Britain and terrorism: A sociogenetic investigation

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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January 2014
Abstract

This thesis is a sociogenetic investigation of terrorism that has been directed against Britain since the late eighteenth century. One of its most fundamental aims is to help lay the foundations of a figurational approach to the study of terrorism. Accordingly, I seek to answer two core and interrelated questions and apply the findings to develop an understanding of the processes and relationships that have contributed to the emergence of home-grown ‘jihadist terrorism’ in Britain. Those questions are:

i) Under what figurational conditions have the concepts of terrorism and terrorist developed, in sociogenetic terms, since they were first coined during the first French Revolution in the late eighteenth century?

ii) Under what figurational conditions do people act according to various designations of terrorism?

In order to develop answers to these questions several kinds of terrorism figurations related to Britain are examined. The first three chapters are dedicated to exploring the research on terrorism that has grown in recent decades. Much of it fails to develop an understanding of terrorism that has sufficient detachment, and consequently can help, in some cases, to perpetuate terrorism figurations.

Subsequent chapters move away from these mainstream approaches and show how terrorism figurations have developed in Britain from the time the concept ‘terrorism’ was first coined during the French Revolution. The core findings relate to how terrorism developed in antithesis to the concept of civilisation, and emerged as part of complex inter- and intra-state relationships and established-outsider figurations. As part of these processes, functional democratisation played a key role both in Britain and in Britain’s relations to other countries.

Finally, I show that these processes have been central to the development of the habituses and identities of the July 7 2005 London bombers.
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Acknowledgements

I am indebted to a number of people for their help, feedback and support in helping me research and write about the complex and controversial subject covered in this thesis. I would not have been able to complete this work without the help and attention I received from my supervisor, Professor Jason Hughes. Jason encouraged me to develop my early ideas about the topic of terrorism and, in particular, championed my desire to approach my research from a figurational standpoint. I am also grateful to the input from my second supervisor, Professor Chris Rojek. Chris helped ensure that I remembered there is a world outside of figurational sociology. As well as my gratitude, I owe Jason and Chris several pints and the odd curry from the many discussions we had about my thesis in Soho.

There are many other people whose support has been invaluable. Foremost among those was my friend, the late Dr Amanda Rohloff. Although we often did not always agree, Amanda and I had many informative and fruitful discussions about figurational sociology and the topics we were covering for our PhDs. Selflessly, Amanda would also always help me with any practical issues related to Brunel if I could not get to the university in person.

I also received advice, support and encouragement from many others, including, in no particular order: Professor Stephen Vertigans, Dr Cas Wouters, Professor Emeritus Eric Dunning, Dr Jonathan Fletcher, Professor Stephen Mennell, Dr Norman Gabriel, Professor Joop Goudsblom, Professor Aurélie Lacassagne, Dr Paddy Dolan, Dr Stephen Loyal, Dr Irem Ozgoren, Dr Barbara Prainsack, Dr Peter Wilkin, Professor Peter Lunt, Professor Clare Williams, Amreen Malik and Ushma Gudka.

I would not have been able to complete my thesis without the support of my family and friends. My heartfelt thanks and appreciation goes to my partner, Laura, whose encouragement, sacrifice and patience has been instrumental in keeping me going. My daughter, Florence, who was born in 2011, has inspired me to finish my thesis and have the determination to follow my ambitions.

My father, Emeritus Professor Eric Dunning, also requires special mention. We have discussed sociology for almost as long as I can remember and if it was not for his inspiration I would not have embarked on my PhD in the first place. My mother, Judith, has also been fundamental in encouraging my interest in sociology, and for that I am eternally grateful. Thanks also go to my sister, Rachel, and to John Crooks for their support.
Introduction

This thesis examines how a number of macro-level processes and relationships have contributed to the development of terrorism that has been directed at Britain. It then explains how such broad structural processes, in combination with interdependent micro-level processes, have contributed to the emergence of home-grown jihadist terrorism in Britain including the July 7th, 2005 London bombings.

The macro-level processes, highlighted above, include inter- and intra-state competitive pressures, civilising and decivilising processes (including how the concept of terrorism developed in antithesis to the concept of civilisation), established-outsider relations, functional democratisation in Britain, Europe and globally, and ‘double-binds’. The interdependent micro-level processes include ‘we-I balances’, the development of certain habituses and processes of identification. It is established, in this thesis, how these have been at the centre of British terrorism figurations since the late eighteenth century.

