A HISTORY OF VIOLENCE: THE SHOOTING IN JERUSALEM OF BRITISH ASSISTANT POLICE SUPERINTENDENT ALAN SIGRIST, 12 JUNE 1936

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This article provides a narrative of the shooting in Jerusalem by two Palestinian gunmen – Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah and Sami al-Ansari – in June 1936 during the Arab revolt in Palestine of a British police officer, Alan Edward Sigrist. Abu Gharbiyah and al-Ansari specifically targeted Sigrist because of his violence towards Palestinians, an issue that has not been discussed fully in the literature. This study measures Abu Gharbiyah’s account of why he shot Sigrist against the contemporary record, using the shooting as a case study to open up debates on the British use of official and unofficial violence to maintain colonial rule, alongside one on the response of local people to such violence. While recognizing the partisan nature of Abu Gharbiyah’s memory of events in Palestine, the article gives voice to the Palestinians, explaining how and why rebels fighting British rule and Jewish immigration to Palestine used violence. Following the analysis of the shooting of Sigrist, the article details more general torture by British forces as recalled by Abu Gharbiyah, setting this against the extant evidence to test the traditional notion that Britain used ‘minimum force’ in countering colonial disturbances, tying Sigrist’s behaviour to that of British troops and police in Palestine more generally. Thus, while the article is narrow in its focus it has broader implications for contemporary imperial and military history.
Just before midday on Friday, 12 June 1936 by St Stephen’s (or Lions’) Gate outside the Old City of Jerusalem, two armed Palestinians, Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah and Sami al-Ansari, both teachers aged respectively twenty and eighteen, ambushed a car containing British acting Assistant Police Superintendent Alan Sigrist and his guard, British Constable Edmund Doxat. The assailants’ primary target was the senior officer, Sigrist, notorious locally for his violent attacks against Palestinians, not Doxat. This was almost two months into the Arab revolt in Palestine during which Palestinian rebels targeted British officials, in protest against Britain’s policy of supporting Jewish immigration and settlement to the country. The assassins shot Sigrist but did not kill him.

In June 2009, Abu Gharbiyah, now ninety-three, agreed to an interview with this author at his home in Amman to discuss his reasons for trying to kill Sigrist, or this, at least, is what the interviewer wanted to discuss.¹ In fact, for much of the time Abu Gharbiyah talked about the British in the context of the Palestinian struggle generally. The discussion of Sigrist was not as detailed as the interviewer would have wished and accorded with the account of Sigrist’s shooting as detailed in Abu Gharbiyah’s memoirs published in Arabic in 1993.² Unexpectedly, the interview moved on to examine police torture in Palestine, with Abu Gharbiyah levelling specific charges against the British. Subsequent correspondence sent by way of Abu Gharbiyah’s son who was present at the interview – Abu Gharbiyah has poor eyesight – clarified a number of points on the Sigrist shooting.
While oral history has its pitfalls – certainly one as partisan as Abu Gharbiyah’s, a life-long advocate of the Palestinian cause – the contemporary record supports Abu Gharbiyah’s memory of Sigrist’s violent behaviour in 1936. Abu Gharbiyah’s recollections open up debates on the use of violence in Palestine in the late 1930s by the British and the Palestinians. Sigrist was not a target of opportunity – one based on vulnerability, chance and the ease with which assassins could execute an operation – but his was a pro-active attack against a hated local official by two determined men. There were other such targeted attacks by Palestinians against particularly disliked British officials, such as the colonial officials Lewis Andrews and W.S.S. Moffat, both shot dead by assassins later on in the revolt; similarly, Jewish fighters in Palestine also targeted particular British officials, especially after 1945. What is not discussed here is the rebels’ targeting of Palestinian and Jewish police officers, a relevant issue but beyond the remit of this article.

Abu Gharbiyah’s discussion of the police and prison service in Palestine, detailing torture in dedicated centres for such purposes, raises wider questions about the use of violence in Palestine at this time. Was Sigrist’s violence an isolated activity or an example of a wider malaise affecting the forces of law and order in British Mandate Palestine? Abu Gharbiyah claims that he and al-Ansari were responding to general brutality within the Army, police and prison service in Jerusalem that had some official sanction. During the Arab revolt, a police Criminal Investigation Department
(CID) officer told Abu Gharbiyah how, ‘You haven’t seen anything yet; we will use
the same things against you as we did in Ireland.’ The reference to illegal British
activities in Ireland during the war of independence there (1919-21) suggests a
continuity of violence across colonial conflicts. In Ireland, even ordinary British
units such as the Essex Regiment had an in-house ‘Torture Squad’ that used pincers
and pliers on Irish nationalist prisoners, driving one victim insane. Caroline Elkins
in her study of British counter-rebel operations in Kenya in the 1950s supports Abu
Gharbiyah’s memory of the activities of CID in Palestine, implicating CID and
Special Branch officers in Kenya with some of the worst brutality – the colony’s
Gestapo as one officer put it.

Recent studies on the Arab revolt and on British counter-insurgency generally
support Abu Gharbiyah’s memory. Such works outline human-rights abuses in
countering colonial unrest, challenging the theory that Britain used ‘minimum force’
in its colonial campaigns against insurgents, something that supposedly
differentiated Britain from other colonial and neo-colonial powers. There was,
perhaps, continuity in the behaviour of the British security forces, with the police
and soldiers often working together to brutalize colonial peoples. This stretched
from the Egyptian revolt (1919) and the Irish war of independence (1919-21) to
Palestine in the 1930s and 1940s – the Jewish insurgency in the 1940s being neatly
covered in David Cesarani’s recent study – through Kenya and Cyprus in the 1950s
to Aden and Northern Ireland in the 1960s and 1970s. Such a discussion is useful as
in counter-insurgency theory and practice there is usually no interest in human rights per se, only in how respect for civilians’ dignity is an issue inasmuch as it helps or hinders military plans to defeat insurgents, and so might require a friendly or minimally hostile populace. Human rights are a peripheral, indirect problem to the key driver of military operations.

