THE ROLE OF IMAGINATION IN BERGMAN, KLEIN AND SARTRE

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

by

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Abstract

This thesis provides an inter-disciplinary study of selected works by Ingmar Bergman. I explore how key concepts from Melanie Klein and Jean-Paul Sartre apply to the focus on characters in a state of heightened imagination; and the value placed on imagination in the construction of these films. This involves recognition of the way an active response from the viewer is encouraged.

Klein, Sartre and Bergman also attend to contextual factors that challenge any notion of subjectivity as sovereign and the power of imagination is frequently placed in a social context. All three figures develop their ideas within specialised fields drawing on the influence of others. Chapter 2 shows how Klein’s ideas relate to the influence of Freud before exploring how her work can be applied to Bergman’s films through the example of *Wild Strawberries*. Chapter 3 concentrates on Sartre’s early work, *The Imaginary* and considers how this is significant in relation to some of Sartre’s better-known philosophical ideas developed during and after the Second World War. These ideas will lead to an exploration of *The Seventh Seal*.

Chapters 4, 5, and 6 focus on three films from distinct parts of Bergman’s career: *Summer with Monika*, *The Virgin Spring* and *Hour of the Wolf*. In Chapter 4 this will be preceded by a brief over-view of three more films from the early part of Bergman’s career. These chapters explore how Kleinian and Sartrean ideas can be incorporated in close analysis, and alongside selected critical responses to the films. The analysis integrates key points from Klein and Sartre in a methodology specific to film studies. This will include analysis of cinematic elements such as camera work and lighting, and recognition of narrative structure and character development.
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Acknowledgements

Thank you to Mike Wayne for all the feedback and supervision.

Thank you to Michele Aaron for supervising in the first year.

Thank you to everyone at Brunel University who has helped since I started there.

Thank you to The British Library for their support and assistance.
1 The imagination: Bergman, Klein and Sartre

‘And every picture—every one of my pictures are dreams.’ Ingmar Bergman

‘Everything can happen. Everything is possible and probable. Time and space do not exist. On a flimsy framework of reality the imagination spins and weaves new patterns.’ August Strindberg

The final lines of *Fanny and Alexander*, in which Helena Ekdahl reads the above words from August Strindberg to her grandson Alexander, are significant not just as a conclusion to this film but as an expression of Ingmar Bergman’s belief in the ultimate value of imagination throughout his work. This quotation shows that Bergman was able to extract core values from Strindberg without slavishly following his other ideas. This is made apparent moments earlier in *Fanny and Alexander* as the grandmother of the Ekdahl family reacts with dismay to her daughter-in-law’s suggestion that they should both act in Strindberg’s *A Dream Play*:

Emilie Ekdahl: I’d like you to read a new play by August Strindberg.
Helena Ekdahl: That nasty misogynist!

The final words appear to signal that Helena has accepted Strindberg. However, her initial objection retains its force as a warning that the famous Swedish playwright is flawed in his attitude to women. Nevertheless, in *Fanny and Alexander* imagination is a unique and powerful force as in the quotation. Intermittently verisimilitude is punctured by Alexander’s visions of his dead father as a ghost. When Isak rescues the children from the bishop an apparently magical agency is introduced, which allows the children to be momentarily in two places at the same time, and this agency develops as Alexander meets the mysterious Ishmael. This magical agency may or may not have a metaphysical cause but appears to be directly related to Alexander’s capacity for seeing beyond the immediately perceptible world. Thus, *Fanny and Alexander* demonstrates how imagination is not only an abiding concept for Bergman, but also how he can utilise this as a structural element with his narratives. Then, near the end, with the reappearance of the bishop, his step-father, in Alexander’s imaginary world an unresolved moral tension is signalled. I will look at Bergman’s philosophy of imagination in form and meaning in a selection of films from different points in his career.
Researching this thesis, I set out to explore Bergman’s belief in the power of imagination asking initially whether he holds a belief akin to the sentiment of the Strindberg quotation in *Fanny and Alexander*. Although Strindberg is a key influence, it became clear to me that Bergman’s work and ideas suggest a wide range of possible interpretations. Although the library of Bergman appreciation, research and criticism already revolves around the power of his imagination as an auteur, exploration of Bergman’s ideas on imagination, in relation to other artists and thinkers, emerged in my study as a subject worthy of further investigation. As a consequence, in this thesis I am concerned to explore Bergman’s ideas in relation to philosophy and psychoanalytic theory, but also to focus more specifically on the way his films include elements that put particular stress on the process of imagining. In the close analysis of films Chapters 4, 5 and 6, this will involve recognising the structural significance of sections that represent or allude to metaphysics, dreams, nightmares and visions. It will also mean considering the way cinematic language, and narrative orchestration are used at other points to signify a world beyond, which is not transparently observable to all the characters of the diegesis even though it may be accessed by an individual character such as Alexander. A good example of mise-en-scene used to this effect is the appearance of death as a figure for the knight in *The Seventh Seal* (1956). Also central to Bergman’s focus on imagination is the creative use of off-screen elements, which cannot be directly observed by character or viewer, ranging from creative use of off-screen cues to more infamous examples such as the miracle at the end of *The Virgin Spring* (1960). This episode, discussed as part of Chapter 5, may signify imagination or a metaphysical intervention by God, an ambiguity I will return to. Bergman’s need to step beyond a reality strictly dependent on observation must also recognise the significance of memory, a mental faculty that is closely associated and can overlap, with imagination. Thus, I include flashbacks alongside other elements that divert us from a linear narrative anchored in observation of the present. This is particularly apparent in, for instance, Bergman’s use of a form of imaginative flashback in *Wild Strawberries* (1957) where the main character enters his own memory as an observer. Simple cause and effect linear narratives are significantly diverted or interrupted at key moments in Bergman’s work, thus signifying his focus on the imagination in the broad sense that I am introducing. Because he also maintains narrative fluency these disruptions appear
less experimental than more avant-garde film-making, but the appeal to imagination is very pervasive, ranging from flashbacks that represent character reflections to the way off-screen space is used to make the audience think beyond that which is immediately given.

The attention to sequences or elements foregrounding imagination will be tied in with a wider enquiry. A scholar who has already written about imagination in Bergman’s work in relation to a broader context is Marilyn Johns Blackwell, who focuses in the final chapter of her book, on a number of sequences from films, including *Wild Strawberries* and *The Seventh Seal*, which represent characters imagining. In an inspiring and instructive way, Johns Blackwell considers how these sequences contribute to the representation of gender. For my analysis it is equally important to recognise how Bergman relates sequences concerned with his characters imagining to the rest of the narrative in which they are situated. It is necessary to investigate Bergman’s approach to imagination at the level of meaning because it is often figured as a significant value in his work. That is not to say imagination is automatically seen as beneficent. After all, the figure of death in *The Seventh Seal*, and the final appearance of the bishop in *Fanny and Alexander* introduce Manichean division into the imaginary realm. Like the miracle in *The Virgin Spring*, these phenomena appear to be ambiguously placed on the borderline of metaphysics and imagination, carrying connotations of a power beyond human agency. However, I want to explore the idea that for Bergman the imagination does ultimately carry potential for redemption in humanist terms. Here we enter the debates about Bergman as a philosophical director and his relationship to religion. While there are an enormous range of intellectuals and artists who champion the power of the imagination, my research has gravitated towards a more specific comparison between Bergman and the work of psychoanalyst Melanie Klein and the philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre, who are both humanistic thinkers. The comparison of Bergman’s films with ideas from these thinkers is intended as an exploratory association and not as a claim about the definitive way to read Bergman’s films or the existence of direct influence between these figures. However, I do hope that this grouping can make an original contribution to understanding of Bergman’s career and the question of how film theory should approach this work, sixty-eight years after his film-making career was launched with the script of *Frenzy* (1944).
In 1985, subsequent to completion of *Fanny and Alexander*, Bergman declared that this was his last film. The retrospective decision to conclude his career with a film partly inspired by his own childhood testifies to Bergman’s understanding of himself as a director dealing with personal material. By this stage in his career the discipline of film studies had fully emerged in higher education. The evolution of the subject involved enormous appreciation of the work of directors due partly to the publication of *Cahiers du Cinéma*, a significant agent in the development of Bergman’s international reputation. However, the development of film studies as an academic discipline also gave rise to a reaction against the auteur theory through the emergence of semiotics, structuralism and post-structuralism, as theories applied to cinema. The questioning of authorship itself was already apparent in the 1960s, and coincided with a relative decline in Bergman’s reputation as a groundbreaking director. And yet, critical work on Bergman has rarely strayed away from an emphasis on his authorship. Indeed, as Bergman made a range of returns to filmmaking after his self-declared retirement, including *Saraband*, authorship had recovered some of its credibility in the discipline and this is reflected in more recent work on Bergman. For example, the collection of essays *Ingmar Bergman Revisited*, published in 2008, introduces many new ideas into Bergman research but does not seek to challenge the very concept of authorship. Instead, this is deployed in a wide-ranging and discursive fashion across the essays.

In this introductory chapter I am concerned to set out general points that set the context for the subsequent work in this thesis. I will begin by showing how three auteurist responses to Bergman’s work, from the 1950s onwards, challenge a view of Bergman restricted to a thematic world-view full of angst and metaphysics. Instead, we find that critics as diverse as Jean-Luc Godard, Peter Cowie and Thomas Elsaesser move beyond this stereotype to highlight Bergman’s cinematic qualities, but also indicate an interest in relating his films to a broader context. This context varies including references to other film-makers, culture in general, philosophy and psychology. These responses are not indicative of research on Bergman’s relationship to Swedish and Scandinavian culture but do give an indication of the way Bergman relates to a more generalised European intellectual context. Following consideration of points from these critics, I will provide an introductory overview of
the careers of Klein, Sartre and Bergman with a view to setting up more specific ideas of comparison and contrast. An immediate sense of correspondences and differences can be gained from a brief introductory overview of each figure’s working life, and some of the concepts that are central to this thesis. After overviews of their work I will sketch in a political and intellectual context that suggests a degree of convergence in their ideas about society and culture, which I describe as ‘humanistic’. I will go on to consider how the work of Jacques Lacan, in particular, but also structuralism and post-structuralism, in general, challenges the convergence of a range of humanist intellectuals, which includes Klein, Sartre and Bergman. I will note how that the emergence of structuralism and, subsequently, post-structuralism involved a strong turn away from the humanistic philosophy of imagination found across the work of Klein, Sartre and Bergman. I am not intending to consider in depth here the work of Lacan, but to indicate the tension between his theory and the ideas on imagination identified with the three figures on whom I am focussing. In order to sharpen this contrast I will briefly resume the work of two critics of ‘the structuralist turn’, Arthur Marwick, and José Guilherme Merquoir, who highlight what, in their opinion, is a too destructive move in the field of cultural interpretation.

In Chapter 2 I will concentrate on the development of Klein’s ideas with some further application to a Bergman work that has been considered of great interest for psychoanalysis and psychology: *Wild Strawberries*. The following chapter will concentrate on Sartre and conclude with analysis of a Bergman film that shows a strong awareness of the tension between the individual and external reality: *The Seventh Seal*. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 are devoted to extended analysis of three Bergman films. The aim here is to explore the relevance of Kleinian and Sartrean ideas whilst focussing more intensively on film style and narrative form.

**Culture, existentialism and psychoanalysis in Bergman criticism**

The history of criticism and appreciation of Bergman’s oeuvre reveals that preoccupation with his originality goes hand-in-hand with reflection on a range of contexts. It is true that Bergman criticism has rarely focused extensively on social and political factors, but a need to relate his work to ideas of culture, history, psychology, and philosophy is frequently apparent. No one, to my knowledge, has explored more than a passing affinity between Bergman and Klein’s work.
Nevertheless, there is a significant history of psychoanalytical responses to Bergman’s work including elements in Robin Wood’s book in 1969, a key auteurist reading of the director’s films, and Frank Gado’s Freudian study of the director’s entire filmic output. These are works I will refer to and discuss in my film analyses in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. Existentialism, like psychoanalysis, figures frequently as a reference in Bergman’s reception, but sustained book length application of this theory is relatively uncommon. Examples of the discussion of existentialist ideas in relation to Bergman include Birgitta Steene’s analysis of *The Seventh Seal*, and Jesse Kalin’s argument for the significance of Martin Heidegger (as opposed to Sartre) in understanding selected Bergman films. Passing references to Sartre can be found across writing about Bergman, including, for instance, his interviews, but this is frequently a shorthand for evoking an idea of Bergman’s world view rather than a sustained analysis of the applicability of Sartre’s ideas. Nevertheless, the concern to reference society and culture found in the work of critics and theorists focussed on Bergman’s authorship suggests the potential for further analysis of cultural influences, including existentialism and psychoanalysis. Here I will focus on just three examples from Godard, Cowie and Elsaesser, which suggest the potential of placing Bergman in a broader cultural context and one that I feel should include reference to existentialism and psychoanalysis.

Bergman’s early works of the 1940s raised searching questions about Swedish society, as we shall see later in Chapter 4 when I discuss three films from this period. In the 1950s Bergman’s reputation became significantly more internationalised. In 1958 Godard writes more of a celebration of Bergman’s films rather than an analysis. For Godard, *Summer with Monika* (1953) is an inspiration for modern film-making, but he also writes enthusiastically about the range of the director’s output. You can see why Godard enthuses about the moment in *Summer with Monika* when the Harriet Anderson character addresses the audience directly. As Godard points out, here is a disruption of the diegesis used subsequently by the French New Wave directors. Godard enthuses about the spontaneity and lack of formula in Bergman’s work so that he suggests the audience may love one film and be confused by the next. Godard loves the way Bergman transforms his narratives with flashbacks speaking of ‘l’importance primordial du « flashback »’. Bergman is someone who improvises more than the studied approach of other admirable auteurs. The emphasis
is also on Bergman’s authorship as a cineaste as well as a writer and dramatist. Godard says that as a ‘homme de théâtre’ Bergman adapts the work of others, but as a ‘homme de cinéma, il entend rester seul maître à bord….Bergman crée ex nihilo aventures et personnages.’

There is concern here with Bergman’s originality in relation to tradition - the fact that he has adapted many great plays of Scandinavian literature by such artists as Henrik Ibsen and Strindberg - and in relation to other contemporary directors. Godard argues that Bergman’s work is distinguished from other directors, including Robert Bresson and Luchino Visconti, because he uses a personal starting point. The method of evaluating a director’s work, through comparison with other film directors, is employed here rhetorically by Godard. Nevertheless, it is clear that Bergman’s style is favoured because it is personal and also bears comparison with the ideas of existentialism. That is, we have the idea of creativity as a very spontaneous form of invention. For Sartre, as we shall see, the self is confronted by nothingness. In Bergman’s case the laws of the traditional forms that he follows are, according to Godard, subverted through pure invention. Godard thinks that Bergman reduces traditional frameworks to nothing before he reworks elements from such traditions. Godard’s views are conveyed using the rhetoric of modernism and existentialism and in particular the love of art that is judged to be throwing away the rule-book. The individualistic, existential ethos comes through further in the following, as Godard emphasises Berman’s dedication to an individual reality: ‘On est toujours seul; sur le plateau comme devant la page blanche. Et pour Bergman, être seul, c’est poser des questions’.

For Godard, Bergman’s films do not simply involve an annihilation of preceding traditions but also their creative transformation. The notion of bricolage has been associated more with post-modernism, but here it is given more depth through reference to the author’s creativity and because a new synthesis is achieved through the creative influence of earlier styles. Godard refers to Summer Interlude (1951) and the way that the flashback structure opens up a narrative that has a mythical dimension and a modernist sense of time. Godard refers to a moment in this film when he says that through just one look in the mirror Maj Britt Nilsson is
transported: ‘comme Orphée et Lancelot à la poursuite du paradis perdu et du temps retrouvé.’\textsuperscript{13} Bergman, according to Godard, creatively draws on a range of artistic influences (Guy de Maupassant, Germaine Dulac, and Man Ray are cited) that are not restricted to his preoccupation with Sandanavian drama.\textsuperscript{14} Thus, Godard’s response to Bergman evokes existentialism and modernism in its celebration of a spontaneous transcendence of existing norms, but nonetheless draws inspiration from art and culture as a whole.

Peter Cowie is a film critic who championed Bergman’s work in Britain in the 1960s. In 2004 Cowie returns to Bergman’s significance in relation to radical developments in film culture in the 1960s. Cowie identifies Bergman as the key cutting edge director of the 1950s. ‘Bergman excited the imagination of critics, audiences and film-makers alike, more than any director of the fifties…’\textsuperscript{15} Cowie notes how Bergman’s films were represented by influential commentators:

French critics such as Jean Béranger and Jacques Siclier wrote about Bergman tapping into the fifties Zeitgeist, and how the dread of nuclear Armageddon explained the fervour with which The Seventh Seal was embraced.\textsuperscript{16}

In contrast, Cowie highlights specific qualities of Bergman’s work such as the use of flashbacks, and the complexity with which women were represented in his films of the 1950s.\textsuperscript{17} Cowie argues that these elements set the Swedish director apart from his contemporaries just as much as his vision of society. Nevertheless, Cowie still retains a discursive sense of Bergman’s engagement with society. He refers to Bergman’s range of subjects in this period. This significantly moves us away from the stereotype associated with the idea of an angst-ridden auteur behind The Seventh Seal. As Cowie indicates, the latter was crucial in developing Bergman’s international reputation and therefore may have led some audiences to be unaware of his other work. Cowie, also, side steps a narrow version of auteur theory in other ways. He highlights the talented team that Bergman worked with through the 1950s; later he points to the way the films changed in the 1960s with Sven Nykvist taking over from Gunnar Fischer as cinematographer; and he develops a comparison with Federico Fellini: the two admired each other’s work and showmanship appears to have been a factor that they had in common, a point which could lead to a further recognition of shared traits with more mainstream entertainment cinema.\textsuperscript{18}
For Cowie, Bergman’s film-making represents a new type of psychological cinema, which other directors such as Michelangelo Antonioni also became associated with. Cowie is struck, in particular, by the fact that Bergman includes in his films questions and themes that had previously been explored in the context of other art forms. Cowie states:

Bergman broached his metaphysical themes with disarming skill, daring to ask fundamental questions - both for himself and of his audience - that one associated more readily with poets and novelists, or painters such as Rembrandt and Goya.¹⁹

This captures one of the reasons why interest in Bergman’s work has endured. Bergman’s work involves a greater prominence for high art values in cinema. Paradoxically, however, this high cultural status can also be read as a popularisation of high culture - part of the trend involved in claiming that popular works could reach the level of traditional masterpieces, which emerged forcefully in 1960s culture.

Cowie suggests that the appeal of uncertainty in the work of 1960s film directors was a cultural phenomenon. He conveys the point that ‘anxiety’ became a key subject: ‘Uncertainty replaced the doughty dedication to post-war recovery and emancipation.’²⁰ This extends the idea of ambiguity as a formal quality of the works (explained in David Bordwell’s account of art cinema)²¹ to a sense of more engagement with the contemporary society. The influence of existentialism and psychoanalysis accords with this questioning sensibility. Recognising this also allows a greater sense of the way this uncertainty could be fused or combined with radical political commitment. This is clearer in the case of directors such as Pier Paolo Pasolini, Bernardo Bertolucci, and Andrzej Wadja, but it also has some effect on Bergman and was vital in his reception. Bergman, like other prominent directors of the 1950s and 1960s, such as Antonioni, was seen to represent alienation. So the cinema of this period requires an awareness of the content as well as the form. The formal innovations of art cinema might after all be read as a drift away from politics. However, contrary to this it has been noted how European film-makers inventively found means of expression outside cast iron ideologies.²²
Thomas Elsaesser is more immersed in post-1960s critical theory than Cowie, but his discussion of Bergman still retains elements of auteur theory, the significance of a modernist aesthetic and film history. Elsaesser has written about Bergman at different points since the 1960s. Two relatively recent articles by Elsaesser provide a useful introduction to some of the key issues involved in discussing the director’s films, but they are also suggestive of the need to re-evaluate Bergman’s work and point ultimately to the relevance of a philosophical understanding. Elsaesser refers to Bergman’s book *Images* and through a response to this notes some of the key aspects of Bergman’s style. Elsaesser notes that Bergman himself is not so revealing about his style, but does disclose certain points such as his preference for black and white over colour. Elsaesser is slightly disappointed that *Images* does not include discussion from Bergman about camerawork, and a significant element of film style which Elsaesser highlights: namely the way Bergman creates ‘complex fluid action spaces’; Elsaesser also wanted more from Bergman’s book on the use of the close-up in his work and the soundtrack.

Elsaesser makes it clear that interpreting Bergman has moved on from exclusive concern with the director’s existential and religious themes, and also the theme found elsewhere in art cinema of the opposition between reality and illusion. Bergman achieved critical acclaim and acquired funding from Svenski with films dominated by such themes. However, Elsaesser argues that it may be that Bergman’s international reputation also developed because his films were known for liberal, explicit and sometimes shocking treatment of contemporary life. As Elsaesser notes, our reading of Bergman is determined by numerous contextual factors, but what Elsaesser seeks to do is clarify how the work might be extracted from various rigid forms of category and stereotype, including Bergman as the voice of Nordic gloom, and Bergman as a national monument. These ideas have partly arisen, it is argued, due to the economics of world cinema and the need to use authorship and an idea of national cinema to achieve a niche in the market.

Thus, Elsaesser extracts Bergman from the formulaic emphasis on his authorship as the source of all meaning in his work and repositions the films with historical awareness in relation to the auteur tradition. In the first article he writes:
Auteur cinema today may not be dead, but what we mean by an auteur has shifted somewhat: for Europe and America, it is no longer about self-doubt or self-expression, metaphysical themes or a realist aesthetic. Instead auteurs now dissimulate such signatures of selfhood as Bergman sported, even when they believe or doubt as passionately as he did.\textsuperscript{27}

Undoubtedly, there has been some kind of trend away from attention to themes as philosophical in art cinema, and the association of this with overtly personalised styles of film-making. The heyday of Bergman, Antonioni and Andrei Tarkovsky appears to have passed. From the 1960s onward, the critical trend of structuralist theory, and subsequent critical moves, turned the focus away from the auteur as the grand centre of significant themes. Elsaesser suggests that Bergman overtly pursued this kind of cinema in a particular historical context, and that in contrast, now authorship is more concerned with cinematic expression divorced from such themes. The films of auteurs such as David Lynch, Jane Campion and Dario Argento have themes, but according to Elsaesser these are secondary to the originality of the cinematic expression, which he refers to as the creation of a cinematic ‘tour de force’.\textsuperscript{28}

However, just as Godard’s observations went beyond formal appreciation of Bergman’s work to suggest an existentialist ethos of spontaneity and cultural invention, Elsaesser signifies the need to place the director in a context, including his relation to a form of introspective awareness revealed through external cues. Elsaesser makes a striking observation of the dialectic between inner and outer reality in Bergman’s work. Elsaesser discusses how this is introduced in \textit{Persona}. At the beginning of this film Elisabet Vogler loses her power of speech on the stage. She turns from looking at the theatre audience to looking in the direction of the camera and thus in effect, as Elsaesser points out, the film audience. Thus, Elsaesser suggests that Bergman condenses the relationship between cinema and theatre into a silent movement by the character, using this ultimately to represent a psychic movement from outer world to ‘an inner revelation of being’, ‘emotional reality’.\textsuperscript{29} The film shows that her public self, like her stage self, is related to an inner self. This inner self like the backstage in a theatre is hidden from the audience. As Elsaesser puts it: ‘...just as the business that habitually goes on backstage in a theatre is
necessary in order to produce the “show”, so the chaos of one’s inner self may well be the necessary precondition of one’s active “social” life…'

30 Elsaesser notes that Bergman uses the backstage metaphor for the relationship between internal reality and social reality in other films such as *Smiles of a Summer Night* (1955) and *Sawdust and Tinsel* (1953). For Elsaesser, Bergman demonstrates how cinema can explore the phenomena of psychic reality, which are not amenable to perception or language. Of course, both perception and words are crucial to *Persona* (1966) but more fundamental is the focus on the dialectical movement between inner and outer reality. Thus, despite qualifications to the image of Bergman as an auteur defined by existential and psychological themes, Elsaesser’s account of Bergman seems to suggest that within his work the core concern is of a philosophical/psychological nature, and seems to touch on the concerns of existentialism and psychoanalysis. In addition Elsaesser suggests that the scene from *Persona* “…could serve as a very persuasive argument for the auteur theory - a scene whose minimal overt “content” reveals a maximum of cinematic meaning.”

32 The potency of the scene leads Elsaesser to suggest that Bergman’s exploration of psychic reality can, at key points, reach beyond the theories of psychology and psychoanalysis:

In his best moments, Bergman manages to render palpable a sense of indeterminacy such as it has rarely existed in the cinema since the great silent European cinema of the 1920s (the films of Murnau, Lang, Dryer): not psychological, nor psychoanalytical, but ‘phenomenal’.

33 Godard, Cowie and Elsaesser share a focus on Bergman as the source of meaning in his work, but each refuses to identify precisely Bergman’s world-view. At the same time, their criticism suggests that we should not abandon ideas from existentialism and psychoanalysis. Although Godard, Cowie and Elsaesser are concerned with Bergman’s cinematic qualities, and they do not refer directly to existential philosophy or psychoanalytic theory, their observations suggest that these fields remain critical alongside an awareness of the diversity of cultural influences on Bergman’s work. As Elsaesser’s observations convey, Bergman’s interest in silent cinema and theatre must be included in our appreciation of his ability to represent psychic depth, and the dialectic between inner and outer worlds. A comparison with Klein and Sartre offers the potential of bringing together diverse ideas about
existential and psychoanalytical elements in Bergman’s work.

In this thesis I will accept that we cannot dispense with a focus on Bergman as the organising centre of his work. I will, though, note ways in which any simple idea of Bergman as the locus of all meanings in his films is qualified, including the way we must take account of his collaborators. However, the main aim of the thesis is to deep knowledge of the significance of imagination in Bergman’s films, drawing on the body of appreciation and criticism, and by contrasting and comparing Bergman’s output with the work of Klein and Sartre. In this way I will expand from Bergman’s films and the body of Bergman criticism to make more of the potential psychological and philosophical meaning in his work. I will investigate and explore whether these three figures converge in their ideas about imagination and the artist and whether their work reconceptualises authorship.

The central focus on the imagination is not intended as a return to the romanticist mythology of the artist as creative genius. On the contrary Klein, Sartre and Bergman are firmly situated within a modernity, which insists that the relationship between the artist and external forces is a critical issue and that both sides of this dichotomy must be given weight. If we take Bergman as an example of this it is clear that at least at certain times in his life, he holds the opinion that art must be subjected to serious questioning. This is apparent in different Bergman interviews including for instance his discussion of Persona. Bergman mocks his own character’s argument that art can be therapeutic, suggests that art is marginal in its political effect, and that artists are elevated, too frequently, by their audience. However, his analysis of his own work also involves contradictory views, which prevent us seeing his viewpoint as straightforward or cynical. In a sense, he seems to say that it is up to the audience to decide about therapeutic or other values in the work. When asked if it is ‘legitimate’ for an audience to use art in this way Bergman replies: ‘if they can, it’s marvellous.’

Klein

Writing of Klein, Julia Kristeva observes: ‘…beneath the apparent self-assurance of this woman, who became the leader of a school of thought, lay an exceptionally close relationship with anxiety, both in other people and herself.’ Kristeva goes on to
make a comparison between Klein and the philosopher Hannah Arendt:

...both of whom emerged from secular Jewish worlds, appropriated Christian philosophy, Enlightenment humanism, and contemporary science in a uniquely critical and highly personal way.  

Here are two reasons to look at Klein’s work in a broader context: her personal understanding of anxiety and her absorption of perspectives from philosophy and science. Fundamental to her place in this thesis is the idea that Klein provides an alternative to other ideas because of the significance she attaches to imagination. This, however, must be clarified at the outset. Klein puts emphasis on the presence of something like imagination in the infant from birth but she calls this ‘phantasy’. The New Kleinian Dictionary begins the definition of unconscious phantasy by stating that ‘unconscious phantasies underlie every mental process and accompany all mental activity.’ It is admitted that the term phantasy has created confusion and given rise to different interpretations. James Strachey, a key early explainer of psychoanalytic theory, is said to give us ‘the definitive exposition’ of this concept, differentiating ‘fantasy’, meaning ‘“caprice, whim, and fanciful invention”’, from ‘phantasy’ meaning ‘“imagination, visionary notion”’. However, as the authors of The New Kleinian Dictionary note, many analysts, let alone readers have equated phantasy with fantasy, as the latter is defined by Strachey. In Chapter 2 I will place Klein’s philosophy of imagination in the context of her commitment to Sigmund Freud’s work and the development of her own ideas about infant phantasies.

Klein was born in 1882 in Vienna. Janet Sayers explains that Klein’s personal life was event filled and traumatic. Her sister Sidonie died when she was young. Later in her teenage years her father died and this was followed by the loss of her beloved brother Emmanuel, an art student who encouraged her to write fiction. Klein started analysis with Sándor Ferenczi in 1912 and his interest in child analysis led her to analyse her own son. Sayers argues that Klein’s analysis of her own son and her ensuing work with children, ‘shifted psychoanalysis from Freud’s instinct-based approach to one that was more alert to children’s inner images of the relations between others and themselves.’

Klein became separated from her husband after World War One, another personal
factor informing her understanding of human problems. As well as noting the impact of Klein’s personal life, her work must be related to the context of cultural, social and political upheaval. Moving to Berlin in the 1920s she developed her ideas on psychoanalysis alongside other pioneers of the discipline and amidst an increasingly forceful clash between the ideologies of communism and fascism. In her first book, *The Psychoanalysis of Children* of 1932, her analysis of her son is included alongside other case studies and theory, although he is given a different name. Following this, living in London, her reputation as an analyst developed through the 1930s. However, she experienced further emotional loss again with rejection from a daughter, and the loss of a son through an accident in a mountaineering holiday. The importance of Klein’s personal life to her work is made clear by the fact that she followed her experience of loss by working on a talk for a meeting in Lucerne on the subject of depression.

To analyse your own child would clearly be controversial today. Klein’s emphasis on analysing children shocked contemporaries in the psychoanalytical movement. A very important theoretical divergence had already emerged in the 1920s between her approach and that of Anna Freud. This conflict of ideas split the psychoanalytical movement leading to a major debate between the followers of both women in the 1940s. Sayers summarises: ‘She {Klein} rejected Anna Freud’s claim that children are too closely involved with their parents to entertain phantasies about them.’ Sayers goes on to account for Klein’s divergence from Anna Freud by showing that Klein felt that analysis had to engage with and liberate children from negative phantasies internalised prior to the Oedipus complex:

Freeing children from inhibition accordingly depends on exposing and reducing the harshness of these figures rather than strengthening them, as Anna Freud advocated, in seeking to reinforce the child’s superego.

Klein’s central ideas of the paranoid-schizoid position and the depressive position developed from her earlier work. Klein described on the basis of clinical examples the way in which, prior to the oedipal phase, the child transfers love and hate on to the parental figure, re-internalises these emotions in phantasy and then projects these phantasies outward again. This describes how the child from the beginning of its life
is torn between oscillating states of love and hate. The instinctive pull of the child towards that which it deems as good is challenged by fear of attack and physical invasion. For Klein, this state begins with the mother’s breast as an object that may be imagined as good or bad. It can thus be related to feeding, but is not strictly determined by this because of the over determination played by the child’s projection of meaning on to this content. Klein first introduced the paranoid-schizoid position formally as a concept in 1946, using it to bring together observations from her work up to this point. In 1946 she summarises the key idea underlying this position as follows: ‘The vital need to deal with anxiety forces the early ego to develop fundamental mechanisms and defences.’47 This involves the child categorising thoughts and feelings in a Manichean dichotomy and resorting to extreme patterns such as assumed omnipotence or debilitating fear. The New Dictionary of Kleinian Thought provides an updated summary of Klein’s key concept as follows:

…paranoid-schizoid mental states play an important part throughout life. The chief characteristic of the paranoid-schizoid position is the splitting of both self and object into good and bad, with at first little or no integration between them. 48

This position is according to Klein necessary but also must be overcome or transcended. The depressive phase is used by Klein to discuss how the child moves beyond the paranoid-schizoid. Again, this occurs very early in an individual’s life, beginning in the first year, but continuing to reappear at different points in an individual’s life. In effect, for Klein, it is a continual possibility of mental life. It is through the depressive position, and a transcendence of it, that Klein provides a narrative of integration and redemption based on a primitive concept of compassion. I will look at examples from Klein’s writing about this concept in Chapter 2, and its relevance to cultural criticism and film analysis; but here let us note again a contemporary summary of the ‘depressive position’, which conveys a key element of Klein’s concept. Again, for the purposes of an introduction a quote from The New Kleinian Dictionary provides a useful overview of the depressive position:

If the confluence of loved and hated figures can be borne, anxiety begins to centre on the welfare and survival of the other as a whole object, eventually giving rise to remorseful guilt and poignant sadness, linked to deepening of love.49
Klein’s work made a decisive intervention in psychoanalytical theory. As Sayers puts it, in relation to the idea of the paranoid-schizoid position:

In describing this process she launched her theory of what she called ‘projective identification’, involving not so much projecting instincts from within us on to others, as Freud had described, but projecting and identifying with others on the basis of putting into them loved and hated figures from within us.\(^{50}\)

Thus, Klein’s work points to an imaginary world that informs projection and can be altered and cultivated to improve projection. As a consequence, it also continually reaffirms an inevitable instability of the ego, a doctrine, which like Freudianism, challenges some of the key assumptions behind rationalist discourses. Klein describes the infant’s internal imaginary world in terms of ‘internal objects’. Again, this is a difficult and controversial idea. One strong appeal of this concept is Klein’s emphasis on the role emotion plays in constituting the internal world. This perspective will find comparison in the way Sartre and Bergman challenge an exclusively rational or linguistic account of subjectivity.

As David Macey notes, there is a lack of scientific evidence for Klein’s claims about childhood.\(^{51}\) However, her work set up a significant divergence from Freudianism and played an influential role in the development of psychoanalysis through object relations theory. There is no evidence that either Bergman or Sartre read or understood these developments. Nevertheless, in Klein’s emphasis on the dangers of a super ego, we can see both an updating of Freud’s work on this concept, and an idea which corresponds with Bergman’s representation of individuals tormented by authority figures, either real or imagined; Sartre also takes the struggle against authority as an issue that is simultaneously highly subjective and related to external determinants.

Klein’s emphasis on children’s play as a source of understanding of the psyche is distinctive, and historically significant in the development of child psychology. Throughout Bergman’s work we find sensitivity to the subjectivity of children and
young people. The concept of ‘play’ runs alongside that of imagination and can be used to consider the social implications of actions ignored by adult sensibility. Klein attributed the expression of intensely negative emotions to the play she witnessed, but also, through the concept of the depressive position, she paved the way for constructive recognition of the child’s sense of morality.

Klein’s work was very empirically based and sometimes shockingly direct. Lacan criticised Klein’s crude deterministic account of certain observations of child’s play but, as already stated, this work became a foundation for a major development in psychoanalysis. It offers the possibility of less emphasis on Oedipal development and more account of the child’s relationship to his/her environment, even though Klein herself remained completely committed to Freud’s concept of the Oedipus complex. The fear that her work fails to take account of material not amenable to empirical observation explains something of the gulf between Lacan and Klein’s ideas that has frequently appeared. But some defenders of Klein hold onto her proximity to Freudian work and argue that her work resists reduction to a psychology centred on the ego. It is indisputable that, for Klein, therapy seeks to integrate the ego, whilst mental illness and neurosis stems from the ego in crisis. However, through the central role given to what Klein calls phantasy, which I see as a contribution to the understanding of imagination, she fully recognises how the ego may be assailed by forces that are deep and that require interpretation as well as observation.

Connected to this emphasis on interpretation and the depths of the psyche is Klein’s distinctive emphasis on the significance of the maternal. This has not always been welcomed, and was criticised by Anna Freud and her followers for the failure to analyse the actual roles played by mothers. However, in the context of psychoanalysis it provides an enormous counterpoint to Freudian and Lacanian emphasis on the structural power of the father as a real person and as a concept. The structural significance of the maternal in Klein corresponds with the powerful position of women in a large number of Bergman’s works. In Sartre’s work we find recognition of the maternal most strongly in his autobiographical and literary biographical work, including his analysis of Gustave Flaubert’s relationship with his mother.
Klein had moved to the UK in the 1930s and stayed to work continuously until her death in 1960. Her work lacks explicit engagement with macro social and political issues outside her clinical work but at key points this emerges. For instance, this can be seen in her comments on punishment in her 1934 essay *On Criminality*, which in Chapter 5 I relate to the treatment of crime in *The Virgin Spring*. The psychoanalytic movement was notoriously inward looking during the Second World War as the famous anecdote about a bomb attack illustrates.\(^{57}\) Against this, we can see how Klein’s work involved analysis of a psychic reality with serious implications for the analysis of division and conflict in society. I will return to this potential for a more socially engaged understanding of Kleinianism when I consider further points of convergence with Sartre and Bergman.

**Sartre**

Sartre was born in 1905 in Paris.\(^{58}\) His father died a year later leaving Sartre to be brought up by his mother, and influenced by his patriarchal grandfather; and later, deeply resentful of his step-father. His autobiography of 1963 *Words* recalls his childhood including the way he became an intellectual with his grandfather’s books dominating his imagination. Sartre sees himself as someone drawn to an abstract intellectual and imaginary universe even before he could read. As Sartre puts it:

\[\text{A Platonist by condition, I moved from knowledge to its object; I found ideas more real than things, because they were the first to give themselves to me and because they gave themselves like things.}^{59}\]

Whilst continuing his early attraction to intellectual existence Sartre, as a reader, was taken, in his childhood, by action adventure stories,\(^{60}\) a fact which provides one origin for his later emphasis on heroic individual commitment as a fundamental philosophical principle. The study of Sartre in this thesis will demonstrate the relevance of existentialism and phenomenology to Bergman and Klein, as well as revealing the distinctiveness of a philosophical approach to the imagination. I will look in particular in Chapter 3 at his early work *The Imaginary*, and then at how his understanding of this subject develops across some of his subsequent work.

At school Sartre was already highly imaginative, writing stories inspired by the detective fiction he adored and acting out the films he saw at the cinema with his
mother. As David Drake records:

At local venues as well as the bigger picture houses they watched melodramatic adventure films, many of their features borrowed from popular literature: the rescuing of damsels in distress, the dastardly machinations of the villains and the courage and daring of the heroes.61

According to Drake, Sartre’s early fiction, written after he left school, already reveals a number of themes and preoccupations that return later, including a strong awareness of self-deception as a psychological process, and contempt for the bourgeoisie. Drake emphasises how Sartre moved beyond the simple moral binaries of the fiction he loved as a child, and in its place emerged a fascination with the lack of certainty in human affairs. As Drake tells us:

Life, he observed, was nothing but contingency. He was struck by the contrast with what happened in the cinema. In films everything has a significance and contributes to the story, which has a beginning, a middle and a (usually happy) end. In life, on the other hand, there is no necessity.62

While Sartre’s early adult life reveals his precocity and intelligence, it also has been recognised that there is a disturbing unstable element at work. Sartre’s study of philosophy during the 1930s involved some time spent in Berlin on a scholarship, a situation, which brought him into contact with fascism. By this stage Sartre was developing his ideas about the individual’s responsibility for his own existence in the face of a world where political action could appear absurd in its futility. He is preoccupied with the terrible nature of ‘freedom’ that confronts the individual consciousness. His early work on the imagination can be regarded as bound up with the problem of responding to the negative, annihilating quality of consciousness that goes with the possibility of freedom. At the same time this work is influenced by his non-conformist lifestyle such that during his work on the imagination he felt negatively affected by his experiments with mescaline and the resulting hallucinations. Nevertheless, The Imaginary, published in 1940, four years after being written by Sartre, is still of interest, particularly when considered in relation to his subsequent work.63 It shows Sartre concerned to differentiate his idea of imagination from one based on an empiricist philosophy of perception. Yet, at the
same time, he wishes to show why the imaginary is not a romantic nether world, or a
metaphysical realm, but one in which consciousness may discover its own power and
freedom. Although the positive force of this argument is not explicit in this early
work it remains a consistent feature through Sartre’s complex career. His novel
published in 1938 was originally called Melancholia. Ultimately named Nausea it
explores the theme of individual freedom, but encapsulated by the alienated
consciousness of a protagonist overwhelmed by his discovery of contingency.

In another early work of philosophy Transcendence of the Ego, written in 1936 we
can see an approach that in some respects appears to share much with post-
structuralist deconstruction. Here Sartre, whilst heavily indebted to Edmund
Husserl challenges the latter’s emphasis on the unity of consciousness arguing in
effect that the ego must be continually recreated. This early work, along with Sartre’s
account of the emotions written in 1939, is relevant to the relativism and emotional
intensity that we find across Bergman’s work - a point that will be returned to. But
we also have to note how Sartre chose not to dismantle the heritage of Idealist
philosophy. During the war Sartre wrote Being and Nothingness.

In Being and Nothingness Sartre developed his insights on freedom using an
elaborate philosophical discourse that was both original and strongly influenced by
Idealism. Here we find his development of the concepts of the ‘for-itself’ and the ‘in-
itself’. While Sartre gives weight to the material world’s independence through his
notion of being ‘in-itself’, he retains an opposition with consciousness, conveying the
independence of the latter and its inherent intentionality with the term ‘for-itself’. In
between these states, what Sartre terms ‘bad faith’, involves consciousness denying
its nature and potential as something which is ‘for-itself’ and thus reducing the self
activating process of consciousness to a fixed state: consciousness becomes an ‘in-
itself’, it becomes like a thing. These concepts signify a profound split in human
consciousness, but it is wrong to immediately assume that Sartre is irredeemably
pessimistic about the possibility of synthesis in human consciousness, and following
on from this that he is pessimistic in relation to morality, political commitments and
aesthetic value. Sartre retains the sense of agency conveyed in the idealist tradition
including the Cartesian emphasis on personal reflection as a starting point for
philosophy, and the Kantian philosophy of the transcendent power of conceptual
reason. Perhaps even more significant is his continuing engagement with the Hegelian and Marxist understanding of dialectical relationships. This engagement suggests that progress must be sought for through greater awareness of conflict within the individual and in society. All these influences from philosophy count, when we weigh up Sartre’s position against the challenge of structuralism and post-structuralism, because the continuing presence of elements influenced by idealism signify a dogged commitment to a notion of meaningful and accessible individual decision making.

Undoubtedly, Sartre’s philosophy is complex and not always consistent. *Being and Nothingness* also reveals the influence of Søren Kierkegaard, Heidegger and Friedrich Nietzsche. Their work leads Sartre towards a complex understanding of subjectivity in which high and elusive standards accompany meaningful individual action. The individualism of these thinkers is reflected in Sartre’s insistence that the individual must overcome self-inflicted concepts of deterministic causation. In *Being and Nothingness* Sartre infamously does not tell us what constitutes good faith, but we may suppose that it must involve authenticity, a concept derived from Heidegger. Nevertheless, the continuing presence of the other Idealist thinkers in Sartre’s philosophy points to a more socially engaged sense of subjectivity. This was to become apparent in Sartre’s Kantian influenced polemic about humanism following World War Two, ‘Existentialism is a Humanism’, and in his Hegelian influenced engagement with Marxist dialectics in the post-war period.

Sartre’s awareness of the Spanish civil war and the subsequent Nazi occupation coincide with development in his ideas. During the war he was released from a German prisoner of war camp. Back in Paris he initiated a resistance group involving close associates. At the same time his career developed in a way, according to Drake, that avoided outright confrontation with the Nazi occupier even though he managed to smuggle his resistance ideals into his work. His work during the war continues his preoccupation with individual ‘freedom’ but also moves towards articulating how we should respond to this freedom. The Occupation reinforced his awareness of freedom as the fundamental issue that confronted humanity, but it is a philosophical conception of freedom quite distinct from the economic ideology of capitalism. Sartre makes it clear in his *War Diaries* that his experiences in the war...
led him to recognize that freedom must be placed in context:

To be authentic is to realize fully one’s being-in-situation, whatever that situation may happen to be… This presupposes a patient study of what the situation requires, and then a way of throwing oneself into it and determining oneself to ‘be-for’ this situation. Of course situations are not catalogued once and for all. On the contrary, they are new each time.  

In his overview of Sartre’s work István Mészáros traces the way morally committed politics became a growing emphasis of Sartre’s work during the 1950s. Mészáros sees a line of continuity alongside transformation in Sartre’s work. The latter became more politicised during the late 1940s and 1950s with *Existentialism and Humanism* in 1945, his sympathy for Marxism in *What is Literature?* in 1948, and in Sartre’s involvement with contemporary struggles against imperialism in the latter half of the 1950s and the early 1960s, Mészáros finds that Sartre made a transition from a ‘self oriented subjectivity’ to his more mature philosophy of moral commitment. Even when he sought a synthesis with Marxism Sartre sought to maintain the significance of individual autonomy. As Mészáros indicates, Sartre’s early philosophy of the imagination does not disappear. It returns most explicitly for instance in his hope that the rebellions of 1968 would involve ‘imagination in power’. Meszaros quotes from Sartre’s work on Flaubert:

A man is like a leak of gas, escaping into the imaginary. Flaubert did so perpetually; yet he also had to see reality because he hated it, so there is the whole question of the relationship between the real and the imaginary which I try to study in his life and work.

According to Mészáros, Sartre regards Flaubert as someone who makes a choice to escape into the imaginary, and this is ultimately contrasted to moral engagement with social conditions. For Sartre, the abiding concern is with the problematic of freedom and how it is constituted internally in the face of external conditioning. In this way Sartre suggests that the imaginary must be reflected on for its potential as a negation of society, but also critically because of its potential for self-deception. Mészáros quotes Sartre as saying in 1969: ‘I would today accord to freedom the small movement which makes of a socially conditioned social being someone who does not render back completely what his conditioning has given him.’ For Mészáros,
Sartre’s individualistic understanding of subjectivity and social determinism is problematic, but Mészáros recognises how Sartre, from the 1930s to his death, is focussed on maintaining a degree of unity in his idea of subjectivity. Discontinuity resulting from external social forces is internalised by the individual.

It is not surprising, therefore, that Sartre is drawn in his later career to biography, as Bergman is drawn to the personal confessional mode, and Klein worked on abstract theoretical issues with her own children. More explicitly than the other two, and partly because of his immersion in continental philosophy, Sartre is a dialectical thinker, whose thought continually probes contradictions faced by the individual. This again is a point that Mészáros develops effectively. With Sartre we will see a commitment to the freedom of imagination, and we will see recognition of why this faculty should not be idealised, but situated in a realistic context. This, I would suggest, is relevant to Bergman because his attraction to representing subjectivity also maintains a critical awareness of external determinations outside the individual.

**Bergman**

Bergman was born in Uppsala in 1918. He was brought up in a strict religious household and his father was a pastor who was appointed, early in Bergman’s life as a religious minister for the king. In Bergman’s autobiography of 1987 he starts by describing the punishment he received as a child. This included being made to wear a skirt, and more seriously physical punishment: ‘After the strokes had been administered, you had to kiss Father’s hand, at which forgiveness was declared and the burden of sin fell away, deliverance and grace ensued.’ Bergman also describes how he was punished by being locked in a cupboard, an experience that was made worse when the maid made him think there was ‘a creature’ hiding in the cupboard and it would eat his toes. These anecdotes provide an explanation for Bergman’s preoccupation in his work with themes of shame, humiliation and the power of imagination. Very clearly he turns to these incidents and reworks them. His 1968 film *Hour of the Wolf* involves the main character describing his terror as a child locked in the cupboard and his fear of an imaginary creature. In *Fanny and Alexander* the evil step-father appears to represent in a more grotesque form some of the actions of Bergman’s father, described in *The Magic Lantern*. 
In Bergman’s first screenplay for Alf Sjoberg’s *Frenzy* (1944), there is a focus on the conflict between a teenage male protagonist and a tyrannical male teacher. Bergman’s first film as a director, *Crisis*, adapted from a radio play concerned a charismatic but tragic male protagonist, Jack, who commits suicide. Throughout Bergman’s work we find a gallery of flawed and disturbed male protagonists. When Bergman announced his retirement, in 1984, the final film *Fanny and Alexander* provided a different take on flawed masculinity in the form of the evil bishop who abuses his step-children. Bergman’s flawed, and intermittently dangerous men, do not preclude a noted concentration on a sensitive male hero in his early films, for whom he frequently used the actor Birger Malmsten. One of Bergman’s earliest films that has received extensive critical acclaim and makes notable use of melancholy narrative premise is *Summer Interlude*, the film Godard celebrated, in which the lead character is a young woman played by Maj-Britt Nilsson, remembering the summer when her boyfriend, played sensitively by Malmsten, was tragically killed in an accident in an idyllic island setting. This narrative of young love set in the Swedish archipelago compares with *Summer with Monika*, a film I analyse in depth in Chapter 4.

During the 1950s and 1960s another actor emerged as a powerful lead for a number of Bergman works. Max von Sydow played roles that can be construed as at least partly expressive of the director’s personal feelings including *Hour of the Wolf*, which will be analysed in Chapter 6. Bergman’s preoccupation with the flaws of a male authority figure, and his concern to project either sensitive or more introspective male characters can be related to his conflict with his father detailed in his autobiography. In his questioning of self-evident male authority and concern with the absence of God, expressed so famously by von Sydow’s knight in *The Seventh Seal* and in other works such as *The Virgin Spring* (see Chapter 5), Bergman appears to gravitate towards existentialism as an alternative. This is the position he conveys in his famous lengthy interviews with Stig Björkman, Torsten Manns and Jonas Sims made at the end of the 1960s but published in English in 1973. In these interviews Bergman describes how he shed his belief in religion in the early 1960s.  

Bergman’s doubts about religion emerged at an early stage. In relation to broader historical influences it is also important to recognise, as Vernon Young points out,
that Bergman is born at the traumatic historical moment of the end of the First World War, is developing his adult consciousness during the Second World War, and launches as a film director in its aftermath. We need to take account of Sweden’s neutrality in both wars and Bergman’s early political confusion. He discusses in his biography his adolescent attraction to fascism on a visit to Germany as an exchange student. He discusses how the revelation of Nazi atrocities filled him with guilt about his own early enthusiasm for Adolf Hitler: ‘I did not realize until long afterwards that I was guilty by association only.’ After the war, amidst tensions in a Gothenburg theatre between different sides of the conflict from Sweden and Germany, Bergman could not talk about his mistakes regarding fascism. Shame about his early political sympathies appears to have made Bergman steer away from overt political content, but this is something that he realises was a mistake: ‘I did not mention my aberrations and despair, but a strange decision slowly matured. Politics – never again! Of course I should have made an utterly different decision.’ Nevertheless, perhaps Bergman did not suppress his new-found political awareness. The argument has been made that Bergman’s films have a pervasive questioning of oppressive authority structures. Johns Blackwell, for instance, brings together Bergman’s critical approach to father figures and religion with a critical approach to dominant structures in society. This subversive stance is connected, by Johns Blackwell, to Bergman’s early experience of seeing his father work at the King’s court. Johns Blackwell complements this observation with the suggestion that Bergman represented motherhood sympathetically in a range of films because of his close relationship with his own mother and also because of his early experience with Swedish silent cinema. Johns Blackwell states:

In part because of the influential writings of the feminist Ellen Kay, there developed in Sweden in the early part of this century a kind of ‘renaissance of motherhood’ that was played out in, among other arenas, the silent films of the era...

Emotion and personal experiences are a more self-evident influence on Bergman’s creativity than external political structures. Young refers to the anxiety of Bergman’s youth, including at the age of 19, significant romantic disappointment, and disillusionment with religion and ‘at nearly the same time, though Bergman is unable
to place the event - his memory for the chronology of those years is by now confused - he also lost by death a very close male companion. The themes of romance, bereavement and mourning, which developed into such a major theme in *Summer Interlude*, may owe their setting to the summer which Bergman spent on the Swedish islands, at the age of nineteen, when, as Young tells us, he was rejected by a girl whom he loved. There appears to be an imaginative condensation of romantic and mortal loss in this work, which indicates how Bergman reworks his own anxieties into his work.

The use of location and the setting of the Swedish archipelago, in some of Bergman’s early works, reinforce the point that he is concerned with love from a romantic aesthetic perspective. However, the emphasis on nature, passion and imagination is continually problematised in his work by the representation of psychological conflicts. His lyrical treatment of Swedish landscapes has to be counterbalanced against his notable experimentation with a wide range of mise-en-scene including treatment of industrial settings (for instance in *Port of Call* (1948)). By the time we get to *The Seventh Seal* the beautifully lit landscape is pervaded by death and nine years later with *Persona*, a beautiful but bleak landscape is the backdrop to psychodrama. This signals Bergman’s divergence from a nostalgic heritage tradition in which the landscape is represented as a national treasure, and as a site for a sense of coherence at the level of national identity (an argument made by Erik Hedling). For Bergman, the landscape may be beautiful but also it is continually a site of conflict, implicated in personal and sometimes social struggles.

Bergman’s biography details his early obsession with theatrical illusion and, closely connected to this, his early love of cinematic make-believe. Maaret Koskinen records how Bergman played with his own film projector and puppet theatres in his childhood, thus creating his own imaginary worlds. References to his childhood are repeated in a number of films including references to a toy cinematograph in *Prison* (1949) and *Persona*, two films that otherwise are amongst his most disturbing works. Bergman’s internationalism has frequently been noted, in relation to his preoccupation with philosophical themes, and his representation of ambiguity, in a style, which affords comparison with other ‘auteurs’ of the European art cinema. In a special edition of the Swedish film magazine *Chaplin*, Koskinen develops the
argument convincingly that despite disparate Swedish influences Bergman’s work transcends its natural roots. This, she argues, is the result of work, which is ‘…a peculiar mixture of the abstract and the concrete, the metaphysical and the realistic.’ Koskinen argues that to explain Bergman’s work through Swedish culture alone does not sufficiently recognise how Bergman's work is an ‘addition’ to the existing cultural reality rather a ‘substitute’ or ‘parallel’; and how right from the beginning of his career he gravitated towards a European literary tradition and universal themes. The danger of over-emphasising Bergman’s internationalism has also been widely recognised. Scholarship on Bergman has sought to recover some of the more specific cultural meanings of his work issuing from Sweden and Scandinavia in general as Steene notes. Scholarship on Bergman has also sought to recognise the interplay between Bergman’s work in cinema with his equally prolific theatrical career and his work as a writer and a producer. The theatre-film relationship is crucial to understanding his art, including the confessional quality of the dialogue, versatile switching between different genres that include comedy, and the influence of Strindberg.

Whilst fully recognising the significance of attending to localised influences on Bergman’s work, this thesis is premised on the idea that the humanism emerging from Bergman’s work, in form and content, and its international connection with Klein and Sartre, has not been fully explored despite the frequent assumptions that Bergman relates to psychology and existentialism. Relevant to this is recognition of Bergman’s diversity as an artist including the interplay between his experience of theatre and his openness to different film styles. By way of introduction, it is best to simply describe Bergman as an experimenter, or bricoleur, who drew on a wide range of styles and remarkably forged a unique and unified style. The focus on two films which fully established him as an icon of European art cinema, Wild Strawberries and The Seventh Seal, and have received extensive critical analysis, potentially obscures the way he incorporates theatrical techniques and multiple filmic influences across his other films. In particular, I want to highlight his continuing respect for silent cinema. His love of the theatre and silent cinema inform the way Bergman thinks, and directs and are very significant in an account of the value he places on imagination.
In relation to Bergman’s adult life, his own psychological crises, including a number of broken marriages, and his visit to hospital with the nervous breakdown that preceded *Persona*, indicate the very real foundations of his psychological themes and, hence, the relevance of opening up comparisons and contrasts with Kleinian theory. However, just as important to understand is that his life as an artist was extremely social and productive with almost continuous involvement in theatre and film. Another basic point to make is that Bergman’s regular work with highly talented actors, and actresses across film and theatre, and other members of the production teams (such as his cinematographers), allowed for a continuity that fostered creative excellence. From Bergman’s biography we expect the themes of loss and anxiety to appear in his work, but we can also recognise how his creativity must be understood as a dialectic that involves a balance between romantic melancholy, and a more dynamic and optimistic creative spirit. This combination led to his dominance of Swedish cinema and success at international level.

**Klein, Sartre and Bergman: connections**

A general overview suggests that each of these figures brought traumatic personal issues into their work. This supports a widely accepted cliché about art and intellectual life that in some sense suffering is necessary for inspiration, creativity and insight. However, this is the starting point for recognising a deeper convergence, one that can be related to the Kleinian understanding of modernism developed by Esther Sánchez-Pardo. She writes:

> Modernist art and literature, with their emphasis on spatialization and the relevance of forms, reveal a troubled aesthetic state pervaded with melancholia….Klein echoes a modernist concern with the precarious and contingent character of the analytic vocabularies available and more widely with the nature of representational discourse itself.  