Inter- and intra-state competitive pressures are understood as specific manifestations of more general established-outsider processes and relationships that are fundamental to all terrorism figurations. These operate on a variety of levels, from the inter-state to the related community planes and, therefore, are a central focus of this thesis.

Accordingly, I attempt to lay the foundations for a figurational sociological understanding of terrorism, as well as building on such work as has already been undertaken in this area. I, therefore, examine the sociogenetic conditions under which terrorism has come about in relation to Britain and its ‘component parts’, and utilise a number of concepts and ideas that were originally developed by Norbert Elias. This means that it is distinctively different from mainstream and other approaches to terrorism in a number of ways. For example, it moves away from concerns focused on causes of terrorism to asking how did certain instances of terrorism come into being?

Such a task, however, is complex, not least because the topic of terrorism is immense, as is borne out by the ‘mountains’ of literature dedicated to trying to understand and explain it. As this thesis is concerned with the examination of terrorism in relation to Britain, it is focused on the structural processes by which it has come into being in British contexts, which helps to narrow the field a little. The fact that my approach is figurational means that I am seeking to uncover long-term social processes in this regard. As such, I concentrate on the diachronic structure of changes in the concepts of terrorism and terrorist since they were first coined in the late eighteenth century. I also detail a number of different terrorism figurations. This is because an examination of the changes in concepts and their functions help to reveal changes in wider social processes and relations. The latter part of this thesis examines the case of the July 7th, 2005 London bombers (7/7 bombers) in relation to how these processes have developed.
The use of figurational terminology in this thesis is for purposes of precision. However, many readers may not be familiar with some of these terms. As such, an exposition of some key figurational concepts follows shortly to help explain exactly the kinds of processes and relationships that are examined throughout.

Why then, should an approach that examines how terrorism has come into being through sociogenetic changes, as part of established-outsider relations, be an important and original contribution to our understanding of the subject and how does it differ from research that has gone before? At the heart of what follows is that it attempts to transcend, on the one hand, what are sometimes referred to as mainstream terrorism theories, and on the other, accounts that tend to be relativistic, and couch all social processes and reality as only existing as part of language. In this sense, I show how research on terrorism forms part of wider terrorism figurations, even though many researchers may not recognise this. As such, this thesis moves beyond approaches that fail to take into account the power relations at play when established groups stigmatise outsider groups as terrorists. However, at the same time it accepts that those who are designated as terrorists do in fact act according to those designations and that what is called terrorism and those who are called terrorists are worth researching as part of the same processes by which they are labelled as terrorists.

Additionally, the various designations tend to differ at different times and in different places. For example, the designation of terrorism in Britain in 1887 is different from the designation of terrorism in Britain in 2013. With these points in mind, I adopt a broader approach to the subject than those generally attempted by mainstream terrorism theorists or those who are critical of those approaches but fail to acknowledge that social processes can exist outside of language. Compared to other research, therefore, this thesis examines how certain social relations and processes have come to be labelled as terrorism and the groups involved as terrorists, and why those groups have acted according to various designations of terrorism. In addition, my approach seeks to be more detached than much of the research that has gone before, as I recognise that research on terrorism (including this thesis), in fact, forms part of wider terrorism figurations. Before discussing these issues in greater depth, however, it will be useful to explain how the idea for this thesis was first developed.

My thinking behind this thesis began in 2005. I was in the process of considering a topic for a PhD but did not know exactly what subject area I wanted to study. However, I was sure that I wanted to examine violence in one way or another, and had toyed with the idea of researching the Khmer Rouge genocide in Cambodia, having recently been to that country. Then, on 7th July 2005, as I made my way to work in Aldgate in the City of London on my bicycle a huge number of police cars sped passed me. This was not necessarily out of the ordinary but it did give me pause for thought. When I got close to my workplace there was a large crowd of people standing around and the police were in the process of creating a cordon, which meant I could not get to my building. The reason for the cordon was that four young men had blown themselves up on London’s transport system, killing 52 people and injuring around 700. One of the attacks was on the Circle Line, near Aldgate tube station, which was just below where I worked. In fact, on the occasions I did not cycle to work, I would take the Circle Line to Aldgate. The atmosphere in London, and especially the City, over the next few weeks...
was one of heightened emotions, including fear, anger and bewilderment. It was in this context that it occurred to me that terrorism would be an interesting and important topic to cover in a PhD.

