and addiction in much of the climate change media contributed to my growing interest in these areas, hence most of the examples in this chapter have come to be associated with problematized consumption and/or addiction (excluding the case of terrorism, which was primarily included in this chapter due to its status as a relatively ‘strong’ moral panic).

**Conclusion**

This chapter has set out my approach to the research – largely informed by a synthesis of moral panic and figurational approaches, without being completely ‘lead’ by one or the other. In the next chapter, I discuss the first of my four stages of the research process: a historical documentary analysis of the long-term development of ecological civilizing processes and how this relates to the development of climate change as an actual and perceived social problem.
Chapter Five

Historical Analysis: Part One:
Climate Change and Ecological Civilizing Processes

Introduction

Having provided an introduction to the notion of ecological civilizing processes in Chapter 2, we now turn to exploring the extent to which the development of climate change as a perceived social problem can be situated within an empirical example of a wider ecological civilizing process.

Covering the time period from 1800 to the present, and focusing on England (while also drawing from examples from other countries), this chapter will explore the extent to which gradual changes in nature-society relations, changes in perceptions about the environment, and changes in behaviour, can be characterized as an ecological civilizing process, and how these are interspersed with intentional campaigns. In the next chapter, these changes will be linked to more recent developments regarding climate change, combining civilizing offensives with moral panics.

The Aestheticization of 'Nature'

In On the Process of Civilisation, when discussing art from the Middle Ages (specifically, scenes from the life of a knight in the picture-book Medieval House-Book, published between 1475 and 1480), Elias observes that in these drawings 'nature' was merely something that was in the background to humans: ‘...there

33 Some of the developments included in this chapter, which focuses mostly (but not exclusively) on England, may have occurred quite differently in other countries. For example, see Mennell ((1985) 1996) on the different perception of the countryside in France compared with England.
is nothing in these pictures of the nostalgic mood, the “sentimental” attitude to “nature” that slowly became perceptible not very long afterwards…” (Elias, [1939] 2012, p. 200). Not only was there little emotional identification with ‘nature’ in these drawings, there was also little identification with other people.

Over time, as more and more people (particularly the upper classes) migrated from the country to the town, and as knights came to be increasingly dependent on the court society, perceptions about ‘nature’ changed. Representations of ‘nature’ became increasingly more selective, obscuring the less desirable attributes:

...much that really existed in the country, in ‘nature’, was no longer portrayed. The hill was shown, but not the gallows on it, nor the corpse hanging from the gallows. The field was shown, but no longer the ragged peasant laboriously driving his horses. Just as everything ‘common’ or ‘vulgar’ disappeared from courtly language, so it vanished also from the pictures and drawings intended for the courtly upper class. (Elias, [1939] 2012, p. 201)34

And so these ‘distasteful’ aspects of ‘nature’ came to be increasingly hidden behind the scenes, as part of a broader development to make things appear more ‘civilized’. Elias links these changes in representations, experiences and perceptions of ‘nature’ with broader developments in civilizing processes. For example, the gradual development of the homo-clusus mode of self-experience – where the self comes to be increasingly perceived to be ‘sharply cut off within its own fate, standing opposed to every other self and to the whole world, as if separated from them by an abyss’ – facilitated the view of nature as ‘landscape’, as a visually pleasurable experience (Elias, [1921] 2006, p. 7). An additional way

34 It should be noted that this was not the first time such relatively similar (though somewhat different) developments occurred. Coates argues that artwork from ancient Greece and Rome suggests an aesthetic appreciation of ‘nature’, and the countryside was viewed as an antidote to city life (Coates, 1998, pp. 34-35; for differences in these developments, see Elias, 2006 [1921])
Elias links these developments with civilizing processes is through exploring the increasing control over ‘nature’.

**Increasing Control over ‘Nature’**

An additional long-term change that influenced the development of changes in perceptions about and experiences of nature was the increasing control and pacification of ‘nature’:

The manner in which ‘nature’ was experienced was fundamentally affected, slowly at the end of the Middle Ages and then more quickly from the sixteenth century onwards, by the pacification of larger and larger populated areas. Only then did forests, meadows and mountains gradually cease to be danger zones of the first order, from which anxiety and fear constantly intrude into individual life. And then, as the network of roads became, like social interdependence in general, more dense; as robber-knights and beasts of prey slowly disappeared; as forest and field ceased to be the scene of unbridled passions, of the savage pursuit of man and beast, of wild joy and fear, and as they were moulded by intertwining peaceful activities, the production of goods, trade and transport – so then, to pacified people, a correspondingly pacified nature became visible, and in a new way. It became – in keeping with the mounting significance that the eye attained as the mediator of pleasure with the growing moderation of the affects – to a high degree an object of visual pleasure. In addition, people...grew more sensitive and began to see the open country in a more differentiated way...They took pleasure in the harmony of colour and lines, became open to what is called the beauty of nature; their feelings were aroused by the changing shades and shapes of the clouds and the play of light on the leaves of a tree. (Elias, [1939] 2012, p. 461)
We can see here how increasing pacification of nature also contributed to the aestheticization of nature; how, as ‘nature’ came to be increasingly safer, it became increasingly possible for people to relax in ‘nature’ and aesthetically enjoy ‘seeing’ (and smelling, hearing, tasting, and touching) ‘nature’. Sutton argues that such developments eventually contributed to the development of changing ecological sensibilities and, later, the development of environmental campaigns and organisations (Sutton, 2000, 2004). As will be discussed later in the chapter, it is this overall increasingly aestheticized engagement with nature that is first expressed as the focus of concern when discourse about littering first emerged, and aesthetic appreciations were also prominent in early concerns about pollution.

*The ‘Wilderness’*

Similar developments occurred in the United States. In the early period of European settlement, during the time of the ‘frontier’ expansion, the ‘wilderness’ was seen as both physically dangerous and morally corrupting. The ‘wild’ ‘nature’ of it was believed to potentially unleash the ‘wildness’ in men: ‘A more subtle terror than Indians or animals was the opportunity the freedom of wilderness presented for men to behave in a savage or bestial manner.’ (Nash, [1967] 2001, p. 29) Here, we see not only the low identification with Indians – where they are placed on a par with animals as an additional ‘terror’ to overcome – but also a metaphor of contagion, where one can ‘catch’ ‘savage’ and ‘bestial’ behaviour simply by living in a ‘savage’ ‘wilderness’. This perhaps relates to in-group out-group fears that may have existed at the time, with correspondingly very small circles of mutual identification amongst early settlers, and particularly between early settlers and Native Americans.

By the early nineteenth century, the American ‘wilderness’ was still seen as dangerous, but only physically so, and it was increasingly regarded as pleasurable and exciting. By this time (and particularly into the early twentieth century), relations with Native Americans were improving also. As most people
now lived in cities or on farms, the ‘wilderness’ presented a novelty, and an escape (Nash, [1967] 2001, pp. 56-57) (similar to the ‘countryside’ in England). And now, ‘wilderness’ has shifted from being morally corrupting to morally curing, where ‘civilization’ is now regarded as being problematic and full of restraints and rules; only in the ‘wilderness’ can one truly be free (Nash, [1967] 2001, p. 65). However, this only represented an ideal, and travelers only ever visited the ‘wilderness’, always returning to ‘civilization’.

In this way, we can see how going to the ‘wilderness’ or going to the ‘countryside’ came to be a source of ‘mimetic excitement’ (Elias & Dunning, [1986] 2008), along with other leisure activities. As people came to gain increasing control over the ‘wilderness’/’countryside’, and increasing control over themselves, it became increasingly possible for them to travel to these places with little or no fear (and, if there was fear, it was a fear to be embraced). Places of ‘nature’ thus came to be associated with a ‘quest for excitement’, a controlled de-controlling of restraints on emotions (Elias & Dunning, [1986] 2008), with both self- and social-controls. For example, in the ‘wilderness’, as in the ‘countryside’, despite this relaxation there were still rules about how to behave and how not to behave – in the ‘wilderness’, one could never completely escape ‘civilization’.

The Contrast between the ‘City’ and the ‘Countryside’: Spatial Informalization

In ‘the country’, manners are different from those required in ‘the city’. For example, in the 1868 edition of The Habits of Good Society, the author writes, ‘While in most cases a rougher and easier mode of dress is both admissible and desirable in the country, there are many occasions of country visiting where a town man finds it difficult to decide’ (The Habits of Good Society: A Handbook of Etiquette for Ladies and Gentlemen, 1868, p. 136). In this sense, going to the ‘country’ represents a relaxing of etiquette, but not an absence. Rules about
what to wear and what not to wear still exist. Yet, as the above extract suggests, this spatial ‘informalization’ that occurs in relation to ‘nature’, and the relaxation of manners that accompanies it, brings about a confusion and uncertainty about how one should behave. As the above extract illustrates, people find it difficult to decide what they should wear (similarly, see Hughes, 2010, pp. 44-45, on informalization in the workplace).

In 1897, in Manners for Men, we have a comparison of the formal attire of the school ‘uniform’ compared with the relaxed ‘country suit’:

Dress in the country varies considerably in many matters from that worn in town. A boy's first "country suit" after he leaves school is a great event to him. At Eton and Harrow the style of dress might almost be called a uniform, and the first suit of tweeds marks the emancipation from school-life (Humphrey, [1897] 1993, p. 119).

Here, the ‘country’ is seen as like an emancipation from the town, where the manners and modes of behaviour are increasingly more relaxed, as is evident in the next extract from the early twentieth century.

In 1921, in the following extract from Cassell's Book of Etiquette, we can also see the difference in people’s emotions when having picnics in ‘the country’ compared with life in the town or city:

There are plenty of people who enjoy picnics besides the children for whose benefit they are generally supposed to be arranged. Rural sights and rural sounds, when all nature is alive and gay in the glad summer time, have a happy and genial effect; then, too, the absence of all state and ceremony, the liberty, the entire change and freedom from etiquette, conduce to gaiety of spirit and mirth. After all, it is the novelty which is the great charm – for the same set of people whom you now see making merry
because the salt and the sugar have fraternized on the journey, and who now declare it to be the summit of human felicity to sit in an uncomfortable position upon something never intended to be a seat, beside a table-cloth which, being spread upon an uneven surface, causes everything that should remain perpendicular to assume a horizontal attitude – these same people would grumble loudly did such things occur daily (Cassell and Co., 1921, p. 157)

There are several things we can take from this extract. First, there is the allusion to sex: ‘making merry because the salt and sugar have fraternized on the journey’, where ‘salt’ and ‘sugar’ refers to males and females; and ‘causes everything that should remain perpendicular to assume a horizontal attitude’, where ‘horizontal attitude’ refers to sexual relations. While this is written in a cryptic way, where euphemisms are used to disguise the true content of the text, it is also written in a way that is not condemning – the jovial tone of the text makes it appear to be almost acceptable, but only in the ‘country’, as the author points out, ‘these same people would grumble loudly did such things occur daily’.

It is only through an increasing control over natural, social and psychic processes that this had become possible – as noted earlier in the chapter, the ‘wilderness’ was seen as terrifying partly because the absence of formal constraints would bring about a ‘loss of control’ in individuals who ventured there. By the 1920s, however, people were seen to have a greater degree of self-control and were thus seen to be less likely to ‘lose control’. However, as already mentioned, manners still remained, but in a different format.

Additionally, the tone of the text seems to almost celebrate the informality of manners in rural areas, the ‘entire change and freedom from etiquette’. The text depicts how going to rural areas represents an escape, a liberation from the increasingly formalized manners that existed at the time.
The ability for people to travel to the ‘countryside’ was further aided by the development of technologies, specifically the motor car:

In the past, the picnic was the indulgence largely of country folk, nowadays, thanks to enterprise, the Londoner may hire a private omnibus, go out to some picturesque spot in any of the home counties, or even a far field as the New Forest on one side, or say, Oxford on the other, and come home in the delightful coolness of a summer’s evening (Cassell and Co., 1921, p. 158).

This contributed to the countryside becoming more and more accessible to more types of people, as the motor car and other technologies became more widespread and affordable. Here we still see the visual appreciation of ‘nature’, where it is described as ‘picturesque’, and this is juxtaposed with the uncritical appreciation of technology: ‘nowadays, thanks to enterprise’. Paradoxically, this same development contributed to environmental problems, for example the increasing use of motor-cars over long distances contributed to increasing pollution and the increase in the building of roads (the latter, which also necessitated the changing of the ‘landscape’).

The visual aesthetics of the countryside – and of garden parties in ‘the country’ – were contrasted with the coldness of the city and town: ‘If Fortune favours, there is an abiding charm about such a gathering [Garden Party], even in London or the suburbs, for some of the older houses boast delightful gardens which are in vivid contrast with their stern, forbidding facades’ (Etiquette for Gentlemen: A Guide to the Observances of Good Society, 1923, p. 102). Here, despite the appreciation of technology noted in the previous extract, we see evidence of an increasing depressing lifelessness associated with the ‘city’. This is contrasted with the life, warmth and ‘charm’ of the ‘countryside’. 
The following extracts recall a point earlier discussed, about manners in the 'countryside' compared to those in 'the city'. In 1925, in *Etiquette Up to Date*, the author writes:

> In our fickle climate the success of all outdoor entertainments is more or less at the mercy of the weather, but when it proves kind, the river and countryside offer delightful possibilities, because so much tiresome formality may be dispensed with. Invitations are often very informal, a riverside hostess frequently giving a general invitation to her friends to "run down and see us any day," though visits have to be more definitely arranged when accommodation is limited... (Burleigh, 1925, p. 170)

Here, we see that manners in the 'countryside' are less formal than those in the town or city; the 'countryside' is seen as an escape from social mores, from the 'tiresome formality' of life in the city. Yet, as the author of this etiquette book points out, formalities are still required (even if they are less formal), as the below extract also illustrates.

> With the exception of the necessary conventions, life on the river allows of a free-and-easy comradeship, and guests practically entertain themselves with boating, punting, bathing, impromptu concerts or dances by moonlight, motor-boat or motor-car expeditions, up-river trips, long lazy hours in shady backwaters, or the added excitement of a regatta for which, however, special parties are usually arranged by the hostess, and a rather more formal etiquette and elaborate hospitality may prevail. (Burleigh, 1925, pp. 170-171)

Here, we see that even in the 'countryside' all is not informal – there are those occasions that are increasingly formalized. We also see reference to both relaxation and excitement, where leisure in the 'country' is seen as an escape
from city life in the form of relaxing – ‘long lazy hours’ – implying that the city is far from relaxing; and exciting – ‘the added excitement of a regatta’ – implying that the city is not exciting.

In the following extract, the relaxation of dress in the countryside is also evident:

Unlimited scope is offered in the matter of riverside dress, whether one’s taste inclines to frilly muslins and organdies or severly perfect linens and white or light-coloured flannels, serges and woollies, gaudily gay colours, soft pastel shades or bizarre effects, but tailored cloth and tweed or elaborate confections and materials are out of place, and the charm of simplicity is perhaps more apparent on the river than anywhere else. (Burleigh, 1925, p. 173)

Here, we see further evidence to suggest that the relaxation of manners regarding what to wear would have also brought with it confusion over what one can wear in the ‘countryside’ – as the author notes, ‘unlimited scope is offered in riverside dress’.

In another extract from the same text, we have an illustration of how, despite these relaxations of manners, there are still rules of how one should behave – one must still exercise a degree of restraint:

Boisterous shouting and laughter or any kind of rowdyism and "horse-play," with needless changing of places and splashing of oars, all betray a lack of breeding that is particularly conspicuous and objectionable on the river, as is also any other want of consideration for one’s fellow, such as mooring up close to another boat or punt when there is plenty of room elsewhere along the banks. (Burleigh, 1925, p. 173)
Despite that the earlier extracts discussed pointed towards an increasing security regarding the belief that one could relax the rules in the ‘country’, as people were seen to have a greater degree of self-control than they had in the past, the above extract suggests that there are still concerns about the degree of self-control people have. The fact that this was written in a manners book in 1925 suggests that it was felt by some, at the time, that there was a risk that people would ‘lose control’ in the ‘countryside’, and so had to be reminded what the (less formal) rules were.

These extracts suggest a spatial informalization of manners in the ‘countryside’, where manners are less strict but require an increasing self-control to manage the divide between acceptable ‘country’ behaviour and unacceptable ‘country’ behaviour. This spatial informalization – informalization that is restricted to the ‘countryside’ – could have contributed to a wider informalizing process. Having to increasingly ‘switch’ between codes of behaviour when travelling from ‘country’ to ‘city’ places increasing demands on people to adjust their behaviour accordingly, to remember where they are, and it is also characteristic of increasingly varied codes of behaviour. As more people were increasingly able to gain more and more access to the ‘countryside’, this could have contributed to the spread of informalization and its growing development.

It is important to highlight, however, that this contrast between the city and ‘the countryside’, where the latter is favoured over the former, may have been restricted to countries like England (and America, also in the form of ‘the wilderness’). For as Mennell ([1985] 1996) demonstrates, in France this appreciation of ‘the countryside’ did not occur in the same way; rather, it was quite the opposite, where in France the city and the court society was largely preferred to the ‘escape’ of ‘the countryside’, as reflected in the development of cooking in France versus in England.
The Development of ‘Unnatural’ and ‘Artificial’: the Idealisation of ‘Natural’

The contrast between ‘countryside’ and ‘city' was related to the development of disgust at ‘unnatural’ or ‘artificial’ appearances, where the former came to be seen as ‘natural’ and the latter as ‘artificial’. The following two extracts, from 1883, discuss many don’ ts regarding the ‘natural’ versus ‘artificial’ presentation of the self:

Don’t use hair-dye. The color is not like nature, and deceives no one. (footnote: Hair and beard dyed black produce a singular effect. They seem to coarsen and vulgarize the lines of the face. Any one who has ever seen an elderly gentleman suddenly abandon his dye, and appear with his gray locks in all their natural beauty, will realize what we mean – for he has seen what appeared to him a rather coarse and sensuous face all at once changed into one of refinement and character (Censor., 1883, p. 28).

Don’t supplement the charms of nature by the use of the color-box. Fresh air, exercise, the morning bath, and proper food, will give to the cheek nature’s own tints, and no other have any true beauty. (Censor., 1883, pp. 91-92)

Here, the use of hair dye and other ‘artificial’ cosmetics are associated with presenting a ‘false’ image of self. This perhaps relates to earlier developments regarding sumptuary laws, where laws were developed to restrict consumption according to social status (Hunt, 1995). Presenting an ‘artificial’ image could have been seen as a form of deception, complicating the ability to determine someone’s age, social status, and so on. An additional explanation could be due to the limits of the capabilities of dyes at the time, where they were ‘obviously’ artificial. In manners books of that time, things like ‘obviously’ ‘false’ praise
were also criticised. And so using ‘obviously’ ‘artificial’ cosmetics is seen as vulgar too.

In 1936, in *How to be a Good Wife*, we again see a critique of artificial adornments:

Don’t also become one of the blood-red nail brigade. Most men dislike the attempt to improve on nature, especially as it is largely associated with the demi-monde. (*How to be a Good Wife*, [1936] 2008, p. 28)

In the first extract, the relationship between social status and one’s appearance is clearly articulated. The author likens ‘artificial’ red nail polish with the ‘demi-monde’, implying that those who adorn themselves in such a way are akin to prostitutes. In contrast to the ‘impure’ demi-monde (adorned with ‘artificial’ red nail polish), someone who has a more ‘natural’ look is seen as more ‘pure’ and ‘innocent’; thereby, ‘nature’ is seen as ‘pure’ and ‘innocent’.

In another extract from the same text, there is a call to return to nature for its healthy benefits

Don’t forget that one of the best doctors in the world is Mother Earth. The trouble is with most of us that we have become too artificial and do not realise that we should gain in health, strength, and efficiency if at least, for a time, we went back to a simpler life. Try the simple, healing power of the countryside rather than the nerve-racking amusements of the fashionable seaside resort. (*How to be a Good Wife*, [1936] 2008, p. 83)

This latter extract once again draws a contrast between the ‘good’ countryside and the ‘bad’ built up cities (and ‘fashionable seaside resort[s]’). Here, there is the perception that ‘artificial’ things have overwhelmed us – it is not just a few who are dabbling in the ‘artificial’. And so we see a feminine
anthropomorphization of ‘nature’ in the form of ‘Mother Earth’ who cares for us, heals us, and gives us strength. This further implies that the city and other hectic places (such as seaside resorts), in contrast, are bad for our health.

And while the city, and pollution in the city, did eventually come to be associated with being bad for our health, some of the early concerns about pollution developed for other reasons.

Pollution

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, growing pollution from increasingly built up, more populated cities, with growing industries, contributed to the desire for city dwellers to escape to the countryside for some ‘fresh air’ (Thomas, 1987, pp. 244-246). Prior to this, since the thirteenth century, when a shortage of wood lead to replacing the burning of wood with the burning of sea coal (Coates, 1998, p. 17), people had been complaining about the London air. In 1273, a law to restrict the burning of coal was introduced, and then as industrialisation developed, and pollution from coal correspondingly increased, concern about air pollution became increasingly more widespread (Sutton, 2007). As Thomas writes,

The coal which was burned in the early modern period contained twice as much sulphur as that commonly used today; and its effects were correspondingly lethal. The smoke darkened the air, dirtied clothes, ruined curtains, killed flowers and tress and corroded buildings. By the mid eighteenth century the statues in London of some of the Stuart kings were so black that they looked like chimney sweeps or Africans in royal costume. (Thomas, 1987, p. 244)
He goes on to argue that it was this pollution and deterioration of the cities that contributed to the appeal of the 'countryside'. And cities were seen to be not just physically polluting, but morally polluting as well.

In addition to this industrial pollution, certain sections from manners books highlight the development of growing concern about pollution of smells in general: 'Don't go into the presence of ladies with your breath redolent of wine or spirits, or your beard rank with the odor of tobacco. Smokers should be careful to wash the mustache and beard after smoking' (Censor., 1883, p. 38). Hughes (2003) outlines how such developments restricting the 'polluting' effects of tobacco smoke initially developed for aesthetic reasons, and then only later came to be medicalized.

In a similar way, technology, particularly cars, also came to be seen to be 'polluting' the 'countryside':

Cars of all sizes and descriptions which tear along peaceful country roads, through villages and round winding lanes, without slowing down, caring nothing about scaring pedestrians or smothering them with dust and mud, and the danger to children and live stock. (Burleigh, 1925, p. 165)

Cars which race past others emitting clouds of "exhaust," with its accompanying unpleasant odour... (Burleigh, 1925, p. 166).

In these two extracts about car pollution, we see that initially the concerns are primarily aesthetic: disrupting the peace of the 'countryside'; smothering pedestrians with dust and mud; emitting unpleasant odours. An additional concern mentioned in the first extract is danger to children and livestock. But this concern for animals is purely an economic one, for only 'livestock' is mentioned. Notably, there is no mention of concern for 'the environment', per se. This concern about car pollution from 1925 is quite different to today's focus
on car pollution contributing to climate change, and to the physical ill health of humans.

Looking at how climate change is discussed today, in terms of carbon emissions, we can therefore witness a long-term shift from concern with aesthetics (the aestheticization of ‘nature’), to pollution (first aesthetics, then health), to carbon emissions. Importantly, these shifts do not imply a shift from one stage to the other, leaving the previous stage behind. Rather, they represent a widening in the scope of how concerns are framed and linked, and how current concerns that may on the surface appear to be new and sudden are connected with and have emerged from a long history of related concerns.

**Changes in Human-Animal Relations**

As is clear from the previous section on car pollution, human-animal relations have changed over time; where once concern for animals was purely for economic reasons, now there exists more of an emotional identification with an increasing variety of life, so that those creatures that are not economically beneficial to humans are still identified with.

In the past, animals were seen as immoral and evil, harboring evil spirits. Treatises on good manners compared bad manners with animal behaviours (Thomas, 1987, pp. 36-37) (some of these are included in this chapter in the section on consumption, where people who were relatively unrestrained in excessive consumption were likened to various animals). Animals were seen as morally corruptible (similar to how the ‘wilderness’ was regarded, as mentioned earlier). And in the nineteenth century, one of the arguments against vaccines was that the transference of cow fluids into humans would cause the ‘animalization’ of people (Thomas, 1987, p. 39).
The development of initial concern about cruelty to animals was less concerned with the welfare of the animals; it was more concerned with how such behaviour would affect the moral status of the people involved, and how those people subsequently behaved towards other humans (Coates, 1998, p. 137). As Franklin observes, animal anti-cruelty legislation\textsuperscript{35} enacted from the early twentieth century was initially targeted at the behaviour of the working class in an attempt to ‘civilize’ them (Franklin, 1999, p. 22). The development of animal welfare, then, was initially part of a civilizing offensive directed toward the welfare of humans, rather than other animals.

In 1893, an etiquette book depicts how concern about animals came to be linked to the (economic) function they served:

> It is the correct thing to control one's temper in dealing with a horse as well as in other relations of life. If you lose your temper, you spoil the horse’s, and you yourself are, of necessity, at a disadvantage. (M.C., [1893] 1995, p. 179)

In this example, concern with neglect of one’s horse was focused on how the horse’s welfare would influence the owner’s welfare – the interdependence between the horse and the rider.

Jumping to 1936, in a chapter entitled ‘Approval of Animals’, readers are advised: ‘If you can, lov as many animals as possible and pat and tickle them, especialli pupdouges [puppy dogs] and putzikats [pussy cats], which are very popular in England, whatever they may do. Of course, however, some animals must be disrelisched’ [the text is next to a drawing of a smiling man, looking down at a dog whose jaw is locked on the man's ankle] (Robertson, [1936] 2001, p. 59). This extract illustrates the growing affection towards some

\textsuperscript{35} This legislation was part of a broader civilizing offensive that included other legislation regulating transport, alcohol consumption, and so on.
animals, noting that others are simply disregarded or perhaps even treated with contempt.

These concerns about animal cruelty initially developed amongst those who were most removed from animal-labour, and for more economic reasons: treat animals well and they will perform better. Over time, the reason for this concern shifted to become increasingly dominated by emotional sentiment, for concern for the animals for their own sake (rather than for the sake of humans) (Thomas, 1987, pp. 182, 188-190).

From the latter half of the twentieth century onwards, we can see household pets being increasingly treated like humans, as one of the family. Such goods and services formerly the domain of humans included the development of gourmet foods, pet graveyards and obituaries, pet psychologists, and so on (Franklin, 1999, p. 49).

Part of the reason for this shift was related to humans’ increasing removal from direct relations with animals (other than pets). Prior to the later nineteenth century, animals were slaughtered and butchered in cities, and were visible to all. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, however, this process has come to be increasingly sequestered to rural areas. Along with a change in location and visibility, the mechanism of slaughter has changed so that workers are increasingly removed from the process: ‘Most workers were separated from contact with whole animals and the act of killing was divided between two separate tasks (stunning and bleeding) so that no person was completely responsible for deaths’ (Franklin, 1999, p. 41)36. As disgust and repugnance towards the killing of animals increased, the visual display of meat shifted

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36 Such developments in the slaughtering of livestock parallel those developments in the executions of humans, where the process of execution has come to be less visibly violent, those involved are increasingly more physically removed from the act of killing, and the event itself becomes increasingly more private, accessible only to a select audience.
towards looking less and less recognizably like part of an animal (Franklin, 1999, p. 42).

However, these developments for mammalian meat differ somewhat to those for seafood. Excluding the exceptions of such creatures as whales and dolphins, seafood is often displayed in supermarkets in its whole form (for example, a whole fish [albeit gutted], a whole live crayfish, whole prawns). Hunting is less popular, and seen to be more violent, than fishing. This could be for several reasons. First, mammalian meat is typically red meat (as opposed to the white meat of much seafood), and is therefore bloodier and, one might argue, messier. A piece of fish does not ooze blood the way a joint of beef does, nor does it ooze blood the way a human does. This brings us to our second reason: there is less species distance between mammals and humans than there is between seafood and humans. Lambs, deer, pigs and cows look more like humans than seafood does – they have four limbs like us, they produce milk for their young like we do. And, until the recent development of the likes of films such as Finding Nemo (where the main characters are fish), it tended to be those animals that were biologically closer to us that were anthropomorphized in children’s tales. The emotional attachment with these creatures is also limited to their physical proximity to us: you can’t cuddle a fish, but you can cuddle a lamb. A fish is cold and slimy; a lamb is warm and fluffy.

Scientific Interest in the Study of ‘Nature’ and the Democratisation of Science

Another contribution to changes in human-animal relations, and environmental ideas more generally, comes from developments in the sciences. The science of natural history was initially pursued to further advance human progress and to aid in mastering and managing nature; plants and animals were studied purely to find out if they would advantage humans in any way (for example, as food, medicine, labour) (Thomas, 1987, p. 27). By the eighteenth century, this shifted
from a strictly anthropocentric aim, where plants and animals were classified according to their human-serving function, to a more detached understanding, where they were classified according to their structure (Thomas, 1987, p. 66).

From the eighteenth century onwards, as authors published increasingly in English instead of Latin, natural history came to be increasingly popularised and democratized (Thomas, 1987, p. 282). It was no longer restricted to the elite who were educated in Latin; it was now restricted to the literate. In the late eighteenth / early nineteenth century, natural history became an increasingly popular leisure activity: ‘Ladies and gentlemen, while strolling along the beach, picked up pebbles and fossils, made notes on the flora and the state of the sky’ (Tuan, 1974, p. 125). This popular involvement in ‘science for fun’ has developed to such an extent that ‘citizen scientists’ are now used to assist with research. For example, the project ‘Planet Hunters’ (planethunters.org), which states on its website: ‘With your help, we are looking for planets around other stars.’ Citizen scientists can then click on ‘Start hunting for planets’ to begin their search for habitable planets (‘Planet Hunters,’ n.d.).

Returning to the nineteenth century, the development of the ecological sciences was interspersed with campaigns for the preservation of ‘nature’ reserves. In the mid nineteenth century, Henry Thoreau37 and others were arguing for the preservation of nature. In 1832, the Arkansas Hot Springs was proclaimed as a national reservation. In 1864, a national park was established in California. Then in 1872, the Yellowstone region was designated as a preservation, as a public park, and in 1895 a forest reserve was established in New York. However, the rationale for these initial preservations of land was economic, not for the sake of wilderness per se (Nash, [1967] 2001, pp. 102-108). It was only once the idea of conservation became established for economic reasons that it

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37 Thoreau, author of such books as *Walden and Other Writings* and *Excursions*, was a nineteenth century writer, poet, environmentalist, philosopher, and naturalist.
eventually came to be increasingly argued for other reasons, such as ecological ones.

In 1866, Ernst Haeckel first coined the term ‘ecology’. He used the word ‘oeökologie’ (ecology) to characterize ‘the science of relations between organisms and their environment’, emphasizing interdependence and mutual cooperation between species. Prior to 1866, ecological ideas were employed in evolutionary biology, though without using the term ‘ecology’ (Coates, 1998, p. 142; Worster, 1994). In 1913, the British Ecological Society was formed, with the American one forming two years later (Worster, 1994, pp. 205-206). But it was not until a century later, that the term ecology came to be widespread in popular discourse.

The development of nuclear bomb testing in the 1940s and 1950s brought about increased research into the effects of radiation on the environment. Coupled with general public and scientists’ concerns about nuclear radiation, this contributed to the development of the environmental movements in the United States (Worster, 1994, Ch.16). At the same time, growing control over other areas of life increasingly allowed one the luxury to be concerned about the environment. However, with this growing popularity of and concern about the environment, came paradoxical unintended consequences.

By the 1960s and 1970s, wilderness had come to be increasingly popular, with growing numbers of tourism to wilderness reserves (Nash, [1967] 2001, p. 316). Paradoxically, this growing popularity in wilderness tourism has itself endangered wilderness, with reserves having to limit the numbers of visitors, and calls for the education of ‘wilderness etiquette’ so that those who do visit the wilderness do as little damage as possible (Nash, [1967] 2001, p. 322). Here, the rapid increase in travel to the ‘wilderness’ has not brought about a rapid enough change in people’s self-controls, or at least this is the perception.
Therefore, there is a call for increasing regulation of these areas, both formal (restricting numbers) and informal (wilderness etiquette).

**The Development of the Sciences of Climate Change**

Similar to the role of the ecological sciences in the development of environmentalism, an important part of the development of climate change as a perceived social problem is the development of the sciences that have contributed to the ‘discovery of global warming’. Spencer Weart ([2003] 2008) traces this development from the early nineteenth century to the present, noting struggle for scientists to become concerned about climate change, followed by other groups (including the general public) coming to be concerned. While noting the discoveries of scientists, Weart also traces other developments, including changes in understandings about science, technology and the environment. Initially, as the science of climate change was developing, most scientists believed that the earth was so robust that humans couldn’t possibly have such a worryingly significant impact on climate.

This can be compared with Elias’s writings on the initial rejection of the heliocentric theory. Elias ([1987] 2007) argued that the eventual acceptance that the sun, and not the earth, was at the centre of the universe required a greater level of detachment; not only to step back and see things from a distance (from earth, the sun appears to rotate around the earth, but from outside earth...), but also to be open to an idea that ‘runs counter to their wishes and self-love’ (Elias, [1987] 2007, p. 34); that is, the idea that they are no longer the centre of the universe. In some ways, the idea that we are contributing to climate change (and the implications this has for our way of life) runs counter to ideas of progress. James Lovelock’s ([1979] 2000) account of how he came to develop his ‘Gaia hypothesis’ suggests an additional ‘stepping back’ – he recounts how he came up with the theory only once he began to visualize earth ‘outside’, as if he was seeing it as a whole from space.
Conversely, we could argue that a human-centric view of the world has contributed to the very idea of *anthropogenic* climate change. Only a view that sees the influence of humans as being greater than natural processes would allow one to see the possibility of anthropogenic climate change. In this way, the development of the sciences of anthropogenic climate change required both involved and detached thinking.

*Ecological Intelligence, Biophilia, and the Land Ethic*

Similar to the works by Aldo Leopold (*The Land Ethic*) and E. O. Wilson (*Biophilia*) (see Quilley, 2009a; Quilley, 2009b), Daniel Goleman’s *Ecological Intelligence* argues for a new sensibility:

Ecological intelligence lets us apply what we have learnt about how human activity impinges on ecosystems so as to do less harm and once again to live sustainably in our niche – these days the entire planet (Goleman, 2009, p. 43).

Only such an all-encompassing sensibility can let us see the interconnections between our actions and their hidden impacts on the planet, our health, and our social systems. Ecological intelligence melds these cognitive skills with empathy for all life. Just as social and emotional intelligence build on the abilities to take other people’s perspective, feel with them, and show our concern, ecological intelligence extends this capacity to all natural systems. We display such empathy whenever we feel distress at a sign of the ‘pain’ of the planet or resolve to make things better. This expanded empathy adds to a rational analysis of cause and effect and the motivation to help (Goleman, 2009, p. 44).

Here, Goleman is calling for increased mutual identification with all life, with the biosphere as a whole, and for increasing recognition, increasing awareness of
the interdependencies between the various forms of life on earth. This is similar to the ecological sciences themselves, out of which both Aldo Leopold’s and E.O. Wilson’s work emerged. In this way, Goleman’s *Ecological Intelligence* and his other books are similar to manners books, except that instead of a strictly moral proclamation of how one should behave, we have a scientific justification for why one should behave in a particular way: morality thus becomes less explicit as science becomes more explicit.

*Changing Arbiters: From Manners Books to...*

This shift towards increasingly popularizing these ideas corresponds with a shift in who are the arbiters, what are the texts that dictate socially acceptable behaviour. While in the early twentieth century and before, people may have read manners books for this purpose, increasingly it is a wider variety of texts that people can obtain this information from. And those who are the arbiters can range from scientists to celebrities.

*Consumption: Increasing Self-Restraint*

While some of the changes in nature-society relations already explored in this chapter may be developing, in part, as an unplanned process of civilization, there are also intentional campaigns to bring about a more ecological identity, as reflected in the nineteenth century and early twentieth century writings of Henry David Thoreau, amongst others. If we go back to the nineteenth century, we can look at the tandem development of changing references to what might today be termed ‘eco-friendly’ behaviours in manners books, along with corresponding environmentalist literature from the nineteenth and early twentieth century.

Throughout the nineteenth century, there are references in manners texts, condemning ‘excessive’ consumption in eating and drinking, as well as ‘excessive’ clothing and adornments. For example, in 1830, Stanhope writes:
A man of pleasure, in the vulgar acceptation of that phrase, means only a beastly drunkard, an abandoned rake, a profligate swearer; we should weigh the present enjoyment of our pleasures against the unavoidable consequences of them, and then let our common sense determine the choice.

We may enjoy the pleasures of the table and the wine, but stop short of the pains inseparably annexed to an excess in either...Good company are not fond of having a man reeling drunk among them (pp. 81-82).

The more we apply to business, the more we relish our pleasures...But, when I speak of pleasures, I always mean the elegant pleasures of a rational being, and not the brutal ones of a swine (Stanhope, 1830, p. 83).

In these extracts, we see those who consume to ‘excess’ as compared with animals – ‘beastly’, ‘swine’. The notion of losing control when consuming is compared with the perceived lack of control of animals.

We see these same themes in the same year, where Cobbett instructs:

As to drunkenness and gluttony, generally so called, these are vices so nasty and beastly, that I deem any one capable of indulging in them to be wholly unworthy of my advice... (Cobbett, [1830] 1926, p. 19).

But the great security of all is, to eat little, and to drink nothing that intoxicates. He that eats till he is full is little better than a beast; and he that drinks till he is drunk is quite a beast (Cobbett, [1830] 1926, p. 27).

Here, we see the notion of the ‘slippery slope’, where the best thing to do is seen to be drinking nothing intoxicating, lest one loses control and drinks too much.
Extravagance in dress, in the haunting of playhouses, in horses, in everything else, is to be avoided, and, in youths and young men, extravagance in dress particularly. This sort of extravagance, this waste of money on the decoration of the body, arises solely from vanity and from vanity of the most contemptible sort. It arises from the notion, that all the people in the street, for instance, will be looking at you as soon as you walk out; and that they will, in a greater or lesser degree, think the better of you on account of your fine dress. Never was notion more false...Dress should be suited to your station: a surgeon or physician should not dress like a carpenter; but there is no reason why a tradesman, a merchant’s clerk, or clerk of any kind, or why a shopkeeper, or manufacturer, or even a merchant; no reason at all why any of these should dress in an expensive manner. (Cobbett, [1830] 1926, pp. 13-14)

In another extract by Cobbett, the focus is on extravagance in dress. Here, rather than losing control in consumption, the concern is with dressing inappropriately. This could be in the form of attracting too much attention due to conspicuous dress, or dressing outside (primarily above) one’s social status. Much of this concern could be due to changing power relations between the classes, and a fear from above about those below.