This perspective is useful because it relates the apparent focus on traumatic content with the formal innovation of modernism and a broader cultural context developing most intensely from World War One onwards. However, as already noted, these three figures also seek the means of recovery through and from melancholia. This occurs either at the level of ideas, clinical practise, philosophical reflection or through narrative and character development. I will explore the idea that they share what has been called a culture of modernist melancholia, but also a humanistic
search for progress, thus relating the individual circumstances of these figures to broader historical developments. The shared philosophy is humanist because there is a real sense in which each figure seeks positive values beyond localised boundaries and thus invokes a sense of universality. Briefly, this is apparent in Klein’s model of reparation; Sartre’s search for an existentialist ethics and politics; and the presence of a degree of narrative resolution in many Bergman films alongside their emphasis on melancholy themes and disjuncture. Although this involves debate and disagreement with various commentators who stress the pessimism of each of these figures (for instance, Gado’s account of Bergman’s films, and Rustin’s equation of Sartre with Lacanian theory⁹²), it is necessary to consider how recovery and renewal are represented or constructed by Klein, Sartre and Bergman, even when this is oblique or in question.

Another point of comparison is that across their work there is an emphasis on psychological depth and reflection, which extends to a more critical engagement with their society. Klein is more concerned with a vision of psychic depth than other psychological practitioners as can be seen in her challenge to uncover the unconscious of children, and her opposition to theories that have no sense of the unconscious. For Klein, reflection must grasp the dynamics of unconscious phantasies in order that progress can be achieved. Sartre, on the other hand, challenges the Freudian concept of the unconscious. However, Sartre maintains an emphasis on the efficacy of individual reflection, and this is where he establishes a depth of subjectivity in contrast to other philosophies, coming into conflict with empirical and positivistic theories, and then in the 1960s structuralism. Bergman’s cinema is more concerned with reflection through introspective dialogue and psychological themes, thus contrasting with the action based cinema of some Hollywood films in particular. Through reflection Bergman characters often interrogate their own lives and histories, a classic example being the ruminations of Isac Borg in Wild Strawberries. This concern with reflection and depth relates to a broader historical context and position. Let us just note at this point a few indicators. All three were significantly influenced by the horror of World War Two, the questioning and reflection in the post-war aftermath and the constructive optimism of the post-war rebuilding. It is necessary to consider whether the emphasis on psychic depth is influenced by these, and other historical, horizons.
A sense of critical engagement with post-war developments can be read across their work. For instance, Klein’s concept of the paranoid-schizoid has been used to criticize the nuclear arms race and to criticise and conceptualise, as Ian Parker puts it, ‘the cultural dynamics that keep this war drive on the move.’ Furthermore, Klein’s work has been considered from an explicitly political perspective as Julia Kristeva notes:

Some critics emphasize her theory of the negative and the importance of the death drive and of the disruptive forces that call to mind the image of the anti-establishmentarian and the rebel when they do not descend into the figures of the paranoid person or the quietly schizophrenic egotist.

This indicates Klein’s faith in the liberating powers of the imagination as well as the dangers of delusion, obsession and other psychological complexes. Kristeva notes that Klein’s work:

…did not focus on the political aspects of the madness which tainted the twentieth century. At the same time, even if she shielded herself from the horrors that surrounded her, Klein’s analysis of private psychosis, whether in children or in adults, helps us to identify the most deep-seated mechanisms that - along with economic and ideological influences - paved the way for the destruction of psychic space and the annihilation of the life of the mind that threatened the modern era.

Sartre becomes politicised from the period of his imprisonment in the Second World War and in the post-war period is an active contributor to anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist struggles. Opinion is mixed on the identity of Sartre’s politics in the latter stages of his career, as he tried to synthesise Marxism and politics. Frederic Jameson offers one side of the argument when he argues that Sartre can be considered as part of ‘the new left’, which incorporated cultural critique.

Bergman’s work included some soap commercials when he needed to earn a living at the start of the 1950s. His sophisticated comedies of this decade are just as worthy of analysis as his other work but also reveal his attempt to win an audience. Thus, Bergman shows that he was broad minded enough to experiment with different modes of film-making whilst seeking to get sufficient funding. However, the fact that
he did not migrate to Hollywood is an indicator of his orientation outside a more consumer focussed film industry. This is notable particularly given his struggle with budgets if not the enduring support of the Swedish film industry. An aspect of Bergman’s politics which Bergman himself discusses is his flirtation with fascism in the 1940s as an impressionable teenager staying in Germany. Bergman discusses how this episode made him move away from political subjects subsequently; but also he discusses how *Shame* made in 1968 was motivated by continuing thoughts about World War Two about the threat of Nazism. This work can also be read as suggestive of a critical engagement with contemporary politics. *Shame* was made before the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia and the intensification of the conflict in Vietnam. Bergman makes clear that he would have made the film differently if these events had already occurred, which shows, perhaps surprisingly, his willingness to respond to, or take account of, political upheaval in this instance.

The concern with depth and its significance for reflection on society in Klein, Bergman and Sartre can be contrasted with the increasing emphasis on surface and anonymity which is associated with the expansion of consumer culture and post-modernism. Arguably Klein, Sartre and Bergman are concerned with the same signs of alienation and conformity, which concerned a range of liberal and leftist intellectuals. Thus their work can be connected to the critical responses, which developed towards the consequences of late capitalism including the critique of mass society found in the work of the Frankfurt School. In the case of Bergman, this does not lead to an obvious ideological position. It has been argued by Jörn Donner that Bergman’s work is responding to a society, Sweden, that was extremely advanced in terms of economic security and thus even more vulnerable to issues concerning the ‘inner life’. In this sense, Bergman’s work confronts a loss of ideology. Nevertheless, even if this context prevails across Bergman’s work we also find issues of equality, and disempowerment. Some of Bergman’s early works, influenced by neo-realism demonstrate a marked concern with the alienation of young working class characters from their society. In other works we find expressive and powerful treatment of alienation including a striking awareness of injustice and challenges faced by his female protagonists.

Meanwhile, the politics of Kleinianism are brought forward when Michael Rustin
argues that British psychoanalysis in the post-war period, which included an influential Kleinian stream, was defined by a progressive cultural agenda. In his essay *Lacan, Klein and Politics* Rustin argues that this and related sections of British psychoanalysis are ‘defined to some degree in opposition to the values of a merely materialist or power-seeking society.’ Another Kleinian theorist, C. Fred Alford attempts to bring together Kleinian and Frankfurt School theory. In Jameson’s *Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* the theories of structuralism and post-structuralism are implicated in the development of depthless culture partly because of their failure to attend to history. A crucial question, then, which arises in relation to a humanist focus on the power of individual imagination is whether this is more successful than structuralism in maintaining awareness of historical forces. This question can only be dealt with through the focussed analysis of individual works, which will follow in subsequent chapters. Despite concentrating on the role of imagination I will explore not just the issues that confront Klein, Sartre and Bergman within their respective fields, but the relevance or lack of relevance of political and social connotations in the work.

**The challenge of structuralism and Lacan**

The sense of a humanistic convergence between Klein, Sartre and Bergman is reinforced when we look at the contrast offered by the structuralist theory emerging in the 1960s. In the late 1950s Sartre was a cult figure, Klein had strong claims to being Freud’s successor and Bergman was considered to be at the forefront of creativity in world cinema. These reputations did not disappear. However, by the end of the 1960s, the constituency of each figure had been diminished, and a critical factor in this was the turn against the individual subject conveyed by structuralist theory. Structuralist critiques of the auteur theory challenge the way in which the work of all these figures had been appreciated. As Merquior notes, the structuralist Claude Lévi-Strauss explicitly challenged Sartre’s existentialism. Also, as Rustin makes clear, British critical theory gravitated towards Lacan rather than Klein and the object relations tradition.

Lacan’s work was influential across the fields of psychoanalysis, philosophy and cultural studies. Of particular relevance to this thesis is that it had a critical influence on post-1960s film theory. Susan Hayward argues that the beneficial influence of
Lacan on feminist film theory is particularly evident in relation to film noir and women’s films because Lacanian and post-Lacanian critics have been able to show how women who refuse to ‘mirror’ the desires of the male are perceived as posing a threat or disruption to male controlled society. She suggests that Lacan with his theory of the unconscious as a language exposes the illusions imposed on images by patriarchy. In Laura Mulvey’s seminal article on visual pleasure the illusory unifying effect of the patriarchal regime is explained specifically using voyeurism and fetishism as key structural concepts. There is a complex history of film theory here, and, clearly, Lacan’s willingness to challenge any conception of individual autonomy can inform a critique of individual films. However, my purpose is more specific: to indicate how this structuralist perspective conflicts with the intentions and ambitions of Klein, Bergman and Sartre’s humanism.

Lacan, in his early formulation of the mirror phase in 1949, suggests that the infant overcomes a sense of internal fragmentation and disunity with a specular image of him/herself in which unity of the ego is attributed to unity of the body. He writes:

> The fact is that the total form of the body by which the subject anticipates in a mirage the maturation of his power is given to him only as a Gestalt, that is to say, in an exteriority in which this form is certainly more constituent than constituted, but in which it appears above all in a contrasting size (un relief de stature) that fixes it and in a symmetry that inverts it, in contrast with the turbulent movements that the subject feels are animating him.

According to Lacan, then, this mirror image transcends its apparent origin outside the subject and offers an imaginary sense of autonomy, which the subject will cling on to through the subsequent trials of the Oedipal phase and its inter-relations with others. Lacan’s intervention has cultural implications. He pays tribute to the surrealists for recognising this illusory sense of unity in images:

> I have myself shown in the social dialectic that structures human knowledge as paranoiac why human knowledge has greater autonomy than animal knowledge in relation to the field of force of desire, but also why human knowledge is determined in that ‘little reality’ (ce peu de réalité), which the surrealists, in their restless way, saw as its limitation.

Lacan opens his 1949 address with his attack on René Descartes’ philosophy of the cogito. Here he refers to the Cartesian legacy, and the belief that knowledge’s
foundation is self-reflection. Later in the address, Lacan turns against existentialism as a philosophy. He recognises that the latter has grasped a sense of negativity which ego psychology plays down or excludes:

But unfortunately that philosophy [existentialism] grasps negativity only within the limits of a self-sufficiency of consciousness, which, as one of its premises, links to the meconnaissances that constitute the ego, the illusion of autonomy to which it entrusts itself.¹¹⁰

This explains, according to Lacan, why the freedom that existentialism offers is so contradictory, and perversely pessimistic, believing in ‘a freedom that is never more authentic than when it is in the walls of a prison’.¹¹¹ We are still here at an early stage in Lacan’s career and later his work became more defined by structuralism as he developed the idea that the unconscious is structured like a language. Since semiotics was starting to play a part in film theory in the 1960s, the conjunction of psychoanalysis and semiotics in Lacan’s work proved an attractive foundation for many film theorists, as Geoffrey Nowell Smith notes.¹¹²

Klein and Sartre do not give a carte blanche to the autonomous Cartesian human subject but they introduce innovative ideas of human agency. For Klein the infant’s recognition of the mother and other internalised objects through the depressive phase provides a model for greater synthesis of the ego. This is a significant foundation for linguistic development and is morally desirable in its projection of a form of compassion for the other. For Sartre, freedom is not forever dependent on the ‘prison’ Lacan refers to in his address, but remains a horizon for analysis. Klein and Sartre do not invoke Cartesian reflection but they provide new perspectives on the inward gaze, which detaches this psychology from all consuming narcissism. In Bergman’s films characters continually look into themselves. A Lacanian perspective offers insight into the fragmentation that some Bergman characters experience and a critique of the illusions of autonomy which others are beset by, but this perspective does not provide an accessible model for recognising patterns of integration and individual self-realisation.

Lacan’s ideas are just one example of the structuralist critique of a model of individual agency. On the whole, Klein, Sartre and Bergman simply do not engage
with the challenge that emerges through structuralist theorists such as Lacan. Their continued assumption of a level of individual agency is supported, however, by a range of theorists who have challenged the structuralist intervention, precisely on its elimination of ideas of the individual.

**Marwick’s historical account of structuralism and post-structuralism**

In tracing the intellectual history of the 1960s Marwick charts the rise of structuralism and also links this to post-structuralism. Reading through Marwick’s summary of the views of key structuralist thinkers we return frequently to the way in which ideas of individual autonomy are challenged. This is evident for Marwick from Roland Barthes’ essay *The Death of an Author*, and in Lévi-Strauss’ insistence on the work of Ferdinand de Saussure. Marwick summarises Saussure’s argument as follows:

> Words, he argued, can only have meaning within the entire language system of which they are a part; they derive their meaning from their difference from other words. This language system, he asserted (there is certainly nothing in the way of proof), is external to human beings, arising instead from the power structure of society.  

From work that has been influential on the subject of film studies, as it became academically institutionalised in the 1970s, we are aware of Saussure’s semiotics, Lévi-Strauss’ insight that anthropology could be analysed as language, and the work of the other structuralists and post-structuralists, ranging from Michel Foucault to Lacan. Marwick’s historical account reminds us that a recurring dominant theme is the attack on individual agency. Lévi-Strauss in his book *La Pensee Sauvage* made ‘an undisguised attack on Sartre.’ Lacan decided that ‘...subconscious desires are not those of the individual “subject” but of the (bourgeois) power structure of the society to which the subject belongs.’ Further on, Marwick notes that:

> Foucault also joined in the attack on the bourgeois notion that any significance attached to the individual human ‘subject’ or historical actor. Only the modern ‘human sciences’ put the individual ‘human subject’ at the centre of things; Foucault suggested that this had not always been so, and would not long continue to be so.

One can argue with Marwick’s generalisations, which seek to extract the common
sense meaning from these radical theorists. One might also argue with his point that these theorists remain uncritical of Marxism and that this is why they continue to emphasise the dominance of bourgeois ideology over the individual. However, Marwick’s account is useful in indicating some of the broad differences of this intellectual trend that became so prominent in the 1960s from the ideas and practice of the figures who I am studying. Marwick sees the structuralist and post-structuralist movement as an example of ‘cultural extremism’, in which fairly consensual ideas about how individual agency must be placed in context are transformed into new absolutes about the weakness and fictional nature of the individual agent. He writes:

They pushed their conclusions to ultimate extremes. Thus the sensible observation that all human activities are in some way influenced by the society or culture within which they live becomes the dogma that all such activities are socially or culturally constructed. The sensible observation that readers, or audiences, often bring their own perceptions or imaginings to bear on the ‘text’ they read (novels, etc.) or watch (films, etc.) becomes the dogma that texts are autonomous, that there is no author. The sensible observation that language is very important to the way in which we frame our thoughts, and that most of what we know comes, not from direct observation, but from someone else’s writing or speech, becomes the dogma that everything is constructed within language.\(^\text{118}\)

**Merquior’s critique of structuralism**

The reason for looking now at some points raised in Merquior’s critique of structuralism is that he pinpoints the way in which its eclipsing of the role assigned to the individual was not a foregone conclusion given the antecedents of structuralism.

As Merquior points out, structuralism, despite its own history including roots in the work of Saussure, Czech and Russian formalism, was primarily an intellectual development in France in the 1960s. Merquior opens his critique of this intellectual development by emphasising how it displaced and opposed Sartrean existentialism. Structuralism opposed the placing of individual consciousness at the centre of theory.\(^\text{119}\) According to Merquior, existentialism, through Heidegger in particular, had romanticised the Cartesian notion of the centrality of consciousness. But Heidegger did this in a way that placed consciousness under the sway of Being (as Merquior puts it in Heidegger’s work existentialism is ‘nourished’ by ‘quasi-
religious needs’). 120 With Sartre the cogito becomes more centrally identified with freedom or the possibility of freedom, but also, as Merquior argues, existentialism and Sartre in particular, with his work on Marxism and existentialism, took increasing account of history. In contrast, Merquior says the structuralist argument against existentialism involved primarily an opposition to history and humanism.

Merquior argues that in the history of the development of structuralism we find not only an overlap with the ideas of other philosophies (for instance on the theory of the arbitrariness of the sign he finds comparison with diverse philosophies going back to Plato); but also instances where a greater emphasis on historical context is included. He refers to the success of Jan Mukařovsky in retaining a sense of ‘the phenomenological accent on the “intentional” status of the aesthetic object’, whilst developing a ‘semiological’ mode of analysis. 121 Merquior makes the case that Mukařovsky’s recognition of the significance of intentionality in art made him more acutely aware of the way the norms governing the artwork are affected by social and historical transformation. 122

Merquior uses the case of Mukařovsky to reiterate the need of cultural theory to recognise the significance of individual intention. My aim here is not to study the history of semiology but Merquior’s argument is relevant because Klein, Sartre and Bergman go much further in elaborating on the significance of the individual’s intentions against the context in which they operate. Klein appears to be closest to a form of determinism and Sartre closest to an idealisation of free will, but it is the common core preoccupation with imagination that insures their insistence that the individual can achieve a degree of transcendence in relation to their circumstances. It is worth noting here the point made by Mészáros: he argues that Sartre throughout his career was preoccupied with the constraints and limits on freedom. 123 This preoccupation is also evident in the way Klein tracks the conflicts rooted in the psyche and in Bergman’s representations of psychological conflict, but each retains a belief in the possibility of liberation through the imagination.

Structuralism and post-structuralism have played a significant role in post-1960s film theory. However, the aim of this thesis is not to explore the debates that have ensued about the value of these theoretical developments. Instead, I have referred to
Marwick and Merquior’s criticisms of structuralism because this allows a stronger appreciation of the intellectual convergence of Bergman, Klein and Sartre. The central focus of this thesis is on an inter-disciplinary study of selected works by Bergman. This involves an exploration of how key concepts from Klein and Sartre can be incorporated in an appreciation of the role played by imagination across Bergman’s work. This idea of a convergence between Bergman, Klein and Sartre involves retaining a significant emphasis on individual agency through the activity of the imagination. At the same time each figure represents contextual factors that challenge and conflict with any notion of subjectivity as sovereign, and the imagination is not represented as a power operating in isolation. All three figures develop their ideas within specialised fields drawing on the influence of others.

In Chapter 2 I will argue that Klein’s ideas relate to the influence of Freud, before exploring how her work can be applied to Bergman’s films through the example of *Wild Strawberries*. In Chapter 3 I will concentrate on Sartre’s early work, *The Imaginary* and consider how this is significant in relation to some of Sartre’s better-known philosophical ideas developed during and after World War Two. I will then explore the relevance of these ideas, and existentialism in general, for Bergman’s work through the example of *The Seventh Seal*. In Chapters 4, 5, and 6 I will concentrate on three films from distinct parts of Bergman’s career *Summer with Monika*, *The Virgin Spring* and *Hour of the Wolf*. In Chapter 4 this will be preceded by a brief over-view of three more films from the early part of Bergman’s career. The intention of these chapters is to explore how Kleinian and Sartrean ideas can be incorporated in close analysis. This involves integrating key points from these theorists alongside a methodology specific to film studies including analysis of cinematic elements such as camerawork and lighting, and recognition of narrative structure and character development. The films chosen have already been extensively analysed and discussed but are not as well known as *Fanny and Alexander*, *Wild Strawberries* and *The Seventh Seal*. The three films studied briefly at the beginning of Chapter 4 *Music in Darkness* (1948), *Port of Call*, and *Prison* have been selected because they show how Bergman’s early work involves a mixture of styles, but nevertheless relates to key points raised by Klein and Sartre, most importantly the significance attached to imagination.
The work of these theorists must now be explored more fully. As these ideas are applied in later chapters we will also gain a stronger understanding of how they are relevant to detailed analysis of film and narrative form. In the process we will see how Bergman’s work evolved from his early experiments with style and narrative in the 1940s.
Chapter 1 – REFERENCES AND ENDNOTES


2 Strindberg, A. Author’s Note for A Dream Play quoted in Fanny and Alexander.

3 Johns Blackwell, M. (1997) Gender and Representation in the Films of Ingmar Bergman, Columbia, S.C. : Camden House. In the conclusion, ‘Genderness and the Imagination’, pp.197-217, Johns Blackwell argues that Bergman’s films after Wild Strawberries demonstrate the ‘redemptive power of imagination’ with limited success, and she suggests that in this period Bergman frequently equates imagination with female experience. Johns Blackwell focuses on feminist analysis of Bergman’s work but also says that Wild Strawberries can be understood as ‘embodying the denial stage of mourning’ (p.6). My analysis puts more emphasis on melancholy, mourning and reparation in Bergman’s work. Like Johns Blackwell, I relate Bergman’s representation of imagination to a wider context including issues of gender but this is different from her work because of the focus on Klein and Sartre, and involves different readings of selected films.


7 Steene and Kalin will be discussed as part of Chapter 3.


9 ibid., p.2.

10 ibid., p.5.

11 ibid.

12 ibid., p.2.

13 ibid., pp.2-3.

14 ibid., p.2.


16 ibid., p.9.

17 ibid.

18 ibid., p.240, Cowie quotes Bergman, from Positif - Paris, July-August 2002 and Fellini from Fellini on Fellini. The latter refers to Bergman as a ‘“showman”’, and makes clear his appreciation of Bergman’s work.

19 ibid., p.9.

20 ibid., p.xii.


22 Cowie uses an argument like this to evaluate the search for a new aesthetic in
Eastern European cinema in the 1960s, op.cit., p.139, in the same chapter, entitled ‘Towards a Fresh Aesthetic’ he also includes Bergman’s *Persona, Shame, The Virgin Spring* and *The Silence* as films which incorporate a challenging representation of contemporary culture. Cowie, op.cit., p.153.


25 ibid., pp.146-147.

26 ibid., p.147.


28 ibid.


30 ibid.

31 ibid., p.141.

32 ibid.

33 ibid., p.152.


36 ibid., p.16.


38 ibid., p.5.


40 ibid., pp.9-10.

41 ibid., p.11.

42 ibid., p.13.

43 ibid., p.19.

44 ibid.

45 ibid., p.17.

46 ibid.


49 ibid., p.84.

50 Sayers, op.cit., p.25.


52 Kristeva explains how Lacan was sympathetic to key Kleinian ideas but also how he criticised her work. For instance he spoke of the ‘utter brutality’ of her concepts as well as the ‘failure to acknowledge the paternal function or to create a theory of the subject.’ Kristeva, op.cit., p.229.

53 Lionel Bailly, for instance, criticises Klein from a Lacanian perspective for
being too concerned that an integrated ego was the goal of therapy when the concepts
she used to describe integration – the unconscious, phantasy etc are so open to debate

Return to Melanie Klein, Oxford: Blackwell.

Sartre’s work on Flaubert was an enormous psycho-literary study entitled The

The introspection of the British psychoanalytical movement caught up in its
internal arguments during the 1930s and subsequently is illustrated by the anecdote
in which it is said the argument was so heated that nobody paid attention to the
bombs dropping, until Winnicott raised this as an issue. For details of the anecdote:


(originally published in France in 1964), p.34.

Sartre describes his early reading and day dreaming, pp.45-49.


Drake, op.cit., p.20.

Imagination, revisions and Historical Introduction by Arlette Elkaim-Sartre,

Drake, op.cit., p.33.

phenomenological description, translated by Andrew Brown, Abingdon,

In part one of Being and Nothingness Sartre demonstrates his challenge to
common sense with his account of the ‘nothingness‘ that is dialectically entwined
with Being. He shows his debt to Hegel in placing negation at the centre of his
metaphysics but also draws on the existentialism of Kierkegaard to represent the
significance of anguish. Only after he has discussed the problem of bad faith does
Sartre turn in part three to a systematic definition of the concept of the ‘for-itself.’ In
part two Sartre develops his explanation of how these concepts fit into his
philosophy. Sartre, J-P. (1953) Being and Nothingness : An Essay on
Phenomenological Ontology, translated by Hazel Barnes, Philosophical Library,
New York (originally published in France in 1943).

A Hegelian dialectical interpretation of Klein’s work suggests a link with
Sartre’s Hegelianism. The Hegelian account of Klein is explored by Jon Mills in
‘Hegel on projective identification: implications for Klein, Bion and Beyond’, in

For instance, as Drake puts it: ‘In order to get The Flies past the German
censors Sartre turned to Greek mythology.’ Drake op.cit., p.54.

Drake, op.cit., p.45; quotation from Sartre, Carnets, p.244; in English,

This is discussed by Mészáros with reference to the concept of the ‘singular universal’ in Sartre’s later work. This is a concept which seeks to retain an emphasis on lived experience whilst taking account of historical determinations, pp. 85-87.


ibid., op.cit. p.8.


ibid.

Johns Blackwell refers to Bergman’s biographical account of his childhood to show that he ‘learned early to equate the familial, social, and religious hierarchies of which he perceived himself as a victim.’ Johns Blackwell, op cit., p.1.

For this observation Johns Blackwell references a lecture by Mark Sandberg, ‘Motherhood and Modernism in Early Swedish Cinema : Victor Sjöström’s *Ingeborg Holm*’ ( lecture given in Ohio State University, 1992), p.67.

Young, op.cit., p.10.

ibid.


ibid.


Gado and Rustin are returned to regularly for different points in the thesis.


Kristeva, op.cit., p.232.

ibid., p.15.

Bergman describes how making the commercials was an economic necessity for him. Björkman et al (eds.), op.cit., p.54.

In relation to *Smiles of a Summer Night* Bergman states: ‘the situation was simply that I needed another success.’ ibid., p.99.

Bergman describes how his success at Cannes with *Smiles of a Summer Night* made his studio receptive to the script for *The Seventh Seal* ibid., pp.102-103.


Elliot and Frosh, op.cit., p.223.


Nowell Smith suggests that semiotics could not account for how audiences create meaning, and thus Lacanian psychoanalysis was turned to for a theory of subject formation. ‘How films mean, or, from aesthetics to semiotics and half-way back again’, in Gledhill, C. and Williams, L. (eds.) (2000) *Reinventing Film Studies*, London : Arnold, pp.8-17.

2 From Freud to Klein, and Wild Strawberries

In this chapter I will concentrate on the specific innovations in psychoanalytic theory achieved by Melanie Klein and her followers. I will start by arguing that Sigmund Freud’s ideas on narcissism and the death instinct provide a platform for Klein’s work. Klein’s significance rests partly on her application of psychoanalysis to children evident in her earliest work, but throughout her career we find consistency and evolution in the development of her ideas relating to an internal object world for children and adults alike. Most of Klein’s writing refers to examples from her practice and involves formulation of her key concepts, often in relation to Freud. Klein rarely applied her ideas to a wider context, but there are some writings on culture including notes for a review of *Citizen Kane*. The account of Freud’s influence on Klein’s theoretical development and her main ideas will be followed with a brief account of her treatment of creativity in relation to the case of an artist recovering from depression, and a short novel about identity transformation which Klein analyses later in her career. The relevance of Kleinian thinking for culture rests on its dialectical conception of art as a practice that is capable of articulating great negativity for both the artist and the viewer through a conception of the imagination that is, however, ultimately constructive and benign. This vision of an imaginary world operating from birth will be explored further by considering the application of Klein’s ideas to film and, in particular, *Wild Strawberries*, one of Bergman’s most psychoanalytic films. The latter offers comparisons to Klein’s preoccupation with the death drive, and the representation of a cathartic process, in which the lead character models a process of psychic transformation and integration.

Applying Klein’s ideas to art and film undoubtedly raises methodological issues because of her immersion in psychoanalytic practice and discourse. The elaboration of Kleinian ideas by her contemporaries and theorists dedicated to her ideas is a necessary resource for the application of her ideas to culture. Throughout the chapter I will call on points made by Kleinians including Joan Riviere, Adrian Stokes and Hanna Segal, as well as more recent accounts of the theory. For the first half I will focus on how Klein’s ideas build on the work of Freud. In addition to the paranoid-schizoid position and the depressive position, introduced in the previous chapter, key concepts in Klein’s work include those of the inner world, introjection, projection,
splitting and envy.

The Kleinian concept of the internal world structured by unconscious impulses is one that requires clarification at the outset. As Klein’s fellow analyst Riviere says, for many people the idea that an individual internalises other people or objects is difficult to accept. Riviere explains that this is partly because this inner world represents the ‘unknown’ and is thus encountered with apprehension. She also argues that we are more conscious of the threat posed by internal figures at the expense of recognising good elements that have been introjected. It is important to note the emphasis developed by Riviere amongst others that this inner world should be understood primarily in relation to emotion. There are different approaches within Kleinian theory but the re-working and evolution of this theory is placed in a historical perspective by noting Lavinia Gomez’s account of it. Discussing the heritage of Klein’s work, Gomez discusses how it has been modified so that the language of internalised and projected objects and part objects has to some extent been subsumed under terms that convey the subject’s ‘psychological functions such as seeing and hearing, thinking and experiencing’. More important for this chapter is the idea that Klein continues to represent an understanding of the psyche that can throw into question and challenge preconceptions about the individual, and by extension their social world. Jacqueline Rose represents this when she says: ‘In the humanities, a post-Lacanian orthodoxy has blocked access to Klein.’ Later in this paragraph Rose adds: ‘Especially in the United States, Klein’s work has been rejected on account of its violence and negativity.’ The appeal of the Kleinian model for analysing Bergman’s work rests on its ability to provide a model of integration whilst simultaneously maintaining a vision of negativity. In other words the goal for both Klein and Bergman is not an unequivocal good object, but instead they value awareness and recognition of the way good and bad are intertwined. In Klein’s case understanding this vision requires analysis of her response to Freud.

**The Freudian inheritance**

The degree to which Kleinian theory emphasises internalised negativity from infancy in destructive emotions such as jealousy and envy, and her account of the relation between paranoid-schizoid states and on the other depressive mental states involves a
significant transformation of the concept of narcissism. The latter is an important critical concept which has been used in psychoanalytical theory to represent an individual’s failure to engage with reality through a deluding imaginative life based on self-indulgent thoughts and desires. Klein’s work does not seek to eliminate critical reflections on narcissism, but expands on this idea with a focus on active transformation through achieving the depressive position and reparative strategies.

To understand Klein’s interventions at a general level we must return to the influence of Freud and other psychoanalysts on her work.

In his 1914 piece, ‘On Narcissism’, Freud believes that narcissism, or self-love, is a necessary stage of child development prior to the Oedipus complex and genital sexuality. He notes how it has been associated with ‘disorders’ amongst which were included homosexuality, but refers to the broader perspective that it is a natural stage ‘…in the regular course of human sexual development.’ However, it is necessary to pass beyond this stage. For Freud, in these cases the individual’s libido has become overly directed towards their ego, blocking their capacity to love. Klein follows Freud in recognising the need to transcend narcissism but nevertheless it is worth noting that this issue produces different perspectives across both Freudian and Kleinian thought. For example, adopting a Kleinian approach Sánchez-Prado suggests that the Kleinian idea of an inner object, which is loved in conflict with social norms can be conceptualised as a form of resistance to imposed ideas on sexuality. For Freud, reality has to intervene to establish greater reciprocity and contingency in relationships. Arguably, Klein’s work advances from this in showing how narcissism may be deeply embedded in a set of relationships at the beginning of an individual’s existence taking precedence over the state of narcissism described by Freud. As a result of this one could say that Kleinian theory goes further than Freudian theory in challenging stereotypes about gender and sexuality noted already in relation to Freud.Whilst Freud uses the ideas of projection and introjection, he still puts a strong emphasis on narcissism as a state in which the individual is virtually solipsistic, and thus he fails to recognise the extent of relationships to external objects that are involved at the earliest level. In Kleinian theory the self-absorption of narcissism is not disputed, but it is placed in a more complex set of relationships.
In Kleinian theory the importance of passing through the paranoid-schizoid position and the depressive position, become crucial in transcending narcissism. Freud’s notion of primary narcissism, an all-consuming narcissism dominant in the early years, was so strongly challenged by Klein’s ideas that this became a key issue in the dispute with Anna Freud. As Meira Likierman tells us, Anna Freud was completely opposed to Klein’s idea that the baby made discriminations between good and bad objects. Likierman writes:

To Anna Freud such advanced differentiating capacities in the infant were hardly credible. They also threatened her father’s model of development, which postulated instead an initial foetal-like primary narcissism. Sigmund Freud had envisaged the young infant as noticing very little of the outside world, its existence governed by the pleasure principle, and its primitive mind drifting into dream-like, hallucinatory states that hinder the full apprehension of worldly frustrations. Only gradually do such frustrations impinge on the infantile mind, thus enabling it to begin to accommodate the reality principle, and only then are object relations tenable.

Melanie Klein not only subverted this notion, but, on the basis of her beliefs proceeded to hypothesize a rudimentary psychical activity that exists from birth and that she termed ‘phantasy’.  

In highlighting Klein’s evolution of Freud’s theory we should not underestimate the degree to which she honours and builds on his work. In 1920 Freud’s work ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’ initiated fuller recognition of negativity and self-destruction in the unconscious. ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’ demonstrates a proximity in Freud’s theory to the direction developed subsequently by Klein, and is also striking in its reference to child’s play as a source of evidence for psychoanalysis, precisely the area that Klein decided to specialise in, and the source of her conviction that phantasy is complex from the beginning of infancy. In ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’ Freud returns to his theory that human motivation must be explained by the search for pleasure, and by the repression and censorship of this drive in accordance with the reality principle. Freud ponders the impression that unpleasure is not just caused by the necessity of compromise. Here, he is partly responding to the events of World War One and the question of how to help traumatised soldiers.
Freud emphasises the way such soldiers are compelled to repeat in their dreams, the traumatised incidents causing their distress. In contrast, before this Freud had argued, following the pleasure principle, that dreams provide wish fulfilment. What masochistic urges are responsible for the compulsion to repeat painful experiences even in the form of fantasy? As Freud puts it:

If the dreams of those with accident-induced neurosis are not to make us start doubting the wish-fulfilling tendency of dreams in general, then we might have recourse to the explanation that in this disorder the dream-function, like so much else, is thrown into disarray and distracted from its proper purposes; or we might turn our minds to the mysterious, masochistic tendencies of the ego.¹²

Freud turns to his example of children and play, which derived from his personal experience staying as a guest with a family. Freud notices the child’s repeated tendency to throw away his toys uttering an exclamation, ‘“o-o-o-o”’, that to Freud and the mother signifies the word ‘fort (“gone”)’. Freud also notices in connection with this that the child plays a particular game where he throws a reel into his cot but then uses the string attached to bring it back. Whilst the throwing out of the reel is accompanied by the same sound, ‘“o-o-o-o”’, that Freud takes to signify ‘gone’, in contrast the return of the reel is accompanied by ‘a joyful Da (“Here!”)’.¹³ Freud interprets the game in relation to the child’s response to the periods when his mother leaves him. His game of disappearance and make believe, according to Freud, helps the child to deal with the anxiety of his mother’s absence. This famous example from Freud’s work leads directly into Klein’s extensive work on the symbolic significance of children’s play.

We should notice that Freud makes this example deeper and more interesting than at first it appears. Freud looks further into psychoanalytic elements of the child’s situation and asks in effect: why does the child include the mother’s departure, when this was clearly an unpleasant experience? The game could have just re-enacted the wish fulfilment of the mother’s return, but instead, the departure is often a game in its own right. Freud speculates about an alternative interpretation whereby repetition affords the child control over a painful experience, but then he offers another
‘interpretation’: that in fact the throwing away of the toys could be regarded as a hostile action designed to provide some revenge against the mother. As Freud says, the action might be taken as conveying the statement: ‘“Alright, go away! I don’t need you; I’m sending you away myself!”’ \footnote{14} Freud continues by comparing the situation with a similar pattern found with the same child a year later. The father having gone to war, the child would accompany his disposal of the toys with ‘“Go in war!”’ \footnote{15} In this case Freud considers that the child, being more attached to his mother, could enjoy the father’s departure, but this does not obscure the point for Freud that children may frequently take up negative or unpleasant experiences in their play, and through their play activities seek a form of control over their experience. At this point Freud brings in the comparison with adult culture, and in particular the way tragedies provide an audience with apparently painful experiences to enjoy.\footnote{16} For Freud, this cannot be explained with reference to just the search for pleasure, even if the latter transcends the pain and is the final outcome of the spectator’s experience. Such an approach neglects: ‘…the prevalence of tendencies beyond the pleasure principle; tendencies, that is, that are arguably more primal than the pleasure principle, and quite independent of it.’\footnote{17}

Following his discussion of the fort/da game and his brief discussion of the therapeutic process, Freud moves on to focus on the phenomenon of repetition. In the patient’s re-experiencing of repressed material he detects the pleasure principle because wishes that have been repressed come to the surface. He also states:

The new and remarkable fact that we now have to report, however, is that the compulsion to repeat also brings back experiences from the past that contain no potential for pleasure whatever, and which even at the time cannot have constituted gratification, not even in respect of drive-impulses that were only subsequently repressed.\footnote{18}

Freud is on his way here to locating the death drive in the unconscious. He discusses after this the cases where individuals appear compelled to repeat unfortunate circumstances for themselves, and he returns to the prevalence of repetition in children’s play. Although it is possible for the repetition of pain to be compatible
with a final gain of pleasure Freud insists that there are many examples where the repetition is incompatible with the pleasure principle. Despite the pervasive relevance of the pleasure principle, Freud argues that:

Sufficient evidence remains to justify the hypothesis of a compulsion to repeat; and this compulsion appears to us to be more primal, more elemental, more deeply instinctual than the pleasure principle, which it simply thrusts aside.¹⁹

However, this point is qualified as Freud remarks just above this observation: ‘…we do need to bear in mind that only on rare occasions will we be able to catch the compulsion to repeat operating purely on its own, without the interaction of other motive forces.’²⁰

In ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’ Freud deliberates on the question of whether biological evidence supports the notion of a death instinct. Somewhat tentatively, he suggests that beneath the pleasure principle the more primitive urge is to return to a state of non-being. This does not mean that humanity is reckless and suicidal. But instead there is a deep instinct to maintain circumstances in which one’s death will be secured on one’s own terms. For Freud, the death instinct is like the pleasure principle regulated by the requirement of equilibrium. How does Freud square this idea with evidence of natural instincts geared to self-preservation? He writes:

The theory that there are drives directed at self-preservation, drives that we ascribe to all living beings, stands in striking opposition to the hypothesis that the entire life of the drives serves to procure death. Considered in this light, the theoretical significance of the drives concerned with self-preservation, self-assertion and dominance diminishes greatly. They are indeed partial ‘drives’, charged with the task of safeguarding the organism’s particular path to death and barring all possible means of return to the inorganic other than those already immanent…²¹

Freud proceeds to consider how his work on sexuality fits into this picture and whether it contradicts the ideas being advanced. This leads him to situate sexual instincts as opposed to the death instinct and, hence, develop a dualistic theory. Commenting on Freud’s introduction of the death instinct (including the suppression
of the opposition between ego and sexuality with the speculative opposition between life and death), Charles Rycroft indicates that even Freud’s close follower Ernest Jones was not able to accept that there was biological evidence for Freud’s theory of the death instinct. However, Rycroft notes the influence of the theory on Kleinian work. As Rycroft puts it:

the idea still has a certain currency and forms an essential part of Kleinian theory, which conceives of aggression as a projection of the individual’s own innate self-destructive drive.\textsuperscript{22}

**Klein’s development of Freudian ideas**

Klein’s adherence to Freud is apparent throughout her work. From the outset she uses Freudian ideas about sexuality in the analysis of both children and adults. We also find that Klein includes some reflections on the implication of psychoanalytic ideas for the understanding of creativity and culture. An early example of Klein’s response to both Freud and her interest in culture is evident in her 1923 essay titled ‘Early Analysis’. Here she picks up Freud’s account of Leonardo da Vinci. She notes how Freud’s analysis draws attention to da Vinci’s phantasy of a vulture descending on him in his infancy. Klein follows Freud in relating this to da Vinci’s early memory of his mother and ‘a condensation of Leonardo’s early infantile sexual theories’.\textsuperscript{23} Klein goes on, inspired by Freud, to emphasise that da Vinci did not become fixated on the meaning of his infantile sexual theories about this experience. ‘In Leonardo’s case not only was an identification established between nipple, penis and bird’s tail, but this identification became merged into an interest in the motion of this object, in the bird itself and its flight and the space in which it flew.’\textsuperscript{24} Thus, Klein takes on from Freud the idea that artistic activity can take the fascination of sexual fixation and transform this into a creative response to other external phenomena.

In the same essay Klein discusses the case of a patient, a 13-year-old boy called Felix, who is unconsciously fixated on material developed by his imagination, as an infant, of sounds connected to sex. Klein makes it clear that these sounds may have been real or imaginary. But when Felix is able to overcome the fixation he discovers a passion for music. Klein goes on to note the progression in Felix’s interest from
enhanced critical awareness of music to a stage at which he might have risked composing music himself. Klein is not overtly idealistic about this and recognises that it depends on his talent, but she suggests that there is a process leading to the release of this talent which also involves his confidence in assuming the ‘paternal role’ of the ‘composer’. These examples illustrate Klein’s early interest in Freud’s theories of sexual sublimation and its relationship with creativity.

Klein’s continuing adherence to Freud is apparent throughout her work, including her essay of 1929, ‘Infantile Anxiety Situations Reflected in a Work of Art and The Reparative Impulse’, which was written before she formally developed her key concepts of the paranoid-schizoid position and depressive position. In this essay she refers to Freud’s work on early anxiety situations for the baby. She builds on this to convey her conviction that these situations have been revealed by children in her analysis, but are also manifest more widely in culture, and represent a fundamental dynamic in human nature. Klein illustrates this through her discussion of an opera in which a child destroys the objects around him. For Klein, this destruction corresponds to a primitive attack on the child’s internal world, where the primary objects are the mother’s body, the father’s body and a union of the parents. Klein argues that this fundamental destructive anxiety is symbolised by the objects which the child attacks, and that as a necessary consequence the child experiences a paranoid fear of reprisal, which is played out in the opera through the coming to life of the objects he has attacked. The same danger is posed outside in nature as animals and objects threaten him. The child, however, overcomes his anxiety through love and concern for a wounded squirrel. For Klein, the child’s empathy and concern for nature begins with his transcendence of the violence he has committed initially in phantasy against the maternal body, which is now sublimated as various objects and animals.

We can also find here the emergence of Klein’s difference from Freud in relation to the concept of super-ego. Freud had developed this concept to account for the child’s internalisation of the parents but, primarily, the internalisation of the father as an authority figure. For Freud, this is the key to repression and thus a key area for analysis of internal conflict. Klein essentially takes this a stage further so that the
internalised parents are potentially much more threatening, evoking threats of reprisal for infantile phantasies that are present from the beginning of the child’s life and precede the Oedipus complex. This primitive archaic form of the super-ego does not have the social content associated with Freud’s conception of the fully developed super-ego necessary for obedience to social norms. The primitive super-ego theorised by Klein carries the threat of annihilating the child completely, thus giving the death instinct a primacy over the castration anxiety which Freud placed such emphasis on.

Much later in her career Klein summarised her divergence from Freud as follows:

The threat of annihilation by the death instinct within is, in my view - which differs from Freud’s on this point - the primordial anxiety, and it is the ego which, in the service of the life instinct - possibly even called into operation by the life instinct - deflects to some extent that threat outwards. This fundamental defence against the death instinct Freud attributed to the organism, whereas I regard this process as the prime activity of the ego.\textsuperscript{28}

Klein distinguishes herself from Freud in her belief that the ego is necessitated at an early stage of development by the struggle with the death instinct. For Klein, the ego is threatened by the death instinct through bad objects, which are internalised or projected, whereas for Freud the death instinct is more like a drive towards oblivion. Alford’s comments are instructive on this:

whereas both Freud and Klein set Eros against Thanatos, life against death, for Klein there is no nirvana principle, no connection between the hatred and aggression of Thanatos and the peace and absence of stimulation that Freud writes of in ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’.\textsuperscript{29}

Alford notes how Klein’s theory of the death instinct troubled many of her supporters; but in the end, according to Alford, Klein differs from Freud because of her emphasis on the way negativity is ‘integrated’. As Alford puts it: ‘As the individual matures, the destructive elements of the self are split off and regained, over and over, until greater integration comes about.’\textsuperscript{30}
Klein’s colleague, Riviere, is instructive on the relevance of Freud’s work to the Kleinian focus on the death drive. Riviere suggests that Freud recognised a major cause of the death instinct in his emphasis on dependency in childhood such that fear of losing the love of one’s parents is equated with the possibility of annihilation.\footnote{31} Riviere, however, follows Klein in placing the death drive more centrally than Freud:

> We cannot escape the conclusion that an intense fear of dying by active aggression or passive neglect is a fundamental element in our emotional life, is as deeply rooted in our unconscious minds as life itself and is barricaded off from conscious experience by every known mechanism of defence.\footnote{32}

For further understanding Riviere refers the reader to work by Klein and Paula Heimann, another associate of Klein.

**Abraham’s influence on Klein**

Klein was not just influenced by Freud in relation to the death instinct, but by her own analyst, Karl Abraham, who had argued that the infant is struck by both ‘benign’ and ‘destructive’ traits.\footnote{33} The latter were related by Abraham to the point at which the child develops teeth. This triggers a number of sadistic phantasies that go beyond biting. Likierman tells us that:

> Abraham redescribed the Freudian oral and anal stages as propelled by archaic relating mechanisms of preserving or expelling, and this was a significant addition to Freud’s view that they were merely propelled by blind, pleasure-seeking drives.\footnote{34}

This is a very important source of Klein’s emphasis on the aggression of the infant. Likierman argues that it threatened to make Klein’s work convey an idea of human nature as flawed from birth (the idea of ‘original sin’). However, Likierman also points out that Klein’s adoption of Abraham’s ideas led her to seek to balance this picture. Likierman argues that this becomes apparent as Klein’s work progresses:

> From 1935 onwards, she was to suggest that benign and destructive tendencies are not neatly separated in discrete developmental phases, and that it is simplistic to view the infant as proceeding from sadism to goodness. Klein was ultimately to conclude that destructive and loving impulses coexist from the
beginning, living in continual conflict, and it is through this that a human mental life is shaped.\textsuperscript{35}

Likierman comes back to the influence of Abraham on Klein by pointing to the way he listened so acutely to his patients. Thus, he picked up on the way mental life was structured by emotional relationships, as well as by the pure quest of the instincts. So, Abraham is a significant influence on Klein because like Freud he is a forerunner of object relations theory, and the understanding that the origins of emotional relationships lie in an inner world that emerges as early as the pre-genital phase. Freud introduced the ideas of ‘introjection’ and ‘projection’ to account for the patient’s inner world and narcissistic disorders. However, according to Likierman:

Freud did not integrate his thinking on these mechanisms into a broader vision, nor did he link them to infantile mental development. And while Abraham was much more aware of these possibilities, his was also a half-glimpsed version of early mental life, and it was left to Klein to integrate all the available thinking in a full object relations theory.\textsuperscript{36}

The depressive position, melancholy and mourning

As we have seen, in her analysis of Maurice Ravel’s \textit{L’Enfant et Les Sortilèges}, Klein accounted for a sense of emotional pity as a primitive and fundamental emotion involved in the infant’s psychic life in her early work. This was a consistent idea throughout her work. In her 1940 piece, ‘Mourning and its Relation to Manic Depressive States’, she elaborates on the work of reparation achieved by the individual, from infant to adult by referencing Freud’s work ‘Mourning and Melancholia’.\textsuperscript{37} In this essay Freud had taken melancholia as a ‘narcissistic disorder’ and explained it more fully through contrast and comparison with mourning. Freud argues that in both states the individual internalises a loved object:

If we listen patiently to the many and various self-reproaches of the melancholic, we will be unable to avoid a sense that the most intense among them often have little to do with the patient himself, but may with slight modifications be adapted to another person whom the patient loves, has loved or is supposed to love.\textsuperscript{38}
Freud suggests that a condition in which the conscience obsessively directs reproaches against its own person is paralleled by cases of pathological mourning where the individual is simply unable to make any progress through grief. However, most mourning is a process that allows transformation whereas melancholia is more intractable. As Freud points out:

...the causes of melancholia go beyond the clear case of loss through death, and include all situations of insult, slight, setback and disappointment through which an opposition of love and hate can be introduced to the relationship, or an ambivalence already presented can be intensified.  

For Freud, the mourner’s progress beyond debilitating grief is overcome through a form of ‘reality’ testing such that the real absence of the lost person is accepted, and not denied through the phantasy of the internalised object, but melancholia can be more resistant to this reality testing. He acknowledges that it is difficult to understand how the mourner overcomes his grief, but argues that this involves narcissistic wishes being directed out towards external reality rather than inward towards the lost object.

Klein picks up Freud’s emphasis on reality testing to overcome mourning, but argues that this is a process that extends to early infancy. She writes:

My contention is that the child goes through states of mind comparable to the mourning of an adult, or rather, that this early mourning is revived whenever grief is experienced in later life. The most important of the methods by which the child overcomes his states of mourning, is, in my view, the testing of reality; this process, however, as Freud stresses, is part of the work of mourning.

Kleinian theorists have noted that for Klein the child’s inquisitiveness and desire to know are elevated into an instinct. In her earlier work the destructive possibilities of this instinct were recognised alongside its place in normal development but, as Klein’s work progresses, further emphasis is given to the contribution of this instinct to the individual’s development. Discussing Wilfred Bion’s work after Klein, Rustin emphasises how Klein’s ideas about an “epistemophilic instinct” were highly
influential for the idea that a caring environment is necessary for the child to develop their curiosity and engagement with reality. When I apply Klein’s ideas to Bergman’s work I will argue that there is a strong parallel in the way that both Bergman and Klein stress the need for a balance between the search for greater knowledge about external reality, a kind of reality recognition, and its internalisation through imagination.

Returning to the study of melancholy and mourning, it should be noted that Klein’s account differs in the greater emphasis on how mourning repairs the inner world. Thus, the divergence between Klein and Freud has been summarised as follows:

Freud sees the melancholic as burdened internally with an object that cannot be relinquished, whereas the mourner manages to let the object go and is thus able to form new attachments. Klein’s more complex conception of the inner world allows a view of the mourner as able to reinstate the lost loved object internally, in a more real and separate form, strengthening rather than depleting the ego in its task of forming new attachments…

For Klein, reality testing allows greater co-existence between the internal and external realities of the subject. The individual is seen as restoring an internalised lost object but also an inner world that precedes this. Ultimately, the restoration of an internal object refers to infantile introjection of the parents.

In normal mourning the individual reintrojects and reinstates, as well as the actual lost person, his loved parents who are felt to be his ‘good’ inner objects. His inner world, the one which he has built up from his earliest days onwards, in his phantasy was destroyed when the actual loss occurred. The rebuilding of this inner world characterizes the successful work of mourning.

**Splitting**

Klein’s piece of 1946, ‘Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms’, is notable for its explanation of the paranoid-schizoid position, already explored in her earlier work, including its relationship with the depressive position. From the beginning of life the infant’s phantasies according to Klein involve denial of perceptual reality with ideas
Klein states:

I enumerated various typical defences of the early ego, such as the mechanisms of splitting the object and the impulses, idealization, denial of inner and outer reality and the stifling of emotions.

Klein uses the concept of splitting to discuss how the infant seeks to expel or deflect painful experiences. In the appendix to this article she refers to the significance of Freud’s analysis of the Daniel Schreber case, a judge whose memoirs record his descent into psychosis. Klein uses the Schreber case as a significant example of a patient who exemplifies the process of ‘splitting’. Schreber had become convinced that his doctor, Fleschig, had implanted in him the idea of turning into a woman. Schreber had, later, become convinced that the doctor was attacking him in different guises. The process of splitting continued as Schreber believed a whole army of souls was invading his consciousness. Klein writes:

I would suggest, in keeping with the hypothesis outlined in the present chapter, that the division of the Flechsig soul into many souls was not only a splitting of the object but also a projection of Schreber’s feeling that his ego was split….The anxieties and phantasies about inner destruction and ego-disintegration bound up with this mechanism {splitting} are projected on to the external world and underlie the delusions of its destruction.

The concept of splitting reinforces the understanding of a dialectical dynamic in Klein’s thought in which the inner world from the earliest ages is characterised by a process involving division and negation, introjection and projection. The transference between inner and outer reality is a dynamic, which Klein believes can be productively returned to and assessed through the synthesising and reparative strategies of the depressive position, and emotional development beyond this position. The drive to unity and against fragmentation is notable, but does not detract from the recognition of the inevitability, and indeed necessity of splitting in all psychological development, as well as its manifestation in the delusions of psychotic patients like Schreber.
Destructive instincts

In her 1955 piece, ‘Envy and Gratitude’, Klein focuses on how these emotional states in particular are related to the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions. Here, the idea of envy as a destructive emotion is connected to the infantile envy of the breast thus qualifying the significance of penis envy as elaborated by Freud. Klein challenges and displaces emphasis on the authority of the father and patriarchal symbolism. For Klein: ‘Envy is the angry feeling that another person possesses and enjoys something desirable - the envious impulse being to take it away, or spoil it.’ Klein relates this to the baby’s experience at the breast. This is summarised by Segal in her account of Klein’s work: ‘Since the infant idealizes the breast in phantasy, when he is deprived he assumes that the riches he attributes to the breast are enjoyed by the breast itself.’

Jealousy, for Klein, means wanting what someone else possesses. Klein refers to the Shorter Oxford Dictionary and Cobb’s Synonyms for her definition of jealousy. Paraphrased, the distinction between jealousy and envy that is important for Klein, is that the former involves anxiety about the loss of an object, whilst envy desires what the other already has, and seeks to destroy the other’s enjoyment of his/her object. Klein uses cultural references to support this definition of specific negative impulses. She refers to Othello and comments that William Shakespeare does not always seem to differentiate between envy and jealousy. Segal helps us to understand the distinctions which are important for Klein:

Envy is more primitive than jealousy; it arises in a part-object relation and is not related to a triangular situation. Jealousy is a more sophisticated feeling belonging to the Oedipal triangle.

Segal shows how Klein’s ideas here relate to her concept of the paranoid-schizoid position, and beyond this Segal also shows how Klein’s work extends Freud’s ideas about the authority of the super-ego:

Envy attacks the good object and, by projection and fragmentation, makes it bad: therefore it produces a state of confusion between good and bad, which is
at the root of many psychotic confusions…. The more the good internal object is destroyed, the more impoverished the ego feels, and this in turn increases envy. The projection of envy onto the object gives rise to an envious super-ego.\textsuperscript{55}

\textbf{From Ruth Kjar to ‘On Identification’: Kleinian theory and creativity}

I turn now to look in more detail at the application of Klein’s ideas to culture. We have seen how she took an interest in Freud’s account of da Vinci in her essay ‘Early Analysis’, and how she related Ravel’s opera to a process of repairing damaged objects in her 1929 essay. The idea of art as therapeutic is key in the development of Kleinian art theory by her contemporaries such as Ella Sharpe, Marion Milner and Riviere; and subsequent theorists including the analyst Segal and the art historian Stokes.\textsuperscript{56} Klein’s 1929 essay also illustrates how depression can be related to the creative impulse with discussion of a case where a woman, the painter Ruth Kjar, discovered her artistic impulse after being struck with melancholy. The transformation of Kjar was recounted, Klein tells us, by her friend Karion Michaelis. The change occurred after Kjar had been overcome by sadness coinciding with, and apparently caused by, the appearance of an empty space left on her wall after the removal of a picture, which had been lent to her. As Klein says: ‘The blank space on the wall caused her to forget her beautiful home, her happiness, her friends, everything.’\textsuperscript{57} However, Kjar then discovered her own creative impulse filling the space with her own work. It was as if she was suddenly addressing the emptiness inside herself, actively repairing her internal world instead of simply purchasing another external object. Kajar’s paintings included a ‘life-sized figure of a naked negress. Apart from one picture of flowers, she had confined herself to portraits’, which also included, ‘an old woman bearing the mark of years and disillusionments.’\textsuperscript{58} According to Klein, Kjar had not just decided to address her internal world, but this manifested the desire to repair damage inflicted on her mother as an infant, a destructive impulse retained by the unconscious.

The Kleinian theory of art involves recognising the intimate relation between destructive, fragmenting impulses and the possibility of synthesis and unification achieved through depression. This is not to eulogise depression and melancholia but
to insist on these as mobile states. Thus, the recovery from depression is connected to
the recovery from the destructive impulses contained in the paranoid-schizoid phase.
Segal elaborates that the artist, like the psychoanalytic patient, is engaged in
confronting their inner pain and anxiety and seeking to repair this inner world.\textsuperscript{59} This
path should not be taken too literally as might be suggested by the Kleinian emphasis
on restoring the internalised parents or at a more primary level the mother’s breast as
a good internal object. While Kjar’s art had some correspondence at the level of
content with the figure of her mother, the burden of this approach to aesthetics is to
recognise how inner feelings of well-being, on the one hand, and conflict (hate,
destruction and fear) are transferred to internal and external objects. This idea builds
on Freud’s notion of sublimation, in which the individual must find substitute objects
for destructive and damaging impulses. Klein pays intense attention to the way
creativity is necessary for the individual to overcome the damaged inner world.

Klein returns to the analysis of a cultural text in her paper ‘On Identification’,\textsuperscript{60}
which elaborates her work ‘Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms’. ‘On
Identification’ is an account and an analysis of Julian Green’s contemporary novel, \textit{If
I Were You}, translated into English in 1950.\textsuperscript{61} In this story a young man makes a pact
with the Devil which gives him the possibility of becoming other people. On the one
hand, the story may be taken as a terrifying account of unstable identity, and a giddy
journey of the protagonist into a vampire-like persona. On the other hand, one can
extract from this story a more positive sense of how the self is formed through
mediation with other people: a parable which shows how the protagonist learns from
his nightmarish journey through other selves. Klein is pre-disposed to this kind of
balanced response. The analysis clearly reveals her reworking of Freudian ideas and
the application of her key concepts to a narrative text.