This article starts with a narrative account of the dramatic events of 12 June 1936 – showing how an assassination was planned and executed – before examining the activities of Sigrist prior to his shooting. The essay then moves to a broader discussion of police and army brutality in Palestine, pivoting the analysis on Abu Gharbiyah’s memory of events. The shooting of Sigrist gets little mention in the English-language literature, unsurprising considering the large number of attacks on British officials in Palestine during the revolt. In Arabic, the Palestinian (Christian) educator and writer Khalil al-Sakakini mentions the incident in his diary, as does Abu Gharbiyah in his written memoir, but it is not included in the Arabic secondary literature; nor is it covered in the Hebrew literature. Tom Segev’s nicely crafted (and translated) One Palestine, Complete (2000) does mention the outrage, very briefly: ‘a young Arab [al-Ansari] opened fire on the car of a Jerusalem police officer, wounding him. A British soldier returned fire; the Arab was hit and later died.’ Sigrist’s shooting deserves fuller treatment.
Sigrist was on a tour of the police units guarding the gates of the Old City when he was shot. This was the day for Friday prayers – ‘the streets were heavy with anger’ – and British security was especially tight. Sigrist was driving a left-hand drive car on the right side of the road as cars had been introduced to Palestine in the Ottoman era, before the British – who drive on the left – arrived in 1917. The British drove both left- and right-hand drive vehicles in Palestine at this time, the police using a mix of Austin and Morris cars. The Cowley car plant in the UK produced the Morris cars issued to the Palestine police with right-hand drives but as Sigrist was driving a left-hand drive vehicle it was either an Austin or, as the official report states, ‘his own car.’ Doxat sat to Sigrist’s right in the passenger seat armed with a British Army-issue Lee-Enfield rifle and a Service revolver pistol. As the two men drove away from St Stephen’s Gate following Sigrist’s visit to the police picket there, the assassins, who had been tracking Sigrist’s daily schedule, struck on the Jericho road just outside, shooting Sigrist on the incline by the Muslim cemetery a few meters before the turn at the northeast corner of the Old City walls opposite the Rockefeller Museum and by the Stork Tower. Sigrist being on the road-side side of the car meant that the two assassins had to step into the middle of the road to shoot him, and as both men aimed at Sigrist this left Doxat temporarily free to return fire. The assassins had chosen this spot as Sigrist’s car slowed on the incline before the turning; Abu Gharbiyah’s memory is that both men were ‘calm and in full control of the situation’ when they launched their attack.
The *Palestine Post* reported that the two assassins had hidden below the side of the Jericho road before the attack, a claim refuted by Abu Gharbiyah who later wrote that they were both walking openly in the street; other accounts have the men jumping on and even into the car.\(^{17}\) For the attack, Abu Gharbiyah had hidden his weapon under his *tarbush* headwear, what is known in the West as a *fez*, while al-Ansari’s was in his pocket. Both assassins had 7mm automatic pistols, Abu Gharbiyah an Italian Beretta and al-Ansari a French Lafayette, which could fire about seven rounds each in one shooting.\(^{18}\) The use of the *tarbush* to conceal weapons was possible early in the revolt. Later on, rebels insisted that all Palestinians should ditch the *tarbush* popular amongst more urbane town-folk and don instead the rural *kufiya* (also known as the *hatta* or *igal*) turban-style headwear so that rural rebels operating in the towns could more easily blend in with the populace. It was an act of ‘sartorial patriotism.’\(^{19}\) The return of the *tarbush* in 1939 was a visible sign that the revolt was over.

Abu Gharbiyah and al-Ansari fired together from about a meter away at Sigrist who was inside the car, wounding him twice in the shoulder and side.\(^{20}\) Abu Gharbiyah had his left hand at one stage on the front left wing of the car. Abu Gharbiyah and al-Ansari had agreed to fire slowly but Doxat, struggling with his rifle inside the confined space of the car, managed to return fire with his pistol that he had previously drawn on seeing the two men loitering in the area, so al-Ansari shouted at Abu Gharbiyah to shoot more rapidly.\(^{21}\) Doxat was quick off the mark as he was
returning fire at the same time or even before the two assassins opened up with
their weapons on Sigrist, shooting at first to his left across his comrade and through
his open window, a decisive reaction that would surely have deafened Sigrist.22
Doxat and the assassins also exchanged bullets through the windscreen, with Abu
Gharbiyah’s bullets bouncing off the glass after which Doxat returned fire shattering
the glass.23 The windscreens and door tops of all new vehicles sent to Palestine in
the early 1930s were fitted with Triplex toughened glass that perhaps helped to
deflect bullets.24 In the mêlée, al-Ansari emptied his pistol and ran off, wounded,
shot by Doxat in the fire-fight. His direction of flight is uncertain, either to the south
and east towards Gethsemane and the Kidron valley, or to the north towards Wadi
el-Joz according to Abu Gharbiyah.25 Abu Gharbiyah fired off his last three rounds
at Doxat, aware that by chance an Army-escorted Jewish Potash Company convoy
was fast approaching the scene from the southeast.