In the 1875 edition of The Habits of Good Society, the author writes:

..but I beg you will not make that odious noise in drinking your soup. It is louder than a dog lapping water, and a cat would be quite genteel to it. (The Habits of Good Society, 1875, p. 259)

So now you have got a plate. Surely you are not taking two on your plate. There is plenty of dinner to come, and one is quite enough.
Fast eating is bad for the digestion, my good sir, and not very good manners either. 

*Eat slowly.* Have you not heard that Napoleon lost the battle of Leipsic by eating too fast? It is a fact though. His haste caused indigestion, which made him incapable of attending the details about the battle (*The Habits of Good Society*, 1875, p. 260).

No man should drink enough wine to make him too easy with the ladies (*The Habits of Good Society*, 1875, p. 319).

Drinking much wine is vulgar...all manifest self-indulgence tends to vulgarity (*The Habits of Good Society*, p. 328).

Here, we still see concerns about eating and drinking like an animal. And in 1883, in *Don't*:

Don’t drink wine or spirits in the morning, or often at other times than at dinner. Don’t frequent bar-rooms. Tippling is not only vulgar and disreputable, but injurious to health (Censor., 1883, p. 38).

Don’t over-trim your gowns or other articles of apparel...Leave excesses of all kinds to the vulgar. (Censor., 1883, pp. 88-89)

Don’t cover your fingers with finger-rings. A few well-chosen rings give elegance and beauty to the hand; a great number disfigure it, while the ostentation of such a display is vulgar.

Don’t wear ear-rings that draw down the lobe of the ear. A well-shaped ear is a handsome feature; but an ear misshapen by the weight of its trinkets is a thing not pleasant to behold.

Don’t wear diamonds in the morning, or to any extent except upon dress occasions. Don’t wear too many trinkets of any kind. (Censor., 1883, p. 91)
These extracts, similar to the earlier ones, also reflect a notion of temperance in eating, drinking, and dressing.

Around the same time of these temperance themes in etiquette manuals, Thoreau was writing and giving talks about the appreciation of Nature, and of humans’ relationship with ‘nature’. In 1862, Thoreau was trying to persuade others to think of humans in an ecological sense as part of ‘nature’. His essay ‘Walking’ opens with the following sentence:

I wish to speak a word for Nature, for absolute freedom and wildness, as contrasted with a freedom and culture merely civil, – to regard man as an inhabitant, or a part and parcel of Nature, rather than a member of society (p. 161).

Here, Thoreau is pointing towards ecological ideas, of seeing the interdependence between humans and the rest of the biosphere. Yet there is also a nostalgic tone to it, similar to that which was present in manners texts’ accounts that contrasted the city with the ‘countryside’. Thoreau also writes on the separation of man from nature:

I, who cannot stay in my chamber for a single day without acquiring some rust [and when I leave for my walk late in the day], too late to redeem the day...have felt as if I had committed some sin to be atoned for, – I confess that I am astonished at the power of endurance, to say nothing of the moral insensitivity, of my neighbors who confine themselves to shops and offices the whole day for weeks and months, ay, and almost years (1863, p. 165).

Here, again, we see the same themes from manners books, of the idealisation of ‘nature’ in contrast with the everyday ‘city’ or ‘town’ life. He adds to this when
discussing the transformation of the landscape: ‘Nowadays almost all man’s improvements, so called, as the building of houses, and the cutting down of the forest and of all large trees, simply deform the landscape, and make it more and more tame and cheap’ (Thoreau, 1863, p. 169). The notion of ‘landscape’ is seen here as being ‘natural’, as contrasted with the ugly ‘artificial’ developments. He adds:

While almost all men feel an attraction drawing them to society, few are attracted strongly to Nature. In their relation to Nature men appear to me for the most part, notwithstanding their arts, lower than the animals...How little appreciation of the beauty of the landscape there is among us (Thoreau, 1863, p. 206).

In this extract, we see the beginnings of an increasing identification with non-human life coinciding with a decreasing identification with most other humans, where they are described as being ‘lower than the animals’.

In Thoreau’s writings there is not only this idealization/aestheticization of ‘Nature’, but there is also moments where he refers to the idea of consuming only what is needed – of moderating consumption with self-restraint: ‘There is a difference between eating and drinking for strength and from mere gluttony’ (Thoreau, 1863, p. 186). Around the time Thoreau wrote this, in manners books there were similar references to restraining consumption, and controlling the way one consumed, such as the examples mentioned earlier. Here, we see tandem developments in both environmental literature and books on general manners and etiquette.

In Don’t, published in 1883, the author states:

Don’t drink too much wine (Censor., 1883, p. 23)
In 1897:

It is scarcely necessary to remark that drinking too much wine is a very bad phase of ill manners. At one time it was actually fashionable to become intoxicated after dinner, but those days are gone, I am thankful to say. The young man who exceeds in this way is soon made aware of the fact that he has given his hostess dire offence. He is never invited again, or not for a long time.

The wineglass is never drained at a draught in polite society; nor is it considered polite to eat very quickly. (Humphrey, [1897] 1993, p. 67)

In 1923:

When drinking do not empty the glass at one gulp; it is very vulgar to do so. (Etiquette for gentlemen: A Guide to the Observances of Good Society, 1923, p. 45)

At the conclusion of each course, place your knife and fork side by side on your plate. If you cross them it is taken as a sign that you desire a second helping, and such ought never to be requested at a formal dinner. (Etiquette for gentlemen: A Guide to the Observances of Good Society, 1923, p. 50)

In 1925:

DO NOT
Ask for a second helping of anything at a course lunch or dinner, though at simple family meals of only two or three courses an offer of a second helping of any dish may be accepted.
[DO NOT] Take such a large portion of any thing that other guests must go short, or an absurdly small one, but just help yourself moderately. (Burleigh, 1925, p. 68)

In these latter extracts, it is interesting to observe two absences. There is no direct reference to animals, no explicit comparison between animals and those who consume too much. Likewise, there is no mention of the slippery slope, of fear of losing control. And the phrase ‘At one time it was actually fashionable to become intoxicated after dinner, but those days are gone’ suggests that becoming intoxicated is becoming increasingly less common. These changes in what is and is not said suggests that there was increasingly less concern about ‘excess’ consumption of food and alcohol, and less concern about one losing control when consuming these things. The focus, instead, seems to be more on those who are unaware of the rules regarding such conduct.

These same discourses about temperance in relation to eating, drinking and adorning oneself are to be found in more recent texts on climate change, which will be examined later in this chapter. We can therefore witness the influence of these nineteenth century temperance ideas on the emergence of a form of ‘carbon temperance’ in the twentieth and twenty-first century.

**Littering: Widening Circles of Identification**

While we can see the tandem developments of controlling consumption in both manners books and the writings of Thoreau, it was not until the early twentieth century that Thoreau’s and others’ writings on ideals of humans’ relationships with ‘nature’ and the ‘environment’ appear in manners books.

In the 1868 edition of *The Habits of Good Society*, there is a section on picnics, but there is no mention of litter/trash/rubbish: ‘It is of necessity somewhat rough, for these same pic-nics are the happy occasions when people try to forget
that they are highly civilized, but are scarcely ever allowed to do so’ (*The Habits of Good Society*, 1868, p. 358). Here, we see further evidence of going to the ‘countryside’ (in this case for a picnic) as an escape from city life, but there is no concern about how their picnicking will affect the ‘countryside’. 

It is not until 1921, in the section on Excursions and Picnics, in *Cassell’s Book of Etiquette*, that we see the first mention of litter in manners books:

> ['picnic sets'] are cheap, cleanly and portable, but they constitute something that is very untidy if left on the turf of the seashore. Indeed, some owners of private property do not allow picnicking on it on account of the litter and debris left behind. Good manners and consideration for others demand that such unpleasing remnants of the feast should be obliterated, and the simplest and most convenient way of doing this is to dig a hole and bury them (p. 161).

And when a land owner gives permission for others to picnic on their land: ‘Good manners and gratitude will then take care that no greasy papers or other debris are left behind’ (Cassell and Co., 1921, p. 161). In both of these extracts, littering is understood in terms of the blight it has on the landscape. And there is also a consideration for other people, in terms of not wanting to litter on another person’s land.

In 1923, in *Etiquette for Gentlemen*, when discussing River Parties, this same consideration is given to other people: ‘Paper plates and dishes, if used, should not afterwards be thrown “on the face of the waters,” to remain drifting hither and thither to the intense annoyance of other boating parties’ (*Etiquette for gentlemen: A Guide to the Observances of Good Society*, p. 100).

And in 1925, in *Etiquette up to Date*: 

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Many owners of grounds reaching down to the river have no objection to the mooring of boats along the banks, and some even permit landing at certain places, but all persons availing themselves of such privileges should respect them by refraining from causing any damage or leaving any litter behind them; indeed, whether it be on public or private property, paper bags, orange and banana skins, used cardboard plates and boxes, empty bottles and other picnic debris should never be left to litter up river or countryside beauty spots (p. 174).

Here we see again a focus on 'landscape': 'picnic debris should never be left to litter up river or countryside beauty spots'.

In 1933, a children's book discussed 'Untidy People': "I must not throw things in the street. Orange peel and banana skins will make people fall. Paper looks untidy in the street. I can see a bin for it." (The Happy Child, 1933, p. 22) Again, the concern here is for the visual effect litter has, and the effect it has on other people.

In 1936, in a text advising students how to behave in England when at 'pickniks', students are told: 'Never cast a cigarette end into an ambush, lest blaze develop. Never relinquish odds and ends. To permit rubbish to repose on the turf is not even the privilege of the best people' (Robertson, [1936] 2001, p. 14).

In 1949, in a Canadian etiquette book, the following section on Picnics states:

Special hampers for picnics, containing various compartments, are for sale in the trunk stores. And very much less expensive sets can be made by using a fibre suitcase and outfitting with cheap enamel or plastic plates and cutlery. Picnic sets consisting of cardboard plates and dishes, cups and saucers and tin spoons, cost so little that after being used they may be disposed of by burying them. (Pringle, 1949, p. 186)
Here we see two interesting trends. Firstly, the notion of using existing materials (suitcases) to make something else (picnic sets); reusing/recycling material (albeit not with an ecological rationale). Yet at the same time the cheapness and wide availability of some materials encourages people to throw them away and not reuse them. In this same section on picnics, readers are also provided with reasons not to litter – it ‘disfigures’ the landscape and ‘attracts flies’:

Wherever a picnic takes place, whether in the woods, on a public highway, or by the water, great care should be taken not to leave any waste paper, empty cans or bottles about to disfigure the beauty of the landscape and attract flies.

Wild flowers are picked only to fade, and if they are dragged up by the roots, as so often happens, their place knows them no more. Thus many beautiful varieties are rapidly disappearing because of such unthinking carelessness.

Cigarette stubs or matches should be carefully extinguished. Serious forest fires, with loss of life and property, have been caused by someone dropping down a match he thought was out, or throwing away the butt of a cigarette. (Pringle, 1949, p. 186)

In this extract flower picking is also condemned, presumably as this also spoils the beauty of the landscape. The concern for the disappearance of certain varieties of flowers may be more due to preservation for beauties sake rather than concern for the biosphere (for example, the impact the removal of one species may have on other species). And again, with concern over cigarette butts causing forest fires, the focus is on the impact on human life and human property.
These excerpts differ from the way littering is additionally talked about today; they are concerned with how littering will affect other people. But as identification has expanded to an increasing concern about other animals, and to ‘nature’ and the ‘environment’ in general, littering is now additionally discussed in terms of the impact littering has on animals, and on the environment in general. Here we can witness a widening scope of identification – a part of civilizing processes – that encompasses the long-term development of what is now described as ‘eco-friendly’ behaviours.

This civilizing process was contributed to by civilizing offensives. For example, in 1954, the National Federation of Women’s Institutes initiated ‘Keep Britain Tidy’ in an effort to ‘tackle the increasing litter problem’ (‘Keep Britain Tidy – About Us – Our History’).

In a book on the disposal of waste and litter, published in 1970, concern with litter is still restricted to the impact on humans and the visual landscape:

Assuming that the difficulties with ‘land’ litter could be overcome, one would still be faced with ‘marine’ litter, i.e. all the plastics material which, because of. Their low specific gravity, float on the surface of, or drift half submerged in, rivers, canals, lakes and surrounding seas. Being insoluble in water and entirely inert to marine micro-organisms, waterborne litter is bound to accumulate in time and, when washed up to the water’s edge, will drift with wind, tides and currents to inshore waters, harbours and breakwaters where it’s unsightly presence can be a hazard to swimmers, anglers, boaters and yachtsmen. (Staudinger, 1970, p. 87)

It was not until 1985 that litter and harm to animals was mentioned in newspapers. In the Toronto Star,
“I was cutting my third crop of hay when I hit two liquor bottles that shattered into a thousand pieces," says Gray, 44, who worries about his animals eating such dangerous litter (Crawford, 1985, November 3).

However, even this first mention in 1985 may relate more to the economic concerns that litter posed to the animals on this person’s farm.

In 1988, in *St Petersburg Times* (Florida), in 'Teachers, students plan cleanup of Kings Bay and Shell Island’, there appears concern for animals purely for the sake of the animals (and not for any economic reasons):

There are several reasons beyond aesthetics for cleaning up the waterways and the island, Miss Merritt said. Plastic products can choke or strangle some animals. One of the worst offenders is monofilament fishing line, which can entangle a bird or animal and cut or choke it.

The materials dumped overboard could also add elements to the water that would harm plants and animals. "The key is that anything that you put in the water is going to affect what’s there," Miss Merritt said. "You can’t just dump things in there and not expect that things will change." (Behrendt, 1988, October 27)

The use of the phrase 'There are several reasons beyond aesthetics for cleaning up…' suggests an attempt by the author to draw readers’ attention beyond merely aesthetics and towards the harm done to animals. This suggests that, at the time the author wrote this piece, the author thought that there was not enough being done towards preventing harm to animals from litter, suggesting that it was not as widespread a concern as the author perhaps wanted it to be.

During the 1980s, research began to uncover the extent to which plastic waste was present in the seas, culminating in the discovery of the ‘Great Pacific Garbage Patch’, a massive area of plastic waste located in the North Pacific Gyre.
An article from the *Independent* in 2008 reflects the growing concern that such litter posed to non-human life:

According to the UN Environment Programme, plastic debris causes the deaths of more than a million seabirds every year, as well as more than 100,000 marine mammals. Syringes, cigarette lighters and toothbrushes have been found inside the stomachs of dead seabirds, which mistake them for food (Marks, 2008, February 5).

At the beginning of the twenty first century, Keep Northern Ireland Tidy launched a littering campaign that was directed at youth, highlighting the harm to animals that littering could cause. The following was one of the posters (Keep Northern Ireland Tidy, n.d.).

**Figure 5.1: 'Litter Kills', Keep Northern Ireland Tidy poster**
However, while in this poster and in other media there is some linkage between littering and harm to animals and the biosphere as a whole, reflecting a widening in identification, the UK government seems to place the focus of littering on the nuisance it poses to other people, including ‘littering’ as an environmental crime constituting Anti-Social Behaviour (see Directgov, n.d.). So while we can witness a long-term shift – from concern with humans, to concern with animals, to concern with the environment as a whole – this has not
involved a shift where later developments have become more dominant. Rather, it merely represents a widening in the scope of identification and concern, but where the majority of concern still remains close to one’s self.

**Television Shows and Eco-Etiquette**

An additional media involved in the development of ecological sensibilities in television. From 1990 to 1996, the animated series *Captain Planet and the Planeteers* screened in the United States and other countries. Covering themes such as pollution, recycling, and capitalism, the spirit of Gaia, along with Captain Planet, work with five young people (the Planeteers) to protect the environment from the ‘eco-villains’ such as ‘Sly Sludge’, ‘Verminous Scum’, ‘Duke Nukum’, ‘Hoggish Greedly’ and ‘Looten Plunder’. At the end of each episode, there is a ‘Planeteer Alert’, where Captain Planet and the Planeteers educate viewers on different environmental issues and advise them of action they should take:

We should pass laws to make trading in bear parts illegal.

We should protect all animals whose habitats are threatened. Kids, write your government representatives. Your letters can save teddy bears and endangered animals around the world. The power is yours.

The best things you can do to help our environment is to get involved.

Join an environmental group or team up with friends to start your own projects.

Clean up a park or a beach.

Organise a recycling programme at school or in your neighbourhood. Or plant trees and remember to take care of them.

It’s all part of making our planet healthy again.

We must all work together to protect the animals, trees, oceans and air.

The power is yours (‘Captain Planet and the Planeteers,’ 1990–1996, season 4, episode 2).
In the above transcript from *Captain Planet*, there is a strong focus on individual action, of individuals working together to improve the planet. The onus is on individuals to organise recycling programmes, rather than government organised initiatives. The only mention of the government is where individuals cannot have much of an influence: the trading in bear parts.

As well as being a form of entertainment, this children's TV show was also a form of education, teaching children about environmental issues, eco-etiquette, and what different types of action they could take to protect the environment. These aims are also present in the more recent eco-makeover reality TV shows, which will be discussed in the following chapter.

**From Manners Books to ‘Green Guides’**

Before ‘Captain Planet’, guidance on how one should behave in order to protect the environment was already emerging in a genre similar to manners books before them. In 1970 the *Consumers’ Guide to the Protection of the Environment* (Holliman, [1970] 1974) was published. This book explored the impact consumer decisions have on the environment. It argued that increasing production and consumption meant that people were consuming more and more than what they needed to, and this was having a negative impact on the environment:

> It is certainly not easy for the individual to do much about these more far-reaching effects of our inflated consumption rate. What people *can* control, however, is the extent to which their individual actions contribute to these major collective problems. This is important because up to now it is the escalation of individual *consumption*, more than the increase in our numbers, that has so adversely affected the quality of our environment.

The Consumers Guide looks at several major areas of goods and services and explains simply and clearly the environmental costs of their production, use and disposal. You will find: BACKGROUND INFORMATION – on environmental and consumer problems such as packaging and waste disposal; PRODUCT INFORMATION – specific information on what to buy, selecting alternatives and brand names, what is behind the product or processes and what good or harm it causes; HOW TO EVALUATE – how to measure for yourself what effects the products or processes have on the environment. The Consumers’ Guide is not only a handbook but also a strategy for change to a way of life more related to the ability of the environment to support our real needs (Holliman, [1970] 1974, back cover).

Similar to the ‘how to live green’ guides of today, which I will discuss shortly, the Consumers’ Guide to the Protection of the Environment aimed to inform readers of the environmental impact of different areas of consumption. The environment was regarded as a problem, but it was seen to be a problem that was within the realms of human control (hence the ‘guide’). The Consumer’s Guide provided guidelines on how individuals could change their consumer habits to help save the environment. Such tips included ‘turn lights off when they are not needed’ (Holliman, [1970] 1974, p. 129); reduce the impact of your car by sharing or hiring vehicles, using car pools, walking or cycling. However, at this stage, while there was concern about some environmental impacts, littering was still concerned only with humans and aesthetics.

Since the 1970s, there have been a few similar guides, such as The Green Consumer Guide in 1988 and The Young Green Consumer Guide in 1990. In these guides, there is a focus on how individual actions have a direct impact on the environment:
Every day of the week, whether we are shopping for simple necessities or for luxury items, for fish fingers or for fur coats, we are making choices that affect the environmental quality of the world we live in.

Take a bite out of a hamburger, we are told, and we take a bite out of the world's rain forests. Buy the wrong car and we may end up not only with a large fuel bill, but also with fewer trees and, quite possibly, less intelligent children. Spray a handful of hair gel or a mist of furniture polish from certain aerosols, and you help destroy the planet's atmosphere - increasing everybody's chances of contracting skin cancer (Elkington & Hailes, 1988, p. 1).

At the end of this extract, we see that individual behaviour is also connected to harm to others. These early guides focused on providing readers with information about which brands or products to buy over others. In these guides, we can see a concern with animals and the environment:

In general, the Green Consumer avoids products which are likely to:
- endanger the health of the consumer or of others
- cause significant damage to the environment during manufacture, use or disposal
- consume a disproportionate amount of energy during manufacture, use or disposal
- cause unnecessary waste, either because of over-packaging or because of an unduly short useful life
- use materials derived from threatened species or from threatened environments
- involve the unnecessary use - or cruelty to - animals, whether this be for toxicity testing or for other purposes
- adversely affect other countries, particularly in the Third World (Elkington & Hailes, 1988, p. 5).
In 1990, the same authors published *The Young Green Consumer Guide*. This book emphasised the increasing dangers posed to the earth, and what young people can and must do to help:

The WORLD needs your help
From felt tips to rubbish tips, from fizzy drinks to kitchen sinks. Discover how YOU can help save the earth (Elkington, Hailes, & with Douglas Hill, 1990, front cover).

Helping to save the Earth
From Manchester to Moscow, from Tokyo to Toronto, young people like you are more aware than ever that our world is under threat (Elkington et al., 1990, p. 6).

In 1993, this 'green' or 'ethical consumption' was celebrated with the launch of the 'Buy Nothing Day', an annual challenge for consumers to buy nothing for 24 hours.

While these earlier guides, and the development of 'Buy Nothing Day', were directed at consuming (or not consuming) in order to 'help save the earth', many of the more recent 'green guides' are explicitly linked with the climate crisis of global warming and contain a greater sense of urgency for change. With growing talk of a potential 'climate crisis', we have witnessed the emergence of guides containing prescriptions on what you must do to 'live green', 'save the planet' and 'stop global warming', as well as calls for more formal social controls. For example, in the book, *I Count: Together We Can Stop Climate Chaos: Your Step-By-Step Guide to Climate Bliss*, there is a focus on the individual management of behaviour to decrease individual carbon footprints. These two pages from *I count* [see Figures 5.2 and 5.3] show some of the ways in which the notion of 'good' and 'bad' behaviours are being formulated:
Figure 5.2: Do Something versus Do Nothing

In *I Count*, there are several steps one can go through to try and ‘stop climate chaos’. Step 10 is called ‘Reject the ridiculous’:

On occasion we are all ridiculous.
But this step will help.
It works like this.
Next time you are about to buy something, simply ask yourself if your purchase of that crazy packaged up beef burger is worth planetary chaos, mass starvation and general unpleasantness. Almost magically you will know the answer.
So, repeat after me. I do not need my oranges individually wrapped; I believe their existing skin to be adequate. I do not need to heat the outside of my house with a gas-fired patio heater; I am capable of going inside (*I
And in another section from *I Count*:

Some habits kind of feel like they’re good, but they aren’t.
Flying, for instance.
There’s no way around this.
Aircraft just pipe greenhouse gases into our upper atmosphere, where they immediately do most damage.
Let’s get this in perspective: fly to Athens and to make up for your climate impact you will have to go without heating, cooking, lighting and all forms of motorised transport for 2 years and 3 months. Which you don’t really fancy, do you?
So you have to promise.
I hereby solemnly swear that:
I won’t fly when I can take the train or boat.
I will take more holidays in my lovely, comfy UK.
I will use video conference technology.
I will take at least one less flight a year (*I Count: Together We Can Stop Climate Chaos: Your Step-By-Step Guide to Climate Bliss*, 2006, p. 58).

Tamer versions of these guides include *The Rough Guide to Ethical Living* and *The Rough Guide to Green Living*, both very similar books that, like the consumer guides of the 1970s and 1980s, contain information about how to consume responsibly. As the author describes it: ‘...in the last few years, [ethical living] has come to mean something more specific: adapting our lifestyles and shopping habits with then aim of reducing our negative impact (and increasing our positive impact) on the world’s environments, people and animals’ (Clark, 2006, p. 3). Here we again see a widening identification – with not just people, but also animals and the environment as a whole. In contrast to the earlier
green consumer guides, in these two books the concern about impact on the world’s environment is focused very much on climate change and carbon footprints. We thus have a narrowing of the focus of these guides, as they come to be attached to a more specific social problem.

Readers of some of these guides are encouraged to carry out audits of their homes with an ‘eco-calculator’ or ‘carbon-calculator’:

The impact we are having on the planet is often hard to see. To start, we need to look at the resources we are using, and the waste we are creating in terms of power, water, and fuel...We developed a unique eco calculator...With this we can get an idea of the impact our lives are having on the planet and track the effect of improvements we make (Wa$ted!, 2007, p. 8).

And in the same book, readers are urged to buy a ‘power monitor’, which works in a similar way to a speedometer, to track electricity use. This individualised focus on self-monitoring corresponds to a call to increasingly educate oneself about ‘hidden’ processes (such as what happens to my waste, how much waste do I produce, how much of my electricity bill is from my dryer, and so on). In addition, the self-monitoring encourages an increasingly reflexive self that thinks twice before switching the heater on, before leaving a room with the lights turned on, before driving to work, and so on. One is encouraged to exercise a greater degree of both restraint and foresight, in thinking about how an immediate, short-term action can have a long-term cumulative effect. In this regard, ecology is utilised as a means of regulation, similar to morality and medicine.

In these guides, there is also an emphasis on a perceived trend towards increasing overconsumption. In How to Live a Low-Carbon Life: The Individual’s Guide to Stopping Climate Change, the author writes ‘As responsible members of
prosperous societies, we have a duty to curb our own consumption rather than to rely on ineffectual governments and profit seeking companies’ (Goodall, 2007, p. 4). Here there is the perception that, not only are individuals failing to regulate their consumption, but also that states and corporations are failing to regulate carbon emissions:

Climate change is the greatest challenge facing humanity: drastic reduction of carbon emissions is vital if we are to avoid a catastrophe that devastates large parts of the world (Goodall, 2007, back cover).

This book tries to show that individuals – rather than governments or companies – are going to have to be the driving force behind reductions in greenhouse gases. We cannot hide behind an unjustified expectation that political or corporate leaders are going to do something for us: the threat from climate change requires each of us to take personal responsibility for reducing our impact on the planet’s atmosphere. Individually, of course, we are powerless; but our actions influence those around us. Eventually, private companies will perceive a market for low-carbon products, and governments will come to see that real action on climate change is not electorally disastrous. Individuals must provide the leadership that will galvanize the rest of society (Goodall, 2007, p. 3).

This focus on bottom-up, individual action, along with a criticism of politicians and corporations, reflects the perceived failure of states and corporations. The themes in these guides relate very much to the development of ‘neat capitalism’ (Rojek, 2007, Ch.8), where the guides promote individuals working with the market (as opposed to the state) to try and improve the environment. This is most evident with Virgin’s guide, *The Virgin Green Guide: The Easy Way to Save the Planet and Save £££s* (2007):
Global warming and environmental issues are front-page news, but a few simple changes to your lifestyle can lead to huge benefits to the health of our planet.

The Virgin Green Guide is a practical, no-nonsense and timely guide to help you do your bit for the environment – and save some cash at the same time. Find out how much you could be wasting – from gas and electricity to food and water – and what you can do to stop it.

Virgin’s guide epitomises the corporate social responsibility developments, where big corporations who are contributing to climate change, are implementing developments to make it look like they are working with consumers to ‘save the planet’.

In other guides, there is a strong metaphor of a diet – where excess consumption is making the earth fat with pollution, and so it and we must go on a diet. The following text is from The Climate Diet: How You Can Cut Your Carbon, Cut Costs, and Save the Planet (Harrington, 2008, back cover):

The atmosphere is getting fat on our carbon and other greenhouse gas emissions and it needs our help. We live in a world of excess, consuming too much of everything – food, clothes, cars, toys, shoes, bricks, and mortar. Our bingeing is often so extreme that it threatens our own health and wellbeing. And we are not the only ones who are getting sick. The Earth, which provides the food, air, water, and land that sustains us, is also under severe pressure. We either take steps to put our personal and planetary systems back into balance or we suffer the consequences. So, what does any unhealthy overweight person do when the doctor tells him or her that they are eating themselves into an early grave? Go on a diet!

This metaphor of diet – a form of ‘carbon temperance’ similar to the other forms of temperance mentioned earlier (in relation to drinking alcohol, eating food,
adorning oneself) – can be compared to the metaphors of addiction that occur throughout many green guides, such as Virgin’s guide:

Sad to say, we’ve become a nation of shopaholics. Consumerism has run out of control as we buy more products that ever before...these days, people think nothing of buying something because they fancy it rather than because they absolutely need it *(The Virgin Green Guide: The Easy Way to Save the Planet and Save £££s, 2007, p. 16).*

It’s generally the ladies who are tagged with the label ‘shopaholic’, but more and more men are now compulsive spenders *(The Virgin Green Guide: The Easy Way to Save the Planet and Save £££s, 2007, p. 17).*

This reference to ‘addiction’, to ‘shopaholics’, in part removes responsibility from individuals, as it is seen to be beyond their control. Additionally, the phrase ‘these days’ also suggests that moral standards are deteriorating, that life was better in some ‘golden age’ past. Goodall also contributes to the addiction analogy: ‘Speeches and articles contributed by political leaders worldwide conclude that climate change is a serious problem. But the figures reveal that we are as addicted as ever to the consumption of fossil fuels.’ *(Goodall, 2007, p. 4)*

The following extract, utilising the metaphor of ‘getting high’, also suggests a discourse of addiction, and the comparison with drugs lowers the status of the behaviour:

A growing number of us are using ‘retail therapy’ to counter our increasingly stressful and busy lives. Shopping can give us an instant ‘high’ and buying new things makes us feel good. However, for many, these spending habits are becoming increasingly difficult to manage *(The Virgin Green Guide: The Easy Way to Save the Planet and Save £££s, 2007, p. 17).*
This struggle to manage the habit of shopping further contributes to the addiction metaphor, as does the notion of being a slave to the habit:

Are you a shopping slave?

• Do you buy things you don’t need, use or want?
• Are you spending more than you can afford?

If either of these are the case, you may have a problem (The Virgin Green Guide: The Easy Way to Save the Planet and Save £££s, 2007, p. 17)

And the distinction is drawn between ‘normal’ shoppers and ‘shopaholics’ (similar to that between ‘normal’ drinkers and ‘alcoholics’):

It’s not that we should never go shopping again, just because of the temptation to overindulge and splurge, which we all sometimes give in to. But for ‘shopaholics’ it’s a different matter. They are compulsive spenders who act this way most of the time, not just occasionally (The Virgin Green Guide: The Easy Way to Save the Planet and Save £££s, 2007, p. 18).

There is even a quiz readers can take to find out if they are shopaholics (see Figure 5.4, below). 'If you answer “yes” to more than five of these questions, your spending may be getting out of control. Try to figure out what triggers your spending sprees' (The Virgin Green Guide: The Easy Way to Save the Planet and Save £££s, 2007, pp. 18-19).

The guide then goes on to list the seven deadly sins of shopping: greed, gluttony, lust, wrath, envy, sloth and pride. The guide then goes on to advise readers on how they should be shopping. And they focus on what individuals can do, while also highlighting the problems of governments and big business:
Yes, there’s a lot of environmental harm that’s beyond our control – governments and big businesses have a lot to answer for. But there are an awful lot of us ‘ordinary people’ out there. And all the little changes we make – like recycling, switching off televisions and using energy-efficient light bulbs – can be multiplied millions of times over, to make a real difference.

This book will help you to be a part of that difference. We’ll show you how to reduce the impact you have on the environment, both locally and on a global scale. It’s easy, it can be fun and, what’s more, it can even save you money! (The Virgin Green Guide: The Easy Way to Save the Planet and Save £££s, 2007, p. 1)

Towards the end of the extract, there is also the link between ‘carbon temperance’ and austerity, where making these changes ‘can even save you money’.
In the section 'What kind of waster are you?', readers are asked to tick all of the following descriptions that apply to them:

TOSSEs
Do you throw out endless binloads of rubbish without a second thought? If so, you're a tosser! What about all the stuff that could be reduced, reused or recycled? Even if you know your 3Rs, you never apply them.

GUZZLERS
Guzzlers are the big energy wasters. You leave lights blazing away in unoccupied rooms, you've got a glut of kitchen and other household electrical gadgets and run them all day long, and when your TV and video aren't switched on, they're on constant stand-by.

BELCHERS
Belchers are the car users, and major polluters in the process. You may even have more that one car and you'd never, ever walk anywhere, let alone think about what damage your fuel is causing.

PLONKERS
Plonkers are large families producing massive overflowing nappy mountains, munching their way through packets and packets of processed food, and binning large quantities of plastic and polystyrene take-away packaging.

SCRAPPERS
Hey, big spenders! If you can't resist buying the latest trendy new clothes, make-up or shoes, then you're a Scraper. I bet you never wear or use half the stuff you buy and once the latest TV 'fashion guru' tells you it's no longer hip, it'll go straight in the bin, or waste space cluttering up your
wardrobe (The Virgin Green Guide: The Easy Way to Save the Planet and Save ££££s, 2007, pp. 11-12).

Those who score high, with 4 to 5 ticks, are described as follows:

You really are the pits in green terms! You're hot-water hogs; energy bandits through and through, and wanton wasters of energy and resources. But if you pay attention and change your horrible habits you could make a POTENTIAL SAVING of £4,000 a year. Just think what you could spend it on instead of chucking it away – which is literally what you're doing by being so wasteful (The Virgin Green Guide: The Easy Way to Save the Planet and Save ££££s, 2007, pp. 12-13).

The name-calling and deviantization is typical of these guides, most evident in the terms ‘eco-criminal’ and ‘eco-deviant’ to be examined in the next chapter. However, some of this name-calling appears almost tongue in cheek, a playful use of the terms rather than a usage that is imbued with hatred and extreme condemnation (even if the sentiment is still there). In this way, deviantization regarding climate change differs to that associated with other social problems.

The illustration of how much money (and carbon emissions) one can save by making changes is also very typical of these guides, exemplified in the notion of the ‘carbon audit’ and the ‘carbon calculator’. This raises the question to what extent some of these guides are more about money, about financial concerns, than they are about ecological concerns.

In Green is the New Black: How to Change the World with Style, the focus is on how one can stop global warming without completely sacrificing a life of consumption: ‘At the very least, I hope that this book will show you how to choose the handbag and the heels that enhance your life, and contribute least to global warming’ (Blanchard, 2007, p. 9). Shopping in itself is not seen as a ‘bad’
thing, only when it is deemed ‘wasteful’ and a symptom of ‘shopaholism’. In this way, many of these guides are not trying to bring about a revolution, but are instead trying to work with the existing system.

Similarly, *The Lazy Environmentalist: Your Guide to Easy, Stylish, Green Living* (Dorfman, 2007) emphasizes how eco-conscious consumerism, even down to death and dying (with eco-burials), can help to save the environment. This focus on how every aspect of our life, along with our death, can be used to control climate change creates a sense that we do have control over these processes, and that we can make a difference. This once again reflects an egocentric conception of climate change.

In response to this perceived crisis and excess, a wider civilizing offensive is implemented in an attempt to avert the crisis and curb the excess: ‘Our excessive use of natural resources – fuelled by population increases and a relentless pursuit of economic growth and material possessions – is causing alarming damage to the environment.’ (Mann, 2007, p. 6) These green guides are part of that civilizing offensive, and climate change is seen as only a ‘sign of the times’:

That’s not the only problem. We’re close to wiping out much of the planet’s marine life. We’re destroying rainforests and other wild ecosystems, which is decimating the planet’s wildlife and biodiversity. We’re turning vast tracts of fertile land into desert by over-farming. We’re polluting our waters, soil and air with chemicals that are toxic to plants, animals and ourselves.
In short, if we don’t change – quickly – the future looks grim (Mann, 2007, p. 7).

**Signs of crisis**
Since 1961, humanity’s ecological footprint has tripled while 30 per cent of earth’s wildlife and natural ecosystems have been lost.

Far from falling, annual global greenhouse emissions have risen 28 per cent since 1990 – and are still rising.

20 per cent of the world’s population, mainly in Europe and North America, consume 80 per cent of its natural resources.

The average Briton generates as much CO2 in eight days as the average Zambian does in a year.

The world’s population rose from two billion in 1930 to six billion in 2000 and is predicted to reach nine billion by 2050. (Mann, 2007, p. 9)

From these green guides reader can develop understandings of how they should behave, similar to the role of manners books before them. A more explicit example of this is found in the guide *It’s Easy Being Green*, where the author outlines several ‘Green principles’: live with less; reduce energy, water, chemicals, waste; use green alternatives. For the author, ‘being green’ means: saving money; being healthier; creating new habits; doing what you can; learning to love nature; being happy with less; focusing on what you *can* do, not despairing about what you can’t (Mann, 2007, pp. 9-13).

These extracts from the green guides, along with all the extracts from manners books discussed in earlier sections of this chapter, suggest that changes in understandings about nature, the environment, and climate change, have come about via the interplay between more gradual attempts to bring about changes in behaviour via manners books (both intended and unintended), and more heightened campaigns to bring about changes in behaviour in order to alleviate a perceived crisis (in this case, climate change). The interplay between these processes suggests that the regulation of behaviour may develop via a combination of gradual processes and heightened spurts. However, the extent to which these ‘crisis’ campaigns *do* affect sudden changes in behaviour has yet
to be explored (the reception to these guides and other forms of climate change governance will be explored in Chapter 7).

**Changes in the Regulation of Behaviour**

On the one hand, the abovementioned ‘green guides’ point towards a partial phase of reformalization, where the ideals of the likes of Thoreau are still present, but the emergence of the guides indicates a shift towards increasing prescriptions – what behaviour to do, and what not to do, to ‘save the planet’ and ‘stop global warming’. It is almost as if the potential future crises from climate change have engendered a sense that changes in behaviour regarding the environment have not been occurring at a fast enough rate (or have gone into ‘reverse’). And the process of informalization has brought with it fears that a relaxing of controls has brought with it a loss of control, in the form of ‘excess’ and ‘overconsumption’. And so this perceived social crisis has brought about a phase of reformalization, where (some) nature-society relations are written down in the form of guides containing prescriptions and prohibitions, such as the ‘Do something / Do nothing’ and ‘This good / This bad’ sections from *I Count*. However, at the same time, the way these guides are written differs to those manners books of the nineteenth century and earlier. It is as if they are appealing to a more reflexive and self-regulating ‘third nature personality’. Some of the extracts are more playful – the name-calling in the Virgin guide. It seems more that there is hope and faith that individuals can change their behaviour, they just need to be educated about why they need to change with some, but not all, guidelines about how they might go about doing this, with the possibility of picking and choosing what changes to make and what changes not to make.

In a similar way, the development of reality TV shows, such as *Carbon Cops*, *Wasted*, and *No Waste Like Home*, where ‘experts’ carry out ‘carbon audits’ of people’s homes, and then provide recommendations about how they can change
their lifestyle to decrease their carbon footprint, could be seen as a new form of manners/etiquette books. These shows, like other ‘lifestyle shows’, provide recommendations about how one ought to behave, but in a less prescriptive way to manners books of earlier times. In this way, these shows are representative of a wider informalizing of guides on how to live, and represent a shift in the way behaviours are regulated.