Klein derives a balanced reading of the novel partly because she relates it to her
emphasis on the importance of ‘integration’. At one level the protagonist’s quest is
futile because it involves a series of substitutions for his real needs. He becomes
various people, but these transformations do not address the primary source of his
unhappiness. The primary problem according to Klein is a threat directed at his
relationship to an internalised ‘good object’. In joining with the Devil, Fabian takes on negative characteristics, which negate and damage his internalised goodness. According to Klein, he is launched on this quest because of frustration in his relationship with both parents. The Devil represents, then, his most negative and self-destructive impulses. The impossibility of full integration is an explanation, then, of why Fabian eventually dies. But Klein also sees hope in the story. Fabian dies happily with reparative feelings towards mother and father, thus achieving a level of integration. Klein argues that in the course of the novel Fabian is ‘working through the depressive and paranoid-schizoid positions’ and she goes on to say on the same page:

As a result of overcoming the fundamental psychotic anxieties of infancy, the intrinsic need for integration comes out in full force. He achieves integration concurrently with good object relations and thereby repairs what had gone wrong in his life.62

Klein’s account emphasises the relevance of infantile states throughout the narrative. For instance, she discusses an episode in the novel, in which the protagonist is intoxicated by a woman who serves in a bakery. Klein uses Freudian concepts to analyse the situation. She refers, for example, to the way the situation is oedipalised. Fabian-Fruges (this is his name at this stage because he has already adapted another person’s identity) is consumed by his desire for the woman and cannot bear to watch her intimacy with another man, which Klein relates to the concept of the primal scene. Alongside these concepts, however, we also have Klein’s characteristic emphasis on the privacy of the relationship to the mother. Take, for instance, her remarks:

I believe that the whole shop turns in his mind into the feeding mother. He is engrossed in looking at a large basket of fresh rolls and stretches his hand out towards them when he hears a woman’s voice asking him what he wants.63

Here, again, a significant narrative action is seen to express a fundamental structure familiar from Klein’s other writings. She stresses that Fabian’s frustrations, which lead him to trampling the bread and his compulsive eating, represent ‘anal-sadistic attacks’, and ‘cannibalism’ and ‘oral-sadistic impulses’ directed towards the mother’s body.64 Klein places these destructive impulses alongside one another.
Thus, as Segal explains, Klein takes up the Freudian chronology of oral, and anal stages of development prior to the Oedipus complex, but she moves away from the idea of a strict division between these phases. Instead of this chronology she ultimately places these impulses within the framework afforded by her concepts of the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions. While she makes us aware of the Oedipal aspects of Fabian’s meeting with this woman, Klein’s primary emphasis is on a deluge of different destructive impulses that can all ultimately be understood as manifestations of the paranoid-schizoid position.

Klein situates the Oedipus complex in a fluid way that recognises its manifestation alongside the earliest destructive impulses, with the complex emerging more fully after the child has passed through the depressive position. Failure to pass through the depressive position is likely to result in more severe Oedipal trauma because the child is unable to respect the autonomy of the parents on to whom love and hate are projected. Klein’s emphasises ‘envy’ and ‘jealousy’ as the dominant passions to be recognised in the early stages of the Oedipus complex. She relates Fabian-Fruges’ ‘passionate jealousy of the man who he believes possesses the baker-woman at night’ to more primitive destructive impulses. Essentially what Klein is describing are the protagonist’s self-destructive impulses towards his internalised ‘good object’ - the mother’s breast, and following this, the mother herself. Klein recognises how the situation develops from this origin and becomes more complex. Her theory entails recognising how in the depressive position a sense of guilt about aggression can lead to a transformation of bad objects so that these become a source of self-knowledge. Klein’s emphasis on the initial identification with the mother can be re-worked as a picture of an internal source of well-being in the child that takes many forms of imaginative association and transformation. All the qualities which, according to Klein, follow from successful early object relations - trust, hope, a sense of goodness and well-being can be abstracted from her hypotheses about infantile imagination. This means that the idea of identity and goodness is predicated on an internalised relationship to external desired objects.
Klein notes the ambiguity of the ending of the novel: Fabian regains his former self who had been asleep in bed for three days before he dies. Klein comments:

Perhaps the author intends us to take the whole story as representing Fabian’s phantasies during the illness preceding his death? This would imply that all the characters were figures of his inner world and again illustrate that introjection and projection were operating in him in closest interaction.  

For Klein, introjection refers to the way aspects of another person are internalised but this may involve achieving characteristics that had previously been projected. She recognises the to and fro of the personality involved in releasing qualities on to other objects, and people, and holding external qualities within. Having described this process she emphasises the way Fabian as a character ‘literally leaves his self and enters into his victim’. Thus, for Klein, the final integration of Fabian’s emotions is so significant that the ending can be viewed as revealing that the whole story was situated within his psyche, and is, in effect, a parable about the process of splitting and integration.

**Kleinian theory and Bergman’s Wild Strawberries**

Klein’s praise for Green’s novel focuses on his ability to convey universal unconscious psychic processes. However, she does not argue that Fabian and the Devil are two sides of the author’s personality. Instead, her understanding of how the text is created from the unconscious avoids a transparent psychoanalytical diagnosis of the author’s expression, and also leaves open the question of how extensively the processes expressed in the story are relevant to the readers. In effect, Klein maintains an implicit respect for the autonomy of artists because she does not offer an interpretation of the author’s personality. However, she does evaluate this work positively because it displays sensitive expression of processes normally locked in the unconscious. In this way, value is placed on the artist’s ability to engage with their inner world and find the resources for imaginative elaboration of universal processes.
Like *The Seventh Seal* which preceded, *Wild Strawberries* established Bergman’s reputation internationally as a director aspiring to express universal themes of death and anxiety in a highly symbolic form, and as a sophisticated exponent of melancholy. Whilst *The Seventh Seal* personifies death, *Wild Strawberries* begins with the elderly protagonist apparently haunted by dreams of death. As we shall see, it is not just the presence of death, as a theme, which evokes comparisons with Klein’s work but, also, the film can be related to the metapsychology which surrounds this concept in the work of Klein and her followers. The dominant theme of the film is not, in fact, death, but the troubles of Isak’s life, as whole, with particular attention to his failure to find greater emotional and imaginative contact with others. The film begins with a monologue of Isak’s thoughts, which he is writing in a diary:

> Our relations with other people mainly consist of discussing and judging our neighbour’s character and behaviour. For me this has led to a voluntary withdrawal from virtually all so-called social intercourse.

The anxiety around ideas of death is part of an underlying emotional torrent about life that emerges intermittently in the film through access to Isak’s imagination in the forms of dreams and memories. *Wild Strawberries* relates to Kleinian ideas at a structural level as well as the convergence around preoccupation with death and inner conflict. Like the story analysed by Klein in ‘On Identification’, *Wild Strawberries* is a narrative about instability of identity. In contrast to Green’s story the film has a realist focus on consistency in Isak’s self-understanding, but the use of imaginative shifts into his subjective world throws his secure identity into chaos just as happened to Fabian through his encounter with his victims. We do not see Isak transformed into other people, but we do see how his relationship to others is buried in the past and this continues to emerge in unpredictable, startling form. Like Klein’s diagnosis of the resolution in Ravel’s opera and like Klein’s account of the reparative process in her case studies Isak must face up to his imaginative world.

The structure of the film with its alternation of Isak’s internal world and external reality is significant as stream of consciousness cinema and it has been duly noted.
how Bergman is influenced significantly by Strindberg in this respect. This structural patterning of the narrative is also known more generally through modernism and a wide range of possible comparisons are possible. A silent film, which clearly had a big influence on Bergman was Victor Sjöström’s *The Phantom Carriage*. The pattern of moving between inner and outer worlds also compares I would suggest to the Kleinian emphasis on the interplay between the infant and his or her first objects. Bergman appears to intuitively represent some of the processes described and analysed by Klein including the significance of phantasy as an expression of emotional, internal conflict, and ultimately as a resource for self-understanding. Bergman, like Klein, recognises, through the character of Isak, a deep-rooted negativity, akin to Klein’s all encompassing concept of the death drive that takes various forms including the imagining his own death. Furthermore, in his preoccupation with subjectivity Bergman could be said to raise the issues that surround narcissism. An initial clue to this is present in the fact that the protagonist’s initials are those of the director and we should also note that Bergman explained the film in relation to himself. As Donner puts it, the film involves a ‘journey towards the center of the ego’ by Isak Borg. In the early nightmare sequence this journey within is figured directly as Isak meets his double in a coffin. In keeping with the development of ideas about narcissism through Freud and Klein’s work we find that the subjective world that confronts Isak in his nightmare is not just represented as indulgent departure from reality, but instead, despite the film’s ‘mellowness’, angst is a fundamental constituent of the subjective reality.

Klein focussed on splitting within introjection and projection but we can also see that the term ‘splitting’ is appropriate for the division between the inner and outer as separate worlds. The whole of *Wild Strawberries* can be regarded as a process imbued with ‘splitting’ signified by the disruption of the ongoing narrative with Isak’s imaginings and memories. As Wood points out after Isak’s nightmare:

> …actual encounters, further dream, daydream-cum-memory (for Isak ‘remembers’ scenes at which he wasn’t in fact present) - are like the pieces of a jig-saw that Isak, jolted by his own subconscious sense of human failure (the dream) to a new vigilance, must learn to put together in order to pass through self-awareness to salvation.
It is worth noting here how Riviere in her application of Kleinian theory to literature makes the connection between dream and memory, a fusion that defines Isak’s inner world: ‘It can be said perhaps that the nearest a normal person, at any rate in Western culture, comes to conscious realization of his own inner world is through the process of memory.’

The dreams and memories in *Wild Strawberries* go against the grain of a narrative structure built around Isak’s collection of a special ‘jubilee’ award, which honours 50 years since his graduation, and the physical journey he makes to collect this award in Lund. The content of the subjective sequences convey that the source of conflict is deeper than a few bad memories of actual events. Despite the verisimilitude of Isak’s memories, expressed through dreams, these recollections are more significant as an expression of Isak’s emotions contained within his inner world. As Riviere stresses, memories contain, above all, significant emotional experiences. Isak’s emotions include his desires and his regrets. The subjective sequences which reveal these emotions, are echoed by conflicts, and divisions in his conscious world, as he travels to Lund.

In the early nightmare sequence Isak dreams of a walk in the city in which he is persecuted by an anonymous agency that heralds his death. This sequence conveys a frenzy of destruction and ominous signs in the form of objects carrying a mysterious threat. These threats evoke Klein’s concept of the paranoid-schizoid because Isak feels that he is being assailed by the world itself and this negativity resides inside his psyche. In the nightmare a stranger who he meets is revealed as a mannequin that falls and bleeds profusely in the street. Isak looks at a clock noticing that it has no hands, and then looks at his own watch and notices the same impairment. A carriage with no driver is revealed, carrying a coffin and careers before Isak, with a wheel spinning off and crashing into a lamppost. The carriage releases the coffin, in which is a figure who is revealed to be Isak’s double, dressed in the clothes he will wear for the ceremony in Lund. The double appears to draw Isak into the coffin. In sum, the dream expresses his fear of his own mortality at the age of 78, but also appears to
reanimate a deep-rooted anxiety. Bergman, like Klein, focuses on a fear of annihilation, which is elemental. As Gado notes, the screech of the carriage wheels which carry the coffin sound like a baby’s cry\textsuperscript{81} which suggests that Bergman is drawing on ideas of infantile anxiety. More than this, he is connecting the fear of death to Isak’s complete personal history. As Riviere argues: ‘when one fears one’s own death, it is all that one will lose, one’s “life” - in both senses - one’s present breath of life, and one’s “past life” out of which one’s identity is constituted.’\textsuperscript{82} It is in keeping with this understanding that the film involves Isak turning from his immediate fears of death to the way his past has been constituted through relations with others. Whilst some of the symbolism of the opening is taken up later in the film, the abstraction of the nightmare symbolism also means that Bergman leaves space for the audience to find their own connections.

The nightmare sequence has often been praised for its innovative form including surrealist imagery, the sound effects, including at one point Isak’s amplified heartbeat, and the high contrast of the black and white cinematography, which recalls the Gothic expressionism of silent cinema. Kleinian theory has been used in art history by Stokes. He argues that:

\ldots negative expressions may figure successfully in art only if there is present as well a reparative nucleus: one sign of it, we have said, is a richness or excellence attributed to the medium: perhaps not to medium but at any rate to art in general. Indeed, it is because there is excellence in art’s succinctness and pattern that some trends which are usually inhibited can so freely be displayed: this is part of the bringing together, of a coalescence that provides an emblem to the difficult organization of the ego. Art is a powerful means for the harmless expression of aggressive trends.\textsuperscript{83}

Stokes’ argument relates to existing theories of art including emphasis on the power of form to find expression through a specific medium; and also the potential of art for sublimating violence. What is most relevant for understanding this nightmare sequence is his understanding of these aesthetic ideas in relation to the concepts of Kleinian metapsychology. Stokes argues that the artist is involved in repairing lost and damaged objects as in the depressive position, but also form must convey more elemental, manic processes which for Stokes are connected back to the infant’s first
experience of the breast. For Stokes, art must achieve self-containment through control of form but also connect beyond this with external reality through less controlled expression. Acknowledging the impact of social context and artistic tradition, Stokes feels that the most fundamental contact with the external world signified by art is a sublimation of the infant’s earliest experience in the paranoid-schizoid phase. For Stokes, whilst the art work as a whole harmonises and placates destructive impulses, in places it should give full expression to destructive impulses. The terror and screeching of the wheels in Isak’s nightmare suggest that he experiences a manic sense of attack. The unpredictable images and sudden changes in angle reveal chaos at the level of form. At the same time the distinctive aesthetic properties of this sequence, including its elemental connection to the film medium, conveyed through over exposure, provide a sense of mastery and unity. Looking at the film as a whole we can see that the returns to Isak’s subjectivity show how phantasises that are either gratifying or terrifying animate but also sharpen Bergman’s control over the film medium in their stylised departure from the realism of the ongoing story.\[84\]

Seldon Bach comments on the use of flashbacks, dreams and nightmares in *Wild Strawberries*:

> We are confronting an internal world that has been mirrored and projected and the movements we witness on the screen are reflections of the movements of internal objects or, as Bergman might say, the movements of the soul.\[85\]

Bach is referring here to the way that correspondences are established between the content of the dream sequences and other events in the narrative. The film continues with the story of Isak’s journey to Lund. In the preparation for this we see his dependency on Agda, his housekeeper, and his argumentative dialogue with her. There is a sense of humour here in the way Agda mocks Isak whilst caring for him. Then Marianne appears, his daughter-in-law who has been staying with Isak and travels in the car with him to Lund. As with Agda we see that Isak has an argumentative relationship with Marianne who accuses him of egotism and lack of feeling. Thus, the dialogue and the development of the narrative build on Isak’s initial monologue, and the nightmare sequence, to suggest that his inner self is not
immediately as sympathetic as we may suppose from his appearance as a slightly frail and lonely old man. We understand that his relationship with others involves conflict, but also carries the potential for greater mutuality.

When Isak decides to stop at a house where his family lived in the summer, he experiences a daydream in which he returns to his past appearing as an omniscient onlooker. The scene begins as Isak returns to the wild strawberry patch outside the house. This is the location in which, as Isak remembers, his brother Sigfrid seduced his cousin Sara. Isak relives this scene from a voyeuristic perspective unseen by the others. The key point of this sequence is that the return to the strawberry patch evokes Isak’s jealousy and loss, as Sigfrid displaces Isak in Sara’s affections. It also establishes his passivity as an onlooker and this is understood as a displacement of his emotions.

From a psychoanalytic perspective the symbol of the wild strawberries has been understood in various ways. Bach’s analysis bears the hallmarks of Kleinian theory: ‘The strawberry patch here represents the maternal breast to which one returns with a sense of familiarity and where one feeds, falls asleep and dreams.’ Bach does not focus on this symbol as a sublimation of the sibling rivalry which Isak remembers, but rather Bach goes on to argue that the symbolic content of Isak’s phantasies involves anxiety about the parental couple and childbirth. Bach’s argument is supported by the way that the film finishes with Isak’s nostalgic image of his parents. This is a tranquil, serene image distant from the abstraction and chaos in the nightmare sequence and Isak’s painful memories of his loss of Sara. In the initial daydream Isak as a boy and his father are not seen because they are by the riverside fishing, and have not heard the call to the breakfast table, whilst in the film’s climax the parents magically appear in Isak’s thoughts and salute him. Thus, the attainment of a nostalgic grasp of the past is more complete. Whilst Isak’s return to the past uncovers painful emotions including jealousy of his brother, the imagery of this daydream and the finale are relatively speaking more realistic than the initial nightmare, and signify the possibility of greater integration of Isak’s subjective world. This fits with the idea that the individual makes progress through recovering
painful emotions, and, ultimately through developing a more realistic idea of the parents’ presence in the inner world of memory and emotion. It is striking that in this film Bergman intuitively envisages resolution in a manner that corresponds with Klein’s account of the parents as the key internal figures that must be restored in the subjective world. Of course this idea of the parents should not be taken too literally and we find that both Klein and Bergman understand that any object may be transformed through imagination to become a potent motif in the inner world.

The wild strawberries can be understood as a key symbol in Isak’s sublimation of past desires and emotions. Here it is an image that cues the recovery of the past but also confrontation with past losses. It is a poignant image of sensuous pleasure but also suggests transience. This is consistent with the cultural connotations that, as Elizabeth Cowie notes, have been attached to wild strawberries as a motif in Swedish culture where they have carried associations of innocence as well as the passing pleasures of the Swedish summer. Furthermore, as Philip and Kirsti French explain, in Swedish culture there is a traditional idea that each child will discover his own special area in the form of a ‘wild strawberry patch’. As Cowie comments: in Isak’s dream the strawberries are ‘spilled’. The conjunction of a narcissistic reverie of the past and a sense of destructive loss is focussed on through the motif of the fruit. Bergman’s interest in this symbolism can be seen further in his other films that make the Swedish summer a significant narrative setting, and in his specific use of wild strawberries to represent innocence in a dangerous world, as seen in *The Seventh Seal*. *Wild Strawberries* proceeds to depict some of the causes of Isak’s inner anxiety.

The initial daydream progresses as the present day Isak observes the laughter and gaiety of others in his family gathering, at the breakfast table, to celebrate his uncle Aron’s birthday. His mother is an authoritative presence but fails to control the chaos, which ensues after the flirtation between Sara and Sigfrid is revealed. Next Isak witnesses, in the hallway, Sara’s reflections on why she is torn between himself and Sigfrid. From this we gain an understanding that Isak is too serious compared with his brother. However, the diagnosis is not precise because what drives the film
here is emotion as much as analysis, and in particular a turn to the past that echoes the ideas of melancholy and mourning foregrounded by Klein. Isak himself speaks of his memories in relation to these concepts introducing the daydream by saying that he feels ‘a trifle melancholy’ and concluding it by saying ‘I was overcome by a feeling of emptiness and mournfulness’. These feelings can be judged from Klein’s theory as part of Isak’s recovery of his damaged inner world. The possibility of development and change within this emotional landscape depends on the interplay between his conscious and unconscious worlds.

A striking way in which these worlds overlap is revealed when Isak wakes from his daydream to meet a young woman who is the double of his childhood sweetheart Sara. Played by the same actress, Bibi Andersson, the second Sara who lives in Isak’s childhood house, engages him in a playful, flirtatious conversation and he agrees to give her and her two male friends a lift to Lund when he continues the journey with Marianne. The second Sara is, then, like the recovery of the lost loved object discussed in psychoanalytical accounts of mourning, an imaginative process that Klein believes is essential in the transition towards greater integration. The mirroring of internal and external world is developed further because Sara’s two male companions echo the rivalry of Sigfrid and Isak for their cousin Sara. Bergman’s narrative technique develops the skilful interweaving of these relationships, but also the dynamic of underlying impulses that dominate Isak’s psyche, including his fascination for the childhood sweetheart Sara, and his anxieties about achieving reciprocal and fulfilled relationships with others. The conflict of the two young men, Anders and Viktor, is presented in ways that are humorous and philosophical as they argue about the nature of reality, but these echo a more acute sense of conflict in relationships, initially signified by Isak in his remarks about the difficulty of relations with others during the opening, and in the revelation of his feelings of rivalry with his brother Sigfrid.

The physical journey on which the narrative is based is a structure which encompasses Isak’s acquisition of knowledge and insight. However, it is not exclusively Isak who gains in understanding but also other characters including
Marianne. Both characters harbour melancholy secrets, which are brought out into
the open through the course of the film. The sense of melancholy is juxtaposed to a
playful gaiety represented by Sara and her two male companions. Bergman does not
present his material as a drama of origins concerned with who is responsible for the
problems that afflict Isak. Instead, humanistically the film conveys that a tragic
current, which can be compared to Klein’s death drive, is dispersed through a range
of relationships and phenomena. Tragic destruction is signified as impersonal,
accidental force when Isak’s car collides with another, but the negativity, which the
film focuses on, is located inside the characters. Everyone survives, and it is made
clear that the crash does not after all signify the malign power of chance and
accident. Instead, the incident creates a momentary sense of an impersonal
destructive force and foreboding before transferring this sense of negativity into the
representation of the couple whose car crashed into Isak’s. The couple with whom
Isak collided are the Almans. Following the accident, Isak gives them a lift because
of the damage to their car. This provides the opportunity for Bergman to show that
this couple represent a different kind of annihilation, tied to self-destruction in their
competitive failing marriage, with a strong emphasis on the heartless egotism of the
husband. The competitive element is striking and was a feature of human nature that
Klein related to destructive infantile emotions.  
Eventually Marianne insists that
they leave because they present a bad example to the young fellow passengers. The
Almans depart, confessing their shame. Even here the negativity is balanced by a
reparative element. As Gado notes, the Almans provide a comparison with other
failing relationships depicted later in the film. Marianne’s relationship with Evald
and Isak’s relationship with his wife are, thus, tied in with the theme of a
psychological strife under the surface of this civilized society.

When Isak stops at a garage in an area where he worked as a young doctor, the
garage attendant is overjoyed to see him and shows great respect for the work he did
in that area. The garage attendant, played in an unusual cameo role by von Sydow,
suggests to his wife that they should name their baby after Isak. This digression in
the plot looks ahead to the empathy involved in the film’s resolution, drawing on the
caring side of Isak’s work to show that he is not always as egotistical as Marianne
has alleged. It is also a cue for Isak to look confused realising that this was a point in
his life where he achieved more in his contribution to other people, a point well illustrated by Sjöström’s masterful, understated, but expressive representation of momentary bewilderment. However, even here the negative pole of the film’s emotional dialectic is lurking in the background. As Gado points out, we learn later that at this time Isak’s wife was having an affair.  

The emotional substratum of the film appears to move towards equilibrium in the ensuing scene. Having stopped their journey for a meal Isak sympathises with Anders in his argument with Victor about God. Over the meal Isak recites a poem about a loving divine presence and the others join him in this well known verse. Certainly this can be viewed as part of Isak’s journey to a more integrated state of mind, capable of reparation and empathy towards others, and probably expresses, in some sense, Bergman’s intimacy with religious belief. However, the scene is not a resolution. Its impact is qualified by its place within the overall structure of the film and the abstract imaginative quality of the poem’s lines addressed to an unknown friend. According to Harvey Greenberg, Isak is not here expressing religious conviction, as Sara suggests, but ‘a painful conversion’. Isak tells the others that he must visit his mother who is nearby and Marianne asks to join him.

When Isak and Marianne arrive at his mother’s house there are ominous dark skies. During this scene there are repeated medium close-ups of Marianne observing the inter-action between mother and son. These register that Marianne understands that Isak’s emotional coldness derives from his mother, and that this also explains the alienation of her husband Evald, Isak’s son. In this way Marianne’s observation of Isak and his mother contributes to her emotional understanding of her own husband’s inner world and by implication her own. It is important for the viability of Kleinian analysis to recognise the emphasis on reciprocity between increased knowledge of the external world through observation, for instance, and integration of the individual’s inner world. This scene is a further example of the way the progress of the narrative corresponds to an increased sense of realism allied to greater integration of inner and outer worlds. This occurs progressively through the film as Isak in particular becomes more self-aware about his past disappointments and their
emotional implications. In this case the move to integration occurs as Marianne’s understanding is extended through perception. However, it is important to recognise that Marianne’s perception is just one moment in a process, and at this stage her thoughts are not conveyed to the audience. In this way, Marianne’s subjectivity gains a stronger foothold in the narrative alongside the focus on Isak’s consciousness.

The scene has been criticised for the negative representation of Isak’s mother. However, a recognition of the attention to Marianne’s subjectivity undermines the idea that this is a completely male centred narrative. Bergman, like Klein, strives for a ‘universal’ level. While the possibility of achieving universalism is obviously open to question, it has to be acknowledged that in this scene there is a clear attempt to signify complexity, interiority and a more general, shared plane of experience. Marianne is projecting her own concerns, however insightful and justified. We should understand that she, like Isak, is a character in a state of flux. This sense of uncertainty is maintained to the end of the film, as Marianne and Evald’s relationship is unresolved at the climax. Returning to the representation of Isak’s mother, it can be observed that although her character conveys coldness, the narrative momentum does not present this as a revelation of the single cause of Isak’s personality. Instead there is still an element of mystery maintained in this scene as the mother shows Isak her father’s watch, which has no hands. This is a haunting reminder of Isak’s nightmare and thus connects with a broader sense of alienation. The mother has a chilling presence and an arrogant appearance, but in the brevity of the scene, and the symbolism of the clock, we are given the impression that both, she and Isak, are lonely characters, and that the lack of emotional warmth in their lives is bound up with a wider context.

According to Klein, the development of greater integration is not a linear process with a clear-cut end. The paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions reappear throughout the individual’s life although with less ferocity if the depressive position has been successfully experienced. All the characters in *Wild Strawberries* and not just Isak’s mother in particular, who only appears in cameo, live in the shadow of an emotional deficit, even if their world appears to be one of bourgeois civility.
Underneath even the closest family relationships there is turmoil, ultimately encapsulated in a force that is antithetical to life. This is what lies behind Marianne’s perception of Isak’s meeting with his mother. As already stated, Bergman is not so focussed on establishing a single origin for the malaise that affects Isak, but rather suggests that in a way, these problems are integral to life, including a sense of loss that can be accentuated through loneliness and/or ageing and frustration in a marriage.

Shortly after the visit to his mother’s house, Isak’s third flight into subjectivity is developed through another daydream, which provides the most complex presentation of his inner anxieties and is charged with a range of painful psychological issues. Falling asleep as Marianne is driving, Isak dreams again that he is at the wild strawberry patch where, as a 78 year old he meets the Sara of his childhood. This is no reverie. The narcissistic submersion of painful realities is dramatized and exposed as she holds up a mirror and asks him to confront the truth as she declares that she loves his brother. The reality of his distance from this past, and the isolation caused by her, are captured through imaginative condensation of material, already introduced, which highlights his identity as an elderly professor, as well as anxieties from his youth. Thematically we can see how the film deconstructs his power as a man with a distinguished career. The sequence goes on to combine loosely associated episodes foregrounding Isak’s pain and humiliation.

We see Sara nursing her sister’s baby beneath a dark, melancholy night sky. When Isak follows and looks on at the empty cot, the theme of his loss is expressed through the imagery. He proceeds to look on from outside the house at Sara and Sigfrid who are in evening dress. She has taken Sigbritt’s baby safely inside and plays the piano before embracing Sigfrid. Isak looks on and turns the pain of this perception inwards as he pierces his hand on a nail in the wall. Next, the sequence extends to the subject of his career as bizarrely he is ushered into the building by Alman, the failed husband of the car crash. Now, Alman is an authoritative patriarchal figure testing Isak on his proficiency as a doctor with the young characters, Sara, Anders and Viktor, among the audience. When Isak is asked to treat a female patient, he pronounces her dead
but then she is revealed to be a double of Berit, Alman’s wife, who throws back her head in manic laughter. Mr Alman gives the verdict that Isak is not only incompetent, but lacks the human qualities to be a doctor. He then leads Isak to a space in the woods lit like a stage by the moonlight in which they witness a scene where Isak’s wife Karin meets her lover. Isak sees how the lover overpowers his wife but also how she throws her head back in laughter, like Berit did on the operating table. Karin then declares that if Isak is informed of the incident he will be full of forgiveness, but adds that this is meaningless for her because he lacks human warmth. As Alman says, this scene is a direct replay of a situation witnessed by Isak in 1917, which he retains as a clear, distinct memory.

Isak’s anxieties in this sequence connect with the other episodes. In this sequence the material develops the focus on Isak’s self-destructive impulses evident in the earlier scenes. However, in his melancholy reflection there is a sense of a confused move towards greater self-awareness. The accusations against him delivered by Alman are self-evidently the product of an over punitive and unjust authority. Following Klein’s account of the need to recognise and then transform a punitive super-ego, we can allow that there is perhaps a sense of cathartic release, a working through of the depressive position, in the flickering awareness that Isak’s persecution is excessive. The verdict from Mr Alman that Isak is ‘guilty of guilt’ refers to a world in which conflict lurks underneath appearances, but it also conveys absurdity. Isak’s anxieties have become less rooted, transferring associations between his conscious awareness of the faults of others and the idea of self-inflicted chastisement from his inner world. This fluidity of meaning is partly captured by the Kleinian conception of a dialectical emotional development as opposed to the representation of isolated and realistic behavioural issues such as Isak’s professional practise. The latter concern is sidelined by an aesthetic, which instead focuses on the recovery of submerged emotion. Isak’s sense of shame is more real than any of the events he sees in this internal world. The revelation of his responsibility for his wife’s infidelity pushes the self-recrimination to a new extreme, but also consolidates the idea that Isak’s problems partially lie within his own psyche and that he has responsibility for facing them. Certainly, this sequence reinforces the horror of Isak’s nightmare at the beginning of the film, but it
also moves towards a more explicit and realistic understanding of the negativity that haunts Isak. However, the most significant shift occurs in the scene that follows.

Isak awakes to see Marianne who has stopped the car and is smoking. She tells Isak of her problems with Evald and this is conveyed with a flashback. The theme of death returns in this scene as Evald responds to Marianne’s news about her pregnancy by saying that he wants nothing to do with bringing up a child. He states that for him the purpose of life is death. Isak is troubled by this, and listens anxiously as Marianne explains the situation and how she will not give in to Evald’s wish that she abandon the baby. Here is a key point in the film’s thematic development as the possibility of new birth is counter posed to the various intimations of death and emotional coldness. However, the most important development is that Isak displays empathy for Marianne’s predicament. This is a turn away from his desire to cut off emotional relationships and a turn outwards from his concern with lingering hurts and recriminations. At the end of this scene as Sara, Anders and Victor present Isak with flowers, the light fades and Isak turns into a spotlight, a theatrical moment in which the realistic aesthetic of Isak’s conscious life is overtaken by the stylisation associated with his dream world. In this way the film involves a stylistic and dramatic expression of the sense that Isak’s inner and outer worlds are converging. This sets up the ending in which Isak’s formal triumph at the award ceremony is juxtaposed with the achievement of warmer and more intimate relationships with Agda, Marianne, and Evald. This is expressed also by the way the young people serenade Isak before he goes to bed. The internal transformation is registered by Isak. His internal monologue explains that he has learnt from the day just at the moment we see him collect his award. Admittedly this transformation maintains some ambiguity. Isak, for instance, only suggests that he can perceive causality in the day’s events without elaborating in depth on his emotions. Evald does not commit to Marianne’s baby even though the couple seem to be close. Agda refuses Isak’s request that they talk to each other less formally. However, this lack of resolution can be seen as part of a commitment to realism against contrived resolution and Isak’s final dream, which he explains as his way of going to sleep, conveys, as I have said, a tranquil image of his parents and a significant change from his nightmare of death.
Critical responses to *Wild Strawberries*

This chapter has represented the relevance of Kleinian ideas to *Wild Strawberries*. At the same time it is necessary to engage with the critical idea that this focus on an inner world is in some respects a limitation. Various critics have considered the issue of whether *Wild Strawberries* is sufficiently negative in relation to its content. There is not the space here to survey the range of critical responses, but I wish to note several points that have implications for the Kleinian theory advanced in this chapter. Even Wood, who provides a very insightful and appreciative commentary on the film, conveys a degree of criticism in relation to Bergman’s subsequent achievement with *Persona*.

In retrospect it {*Wild Strawberries*} looks on one level almost too complete, too self-contained in its jig-saw structure, to stand as an adequate response to the stresses of the contemporary world. Though far removed from Art for Art’s Sake, it is perhaps more satisfying as a Work of Art than as a record of fully lived experience.96

Wood questions whether, ‘Bergman was working from the whole of himself’?97 Gado argues on the other hand that the film can be understood as a quest by Bergman for reconciliation with his father. He suggests that the ending shows the way that Bergman is split between commitment to the truth of his own experience of alienation from his father - rendered through Evald’s continued detachment from Isak - and an attempt to flee from this into an imaginary resolution.98

Maria Bergom-Larsson provides a reading, which is ambivalent on the basis of the film’s psychoanalytical content. She notes that the film has been called ‘a psychoanalysis’, referring to Donner’s interview with Bergman, and notes in the film the ‘…tone is far more conciliatory…’ towards the father than for instance the anger against the father figure expressed in Bergman’s first script *Frenzy*.99 Her overriding argument about Bergman’s treatment of patriarchy is, however, that he is unable to free himself from patriarchal structures including ‘his image of God’ ‘except in a few isolated cases, when we encounter a critique which is often perspicuous but completely atomistic, never structured.’100 Despite this Bergom- Larsson acknowledges that in *Wild Strawberries* ‘the analysis’ of the father is ‘more
penetrating and psychologically profound' (than in the earlier aggression against patriarchy in films such as *Frenzy.*) Johns Blackwell also shows ambivalence about the film in relation to the representation of gender. She praises one scene in particular, that in which Isak’s wife is seen to reveal that her infidelity was caused by his lack of love for her. Only at this point, according to Johns Blackwell, does the film fully question a patriarchal representation of gender. For Johns Blackwell, women are forced throughout the film to fit into a male conception of them. ‘Almost all the women in the film cohere into maternality: even Agda the housekeeper nurtures her employer.’ She goes on to argue that:

The female body is almost exclusively a site of potential or frustrated maternal plenitude for the male. That in *Wild Strawberries* the legacy of coldness and death, elsewhere in Bergman attributed to the father, is associated with the mother is a case of a projection of the failings of the father onto the mother in order to save the father so that the son might be reconciled with him.

Finally in relation to critical responses we should consider Bergman himself who has explained the film in different ways at different times. In *Images* he corrects this and reinforces the sense of melancholy narcissism, stating that the initials not only refer to himself, but also the words Isak and Borg connote ‘ice’ and ‘a fortress’ respectively. Bergman looks back quite critically at his psychological motivation for the film:

The driving force in *Wild Strawberries* is, therefore, a desperate attempt to justify myself to mythologically oversized parents who have turned away, an attempt that was doomed to failure. It wasn’t until many years later that my mother and father were transformed into human beings of normal proportions, and the infantile hatred was dissolved and disappeared.

These criticisms just noted challenge the Kleinian reading I have developed in this chapter. Wood suggests that we must turn to *Persona* because too much integration in the artwork blocks off engagement with social issues. Gado denies the efficacy of the catharsis in *Wild Strawberries* due to underlying antagonism against the father. Both Bergom-Larsson and Johns Blackwell put more emphasis on the film’s sublimation of patriarchal authority than the idea of a creative sublimation of the
death instinct. Bergman himself suggests that the film is constrained by its lack of realism in relation to the representation of his parents.

These are significant points to take into consideration. On the other hand, we can still reaffirm the achievements of *Wild Strawberries*. We have seen how the film compares to complex development of ideas about narcissism in all its manifestations both positive and negative in Kleinian thought. The integration that is so central to the film’s aesthetic achievement is not total. The metapsychology that is conveyed through imaginative sequences engages with a range of conflicts that apply beyond Isak Borg, making him in effect a kind of everyman figure. Although clearly constructed from the perspective of a male character, much of the film represents his subjectivity in crisis. Furthermore, other perspectives are developed through the assertive actions of female characters including Marianne, Agda, and Isak’s wife. The Kleinian argument suggests that criticism as well as the work itself must recognise the power of both genders in the construction of the imagination.

Bergman clearly sought to continue developing new ideas about film-making after *Wild Strawberries* and moved further away from the ideas of religion that he had accepted from his familial upbringing. However, as the Kleinian analysis suggests already in *Wild Strawberries* the reflection on his parents is subjected to sublimation and re-working, to such an extent that the image of tranquillity at the end is an isolated symbol and not the representative of a dominant theme. Thus the Kleinian approach should be complemented by recognition of the degree of openness in the text. Bergman himself seems to hanker after such freedom of interpretation suggesting that beyond the self-analysis is a creative response to the figure of Sjöström, a personal representation of a man who represents a significant cultural and filmic influence on Bergman.

Donner moves towards a more socially engaged version of the humanistic understanding of *Wild Strawberries*, putting across the idea that in Bergman’s work we see the transition to a more individualised society and the internal and spiritual issues that arise:
Swedish literature from the 1940s on accentuates the spiritual transformation {away from a more religious society} by leaving behind all the collective philosophies to which the authors of the 1930s still were attracted. As an artist, Bergman becomes extraordinarily representative of the change, a victim of the time, and simultaneously its interpreter.105

In this engagement with the psychology of individualism and its difficulties Bergman finds common ground with the Kleinian focus on the way the inner self emerges through a history that is social and emotional. *Wild Strawberries* explores and exposes the fear of death and ties this into a wide range of relationships: from infancy to old age; familial, professional and between strangers. We have also seen how the issues of loneliness and humiliation are countered through a focus on more empathic and emotional understanding. I have drawn attention to the contribution to Kleinian theory of distinctive elements including the Kleinian theory of art put forward by Stokes, which resists the idea of too much integration.

The debate about integration and about the gendered politics of the film remains nuanced and open to further argument. It is wrong to reduce all Bergman’s work to one theoretical framework, given his range of influences. Kleinian theory itself does not necessarily have this ambition, developed as it has largely been within psychoanalysis and only intermittently applied to culture. What about other influences and philosophies of imagination? Alford makes an interesting argument from within Kleinian theory, suggesting that we can use the achievement of integration within an artwork for comparison with the phenomenon of resolution in our own society, but this clearly depends on the spectator gaining a sense of freedom as they respond to and judge the text.106 As we turn to Sartre for another model we will find points of convergence with Kleinian concepts, but also a different emphasis on the individual’s engagement with society. Just as it has been psychoanalysed, *Wild Strawberries* has been interpreted with existentialist thought to the fore. Steene, for instance, comments that:

Every time Isak steps out of the car, he in a sense steps into a world that challenges him to commitment. All of his experiences during the trip from Stockholm to Lund dramatize the existential view which is the film’s
philosophical core: that life is not a matter of merely being a spectator or submitting it to cold analysis.¹⁰⁷

There is overlap here with Kleinian analysis in the idea of expressing a departure from cold analysis as encapsulated in Isak’s repressed emotional life. This is also dramatised most effectively in Bergman’s other breakthrough film of the period, *The Seventh Seal* with its focus on the existential predicament of a knight in a hellish world. The following chapter will consider the evolution of Sartre’s ideas on imagination and the power he attributes to emotion before considering how these ideas can be applied to Bergman’s *The Seventh Seal*. 
Chapter 2 – REFERENCES AND ENDNOTES

1 Klein’s notes on Citizen Kane describe the eponymous character’s narcissistic personality and the manic way he attempts to stave off loss and melancholia through internal objects. The latter involves his accumulation of possessions amongst which are the sled, and his wife who he manipulates. Laura Mulvey introduces these notes commenting on how the film demands: ‘a psychoanalytic imagination’ and how Klein provides this: Stonebridge, L. and Phillips, J. (eds.) (1998), Reading Melanie Klein, London: Routledge, pp.245-254.


3 ibid., p.349.


6 ibid.


9 As Freud famously argues we must consider ‘…what makes it necessary at all for our mental life to pass beyond the limits of narcissism…’, ibid., p.78.


13 ibid., p53. For Freud’s explanation see pp.52-55.

14 ibid., p.54.

15 ibid.

16 ibid., p.55.

17 ibid.

18 ibid., p.58.

19 ibid., p.61.

20 ibid.

21 ibid., p.79.

22 Rycroft, op.cit., p.31.


Klein, Envy and Gratitude and Other Works, op.cit., pp. 176-235.


Klein, Envy and Gratitude and Other Works, op.cit., p. 182.
Segal, op.cit., p.141.  
ibid., p.43.  
All of these writers have pieces collected in Klein, Heimann, Money-Kyrle (eds.), New Directions in Psycho-Analysis, op.cit.  
ibid., p.217.  
ibid., p.145.  
ibid., p.175.  
ibid., p.156.  
ibid., p.157.  
Segal, Klein, op.cit., p.125.  
Klein’s review of the opera in which the child saves the wounded squirrel illustrates in simple form a process that she elaborated subsequently. Her emphasis on transformation of bad objects reveals the limitations of simply clinging on to good objects. The child must ultimately allow for the co-existence of both internally and externally.  
Klein, Envy and Gratitude and Other Works 1946-1963, op.cit., pp.165-166.  
ibid., p.166.  
Segal is best known for developing this approach to art.  
Hubner describes how Bergman grew up knowing The Phantom Carriage and how Swedish viewers of Wild Strawberries would have already known about Sjöström and Selma Lagerlöf, the author of the original novel which was adapted for The Phantom Carriage. Hubner, L. (2007) The Films of Ingmar Bergman : Illusions of Light and Darkness, Basingstoke ; New York : Palgrave Macmillan, p.94.  
Wood, op.cit., p.78.  
ibid.  
Gado, op.cit., p.213.
ibid.

83 Stokes, ibid., pp.406-421; p.411 in particular.
85 ibid., p.197.
86 ibid.
89 ibid.
91 Gado, op.cit., p.215.
92 ibid.
93 ibid.
94 As Gado points out the choice is a well-known part of the Swedish Hymnal ‘marked “The last Judgement” under the heading “The Christian Hope Before Death.”’ ibid., pp.215-216.
97 Wood, op.cit., p.81.
98 ibid.
101 ibid., p.43.
102 ibid., p.21.
105 Donner, J., op.cit.
Sartre’s theory of imagination and *The Seventh Seal*

Sartrean and Kleinian theories both provide an account of human nature which foregrounds internal division and negation. It is helpful here to recall how Sartre’s best known work of philosophy, *Being and Nothingness*, employs the concepts of the ‘for-itself’ and the ‘in-itself’ to distinguish two modes of being. As a starting point we can see that the ‘for-itself’ refers to consciousness and the ‘in-itself’ refers to matter. However, Sartre’s thesis is more complex than this. For example, consciousness may assume an idea of itself as being thing-like, of fixed and determinate nature. Sartre challenges this as a form of false consciousness, an evasion of freedom and a denial of the truth contained in the very concept of the ‘for-itself’. However, this does not mean that consciousness can deny its inherent relationship with the ‘in-itself’. We cannot deny material factors including the self’s relation to the body. For Sartre in *Being and Nothingness* we must understand the internal relationship between the ‘for-itself’ and the ‘in-itself’. Thus, negation is placed at the heart of being and the Sartrean model like Kleinian theory believes that knowledge requires engagement with an ineradicable division within human nature.¹

There seems, nevertheless, to be an immediate gulf between Sartrean and Kleinian theories on account of Sartre’s opposition in *A Sketch for the Theory of Emotions* and *Being and Nothingness* to the Freudian concept of the unconscious. Sartre insists in *Being and Nothingness* on the power of the individual’s self-consciousness. He writes:

> If we reject the language and materialistic mythology of psychoanalysis, we perceive that the censor in order to apply its activity with discernment must know what it is repressing.²

This belief in the power of consciousness is articulated through Sartre’s criticism of a state of mind, which he calls ‘bad faith’. I will return to this well-known concept later in this chapter. Critics believe that Sartre concentrates on free will at the expense of recognising social influences, which can impact on the subject without his or her awareness. His individualism has been viewed as extremely problematic for gaining a sense of social context. Rustin, for instance, argues from a Kleinian perspective that Sartre fails to appreciate the full significance of the individual’s
place in society. Rustin argues that Lacanian theory and Sartrean philosophy share a view of the individual as isolated while Kleinian psychoanalysis shows the individual’s immersion in a social reality from infancy.

Sartre is indeed preoccupied with an individualistic perspective, and, for this very reason, his work represents an alternative perspective on Bergman’s films. Bergman is concerned with the mysteries of the psyche, but he is equally focussed on conveying the alienation of individuals in society. *Wild Strawberries* relates to this because it focuses on the consciousness of Isak, but connects his inner world to social experiences. Also, we saw that *Wild Strawberries* uses the idea of death as a cue for reflections on life. Sartre engages with this issue in *Being and Nothingness* through his dialogue with Heidegger’s ideas about death. The language in the book suggests that Sartre accords it at least the same centrality as Freud and Klein stating: ‘… death haunts me at the very heart of my projects as their inevitable reverse side.’

However, Sartre does not believe that we find in the concept of death the truth of our existence, but rather that death demarcates a boundary. This is made clear as the above quotation continues:

> But precisely because this ‘reverse’ is to be assumed not as *my* possibility but as the possibility that there are for me no longer any possibilities, it does not penetrate me. The freedom which is *my freedom* remains total and infinite. Death is not an obstacle to my projects; it is only a destiny of these projects elsewhere. And this is not because death does not limit my freedom but because freedom never encounters this limit.

This philosophical reflection relates to Bergman’s representation of individuals who establish their own ‘projects’ in the shadow of death. The significance of death as a theme in Bergman’s work is reinforced when we recognise that his international reputation was really boosted by *The Seventh Seal*, made one year prior to *Wild Strawberries*, in which death is personified. In this film a medieval knight who has returned from The Crusades with his squire finds a brutal society. The knight is preoccupied with the apparent absence of God and is haunted by the figure of Death, but strives to combat this threat psychologically and through action. This subject matter and its treatment led Andrew Sarris to declare that *The Seventh Seal* ‘is perhaps the first genuinely existential film’.
In this chapter I will explore the relationship between Sartrean theory and Bergman’s work by focussing on Sartre’s early philosophical book on the imagination: *The Imaginary*. This has received less attention than *Being and Nothingness*, but arguably it paves the way for key ideas in the latter. Sartre’s approach to imagination is better known through his own creative work including, notably, *Nausea* and his work as a cultural theorist and critic, including *What is Literature*. Both of these works afford points of comparison and contrast with his early philosophical study of the imagination. Sartre’s work on the imagination actually begins with a short early work *The Imagination: a Psychological Critique* published in 1936, but this is followed by *The Imaginary* (also called *The Psychology of Imagination*), first drafted in 1937 but published in 1940. Peter Caws points out that:

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> It was in the second and unpublished part of Imagination (i.e. precisely the first draft of *The Psychology of Imagination*) that Sartre, according to Simone de Beauvoir, ‘crystallized the first key concepts of his philosophy: the conscious mind as tabula rasa, and its capacity for annihilation (néantisation).’

In his early work on the imagination, but also his other early work on emotion and on the ego, Sartre challenges the idea of an inner world as conceived by a range of philosophers and psychologists. This is the beginning of Sartre’s distinctive approach to the human condition. The particular interest of *The Imaginary* lies in the way that, using a phenomenological method, he distinguishes imagination as a distinctive attitude of consciousness. I will consider how his theory is developed through a range of examples, which rely on his own self-reflection and how he is engaged in a debate with other philosophers and psychologists. By focussing on imagination Sartre’s theory compares with the Kleinian emphasis on phantasy. Both theories recognise the power of imagination in contrast to rationality and the causal power of external influences. However, as noted a moment ago, there is a significant gulf. Sartre’s rejection of the unconscious, through insistence on the reality of individualised consciousness, may be interpreted as a failure to fully acknowledge social reality. While accepting some legitimacy behind this argument I will explore the alternative view that Sartre’s theory of imagination recognises the place of
consciousness within social existence, albeit filtered through an individualistic perspective. Following a study of *The Imaginary* I will consider why commentators on Sartre’s work have thought that his early reflections on the imagination are useful for a theory of art and culture. I will explore how in his other work we can find examples which complement and help to develop his work on imagination. This broader sense of Sartre’s philosophy of imagination is useful when turning to cinema, Bergman’s work and the case of *The Seventh Seal*, in particular. And it is useful in retaining a sense of the interaction between art and society.

The Imaginary

As Dermot Moran points out, the first section of Sartre’s *The Imaginary* is called ‘The Certain’ because Descartes is an important influence. Like Descartes in his *Meditations*, Sartre puts his faith in reflection and self-awareness. Sartre believes that these are important sources of knowledge that must be defended against positivistic forms of science. Like Descartes he begins with that which he thinks he can be certain of. Nevertheless, Sartre is well aware of the problems with Descartes’ philosophy. As an alternative to Descartes’ philosophical conclusion, in which pure consciousness and God provided the foundations of knowledge, Sartre draws on the work of the phenomenologist Husserl, and yet Sartre also argues that it necessary to move beyond Husserl.

The imaginary phenomena that Sartre refers to are often images in the usual sense of the word but also include other kinds of phenomena: he discusses phenomena that appear before consciousness including fictional ideas, ideas about people who exist but are absent, hallucinations, dream imagery and external images like paintings and photographs. Sartre also includes reference to some examples of aural imagination and it is clear that he wishes ultimately to relate his observations to art in general. His initial agenda involves commitment to the insights of Franz Brentano and Husserl, both of whom understood consciousness as defined by intentionality. Following these thinkers Sartre argues that all examples of consciousness involve consciousness of something and thus consciousness is defined by its intention towards something other than itself. Sartre aims to show that imagination is like other examples of consciousness in that it also is defined through its intention towards something other than itself. One of the key subjects for attack in *The Imaginary*, and in Sartre’s
preceding work, *Imagination: a Psychological Critique* (1936), is what he calls ‘the illusion of immanence’. This phrase is used by Sartre to refer to a mistake that he locates in a range of theories. He argues that these theories make the common mistake of suggesting that the object of an image is, in some way, reproduced within the image. We can see how an idealist philosopher such as Bishop Berkeley may be guilty of such an approach, because for him existence is dependent on perception. As Beata Stawarska puts it: ‘Sartre targets Berkeley’s idealism for having reduced transcendent objects to their mode of appearance, and so reduced the objective world to subjective impressions.’ However, it is less clear how this applies to empiricist philosophers such as David Hume who is also a target of Sartre’s criticism.

Hume, in fact, gave imagination a very prominent role, as Gerhard Streminger has demonstrated with reference to Hume’s key works. Streminger shows how Hume held imagination responsible for mistaken metaphysical ideas, but also gave it an extremely positive role in unifying disparate elements in experience. Streminger provides a range of examples, which illustrate Hume’s paradoxical treatment of the imagination. Streminger informs us that: ‘While in the first book of the Treatise… the ideas of imagination cannot yet attain the vivacity of memories and experiences, in his later writings Hume already regards it as “certain we may feel sickness and pain from the mere force of imagination…” ’ One of Hume’s most famous examples is that of ‘the golden mountain’. According to Hume whatever we can imagine could exist at some point in time, and thus the golden mountain is possible, but we cannot imagine ‘ “a mountain without a valley, and therefore regard it as impossible.” ’ This illustrates how Hume allows a creative role for imagination in its ability to combine different ideas and envisage different possibilities, but Hume’s example of the mountain without a valley also suggests a constraint on imagination, because, for Hume, we cannot imagine what is impossible. An objection can made here: who determines what is possible and impossible?

In order to understand Hume’s account of imagination, and Sartre’s criticism of it, we must return to Hume’s theory of the mind, in which he divides consciousness between impressions and ideas. The former are acquired directly through perception and consequently more vivid than memories, ideas about objects or people that are absent or fictitious, and ideas like that of the golden mountain. However, for Hume
all ideas are derivative of impressions and ultimately causally dependent on the channel of perception. Thus, imagination creates an image like that of the golden mountain by synthesising discrete impressions from experience. In *The Imaginary* Sartre challenges Hume’s equation of the mental image with an idea derived from experience. For Sartre, this fails to acknowledge the distinctive mode of consciousness involved when we imagine something. He uses a reduction ad absurdum argument to suggest that for Hume an idea of an object imagined involves speaking as if the object were reproduced inside the idea. Sartre notes Hume’s argument that it ‘“is impossible to form an idea of an object that is possest of quantity and quality, and yet is possest of no precise degree of either...”’. Sartre takes this to be an unnecessary prescription that the image should resemble a real object. Using the example of a chair he says it would be absurd to think that perception involved the chair being inside consciousness. He continues:

Now I close my eyes and I produce the image of the chair that I have just perceived. The chair, now being given as imaged, can no more enter into consciousness than previously. An image of a chair is not and cannot be a chair.

Sartre continues by saying that the assumption that images are merely weak copies of the objects to which they refer is contained within a wide body of opinion:

Psychologists and philosophers have mainly adopted this point of view. It is also that of common sense. When I say that ‘I have an image’ of Pierre, it is thought that I presently have a certain portrait of Pierre in consciousness. The object of my current consciousness is precisely this portrait, and Pierre, the man of flesh and blood, is reached only very indirectly, in an ‘extrinsic’ manner, only by the fact that he is what the portrait represents.

According to Sartre theories of the imagination which suggest that mental images are portrait-like objects conflict with our understanding of the nature of consciousness:

Without doubt, the illusion of immanence was always left implicit. Otherwise it would have been understood that it was impossible to slip these material portraits into a conscious synthetic structure without destroying the structure, cutting the contacts, stopping the current, breaking the continuity. Consciousness would cease to be transparent to itself; everywhere its unity would be broken by the inassimilable, opaque screens.
Sartre argues that many philosophers and psychologists, including such figures as Hume, are in effect speaking of images in the mind as being copies of objects. This is because they suggest that the image is a secondary version of the object, and therefore has qualities that are derived from the object, albeit in a weakened form. Sartre argues in effect that the mistaken theories tend to objectify images. The image itself is spoken of as a thing rather than being the means through which we are made aware of things in external reality, or indeed made aware of things which are fictional. In his commentary on Sartre’s work Anthony Manser characterises the philosophy of imagination criticised by Sartre:

The conventional view of the imagination might be crudely represented in the following way: there arise in the mind ‘mental pictures’ which are in many ways like actual perceptions of external objects. These pictures are of two sorts, those of the reproductive imagination, exact copies of things seen in the past, and those of the free imagination or fancy, combinations of fragments from the reproductive imagination into new shapes.\(^{19}\)

Even when imagination conjures up an image that does not correspond to an object of perception such as the golden mountain, impressions are given a formative role by Hume who argues that the imagination freely rearranges and transfigures elements from perceptual experience. Sartre, in contrast, sees the example of images that depart from perceptual experience as a clear indication that the imaginary is a distinct realm. In this, he draws on the influence of Husserl. As Stawarska indicates, Sartre turned to Husserl’s example of a flute playing centaur in *The Psychology of Imagination*.\(^ {20}\) Sartre insists that we must follow Husserl’s argument that this image is the result of the creative intentionality of the imagination and thus detached from the influence of the empirical world and its impact on perception. The import of Sartre’s argument can be expressed as follows: in trying to tie imagination to empirical data, in a strict pattern of cause and effect, philosophers like Hume have put the issue of origins before a phenomenology of experience, and have thus failed to recognise the autonomy of imagination.

In endorsing Sartre’s criticisms of the conventional views on imagination Manser comments:
The philosophers appear to have talked as if there were a central notion of mental picturing which had little or nothing to do with other things called imaginative.  

Having started from the basis that imagination is a distinct form of consciousness, Sartre moves on to look more closely at the way in which it compares and contrasts with perception. Thus, the third section of the first chapter is concerned with what Sartre calls ‘quasi-observation’.  

He discusses examples where he observes objects in imagination. At first, Sartre’s argument appears to be very close to that of Hume who suggested that ideas are weakened impressions. Sartre claims that observation of images has an ‘essential poverty’ in comparison to the impressions that make up perception. For Sartre, the mental image is limited but this is not because it is a secondary form of perception or because it has been derived from perception. Instead, Sartre argues that these limitations are inherent to imagination itself and are apparent when we reflect on the nature of images:

> Our attitude in relation to the object of the image could be called ‘quasi-observation’. We are, indeed, placed in the attitude of observation, but it is an observation that does not teach anything. If I give myself in image the page of a book, I am in the attitude of the reader, I look at the printed lines. But I do not read. And, at bottom, I am not even looking, because I already know what is written.

While he is trying to construct a sense of what imagination involves, Sartre is also simultaneously deconstructing the illusions left by other theories. In this sense, Sartre pre-empts those theories which insist that we must recognise the illusory nature of the image. Sartre conveys the limitations of imagination, but this does not lead him to say that imagination has nothing to say about the world.