Before going into more detail about the specifics of this thesis, it is necessary to explain that, in earlier drafts, the words terrorism and terrorist had been placed in inverted commas to denote the fact that they are highly politicised and contested terms. The saying, one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter is perhaps the most pertinent example of how disputed these words are. However, in most uses of the terms in this thesis I have decided to drop the inverted commas in favour of pointing out the controversy of these terms here at the beginning. On some occasions I have left them in, when I have deemed it necessary to emphasise that the terms are and should be regarded as contested. With this in mind, when identifying terrorists related to a particular ideology, cause, religion or country, I use terms that denote this, such as ‘anarchist terrorists’ in the case of those who label themselves thus or are labelled by others as anarchists. Likewise, in the case of terrorists who claim to be fighting a jihad in the name of Islam, I use the terms ‘jihadist terrorists’ or terrorism, simply for the reason that there are a variety of disputes related to these definitions and this particular one has some common currency at the time of writing.

Having briefly explained the processes involved in the initial thinking behind this thesis, let me explain in more detail exactly what is being examined. As already mentioned, the central concern here is the development of a sociological understanding of the processes that have contributed to different historical incidences of terrorism in or involving Britain. This is followed up by applying these findings to figurations in which the 7/7 bombers were a part. By figurational, I mean that this study is processual and relational and considers terrorism as a part of complex inter-generational interdependencies that occur both within and between states. Also, as mentioned, central to this is recognition that as part of these figurations, certain human groups are labelled as terrorists by other groups. So what is being asked is: how have these processes and relationships come into being? In order to attempt an answer to this problem, two further, interconnected questions are posed:

The first is: under what figurational conditions have the concepts of terrorism and terrorist developed, in sociogenetic terms, since they were first coined during the first French Revolution in the late eighteenth century? Related to this first question, is a second, namely to ask under what figurational conditions do people act according to various designations of terrorism?

There is a specific relationship between these two questions, which is that changes in a concept, in this case terrorism, can reveal wider social transformations. This means that the sociogenesis of the concepts of terrorism and terrorist are related to wider structural changes (for example, processes of state formation and disintegration, inter- and intra-state competition, functional democratisation, civilising and decivilising processes and so on). Accordingly therefore, so are the figurational conditions under which people might act according to a designation of terrorism. The work of Norbert Elias is a key platform through which this thesis develops an understanding of the problems posed above. A brief explanation of some of the concepts developed by Elias and used in this thesis follows shortly, as well as a discussion as to why I deemed it appropriate to use a figurational approach for this research.
It is important to reiterate that central to the sociogenesis of the concept of terrorism and the figurational conditions under which people act according to designations of this phenomenon are complex webs of established-outsider figurations, which form parts of competitive inter- and intra-state processes. Established-outsider figurations involve, in a nutshell, shifting balances of power between two or more groups, in which a group with greater power chances sometimes attributes inferior or sub-human characteristics to another group with fewer power chances and is able to make these labels stick in some way, while at the same time attributing superior characteristics to its own group. It is, therefore, a contention here that the concepts of terrorism and terrorist have particular functions and are used by some groups to stigmatisate, dehumanise and delegitimise their interdependent enemies. These functions extend to groups that use them to stigmatisate and to groups that are stigmatised; for example, their use can reinforce differences between groups, thus bolstering internal cohesion within each of them or even, if balances of power are so uneven, reduce the internal cohesion of the stigmatised group. The figurations in which the functional use of the concepts of terrorism and terrorist are applied often involve highly asymmetrical conflicts between a state and a group or groups that are opposed in some way to that state. However, states and other established groups have also often referred to the actions of other states and established groups with which they are in conflict, as terrorism. Non-state groups also often refer to the actions of states as terrorism, which in effect, are usually attempts at counter-stigmatisation.

In order to tackle these and related problems, I draw on a detailed study of time-series data gleaned from newspapers and other documentary sources, together with a case study of the 7/7 bombers.