We can explore how this proliferation of a variety of texts relates to those texts examined by Elias in *On the Process of Civilisation*. Erasmus's 1530 publication, ‘On Civility in Boys’, was produced at a time when only a select proportion of the population could read, and there were not many other competing texts. There was therefore a dominant discourse on how one should behave that was directed towards those aspiring to become part of the ‘good society’. We can view that text as both reflecting and attempting to affect changes in behavior. Today, however, literacy is more widespread, and there is an increasing variety of multiple types of texts. While manners books are perhaps not so often read nowadays, we can make the argument that these different texts – newspapers, TV shows, documentaries, ‘green guides’, films, novels, podcasts, and so on – serve a similar function to manners books of the past. And compared with the time of Erasmus, because there is no single text or type of text to dominate, there is perhaps more contestation over how to behave, and an increasing variety of the types of behavior that are regarded as acceptable.

**Countervailing Trends**

In tandem with the aforementioned ecological civilizing process, there are also other trends occurring that have contributed to the development of the phenomenon of climate change. Some of these have developed as unintended outcomes of civilizing processes. Here are just a few of these countervailing trends.
We have already hinted towards some of these earlier in this chapter and other chapters. As mentioned in Chapter 1, anthropogenic climate change can be seen as an unintended outcome of increasing industrialization and increasing population, both of which are intimately tied in with processes of civilization. For example, increasing control over natural processes: increasing control over biomedical processes has contributed to increases in health and longevity; and increasing control over agricultural processes has contributed to increases in food yields. These two examples demonstrate how increasing control over natural processes has contributed to increasing human populations, and thereby the increasing expansion of the anthroposphere (see also Quilley, 2004). In turn, this has contributed to increasing carbon emissions and other greenhouse gases that contribute to climate change.

As populations increased, and as ‘rubbish’ increasingly came to be dominated by non-biodegradable materials, rubbish and litter increased overall, contributing to concerns about street litter, and more recently ecological concerns associated with especially plastic waste (Quilley, 2009a), such as those outlined earlier concerning non-human animals, the ocean, and space. As two of the ‘green guides’ mentioned earlier state:

We’re producing three times as much rubbish as we were 20 years ago and a lot of this is because 80% of what we now produce is discarded after a single use [text appears on a photo: background, bags of waste, foreground, empty plastic water bottle] (Wa$ted!, 2007, pp. 24-25).

We produce and use 20 times more plastic today than we did 50 years ago (The Virgin Green Guide: The Easy Way to Save the Planet and Save £££s, 2007, p. 2).

The assumption in these extracts is that of a ‘throw-away’ society, compared with a ‘golden-age’ past where things were re-used and mended, and where
people grew and made their own things. It is interesting to note that ‘rubbish’ is seen as something that is ‘dirty’, and is hidden behind the scenes – landfills are in remote locations, and jobs associated with rubbish are seen as examples of ‘dirty work’. The sequestration of not only rubbish but also the processes involved in the production, transportation, and disposal, of products, has contributed to both a ‘not knowing’ and a ‘not wanting to know’.

The development of increasing networks of interdependence, with more and more people relying on others (such as supermarkets) for their food supplies, has contributed to not only increasing packaging, but also transportation has been increasing, along with increases in other associated uses of energy required to store and transport large quantities of food. These developments associated with civilizing processes have further contributed to increasing greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and, thereby, increasing climate change.

Despite the apparent growth of ethical consumption, over the past century battery farming and other intensive farming methods have become increasingly more common (with free range less common) (Franklin, 1999, p. 136). This suggests that, if processes are hidden, we can ignore them, focusing our ‘ethical’ efforts on those things that are visible and less possible to deny. On the one hand, we have greater 'kindness' being shown towards animals in zoos, and to pets in homes, yet on the other hand we have increasingly intensive farming practices, where animals are treated in increasingly more 'cruel' ways. Perhaps this is because zoos and household pets are 'visible', whereas intensive farming practices are 'hidden' and certain measures are in place to 'remove' even the workers from the more unsavoury aspects of this.

These counter-trends outlined here are but a few of the many counter-trends occurring alongside ecological civilizing processes. Civilizing processes themselves, then, can contribute to both concern about the biosphere and damage towards the biosphere.
Conclusion

The analysis presented here suggests that there has been at least a partial ecological civilizing process developing, albeit with counter processes occurring that have themselves contributed to the phenomenon of climate change itself. The gradual, blind development of an ecological civilizing process has affected, and been affected by, more intentional actions by various campaigners and writers throughout the centuries – from the likes of Thoreau and Leopold through to the makers of Captain Planet, through to Virgin and other producers of ‘green guides’. The long-term changes in the medium of text that is used to communicate how one should behave has also changed, from manners texts to newspaper articles, television shows, ‘green guides’, and other media that will be discussed in the next chapter. The people who dictate how one should behave has also shifted from the middle class ‘good society’ and moral figures such as religious leaders, through to scientists, celebrities and corporations. This more general shift in changes of the arbiters of socially acceptable behaviour is also accompanied by an increasing informalizing of the way that these various media outline prescriptions and proscriptions. In the next chapter, we further expand on these points by exploring how reactions to the perceived crisis of climate change may relate to moral panics, civilizing offensives, and decivilizing processes (that is, how long-term ecological civilizing processes relate to civilizing offensives or moral panics about climate change).
Chapter Six

Historical Analysis: Part Two:
Climate Change and Moral Panics38

Introduction

In the previous chapter, we explored how the development of concern about climate change can be seen as part of a broader ecological civilizing process, including such developments as increasing identification with animals, plants, and the biosphere as a whole; and increasing awareness of the interdependencies between different natural processes. In this chapter, we now turn to exploring the development of climate change campaigns as a reaction to the perception that ecological civilizing processes are either not occurring at a fast enough rate (to counter other processes) or have gone into reverse. Combining the concept of moral panic with the notion of civilizing offensives, this chapter explores the extent to which reactions to climate change can be considered to be moral panics, and how this relates to the previously explored ecological civilizing processes.

Following this discussion of moral panics, the question of folk devils is raised, during which the relation between climate change campaigners and sceptics is explored. This then leads into a discussion of the relationship between panic and denial. I then examine the media and moral panic, exploring how changes in the production and dissemination of knowledge (including changes media technologies) may influence the development of concern about and regulation of social problems, thereby influencing the development of moral panics and,

38 An earlier version of this chapter was written for the Ashgate Companion to Moral Panics
therefore, informing how we conceptualise moral panic and how we go about moral panic research.

**The Emergence of Concern**

One of Goode and Ben-Yehuda’s ([1994] 2009) five elements or criteria of moral panic includes the notion of concern; where (some) people come to be increasingly concerned about the behaviour of a group of people, or about particular events that are occurring. This is what Critcher (2003) terms the ‘emergence’ of the problem – where the problem comes to be recognised as such, and is perceived to be a threat to the moral and social order.

We can trace the emergence of concern about climate change in several ways; one is through inferring concern from newspaper coverage. The following graph (Figure 6.1) is taken from a report by Boykoff and Roberts (2007, p. 36), and shows the frequency of English-speaking newspaper coverage of climate change from 1988 to 2006. We can clearly see in the above graphic representation, how coverage of climate change has steadily increased since 1988, with a rapid increase from 2004 to at least 2006.

An additional way to infer concern is through examining the publication of ‘green guides’ that were mentioned in the previous chapter. Until recently, I had never come across these publications. Then, in January 2008, when I entered two small bookshops in Sydney, Australia, I discovered what I now call ‘green guides’ – 26 of them. These included books about climate change, how to ‘live green’ and ‘stop global warming’. Soon after this, I ventured to bookshops in other countries, finding numerous copies of this seemingly new genre of publication. The second graph (Figure 6.2) shows the annual frequency of new ‘green guide’ publication titles.

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39 Results from search on WorldCat (worldcat.org) on 16 November 2011. Keywords: "ethical living" or "green living" or "green guide" or "live green" or "ethical guide" or "living green" or
Figure 6.1: English-Language Newspaper Coverage of Climate Change, 1988–2006

[Source: Boykoff and Roberts, 2007, p. 36]

“how to stop climate” or “how to stop global warming”. False positives were not counted. Results also include those green guides I discovered in bookshops, some of which were not listed in WorldCat. See appendix for table of results.
Figure 6.2: Frequency of Titles of ‘Green Guides’ Published Per Year

[Source: see Appendix C]

The first peak in this graph occurs in 1990, the second in 2008 (with 2007, 2009 and 2010 being peak years as well).

This graph highlights a sudden increase in guides on how to live green, suggesting a sudden concern about eco-friendly behaviour and about climate change (the guides reflecting and/or generating concern about climate change). The 1990 spike coincides with the aftermath of ‘the greenhouse summer of ’88’, a summer of severe heat and drought, where climate change campaigners and the media increasingly came to link the ‘strange weather’ to climate change (Ungar, 1992). That same year, the United Nations created the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate change (IPCC). The timing of the second and largest peak immediately follows the disaster of Hurricane Katrina (2005) and the release of the Al Gore presented climate change documentary *An Inconvenient Truth* (Guggenheim, 2006).
While *An Inconvenient Truth* received a great deal of attention at the time, it is only one of many, representative of a wider discourse surrounding climate change, as represented in other ‘texts’, such as other ‘eco-documentaries’, popular books about climate change, guides on ‘how to live green’, ‘save the planet’ and ‘stop global warming’, ‘eco-makeover’ lifestyle reality TV shows, and manners podcasts dedicated to ‘green living’. For example, a *Scientific American* podcast, episode ‘Anesthesiologists Can Help Cut Climate Change’, suggests that climate change should be on the mind of anesthesiologists, ‘because the gasses used to knock you out contribute to global warming’. The presenter describes a study undertaken on three common gases used by anesthesiologists, noting how two of the three gases have a significantly less carbon footprint: ‘if a choice can be safely made, anesthesiologists should go with the one that’s kindest to the climate’ (*Scientific American - 60-Second Science*, 2010, December 6). Here, we see that concern about the effects of climate change, and how we should modify our actions accordingly, is present in a variety of areas, amongst a variety of groups (including, in this case, medical professionals).

Another measure of concern is through the number of mentions that ‘climate change’ receives. A Google search reveals about 80,000,000 (80 million) results for ‘global warming’, 112,000,000 (112 million) for ‘climate change’, and 1,750,000 (1.75 million) for ‘climate crisis’. The former two illustrate how widespread and popular the topic of climate change has become, while the latter – ‘climate crisis’ – illustrates how widespread concern about climate change is, where it is termed a ‘crisis’. While it is difficult to discern from such results exactly who is concerned, the mass of concern is still evident.

The ‘climate crisis’, as the term suggests, entails a sense of urgency, to act now before it is too late (if it is not already so). Discourses about climate change include the ‘new catastrophism’ (Urry, 2011), predicting catastrophic consequences of ‘high carbon’ lifestyles. As already mentioned, there exists the

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40 Google searches were carried out on 28 November 2011
perception that what has been termed ecological civilizing processes are either not developing at a fast enough rate (to counter other processes) or have gone into reverse. Such discourses are present in the ‘green guides’ explored in the previous chapter, and in other texts to be explored here. Importantly, however, these discourses are not uniform, in that there is no overall consensus about climate change in popular media.

**Consensus About Climate Change**

An additional criterion of Goode and Ben-Yehuda ([1994] 2009) is that there is consensus amongst a group of people (not necessarily the whole population) that there is a problem. It is relatively easy to prove that a degree of consensus exists within the community of those engaged in climate science. Naomi Oreskes, in a paper subtitled ‘the scientific consensus on global warming’, (2004) study, reports findings from an analysis of peer-reviewed journal articles on ‘global climate change’. Her results found no study that disagreed with the apparent scientific consensus about the reality of anthropogenic climate change. However, this consensus does not extend to the entire population. As will be discussed later in the chapter, there are those who believe or at least claim to believe that (a) the threat of anthropogenic climate change is not as great as it is believed; (b) it is happening, but so slowly that we will be able to address it so we need not be concerned; (c) it is happening but it is not caused by humans; or (d) the global climate is not warming. It is this disagreement about different aspects of climate change that may have contributed to the increasing moralization of the issue.

**Increasing Moralization and Responsibilization**

One important characteristic of moral panics is that they are moral panics. But for some moral panic researchers, ‘moral’ is somehow seen as a separate sphere; for example, Kenneth Thompson argues that ‘Sometimes panics about
food (e.g. the BSE scare about infected beef) or health have been confused with panics that relate directly to morals’ (Thompson, 1998, p. vii). Such a stance suggests that ‘panics about food’ cannot contain a moral element; it is a question of moral panics versus risk panics (Ungar, 2001). In his introduction to the third edition of Folk Devils and Moral Panics, Stan Cohen describes how technical risks can be transformed into moral panics when the risk ‘becomes perceived as primarily moral rather than technical (the moral irresponsibility for taking this risk)’ (Cohen, [1972] 2002, p. xxxvi). While climate change has been informed by the science of climate change, and carries with it elements of a technical risk, I wish to argue that it has become increasingly moralized over time.

Eco-Documentaries
An example of this increasing moralization is the award-winning climate change documentary An Inconvenient Truth (Guggenheim, 2006). In a previous paper, I analyzed the documentary, demonstrating the moral panic themes that were present and how they might relate to wider social processes (Rohloff, 2011a). I saw the documentary when it was first released in theatres in 2006, and was immediately struck by how moralized the ‘risk’ of climate change was throughout the documentary; I remember leaving the theatre contemplating whether or not this could indeed be a prime case to explore from a moral panic perspective (it then formed the basis of my Honours dissertation, which was eventually rewritten into the abovementioned paper). Examples of the moralization throughout the documentary includes the following quotes from Al Gore:

‘...the moral imperative to make big changes is inescapable’

‘Ultimately, this is really not a political issue so much as a moral issue. If we allow [the projected CO2 concentrations after 50 years of unrestricted fossil fuel burning] to happen, it is deeply unethical’
‘...this is what is at stake, our ability to live on planet earth, to have a future as a civilization. I believe this is a moral issue. It is your time to seize this issue. It is our time to rise again to secure our future’ (Guggenheim, 2006).

If we refer back to Cohen, the ‘moral irresponsibility of taking this risk’ becomes further apparent when Gore compares the development of the science of global warming and a lack of action, with initial responses to the scientific literature linking tobacco smoking with lung cancer – in the case of tobacco, Gore argues that the slow response resulted in the deaths of many, implying that a slow or inadequate response to climate change could have devastating consequences. He also draws comparisons between the storm brewing in Nazi Germany and the storm brewing in the form of Hurricane Katrina (for further analysis of the documentary, see Rohloff, 2011a).

Podcasts and Blogs
Similarly, in an episode of Make-It-Green-Girl: Quick and Dirty Tips for An Earth Friendly Life, titled ‘Dry Clean Dilemma’ (2008, September 18), the presenter discusses the problem of ‘eco-guilt’ associated with dry cleaning, urging listeners to choose dry cleaners that use ‘environmentally friendly’ solvents. This ‘eco-guilt’ is manifested clearly in The Guardian blog, ‘Ask Leo & Lucy: Your Green Questions Answered’ (guardian.co.uk/environment/series/ask-leo-lucy), where readers submit questions such as ‘Can I use perfume and be green?’, ‘Do dimmer switches really save energy when lighting a room?’, ‘What is the most eco-friendly alcoholic drink?’, ‘What’s the best form of carbon offsetting?’, ‘How green is your pension?’, and so on. While some of these questions are about ‘living green’ and being ‘kind to the environment’ in general, many relate back to climate change and carbon footprints.

‘Green Guides’ An additional source of information on ‘green’ questions is the recent proliferation of ‘green guides’ mentioned above. As seen in the extracts
presented in the Chapter 5, these texts typically contain prescriptions and proscriptions on how one should modify their behaviour in order to combat climate change. One of the themes from these texts, the diet metaphor, contrasts excess eating or drinking with excess consumption in general (i.e. a ‘high carbon’ lifestyle). This draws parallels with other wider discourses and practices for moderating ones behaviour, and is perhaps in an attempt to establish a moderation of ‘carbon consumption’ as a status aspiration (for example, see Aarts, Goudsblom, et al, 1995). Many of these same themes from the ‘green guides’ are also present in other media, such as eco-makeover lifestyle reality TV shows

Eco-Makeover Lifestyle Reality TV Shows

A further type of media is the ‘eco-makeover’ lifestyle reality TV show. In these shows which have been made in many countries around the world, such as Wa$ted (New Zealand) (Wallis & Pringle, 2007), Carbon Cops (Australia) (Meyrick & Cousins, 2007), and No Waste Like Home (UK) (Ludgate, 2005), ‘experts’ go into people’s homes, workplaces, etc. and carry out a carbon audit. In some of these ‘eco-makeover’ shows, participants’ are described as ‘eco-criminals’, and their actions ‘eco-crimes’. There occurs a ‘naming and shaming’ process in some of these shows, where the ‘eco-deviance’ is exposed and attempts are made to transform them into ‘eco-friendly’ practices (see also Lewis, 2008). Throughout, various suggestions appear to the audience (anyone who might be watching the show), about what they can do (or should do) to cut down their own carbon emissions.

The transference between ‘ethical living’ and ‘green living’, often tied to climate change, further highlights the morality of climate change and the processes of moral regulation occurring in relation to climate change.

The ‘Climate Crisis’: A Symptom of Wider Problems
The above highlights the ‘moral dimension’ of climate change discourse, but this deviance is also seen to be symptomatic of other problems (Garland, 2008). This is what Cohen refers to as ‘it’s not only this’ ([1972] 2002, p. 39), where other issues come to be associated with the prime issue of concern. With the case of climate change, it is not only the natural crisis of global warming, but also the social crisis of our relationship with the environment, including patterns of consumption. The ‘climate crisis’, as with other moral panics, is not simply a crisis about the changing climate. It is also a crisis about overconsumption, industrialization, capitalism, and how we see ourselves in relation to each other, other animals, and the biosphere as a whole.

Related to the above is the notion of the issue being seen as a ‘sign of the times’ (Cohen, [1972] 2002, p. 46). As early as the 1970s, the antecedents of today’s ‘green guides’ were drawing attention to environmental problems as being a sign that people’s values were wrong, and that environmental problems are a symptom of this; for example, as Jonathan Holliman wrote in the Consumer’s Guide to The Protection of the Environment, ‘Certainly the state of the environment is the clearest indication that some of our cherished values may be wrong’ (Holliman, [1970] 1974, p. 13).

More recently, in the green guides of today, we can see examples of how climate change is seen as a symptom of several deeper problems, such as overconsumption and capitalism. The diet metaphors mentioned in the previous chapter, along with the metaphor of addiction, suggests that consumption has gotten out of control. The development of initiatives such as ‘Freecycle’41 (uk.freecycle.org) and ‘Buy Nothing Day’42 (buynothingday.co.uk), along with the emergence of groups such as ‘Freegans’43 (freegan.info), are

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41 'Freecycle’ is similar to eBay, except that items are ‘gifted’ rather than sold, the aim being to reduce the amount of products that are sent to landfills by instead reusing them.

42 'Buy Nothing Day’ is an annual, international day when people are urged to protest against consumerism by not buying anything for the whole day.

43 According to their website, “The word freegan is compounded from “free” and “vegan”. Vegans are people who avoid products from animal sources or products tested on animals in an
indicative of perceptions that capitalism itself is a problem. This is most clearly represented in notions of how to transform capitalism towards a ‘green’ capitalism, or how to replace capitalism with an entirely different system.

There thus exists the perception of moral decline, hence the perceived need for these guides, documentaries, TV shows, and so on. Similar to manners books of the past, these ‘green’ documents implicitly entail a sense of looking down to those who are not ‘ethical consumers’, and a corresponding looking up to those who are (as epitomized in the ‘eco-celebrity’). Having explored the moral dimension of climate change discourse, we now turn to the panic dimension.

**Disproportionality**

Disproportionality – the panic part of moral panic – is potentially a problematic criterion for climate change, for in some people’s minds it implies that the reaction is an overreaction, and is therefore inappropriate and unjust. Refuting Ungar’s contention that disproportionality is not an essential feature of moral panic, Goode and Ben-Yehuda argue that ‘the very word “panic” implies disproportion’ ([1994] 2009, p. 82). However, it depends how we define ‘panic’ and how we define ‘disproportionality’. Goode and Ben-Yehuda also mention several different indicators of disproportion, one of which is ‘changes over time’. They argue that ‘if the attention paid to a given condition at one point in time is vastly greater than that paid to it during a previous or later time, without any corresponding increase in objective seriousness, then, once again, the criterion of disproportion may be said to have been met’ (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, [1994] 2009, p. 46).

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effort to avoid harming animals. Freegans take this a step further by recognizing that in a complex, industrial, mass-production economy driven by profit, abuses of humans, animals, and the earth abound at all levels of production (from acquisition to raw materials to production to transportation) and in just about every product we buy.” Freegans therefore avoid buying products and services wherever they can.
It is a slightly modified version of this that I wish to utilize in relation to climate change. I wish to conceptualize disproportionality in two ways. First, by exploring the change in the degree of attention paid to a given issue, what sort of attention is paid to it in what way, and how this changes over time. Put in another way, we can explore the relation over time between changes in: (a) public awareness of the problem, (b) ‘media’ and other coverage or attention paid to the problem, and (c) the actual incidence of the problem.

The second way that I wish to reconceptualize disproportionality is in terms of degrees of ‘reality congruence’ and ‘value congruence’. By this I mean we should assess, through empirical research, the accuracy and appropriateness of representations of the issue, and attempts to regulate the issue; that is, assessing the degree to which regulatory attempts are likely to have more intended than unintended, and integrative rather than disintegrative consequences, as well as exploring the values behind different representations. This will be further explicated in Chapter 9 (the concluding chapter) where, following this theoretical-empirical research, I discuss to what extent moral panic, as a concept, still remains useful; the purpose of the concept, including how it should be used; and how moral panic research should be undertaken.

We can see from the graphs at the start of this chapter that the degree of attention paid to climate change has indeed changed over time, since its shift outward from the scientific domain to the political arena and to popular culture. In the next chapter, where I analyze the interviews I carried out with people who I defined as ‘climate change activists’ and ‘climate change non-activists’, I will explore the second part of disproportionality: the degree of reality congruence and value congruence.

**Volatility**
A related criterion to disproportionality is volatility. However, for the purposes of this chapter, I will ignore volatility. In their book, Goode and Ben-Yehuda contradict themselves about the meaning of this term. At the beginning of the section on volatility, they state that: ‘moral panics are volatile; they erupt fairly suddenly...and, nearly as suddenly, subside’ and ‘the fever pitch that characterizes a society during the course of a moral panic is not typically sustainable over a long stretch of time’ (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, [1994] 2009, p. 41). At the end of that section, however, they then go on to point out that: The satanic witch craze gripped Europe for nearly three centuries. The fact that certain concerns are long-lasting does not mean they are not panics, though’ (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, [1994] 2009, p. 43). This latter quote seems to negate the necessity and validity of ‘volatility’ as a criterion for moral panic. However, we can still think about volatility in relation to civilizing offensives – how gradual long-term civilizing processes may be accelerated by a civilizing spurt.

**Civilizing Offensives, Decivilizing Processes and Moral Panics**

The campaigns surrounding climate change – books, guides, documentaries, reality-TV shows and other media mentioned earlier – that seek to both educate people and bring about changes in behaviour can be conceptualized as a civilizing offensive; campaigns to ‘civilize’ the self and/or the other in an attempt to develop a civilizing spurt. In this way, moral panics in general can be seen as civilizing offensives. However, depending on how the historical social processes have been developing in relation to any particular example, different types of civilizing offensives may accompany moral panics: from ‘civilizing’ all of us, in the case of climate change; to ‘civilizing’ some, making ‘them’ more like ‘us’; to more exclusionary campaigns that seek to make society more ‘civilized’ by excluding those that are deemed by some to be too ‘uncivilized’.

Perhaps civilizing processes themselves have contributed to decivilizing consequences in the form of what Urry calls a ‘capitalism of excess’ and
overconsumption. On the one hand we can witness certain trends towards increasing moderation and self-control (changes in long-term patterns of eating (Mennell, [1985] 1996) and smoking (Hughes, 2003)), and on the other we can see the growing emergence of multiple sites of excess consumption, and the increasing ‘freedom to become “addicted”, to be emotionally and/or physically dependent upon excessive consumption of certain products and services of global capitalism, legal, illegal or semi-legal’ (Urry, 2010, p. 204).

Here, consumption associated with climate change may share some similarities with the consumption of tobacco. As a counter to the notion of ‘consumer gluttony’, excessive consumption may in part be being used as a means of self-control, akin to the use of tobacco, and perhaps in some ways alcohol, and as a means to try and control ones emotions (for example, consider the concept of ‘retail therapy’ – shopping to ‘improve’ one’s mood). The notion of ‘ethical consumerism’ or ‘green consumerism’ is an additional way that consumption (albeit not excess consumption) can be used as a means of control, as a means to try and control environmental and ethical developments.

Additionally, the notion of travelling to sites of ‘excess consumption’ shares some similarities with the notion of travelling to ‘the countryside’. In the previous chapter I outlined how, when one travelled to ‘the countryside’, there was a relaxation of manners, a spatial informalization and a ‘quest for excitement’. Similarly, for these places of ‘excess consumption’ that Urry writes of, people also have to travel to these sites, and there is also a relaxation of rules – the same rules do not apply in these ‘places of excess’ as they do elsewhere. In that respect, like ‘the countryside’, ‘places of excess’ represent an emancipation from everyday life.

These decivilizing consequences may be contributing to the detriment of the environment and social life as a whole (see also Ampudia de Haro, 2008), including the development of anthropogenic climate change. To counter this,
climate change campaigns could potentially be utilized as ‘good’ moral panics or civilizing offensives, to bring about a civilizing ‘spurt’ or an acceleration in ecological civilizing processes. However, the notion of ‘good’ moral panics is not so straightforward in several ways. First, from whose perspective is the moral panic ‘good’? For example, from past moral panics that have been deemed ‘bad’ by researchers, the moral entrepreneurs involved in those quite often probably regarded their campaigns as ‘good’ (not that they would have called them good moral panics). Second, while attempting to do ‘good’ (again a problematic use of the word), these campaigns also have the potential to have decivilizing consequences, for example, if ‘good’ and ‘bad’ behaviours developed into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ people. We can already witness this to a certain extent with the notion of ‘eco-criminals’ and ‘eco-deviants’ mentioned earlier, two labels that featured in eco-makeover lifestyle reality-TV shows. So, potentially, moral panics over climate change could be regarded as both civilizing and decivilizing processes, with the possibility of contributing to the development of deviance and deviants, crime and criminals. The extent to which these deviants will become integrated or sequestered is uncertain. This takes us into a discussion about ‘folk devils’.

**Folk Devils and Hostility**

Goode and Ben-Yehuda, in their most recent edition of *Moral Panics: The Social Construction of Deviance*, argue that ‘threatening, dangerous or risky conditions...[such as] nuclear energy, swine flu, E. coli, global warming, the shrinking ozone layer...and so on....may cause anxiety, concern, or fear but in the absence of folk devils or evildoers do not touch off moral panics’ ([1994] 2009, p. 42). They acknowledge that some have argued that we should look at such issues in relation to moral panic, but Goode and Ben-Yehuda disagree. The question is, why do they and others disagree? Can this tell us something about the function of moral panic research, and the political and ideological influences on the researcher? There is not space here to answer such questions – these will
be explored in a subsequent piece of research. Instead, in this chapter I wish to illustrate how folk devils may be being formed in relation to climate change, how these folk devils differ to folk devils from other more ‘classic’ moral panics, and what implications this has.

As with manners books of the past, in today’s ‘green guides’ and other climate change related media, there are dictums of how one should and should not behave (see Chapter 5 for examples). Within these various texts, the implication is that if you ‘do nothing’ or do ‘bad’ things, you are a ‘bad’ person. This is epitomized in the Virgin Green Guide’s name-calling and deviantization of ‘eco-deviants’ mentioned in the previous chapter. And in some of the eco-makeover lifestyle reality TV shows, this is further evident. For example, in Wa$ted, people whose behaviour is regarded by the producers as ‘bad’ are shown in a mug style shot, with the label ‘guilty’ emblazoned across the screen. The very development of the terms ‘eco-deviant’ and ‘eco-criminal’ is further evidence to suggest that there is certainly a deviantization process occurring, but to what extent this equates to folk devils is unclear.

A more likely candidate for the label of fold devil is the ‘climate change sceptic’ or the ‘climate change denier’. The more pejorative term, ‘climate change denier’, is a prevalent term: a search carried out in Nexis UK on 9 May 2012, for the phrase ‘climate change denier’ in ‘anywhere’, retrieved more than 3,000 results; a Google search for the same phrase retrieved about 473,000 results. So strongly established is this label, it sometimes does not take much to be termed a ‘sceptic’ or ‘denier’. I had the unfortunate experience once, of being labeled a ‘climate change sceptic’, and my research a piece of ‘climate change denial’. And this was simply because I was exploring climate change from a (reformulated) moral panic approach. As well as telling us something about moral panic, this example (along with many others) demonstrates how quick some people can be to label others as ‘deniers’, with the associated stereotypical assumptions that it carries. The comparison of those who dispute the reality of anthropogenic
climate change, or the urgency of it, with holocaust deniers adds an additional emotive, demonizing characteristic to these folk devils – associating them, implicitly, with neo-Nazis.

However, despite the relative popularity of the term ‘climate change denier’, and other potential folk devils associated with climate change, this example contrasts with some of the classic examples of moral panic – panics over youth, working class, and other marginalized groups. Climate change provides us with new types of folk devils: (1) ‘climate skeptics/deniers’; (2) big corporations (including, but not limited to, the energy industry); (3) governments; (4) the affluent, SUV driving, ‘gas-guzzling’ consumer with a large carbon footprint; and (5) the extremely rich who consume to ‘excess’ in sites of ‘excess consumption’ (in relation to the latter, see Urry, 2010). As the power ratios between these new types of folk devils and the ‘control culture’ is less ‘unbalanced’ than power ratios between more marginalized groups and the control culture, we witness a different type of governance. On the one hand, we witness an increase in the development of non-governmental interventions – the campaigning of environmental organizations, celebrities, scientists, and the increasing occurrence of ‘activism’ and participation in protests and demonstrations; the emergence of ‘neat capitalism’ (Rojek, 2007, Ch.8), ‘ethical consumerism’ and ‘green consumerism’. At the same time, however, as well as these notional (or difficult to regulate) folk devils, there is also a call upon everyone to regulate and reassess their own behaviour, and their own contributions to climate change. These trends towards a critique of current practices of consumption, and the ‘guides’ (books, reality TV shows, documentaries, podcasts, etc.) that have been produced to try and provide a means for people to change their own behaviour, ‘save the planet’ and ‘stop global warming’, are similar to manners books, etiquette books, and environmental literature of the past, but they also differ to the extent that they are connected with a perceived ‘crisis’.
And while this general trend towards ‘self-governance’ is directed towards everyone, as mentioned earlier, we can also witness the emergence of ‘eco-deviance’ and ‘eco-crime’. Similar to issues such as smoking and drinking, one’s own behaviour can affect the ‘wellbeing’ of many others (Hier, 2008, 2011b). With the example of climate change, the choices of one person is related to the impact on the whole world, most explicitly with the case of the individual carbon footprint. Therefore, it may be the case that these deviant behaviours associated with climate change come to be increasingly established, and the gap between the ‘eco-friendly’ and the ‘eco-deviant’ may widen, and a more established, more marginalized folk devil may eventually emerge. These divides may become further entrenched as/if climate change continues to accelerate, and natural and social crises increasingly develop as an outcome of this.

**Panic and Denial**

There is also the flipside of this ‘moral panic’: ‘denial’. As witnessed in the aftermath of ‘Climategate’, as well as the development of so-called ‘climate change sceptics’ or ‘climate change deniers’, along with existing research interviewing people about their thoughts about climate change, the growing awareness of the ‘exaggeration and distortion’ in the media, combined with multiple media sources (McRobbie & Thornton, 1995), suggests that generating both concern and changes in behaviour can prove difficult in some cases. Paradoxically, moral panics themselves may contribute to the denial of social problems, as the general public grow increasingly more sceptical and cynical about the media. It is in this regard that moral panic research can be tremendously informative: in assessing past and current campaigns and interventions in terms of how adequate, appropriate and successful they may be; that is, whether they will have more intended than unintended outcomes.

As with other moral panics, there has been contestation over the reality of the social problem of climate change, with sceptics critiquing advocates, and
advocates in turn responding to sceptics. There is even now an iPhone application called ‘Our Climate’ that one can use to ‘discredit’ climate change sceptic arguments (Cook, 2010, Aug 6). There are also numerous blogs dedicated to addressing and debunking ‘climate change denial’, as well as numerous books (an Amazon.co.uk search, on 9 May 2012, for ‘climate change denial’ in ‘books’ retrieved 255 results). This exchange and battle between advocates and skeptics, along with increasing skepticism of the media, relates to how changes in the production and dissemination of knowledge affect the development of moral panics (and the denial of them).

The Media and Moral Panic: Long-Term Changes in the Production and Dissemination of Knowledge

Since the concept of moral panic was developed by Stan Cohen and Jock Young in their PhD theses in the late 1960s and early 1970s, there have been tremendous developments in media and communications, including the development of: the Internet, blogs, Twitter, Facebook and other social networking sites, Skype, SMS text messaging, smartphones with applications and cameras, online newspapers with comments sections, podcasts, YouTube, and others. Building on McRobbie and Thornton’s argument about ‘multi-mediated social worlds’ (1995), these ‘new media’ devices have all contributed to the rapid exchange of information, the increasing ease for ‘citizen-journalists’ to produce and disseminate their own interpretations of events and issues, and therefore the growing potential (with some cases, not all) to contest dominant narratives. Although some argue that professional and elite journalism ‘institutions still break and frame a large proportion of the news stories circulating through the online sphere and this is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future’ (Goode, 2009, p. 1291). Additionally, for some issues that are firmly entrenched, it may be more difficult and less likely that dissenting voices would be communicated and listened to; with others, it may be more likely.
Along with these changes in technology that have facilitated the potential for a degree of increasing democratization of knowledge, there has also been a gradual shift in the types of media that have been utilized and how they have been utilized. While much moral panic research has focused on news media – newspapers, television news – throughout this research I have attempted to broaden that scope, to explore how and the extent to which other types of media, other types of documents, contribute to moral panics. Not just newspapers, but also manners books, environmentalist literature, science books, novels, ‘green guides’, television shows, documentaries, and films, have all contributed to media representations of climate change, ‘nature’ and ‘the environment’. They have contributed to the formulation of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ behaviours, and ‘good’ and ‘bad’ people. Within these texts, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the arbiters of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ have changed to include celebrities, amongst others.

As with other social problems, celebrities are increasingly used to support climate change campaigns and ‘green living’. They are used as an authority, as in the case of documentaries – for example, The 11th Hour (Conners & Conners-Petersen, 2007), produced and narrated by Leonardo DiCaprio; the National Geographic documentary Six Degrees Could Change the World (Bowman, 2007), narrated by Alec Baldwin; the PBS documentary, Global Warming: The Signs and the Science (Taylor, 2005), hosted and narrated by Alanis Morissette; and An Inconvenient Truth (Guggenheim, 2006), presented by Al Gore. Celebrities are also used as a status aspiration, in the case of ‘green living’ and ‘ethical living’. For example, in 2006 Vanity Fair began releasing an annual ‘green issue’ of their magazine. The magazine covers featured ‘eco-celebrities’ Julia Roberts, Al Gore, George Clooney, Robert F, Kennedy Jr., Leonardo DiCaprio, and Madonna. Just as celebrities became models of what to buy, what to wear (think of the women’s magazines that show photos of celebrities in their outfits and where you can buy lookalike outfits at affordable prices), some celebrities are now

44 These ‘annual green issues’ were subsequently abandoned in 2009.
becoming models of how to live ‘eco-friendly’ lives. Some are like moral entrepreneurs of previous times. They are like the ‘good society’, the ‘court society’ that other people aspire to be like and to be part of.

**Conclusion: Climate Change Moral Panics?**

I wish to suggest that climate change campaigns – including the previously mentioned green guides – have similarities with moral panics, but some differences as well. Certainly, I do not wish to suggest that climate change campaigns are moral panics in the classic understanding of the term; I do not wish to suggest that this reaction to climate change is necessarily an irrational overreaction. Instead, I wish to utilise a reformulation of the moral panic concept, one that does not carry the same normative assumptions of the original model.

Situating the concept within Elias’s theory of civilizing processes, I wish to argue that moral panics can be conceptualised as perceived social crises, where there is a perceived failure in the civilizing of the ‘self’ and/or the ‘other’, in long-term civilizing processes. With the case of climate change, it is not only the natural crisis of global warming, but also the social crisis of our relationship with the environment, including patterns of consumption. The campaigns surrounding climate change – books, guides, documentaries, reality-TV shows and other media – that seek to both educate people and bring about changes in behaviour can be conceptualized as a civilizing offensive; campaigns to ‘civilize’ the self and/or the other. In this way, moral panics in general can perhaps be seen as civilizing offensives. However, depending on how the historical social processes have been developing in relation to any particular example, different types of civilizing offensives may accompany moral panics: from ‘civilizing’ all of us, in the case of climate change; to ‘civilizing’ some, making ‘them’ more like ‘us’; to more exclusionary campaigns that seek to make society more ‘civilized’ by excluding those that are deemed by some to be too ‘uncivilized’.
In Chapter 8, I take this analysis further by comparing this example of climate change to several other examples, in order to further develop my reformulation of moral panic and decivilizing processes, and to reassess the relation between civilizing offensives and civilizing processes.

Before this, however, in Chapter 7 I explore how the (historical) developments in Chapters 5 and 6 relate to individual biographical developments, including the possibility of individual ecological civilizing processes. I also examine the reception of both ‘activists’ and ‘non-activists’ to the various climate change discourses discussed in these two historical chapters.
Chapter Seven

Interviews: Involvement (and Non-Involvement) in Climate Change ‘Activism’

Introduction

Having explored in the previous two chapters the notion of ecological civilizing processes, and analyzing the content of some of the various different types of climate change media in relation to moral panic, this chapter builds on the previous two by analyzing developments in individual people’s lives, and their perceptions about climate change media.

As discussed in Chapter 4, for this stage of the research I interviewed eight participants who were: involved in environmental education, campaigns or protests (all related to climate change); were employed in the area of sustainability; or volunteered for climate change organizations. I also interviewed seven participants who were not involved in these climate change related activities, although many of these seven did things like voting for Green parties or donating to environmental charities. I drew a distinction between the former eight participants who were actively seeking to change other people’s behaviour, and the latter seven who were not involved in this form of (what might loosely be called) climate change ‘activism’.