As already noted, Hume’s theory suggests that we recognise the image by the inferiority and weakness it has in contrast to perception. Sartre goes further than Hume then in asserting the limitations of imagination and says that we have a strong awareness of the imagined object as something different from the perceived object. Sartre states this more fully as follows:

> Every consciousness posits its object, but each in its own way. Perception, for example, posits its objects as existing. The image also includes an act of belief or a positional act. The act can take four and only four forms: it can posit the
object as nonexistent, or as absent, or as existing elsewhere; it can also
‘neutralize’ itself, which is to say not posit its object as existent.  

Here, Sartre refers to our awareness that the mental image may apply to something
that has been invented. Hume’s golden mountain might fit this category. Or the
mental image may refer to our idea of a person or object that is missing from a
location. Sartre uses the example of the everyman Pierre and talks about his tangible
sense of Pierre’s absence when, for instance, he is not sure whether a figure walking
towards him is Pierre or not. Or the mental image may refer to our image of someone
or an object, which we picture in a different locale from ourselves. The final form
that Sartre attributes to the image concerns a level of self-awareness in which we are
aware of imaginative capacity before an object materialises. In this case we have a
spontaneous sense of the negation of perceptual content. Sartre is poetic on this point
and suggests the possibility that, in this form, consciousness intuitively connects with
past experiences whilst maintaining a creative, spontaneous intentionality towards
the present and future:

> The consciousness appears to itself as creative, but without positing as object
this creative character. It is thanks to this vague and fugitive quality that the
image consciousness is not given as a piece of wood that floats on the sea, but
as a wave among the waves. It feels itself to be consciousness through and
through and homogenous with the other consciousnesses that have preceded it
and with which it is synthetically united.  

Thus, Sartre’s work conflicts with theories that seek an exclusively factual or
empirical basis for knowledge. He recognises different levels of consciousness
describing the form of consciousness above as ‘nonthetic’ consciousness of itself.  
This means that he is talking about an internal, ‘implicit’, pre-reflective sense of
one’s own consciousness which is distinct from self-consciousness in the sense of
reflecting on our own thoughts.  
Sartre believes that the spontaneous nature of this
form of consciousness is conveyed through a metaphor of movement, ‘waves’. In
sum, although he recognises the limitations of imagination Sartre also conveys its
independent qualities.

‘Image, portrait, caricature’
Sartre considers three different examples of imaginative consciousness, a mental
image, a photographic portrait, and a caricature in relation to the example of a friend ‘Pierre’. Sartre argues that these three forms of imagination have in common the attempt to make present a subject who is absent. In making the subject present they substitute the sensation of presence that would be provided by perception. Sartre suggests that psychology would normally distinguish the mental image as more subjective than the portrait. He accepts that the image will lack the detail of the photograph, but the latter will lack the expressive qualities of the subject captured in the caricature. He says: ‘...something that was lacking in the photograph, life, expression, is clearly manifest in the drawing: I “regain” Pierre.’

Sartre points out that many theorists would regard the mental image as a different type of phenomenon from the photograph and the caricature. However, Sartre’s phenomenological method involves searching for points in common between different states of consciousness. All three ways of imagining their subject share certain characteristics. In each example consciousness is involved in the intention of creating the imaginary object. Clearly, the intentionality may vary or even be difficult to uncover, but Sartre insists that consciousness must play a critical role in creating the meaning of the absent Pierre, even when he is presented as photograph or caricature. We must create this meaning from the ensemble of sense data.

If someone suddenly shows me a photo of Pierre, the case is functionally the same as when an image appears in my consciousness suddenly and without being willed. However this photograph, if it is simply perceived, appears to me as a paper rectangle of a special quality and colour, with shades and clear spots distributed in a certain way. If I perceive that photograph as ‘photo of man standing on steps’, the mental phenomenon is necessarily already of a different structure: a different intention animates it. And if that photo appears to me as the photo ‘of Pierre’, if, in some way, I see Pierre behind it, it is necessary that the piece of card is animated with some help from me, giving it a meaning it did not yet have.

In discussing the portrait Sartre is very careful to indicate how the image as object in the external world can be taken by consciousness in different ways. We may simply perceive the portrait without investing imaginatively. Sartre provides us with a sense of the way the material aspect of the image as object has to be transcended for imaginary consciousness to take over.
Another example used by Sartre is that of a different caricature, in the form of a female performer, Franconay, impersonating a well-known jazz singer and performer Maurice Chevalier. Sartre talks about how the consciousness of the spectator may oscillate between perceiving obvious discrepancies between the image of the performer and that which is imagined:

The imitator is small, stout, brunette; a woman, she imitates a man. The result is that the imitation is *approximate*. The object that Franconay produces by means of her body is a feeble form, which can always be interpreted in two distinct ways: I am always free to see Maurice Chevalier as imaged, or a small woman pulling faces.\(^{31}\)

Sartre points again to the duality between seeing the performer as herself and as the character she portrays, but he goes further in recognising a complexity in the build up to the imaging consciousness. He talks of the way consciousness must synthesise the materials presented:

To decipher the signs is to produce the concept ‘Chevalier’. At the same time I judge: ‘She is imitating Chevalier’. With this judgement the structure of consciousness is transformed. The theme now is Chevalier. By its central intention, the consciousness is imaging, it acts to realize my knowledge in the intuitive matter that is furnished for me.\(^{32}\)

This suggests how cognition and imagination work together. The spectator may grasp the point of the impersonation before acquiring the image, which the performance elicits. Whilst perception and imagination are different attitudes the latter may involve a transformation of concepts into a sensible form. However, Sartre also recognises how emotion may play a part in the imagining of Chevalier. Since the latter is well-known Sartre perceived him before Franconay's performance and this was accompanied by a certain ‘affective reaction’ (perhaps enjoyment of his performance). This emotional response may be brought back to life in the imagined Chevalier:

... the affective sense of the face of Chevalier will appear on the face of Franconay. It is this that realizes the synthetic union of the different signs, it is this that animates their fixed dryness, that gives them life and a certain depth.\(^{33}\)
This allows Sartre to recognize more fully the ‘expressive’ nature of imagination.\textsuperscript{34} At the same time Sartre talks about the ‘spontaneity’ of imagination, and also about situations where the spectator is in a hybrid state and the object of consciousness is ‘neither fully perception nor fully image’.\textsuperscript{35}

**The analogon**

It can be objected that Sartre’s account leaves us mystified as to what actually resides in consciousness when we imagine. For Sartre, imagination is a form of consciousness that may share qualities with other forms of consciousness, but at the same time maintains its own distinctive nature. In this sense, Sartre’s account of the imagination engages with the epistemology and the nature of consciousness, but lays stress on the creativity of artistic ideas of consciousness. However, there is still the problem of determining whether Sartre is denying any form of representation within consciousness.\textsuperscript{36} Here we need to consider the concept of the ‘analogon’.

Sartre uses the term ‘analogon’ to describe the way imagination grasps something that is not a derivative from reality, but instead a set of details which allow imagination to constitute its object. The analogon is the prop or medium for this activity. As such it may be used to refer to the image as external object or as immaterial psychic content. Sartre states:

\begin{quote}
I will say in consequence that the image is an act that aims in its corporeality at an absent or nonexistent object, through a physical or psychic content that is given not as itself but in the capacity of ‘analogical representative’ of the object aimed at.\textsuperscript{37}
\end{quote}

This explanation replaces an idea of passive representation with a more active sense of the mind’s capacity for imaginative creation. In his commentary on Sartre’s theory of history, Thomas Flynn explains this concept of the analogical representative as follows:

\begin{quote}
Perhaps the most distinctive feature of Sartre’s theory (in *The Imaginary*) and one that figures in his understanding of history is his concept of the ‘analogical representative’ or analogon in imaging consciousness. This may be a physical thing, like a carving or the printed letters on a page, or physiological changes,
\end{quote}
like the eye movements that serve as content for hypnagogic images. The analogon is synthesised with cognitive, emotive and often, kinaesthetic elements to yield the intended object. The carving for example, is simply a piece of polished wood until it is ‘derealized’ into the analogue for the aesthetic object.\textsuperscript{38}

Flynn conveys how the concept of the analagon differs from the assumptions of Hume and others about the imagination as representational of the world. The difference comes back to Sartre’s insistence on imagination as a distinctive creative process, one that cannot be pinned down or captured in the notion of images as object-like entities. The psychic content of the analagon may vary from hypnagogic images to paintings, so that Sartre’s main method of elucidation is through diverse examples and recognition of how the imagination works in a relational way, driven by intention.

Sartre uses the concept of the analogon to represent how consciousness is different when involved in imagining. Imagination will reach beyond its own content, taking perhaps simple perceptual details and imbuing these with a deeper meaning. In the case of images that are external objects imagination invests the material of the object with its own subjectivity. In the case of immaterial mental images, imagination also reaches beyond the surface content. In all cases imagination strives towards a signified subject. Thus Sartre does not romanticise reading as act consumed by imaginative production. Instead, he notes how the reader may move between taking words as signs and entering into mental images. In all cases the intention behind the creation of the analogon signifies a radically different orientation from that involved in perception or cognition. External objects may become the props for the imagination at any time. In these instances, we can recognize, says Sartre, that:

\begin{quote}
The two worlds, the imaginary and the real, are constituted by the same objects; only the grouping and the interpretation of these objects varies. What defines the imaginary world, as with the real universe, is an attitude of consciousness.\textsuperscript{39}
\end{quote}

Therefore, Sartre approaches the imaginary as an elemental state. In this book he does not discuss imagined fictional worlds, but is concerned with the moment at which consciousness summons an imaginary object. As already indicated he is keen
to outline the limitations of this act: how it cannot compete with the world’s complexity. It is as if one imagined object followed by another is like a jerky film in which continuity does not completely work. For Sartre, transformation of imagined objects and people is a precarious business in which consciousness intervenes and may not be able to realise its full intentions.  

Discontinuity and emotional projection in the imaginary

An example which Sartre provides to illustrate the fragmented, discontinuous nature of the imagination comes in his response to Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s claim that he could ‘produce a flower as a bud, make it grow, blossom, open, close, shed its petals, etc.’ Sartre replies to this claim:

Without doubt, one can indeed make a top hat appear, and also the figure of Pierre. Perhaps one sees them simultaneously, perhaps one can even see Pierre’s face below the top hat. But what one can never see as imaged is the effect of a top hat on Pierre’s face... For Sartre, the actions of the imagination have to be complemented by reflection to achieve unity, and he backs this up by referring to the way a painter will step back from his work to observe it from a different perspective.

Further on, Sartre takes up another example, which concerns desire. Mental images of food may respond to the desire to eat and reinforce this desire. Sartre argues that we should not make the mistake, which he attributes to the illusion of immanence, to believe that the hunger stems from the images of food. These images resulted from the hunger. Hunger brought the imaginary food into the mind. The consequent images are a medium for this desire. They are determined subjectively and should not be regarded as even a secondary cause of the hunger. Also, we should note that there are secondary, emotional, responses to the imaginary. In these responses affective schemata come to the fore simply as a result of a second-hand account of a particular event. This is evident in another example, which Sartre gives: when someone responds to hearing of a terrible event by exclaiming their distress but the emotion is unconvincing. Again Sartre’s emphasis is on an example where subjectivity dominates the response of the individual and constitutes how they take up a particular imaginary scenario.
Sartre accepts that the imaginary can have a transformative effect on the emotional element that constituted it:

One could not therefore deny that my hunger, my sexual desire, my disgust underwent a significant modification while passing through the imaging state. They were concentrated, made more precise, and their intensity increased.  

Sartre’s account of the way emotion works in imagination is closely tied to his view of the way emotion works in perception. He argues, in relation to the latter, that we may project feelings on to an object through perception. He then suggests that we may have the impression of these feelings being caused by the object, so the emotion appears to be confirmed by the external source. This exchange between emotional projection and the object of perception can become an elaborate pattern of exchange back and forth: ‘each affective quality is so deeply incorporated in the object that it is impossible to distinguish between what is felt and what is perceived.’ With the imaginary object, however, emotion is projected on to something which is fundamentally empty so that, according to Sartre, the irreal object can become simply the reflection of the subject’s feeling: ‘Feeling therefore feeds on its own reflection.’

Thus, Sartre’s account of the imaginary ultimately recognises how external phenomena influence the content of imaginary experiences. Yet he does not seek to invoke a definitive set of causes or sustain a surreal idea of the imaginary as a completely spontaneous mode of consciousness. Instead, he focuses on the phenomena and experience which reveal emotion intersecting with imaginary content. Sartre also approaches the issue of how we may be gripped by an imaginary experience despite its unreality and suggests that psychological knowledge can inform our understanding of extreme states of delusion where the imaginary takes over. I will return to this point shortly in the chapter in considering Stawarska’s commentary on The Imaginary.

The conclusion of the Imaginary
In the conclusion Sartre reiterates his central point. Referring again to his mental
images of Pierre in a different location he states that: ‘This fundamental absence, this essential nothingness of the imaged object, suffices to differentiate it from the objects of perception.’ Sartre also spells out his opposition to a deterministic form of psychology: ‘For consciousness to be able to imagine, it must be able to escape from the world by its very nature, it must be able to stand back from the world by its own efforts. In a word, it must be free.’ He spells out the philosophical consequences of his arguments so far and starts to apply this work to questions raised in aesthetics (although he insists that the latter requires a book of its own). For Sartre imagination is a continuous possibility. He suggests that imagination is a ‘surpassing’ of the ‘real’ and compares his thinking here with Heidegger’s use of the concept of ‘surpassing’. Thus, imagination does not enter into nothingness, but must reduce the real to a temporary nothingness in order to bring forward the content that was previously absent. Returning to an example discussed earlier, he argues that our imagination becomes active in the face of a portrait when we use the material and formal aspects of the portrait to reach the subject who is not there. This means that if some aspect of present empirical reality changes, such as a change of light in the room where I look at the portrait, this has no impact on the nature of the imaginary object. The latter is determined by my consciousness of the formal intentions that I read as the work.

Thus, Sartre argues that in his enjoyment of a particular symphony the imaginary object remains the same despite different performances. For example, he might judge a poor performance of the symphony as a less successful ‘analogon’ (to use Sartre’s term) of how he imagines the symphony.

Does one not clearly see that the performance of the Seventh Symphony is its analogon. It can be manifested only through analogons that are dated and that unfurl in our time. But in order to grasp it on these analogons, it is necessary to operate the imaging reduction, which is to say, apprehend precisely the real sounds as analogons. It is therefore given as a perpetual elsewhere, a perpetual absence. We must not picture it (as does Spandrell in Huxley’s Point Counter Point - as do so many Platonists) such that it exists in another world, in an intelligible heaven.

For Sartre, our imagined symphony is more than the symphony performed in the present, but the former is wedded to the latter. One could say the present symphony cues us for the imaginary. The value of art is undisputed. It gives expression to the
Commentary on Sartre’s philosophy of imagination

In evaluating Sartre’s argument Mary Warnock makes the point that we may feel he has simply dressed up what we know from common sense:

it might be objected, there is nothing very surprising in the conclusion that imagination differs from perception in that the objects of the latter are real while those of the former are not. 52

However Warnock defends the originality of Sartre’s work:

Imagination has been redefined. All the definitions which made it a kind of thinking, or a kind of peering at mental entities called images, have been rejected. It has been redefined as the mode of consciousness of an object, …which entails the bringing into fleeting existence of an appearance which fades at once to nothingness. And this is significant for Sartre, just because he has already more than half formed the concept of human nature which is expounded in Being and Nothingness, and which turns essentially on the possibility of projecting what is not the case….Man’s ability to imagine things, which, of course, was never in doubt, is now shown to be connected, in its essence, with his ability to choose. 53

Flynn indicates Sartre’s innovation in giving imagination a stronger role than envisaged by Husserl, so the emphasis on intentionality becomes wedded to a recognition of the distinctive roles of imagination:

…the image is not a ‘thing,’ not even a mental thing, but a form of consciousness, a way of being present to the world. This way is called ‘intentionality’ by Husserl and his followers in the phenomenological movement. Sartre never questioned the claim that consciousness is characteristically other-referring, that it ‘intends’ an object in its every act. Where he augmented the Husserlian thesis was his account of the way consciousness ‘intends’ its objects imaginatively (as distinct from perceptively or emotively).54

This clarifies how Sartre goes beyond Husserl and is suggestive of the sense in which imagination can dominate consciousness in its deepest work.
However, there is also considerable doubt in commentaries on *The Imaginary* about whether Sartre convincingly develops Husserl’s ideas. Stawarska focuses on the concept of the analogon as an essential element that requires revision if Sartre’s account of imagination is to succeed. Stawarska argues that Sartre was decisively influenced by Husserl. This is manifest in Sartre’s discussion of the flute playing centaur, and Albrecht Durer’s engraving of ‘The Knight, Death and the Devil’, both images discussed previously by Husserl. As Stawarska points out, Husserl used the latter as an example of the way an object can be ‘apprehended’ through ‘normal perception’ or ‘aesthetic contemplation’. As Stawaska explains, Sartre believes that Durer’s picture ‘can be aligned with an act of pure fantasy’ such as imagining a flute playing centaur, in that both acts consist of intentionally animating some content, which may be mental or physical. We have seen how Sartre uses other examples to make this point.

Stawarska is persuaded that this ‘unitary’ theory of imagination (images and external pictures together in a unified theory) is problematic. He describes it as a picture theory of imagination and describes how Husserl decided that he could not maintain this perspective. The problem occurs in equating the mental representation with the physical object of the picture. As Stawaska puts it:

> In fantasy it is impossible to distinguish a picture thing from the picture-subject it represents, and so it is difficult see how the internal function can serve the symbolic function at all.

This doubt is extended later as Stawarska contends that there is a crucial difference between our image of a person or thing which is absent and our image of something like a mythical creature which we know has no real existence. As Stawarska puts it:

> A centaur cannot be absent (nor present) since it does not belong to the class of things posited as existent. This being so, the centaur (and any other fictional being) can no longer be argued to function as a referent of a picture representing something *absent*, and consciousness imagining a centaur cannot be mapped onto the consciousness of a picture representing an external referent or an ‘original’.

Stawarska argues, in effect, that Sartre’s account of the imaginary has serious
problems in taking account of fiction because it relies on a picture theory of imagination; and this theory retains the dependence of the imaginary on a referent which can be grasped through perception. We can agree with this criticism, to an extent, because it is notable how perceptual experience through memory was not eclipsed by the examples of the image of the absent Pierre and the caricature of Chevalier. These examples may lead us to suspect that Sartre has not escaped the idea that imagination is ultimately derivative in relation to perception. Nevertheless, Stawarska believes that Sartre’s account can support the idea of the imagination as an autonomous activity distinct from perception, but the basis for this is developed through the section where Sartre discusses the pathology of imagination.

In this section Sartre aims to show how we can discriminate between different types of imaginary experience, which include dreaming and hallucinations. Stawarska emphasises how Sartre draws on Pierre Janet to conceptualise these forms of imagining as obsessive, in which awareness of reality is lost. Janet focussed on patients where obsession involved a ‘dimishment of the reality function’. Thus, Stawarska elicits from Sartre’s text that imagination depends on an attitude of belief, in which I believe temporarily in the existence of the imagined world, whilst knowing that it is imaginary. Dreaming and hallucination differ from reading fiction in that they fail to expose the unreality of the imagined scenario. Obsession becomes a pathological instance of the imaginary. This account fits with Sartre’s theory as already outlined, which included a sense of the imagination’s limitations as well as its capacity. It ties Sartre’s phenomenological analysis in with aesthetics where the suspension of disbelief is a key idea that parallels Sartre’s emphasis on a knowing engagement with the unreal.

One of the problems Stawarska’s intervention exposes is that of converting Sartre’s insights into an aesthetic theory. To analyse the imagination of texts and narratives we need to go beyond the idea these are the product of a distinct mode of consciousness. In his work on the pathology of imagination Sartre shows himself to be aware of this problem. When Sartre discusses how hallucinations and dreaming may be distinguished from perception he recognises how in pathological imagination there is a disintegration of subjectivity. Discussing hallucination as something comparable to obsession, Sartre writes:
The hallucination therefore bears a resemblance to the obsession up to a certain point: in both consciousness is attracted by the idea that it can produce a certain object. Only, in the case of the hallucinator, a very important modification has surfaced: disintegration.\(^6^2\)

Extrapolating from this we might say that Sartre allows that the imagination in art can produce something of the power that we find in a hallucination, but it will be distinguished because through the conventions of art, including suspension of disbelief, the artist and the reader find meaning in the work and, thus overcome the possibility of disintegration inherent in the work of imagination. Sartre’s discussion of dreaming becomes an important element in his move towards a theory which can accommodate narrative. He accepts that the dream presents a different type of example because of story form ‘Due to the fact that the dream makes us suddenly enter into a temporal world, every dream is given to us as a story.’\(^6^3\) Speaking of the ‘spatio-temporal universe’ of the dream, Sartre states:

> To tell the truth, it is not even imaged, in the sense in which consciousness imagines when it presentifies something through an analogon. It is, as imaginary world, the correlate of a belief, the dreamer believes that the scene unfurls in a world; that is to say, the world is the object of empty intentions that are directed on it starting from the central image.\(^6^4\)

Here, Sartre acknowledges that, while the analogon (in the form of a mental image) may be the cue for an imaginary world, the latter elaborates from the initial imagined content. We should also remember here, that Sartre discusses the process of reading as one in which words on the page are the analogon for the production of an imaginary universe:

> Reading is a kind of fascination, and when I read a detective story I believe in what I read. But this does not signify in the least that I cease to hold the detective’s adventures to be imaginary. Simply, an entire world appears to me as imaged through the lines of the book (I have already shown that words serve as an analogon) and this world encloses my consciousness, I cannot disengage, I am fascinated by it.\(^6^5\)

Here Sartre acknowledges that the reader’s involvement in an imaginary world calls on more than the imaginary attitude. The relevance of Janet’s theory of obsession as
explained by Stawarska is that it shows what happens when the imaginary takes over from other mental operations.

Sartre is interested in exploring the boundary between pathological forms of imagination and those controlled by the suspension of disbelief. This is apparent for instance through his novel *Nausea*, in which the narrator Roquentin becomes preoccupied with the way his perception can be transformed through subjectivity. We can conclude, therefore, that when Sartre wrote *The Imaginary* he did not successfully clarify how such ambiguity bears on a theory of art. It is also unclear whether he trusts in the imaginary to produce a deeper awareness of social reality. Mészáros points to the tension in Sartre’s early work, indicating how Sartre tries to maintain the idea of imagination as inherently related to freedom and as at the same time a mode of consciousness that is situated ‘in the midst of the world’:

> On the one hand he wants to assert the complete freedom and its vital negating function. On the other hand, he is very much concerned with showing that consciousness...cannot possibly construct another world than exactly the one in which we happen to live. Of course, this is a most uneasy solution that constantly oscillates between the extreme poles of total indeterminacy, and its diametrical opposite: the massive contingency, facticity, ‘absurdity’ and absolute giveness of the ‘things in the world’, with all their iron determinations.66

While we can agree with Mészáros, it can also be noted here how fiction offers a solution to the problem identified in Sartre’s work. If the power of imagination is delegated to characters, the author can reveal the tension between their capacity for freedom and the constraints of their surrounding world. Further to this, the author himself /or herself can seek to situate his or her perspective in the imaginary world in a way that parallels the contingency of the characters. This demonstrates the artifice of fiction, but extends the idea of the imaginary as a unique mode of consciousness to include representation of the interaction between consciousness and the world. Although Mészáros does not discuss this argument, he acknowledges that Sartre’s commitment to the tension between freedom and determinism allowed his fiction and drama to present, in imaginary form, acute contradictions from his own social context. Mészáros also sees in Sartre’s early work a commitment and tension that is apparent in his subsequent philosophy.67
A comparable understanding of Sartre is also apparent in some other contributions, which relate *The Imaginary* to his later work. Writing generally about the philosophical legacy of existentialism, Peter Rickman claims that the two key legacies of this movement are: 1) its emphasis on the relevance of philosophy to daily life and; 2) the emphasis on ‘the uniqueness of individuals’. Using Sartre as an example, alongside Kierkegaard, Rickman maintains these two reasons explain the close relationship between existentialism and literature which provides the resources for exploration of both these concerns: ‘Over and above offering formal criteria and frameworks for reflection we can conjure up individualised models, or types of life, and the imaginative exploration of their implications.’

Rickman’s argument reinforces the significance of the imaginary in a broad sense for existentialism. Returning more specifically to Sartre’s theory of imagination, we find that that an element that has been highly valued is that of ‘negation’ or ‘nihilation’. The power of imagination, to render reality as ‘nothingness’, has been regarded as the key to his philosophy of freedom. As Flynn puts it

…that ‘othering’ feature of the imaging act gives the imaginer a certain power to suspend the actual in the possible as an exercise of freedom and to ‘hollow’, as Foucault might say, the plenum of the ‘in-itself’ with lack.

Flynn duly recognises how Sartre’s philosophy can be used to challenge a restrictive notion of art based on resemblance, distinguishing Francesco Guardi’s paintings of Venice from those of Giovanni Canaletto because the former provide a sense of Venice that transcends perceptual experience. Flynn also argues that the idea of the imaginary plays a part in Sartre’s ‘Existentialism is a Humanism’ noting how the text has been criticised for its introduction of the Kantian philosophy of a universal morality. Flynn then suggests that Sartre’s version of this argument is carried by his ‘appeal to ‘the image’ of the kind of person we think we should be when we make a moral choice.’ Thus, Flynn argues that Sartre’s turn towards greater social commitment is accompanied by his philosophy of the imaginary quoting ‘Existentialism is a Humanism’ as follows: ‘I create a certain image of the man I choose; choosing myself I choose man.’ Flynn duly acknowledges that Sartre recognises a dialectical relationship between imagination and perception, but notes
the continuing efficacy afforded the imagination in Sartre’s literary biographies. Sartre, in these works, showed how Flaubert, Jean Genet and Charles Baudelaire rebel against oppressive circumstances through their use of imagination.⁷⁴

The relevance of Sartre’s philosophy of imagination to his other work

The examples from Flynn indicate how Sartre’s account of psychological processes behind imagination is complemented by his other work. There is only the space here to consider a few further points from Sartre’s oeuvre but this remains necessary as a context for applying his theory of imagination to cinema and Bergman. In *The Transcendence of the Ego* Sartre argued against the idea that the ego is a fixed object-like entity.⁷⁵ This led him to challenge even Husserl whose theory included the concept a transcendent ego. For Sartre, phenomenology had to recognise how the ego is continually recreated from the flow of an impersonal consciousness. Similarly in *Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions*, Sartre criticises psychologists who talk of emotions as purely physical manifestations, and questions the idea of emotions as fixed states.⁷⁶ For Sartre, emotions are bound up with consciousness and as such reveal the intentions of the subjects in relation to reality. This view is repeated in *Being and Nothingness* when Sartre states:

…the empirical psychologist, while defining man by his desires, remains the victim of the illusion of substance. He views desire as being in man by virtue of being ‘contained’ by his consciousness, and he believes that the meaning of the desire is inherent in the desire itself. Thus he avoids everything which could evoke the idea of transcendence.⁷⁷

Sartre’s determination to resist fixed programmatic accounts of the self, imagination and emotions has been interpreted by some as a forerunner of post-structuralism. We saw that he notes the way imaginary experiences resist continuity in a complex form, and how hallucinations were differentiated from perceptions because they signalled the disintegration of subjectivity.⁷⁸ However, Sartre is keen to maintain the reality of the individual as an integrated unit. His vision of the fragility of individual identity is developed extensively in *Being and Nothingness*, but elements of this work suggest that total dismantling of subjectivity is not the aim. As noted earlier internal negation is at the heart of Sartre’s philosophy in *Being and Nothingness* so that subjectivity is inherently liable to division, but still can be understood as a coherent unit.⁷⁹
The intricate balance between a deconstructive approach and one that maintains a sense of the individual as a coherent unit is present in Sartre’s, well-known, discussion of bad faith in *Being and Nothingness*. Sartre’s examples of bad faith include the example of a woman who leaves her hand intertwined with that of a flirtatious man, despite her indecision about responding to his seductions. She engages the man’s potential to speak in a high-minded form of love. As Sartre puts it:

She draws her companion up to the most lofty regions of sentimental speculation…And during this time the divorce of the body from the soul is accomplished; the hand rests inert between the warm hands of her companion - neither consenting nor resisting - a thing.  

This example shows how bad faith involves refusing the possibility of choice such that the body, or in this case a part of the body, appears to signify a final decision which has not actually been made. In this sense the hand becomes object-like because it fails to represent the uncertainty and continuing evolution of the woman’s consciousness in relation to her suitor. Another famous example concerns the waiter who Sartre describes in evocative terms. According to Sartre, the waiter fails to express his freedom as consciousness ‘for-itself’: ‘He applies himself to chaining his movements as if they were mechanisms… he gives himself the quickness and pitiless rapidity of things.’ The waiter seeks to give his role the substance that Sartre reserves for being ‘in-itself’. As we know, for Sartre consciousness can never coincide with being ‘in-itself’ and thus, as Sartre observes, the waiter’s movements, Sartre recognises the intentionality, the striving for definition: ‘He is playing, he is amusing himself. But what is he playing? We need not watch long before we can explain it: he is playing at being a waiter in a café.’

Sartre’s examples read like intensely imagined, literary or cinematic, episodes. We may see the woman’s hand in close-up, and we may imagine the waiter as a clearly defined character of the subplot. At the philosophical level, Sartre goes beyond the particular. He wants to show how these individual moments signify insights into the human situation in general. We are meant to recognise the possibility that humans in any situation may conceal their freedom through objectification of the body. As Sartre’s account of the relations between self and other indicates, this objectification
can be projected on to someone else. In any situation a person may seek to limit their freedom through fastidious playing of a particular role or dogmatic adherence to a fixed identity. Sartre compares the waiter’s situation to that of a child who plays a game. For Sartre, the waiter ‘plays with his body in order to realize it’; he also compares the waiter’s situation to that of many different jobs in which the public are served ranging from the grocer to the soldier.\textsuperscript{83}

As Gary Cox highlights, Sartre is not simply discussing self-deception but rather understanding how an individual may constrain his or her freedom through self-definition.\textsuperscript{84} The example is complicated, as Cox points out, because the waiter could conceivably be understood as transcending bad faith. This is because he knowingly plays his role. For Sartre, bad faith can be overcome but only when we attain awareness of the tension between our freedom to choose and the resistance provided by the external world. Sartre also focuses on how this tension emerges in potentially intersubjective situations. Looking at the waiter Sartre becomes aware that he can only become like the waiter if he recognises the waiter’s imaginary representation of himself. Describing the waiter’s performance Sartre says: ‘It is a “representation” for others and for myself, which means that I can be he only in representation.’\textsuperscript{85} Thus, the waiter becomes an analogue animated by Sartre’s intention to imagine himself as a waiter:

\begin{quote}
I can be he only in the neutralised mode, as the actor is Hamlet, by mechanically making the typical gestures of my state and by aiming at myself as an imaginary café waiter through those gestures taken as an ‘analogue.’\textsuperscript{86}
\end{quote}

Sartre draws on his earlier work on the imagination, using the concept of the analogue/analogon and figuring in imagination as a mode of consciousness essential to both the waiter and the empathic onlooker. Sartre regards understanding of the other as a process potentially imbued with dramatic role-play, a process defined by movement and creation. This contrasts with an account of the relationship between self and other which relies on fixed roles or identities, but Sartre’s account is also at odds with a nihilistic sense of complete disintegration in meaningful human relations.

Sartre gives centre stage to a vision of emotion caught up in the flux of
consciousness. In *Being and Nothingness* Sartre gives a special place to anguish as a response to the realisation of the freedom of the ‘for-itself’. He argues that his ideas are in accordance with the work of Kierkegaard and Heidegger, and the idea of anguish at which he arrives through these thinkers is distinguished from fear. In anguish, we turn towards the self. Anguish accompanies the recognition that either in the future or in the past we hold responsibility for our decisions. The centrality given to this can be compared to the Kleinian focus on moderating the anxiety of the paranoid-schizoid phase through mourning and melancholy in the depressive phase. Anguish in this sense has constructive potential. Christine Daigle argues convincingly that Sartre’s representation of anguish involves understanding this emotion in opposition to bad faith. If bad faith is a denial of one’s own freedom, anguish represents an advance because it involves recognition of this freedom. Daigle indicates that Sartre’s account of the relationship between bad faith and anguish reveals a movement towards an ethical philosophy of authenticity. Sartre recognises that emotions and consciousness are interdependent and inseparable from human relations.

Sartre’s analysis of the relations between self and other is complemented by the development of a more dialectical conception of imagination, which is resistant to metaphysics, in his post-war work. In Sartre’s post-war treatise *What is Literature?*, based on his articles in *Les Temps Modernes*, he envisages literature as a relationship between writer and reader. In this, he rejects the Kantian idea of art as ‘finality without end’ in favour of the more circumscribed notion of literature as a relationship between two creators: the reader and writer. In the Kantian philosophy the reader has the freedom to play through their experience of the artist’s creativity, but in Sartre’s revision of this, the reader has a responsibility to recreate the imaginative world suggested through the art work. He writes:

…the Kantian expression ‘finality without end’ seems to me quite inappropriate for designating the work of art. In fact, it implies that the aesthetic object presents only the appearance of a finality and is limited to soliciting the free and ordered play of the imagination. It forgets that the imagination of the spectator has not only a regulating function, but a constitutive one. It does not play; it is called upon to recompose the beautiful object beyond the traces left by the artist. The imagination cannot revel ‘in-itself’ any more than can the other functions of the mind; it is always on the outside, always engaged in an
Sartre’s conception of the reciprocal relationship between artist and reader is supplemented by his emphasis in *What is Literature?* on the need for a historically informed self-awareness of the artist’s identity. Sartre provides an overview of historical developments in French literature. There is not the space here to examine this account apart from three points that overlap with the concerns of Bergman and Klein. Firstly, Sartre argues that his generation has been deeply marked by the horrors of Fascism and the concentration camps. He writes: ‘Satan, Maritain once said, is pure. Pure, that is, without mixture and without remission. We have learned to know this horrible, this irreducible purity.’ Sartre goes on to talk about torture but the key point theoretically is that Sartre recognises how the horrors of the Second World War challenge the idea of a recuperative, redemptive dialectic. Like the recognition of the death drive by Klein and the underlying sense of negativity in *Wild Strawberries* and *The Seventh Seal*, a malignant force is identified by Sartre as a part of human nature. However, secondly, he stresses that the agenda for his generation involves reflecting on the contingency and uncertainty of their situation:

In short, if we wished to give an account of our age, we had to make the technique of the novel shift from Newtonian mechanics to generalized relativity; we had to people our books with minds that were half lucid and half overcast, some of which we might consider with more sympathy than others, but none of which would have a privileged point of view either upon the event or upon itself.

Thus, Sartre is inspired by the idea of locating meaning in the midst of the world. This also applies to Klein’s immersion in the relationship between the individual and external reality through the medium of phantasy. Thirdly, Sartre retains a belief in progress, which depends on a creative negativity that transcends the destructive forces in the human situation:

In so far as literature is negative it will challenge the alienation of work; in so far as it is a creation and an act of surpassing, it will present man as *creative action*. It will go along with him in his effort to pass beyond his present alienation towards a better situation.
What is Literature? like ‘Existentialism is a Humanism’ expresses Sartre’s constructive optimism after World War Two, but both works also draw productively on his pre-war philosophising about the imagination and contingency.

Sartre and Cinema
Little has been written explicitly and at length about Sartre’s ideas in relation to the cinema. An initial scepticism about the relevance of Sartre’s ideas to film studies is suggested by two specific comments. The first is from Giles Deleuze, who notes how Sartre’s book on The Imaginary does not include an account of films:

As for Husserl, as far as we know, he never mentions the cinema at all (it is noteworthy that Sartre too, much later, in making an inventory and analysis of all kinds of images in The Imagination, does not cite the cinematographic image). 96

The second sceptical point about Sartre’s relevance to film, that I wish to highlight, is made by Eric Rohmer:

Bazin introduced a new metaphysical dimension (we can use the word, as he did so himself, though at the same time he was careful not to play the philosopher) or if one prefers, a phenomenological approach. Sartre’s influence was, as he said, a decisive factor in his career. We can admire the disciple’s subsequent independence from his teacher. 97

The quotation from Rohmer acknowledges, at least, that there is a line of influence from Sartre to film theory through the work of André Bazin. This is a development discussed by Dudley Andrew in his book on Bazin. Andrew explicitly emphasises the role of the ideas in The Imaginary:

…the book that changed Bazin’s whole cast of mind, a book that he bought immediately and underlined heavily, was the 1940 study called The Psychology of the Imagination. This book provided the final foundation block for Bazin’s theory of film. 98

As Andrew spells out, the basis for the influence of this book on Bazin was Sartre’s account of the special place of art, as an autonomous activity of the imagination. For Rohmer, concern with cinematic specificity is the advance signified by Bazin and
neo-realism. However, Sartre is not prepared to essentialise the nature of cinema, something, which Rohmer and Bazin appear to do in different ways. Taking Bazin as an example, we can see that the unique qualities of cinema are given special status over other forms of imagination. For example, at certain points in his essay, ‘Theatre and Cinema - Part Two’, he conveys the idea that the theatre audience and the film spectator are radically different because of the different forms involved:

> Illusion in the cinema is not based as it is in the theater on convention tacitly accepted by the general public; rather, contrariwise, it is based on the inalienable realism of that which is shown. All trick work must be perfect in all material respects on the screen. The ‘invisible man’ must wear pyjamas and smoke a cigarette.\(^9\)

Here, Bazin appears to make assumptions about both the theatre audience and the conventions adopted by film-makers, arguing that cinematic illusion has a more inherent connection with reality. At other points, however, Bazin openly acknowledges the limitations of realism and enthuses about the way theatre and film can be creatively combined.\(^1\)

Dudley Andrew casts some light on the question of how Bazin deviated from Sartre. He states:

> Sartre’s ideas pose a great problem for the photographic arts because, in his view, all image-making must be the intentional act of consciousness, whereas photographs can be snapped automatically.\(^2\)

And two pages later Andrew adds: ‘Sartre had said that beauty is an attribute only of the imagination and not of the world, but the naturalist in Bazin could not accept this.’\(^3\)

We have seen enough of the tensions in Sartre’s theory and the apparent contradictions in Bazin’s work to see that Andrew’s summary is not complete. For Sartre, imagination involves engagement with the world, while Bazin thinks that cinema has a special ability to communicate the world’s beauty. The idea that Bazin corrects Sartre’s subjectivism seems to mask the philosophical limitations of Bazin’s work. This is most apparent when Bazin insists on the inherent relationship between cinema as a medium and realism. Consider, for instance, Bazin’s belief in the special
properties of cinema in the following quotation from *The Ontology of the Photographic Image*:

The objective nature of photography confers on it a quality of credibility absent from all other forms of picture making. In spite of any objections our critical spirit may offer, we are forced to accept as real the existence of the object reproduced, actually re-presented, set before us, in time and space. Photography enjoys a certain advantage in virtue of this transference of reality from the thing to its reproduction.”

Admittedly there is a marked comparison between Bazin and Sartre in the idea of film as a material process that allows imaginative engagement with external reality. The medium provides access to a transcendent apprehension of the real. However, we saw that various issues are raised by Sartre’s concept of the analogon - most significantly that it threatened to turn the object of imagination into an object directly caused by external reality and dependent on perception. Bazin appears to make cinema this kind of object. Sartre, on the other hand, accentuates the otherness of imagination.

Through his emphasis on negativity Sartre signals the tension between reality and imagination. For Sartre, imagination is a different mode of consciousness, which suggests that it is more compatible with anti-realism, magic realism or an overtly subjective expressionist aesthetic. Nevertheless, we do not have to go this far in marking a divergence from Bazin. We have seen the situation is not simple because in Sartre’s philosophy imagination is not sovereign, but plays a role along with perception, emotion and cognition. Ultimately, the imaginary is situated within a social context. Whilst art is valued as a prime instance of imaginative work, we also find the imagination playing a part in daily life. The significance attributed to imagination and the abstraction accorded to it through the concept of the analogon does not pave the way for a celebration of art for art’s sake, Sartre’s insistence on imagination as an integral and distinct attitude of consciousness means that ambiguity is a necessary quality of consciousness, and not the preserve of one art form or indeed an elite artist with special gifts. Bergman, we might say, has this status, but the parallels between the foregrounding of imagination in Bergman’s
work and Sartre’s passionately democratic philosophy of imagination are revealed by looking at *The Seventh Seal*, the film which really established Bergman’s reputation as an allegorical film-maker.

**The Seventh Seal**

A number of critics find in *The Seventh Seal* a range of ideas that they consider existential. Sarris, for instance, relates the film to the fashionable interest of the 1950s in the ‘the anguished self-consciousness of Kierkegard and Nietzsche’. Sarris suggests that: Bergman’s depiction of a church painter and his representations of death

   typifies Bergman’s concern with the role of art in transcending the existential limits of life.

The idea that Bergman is influenced by existentialism is also expressed in Birgitta Steene’s analysis. Steene’s piece is aptly titled ‘*The Seventh Seal* : An Existential Vision’. She notes that the film opens by depicting the isolation of the knight and Jöns, his squire, and the way the direction incorporates religious references: starting with a sound track of a church choir, the opening scene also includes a voice reading ‘a brief passage from the Revelation of St John the Divine’, but the knight ‘fails to understand its message’. So, the film draws on Bergman’s knowledge and interest in Christian scripture, but also, as Steene shows, at various levels the film subjects the certainties of Christian faith to imaginative uncertainty. This is apparent in the style of the film which resembles ‘a medieval allegory’. As Steene points out Bergman subverts this form through the emphasis on ‘doubt’ and the absence of ‘an orderly universe’, whilst the redeeming power of God is replaced by a sense of God as ‘enigma’. She argues that:

   the knight and his squire complement each other, and depict the sceptic personality facing a world where God is silent: one in futile introspection, the other in gallant action. They do not offer an alternative. All the film seems to say is that some people can live without illusions and still function as useful social beings, while others succumb to their need to believe and lose themselves in a search for God.

Steene adds:
Yet, both the knight and Jöns are conceived as moral agents, and in this ambivalence Bergman establishes his affinity with existentialist philosophy and its tenet that we must live as though we had free will.\footnote{111}

Other critics have considered whether or not Bergman transcends the bleakness of Sartre’s existentialism. Robert Lauder, for example, explicitly accounts for Bergman’s 1968 film \textit{Shame} using Sartre’s ideas, but argues that the \textit{The Seventh Seal}, despite its similarities with \textit{Shame}, offers an alternative because it includes a sense of hope through the representation of the family of travelling artists as a symbol of the Holy Family, and the significance of the knight’s relationship to this family.\footnote{112} Lauder is not alone in pondering Bergman’s relationship to Sartrean philosophy from a position which perceives the latter as overly pessimistic, if not as nihilistic. Jesse Kalin, for instance, entertains the idea that Bergman’s work can be compared to Sartre, and then goes on to argue that there is a decisive difference. Kalin insists that there are differences, at least of degree, in the way the two authors approach freedom and morality:

\begin{quote}
First, certainly in \textit{The Flies}, Sartre describes, and advocates, a conversion - to truth, to responsibility, to authenticity. But in existentialist texts it is never clear that this is more than a formal commitment to freedom as such, more than acting in the terrible awareness of the utter groundlessness (arbitrariness, absurdity) of one’s situation and choice….For Bergman, there is good and evil in the world, in its (our) very nature. One’s second chance is not just (or really) for an ‘authentic’ life but for a better one, in which one becomes a better person.\footnote{113}
\end{quote}

Kalin’s argument provides an interesting platform for contrast and comparison of Bergman and Sartre in terms of ethics, but in relation to \textit{The Seventh Seal} I will focus on whether there is a comparison with Sartre’s ideas of imagination. We must start with Bergman’s reflections on the film in \textit{Images: My Life in Film}. The title of this book immediately suggests a point of comparison. Bergman reveals in relation to a range of his films how particular mental images inspired him. With \textit{The Seventh Seal} he remembers how the film was based on a one-act play \textit{Wood Painting}, which he wrote as a teacher for drama students before he became a film-maker. Bergman says that this play was based on ‘visual memories from my childhood.’\footnote{114} He recalls how
as a child he was captivated by images in his father’s country church, a point that Steene emphasised. Quoting his earlier autobiography he says ‘Like all churchgoers have at times, I let my mind wander as I contemplated the altarpieces, triptychs, crucifixes, stained-glass windows and murals.’ These images led him to the images of *The Seventh Seal* including the knight playing chess with Death. Bergman goes on to mention music that inspired the film, Carl Orff’s *Carmina Burana*, itself ‘inspired by medieval songs written by minstrels …, during the years of the plague and the bloody wars...’ We should also note Bergman’s comments on the presentation of Death. Bergman describes the decision to represent Death as an unusual hybrid, a risky move, which succeeded: ‘Bengt Ekerot and I agreed that Death should have the features of a white clown. An amalgamation of a clown mask and skull.’ In particular this was a victory for the idea of eliciting imaginative vision from the audience. But perhaps, as with Sartre’s example of the caricature and the portrait, part of the fascination lies in the ambiguity of the image, the fact that the imaginative apprehension teeters on the edge of a more mundane perception. It is not just interest in ambiguity which suggests a comparison between the two authors. Looking at the initial scenes of the film we find key ideas from Sartre’s study of the imagination are applicable. There is a sense that images have an independent power but also a play on the representation of the unseen and absent is central to the film’s creative development.

*The Seventh Seal* represents a range of characters, but centres on a knight and his squire returning to Sweden after the Crusades. The initial shots reveal how Bergman foregrounds imagery and symbolism before establishing the narrative. Momentous music begins, whilst the screen is still black, before orchestrating the dramatic appearance of the sunlight as a distinct compositional element. The first shot depicts a startling patch of sunlight amidst the cloudy skyscape, whilst the second shows a bird of prey hovering, a suggestion of death below. This mise-en-scene hints at symbolic meaning to be revealed later while an anonymous male voice reads from *Revelations*.

Drawing on the Sartrean study of imagination we can say that the film invites the audience to enter an imaginary world in which their perception is merely the
preliminary process before arriving at a fully imaginative attitude of consciousness. The film already suggests that a meaning will be attributed to this engagement with something beyond perception through the authority of a religious textual citation. However, as the narrative begins with the introduction of the knight Antonius Block and Jöns, his squire, the ambiguity of the relationship between the real world and the imaginary is maintained. The characters themselves experience and demonstrate this dichotomy giving the audience an omniscient perspective on the relationship between the imaginary and reality in the diegetic world. The interest in the subjectivity of both characters is prepared by their first appearance sleeping on a beach. Without representing their dreams, a dreamlike atmosphere is set up by the representation of their drowsiness. The idea that the knight has access to an imaginative dimension is suggested, because when Death suddenly appears before him on the beach as a figure in a black cape, this is registered as a private experience. The squire is still asleep. In the initial conversation with Death, the knight testifies to the strength of his mind over his body, refusing to submit to the idea that he must immediately accept his own demise. The idea of an ambiguous overlap of different realities is presented through the image of a chess set beside the knight, which later in the scene is superimposed over the image of the sea in the background. This condenses the narrative idea of the knight’s contest with Death - they will play chess to determine whether the knight can avoid his own death - but at a more philosophical level this image emphasises the juxtaposition of the knight’s subjective world (it is a private contest) and the external world shared with the squire and the other characters which, in this case, is represented by nature (the sea). The knight’s subjective visions are not, however, the only manifestation of an imaginary dimension. In the following scene, as he rides with Jöns, the latter stops to approach a hooded figure only to be confronted with a skull. They are riding through a land plagued by death, but in reporting his meeting with the skull Jöns adopts a metaphorical perspective telling the knight that the gentleman was most eloquent in his speech despite his silence. This draws attention again to the imagery of death. Throughout the film it is clear that Jöns represents a materialistic perspective in contrast to the knight’s preoccupation with the enigma of God’s silence, but right here at the beginning of the story, we recognise that Bergman references the squire’s imagination as well as that of the knight. For Jöns, the skull means that he can imagine a gruesome death and has a sense of the horror in the society to which they
Next we are introduced to the troupe of performers asleep in their caravan in a tranquil sunlit setting. When Jof, father and juggler, awakes he enjoys alone his vision of the Virgin Mary playing with her child. Jof’s seduction by this vision is conveyed as he rubs his eyes in disbelief and then wakes his wife Mia to report what he has seen. Here, the dialogue reveals her scepticism, but also her reaction that some of his ‘visions’ are about good and some about evil, and some are more real than others. At this point we are reminded of the symbolism introduced earlier as a collaborator of Jof and Mia, the actor Skat places the mask of a skull on his face to recite lines from a forthcoming production. This image of the skull echoes the image of the ‘well spoken’ skeleton who the squire addressed. The imaginative linking of the two narrative strands is extended visually when the knight and squire ride by in the background. Jof and Mia are transfixed by the beauty of their baby, Mikael. Jof has a vision that he will achieve a juggling trick which defies reality by keeping a ball suspended in the air. We are also given the impression that Jof’s imaginative vision extends to his wife as the return of heavenly music from his vision accompanies Jof’s turn towards her at the end of the scene.

In the next scene the squire talks to the church artist who paints The Dance of Death on the walls of a church. The images are realistic, according to the artist, who talks in detail about how the plague has led to horrific physical developments but the squire imagines these horrors. Meanwhile, the knight meets Death again this time disguised as a priest. The dialogue provided by the knight’s confession to this imposter reveals the knight’s fear about God’s absence; however, again this is represented through the themes of a gulf between imagination and reality. The former is represented negatively as the knight states ‘How I live in a ghost world enclosed in my dreams and imaginings.’ He is tormented by his inability to remove his image of God whilst suspecting that the latter is an object, ‘an idol’ made from his own ‘fear’. The knight’s self-reproaches reveal the relevance of Sartre’s insights into the role of emotion in imagination as a compensation for reality’s failings. However, the knight’s introspection brings to the fore anguish. The knight has a heroic quality because he is facing at a psychological level the negativity that pervades his society. Sartre’s idea of imagination as a cue for freedom is evoked as the knight musters
himself again for his confrontation with Death. Looking at his hand the knight relishes that he is still alive, a physical being fully engaged in a challenging confrontation with death, a project in which he finally hopes to achieve a ‘meaningful action’ in the face of nothingness: ‘This is my hand. I can move it. My blood gushes in it. The sun is high in the sky. And I...I Antonius Block am playing chess with Death.’

Imagination is thus explicitly represented through the characters of the knight and Jof, but also through other characters including Jöns, and through the focus on particular images and sounds from a third person perspective. Although it can be argued that the visions of the knight and Jof are intended to represent metaphysical insights, it is clear that Bergman does not wish to suggest that the subjective world of the knight and Jof can transcend the reality of the world they are surrounded by: a society of the Middle Ages dominated by plague, violence and persecution. The over-riding theme of the knight’s visions of death is the absence of God, while Jof is portrayed partly as a naïve dreamer. Both the knight and Jof are aware that the imagined scenarios that emerge for them encompass a dialectic of presence and absence. The figure of Death who the knight meets is initially present only to him, unseen and unheard by the other characters. Jof is transfixed by the beauty of his vision of the Virgin Mary and child but is mocked by the others when he speaks of this. In both cases, the subjective visions involve a negation of the world, as the knight and Jof perceive it. The knight searches for an alternative to the apocalyptic world, that surrounds him, through his struggle with the figure of Death. Although Jof’s vision echoes the bliss of his family life, the vision is removed and represents an escape from the actual dangers he faces. Like Sartre, Bergman is keen to reassert the contingency and absurdity of the world that challenges his imaginative protagonists and other characters, including women burnt as witches and the persecution of Jof because of his role as a creative performer. The brutal reality reveals the limitations of his character’s imaginative lives. However, the theme of imagination is extended because the brutality of the society appears to be dictated by a malevolent imaginary, in which demonisation, sadism and masochism prevail. The third person narration, used to represent the diegetic world as a whole, is itself an imaginative force, one that suggests an authorial vision.
Initially there appears to be no narrative link in terms of action between the visions of the knight and Jof. This means that the imaginary itself is foregrounded and not subsumed by the narrative pattern. It also calls for a thematic response from the audience focused on the meaning of the imaginary episodes. However, a narrative synthesis of the different plot lines emerges. The knight meets the family in an idyllic scene where he is offered wild strawberries and milk. The knight is forced to leave to take up his private challenge, playing chess away from the others, but realises that Death also threatens the family. Bergman plays with the convergence of the different lines. Later in the film, Jof thinks he sees the knight and Death playing, and realises that they must flee despite Mia’s disbelief. Following this point, when there is a virtual convergence of the visions of Jof and the knight, the latter performs his heroic act of knocking over the chess pieces, which diverts Death from the disappearance of the family. This narrative action focuses on the importance of intentionality (the knight’s decision) and action (the knight’s heroics are doubled by the actions of the squire in rescuing a girl). The society is in the grip of a physical disease, but also a spiritual malaise which can be interpreted as ‘bad faith’ in an extreme form, including superstition, mechanical brutality, and self-inflicted pain on the body as shown by a group of flagellants. In contrast, the knight and his squire offer a limited form of transcendence, even though they cannot finally escape the clutches of death. Their limited success is not achieved through rationality, but through imagination and action.

The film’s other plot lines are skilfully integrated with the story of the knight’s journey home including the subplot involving Lisa, Plog and Skat. Despite the horror of Skat’s denouement a humorous element pervades the antics of these characters. When Death kills Skat by sawing down the tree in which he is hiding, there is a strange mixture of horror and absurdity. The film’s range significantly incorporates humour, which extends to the casting of Nils Poppe, a famous Swedish comedian as Jof. The suggestion of absurdity also corresponds to Sartre’s philosophy since recognition of nothingness and the contingency of life may produce a sense of absurdity as well as one of anguish. The humorous element in Bergman’s cinema is not always recognised and is a suitable subject in its own right, but here it reinforces the sense of his overlap with Sartrean thinking. In fact Bergman more than Sartre
expresses absurdity at different points in his work but, nevertheless, like Sartre he remains committed to a more complete and holistic exploration of issues arising from our awareness of life’s contingency.

The conclusion appears at first to represent a transcendence of social reality through imagination in an entirely negative sense. The figure of Death is now rendered triumphant. The representation of a boundary between the material world and the knight’s subjective vision collapses as Death takes over the life of the knight and his entourage. Nevertheless, the ending of the film is more nuanced and ambiguous than this. We should remember here how Sartre insists on the range and diversity of imagination, and how he emphasises breaks between the imaginary and other modes of consciousness. At the end of The Seventh Seal we are confronted by not just the triumph of Death but an insistence on a plurality of individual perspectives. When the knight’s entourage meet Death his appearance cues a sense of different imaginations at work. The squire answers the door but does not see the visitor, either because the squire is so focused on the material world or because Death is hiding (in keeping with his character as the gatekeeper to absolute nothingness, but also one might say in keeping with his fondness for games). His arrival inside the building is anticipated through sound and an intense point-of-view of the empty corridor from the perspective of the peasant girl rescued by Jöns from the thief, Raval, (a villain who had also tormented Jof). The girl’s gaze is dominant in this scene looking intently up towards Death. Then each character introduces themselves with formality as if now they have accepted their loss of freedom, before the girl articulates the simple truth: ‘Now it is finished’. There is a match cut from the peasant girl’s face, looking up at Death, to Mia, completely innocent of this outcome. We are given the sense of two complete independent states of consciousness whilst retaining the suggestion of an imaginative linking of the two women. Now Jof looks to the horizon and sees the knight’s entourage dance with Death on the hill-top.

The image of Death and his followers dancing reinforces the idea that the film’s truth lies within the image, which Bergman initially discovered on the walls of his father’s church. Jof’s vision departs from the third person narration of the previous scene because he sees Skat instead of the peasant girl. While the ending does not involve
the radical disjunction between perception and imaginary evoked by Sartre’s account of various examples in *The Imaginary* such as the portrait, and the mental image of an absent person, it does suggest a disjunction between different subjectivities. The polyphonic qualities of the film noted by Donner can be compared with Sartre’s insistence on a multiplicity of dream worlds rendered at its most extreme by pathological imagination. The difference between Jof’s vision and information given in the preceding scene is one of detail and this slender discrepancy allows space for the spectator’s imagination to join the polyphony.

In the ambiguity and incoherence of the finale we can see that that the film itself is a product of imagination for the viewer, an analogon, which the viewer must transform into their own vision. This possibility has been encouraged by the representation of an oscillation between reality and the characters’ visions throughout the film. The audience is encouraged to move between different levels of reality and ultimately to face, head on, the vision of the director. In this way a sense of reality is reasserted against the power of the imaginary world. The ambiguities of the ending - encourage an active response - and leave open the possibility for the viewer to extract their own meaning. Bergman, like Sartre, respects the autonomy of an imaginative exchange between artist and audience.
Chapter 3 – REFERENCES AND ENDNOTES

5. ibid.
9. This follows from Sartre’s understanding of all consciousness as intentional.
15. ibid., p.7.
16. ibid., p.6.
17. ibid.
22. ibid., p.9.
23. ibid., p.10.
24. ibid., p.12.
26. ibid., p.12.
For Moran, Sartre’s introduction of this term defeats the aim of talking about imagination in a purely relational way, stating that Sartre’s ‘account of imagining, though an interesting attempt to get beyond representationalism, ends up endorsing what it sets out to reject.’ Moran, op.cit., p.384.