Sigrist had slumped back when shot, releasing his feet from the car’s pedals, so
Doxat had shot al-Ansari while inside a vehicle rolling backwards, under fire,
pulling on the hand-brake, and alongside his badly wounded superior officer – no
mean feat. The history of the Palestine police recounts that Doxat was able to ‘leap
out’ of the car and shoot al-Ansari; a contemporary newspaper report states that he
‘whipped out’ his revolver and fired through the windscreen at one of his
assailants.26 The car rolled backwards off the road over a drop into a rocky wadi
landing upright with Sigrist and Doxat inside, both badly bruised, the engine still
running. Abu Gharbiyah’s recollection is that Doxat had exited the vehicle before it went over the edge into the wadi. Filastin [Palestine] noted that Doxat was wounded in the thigh but this does not appear to have been a gunshot; the Palestine Post credited Doxat with a ‘slight’ neck wound in addition to some ‘other injuries’ sustained when the car fell into the valley. In total, six bullets hit the car; up to eight rounds missed the target or were not fired off.

A private car took Sigrist to the government hospital in the British headquarters in the ‘Russian compound’ in west Jerusalem. Doxat soon joined him. On 14 June, Sigrist and Doxat were reportedly ‘cheerful’ in hospital after the incident and both recovered but Sigrist never returned to police work in Palestine. Sigrist was still ‘cheerful’ on the 15 June, in true British style; by September 1936, he was back in England. Once he had recovered, Sigrist returned to duty, subsequently serving in the police forces in Tanganyika, Aden and Cyrenaica. He died at home in England on 1 March 1983, outliving al-Ansari but outlived by Abu Gharbiyah.

The crew and soldiers of the Potash Company convoy tracked the wounded al-Ansari and a police search with a dog uncovered him hiding in a nearby house; he died on the way to the hospital or ‘later’ in hospital of his wounds. Meanwhile, Abu Gharbiyah had run off towards Wadi el-Joz and returned to his family home inside the Old City near the Haram ash Sharif via the Musrara neighbourhood and the New Gate in time to go off to Friday prayers at the al-Aqsa mosque with his
brother, alive to the gossip spreading about the recent outrage. The British insisted that al-Ansari’s funeral be held after the curfew hour of 7 p.m. so while several hundred people attended the funeral service at the mosque, only twenty to thirty mourners followed his body to his grave.

Doxat had shot al-Ansari in the chest – if Doxat was using a Webley pistol, this fired an especially powerful round – but al-Ansari was alive when captured and being tended in a house by two local men, both of whom the British also arrested. British forces took al-Ansari to Government Hospital, alongside Sigrist and Doxat. Abu Gharbiyah detailed British soldiers throwing al-Ansari onto the back of a lorry and denying him first aid, after which in hospital he told police CID officers who had rushed to the scene to interview him that he had acted alone, an obvious lie. A local Palestinian, al-Sakakini recorded how soldiers beat al-Ansari, including with rifle butts, in the lorry on the way to the hospital. Abu Gharbiyah maintains that al-Ansari was ‘conscious’ when he reached the hospital. The charge that al-Ansari was maltreated on the way to the hospital is borne out by other cases where the police allegedly maltreated and assassinated suspects. British Palestine policeman Sydney Burr told his parents that colleagues who were tired of the legal system carried out extra-judicial assassinations and ‘shot out of hand’ suspects. John Briance, a police officer who later became the head of the CID in Palestine, confessed to his mother of colleagues’ shooting on the spot an arrested rebel in 1938.
Being a British colonial or military official made someone a target. Palestinians attacked British police officers, soldiers and officials, including high-profile victims such as British police Inspector-General R.G.B. Spicer who in 1937 had a ‘narrow escape’ when a would-be assassin emptied his pistol into his car at point-blank range as Spicer was being driven into the Russian compound. On 28 May 1936, inside Jerusalem’s Old City, rebels killed British Constable Robert (or Ronald) Bird with three shots from the window of a building, one of which went through his heart. At the same time as the Sigrist shooting, rebels tried to kill J.A.M. Faraday, Deputy Superintendent in Nazareth.

But the rebels also discriminated, picking on particularly hated authority figures such as the pro-Zionist Assistant District Commissioner in Galilee, Lewis Andrews, shot dead leaving church in Nazareth on 26 September 1937. In Jenin on 24 August 1938, an assassin shot nine times and killed acting Assistant District Commissioner W.S.S. Moffat, ‘known for his bad behaviour,’ a man who, Abu Gharbiyah claims, lined up Palestinian villagers during the revolt and shot every fifth man when hidden rifles were not produced for the authorities. Punitive demolitions of buildings in Jenin followed Moffat’s death. The British quickly apprehended Moffat’s assassin after the murder – he was, apparently, a blond hunchback and so rather visible – after which in the tradition of al-Ansari he died in custody, trying to escape, despite his disability and being surrounded by fit, young British soldiers.
'Shot trying to escape' is a recurring phrase in British files. That said, the Arabs nicknamed Moffat’s assassin, ‘Mohammed,’ ‘gazelle’ because he was so swift.45

While Abu Gharbiyah and al-Ansari acted alone in targeting Sigrist – they were not hit-men for a superior rebel organization such as the Arab Higher Committee – their assault was a collective revenge attack by Jerusalemites against an officer who was notorious across the city for his savage truncheon-wielding attacks on Arab townsfolk – until ‘their bodies were broken’ – including beating up the staff of the *al-Difa’ [The Defence]* newspaper office on 31 May 1936.46 Sigrist launched indiscriminate assaults on Arab passers-by, including against a well-dressed Arab District Officer official who was outside the Damascus Gate by the Schmidt school and who refused the British police demand that he pick up nails left by rebels hoping to puncture the tyres of passing vehicles.47 Sigrist and his men wounded dozens in their attack on the *al-Difa’* office, breaking a man’s nose with a truncheon so badly that the victim was hospitalized, dripping with blood and in a ‘perilous state.’48 At the same time, they also smashed in the windows at the Arab Club, one of a number of sports clubs in the city. Abu Gharbiyah boxed at the Islamic Club. On another occasion, one of Sigrist’s blows left a man with concussion.