The chapters

The thesis is divided into four main sections, which are subdivided into 12 chapters. Section 1, which includes chapters 1-3, explores the problem of defining terrorism and why this is so problematic, as well as why most definitions are highly inadequate for the study of terrorism, as they tend to skew research, (consciously or unconsciously) to fit with governments’ objectives. There is also an investigation of some of the theories that claim to uncover the ‘causes’ of terrorism and why such claims are problematic. Following this, I undertake an examination of the sociogenesis of terrorism as a social scientific concern, which demonstrates how the study of the phenomenon has developed in a way that fails to recognise that terrorism is processual and relational, and has led to many researchers claiming that terrorism has ‘thing-like’ properties and has been central in much research in justifying either the actions of governments or the actions of those who have been designated as terrorists. One of the fundamental points made in the first section is that, as mentioned, research on terrorism forms a part of wider terrorism figurations. For the most part, terrorism researchers are members of the same established groups that label certain outsider groups as terrorists. Mainstream terrorism researchers, in particular, often fail to recognise that they are part of these wider terrorism figurations and that, as a result, their work often lacks adequate degrees of detachment and can even be used to escalate and justify tensions and conflicts. In these early chapters I draw out the
relationship between terrorism research and wider terrorism figurations in a way that demonstrates a far greater level of detachment than has, to a large extent, gone before.

Section 2 demonstrates a distinct break from the problems encountered and created by mainstream terrorism research, and instead charts the sociogenesis of the concepts of terrorism and terrorist, in Britain, from their birth during the first French Revolution until the time of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. Chapters in this section cover terrorism in relation to the first French Revolution and Britain; terrorism in relation to Ireland; terrorism and the British reform movements; and terrorism in revolutionary Europe. These chapters show how terrorism developed in antithesis to civilisation, how inter- and intra-state competition and functional democratisation were absolutely central processes in the development of terrorism in Britain during the nineteenth century. Additionally, it dispels any lingering ideas generated by mainstream researchers that terrorism has thing-like properties.

Section 3 follows in the same vein as Section 2 and is divided into chapters that uncover processes in relation to the sociogenesis of terrorism in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. In particular, they explore terrorism in relation to Britain and the world wars; terrorism and the Cold War; terrorism in relation to the break-up of the British Empire, the Middle East and international terrorism; and domestic terrorism including in post-partition Ireland. The fundamental part that inter- and intra-state competition and functional democratisation have played in the development of terrorism in Britain is further expanded upon in these chapters. Other major concepts central to terrorism figurations are also explored in relation to these processes and include among others: established-outsider figurations, civilising offensives, ‘double-binds’ and the ‘royal mechanism’.

Section 4 examines the 7/7 bombers and how the figurations they form a part of are related to the figurations discussed in the earlier section. It ties together how inter- and intra-state competition, functional democratisation, established-outsider figurations and the related we-I balances and habituses of the bombers contributed to their attacking the country in which they were brought up.

There are a number of reasons why the work of Elias is drawn upon so extensively for this thesis. One of the most fundamental of these is that his approach places a much greater emphasis on long-term processes and relationships than almost all the other work on terrorism. An examination of such long-term figurations is valuable as it is able to show how certain relations have come to exist in their present forms as part of much longer-term processes. For example, even among the few approaches to terrorism that incorporate a relatively longer-term perspective, there is a tendency to transplant present-day definitions of terrorism onto past social relations. As such, there is a propensity to claim that terrorism began in the late nineteenth century, during an ‘anarchist wave’ of terrorism because this quite closely resembled how present-day terrorism is defined. A figurational approach deals much more satisfactorily with the processes at play that contributed to why certain anarchist groups were called terrorists in the late nineteenth century and why they acted according to the-then designation of terrorism. This is because it allows for an examination of the long-term processes that preceded anarchist terrorism; for example, how other, seemingly unconnected, previous instances of terrorism may have played a role in such later instances.
As discussed, there are some key social processes and relationships that are examined throughout this thesis that require, early on, some further exposition. The following concepts can be separated into two distinct yet interrelated areas. First are those that deal predominantly with terrorism figurations, involving processes by which certain groups come to be designated as terrorists and act according to those designations. These include:

• Figurations
• Established-outsider figurations (we-they balances) and we-I balances
• Habitus
• Civilising and decivilising processes.
• Double-binds
• Sociogenesis and psychogenesis
• Functional democratisation

The second set of concepts deal with issues concerned with how we understand terrorism figurations, including helping us to examine the work of others on terrorism. These are:

• Homo Clausus ('we-less / I')
• Reality congruence

There is, as is often the case, a significant degree of crossover between these sets of concepts. For example, civilising processes are highly relevant in how we understand terrorism figurations. Likewise, the concept of *Homo Clausus* is pertinent when discussing habitus and processes of identification.