Sartre’s discussion of the Panthéon as a mental image further illustrates his case by saying that in the imagined version we are unable to count the columns of the building: ibid., p.87.
understood in relation to a complex and fluid conception of continuity and discontinuity, thus highlighting the interaction between his work and historical context.


ibid.


ibid.

ibid.

ibid., pp.109-110


Sartre, Being and Nothingness, op.cit., p.557.

Sartre notes that in hallucination: ‘the higher forms of psychic integration have disappeared.’ The Imaginary, op.cit., p.155.

As noted in endnote 1, for this chapter, this is well explained in relation to Hegelian philosophy by Cox.

Sartre, Being and Nothingness, op.cit., p.56.

ibid., p.59.

ibid.

ibid.

ibid., pp.17-18.

Sartre, Being and Nothingness, op.cit., p.60.

ibid.

ibid., p.556.


This argument is developed across Daigle’s chapter and draws on the influence of de Beauvoir to develop the insights of Being and Nothingness in a more ethical direction with more emphasis on authenticity in relationships to ‘the other’, pp.8-13.


ibid., pp.34-35.

Chapters 3 and 4 in this book are focussed on a historical analysis, pp.50-242.

ibid., p.167.

ibid., pp.172-173.

ibid., p.181.


Andrew, op.cit., p.76.

ibid., p.79.


Sarris in Steene (ed.), op.cit., p.81.

ibid., p.84.


ibid., p.92.

ibid., p.93.

ibid.

ibid., p.96.

ibid., p.97.


ibid.

ibid., p.232.

ibid., p.236.

Steene (ed.), op.cit., p.90.

ibid., p.89.
4 From three early Bergman films to an analysis of *Summer with Monika*

The last two chapters have made it clear that Klein and Sartre work with concepts specific to their respective disciplines. Nevertheless, points of convergence are apparent in the application of these ideas to Bergman’s films. Both theories focus on the imagination as an aspect of human nature that must be understood in its own right. At the same time, both theories observe and emphasise a relational process in which the imagination is related to other aspects of human experience. We have seen how emotional elements are given a primary role by Klein but also in Sartre’s thinking.

Both theorists provide an account of imagination that is elemental: in Klein’s case through her theory of infantile imagination; and in Sartre’s case through his phenomenology of imaginary experience. However, it has been striking that the application of both theories to Bergman’s films involves a strong awareness of the value of integration. In Klein’s case this is based on her theory of the depressive position and reparation, whilst in Sartre’s case we have seen, drawing on Stawarska, that he recognises the need to distinguish aesthetic experience from pathological imagination. Both theories seek to develop a complex account of subjectivity, but one that values the idea of coherence at the level of individual experience and this applies to their evaluation of art works. At the same time, we saw that both theories insist on the significance of the interaction between the imagination of the individual and external reality so that a tension between these elements remains. This is particularly apparent in Klein’s account of the epistemophilic instinct, in which knowledge about external reality is recognised as a powerful force driving the development of the individual, and in Sartre’s insistence that the ‘for-itself’ and the ‘in-itself’ are two distinct modes of being. These distinctions carry over into recognition in both Kleinian and Sartrean theory such that imagination is ultimately understood as related, if not reduced, to a social context. In *Wild Strawberries* we saw how the introspective world of an elderly doctor is connected to a wider picture of relationship conflicts, isolation and angst under the surface of an affluent bourgeois society. In *The Seventh Seal* we saw the representation of a society in which fanatical religious beliefs are accompanied by extreme violence including persecution of women and a marked intolerance of creativity and art.
Close examination of the Kleinian and Sartean theories also reveals key points of divergence. Klein’s account of the imagination involves the concept of internal objects in the psyche, whilst Sartre distances his theory from any theory that suggests external objects are replicated inside consciousness. Furthermore, as noted already, Sartre attacks the idea of the unconscious. The possibility remains that Bergman intuitively draws on ideas relevant to both perspectives. Different works in the Bergman oeuvre catch the eye as particularly relevant to the theories in question. For example, Bergman’s film of 1951 *Summer Interlude* is strongly expressive of a cathartic process based on mourning in which a young ballet dancer remembers the tragic death of her boyfriend. In this film, the flashbacks, highlighted by Godard as a key form of expression for Bergman, are used to explore the presence of the past in her subjective world as well as narrative development. Another film, *The Magician*, made in 1958, appears to be more relevant to Sartre’s ideas. This work explores the situation of a showman Albert Vogler whose magic show is subjected to interrogation by a sceptical scientist and the authority of the local aristocrat and police commissioner. Set in the nineteenth century the film shows how Albert and his troupe trick their audience. This film acknowledges that the magician is a skilful manipulator of the imagination of his spectators, but it also critiques the cynical establishment including the scientist’s devotion to instrumental rationality. In the awareness of artifice *The Magician* interrogates appearances in a manner akin to Sartre’s exploration of the imaginary and bad faith, and includes Albert’s self-doubts as subject matter. Without going into further details of *Summer Interlude* and *The Magician*, it can be seen that some works in Bergman’s career show an affinity with psychoanalytic themes, while others are closer to an existentialist preoccupation with the way the individual creates meaning and how this is understood in a social context.

However, my intention is to apply Kleinian and Sartrean ideas together in relation to Bergman’s work. The fundamental differences between the theories are reduced when we consider that Klein’s theory of internal reality remains quite distinct from the theory of internal representation that Sartre was critiquing. Due to Klein’s use of the unconscious as a key concept, the individual’s internal world is understood as a mobile and intangible space characterised by fluctuating emotions. The presence of internal objects is only understood through the dynamic of therapy and the dynamic
of interaction with others and not as fixed reproduction of empirical realities. We can also note that Sartre shifts his ground somewhat to allow for the influence of determination beyond the grasp of individual awareness and various elements in Sartrean thought can be interpreted as compatible with Freudian thinking.¹

In other words, both Sartreans and Kleinians place emphasis on a process of transformation in which the imagination is centre-stage, but must be understood in relation to its situation. I am not suggesting that the theories are synthesised and reduced into one because they each retain their own particular sensitivities and concepts, but they can be explored in combination to reveal the range of individual Bergman films. In doing this we should recognise that both theories aspire to situate the analysis of art in the wider context of their account of human nature. In this way they avoid reducing art to a discussion of the artist’s mastery of techniques specific to his or her medium. Imagination is understood as more than the individual’s talent in a specialised field. At the same time, it has to be acknowledged that neither theory incorporates or engages with the specific concepts of film. These include key concepts ranging from mise-en-scene to camerawork and the organisation of time and space in the narrative.

Just as Klein and Sartre are influenced by specialists in their respective fields Bergman draws on and reworks different cinematic, dramatic and literary influences. Much has been written about Bergman’s work in relation to these influences.² My readings of selected films will complement existing work, but will aim to provide an original contribution by incorporating and integrating ideas from Klein and Sartre. I will not apply these across Bergman’s work as a whole but to selected films using close analysis. The films selected provide a cross section of Bergman’s work but cannot provide a fully comprehensive account. To understand this more fully it is worth at this point noting Steene’s overview and categorisation of Bergman’s films.

The films that I will consider in this chapter, *Music In Darkness*, *Port of Call*, *Prison* and *Summer with Monika* are all placed by Steene in a category entitled ‘Films from the Forties and early Fifties. Focus: The Young Couple’.³ The film I will explore in Chapter 5, *The Virgin Spring* is placed by Steene in the category ‘Religious or Existential Quest Films of the Fifties and Early Sixties, often with Male Protagonists’
Music in Darkness

Music in Darkness, made in 1948 was Bergman’s fourth film as a director. As Steene points out, the title in Swedish has ‘alliteration and cadence’ which evokes the significance of music in the film more poetically than the English translation, and particularly the early American translation of the title, which only focused on the lead character’s blindness (Night is My Future). The film shows immediately Bergman’s interest in including a sequence that steps outside the verisimilitude of the narrative in order to represent a character’s internal state. After a terrible accident on an army training ground, resulting in blindness to Bengt (played by Malmer), the narrative includes a sequence that steps outside the verisimilitude of the narrative in order to represent a character’s internal state. After a terrible accident on an army training ground, resulting in blindness to Bengt (played by Malmer), the

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film’s protagonist, a dream sequence depicts his inner world. Bergman reworked the novel by Dagmar Edqvist to shift the emphasis on to character psychology. Steene informs us that Bergman’s emphasis on the psychological issues facing Bengt contrasted with the novel’s concentration on the theme of romance transcending the division between the middle class hero Bengt and the servant Ingrid (played by Mai Zetterling).

Although Bengt moves on from his initial trauma to pursue his fortune as a pianist the thematic treatment of his struggles with his disability can be read as evoking a more general fragility in human nature and the impossibility of retaining a masterful egocentric dominance. The theme of vulnerability is also pursued in Ingrid’s struggle against class boundaries. The surrealism of the dream sequence, early in the film, is most effective because of the skilful way it is related to the rest of the narrative bringing to mind the Kleinian purpose of integrating elements of the unconscious through social interaction. Sartre’s preoccupation with the contingency of the ego is also relevant here because the instability of the self is conveyed through Bengt’s struggles following his accident, in which a greater sense of agency is only achieved after significant internal and external transformations, including many depressing setbacks caused by the intolerance in society. Bengt’s recognition of Ingrid transcends perception. This is matched by a scene where Ingrid’s intuitive awareness of the fact that Bengt is in a state of danger is the motivation for their final reconciliation. This appears to be a magical resolution, but it maintains the focus on imaginative awareness in the characters that was introduced so traumatically in the dream sequence representing Bengt’s blindness.

*Music in Darkness* has subsequently been dismissed by a range of commercial mainstream critics as lacking seriousness. However, it illustrates not only Bergman’s early interest in representing character subjectivity, but also when placed alongside his next film *Port of Call*, we can see how much he experimented with a range of styles from melodrama to documentary style realism.

*Port of Call*

*Port of Call* made in 1948 was directed from a script almost completely written by Olle Lansberg and differs from many other Bergman works, including *Music in*
Darkness, in its inclusion of some documentary-style representation of the shipping industry and the culture of its workers in the Swedish town of Gothenburg. The film begins with a montage-like sequence of visual perspectives on the industrial setting devoid of dramatis persona, and then focuses on the central protagonist, in this setting. He is Gosta, a sailor who has returned to the harbour from his travels. The emphasis on character and context is interrupted by the violent and sudden suicide attempt of a young woman jumping into the harbour to drown herself who Gosta saves. The film goes on to explore mental instability in the woman, Berit, but extends this to encompass different aspects of society and characters, including Gosta himself who is overtaken by self-hate and depression towards the end of the story, and the shocking story of a friend of Berit’s who has an abortion. The opening reveals the intention to deal with a range of social issues from life in the docks to suicide, using a form of realism. At the same time, there is a clear focus on subjectivity as manifested through the self-destructive nature of Berit’s suicide attempt.

Gosta’s rescue of Berit is a heroic moral action. Through the film Gosta retains this status but this is complicated by his attraction to the woman he has saved. Bergman explains this psychological complexity partly as a result of Lansberg’s screenplay with its sophisticated representation of the character’s emotions. Flashbacks are used to deepen our knowledge of Berit as she recalls her troubled past as a child hearing the arguments of her parents. When she feels compelled to tell Gosta honestly about her past, another flashback is used to convey her turbulent history with her authoritarian mother who arranges for her to be sent to the penitentiary, as well as her search for an escape from the family home with a succession of two boyfriends.

Instead of being just an analysis of the way parental conflict impacts on a child’s consciousness the film condenses this material to suggest that internalisation of conflict and division can eat away at a person to the point where the violence is directed inwards. Klein’s emphasis on the effects of a punishing superego parallels the way Berit struggles with her authoritarian mother and the authority figure of the social worker. Klein’s theory also applies to Gosta. When he learns the truth of Berit’s history he cannot consume his anger about her relations with other men. His
equilibrium is disrupted and his relationship to Berit as a good object in his psyche is apparently destroyed through envy. Against this psychological turmoil the industrial setting provides a context, which contains both stabilising elements, a reality outside the strife of the family, and elements that reinforce and elaborate the existing conflicts including the violent competition between men for the attentions of Berit.

There is an uplifting ending in the manner of Hollywood, but this is not because the characters have conquered all that threatens them. Instead, there is a very strong sense of reconciliation with a transient notion of the present and an acceptance of having to live with the past and difficult issues, which will continue. Critically the union of the couple is only made possible after Berit’s crisis around a decision in which she must give information to the authorities about an illegal abortionist who operated on her friend. Berit is reluctant to divulge the information because she sees no good intentions in the authorities who interrogate her, but this is just one more fixed state, like her self-destruction that she has to rise above to find a degree of personal freedom. Berit foreshadows a whole range of female characters in Bergman’s work who strive for autonomy at a psychological level.

**Prison**

Bergman’s next film as a director, *Prison* is an early example of his attraction to a more philosophical style. The story brings together three plot lines. In the first a retired teacher, Paul, visits his ex-pupil Martin who is directing a film. Paul has recently been released from an asylum and reveals his ideas for a film in which the devil controls reality. Paul specifies that this requires no extraordinary catastrophes to take place since life itself is hell. In the second plot line, Martin’s friend, Thomas, a journalist, explains his idea for an article based on his meeting with a 17-year-old prostitute Birgitta Carolina. The third line of action concerns this young woman and her exploitation by a pimp, Peter who is also her fiancée, and his sister. They force Birgitta Carolina to let them get rid of her baby. The second and third plot lines come together after a further morbid twist when Thomas tries to persuade his girlfriend Sofi to enter a suicide pact. Not knowing that she knocked him out, he mistakenly believes they were successful and wanders the street like a lost soul, meeting the equally bereft Birgitta Carolina. Both characters are in a state of mourning and melancholy. A shift to an overtly imaginative register represents their night together
in an attic-like space, with a mise-en-scene that conveys Bergman’s fascination with childhood imagination, including a toy cinematograph. The imaginative register develops further with Birgitta Carolina’s dream as she re-experiences male violence and the death of her baby in surreal and symbolic form. In this way, the film appears to confirm the gloomy premise provided by the retired teacher at the beginning of the film.

Commenting on the way the film uses realism in the story of the young prostitute but also develops a style that is ‘abstractly representative and at times purely allegorical’, Koskinen draws attention to the influence of the Swedish literary culture in the 1940s, and quotes Donner to identify the preoccupation of this culture with writers such as Albert Camus, Franz Kafka and Sartre. Koskinen goes on to say that this interest in what Donner calls ‘a Sisyphus, a K, a suffering Mankind’ became an integral part of Bergman’s work and is also evident in his later works such as The Seventh Seal.

Young believes that critics discussed the film’s existentialism but failed to recognise the film’s weaknesses. ‘French Existentialism was in the air; more than one interpreter found it irresistible to quote, from Sartre’s No Exit, “Hell is other people”. More than one has continued to find it irresistible. Yet, obviously Bergman had not credibly proven that Hell was other people.’ Young’s comment downplays the efforts of both Bergman and Sartre to engage the audience in critical reflections on their society through allegorical elements. However, as Young notes and as Bergman makes clear, his original title for the film was A True Story. Bergman explains that it was intended as an ironic treatment of a particular kind of story in newspapers but he was required to change the title by his producer to the fashionable sounding one of Prison:

Prison came to be seen, through no fault of its own, as a film typifying the 1940s. This had to do not only with the title but with the fact that because Tomas, played by Birger Malmsten, is a journalist and author, he is presumed to be active in the literary circles of that decade.

This film can be related to the cultural current of pessimistic existentialism in
Swedish society at the time. It can also be accused of self-indulgence with Bergman’s self-reflexive commentary occurring early in the film and the way the middle class male journalist is reunited with his girlfriend at the end. However, these responses are challenged by the way Bergman seeks to elicit an active questioning response from the audience. When he discusses *Prison*, in his book *Images*, Bergman refers to Birgitta Carolina as ‘a soul’ and the intimacy of camerawork and perspective suggests that the film seeks a spiritual dimension through the narrative of her suffering. A theological message is never explicitly developed because it seems clear that Bergman places more emphasis on challenging the audience. In interview he explains that the film was made intuitively to convey his sense of a deep-rooted and ‘incomprehensible’ problem of evil rather than a metaphysical notion of the devil.

Bergman’s existentialism and foray into the inner world of his characters in *Prison* reveals his ambition to take on metaphysical themes. However, the film also demonstrates his interest in combining imaginative representation of character subjectivity and a more ‘realistic’ grasp of external social elements, which are shown to be the cause of alienation and disempowerment. This combination of interests continues when we turn to the film he made in 1953, *Summer with Monika*.

**The application of Kleinian and Sartrean ideas to Summer with Monika**

In Bergman’s early films he frequently uses the formation of a couple as a basis for exploring subjectivity. Bergman’s later films would intensify the focus on the inner world. Bergman was not consciously influenced by Klein, but his interest in psychoanalysis is manifest in a focus on latent emotional forces of desire and destruction. Klein, as we have seen, provides a powerful account of how the infant internalises objects, which it regards as hostile. Anxiety is produced by this sense of the enemy within and the baby desperately looks for good objects to replace this negativity. This vivid account can provide a comparative text for any narrative, which focuses on the struggle between an individual or individuals and a corrupting or hostile environment. For our purposes, the key feature from Klein that should be adopted is that of internalisation. Whilst psychoanalytic theory has focused on the formation of the couple in film narrative, Klein’s theory with its focus on the death drive provides a complementary emphasis on the way characters are threatened by
external forces that they seek to escape from through the processes of projective identification and splitting. In this analysis of Summer with Monika I will consider how the film conveys the alienation of the protagonists, how they project on to each other, and split off from the social environment.

In common with the Kleinian perspective, Sartre focuses on the inner life but conceptualises internal struggle as a conscious battle for authentic knowledge against bad faith. As Jonathan Webber reminds us, bad faith means a battle to maintain a sense of self that is unfixed, not objectified. This kind of transcendence can only be fully achieved in the Kleinian schemata when the individual passes through the depressive position and consequently recognises the ambivalence of the other. There is a strong parallel here between Sartrean and Kleinian thinking in the way that progress is achieved through recognition of the other’s autonomy. For Sartre, part of the struggle against bad faith involves recognition by consciousness that it is part of society. Thus, the struggle for authenticity is against objectification in all its forms, and not confined to the individual’s internal transformation. In Summer with Monika the struggle against bad faith can be seen in the way the principal protagonists resist the roles that are expected of them in society. This becomes even more provocative when finally Monika resists her role as mother and wife, an issue which I will discuss. It should be noted that Sartre, in common with other existential writers believes the struggle can only be fully captured from a first person standpoint. There is always an asymmetry between the self’s authenticity/bad faith and the other/external reality. Before applying these ideas to the text we should consider whether they involve a conception completely at odds with the views of Bergman himself.

Bergman has said about Summer with Monika: ‘I have never made a less complicated film.’ Bergman is referring here to the spirit of freedom in which it was shot. Also of relevance is his emphasis on the ‘genius’ of Harriet Andersson and the moment in the film when she looks directly at the lens. Bergman attributes the originality of this moment to Andersson. Although Bergman is not correct in saying that this was the first moment in cinema where this was done, we can understand his tribute to his actress. This also relates to his skill as a director. In this shot Bergman provides an intense focus on subjectivity and conveys the asymmetry between first and third
person accounts, an effect that I will return to in the analysis.

This story, with its culmination in Monika’s betrayal of Harry has been regarded by some critics as simple and conventional, spiced up by the erotic performance of Harriet Andersson, as well as the dynamics between Bergman and this actress. However, this ignores some of the complexity that can be found in the evolution of the relationships. We will see that throughout the film a strategy of symbolic representation is developed alongside a ‘realistic’ style. From the Kleinian perspective this is critical. Reparation cannot be achieved without creation of a symbolic reality, and Kleinians have evaluated artwork by considering how intensively this process is achieved. A symbol which is clichéd, or predictable, may completely fail to address the intensity of emotion which from the Kleinian perspective is at stake in artistic creation.

Although the film has a refreshing directness, its quality does depend on a complex development of artistic expression. The analysis will consider the cueing of an imaginative response from the audience and a thematic insistence on the imagination of the key protagonists. Both of these elements allow a distinctive focus on emotion to evolve. For Sartre, art’s capacity to explore emotion is important because imagination is the key to unlocking consciousness from bad faith - the belief that freedom does not exist. We will see how Monika and Harry choose to defy a world in which they feel their spirits are deadened - a world of bad faith. At the same time, it is clear that in this work the rebellion is not just viewed as the subjective response of Monika and Harry, but in fact the neo-realist aesthetic of openness continually reminds us that this drama unfolds in a relatively complex social setting so that issues of gender, class, age, and hierarchy are foregrounded at different points.

We have seen in the previous chapter how the concept of intentionality lies behind Sartre’s phenomenological method and theory of imagination. Although Sartre does not provide a model for textual analysis the clear implication is that analysis of art must look for the author’s intentions. This is borne out by the subsequent influence of Sartre’s work on film criticism on the Cahiers group including André Bazin. *Summer with Monika* was elevated by these critics, precisely because they felt it was an authored work. Elsewhere in the world, the film was mainly known for the
performance of Andersson as Gado points out. However, it is the Cahiers group and their practice of reading the author’s intentionality into expressive film form which led to the development of Bergman’s reputation internationally.

For Sartre, the key counterpart to his emphasis on intentionality in the work of the artist is his recognition of the role of subjectivity in the reception of the work. This was seen, for example, in Sartre’s account of the portrait discussed in my previous chapter. As Flynn reminds us, for Sartre, art is valued as an exchange between different consciousnesses that are free:

The artwork, for Sartre, has always carried a special power: that of communicating among freedoms without alienation or objectification…. In his *The Psychology of Imagination*, he speaks of the portrait “inviting” the viewer to realize its possibilities by regarding it aesthetically. In the case of *Summer with Monika* a comparable philosophy is accompanied by elements which suggest a critical response to society. This is partly explained by the source material (a novel), but also the way Bergman is inspired by film-makers including neo-realism and specifically Roberto Rossellini. Jacques Aumont makes this comparison although he suggests that across Bergman’s work as a whole we find a whole range of film styles. For Aumont, it is important that Bergman uses these styles in an autonomous way (he does not elevate one over the other). The point behind the Rossellini comparison rests on the use of a realistic style that, nonetheless, aims to cultivate the free, imaginative role of the viewer. Rossellini famously achieved this with the use of gaps in the narrative as in the theft of the soldier’s shoes in *Paisa* (1946). Discussing *Summer with Monika*, Aumont notes the value placed on exterior location and the use of long take, a conjunction that Bazin understood as a basis for an active response from the viewer. We will see that Sartre’s belief in the value of reader response, like that of Rossellini and the neo-realisists is implicitly endorsed by the ambiguity and indeterminacy of meaning at various points in *Summer with Monika*.

The dual emphasis on the free imagination of the viewer and the artist means that Sartre’s work can be regarded as distinct from those analyses which pinpoint a fixed
and determinate vision in the work of an artist. Sartre, in effect, provides the basis of an alternative to structuralist and Lacanian analysis both of which can be criticised for eliminating intentionality in the work. The phenomenological method involves tracing authorial intention in the work without pinning this to a fixed vision. Throughout the film this method with its focus on how a viewer’s response is actively elicited by the film-makers allows us to see instances where it is necessary to go beyond what is directly given in the film material and instead posit something that is more actively imagined.

**Analysis of the film: the opening**

In the first shots, the absence of voice over and dialogue elevate the documentary images of the Stockholm waterside from factual background to something more meaningful. Following Sartre’s philosophy of imagination the images can be said to await the meaning provided by the audience. At this stage we may not be sure about the significance of these images. For a Swedish audience perhaps they are recognisable, while for other audiences these shots introduce the location. The opening sections demonstrate an awareness of social context. With a documentary style, the first sequence involves a montage of dissolves representing some of the Stockholm waterside, in the early morning, including industrial elements. We see a warehouse and cranes, while working boats are moored in the harbour. Other elements in the landscape are also visible: a church spire to the left of one shot, and faintly in the background of another a solitary barque moves across the harbour. The underlying purpose is poetic: expanses of water that will be significant later as the protagonists escape the mainland; light playing across the water in juxtaposition with the solid, but distant coastline; silence, only interrupted, after several shots, when we hear an industrial boat off-screen. This opening demonstrates how the film brings a romantic sensibility to representation of a local, contemporary landscape. In the tradition of romantic poetry it suggests that the landscape is an emotional resource, a potential counterpart to character subjectivity. However, we should not take this point too far. For Bergman, like Sartre, all material can be animated by imagination, so that nature is not given an exclusive role in their work.

The development of enigma through lack of dialogue is maintained with the representation of Harry. Since information about him is restricted at this stage we
have to intuitively sense his character, another example of Sartre’s notion that the imagination is brought into play when the viewer projects on to the given material. Following the opening montage of the waterfront, the credits sequence continues with a series of dissolves. Now we are made aware of character and time being represented, as the individual shots show different stages of Harry’s journey across the city on bicycle. He is surrounded by traffic with the noises engulfing character and audience. Thus, the film establishes the basis of an existential style in which the gap between the subjectivity of the character and the external world is signified. Evoking character subjectivity and realistic landscape rather than focussing on more plot-entred material paves the way for the later dislocation between the character and his external world. This will be because Harry will look for an alternative to the reality of his social existence through his emotional identification with Monika, and their escape to the island.

In a film, which is in some respects a gentle story of young lovers, it is unsurprising that the world around the characters is presented as, at this stage, relatively benign. The next space is introduced with quiet observation of social inter-action peripheral to the mainline of the story. A man closes the door to a shop and exchanges greetings (through removing of their hats) with another man who walks into the space of a courtyard, following a carriage, which carries a strange assortment of bric-a-brac. This world of the itinerant trader and his cart is one of business and polite custom. The sound of bells is eclipsed by an accordion. Why does the film include these elements? Sartre’s emphasis on the role of imagination provides a perspective. Again, there is the possibility of different interpretations dependent on the context of the audience. What is certain, however, is that the style suspends a fixed immediate connotation and also moves towards greater representation of a social world. At the same time, this social world is partly being set up as a stage in which the subjectivity of the main protagonists will take over. We can only really understand the initial investment in the background when looking back on the story’s thematic development, in particular the separation of the couple from society. At this stage, the detail functions to delay and contextualise their appearance but it carries a slightly whimsical, dreamy momentum alongside the sociological observation. The incorporation of poetic licence in observation of the everyday brings to mind again Rosellini’s works of Italian neo-realism as well as other developments in European
art cinema such as French poetic realism.\textsuperscript{36} The fact that equilibrium is expressed through the background details is significant for the level of formal integration achieved at the end of the film - a critical point from the Kleinian viewpoint which places so much emphasis on reparation achieved through integration. From the beginning, Bergman trusts in an aesthetic notion of synthesis, which provides a counterpoint to (rather than an escape from) irresolvable social conflicts.

Everything seen thus far is pushed towards the background as Monika appears for the first time. A man who is seen leaving his shop walks past the mirror and adjusts his hat, leaving Monika shown in medium shot in the mirror with head slightly bowed. Thus, her appearance is indirect and mediated by context and the mirror. The social background and Monika’s appearance are orchestrated with great attention to a partial meaning that must be completed in the imagination of the viewer. Although the absence of dialogue is crucial, the use of gaps in the text can be found also in the way space is organised between shots. The impact of Monika’s first appearance is intensified because the arrangement of space is disorienting in the lead up to her first appearance. We do not know where we are in relation to the previous shot when she appears. The lack of visual and aural clues intensifies the mystery of her appearance amidst the social context. At this point, we may become more aware that the film is not just a realistic account because the symbolisation is more overt, with the use of mirror as frame. We can see here the Kleinian insistence on the way symbolism is central to the making of art. For Kleinians, art is inherently symbolic and thus must create at this level through the given material, even if this material is realistic or naturalistic.\textsuperscript{37} The Sartrean fascination with an autonomous imaginary level open to the viewer’s interpretation is also vividly represented here. Using Sartre’s categories, we can say that the mirror image evokes Monika’s imagination of herself rather than being just an object of perception. It is as if her image is independent of reality and conveys her dreams. In turn the viewer projects on to this image, conscious already that it is an image for Monika and not simply a perceptual experience. There is ambiguity around Monika’s personality which is immediately evoked by this introduction with its emphasis on imaginary levels which transcend perceptual data - Monika’s imagination of herself and the viewer’s response to this.

Monika turns away from the camera and walks with the group of men into a cafe,
with the last man, previously seen at the beginning of this section, bowing and lifting his cap to allow her in first. The whole effect is that of a theatrical exit, and this provides a further contrast to the everyday normality of the opening sequences. We also have to note that the deployment of a single take here, including action in depth, creates a rhyme with the final shot of the film in which Harry is seen looking into a mirror as a group of man disappear through a cafe door in the background. This final shot is preceded by Harry’s visual memory of Monika on the island. Thus, the rhyming of two shots - Monika’s look in the mirror, and Harry’s look in the mirror - dispersed across the film, concentrate the expression of meaning on the figure of Monika. She is present but imagined in the mirror in the first one, absent but imagined in memory in the latter. All of this might be interpreted as support for the view that Bergman is playing with a representation of the woman from a male perspective as an unknowable other. However, this misses the complexity of Monika’s character, including the directness that evolves through her actions and later through her notorious look towards the camera. The potential of Monika as a source of meaning for the rest of the text can be gauged by the range of connotations produced in her initial appearance in the film. Monika’s point-of-view of her own image in the mirror brings us closer to her character. This initial appearance also presents gender differences (we see the man in the background adjust his hat before she raises her lipstick and then decides not to use it), through the contrasting content in different pockets of the mise-en-scene. The visual information in this sequence also conveys generational differences. The elderly gentleman who ushers Monika into the cafe contrasts with the more middle-aged characters who we see tyrannise Harry with their concerns over work efficiency.

The dream world of the couple
The text cues the viewer to imagine beyond what is shown and this includes a strong sense of the social background, but we need to consider some of the central elements of the story. Sartrean and Kleinian ideas illuminate the relationship between Harry and Monika and their subsequent story. The film cultivates a sense of the subjectivity of the main characters. The initial meeting between Monika and Harry is marked by spontaneity. Their intentions are driven by emotions and imagination. The initially cryptic spatial organisation in this section of the film is minimised because continuity is re-established as Harry reappears. The spatial disorientation that had
prevailed is contrasted with the elements which now provide continuity, including Monika’s presence in the cafe, to convey the idea of romantic destiny as Harry and Monika meet. The camerawork progresses from an omniscient viewpoint in which we see Monika sitting with her back to Harry while he is in medium close-up. The key dialogue, which follows, requires that both characters are in medium close-up. The initial set up also provides continuity through the symbolic quality of the characters’ physical positioning. Monika’s back to the frame continues the sense of her appearance in the mirror, initially latent and withheld. Harry’s appearance in the cafe is static contrasting with his movements travelling across town, but continuing the idea of his solitary existence. Thus, a build-up of associations at the visual level creates anticipation of the moment when these characters speak to each other. This enhances the sense that they only focus on each other, a phenomenon that relates to the Kleinian concept of projective identification whereby the world is coloured by one’s subjective phantasies to the exclusion of other detail.

After introducing herself with, ‘Got a match? I can't find mine’, Monika’s lines carry the most potent meaning in this meeting. She is suddenly outrageously utopian: ‘Spring has come. Let’s clear off and travel and see the world.’ Monika shows little respect for work and shares her dissatisfaction with the conditions: ‘This winter I thought my arse would freeze off.’ Finally as the camera gets closest she asks: ‘Have you seen Song of Love with Garbo?’ Key elements from Bergman’s previous work are here, including, foremost, the idea of the isolated lovers and their desire to escape drudgery. It is as if we are moving into a self-sufficient world structured by their imagination, with Monika taking the lead. The more conventional idea is here too: in Sweden the Spring is so important because the Winter is so cold. Also, emerging strongly we have the idea of a different reality signified by film, a discourse that will continue through the rest of Summer with Monika. The complexity of this imaginary world is a central preoccupation that can only be understood through some scrutiny of the way filmic elements are arranged across the film as a whole, as we saw with the rhyming mirror shots. All the filmic elements including spatial organisation and dialogue build a pattern where some individual elements can be appreciated more deeply through their symbolic relation to other moments in the film. Whilst the linking of different elements creates harmony, the continuous possibility of gaps and fractures conveys how precarious coherence is in this imaginary realm. This is why
the film conveys more than one imaginary level: referring to the world of cinema, and mixing realism with a sensibility that reaches beyond the observation of the physical world. Kleinian and Sartrean insights into imagination provide a conceptual parallel with the representation here because both of these theorists emphasise how imagination leads representation and, in doing this, negativity is a fundamental element. Shifting between realism and theatrical mise-en-scene creates imaginary coherence in the idea of romantic destiny, but it also leaves open the sense that annihilation of the romance is possible. As Klein’s work shows, finding the good object does not insure well-being because it sets up binary opposition with all that is rejected, and intensifies the threat of this other reality. At the same time, as Sartre shows us, intentions carry responsibility and in the reconciliation of two subjects in love, the balance between them can be easily disrupted. As Monika and Harry meet there is already an indication that Monika’s actions will determine what will happen to the couple.

While Monika’s dominance is related to her willingness to imagine an alternative to their drab daily existence Bergman also focuses on Harry’s subjectivity which is juxtaposed with the bad treatment he receives at work. At the beginning we saw how he was represented as a solitary figure in the industrial landscape. Before Harry returns to the shop floor we see the attitude of the other workers towards him. The signs are here of a social critique of power relations in the work place, although this remains schematic. Harry’s immediate colleague/manager (his role is not entirely clear) is chivvied by another man, who never speaks directly to Harry. The man campaigns for pressure to be put on the boy to be more efficient. Another worker shouts through his complaints that Harry is not back from his coffee break. This conveys the idea that work targets are organised unfairly along a chain of command with pressure put on the youngest worker. The anxiety about work targets is strong whilst the slightly, absurd theatrical staging, used for instance in the continual interruptions of the man lifting the shutter, is also striking.

Harry’s alienation from this set up is developed further in the following scene. Here we can see that he is only thinking of Monika. Out on his bike, at the traffic barrier, he gazes ahead dreamily, unaware that he is holding up the traffic. When he moves on, the camera rests momentarily on the blank space that has been vacated. This is a
small sign of empathy for Harry’s state of mind, resting momentarily on absence and
the lingering sense of detachment from the routines and duties of work. Harry’s gaze
into the distance is another instance of frontal staging whereby the camera
concentrates on a character as if he is looking directly out and beyond the audience.
There is no attempt to contextualise the space fully. This style parallels the way
theatrical monologues achieve intimacy between a character and the audience. The
film does not reproduce theatrical conventions but adapts these into a cinematic style.
The lingering of the camera at this moment associates the character’s dreaming with
a slower tempo that contrasts with the anxieties of his workplace. The act of
projective identification is foregrounded because the character’s imaginary world is
seen as a temporary escape from his material surroundings.

The idea of an imaginary escape is developed further as Monika and Harry go to the
cinema. The date film is melodramatic. The snippet we see involves two well-
dressed characters. The woman tells the man he may kiss her but they will never
meet again. Monika’s tears and gaze suggest her total projection into this romantic
tragic scenario, whilst Harry is detached from the movie, yawning, but also looks
with anxiety towards Monika. When the lights come on the camerawork focuses on
the couple and this continues through their exit. It is as if they are separated and like
somnambulists in the dark, slightly awkward, still possessed, by the movie in
Monika’s case, and its significance as part of the date in Harry’s case. Harry is
anxious, but Monika thinks beyond to the glamour of the film. Bergman’s mise-en-
scene shows here how cinematic fantasy is reproduced in the world outside the film
they have seen, as Monika’s attention is drawn briefly to a lighted shop window,
which is like the glowing cinema screen. The imaginary world of the film was not an
innocent beyond but one with connotations of status, signifying the possibility of
commercial exchange, the pervasive capitalist mode of transformation.

Typically, this political element is only hinted at. An industrial image, this time of a
tower against the darkened sky, punctuates the focus on Harry and Monika, before a
cut to them, sitting in medium close-up. This juxtaposition of an exterior location and
an intimate interior is typical of the film’s assimilation of different elements, ranging
from a keen eye for a physical environment to immersion in the private drama of the
characters. In subsequent chapters we will see how Bergman maintains and
intensifies these concerns in more psychological works. The romance of Harry and Monika incorporates a self-referential element by referring to the film just seen. Like the woman in the movie Monika is in charge. After they kiss she evokes obsessive passion saying, ‘we are crazy about each other’. However, the lighting was more stylised in the movie. Here Monika’s face is highlighted but the surroundings are in darkness, which is a reminder of the couple’s precarious position in society. The concentration on Monika’s playful expression contrasts with the solemn atmosphere of the movie they have seen which further illustrates the spontaneity she represents. When she suggests that they move on due to the cold, it is revealed that they are outside and an atmospheric landscape takes over as the signifier of romance.

Elements of melancholy and mourning

Kleinian theory preserves a focus on artistic intentionality and artistic form and gives art a privileged role. Art, however must according to the Kleinian view deal with depression as well as joy. Since art is a symbolic activity emotions will be expressed in a manner that is inevitably indirect, but whatever the genre Kleinian theory stipulates the necessity of the depressive phase to achieve successful artistic expression. Nicky Glover provides a succinct summary of this:

As in psychic health, there must be an awareness of both aspects. All successful (authentic) art must embody the deep experience of the artist - that is, his depression, whose working-through lies at the heart of all artistic creation. Indeed, it is not unusual to find that deeply moving art often stirs feelings of both rapture and melancholy.

For Kleinian analysis there is a sense of loss or damage that must be repaired. This can be compared with an emphasis in film theory on the way narratives work to resolve an underlying equilibrium or sense of lack. However, it is necessary to reiterate key differences involved in the Kleinian approach. In the latter, the sense of loss is attached much more directly to the emotional experience of the artist and the spectator. Disequilibrium is not thought about as fundamentally an ideological effect or as an inherent expression of a reality that the film, in some way, denies or escapes from. Instead, as we see in the art criticism of Richard Wollheim, there is a focus on primitive emotional states for the artist and the spectator, which are ultimately related to the infant’s relationship to the mother and to the quest for a constructive
development of subjectivity. Great value is placed on transformation of loss through creation and the possibility of a creative response to the artwork including an active participation in the text’s value. While other Bergman films like *Wild Strawberries* are permeated by a sense of loss and emotional damage from the past, in *Summer with Monika* this is more implicit. However, it is still significant. We learn that both Harry and Monika as young adults feel a sense of alienation that has been caused by unhappy family histories. This becomes more explicit as we see Monika’s dissatisfaction at home, and in the scene which reveals Harry’s loss of his mother through an early death. In this scene we see how mise-en-scene is used to evoke melancholy and how this is juxtaposed to the plight of the young lovers.

Monika attempts to replace the lost maternal affection and support, as she playfully comforts Harry. The emphasis on maternal loss is emphasised further when Harry’s father returns interrupting the intimacy of Harry and Monika. Instead of Oedipal conflict we have a focus on the pathos of the father, still emotionally ravaged by his wife’s death. The staging of this scene develops this theme. The father enters, remaining in shadowy light as he crosses the room, passing the framed photograph of his wife. The couple in the foreground, Harry and Monika, are not just being pitted against a hostile environment but also one where fate is hostile. Whilst the attack by Lelle which follows shortly after this can be read as part of an Oedipal struggle, it also shifts the focus on to peer rivalry in the struggle for the possession of Monika. Lelle is objectified as a destructive element. He shows the impossibility of Harry and Monika completely expelling the negativity of their society.

**Existential rebellion**

As we saw in the previous chapter, for Sartre imagination must negate. It is an independent force not determined by perception but this does not mean it is nihilistic. Autonomy of imagination is apparent in the characters of Harry and Monika. They are both dreamers. The introspective destructive element in Harry’s rebellion against his work is signified at a symbolic level as he allows a decanter to drop to the ground. Gado notes the way Bergman’s style incorporates a subjective element in this example and throughout the film in a way that was inspiring for the *Nouvelle Vague*. The decision to leave society and head for the isolation of the island is an imaginative decision which negates and transcends the alienation the couple
experience in society. The decision to flee to the island is symbolic and throws the reality of the society into abeyance. Like one of Sartre’s acts of imagination the island only comes into being because the society disappears. Aumont notes how important rebellion against society is in this work and relates it to the earlier Bergman films about young alienated protagonists. As with these other films happiness is difficult to achieve. The island is ‘other’, a new world, but the progression to it is doomed because the couple have not fully confronted the destructive elements incorporated in the previous situation. In particular, the threat from Lelle, a character who attacks Harry from jealousy and molests Monika, remains, representing the paranoid-schizoid reality of a society permeated by division and conflict, which the couple try to escape. Lelle is the most threatening figure for Harry, but his animosity is part of the oppressive social norms from which they run away. Although paranoia may seem too extreme as a term, it is evoked in the sudden violence represented by Lelle and the way his threat is made latent. Part of the innovation of Klein’s thinking lies in showing how the paranoid-schizoid is part of everyday life and only full scale reparation can achieve liberation. Therefore, physical escape is not enough. For Sartre, liberation is also a momentous challenge and the couple do not achieve this. Bergman’s work implicitly confirms Kleinian and Sartrean analysis of the difficulties facing liberation from social constraints.

For critics of Sartre, his emphasis on intentionality is a fall back on ego psychology, but Sartre does not necessarily fit into this box. His work on the imagination alerts us to the way imagination and other modes of consciousness share the possibility of rebellion. As Betty Cannon makes clear, free will, for Sartre, may be guided by emotion, and/or imagination as well as reason. More fundamentally, it is important to recognise that Sartre’s notion of freedom evolved with a distinction made between reflective and pre-reflective consciousness. In this film the rebellion of Harry and Monika has a pre-reflective, spontaneous quality. The film does not map out a set of goals which they seek to achieve through an ego centred process of reasoning, but instead the emphasis is on their creativity in negating their oppressive circumstances. The bravery of choosing an indeterminate future rather than complying with an established order is central to the Sartrean account.

Correlating with Sartre’s philosophy of consciousness is his specific emphasis on the
difference between first person and third person accounts of experience. Matthew Eshleman makes this clear in his argument against the mistaken view that Sartre’s account of freedom is indistinguishable from an acceptance of chance as the ultimate background for our decisions. For Sartre, the first person consciousness is at some level unique:

By an essentially first-person experience, Sartre means an experience (a) necessarily dependent upon our awareness of it, which (b) cannot be directly apprehended (intuited) by other observers. Thus, first-person experience is unlike many objects of experience, which exist independently of our awareness of them and can be straightforwardly examined by multiple observers, like material objects large enough to perceive through the senses. 

In other words, for Sartre subjectivity, at some level, resists complete translation and is most directly expressed by the individual concerned. Rather than being nihilistic, or problematic, this feature of his philosophy provides a basis for ethics because it insists that any moral judgements applied externally to situation must be balanced against available first person testimony. Sartre, more than other existential philosophers like Kierkegaard and Heidegger continually attempts to connect this ontology of subjectivity with social analysis and social justice. Bergman exploits the disjuncture between different narrational viewpoints, to the extent that his films, implicitly critique the collapsing of first person experience into a third person objectivity.

**Escape to the island**

*Summer with Monika* provides good examples of Bergman’s interest in exploring variations in first person and third person narration and his reluctance to let the latter subsume the former. While the film opened with the omniscient narration of the waterside, suggested by long shots from different perspectives, the departure of Harry and Monika for the island is presented with apparently subjective camera work. Aspects of the narrative are left vague as the couple escape the mainland in his father’s boat. Contextual information from the story is minimised to facilitate identification with the subjectivity of the couple. For example, we do not see the reactions of their parents to this flight and the latter remain marginal to the narrative. Instead, the focus is on the couple’s experience. Echoing the style of the opening sequence, the shots reveal landscape rather than character, but the narrational
viewpoint over-runs into the subjectivity of the couple because the visual perspective during this journey appears to be that of the characters. The subjective viewpoint of the couple is suggested (by the camera’s position approximate to Harry and Monika’s position on the boat) although this is not actually confirmed, eliciting a more active interpretation from the viewer and conveying the enigmatic irreducibility of a subjective perspective. The sudden revelation of the open water suggests their newly acquired freedom. All dialogue disappears to be replaced by isolated sounds. The style is relatively simple, almost documentary like, continuing the aesthetic affiliation with neo-realism, but we can also recognise in the combination of realism and subjectivity a precursor of the intense subjective world developed in later works, reaffirming that Bergman’s films are always sensitive to private experience. The extended sequence of the escape to the island thematically conveys the couple’s escape from an oppressive social reality and cannot be reduced to the idea of Monika luring Harry away from security. The reliance on imagery without words is complemented by the lack of specific time references until Monika awakes on the island looking at a clock. As noted in the discussion of *The Seventh Seal*, Bergman explained some of his work through his interest in particular images and this passage also illustrates his willingness to let imagery take over at specific points.48

Although the island is initially an idyllic escape, it becomes the location for the development of conflict already represented in the film. As we saw in Chapter 2, according to Klein, the death drive is manifested in a range of behaviour including greed, jealousy, hatred and violence. Klein’s bleak view of human nature insists that development is inevitably accompanied by these negative states. In this film, the love affair between Harry and Monika is juxtaposed with external threats principally in the form of Lelle and the oppressive work environment, which Harry has to endure. Kleinian ideas alert us to the way that in their love affair Harry and Monika find in each other a substitute for the negativity foisted on them by other external sources. Kleinian theory uses the binary opposition of good and bad objects directly in relation to primordial emotional states, and there is an emphasis on the dialectical development of these states. While Harry and Monika find solace in each other, becoming good objects for one another, and this is reinforced through their rejection of the society, they cannot, according to Klein’s insights, find a resolution to their difficulties until they confront and integrate the external negative threats. The
Kleinian perspective recognises how the death drive is located in society as well as being a psychic force. We can observe this as Lelle intrudes on the couple’s idyllic isolation. In the build-up to this a solemn, eerie foreshadowing of future events is conveyed with lingering shots as the lovers’ boat disappears into the horizon. The long take helps to express that this is the last moment before Lelle returns unexpectedly to reintroduce conflict. While Harry and Monika play innocently, Lelle appears suddenly. His point-of-view replaces that of the omniscient observational long shot. Jealousy and destruction are introduced into the romantic isolation of the couple. The fight with Lelle has a theatrical quality with its exaggerated physical movements and lack of dialogue. The fact that Monika makes the vital blow by hitting Lelle with a saucepan undercuts but does not eliminate the idea that this could be a fight to the death.

Shortly after the fight scene, the representation of Monika centres on her response to becoming pregnant. On the island we witness how Monika’s actions become more desperate. This is another point that demonstrates how a psychological emphasis on Monika’s subjectivity is combined with social observation. When shortly afterwards Monika leads the foray into a middle class house in search of food, physical movements are again foregrounded. Harry and Monika have been separated in the grounds of the house when Monika is apprehended clinging to a large slab of meat. Throughout this scene there is an absence of point-of-view camerawork but, nevertheless, we are aligned with the camera movement that responds to Monika’s actions, and this is very pronounced when she struggles to escape from the family. This is a distinct style from the norms of Hollywood cinema where identification with a character is more reliant on point-of-view.

There was a suggestion of absurdity as well as a connotation of real violence in the struggle with Lelle. The element of absurdity returns because Monika’s presence in the bourgeois setting is so incongruous. Her savage rejection of any communication with the daughter maintains a theme running throughout the film whereby all character interaction is problematic. Monika’s autonomy is central to this theme. When she escapes from the family the camerawork is used to simply track her movements through the wild area adjacent to the house. In this passage, alongside the construction of suspense, there is a preoccupation with subjectivity, which
culminates in a montage of natural elements, including an owl from Monika’s point-of-view. This sequence belongs to a tradition dedicated to evoking the position of primitive characters outside society and may have influenced François Truffaut’s choice of subject matter in *L’Enfant Sauvage*. (1970, d. Truffaut). The meaning of this imagery in *Summer with Monika* is not transparent. At one level, the passage represents Monika’s descent to a savage state mirroring the violence perpetrated by Lelle. However, this is not made explicit because the film does not have the same focus on cause and effect as classical narrative. Klein’s writings about envy, jealousy, and greed provide a perspective on the action here. While jealousy, according to Klein is driven by a sense of loss (the other has taken or threatens my possessions), envy suggests a primal descent into desire for what the other possesses. Monika moves towards this primitive state. On the one hand, Monika can be seen as trying to achieve a lost equilibrium necessary for survival. On the other hand, her mental state seems so desperate that it lacks this basis. She shows greed in a way that is completely justified by her precarious state but her actions also gravitate towards the form of greed that Klein believed was so destructive - an insatiable desire. The reason Monika gives for her desperate actions is the need to feed herself in a state of pregnancy. In the end, we see how this need is complicated by her cavalier existentialism. She desperately needs physical support but is unwilling to conform in the same way as Harry.

**Monika’s abandonment of Harry**

The couple argue desperately as Monika becomes helpless. When they are reconciled the feeling of reparation is unconvincing and this does not address Monika’s rejection of the world, which they must return to. The return journey to the mainland echoes the journey out with ellipses, through shots representing the sea and surroundings as they travel in to Stockholm. On this occasion, shadowy light expresses an ominous atmosphere but it is varied and delicate, maintaining a fragile state of transition. The final act of the film can be explained, therefore, turning to Kleinian theory and its account of the balance between splitting and integration. To an extent Harry succeeds in achieving integration because he finds a sympathetic work place, an outcome foreshadowed in the benign depiction of the workers congregating around the cafe, in the first part of the film. More significantly he is not destroyed by the loss of Monika. On the other hand, Monika shows an opposing side
of the situation since she takes on, in Kleinian terms internalises, the negativity located in society. She becomes identified with the external world that threatened their happiness before.

This point leads to the debate about whether Monika is an existentialist heroine and inevitably this debate must take in Sartre’s efforts to include society and ethics in our reflection on this issue. We have seen that Sartre values negation against determinism. Monika embodies a resistance to definition. She vanishes from the text. However, as Cannon makes clear, Sartre does not celebrate freedom divorced from all conditions:

If, for whatever reasons, I desire to escape my facticity, I may fall into the dishonest position of claiming that I am absolutely free in the sense of being able to do or be anything whatever or in the sense of having no connections with my past self. The dreamer who constantly expects a ‘new tomorrow’ and the schizophrenic who completely ignores reality are examples of this form of bad faith.\(^5\)

Cannon explains that the concept of bad faith is used to criticise a consciousness that suffers the illusion that freedom is absolute as well as one that believes that this freedom does not exist. Monika’s hedonistic freedom embodies the first of these variations. Bergman intends to make this ambiguous and so we are left with both the impression of a powerful independence in Monika’s actions and, at the same time, the text demonises her abandonment of Harry and the baby. By taking on the story of female rebellion Bergman, at least implicitly, brings to the fore the potential for rebellion and destruction in any relationship. Today, it is easy to recognise the deficiencies of the film’s gender politics in its apparent criticism of Monika’s actions, but we can also see why this film maintains a progressive reputation. Monika resists final definition and is played with great charisma by Andersson. At the same time, the film brings to the fore the social context of her rebellion, including her alienation as a young mother (even if this is represented unsympathetically), the apparent corrupt influence of urban life, and the loss of innocence precipitated by the violence of Lelle.

Sartrean analysis values the ability of a character to rise above his or her circumstances, but beyond this, Sartre’s exploration of existential psychoanalysis
provides the possibility of a more complete response to the film. Sartre seeks a form of integration through his own specific model of psychoanalysis. This involves reflection on past actions and events whilst avoiding objectification of this material. Harry goes through a comparable process as he casts his mind back to his time on the island. The film-making gives this moment enough ambiguity such that it does not signify unequivocally nostalgia or regret but rather an engagement through imagination with the past and emotion. The economy of the film-making prevents any further elaboration and thus maintains the sense of existential relation specific to Harry.

The much talked about image where Monika looks directly at the audience is the key moment of this final act and the film as a whole. Quite rightly responses have highlighted this self-reflexive moment and the way it cultivates Monika’s ambiguity. This image relates to the theoretical perspectives I am pursuing. To start with it shows the emphasis on imagination as a process, which means engagement with absence, as Sartre argues, since shortly after this Monika disappears, only to reappear as a memory in Harry’s imagination. This image of Monika looking at the camera also returns us to her initial appearance as an image in the mirror, which strongly evoked an imaginary level beyond perception. In both images she is strikingly framed. Now Monika becomes a portrait framed by the film. This also illustrates how the imagination may be drawn into the projection of emotional characteristics that are not self-evident within the image. We are invited to imagine Monika’s personality, her treachery, insolence and independence. The emotion here is foregrounded because this is the moment that she signifies her autonomy and thus signifies Harry’s loss. The startling immediacy of this image as a result of Monika’s look at the camera and its autonomous position as a result of her subsequent disappearance also provide rich material for psychoanalytic interpretation. It is as if the image provides a direct route to the unconscious for film-maker and spectator. As Sánchez-Pardo, a theorist who applies Kleinian ideas to modernism, reminds us, the development of the snapshot and its cultivation as a moment in film was seen by the theorist Walter Benjamin as a new way of accessing unconscious optics. For Sánchez-Pardo, the isolated, fragmented image cultivated by modernism pursues this sense of fascination with emotion that is outside narrative control. The quotation from Benjamin is:
‘Evidently a different nature opens itself to the camera than opens to the naked eye - if only because an unconsciously penetrated space is substituted for a space consciously explored by man…. The camera introduces us to unconscious optics as does psychoanalysis to unconscious impulses.’

To be sure, the image of Monika differs from the snapshot in various respects, but it is also comparable to the effect identified by Benjamin because it signifies a kind of immediacy that is startling compared with the rest of the film, a sudden random visual access to Monika as subject. Bergman, throughout his work, in collaboration with his cinematographers, uses portraits and close-ups as moments which possess a strong level of autonomy, a force of their own which is not dependent on what precedes or follows in the narrative. This allows the viewer to imagine a character’s emotions more intensely. As we saw in Chapter 3, Sartre challenges our ideas about the representation of character interiority. His theory demands that we consider interior states dynamically in relation to intentions, motivations, and the external cues for these phenomena. This accords with way Summer with Monika presents the enigma of Monika’s motivation but also signals that this relates to a social context. As in Wild Strawberries and The Seventh Seal, Bergman’s images are incorporated very skilfully within the narrative, but at the same time they have an independent subliminal quality like that which Benjamin identifies in the snapshot.

Sartre’s theory of the look not only discloses power relations, but also intersubjectivity and thus conveys the magical element of this moment, which was so fascinating for the directors of the Nouvelle Vague. Sartre also helps us to understand the narrative dislocation with his scepticism in Being and Nothingness about romantic love, the impossibility of reconciliation between two subjects, and the inevitable asymmetry involved in social relations, manifested in this case through the look. But, as already suggested, Sartre’s apparently pessimistic account of social relations is not the full story of his philosophy - it is merely the ground for a more authentic existence, and in this corresponds with the movement between from paranoid-schizoid to depressive relations as tracked by Klein.