Jerusalemites cleared the streets when they heard the approaching hum of Sigrist’s Morris car, fearful of the assault that they were sure would come their way if Sigrist caught them in the open. One sixteen-year old girl learned to remember the name ‘Sickrest, as it hissed down every street,’ a man who attacked people so ‘ferociously’
that he would break their arms. In groups of seven or eight, Sigrist’s men would force their way through the narrow streets of the Old City, pushing local people aside and making them salute the police in ‘humiliation operations.’ At the Old City gates officers slapped and kicked Arabs passing through. Abu Gharbiyah remembers Sigrist to have been an ‘abnormal,’ ‘crazy’ man who broke one man’s jaw and ‘destroyed his looks.’ Sigrist had ratcheted up his brutality after the killing of Constable Bird on 28 May, which might explain the subsequent attack on the al-Difa’ office. There were so many local protests about Sigrist that the leaders of the Istiqlal (Independence) party met J.H. Hall, the Mandate Chief Secretary, to make a complaint about the goings-on but there was no response to these petitions, so Jerusalemites ‘condemned’ and ‘sentenced’ Sigrist to death and it was for this reason that Abu Gharbiyah and al-Ansari had teamed up and were together outside the city walls at around 11.00 a.m. on 12 June 1936 watching Sigrist’s car approaching from the direction of St Stephen’s Gate.

What Abu Gharbiyah does not discuss is the role that personal pique – what Roy Baumeister in his study of evil has categorized as ‘egotism and revenge’ – played in the decision to target Sigrist. Policemen had badly assaulted al-Ansari and Sigrist had beaten and humiliated Abu Gharbiyah on three or four occasions. In one encounter, Sigrist had caught Abu Gharbiyah in the street in Jerusalem and while remaining in his car had searched Abu Gharbiyah through the lowered window, patting him down while he stood on the pavement. Sigrist asked Abu Gharbiyah
what he did for a job, and then he got out of the car saying ‘please’ so that Abu Gharbiyah would step out of the way to allow the door to be opened. Sigrist then searched him again while also trying to punch and slap Abu Gharbiyah’s face and head. When Abu Gharbiyah protected himself from the blows, Sigrist kicked him and then tried to strike or ‘box’ him again. (The use of the rather archaic verb ‘to box’ in the records might be the result of the passion for this sport in the British Army and police at this time. It might also explain the rather anachronistic phrase in Hebrew current into the 1980s, and perhaps picked up from the British: ani etten lekha box – ‘I’ll give you a box’.) With his tarbushe knocked to the ground, Abu Gharbiyah retreated back along the pavement, so Sigrist put his hand on his revolver and said, ‘go away or I’ll shoot you.’ As al-Ansari died and left no record, unlike Abu Gharbiyah, his personal motivations can only be surmised but he had a history of violence, having murdered three Jews in an attack at Jerusalem’s Edison theatre on 16 May 1936, an attack in which Abu Gharbiyah was supposed to have participated but from which he was kept away by the official curfew in force at the time, he claims.\textsuperscript{53} Abu Gharbiyah’s memory – perhaps informed by some ex post facto justification – is that the Edison cinema attack was retaliation for the killing of ‘their best friend,’ Mahmoud al-Tamimi, murdered outside his house by Jewish assassins.\textsuperscript{54} It is not clear whether Sigrist’s supposed Jewish antecedence played any part in the decision to attack him.\textsuperscript{55} Both British officials and Jews generally were suitable targets, it seems.
Abu Gharbiyah targeted other British servicemen on the basis of their branch of the armed forces. Thus, some forty days after the attempt on Sigrist he attacked two Royal Air Force (RAF) servicemen, near the same spot as the 12 June assault, shooting them with a pistol hidden inside his tarbush.\textsuperscript{56} This is a reference to the shooting by an ‘unknown assailant’ of Aircraftsman C.D. White and a colleague on the Jericho road near Gethsemane on 10 August 1936.\textsuperscript{57} White died; the other man was wounded. Abu Gharbiyah picked out the two men because of the RAF’s heavy involvement in aerial bombing of rebels in the countryside of Palestine. Indeed, before attacking them, he had considered targeting a Jewish carpentry shop in the Old City, near al-Ansari’s house, but had subsequently changed his mind, ‘since the English were the main enemies.’\textsuperscript{58} ‘The target had to be English as they were responsible for the killing.’\textsuperscript{59} Again, with Constable Bird’s death on 28 May 1936, one of the men arrested for the crime was a ‘near relative’ of a Jerusalemite shot by British police the previous week at St Stephen’s Gate.\textsuperscript{60} The suggestion here is that Bird’s death was a planned revenge attack, albeit against any British serviceman.

There are other explanations for the attacks on those such as Sigrist. Abu Gharbiyah and al-Ansari were also young men, a significant point when it came to their decision to use direct physical force and part of a wider tradition of energized youth clashing with its more pacific conservative elders on how best to achieve political ends – in this case within the Palestinian nationalist movement, and relevant not just in 1936 but also in the current Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In 1936, al-Ansari had
visited his relatives and neighbours, the Husaynis, in the Musrara neighbourhood where they all lived, and confronted his uncle, Jamal, who was to leave for London to talk with the British to try to resolve the Arab revolt. In this exchange, as recorded by Serene, Jamal’s daughter, in her memoirs, al-Ansari blurted out:

‘Uncle Jamal, we are fed up with your politics. You go to London and try your negotiations there. But we will try ours here, in the land of Palestine.’

My father was shocked. He turned pale, but, smiling nervously, asked: ‘And who are “we”? Sami [al-Ansari], now as pale as my father, responded defiantly: ‘We are the youth of this country.’