After exploring the development of individual ecological civilizing processes occurring within a person’s life, and then contrasting this with evidence to suggest the influence of ecological civilizing offensives, this chapter goes on to compare how some people come to be involved in climate change ‘activism’ and how others do not. Several additional themes from Chapter 5 are then
contrasted with individual developments, such as a romanticizing of the past, and an idealization of ‘nature’. Differences between activists and non-activists are explored, such as the different emotions that are elicited in their narratives, and the relative coherence of their narratives. I then go on to explore perceptions held about ‘eco-deviants’, ‘activists’, and ‘eco-terrorists’. Media representations of climate change are then examined, with a critical discussion of how the fear elicited by some of them may contribute to avoidance and a form of denial. The final part of the chapter discusses perceptions of different levels of regulation of climate change.

The Development of Individual Ecological Civilizing Processes?

Before commencing these interviews, I wanted to explore the possible development of ecological civilizing processes within a person’s life. By this I mean the idea that, from early childhood onwards, they gradually developed and experienced changes that can be associated with long-term civilizing processes. I expected that these developments would be more pronounced amongst participants from the ‘activist’ group.

Many of the ‘activists’ grew up in rural areas. Those who grew up in cities, would holiday in rural areas. However, this may be typical of people in general, and was certainly the case for many of the ‘non-activists’.

Some of the interviewees spoke of how they enjoyed ‘nature’ when they were children, but at the time were not consciously aware of ‘nature’, per se:

…my associations with nature when I was a child would be very much one of like, of holidays, enjoyment, relaxing time basically. I used to love playing in streams when I was a kid. Apparently most kids wanted to build dams, but my parents were like ‘You were the one person who was insistent on clearing streams’. I wanted the water to be able to flow easily.
So, yeah, I had an absolutely fantastic time... You know, I don’t think when I was a kid I was thinking ‘Wow, this is nature and I’m impressed by.’ I was just like, ‘wow, I’m on holiday, I’m having fun’... (Philip, activist, age 25).

From this quote, we can also see the associations of particular emotions with nature: enjoyment, relaxing. Another interviewee noted the contrast between the city and the countryside in terms of space and peacefulness (James, activist, age 23). And someone else spoke of the claustrophobic feeling induced by living in the city (compared to small towns near rural areas) (David, activist, age 26).

Alexander (activist, age 30), who grew up in a very rural area in Wales, described how he felt when he shifted to more urban areas:

...I would go home for sort of a month maybe over the summer. And so I was never completely removed. But yeah...I’ve found living in [a bigger city] the biggest sort of shock to the system in terms of, you know, you can’t even see nature on the horizon. It seems...you have to plan...to be able to go to the nature, which I didn’t think would have much of an effect on me but I think it has had some effect in terms of my general wellbeing. (Alexander, activist, age 30)

In Alexander’s extract, and the earlier extracts, there is a clear dichotomy established between ‘nature’ and the city. This supports the arguments made in Chapter 5, in the analysis of manners books, about ‘nature’ being constructed as an escape from the city, and as healthier for you than the city.

Another participant, who lived in Sri Lanka until she was 12, noted how ‘nature’ was ‘just there’, but she never consciously thought about it:

...there were lots of areas of Sri Lanka that were fairly wild...there was fantastic birdlife there. And down in the low country, yes, there was a
couple of nature reserves. We used to go to the game reserves...we used to
 go several times to see the wildlife...It was just something that was there. I
 would never have thought about it at the time. (Heather, activist, age 58)

She added that now, when she thinks about it, she feels appalled at what the
British did to Sri Lanka:

With the benefit of hindsight, I feel appalled at what we did, because we
were, sort of, the Brits who came and colonized Sri Lanka. The Brits had
gone to Ceylon in the 1860s or so. They first of all grubbed up all the
forest. Masses of wonderful tropical rainforest that must have covered the
island...wonderful biodiversity had been trashed into monocultures...of
tea which were just covered in chemicals. I didn't realize at the time.
(Heather, activist, age 58)

There are several things we can explore in these extracts. Firstly, there is the
disgust expressed towards what was done in Sri Lanka, with terms such as
'grubbed up' and 'trashed'. Secondly, these extracts suggest how, as one gets
older, one develops a greater sense of awareness, and a greater identification
with other humans, animals, other life, and the 'environment' as a whole
(paralleling those developments in relation to littering from Chapter 5). For
example, how children's conceptions of death and dying, and of suffering to
animals, changes and develops as they age. However, the above extract may also
be reflective of more general, broader trends in long-term ecological civilizing
processes. As the same interviewee observed, environmentalism was not really
an issue in her time, not until about the 1970s or so (by which time she had long
since left Sri Lanka and was at university in England).

Compared with the activists, the non-activists experienced a lot of similar
developments in their childhood. Sam, who spend the first 7 years of his life in a
built up area and then moved to a more rural, coastal small town, spoke of how he came to appreciate ‘nature’ and ‘the environment’, even though it was not cool at the time:

…it was quite an important transition for me. It came at 7 years old. I moved schools as well. And I moved from one world into another one; completely different set of rules at school; completely different environment. I became much more aware of, inverted commas, ‘the countryside’, and of living in a rural environment. And I remember writing poems as a 7 year old about the rolling hills, and the, the trees and things like that. And yeah, and I think, I mean my nickname was – this is a denigrating term from some of my friends as I was growing up – was ‘nature boy’, because I was so into the surrounding countryside and, you know, liked going for walks and things like that at a time when it wasn’t particularly cool to be doing that sort of thing. (Sam, non-activist, age 39)

In the above quote, we can see how Sam went through a process of a growing aestheticization of nature – ‘writing poems...about the rolling hills’ – which then developed into a growing concern for nature. As with some of the extracts quoted earlier, there is also a strongly perceived contrast between the more urban and the more rural, where they’re regarded as completely different environments, with completely different rules. Sam went on to recall how, when he was about 12, his geography teacher, who was an environmentalist, taught his class about pollution, and gave them a textbook called ‘What on earth are we doing?’

[This] was the first time I had ever come across, you know, a, a coherent text about the environment. And this was also at a time when I was, you know, me and my Dad, we used to watch David Attenborough ...documentaries about the natural world and the living planet and all those kind of things. And, always, at the end of that, he’d have a thing
about 'but you know these orangutans, there's only 25 of them left in this region now', you know. And it, I was becoming more and more aware, more and more concerned, and genuinely quite anxious about it. (Sam, non-activist, age 39)

Here, Sam makes an association between becoming increasingly aware about environmental issues, and a change in emotions towards them, and towards other animals – the development of concern and anxiety about the plight of the orangutans. Sam's narrative, of increasing aestheticization followed by increasing emotional attachment and identification, corresponds with the long-term ecological civilizing processes as explored in Chapter 5; for example, in changes in understandings about littering.

As an additional illustrative example (albeit somewhat anecdotal, and not strictly part of this research) of this individual ecological civilizing process, one of my friends on Facebook recently posted the following status update about his daughter, illustrating the different identification with animals and threshold of disgust a preschooler has compared with an adult parent:

[She] saw a duck getting run over by an SUV this morning. It was unbelievably gory, and up close. Fearing emotional trauma, I turned to hug her – preparing a consoling explanation about nature and mortality. However, 'That duck is DEAD!' she giggled. Then ran down the hill to her day-care, excited to tell everyone the news. I, on the other hand, am still somewhat shaken. (2012, March 28, personal communication that the author has permitted me to cite)

These extracts demonstrate a growing concern about other animals, a widening of the scope of identification throughout a person's life, and a growing attachment with animals and with the biosphere as a whole.
Similarly, Duncan (non-activist, age 38) reflected on how he would have felt about things when he was a teenager compared with how he feels about things now:

And so you hear about [the] BP oil spill and you just, you know, you do look at it and you go ‘Greedy bastards’...and you do have an immediate reaction to it. Whereas I think when you’re a teenager, you go ‘oh, what’s the harm in that? Can’t they just clean it up?’, and you don’t realize sort of like the level of destruction that is being caused in the name of greed really. (Duncan, non-activist, age 38)

This quote suggests a growing reflexive awareness of the impact that different actions have on the biosphere, and of the growing emotional concern that comes with age. Or, perhaps, the interviewee is merely cynical about teenagers. Additionally, the language that is used in this extract depicts a sense of disgust towards corporations like BP, with the use of words like ‘greedy bastards’ and ‘destruction’.

**Ecological Civilizing Offensives**

Along with these apparent individual ecological civilizing processes, there is also evidence in the interviews to suggest the impact of ecological civilizing offensives. Several participants – both activists and non-activists – noted how their behaviour had changed as they came to learn more and more about climate change. I asked a specific question about this, but interestingly many participants volunteered this information unprompted, long before I asked the question. And the non-activists in particular often focused on one or two individual things they did which, it was implied, made them a ‘good’ person. Conversely, activists tended to mention a variety of changes they had made, and usually only did so when prompted:
Yeah, it’s influenced my behaviour. I mean, you know, I’ve, for some reason, I don’t know why, I care about the world. And so, you know, that’s part of that kind of – that’s naturally how I am, from however I was brought up or whatever. And so, you know, I can see a problem like climate change, I can see what my behaviour does, what my tiny stake in it is. And so, I’ve become vegetarian, for instance, for climate change reasons. I still fly too much, I mean, I fly...when there isn't another alternative, which means I end up doing long-haul flights and not short-haul flights...So, yeah, it influences where I shop...[I]t’s a real pain to have to think about all the environmental consequences of whatever everyone does, every purchase you make, but I do try to as much as I can. I’ll have a vege box delivered, which is local vege, and organic vege, which is, you know, I recognise it’s quite a luxury, most people probably, I mean I can’t really afford it, but I do it simply because I need to, because I think it’s important. And I try not to shop at supermarkets, but you know I still do, and if I do I’ll check the labels, I’ll pester my fiancé not to buy wine from Argentina when there’s perfectly good wine you can get from France. (Alexander, activist, age 30)

In this extract, the ‘activist’ is implying that becoming concerned about the environment was not a personal choice for him; he is just ‘naturally’ like that. He also implies how living a ‘good’ life regarding climate change means a constant self-monitoring, constantly thinking about how the decisions you make affect the environment. He then reiterates his conviction, his ‘need’ to do these things because he thinks they are important – once again, a reaffirmation of his sense of duty and responsibility.

Another activist provided an account of how climate change initially led to him changing his individual behaviour, and then eventually participating in direct action:
I would say that the first starting point I had was individual action. So, I no longer fly. The last time I flew was 2005? Yes. And that was very much a decision taken on the basis of that...You know, things like I have absolutely shoddy insulation in my house – I've attempted to address that, **I had to pay for it myself because my landlord wouldn't**...But, you know, obviously, as it's become a more significant issue, I think that may have contributed to **this need that I felt to address the routes that I took**. So if I was already taking the individual action and some of the sort of formal petition, online petition, letter writing actions, I think the fact that I was becoming more involved in, or talking more about, climate change with friends who are really involved in campaigning, that led to the behavioural change of me then getting involved in, in more direct action as well. (Philip, activist, age 25).

The decision for Philip to include in his narrative the point that he had to pay for his insulation himself as his landlord would not pay, is telling. The choice of the phrase ‘I had to pay’, rather than simply ‘I paid’, suggests a certain amount of resentment towards the landlord. Perhaps this expresses a more general frustration that Philip has with people whom he believes are not doing enough action to combat climate change. He also expresses the sense of duty as well, ‘this need that I felt to address...’ The journey from changing one's own behaviour to seeking to change other people's behaviour was also articulated by George:

I suppose...one of the first things was reducing the amount of things you use, so: reducing the amount of waste you produce, how much you consume, becoming a vegetarian, cycling a lot more. I bought a motorbike, but I don't use that, so I mean I cycle everywhere. I got rid of my car first, and I bought a motorbike, which I used for about a year or so. And I just switched, I just made the switch to my bicycle full time and only using
public transport. So that was the first thing that I did, probably, was changing myself personally and then joining [two environmental organisations]...So we'd have campaigns and try and change the university, change people's mentalities, run specific campaigns based around environmental issues and climate change. (George, activist, age 23)

With the long list of behavioural changes that some people described, one wonders to what extent there is a status competition between ‘activists’, where some look down on others because, for example, they fly or they drive. This may not be the case, or may not be particularly prevalent; it was difficult to determine how and to what extent this occurred from the interviews I carried out. But certainly, as a ‘non-activist’ myself, I was self-conscious about my own lifestyle when interviewing ‘activists’ especially, particularly when they discussed the changes and sacrifices they had made:

I have committed not to fly and no longer own a car. I probably generate more electricity than I use. I am politically active. I helped to start a local sustainability group where I live. I drafted a story which is now published about climate change. This focused on the attitudes and the ways of being that are needed to act on climate change, rather than the problem itself. (Richard, activist, age 38)

Some activists, however, found that this change in lifestyle was not fully sustainable, particularly in the face of disappointments in climate change campaigning:

I was getting to a point where I was pretty hardcore in terms of like only buying raw wholefood ingredients...cooking from scratch everything you know. Avoiding packaging, shopping like in...independent shops you know sort of everything living really simply, not using heating, hardly ever using hot water you know...and then I suppose...I kind of had a bit of a
in...the sort of post-Copenhagen depression, just lapsed into sort of...general, you know, just shopping and doing...I’m still vegan I haven’t like lapsed into like McDonalds...but I’m much less fussy at the moment about like where I buy stuff from, where it comes from...I’m more interested in how...I’m interacting with people (David, activist, age 26)

In this account, there is a shift in focus from changing his behaviour, towards changing how other people see things. Was there also a sense of pride in (temporarily) living a ‘hardcore’ ‘simple’ life?

As all of these extracts from interviews with activists suggest, compared with the non-activists accounts mentioned earlier, there were significant differences in the narratives of activists versus non-activists. This can tell us something about how some people come to be involved in climate change ‘activism’ and how others, who are also concerned about climate change, do not.

**Involvement and Non-Involvement in ‘Activism’**

All of the ‘activists’ I interviewed recalled events or people that were extremely influential on developing their interest and action towards the environment and/or climate change (conversely, only one of the ‘non-activists’ recalled such an event/person). For example, Alexander (activist, age 30) received no explicit environmental education at primary or secondary school, but he did have a particular teacher who was a notable influence on him, along with events reported on in the media at the time:

My geography teacher was quite influential on me I think. And he...made us aware of the consequences of human action on the environment. And also...it was hard to ignore at the time, I mean, in the 90s there were things like the Rio Summit...it was probably the first time it came into my consciousness about there being a wider world than just
At this age, however, many activists were not yet actively involved in environmental organizations. For Alexander, he thought this was for two reasons. First, where he lived: ‘You know, small towns with two thousand people, and there just weren’t those sorts of organizations, or if there were I wasn’t made aware of them.’ There was the additional factor of it not being popular at the time – it was still on the fringes: ‘I don’t think at that time I would have been motivated to do any sort of activism or join anything like that, because it would have been seen to be a bit nerdy back at that time’ (Alexander, activist, age 30). Similarly, in an extract quoted earlier in this chapter, Sam, a non-activist, noted how he was given a derogatory nickname as a child due to his interest in doing things in the countryside ‘at a time when it wasn’t particularly cool to be doing that sort of thing’. (Sam, non-activist, age 39)

Other activists spoke of the influence that their parents indirectly had on their involvement in climate change. For example, Philip (activist, age 25) went on a protest with his parents when he was a child, something which he claims initially dissuaded him from direct action due to the riot that ensued during that protest. Throughout his life, though, he developed a growing interest in democracy and politics, and at university he then joined the green society, learnt more about climate change. As he came to be increasingly involved in climate change, however, he came to the conclusion that individual action and more routine methods of action, such as letter writing and signing petitions, was not enough and had to be combined with ‘direct action’, which he then became involved in.

Just as Philip's parents' belief system influenced his path to climate change activism, so too did James’. James (activist, age 23) noted how his parents are Quakers, and argued that their belief system included a strong emphasis on
looking after the environment. Similar to Philip, James also joined the green society at university, where he became involved in campaigns.

With some activists, their lifestyles were already compatible with those of a ‘climate change activist’ before they were even consciously concerned with the environment:

It’s only the past four years, since I came to university, that I’ve really been involved in or interested in environmental issues. I think before that I was never, never a person for wasting. I didn’t like the idea of it, and I mean I used to cycle to school or walk to school for the past, well for my past four or five years when I was at school. I had a car but I wasn’t, I didn’t use it mass, massively. But it wasn’t really something I was really that concerned or aware of. (George, activist, age 23)

While George could not identify any childhood experiences that had influenced his involvement in activism, his reflection that ‘before that I was never a person for wasting’ suggests that he has a deeply entrenched behavioural standard about waste, which may (or may not) have come from his childhood, possibly his parents. He was not consciously aware of or concerned about environmental issues until he started university, but claims he was always interested in politics. And through reading more information about climate change in newspapers, and talking to various people about it, he became increasingly more interested in the environment and climate change. He joined the green society, and became increasingly more involved in climate change campaigns.

These accounts suggest that several of the people who become involved in ‘activism’ do so at university, when they are students. Other activists became involved in climate change after they had experienced something that caused them to feel a duty towards acting on the environment, and later climate change. For example, Alexander, introduced above, noted how, following his
education, when he was working, he came to the realization that he did not want to be contributing to damage, and this subsequently led to his involvement in environmental education and charities and organizations:

I used to go out every Monday to a field outside [a country town]...to set out a road...for a new housing estate to be built on this lovely wheat green field site. So, it does sort of, while you’re doing that, getting covered in rain...and you realize it’s not really what you want to do; I don’t want to be part, I don’t really want to be a cog in the machine creating this damage – I wanted to be turning it the other way. (Alexander, activist, age 30)

Two other activists observed how going to different places, and witnessing the effects of climate change or the result of conservation, stimulated their involvement in environmental organizations. The first of the two, Richard (activist, age 38), became increasingly involved in climate change following his visit to a country where he witnessed the effects of climate change: ‘I previously spent time working overseas and there I became aware of the impacts of climate change. When I returned I wanted to take up a different job.’ This ‘different job’ turned out to be in the area of sustainability. Upon returning from his trip, he felt a sense of duty towards climate change. In a similar vein, Heather (activist, age 58) noted the influence of going to America and seeing their national parks:

I don’t think the environment was something people even thought about. It was just there in those days...it really wasn’t an issue, until the ‘70s. I don’t think at any of my time at university I gave the environment one single backward thought. But I went to America in 1977, and I went to America again in 1978. And I went to Yosemite in California in 1977 and I was completely blown away. I think it was the effect of seeing the American National Parks that...just made me think ‘This is absolutely phenomenal. And really, really important and really special, and the environment is desperately precious.’ And I think possibly without going
to America those two times, I would probably...not have had the same interest. And...I was very, very naughty, and, I hope this is going to be anonymous. When I was in America, a long, long time ago, I nicked a book about the environment out of a shop. And I was so guilty; I said ‘I’m going to be an environmentalist all my life because I feel so guilty about nicking this book out of a shop’... It was about 1977 or so. I thought, ‘What if I nick this book?’...I thought, ‘Yes, I’ll have to work to protect the environment to do penance for my theft.’

Again, we see a sense of duty towards, in this case, environmentalism. This is most explicit in Heather’s account about stealing the book about the environment.

As well as childhood and later experiences, and the influence of parents, childhood interests also played a part in the process of becoming increasingly involved in activism. For example, Jack (activist, age 63) talked about how he was always interested in plants and animals, and enjoyed identifying them. While he had always been interested in wildlife, it was not until he took a course on ecology that his interest in pollution and other environmental issues developed, and he then joined an environmental organization and became involved in campaigns. This is similar to the long-term development of the natural sciences and climate change sciences, and the increasing political involvement of scientists as discussed in Chapter 5.

Additionally, many activists noted a history of trying to minimize waste and/or being careful with money. While not always being explicitly linked to the caring for the environment, it was often present since childhood and related to activists’ relationships with their parents.
Participants from the activist group also had a strong sense of duty towards the environment and other issues. As one participant stated, when discussing how he came to be in his current occupation:

I will not do a job that I don't believe does some good. If I can get to the end of my career and say, 'On balance it's fair to me, for me to say I've done more good than harm,' that will be a good career as far as I'm concerned. And this definitely contributed to that. (Philip, activist, age 25).

This sense of duty and responsibility was more specifically related to climate change by James (activist, age 23), when he stated:

I think we need to take very good care of our environment in all senses of the word...I sort of feel like it's part of our responsibility, as our generation, to actually bring...these issues into the mainstream and do as much as we responsibly can do, to mitigate any real detrimental climate change which could, you know, render some parts of the earth uninhabitable. (James, activist, age 23)

A noticeable difference between activists and non-activists was in how they answered questions during the interviews. Activists typically gave more certain answers to questions, whereas non-activists frequently expressed uncertainty and contradicted themselves. Due to the subject of the interview, and that it brings up questions about everyone’s beliefs and behaviour, sometimes in a highly moralized way (in some of the climate change media), the interviews themselves could have felt like an interrogation, a self-interrogation. Not only was I asking them questions, but also when participants themselves were then asking questions of themselves, questions which they may never or have rarely asked. This could have contributed to self-doubt and uncertainty, contributing to the dualism that was evident in some of the interview extracts. Conversely, climate change activists had a more established sense of self. Perhaps this is in
part because, to ‘become’ an activist, they had already interrogated themselves a
great deal with these and similar questions. Only after establishing a strong
sense of self in relation to these questions, could they then make the journey
towards activism. And even then, other people quite probably routinely
interrogate them during their ‘activist’ activities. Participants from the ‘activist’
group were therefore more practiced at forming a narrative where these
contradictions, these dualisms, were more reconciled than those in the
narratives of the non-activist participants.

It is worth comparing extracts from one of the activist interviews with those
from two non-activist interviews, where they are talking at the end about how
they felt the interview went. The first extract is from an interview with an
activist, and the second and third extracts are from interviews with non-
activists.

Well I mean I feel like, I feel like I’m relatively happy to talk about my
beliefs and this is, this is broadly something that allowed me to do that. I
think that it’s a really interesting subject. I was slightly hesitant that I’m,
you know, not a useful interviewee because I’ve not been über-involved in
climate change campaigns. But relative to the majority of the population I
probably have. But yeah I mean, they all made sense. They made me think.
I would say I broadly had the positions that I’ve described to you anyway,
but the questions made me sort of formulate then in a particular way. So
yeah, challenging, challenging in that formulation, rather than necessarily
challenging in terms of questioning my beliefs. (Philip, activist, age 25)

[Participant:] Really, really uncomfortable doing it
[Interviewer:] Yeah?
[Participant:] Really uncomfortable, ‘cause it’s very personal, and you feel
like it’s a test, you can’t help but feel like it’s a test (Sam, non-activist, age
39).
...it is an interesting exercise, having to articulate your thoughts on a subject like this – it makes you realise, you know, realise that you do hold opinions that you never thought you did hold; you realise the gaps in knowledge; you realise the...I mean, it would be interesting to know if you do talk to anyone who has a very clear opinion. Maybe I have a clear opinion and I don't realise; I feel I'm very muddled in my thinking – I wonder if everyone feels that they're muddled, whereas some people are like ‘no, this is it, this is what I think, I've got a very clear opinion’, that would be very interesting. (Tracy, non-activist, age 27)

The third extract relates to dualism and the internal dialogue, which will be discussed in a later section of this chapter.

**Time and Space**

Along with the above events, processes and people that activists spoke of, another notable difference between activists and non-activists was the availability of time. Of all the activists I interviewed, three were students, two were retired or did not need to be in paid employment, and the remaining three were employed in areas related to climate change, sustainability and/or democracy and politics. For these participants, then, they either had time available to spend on climate change activism, or it was already effectively part of their jobs.

Conversely, non-activists spoke of how their life constrained their ability to do such things:

I try and recycle as much as possible, within the kind of confines of, of a very...hectic life. (Steven, non-activist, age 34).
...when you work a 40 hour week, and you sort of, you know, your time is precious, I don't think it's up, I don't think it's up to us to do it. I think it’s up to us to play our part, yeah, but not necessarily to out and out sort of do it ourselves. I think that it should be governments. (Duncan, non-activist, age 38)

I don't see it so much as their failings as mine, that I'm not involved in these groups...I find it's so difficult to get involved in anything outside of work because I have a demanding job and also...my personal life is quite demanding and I find it very difficult. So I’m always completely full of admiration of people who are able to champion these kinds of causes and they have that conviction that’s required. I mean, I am full of good intentions, but don’t seem to have the actions to follow them up. Maybe if there were ways, discrete ways, to face down some of these impossibly big tasks, then yeah. I mean, ultimately I think that it's always tempered by the idea that these things are massive and that, you know, the processes that are involved in them are so complex... (Sam, non activist, age 39)

In this last quote, we also see the perception that climate change is too big of a problem and too complex, and so the desire is for easy, little things one can do to help. Perhaps this is one reason why we have witnessed the proliferation of carbon calculators, ‘green guides’, eco-makeover reality TV shows, and so on that focus on small individual changes – seemingly quick and easy fixes to a complex problem.

To overcome this lack of time, one non-activist suggested the following:

Maybe invent a holiday where, you know, people are taking one day to just claim, you know. I know that at some point everyone, you know, there’s a day where everyone switches their lights off and think about the earth, in [North America] we have that sometimes. But these should be happening,
you know, once a month or something. You know, we have a certain holiday once a month, so why not having one green day, you know, having one green day a month could actually do a lot of changes. You know, it could be a day where everyone, you know, can be off or doing work and get paid double time, so you know, the ones who don’t work are actually working on picking up garbage or, you know, saving electricity or something. (Adrianna, non-activist, age 28)

Here, as with the previous extracts, there is the expressed desire for other people to impose external restraints on people, implying that self-initiated individual action is unlikely to occur unless it is imposed ‘from above’. And while activists expressed the need for governmental and other regulations, they felt that individual action was extremely important (hence many of their involvement in campaigns to encourage this in others).

However, all of these factors discussed thus far do not completely explain participants’ lack of involvement in climate change activism. Some of the non-activists I interviewed participated in protests and campaigns about other issues, just not climate change. Several factors may have influenced this: the amount of time they participate in other issues; their perception about the scope and solvability of climate change; their prioritizing of other issues; their perceptions about climate change activists and activism.

**Climate Change Versus Other Issues**

One non-activist who was involved in anti-war protests said the following about the wars compared with climate change:

…the funny thing is I feel so strongly about the wars that we dragged ourselves into unnecessarily…I do feel strongly about that, and I don’t think the environment stirs up – I do believe that there needs to be
attention paid and there needs to be things done about environmental issues. But I suppose you see a direct action taken – going to war is something so direct, something you know we have – there's cause and effect...you can't debate much about this war – you either believe it should've happened or not, these two wars. And so I think that disturbs me more...and you can actually get a response from that, you can get a sort of like, you know, that has a clear goal at the end: I would like you to stop invading these countries. Whereas if you marched on environmental issues...you get a whole long list of bullshit of what they might be doing, and you're kind of like ‘is that enough for me? I don't know’...Whereas with the war, you could actually say, well there was a definite goal that I'm trying to achieve here. You can't expect them to reverse years of, you know, decades – you'll tell me more than decades – centuries of damage to the ozone layer. You can’t sort of ‘oh, we’ll fix that’, but they could fix a war; they could actually stop invading countries. Whereas they can make efforts to, to do better things for the environment. Whereas, but you can't actually say, ‘right, we will do this and fix the environment’. It’s not something that’s immediately fixable, if that all makes sense. (Duncan, non-activist, age 38)

Here we see the belief that not only are some issues felt to be more important than climate change (in the above case, the Afghanistan and Iraq wars), but also that some issues are seen to be simpler, more straight-forward and clearer to potentially ‘solve’. Similarly, another non-activist described the various activities she was involved in with Amnesty International, explaining that those issues somehow seemed more immediate than climate change.

Control

Related to this point of competing social problems, many non-activists invoked a feeling of a lack of control about the environment, a sense that their individual
actions did not matter, and that the problem was too big and beyond their control.

...I don't know exactly what to do about this; **I don't feel like I have any control** as to which trees [the] paper company's going to cut. (Adrianna, non-activist, age 28)

I don't think anyone can say that they sort of don't care about the environment. But **I don't think I do very much about caring for the environment**. I guess I feel I find it hard to get motivated about it, and I find it hard to get interested in campaigning...**climate change is a broad issue**, is maybe **too broad** an issue for me to get passionate about...I maybe would volunteer if it was like cleaning up my neighbourhood... (Tracy, non-activist, age 27).

I've always felt quite **helpless** about it. I've felt that these problems were so huge – and **this is a really good cop-out of course** – but that there was just completely **beyond my control**...I just can't see anything at the local level being that effective. I mean, I recycle, I do things, I buy biodegradable washing up liquid and things like that. But I think it's pretty ineffective... (Sam, non-activist, age 39)

This feeling of a lack of control, that their actions at a local level have no impact, may partly explain the sense of futility about climate change activism, and the focus instead on forms of activism that they believe they can have an impact on (for example, one of the 'non-activists' is involved with Amnesty International and writes letters to a prisoner on death row). This differed to the activists, who had a strong sense of duty and responsibility to taking whatever action they could to address climate change. Without this conviction that they could potentially make a difference, however small, the whole purpose of activism would seem futile (aside from the social side of it).
As reflected in the above quotes, many of the non-activists demonstrated a self-reflexive awareness of coming up with excuses for why they did and did not do certain things. This was most evident with interviewees who talked most openly about what they thought were the reasons for why they did and did not do certain things, what those things were, and how they felt about them. However, one participant did avoid discussing such things – they sometimes avoided talking about themselves by deflecting answers to questions onto their family, discussing instead what their mother, brother, sister, etc. did or said or believed. This may have been a more general characteristic of the person, or it may have been that the topic of climate change contributed to a desire to deflect answers.

**Romanticizing the Past: ‘Nature’ and Childhood**

Towards the beginning of the interviews, I asked questions that aimed to explore participants’ childhood and their experiences and developments from then to now. Unexpectedly, there appeared to be a romanticization of their early childhood memories of ‘nature’, where childhood and nature both came to be romanticized, as part of a broader romanticization of the past. This is perhaps not surprising, given that in the moral panic literature itself, there is reference to a frequent looking back to a ‘golden age’ past. This was also present in the discourse of the ‘green guides’ (see Chapter 5). More broadly, both childhood and ‘nature’ have recently been constructed as innocent and pure; ‘artificial’ and adulthood represent corruptions of the innocent and the pure past.

This romanticization of the past also occurred when participants moved countries. Some participants who were from other countries contrasted the ‘dirt’ of London with memories of their hometown, but then reflected on how when they returned to their hometown, that also seemed more ‘polluted’:
I went to visit the woods [in London], I find it extremely polluted, there’s plastics everywhere, there’s not a spot where you can’t find one piece of garbage lying around, whether we’re talking about a cigarette butt or a plastic bag. I’ve found the city very dirty in comparison to where I lived. Things are used up. I mean, it could be, you know, comparatively obviously London is a lot older than many, all the cities in [North America]. But, I found generally that things were less well maintained. You know, people would be proud of their backyards and their gardens and things like that. But as far as maintaining solid patches of wood where people actually go camping, in terms of actually just being, going out in the forest, I don’t think this is very available, unless you travel for a long period of time…I found that the beaches are different as well, and most of them are rocky and unmaintained, comparatively with [North America], where the beaches are sandy and people actually do maintain – there’s no garbage lying around. I found many of the buildings are weathered down. The temperature is, the climate is definitely different I would think, it’s very cloudy, lots of rain, and the temperature changes during the day – it’s unpredictable. (Adrianna, non-activist, age 28)

And speaking about her own hometown:

I saw the changes in how things look like, you know, things seem to be more clean 20 years ago, unless it was me not paying attention to garbage around when I was a child or something…what used to be forest is actually now either a clear cut or it’s a wall of…a few meters…and then behind it again is another clear cut or something burned…so it’s very saddening. So I…have the impression when I go back there that…I’ve lost something that I was just kind of taking for granted at that point. (Adrianna, non-activist, age 28)
Here, there is a sense that the participant holds nostalgic feelings towards her hometown in the past. And just as there might exist a general perception that when childhood ends, we have lost that ‘childhood innocence’, so too her hometown has ‘lost something’.

The participant does add the proviso, ‘unless it was me not paying attention...when I was a child’. This further suggests a reflexiveness about the unreliability of memory and the possibility that she is romanticizing the past – her experience of ‘nature’ during her childhood. The idealization of the past could contribute to memory recall focusing on those aspects that were more seen to be ‘better’, as well as exaggerating them.

**Guilt**

Many non-activists frequently spoke of the guilt they felt about feeling like they were not doing enough for the environment and climate change, and how this was tied into caring about the environment:

> I was donating to the Australian Wilderness Society, and I think I was also donating to Friends of the Earth...I’d do it for 6 months...and then I’d cancel the direct debits, and then I’d feel really guilty, and then I’d forget about it. (Tracy, non-activist, age 27)

> The biggest change, funnily enough, is guilt. It’s actually feeling that you should...So actually being aware and caring and feeling guilty about not doing enough...I don’t know, everyone feels bad at what they do and don’t [do]. (Duncan, non-activist, age 38)

Conversely, any guilt felt by activists was not apparent in the interviews.
The guilt expressed by non-activists could also be inferred when they discussed things they did or might do which they thought were perhaps not right. Sam (non-activist, age 39), when discussing the greening of corporations and hyper-consumption, noted the following: ‘But, you know, the fact that I’m probably going to be queuing up for an iPad, even though I don’t particularly want one, it’s really worrying; I’m completely duped by it.’ This also related to the earlier point about non-activists feeling helpless, feeling like they cannot do anything, feeling like it is beyond their control.

In this sense, non-activists tended to be more self-deprecating than activists, they were conscious that they wanted to do one thing, but were actually doing another. This played out in the form of an internal dialogue.

**Dualism and the Internal Dialogue**

Dualistic thinking was common in both activists and non-activists. By this I mean that there was conflict within the self (dualistic is perhaps not the most appropriate term, as it implies only two conflicting things). Some of this played out in non-activists reflections as consisting of a dualism between a life instinct and a death instinct; that is, attempts to remedy environmental problems versus unconscious destructiveness that contributes to these problems (Rustin, 2013). However, in their reflections non-activists seemed relatively aware of some of these, they were more *consciously* reflexive about them:

Maybe I sort of like...have the idea of, like, even though I don’t want to admit it, maybe I do have this idea of like ‘oh well, the environment’s fucked anyway, we’re all fucked, what’s the point’. I don’t know. Maybe I do think that. I don’t really want to admit that, because it makes me sound like an idiot, but maybe I do think that...I think that’s just kind of a lazy cynicism from me, rather than a, a very mature response. (Tracy, non-activist, age 27)
Sometimes I think, well maybe we are not as significant as we think we are. And at other times, I think the damage we’ve done is incalculable, immeasurable...I actually don’t know – I’m in two minds. (Tracy, non-activist, age 27)

...I’ll be feeling like buying some recycled toilet paper, but another day, you know, I’ll buy a pair of shoes...although I don’t really need an extra pair of shoes...It’s a bit like a within self-fight when it comes to climate change. (Adrianna, non-activist, age 28)

...so, yeah, I haven’t answered your question completely, but I mean the, I’ve given you a sense of how I feel about it and how conflicted I feel about it and I think that’s probably my answer in a nutshell. (Sam, non-activist, age 39)

Here we also see an element of ambivalence, of conflicted thoughts. This was most evident with non-activists, and may also partly relate to their non-involvement in climate change activism – for issues where they do partake in activism, they appear to hold stronger, certain, set beliefs (for example, Duncan, who participated in anti-war protests).

**Us and Them, We and I: Perceptions about ‘Eco-Deviants’ and ‘Eco-Deviance’**

There was a general perception amongst the participants from the activist group that people were placing too much priority on material things, over the environment:

...not only do I find the fact that they are doing something that causes the environment harm frustrating, I find it more broadly frustrating that, that
people don’t prioritise other more important, what I consider to be more important issues than material consumption. So you know, like flying on holiday, well great, you have a good time but what about the consequences? ...I’ve got a friend who wrote a really interesting dissertation on how consumer society detaches people from the impacts of their behaviour. And I think that’s probably really, really, really important. When you buy something in a shop you don’t think, ‘How was this made?’ most people don’t think, ‘How was this made?’ When you buy a flight you don’t, one tends not to think, ‘What’s the impact of this flight, other than me getting to go on holiday?’ you know...But I think the difficult thing from my perspective is, I hope I do it reasonably well, is managing that frustration so that it doesn’t manifest itself when I engage with people, because that’s not going to help. (Philip, activist, age 25)

Here, we see how Philip, and presumably other activists, has to actively work to manage his emotions and involvement when campaigning for climate change.

There was also the perception that not enough people were changing their behaviour enough, things had improved but they were not improving at a fast enough rate:

I feel that there’s far too much waste and...over-use of things at the moment in the environment, in the world. I think, I mean I'd single out, you know, England and America...and a few of the other big Western powers, as the, the main causes and main culprits in, in global warming and climate change in terms of carbon emissions. I think...it's becoming more of a social thing as opposed to, it's becoming more of like a way of life for people. So getting people to change their...behaviours and change the whole culture as opposed to having a few extremists...who advocate the importance of climate change as it was in the past. It's...much more of
a common thing to talk about and have an interest in these days. But even so it’s still nowhere near as much as it should be. (George, activist, age 23)

This extract highlights the perception that environmentalism is becoming increasingly more mainstream, and less likely to be seen as ‘extreme’ despite the invention of such terms as ‘eco-terrorism’.

Many of the non-activists, when discussing how they felt about people who are seen to be the worst ‘eco-deviants’, who are perceived to be doing little or nothing to try to address climate change, identified themselves as being part of the problem. In that sense, the ‘I’ becomes one of ‘them’, and so ‘them’ becomes ‘us’.

I think there’s a growing tendency for me to feel compelled to think of them as greedy and selfish. And it’s hard to resist that tendency, I got to say, even though I’m probably one of them, to a degree, as well. (Sam, non-activist, age 39).

I mean I, like a lot of people, kind of use the car to just drive round the corner to the shops, ‘cause I don’t want to carry my shopping home ‘cause I’m lazy. But that’s pretty disgusting behaviour. (Tracy, non-activist, age 27)

...like if I see some kid, you know, eating cheeseburgers and then chucking the wrapper out the window or, you know, if you see on America, on televisions, a big fat American driving an SUV, you think ‘oh, how tasteless’, or ‘how inconsiderate’ or ‘how environmentally unaware’. But I’m not, I’m actually no better, it’s just that I – it’s just like a class value, you know, that’s more like a, it doesn’t hold up, it’s hypocritical. Maybe there’d be people who would think that my {inaudible] fly, or the car I drive, is really disgusting. What I mean is I can’t really, I can’t really
muster up as much anger about those sorts of people because I sort of am one to an extent. (Tracy, non-activist, age 27)

In these extracts, there is disgust expressed at both ‘them’ and themselves, and shame and guilt directed towards themselves. In this last extract, there is a telling sign that the identification of the ‘self’ with the ‘they’ makes it increasingly more difficult to be angry and, thereby, to partake in activism, directed towards ‘them’ as ‘we’ are seen to be all a part of the ‘they’.