Monika is restored at the end of the film as a subject in Harry’s imagination. To start with this exemplifies the power of phantasy and imagination. The film respects this
power rather than seeking for solutions in the realm of perception. Sartre is fascinated by the freedom of the imagination to overcome temporal and spatial distance. Although he believes that perception is a more vital source of knowledge than imagination, when reality represents a lack for consciousness imagination can still disclose emotional knowledge.\textsuperscript{53} In a fairly obscure piece of Sartrean writing from early in his career entitled \textit{Faces}, Sartre displays the same sensibility as Bergman in his fascination with the sheer emotional force that lies behind the visual appearance of a face. In her article about Sartre and magic Sarah Richmond draws attention to this example of Sartre’s writing, where it becomes clear that the face of the ‘other’ is not exclusively a threat or an object.\textsuperscript{54} Sartre’s dialectical philosophy allows us to recognise the positive force of Monika’s final appearance as image, after the apparently destructive close up of her enigmatic face. This is consistent with Klein who argues, as already noted, that phantasy contributes to knowledge. For Klein, phantasy restructures time and space. Sánchez-Pardo argues that this is a distinctive characteristic of the Kleinian theory, which explains its affiliation with various examples of modernism. Like modernist art Kleinian theory recognises the value of juxtaposing different fragments in a way that breaks continuity. For Klein, this means greater recognition of psychic material that is submerged in the rigid oppositions imposed by binary thinking. Focusing on the issue of spatial representation in modernism Sánchez-Pardo notes:

\begin{quote}
Space in Kleinian theory is not something that has to be conquered but something that must be experienced in all its complexity. It is also a space that is empty enough to allow the (lost) object to emerge.\textsuperscript{55}
\end{quote}

This is precisely what happens at the end of \textit{Summer with Monika} as the space of the island is re-presented allowing Monika to return in Harry’s imagination. This image is melancholic because Monika has disappeared, but it is also constructive because it allows repressed emotion to be expressed. Thus, both Sartre and Klein lead us back to a fuller examination of how this image is integrated in the film. Whilst it can be read along Freudian lines as wish fulfillment of the male psyche, it is also implicated in a complex patterning that runs through the narrative evoking symmetry and asymmetry as part of the imagined restoration of loss, and carries the possibility of insight alongside its obvious nostalgic qualities.
A possible problem with Kleinian theory, already noted in relation to *Wild Strawberries* in Chapter 2, is that it ends up endorsing a conventional morality through its emphasis on integration. Thus, Monika is demonised because she does not achieve the end point of reparation. In this sense the Kleinian approach appears to be at one with a particular reading of the film, which emphasises its conservative social message. Against this we need to recognise greater complexity in the film and in the theory. Firstly, the theory can be credited with revealing how the reparation narrative is constructed from a male perspective. However, secondly we need to remember that Klein’s theory does not regard the depressive position as a straightforward end point. In Klein’s vision we never attain this as a state of equilibrium but continue to experience the oscillation between emotional splitting and polarised desires on the one hand, and recognition of the other as an autonomous, emotional being. At the same time Klein recognises that the paranoid-schizoid is an integral part of development. It cannot simply be defeated through rationality, but has to be experienced emotionally and art offers the possibility for this. Thirdly, we have the sense developed from the Sartrean perspective of Monika as partially a representative of freedom and transformation.56

Bringing these theories together we can see that, for Bergman, Monika ultimately embodies ambiguity. Thus, *Summer with Monika* builds on the emotional complications and stylistic experimentation observed in Bergman’s earlier work. Despite its realist style it also looks ahead to the ambiguities of more overtly symbolic works like *Wild Strawberries* and *The Seventh Seal*. Perhaps even more clearly than these later works it reveals that ambiguity is not just a formalist value pursued for its own sake, but involves engagement with social and ethical issues. Sartre, Bergman and Klein are all convinced that engagement with social reality is enriched by art that accommodates ambiguity. Thus in their work we find a valuing of catharsis which differs in emphasis from both Aristotelian and Brechtian models. In contrast to such models a combination of Kleinian and Sartrean insights suggests that the audience are not distanced from *Summer with Monika* as they might be through Aristotelian pity or Brechtian distanciation. Instead we are engaged by a process, which lacks certainty in its conclusion due to the enigmatic agency of Monika as a figure in Harry’s imagination. Bergman filters his portrayal of Monika through the consciousness of his male protagonist, but arguably reaches a more
universal level when we consider how imagination and emotion are foregrounded in the narrative as a whole and as part of the viewing experience.
Chapter 4 - REFERENCES AND ENDNOTES


2 The creative overlap between Bergman’s methods in the theatre and the cinema is illustrated in his discussion with the Markers. For instance Bergman discusses the example of a play by Sartre, which depicts torture, but for Bergman the most successful adaptation of this involved suggesting the violence, rather than showing it. As Bergman puts it: ‘That is one of secrets of our business - not to show everything.’ Marker, L-L. and Marker, F. J. (1982) Ingmar Bergman: Four Decades in the Theater, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.25.


4 ibid., p.172.

5 ibid., p.170.

6 ibid., p.172.

7 ibid.

8 At one level the film is about fractures and divisions within the self - Bengt can only understand his love for Ingrid after their separation and a range of negative experiences.


11 ibid., Bergman largely attributes this style to the influence of Rossellini, p.33.

12 ibid.


14 ibid.


16 ibid.


18 ibid., p.152.

19 Björkman et al, op.cit., p.40.

20 Webber comments on Sartre’s concept of bad faith as follows: ‘What does depend on bad faith is the assumption that the other person will be ascribing to one a fixed nature…’ Webber, J. ‘Bad faith and the Other’ in Webber, J. (ed.) (2011), Reading Sartre: On phenomenology and existentialism, London: Routledge, pp.180-194; p.192.

21 ‘Indeed, if bad faith is part of one’s cultural fabric, then one will come to learn that people generally see one another this way as a result of growing up within that culture and relying on the people around one to help one to make sense of the world.’ Webber, ibid..
This is discussed by Matthew Eshelman, ‘What is it like to be free?’, ibid., pp.31-48.

23 Bergman discusses Summer with Monika briefly in Bergman, op.cit. p.295. Aumont’s comments are discussed later in this chapter.

24 ibid., pp.295-296.

25 Direct address to the camera was a pronounced feature in early cinema.


27 ‘Certainly, judged strictly as a piece of fiction, it is a slight thing – in which, moreover, the extent of Bergman’s contribution is difficult to determine.’ ibid., p.158.


29 See Chapter 1 for Godard’s comments on Summer with Monika and Chapter 3 for the influence of Sartre on Bazin.

30 ‘Almost everywhere, interest centred on the erotic appeal of Harriet Andersson, not on the director: France was the exception.’, Gado, op.cit. p.160.


33 ibid., p.194.

34 The openness of style is present in many aspects of Summer with Monika, including in the opening, which demonstrates the creative influence of cinematographer Gunnar Fischer. This is widely recognised. For instance, in the following quotation about Summer with Monika: ‘Bergman’s sympathetic eye and Gunnar Fischer’s atmospheric photography invest the locations with a poetic significance, the light and open spaces of the holiday islands contrasted tellingly with the dark claustrophobia of the city, where the flame of the couple’s love is slowly extinguished by the lack of air.’ Nigel Floyd, Time Out, http://bergmanorama.webs.com/films/summer_with_monika.


36 Strick points to the influence of French poetic realism in this passage of the film with its transition from the street to the interior world of the courtyard: http://bergmanorama.webs.com/films/summer_with_monika_strick.htm. I would suggest that this is a stepping-stone towards the interior world of the main characters, a change of focus, which becomes the dominant priority for Bergman in his later works. We shall see this in The Virgin Spring and Hour of the Wolf.

37 One of the most radical ideas in the Kleinian theory of art suggests that the material of the artwork itself is symbolic of the maternal body. This perspective was applied extensively to fine art by Adrian Stokes, and. Richard Wollheim. What is interesting here is to note that this theory leads to acute observation of technique, alongside a focus on the dialectic between expression and integration. Overt symbolism in the text expresses the underlying dynamic, which is a symbolisation of psychic phantasy. The use of framing and mise-en-scene in the initial appearance of Monika overtly brings into play consciousness of symbolic phantasy. The work of

38 Sartre’s analysis of love is complex and convoluted but part of the futility which he attributes to ‘love’ is captured when he says; ‘The problem of my being-for-others remains therefore without solution. The lovers remain each one for himself in a total subjectivity...’ *Being and Nothingness*, op.cit., p.376.


40 Glover, op.cit., p.75.

41 According to the Lacanian model the imaginary fails to express the way reality contradicts the wish fulfillment inherent in cinematic narratives. This point can be found throughout Lacanian analysis but is explained succently by Tarja Laine: Laine, T. (2007) *Shame and Desire: Emotion, Intersubjectivity, Cinema*, Brussels: Peter Lang, Introduction, pp.9-27.


43 Aumont, op.cit., p.30.

44 ‘...if we strip Sartre’s psychology of its particular philosophical terminology, it turns out to be fundamentally an Adlerian psychology.’ Barrett, W. (1962) *Irrational Man: A Study in Existential Philosophy*, New York: Anchor Books (originally published by Doubleday, in 1958), p.258. William Barrett does not consider that Sartre is analysing a historical juncture in social relations rather than an ontological condition. My argument is that for Bergman as well as Sartre subjectivity is situated in a social, historical context.

45 Cannon spells out the positive contribution that imagination can provide according to Sartre: ‘Although throughout most of *The Psychology of Imagination*, Sartre insists on the magical, impoverished character of the imagination as opposed to perception, toward the end of the book he surprises the reader by noting that without this capacity to imagine - to create the unreal - human beings would be totally engulfed in the real. Indeed, Sartre identifies this capacity to imagine with the very nihilating power of consciousness itself...’ Cannon, B. (1991) *Sartre and Psychoanalysis: an Existentialist Challenge to Clinical Metatheory*, Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, p.248. Cannon discusses, on pp.351-352, how the legacy of Sartre’s philosophy involves recognising the intentionality in imaginative and emotional modes of consciousness. As she makes clear, for Sartre such modes may be self-destructive or contribute to greater freedom. The point here is that as a theorist Sartre recognises a strong role for emotion and imagination in consciousness.

46 Sartre’s development of existential psychoanalysis was an additional chapter in the 1953 version of *Being and Nothingness* in which he discusses how the individual can reorientate towards their past.

47 Eshelman in Webber (ed.), op.cit. p.35. We will also see this emphasis on an inaccessible mode of consciousness in the next two chapters.
Just before starting *Summer with Monika*, Bergman considered making a whole film without dialogue, Bergman op.cit., p.291.

See Chapter 2 for a fuller discussion of Klein’s account of jealousy, envy and greed.

Cannon, op.cit., p.46.

see endnote 46.

Sánchez-Pardo, op.cit., p.12.

‘For Sartre, even when imagining is at its most perceptual, as for instance in visualizing, it has features quite different from those perception involves….While perceiving is the paradigm state that teaches us how things are, imagining is the reverse…. It is uninformative through-and-through.’ Robert Hopkins, ‘Imagination and affective response’ in Webber (ed.), op.cit., pp.100-117; p.100. Nevertheless, Hopkins goes on to explore how imagination, on Sartre’s account tells us about the world, affectively.


Sánchez-Pardo, op.cit., p.12

Many reasons have been given for Bergman’s strong female characters. I will just mention here the inheritance from Swedish drama including the works of Ibsen with an emphasis on autonomous modern female characters; and that Bergman’s enjoyment of Hollywood cinema including so called remarriage comedies provided many sources of inspiration for strongly independent female characters. The last two influences are discussed by John Orr, in ‘Bergman, Nietzsche, Hollywood’, in Koskinen, M. (ed.) (2008) *Ingmar Bergman Revisited: Performance, Cinema and the Arts*, Great Britain: Wallflower Press, pp.143-160.
5 Revenge and reparation in *The Virgin Spring*

*The Virgin Spring*, released in 1960, depicts the rape and murder of Karin, daughter of Töre and Märeta by wild goat herders, as she seeks to take the Virgin’s candles to Mass on the day of Christ’s sacrifice. The film was based on a Swedish 13th century ballad, ‘The Daughter of Töre in Vange’, which had many previous versions in countries using Romance languages.¹ Steene points out that the version used in this film had a particularly Swedish identity because only in this country was the theme of Christian redemption added to the story.² Bergman had been interested in the story since studying at university, and had even considered making a ballet from it, but finally worked with Ulla Isaksson’s script.³

Despite generally positive reviews in Sweden *The Virgin Spring* was met with anxiety by an editorial in a Swedish newspaper, which built on the sense of scandal already introduced by the censorship of the rape scene in the American version.⁴ When Olof Lagecrantz criticised the film and the reviewers who had praised it, in his editorial, a debate ensued for one month.⁵ The film won an Oscar as best foreign picture but subsequently has received a mixed response from critics and historians writing about Bergman’s work.⁶ One way in which the film has been praised subsequently is its historical veracity. Geoffrey MacNab writes: ‘With relatively limited resources and a budget that was extremely modest by Hollywood standards he had managed to recreate the medieval world in an utterly convincing fashion.’⁷ Some of the most sympathetic analyses of the film, such as that produced by Wood, praise the combination of a realistic style and symbolic elements.⁸ On the one hand, Wood observed the use of symbols in the film such as ‘the mystical number three’ used in a number of ways: the three goat herders, the three dead men heard by the beggar, the three branches felled by Töre. On the other hand, Wood appreciated the representation of material reality: ‘the sense of life lived close to the basic physical realities, with little to soften or screen….Physical experience is consistently vivid…’.⁹ This viewpoint contrasts with the generally negative reaction to this film described by Hubner: ‘Bergman’s popularity plummeted across Europe and America. *The Virgin Spring* was loathed as *The Seventh Seal* had been loved.’¹⁰

Hubner also indicates that the film’s status was in fact part of a wider picture. For
instance, she points out that the criticisms were directed at Bergman’s other films in this period, *The Face* of 1958 and *The Devil’s Eye* 1960.\(^{11}\) Hubner points out that there was a backlash against Bergman’s use of symbolism, but comments that in fact he had made diverse kinds of film before this spate of allegorical works.

Summarising the reaction against the symbolism, which various critics thought tired and pretentious, Hubner quotes Penelope Gilliat from the *Observer* in 1961:

‘Bergman is still sowing his wild strawberries and symbolic devices abound.’\(^{12}\) In contrast to this critical backlash my analysis will side with the sympathetic critics like Wood and argue that the film’s interest lies in its creative combination of ‘realistic’ elements with a more imaginative symbolic style. In order to do this it is necessary to look in detail at the stylistic organisation of the film which includes recognising elements already noted in Bergman’s films: a style that draws on a range of cinematic influences including; silent cinema; an understanding of how elements held in common with theatre, including mise-en-scene and acting can be used to greatest effect; and a commitment to the idea of the open text traced in previous chapters to Bazin and the Sartrean concept of imagination. Various commentaries and elements of film theory will contribute to this positive re-evaluation of the film.

Bordwell’s analysis of art cinema provides a useful starting point for contextualising the film. Bordwell’s focus on narration involves close analysis of film form. In his account of art cinema he states: ‘The art cinema motivates its narratives by two principles: realism and authorial expressivity.’\(^{13}\) This provides an initial match with the idea that *The Virgin Spring* is a combination of realism and, in the eyes of the negative critics, over-wrought symbolism, in which Bergman repeats his own formula. Bordwell explains that in the ‘art cinema’ realism included use of ‘real locations’, ‘contemporary alienation’ and in various examples a notably overt treatment of sexuality. ‘Most important, the art cinema uses “realistic” - that is, psychologically complex-characters.’\(^{14}\) With *The Virgin Spring* we will see how stylistic elements are designed to produce ‘psychologically complex characters’. Bordwell also insists on the significance of ‘ambiguity’ in the art cinema, which avoids clear-cut meaning. While this does not seem completely apposite for *The Virgin Spring* because the latter appears to have a more directly religious message than other Bergman works, nevertheless closer analysis reveals that this religious message is open to debate. One analysis which notes a certain amount of ambiguity
is that of Marc Gervais, who enthuses about the spirituality of the conclusion, and then suggests that this may be the voice of Isaksson rather than Bergman:

…Bergman may well have had misgivings all along about the film’s lacking a voice steeped in contemporary irony, the Christian affirmation ringing out so strong that it excludes the Sartrean pole of the existentialist dialectic. We may indeed be hearing far more of Ulla Isaksson’s voice than Ingmar Bergman’s. 15

Gervais is one of many, who locate elements of ambiguity, unconscious and conscious, in this film’s final message. Steene, for instance, summed up The Virgin Spring as ‘a strange hybrid of a film, in which psychological modernisms - as for instance the Freudian approach to Märeta ... jars with the director’s ritual conception of the story.’ 16 Appreciation of ambiguity in the text is usefully supplemented by the concepts of alignment and affiliation used by Murray Smith. His analysis of cinema depends on recognising the way the text cues a moral response as part of the viewer’s imaginative and emotional engagement. Thus, Smith distinguishes between alignment, which refers to the viewer’s proximity with a character (through point-of-view shots, for instance) and allegiance, which describes our moral evaluation of the character. The latter means that the film affords the viewer an opportunity to think of the film world as a social microcosm such that an assessment can be made of how one character compares to another, and although this may be affected by alignment it does not have to be. As Smith explains:

To become allied with a character, the spectator must evaluate the character as representing a morally desirable (or at least preferable) set of traits, in relation to other characters within the fiction. 17

This perspective puts content on an equal level with form as part of the film experience. Characters are made more or less sympathetic by, for instance, their actions towards others. In The Virgin Spring the revenge taken by Töre against the goat herders involves significant alignment with him. We witness his close relationship to his daughter, we have knowledge before him about the terrible crime, we are given a close view of his emotional response when he discovers the truth and we are given a fully detailed account of his preparations for the revenge. In following
his responses and actions formal mechanisms such as camera angles focussed on his movements produce a strong alignment of the narrative with this character. However, his decision to kill the young boy is designed by Isaksson and Bergman to challenge our allegiance with Töre’s revenge quest, and this emerges through Töre’s guilt and his relationship to other characters including the young boy he kills.

Smith’s concepts of alignment and allegiance can accommodate much of the ambiguity in the film but in the precise attention to the way a cognitive response is elicited from the viewer we may miss the symbolic undercurrents of this work. For a number of critics psychoanalytical theory has a particular purchase on this film. For example, Wood says when discussing the final outcome of the narrative: ‘The motivation behind Töre’s revenge is slightly suspect, let alone the morality of the action: haven’t the goatherds done to his daughter what he subconsciously wanted to do...’18 Through the analysis I will show how Kleinian theory adds to this focus on desire and the Oedipal scenario. I will argue that the story of redemption can also be understood as a process of reparation. As in the case of Summer with Monika, it is important to recognise how stylistic variation and ingenuity deepens the emotional reach of this reparation. Thus, Kleinian theory is bound up with the skill and artistry of not only Bergman but all the creative contributions to this work. Kleinian theory as we have seen provides a particular perspective on ambiguity, noticing how this may express an overcoming of rigid Manichean boundaries of good and evil. The analysis will include observations of the lighting patterns in this work, which create a rich level of ambiguity. The usual starting point for analysis of the lighting is to note how Sven Nykvist replaced Gunnar Fischer as Bergman’s cameraman for The Virgin Spring and went on to create with Bergman a more realistic style of lighting.19 Fischer had been very successful in incorporating symbolic lighting effects but, in this, Nykvist’s second film with Bergman, we can notice a symbolic level as patterns of light and shade connote a synthesis of morality and emotion that invites interpretation. The bright sunlight in which Karin is attacked makes the crime more startling. While Töre’s slaughter of the goat herders is carried out at dawn, with deep shadows conveying a sinister half-light that fits his actions. Nykvist and Bergman do not replicate the cliché of light signifying goodness, and shadows as threatening, but instead evoke shifting ideas of purity and evil whilst maintaining realistic motivation for the lighting effects. Thus, moral evaluation is made part of a process, not
represented as a given and not symbolised through melodramatic imagery.

Kleinian theory is sensitive to the range of stylistic elements because it involves, as we have seen in relation to Summer with Monika, a focus on integration. The narrative must achieve coherence not at the level of wish fulfilment as in ‘the happy ending’ but instead aesthetic range brought into harmony can allow a more fruitful release of negative emotion. A fine example of aesthetic analysis informed by this sensibility is Wollheim’s analysis of Pablo Picasso’s work which argues that Picasso sought to balance a concentration on the power of the eye with a focus on representing ‘touch’ through, for example, depictions of shape and texture.²⁰ Bergman’s work is also concerned with achieving an internal balance that, nevertheless, allows the full expression of disequilibrium. A striking image, which is relevant here, is that of Töre having murdered the boy who holds his hands in front of his face, asking for God’s judgement.²¹ This conveys the theme of Töre’s split between Paganism and Christianity, but also has further significance. The focus on Töre’s hands is consistent with a close attention to physical acting throughout the film. Just as we find a fluid exploration of light and dark, disequilibrium and balance are expressed through the representation of the body as a complex source of meaning alongside other stylistic elements such as point-of-view and dialogue. The creative orchestration of different elements in patterns of alternation, repetition, echoing and foregrounding found throughout Bergman’s work can be compared to the Kleinian belief in formal coherence and patterning as a medium for catharsis.²² The complexity is related to the artist’s need to release emotion, which in turn offers the viewer a cathartic experience.

I will argue that, as with Summer with Monika, understanding this film as an expression of reparation involves recognising the representation of social conflict and injustice. We are drawn into a theatre of power relations within the family structure. More than in the Freudian model, but in a way that Klein attends to, we also recognise the symbolic significance of the mother. In fact social conflict and the position of motherhood come together in the role of Ingeri (played by Gunnel Lindbloom). This character, and her marginalisation, are striking additions to the original ballad and create a psychological context for the representation of the goat herders’ crime. Another significant change was that the miracle arose after the
revenge, whereas in the ballad it had been immediate: ‘They severed then her lovely head/A spring welled up upon that stead.’

The rape and murder scene in *The Virgin Spring* appears to show pure evil. For the period in which it was made it is a very direct representation of rape and murder. In this it is not as brutal as the original ballad but, nevertheless, aims to capture the horror in that original ballad through the level of visual detail. The self-conscious legendary quality of this crime reworked for the twentieth century suggests that Bergman and Isaksson were aiming for a grand symbolic statement about evil. For this reason I will refer to Klein’s discussion of evil in *Othello*, and Donner’s argument that this is a film dealing with the presence of evil in twentieth century Europe. Isaksson, the screenwriter, said that ultimately she wanted to inspire sympathy for all the characters, a clear invocation of the concept of reparative ethics. She stated: ‘The three criminals are not totally evil. On the whole we emphasise that the spectators have pity for all the people in this film.’ This can be compared to the humanistic ambition of Klein’s writing about criminal psychology:

> One of the great problems about criminals, which has always made them incomprehensible to the rest of the world, is their lack of natural human good feelings; but this lack is only apparent.

Thus, Klein sets out her belief about how criminality involves a distortion and deflection of positive instincts.

However, the presentation of this scene could still leave the viewer in such a state of revulsion as to endorse Töre’s revenge. This is a prime example of the film’s ambiguity, its possibility of different readings. The Kleinian model, and the link between Ingeri and the crime mean that one possible reading is to understand the crime in relation to the unconscious phantasy of an attack on the maternal body. Klein supplements Freud’s emphasis on the power of male sexuality (the phallus) and its displacement, by arguing that there is even more obsessive unconscious obsession with the maternal body and its incorporation of invasion by the phallus. This obsession is manifest in the enigma and neglect surrounding Ingeri’s pregnancy, Ingeri’s demonic fascination with the possibility of a sexual violation of Karin, the symbolism of the toad in the bread, and the psychotic combination of lust and
violence from the elder goat herders. The focus on the maternal body in Kleinian theory suggests that we should link these elements in the text. The Kleinian theory of integration leads to a subtle appreciation of the myriad ways in which this unconscious phantasy may be shaped through art to provide catharsis and self-realisation, the latter being a process that parallels the freedom that Sartre invokes as an authentic response to alienation. It could be argued, however, that Sartre’s work leads to a stronger understanding of the social context of the violence depicted because of a stronger focus on individual motivation in the characters.

Here I turn to the influence of Sartre and existentialism. This influence is not direct but has been noted by various commentaries. As noted, Gervais sees a curious mix of existentialism and the religious expression from Isaksson, but it is Donner who focuses more on the social message of the text. Donner, in his sympathetic response written in 1962, thinks that this is a work that represents destructive social forces in a way that shows the influence on Bergman of European modernists such as Sartre, as well as a range of Swedish intellectual influences.26 The psychoanalytic and existential elements represent instability in this historical setting. Donner argues convincingly that we need to look beyond the historical realism and consider this as a work that raises questions relevant to the world in which it was made. At the stylistic level he is critical of the dialogue but praises the impassive camerawork in the rape scene, which he feels successfully maintains the impersonal voice of the ballad. Within his analysis is also the idea that the use of static camera and long take involve Bazinian openness so that the viewer must play a more active role in interpreting the material. Donner argues that:

The remarkable thing is that of all B[ergman]’s films The Virgin Spring comes closest to the European experience of evil. As a parable of our time’s destructive forces, the film is more successful than several of B[ergman]’s tales of the present.27

Donner is not just talking about the representation of Swedish society but instead, at a very general level, about the trauma of twentieth century European history. He argues that due to Bergman’s lack of direct experience of the horrors of war, which directly influenced the work of European intellectuals like Sartre, Bergman needed
the artifice provided by a medieval context. For Donner, the relevance of existentialism lies in the representation of social conflict through the plight of individual characters. He makes a contrast between Bergman and Bertolt Brecht, arguing that the chief difference lies in the former’s focus on the individual’s inner world, which is nonetheless expressive of alienation from contemporary society.\textsuperscript{28} We can see how this relates to Sartre’s insistence on intentionality, a phenomenological underpinning of his belief that subjectivity is, in some way, irreducible. In ‘Existentialism is a Humanism’ he argues that it is precisely this subjective isolation that we all share and thus forms an important platform for morality.\textsuperscript{29} There are some key moments in \textit{The Virgin Spring}, which are particularly evocative of the existential focus on isolation, including Töre’s angst ridden speech to God.

Paisley Livingston’s work on Bergman proves insightful here. He analyses specific images in Bergman’s work, which relate to Sartre’s theory of shame because the character shown looking in the mirror experiences a sense of exposure before the onlooker. Livingston argues that Bergman is preoccupied with the primacy of a very similar emotional state to shame, frequently manifested as humiliation. Drawing on Bergman’s comments in interview, Livingston points to the director’s belief that shame and humiliation can lead to a vicious circle, which institutionalises violence. In interview Bergman stated: ‘The person humiliated asks himself constantly how he will be able, in turn, to humiliate someone else. It is one of the most terrible poisons that exists today.’\textsuperscript{30} Livingston also says that this humiliation can be part of a process of re-orientation to society and suggests that both Sartre and Bergman recognise this:

Sartre, in his dramatic descriptions of the violent conflict between consciousnesses, speaks of an ‘internal haemorrhage’ in which the order of the subject’s entire perceptual field is disturbed. It is correct to emphasize in this manner the critical nature of the interaction, but the crisis has a double nature: as confusion, it brings the momentary disruption of the self’s stability, as decision it suggests that emotions such as humiliation also serve to resolve the conflict.\textsuperscript{31}

Livingston argues that for Bergman the artist has a particular affinity with the emotional experience of humiliation, and can therefore articulate the social problems
involved, and may sometimes express the terms of a solution. He writes:

> Attempting to find alternatives to the various masks of humiliation, Bergman rejects the illusion of individualism and implies that a genuine realization of self occurs not in a flight from others but within the context of a community.\(^{32}\)

A parallel humanistic concern with the possibilities for progressive development allied to acute observation of alienation is part of the Kleinian tradition with its emphasis on achieving the ethics of the depressive position. Furthermore, Alford’s argument that Kleinian aesthetics encourages the viewer to compare the resolution of a narrative with his/her own situation applies here. This approach corresponds with Donner’s argument that the rape scene in *The Virgin Spring* is shocking in order to provoke the audience into reflection on their own society.

**Ingeri’s plot/Karin’s journey**

In the opening scene shadowy light is deployed to heighten mystery and the intensity of Ingeri longing for the intervention from the pagan Norse God, Odin.\(^{33}\) As Ingeri lights the fire the flames are like a hell being raised. Ingeri looks continually beyond the space into the abstract space of her imagination, but also to check whether she is alone as she tries to summon her God. There is a balance between the sense conveyed of Ingeri’s inner world, including her pregnancy, and her dreams of Odin’s assistance, with the observations of her external surrounding. The integration of diverse elements in the artwork provides a guide to this scene’s expressive range.

The off-screen sound of the cockerel is used to signify the external setting and the hour in a way that engages the viewer’s imagination, whilst Ingeri’s look brings us back to the immediacy of her subjective experience. The intensity of Ingeri’s gaze is matched by her posture as she grasps the pole in her prayer to Odin.

The juxtaposition of Ingeri’s imagined off-screen deity, and the medium close-up, at the start of the second scene, which depicts a statue representing Christ’s sorrow on the cross, conveys conflicting metaphysical ideas. The juxtaposition means that the figure of Christ seems momentarily to fill the imaginary space that Ingeri communicated with. As a result the internal conflict of two different beliefs is suggested at the level of image. In these opening scenes we are presented with a culture in which anxiety and obedience to a religious authority are key elements.
Töre and Märeta are first shown penitent in their appeal to the Lord. The atmosphere of submission is dramatised as we witness Märeta’s urge to pour hot candle wax across her arm as a sign of her respect for Christ’s suffering and Töre’s intervention to restrain her. According to Donner, the film represents Töre’s difficulty in living with his Christianity, and on this reading part of the thematic tension resides in the representation of religious values in transition - Töre is an early convert to Christianity who reverts to more primitive beliefs in the revenge he exacts later in the story. Whilst the idea of conflicting religious systems is a key theme, from a psychoanalytic perspective we can see a comparison between Ingeri’s beliefs and the Christianity of Töre’s community. For Freud, the concept of the super-ego is an internalised authority figure that may be personified by God or another powerful figure such as the patriarch. Looking again at the opening sections of the film, one experiences not so much the contrast between Ingeri’s paganism and the Christian devotion of Töre and Märeta, but the comparison. In both situations the appeal is to an authoritarian master. This is conveyed partly through character movement. Ingeri looks up with a passionate face, searching for ‘service’ from Odin. In the succeeding scenes she carries out her chores ritualistically, her body directed by a system of rules she does not control. Töre and Märeta move ritualistically, devout in their belief system, whilst their faces are pensive.

Klein focuses acutely on the impact of the super-ego on the infant. In 1934 using her research on infancy to discuss adult criminality she wrote:

In the early sadistic phase, which every individual normally passes through, the child protects himself against his fear of his violent objects, both introjected and external, by redoubling his attacks upon them in his imagination; his aim in thus getting rid of his objects is in part to silence the intolerable threats of his super-ego.

For Klein, anxiety is related to a threat from both an external and internal authority. It appears that Ingeri invests in the internal authority of Odin because she has been punished and victimised. Reduced to a slave status and ostracised, her response at the level of imagination is to a god who will produce even more punishment but visited upon Karin. This reinforces the idea that Odin is a rival super-ego figure to both the Christian God and the paternal authority figure of Töre. Since Karin has the aura of the fairytale princess Ingeri’s hatred incorporates what Klein and Freud identified as
the death drive, an externalisation of internal hatred in direct opposition to the beauty of Karin who is the main source of pleasure for her religious parents.

Sartre’s analysis of power relations accords with this psychoanalytic analysis. As Livingston showed, in Sartre’s account of the look, in *Being and Nothingness*, alienation is created by the internalisation of the other. What is most relevant here is the role that Sartre assigns to shame. As Tarja Laine puts it: ‘For Sartre, it is through the experience of shame that the subject is revealed to him - or herself as existing for others.’\(^{38}\) For Sartre, a key to the experience of shame is that one is seen by the other and this feeling of being watched is translated into an awareness of shared humanity: being-with-others. In this sense shame can be said to have an ontological status, it lies at the foundation of being. Although shame becomes much more significant later in the transformation of the young goat herder, Ingeri, Töre and Märeta, it is evident at the beginning as the characters submit to an external authority. This is a shame culture in which the characters feel that they are overseen by the vision of a metaphysical authority. The screenwriter and Bergman challenge this with a more compassionate form of shame in the conclusion to the story, reworking the Christian theme of tragedy and redemption. As Klein explains in the quote above, and very regularly throughout her work, emotions take hold at an unconscious level and this impacts on the individual’s imaginative world, but also their perception of external reality. Ingeri’s emotions are governed by her imagination but also are the result of what she perceives, and this leads her to change as the narrative progresses. Thus the combination of realism and an imaginative symbolic style serve psychological exposition.

Gado’s psychoanalytic account of the film argues that Ingeri is related to Bergman’s own sense of guilt. Ingeri’s progression toward shame about her hatred repeats, according to Gado, a continuous theme in Bergman films where characters play out an abiding sense of guilt, which is related to sexual impulses. Bergman, having been a favoured child, suffered acutely this sense of shame and translated this into his characters, both male and female.\(^{39}\) But we should also recognise that the film represents a wider sphere than Bergman’s psyche. Ingeri was added by Isaksson to the original ballad.\(^{40}\) An immediate consequence is to introduce stronger ideas of social and cultural conflict. Ingeri is in conflict with the rest of the household.
Shockingly her pregnancy is ignored, not even talked about. This is clearly a theme deliberately introduced by Isaksson, who previously worked with Bergman on *Close to Life* (1958), a film about three pregnant women in hospital, and the subject is handled skilfully so that the viewer is left to recognise the prejudice rather than hearing this overtly voiced. Ingeri is represented as wild, a lower form of being, with reminders of the savage state reached by Monika in the film of 1953.

The introduction of the main characters creates an awareness of the power relationships in Töre’s household. When they gather for the evening meal the pictorial style echoes a religious tableau. The reverence of this shared space is undermined by the underlying sense of conflict manifest in the marginalisation of Ingeri, who is present like a Judas, and yet also like a grateful member of a slave class. Töre controls the situation but there are intimations of an underlying instability. Töre’s wife is haunted by the past and nightmares while Karin is talked about as a precious symbol, but one that might be tainted by proximity with her foster sister. The sense of religious purpose is the main source of hope as Märeta concurs with Töre’s decision that Karin should embark on a journey with the sacred candles.

The degree of alignment with Ingeri in the first half is striking, but our allegiance is gradually transformed as the narrative progresses so that the character becomes more sympathetic. In the first half of the story the character of Ingeri is partly represented as a villainess, and emotionally we appreciate her hate and venom directed towards her foster sister. Ingeri’s story is just one plot line in the film, but we gain special access to her private thoughts from the outset of the film, as she summons Odin. As the story unfolds the viewer realises something, that the characters being represented are innocent of, namely Ingeri’s malevolence towards Karin including her decision to place the toad inside her sister’s bread. The viewer’s access to the consciousness of Ingeri is intensified where we share her visual perspective. However, the alignment is not always presented straightforwardly. For instance, early in the narrative we realise that Ingeri is observing the mother and Frida, a more senior servant, in conversation about Karin, but this is conveyed by showing Ingeri in the background, rather than through her point-of-view. This shot conveys Ingeri’s marginalisation whilst cueing our awareness of her jealousy and hostility to Karin as the two women
discuss the latter.

Smith draws a distinction between films in which the allegiance is didactic and those where it is more gradual or subtle. Thus, the initial interplay between Töre and Märeta belongs to the more gradual variety of allegiance because it shows that each has protective feelings for their daughter. The presentation does not necessarily privilege Töre or Märeta as more or less sympathetic for the audience. Similarly, the presentation of Karin, with first her mother and then her father, refuses to convey a major conflict on which we are invited to take sides, but there are indications that Karin is spoilt and, on the other side, that she has a free and playful spirit. As the story evolves the emotional complexion of the film becomes complicated.

In addition to intimations of incest, the film deliberately leaves hidden the circumstances behind Ingeri’s pregnancy, and why she is Karin’s foster sister. The whole sense of a traumatic past about which the viewer cannot attain omniscient knowledge contributes to the psychoanalytical dimension. The focus on the present means the past is experienced as a set of emotional repercussions. The initial issue facing the family is Karin’s late rise on the day. There is an explicit sense that she has already transgressed with her dancing the previous night responsible for her late rise, and will face her father’s anger. Märeta conveys to her daughter the disapproval of Töre, but Karin with a sense of conviction responds that her father will understand when he sees her in the magnificent dress reserved for the special occasion of her journey to the church. Thus, understood psychoanalytically, Karin seeks to establish herself as a valued object, for the male gaze in particular.

The father’s response is genuinely caring, but male desire for Karin erupts in a massively destructive fashion in the later rape and murder, and this leads to the father’s violence towards the perpetrators. Thus, we can interpret the chain of events that link male desire and violence towards women. The theme of male violence and power is echoed in Ingeri’s worship of Odin. The suggestions of an incestuous relationship and the assertion of male power convey a Freudian scenario in which patriarchal power is dominant. This Freudian perspective is a matter of interpretation and perhaps the biggest reservation about it is the weight given to the role of the father. In fact, although Wood provides a Freudian reading perhaps he is more
convincing when he simply asserts that in *The Virgin Spring*: ‘…good and evil are like subterranean streams, potent, determining matters of life and death, but invisible and mysterious. No one is pure.’\(^{44}\) This observation is closer to Kleinian theory in which unconscious development is seen as a process in which the subject is overtaken by projections of good and evil and must work through this to recognise ambivalence and ambiguity.\(^{45}\)

Kleinian theory provides a useful extension of the focus on desire and the Oedipal scenario. The focus in Klein’s work on primitive needs related to the mother and the first experiences of food can be compared to the emphasis in this film on Töre and Märeta’s home as a source of nourishment for an extended family. Early in the film, Ingeri is instructed to prepare the milk, which then sits centre stage at the morning meal from which everybody feeds. As already noted, despite the nourishment everyone receives, under the surface there is a disturbance signified by Ingeri’s discontent as well as other signs of emotional trauma. This is carried forward to Ingeri’s decision to secretly insert the toad into Karin’s bread. In medieval life the toad symbolised the devil but also sexuality.\(^{46}\) This contamination of the food is vital to the film’s meaning since the rape and murder are linked to, if not caused by, the toad’s appearance. In Kleinian theory ‘introjection’ is a crucial concept, which conveys the process of internalising both good and bad objects.\(^{47}\) The toad, hidden inside the food, demonises this process and so, it could be said that, the way is paved for psychosis and the evil is externalised. Thus, Ingeri’s primitive appeal to Odin and the spell she hopes to achieve with the frog appears to succeed.

Klein’s emphasis on female agency is also relevant. In this story female actions are immediately centre stage in the prominence given to Ingeri. As Cowie notes, her character retains a sensuality.\(^{48}\) Her hostility to Karin is wrapped up in feelings about how her own sexuality was exploited by the male dominated world. On their journey Ingeri confronts Karin, arguing that she too will receive the effects of male desire as a destructive power. Ingeri is a victim of the patriarchal society but has been cast aside. Her words to Karin express the view that Karin cannot escape the same fate. She alludes to Karin’s flirtation with various men. In this way female desire is incorporated as an element in a story, which is fundamentally about the demonic possibility of violence related to male desire.
Klein’s discussion of envy provides further understanding. Envy according to Klein is one of the most destructive emotions surpassing jealousy. While the latter is resentment about what the other possesses envy, according to Klein, goes much further in its destructiveness. The other’s possession of goodness must be destroyed. This aim is ascribed by Märeta to the devil, as she combs her daughter's hair. Asked by her daughter, why she talks of the devil while Töre does not, Märeta says: ‘Because he is the seducer of the innocent. He strives to destroy all goodness.’ This appears to be a premonition of the attack on Karin whilst developing the theme of moral and psychological debasement, as well as characterising the devil in a manner akin to Klein’s account of envy.

A key example for Klein is Iago. She draws attention to the way he finds it disgusting to look at love between other people (Othello and Desdemona) but in its place yearns and schemes for a debased alternative. In a sense this describes Ingeri’s hatred directed towards Karin. One scene, for instance, gives us a clear sense of Ingeri’s hostility aligned with her point-of-view, as Karin meets one of the men she danced with the previous night. This man may be the father of Ingeri’s child. Karin herself could be accused of stirring envy in Ingeri at this point through her flirtation but also the restriction of information means that Ingeri appears to be projecting her emotions on to Karin, even willing the archetypal princess figure towards an obscene alternative to the innocent affection she displays. Ingeri wants the sexuality of Karin’s relationships with men to become explicit and believes that in this process Karin will suffer. In this way her project could be compared with that of Iago as she seeks to ‘contaminate’ her rival’s mind leading into ‘deterioration’.

We also have to take into account the Kleinian awareness of how paranoid-schizoid processes including envy may be surpassed by a greater appreciation of ambiguity in the other. Iago is a key example for Klein because he is incapable of this development, as Robert Caper explains:

Iago is perhaps unique in Shakespeare’s work because he lacks ambivalence and ambiguity and seems therefore more like a representative of pure, malicious envy as a psychological force - a part object - than like a real human being.
Ingeri therefore is ultimately quite different from Iago. She simply appeals to a
metaphysical entity instead of scheming and cultivating the envy in Karin that she
herself feels. In this way the film shows the projection of envy, which in the case of
*Othello* is hidden behind Iago’s efficacy as a villain. He is a villain who really
intervenes instead of willing this from a supernatural entity. It is clear that Ingeri has
doubts and anxiety about her malevolent wishes towards Karin. Meanwhile, Karin’s
class privilege raises questions about how Ingeri was marginalised in the first place.
Klein makes it clear how these emotions are developed through social interaction,
fuelled by processes of projection by which characters superimpose their own
emotions on to others. Desperate about her own pregnancy and its circumstances,
Ingeri appears to displace her own internal problems on to Karin or, to be more
exact, on to her vision of a pagan metaphysical retribution against her foster sister,
thus inflicting harm on the parents and the social order that she is ostracised from.
The mise-en-scene reinforces the contrast between the sisters: Ingeri’s poverty in her
plain clothes and the special status of Karin in her dress which Märeta tells us ‘was
stitched by fifteen maidens’ signifies the contrast between their different religious
faiths and their social status.

The imaginative and open-ended qualities of the film lay the ground for the
transformation of Ingeri and ultimately the existential crisis of Töre. Diverse aspects
of the style contribute to the aesthetic distance from the original ballad. The dialogue
plays an important part in this opening up of characterisation in place of the direct
economical omniscience of the original. In the original we are told: ‘First she was
three herdsmen’s wife/Then she gave up her young life/They took her by the golden
birch/and placed her against a branchless.’\(^5\) In contrast to this focus on the event a
whole world of subjective nuances is introduced in the lead up to the crime. Karin
agrees to make the journey to church telling her mother: ‘How demurely I’ll ride to
Church. And Tawny’s hooves will trot as though on a pilgrimage.’

Karin has a playful air and a dreamlike naivety. In this, she parallels other young
characters in Bergman films who express a different existential reality because they
make us aware of their unique perspective.\(^5\) Here, it is as if Karin is momentarily the
narrator, but her power and independence will be crushed by the savage reality that

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she cannot anticipate. In other parts of the dialogue we can also find a pattern of talking that contrasts with the single omniscient voice of the original ballad, turning the characters themselves into intermittent storytellers. Treating his daughter with affection, Töre teases her with the punishment she should receive for her audacity in challenging his authority: ‘I’ll ride to the mountains with this wicked maid and imprison her in the mountain for seven years. When she is chastened I’ll take her back.’ Here Töre’s speech echoes that of a storyteller, whilst taking the story into the first person. In the scene that follows, the beggar who has travelled beyond the homestead, responds to Frida in the mode of a storyteller: ‘A bird on the wing finds food. A bird on the roost dies. I’ve seen women and churches.’ Here he is justifying to Frida his decision to flee the town, a brief allusion to some form of persecution about which we learn no more.

In these examples the dialogue provides a background but also opens up a different perspective from the historical authenticity of the mise-en-scene. The cumulative effect of this, self-conscious, story telling speech links the medieval setting to a more modern, self-conscious, sense of narrative and narration. This relates to Sartre’s insistence on the central role of subjectivity in creating meaning. Isaksson made clear her desire to inject realism into the story through the dialogue, but these fragments also show an interest in modes of stylised, subjective narration that are different from the quest for verisimilitude.

Another key to the film’s style is the mise-en-scene of the Swedish countryside and dwellings inhabited by Töre and his household. The landscape and setting for the main part maintain an impressive verisimilitude, although even an ardent fan of the film like Donner is critical of some of the interiors. However, the historical authenticity of the detail is not an end in-itself, but inevitably contributes to the representation of emotion and social context. Despite the patriarchal authority of Töre his household is not one of massively accumulated wealth and resources. The harshness of the setting is exemplified early on when we see Ingeri travel between the different buildings of this establishment, which are poised on a dramatic slope covered in thick mud. The graphic presentation of the diagonal line of the incline economically conveys the modesty of the farm’s status. When Karin and Ingeri set forth the landscape is in contrast magnificently expansive. As they leave the
beggar/storyteller’s words evoke the idea of legendary journey. Shown in long shot, we see the forests stretching in to the distance glowing in the sunlight. At this point the film appears to fit the mould of a classic National cinema in which landscape is a heritage background. Given the earlier intimations of foreboding, the freedom offered by the sunlit countryside, at this stage, appears only to be a temporary counterpoint to the evil that will emerge from it.

The Kleinian preoccupation with restructuring Manichean patterns through emotional development parallels the aesthetic patterns developed through lighting in mise-en-scene. Throughout the opening sections of the film, intimations of purity, on the one hand, and foreboding on the other, are conveyed in such a way that the viewer cannot be sure where goodness and security lie. The collaboration between cinematographer and director is evident in the shifts in lighting engineered in some of the early scenes. After the flickering shadows, that surround the characters in the first scenes, bright light is introduced, as Frida releases a group of chicks that she is protecting in her dress. Frida talks about the way these chicks symbolise life. We cannot think about the optimism of the bright light here outside the context of a world that already seems troubled. Maybe, both Bergman and Nykvist draw on their respective experiences of religious upbringing in their inclination to incorporate Manichean oppositions in the lighting schemes, but they are also both committed to avoiding cliche.

The fact that the lighting carries ambiguity is shown by the scene in which Karin is raised from bed by her mother. The bright light here contrasts with the shadows surrounding Ingeri in the previous scene. However, Karin’s status as the fairytale princess is slightly challenged by her arguments with Märeta about the previous night. Her mother is concerned that she may lose her purity. Karin herself shows signs of narcissism, gazing at her image in the water, and asking her mother not to block the light. The shadows of the mother and Karin in this scene are not pronounced. Karin stands brightly lit as her mother straightens the hair. However, when her father arrives and agrees to Karin’s request that Ingeri join her on the journey, shadows are cast across the face of both Töre and Karin. Again, care is taken to naturalise this with the accompanying mise-en-scene. Nevertheless, a mood of uncertainty is evoked through this light. The film-makers do not seek the sense of
inevitable doom that might seem appropriate to the authoritative voice of the ballad’s narration. Instead, as the film progresses, we are engaged more strongly by the moment, by possible and contingent shifts of meaning suggested through the lighting patterns.

Without over-elaboration, the journey through the Swedish landscape conveys directly the mood of uncertainty, already represented by the lighting and dialogue as the women travel into the forest. Despite the realism of period re-creation, the journey suggests a dreamlike path towards the evil forces that await. This point can also be extended to the soundtrack, which at the start of the journey accumulates three elemental sounds. These include a mixture of diegetic and non-diegetic sources. So, as the women travel past the lake, we hear the sound of the cuckoo, gentle flute music and the sound of the water.\(^5\) Throughout the film, imaginative allusion, beyond what can be seen, is used in conjunction with a realistic style. However, as we approach the violent attack on Karin, it might be asserted that this principle is abandoned. I will argue, nevertheless, that the transition from a more expressive style to a reserved realistic detachment is used as a strategy to maximise an imaginative engagement with the material from the ballad.

The journey continues interspersed with confrontations between Ingeri and Karin. Karin demonstrates more empathy than other characters in asking Ingeri about her pregnancy, the first time this is mentioned. Ingeri however is concentrated in her hostility and verbally tries to undermine what she sees as Karin’s haughty belief that she can escape predatory men. In this way the story relates gender to power and violence in the society. The next time they stop, Karin is provoked by Ingeri’s assertion that Karin will be sexually attacked. Karin slaps Ingeri across the face, an action which contrasts with the massive increase in physical violence, directed at Karin later.

When the women arrive at the house of a one-eyed man various elements evoke an imaginative reading of the situation including the sudden appearance of a crow, in close-up, beak open screaming to the camera. This Bergmanesque motif (a crow is used in similar fashion in other works such as *The Magician*) contributes a sinister symbolism, incorporated in the narrative development. The forest dweller is
introduced looking out at his visitors from his abode daubed in animal skins. Following the representation of his point-of-view the man suddenly appears in frame taking Karin’s horse. Ingeri looks on as Karin crosses the water and her face, in medium close-up, registers extreme anxiety. This appears as a pre-reflective embodied state of anxiety, caused by guilt for her appeals to Odin that an evil fate should befall Karin. She rushes across the stream. The imagery of water foreshadows the final transformation of consciousness achieved through the miracle of the spring. Ingeri is still in a very divided state, unable to articulate the danger except through a fairytale mode of primitive superstition saying: ‘The forest is so black. I can’t go on.’ Karin departs, having arranged for Ingeri to stay with the old man for rest. When he asks whether Ingeri is in labour her melodramatic response, ‘No, much worse’ suggests a spiritual malaise brought on by her evil wishes directed towards Karin. From Ingeri’s visual perspective, we see Karin receding into the striped shadows and sunlight in the forest whilst the space she occupied is filled by bright light.

Having accepted the man’s offer of assistance Ingeri finds herself in the strange space of his abode sitting on a throne like chair with water streaming in the background and a water gate in the foreground. Her expression returns to an awareness of metaphysical horror. The man talks to Ingeri now as if he has godlike power: ‘I hear what mankind whispers in secret and I see what it believes no one can hear.’ He seems to offer the pact with evil that she desired from Odin. Ingeri’s look off-screen echoes her appeal to Odin in the first scene. She wonders about the off-screen sound of thunder and the man tells her that it is ‘the sound of three dead men riding north.’ Rather than maintaining a narrative distance the film-making includes subjectivity because the sound of hooves is heard alluding both to metaphysical presence and Ingeri’s subjective state of belief in these evil powers. The man now appears far more sinister with his collection of strange objects including human and animal body parts. These, it seems, will be used for a primitive abortive operation on Ingeri or to cast a pagan spell. She is suddenly gripped by fear as he starts to hold her, and expresses her anxiety that he has made a human sacrifice for Odin, the very event that she appears to have called for.

The theme of Odin’s power shows again the grip on Ingeri’s imagination of a powerful authority figure, now embodied by this man. For Klein, the paranoid-
schizoid position involves such fierce attacks on the body in imagination that it is split into parts. Thus, through her apprehension of a human sacrifice Ingeri becomes more conscious of destructive power. The concept of projective identification is relevant because in this scene we see how the individual casts his/her apprehension of evil on to the ‘other’. The man appeals to Ingeri that they have long known each other. This expression of intimacy is like the action of a cult follower, but also conveys the idea that in their shared worship of Odin, the man and Ingeri are no longer independent people. Ingeri’s resources for expelling this invasion are stretched. There appears to be no resource of goodness for her to counter- pose to this fate. For Klein, anxiety is inevitable in the struggle to overcome an obsessive consciousness of being invaded by evil, and this is manifest as Ingeri breaks free. The film-makers clearly focus on the issue of gender here since the man’s actions convey the theme of violence against the female body. The fact that this theme does not become puritanical is because we are being presented with a process in which sexuality is not represented as dangerous, but instead its control by male violence is focussed on. The lack of puritanism is evident in the focus on Ingeri herself, her sensuous appearance and her emotional actions. The way this scene edges beyond dramatic verisimilitude towards a more surprising representation is confirmed when Ingeri escapes, and the drama is presented in a confusing manner such that the man’s face is suddenly in the foreground nearby, but passive like a totemic mask. As Ingeri rushes to reach Karin anticipation of tragedy is developed. Ingeri rushes after her foster sister, oblivious of the threat to her own child as she crashes through an area of woodland, thick with small plants and trees. From this we gain a greater sense of panic about the tragedy that will happen.

The murder of Karin
In the critical response of the Swedish newspaper editor, Olof Lagercrantz, to The Virgin Spring, there was an anxiety that the film-makers were substituting sensationalism for art. From a Kleinian perspective, however this scene is an integral element of the film’s representation, which implicates Ingeri and, if the interpretation is stretched further, the father and mother in the understanding of the crime. By refusing to fully deconstruct Ingeri’s paganism the film makes the psychological context of the crime more complex. Ingeri’s envy sits alongside the violence, lust and material craving of the goat herders. For Kleinian art theory, it is
vital that art becomes more serious than play, even though the latter already contains the key ingredients of artistic creativity. Thus, the crime juxtaposes Karin’s playful naivety with the violent instincts of the goat herders, and the artwork forces us to think beyond the confines of wishful subjectivity. Perception is reasserted as the apprehension of material reality which imagination failed to grasp. Karin and her parents in the trance of their religious subjectivity failed to anticipate the dangers of her journey. We will see how the camerawork draws on a realist aesthetic of long take, long shot, and static camera position to create a detachment, which allows the viewer to reflect on the deadly situation that leads to Karin’s death.

At the same time, the focus on intentionality is crucial for the morality of the scene. Whilst we can see that the goat herders are poor and live outside the benefits of society, as represented by Töre’s establishment; the preoccupation with their actions and the intent behind them means that Bergman and Isaksson appear to share Sartre’s conviction that, despite contextual factors, humans are always, at a certain level, responsible for their actions. As Sartre puts it: ‘Man is nothing else but that which he makes of himself. That is the first principle of existentialism.’ On the first page of this document Sartre explicitly contrasts his viewpoint with the naturalism of Emile Zola because he argues that an existentialist novel, unlike a naturalistic one, will confront the viewer with the responsibility of individual actions.

The goat herders are initially seen in the background of a shot. Immediately they are defined by their perception of Karin passing in the distance. One of the brothers runs forward into medium close-up, so that as we perceive his face in closer detail the intensity of his gaze towards Karin is registered. When he moves forward and out of shot, the other two goat herders come to occupy the position he just held, reinforcing the idea of the look and their vantage point as a dramatic action in-itself. The shot which follows shows Karin in profile on her horse reposing as the sun falls on her face. Her state of rest rhymes with the brothers’ fixed viewing positions in the quality of stasis, but no other shots are offered to contextualise the spatial relationship contributing to the enigma of how the brothers will advance. Here, Bergman’s style draws on key components of cinematic form established during the silent era. Follower and followed is one of the most formulaic narrative structures, which was dynamically used through the development, in the silent era, of rhythmical cross
cutting and used ever since. In this case, dramatic involvement is developed using this technique, but there is close attention to the locale which contrasts with the theatrical-like interiors, seen at other points in the film, such as the one-eyed man’s house from which Ingeri escaped. The goat herders creep up on Karin using their knowledge of the forest terrain. We see them look down again from high above as she passes below a hill. The camera position replicates the high angle but is significantly detached from their visual perspective. Here, alignment is not confused with affiliation. Condensation of the action means that suddenly the goat herders appear, passing Karin from the opposite direction rather than creeping up from behind. Thus, they give the appearance of meeting her accidentally. The moving camera, which alternates between her perspective and theirs, serves to create the irony that she is the one who stops, tricked into believing that they are innocent passers-by. In this way we are made more aware of their devious intentionality.

Despite the emphasis on intentionality the dialogue contributes a symbolic layer of meaning, which complicates the focus on materialistic forces of aggression and lust with reference to family relations. When Karin’s attention is caught by the goat herder’s instrument, one of them explains that it belonged to his father, adding: ‘who got it from his father’s father.’ The goat herder exploits Karin’s pity for them and she becomes more maternal, wondering about who cares for them. The theme of sharing food is also reminiscent of the family picnic in The Seventh Seal, where death haunts the idyll. Klein’s concern with the way the baby’s nourishment is invaded by psychic conflict parallels Bergman’s awareness of how the basic need for food is transformed by powerful forces that overcome the symbolic meaning of food as spiritual nourishment. The brother without a tongue seems to inspire Karin’s maternal instincts, in particular, but this also brings to the fore Bergman’s fascination with the range of meanings that can lie behind non-verbal communication.

Karin is still lost in a fairytale-like reverie, in which she jovially regales the brothers with exaggerated stories of her father’s wealth and her family status. The air of menace is introduced very suddenly so that it appears to break completely with this discourse. Karin innocently tells the brothers that they might be under the spell of a witch. There is a cut to Ingeri who looks on from a distant vantage point, her eyes expressing her intensity. As if her spell is enacted, suddenly medium close-ups of the
goat herders looking intently towards Karin register their malign intent. The abruptness of the juxtaposition with Karin’s discourse of privilege demonstrates that her fanciful words mean nothing in this situation and, yet also, it is as if the brothers are setting out to attack and destroy this privileged princess, reiterating the theme of Ingeri’s envy.

The goat herders are not obedient to any rule or law. In this, the film convincingly represents medieval savagery. Further meaning is added through the folkloric dialogue. Again, the magic number three is present as the fair-haired articulate goat herder translates three questions to Karin from the black-bearded, tongue-less goat herder. The sinister double meaning of the sexualised address to ‘her lady’ suggests that the goat herders’ attack is accompanied by a consciousness of inverting Karin’s princess-like status. In the manner referred to in Klein’s analysis of Iago, there is a desire on the part of the villain to spoil the beauty they perceive. Thus, in effect, there is the suggestion of an attack on the dominant social order from these violent outsiders, including Ingeri whose intentions are ambivalently directed towards eliciting the murderous action. The psychoanalytic theory of violence as developed by Freud and Klein is also relevant here because of its insistence on understanding the relation between aggression and libido. Klein follows Freud and argues that sadism is a fusion of the life and death instincts. The goat herders are driven by specific materialistic aims, but also the nature of the crime is made more shocking because of the combination of sexual assault and murder. The deadly fusion of different instincts is made manifest because they all attack her together. This is a re-working of the medieval ballad, which did not concentrate on the rape. Perhaps, Isaksson and Bergman cannot help but intimate psychoanalytic exploration of the relation between crime and desire and, as Donner suggests, they sought to shock a contemporary audience into reflection on the problem of evil.

A criticism of the film when it was released was that the aestheticisation of this scene was particularly problematic. However, close attention to the role of the virtually silent soundtrack, the use of cross cutting, carefully chosen mise-en-scene, camerawork and cinematography are vital here. Analysis of these stylistic elements shows how the film-makers’ intention is to engage the imagination whilst depicting the viciousness of the attack in a realistic fashion. The medium close-ups reveal the
changes in expression of the goat herders which alarm Karin, who loses her playful spirit. She asks the youngest goat herder to cut the bread returning to the innocence associated with food. The blackbearded goat herder picks up the knife suggesting that the crime is imminent, an action which Karin sees with rising anxiety. At this point the youngest goat herder drops the bread and the toad leaps out. The alternation of shots shows the toad gleaming and alive, with Ingeri advancing to look on from a closer position, and each of the goat herders looking on at Karin and the toad. This alternation returns the emphasis to the evil symbol. The act of looking contrasts with the physical struggle that ensues. Thus, the sense of revulsion encapsulated by the toad’s sudden appearance sets the mood for the crime. But this symbolic creature also complicates the message. Whilst the signs are that the crime is driven by material instincts, the symbolic level is also explicit. All are transfixed by the toad so that it can be understood as a catalyst for the crime as Ingeri intended.