Had al-Ansari lived, he and Abu Gharbiyah would likely have made further violent attacks as a team; they would have become what a later generation would glamorously call ‘urban guerrillas’ fighting to save their nation and eschewing the political moderation of their elders, their political cause justifying any assaults on British officials and Jewish settlers.

In interview, Abu Gharbiyah extended British brutality to include torture, headed up by an ‘Inspector Rex/Ricks.’ This is almost certainly a reference to Jerusalem-based CID Deputy Superintendent A.W. Riggs, a point clarified in subsequent correspondence with Abu Gharbiyah. This was carried out in dedicated police-run torture centres during a six-month period in 1938-39. As well as the main police
headquarters at the Russian compound in west Jerusalem – where Israel allegedly tortured Palestinians in the 1970s – CID had a separate, secret house at the Talavera military camp at the Allenby barracks in south Jerusalem, now covered by residential housing; another torture site was in Acre Citadel prison. The use of Army barracks for joint military-police activities continued after Palestine, in Fort Morbut and Waterloo barracks (or Lines) in Aden in the 1960s, and Palace and Girdwood barracks in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s. (It should be noted here that a former Palestine policeman wrote to this author after seeing Abu Gharbiyah’s allegations to say that it was ‘hard to believe’ that the ‘amiable’ Riggs was associated with torture.)

According to Abu Gharbiyah, Arab suspects were ‘lifted’ from their homes and executed; others found themselves the subject of torture ‘in methods we would hear about in the Middle Ages.’ If there were extra-judicial executions, these were, in effect, the actions of death squads. This author has found only one officially documented account of policemen executing an Arab suspect, which led to an investigation and charging of four police officers who received minimal sentences reduced on appeal but this was a unique case of servicemen being brought to justice. Abu Gharbiyah had friends who were abused a variety of ways. In addition to regular beatings in which guards knocked out suspects’ teeth and which could leave victims ‘almost unrecognizable,’ Abu Gharbiyah in interview detailed a litany of torture, especially in the latter stages of the revolt:
• The simplest method – known, ironically, as ‘playful’ – involved tying a naked prisoner to a board with his legs raised and tied to a window. Jailers would then leave him there for several days during which time he would soil himself.

• Guards would treat prisoners as per the ‘playful’ method described above but they would also tie the prisoner’s genitals, after which the guards would rub or beat the swollen organ. In at least one case, such torture led to the severing/tearing of the testicles, resulting in their having to be stitched. One British officer recalled a lighted cigarette applied to a Palestinian prisoner’s testicles. Similarly, British soldiers and police in Northern Ireland in the 1970s allegedly squeezed suspects’ testicles and inserted objects into anuses or insinuated that they would do so.

• At the Talavera camp, police officers laid a ‘religious man’ on the ground, inserted a funnel into his mouth, and poured in water after which they stepped on the man’s distended stomach.

• There was the ‘crucifixion’ torture in which guards laid the prisoner on a table with a 2 cm. ridge running down the middle, along the prisoner’s spine. They then tied sandbags to the prisoner’s arms and legs.

• The police also used ‘awful’ local Arabs to rape (male) prisoners – employing a ‘Castero/Kastero’ in Jaffa and a ‘Saleh Alwalaji’ in Jerusalem for this purpose, both subsequently assassinated by the rebels but ‘there were others’
– to the extent that some handsome young Arab men would be detained for
the purpose of sexual abuse. As guards told one naked female detainee in
Bethlehem’s Ladies’ prison whom they had previously tortured, ‘If you won’t
speak, we’ll bring a nigger to rape you’ – although the victim did also recall
that ‘it seems that they had an order not to rape me.’ Various officers did,
however, molest her. Similarly, the British in Kenya in the 1950s used local
Kenyan askaris to sodomize prisoners, Elkins claims.

- Finally, at a ‘Christian site’ close to Kfar Etzion south of Jerusalem, prisoners
would daily dig holes of 2-1-1 meters dimension, and then fill them in,
endlessly repeating the labour. This is a reference to the Russian monastery
built on a Byzantine site close to Kfar Etzion – in Arabic, Dayr al-Shi’ar.

Abu Gharbiyah remembers that a Jewish police officer ‘Sofer’ took part in torturing
suspects, a point supported by the written record in which two Britons, Biggs and
Robinson, and a Jew, Sofer, were ‘principal offenders.’ Robinson – of ‘Greek’
descent – once interrogated Abu Gharbiyah who also recalls a ‘notorious’ CID
officer of (Christian) Lebanese origin, Muneer Abu Fadel, who later became a
member of Lebanon’s parliament. Abu Gharbiyah’s memory is that the police and
prison service carried out these pre-mediated tortures, not the Army which simply
wrecked villages and shot people. In prison, the British would get Jewish guards to
beat Arab suspects and vice versa. The British also ‘ordered’ the Arab police to
carry out torture. The British also maltreated Jewish detainees.
As with Sigrist, the written record supports Abu Gharbiyah’s memory of the torture at the Talavera camp and elsewhere, with accounts in Arabic and English of torture, of Arabs being blown to bits in vehicles after being forced along roads in which the British had placed mines, of British operatives placing ‘terrorist’ bombs, of detainees being left in open cages in the sun without sustenance, of men being beaten with wet ropes, ‘boxed’ and having their teeth smashed, and men having their feet burnt with oil.80 Those who were ‘boxed’ were beaten until they were knocked out, ‘needles’ were used on suspects, dogs were set upon Arab detainees, and British and Jewish auxiliary forces maltreated Arabs by having them hold heavy stones and then beating them when they dropped them. Guards also used bayonets on sleep-deprived men and made them wear bells around their necks and then dance.81 Arab detainees in Palestine’s prisons protested in petitions made through the Christian (British) Anglican mission at the extreme treatment meted out by guards. Prisoners jumped to their deaths from high windows to escape their captors, had their testicles tied with cord, were tortured with strips of wood with nails in, had wire tightened around their big toes, hair was torn from their faces and heads, special instruments were used to pull out fingernails, red hot skewers were used on detainees, prisoners were sodomized, boiling oil was used on prisoners as were intoxicants (morphine, cocaine and heroin), there were electric shocks, water was funnelled into suspects’ stomachs and there were mock executions.82 As Frances Newton, a pro-Arab British resident in Palestine noted, after the murder on 26
September 1937 by Arab gunmen of Lewis Andrews, ‘the police asked permission to use torture to the prisoners to extract information and that permission was granted from the Colonial Office. Several of the leading police officers in Jerusalem refused to countenance it. One of them has since left the country.’ Newton’s complaints led to an official order banning her from Palestine.