This blame was directed towards not just the self and the stereotypical ‘eco-deviant’ – blame was much more widespread than that. For example, it was observed by one non-activist that even eco-celebrities, such as Sting, are criticized for how their behaviour contributes to climate change (Sam, non-activist, age 39). According to another non-activist, the only people who are not to blame, perhaps, are those living extremely low carbon lives in places like Africa (Tracy, non-activist, age 27).

However, when activists discussed this issue, they seemed less concerned about their role in climate change: ‘I am part of it, and I still have consumerist values…it’s hard to avoid them [laughs]’. (Alexander, activist, age 30). In this way, activists seemed more comfortable with themselves, and with their relationship with climate change – they had a more reconciled sense of self.

As compared with some other issues, with climate change there was no strong ‘minority of the worst’, no strong ‘folk devil’ to be blamed. Indeed, when asked who or what is responsible for causing climate change, most participants responded with the answer: everyone. This is perhaps an additional obstacle to involvement in climate change activism: there is no easily identifiable, easily marginalized group to target as folk devils, to direct blame, hatred and anger towards. However, there were a few things identified as constituting the ‘worst’ of ‘us’: capitalism, the extremely rich, and skeptics and ‘deniers’.
Several activists spoke of a problem with capitalism and increasing desires and how that had a negative relationship with wellbeing – as the quote below states, ‘it doesn’t make people happy’:

So there’s the population, there’s the finite resources, and there’s also the sort of **moral standpoint on**, like, the sort of highly capitalism, the capitalism, **the culture of capitalism**, where it’s **greedy** and, you know, **people aren’t actually necessarily happy with the pursuit of wealth** and that kind of thing; it doesn’t make people happy, so I think a **return to a more simple living** and that kind of thing would be better. (James, activist, age 23)

Here, there is a strong moralization of capitalism, with once again a romanticization of the past – with the call to ‘return to a more simple living’. However, not all activists were completely against capitalism, as Philip stated: I’m not innately anti-capitalist. I’m sceptical about the benefits of capitalism. (Phillip, activist, age 25).

Non-activists were equally critical of capitalism, where capitalism was seen to be controlling their behaviour, and controlling their desires:

I guess, you know, capitalism has got us into some of these situations where we can expect – you know, we have desires that we didn’t used to have, and we expect those desires to be met. And I guess maybe some of those...actions from companies as just replacements of unsustainable desires, rather than, yeah. (Tracy, non-activist, age 27)

I guess I feel...that perhaps climate change is the inevitable consequence of...like, capitalism or industrialized society or something. You know, you
can’t really kind of get very interested in like, you know, pointing the blame. Well, I don’t know. (Tracy, non-activist, age 27)

The above quote demonstrates how difficult it is to blame and direct regulation towards ‘capitalism’, yet another obstacle towards climate change activism. Yet capitalism and industrialization were identified as processes that inevitably contributed towards climate change.

And I’ve always seen it as a problem to do with...kind of industry, from about the age of 16 onwards, always saw it as a problem to do with capitalism. For me there was always a, particularly when I was about 16 – between 16 and 19, I became very, very sort of radical Marxist, hard-line Marxist, and for me it was just all about capitalist excess and this was kind of a classic example of how capitalism excess destroys not just the kind of foundations for life but foundations and life in the sense of, you know, human relationships, but life in a more general sense and the relationship between those two things. (Sam, non-activist, age 39)

Here, the often used term ‘capitalism excess’ has interesting parallels with other forms of previously identified forms of excess consumption – gambling, drinking alcohol, eating, smoking tobacco, all of which at times were targets of campaigns to limit the ‘excess’ of their consumption, to moderate them. These temperance themes were present in both the historical documents discussed in chapters 5 and 6, and in the interviews discussed here.

*The ‘Extremely Rich’*

Another group that were seen to be more to blame, by both activists and non-activists, were the rich:

...if you take for example the rich businessman or whatever, they might not care – same thing, they’re focused on something...Yeah, **that annoys**
me, and I can see why people become activists just because of that. **You live in the world, and so do other people, so you affect them, so if you try to minimise your effect on others**, that was, that’s my. But yeah, I don’t see why they shouldn’t do the simple things at least. (Katherine, non-activist, age 25)

Here, Katherine expresses her frustration towards those who she believes are not caring enough about others, about how their behaviour affects others – this shares some interesting parallels with how one’s consumption in general affects other people, for example, compared with the notion of ‘passive drinking’ and ‘passive smoking’.

I find rich people particularly annoying...But in general the rich tend to have higher carbon footprints when they tend to have bigger cars and bigger houses and more this and more that and so on. And a kind of show-off lifestyle is not good. A, kind of, having big stuff, ‘Just because I’m rich I can do it’. I find that deeply annoying. Very annoying. It’s, kind of, ‘Got to have a big car. Got to have a four-by-four because everyone else has a four-by-four’...It’s so un-environmentally sustainable. But, yes, I, I’m not happy with that kind of thing. But I do try to be tolerant and understanding. As well as getting cross very easily. (Heather, activist, age 58)

In this second quote, the anger expressed towards ‘rich people’ is even more evident. In this quote and others in this chapter, there are also hints towards a stereotypical image of the ‘worst of the worst’ – those with a ‘show-off lifestyle’, driving 4x4s, with big houses, big cars, and large carbon footprints. So while there is not a strong ‘minority of the worst’, a clearly identifiable folk devil, there is a notional idea of what traits, what stereotypes constitute the worst type of ‘eco-deviance’.

*The ‘Ignorant’*
While interviewees were frustrated with people who they believed were ignorant about climate change, and did not act due to that ignorance, there was a degree of tolerance and understanding towards them. Activists hoped that through their campaigning, they would help to overcome some of this ignorance:

I find it really, really frustrating and sometimes I want to get angry with people who I see driving Range Rovers around. But, if I actually sit back and look at it I think that there’s always a reasonable explanation for why people act the way they do...So yeah I find it really frustrating, I find it really aggravating when they do polls and people, still the majority of people are sceptical about climate change. And I think it is a lack of information, or I think it’s a lack of, I think those people tend to have not engaged with the subject particularly critically. I think, maybe this, maybe I’m willing to be proven wrong on this, but I think I take quite a sceptical view on why people are sceptical about climate change. I think that generally they have a life they like, or they have a life they think they like, or whatever, and they don’t like the idea that they have to stop doing something, or reducing something, or that sort of thing. (Philip, activist, age 25)

And the self-reflexive awareness discussed earlier was evident with the perception, held by some non-activists, that they too were partially ignorant and contributing to the problem at the same time as they felt disgust toward the actions of others and the ignorance of others:

I think there’s, there’s part of me that has probably bought into this idea – and this is the young, reflexive part – that people who ignore it completely, and kind of quite obstinately ignoring it, are selfish and are not thinking. See, again, you know I was talking to you earlier about how you have to have coherent sense of self and I’m not doing this. I’m not thinking about
how, see there you go I’m going to contradict myself, how they can do their bit. I’m buying that, and I’m probably one of them at the same time. I’m buying that idea, because it does tap into a genuine anxiety that I have; it’s probably not so much to do simply with climate change, but to do with capitalistic excess, which I find abhorrent. And this, you know, when you see just the scale of capitalist production in relation to agriculture and consumer durables. And the people who just seem so completely unaware of how those costs are met. There are no such things as cheap cars, or cheap mobile phones, or cheap clothes – someone always pays. And whether it’s the kind of sweatshop in Indonesia or whatever it is, there’s always someone who pays and, and so it’s kind of buried in with those kind of anxieties and feelings as well; that people who do this, not only are not sort of really aware of, they’re choosing to kind of put their heads in the sand about it. I’m buying that, probably at the same time as participating in it. But also it seems to be the same kind of people who are just kind of very individualistic, very self-centred, and not really sensitive.

(Sam, non-activist, age 39)

But at the end of this quote, there is still a ‘But’ that separates those ignorant people from the rest of ‘us’: ‘they’ are ‘just kind of very individualistic, very self-centred, and not really sensitive’, implying that ‘we’ are not. So these divisions do still exist, but they are not yet as strong as those divisions between other groups about other issues and identities.

‘Skeptics’ and ‘Deniers’

Both activists and non-activists were far less tolerant about climate change skeptics or deniers. Jack, an activist, was appalled and worried about climate change denial, comparing it to holocaust denial; climate change denial, he argued, was far more serious:
I think, you know, what’s very interesting and extremely worrying is the denial of it. Which I just think is, you know appalling basically. (Jack, activist, age 63)

The difficulty is, we’ve got a relatively small group of people, um, deniers who are quite deliberately misleading [inaudible] debate and aren’t take, you know, are convincing, sort of sewing doubt in the minds of quite a lot of the public. (Jack, activist, age 63)

And I think maybe we’ve got to start taking these people on. You know, we don’t, we don’t let holocaust deniers get away with it. So why will do we let the climate deniers get away with it, which is much more serious. So yeah, I think maybe we’ve actually got to sort of start taking these people on. (Jack, activist, age 63)

The seriousness of climate change skepticism was further elaborated on by James, also an activist, who argued that climate skeptics are ‘toying with people’s lives’:

…every time someone is climate skeptical, it pushes, it slows down the movement, as it were, towards, you know, mitigating the circumstances of climate change, because, you know, they’re counteracting whatever the Green movement is saying. So, I think it’s somewhat irresponsible of people to actually be climate skeptics...I think there’s a lot of people who just resent the idea of the Green movement in the first place, so, yeah. But I think it’s generally, it’s quite irresponsible of a lot of people to be climate skeptics, because it’s actually, you know, you’re actually toying with people’s lives in the end... (James, activist, age 23).
Tracy, a non-activist, also noted the parallels between holocaust denial and climate change denial, when asked about her choice of wording of ‘climate change deniers’:

I guess my thoughts on climate change deniers would depend on where I suspected their motivations to be...[And when asked about her choice of words: ‘deniers’] Well I guess I was thinking of it like, you know, like this awful idea of Holocaust deniers, and I feel that that is just a scary concept, ‘cause it just seems so weird that you could deny something that... Like I, I would be so suspicious of anyone’s motives for denying that the Holocaust happened – that creeps me out. But if somebody was to deny climate change I wouldn’t necessarily suspect they were acting with malice; I feel they might be acting on, you know, in a pragmatic way. Maybe Holocaust deniers – ooh God [shudders] – maybe they think that too; maybe they just think, ’Well I just haven’t seen evidence that there was a Holocaust’. I don’t know, but yeah I guess it was making that parallel at one time, which was kind of on purpose. (Tracy, non-activist, age 27)

In a recent publication, Michael Rustin discusses ‘denialist’ (in psychoanalytic terms) arguments, but also the morally outraged responses to them. He argues that the unconscious processes that influence the development of a personality structure that aims to subordinate nature to the control of humans further contributes to denialist arguments. However, he argues that the converse ‘environmentalist’ personality structure also sees this split between nature and humans, but places value on nature to the relative neglect of industrialization (the opposite of the denialist). These, he argues, are two opposite but similar paranoid-schizoid states. By this he means that they are both characterized by beliefs that certain things are either wholly good or wholly bad – they cannot entail aspects of both (Rustin, 2013). However, from the interviews carried out with both activists and non-activists, it appears that this paranoid-schizoid state was not prominent, and indeed interviewees displayed more of a dualistic
feeling about things, characteristic of more of a ‘depressive’\(^{45}\) (Rustin, 2013) state of mind, as reflected in the extracts above. This is further articulated in the quote below, where a non-activist discusses the campaigns of those who are arguing for versus those who are arguing against climate change:

And I think the tendency to downplay, or underestimate the significance of human activity, versus the tendency to overplay it on the side of those who are arguing the case for climate change, is greater. So by that I mean that the, the anti-climate change – they’re now called ‘climate change deniers’ which is interesting, because there’s kind of an implicit link to the holocaust deniers there and that’s, that’s not accidental. The climate change deniers probably have a greater tendency to manipulate evidence to suit their arguments, than the, the kind of pro-lobby. But that’s impressionistic. (Sam, non-activist, age 39)

This also relates to media representations of climate change, which will be discussed later in this chapter.

*The ‘Poor’*

Amongst those who were seen to be not acting enough to mitigate climate change, included those who were relatively poor. But they were considered to be justified in their lack of involvement, due to their need to focus on more immediate issues:

I care about [the environment], because we have the luxury of most of our life being comfortable enough that we can worry about more abstract issues. But a lot of people in the world don’t have that luxury, and a lot of people in Britain don’t have that luxury – they’re just worried about where they can get their next meal from, how they’re going to pay the bills, and,

\(^{45}\) Rustin describes this depressive way of thinking as being the opposite of paranoid-schizoid states, and is characterized by “enabling loved and hated attributes to be recognized as belonging to the same object.” (Rustin, 2013, p. 177)
you know, if they have to buy Tesco value to be able to afford a meal. And so, the environmental concern comes very low down. (Alexander, activist, age 30)

This also relates to long-term changes in control over natural (and social) processes, and how this relates to changes in experiences of and perceptions about ‘nature’ and the ‘environment’, as discussed in Chapter 5. On an individual level, only when people are relatively secure in their lives, establishing a great enough degree of control over the ‘triad of controls’, only then are they free enough to contemplate such issues as climate change, let alone participate in climate change activism.

Perceptions about Climate Change ‘Activists’ and ‘Activism’

As mentioned earlier, participants’ non-involvement in climate change activism may in part be related to their perceptions about ‘activists’ and ‘activism’. Some participants exhibited negative stereotypes of activism, believing that ‘those sorts of actions’ were unhelpful:

I have a problem with the environmental movement that’s all wishy-washy and they want us all to live in wigwams and dance around bushes naked and that kind of thing. I’m not into that kind of thing. [laughs] But I think there’s an element of that in the environmental movement, so they’ll dismiss things like nuclear power. (Steven, non-activist, age 34)

In this first extract, there’s almost a mockery of the environmental movement, characterizing it as some primitive culture that is not in touch with reality – dancing naked around bushes, dismissing nuclear power, and so on.

...my view of it is that, sometimes I see...some of the...activists as extreme. So I don’t think, like, chaining yourself to trees, or superglueing yourself to
power plants or whatever, that necessarily helps. I mean, you got to get your point across, but I think, I don’t think I’d ever go as far as that. But I think, I think it’s more, if it was related to me and, like, in part of my life, if that makes sense, I’d do something then. (Katherine, non-activist, age 25).

In the second extract, in addition to the stereotypical images of environmental extremism, we again see a sense that climate change activism does not relate directly to the lives of those who do not participate in climate change activism. There was also the perception that the actions of activists were futile:

I think that the goal [of activism] is good...But, so I see that – the extreme sides for them – and I see really how pointless their, like, their activities. Not, I shouldn’t say pointless, because it does make people aware of it, but I see from that side that the extreme side doesn’t really seem to get anywhere in my point of view, because the companies would do it anyway...I think, if you can do it in a way that is not violent or extreme, then I think it’s good because people need to be aware of it, and constantly reminded. But I think...because you see those extreme sides of it, and then people just think it’s rubbish. (Katherine, non-activist, age 25).

The ‘extreme’ stereotype of an environmental activist was held by some non-activists due to someone they knew or knew of who was an environmental activist. Some non-activists were aware that these relationships were influencing how they perceived activists, but they still held these perceptions:

...she used to be an activist about 4 or 5 years ago, and it comes into it, I guess there’s this big stereotype, because she had long hair that was dreadlocked, she had tatty clothes and it, anyway, followed that general stereotype. And, when talking to her, I didn’t actually see, it was just more for the, the social side of it more than, if anything she truly believed. And that’s probably just a, it’s just her point of view, whereas I’m sure other
people have true beliefs about it, but I think that kind of coloured my views of, I guess, the more active people. (Katherine, non-activist, age 25).

Related to the earlier point about time, one non-activist felt guilty or embarrassed to admit, but she felt like activists should be doing something else with their time:

...for some reason I do sort of seem to avoid...those sorts of groups perhaps. I guess I sometimes feel like I don't have time to be involved in those kinds of groups. And that maybe, yeah, maybe I think those groups are a bit...ineffectual? I guess, also, I do sometimes wonder when I see, you know, read in the news about the – was it the G20 protests? And these sorts of climate change, like, activists, the people that oppose – was it the group that oppose cheap flights, like the no plane kind of groups? I guess there's some part of me that kind of thinks 'where do they get the time?’ Like, why, you know, haven't they got other things they should be doing? I mean, I hate to say that, but I sort of do sometimes think that. And then I sometimes think, 'oh well I guess they, you know, they, they enjoy those sorts of activities and they must have friends, like, they must have friends doing it’. Sometimes I wonder whether some of those groups – especially the Uni type ones – might be a bit more about hanging out and being seen. I don't know, like I wonder if they serve as much of a, like, if they serve a social function for the people that are in those groups. And maybe I think that I don't need that social function or something? That, yeah, I don’t know. Maybe I think that I don't have that much time, that I express my opinions by voting carefully, and that when it comes to putting in my own time for issues, I choose to put them into other causes. Yeah, I don’t know. I sort of don’t really have a great desire to join 'Green' groups, I don’t know why. (Tracy, non-activist, age 27)
Here, we see the perception, again, that one of the functions of environmental organisations is a social function – it is not merely about the ‘activism’. This also relates to the earlier point about uncertainty, reflexive awareness and dualism – throughout this extract, the interviewee is reflecting on possible reasons why she does not participate in climate change activism, and why she holds those perceptions about climate change activism and activists.

‘Activists’ themselves held a variety of perceptions about different types of climate change ‘activism’.

I’ve kind of avoided [protests], if I’m honest. I’ve been on one or two climate change marches in London and I’ve just found them very, I find them very uncomfortable…I never really felt like it was representing all the facts about the issues, or the right way of…creating change around it…[I]t tends to be people who just want to march for some reason, and they don’t really mind what the reason is. And I…remember…being really sort of frustrated by being surrounded by people who are in fancy dress and laughing and singing…it felt like a carnival and a celebration…I think, if you’re angry about something, then you’re angry, and that’s what your emotion is, and it never felt like that to me. And so I’ve never really felt engaged in it (Alexander, activist, age 30).

Here, it is no so much a lack of identification with the people involved, and a stereotyping of them, but instead it is about the reason why people protest, and the way they protest. This illustrates an intra-competition between activists, where some forms of activism, and some activists, are seen to be more ‘good’ and worthwhile than others.

And when discussing why he doesn’t engage in protests, Alexander added: ‘the perception still exists, you know, the sort of hippy perspective perception still exists…I mean, a lot of it’s to do with the way it’s reported in the media that,
well, on the front page would be the roughest person they can find. And that’s not true – if you go, there’s people that you’d call normal people.’ Here, Alexander is demarcating between ‘normal’ activists and ‘deviant’ (‘rough looking’) activists. This could be as a means to try and distance the majority of members of environmental movements from these media-fuelled stereotypes. Despite this, he goes on to add that he thinks, ‘most people perceive [activists] as...do-gooders, or very earnest and worthy people’.

Several activists also hinted towards the social function of activism:

...there's tribalism within it as well – that people want to be part of, feel part of a movement...so and so loves a good march but doesn’t really mind what it’s about – he just wants to be there and be part of that. (Alexander, activist, age 30)

Whereas non-activists implied that this was a 'bad' thing, activists just saw this as one part of involvement in activism – another part being concern about the specific issue and wanting to make a difference.

‘Eco-Terrorism’
In the early stages of my research, I came across the term ‘eco-terrorism’. I wanted to explore how and the extent to which participants had come across this term, and how and to what extent it influenced their perceptions about and involvement in climate change activism.

Most interviewees had heard of the term ‘eco-terrorism’ or eco-terrorist’, and most participants came across the term in the news. While the context of the term – the news media – led participants to be skeptical about the usage of the term, they did associate the term with violence, destruction of property, and harm:
I think I’ve only heard it through the news, so that’s probably not that trustworthy. But I guess it’s, I guess the more, I see it as the more...active activists, in terms of say destroying a power plant or, you know, destroying perhaps organisations or things that, I don’t know, that are seen to harm the world in some way. (Katherine, non-activist, age 25)

While Katherine – a non-activist – begins by stating that what she knows about eco-terrorism is ‘probably not that trustworthy’, she then goes on to characterize it as being all about destruction and destroying of things. And while participants tended to suggest that the media exaggerated and distorted these stories, they also believed that activism should not be too violent:

...in some cases it's probably the media hyping it up; it might not be that bad, 'cause you can’t always trust what the media says. So, but they [activists] have to have done something, I guess, that's more extreme than the general. So, I think in some ways it's a, it's a good way because everybody needs, I guess everybody, everyone has to have an opinion, so the fact that they're leading that opinion is good. But whether they're doing it in the right way, that's the question. Whereas if it's too violent, or, you know, I guess it makes it known but it's not, what's the word...I don’t think it’s good to be too violent or active, if that makes sense. (Katherine, non-activist, age 25)

There is also here a degree of uncertainty expressed by this non-activist, a frequent them throughout this chapter. Phrases like ‘I guess it makes it known’, suggest that she is not sure about the relative influence and effect of activism, or particular types of activism. This contrasted with activist accounts, which were much more certain.

Some participants from the non-activist group, however, firmly believed that there were some levels of activism that were completely inappropriate and did
nothing to further the cause. Interestingly, some participants linked ‘eco-terrorism’ with groups like the Animal Liberation Front:

I think there are some levels of activism that I think are wholly inappropriate and self-defeating. I can’t remember who would've said it, but fighting for peace is like screwing for virginity. There’s the classic argument about means and ends, and the extent to which means support the ends. You know, and it's like the irony of people who are pro-life, you know, pro-life campaigners, the anti-abortion campaigners in the US killing people, you know. I just find that, that kind of contradiction unbelievable, and I also think, I can understand why people get incredibly passionate about these things. But no, I don’t, I don’t personally think those kind of activism, those forms of activism, do actually...serve the interests that they think they serve. I think that they have a whole series of unintended consequences that are kind of ultimately self-defeating, in terms of their espoused objectives. So I don't agree morally, ethically I don't agree. I also don’t think, in terms of what they want to achieve, that’s the best way to go about it. And I’m thinking, when you start, when things around animal rights, PETA and PET or whatever the organisation is, and then the kind of Animal Liberation Front, I don't know if it’s still called that, as a kind of off-shoot of that, some of those were mobilised in the name of environmentalism, and you know it’s a very blurry term isn’t it, it kind of overlaps with lots of other things. And, you know, some of those I find abhorrent, some of the things that were done. I remember reading about it a few years ago, like kidnapping the family of a scientist and things like that – really, pretty horrific nasty things to do. (Sam, non-activist, age 39)

It is clear that this non-activist is horrified by some of the activities of those people that he associates with ‘eco-terrorism’. Perhaps this also related to his non-involvement in climate change activism. In contrast to this, some activists
were quick to draw the distinction between environmental activism and animal rights activism, to distance themselves from the likes of the Animal Liberation Front:

...people get confused between the animal rights lobby and environmentalists. I think the animal rights lobby have got some quite odd people in there and they have been violent, and they have behaved violently. And they’ve dug up people’s grannies and stuff. And that’s not sensible. That is not the same as the climate change people. I don’t know why the animal rights lobby have had people who have behaved very badly and got themselves a bad name. And tarred the whole environmental movement with the same brush. They’re not the same. And, and they have behaved badly and it doesn’t do the cause any good at all. But I’ve never come across anybody in the climate movement who was even remotely violent. But they might damage a bit of property on the way. (Heather, activist, age 58)

Once again, we have here an attempt to construct a difference between ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ forms of activism and groups of activists, to distance ‘us’ from ‘them’. In this way, within environmental and animal rights activism, there exists both established and outsider groups, part of the function of which is to control the image of the group, and of the activist.

A couple of interviewees had never come across the term ‘eco-terrorism’ before, or they confused it with other terms – attributing it to the usage of bio-chemical weapons by Middle Eastern terrorists in America in television shows such as CSI (Cynthia, non-activist, age 34), or guessing that it meant someone who terrorizes their ecosystem (Adrianna, non-activist, age 28); i.e. a form of ‘eco-crime’.
Some participants observed how the more violent or the more destructive activism was, the more media coverage it would receive:

violence...has been effective in getting coverage, I think...there was a demonstration last week, I think, and it was barely covered because there was no trouble. (Steven, non-activist, age 34)

I do wonder when I hear sort of like any kind of eco-terrorism sabotage, I always wonder how much is malice at the organisation involved and how much is um is just trying to get coverage...So, um, but I don’t particularly, I mean, you draw the line at harming people. Harming property, I actually, I don’t have a problem with that [laughs]. But I think that, I don’t know. It’s, it’s one of those funny areas where you don’t want to advocate sort of, I don’t know, you don’t want to. I don’t particularly want to push people and say, ‘oh, you know, my friend [inaudible], you should go and destroy as much as you can to get headlines’. I think in a fairer world you would get, you know...get more coverage and I think that perhaps it needs to be dealt with from a different angle and you shouldn’t have to blow things up to get any kind of coverage for your cause. But I guess, you know, if people think they do, I think it says more about the system that they’re sort of working against. (Duncan, non-activist, age 38).

This argument served to deflect blame that may be directed at so-called ‘eco-terrorist’, for it implied that it was not their fault that they seemingly had to partake in this violence to achieve any kind of media attention.

Developing this theme further, some activists observed how doing things legally, following the system, could only get you so far, and sometimes it was necessary to do something more to get attention:
I think they're very justified for their actions, in a lot of senses. I think, a lot of the time, talking can only do so much and sometimes action is the only viable next step. Like take the Copenhagen summit that happened in December last year. There was so much hype about it and it was a fantastic event. You've got all these countries, all these representatives from countries around the world coming to talk about one thing. And at the end of the day a few people were reluctant to make certain decisions, and certain things come out like the stink about the email scandal in, in the University of East Anglia...And, in that sense, I very much sympathise with people because a lot of the time it is hard to get people to change their minds unless you force them or do something which is, yeah, I mean force them, or do something very bold which is going to bring attention to the cause that you want or the result in action that you want to see (George, activist, age 23).

There's only so far you can go by doing everything by the book. P- Politely writing letters and standing holding placards and so on...if only the system worked well that if you wrote polite letters and went to visit your own MP and wrote to the paper and so on that something changed. That'd be fine. But it doesn't change. You can be trampled on. Your rights are removed because it's not a visible enough way of protesting. And so people have become fed up with being polite...because their comments are not listened to properly...the people like Plane Stupid and the Climate Camp people – they are very well educated. A lot of them have got PhDs. They're highly educated. They're highly moral. A lot of them are vegetarians, pacifists, all the rest of it. They do not do anything which puts anybody's life, or welfare in danger. They are careful, thoughtful, sensible people...they will endanger property, but they will not endanger life. They are very careful that nobody would be injured. No-one would put in danger. (Heather, activist, age 58)
In this second extract, the activist is emphasizing that those people who are associated with ‘eco-terrorism’ are not ‘bad’, ‘dangerous’ people; they are ‘moral’ pacifists who ‘will not endanger life’.

There was also the perception, held by both activists and non-activists, that the police were wasting their time by infiltrating environmental groups and other ‘activist’ groups, and that they should spend taxpayer time and money focusing on the real, serious threats. ‘Eco-terrorists’, in other words, were not seen to be ‘real’ ‘terrorists’.

Some participants, notably activists, were even proud of so-called ‘eco-terrorists’:

I think, good on them, because...they’re not just going and banging a drum and laughing and smiling, they’re actually willing to put their ass on the line; climbing up a power station [inaudible], that’s commitment. And so, I have a lot of respect for that...I mean the drive to do that, and backing up what you say, what you believe in (Alexander, activist, age 30).

Once again, there is a demarcation between those activists that are doing some good, and those who are ‘just going and banging a drum’.

Several participants also observed the function of the term ‘eco-terrorism’:

...‘eco-terrorist’ is used as a justification for certain ways of policing which appear to try and act beyond the reaches of the law (Richard, activist, age 38)

I guess...they want to use that terminology because of the connotations it has for real terrorism, and trying to make them look like extremists... (Alexander, activist, age 30)
I think it was the police that coined the term actually, who often – well, definitely under Jacqui Smith’s administration – used a lot of sort of rather questionable, powers that were given to them by the Terrorism Act, which meant that people could be detained very easily and that sort of thing. Using the terrorism label is just an extremely easy cop-out for, for the authorities to justify any kind of overreactions or...their not following the correct procedure in terms of normal policing. (James, activist, age 23)

...terrorism is generally, in my opinion, used by authorities as an excuse to put stuff through without much explanation or, you know, you just use the word terrorist and then you can get through legislation without much, no-one’s going to oppose the fight against terror. (David, activist, age 26)

Eco-terrorism is, it’s a term bandied about by big business to make people afraid of what environmental protestors are doing...But I do not believe the bona fide climate people are in any way violent or in any way would put anyone’s welfare at risk. They would say that by not doing something, the welfare of millions are being put at risk...And there’s a good argument that actually it’s violent to humanity’s welfare not to be doing something. So I don’t believe in eco-terrorism. It’s a, it’s just...a bit of PR spin put out by the opposition to make people nervous. (Heather, activist, age 58)

Interestingly, all of these quotes about the function of the term ‘eco-terrorism’ were by activists. This may be partly due to them being increasingly aware of this, because of their involvement in activism. Their involvement in activism may also make them increasingly more likely to defend how different forms of activism are portrayed.

In these quotes there is also the belief that by not acting, one is causing more damage; it is more criminal not to do something. Additionally, the notion of
'bona fide climate people’ points towards in groups and out groups within the environmental movement – there are ‘real’ activists (the in group), and then there are just those that ‘call’ themselves activists (the out group).

An alternative definition of eco-terrorist was offered by one of the activist participants: ‘Eco-terrorism. The governments are eco-terrorists, aren't they? I mean, you know, we live in a system which creates this much environmental damage, and they're kind of in charge of the system, then they're terrorizing the environment.’ (Alexander, activist, age 30) In this way, Alexander may be attempting to re-appropriate the term in order to decrease the ability for it to be influential.

A different activist argued that the term was an inaccurate representation: ‘I think that utilising that sort of language is probably not helpful to a discourse. I just think, you know, the image of terrorists that is conjured into most people’s mind is not a reasonable analysis of what these people are doing.’ (Philip, activist, age 25). They also acknowledged, however, that these activities could be unhelpful:

I think they’re a pain the ass sometimes. I think that they actually, they do things that are problematic for climate change campaigners...The problem is, if you use a tactic like smashing stuff up, or knocking fences down, the press are going to come along, they’re not going to focus on the issue anymore; they’re going to focus on the fact that you’re smashing stuff up. (Philip, activist, age 25)

I think that sometimes it can be justified...but, on the other hand...I think it often alienates people who would consider themselves, well, people who are edging on the Green movement, and they, you know, it’s not everyone's cup of tea, and they might not want to be associated with people doing directly criminal acts or illegal acts, you know, for whatever
reason. And therefore that does, I think that does push people away, who might be interested otherwise. I haven’t been involved in anything like that yet, but I wouldn’t completely rule it out. I mean, it depends on the level of it. And I think, you know the good thing about the majority of direct actions that I’ve heard of is that they don’t involve any harm to any people; people are very respectful and peaceful about the way they go about these things. (James, activist, age 23)

In both of these quotes, the activists are critically reflecting on what type of activism is most appropriate, and most likely to be effectual. This is not surprising, as to be involved in activism they would no doubt have to make these decisions on a continual basis in order to decide which campaigns, protests, and so on they will and will not partake in.

**Media Representations of Climate Change**

As mentioned in the previous section, several participants discussed the media representations of ‘activism’ and ‘eco-terrorism’, and were quite skeptical about the media’s possible distortion of these groups and events:

I took part in a climate march in London. It gathered lots of people together. The experience of what it was like to be on a march is not the same as the way it’s portrayed in the media (Richard, activist, age 38)

Several of the activists in particular complained about the media’s misrepresentation of climate change, through their providing ‘equal time’ to climate change ‘sceptics’:

…the other rather annoying thing is broadcasters giving what they call a balanced view, which means they spend half the time, you know, giving, giving airtime to the deniers and the sceptics and such like, which I
actually think is quite wrong. You know, when they put on a program about crime they don't give half the time to the criminals. So, you know, why do you give half the time to the climate deniers? I think it's an absurd argument. And it does make for more exciting television and controversy. But, you know I, I still don't think it's right. Because it, it misleads the public. If the public see a program where half the people are talking about the dangers of climate change and half are denying it, the public think opinion is really divided, which it isn't. Scientific opinion is barely divided at all; there's barely a serious scientist that doesn't, climate scientist, who doesn't doubt it. So I think broadcasters in particular are actually playing a major part and a major role in undermining, uh, undermining the situation as far as the public concern on climate change goes. (Jack, activist, age 63)

the BBC, leading up to and probably during Copenhagen, and still now as well, are very frustrating really, the way they present it, I think. They... have this BBC agenda of balanced reporting and both sides of the argument, giving voice to both sides. And I feel that, as much as I agree with objectivity, I think they can create a lot of harm...they're still an organization who need to be a little bit sensationalist to get their viewing figures up, and so...[they still] have skeptics on the sofa at Breakfast or on the Today programme – guys who’ve been, you know, quite widely sort of panned by scientists. (Alexander, activist, age 30)

Amongst the activists, there was also a strong scepticism of the media:

maybe also from a more sceptical point of view, who runs these organizations and what their agendas are, you know, they might be...trying desperately to cling on to the status quo and not want to change the economic paradigm that we have, because that's the question it comes down to, is the growth paradigm based on consumer economy, and they
don’t want to question that, so they, so anything that they can do to stall that question, they will. So I think that’s part of the reason why we get this balanced view or whatever. So, I mean, yeah I find it frustrating… (Alexander, activist, age 30)

Because I think, things like Al Gore, it [An Inconvenient Truth] had a political impact in America no doubt, but you still have to be very wary of the guy because he was vice-president of the USA for, was it, eight years. And what did they do? They didn’t do anything. And so, you know, he was a heartbeat away from the president, the most powerful man in the world, and you would have thought he’d have had Clinton’s ear to actually really, really make progress. I mean they did make some, but they didn’t really make enough. (Alexander, activist, age 30).

I’m very wary of [propaganda] now, it’s much harder for the government to do it because of the way the truth can go out so easily through the Internet. (Alexander, activist, age 30).

Several different authors and television personalities were identified as being influential in participants (both activists and non-activists) becoming more aware and concerned about environmental issues and about climate change. These included David Attenborough, Gerald Durrell, Al Gore, George Monbiot, Jonathan Porritt, and Jared Diamond. Some of these forms of media were not explicitly environmental, but did have a strong influence on participants, according to what they said during their interviews. I frequently stumbled across many of these names in some of the other stages of the research process, suggesting that some of these people have indeed become influential arbiters of good (and bad) behaviours.

Many of the interviewees – both activists and non-activists – had watched many documentaries about climate change, and had seen or read many other media
about climate change. Some of them were quite divided on the framing that documentaries about climate change should use. For example, some of the activists thought *The Age of Stupid* was very interesting, while others thought it was very poorly made:

...it's not subtle. It's...like being punched in the face basically. You know, okay, I understand, and the likelihood that you're preaching to the converted anyway, how many people who are climate change sceptics are going to go and watch that? Very unlikely...You know, from, from the perspective of analysing it as a film it's not particularly well produced or anything like that...And so, yeah, just really unsubtle and not particularly exciting from the perspective of being an entertaining film. (Philip, activist, age 25)

Part of this division was to do with positive versus negative framing of climate change. Some participants argued for positive messages, while others argued that there had to be negative, depressing images that would induce feelings of guilt.

One of the activists felt that climate change reality-TV shows were not made particularly well: ‘I don’t think they’re done so appealingly, yeah. I think that there is a danger of boring people with it...’ (Duncan, non-activist, age 38). Whereas one of the activists thought that the programme *It's Not Easy Being Green* was very well made: ‘That was a really good format programme, because it also, it showed sort of mainstream people being involved in Green issues and it explained quite a lot of things in, sort of, innovative ways and that kind of helps.’ (James, activist, age 23). However, another activist argued that the reality-TV shows, like the ‘green guides’, were too simplistic and did not always focus on all the things that should be addressed – they did not focus on the areas where people could make the biggest changes (Jack, activist, age 63).
Some interviewees noted how they thought that some of the ‘green living’ pamphlets had encouraged them to do certain things, whereas others felt that they would do some of those things anyway, and felt like they did not need any more information, any more pamphlets. And awareness about some of these issues, and the suggested behavioural changes, did not always translate into behaviour changes. Some interviewees spoke of their skepticism towards such documents: ‘I always feel like I’m being manipulated when someone chucks a pamphlet at me...there’s an information war going on about these things...’ (Sam, non-activist, age 39).

Similarly, activists tended to find that they already knew everything that was in the ‘green guides’, and could not see how they could use those guides to convince other people to change their behaviours. As one activist said, ‘...there’s only a certain amount I feel I need to know about it [climate change]; I don’t need to know all of the detail, I just need to know there’s a problem, really.’ (Alexander, activist, age 30)

Both activists and non-activists gathered information about climate change from a variety of sources, including: newspapers, attending public talks, talking to academics and other people, email networks, Facebook, BBC news, environmental organizations, documentaries, The Guardian, films, email contacts, mailing lists, word of mouth, websites of various organizations, television programmes, the Ecologist magazine, the Internet, and ‘green guides’. This highlights the importance, mentioned in Chapter 6, of exploring a variety of documents and media in both moral panic research and figurational research.

**Concern, Fear and Avoidance**

Some participants consciously avoided being exposed to certain media about environmental issues. Concern was not always translated into action; concern plus fear or sadness sometimes translates into avoidance:
I rarely see the documentaries about the environment, because it makes me sad...they might show the animals, they are suffering, and all these things. So I don't like to see that...I don't want to suffer myself, so I don't watch that. (Cynthia, non-activist, age 34)

In response to the framing of climate change in the media, one non-activist suggested using comedy to get people's attention:

I always think comedy is a fantastic tool in these things. But the, you know, irony and comedy that say Michael Moore uses I think is really good for um attention and I think there's something about being funny and clever at the same time that really works, and gets people, I think it gets people on board because if you're laughing at a scenario then you kind of go 'god, it's sort of funny but so true', and that's what you're aiming at I think. (Duncan, non-activist, age 38)

These extracts seem to support O'Neil and Nicholson-Cole's research (2009), which concluded that while fearful images are useful to attract people's attention, they also induce a lack of personal engagement with the issue and a feeling of helplessness. Less fearful, less threatening images, they argue, are most likely to engage individuals in climate change action. The interviews reported here support this argument, suggesting that we need a more positive framing of climate change, with media that provides a way for people to see how they can engage and act.