Psychoanalytically, we can understand her insertion of the toad in the bread as representing a poisonous invasion which catalyses the destructiveness of the attack on Karin’s body. When Karin attempts to leave, the fair-haired goat herder takes control of her horse and, as she moves in the other direction, the black bearded goat herder blocks her route. As she tries to escape through the branches of a fallen tree all the brothers jump on her.

The sexual assault by the brothers is shown in a number of medium long shots with some variation of angle motivated by the action. Nothing can be heard apart from the sound of the struggle. When the youngest is cast off he immediately tries to return, but stops transfixed by the sight in front of him. Shadow is cast on his face as his look is juxtaposed with the struggle and another shot that shows Ingeri, now traumatised. The rural setting remains an important pictorial element, a backcloth for the horrific crime. The mise-en-scene of rural tranquility provides a detachment from the crime, in contrast to Ingeri’s face, which expresses her traumatic involvement. The stone, that she seems to eat while watching, signifies her desire to attack the goat herders but this is arrested by her traumatic fascination with the spectacle. When she drops the stone, her face expresses abject resignation, a realisation that Karin’s status as the sacred virgin has been destroyed. Thus, the shots showing Ingeri, and the boy looking, mark the beginning of remorse, and a pattern of reparation, in which expression and actions reveal guilt felt by these protagonists, and their imaginative
sympathy for the victim. This illustrates how reparation goes beyond individual awareness of culpability, and re-orientates the individual to a social reality.

Aware of how the film was criticised by some for its sensationalism, Donner defends Bergman’s impassive use of the camera as a response to the original detached tone of the ballad. At the same time, Donner argues, in effect, that this is film-making which carries the Bazinian ideals of neo-realism forward because a detached camera style and observation of social reality is infused with a more subjective individualistic sensibility. This focus on subjective experience ultimately gravitates towards despair through the characters of Ingeri and the boy. However, before this the final stages of the assault involve imaginative use of naturalistic light, and it is notable that the final blow is heard but not seen. At the same time we see the economic motivation behind the crime as Karin’s body is ransacked.

The talking goat herder threatens the boy that he must guard the goats while the elder ones leave the scene. Unexpectedly, a shot up to the sky reveals snow falling, which is related but not aligned to the boy’s point-of-view as we see him look up in the following shot. Thus, a shift in mood is orchestrated through mise-en-scene, representing a sudden change in the environment. Klein’s account of internal pain, as something the subject will feel compelled to expel, explains how the boy’s emotional state is manifested through nausea. The camerawork accentuates the focus on the boy’s reaction, showing in extreme close-up his face turn towards the body that lies on the other side of the tree. This turn echoes the final turn of Karin’s head. Memory, a key part of subjectivity in other Bergman works and closely related to the imagination, starts to play a vital role in the boy’s response to his surroundings. The deathly quiet throughout the scene focuses attention on the boy’s reaction and the idea of an internal response, which leads him to throw some handfuls of earth over the body. Young observes how the sudden and unexpected introduction of light snowfall at this point represents ‘a few flakes of benediction’.

This is a striking moment of attempted reparation but whether there is a sign of divine intervention remains ambiguous. For Sartre, authentic self-realisation involves loss, which he describes using the concept of abandonment, a recognition of our isolation from the guidance of others. This is relevant because the boy is thrown
back on to his own resources. The sense of being, detached now from the guidance of external causes, parallels the Kleinian concept of an imaginative reach beyond the struggle for domination to a more empathic understanding of external reality. The snow falling introduces the idea of the external reality’s existence independent of human subjectivity, but this enhances the boy’s loneliness. Bergman and Isaksson might be happy for this experience to be understood in a more religious fashion as a foreshadowing of the miraculous appearance of the spring at the end of the film, but the scene also expresses how the boy embodies the existential isolation, which for Sartre is the starting point of authentic self-realisation.

The most explicit continuity is now conveyed through the representation of the boy’s inner experience. Gaps in the narration leave this open for the spectator to respond to, rather than focusing precisely on cause and effect development. Therefore, despite the threat to the boy by his elder brother that he must stay with the goats, he is more moved by his dread of the body and runs away. Existential dread overcomes temporarily a command from the super-ego. The outcome of this is elided and suddenly in, dreamlike fashion, the three goat herders are at the gate of Töre’s establishment. The focus on the boy during this section of the film contrasts with the representation of his brothers. From a Kleinian viewpoint, the two elder goat herders have been possessed by destructiveness to such a degree it is as if they have lost all their subjectivity. They are still driven by a symbolic understanding because they have the motivation to travel, carrying their new material possessions, but this is just a mechanical operation dictated by the savage reality that appears to dictate their actions. Although they appear to be free of the moral dictates of the super-ego, in fact, their actions externalise their experience of a savage world. This logic is pursued by the film through the depiction of Töre’s revenge.

The meeting at Töre’s gate contains elements of realism in the way the relationship between a medieval farmer and the outsiders is represented as one controlled by power. Töre’s character demonstrates authority and leniency but the over-riding impact is symbolic. The murderers are immediately facing the patriarch, a set up which demonstrates how this film differs from a more conventional adventure action drama. Throughout Freud and Klein’s writing we know there is a very distinctive awareness of pressure within the family structure. This psychoanalytic preoccupation
is present, at least in a varied form, in this narrative. Instead of a quest by Töre to find his daughter, a second journey in the narrative, there is instead a compression so that now the goat herders, strangely unaware that they are at Karin’s home, occupy a place rather like being children to Töre and Märeta.

The ambiguous signification of the goat herders as sons/outsiders parallels the trials and confusion for subjectivity that Klein and Sartre chart in their focus on processes of internalisation and externalisation. The focus on the boy’s inner world emerges most strongly because of the simple directness of the film-making. Mise-en-scene conveys the memory of the crime, whilst the parents are clearly unsuspecting of these three guests. For example, the mother sits knitting from a large bundle of material that resembles her daughter’s hair, a prop inspired by the ballad. When the storyteller suddenly narrates the story of the May Queen who did not return, the boy’s head turns nervously to his brother. Töre’s return into the room and the mother’s inquiring glance convey simply, through facial expression, Karin’s continued absence. When the goat herders are invited to the supper table the image repeats the earlier meal in its evocation of the Last Supper. Now, Ingeri is not present but Judas like guilt is manifested through the boy’s anxiety. To the words of the prayer he moves nervously recognising perhaps the prayer spoken by Karin. The boy’s nervousness is kept in check, as he is gripped by the black bearded goat herder. Bergman’s preoccupation with close-ups of the face is central to the representation. Unlike the earlier supper scene this one involves point-of-view shots, dominated by the perspective of the young goat herder. The boy looks at the mother, father and Frida, and their expressions reinforce his sense of foreboding. They are like tyrannical super-ego figures to him, but he has not internalised the savagery of his elder brothers, and cannot contain the anxiety evoked by the memory of the meal with Karin, and the subsequent crime, which leads to his sickness. At this stage the parents have no overt suspicions, as made clear by Märeta’s offer of help to the boy, so that the film effectively concentrates on the separation of his emotional trauma, whilst building suspense about the point when the parents will realise the goat herder’s guilt.

The maternal care for the boy offered initially by Frida accentuates the way he is split off from his brothers. For Klein, splitting is an inevitable psychic process. The
elaboration here of a different mentality from that occupied by the murderers appears to be embedded in the boy’s own feeling of shame. Sensing this but not the cause Frida offers the simple answer that the Lord is merciful. But this does not end the process. The boy’s mind continues to reel with troubled thoughts although a contemplative air is co-existent with this anxiety as he gazes up from his bed. As Johns Blackwell has noted, the bed is a crucial prop in Bergman’s work. It is like a platform and used as a pretext to convey a dreamlike elaboration of subjectivity. The boy’s gaze-up, like that of Ingeri, and his look at the snow, suggests metaphysical presence, a contemplation of the world beyond human action. A specific religious interpretation is elaborated as the storytelling beggar looms over the boy, narrating a metaphorical account of fear and punishment in hell. Whilst religious, it is striking that poetic words are used as the beggar includes similes to convey his philosophy, and the boy’s contemplation of these words can be read as a flight of imagination. The image of hell is conveyed more as imaginative description than as a strict, biblical threat.

Töre and Märeta’s conversation in the next scene alludes to recrimination and past traumas. Märeta’s anxiety is expressed through the contorted tension that takes over her hands, gripped in prayer. The physicality of Birgitta Vallberg’s acting as Märeta continues in the following scenes, which lead to the discovery of the criminals’ guilt. She hears a sound off-screen reminding us of Karin’s cry and perhaps, further back in the film, the cry of the crow. Suspense is conveyed by the darkness of the passage where she passes the storyteller, who conveys that the goat herders are attacking the boy. Active maternal concern for the boy remains an essential element even when Märeta is on the verge of discovering that her daughter is dead. The intensity of emotions is realised slowly using a long take as Märeta touches the blood on the boy’s face. Preoccupied with this, apparently wondering whether the same people committed violence against her daughter, she walks back. In an attempt to placate her anxiety the light-haired goat herder offers the dress. Märeta’s response is marked by her downcast eyes, which absorb the true significance of this object. The dress is in some ways a peace offering designed to allay the mother’s suspicions of violence. As such, however, it is an unsuccessful reparative act. The materialistic nature of this offering is marked as Märeta says that her husband will decide a fair price. This links the process of economic transaction, which dictates the goat herders’ actions, with
the father’s decision to exact vengeance. The film does not seek to explain a social system, but it suggests an explicit connection between violence, emotion and materialism. Märeta conveys a mixture of feeling as she reveals to her husband the evidence. She is concerned for his safety, but this merely marks her desire that his actions should be accomplished. The single action of throwing the dress on the bed, and telling him about the bloodstains (which we do not see) focuses us on her motivation for revenge.

Töre’s revenge
In this section von Sydow’s acting and the stylistic elements that have been used creatively throughout the film are combined to give a masterful representation of the intensity with which the father avenges his daughter’s death. Livingston argues persuasively that violence in Bergman’s films is ritualistic and the director is preoccupied with the parallels between such a ritual and art. Although Livingston leaves The Virgin Spring out of his account, this scene is a perfect example. Despite the suspense, greater attention is paid to the emotional content and the way Töre’s ritualistic actions convey a single-minded purpose, a performance that must be enacted drawing on an enormity of inner strength as well as physical strength. First, Töre confronts Ingeri. Ingeri’s confession is ignored and she is simply instructed to assist him in his preparations by getting the knife. Overt symbolism is used as Töre wrestles with a single birch tree on top of the mountain. This emphasises his physical power and his inner struggle. It also expresses the idea of ritual because in the following scene he washes vigorously using the branches of the tree, a meticulous preparation, like an actor getting ready for his performance rather than a character only driven by the goal of extinguishing his enemies. Throughout the preparations, the minimal amount of dialogue means the sound of dawn birdsong, along with the faint light of this hour, contributes to the atmosphere. This includes a personal element from Bergman who frequently expressed his sense that the early hours have a special significance in their capacity for horror (Bergman refers to this time as ‘the hour of the wolf’, as will be seen in the next chapter). The scene with the birch tree is like the moment when the boy was alone and it snowed. It carries a sense of the individual’s isolated existence in the universe/natural world. But it is also important that Ingeri is present as the assistant at other moments in the preparation and that Märeta is present during the killing. As noted before, Bergman’s films will often
show a character preoccupied in a subjective state but witnessed by another. Subjectivity involves the experience of estrangement as one registers the look of the other, but what occurs in these scenes is not a sense of shame before the other but rather a diametrically opposed effect, namely the witness plays a role in confirming the individual’s quest because they are emotionally complicit with his sense of purpose.

The quietness of the hour contributes suspense. As Töre enters the room where the goat herders sleep the sound of the door is isolated and when he steals across the room we may contemplate what will happen if they awake. When he reaches the other side he simply sits and then plunges his knife loudly into the table. This gesture foregrounds not just his confidence but also the ritualistic nature of his actions. A quick attack on the goat herders in their sleep is not his desire, but rather the catharsis of an execution in which they fully face his wrath. Töre embodies the strength, and ferocity, which Ingeri appeared to desire from Odin, and this comparison is strengthened because the knife is adorned with a Norse-like handle. As he waits, the juxtaposition of conscious intent and dream reality is suggested as the goat herders sleep. The struggle when they awake is brief demonstrating Töre’s supremacy. The focus on a bodily confrontation is accentuated through close camera shots, which then yield overtly symbolic images. The black bearded goat herder is shown after his death, face inverted (an image used elsewhere by Bergman). The light-haired goat herder struggles hard so that both he and Töre are shown in close-up in the flames of the fire, an example of how realistic mise-en-scene is combined with a symbolic representation to represent hell. When it comes to the boy a different tone is expressed. He runs to Märeta, who tries to protect him, but Töre in his fury grabs the boy and he is thrown against the wall, a blow which kills him. Töre bends over the body and shakes the boy, his face cast in shadow and the boy’s lit. Töre’s look switches between the bodies of his victims and his hands, clenching his fists and closing his eyes. His lips quiver and his face is fixed in a state that suggests some disbelief. ‘God have mercy on me’ he says. Märeta runs and kneels over the boy. The sense of shame that emerges in this action scene complicates the catharsis of Töre’s victory. The skill in the acting and mise-en-scene is not to spell out this shame, but instead to signify it as a stirring within Töre that is minimally represented through his physical movements and expressions. Equally, the lighting continues to
play with the fluidity of a realistic range of shadows and illuminations whilst incorporating the suggestion of a moral code of good and evil. When the characters emerge outside in the morning light, the catharsis of Töre’s success is undercut by the solemnity, and the long shot shows the household in a state of shock. Töre continues to be purposeful having insisted that they must search for Karin’s body.

Now the journey is repeated, but this time there is a variation of the elements. For instance, again, we see the crow next to the one eyed man’s dwelling, but from a different angle. The whole household walks but the use of medium close-ups focuses on the state of shock and grief rather than the landscape depicted in the original. The dialogue is minimal. Märeta’s speech builds on the earlier allusions to a dysfunctional family, traumatised before the death of Karin, saying: ‘I loved her more than God. Then she turned to you and I began to hate you. The guilt is mine.’ But Töre replies that the guilt is shared. This scene involves the transition to a spirit of Christian redemption through a shared sense of shame and Töre’s insistence that he will build a church for God on the spot when Karin lies.

The Christian sentiment gives the film a thematic coherence so that the psychological strife and the crime are united behind the theme of a desire and hope for a more benign authority. However, the expressiveness is focused on physically manifested angst. When Ingeri leads the parents to the body they both bend over her outstretched body in love contrasting with lust shown by the goat herders in the assault. Töre tears himself away to express his dismay to God. This is primarily a physical expression focussed on his hands as if to say that the material world is damned without some divine intervention. When the spring emerges next to Karin’s head, which is held by her parents there is no further dialogue. Close-ups of Töre and Märeta are used to convey their awe at this miracle, whilst Ingeri is shown in medium shot receiving the flowing water as a cleansing force. Märeta is calmed by the miracle and brings water to Karin’s blood stained face. With very little non-diegetic sound in the film, the use of music marks this moment as an elevation from the tragic events of the material world, and the camerawork is used to depict the response of the household and, from an aerial position, their shared reverence for God’s intervention.

This scene involves expressing serious doubts about the power of God. It seems to fit
with Bergman’s questioning of the religion with which he grew up. As Töre says to God: ‘You saw it. The innocent child’s death and my vengeance. You permitted it. I don’t understand you.’

The commitment to building the church and the introduction of the choral hymn on the soundtrack, nevertheless, present a religious resolution. Despite all the emphasis on psychological forces and embodied consciousness the conclusion defers to faith and metaphysics. This seems to be the clearest reason why Bergman talked negatively about his own work, not just saying it was a poor imitation of a Kurosawa film but also highlighting the religious element as inadequate with ‘a totally unanalyzed idea of God’ and criticising ‘the introduction of a therapeutic idea’: 72

the idea of making something out of the old folk-song ‘Herre Töre of Venge’s daughter’ was a sound one. But then the jiggery pokerr began - the spiritual jiggery-pokery. 73

This is a fairly damning critique but Bergman does not analyse the complexity of the work. Another statement from Bergman, in a different interview, is more useful here and somewhat contradicts the above self-criticism:

In *The Virgin Spring* the welling of the spring was not meant as simply the tidy expression of a religious miracle. The spring was the medieval symbol of the water of feelings. I didn’t see how it was possible to allow the picture to end without the spring, for if the father had merely gone home and there had been a great silence, there would have been no release for the feelings of the people of the story, nor for those of the audience. 74

The adoption of the spring motif therefore has various levels. In addition to religious sentiment and concern with narrative catharsis Bergman was inspired by the real spring located in the churchyard of Karna in Ostergitand. Thus, the film’s response to history and myth involves a bricolage of different influences, a point that is even more apparent when we consider that, despite longstanding interest in the original ballad, ‘The daughter of Töre in Vange’, it was Isaksson who transformed it with the script. Given Bergman’s ambivalence about the religious message it is important that Isaksson had an established interest in Christian existential themes as well as her
focus on women.  

Bergman’s explanation of the spring as an emotional release for the audience is on the face of it relatively conventional. The audience required a resolution and an uplift. But it is in contrast to a more mainstream cinema that a symbol was selected for resolution rather than an extended narrative development/set of actions. This allowed concentration on emotion and is in keeping with the repeated use of symbolism throughout the film. Moreover, Bergman’s explanation maintains an openness in relation to the emotional meaning. Given that this symbol is an answer to such traumatic events, the comparison with a Kleinian emphasis on the value of symbolism is clear. The Kleinian analyst Segal quotes from the art historian Roger Fry to convey the significance of symbolism in art:

> I think that form, be it musical, visual, or verbal, can move us so deeply because it symbolically embodies an unconscious meaning. In other words, art embodies and symbolises and evokes in the recipient a certain kind of archaic emotion of a preverbal kind.

A psychoanalytic theory of the unconscious allows the symbol to be understood as something without a prescribed meaning. Kleinianism more than Freudianism focuses on infantile emotions and, thus, for Segal symbolism is not just about wish fulfilment, but expresses conflict involving even more primitive emotions. While the spring may seem to play the role of wish fulfilment, such a view ignores the fact that this miracle fails to remedy the damage and trauma represented by Karin’s death. It does not have this efficacy and may leave the spectator with questions: why is God manifested now and not earlier? Is God in some way ever present but detached from causality? This element of ambiguity differentiates the integration in this text from one that just provides a happy resolution. The desire to raise questions remains important for both Bergman and Isaksson.

A further understanding of the role played by this symbol can be developed drawing on Sartre’s theory of the imagination. As Andreas Elpidorou argues, Sartre made it clear that abstraction can serve to bring forward an emotional response. For Sartre, the spectator does not just respond at the cognitive level, but the derealizing action of the imagination is given content through an emotional response. On this reading one
can see that, for Sartre, abstraction may heighten the emotional force of an artwork or allow the expression of emotion alongside other types of content. This provides an insight into the emotional force of the symbol because not only does it have relevance to religious imagery and knowledge, but also could allow, in the intimation of infinity, a free projection of emotion into the space vacated. The style and content aims to provoke an imaginative response from the audience. The film raises questions about society, including the role of primitive emotions, and the causes of violence. These questions, alongside belief in the power of art show that, as Bergman’s work advanced towards the 1960s, it continued to share ideas with Klein and Sartre. Although Bergman continues to experiment with a range of styles through the 1960s, by the time we reach *Persona* and *Hour of the Wolf*, a more experimental approach emerges. I will turn now to the latter film, which relies more intensely than *The Virgin Spring* on enigmatic symbolism.
Chapter 5 - REFERENCES AND ENDNOTES

1  Steene, B. (1968) Ingmar Bergman, Boston : Twayne, p.89.
2  ibid., pp.89-90.
3  ibid., p.89.
4  The Swedish press response to The Virgin Spring is summarised by Steene in
University Press on pp.242-243.
5  ibid.
6  Most famously Bergman himself dismissed the film saying, for instance, that
‘he and Isaksson had influenced one another in the wrong way, and it was rather
University Press. Gado is quoting Bergman from Björkman et al, Bergman on
Bergman.
7  MacNab, G. (2009) Ingmar Bergman: The Life and Films of the Last Great
9  ibid., p.101.
10  Hubner, L. (2007) The Films of Ingmar Bergman : Illusions of Light and
11  ibid.
12  ibid., p.153.
This edition includes Bordwell, D. ‘The Art Cinema as a Mode of Film Practice’,
pp.716-724 (originally published in Film Comment, Volume IV, no.1, Fall, 1979)
p.718.
14  ibid.
16  Steene, op.cit., p.90.
Oxford : Clarendon Press, p.188.
18  Wood, op.cit., p.103.
19  Nykvist provides an anecdote about how Bergman corrected him for lighting a
scene in The Virgin Spring in a non-naturalistic way. (‘“God damn it! How can there
be shadows when the sun has gone down?”’ ), quoted in Ettedgui, P. (1998)
Cinematography Screencraft, Woburn, MA : Focal Press, p.38. But, Nykvist also
suggests that they shared a fascination with the emotional impact of lighting:
‘Because Ingmar had worked in the theatre, he was fascinated by light and how it can
be applied to create a mood.’ ibid.
20  Wollheim, R. (1987) Painting as an Art, London : Thames and Hudson,
pp.293-294.
21  For an analysis of the representation of hands in Persona see Linda Haverty
Rugg, ‘Self-Projection and Still Photography in the Work of Ingmar Bergman’ in
the Arts, Great Britain : Wallflower Press, pp.107-119.
22  Alford insists that Kleinian art theory can move on from the idea that catharsis
is just an emotional release: ‘Art, at its best, allows us to work through - that is, to
obtain emotional clarification about - our fear so that we can realise our potential to
feel pity, the ground of reparation. This working though is, of course, quite different from mere purgation, just as Klenian psychoanalysis is quite different from therapies aimed at promoting emotional catharsis. Working though is a combination of insight (illumination) and emotional integration of love and hate, evidently the same type of emotional experience that Aristotle had in mind in the definition of tragedy.’ Alford, C.F. (1989) Melanie Klein and Critical Social Theory: an Account of Politics, Art and Reason Based on Her Psychoanalytic Theory, New Haven; London: Yale University, p.121.

23 Steene, op.cit., p.93.
24 ibid., Steene is quoting here from Sven Stolpe, Jung-framst regikonst, Aftonbladet, February 1960.
27 ibid.
28 ibid., p.190.
29 Sartre writes in ‘Existentialism Is a Humanism’: ‘Subjectivism means, on the one hand, the freedom of the individual subject and, on the other, that man cannot pass beyond human subjectivity. It is the latter which is the deeper meaning of existentialism.’ p.4. This paradox leads to the suspicion that Sartre is maintaining an Idealist morality drawing on Descartes. What needs to be noted in relation to Bergman’s work is simply the conviction that morality must start with the inner experience of the individual. Sartre seeks to avoid the pitfalls of idealism through his phenomenological focus on material reality and his account of intersubjectivity. Sartre, J-P. (1989) ‘Existentialism Is a Humanism’, first published 1946; published in Kaufman (ed), Existentialism from Dostyevsky to Sartre, Meridian, 1989; this copy at http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/sartre/works/exist/sart.htm
31 ibid., p.53.
32 ibid., p.64.
33 Odin is thought to have been based on a real chieftan from the Viking period who invaded Sweden. Walter Gibbs, New York Times, November 2001. ‘In Germanic mythology, the one-eyed deity of battle, magic, inspiration and the dead.’, Cotterell, A. (1979) A Dictionary of World Mythology, Leicester :Windward, p.150.
34 Donner, op.cit., p.193.
35 Freud introduced the super-ego in The Ego and the Id (1923). For discussion of this and why Klein elaborated the concept see Chapter 2.
36 The way the characters are defined by their physical movements compares with the loss of freedom and submission to the body that Sartre discusses in his examples of ‘bad faith’. Here we might say that the individuals have lost their recognition of the relationship between imagination and freedom.
37 Klein, op.cit., p.259.
38 Laine, op.cit., p.17.
40 Steene, op.cit., p.91.
The relationship of the film’s imagery to religious imagery has been widely noted. For example, Steene describes the second meal scene in the film as having ‘...the ceremonial buildup of an altar painting of Christ’s last supper.’ ibid., p.94. Steene makes it clear that, whilst Ingeri is at one level associated with the role of evil as a stepsister, she is actually adopted. ibid., p.91.

See Smith, op.cit., pp.207-212.

Wood, op.cit., p.103.

See Chapter 2 for a fuller account of Klein’s theory of projection.

Steene, op.cit., p.91, and Donner op.cit., p.193.

_The New Kleinian Dictionary_ explains that although ‘introjection’ was used by Freud he did not extend it to the process of mourning. Klein builds on the work of Freud and others to represent introjection as a process significant in the infant mind and involving incorporation of good and bad objects, Bott Spillius, E., Milton, J., Garvey, P., Couve, C., and Steiner, D. (2011) _The New Dictionary of Kleinian Thought_, Hove; New York : Routledge, pp.374-379.


This concept can be used as a contribution to differentiating Kleinianism from structuralist or Lacanian theory, which seeks to explain instincts through reference to language.


ibid., Sodré, I., p.31.

ibid., Caper,R., p.46.

Steene, op.cit., p.92.

This is much more pronounced, for instance, in _Persona_ with the young boy, whose point-of-view is represented optically in the opening scenes before the drama attaches to the subjectivity of the female protagonists. Donner discusses Bergman’s early commitment to a narration that avoided traditional storytelling, Donner, op.cit., p.16.

Donner says that: ‘Almost all the weaker scenes are enacted indoors, in the studio.’ ibid., p.191.


Eric Nordgren, Bergman’s regular collaborator, was responsible for the music in _The Virgin Spring_.

Gado explains that Ingeri ‘interprets a roar heard from outside the house as the sound of three dead men riding north’ which she takes as a sign of Karin’s impending doom. Gado, op.cit., p.245.

‘Play may involve a minimum of imagination or on the contrary be very imaginative.’ Segal, H. (1991) Dream, Phantasy and Art, London: Routledge. p.107. Ultimately for Segal, art provides deeper engagement with emotion and the unconscious than play or dreaming, which are related activities.

In ‘The Early Development of Conscience in the Child’ (1933) Klein reminds the reader of Freud’s insight that sadism results from a fusion of aggression and libido so that aggression is redirected away from subjective reality towards targets in the external world. Klein, Love, Guilt and Reparation and other works 1921-1945, op.cit., p.250.

Donner, op.cit., p.190.
Sartre uses the idea of abandonment in Existentialism and Humanism.

Livingston argues that: ‘The problem of a violence that is senselessly repeated at every level of human interaction is central to Bergman’s vision of art...’ Livingston, op.cit. p.173. Livingston develops this argument partly through reference to the recurrent theme of humiliation in Bergman films.

Aumont draws attention to this motif in Bergman’s work. For example, see, Aumont, op.cit., p.114.
Donner begins his analysis with attention to the image of Töre looking at his hands and speaking to God. Donner, op.cit., p.188.

Alpert, ‘Style is the Director’, Saturday Review, December 23, 1961
http://bergmanorama.webs.com/satrev_alpert61.htm, Bergman is quoted.


The quotation is from Roger Fry, The Artist and Psychoanalysis (1929) in Segal, op.cit., p.81.

6 The destruction of the artist: Hour of the Wolf

*Hour of the Wolf* (1967) started as a project for Bergman three years before its eventual completion. It is unusual for a Bergman film to take so long, but the director’s health problems, and then the inspiration to make *Persona*, were responsible for the delay. Bergman also made clear that the personal nature of the story led to complications in the production including the decision to edit out much of the opening prologue. The original title, *The Cannibals*, is instructive of Bergman’s intent in representing an artist surrounded by an aristocratic entourage who effectively devour him, and the way damage is enacted by malign elements that possess the artist’s imagination and eat away at his sense of identity. The story begins in digressive fashion with a figure, that we may suppose is the director, recalling how he received the diary of Johan Borg, an artist who disappeared, from his wife Alma. This is fictitious although it obliquely refers to autobiographical elements in the film, including the pregnancy of Liv Ullmann who plays Alma (with Bergman’s child). The story goes on to tell through a range of flashbacks how the artist Johan Borg (played by Max von Sydow) disappeared on the island of Baltrum. I will provide a detailed analysis of the film, but before this I will look at reasons why this work in particular justifies psychoanalytical and philosophical analysis.

**Critical responses**

In the previous chapter we saw Bergman’s preoccupation with the emotions of shame and guilt. It is thought by various commentators that these are even more extreme in their ferocity in *Hour of the Wolf*. For instance, Cowie comments on the finale of the film: ‘Forced back into insecurity, the Bergman artist figure finds himself assailed by waves of humiliation, guilt and shame.’ Cowie argues that Max von Sydow is used ‘as Bergman’s alter ego, the artist as fugitive….In *Hour of the Wolf* he is a painter, Johan Borg. In *Shame*, a violinist.’

We can also reach back further in to Bergman’s career for affiliations. For instance, John Simon notes the way this is a film about the artist and madness, thus positioning it alongside such Bergman works as *Prison*. These groupings revolve around Bergman’s authorship, and yet at one level *Hour of the Wolf* signals a sense of crisis around this whole concept with its story of the self-destructive artist unable to
maintain a relationship with reality. After the doubts directed towards Bergman’s allegorical style at the end of the 1950s, the director had regained favour from Cahiers du Cinéma through Persona in particular. This was partly because, like the journal itself, he appeared to be calling into question an uncritical humanism. The humanistic expressionism and symbolism of films like The Seventh Seal was challenged with a pared-down critical challenge to metaphysics in his trilogy of films in the early 1960s, Through a Glass Darkly, Winter Light and The Silence. This trend can be seen continuing with Persona, where psychological complexity calls into question easy humanistic assumptions about character and narrative meaning. Formal experimentation at the expense of narrative accessibility appears to be maintained with Hour of the Wolf. The Cahiers critic Jean-Louis Comolli was most impressed, not by the range of expressive devices in the film, but instead by the way a kind of sleepwalking authorship evolves, allowing the film to achieve its true destiny as dream, through the submersion of individual agency. He wrote:

The film unfolds like a dream in progress, ‘in-itself’ a kind of dream, resisting predetermined course, switching direction at will. Which gives credence to the idea of the film as an independent object, freed, at last from the constraints of narrative and form which, powerlessly, its ‘author’ would wish to impose on it: the film as living organism, a fabrication, of course, but also something which in a sense fabricates itself.

Intriguingly, British critics were very appreciative of Hour of the Wolf for its visual flair and imagination. However, looking more widely at the film’s reception shows that Bergman was equally being taken to task for over bearing authorship. Critics in a number of countries echoed the earlier concern of Cahiers in relation to The Virgin Spring and his heavily symbolic works that Bergman was narcissistic, indulging in melancholic reflections on his role as an artist.

While the film has been predominantly read as both a representation of artistic process and as Bergman’s exploration of personal issues, Bergman himself offers an enigmatic assessment of the artist:

What Johan Borg wanted to say was that he is faced with a ‘must’; an unending torment, toothache. He can’t escape it. There’s no question of a gift from on high. No otherworldly relationship. It’s just here. Disease. A perversion. A five legged calf. He takes a very brutal view of the situation.
Some commentators respond to the way this is conveyed in the text as an expression of nihilism. For Wood, Johan’s demons represent a negative version of artistic creativity and not its true realisation. ‘The point is made quite unequivocally that the demons are inimical to artistic creation - their emergence in the first stretches of the film corresponds to a decline in Johan’s art.’¹² Thus, the film, for Wood, has a message about a negative psychological experience but is not offering this as a full account of what art involves. Livingston goes further in stressing the expression of nihilism. For Livingston, Hour of the Wolf is a grotesque displacement of The Magic Flute narrative, a nihilistic reversal of the latter’s expression of the power of art. A more positive evaluation is produced, however, through the expansive process of relating Hour of the Wolf to other texts, and contexts. Thus, even Livingston feels that this morbid account of the artist gains in value when we compare it with the superior narrative of The Magic Flute, including Bergman’s 1975 film production of the opera. As both Wood and Livingston stress, The Magic Flute is made a part of Hour of the Wolf itself with the puppet production of Wolfgang Mozart’s opera. Livingston states that Hour of the Wolf: ‘like all of Bergman’s negative moments, must be perceived in a larger context.’¹³ Wood identifies Alma as representing Pamina and thus a representative of wholeness for the struggling artist Johan/Tamino, but recognises that Johan is diverted towards destruction.¹⁴

A horror film with psychoanalytical themes

Hubner suggests that Hour of the Wolf lends itself to psychoanalytical interpretation more than other Bergman works.¹⁵ She discusses the relevance of psychoanalysis to horror:

Psychoanalytical discourse is common to both horror movies and dreams. In reading meaning from both, film critics, directors and audiences have looked to the unconscious, suggesting that dreams and horror films can be read as the return of the repressed. Alter egos, split personalities, monsters and werewolves have been read as creatures of the Freudian ‘id’…¹⁶

One way Hubner develops this is through reference to sexuality: ‘Hour of the Wolf draws on the werewolf tradition of fission and conflict, traditionally associated with notions of confused sexuality.’¹⁷ The departure from realism becomes more forceful,
when eventually Johan is surrounded by a community of unreal characters in the
castle of Baron von Merkens. They are like a collection from the horror genre,
carrying some of the names from *The Tales of Hoffmann*, a favourite for Bergman.18
The indication of horror-like excess, through elements that suggest vampirism, and
the dual identity of man and wolf (the title), make the case for a focus on
unconscious and sublimated material for an understanding of this film more
compelling. As Wood observes: ‘What is surprising is Bergman’s use of the
traditions of the American horror film, from Whale and Browning to Hitchcock.’19
Supernatural images proliferate, as the story reaches its climax, including a moment,
where the baron walks up the wall, like a fly, and another moment where a woman
removes her face and drops her eyeball in a glass. Hubner, like Wood, recognises the
creativity involved in the bricolage of horror references.

In this chapter I want to argue that the horror conventions are used to represent a
merger between the artist’s imagination and his oppression by a group of aristocrats.
The imagery of Johan’s tormentors as vampire-like creatures adds to the sense of
alienation, which is shown through the application of Kleinian and Sartrean
perspectives. In the previous chapters we considered films with a marked tension
between the subjectivity of the characters and external reality. In *Hour of the Wolf* it
is as if the unreality of Johan’s world takes over. This threatens any sense of
integration, that for Klein depends on a closer relationship between phantasy and
reality. Discussing how emotional development involves a modification of the
process of splitting, Klein writes: ‘as the adaptation to the external world increases,
this splitting is carried out on planes which gradually become increasingly nearer and
nearer to reality. This goes on until love for the real and internalized objects and trust
in them are well established.’20 As we have seen, Sartrean theory also calls for
recognition of the gulf between consciousness and reality such that pathological
imagination is a failure to fully understand this division. These theories are relevant
to the depiction of Johan’s alienation because through the film we see him become
swallowed up in an unreal world. Thus, Bergman uses the conventions of horror to
represent a loss of reality for the main protagonist. At the same time, reality is
referred to because the eerie figures, who take over Johan’s mind, dominate the
artist. For Bergman this is a real issue. Throughout his career he received good
support from the Swedish film industry but he also had to struggle with the logic of a
capitalist market. For instance, *The Seventh Seal* was only made after the critical success of *Smiles of a Summer Night*.²¹

Sartrean and Kleinian ideas also help with an understanding of Alma’s role in the film. Johan’s wife represents a reparative philosophy and an authentic project distinct from Johan’s fatal flaws as she tries to help and understand his situation. Much of the film reveals that, while he is oppressed by a grotesque elite, she is victimised in their relationship. At the same time she achieves greater detachment than Johan and is not engulfed by the hallucinatory world he falls into. For Gado, who writes from a Freudian perspective, all of the supernatural happenings in the story are an ‘embarrassment’, lacking dramatic purpose and only designed to express some elements of Bergman’s psychological turmoil.²² Gado reads the film as a supernatural nightmare from start to finish, but this underplays the internal tension between narrative coherence and a dreamlike logic that resists explanation. Many critics, including Gado, recognise that Alma represents a counterpoint and alternative values to the world of nightmare that envelops Johan, but not sufficient attention is given to her prominence as a narrator and as a spectator. The film presents a degenerative spectacle as Johan visits the castle, having apparently shot his wife, but this episode is framed by a focus on Alma as an empathic presence and, furthermore, this passage is not the only example of a strikingly framed episode in the film as a whole. The whole film presents labyrinthine shifts in the sense of reality, which creates the potential for a creative exploration of alienation.

Livingston argues that we can trace a significant influence on Bergman’s work in general from Eino Kaila, a Finnish philosopher and opposes this to the tendency to discuss Bergman’s work vaguely in relation to existentialism.²³ Livingston draws many interesting parallels between Kaila’s ideas and Bergman’s work, including the psychological consequences of corporal punishment on a child (we will see how important this is in the film), but it can be noted at the outset that some of these ideas overlap with those of other thinkers. Of particular interest for this thesis is the idea that Bergman shares Kaila’s interests in magical thinking and the way individuals are driven by irrational motivations. These are both explicit themes in the early work of Sartre. For example, Sartre conveys the obsessive dynamic of emotion with reference to ‘magical thinking’. He writes:
... when consciousness is living the magical world into which it has precipitated itself, it tends to perpetuate the world, by which it is captivated: the emotion tends to perpetuate itself. 24

This focus on magical thinking in A Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions describes an irrational world, which Johan appears to perpetuate. This is like the example of emotions, which feed on themselves, provided by Sartre’s account of The Imaginary. Relating Bergman to a more general philosophical background than the influence of Kaila is necessary. As argued in Chapter 1, Bergman, Klein and Sartre share an enduring conception of the individual and the role of imagination. While this conception is pushed to the limit of comprehensibility in Hour of the Wolf, there is not a total collapse but instead an expression of how the individual’s imaginary world is inevitably permeated by social reality. In order to understand how Bergman maintains an awareness of social power we must look in detail at the film’s style and content.

The atmosphere of total breakdown in the film is signalled through enigmatic details that derail a coherent sense of time and space culminating in the ambiguity of Johan’s disappearance: he appears to have vanished into the environment. However, Bergman keeps alive a coherent conception of a world in which experience accords with our concepts through the character of Alma. As the narrator, Alma is able to offer an explanation of what happens that does not fundamentally challenge our conception of empirical reality. Fundamental to the coherence of her explanation are concepts of time and space. The whole story is her flashback and her articulation emphasises key points that give the temporal and spatial quality of the story some plausibility even if they do not fully restore convincing realism to the narrative. Despite her common sense Alma is also affected by Johan’s psychic breakdown and disappearance, but this is dialectically incorporated in her position as someone who witnesses and empathises with her husband’s problems. Through Alma we experience the relationship between the real and imaginary.
The power and dangers of imagination

By drawing on Klein and Sartre, and the films analysed so far in this thesis, we see that Bergman’s work does not evoke a strict opposition between artistic freedom, on the one hand, and a preoccupation with external structures, on the other. Consistent with this balance Hour of the Wolf represents the power and dangers of imagination. Kleinian and Sartrean theories share ideas in common with an article about Bergman’s work which relates Hour of the Wolf to two more Bergman films, From Life of the Marionettes (1980) and The Devil’s Wanton (Prison). In this article Marsha Kinder argues that Bergman is reworking a recurring nightmare from his childhood. The nightmare is a condensation of the classic fairytale structure of Little Red Riding Hood and mythologies of the werewolf. Kinder suggests:

> These two myths are reverse sides of the same cannibalistic fear - of devouring the mother, or being devoured by her gaping red mouth. That’s why Bergman’s murderous nightmares always evoke the relationship between parent and child.25

According to Kinder the film is not determined by these folkloric structures, but remarkable for the way Bergman produces an aesthetic that provides existential challenges to the audience, involving them in his ‘hallucination’. She talks about how Bergman ‘shifts from coded surrealistic visuals to a richer phenomenological experience of the dream.’26 Klein’s account of a surging psychotic oscillation in the consciousness of the infant between being devoured and devouring, or attacked and attacking, compares with the reference to these early horror tales and also mythology about vampires. Klein refers herself to these stories in her account of the destructive impact of the super-ego:

> ...in the small child we come across a super-ego of the most incredible and phantastic character. And the younger the child is, or the deeper the mental level we penetrate to, the more this is the case. We get to look upon the child’s fear of being devoured, or cut up, or torn to pieces, or its terror of being surrounded and pursued by menacing figures, as a regular component of its mental life; and we know that the man-eating wolf, the fire-spewing dragon, and all the evil monsters out of myths and fairy-stories flourish and exert their unconscious influence in the phantasy of each individual child, and it feels itself persecuted and threatened by those evil shapes….I have no doubt from my analytic observations that the real objects behind those imaginary, terrifying figures are the child’s own parents.27
For Klein, this means that all real objects encountered by the child, including people, are potentially transformed by a super-ego detached from reality. Klein shows how this dynamic takes over the individual. The film’s account of the artist’s self-torment can be thought of as a self possessed by demons in a way that compares to Klein’s account of how the self may be attacked from within by bad objects. Klein’s principal focus is on anxiety more than desire, and for much of the film this appears to be what eats at Johan Borg. Like other psychoanalytical interpretations of the work, Klein’s account suggests that Bergman is not just narcissistic, preoccupied with his own demons, but attempting to express an experience, which has cultural and social dimensions. Kristeva makes clear in her account of Klein, that the individual’s struggle with anxiety is life long, and thus desire becomes inevitably caught up in the search to alleviate anxiety. As Kristeva clarifies, for Klein it is when the death drive takes over that we become disassociated from pleasure, and, from the life drive.28

In the interview about Hour of the Wolf Bergman refuses to pin down the psychoanalytical message but he does refer to Sartre:

Sartre has said how inhibited he used to be as an artist and author, how he suffered because what he was doing wasn’t good enough. By a slow intellectual process he came to realize that his anxieties about not making anything of value were an atavistic relic from the religious notion that something exists which can be called the Supreme Good, or that anything is perfect.29

Bergman then goes on to make a comparison with his own work: ‘When my top-heavy religious superstructure collapsed I lost my inhibitions as a writer.’30 Sartrean theory provides a philosophical overview, which nonetheless maintains the role of contingency and individualism. The phenomenological method involves recognising the experiential qualities of the text rather than subsuming them under determining categories. This is why Sartre’s ideas are compatible with Kinder’s argument that in Hour of the Wolf Bergman ‘moves his audience from external observation and analysis of the events to a fuller participation inside the hallucination.’31 Sartrean theory can be used to explain how subjectivity is evoked whilst attending to the disintegration of Johan’s consciousness.
Sartre pulled back from dismantling individual identity completely, and maintained a degree of essentialism in Transcendance of the Ego and Being and Nothingness, with an idea of subjectivity alongside a transcendental philosophy of freedom. Sartre’s anti-naturalism is also relevant to Bergman because it leads to an appreciation of how the self may be thought of outside common sense and the boundaries of empirical science. Bergman declines a common sense or straightforwardly scientific/psychological explanation for Johan’s downfall. We recognise that the latter is a deeply flawed character, but the impossibility of substantive identification with him means that the film is more concerned with reflection on the conditions of his malaise. Bergman himself is once again a harsh critic of his own work, suggesting that he should have focussed on the transference of Johan’s difficulties to Alma. However, if Alma had also been fully afflicted (she shares Johan’s vision of demons and so is partly afflicted) Bergman would have lost an important source of thematic tension in the opposition between Alma’s nurturing character and the self-indulgence of Johan.

Analysis of the film; the prologue
The film begins with a simple direct statement of its subject. The inter-titles, which inform about the diary and the artist’s disappearance, initiate a digressive, self-reflexive, credits sequence, in which we hear a film crew. This beginning, which is followed by the director’s instructions to his crew, heard against a black screen, compares with other self-reflexive 1960s art films like those of Godard, with its self-conscious, experimental reference to the film-making process. However, this opening flows into the second shot where Alma makes it clear that she is talking to the director. Bergman has said he felt it important to contain development of an interplay between a documentary-style reference to himself and the fictional world, and thus from the original script the material referring to his role was reduced. The rendering of this connection as elliptical means that an omniscient perspective is undercut, thus heightening ambiguity, but nevertheless the establishment of this perspective contributes substantially to Alma’s authority which will be confirmed by her character and actions throughout the story.

In the transition from the credits, the director evolves as a fictional character. His presence, although still unseen, provides a focal point after the digression of the
credits, in which noises and indistinguishable conversation allow the viewer to wonder what is going on and/or enjoy the imaginative freedom of eavesdropping on the daily routine of film production. The unseen director of the second shot makes camera position a psychological element in the story. All of this relates to Sartre’s philosophy of imagination. For Sartre, imagination negates the world but consciousness is immersed in it. Since consciousness is not securely detached it must be the case that knowledge is perspectival, restricted by the viewpoint of the individual subject, and thus dispersed across a range of different perspectives. Sartre recognises the role of elements in consciousness including pre-reflective consciousness as part of the way the individual determines his or her own reality. This intuitive, contingent linking is presented at the outset of the film. The relationship between the film’s representation of fiction and its representation of reality is neither arbitrary nor surreal. Instead, it is a sketch of an enigmatic connection that refuses complete disclosure.

The second shot shows a thatched cottage with windswept tree, and basket of fruit in front of it. Into this mise-en-scene Alma walks. A digressive naturalistic quality is evoked, with Alma talking directly to camera, and stating that there is nothing more to say. She has given the director her husband’s diary, but she continues, thus blurring the boundaries between the representation of events and the representation that will follow. Her speech foregrounds a consciousness of time as she mentions the hour at which she arrived at this location with her husband, and the fact that now she is expecting a baby in a month. Bergman’s attention to temporal organisation involves a deviation here, such that temporal reference points are established and then undermined at different levels in the rest of the narrative. When Alma says, in this opening scene, that she and her husband lived together for seven year, the information is planted for the audience who may become puzzled later in the narrative by the time frame of Johan’s affair with Veronica Vogler. If, as is stated later, Johan was with Veronica for five years and there was a public scandal, how are we to understand Alma’s innocence, her apparent lack of knowledge about Veronica? This is just one of many enigmas that are distributed through the text. Bergman creates a troubling sense that temporal cues are floating free from other elements in the film. Aligned with this is the inverse notion that if we lose our understanding of time there is a kind of breakdown in reality. Previously, in the
nightmare sequence in *Wild Strawberries* with its handless clock Bergman experimented with a distorted apprehension of time as signifier of mental confusion and terror.

The absence of Alma’s husband in this second shot helps to build curiosity about his character, based on Alma’s description of key elements in his personality: she talks about his preference for silence, his ease with her but no-one else, and their arrival at the cottage. The long take is animated by camera movement, which responds to Alma’s movement towards the camera. This builds the idea of a dialectical relationship between character and narration and furthers the idea of the authorial consciousness immersed in the phenomenological reality of the narrative. It is also suggestive of a psychoanalytical relationship as Alma’s speech is like a confession, introducing *an other* (the director and/or the audience), for the first time, to the details of a private trauma. The long take and camera movement give Ullman’s performance a stronger profile. When she pauses reflectively we experience the longeur, and a sense of her focus on an inner world, before she resumes her recollection. Already marked as excessive (the director has all the information already), the direct address is intimate, foregrounds emotion, and prompts imaginative questioning. The audience will be struck by her sense of loss but also they might wonder about the back-story? How is Alma here to tell the story? Is this Alma or an actress playing Alma?

From the Sartrean viewpoint, we can see that Alma’s ambiguous status, like Monika when she addressed the camera, is a further demonstration of the need to understand consciousness and the external world as co-existent rather than giving priority to one over the other. Alma’s connection to the extra-diegetic, emphasised through direct address, is not used to comment on the meaning of the fictional world, but reminds us again of the way consciousness remains contingent across different situations, and this challenges the viewer to produce meaning. From the Kleinian perspective, the representation of gender is significant. The off-screen controlling male director is offset by the knowledgeable, maternal presence of Alma. Where knowledge and authority lie appears as ambiguous as the divide between fiction and non-fiction. Through Alma, a nurturing empathic character is foregrounded as powerful source of information and understanding.
When Alma talks about her husband we already gain a sense of his inner world. He is an artist carrying an atmosphere of melancholy. It has already been noted how Kleinian theory can be affiliated with an aesthetic of melancholia and how object relations theory is part of Klein’s attempt to reconstruct the grieving psyche. In what follows we can read Johan’s personality into the form and content of the film, but we can also read a kind of diagnosis, a move towards the reparation sought through analysis of object relations. Later in the narrative Johan is tormented in relation to other people. They lose their definition as characters with a separate life and become the bad objects of his psyche, an experience that is captured through a range of expressive film techniques. Meanwhile, Alma is the good object, the nurturing, and patient wife. It is not just people who represent Johan’s turmoil, but also his environment. In fact people become an element of the environment very explicitly later in the film.

**Arrival on the island**

Following Alma’s introduction, we go back in time to the couple’s arrival on the island. The long take style is maintained through the four shots in this sequence. The direction suddenly has a more external quality, looking on without participation, but it is affiliated with Alma’s act of recollection. The intimacy of the previous scene is eclipsed and there is no dialogue. Juxtaposition through editing is a factor since there is a strong contrast with Alma’s conversation in the previous scene with the silence motivated by Johan’s taciturn character. He symbolises, amongst other things, art’s potential concentration on the visual, and in this respect is akin to Mrs Vogler in *Persona*, for whom silence is an existential choice. Stripped of noise and dialogue we observe the action in more detail as the couple arrive by boat. The rocks of the island stand as impressive testimony to the couple’s decision to choose this landscape over other people. Alma and Johan are left by the boatman and the shot is held, like the early Lumière film of a boat leaving the shore, but formal control is manifested because the climax of the shot coincides with the boat’s disappearance behind the dark mass of a boulder in the foreground. The concentration on the solitary squeak of the wheelbarrow highlights the quietness of the location. There is a naturally strange quality to the situation in that we have been told it is 3 o’clock, and yet it is
completely light in keeping with the Swedish summer, but in contrast to the rest of the film, much of which happens in darkness.

Johan and Alma are presented as explorers of the environment, seeking a way out of society, like Monika and Harry. Thus, the landscape becomes significant psychologically. For now, the harshness of the terrain and the purity of the light are good objects due to the incipient sense of the artist’s mission. A mini-climax that compares to the boat’s disappearance into the depth of the image, occurs as the next scene ends on a poetic note. Alma and Johan disappear into the cottage and are seen, through the doorway, embracing in silhouette, by the light from a window at the back. The camera distance highlights the mood of aesthetic contemplation, which in Kleinian terms carries the possibility of psychic wholeness. Continuity across the episodic structure of the narrative is provided by the motif of light because in the following shot we find the couple basking in the sunlight. But these are transient moments. In Kleinian theory the individual forms relationships with part objects, but the striving for greater integration is confronted with numerous obstacles, including the phenomenon of splitting. Nature appears to promise integration, but in Bergman’s work we know that it will be difficult for this promise to break through the forces of alienation. When Alma poses for Johan, it is as if at this moment he turns to her for integration. She has an ideal nature for Johan, which must be crushed by his inner demons. His possession of Alma through representation only offers a temporary solace from his psychic turmoil. This arrangement of artist and model carries the promise and idea of integration, but it cannot be sustained and serves male subjectivity.

Alma is objectified because of Johan’s precise instructions, and when she bares her shoulders, there is an echo of Monika’s provocative appearance on the island. Although we see Alma pose we never see the drawing, so that the viewer is kept at some distance from the artist’s idealisation of the woman. There is another temporal reference as Johan suggests that he wants to draw Alma every day. This sense of time arrested contrasts with the confusion about time that emerges in the rest of the story. Temporarily we have an idea of the artist finding sanctuary in his work. Related to this, however, is the point that this is, in fact one of the few moments of intimacy between husband and wife and one of the only moments in which he shows
sexual attraction towards her. This is significant in relation to the character of Veronica. As we shall see, Veronica appears as a kind of femme fatale, but arguably the way Johan’s obsession with her leads to his disintegration is not a problem exclusively driven by his desire. In the brief moment of tenderness with Alma and the eroticised encounters with Veronica, we see the hope for Johan that idealisation of the woman may resolve the psychic conflict that torments him. Kleinian theory is distinct on this issue from Freudian orthodoxy because for Klein sexuality is an impulse designed to combat the death drive. Robert Hinshelwood quotes Klein to this effect: ‘the sexual act serves to restore the mother’s injured body and thus to master anxiety and guilt.’

Hinshelwood goes on to say:

The implication is that the person (or ego) is in a position to struggle with their own impulses in a way that is not deterministic. Love is a state to be struggled for, and sex a strategy in that struggle. Eroticisation is not simply a mechanical discharge of libido.

To be sure, Johan’s lack of fidelity to Alma is an issue in his disintegration, and the idealisation of Veronica represents a split in Johan’s consciousness that comes to separate him from Alma, but following the Kleinian emphasis, the process of splitting can be read as an outcome of the death drive and not as an inevitable consequence of sexuality alone.

**The emergence of Johan’s inner world**

The following scene registers a change of mood and a more critical representation of the way Johan’s self-obsession as an artist excludes his wife. When he returns to the cottage, the image of the obtrusive sheets blowing on the washing line expresses an element of discord in his consciousness, which contrasts with Alma’s joy at this return. Alma looks bewildered at his mood; and the fade that accompanies the end of the scene, which momentarily leaves her in twilight, registers the film’s descent towards darkness. In the following scene long take and close-up concentrate attention on Alma’s unease as she sits in the lamplight while Johan restlessly moves around, and then reaches across Alma for a bottle of spirits. The emphasis on Alma means that we are made aware of the objects of her consciousness in counterpoint to Johan’s account of his internal demons. Johan is the disturbing object, which occupies Alma’s thoughts as we can empathise with her unease. Although Johan
does not give a name, at this stage, to the time of night, he makes it clear that the
hour before dawn is in some way significant. The development, in a later scene, of
the idea that this time has a special status, as ‘the hour of the wolf’, shows attention
to time itself, but also reveals awareness of the way an uncanny and disturbing reality
is located behind the façade of normality.

For Johan, the hour before dawn is filled with horror and coincides with a sense of
personal crisis. His loss of control is related to his identity as an artist. His paintings
manifest the unruly content of his mind. Johan’s malaise ushers in a more febrile
gothic imagination, unconstrained by taste and decorum. This is the onset of madness
and what Livingston and Wood see as the nihilistic alternative to the artistic
transcendence of The Magic Flute. The refusal of Bergman to identify with one
charity and one narrational perspective, nevertheless, allows the greater freedom,
which Wood acknowledges, and draws on Bergman’s empathy with gothic
imagination, including the influence of horror films. In other words, this is not a self-
indulgent endorsement of Johan’s gothic sensibility because the tension between
Alma’s perspective and Johan’s actions already creates some critical distance.

As Johan laments the horror he finds in his own work it is significant that these
paintings are not presented to the viewer. This absence foregrounds the process of
projection involved in responding to art. In Johan’s dialogue the boundary between
the work and subject matter blurs, reminding us of Sartre’s insistence that
imagination involves a relationship with an external reality, real or completely
fictitious. Johan despairs about the work and its subjects simultaneously, consumed
by his feeling that his paintings represent a grotesque world. He offers explanations,
regarding one portrait as evocative of Papageno from The Magic Flute, but this
comparison does not give him joy. Thus, Johan’s paintings put us in a psychological
space in which the work represents the demons who terrorise him. These are his bad
objects, an internalised world in which his desires are destructive, linked by paranoia
and fear. His fears produce isolated images without connection ranging from a fear
of birds to a possible fear of homosexuality. This is an excessive form of splitting in
which the representation of negativity multiplies, creating a sense of inward futility.

While the pictures are shown, Alma’s face and responses are in the foreground.
Afterwards, as Johan speaks, we see her face trained on him, but there is no reverse
shot, so that Johan becomes a shadowy figure. Only able to sleep by daylight, he
seems to be connecting himself with the monster of the title. Johan strikes a match
and asks Alma to think about the slowness with which a minute passes. Here, the
passing of time is signalled by the sound of the clock ticking and various declarations
from Johan, including his assertion that a minute can be like eternity. The sense that
he is tortured by this time lag is a reversal of the joy with which he contemplated
painting his wife for eternity. Alma also looks into the void and speculates about
their love, about the possibility of total union in which identity dissolves. The theme
of time passing is elaborated to incorporate imagination of their lives in the future as
age obliterates differences, but Bergman, like Sartre, is more interested in charting
the illusions of love than producing sentimental effects. Alma’s hope for the future
is fragile alongside the fragmenting psyche of her husband. While Johan is
traumatised about the pictures, which explore the wilder regions of his psyche, Alma
knits, looks after the washing and, after he falls asleep during her romantic speech,
she helps him to bed. All of this reinforces a realistic sense of how, in this
relationship, the wife serves the artist, and obsession with his subjectivity creates an
oppressive situation.