The British police at the grass-roots level were typically former soldiers – indeed, until the early 1930s this was required of new recruits. They were tough men who were given military-style training at their depot on Mount Scopus to prepare them for tough, necessary jobs such as riot control. Sigrist had been in the Army – and continued on the Reserve list, retiring as a lieutenant-colonel – and like his fellow officers was accustomed to violent encounters with Palestinians and Jews. The citation for Sigrist’s King’s Police Medal, awarded in 1934 for service rendered at riots in Jaffa in 1933, shows how hard colonial policing could be: ‘In the first charge he [Sigrist] was severely wounded in the face by a broken bottle, and though severely injured in both arms and legs, he remained on duty and led his men in a second and third baton charge.’ Many policemen saw their service as akin to serving in the French Foreign Legion, and made explicit reference to this – ‘a British Foreign Legion. With the faults as well’ – and some seem to have acted accordingly. One Palestine policeman had been in the French Foreign Legion and opined that it was ‘cushy’ by comparison to service in Palestine. A ‘Legion of the Lost’ was how another policeman described service in the 1920s. Moreover, in the
early life of the Palestine police, many of its recruits were men who had fought against Irish nationalists in the Irish war of independence and so came with experience of that brutal conflict, imbuing the force with a robust ethos when it came to policing the country. The British divisional commander in Jerusalem, Sir Richard O’Connor, wrote of the use of the ‘third degree’ and ‘black and tan methods’ (oft-used phrases), the latter a reference to the infamous British paramilitary force known as the ‘Black and Tans’ that operated against Irish rebels.\textsuperscript{88}

Some level of violence by ordinary policemen should not surprise us, more especially considering the job that they had to do in Palestine during the turbulence of the Arab revolt after April 1936. What is more surprising is the behaviour of some higher echelon officers. Sir Charles Tegart, a senior police officer brought in from India, established torture centres, known euphemistically as ‘Arab Investigation Centres,’ where suspects got the ‘third degree’ until they ‘spilled the beans,’ the British only closing a major one in a Jewish quarter of West Jerusalem after colonial officials such as Edward Keith-Roach complained to the High Commissioner.\textsuperscript{89} This could be a reference to the Talavera torture centre, located as it was close to the Jewish neighbourhood of Talpiyot in south-west Jerusalem. The use of the phrase ‘third degree’ reappeared in Kenya, where the ‘Arab’ Investigation Centres were replaced with ‘Mau Mau’ Investigation Centres in which British forces conducted the worst torture.\textsuperscript{90} In Palestine, interrogators used the ‘water-boarding’ torture at these centres.\textsuperscript{91} Abu Gharbiyah states that torture only ended in Jerusalem after
questions were asked in Britain’s Parliament, possibly a reference to Mr Maxton’s
question to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in June 1939 about ‘gross’ charges
against the Mandate authorities, ‘foul and filthy ones.’ Keith-Roach, to his credit,
raised the issue that the ‘questionable practises’ carried out by CID officers on
suspects were counter-productive both in terms of the information gathered and the
effect that they had on local people’s confidence in the police.

The British used euphemisms, sporting metaphors and humour to describe their
violent clashes with Palestinians. Or they just said nothing. Or there was laconic
under-statement. Jack Binsley in his memoir of his time as a Palestine policeman
recalled that following the rebels’ placing of sharp tacks on the roads of Jerusalem,
‘a directive was issued that in future we were not to be Aunt Sallys, but should
assert our authority and take the initiative.’ The issue here is how the British
‘asserted’ themselves, officially and unofficially, and whether the minimum force
that supposedly characterized British counter-rebel operations and which
underpinned their taking the ‘initiative’ often, in reality, escalated quickly to the use
of ‘excessive’ force, a bland phrase that masked all manner of strippings, beatings,
humiliations, torture, theft, sexual violence, hunger and trauma. A
contemporaneous phrase for such activity was ‘frightfulness,’ used during the First
World War to describe German excesses in occupied France and which now seems
dated and quaint. The variation between the official and unofficial accounts of
events during the Arab revolt suggests a hidden history of semi-official, excessive
violence, when one can find the evidence. Thus, following the assassination of two Black Watch, Scottish-based, Regiment soldiers by the Jaffa Gate in Jerusalem on 5 November 1937 General Sir Archibald Wavell, the supreme British commander in Palestine at the time (and originally an officer in the Black Watch), remarked on the restraint shown by the regiment on a subsequent operation against Silwan, the village south of the city blamed for the attack, although he admitted that a suspect died ‘falling over a cliff.’ Officially, after tracker dogs following the scent of the soldiers’ killers led the authorities to Silwan, one villager ended up hospital after falling off a cliff, while soldiers shot dead one man and wounded another. Then the authorities sealed the village forbidding villagers to leave without a permit, made all males report every evening to the police and made the village pay for a twenty-man police post. Yet, the private diary of a North Staffordshire Regiment officer tells a different tale, recording how Black Watch men beat to death twelve Arabs in Silwan with rifle butts. The assailants apparently left the two dead soldiers face down with their kilts raised and buttocks exposed, further enraging their comrades: ‘An insult the local Arabs suffered for.’ Another British officer recalled that the ‘Jocks’ (slang for the Scottish) were uncontrollable after their comrades’ deaths and so the high command gave them eight hours to ‘search’ Silwan without rifles: ‘a lot of Arabs were very sorry that it had happened.’