**Figurations**

The idea that complex established-outsider figurations are central to terrorist figurations, begs the question: what are figurations? Of course, that there is a sociological approach called ‘figurational’ shows how fundamental a concept this is to those undertaking such research. To oversimplify somewhat, figurations are structures of dynamic interdependent relationships that people have with each other. In other words they are webs of processual relationships. These can have varying degrees of complexity and work on a variety of different levels, for example between two people or many millions of people. Power relationships always play a part in interdependencies and are, for example, always a part of established-outside figurations. However, power relationships always involve a balance between groups, as power is not something tangible that can be possessed – it is relational. Therefore, power is the ability by certain groups to monopolise what other, interdependent groups need or are seeking, such as food, knowledge, material wealth, violence and so on. It is rarely the case that one group holds all the power chances over another and if one does it would see the other group as being incapable of performing any functions for it. Something along these lines, according to Elias (1994: xxxi) seems to have been the case with the relationships between the Spanish and native South Americans when Spain first began to colonise the New World. The native
South Americans had no function for the Spanish and so were exterminated. There are other similar examples across human history. Nevertheless, groups do tend to have functions for each other and are, therefore, interdependent in a huge number of different ways.

Elias (1978: 130-131) provided simple examples of how figurations work through analogies with what he called ‘game models’. He suggested:

‘Taking football as an example, it can be seen that a figuration is a game structure which may have a hierarchy of several “I” and “he” or “we” and “they” relationships. It becomes quite apparent that two groups of opponents, who have a “we” and “they” relationship to each other, form one single figuration. We can only understand the constant flux in the grouping of players on one side if we see that the grouping of players on the other side is also in constant flux.’ (Elias, 1978: 130-131).

The most prominent figuration formed here, therefore, is what we call a football match. Each player has a function in relation to the others, whether that is as a team mate or an opponent. At the same time, the opposing teams have functions for each other. The various strengths and weaknesses of the individual players, and the relationships between the players help to determine the outcome of the game. This is also the case with figurations outside of football matches, for example, war figurations, figurations at work and so on. Elias added:

‘At the core of the changing figurations – indeed the very hub of the figuration process – is a fluctuating, tensile equilibrium, a balance of power moving to and fro, inclining first to one side and then to the other. This kind of fluctuating balance of power is a structural characteristic of the flow of every figuration.’ (Elias, 1978: 131).

What Elias is expressing here is that figurations do not involve fixed relationships. They are processes, and the balances of power between individuals and groups shift over time. To take the football match analogy again: in most games, one side will be in the ascendency while the other is forced to defend, and these dynamic relationships fluctuate between the two teams. This is based simply on the dynamic relationships between the players on the pitch.

The more complex figurations are, the more opaque they become to the individuals who form them. In this sense, figurations take on a life of their own that is not controllable by any one individual, or even by groups of individuals. Each person who makes up a particular figuration is also constrained by that figuration. The flow of figurations is, therefore, blind. In fact, as groups or individuals attempt to move figurations in a particular direction, they often find that the complexity of interdependencies means that a totally different outcome from the one desired is the consequence. For example, Britain and the United States have undertaken a ‘War on Terror’ in what their respective leaders claimed was/is an attempt to eradicate, or at least to lessen, the incidence of terrorism (others have argued that this was more to do with seeking control in strategically important countries in the Middle East, such as Iraq). However, it is now widely believed that wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and the foreign policies of the two former countries, as part of the ‘War on Terror’, have contributed to terrorist attacks, such as the Madrid commuter train bombings and the 7/7 bombings. As such, it can be argued that terrorist attacks form part of the unintended consequences of inter-state competition.

Accordingly, figurations are what I am seeking in this thesis to uncover and explain. In this case, they are terrorism figurations in relation to Britain. Such figurations are almost invariably established-
outsider figurations in one way or another. In this study, in most cases, the established are groups that are often described as the British establishment. These groups have varying power ratios relative to other groups that they have labelled as terrorists – in some cases those power relations are relatively unequal; in others they are more equal.