**Alma’s discovery of the diary**

Alma is also launched on an exploration. For this to happen she must participate in
Johan’s world of disturbing objects. The pictures are just the introduction to this type
of being/object. The couple will be confronted by a range of characters that appear to
live, but then negate life, reverting to an object-hood that mirrors the drive to
destruction. These people/objects, like the process of art can also be seen more
fluidly as potentially parts on a journey towards greater understanding, creativity and
self-realisation, which brings home the significance of Klein’s analysis of internal
objects, but also deepens the idea of the artist’s malaise suggesting that his demons
correspond with powerful social forces that cannot be escaped.

The concentration on Alma’s reactions, conveyed through Ullman’s subtle
performance, forms a pattern through the narrative. In the scene which depicted
Johan’s return to the cottage and the image of the flapping sheets a key moment
involved a shot of Alma attending to the sound of her husband’s approach. The next
day we see Alma aware of something off-screen, but without a sound to tell us who or what the arrival is. Thus, continuity is provided through a concentration on her perception, but around this a web of enigmatic phenomena emerge. In this scene Alma is confronted suddenly by the incongruous figure of a smartly dressed old lady who talks in a fluent, pre-meditated way about Johan. Now, Alma looks shocked. Bergman with his acute awareness of stage entrance as a dramatic moment makes the lady’s appearance suggestive of magic or perhaps nightmare. The lady appears to be merely incongruous on the remote hillside, but actually when she makes a slip of tongue referring to herself, as 216 years old, this plants a seed for the transition to the supernatural story of vampires later in the film. She seems to know that Alma has just looked at Johan’s pictures and encourages Alma’s absorption into Johan’s nightmare world, but this also launches Alma’s quest for further knowledge. The demonic old lady asks for Johan’s pictures to be preserved - he should live with their destructiveness instead of destroying them. She also instructs Alma to read Johan’s diary.

The reading sequence includes three episodes imagined by Alma, in which other characters suddenly appear before Johan. Between these appearances we see Alma’s attention to the text as she discovers about her husband’s secret life. A montage aesthetic organised around Alma’s imagination leaves us with questions about whether these characters are inter-related, how they relate to Johan’s state of mind and how they represent external reality. In the first, a man, who introduces himself as the baron (played by Erland Josephson), walks up to Johan as he is painting and invites the couple to dinner. The baron makes it clear that he and his wife admire the artist’s work. This declaration at least coheres with the narrative of Alma and Johan’s arrival on the island. In the second episode we see Johan on a stony stretch of ground, narrating his state of distress about his work and his health. The appearance of Veronica, (not named at this stage, played by Ingrid Thulin) occurs slowly as we see just her legs walking towards Johan whose face is in close-up. The attention given to character entrances heightens mystery and, in this case, heightens Veronica’s sexual mystery. Tom Milne relates the imagery of the baron’s arrival in the previous shot to the strange arrival of Veronica: ‘...a car crawling over the horizon, a girl picking her way through the rocks on a sun-bleached beach, look momentarily like weird, threatening insects.’44 This comment captures the imagistic
quality facilitated by the montage aesthetic that adds a different dimension to the narrative development. When Veronica starts talking we are plunged into the middle of a situation, which conveys their explicitly sexual relationship. The dialogue reaches beyond what we know, providing fragmentary details of Veronica’s fears that antagonistic characters have watched her (or them) and are writing to her in a threatening way. Veronica is a good object for Johan in the sense that her arrival overcomes his anxiety about his work. But the affair also signifies trouble in her references to an external threat and through the initial reference to her bruise. The effect of the fragmentation is to heighten enigma and provoke an imaginative interpretation from the audience and this is guided by alignment with Alma’s perspective as we return to her, the character who imagines this scene.

Thus, we proceed to the third fragmentary diary entry in which Johan is being pursued. This is another variation on the convention of the stage entrance because through alternating shots this flashback picks up the action in the middle of the scene with both Johan and another man, Heerbrand the psychiatrist walking briskly across a stretch of the island landscape. Johan striding across the countryside is pursued and turns to strike down Heerbrand, annoyed by his psychobabble. Beyond the allusion to a clash of values between art and psychiatry the sequence has an absurd quality. When the psychiatrist remains on the ground in order to stop his nose bleeding, it is as if Johan has expelled an invader from his consciousness.

The sequence of the three diary entries has similarities with the nightmare passage in *Wild Strawberries* because the surreal, and symbolic episodes convey a hidden side in Johan’s past. Like the memory content in *Wild Strawberries*, we are left to assume that what is seen actually happened in the story and is not a figment of imagination. In both films imagination of the past has an explicit spectator; but in this case the spectator position is layered because it is not just Johan’s memories, but also Alma’s imaginative recreation of the scenes and she remains reticent. This creates a more detached and passive point-of-view, which strengthens the work’s focus on character relations rather than ego psychology. This perspective is consistent with both Kleinian innovations in psychoanalysis and the Sartrean focus on intersubjectivity because it challenges the mastery of the individual ego and provides a tangible sense that neurosis has to be understood in a wider context of social relations. Thus,
imagination figures in both the form and the content as a way of accessing further knowledge about the context surrounding the characters.

Johan’s confessions to his diary are enigmatic as we are invited to make associations. Is Johan’s lover the wife of the baron? Does the woman’s bruise and the physical attack on the therapist indicate Johan’s propensity for violence? The fact that these questions are, at least partly, answered by later narrative developments testifies to Bergman’s commitment to an aesthetic of narrative integration, but he is also inspired by singular images and fragmented happenings. These episodes, like curtailed stage entrances, provide, in film terms, a surreal montage but a dialectical tension is maintained because Alma herself is mysterious. The minimalism of her expression means that her reaction is not expressed, and in the following scene her energy is transferred into domestic detail when she asks Johan to consider various details of her use of the household budget: the cost of a toothbrush, for example. This is a level of reality that Johan does not wish to engage with. So, while the story emerges, based on Johan’s private revelations about his past, a confessional mode familiar from Bergman’s work, a parallel development involves epistemic ambiguity. We are drawn into questions about each of the central characters. We are also drawn into questions about whether the narrative details fit plausibly into a realist aesthetic. The viewer is invited to share knowledge with Alma, which creates a perspective on the action, which follows. From this perspective we can start to appreciate that Johan’s problems are related to the public scandal of his relationship with Veronica and his lack of autonomy in a world where he depends on the patronage of powerful elites.

It is necessary to hold on to the development of Alma’s character whilst noting that the film displays a fascination with the symbolism, surrealism and eroticism of artist’s private life. Action gravitates to the baron’s castle but point-of-view shots are given an interesting role in the introduction of this scene. At the end of the meal scene Alma replies that she knows they have been invited to the castle that night. This, in effect, reveals that she has acquired information from Johan’s diary. But a confrontation does not ensue. Instead, the transition to the castle is managed through a mysterious combination of point-of-view shots. After Alma’s revelation she gets up from the table, but Johan gazes intently in the other direction. The following shot
shows the baron talking directly to an interlocutor who we can infer is Johan because of the editing pattern. It is revealed immediately, however, that he is talking to both Johan and Alma because the camera moves to indicate the baron turning his attention from one to the other. We might wonder why there is a formal pattern linking Johan’s gaze off-screen, and his implicit point-of-view in the following shot. The viewer can provide their own interpretation, but this strategy shows how the film is organised around conceptions of subjectivity. These are sufficiently complex to unsettle any straightforward identification between the audience and Johan. Johan’s gaze is prominent at this point because we are being drawn into his inner world, but we also become aware of the way Alma is integrated into the position from which the point-of-view perspective is seen. Thus, Alma remains integral to the narrative development and the first shot at the castle asks the audience to imagine the subjectivity of both Johan and Alma.

An evening at the castle
The subjective camera and a wide-angle lens create a distancing effect as each of the baron’s entourage greets the guests. Further elements create a sense of unreality. When the baron introduces his wife there is a jump cut whilst the rest of the introductions, to his mother, brother Ernst, Lindhorst and Heerbrand are conveyed through camera movement around the space occupied by the hosts, and through their movement and look towards the camera. These introductions are similar to the earlier stage-like entrances representing Johan’s diary entries, but this section creates another imaginative dimension. The aristocratic party are like figures in a dream world, objects or fragments that have drifted from their original context while the subjective camera unites the vision of Alma and Johan. Like the camera work that showed Alma at the beginning without showing the director, the diegetic look here is represented but not established with a reverse shot. This conveys an indeterminate, because unseen, subjectivity immersed in a dreamlike, phenomenal reality. Because point-of-view is usually related to one character the unity of this set up becomes more dreamlike and part of the innovative approach to narration within the film.

The unusual style reinforces the shift that has occurred in the narrative. Previously the film conveyed the couple’s isolation and in particular Johan’s melancholic withdrawal from social reality, apparent in his silence with Alma. Now, as we enter a
world that promises to reveal more about the secret world of his diary and his art, a more social environment emerges. The effect of the camera work is to show that the hosts crowd in on their guests. This creates an interesting conjunction of psychological and social representation.⁴⁶

The representation of Alma and Johan being psychologically dominated at the dinner table by their hosts is significant for the idea that the latter become internal objects primarily for Johan, but also for Alma. The aristocratic entourage impose a fragmented discourse on to the consciousness of the guests. This effect is represented through the continuous unpredictable shifts in attention and focus. The combination of elided conversation, circling camera movement, and whip pans, constructs the feeling that Alma and Johan are overawed and out of place. Amongst this bricolage of elements are static shots, including one of the baron looking on enigmatically at his guests. The static shots of the couple further develop the idea that they are captives of a situation that overwhelms. In one shot Johan is shown from the back in darkness. In another, Alma’s expression is one of blank bemusement.

Meanwhile, the conversations give the impression of the narcissism of the rich and powerful hosts as they talk about their own medical, and financial problems. The fragments of conversation about physical ailment and decline signify a sadistic subtext with gothic undertones. Corinne, the baron’s wife, talks blithely about Veronica, and feigns naivety whilst alluding to Johan’s relationship with her. When the mother refers to her fangs, there is another suggestion of the horror already hinted at. When Lindhorst talks about 'hatred in her eyes', we do not know if this is a sadistic description of Alma’s look as she is forced to respond on the subject of Veronica. The laughter at Lindhorst’s remark can be read as reinforcing an enjoyment at the expense of Alma, or alternatively as another enigma playing on our lack of narrative knowledge. At the end of this sequence, the physical movement from Johan as he drinks a glass of wine and wipes his fingers, with the candles burning in the foreground isolates his figure in juxtaposition with the group-dominated environment. This nightmarish experience of the party relates to the Kleinian critique of groups, which suggests that they reinforce splitting. As Alford puts it: ‘If one takes Klein seriously, one will not, however, be terribly optimistic about the emergence of a reparative morality among elite-or any other-groups.
Groups tend to remain stuck at the paranoid-schizoid stage. The group exudes a sense that they form a reality in their own right, but the exclusion of others is conveyed through the experience of Alma and Johan.

Bergman shows himself drawn to the position of outsider but, as my previous chapters have indicated, for him this role is not a fixed identity and can be occupied temporarily by a couple, an individual or only retained through fleeting moments of imagination. Here the representation of the oppressive elite is highly expressionistic. Bergman represents only part of the wider economic structure beyond the life of Johan and Alma. We are given fragments about this group of characters, which intimates that they are part of a reality that is fading. Like the couple they are cut off from the mainstream of society. They may have emotional and commercial power, but their dependence is on a privilege that is not explicitly connected with contemporary social organisation and this means that they possess a quality of unreality. The ghoulish members of the upper class are not just representatives of a subjective madness, but also represent a society where psychic divisions naturally coexist with social and economic inequality. The Kleinian concept of splitting also represents this interplay, between social and subjective alienation, because it unmasks strategies, which are used to achieve a false sense of integration. Bergman’s style of film-making, in this sequence, repeats the sense of fragmentation conveyed in relation to Johan’s psyche, and Alma’s attempt to imagine his diary. This attention to fragmentation parallels the Kleinian argument that splitting is inevitable at the level of the individual and society. Bergman’s focus on fragmentation also seems to accord with the Kleinian emphasis that individuals and groups will deny and perpetuate the unreality of this process of splitting. To understand the unreality of this process we must engage with it and this involves emotion and imagination as well as understanding.

In the section at the castle there are key moments that unify Alma and Johan, such as the point at which they kiss on the walk through the castle grounds, but they are also split and this is focused on in their response to art. The puppet show of *The Magic Flute* captivates the whole crowd, and provides the kind of absorption in a shared experience that was lacking around the dinner table. The puppet show is a microcosm for art. It is a personal symbol for Bergman who grew up playing with his
own miniature theatre, and whose love for *The Magic Flute* is well documented, not least through his later film of the opera. As Lindhorst, a keeper of the baron’s archives, explains, this opera unifies aesthetic pleasure and disturbing emotions. Lindhorst is suddenly a civilised host who even singles out Alma as ‘the guest’. Alma’s viewing of the scene from *The Magic Flute* is highlighted through editing, camera scale and her dreamlike expression. Her empathic response is shown in close-up. In contrast, when Johan is called to talk about his response he chooses to present his own philosophy of art, an existential rejection of value, a viewpoint that the hosts enjoy.

Considering the scene as a whole is vital to the understanding of the film. Kinder and Beverle Houston say that Bergman is preoccupied with art achieving a ‘balance’ of the conflicting forces facing the artist. These conflicts involve ‘a precarious balance between genius and madness, between passion and reason, between spontaneity and control.’ They argue that Mozart’s opera is included because it is ‘the supreme example’ of a work ‘that successfully maintains this balance’. The inclusion of a performance within the performance of his films is used regularly by Bergman (for instance the theatre troupe perform in *The Seventh Seal*), but as already indicated *Hour of the Wolf* appears to be self-reflexive at many levels. The choice of scene from *The Magic Flute* returns to the idea of a protagonist’s emotional upheaval, isolated in the midst of the night, and the absence of the loved one, suggested by the story of Veronica. Across these ideas the focus on Alma is significant because the achievement of integration shifts from the idealised world of the performance to the experience of spectatorship, which is similarly confronted with the challenge of splitting and the need to achieve meaningful integration. In the dark, Alma’s face shown in close-up more frequently than those of the other characters absorbs the information as Lindhorst informs the audience about Tamino’s anxiety. Tamino yearns for an answer to the question - does Pamina live? - and the affirmative reply comes from the chorus. Across this articulation of a happy ending there is consciousness of division as Lindhorst pauses, in his explanation of the play, between the syllables of the word Pamina. Johan’s face is shown in a mirroring shot alongside Alma’s with both of them half covered in shadow. The opera is, thus, related to the idea of overcoming division but the latter persists in the visual presentation of the spectators.
It is also striking that in this scene we are made so aware of Lindhorst as the controller of the theatre, whilst Alma, and, to a lesser extent, Johan and the others are spectators. This conveys the idea of art as an interaction with both formal control and emotional projection as key components. This understanding of art’s dual capacity for manipulation and regeneration is important as a contrast to Johan’s state of mind. When the play ends, Johan speaks of art’s irrelevance to the real world. For the crowd of aristocrats, he sounds like a true intellectual because he paradoxically negates his own role as an artist. But Johan’s words raise questions: does he say this simply to please his audience? Is this a mask? Alma thinks he is being inauthentic, excusing his drunkenness as he tussles with the countess, who has scratched him with a rose. Thus, across the whole scene the focus on Alma is not simply to make a comparison with Pamina, but instead to elaborate her position as a spectator and active agent, providing a route for the viewer which is detached from Johan’s identity as an artist.

In the room of the baroness the couple are invited to look at Johan’s portrait of Veronica and the baroness talks about Johan’s relationship with this woman. The feeling of entering a labyrinth of mirrors where identity loses certainty is matched at the level of mise-en-scene. We do not see the portrait of Veronica but the baroness, in a sense, takes her place, reinforcing the pattern of sublimation and transference involved in this text. When Johan turns round to the baroness she points to her bruise. However, Alma, at the edge of the frame on the left, is reflected in the mirror on the right. Thus, in a situation where self and image are confused and Johan’s desire and violence cast a shadow over his sense of self, Alma’s association with an integration of image and reality is reinforced. It is easy to assume that the driving force behind this film is a fascination with the surreal and the irrational or an overpowering fascination with the death drive. However, in order to understand how the narration offers detachment we must continue to note the representation of Alma.

The fact that we do not see Veronica’s portrait returns the dramatic focus on to the couple. Both are presented in portrait form, half in shadow. The expressions convey incomprehension, but also, in Alma’s case fear, which she confirms verbally. Alma’s self-expression becomes even more forceful as they travel home. The long take
allows us to see Alma’s beseeching face as she protests about the baron’s entourage and their attitude to her, but her expression is transformed as she gets no response from Johan. A match on action emphasises her move away from Johan, as her fear intensifies. His passivity and weak attempts to comfort her are not sufficient. The windswept landscape expresses their tumult, and the negativity, now associated with his character, is shown more fully as he walks away to the cottage.

Alma’s faith in Johan means that she projects hope and faith towards him, but we see how this hope is contradicted. Violence is an integral part of human nature in the Kleinian scheme, but the transcendence of violence can be achieved through recognition of negativity, a detachment of negativity from experience. This is not a linear process. Although Alma has progressed from seeing demons in her husband’s psyche to a more complete sense that he is haunted, she is still bound to him. She listens to his difficulties, which leads to more explicit understanding of his alienation.

**The Hour of the Wolf**

Johns Blackwell criticises the way Alma is represented as passive and transparent whilst male subjectivity is mysterious. She argues that the film expresses fears about homosexuality and the female body and retreats from the radicalism of *Persona*. However, she acknowledges that it does ‘avail itself of some disjunctive strategies that contribute to a feminist reading…’ 50 My argument is that the positive role I have attributed to Alma works with ‘disjunctive strategies’ as a means of understanding the artist’s isolation in society, but also as a means of criticising his obsession. Bergman's decision to reintroduce the title suddenly prior to the next scene reveals his formal innovation and parallels the moment in *Persona* when we are suddenly shown the film reel, a moment that according to Linda Rugg represents a breaking of psychic integration. 51 Nevertheless, the moment of fracture in *Hour of the Wolf* relies on a very simple convention and is related to silent cinema. Bergman explains this moment as one in which he tries to wake the audience. 52 Putting these observations together we can account for this moment as another example of Bergman’s project to represent fragmentation, at a general level, alongside the process of splitting represented in the story of Johan. The scene that follows burrows
deeply into Johan’s madness, but also allows the viewer to gain detachment, and this is achieved in narrative terms through Alma.

The sequence should be sketched initially. It starts with Johan telling Alma how he was abusively punished by his father. Secondly, he tells how he killed a young boy who taunted him whilst he was fishing. Thirdly, Heerbrand arrives at their house and provides a gun ostensibly for Johan to kill wild animals on the island. He also invites them to the castle. Fourthly, Alma reveals that she knows about Johan’s affair with Veronica from reading his diary. Finally, Johan appears to shoot Alma and rushes off to the castle.

At the start of this scene, Alma is passive as they sit in the depths of the night. Johan provides the narration. The reliance on verbal description cues a possible visual imaginary for the spectator. This impulse towards the imaginary is made even stronger because Johan’s story relates how he experienced imagined horror. The threat of an unseen creature in this cupboard is an early form of one of Johan’s bad objects or demons. This story, thus, contributes to Alma’s acquisition of knowledge about her husband’s neurosis. The creature in the cupboard evokes the cruelty of the parents, and this theme continues with the violence of the father which follows, as Johan recalls the beating he is given when he leaves the cupboard. Perhaps, the creature in the cupboard represents a subliminal mix of fear and desire, which is displaced by the violence of reality. The imaginary dimension remains ambiguous and more potent for this. Johan’s paranoid-schizoid state emerges more explicitly. Instead of concentrating on the way the violence exceeds his understanding he confesses to masochism in the beating. In Sartrean terms he relinquishes his freedom and is masochistically involved in his earlier suffering to the point that this negativity is projected on to the external world and becomes a dominant totality.

Johan’s story about his imprisonment by his parents in a cupboard was a key autobiographical episode for Bergman. When asked if he ever experienced being beaten as a child Bergman replies: ‘How I ever got out alive passes my understanding. In the original script I’d intended to show the whole episode taking place.’ A powerful case can be made that this episode is structured by a real engagement with society in the form of violence within the family. As Bergom-
Larsson argues, following Donner, humiliation is of central importance in Bergman’s work. Bergom-Larsson continues:

It is against this background of harrowing experience and conflicts, conscious and unconscious, that Bergman’s confrontation with the bourgeois authoritarian family must be seen. He has experienced it with his nerve-ends, and it does not cease to fascinate and at the same time repel him.54

The incident in the cupboard clearly refers back to Bergman’s own experience of punishment as a child. The linking of this story with the immediately following one that Johan tells us of his encounter with a boy, conveys a complex psychological relationship, in which the child lives on as a presence within the adult. We have already heard about Bergman’s lifelong fascination with the motif of the murderous nightmare encapsulated in the condensation of the Red Riding Hood story and werewolf mythology. According to Kleinian ideas we need more than an existential cutting free of the past. Johan needs to find the internalised violence. This erupts in the second story. Johan becomes the Oedipal tyrant but the violence is played out through a series of views and objects without words as we watch his encounter with a boy next to the sea, an encounter which shows Johan batter the boy to death. The boy creeps up while Johan stands alone fishing. The drama is orchestrated by alienating, discordant music. The absence of dialogue represents this as Johan’s subjective experience. The overexposed look and the obtuse angles heighten the alienation. Horror returns because the boy is like a vampire child and thus connected to the oppressive social world represented in the castle. The viewer is forced again to step outside a naturalistic interpretation. As Kinder and Houston put it:

The boy like the other demons is clearly a projection - a combination of the frightened child in the closet and the demon who threatens to bite off his toes: Johan is both the authoritarian father with the whip and the child receiving the beating.55

Alma’s comprehension reaches a certain level before it is terminated in the chaos of the material: with her lack of understanding fear returns. A curious stasis takes over. We might expect, based on earlier Bergman films, a more concrete response or outcome to the revelation that Johan has murdered a child. The conflict has been articulated in highly dramatic form, but the resolution remains elusive. The formal
preoccupation with appearance and reality comes to the fore. Suddenly Heerbrand, the curator, another member of the baron’s party, knocks at the door and gives Johan the gun. This is symbolically an object that allows Johan to use violence without compunction. Whilst Heerbrand’s first appearance in the diary showed Johan’s determination to expel the psychiatrist’s analysis from his consciousness, now he accepts the latter’s invitation to use the gun.

We do not see the results of the shooting, but the three shots fired by Johan cut the bond with Alma more decisively than before. They are about intention rather than result. Johan’s actions usher in a self-determined path in which he follows his own desire. At this point however it is not certain that Johan is doomed. As Philip Mosley points out:

The sequence of the *Hour of the Wolf* itself is the final break in the Alma/Johan relationship; he begins to see her too as a ‘demon’ and it is at this point that he tries to shoot her. However, it is not at his point where his doom is clearly set out. There is still the hope that this mad act might bring him to his senses.56

Existential analysis is not just concerned with the authentic, but also bad faith, and thus provides the means to recognise Johan’s illusions. Johan’s odyssey after shooting his wife releases his imaginary world. While up to this point the spectator has been confronted with gaps and absences provoking an active imaginative interpretation, now he/she may be overwhelmed by the subliminal imagery. Thus, Johan’s odyssey cannot escape emptiness. Freed from his relationship with Alma, Johan’s demons take over. Each character promises to be a sign on the way to Veronica, who is the goal and the origin of his desire at this point. In these exchanges we see more and more fragmentation.

**Johan’s return to the castle**

When Johan meets the mother of Baron von Merkens she entrances him with her foot. She is another representative of Veronica, the idealised woman he pursues but cannot obtain. He is now in a world stripped of empathic emotions, devoid of the pity exhibited by Alma. Next, the baron confesses that he is another lover of Veronica. As unresolved conflicts are put centre-stage, the veneer of civilisation maintained by the aristocracy continues. It is absurd as the baron suddenly reveals his ability to defy the
rules of gravity walking up the wall and across the ceiling, reinforcing the established association of the aristocracy and vampires. An old lady removes her face, and places her eyeball in a glass. When Johan passively accepts make-up this highlights his loss of identity. Voyeurism is a key component in this paranoid-schizoid world. According to the Kleinian theorist Segal it is also one of the phenomena which artists are drawn to in their engagement with the fractured psyche. In this sequence it becomes a more prominent theme as the baron promises to be close by, watching Johan with Veronica. When Johan finds Veronica it appears to be a sublime fulfilment of his desire. She lies on a bed, which looks like a stage, as if her body has been preserved for him. The close camerawork that follows as he touches her skin down to the foot can be interpreted as an objectification of the female body. It is like one of his images, but this is a dream only founded on his desire, and when Veronica suddenly springs to life, her laughter and savage desire is excessive, shocking. Her independence is shocking for Johan, and her laughter is echoed in the assembly who watch, as Johan with his clown like make up looks devastated by the public humiliation. Sartre emphasised most strongly in his theory of imagination the gulf that can emerge between perception and imagination. We see continual oscillations in Johan’s trip to the castle which present variations on this division, most notably in the way Veronica is transformed from corpse to animated laughter, and in the switch from their isolation to the revealed presence of a mocking crowd whose laughter cements Johan’s humiliation. In other words, Johan is continually surprised by the phenomena he confronts, as apparently empirical realities are revealed to be deceptive. Johan’s desire is apparently just part of a wider plot controlled by others. Thus, as he caresses Veronica we see his possession of her and as he turns to the crowd we see that he is possessed by forces outside his influence. In Kleinian terms, this paranoid-schizoid pattern of oscillation contrasts with the concern and empathy offered by Alma.

Bergman has made it clear that humiliation and shame are key emotional states for him. The scene with Veronica also returns to his fascination with the set-up of a theatrical performance. The fact that Veronica is only presented in this way reminds us of Monika’s naked appearance as a key symbolic moment. Without Alma’s presence Bergman’s work would be more self-indulgent. In this film she is the key element that retains a link with the presentation of a recognisable social world. She
can only speculate on what would have saved her husband. She has the role of questioner, which for Bergman despite his aesthetic opposition to theorising is a valued activity, a philosophy for everyday life. The abrupt end, with Alma in mid-sentence undercuts the idealisation of her character, reinforcing the realism of her discourse, and returns to the opening set up in which there is an emotional interface between Alma, director and spectator. Bergman’s message is made clearer because Alma remains a quiet character, unrealised. Her love for Johan is unconditional. Looking for him in the woods she found him, but now time and space are fragmented and he cannot be recovered. This landscape is the mise-en-scene of Johan’s abjection and his loss of freedom with the baron’s entourage.

The ambiguity of the film’s conclusion reinforces the connection with philosophical and psychoanalytic discourses. The work of Sartre and Klein provides a particular understanding of Bergman’s reach towards these discourses. The fact that Johan’s downfall is related to his own imagination has been set up and played out in the focus on his obsessive character. While Sartre insists that the imaginary involves subjective creation, he also insists that it involves engagement with external phenomena. The excesses of Johan’s imagination accord with this because they are also the representation of an oppressive social situation in which the artist is defeated by his dependence on powerful elites. Johan’s imagination provides an expressive and distorted representation of this elite, the alienation of his emotions and the collapse of his marriage. The imaginative excess also reveals childhood terror and the fear of annihilation. In the character of Alma we also find a dialectic between recognition of the values and dangers of imagination. She participates to an extent in Johan’s nightmare, but remains moderate and grounded. This can be understood as the result of an exclusive focus on male artistic subjectivity. However, Bergman’s other work backs up the argument that he does not restrict himself to the imaginative life of his male characters. As I have shown, the character of Alma can also be read as representing the value of empathic imagination and the possibility of linking imagination and reality.
Chapter 6 - REFERENCES AND ENDTNOTES

5. Cowie adds the point that *Passion of Anna* focuses on Max von Sydow as a recluse (Bergman as we know escaped society for the remote island of Fårö). Cowie also mentions *Persona*, suggesting that across all these films ‘the humiliation grows more violent in its manifestation.’ p. 246.
7. ‘In France *Persona* redeemed Ingmar Bergman to the critics.’ Steene, op.cit., p.271.
10. ‘Swedish press reacted to *Vargtimmen* as to a cinematic déjà vu. Though recognizing Bergman’s virtuosity as a film-maker, the critics had reservations about the portrait of the self-absorbed artist Johan Borg. Goran O. Eriksson in BLM 38, no.3 (March 1968): 212-14, found that Bergman overestimated the importance of the artistic self, which was considered an obsolete theme in today’s world.’ ibid., p.278.
16. ibid.
17. ibid., p.101.
18. Bergman explains that the names of several characters are taken from Hoffman: ‘Kreisler the “kapellmeister”, Heerbrand the curator, Lindhorst the archivist’, Björkman et al. (eds.), op.cit., p.218.
21. See Chapter 1, p.35.
Livingston argues that Bergman may have been significantly affected by Kaila’s Psychology of the Personality. As Livingston notes, Bergman said that he was very struck by Kaila’s philosophy in this book. Bergman singles out, in particular, the idea from Kaila’s “that man lives strictly according to his needs.” Livingston, P. (2009) Cinema, Philosophy, Bergman: On Film as Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.126. Livingston’s quotation is from Bergman’s film script (1960), Wild Strawberries: a film, translated from the Swedish by Lars Malmström and David Kushner. Livingston refers to ‘many films scholars’ assumption that Bergman can be unproblematically situated in a general “European” existentialist tradition or movement”; and notes in footnote that apart from ‘Camus’ Caligula, Bergman never chose to stage any of the great existentialist dramas…” p.127.


ibid., p.28.


Explaining Klein’s account of ‘the fear of life’ Kristeva writes: ‘In a word, it is for Eros’ sake that our anxiety about the annihilation of life penetrates the deepest layers of the psyche.’ Kristeva, J. (2001) Melanie Klein, translated by Ross Guberman, New York; Chichester: Columbia University Press, p.84.


ibid.

Kinder, op.cit., p.28.


ibid., p.216.

This seems to follow from Sartre’s account of the imagination, his work on consciousness and ‘Existentialism is a Humanism’, but it becomes more pronounced later in his career. In his engagement with Marxism in The Search for a Method Sartre criticises overly subjective existentialism: ‘Kierkegaard realised some progress over Hegel by affirming the reality of the lived: Jaspers regresses in the historical movement, for he flees from the real movement of praxis and takes refuge in an abstract subjectivity, whose sole aim is to achieve a certain inward quality.’ Sartre, J-P. (1960) The Search for a Method, in Existentialism from Dostoyevsky to Sartre op.cit; this copy at http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/sartre/works/critic/sartre1.htm p.7.

The island resembles Fårö where Bergman moved in the 1960s.

See Chapter 2 for an account of integration and reparation in Kleinian theory.


ibid., p.19.

This image is discussed by Gordon Thomas in Bright Lights Film Journal. He

41 Steene explains that Bergman is drawing here on Swedish folklore, Steene, op.cit., p.276.
42 Livingston, op.cit and Wood, op.cit.
43 See endnote 38, Chapter 4, this thesis.
45 Michael Rustin provides a good account of the political and philosophical relevance of Klein on this point: ‘We could say that Klein’s revision of Freud’s theory of infancy, and her postulation of a state of initial, innate relatedness of infant to parents, is an indirect riposte to the atomistic theory of liberal individualism first formulated by the English empiricist philosophers.’ Rustin, ‘Klein on Human Nature’ in Mills (ed.), op.cit., pp.25-44; p.27.
46 As we saw in Chapter 2 a number of recent contributions to Kleinian theory make this point. For instance Sánchez-Pardo, op.cit., p.150.
49 ibid.
53 ibid., p.220.
55 Kinder and Houston, op.cit., p.276.
56 Mosley, op.cit., p.97.
7 Conclusion

In this chapter I will start by noting a few debates and alternative readings in relation to the key films analysed. I will acknowledge some of the complications facing the convergence of two distinct theories employed in my analysis. Following these points, I will consider in greater depth how some of Bergman’s more general observations on his work relate to the content of the theories used, before returning to a final statement of the core points arising from the approach I have adopted.

Issues and points for further debate

The combination of Kleinian and Sartrean theories expands upon the established idea that Bergman’s cinema involves a mixture of realism and more symbolic, expressionistic techniques. For both theorists the imagination plays a central role in consciousness and is a key to understanding the relationship between the individual and society. The application of Kleinian and Sartrean ideas has pointed to issues for further debate. For instance, we have seen how a Sartrean response to the character of Monika may involve condemnation based on her selfish abandonment of Harry and the baby or a degree of empathy for her rebellion based on its negation of an oppressive social context. With The Virgin Spring ambiguity was noted in the symbolic representation of divine intervention. The argument that this is an image which can be subjected to humanist appropriation, as an aesthetic investment in the ambiguity of the image itself, is clearly open to further discussion given Bergman’s changing attitude to religion. Another point for debate arises because the Kleinian focus on integration is wedded, in my analysis, to an appreciation of the empathic qualities of Alma in Hour of the Wolf, a reading which tempers the apparent turn to a more experimental mode signalled by this film and, also, Persona. However, I have not argued that Kleinian and Sartrean ideas provide definitive readings of Bergman’s work. Their critical relevance has a specific focus. Kleinian work puts across the idea that art gains from the artist’s confrontation with psychic conflict. On this score Bergman’s work has been shown to succeed in a range of films. The analysis of how this conflict is translated into film form and narrative has also drawn on Kleinian ideas of integration and a synthesis of control and expression in Bergman’s handling
of the film medium. Sartrean theory has been used to show how fascination with the products of imagination is used by Bergman in a creative way to represent oppression and the possibility of freedom for his protagonists. Both Sartrean and Kleinian ideas work most effectively as an extension of Bergman’s intuitive pursuit of psychological and philosophical themes.

We also have to note that the work of Bergman, Klein, and Sartre involves historical transformation. It has been argued for instance in The New Kleinian Dictionary that Klein placed more emphasis on the negative qualities of epistemophilia in her early work, and that later, in 1935, she emphasised a more positive value for this instinct, speaking of ‘the way the capacity to learn and to work may be hampered by depression and despair about damaged objects.’ In other words she increasingly sees greater integration of this instinct as part of the reparative process. In the case of Sartre, his turn towards Marxism in the 1950s provides a different set of criteria for evaluating fictional characters. This was already apparent in What is Literature?, which argues that artists must engage with social injustice. The ongoing vitality of debate about the concepts of each thinker including the relationship between their early and later work testifies to their continued relevance. However, the broader historical perspective of their engagement with social circumstances outlined in Chapter 1 suggests that despite significant changes in their work a degree of convergence can be recognised. Through the discipline of film analysis general points of convergence have been clarified involving an inclusive aesthetic, which seeks to express conflicts whilst retaining an ideal of autonomy in the imagination. It has been argued that in this respect the Bergman films analysed parallel concerns in Klein and Sartre through his representation of character, development of narrative, the creativity of film form and the way the audience are engaged in imaginative interpretation of the material.

The analysis of key works from Bergman has revealed continuities and discontinuities in style and theme. One of the clearest accounts of film style at a general level is provided by Bordwell’s account of different cinematic modes including European art cinema. The three films analysed in depth fit with key elements of this mode identified by Bordwell including the prevalence of ambiguity,
alongside the theme of reality and illusion, and an investment in characterisation. Close analysis combined with reflection on Kleinian and Sartrean ideas has shown that in Bergman’s work the formal concerns of art cinema are wedded to philosophical and psychoanalytic interests. In relation to Sartre, the tension between recognition of reality and imagination as an autonomous power was explored in my film analysis. In relation to Klein, the most persistent point of comparison was the way each film represented a movement between signs of psychic fragmentation and the expression of a reparative trajectory. This trajectory was located in the characters and in the form of the film itself.

Both Sartrean and Kleinian perspectives relate to Bergman’s preoccupation with internal worlds, represented through character subjectivity and overt authorial narration. At the same time, Kleinian and Sartrean perspectives share Bergman’s concern with recognising social reality. While Sartre and Klein themselves can be criticised for not focussing sufficiently on social reality, it is clear that each theorist seeks to establish a connection between the world of imagination and social context. For Sartre, this connection is focussed initially on recognising a tension between the individual and the external world, which maps on to a tension between the individual and their social context. For Klein, the individual has to overcome self-destructive tendencies by progressing through the depressive position. This requires a re-orientation to the external world through internalised objects and consequently her theory points to the obstacle of self-destructive tendencies within the external world. The fact that these theorists express a connection between the individual and social reality, which is often oblique, makes them even more relevant to Bergman because we can recognise that he also includes recognition of social reality as a significant element despite his forceful emphasis on the world of imagination.

Bergman’s comments on his art

In the course of the analysis I have referred to Bergman’s insights into his own work. More general comments made by Bergman in interviews can now be briefly considered to get a measure of how his insights relate to the theoretical perspectives
and stylistic analysis used in this thesis. In an interview with Jean Beranger in 1958 Bergman makes it clear that he is still religious, but marks out his divergence from his upbringing by stating that his belief is not connected to the Church and relates his faith to a critique of ‘materialism’: ‘Integral materialism could only lead humanity to an impasse without warmth.’ In the same interview Bergman makes clear his aspiration to communicate at a universal level whilst recognising that his identity is indissolubly linked with Swedish culture:

An artist cannot express himself fully and thereby succeed in touching the public in other countries except by remaining attached to all the particularities of his native soil.

At this stage Bergman shares at a very general level the humanist opposition of Klein and Sartre to a world dominated by materialism and searches for value at a universal level.

By 1965 Bergman’s pronouncements on art and his own reasons for making art take a more sceptical turn in the form of his acceptance speech of the Erasmus Prize in Amsterdam. Here he turns to the idea that his art originated in his childhood dreaming, which he suggests was characterised by a self-centred rebellion against the external world. ‘A contact-seeking child, beset by fantasies, I was quickly transformed into a hurt, cunning and suspicious day-dreamer.’ At this point in the speech, Bergman’s words echo the distinction between dreaming and art developed in Freudian and Kleinian thought, and he considers how he had to progress from this solipsistic interest to a more social domain. ‘The need to get people to listen, to correspond, to live in the warmth of a fellowship, remained.’ However, from this Bergman takes a sceptical turn saying: ‘Now, to be completely honest, I regard art (and not only the art of cinema) as lacking importance.’ He offers the image of a dead snakeskin still moving due to the activity of parasitic ants. Art proliferates but it is like the dead snakeskin deprived of its essence whilst Bergman continues, one of the ants. However, as with Hour of the Wolf, Bergman’s negativity here masks a dialectic. In his brutal honesty he seeks to recover a sense of art as his destiny, his personal project, removed from the pomp of expressing universal truths. He also obliquely places himself in a changed world where the dynamic of increasing freedom for artists, through the expansion of the media and technological
developments, raises new questions about the artist’s place in society. Thus, Bergen articulates a more existential Sartrean sense of intractable individualism while clinging on to the idea that this identity cannot be reduced to a commercial function (of course he acknowledges his need to make a living). This piece also conveys a hidden potential for imaginative creation beyond the elite world of his own success and recognition: ‘There are film-makers who live their films and would never abuse their gift by materializing them in reality.’

Aware that he is treading a thin line in self-justification Bergman concludes by claiming that ultimately the benefit of being ‘an artist for one’s own sake’ is that this places himself ‘on an equal footing with every other creature who also exists solely for his own sake.’ This rhetoric may seem like a dismal retreat from his earlier ambition to express a universal message and themes through imaginative representations of his own culture and psyche, until one recognises that Bergman’s position shares characteristics with the revision of humanism in other strands of modernist theory. Arguably this idea links with Sartre’s attempt to reformulate his philosophy as a democratic ethics in ‘Existentialism is a Humanism’, with the search to link individuals by virtue of their shared experience of isolation and confrontation with meaninglessness. This sentiment was located in the representation of the boy in The Virgin Spring, but also in the concern with isolated characters in all the films selected for this thesis. If Bergman does not go as far as Sartre’s programmatic rhetoric of inclusion it is because Bergman also hints at the therapeutic value of art for himself, so that through art he co-exists with his internal world. ‘I revolve with the objects I have captured for myself and am cheerfully or melancholically occupied.’ There is a recognition that others (the audience) cannot be coerced into this process but that the artist is still connected, part of ‘a fairly large brotherhood who exist… in selfish fellowship…’

This speech is rather like a performance, an extension of Bergman’s persona as a showman. A more measured perspective emerges from Bergman on Bergman, the most extensive interviews given by the director. When asked by Björkman about whether he felt, at the outset of his career, ‘solidarity with the social, cultural, and philosophical currents of the mid-forties?’ Bergman agrees, going on to say: ‘Then came existentialism - Sartre and Camus. Above all Sartre. Camus came later, with a sort of refined existentialism.’ Bergman does not expand much on this,
acknowledging later that he was far from being well read in existential philosophy, but the idea that existentialism expressed a position with which he could identify can be read into his commentary in this set of interviews. As I noted earlier it is in these interviews that Bergman compares his final rejection of religion to Sartre’s experience. However, Bergman fashions his affiliation with existentialism to his own concerns. He is insistent on his detachment from politics, at least during the first half of his career and his ongoing preoccupations with religion. He pushes any sympathy with existentialism away from political engagement by proclaiming his hostility to any concept of ideology and puts this in the present tense. When Björkman says: ‘You give an account of your experience of the world. But you don’t make films programmatically?’ Bergman responds: ‘No, never tied to an ideology. I can’t. For me nothing of that sort exists.’ However this position seems to be slightly modified in a later interview: ‘I’ve stated firmly and clearly, that though as an artist I’m not politically involved, I obviously am an expression of the society I live in. Anything else would be grotesque.’

Whilst comments on Sartre are fleeting, references to psychoanalysis are minimal and references to Klein are non-existent. However, we have seen how *Wild Strawberries* overtly courted a process of engagement with past emotions and the unconscious through the character of Isak and how Klein’s concepts apply to films at different points of Bergman’s career. Without taking on board the concepts of particular psychoanalysts Bergman’s reflections on his work suggest that he recognises a connection. It has been pointed out that in an interview with Björkman and Olivier Assayas in 2006 Bergman suggests that his initial writing involved a feeling that it was a pleasurable and therapeutic activity. Bergman refers to a period in 1941 when he was allowed to suspend his military service and stayed at the house of his grandmother. Here he found peace through writing. He mentions that his mother was also living there, which contributes to the idea of a creative element in his relationship to his mother, and he goes on to say he felt that in the writing he could escape from the tensions of the war. About the writing he says: ‘“it was a completely new feeling that I had not experienced before, this business of just sitting down and writing in longhand and seeing the words emerge. I liked it a lot… It was just an enormous… comfort…. Something opened up for me….”’ As Steene

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remarks: ‘Bergman’ s statement points to the therapeutic function that the creative act would come to have for him. The transformation of a subjective world into artistic form, be it as a play, a script, a piece for television, or a novel, was to become a continuing form of psychological purgation, without which he says he probably would have gone mad.’

One interpretation of Bergman’s representation of emotional reality in his filmmaking career is that despite his focus on characters’ feelings he remains detached. We saw an apparent example of this in Hour of the Wolf when the idea of a detached creator controlling his characters and their emotions was alluded to in the puppet performance by of The Magic Flute. In interview, Bergman acknowledges his own actions manipulating characters and audience. However, as we have seen there is a complex interplay between the representation of characters’ emotions and more detached representation. We saw how, for instance, Hour of the Wolf is focussed primarily on psychic conflict in the experience of Johan and Alma. Bergman comes closer to expressing an affiliation with psychoanalysis when he focuses on emotion and the idea of emotional structures permeating social relationships. This emerges clearly when he discusses humiliation. Like Klein he demonstrates, here, awareness of a repetitive pattern in which destructive impulses are perpetuated at an unconscious level across society.

For the most part, Bergman is most comfortable talking about his films as a creative process. In interviews through his career a repeated question has concerned his feelings about cinema and theatre. Implicit in the application of Kleinian and Sartrean ideas is the idea that the distinction between art forms is at some level transcended in favour of a focus on imagination itself. At the same time it has to be acknowledged that detailed analysis of Bergman films required specific attention to film form. Bergman himself produces different answers at different times on the relationship between cinema and theatre and his preferences. The conclusion I draw is that a philosophy of imagination gains in insight by avoiding too much reduction to the specific art form in question. More conclusively, it is clear that Bergman’s films involve a creative combination of different film styles, ranging from the silent era to his more disjunctive style in Hour of the Wolf and this extends to a creative
combination of theatrical and filmic devices including in particular his infamous use of close-ups and lighting. All of this refers us to the importance of his working relationships with key personnel such as the cinematographers Gunnar Fischer and Sven Nykvist. The creative link between Bergman’s film and theatre work is most apparent in his focus on acting. Bergman suggests that on both stage and film set he seeks to position the actor so that ‘they feel they are at their best’. What Bergman appears to be expressing here is the cultivation of the actor’s image of himself/herself. And this takes place in an intimate working relationship with Bergman who says that he ‘must always function as a kind of radar’ using his ‘intuition’ to focus on the actor’s feelings. Bergman conveys in this interview that both film and theatre must cultivate the audience imagination. Bergman elaborates this in relation to Persona. In this film the nurse Alma recounts to her patient Elisabet Vogler, an actress who has withdrawn from all conversation, a shocking story of her participation in an orgy. Bergman explains that he chose only to show Vogler’s reaction: ‘…the only thing we see, practically the entire time, is the face of Liv Ullmann (in the role of the actress, Elisabet Vogler), who eats the scene. She eats with her lips what she is being told - and it is a very erotic scene. If you had tried to re-create the scene with the two boys and the two girls, it would have been merely disgusting. Now, it’s very erotic. It’s strange, isn’t it.’

Bergman in effect suggests that he can achieve chemistry with his actors and his audience through emphasis on the emotions and images that are not self-evidently contained in perception.

There are examples where Bergman’s interview material has been considered more directly significant from a psychotherapeutic perspective. The psychotherapist Ira Progoff provided an article, in a 1968 edited collection of essays, which drew its key ideas from a television interview with Bergman. Progoff’s approach is Jungian but shares certain concerns with Kleinian and Freudian thought, as well as Sartre’s account of the imagination. Progoff attaches great importance to the way Bergman conceives of his pictures as ‘dreams’. This suggests to Progoff that Bergman ‘intuitively grasps the symbolic dimension of dream imagery’. He is interested that Bergman feels that: ‘“The dream is never intellectual”… “But when you have dreamt, it can start your intellect…It can give you a new way of thinking, or feeling”…’ Progoff’s account of the interview draws attention to the way Bergman
makes creative use of his own ‘demons’ and seeks to ‘integrate’ such material. Although Progoff’s emphasis is clearly Jungian, in his idea that Bergman references a ‘symbolic dimension’ {which} is an all pervasive, universal ground of transpersonal meaning; there is a proximity to Klein in the idea that Bergman’s demons are within him. And that art provides a means of release. Bergman is quoted as saying: ‘“I always have been interested in those voices inside you.” […] “I think everybody hears those voices and those forces.” “And I have wanted to put them in ‘reality’, to put them on the table.” ’ As Progoff notes, Bergman says that his aim is to ‘“treat the inner demons not as though they were unreal imaginings but to treat them as facts, and therefore to relate to them in a serious way.” ’

**Concluding points**

Thus, Bergman’s interviews provide some material which suggests the relevance of Sartrean and Kleinian ideas. However, these theories were not introduced merely to clarify the intention of the artist. Instead the motivation in exploring convergence, and points of difference between Bergman, Klein and Sartre is that this allows a dialogue across disciplines and specialist fields of knowledge which may exceed the director’s self-analysis. In particular, it suggests that Bergman’s work is more than an aesthetic achievement. Taking on board Sartrean ideas, we can see how Bergman provides challenging representations of social reality through his portrayal of the tension between individual subjectivity and social forces. By looking at films from different periods of his career, variations on this project have been made clear. In *Summer with Monika* the film is driven by the tension between the young lovers as dreamers and their alienation in society. In *The Virgin Spring* the division between subjectivity and social context is represented through a range of characters. Centrally we have Töre’s dialogue with a hidden God, accompanying his brutal revenge of his daughter, but the subjectivity of the female characters is equally significant including the juxtaposition of Ingeri’s imaginative search for the infliction of malice against Karin, and the real source of the crime in the form of the goat herders’ instinctive attack. Finally, we have seen how in *Hour of the Wolf* Johan’s downfall results from his own demons and, on the other hand, is an allegory of an oppressive social arrangement, in which the artist is fatally dependent on a cannibalistic aristocracy. In
all three films the isolation of the individual is articulated through access to their imagination, which hints at solipsism but decisively marks the inevitability of a social horizon that must be confronted.

Drawing on Kleinian ideas we have seen how the idea of imaginative struggle for reparation is applicable to Harry at the end of Summer with Monika. While some reconciliation with social reality is achieved through this conclusion Monika remains enigmatically an image representing the deeper reality of his romance with her and their split from society. Monika’s disappearance conveys the failure of reparation and thus Bergman reminds the audience of the difficulties in a transition to this resolution. The tension between feelings of persecution and guilt are vividly demonstrated through the character of Töre in The Virgin Spring, but also in the transition made by Ingeri and the youngest goat herder. These remind us of the path of reparation described by Klein and the difficulties in overcoming ‘the death drive’ in all its forms. In Hour of the Wolf Johan like Monika represents a failure to achieve reparation, but empathy is projected through the narration of Alma. Thus, characters in these films play out themes and issues, which connect with Kleinian concepts.

In work from Sartre and Klein I pointed to an emphasis on the relationship between the real and the imaginary. For both theorists a sense of reality played a vital role in tempering the excesses of imagination. The dialectic between the real and imaginary was noted at various levels in the three films analysed in depth. This included noting the way Harry and Monika’s dreamy escape from society fails; Karin’s tragic discovery of the real intent of the goat herders in the context of her idealistic pilgrimage; and Alma’s role mediating between the Johan’s nightmare world and a more plausible sense of reality in her account of how the couple arrived on the island. Drawing on the example of The Seventh Seal in Chapter 3 it was recognised that Bergman mastered a polyphonic style representing interlocking but disjunctive character trajectories. In the films analysed we can see that there is the suggestion of a developing pattern in the characterisation from a focus on the couple to a more disparate engagement with a greater range of characters. With Summer with Monika I noted the focus on the subjectivity of the two protagonists. Wild Strawberries and The Seventh Seal showed that despite the concern with an individual protagonist and his inner world Bergman also explored a flow between and across different subjectivities. In Wild Strawberries this is organised around the focal point of Isak’s
consciousness, but the narrative trajectory involved the evolutions of his thoughts
and feelings about others to a more socialised state. In *The Seventh Seal* the central
focus on the consciousness of the knight was explored by Bergman, but also the
enigmatic conclusion of the film involved reference to different character
perspectives including those of Jof and his wife, Mia. Looking at *The Virgin Spring* I
suggested that a comparable range of characters gives rise to a stronger sense of
dispersed subjectivities including the brutal mindset of the elder goat herders, and the
anguish of Töre, Ingeri and the younger goat herder. In *Hour of the Wolf* a return to a
focus on the couple, Alma and Johan, with concentration on the latter’s mental
complexity was considered. It was shown that an even stronger sense of split
subjectivities resulted in a diminution of coherence in the diegesis. Despite this
pattern moving from concentration on the couple to a more pluralistic conception and
finally a sense of disintegration, the idea of a linear development in Bergman’s
organisation of his characters should be treated with some caution. Other work on
Bergman has explored the idea of different patterns across his work including films
made before and after those in this study.

For example, at the beginning of Chapter 3, I noted Steene’s categorisation of
Bergman’s work. However, Steene does not seek to impose these as rigid categories
and her organisation allows perceptive observations of contrast between the
categories. Thus, she notes that in *The Seventh Seal* the juggler Jof is ‘a naïve
visionary’ who suffers abuse from the crowd; whereas in the films headed
‘Exploring the Role of the Artist and/or Directorial Persona’ there is a more acute
development of the idea that the artist is a figure to be persecuted and as in *Hour of
the Wolf* this can culminate in the artist’s destruction.24 It is also worth noting here
that in this category Steene includes such early films as *To Joy* made in 1949 which
focuses on a classical music composer, and *The Naked Night* in 1953 which focuses
on a circus troupe. In fact, Steene’s group 4 is the most diverse category in terms of
the historical dates of the Bergman productions.

A brief survey across the different categories reveals that one of Bergman’s repeated
strategies is to use artists as characters. For example, in addition to the early films
included we can point to the role of the blind composer in *Music in Darkness*, and
the ballerina in *Summer Interlude*. This is not to disagree that both of these works focus on the young couple but it does reinforce the idea of Bergman’s determination to represent creativity through his characters. At a general level, detached from close analysis of film style, Bergman’s use of creative/artistic figures provides an impression of the role he assigns to imagination across his career. We find that Bergman retains a desperate need to give imagination an active presence in the diegetic world. However, this is not a transparent and uniform attempt to find a vehicle for his own beliefs but rather part of a more complex process such that the audience are presented with creativity in many forms. This disparate use of the artist/creator as character means that throughout Bergman’s work there are suggestions of a relationship between creativity and social reality. Furthermore, there is great variation in this pattern. We have seen how the role of artist may be represented through more minor characters including for instance the storyteller in *The Virgin Spring*. We have also seen that the role of the one who imagines or dreams is not reserved for the artist but ranges from the religious anxieties of the knight in *The Seventh Seal* and the introspection of a retired doctor in *Wild Strawberries*, to the pagan beliefs of Ingeri in *The Virgin Spring*.

Connected to Bergman’s continued use of characters involved in the act of imagining, I have explored the way his films convey a mixture of realism and more expressionistic and symbolic techniques. In the close analysis of Chapters 4, 5 and 6, the theme of reality recognition was evident in the way excursions into a more imaginative register, principally through the representations of character subjectivity, are ultimately in all three films framed by a return to a more ‘realistic’ mode. However, this was achieved with a distinct level of ambiguity. In *Summer with Monika* we end with Harry’s subjective image of Monika, but this is a memory juxtaposed to his presence as a father holding his baby. In *The Virgin Spring* the miracle of the water manifests a metaphysical intervention, but is restricted to a naturalistic image. In *Hour of the Wolf* Johan’s disappearance is enigmatic, but Alma’s narration provides at least some explanation. As Bordwell makes clear, ambiguity is highly valued in the art cinema, and this is consistently apparent in Bergman’s work. The appreciation of this through Kleinian and Sartrean perspectives reveals that this is not just about Bergman’s creativity with film form, but also is relevant to psychoanalysis and philosophy. The imagination consistently plays a role
in Bergman’s work representing the internal conflicts of the psyche, the possibility of creative freedom and the continuing relationship between the individual and his/her reality.
Conclusion - REFERENCES AND ENDNOTES


4 ibid., p.15.


6 ibid., p.12.

7 ibid.

8 ibid., p.13.

9 ibid., p.15.

10 ibid.


12 ibid.

13 ibid., p.178.


15 ibid.

16 ibid., p.51.


18 ibid.

19 ibid., p.25.


21 ibid.

22 ibid., p.189.

23 ibid.

24 Steene, op.cit., p.147.
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Films by Ingmar Bergman analysed, discussed or referred to in this thesis:

**Hets** 1944 (screenplay), *Frenzy; Torment (US)*
**Kris** 1946, *Crisis*
**Musik I Mörker** 1948, *Music in Darkness; Night is My Future/Music in Darkness (US)*
**Hamnstad** 1948, *Port of Call*
**Fängelese** 1949, *Prison; The Devil’s Wanton* (initial American title)
**Bris-Filmerna** 1951-3, *Breeze soap commercials*
**Sommarekte** 1951, *Summer Interlude; Illicit Interlude (US)*
**Sommaren Med Monika** 1953, *Summer With Monika; Monica: The Story of a Bad Girl/Monical/Summer with Monica*
**Gycklarnas Afton** 1953, *Sawdust and Tinsel; The Naked Night (US)*
**Sommarnattens Leende** 1955, *Smiles of a Summer Night*
**Det Sjunde Inseglet** 1956, *The Seventh Seal*
**Smultronstället** 1957, *Wild Strawberries*
**Nära Livet** 1958, *So Close to Life; Brink of Life (US)*
**Ansikte** 1958, *The Magician/The Face; The Magician (US)*
**Jungfrukällen** 1960, *The Virgin Spring*
**Djävulens Öga** 1960, *The Devil’s Eye*
**Såsom I En Spigel** 1961, *Through a Glass Darkly*
**Nattvardsgästerna** 1961, *Winter Light/The Communicants; Winter Light (US)*
**Tystnaden** 1963, *The Silence*
**Persona** 1966, *Persona*
**Vargtimmen** 1968, *Hour of the Wolf*
**Skammen** 1968, *Shame*
**Trollflöjten** 1975, *The Magic Flute (TV opera)*
**Ur Marionetternas Liv/Aus Dem Leben Der Marionetten** (Germany) 1980, *From the Life of the Marionettes*
**Fanny Och Alexander** 1982-3, *Fanny and Alexander*


Films by other directors

*The Phantom Carriage*, d.Sjöström, 1921, Sweden
*Citizen Kane*, d.Welles, 1941, US
*Paisa*, d.Rossellini, 1946, Italy
*L’Enfant Sauvage*, d.Truffaut, 1970, France