To give a beating with a rifle-butt some human substance – to state clearly rather than to understate what such an assault really means – consider the following
account of a rifle-butt beating delivered by a British policeman (properly a gendarme at this time) to a Palestinian in the 1920s: ‘When one of the Nablus detachment produced an old cigarette tin containing the brains of a man whose skull he had splintered with his rifle butt….I felt physically sick….the sight of that grog-blossomed face of the gendarme with his can half-full of human brains proudly brandishing his smashed rifle-butt as proof of his prowess, altered something inside of me; people who owned skins other than pink Western ones became human beings.’\(^{101}\) The same policeman, in another memoir of his time in Palestine, wrote of a beating he was delivering to an Arab and how he ‘thought that the wood would snap under the impact.’\(^{102}\)

This article has shown that by carefully setting Abu Gharbiyah’s oral history against the evidence available from other sources, it is possible to provide a fuller account both of British methods of colonial policing and the reactions of local peoples, giving voice to the colonial officials with the difficult job of maintaining empire and to what Edward Said has described as the ‘invisible and inaudible’ Palestinians who fought the British in the late 1930s.\(^{103}\) Abu Gharbiyah’s selective memories of the 1930s open up a useful debate on Britain’s use of force in its colonies during periods of unrest, exposing a hidden history of unpleasantness, and one which formed the back-drop for the heavy-handed actions of men such as Sigrist. Such actions grate against traditional notions of Britain’s use of restraint in countering colonial rebellions. That said, British violence does not explain the deaths of the three Jews at
the Edison theatre, to give just one example, undermining the notion of righteous reactive violence by Abu Gharbiyah and al-Ansari, and suggesting that Palestinian violence, as with that of the British, was a vexed, personal business. A mix of personal revenge, a desire to rid Jerusalem of a violent British official and support for the Palestinian national struggle motivated Abu Gharbiyah and al-Ansari’s assault on Sigrist. There was also, perhaps, a ‘joy of hurting,’ a nebulous phrase that applies a fortiori to Sigrist. It is not easy systematically to understand personal acts of violence by ‘ordinary men,’ especially in times of conflict. Some British officials were directly targeted; others were opportunity targets. Moreover, the attack on Sigrist was not centrally directed, suggestive of a reactive, poorly coordinated, local and ad hoc response by the Palestinians to the British whose ‘counter-insurgency’ – born of years of experience of imperial policing and countering colonial rebellions – was effective, successful and necessarily violent.

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1 Author interview with Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah, Amman, 21 June 2009.


Author interview, Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah, Amman, 21 June 2009 and subsequent elucidatory correspondence to Abu Gharbiyah via his son Sami Abu Gharbiyah, July-December 2009.


11 Tom Segev, One Palestine, Complete (New York 2000), 365-66. This was first published in Hebrew.

12 Shahid, op. cit., 94.

13 Author interview with Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah, Amman, 21 June 2009; correspondence, Sami Abu Gharbiyah (son of Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah, present at the interview on 21 June 2009) to author, 29 July 2009.


16 Correspondence, Sami Abu Gharbiyah (son of Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah, present at the interview on 21 June 2009) to author, 29 July 2009.

29

18 Correspondence, Sami Abu Gharbiyah (son of Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah, present at the interview on 21 June 2009) to author, 29 July 2009.


21 Abu Gharbiyah, op. cit., 74.

22 Correspondence, Sami Abu Gharbiyah (son of Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah, present at the interview on 21 June 2009) to author, 29 July 2009.

23 Abu Gharbiyah, op. cit., 74-75.


25 Correspondence, Sami Abu Gharbiyah (son of Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah, present at the interview on 21 June 2009) to author, 29 July 2009; Abu Gharbiyah, op. cit., 74-76.

26 Edward Horne, *A Job Well Done* (Sussex 2003), 212; *Palestine Post*, 14 June 1936, 1.

27 *Palestine Post*, 14 June 1936, 4.

28 Correspondence, Sami Abu Gharbiyah (son of Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah, present at the interview on 21 June 2009) to author, 29 July 2009.

29 *Filastin* [*Palestine*] (Jaffa), 13 June 1936; *Palestine Post*, 14 June 1936, 1.

31 Palestine Post, 14 June 1936, 4; 15 June, 5; and 14 September 1936, 3.

32 Obituary of Lt-Col Alan Edward Sigrist KPM by Edward Horne, Palestine Police Old Comrades’ Association Quarterly Newsletter, 131 (June 1983); Correspondence, Edward Horne (formerly of the Palestine police) to author, 14 September 2006; Supplement to the London Gazette, 8 June 1944, 2651.

33 Palestine Post, 14 June 1936, 4; Filastin, 13 June 1936.

34 Correspondence, John Foster (Palestine Police Old Comrades’ Association) to author, 25 July 2009.

35 Abu Gharbiyah, op. cit., 75

36 al-Sakakini, Kadha Ana Ya Duniya, pages covering 13 June 1936.

37 Correspondence, Sami Abu Gharbiyah (son of Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah, present at the interview on 21 June 2009) to author, 29 July 2009; see also, Haaretz [The Land] (Tel Aviv), 14 June 1936, morning issue.