**Perceptions about the Regulation of Climate Change**

*Individual Regulation*
Several participants were critical of the carbon calculators. Some thought they were a good idea, but did not know how to use them (Cynthia, non-activist, age 34).

Others, who had used a carbon calculator, did not like the result:

I don't know if I'm willing to give up my steak once a month or something...although this calculator is telling me that, you know, basically, I would have to give it up...I'm not questioning the validity, but it seems like it's implying that my standards of living should go much lower than what I'm used to and I'm not sure if I could actually get there. (Adrianna, non-activist, age 28).

And another participant argued that carbon calculators were incredibly inaccurate, for example, because they did not calculate such things as the carbon footprint of what we eat, what we buy, when we go out to places, what we waste, and so on (Richard, activist, age 38). Others stated that:

I have calculated my carbon footprint but I'm not entirely trusting of the accuracy of the calculation. Because basically when I was going through the questions, they were like these incredibly broad questions (Philip, activist, age 25).

In the interviews with non-activists, there were often one or two particular things they did that they focused on, almost as evidence for how they are behaving in a ‘good’ way towards the environment. For example, Cynthia (non-activist, age 34) frequently referred to sorting rubbish and recycling, and to using reusable utensils instead of disposable ones. Some of this perhaps related to status aspirations, where they would focus on the ‘good’ things to assert that they are a ‘good’ person. These status aspirations are reflected in the following extracts:
I know that using bottled water was a big thing in, back in [a North American city]. I mean, if you would actually walk with a bottled water, people would actually look down on you because, yeah, the plastic used and stuff like that. Actually, laughing at myself, I do have a bottle of water with me right now, and if someone would see me with a bottle of water back home, they would probably say something about it. (Adrianna, non-activist, age 28)

I think that perhaps people should be a little bit more educated about their behaviour, ah, towards the environment; it’s quite common I will see some friends who will throw their cigarette butts away because there’s no ashtray around is something which I think is not justified, for example...I’m trying to carry an empty pack of cigarette with me so I can actually put my butts into it instead of throwing them on the ground. Sometimes if I see a bag lying around I just pick it up and put it in the garbage, you know. (Adrianna, non-activist, age 28)

But these same status aspirations were seen to be part of the problem by some activists:

...recycling saves a certain amount of energy but it’s one of those things that- it doesn’t do an awful lot of good if one thinks, ‘Oh, I’ve recycled, therefore I’ve saved the planet. That’s the end of it’. Recycling’s almost quite quite damaging in that sense. And this bloody thing about cotton bags. Everyone says, ‘I’ve got a cotton shopping bag’. Cotton has a terribly high carbon footprint and a terribly high environmental footprint. So it’s actually better to have a plastic bag, actually. It’s far less damage to the planet by having a plastic bag. But they all go around with the cotton shopping bags and then they throw them away after a couple of uses. It’s not environmental at all. (Heather, activist, age 58)
Here we also see the perception that if someone makes just one small change in their life regarding climate change, that becomes almost a master behaviour trait and that person then sees themselves as being ‘environmental’, regardless of how their other actions relate to climate change. This is perhaps one of the downfalls of things like ‘green guides’. This was further explicated by another activists, when discussing the 10:10 campaign:

You know, we can do, we can make those sort of changes, but then it’s, it just lets people off the hook too much, though, because then they’ll think, ‘oh, I’ve done it’. And actually, probably for a lot of people who’ve signed up to that, just signing up to it lets them off the hook, especially for businesses – they get to put a nice logo on their website...and it’s just, it’s completely and utterly PR based. (Alexander, activist, age 30).

Some of the activists argued that campaigns directed at individual change had to be combined with legislation:

I think if you work on the legislation at the same time as you’re working on engaging individuals and getting them to bring about change themselves, then you’re going to get a more sustainable change basically. You know, if you impose legislation, we live in a democracy; if people really hate it, they might try and get rid of it. You know, whereas if you do both at the same the likelihood is, it’s less. (Philip, activist, age 25)

It was implied that processes of individualization required campaigns that targeted individual people electing to change their own behaviour (rather than just changes being imposed on them by governments).

*Corporate Regulation*
Many participants were skeptical about corporations' ability or desire to regulate their activities in order to decrease their carbon footprints. Several interviewees made reference to 'greenwash', where corporations *appear* to be 'green' in order to improve their brand image. But some interviewees felt that, with government incentives and support, and if 'green' lifestyles became more popular, corporations could become more 'green'.

...there’s the whole worry of the greenwashing issue, that they'll create an illusion of being sustainable, and it's very easy to do that through advertising and through marketing. And so...I wish there was more honesty...[W]e've got a certain amount of fossil fuels that we're going to burn, so [they] should be more honest about how they're going to burn them and why. You know, stand up and say, 'well...we've got to turn the lights on tomorrow, but for about 10, 15 years time we're working on this'. And just do it in that way, but not do it for political gains. That’s where people get frustrated with it, is when there's a clear sort of, when it looks, well it makes you very sceptical about their motives, and you just feel that they're doing it just so they can carry on doing the bad stuff, rather than doing it because...they actually believe they need to do it. (Alexander, activist, age 30).

My parents were involved in the Nestlé campaign, not I mean heavily, but I was definitely brought up in an atmosphere of, 'be wary'...What’s really bizarre is how people will dismiss a scepticism about corporate behaviour as some sort of unfair rhetoric...they won't entertain the idea that a corporation might be acting just for profit...Their primary purpose is to function for profit...I am very sceptical about it. I would definitely avoid buying into corporate solutions. As far as I’m concerned, we need legislation. The state needs to define what is right or wrong because corporations don’t have a moral conscience. (Philip, activist, age 25)
...the corporations are the ones which are, they’re very powerful in terms of people's mentality and views on things and what people can get hold of, and what people consume, and they’re very powerful, well quite powerful in terms of politics as well. So, I think it is, it is definitely a lot better that corporations are more involved in environmental production at the moment. (George, activist, age 23).

Significantly, all of these relatively negative interpretations of corporate regulation all come from activists.

By both activists and non-activists, consumption was seen to be a signifier of competitive success (Rustin, 2013). This was discussed by participants as being both a problem and a solution. It was believed that attempts to keep up with an increasing consumer society furthered the problem, but that if more sustainable, ‘green’ lifestyles became increasingly more popular, the status aspirations associated with these may help to further spread low carbon lifestyles. ‘I don’t know, it seems like, like posh if you get something, you know, environmental product...then people might think “wow, look at this”, you know.’ (Cynthia, non-activist, age 34) This suggests that the ‘green guides’ discussed in the previous two chapters, and how they relate to status aspirations and ecological civilizing offensives, might have some part to play in long-term changes in people’s behaviour.

**Governmental Regulation**

Some participants felt that the government was not doing enough to bring about change. And participants thought that the government needed to do more to regulate or incentivize corporations as well as individual behaviour. One suggestion was to have more education at a much younger age:

if the education was started since, you know, a human being who is little, then that becomes a natural thing, just like a part of your life; you know,
you just do it, so it's natural, so we just do it. (Cynthia, non-activist, age 34).

Here, we can see allusions to the development of an ecological second-nature via a type of ecological civilizing offensive. And while this non-activist does not participate in climate change activism, they were very keen to participate in early childhood education of this sort.

One activist spoke of the necessity for local investments to make ‘living green lifestyles’ more popular:

A good example of that could be the Boris bikes in London. A significant investment, which followed the increase in cycling, perhaps due to the congestion charge, had no real political downside. More people have opted to get on bikes and you could argue that it is now culturally normal to cycle on many journeys in London – whereas, 10 or 15 years ago, if you were a cyclist in London, you were not part of mainstream culture. (Richard, activist, age 38)

Other participants talked about the weakening of states in neo-liberalism, and the need for them to get back some of the power that they had given away to corporations: ‘I think the government needs to take back a bit more power, have a bit more say in what corporations can do, rather than, you know, they tell them rather than the corporations telling the government, I think’ (Alexander, activist, age 30).

I’m nowhere near as sceptical about government as I am about corporations, which is probably, probably would make me quite different to most people; I’d say most people are more accepting of corporations and more sceptical about ‘politicians’ and ‘government’ and, ‘it’s a big waste of time and they’re all corrupt.’ (Philip, activist, age 25)
Others, talking specifically about the United States, argued how incredibly difficult it was to make such big complex changes to social life:

...because the whole system is based around cheap, very, very cheap, easily available, dirty, usually dirty fuel, but not always, it’s, it’s a lot harder for the Americans and for the, you know, for the White House to actually do anything about changing the lifestyle of a whole country as big as America. (George, activist, age 23)

This complication seems increasingly more complex at the level of intergovernmental regulation.

*Intergovernmental Regulation*

All interviewees regarded intergovernmental regulation as vital to combating climate change. However, while they tended to acknowledge the progress that the IPCC and the UN have already made, they believed that there was much more still to be done, and that this would be incredibly difficult to achieve due to the uneven power relations between different nations and the vested interests that they have. Most of the interviewees also believed that they did not know enough about intergovernmental relations to provide an answer to this question.

*Conclusion*

The hypothesis of individual ecological civilizing processes explored in various ways in this chapter appears to parallel long-term broader ecological civilizing processes, as explored in Chapter 5. Some of the participants provided narratives that indicated a growing aestheticization of ‘nature’ with age, a growing concern about and anxiety towards other animals and the environment as a whole, with a growing sense of shame, disgust and emotional involvement.
All of these accounts suggest individual ecological civilizing processes, although this needs to be explored in more detail in subsequent research.

Status aspirations characteristic of civilizing processes and offensives were reflected particularly in non-activists’ volunteering of the ‘good’ behavioural changes they had made. By focusing on just one or two actions, it was as if these had become like a master status for them, negating all the other ‘bad’ things they might be doing. However, non-activists did express guilt about not doing enough. They were more self-deprecatating than activists, recognizing that they wanted to do one thing, but did another. Activists had a much more coherent dialogue in this and other respects, it was as if their thoughts and perceptions about climate change, the environment, and related issues, were much more reconciled than those of non-activists.

All interviewees seemed to be relatively knowledgeable about climate change, and all believed anthropogenic processes probably contributed to it, and that it was an urgent issue. Many participants also thought that it did not matter whether or not climate change was happening, as the types of changes that were called for in relation to climate change were necessary anyway, with or without climate change. In that sense, both activists and non-activists were concerned about climate change; it is just that the concern translated into different types and degrees of action.

There appeared to be several factors influencing to what extent participants did or did not become involved in climate change ‘activism’. In their accounts, activists reflected on important people, events and places that they believed had strong influences on their interest in environmental issues. They also expressed a strong sense of duty, and of responsibility towards the environment, and towards climate change. Activists had more time available for ‘activism’ – they were students, or they did not have to work, or climate change/sustainability was part of their job. In contrast, non-activists spoke of having hectic lives, and
not having time for such things. However, some non-activists did participate in activism in relation to other social issues. This in turn related to their sense of control – they felt like they had little or no control over climate change, that their actions did not matter, in contrast to simpler, less complex issues.

The narratives of the participants related to the concept of moral panic in several ways. Firstly, there was clearly not a strong folk devil identified. This was primarily because non-activists in particular identified themselves as being part of the problem, as being to blame as well – there was no ‘minority of the worst’, no ‘us’ and ‘them’; instead, the ‘I’ was identified as being part of ‘them’ and so ‘them’ became an all inclusive ‘us’. Despite this, however, there was a ‘worst’ of ‘us’ identified in the form of capitalism, the extremely rich, skeptics/deniers, and a stereotype of someone with a big carbon footprint.

Additionally, these interviews suggested that moral panic’s conceptualization of the relationship between deviants and non-deviants, between the established and the outsiders, is too simplistic. We have already outlined how there were varying degrees of deviance identified. But also within the activists themselves there was an intra-competition. Certain types of activism and activists were identified as being more ‘good’ and worthwhile than others, and the implication was made that there were ‘normal’ activists and there were ‘deviant’ activists’, legitimate and illegitimate activists and activism. This suggests that we need to think beyond a simplistic dichotomy in understanding the relationship between folk devils and everyone else, between the outsiders and the established, and instead explore the degrees of moralization, deviantization, responsibilization, and so on, that is targeted at different people.

Finally, the avoidance, by some non-activists, of being exposed to saddening and fearful media about climate change and other environmental issues further suggests a relationship between moral panic and denial. In this particular case, fearful and saddening media contribute to avoidance and denial – not seeing
and not knowing – in a situation such as a polar beer in harms way, where there is little or no hope of reparation. This suggests that campaigners need to be wary, for their attempts to try and bring about social change, to try and engineer what they may regard to be a ‘good’ moral panic, may have unintended consequences that contribute to the denial of the problem.

Having explored in these three chapters the development of climate change, in the next chapter I primarily focus on the theoretical, conceptual and methodological aims of this thesis. I compare the example of climate change with five other empirical examples that have been researched separately from a moral panic and a figurational approach, in order to assist with the reformulation of moral panic and decivilizing processes, and a reassessment of the relation between civilizing offensives and processes, and between civilizing and decivilizing processes.
Chapter Eight

Moral Panics as Civilizing and Decivilizing Processes: A Comparative Analysis

Introduction

Having demonstrated in Chapters 5 and 6 how climate change can be explored from both a figurational and a moral panic approach, this chapter goes on to compare several case studies: alcohol, climate change, (illegal) drugs, eating/obesity, terrorism, and tobacco. This chapter will draw from existing research on these examples; research from both moral panic studies and figurational sociology.

The aim of this comparative analysis is twofold. First, to identify the complex, countervailing trends that occur before, during and after a moral panic, highlighting the complexity of moral panics and therefore dismissing the notion that they are mere ‘bad’ (or ‘good’) aberrations. This will aid in the theoretical-conceptual-empirical development of moral panic. Second, to use these case studies to raise some questions about how we conceptualize civilizing and decivilizing processes and civilizing offensives.

Through combining this comparative analysis with a discussion of Elias, Foucault, and the concept of moral panic, this chapter will identify several areas where we can further the development of the work of Norbert Elias and figurational sociology. These areas are: the relation between civilizing and decivilizing processes; the relation between intended and unintended

46 An earlier version of this chapter was written for the figurational sociology special issue of the journal Política y Sociedad / Politics and Society (manuscript is currently under review).
developments; the relation between short-term and long-term processes; and the role of knowledge in civilizing processes.

**Moral Panics?**

Before we go on to compare these examples, let us first explore the extent to which (some of the) reactions to them might be regarded as moral panics.

*Alcohol*

A small number of moral panic scholars have examined alcohol, specifically the ‘gin craze’ of the eighteenth century and recent concerns about ‘binge drinking’ (see Critcher, 2008b, 2011a, 2011b; Yeomans, 2009). In 2003, the New Labour government declared that ‘binge drinking’ was a serious social problem. Chas Critcher’s analysis of several British newspapers illustrates a process of stereotyping people who binge drink, labelling the males as violent or criminal and the females as ‘potentially risking their health and/or sexual integrity’ (Critcher, 2008b, p. 169). However, he adds that ‘binge drinkers’ do not make ‘impressive folk devils’, for they do not induce the same feeling that one will be a likely victim of the ‘binge drinker’, the way that other folk devils, such as paedophiles and muggers, do. And aside from that of politicians and journalists, there is little in the way of public outcry and moralisation (Critcher, 2008b, p. 169).

However, campaigns by health authorities in numerous countries and voluntary organizations such as MADD (Mothers Against Drunk Driving47), along with the activities of recent groups such as HSM (Hello Sunday Morning48), suggest that there is a degree of concern about alcohol and ‘binge drinking’. Hier (Hier, 2008) observes how this moralizing at the individual level, of drinking responsibly and avoiding the risks associated to the self, goes hand in hand with

47 madd.org
48 hellosundaymorning.com.au
moralizing at the collective level, directed towards the potential (or actual) ‘irresponsible’ drinker – the ‘binge drinker’ whose actions, while under the influence of alcohol, are harmful to others. The notion of ‘passive drinking’ captures the collective moralizing well.

‘Passive drinking’ has been used in the popular media to refer to the practice of inhaling alcohol vapour or fumes49 (see Bruce-Briggs, 1988, April 25; Stepney, 1993, December 28). But it has most recently been used by Sir Liam Donaldson, Chief Medical Officer in the UK, to refer to the direct and indirect effects that people’s drinking of alcohol has on others – what he terms ‘the collateral damage from alcohol’ (Donaldson, 2009, pp. 16-23). Comparing alcohol with tobacco (and ‘passive smoking’), Donaldson defines ‘passive drinking’ as ‘the consequences of one person’s drinking on another’s well-being’; these consequences can include ‘harm to the unborn fetus, acts of drunken violence, vandalism, sexual assault and child abuse, and a huge health burden carried by both the NHS and friends and family who care for those damaged by alcohol.’ (Donaldson, 2009, p. 17) This further extends the responsibility of the ‘drinker’ to ‘the rest of us’.

Critcher does observe, however, the changes in policing, with ‘heavier on-the-spot fines, increased arrests for drunkenness and more extensive investigation of under age selling’, some of which are related to the Anti-Social Behaviour Act. He concludes that while rhetoric about binge drinking shares similarities with issues such as terrorism, the two threats do not compare: ‘binge drinking is a fairly mild moral panic’ (Critcher, 2008b, p. 170). In contrast, the ‘gin craze’ is regarded by Critcher as being a much more fully-fledged moral panic (Critcher, 2011b), ‘one of the first truly modern moral panics in Britain’ (Critcher, 2011c, p. 259). The reasons for this difference will be explored later in this chapter.

*Climate Change*

49 This is akin to the notion of ‘secondary smoke’: non-smokers inhaling the smoke of smokers.
As already suggested in Chapter 6, several different reactions to climate change can be conceptualized as moral panics. First, we have reactions of concern about 'runaway climate change', urging governments, corporations and individuals to develop more 'green', 'ethical', moderate ways of living and thus reduce carbon emissions (Cohen, 2011; Rohloff, 2011a). Second, are the reactions of climate change 'sceptics' to such campaigns, some of which claim that climate change campaigners and scientists are conspiring to distort and exaggerate the evidence for climate change (Ungar, 2011). And then there is a third possible moral panic: the reaction of campaigners to sceptics, where sceptics themselves become folk devils in the form of climate change 'deniers' (Cohen, 2011). Within these different moral panics, we may have a variety of folk devils: the affluent, SUV driving, ‘gas-guzzling’, consumer with a large carbon footprint; big corporations; the extremely rich who 'binge' consume in new 'places of excess'; and climate change 'sceptics'/'deniers'.

(Illegal) Drugs
In the first published moral panic study, Jock Young (1971a, 1971b) explored the moral panic surrounding marijuana smokers in Notting Hill. Young focused in particular on the role of the police, and how media coverage of the 'drugtakers' influenced police perceptions about them and their policing practices. He argued that the media's amplification and stereotyping of the drugtakers and their activities, combined with the change in policing, contributed to the marginalization of the drugtaker and an amplification of deviance. Since Young's groundbreaking study, several authors have explored moral panics around other (illegal) drugs, such as mephedrome, LSD and ecstasy (Collins, forthcoming; Goode, 2008; Hier, 2002b).

Eating/Obesity
In the edited collection Alcohol, Tobacco and Obesity: Morality, Mortality and the New Public Health (Bell, McNaughton, & Salmon, 2011), several contributors explore the 'obesity panic'. Conversely, Critcher argues that concerns about
obesity differ to those around binge drinking – the former, he contends, is less likely to generate a moral panic: 'Binge drinking affects public order; obesity affects the economics of productivity and of health care. Excessive drinkers and those who supply them can be legally prosecuted. Nobody can be taken to court for being fat' (Critcher, 2009, p. 25). Critcher further compares obesity with child abuse and drug taking: 'Child abuse is evil; some drug taking is evil; foreigners might be evil; obesity is not and never can be evil. Evil represents a challenge to the moral order of such magnitude that it must be identified, named, cast out' (Critcher, 2009, p. 27). Here, Critcher seems to be arguing that 'evil' is an extreme example of 'immoral', where something comes to be seen as so immoral that it is perceived to be evil and comes to be personified in 'evil' people – an extreme type of folk devil. But by using such language as 'evil', one implies a sudden break from ordinary types or immorality to evil ones. Using degrees of perceived immorality, instead of immoral versus evil, may be a more useful way to conceptualize this.

However, we can see at least some evidence to suggest that obesity is being likened to one of Critcher’s ‘evils’: child abuse. LeBesco refers us to a case in the United States, where a mother was charged with the medical neglect of her 555 pound son (LeBesco, 2011, p. 33). LeBosco illustrates that, since the early 1990s, we have witnessed a rapid increase in media coverage of obesity: ‘a search for the phrase “obesity epidemic” in the general news of major newspapers in English-speaking countries shows an explosion of interest, from just one hit in 1993 to 770 in 2004’ (LeBesco, 2011, p. 35). Campos et al. provide further evidence of moral panic-type media discourse: ‘A content analysis of 221 press articles...found that over half employed alarming metaphors such as “time bomb”’ (Campos, Saguy, Ernsberger, Oliver, & Gaesser, 2006, p. 58). This suggests that obesity is coming to be increasingly moralized, with a growing concern for the perceived rapid increase in incidences of obesity.
One of the issues with exploring obesity from a moral panic perspective is that by using the phrase ‘moral panic’ we may be implying that the social problem of obesity does not exist or is not important. This is most evident with the example of tobacco smoking, which we will look at shortly.

**Terrorism**

Several authors have explored terrorism from a moral panic framework – indeed, it is probably the most ‘obvious’ moral panic example I will be looking at in this chapter. Kappeler and Kappeler (2004) illustrate how the rhetoric themes in the political discourse following 9/11 are conducive to dehumanizing terrorists and others viewed as the enemy, and the construction of a folk devil. Rothe and Muzzatti (2004) further explore the relation between the increased media and popular culture coverage of terrorism in relation to changing patterns of behaviour amongst Americans – increased display of patriotism, attacks on mosques, increase in hate crimes – as well as changes in the justice system – (non-public) military trials for suspected terrorists, with no counsel, no proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and no right of appeal.

Interestingly, Altheide (2009) observes that terrorism was only recently linked to moral panic in academia; in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, moral panic researchers tended to refrain from linking reactions to 9/11 with moral panic. This, Altheide argues, is because many people in the US and the UK regard terrorism as a legitimate concern. This suggests that only illegitimate concerns can be moral panics. The problem here, again, is one of normativity and value judgments: who decides if concern about a given social problem is legitimate or illegitimate? And why can we not have moral panics about legitimate issues? Stan Cohen ([1972] 2002, 2011) would certainly argue that we can – and perhaps that we should – have moral panics about legitimate issues.

**Tobacco**
A subject that, to date, most moral panic researchers have avoided is tobacco smoking. The ‘moral panic’ entry on *RationalWiki*\(^{50}\) argues that there are some issues which do cause panic, but that are ‘amoral in nature’. These include: ‘Global warming; Health dangers from trans fatty acids, obesity and cigarette smoking; Overpopulation; Embryonic stem cell research’ (*RationalWiki*, 2012, 31 January). The author(s) of this *RationalWiki* entry seem to be arguing here that smoking tobacco and other issues mentioned do not involve any moralization and are not seen as threats to the moral order.

Some authors disagree about this lack of moralization. Alan Hunt (2011) argues that tobacco smoking, and other issues, have gone through a process of ‘medico-moralization’. He gives the example of secondary or passive smoking, where ‘smoking is no longer a choice about personal health, but rather a form of harm imposed on others’ (Hunt, 2011, p. 65). While Hunt prefers the concept of moral regulation to moral panic (due to the latter’s normative connotations), he does argue that smoking has gone through a process of increasing moralization; indeed, he prefers the concept of ‘moralization’ to that of ‘moral order’ or even ‘moral regulation’, for moralization encourages researchers to focus on *processes* of moralizing (and further argues that it should be used in combination with Foucault’s concept of problematization – how and why certain things become a problem) (Hunt, 2011, p. 66). Yet authors such as Critcher (2009) still maintain that reactions to issues such as smoking are not moral panics, as smokers do not pose the same kind of threat to the moral order as other groups, such as asylum seekers (akin to his arguments about obesity). This again raises questions about *degrees*: what degree of threat equates to a moral panic? This is an important question, and perhaps instead of focusing on whether or not a given reaction to a perceived problem *is* a moral panic, we can instead use the concept of moral panic (along with other concepts and theories) to develop a greater understanding of the processes involved and thereby

\(^{50}\)理性维基/道德恐慌
develop a more informed understanding about how to direct policy, education, and so on.

The strongest assertion that reactions to passive smoking constitute a moral panic occurs in an episode of an Online Classroom TV podcast, titled ‘Smoking as a Moral Panic’ (2009, 20 May). Host Steve Taylor argues that the moral panic about passive smoking is similar to classic panics, such as those around the Mods and Rockers and drugtakers, where claims about the problem are false or exaggerated. He goes on to compare tobacco with alcohol, arguing that the harm from ‘passive drinking’ is greater than that from ‘passive smoking’, but that the power relations between smokers versus drinkers of alcohol are great, as smokers are a minority and drinkers a majority (2009, 20 May). While his argument about claims being false or exaggerated may not be accurate, his observation of power relations is interesting. However, he does not go on to explore how it has come to pass that tobacco smoking has declined (in numbers of smokers) whereas alcohol drinking has remained widespread. For this, we can turn to figurational research.

**Moral Panics as Decivilizing Processes**

As already argued in Chapters 1 and 3, and elsewhere (see Rohloff, 2008; Rohloff & Wright, 2010), moral panics could be seen as a type of decivilizing episode. We have already explored in Chapter 6 how this might apply to climate change; let us now compare this with other variant example.

Some of the reactions to alcohol consumption can be conceptualized as partial decivilizing processes. During moral panics about both gin and binge drinking, we have witnessed the introduction of new legislation aimed at increasing social controls – a shift towards increasing social constraint, with perceived decreasing self-constraint (as people are believed to have less self-control over their consumption of alcohol, hence the call for increased social control).
Research also suggests that there has been a shift in modes of knowledge. Yeomans argues the reaction to the Licensing Act 2003 (and the alleged impact it would have on ‘binge drinking’) ‘appears irrational and disproportionate to the level of threat actually posed’ (Yeomans, 2009, para. 2.6). Presumably, Yeomans would suggest this could apply to all moral panics about alcohol that have occurred since the first ‘gin panic’ in the eighteenth century. Such comments suggest an increasing incalculability of the dangers posed by alcohol, or at least an increase in the fantasy content and a decrease in the reality congruence of knowledge about alcohol consumption.

In *The Drugtakers* (Young, 1971a), based on research undertaken in the late 1960s with a group of marijuana smokers living in Notting Hill, Jock Young observed a process occurring whereby the population in England was continually changing, and while there was increasing heterogeneity, this appeared to be happening at too fast a pace for some people to be able to adjust to. There was no longer the homogenous population to dictate patterns of behaviour; there was ongoing resistance to established ways of behaving, which resulted in the development of subcultures such as bohemianism. There existed the perception that informal social controls (and self controls) were failing to regulate the behaviour of particular groups (such as the ‘drugtakers’), so social control was left largely in the hands of formal agencies, such as the Police.

Young focuses particularly on the police, for their isolated position, and how this plays a role in deviancy amplification. He argues that ‘drug taking’ begins as a minor actual problem. Via the media’s effect, the problem is amplified, and so comes to be perceived as being greater than what it actually is. This perception contributes to police action which makes the real problem greater, contributing to developments such as increased marginalization of the drugtaker from the rest of society, and the progression onto other drugs and other crimes (as unintended outcomes) (Young, 1971a; see also Becker, [1963] 1991, for earlier
research on this). If we follow Young’s argument, the intentional interventions by the police are contributing to the kinds of things they are trying to prevent: the escalation of occasional marijuana use, and the development of heroin use, other crimes, etc. And so it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, where perceived decivilizing processes contribute to actual decivilizing processes.

The drugtaker is seen as a threat to the moral standards of both the policeman and the regular criminal; drugtakers are seen as something different altogether, as Young quotes one policeman:

I tell you, there’s something about users that bugs me. I don’t know what exactly. You want me to be frank? OK. Well, I can’t stand them; I mean I really can’t stand them. Why? Because they bother me personally. They’re dirty, that’s what they are, filthy. They make my skin crawl.

It’s funny but I don’t get that reaction to ordinary criminals. You pinch a burglar or a pickpocket and you understand each other; you know how it is, you stand around yacking, maybe even crack a few jokes. But Jesus, these guys, they’re a danger. You know what I mean, they’re like Commies or some of those CORE people.

There are some people you can feel sorry for. You know, you go out and pick up some poor chump of a paper hanger [bad-cheque writer] and he’s just a drunk and life’s got him all bugged. You can understand a poor guy like that. It’s different with anybody who’d used drugs (policeman, quoted in Young, 1971a, p. 173).

Here, we can see a process of dehumanization – where ‘they’ (the drugtakers) come to be seen increasingly less like the rest of ‘us’.

Young noted how the drugtaker was a visible target to Police, with his long hair, unusual style of dress, all of which made him exceedingly visible (Young, 1971a, p. 174). This visibility, along with the power ratios between the police and the
media on the one hand, and the drugtakers on the other, meant that the
drugtaker was comparatively easy to typify as a folk devil (as compared to the
example of climate change).

The media are often our main source of information about events, and about
people that we have no direct involvement with. But, as Young argues, news has
to be ‘newsworthy’, so the mass media, ‘selects events which are atypical,
presents them in a stereotypical fashion, and contrasts them against a backcloth
of normality which is overtypical’ (Young, 1971a, p. 179). This further
contributes to the notion of a ‘deviant them’ and a ‘good us’; contrasting the
‘bad’ with the ‘good’, the ‘wrong’ with the ‘right’. This is similar in some ways to
manners books, but in a different format; such media coverage further
contributes to the establishment of what is considered acceptable behaviour.
How stories are played out in the news could be seen to function as ‘moral’
narratives in the same way as the much more explicit prescriptive manners
books of the past. We can also see similarities with Elias & Scotson’s The
Established and the Outsiders ([1965] 2008), regarding how ‘praise gossip’ and
‘blame gossip’ further contribute to amplify divisions between groups, to
further contribute to misperceptions about the reality of what all of these
people are really like. Instead of showing a complex picture of a variety of
people who do and do not smoke marijuana, for example, we are instead
presented with polar opposites that are stereotyped and presented as
representative of all.

In contrast, it is less clear how reactions to obesity entail decivilizing trends,
although the phenomenon of obesity itself may be seen as a partial decivilizing
process. It may be too early yet to say, but some developments in the United
States, for example, suggest an increasing involvement of the state in the
regulation and punishment of those who are obese or are seen to have
contributed to someone’s obesity (see LeBesco, 2011). The processes of
individualization and process reduction — whereby individuals come to be
increasingly blamed for obesity (Campos et al., 2006), based on their alleged individual choices (whether it is the individual choices of said person, or the individual choices of their parent or guardian) – do seem to be contributing to misperceptions about obesity and a concomitant decrease in tolerance towards those viewed as ‘obese’ (or being responsible for obesity).

One might argue that the incidence of obesity is a symptom of decivilizing – where a rapid increasing availability of food has gone hand in hand with a decrease in self control over eating, or at least self control has not increased at a fast enough rate to keep pace with the increasing availability of food. Hughes (2004, November) suggests that with increasing control over natural, social and psychic processes that have enabled the development of stable survival units, the growth of agriculture, and the production of surplus food supplies, we have also witnessed a change in the makeup of the food that we produce – meat has more fat, fruit and vegetables are selectively bred and cultivated to produce goods that are higher in carbohydrates, carbohydrates have come to be increasingly refined, and so on. These developments, he argues, have outpaced the rate of biological evolution: when humans and their ancestors were hunting and foraging, they typically did not have frequent access to large quantities of high carbohydrate food sources – honey being one rare and no doubt infrequent source of high carbohydrates – and the biological processes involved in the intake of high carbohydrate food sources did (and still do) contribute to a greater desire for higher calorie foods (for example, see Page et al., 2011). And so the changes in the types of food we have access to has gone hand in hand with the development of what Hughes terms the ‘infantilization of taste’, where there is a trend away from ‘sophisticated and nuanced cuisine’ towards ‘sweet, salty hits that both satiate and leave one unfulfilled’, exemplified in the McDonald’s burger (Hughes, 2004, November). This ‘infantilization of taste’, and responses to it, could be seen as a decivilizing outcome of civilizing processes. But this also appears to be occurring alongside civilizing trends, as will be discussed later in this chapter.
It is fairly easy to see how some reactions to terrorism are moral panics and decivilizing processes. The word ‘terrorism’ itself is used to dehumanize and stigmatize a group, and to delegitimize their actions (Dunning, 2010). Kappeler and Kappeler’s analysis of political discourse following 9/11 clearly demonstrates this process, where terrorism is constructed as a threat to civilization, and terrorists are likened to evil barbarians that slither like serpents and are associated with a host of other crimes, such as drugs, kidnapping, robbery, extortion, corruption, and so on (Kappeler & Kappeler, 2004). Those who question this rhetoric, or the actions of those who are on the ‘hunt’ for these terrorists, are also regarded as aiding ‘the enemy’. Any counter discourses are thereby silenced.

This process of dehumanization facilitates the development of increasingly cruel measures and an increase in violence. Welch provides an excellent overview of the human rights violations that have occurred post 9/11, such as those that developed from the USA Patriot Act of 2001 (Welch, 2004). Rothe and Muzzatti demonstrate the increase in violence: attacks on mosques, graffiti such as ‘bomb the terrorists’, and an increase in hate crimes towards those who look like the current stereotype of a terrorist (Rothe & Muzzatti, 2004).

However, the moral panic literature on terrorism, which highlights the decivilizing trends involved in reactions to terrorism, neglects exploring how the process of terrorism itself develops; for that, we must look elsewhere (for example, see Vertigans, 2011).

The relative absence of moral panic research on tobacco smoking provides us with little evidence for exploring the decivilizing trends in reactions to tobacco smoking. However, throughout the history of tobacco use in the West, we can see episodes where tobacco came to be increasingly problematized and moralized by some (see Bell, 2011; Hughes, 2003). During some of these
episodes, we can witness an increasing uncertainty about the dangers associated with tobacco, fuelled by the media. For example, in the late nineteenth / early twentieth century, there were growing concerns about mental health issues developing as a result of tobacco. And, indeed, smoking itself was seen to be linked with insanity, with a woman in 1900 being committed to a psychiatric unit because she smoked cigarettes (Hughes, 2003). Newspaper headlines, for example, ‘Cigarettes Made Him a Lunatic!’ and ‘Crazed by Cigarettes’ (cited in Hughes, 2003, p. 101), potentially reflected and affected increasing incalculability of the dangers of tobacco smoking. At this stage, however, more research is required to explore the possible moral panics about tobacco, and the decivilizing and civilizing trends that may be involved. In a later section of this chapter, we will explore how civilizing offensives may be a useful concept in exploring possible moral panics about tobacco and other issues.

**How Civilizing Processes Contribute to Moral Panics**

I wish to argue that it is not simply the case that all moral panics are merely decivilizing processes, and not all moral panics necessarily fit this ‘classic’ model of moral panics as decivilizing processes. Indeed, as Elias himself would no doubt have argued, civilizing and decivilizing processes (and, thereby, moral panics), are much more complex than this. Potentially, civilizing processes may contribute to the emergence of moral panics (and moral panics may, in turn, feed back into civilizing processes).

As we saw in the above account of *The Drugtakers*, one characteristic of civilizing processes – increasing heterogeneity – in part could be said to have contributed to the development of the moral panic about drugtakers. Perhaps the degree of heterogeneity increased at such a rapid rate that people's

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51 This uncertainty of the dangers gradually decreased with developments in research on tobacco.
personality make-ups did not have time to adjust to these changes. Their response, therefore, took the form of a moral panic, containing decivilizing symptoms, and with attempts to ‘reformalize’ the process of ‘informalization’ (on informalization and reformalization, see Wouters, 2007). Along with stereotypes of drug users, the popular understanding of drugtaking as a means to lose control can be seen to exemplify fears associated with informalization; fears that a shift towards more informal codes, with behaviours that were once seen as ‘bad’ now being accepted, will result in a decrease in self-control and a growth in immorality. These fears then contribute to the development of attempts to maintain control in the form of increasing social controls over those who are seen to be most at risk – processes of reformalization. In this way, some moral panics can also be seen not just in relation to civilizing and decivilizing processes, but also to informalizing and reformalizing processes.

Increasing division of labour and functional democratization, also symptoms of civilizing processes, similarly contributed to the moral panic about drugtaking and the decivilizing trends that accompanied it. As we saw above, the police, along with members of the public, had little direct access to the issues and the people involved (i.e. drugtakers and drugtaking). This meant that they were reliant on highly mediated sources of information – media portrayals, rumour, and so on. This mediated knowledge facilitated the distortion of the reality of the social problem, contributing to increasing the fantasy content and decreasing the reality congruence of knowledge about drugtakers.

Within the three possible climate change moral panics, civilizing processes may be giving rise to decivilizing trends in several ways, particularly in the area of knowledge. The long-term civilizing trend of the monopolization of scientific knowledge through increasing specialization within scientific establishments (where knowledge becomes less and less accessible to those outside the specialism) has contributed to what Ungar (2000) calls a ‘knowledge-ignorance paradox’. While everyone potentially has access to this knowledge, to be able to
have readily full access to it they have to learn the language of that specialism and how to interpret its knowledge. Due to the time it would take to 'learn the language' of each specialism, and due to the sheer number that exist, there is a relative illiteracy between areas of knowledge. And so people come increasingly to rely upon mediated, popular, simplified versions of knowledge, as we saw in the example of the drugtakers. For climate change, the numbers of different disciplines that are contributing to the science of climate change further complicate this, as it is difficult for even one specialist to grasp all the areas of expertise required to understand all the different methods that contribute to what we know (and what we do not know) about climate change. And so the monopolization of knowledge by scientific establishments coincides with a demonopolization of knowledge via the public sphere – popular, mediated versions of scientific knowledge that scientific establishments may have little control over (Rohloff, 2011a). In this way, the civilizing trend of increased division of labour in science has contributed to the development of mediated knowledge, facilitating the campaigns by both climate change advocates and climate change sceptics, and allowing for increasing uncertainty about the relative dangers of climate change.