39 Letter, Briance to Mother, 14 May 1938, Briance papers, in possession of Mrs Prunella Briance.


htm (accessed 27 July 2009) lists (Ronald) Bird’s death as having occurred at Mt Zion.

42 Davar [Issue] (Tel Aviv), 14 June 1936.


44 Telegram to Secretary of State, n.d., S25/22762, Central Zionist Archive, Jerusalem; Haaretz, 26 August 1936.

45 Zua’ytir, Al-Harakah al-Wataniyah al-Filastiniyya, 438.

46 Unless otherwise stated, the information in this paragraph and the next one is from author interview, Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah, Amman, 21 June 2009 and Abu Gharbiyah, op. cit., 72-75.

47 al-Sakakini, Kadha Ana Ya Duniya, pages covering 13 June 1936; al-Sirat al-Mustakim [The Right Path] (Jaffa), 1 June 1936.

48 al-Sirat al-Mustakim, 1 June 1936.

49 Shahid, op. cit., 91-2.

50 al-Liwa [The Province] (Jerusalem), 1 June 1936; al-Sirat al-Mustakim, 1 June 1936.

51 Davar, 14 June 1936; Haaretz, 14 June 1936, morning issue.


54 Correspondence, Sami Abu Gharbiyah (son of Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah, present at the interview on 21 June 2009) to author, 7 August 2009 and 10 December 2009.

55 Akram Musallam (ed.), *Yawmiyyat Khalil al-Sakakini*, vol. vi, p. 263.

56 Abu Gharbiyah, op. cit., 78-79; correspondence, Sami Abu Gharbiyah (son of Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah, present at the interview on 21 June 2009) to author, 29 July 2009.

57 ‘RAF Man Killed Outside of Old City’, *Palestine Post*, 11 August 1936.

58 Abu Gharbiyah, op. cit., 78-79.

59 Correspondence, Sami Abu Gharbiyah (son of Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah, present at the interview on 21 June 2009) to author, 29 July 2009.

60 *Palestine Post*, 29 May 1936, 1, 9.

61 Shahid, op. cit., 93.


63 ‘It does seem that Riggs is the person. Rex can be an Arabic mispronunciation of Riggs. “Inspector” in this context [the interview with the author on 21 June 2009] was used as a general term [by Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah] and not a precise rank.’
Correspondence, Sami Abu Gharbiyah (son of Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah, present at the interview on 21 June 2009) to author, 7 July 2009.


65 See note 9 above.

66 Correspondence, Edward Horne (formerly of the Palestine police) to author, 5 September 2009.

67 Unless otherwise stated, the information in this paragraph is from: author interview, Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah, Amman, 21 June 2009 or subsequent elucidatory correspondence to Abu Gharbiyah via his son Sami Abu Gharbiyah, July-December 2009.


69 Prison conditions in League for the Rights of Man, 28 December 1938, 1 in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 65, File 5, 116, MEC.


71 Faul and Murray, op. cit, *passim*.

72 Case of RL, Arrested 15 May 1936, in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 65, File 5, 7-8 but 122-23 in overall file pagination.

Correspondence, Sami Abu Gharbiyah (son of Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah, present at the interview on 21 June 2009) to author, 29 July 2009.

Presumably CID Detective Inspector Robinson; the author has found no further reference to Biggs. In translated Arabic material there is a note that Biggs ‘left Palestine.’ See Allegations of Ill-treatment of Arabs by British Crown Forces in Palestine (translated from the Arabic by F. Newton, 19 June 1939), 2 in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 65, File 5, 142, MEC.

Presumably, S.N. Soffer, who was a Detective Inspector in 1936 and a CID Acting Assistant Superintendent in 1938.

Allegations of Ill-treatment of Arabs by British Crown Forces in Palestine (translated from the Arabic by F. Newton, 19 June 1939), 2 in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 65, File 5, 142, MEC.

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Newsinger, op. cit., p. 137.


Statement about the Torture of Arabs Arrested in Military Camps and Prisons, 1938-39 in ibid., 548, 579, 594, 601; Subhi Yasin, Al-Thawra al-‘Arabiyya al-Kubra (fi
See Palestine Prisons for Howard League for Penal Reform, 6 April 1938 in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 65, File 5, 76ff, MEC and Allegations of Ill-treatment of Arabs by British Crown Forces in Palestine (translated from the Arabic by Frances Newton, 19 June 1939) in ibid., 141-43.

The Alleged Ill-treatment of Prisoners by F. Newton (sent to the Howard League for Penal Reform), 15 April 1938 in ibid., 94.


Letters, O’Connor to Wife, 22 October, 2-3 November 1938, O’Connor papers, 3/1, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives London;


Elkins, op. cit., 63, 87.
91 Segev, op. cit., 416-17.


93 Typed two-page document by Edward Keith-Roach, untitled or dated, at the end of which is added pencilled comment, Keith-Roach papers, in possession of Mrs C. Ames-Lewis London.

94 Jack Binsley, Palestine Police Service (Montreux 1996), 83-84.

95 Diary, 14 May 1939, Forster papers, GB 165-0109, 119-20, MEC; Frightfulness in Retreat (London, 1917).


97 Haaretz, 7-8 November 1937.

98 Diary, 7 November 1937, Major White, Relating to Service in Palestine, 1974-04-24-8, National Army Museum London.

99 Correspondence, Edward Horne (formerly of the Palestine police) to author, 5 September 2009.

100 ‘Pieces of War’, typed memoir, Simonds papers, 08/46/1, 148, IWMD.

101 Duff, op. cit., 46.

102 Douglas Duff, Sword for Hire (London 1934), 171.


Baumeister, op. cit., 203ff.