In a different way, civilizing processes may be contributing to moral panics about alcohol use. Critcher (2011b) identifies several processes that contributed to the 'gin craze'. He notes how, from the late seventeenth to early eighteenth centuries, England had a surplus of grain, which was in turn used to make alcohol. At the same time, the government passed laws to encourage the production of spirits in England (and prohibited imports). This contributed to a great increase in the production and consumption of gin. Many of those involved (in both drinking and selling gin) were female. It thus contributed to shifting power relations between males and females. However, by providing employment for women, it was seen at the time to be wrongfully taking them away from their domestic duties. Gin soon came to be seen as the source of all things evil, and was targeted as a problem drink (while people were encouraged
to instead drink alternatives such as beer). Subsequently, the government passed eight acts of parliament, including ones to increase taxes and licensing fees. Later, poor harvests resulted in a ban on using grain for distilling alcohol (Critcher, 2011b).

We can see, then, how rapid changes in the power relations between men and women, changes towards more equal relations, were responded to with increasing social controls and an increase in the fantasy content (and decrease in the reality congruent) of knowledge about gin drinking. It could also be the case that the sudden wide availability of gin happened at such a fast rate that people did not have time to gradually adjust and develop self-restraint towards the consumption of gin.

In contrast to these moral panic approaches, Gerritsen (2000), in his study of the regulation of alcohol (and opiates), uses Elias to highlight some of the long-term processes that have contributed to the development of different ways alcohol is regulated, consumed and perceived. We might extend Gerritsen’s work to explore how these long-term processes he identifies feed into various moral panics about alcohol. During the nineteenth century, as the temperance movement was developing, Gerritsen notes how at the same time industrialization was changing workers’ jobs. Many people, who had previously worked on the land, were increasingly required to work in factories where they had to adjust to a new way of working: ‘they had to learn more controlled and more predictable patterns of behaviour; the mechanized and factory-based production methods made this indispensable’ (Gerritsen, 2000, p. 144). This regulation of people’s personalities at work transferred to their lives outside work as well, and so they came to be more disciplined in all areas of their lives. This is just one example of how one aspect of civilizing processes contributed to changing standards of behaviour, thereby contributing to concerns about the amount of alcohol people were consuming and how alcohol affected their
behaviour. And so we can see how civilizing processes can contribute to moral panics – and possible decivilizing trends – about alcohol.

Looking at the time period of the Middle Ages to the present, Stephen Mennell (1987) provides an argument for viewing changes in appetite as paralleling long term civilizing processes. The civilizing of appetite, including increasing self-restraint on appetite and a shift in focus from quantity to quality of food, was made possible by the increasing security of food supplies. This security of food supplies was only made possible by civilizing processes such as increasing state control over violence and taxation, the development of a commercial economy, increasing division of labour, and increasing extension of trade. As food became more widely available more often, increasing competition between the classes, contributed to growing anxieties about fear from ‘those below’, which resulted in the development of the sumptuary laws (Mennell, 1987). [Could this be an example of a moral panic? Alan Hunt certainly looks at the process as an example of moral regulation (Hunt, 1995). Perhaps this is an example that illustrates the limitations of how we conceptualize moral panic, or indeed of the concept of moral panic itself.] These sumptuary laws restricted what one could eat and what one could wear, in an attempt to prevent lower classes from emulating the upper classes. In this sense, civilizing processes may have contributed to a process of moral regulation, and a period of panic, but did they contribute to a moral panic?

The civilizing of appetite itself could be seen to be contributing to the emergence of concern about obesity. The development from the mid eighteenth century onwards of favouring quality of food over quantity, and using more refined and delicate styles of eating, with small, delicate, costly dishes, have in the long-term coincided with an increasing awareness and anxiety about overeating and obesity (Mennell, 1987). It is similar to Elias’s argument about child abuse: with long-term changes in relations between children and their parents that have gone alongside civilizing processes, we have seen a growing
development of concern about children (Elias, [1980] 2008). This explains why, today, a majority of people are concerned about child abuse, and indeed what constitutes child abuse is forever expanding as standards of behavior rise and those actions that were formerly tolerated are now regarded as a form of abuse.

We can see, in part, how standards of etiquette and the associated quest for distinction may have contributed to campaigns to reduce or alter tobacco use. Etiquette manuals and manners books are filled with instructions on how to smoke. Before the increasing medicalization of tobacco, etiquette dictated how one consumed tobacco. And in terms of what we now call ‘passive smoking’, only gradually were these arguments that were originally based on aesthetics transformed into medical arguments concerned with the dangers posed to one’s health (Hughes, 2003). This is not to say, necessarily, that these changes in etiquette corresponded, at times, to moral panics. Due to the absence of moral panic research on this topic, all we can say at this stage is that there might have been moral panics about tobacco, and then investigate further. We can say, however, that the civilizing of tobacco smoking – how the long-term changes in tobacco use paralleled a civilizing process, similar to changes in appetite – may have facilitated the development of moral panics about passive smoking (if, indeed, there have been moral panics about passive smoking; perhaps, instead, we might say the increasing moralization of tobacco smoking).

**How Moral Panics Contribute to Civilizing Processes**

In contrast to seeing moral panics as simply decivilizing trends, we could also conceptualize them as civilizing offensives or civilizing spurts that may further the development of civilizing processes.

In the last section about alcohol, we explored how civilizing processes such as industrialization, and the changes in behaviour accompanying it, contributed to a moral panic about alcohol use. We can argue that particular moral panic (that
occurred during the temperance movement) may have contributed, in the long-term, to increasing self-restraint.

Similarly, moral panics about climate change, at least those ones that are seeking to highlight the dangers of climate change and bring about change before it is too late, can be regarded as civilizing offensives. Many aspects of climate change campaigns share similarities with campaigns about alcohol, tobacco and obesity. All of these forms of consumption – eating, drinking and smoking – have experienced long-term changes towards increasing moderation, as already discussed above (Hughes, 2003; Mennell, 1987). Likewise, there now exist many guides on 'living green' or stopping climate change, that urge consumers to decrease their overall consumption, stop 'binge'ing and overcome their addictions to consuming, shopping and fossil fuels. Climate change moral panics can also be seen as civilizing spurts, as attempts to accelerate the development of 'ecological civilizing processes'.

For the example of the drugtakers, it is less clear how that particular moral panic may have contributed to civilizing processes in the long-term. Nevertheless, in the short-term, it might possibly have been similar to a civilizing offensive. The moral indignation directed at the drugtakers is rationalized in the rhetoric of humanitarianism; where the rhetoric of 'saving' or 'bettering' these people is used to mask the 'moral or material conflicts behind the mantle of humanitarianism' (Young, 1971a, p. 99). This is perhaps similar to Robert van Krieken’s (1999) argument that civilizing offensives may be carried out in the name of civilization, but may contain within them decivilizing symptoms. And so, perhaps, some moral panics could be regarded as certain manifestations of civilizing offensives.

Stephen Mennell notes how the incidence of obesity is most prevalent in (a) the poorest people within the world’s more affluent societies, and (b) the privileged few in the Third World. This, he argues, is due to several reasons. First, there
needs to be an abundant supply of food for people to be able to eat enough on a regular basis in order to be classified as obese. Second, he argues ‘clinical evidence suggests that psychological pressures to overeat are often rooted in past hunger, perhaps in a previous generation’ (Mennell, 1987, p. 397). Perhaps, with the rapid increasing in supply of food to people who, until comparatively recently, had a less stable supply of food, the ‘civilizing of appetite’ has not had a chance to develop at a fast enough rate. Could moral panics about obesity function as a civilizing spurt to further the civilizing of appetite? Perhaps. But they may also have unintended consequences, as so many moral panics have.

Perhaps, some of the outrage directed at the decivilizing trends (such as torture and other cruel activities mentioned above) that have developed with current moral panics about terrorism, will feed into a growing desire to ‘civilize’ the world and prevent such cruel measures from occurring. Andrew Linklater argues that the war on terror not only highlights decivilizing aspects, but it also illustrates a global civilizing process, reflected in the global condemnation of the torture that has occurred (Linklater, 2007). Hopefully such episodes of moral panic (and the associated decivilizing trends), leading unintentionally to the condemnation of those activities, will contribute, in the long-term, to increasing civilized self-restraints.

Some of the different campaigns directed at tobacco may have contributed to civilizing processes (if not, then they may have merely reflected them). It is interesting to note that in a recent study, people who were successful in quitting smoking were most often motivated by health (Aarts, Goudsblom, et al., 1995). But once again, as already mentioned in the previous sections on tobacco, more research is required on this topic. However, I would suggest that some of the developments for alcohol, obesity and climate change could be very similar to those for tobacco, as they all focus on consumption and moderation; the ‘civilizing of appetite’ (Mennell, 1987) certainly shares some similarities with the civilizing of tobacco use (Hughes, 2003).
The examples discussed in this chapter highlight the complexity of moral panics, of civilizing offensives, and of civilizing and decivilizing processes. How can this inform our understanding of moral panic? How can it aid our theoretical-conceptual-methodological development of moral panic? First, let us utilize the above analysis to inform our understandings about ‘good’ and ‘bad’ moral panics.

**Good and Bad Moral Panics**

What implications does the above comparative analysis have for the tendency to normatively judge moral panics as being ‘bad’ events? The following two extracts are taken from Stan Cohen’s Introduction to the 3rd edition of *Folk Devils and Moral Panics*, in a section titled ‘Good and Bad Moral Panics?’

It is obviously true that the uses of the [moral panic] concept to expose disproportionality and exaggeration have come from within a left liberal consensus. The empirical project is concentrated on (if not reserved for) cases where the moral outrage appears driven by conservative or reactionary forces...the point [of moral panic research] was to expose social reaction not just as over-reaction in some quantitative sense, but first, as *tendentious* (that is, slanted in a particular ideological direction) and second, as *misplaced* or *displaced* (that is, aimed – whether deliberately or thoughtlessly – at a target which was not the ‘real’ problem) (Cohen, [1972] 2002, p. xxxi).

Perhaps we could purposely *recreate* the conditions that made the Mods and Rockers panic so successful (exaggeration, sensitization, symbolization, prediction, etc.) and thereby overcome the barriers of denial, passivity and indifference that prevent a full acknowledgement of human cruelty and suffering (Cohen, [1972] 2002, p. xxxiii).
The first extract clearly illustrates the assumption – the presupposition – that moral panics are seen as ‘bad’. However, while they are deemed to be ‘bad’ in the eyes of the researcher, no doubt in some instances those involved in the panic thought that they were doing ‘good’ (their intentions may have been good, but they may have had unintended outcomes). This illustrates the necessity for moral panic researchers to look beyond the ‘conservative’ examples that are typical of the classic moral panics; no doubt the climate at the time, 1960s/1970s, contributed to a particular research focus that has left a legacy where the ‘political project’ (Critcher, 2009) of moral panic research remains a prime focus, thereby limiting the application, exploration and development of the concept of moral panic (see Garland, 2008; Rohloff & Wright, 2010).

In stark contrast to this, in the second extract above, Cohen suggests the possibility of purposefully engineering moral panics, to overcome the denial of atrocities (linking in with his work on the flipside of panic: denial; see Cohen, 2001). One could say that Cohen’s idea of a good moral panic is similar to the idea of a civilizing offensive or a civilizing spurt. However, I wish to suggest that even Cohen’s hypothetical ‘good’ panics could have unintended, disintegrative, decivilizing outcomes; given certain conditions, rather than merely bringing attention to atrocities and overcoming denial, the ‘good’ panic may contribute to further cruelty and suffering. Furthermore, if the ‘good’ panic is still not well informed, it may lead to further denial; communicating emotion and fear, rather than enabling, may instead be disabling (for example, in relation to climate change, see O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009).

One of the important contributions of Cohen’s suggestion of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ moral panics is as a heuristic device. As we have seen, moral panic has largely

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52 For example, while some might argue that drugs are ‘bad’ and in need of regulation, Spierenburg (2008, pp. 216-218) notes how the criminalization of drugs has gone hand in hand with an increase in violence and organized crime, and the spread of drug addiction – unintended outcomes, similar to those that developed during the prohibition era.
been conceptualized in negative terms, as a 'bad' episode that needs remedying and even debunking. The introduction of the term 'good moral panic' may help to shift the focus of moral panic studies towards those examples that in the past have largely been neglected (climate change, tobacco smoking, obesity, and so on) as campaigns surrounding those issues are increasingly supported by moral panic researchers (see Cohen, 2011, for a discussion on the changing relationship between researchers and the campaigns they are investigating), and where the notion of debunking would not necessarily apply. This expansion of the selection of real-type examples for analysis would then more widely inform the conceptualization of the ideal-type process of moral panic (on the relationship between real-type and ideal-type in moral panic analysis, see Wright, 2011).

While the notion of 'good' moral panic is useful as a heuristic device, we need to be wary of the dichotomy of bad and good moral panics, or moral panics as either decivilizing processes or civilizing spurts. As we have seen above, moral panics are much more complex than this.

**Moral Panics as Civilizing and Decivilizing Processes**

As argued elsewhere (Rohloff, 2011b; Rohloff & Wright, 2010), one way to overcome this dichotomy – of good or bad, of civilizing or decivilizing – is to utilize a figurational approach to moral panic studies. This would involve efforts to reduce the intrusion of 'heteronomous valuations' (Elias, [1970] 2012) into moral panic research, and remove the normative presupposition that a particular reaction to a given issue is an inappropriate reaction in need of debunking. Such a method would require a detour via detachment and a subsequent secondary involvement (Elias, [1987] 2007) to allow for the possibility of intervention after the research has been completed (for example, to suggest more adequate responses to perceived problems). Combining this with a figurational approach that focuses on long-term developments, exploring
gradual processes that influence the development of panics, can also help to overcome the inherent bias within moral panic studies (this is already happening, to a certain extent, with some researchers incorporating moral regulation approaches (for example, see Hier, 2008; Hunt, 2011)).

As well as employing these methods, we can combine all that we have learned from the above comparative discussion to focus on exploring both civilizing and decivilizing trends, to conceptualize moral panics as civilizing and decivilizing processes. Such an approach can take account of the interplay of complex civilizing and decivilizing processes that are developing before, during and after moral panics, thereby avoiding the dichotomy of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ moral panics.

We can take climate change and broader environmental and animal rights campaigns as an example. As outlined above, moral panic research has explored the role of information and knowledge in climate change – both in campaigns by those who are demanding action to mitigate climate change, and in campaigns by climate change sceptics. Ungar in particular explores what he terms ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ disproportionality; the former referring to claims by sceptics that scientists are distorting and exaggerating, the latter referring to climate campaigners focusing on claims that represent the direst threats (Ungar, 2011). In relation to the argument that climate change campaigns represent civilizing offensives to further civilizing processes (Rohloff, 2011a), there has been some figurational research that has argued that the development of ecological sensibilities could be seen as a type of civilizing process (Quilley, 2009b; Schmidt, 1993). The development of the phenomenon of climate change may, in part, have been contributed to by certain outcomes of processes of civilization, where decivilizing consequences have resulted in the form of excess capitalism and overconsumption, to the relative detriment of the environment and social life as a whole (see Ampudia de Haro, 2008). Moral panics about climate change (excluding those instigated by sceptics) might be used as a civilizing offensive to bring about a civilizing ‘spurt’.
While we might be tempted to classify such a moral panic as a civilizing process, we must consider possible decivilizing trends as well. One has already been mentioned: the strong and weak disproportionality, contributing to increasingly incalculability of danger. Another decivilizing disintegrative processes could occur via the development of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ behaviours into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ people. This is already occurring, through the emergence of such terms as ‘eco-friendly’, ‘eco-criminal’, and ‘eco-deviant’. Potentially, if standards of behaviour increased to such an extent and those who did not behave in an eco-friendly enough manner came to be seen as a great enough threat to the planet and, thereby, every person, then mutual identification between the ‘eco-friendly’ and the ‘eco-deviant’ may decrease, contributing to changes in the way these groups interact. Such a process is already happening, to a limited extent, with a minority of animal rights and environmental activists who prioritize animal/environmental rights over the rights of people they see to be threatening certain animals and environments. Here, increasing mutual identification with animals and the environment is accompanied with a decreasing mutual identification with some other people (for example, see Quilley, 2009b, p. 133). And so we see civilizing processes occurring alongside decivilizing processes. Consequently, moral panics over climate change could be regarded as both, potentially, civilizing and decivilizing processes.

**Elias and Foucault: On (De)Civilizing Processes and Moral Panics**

Having outlined how moral panics can be explored through both civilizing and decivilizing processes, we now turn to bringing an additional approach into the discussion – Foucault – to further a rethink of civilizing and decivilizing process, intended and unintended developments, short- and long-term processes, and the role of knowledge in processes of civilization.
Before we turn to Foucault, let us first recap on what comparing Elias and the concept of moral panic can suggest about civilizing and decivilizing processes. To date, decivilizing processes have been conceptualized as civilizing processes in reverse (Mennell, 1990), occurring where there is an increase in actual danger and a decrease in the calculability of danger. Conversely, as we have seen above, some moral panics occur where there is only a perceived, and not necessarily an actual, increase in danger. This suggests that we may need to expand how we conceptualize decivilizing processes, taking into consideration both realities and perceptions, and the interplay between the two. An additional issue arises when we ask the question: is this particular episode civilizing or decivilizing? Is this even an important question? Does it increase the likelihood of falling into a dichotomous trap (as with good and bad moral panics)? Should we instead be exploring both the civilizing and decivilizing trends that are occurring in any given period of time that we are studying, without concerning ourselves with which ones are dominant? But if we do want to, how do we quantifiably assess the dominance of civilizing processes over decivilizing processes, or vice versa? The question of the relationship between civilizing and decivilizing processes will be further explored in chapter 9.

An additional question we can draw out of the comparison between moral panics and de/civilizing processes is of the relationship between intended and unintended developments. As argued elsewhere (Rohloff & Wright, 2010), some researchers have conceptualized moral panics as intentional developments (while others have characterized them as unintentional). It is well recognized that, while Elias acknowledged that people ‘act intentionally, their intentions always arising from and directed towards the developments not planned by them’ (Elias, [1980] 2008, p. 32), he is regarded as focusing on unplanned developments (even though his ‘process model’ ‘encompasses at its nucleus a dialectical movement between intentional and unintentional social changes’ (Elias, [1980] 2008, p. 32). Foucault, on the other hand, is seen to focus on planned action (Binkley, Dolan, Ernst, & Wouters, 2010, pp. 75-76). Combining
approaches from Foucault and Elias, as exemplified in moral panic research, may help to overcome the division between intended and unintended developments. If we utilize the concept of civilizing offensive, we can devote more space to exploring the relatively neglected area of the relation between processes and offensives, between the unplanned and the planned. As Dunning and Sheard ([1979] 2005, p. 280) and van Krieken (1990, p. 366) argue, this is an area of relative neglect in figurational research.

Inextricably tied into planned action and unplanned developments, is the relation between short- and long-term processes. Moral panic research has tended to focus on the short-term, implying (perhaps in a Foucauldian way) the occurrence of an epistemic rupture. All of a sudden, a problem is identified and we have a moral panic. This focus on sudden, abrupt change is similar to Foucault’s focus on ruptures, discontinuities, breaks, and so on (Binkley et al., 2010; Foucault, [1969] 2002). This contrasts with Elias’s attention to the long-term. Similar to the above, if we combine the work of Foucault and Elias, in the case of moral panic (and other examples), we can explore the interrelation between short-term and long-term processes, thereby developing a more encompassing method for sociological research.

The Role of Knowledge in Civilizing (and Decivilizing) Processes
As already outlined in the case studies discussed above, the role of knowledge in civilizing and decivilizing processes (and moral panics) should be of central focus. Research on decivilizing (and dyscivilizing) processes in particular tends to focus on the role of violence – on its monopolization and de-monopolization by a central state authority (for example, see de Swaan, 2001; Fletcher, 1997; Mennell, 1990). However, as the cases discussed above suggest, as does the development of moral panics more generally, the monopolization and de-monopolization of knowledge can also play a prominent role in the development of decivilizing processes.
Increased reliance upon expert knowledge – the expertization and monopolization of knowledge – leads to increased interdependencies, characteristic of civilizing processes, but this can also contribute to decivilizing. For example, with a moral panic, where claims may be exaggerated, distorted, or even invented, danger may come to be perceived as greater than it actually is\(^{53}\). Thus, as with the monopolization of violence, the monopolization of knowledge may also entail the potential for ‘dyscivilizing processes’ (de Swaan, 2001), as may be the case with ‘elite engineered’ (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, [1994] 2009) moral panics.

Conversely, the growth in alternative media and the advent of the Internet have increasingly enabled the possibility for alternative claims and counter-claims, thereby reducing the monopolization of knowledge in some cases. The decrease in monopolization may then contribute to danger becoming increasingly incalculable (who’s knowledge, or claims, do we believe?). This rise in the incalculability of danger may then contribute to rising fears and anxieties, which may then be expressed as moral panics. And so, the de-monopolization of knowledge, as with violence, may contribute to decivilizing processes. However, the de-monopolization of knowledge may also assist in the prevention of moral panics and, when they do occur, foreshorten the process of moral panics; for, in ‘multi-mediated social worlds’, dissenting voices may be readily voiced and heard (McRobbie & Thornton, 1995).

**Conclusion**

This chapter has compared several moral panic case studies – alcohol, climate change, drugtaking, eating/obesity, terrorism, and tobacco – to analyze and flesh out the civilizing and decivilizing processes that occur before, during and after moral panics. The analysis has furthered the development of moral panic

\(^{53}\) Although this is not necessarily always the case, as can be seen with the example of climate change (Rohloff, 2011a).
research by highlighting that panics are much more complex processes than what many researchers tend to recognize. In doing so, I have attempted to address the issue with moral panics being conceptualized dichotomously as either bad or good moral panics (while acknowledging the usefulness of this as a heuristic).

For figurational research, the above discussion has contributed to efforts to further develop theorizing and research on the relation between civilizing and decivilizing processes, questioning how we conceptualize and quantify these processes. In drawing attention to the relatively neglected role of knowledge, I have highlighted an additional area of research to pursue, one that may contribute to how we conceptualize the development of processes of civilization.

The comparison between Elias, Foucault and moral panic highlights the value of figurational researchers engaging with non-Eliasian concepts and theories. Through combining these three areas of research, we can begin to explore the relatively neglected areas of the relation between short- and long-term processes, and intended and unintended developments, and possibly much more.

In the next and final chapter, I return to the research aims that were introduced in Chapter 1. I suggest how the research findings can inform understanding about climate change. I build upon the discussion presented here and in Chapter 4, of how moral panic should be conceptualized and how moral panic research should be undertaken. Following on from this comparative chapter, I then discuss the relation between civilizing processes and civilizing offensives, and answer some of the questions posed above about decivilizing processes.
Chapter Nine

Conclusion

Introduction

Throughout this thesis, I have explored how and to what extent climate change has developed as a perceived social problem. This has involved exploring this development as part of an ecological civilizing process, and as part of a moral panic; in the long-term and in the short-term; at the societal level and at the individual level. The central aims of the thesis were threefold: (1) to utilize the research findings to develop conclusions about how the governance of climate change has been developing, and how it might or ought to develop in the future; (2) to use the process of research to assess critically the value of the concept of moral panic, concluding with how we can improve both the concept of moral panic and the approach to doing moral panic research; (3) to use the various stages of this research – those focusing on climate change, drawing upon moral panic, and utilizing comparative analysis – to develop a more adequate understanding of the relation between civilizing processes and civilizing offensives; and (4) to reconceptualize decivilizing processes. I will go through my conclusions about these four aims in turn below.

The Past, Present, and Future of Climate Change Governance

As demonstrated in Chapter 5, the development of concern about climate change, along with the individual regulation of climate change, is intimately connected with a long-term ecological civilizing process, and a more general civilizing process. The discourses present within various media that have been produced to try and affect the development of ecological sensibilities, and
changes in behaviour regarding climate change, share similarities with the discourses from manners and etiquette books from before climate change became a ‘popular’, mainstream topic. In understanding how they link into more long-term developments, future creators of popular media and policy can tap into these changing sensibilities and try to direct them from within.

Importantly, as both the analysis of documents and the interviews have demonstrated, those who dictate how we should and should not behave, and those who we seek to emulate, is changing. The shift from authors of manners texts and the middle class, to celebrities, scientists and others, highlights the need to utilise these ‘new arbiters’, but in a way that does not elicit scepticism (for example, one participant was critical and sceptical of Al Gore).

The interviews further added credence to earlier research that cautioned the use of fear in campaigning, or of trying to engineer a ‘good’ moral panic. As was demonstrated in Chapter 7, these intentional campaigns surrounding environmental issues and climate change, which utilised fear and sadness, had the unintended consequence of contributing to avoidance of the issue, of not seeing the issue, and therefore a form of denial of climate change. Future campaigns must take this into consideration, and place greater emphasis on the multiple contributions the elicitation of different emotions have. For example, for some people, fear and sadness can be enabling, for others, disabling. Future research should also explore in more detail the biographical developments of ‘activists’ and ‘non-activists’, to further flesh out the different processes that contribute to activism and those that do not.

The documentary analysis and interviews analysis together suggest that the individual governance of climate change, through various popular media and campaigns, must be combined with social controls and incentives from various formal institutions, including local and national governments. While the individual regulation from popular media and other people does appear to be
having some effect, it can be only partial, resulting in people focusing on a few things that make them feel good (as if they are doing something to help the environment) while neglecting others that may be contributing to climate change.

In this way, the individualised responsibilization of climate change may serve as a distraction from instigating broader, structural changes in society that would be necessary to alleviate climate change. These personal, individual changes serve as a form of emotional satisfaction, to alleviate concerns about climate change, concerns that one is not acting to stop it.

Furthermore, the urgency of climate change necessitates more formal interventions in order to accelerate the development of this ecological civilizing process, to create an ecological civilizing spurt. This could be achieved through increasingly more partnerships between the new arbiters of behavioural standards, governments, and corporations. However, this would need to be accompanied with structural transformations, engineered intentionally by people, but the question remains, unfortunately, to what extent are we adequately informed to be able to make such massive interventions, and how could they practically be achieved? Such questions would constitute an entire research project, and would require the input of scientists from a wide variety of disciplines – not just the social sciences. As such, they will have to wait for a subsequent piece of research.

The Contribution to Climate Change Research

One way in which this thesis has contributed to climate change research, is through its focus on exploring the interplay between short-term and long-term processes, and intentional actions and unintended consequences. In On the Process of Civilization, one of the examples Elias ([1939] 2012) explored in changing manners was ‘on blowing one’s nose’. These intentional campaigns (or
civilizing offensives) to change the way people blew their nose, along with other specific campaigns, fed into unintended consequences such as an increasing internalization of restraints in general, with regard to bodily functions, emotional expression, the expression of violent impulses and so forth. Nonetheless, these nose blowing campaigns were successful to the extent that they did affect changes in the way people blew their noses. And so short-term campaigns can have both intended and unintended consequences.

We can apply this same notion to the example of climate change, and to the theoretical-empirical research discussed in this thesis. From Chapter 5, which explored the long-term development of ecological sensibilities, it appears that ecological concerns about littering have developed, to a certain extent, as the unintended outcome of civilizing processes – there is the growing pacification of ‘nature’ that contributes to the growing aestheticization of ‘nature’, which in turn contributes to aesthetic concerns about littering, which then, in combination with increasing mutual identification with other animals and other forms of life (and indeed the biosphere as a whole), contributes with growing ecological concerns about littering. Throughout this gradual long-term process, there is the interweaving of many part processes as explored in Chapter 5, which includes intentional civilizing offensives. In order to predict the extent to which a given civilizing offensive will have intended relative to unintended consequences, it is therefore necessary to understand the related historical trajectories that have developed thus far, and how they relate to the social problem in question (in this case, climate change). In doing so, campaigners and policy makers may have a greater chance of tapping into those themes that are already developing, and perhaps accelerate them.

As well as exploring these timeframes, this thesis has done something no other climate change research has done to date – it has combined the analysis of the aforementioned civilizing processes and civilizing offensives, with an analysis of moral panics and individual people’s biographical developments. The concept of
moral panic has been a useful tool to explore the unintended consequences of climate change campaigns (or civilizing offensives). For example, as was discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, some climate change campaigns, instead of causing panic and inducing positive behavioural change, are having the unintended consequence of inducing denial and avoidance in some people – the opposite of what was intended, potentially contributing to an increase in the problem. Another potential unintended consequence can occur through the scapegoating of so-called ‘eco-deviants’, ‘climate change deniers’, and so forth. Directing blame at these groups may deflect attention away from the necessary structural and general lifestyle changes that would realistically be required were anthropogenic climate change to be adequately addressed.

At another level, the focus on individual ecological civilizing processes provides an insight into how these necessary lifestyle changes might become internalized as a form of ‘second nature’. There were indications towards this suggested in the example of recycling, where Cynthia frequently referred to sorting rubbish and recycling, and to using recyclable utensils rather than disposable ones. In her home country, this was encouraged by the government (using fines, and so forth). However, when she moved to the UK these standards of behaviour were still prominent, as she spoke of sorting other people’s rubbish and recycling, not just her own. This suggests that at least in a person’s lifetime there may be a relative internalization of ecologically-justified manners.

However, campaigns/offensives as part of moral panics to induce such behavioural change may still have unintended consequences. For example, again using the case of recycling, one of the ‘activists’, Heather, argued that recycling could, effectively, hinder attempts to address climate change. As she stated, people think that, “Oh, I’ve recycled, therefore I’ve saved the planet. That’s the end of it.” Recycling almost quite damaging in that sense.’ As mentioned in Chapter 7, non-activists’ focus on volunteering one or two or so
specific minor ‘green’ things they did suggests that perhaps this is indeed the case to a certain extent.

All of these levels of analysis, of timeframes of analysis, and the interweaving of them, are essential to consider when examining any social problem. As such, not only has this thesis innovatively contributed to research on climate change in this way, but it has also contributed more broadly to the study of social problems, and of deviance. An important concept in the sociology of deviance is moral panic, and this thesis has also contributed to the field of moral panic studies in several ways.

**The Future of the Concept of Moral Panic**

Throughout this thesis, I have demonstrated how complex moral panics are, with the discussion of the literature in Chapter 3, the analysis of climate change in Chapter 6, and the comparative moral panic (and figurational) analysis in Chapter 8. Having demonstrated that previous conceptualizations of moral panic do not allow researchers to explore the complexity of moral panics, I now wish to turn to explicating how I think the concept of moral panic should be used, and how one should go about doing moral panic research.

Primarily, moral panic should not be used as merely a taxonomic tool to say, for example: this is a moral panic, that is not a moral panic; this is a successful moral panic, that is a failed moral panic; this is a strong moral panic, that is a weak moral panic, and so on. While the concept of moral panic may be used outside of academia in this way, as a descriptive term to dismiss a reaction to a social problem, we as researchers should strive to use the concept in a much more sociological way.

Instead, moral panic should be used as an investigative tool, as a sensitizing device to assist in the exploration of an empirical example. Herbert Blumer
provides an argument about the nature of concepts, which can be applied to the current status of moral panic. He delineates between two types of concepts: ‘definitive concepts’ and ‘sensitizing concepts’. To date, moral panic has largely been used as a definitive concept. Blumer defines definitive concepts as follows:

What is common to a class of objects, by the aid of a clear definition in terms of attributes or fixed benchmarks. This definition [of the concept], or the benchmarks, serve as a means of clearly identifying the individual instance of the class and the make-up of that instance that is covered by the concept (Blumer, [1969] 1998, pp. 147-148)

This is similar to Goode and Ben-Yehuda’s ([1994] 2009) often referred to criteria of moral panic, where moral panics, according to them, must have folk devils and they must be comprised of the following five criteria: concern, hostility, consensus, disproportion, volatility. In contrast to this, we can instead use moral panic as a sensitizing concept:

A sensitizing concept lacks such specification of attributes or benchmarks and consequently it does not enable the user to move directly to the instance and its relevant content. Instead, it gives the user a general sense of reference and guidance in approaching empirical instances. Whereas definitive concepts provide prescriptions of what to see, sensitizing concepts merely suggest directions along which to look (Blumer, [1969] 1998, p. 148).

Using concepts as sensitizing devices rather than definitive devices allows the concepts to grow and develop, for it allows the input of empirical data to influence how we think about moral panic – a sensitizing concept is characterized by a much more even relationship between the concept and empirical data.
To undertake moral panic in this way – by using it as a sensitizing concept – one still has to provide guidelines and suggestions about what sort of things to look for. These guidelines and suggestions can be developed and continuously redeveloped in relation to empirical analyses (including Cohen’s original formulation of the concept). For now, let me propose some guidelines for what could be explored. We can break the concept of moral panic up into various different processes, and explore: how and the extent to which something is moralized; how and the extent to which there is concern about an issue; the degree of ‘reality-congruence’ of the representations of the problem, and how these representations develop; the power relations between those who are seen to be the ‘problem’ and those who are trying to ‘control’ the problem. This is just a selection of the many processes and relations that can be explored. Importantly, rather than seeing these guidelines as ‘criteria’, they are merely suggestions of areas that might be explored. The presence or absence of them is irrelevant for deciding if a given phenomenon is a moral panic, for by approaching research in this way that question becomes irrelevant.

However, we cannot ignore the political origins of the concept of moral panic, and the likelihood that many who have undertaken moral panic research in the past and will undertake moral panic research in the future contain a political element in their research. As mentioned in earlier chapters in this thesis (see in particular, Chapters 3 and 4), I do not wish to remove politics from research. Rather, I wish to propose a different way to approach politics in moral panic research. Instead of deciding at the outset that the empirical example one is about to investigate is a moral panic, is a ‘bad’ thing, and must be debunked to liberate those who are suffering as a result of this moral panic, researchers must strive to be aware of these preconceived ideas but work hard at focusing their passion associated with this political involvement on the research process while being wary of this potential bias – they may, after all, be proven wrong. As outlined in Chapters 3 and 4, following this ‘detour via detachment’, researchers
can then practice a form of secondary involvement after the research is complete. This could be comprised of intervening in or communicating with policy, education, media, and so on to try and affect more adequate representations, regulation, and so on, of the given problem.

The question remains, however, is the concept of moral panic still of some use? I wish to argue that it is still useful in several ways. Firstly, it provides some direction about what to look for, what to investigate (as explicated above). But does that not blind us to other theories that we could be investigating? The short answer to this question is: yes. We do need to recognize with sensitizing concepts that if you open door, you potentially close other doors. But this would be the case with any piece of research. The important thing is to be aware of this when carrying out research, to be aware of these biases. Secondly, moral panic emerged as a political concept. This political aspect can be retained, though it must be redrawn as proposed above. Thirdly (and to summarize), the point of moral panic research is to understand and to re-draw; to understand how ‘moral panics’ have been and are developing, and to re-draw the part processes in order to improve their adequacy.

As mentioned in Chapter 6, re-drawing these part processes can be attempted to be achieved through utilizing a reconceptualization of disproportionality. First, by exploring the change in the degree of attention paid to a given issue, what sort of attention is paid to it and in what way, and how and to what extent this changes over time. Second, by exploring the degrees of ‘reality-congruence’ and ‘value-congruence’; that is, the accuracy and appropriateness of representations of the issue, and attempts to regulate the issue (including assessing the degree to which regulatory attempts are likely to have more intended than unintended, and integrative rather than disintegrative consequences, as well as exploring the values behind different representations).
These changes that I have proposed here for how we think about the role of the concept of moral panic, how one should undertake moral panic research, and how the political purpose of research can be redrawn, facilitates the ongoing development of the concept of moral panic. It was initially developed in the 1960s and 1970s, but the political landscape has changed since then, and there have been major developments and changes in the media. Using moral panic as a sensitizing concept, and using it in a similar way to how I have proposed to here, allows for the potential ongoing development of the concept of moral panic, thereby its continuing relevance and longevity.

The Contribution to Moral Panic Research

To summarize, this thesis has contributed to moral panic studies in many ways. To date, no one has synthesized moral panic and figurational sociology through a detailed empirical analysis (a few authors have referred to my first few articles on Elias and moral panic in their own articles that have discussed empirical examples, but these have not been detailed, lengthy research projects such as the one presented in this thesis). The value for moral panic of synthesizing these two bodies of research has been evident in several ways. As with the contribution to climate change research, the focus on exploring the interplay between various different levels and timeframes of analysis is unique to moral panic studies. Prior to this, moral panic research has been very short-term focused. The utilization of civilizing and decivilizing processes and civilizing offensives in comparing several different empirical examples in Chapter 8 provided a more complex insight into the values in moral panic. Specifically, it demonstrated how a conceptualization of moral panics as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ was highly problematic, considering the complex integrative and disintegrative, and intended and unintended developments that occur. This complexity of moral panics provided a further demonstration for why it is necessary to remove the normative presupposition, and to exercise greater levels of detachment in research. The empirical analysis of climate change
provided an additional rationale for this – the results reported in Chapter 7 demonstrate how, while we might think that climate change moral panics would be a ‘good’ thing (to address the social problem of anthropogenic climate change), they might have many unwanted, unintended consequences, such as the denial and avoidance of the issue of climate change, the creation of scapegoats, and a focus on ways of addressing climate change that may not adequately resolve the problem (for example, focusing on individual lifestyles in ‘green guides’, while neglecting structural changes).

**On the Relation between Figurational Sociology and other Approaches to Research**

Throughout this thesis, I have attempted to draw comparisons between Elias’s arguments and those of other social theorists, between figurational sociology and other approaches to research. There were two main reasons for doing this. First, to assist with the critical reassessment of the various concepts and theories I was primarily using in this thesis. Second, to demonstrate the similarities and differences between these theories and approaches in order to stimulate dialogue *with* different theories and approaches, by working with them (rather than against them). These comparisons, including those with Beck, Foucault, and Urry, have shed some light on how, for example, we might consider the relation between intended and unintended developments, and between gradual and sudden change. These are useful to consider when concerning the relation between civilizing processes and civilizing offensives.

**The Relation Between Civilizing Processes and Civilizing Offensives**

In Chapter 5, I primarily explored the development of climate change in relation to ecological civilizing processes – gradual, unintended developments. Indeed, some of the contributing factors to the actual phenomenon of climate change have occurred, in part, as unintended consequences of civilizing processes.
Within these gradual, unplanned developments, however, it was clear that there were deliberate, intentional, ecological civilizing offensives launched to try and bring about more rapid changes in sensibilities. This was further examined in Chapter 6, where I looked at climate change in relation to moral panics.

In assessing how moral panics relate to civilizing offensives and processes, and to intended and unintended developments, I argued that we could utilise the concept of moral panic in order to assess the reality-congruence and value-congruence of the representations and regulation of social problems. By doing so, I proposed, we could explore the extent to which a given moral panic could have more intended than unintended consequences. And so it is not merely the case that short term, sudden change is intentional (i.e. moral panics), and that long term, gradual change is unintentional.

All of this suggests that social processes involve a blend of civilizing offensives and civilizing processes, of intended and unintended developments, and of sudden and gradual changes. Future research should focus on exploring these blends in various empirical examples.

**Conceptualising Decivilizing Processes**

This research has suggested two ways in which decivilizing processes can be approached anew, and it has also raised some questions about the very concept of decivilizing. As argued throughout, notions of decivilizing need to not just focus on the monopolization and demonopolization of violence, but to consider other factors that contribute to decivilizing. In this thesis, I have focused on the monopolization and demonopolization (and democratization) of knowledge, but future research could explore additional areas.

I have also argued that various symptoms or criteria of decivilizing as proposed by Mennell and Fletcher need not to actually occur initially, but the mere
perception that they are occurring can lead to the development of actual symptoms/criteria. In other words, perceived decivilizing can lead to actual decivilizing.

In addition, and in accordance with the likes of van Krieken, Pratt and Vertigans, in exploring moral panics I have examined decivilizing as partial decivilizing, or as part-processes occurring in tandem with civilizing processes. This further suggests that civilizing and decivilizing processes should be conceptualized as a blend, as degrees of civilizing and decivilizing.

However, several questions still remain. Should decivilizing be conceptualized as a reversal? Does that make it a more normative concept? Do we even need the term decivilizing? I wish to suggest that we might want to consider exploring some of the examples discussed here – both my own and others’ – without using the concept of decivilizing. This could help to avoid: normative charges associated with both civilizing and decivilizing processes; a simplification of the dynamic shifts occurring within civilizing processes; and a slip into dichotomous, normative thinking. Instead of using the concept of decivilizing, we can explore the degrees of different part processes and relations, how the degree of these different part processes shift, and how this relates to other part-processes (for example, exploring shifts in the degree of the state monopolization of violence and how this relates to the degree of emotional identification with different groups, and so on). In this way, we do not need to classify part processes or whole processes as either civilizing or decivilizing. We could even perhaps not speak of civilizing processes. Only through research, however, can we determine how and to what extent we might be able to proceed without the concept of decivilizing processes.

The Contribution to Figurational Research
This thesis has contributed to figurational research by further testing and developing the concept of ecological civilizing processes. It has added to the concept by exploring it in relation to multiple levels and timeframes of analysis (as mentioned above), and by examining it in relation to the concept of moral panic. It has suggested that both long-term unplanned ecological civilizing processes and individual ecological civilizing processes are developing, and that ecological civilizing offensives may be contributing to these to a certain extent. However, the question remains whether these developments will occur at fast enough rates to adequately address anthropogenic climate change.

In exploring these different timeframes and levels of analysis, including the relation between the planned and the unplanned, this thesis has gone some way to addressing the lack of research on civilizing offensives, and the interplay between offensives and processes. By combining this with the concept of moral panic, the attention given in research to offensives increases.

An additional relative area of neglect, is the problematic relation between civilizing and decivilizing processes. While several important works have been written on this, it is still unclear precisely how we should conceptualize this relation. It is notable that many figurational researchers do not actually use the term ‘decivilizing’ or ‘decivilization’. This therefore suggests that we could, perhaps, undertake research without it. As I have suggested earlier in this Chapter, and in Chapter 8, the notion of civilizing in contrast to decivilizing has strong normative connotations, akin to ‘good’ and ‘bad’ panics. In collapsing both of these dichotomies, this research intends to contribute to the relative decrease in normative judgments made in both figurational and moral panic research, thereby hopefully decreasing the normative charges that are made towards these fields of study.

**Limitations of the Study**
As with any piece of research, this study had several limitations, some of which I will outline here. One of the limitations was time: I would have liked to have had the time to have analyzed more and a greater variety of historical documents. I had initially intended to explore, in detail, the development of the natural sciences, including popular science, and how these processual changes related to those that were occurring in manners books. While I did briefly touch upon this in this thesis, were I to do this research over again, I would examine this in more detail. I would also analyze a greater variety of documents that are skeptical about climate change.

Additionally, I would have liked to have made my interviews more biographical, exploring in more detail their life stories. The idea of individual ecological civilizing processes was a late development in the research design, only instigated partway through the interviews (indeed, from memory it was one of the first few interviews that prompted the idea). This would potentially have provided greater insight into ecological developments within a person’s lifetime, including the shift from external restraint to the internalization of standards of behaviour as ‘second nature’.

I had initially also considered interviewing climate change ‘activists’ who are active in the so-called ‘denial’ of climate change. However, again time constraints prevented this. Were I to do this research over, and with more time, I would try to interview a selection of people from this group to gain a greater insight into their reception to climate change campaigns and to explore their biographical developments.

Another idea I have had since completing this research is photo diaries. It might prove insightful to utilize these by asking participants to photograph things they associated with ‘nature’ and ‘the environment’, things they enjoy related to these, and things they regard as being ‘eco-friendly’ or ‘eco-deviance’.
As outlined below, I had also intended to explore the development of the concept of moral panic – a sociology of the sociology of moral panic – as I believe this would provide greater insight into how the concept has developed and how it might or ought to develop in the future.

**Suggestions for Future Research**

There were several studies or aspects of studies that were originally intended to be components of this research, but due to restraints on time (and word count), these less vital components were temporarily abandoned. I wish to outline here the two main studies I had intended to do, and how I intend to develop them in the future.

*On the Development of Moral Panic*

One of the last things I removed from this thesis was a whole chapter titled ‘On the development of moral panic’. It would have provided a greater insight into the development of the concept of moral panic, but it was not essential for this thesis (or not as essential as other things). Instead, I will outline here what my research plans are in the immediate future on this topic. As one of the aims of my ongoing research is to develop a reformulation of the moral panic concept, I will carry out an analysis of the development of moral panic. This will involve looking at the development of the concept in both sociological (and related) literature, as well as the popular/media usage of the concept.

Firstly, I will trace the development of the concept (including the antecedents to the concept) in academia. This will involve looking at what topics have been the foci of moral panic research at different times, and the frequency of these topics. I will also look at the frequency of moral panic studies per year, and examine definitions of moral panic in sociology (and criminology, media studies, and related disciplines) dictionaries, encyclopedias and textbooks. As I might
develop an alternative concept, I will also look at existing concepts that are similar to moral panic (from sociology and related disciplines).

Moral panic has also become widespread in popular culture, being employed by the general public and even the media themselves. The term is used in popular discourse sometimes as a way to dismiss reactions, including media stories, as being ‘just’ a moral panic. I therefore intend to trace the development of moral panic in popular culture. This will involve looking at the frequency of usage of the term over time, and in relation to what particular examples, as well as the function of the employment of the term. Throughout this analysis, I intend to ask the question as to whether or not a concept that has a particular meaning in popular culture can still be used in a slightly different way in academia; for example, just as the term ‘civilization’ (as a process) is employed by Elias in a different way to the everyday usage of the term.

Comparative Figurational Moral Panic Analysis of Problematized Consumption

Some of the discourse surrounding climate change focuses on consumption, with references to overconsumption and excess consumption, requiring ‘dieting’, and comparisons to addiction, drug addiction, shopaholics, and so on. This rather fuzzy usage of addiction has prompted my own interest in how a large scale comparative study of various forms of consumption that have been problematized at particular times in particular places can help to inform understandings about addiction and ‘problem’ consumption. Building upon what has already been developed in the comparative chapter in this thesis, future research could utilize both moral panic and figurational approaches to develop a large scale piece of comparative historical research that explores the historical and biographical developments of how various forms of consumption are perceived, regulated, and consumed in a variety of western and non-western nations, and how this has changed and developed over time. This would also feed into understandings about the relations discussed in this conclusion: between civilizing offensives and civilizing processes, between
intended and unintended developments, and between gradual and sudden change. It could also be used as a test case to explore these developments while trying not to use the concept of decivilizing.
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RESEARCH ETHICS CHECKLIST, Department of Sociology and Communications, Brunel University
Effective 10 October 2008

This checklist, based on the Research Ethics Review Checklist from the ESRC Research Ethics Framework, was designed to help determine the level of risk of harm to participants’ welfare entailed in a proposed study within the Dep. of Sociology and Communications in the School of Social Sciences at Brunel University.

This checklist should be completed for every empirical research project in the Department by students and staff (see note below regarding staff funding applications), that involves human participants. It is used to identify whether a full application for ethics approval needs to be submitted. If a full application is required, then the University Research Ethics Committee’s full Application Form for Research Ethics Approval must be used. A Word version of the full Application Form for Research Ethics Approval can be downloaded from: http://intranet.brunel.ac.uk/registry/minutes/researchethics/home.shtml.

Before completing this form, please refer to the university General Ethical Guidelines and Procedures, as well as the Code of Research Ethics (both documents can be downloaded from http://intranet.brunel.ac.uk/registry/minutes/researchethics/home.shtml). The principal investigator at Brunel University (and, when the student is the principal investigator, the student’s immediate supervisor at Brunel University) is responsible for exercising appropriate professional judgement in this review.

This checklist must be completed and approved before potential participants are approached to take part in any research.

Having completed this form, it is possible that we may need further information from you, and in some instances you may be required to submit your plans for addressing the ethical issues raised by your proposal using the University Research Ethics Committee’s full Application Form. This does not mean that you cannot do the research, only that your proposal may need to be considered further and approved by the University Research Ethics Committee. Please note that answering ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ to any of questions does not in itself give rise to the possibility of having to provide a fuller description.

If you answered ‘Yes’ to question 11, and the research falls outside of NHS audit procedures, then you will have to submit an application to the appropriate external health authority ethics committee after you have received provisional approval from the University Research Ethics Committee.

It is your responsibility to follow the Code of Research Ethics, developed by the University Research Ethics Committee, as well as any relevant academic or professional guidelines in the conduct of your study. This includes providing appropriate documentation, and ensuring confidentiality in the storage and use of data. Any significant change in the question, design or conduct over the course of the research should be notified to the Departmental Research Ethics Officer and may require a new application for ethics approval.

Assessed work requiring research ethics approval
Undergraduate and Masters students must retain a copy of the approved form and submit it with their research report or dissertation (bound in the Appendix); MPhil/PhD students must retain a copy of the form and submit it to the Research Degrees Board with their application for Registration. For class exercises, lecturers who have set research projects on behalf of the students will be responsible for obtaining ethics approval; in such instances, students must enclose a copy of their lecturers’ approved ethics forms with their work. All undergraduate and postgraduate work that is submitted without an approved ethics form may be subject to penalties; students must consult the appropriate module convenors for penalties regarding failure to submit approved ethics forms as part of research-based work in specific modules.

Staff research
Please note that all members of staff who are the primary researchers at Brunel University, whether collecting data with or without the aid of students, must submit ethics forms to the Departmental Research Ethics Officer in the first instance. If the ethics submission relates to staff research for which an application to an external funding agency will be has been made, then please complete and submit the full University ethics submission form.

Submission instructions
Please submit two copies of this form completed and signed, to Devinder Saggi via the drop box outside MJ157 for review.
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY AND COMMUNICATIONS RESEARCH ETHICS CHECKLIST

If the ethics submission relates to staff research for which an application to an external funding agency will be/has been made, then please complete and submit the full University ethics submission form.

Section I: Project Details


Section II: Applicant Details

2. Name of researcher (applicant): Amanda Rohloff
3. Status (please circle): Undergrad Student, Postgrad Student, Staff
4. Discipline (please circle): Eco & Fin, His & Pol, Psy/SAnt, Soc & Com
5. Email address: amanda.rohloff@brunel.ac.uk
6. Telephone number: 07531 448 175

Section III: For Students Only

7. Module name and number: PhD Sociology Research
8. Brunel supervisor's or module leader's name: Jason Hughes
9. Brunel supervisor's email address: jason.hughes@brunel.ac.uk

Supervisor: Please tick the appropriate boxes. The study should not begin until all boxes are ticked:

- The student states that he or she has read the Brunel University Code of Research Ethics.
- The topic merits further research.
- The student will possess the skills to carry out the research by the time that he or she starts any work which could affect the well-being of other people. He or she will be deemed to have acquired such skills on passing the relevant research skills module.
- The participant information sheet or leaflet is appropriate.
- The procedures for recruitment and obtaining informed consent are appropriate.

Please confirm the professional research ethics code that will guide the research (please circle)

ASA/BPS/BSA/Other (please state) BSA

 Supervisor's signature

Date 5/11/09
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Does the study involve participants who may be particularly vulnerable and/or unable to give informed consent, thus requiring the consent of parents or guardians? (e.g. children under the age of 16; people with certain learning disabilities)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2a. Will the study require the co-operation of a gatekeeper for initial access to the groups or individuals to be recruited?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2b. If the answer to Question 2a is Yes, then will the study involve people who could be deemed in any way to be vulnerable by virtue of their status within particular institutional settings? (e.g. students at school; disabled people; members of a self-help group; residents of a nursing home, prison, or any other institution where individuals cannot come and go freely)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Does the research involve observational/ethnographic methods?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Will the study involve discussion by or with respondents or interviewees of their own involvement in activities such as sexual behaviour or drug use, where they have not given prior consent to such discussion?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Are drugs, placebos or other substances (e.g. food substances, vitamins) to be administered to the study participants or will the study involve invasive, intrusive or potentially harmful procedures of any kind?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Will blood or tissue samples be obtained from participants?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Is pain or more than mild discomfort likely to result from the study?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Could the study induce psychological stress or anxiety or cause harm or negative consequences beyond the risks encountered in normal life?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Will the study involve prolonged or repetitive testing?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Will financial inducements (other than reasonable expenses and compensation for time) be offered to participants?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Will the study involve recruitment of patients or staff through the NHS?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12a. Have you undertaken this study as part of your work placement?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12b. If your answer to Question 12a is Yes, then have the employers at your work placement conducted their own research ethics review?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Does the research involve MRI, MEG, or EEG methods?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Give a brief description of participants and procedure (methods, tests used etc) in up to 150 words

I intend to carry out individual semi-structured face-to-face interviews, with 20 to 30 participants.

Two different types of participants will be recruited from Brunel University: self-identified ‘environmentalists’ and everyday people (who are not self-identified environmentalists). I intend to recruit the former via the UBS society “Brunel People & Planet (Green Society)”. I intend to audio-record the interviews, while also taking hand-written notes. The length of each interview will be between 30 and 60 minutes.

Interviews will be used to test and develop tentative conclusions drawn from prior documentary analysis. Interviews will explore participants’ ideas about identity; their everyday lifestyle; understandings about climate change; thoughts on the media that have been produced to try and affect both changes in understandings about the environment and changes in behaviour. The interviews will also be used to explore how people come to be self-identified environmentalists and how others do not.

Name of Principal Investigator at Brunel University (please print): Amanda Rohloff

Signature of Principal Investigator at Brunel University:

E-Mail Address: amanda.rohloff@brunel.ac.uk

Date: 05/11/09

This request for expedited review has been: (1) Approved (no additional ethics form is necessary) (2) Declined (full University ethics form is necessary)

Signature of Departmental Research Ethics Officer: T. Nieder

Date: 6 Nov 2009
CONSENT FORM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Have you read the Research Participant Information Sheet?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have you had an opportunity to ask questions and discuss this study?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have you received satisfactory answers to all your questions?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who have you spoken to?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you understand that you will not be referred to by name in any report concerning the study?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you understand that you are free to withdraw from the study:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- at any time?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- without having to give a reason for withdrawing?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I agree to my interview being recorded.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I agree to the use of non-attributable direct quotes when the study is written up or published.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you agree to take part in this study?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signature of Research Participant:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name (in capitals):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Witness statement:
I am satisfied that the above-named has given informed consent.

Signature of Witness:                                      
Date:                                                      
Name (in capitals):                                      
Participant Information Sheet

“Climate change and civilization”

My name is Amanda Rohloff. I am a PhD student at Brunel University, in the Department of Sociology & Communications. For my PhD, I am carrying out a research project on climate change. The purpose of the project is to explore people’s understandings and perceptions about anthropogenic climate change (or ‘global warming’).

For part of my research, I will be interviewing between 20 and 30 people. The interviews will be face-to-face, and will last for approximately 30 to 60 minutes. The interviews will consist of several questions that will provide you with the opportunity to express your ideas, thoughts and opinions about climate change.

Participation in this research project is entirely voluntary. If you decide to participate, you may withdraw your participation at any point during the research.

All interviews will be recorded, to enable more accurate transcribing and analysis. The audio recordings and handwritten notes from the interviews will be kept in a secure environment. To ensure that your interview answers are kept confidential and that your identity is not revealed, I will remove identifying material from the interview transcriptions.

This research project will eventually be submitted as a thesis (and will also form the basis for several conference papers and publications, including: articles, book chapters, and possibly a book). If you would like to receive a summary of the completed research project (due for completion before October 2012), please email me at anytime with either your email or postal address.

If you have any questions about this research project, please feel free to contact me. You may also contact my primary supervisor, Dr Jason Hughes.

Contact details:

Principal researcher:  
Amanda Rohloff  
PhD Candidate  
Sociology & Communications  
School of Social Sciences  
Brunel University  
Uxbridge, Middlesex, UB8 3PH  
Phone: 07531 448 175  
Email: amanda.rohloff@brunel.ac.uk

Primary supervisor:  
Dr Jason Hughes  
Senior Lecturer  
Sociology & Communications  
School of Social Sciences  
Brunel University  
Uxbridge, Middlesex, UB8 3PH  
Phone: 01895 265633  
Email: jason.hughes@brunel.ac.uk
Interview Schedule 1

Demographics

1. Name:
2. Age:
3. Sex:
4. Occupation:
5. Nationality:
   a. If not from the country they’re currently living in, how long have you lived in said country for?
6. Where do you live, and who do you live with:

Nature, environment and environmentalism

7. Can you tell me a bit about your experiences of nature, the environment and the countryside when you were growing up?
8. At school, did you have any education about the environment and/or about environmental issues? If so, can you tell me what you remember about it? [Probe for: conservation, pollution, littering, recycling, biodiversity, ‘outdoor activities’, etc.]
9. Can you tell me a bit about how you feel about the environment, and about environmental issues?
10. Have you ever been a member of any environmental organizations/societies? Or have you ever been involved in any environmental protests, or any type of environmental activities?
   a. If have participated:
      i. Can you tell me about them and your experiences of them; what things you have participated in?
      ii. Can you tell me about how you came to decide to join/participate in society/org/protest/activity
      iii. Are you still involved in...
      iv. What do you think about the impact of...
   b. If haven’t participated:
      i. Do you think that you will ever participate in...?
      ii. What do you think about the impact of...
11. What do you think about people who:
   c. Are members of environmental orgs/societies
   d. Participate in environmental protests/marches
   e. May have been described by some people, or some governments, as “eco-terrorism” [may need to define “eco-terrorism”; e.g. provide examples of definitions and types of activity that are defined as ‘eco-terrorism’]

Climate change

12. Can you tell me a bit about your knowledge about climate change?
13. How do you receive information about climate change? [Probe for specific examples of which specific sources – not just media sources, but other people as well]
14. What do you think about climate change, in terms of how serious the issue is, to what extent it is contributed to by human activity, what (if anything) should be done about it? What do you think about the science of climate change? What do you think about other people’s reactions to climate change?

15. What do you think about different media about climate change? (probe by giving examples of: documentaries, movies, TV shows, popular science books, novels, ‘sceptic’ publications, ‘living green’ and ‘stopping climate change’ guides, pamphlets, the Internet) [Maybe show visual images?]

16. What do you think about efforts to reduce individual people’s carbon footprint? Have you ever calculated your carbon footprint or do you ever intend to? What do you think about individual efforts to reduce carbon emissions in an attempt to address climate change?

17. What do you think about different corporations’ efforts to develop more sustainable, ‘green’, eco-friendly’ practices in their production of goods and services?

18. What do you think about different governmental interventions re. climate change?

19. What do you think about the IPCC? And the UN in general? [i.e. intergovernmental knowledge about, and regulation of climate change]

20. Related to my earlier question about environmental organizations/societies, protests, and other environmental activities, have you been involved in anything like this that has been specifically focused on climate change?
   a. If so, can you tell me about it? What you’ve been involved in, how you came to be involved, what you thought about it.
   b. If not, do you think you ever will get involved in...?
   c. What do you think about other people who are involved in...?

21. Is there anything else you’d like to add? Or anything you’d like to ask?
Interview Schedule 2

Demographics

1. Name:
2. Age:
3. Occupation:
   a. What do you do? What’s your occupation? Are you a student?
   b. How did you come to be involved in that line of work?
   c. What did you do before you were a…?
4. Nationality:
   d. What’s your ethnic background?
   e. If not from the country they’re currently living in, how long have you lived in said country for?
5. At the moment, what sort of living situation are you in? Do you live with other people?

Nature, environment and environmentalism

6. Can you tell me a bit about your experiences of nature, the environment and the countryside when you were growing up?
   a. Where you grew up
   b. Holidays
   c. Did you move
   d. And you now live? For how long have you lived there?

7. At school, did you have any education about the environment and/or about environmental issues? If so, can you tell me what you remember about it? [Probe for: conservation, pollution, littering, recycling, biodiversity, ‘outdoor activities’, etc.]

8. Were you involved in environmental issues in any way (e.g. donating, protests, organizations, activities, programmes) at a young age?
   a. Can you remember how you became interested or involved in…?
   b. Specific examples: what was the outcome of said activity?

9. Can you tell me a bit about how you feel about the environment, and about environmental issues in general? Do you think that this has changed over time? If yes, why do you think this is so?

10. Have you ever been a member of any environmental organizations/societies? Or have you ever been involved in any environmental protests, or any type of environmental activities?
    a. If have participated:
       i. Can you tell me about them and your experiences of them; what things you have participated in?
       ii. Can you tell me about how you came to decide to join/participate in society/org/protest/activity
       iii. Are you still involved in…
       iv. What do you think about the impact/effectiveness of…
    b. If haven’t participated:
       v. Have you been involved in other issues (i.e. not environmental)?
       vi. Do you think that you will ever participate in…?
vii. What do you think about the impact of...

11. What do you think about people who:
   a. Are members of environmental orgs/societies
   b. Participate in environmental protests/marches
   c. May have been described by some people, or some governments, as “eco-terrorists” [may need to define “eco-terrorists”; e.g. provide examples of definitions and types of activity that are defined as ‘eco-terrorism’] How do you perceive them, how do you think they perceive themselves and how do you think others perceive them?

**Climate change**

12. Can you tell me a bit about what climate change is, or what you think it is?
   a. How much confidence do you have about your knowledge about climate change?

13. What do you think about climate change, in terms of how:
   a. serious the issue is, how urgent it is and how much time there is to do something about it before it is too late
   b. to what extent it is contributed to by human activity
   c. what (if anything) should be done about it?
   d. What do you think about the science of climate change?

14. How do you receive information about climate change? [Probe for specific examples of which specific sources – not just media sources, but other people as well]

15. Have you watched or come across any... Can you tell me about them What do you think about different media about climate change? (probe by giving examples of: documentaries, movies, TV shows, popular science books, novels, ‘sceptic’ publications, ‘living green’ and ‘stopping climate change’ guides, pamphlets, the Internet) [Maybe show visual images?]

16. What do you think about efforts to reduce individual people’s carbon footprint? Have you ever calculated your carbon footprint or do you ever intend to? What do you think about individual efforts to reduce carbon emissions in an attempt to address climate change?

17. What do you think about different corporations’ efforts to develop more sustainable, ‘green’, eco-friendly’ practices in their production of goods and services?

18. What do you think about different governmental interventions re. climate change?

19. What do you think about other people’s reactions to climate change?
   a. How has your behaviour changed since you first found out about climate change?
   b. What do you think of people who are relatively ignorant about climate change, and continue to pollute
   c. Who do you think is responsible for climate change – both for causing it and for addressing it?

20. What do you think about the IPCC? And the UN in general? [i.e. intergovernmental knowledge about, and regulation of climate change]
21. Related to my earlier question about environmental organizations/societies, protests, and other environmental activities, have you been involved in anything like this that has been specifically focused on climate change?  
   a. If so, can you tell me about it? What you’ve been involved in, how you came to be involved, what you thought about it.  
   b. If not, do you think you ever will get involved in...?  
   c. What do you think about other people who are involved in...?
22. Is there anything else you’d like to add? Or anything you’d like to ask?  
23. How do you feel about the questions and the interview in general?
Interview Schedule 3

Demographics

1. Name:
2. Age:
3. Occupation:
   a. What do you do? What’s your occupation? Are you a student?
   b. How did you come to be involved in that line of work?
   c. What did you do before you were a...
4. Nationality:
   a. What’s your ethnic background?
   b. If not from the country they’re currently living in, how long have you lived in said country for?
5. At the moment, what sort of living situation are you in? Do you live with other people?

Nature, environment and environmentalism

6. Can you tell me a bit about your experiences of nature, the environment and the countryside when you were growing up?
   a. Where you grew up
   b. Holidays
   c. Did you move
   d. And you now live? For how long have you lived there?
7. At school, did you have any education about the environment and/or about environmental issues? If so, can you tell me what you remember about it? [Probe for: conservation, pollution, littering, recycling, biodiversity, ‘outdoor activities’, etc.]
8. Were you involved in environmental issues in any way (e.g. donating, protests, organizations, activities, programmes) at a young age?
   a. Can you remember how you became interested or involved in...?
   b. Specific examples: what was the outcome of said activity?
9. Can you tell me a bit about how you feel about the environment, and about environmental issues in general? Do you think that this has changed over time? If yes, why do you think this is so?
10. Have you ever been a member of any environmental organizations/societies? Or have you ever been involved in any environmental protests, or any type of environmental activities?
    a. If have participated:
       i. Can you tell me about them and your experiences of them; what things you have participated in?
       ii. Can you tell me about how you came to decide to join/participate in society/org/protest/activity
       iii. Are you still involved in...?
       iv. What do you think about the impact/effectiveness of...?
    b. If haven’t participated:
       i. Have you been involved in other issues (i.e. not environmental)?
       ii. Do you think that you will ever participate in...?
iii. What do you think about the impact of...?

11. What do you think about people who:
   a. Are members of environmental orgs/societies
   b. Participate in environmental protests/marches

12. Have you come across the term ‘eco-terrorist’ or ‘eco-terrorism’?
   a. How would you define it? What acts would you define as acts of ‘eco-terrorism’?
   b. What do you think about people who have been described by some people, or some governments, or the media, as “eco-terrorists”? [May need to define “eco-terrorists”; e.g. provide examples of definitions and types of activity that are defined as ‘eco-terrorism’.]
   c. How do you perceive ‘eco-terrorists’, how do you think they perceive themselves and how do you think others perceive them?

Climate change

13. Can you tell me a bit about what climate change is, or what you think it is?
   a. How much confidence do you have about your knowledge about climate change?

14. What do you think about climate change, in terms of:
   a. How serious the issue is, how urgent it is and how much time there is to do something about it before it is too late
   b. To what extent it is contributed to by human activity
   c. What (if anything) should be done about it?
   d. What do you think about the science of climate change?

15. How do you receive information about climate change? [Probe for: specific examples of which specific sources – not just media sources, but other people as well.]

16. Have you watched or come across any...? Can you tell me about them? What do you think about different media about climate change? [Probe by giving examples of: documentaries, movies, TV shows, popular science books, novels, ‘sceptic’ publications, ‘living green’ and ‘stopping climate change’ guides, pamphlets, the Internet.]

17. What do you think about efforts to reduce individual people’s carbon footprint? Have you ever calculated your carbon footprint or do you ever intend to? What do you think about individual efforts to reduce carbon emissions in an attempt to address climate change?

18. What do you think about different corporations’ efforts to develop more sustainable, ‘green’, eco-friendly practices in their production of goods and services?

19. What do you think about different governmental interventions re. climate change?

20. What do you think about the IPCC? And the UN in general? [i.e. intergovernmental knowledge about, and regulation of climate change]

21. What do you think about other people’s reactions to climate change?
   a. How has your behaviour changed since you first found out about climate change?
   b. What do you think of people who are relatively ignorant about climate change, and continue to pollute?
c. Who do you think is responsible for climate change – both for causing it and for addressing it?

22. Related to my earlier question about environmental organizations/societies, protests, and other environmental activities, have you been involved in anything like this that has been specifically focused on climate change?
   a. If so, can you tell me about it? What you've been involved in, how you came to be involved, what you thought about it?
   b. If not, do you think you ever will get involved in...?
   c. What do you think about other people who are involved in...?

23. Is there anything else you’d like to add? Or anything you’d like to ask?

24. How do you feel about the questions and the interview in general?
Interview Schedule 4

Do you have any questions before we begin?

Demographics

1. Name:
2. Age:
3. Occupation:
   a. What do you do? What's your occupation? Are you a student?
   b. How did you come to be involved in that line of work?
   c. What did you do before you were a...
4. Nationality:
   a. What's your ethnic background?
   b. If not from the country they're currently living in, how long have you lived in said country for?
5. At the moment, what sort of living situation are you in? Do you live with other people?

Nature, environment and environmentalism

6. Can you tell me a bit about your experiences of nature, the environment and the countryside when you were growing up? [Probe for: where you grew up, holidays, did you move, and now you live, for how long have you lived there]
   a. How have these experiences changed over time – from when you were very young, as you got older, and what they're like now?
7. At school, did you have any education about the environment and/or about environmental issues? If so, can you tell me what you remember about it? [Probe for: conservation, pollution, littering, recycling, biodiversity, 'outdoor activities', etc.]
8. Were you involved in environmental issues in any way (e.g. donating, protests, organizations, activities, programmes) at a young age?
   a. Can you remember how you became interested or involved in...?
   b. Specific examples: what was the outcome of said activity?
9. Can you tell me a bit about how you feel about the environment, and about environmental issues in general – when you were younger, as you got older, and now?
   a. Do you think your thoughts, feelings, opinions and experiences about the environment and environmental issues has changed over time?
   b. If yes, why do you think this is so?
10. Have you ever been a member of any environmental organizations/societies? Or have you ever been involved in any environmental protests, or any type of environmental activities?
   a. If have participated:
      i. Can you tell me about them and your experiences of them; what things you have participated in?
      ii. Can you tell me about how you came to decide to join/participate in society/org/protest/activity
      iii. Are you still involved in...?
iv. How worthwhile, or how effective are...?
   a. If haven't participated:
      i. Have you been involved in other issues (i.e. not environmental)?
      ii. Are there any circumstances where you might consider participating in...?
      iii. How worthwhile or how effective are...?

11. What kind of people:
   a. Are members of environmental orgs/societies
   b. Participate in environmental protests/marches and other types of 'direct action'?

12. Why do people
   a. Become members of environmental orgs/societies?
   b. Participate in environmental protests/marches and other types of 'direct action'?

13. Have you come across the term 'eco-terrorist' or 'eco-terrorism'? 
   a. Where have you come across the term and in relation to what examples?
   b. What kind of people are describe as 'eco-terrorists'?
   c. What acts are described as 'eco-terrorism'?
   d. Why do some people take part in these acts?
   e. What do you think about the terms 'eco-terrorist' and 'eco-terrorism'?
      [Probe for: how appropriate or inappropriate do you think the term is?] 
      [Prompts: definition includes any crime committed in the act of 'saving nature', from trespass to murder. Examples include: vandalism, sabotage, property damage, sit-ins, threats to use violence against an inanimate object, arson, 'economic damage', 'economic disruption', threats. The term is used by: governments, the media, and industry lobby groups.]
   f. What do you think about people who have been described by some people, or some governments, or the media, as "eco-terrorists"?

**Climate change**

14. Can you tell me a bit about what climate change is, or what you think it is? OR What do you understand by the term climate change?
   a. How much confidence do you have about your knowledge about climate change?

15. What do you think about climate change, in terms of:
   a. How serious the issue is, how urgent it is and how much time there is to do something about it before it is too late
   b. To what extent it is contributed to by human activity
   c. What (if anything) should be done about it?
   d. What do you think about the science of climate change?

16. How do you receive information about climate change? [Probe for: specific examples of which specific sources – not just media sources, but other people as well.]
17. Have you watched or come across any...? Can you tell me about them? What do you think about different media about climate change? [Probe by giving examples of: documentaries, movies, TV shows, popular science books, novels, 'sceptic' publications, 'living green' and 'stopping climate change' guides, pamphlets, the Internet.]

18. Have you come across the term 'carbon footprint'? Have you ever calculated your carbon footprint or do you ever intend to? What do you think about individual efforts to reduce carbon emissions in an attempt to address climate change?

19. How effective or appropriate are different corporations' efforts to develop more sustainable, 'green', eco-friendly practices in their production of goods and services?

20. Are different governmental interventions and policies re. climate change effective and appropriate?

21. What do you think about the IPCC? And the UN in general? [i.e. intergovernmental knowledge about, and regulation of climate change]

22. Has your behaviour changed since you first found out about climate change? If yes, how has it changed? If not, are there any circumstances where you might change your behaviour?

23. If behaviour has changed:
   a. What do you think of people who are relatively ignorant about climate change, and continue to pollute?
   b. What do you think about people who appear to have a lot of knowledge about climate change, but don’t change their behaviour?

24. Who or what is responsible for climate change – both for causing it and for addressing it?

25. Related to my earlier question about environmental organizations/societies, protests, and other environmental activities, have you been involved in anything like this that has been specifically focused on climate change?
   a. If so, can you tell me about it? What you've been involved in, how you came to be involved, what you thought about it?
   b. If not, are there any circumstances where you might participate in...?
   c. What kind of people become involved in...?
   d. Why do people become involved in...?

26. Is there anything else you’d like to add? Or anything you’d like to ask?

27. How do you feel about the questions and the interview in general?

28. Is there anything that you would have liked me to ask about, or anything you expected me to ask that I didn’t ask?
Interview Schedule 5

Demographics

1. Name:
2. Age:
3. Occupation:
   a. What do you do? What’s your occupation? Are you a student?
   b. How did you come to be involved in that line of work?
   c. What did you do before you were a…?
4. Nationality:
   a. What’s your ethnic background?
   b. If not from the country they’re currently living in, how long have you lived in said country for?
5. At the moment, what sort of living situation are you in? Do you live with other people?

Nature, environment and environmentalism

6. Can you tell me a bit about your experiences of nature, the environment and the countryside when you were growing up? [Probe for: where you grew up, holidays, did you move, and now you live, for how long have you lived there]
   a. How have these experiences changed over time – from when you were very young, as you got older, and what they’re like now?
7. At school, did you have any education about the environment and/or about environmental issues? If so, can you tell me what you remember about it? [Probe for: conservation, pollution, littering, recycling, biodiversity, ‘outdoor activities’, etc.]
8. Were you involved in environmental issues in any way (e.g. donating, protests, organizations, activities, programmes) at a young age?
   a. Can you remember how you became interested or involved in…?
   b. Specific examples: what was the outcome of said activity?
9. Can you tell me a bit about how you feel about the environment, and about environmental issues in general – when you were younger, as you got older, and now?
   a. Do you think your thoughts, feelings, opinions and experiences about the environment and environmental issues has changed over time?
   b. If yes, why do you think this is so?
10. Have you ever been a member of any environmental organizations/societies? Or have you ever been involved in any environmental protests, or any type of environmental activities?
    a. If have participated:
       i. Can you tell me about them and your experiences of them; what things you have participated in?
       ii. Can you tell me about how you came to decide to join/participate in society/org/protest/activity
       iii. Are you still involved in…?
       vii. What do you think about the impact/effectiveness of…?
    b. If haven’t participated:
i. Have you been involved in other issues (i.e. not environmental)?
ii. Do you think that you will ever participate in...
iii. What do you think about the impact of...

11. What do you think about people who:
   a. Are members of environmental orgs/societies
   b. Participate in environmental protests/marches

12. Have you come across the term ‘eco-terrorist’ or ‘eco-terrorism’?
   a. Where have you come across the term and in relation to what examples?
      How would you define the term? What acts would you define as acts of ‘eco-terrorism’? What do you think about the term itself – how appropriate or inappropriate do you think the term is? [Prompts: definition includes any crime committed in the act of ‘saving nature’, from trespass to murder. Examples include: vandalism, sabotage, property damage, sit-ins, threats to use violence against an inanimate object, arson, ‘economic damage’, ‘economic disruption’, threats. The term is used by: governments, the media, and industry lobby groups.]
   b. What do you think about people who have been described by some people, or some governments, or the media, as “eco-terrorists”?
   c. How do you perceive ‘eco-terrorists’, how do you think they perceive themselves and how do you think others perceive them?
   d. What do you think about the recent Mark Stone/Mark Kennedy story (and other undercover police in groups)? [Probe for: George Monbiot, The Guardian, “Eco-terrorism: The non-existent threat we spend millions policing.”]

13. Can you tell me a bit about what climate change is, or what you think it is?
   a. How much confidence do you have about your knowledge about climate change?

14. What do you think about climate change, in terms of:
   a. How serious the issue is, how urgent it is and how much time there is to do something about it before it is too late
   b. To what extent it is contributed to by human activity
   c. What (if anything) should be done about it?
   d. What do you think about the science of climate change?

15. How do you receive information about climate change? [Probe for: specific examples of which specific sources – not just media sources, but other people as well.]

16. Have you watched or come across any...? Can you tell me about them? What do you think about different media about climate change? [Probe by giving examples of: documentaries, movies, TV shows, popular science books, novels, ‘sceptic’ publications, ‘living green’ and ‘stopping climate change’ guides, pamphlets, the Internet.]

17. What do you think about efforts to reduce individual people’s carbon footprint? Have you ever calculated your carbon footprint or do you ever intend to? What do you think about individual efforts to reduce carbon emissions in an attempt to address climate change?
18. What do you think about different corporations’ efforts to develop more sustainable, ‘green’, eco-friendly’ practices in their production of goods and services?
19. What do you think about different governmental interventions re. climate change?
20. What do you think about the IPCC? And the UN in general? [i.e. intergovernmental knowledge about, and regulation of climate change]
21. What do you think about other people’s reactions to climate change?
   a. How has your behaviour changed since you first found out about climate change?
   b. What do you think of people who are relatively ignorant about climate change, and continue to pollute?
   c. Who do you think is responsible for climate change – both for causing it and for addressing it?
22. Related to my earlier question about environmental organizations/societies, protests, and other environmental activities, have you been involved in anything like this that has been specifically focused on climate change?
   a. If so, can you tell me about it? What you’ve been involved in, how you came to be involved, what you thought about it?
   b. If not, do you think you ever will get involved in...?
   c. What do you think about other people who are involved in...?
23. Is there anything else you’d like to add? Or anything you’d like to ask?
24. How do you feel about the questions and the interview in general?
25. Is there anything that you would have liked me to ask about, or anything you expected me to ask that I didn’t ask?
### Interviewee Demographics

#### INVOLVED IN CLIMATE CHANGE ‘ACTIVISM’

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