**Established-outsider figurations (we-they balances)**

As is apparent, a further fundamental concept in this thesis and also one central to Elias's approach to power relations, is that of established-outsider figurations. These relationships are so fundamental to human beings that they play a major part in most, if not all figurations. Established-outsider figurations are key in the relationships and, therefore, balances of power between different groups. Those groups that have greater power chances in terms of power ratios often think of themselves as better than other interdependent groups that have fewer power chances. The former are able to manipulate the latter much more than the latter can manipulate the former. They often believe their own groups have special virtues, which they see as lacking in other groups. In fact, groups with fewer power chances are sometimes dehumanised and said to be 'dirty' and 'anomic'.

In their study of community relations in a small part of a Midlands city, Elias and Scotson (1994) suggested that members of stronger, 'established' groups tend to denigrate weaker, 'outsider' groups through what they called 'blame-gossip'. Equivalents to 'blame gossip' can also be said to work in other areas; an example of this would be how certain British newspapers refer to weaker, 'outsider' groups such as asylum seekers and immigrants as being anomic and a threat to established groups. Blame gossip is also used to keep the members of 'established' groups in check and prevents them from mixing with 'anomic outsiders' – if they break this taboo, they risk being denigrated by other members of their own group.

Elias (1994: xviii) points out that the power ratios between groups can be dependent on the level of internal cohesion and communal control exercised by respective groups: generally, the greater the internal cohesion and communal control, the greater the power potential in relation to groups that are much more loosely bound together. With this in mind, this thesis examines established-outsider figurations, as part of intra-state processes and terrorism in Britain, such as those involving British Muslims in the name of Islam, and Irish nationalists, and a variety of other British-based groups seeking political reforms, such as trades unions. Of course, intra-state processes are not distinct from inter-state processes – they have an interdependent relationship which involves competitive pressures between states influencing competitive pressures within states and competitive pressures within states influencing competitive pressures between states. Accordingly, inter-state processes and the established-outsider relationships in those contexts in relation to terrorism are examined here, including Britain’s relationships with France, Germany, Russia, the United States, Ireland and countries that were once part of the British Empire.
Elias (1994: xx-xxi) proposed that established-outsider figurations are variable and this is dependent on the ability of established groups to monopolise positions of power, such as government, production, violence and so on. The greater the grasp that established groups have on such areas of social life, the larger the disparity between them and outsider groups. In order to maintain this position, established groups deploy stigmatising language against outsiders, which can enter the self-image of the outsiders, disarming them and reducing their effectiveness in trying to counter-stigmatisate. However, counter-stigmatisation can become effective if the balance of power changes between an established and outsider group. For example, an established group may be challenged by another established group, which may make it more reliant on the outsider group, therefore, changing the balance of power between them.

These processes of counter-stigmatisation are important foci of this thesis also. As Elias (1994: xxi) points out, industrial workers were/are able to retaliate against more established groups. This thesis highlights examples of established groups in Britain referring to trades unions and other working class groups as terrorists in the nineteenth century. Often a response of the radical press, in these contexts was to refer to establishment groups, including the government, as terrorists themselves and therefore, shows how counter-stigmatisation was a part of these processes.

As mentioned, Elias (1994: xxxvii) contended that struggles between established and outsider groups are always ‘balance of power’ struggles but they operate on a continuum which can vary from subtle conflicts that are part of how two or more groups cooperate within a setting of embedded inequalities, to more obvious battles for control or changes to a society’s institutional framework. In all cases (unless an outsider group is totally ‘powerless’), suggested Elias, outsider groups constantly apply pressure to try to increase their power chances relative to established groups. Likewise, established groups attempt to preserve or even increase these power differentials. Such processes act on both the inter- and intra-state levels and often involve terrorism. For example, outsider Irish groups (usually Catholics) in the nineteenth century were constantly applying pressure to the ruling British establishment in order to increase their power chances as part of attempts to alter the institutional framework in Britain. That is, to end British rule in Ireland. Likewise, the British establishment used many tactics to preserve the unequal status of these relationships in order to preserve the power differentials, including stigmatising Irish Catholic groups as terrorists. Of course, violence often played

1 Elias said:

‘The centrepiece [of established-outsider relations] ... is an uneven balance of power and the tensions inherent in it. It is also the decisive condition of any effective stigmatisation of an outsider group by an established group. One group can effectively stigmatize another only as long as it is well established in positions of power from which the stigmatized group is excluded. As long as that is the case, the stigma of collective disgrace attached to the outsiders can be made to stick. Unmitigated contempt and one-sided stigmatisation of outsiders without redress, such as the stigmatisation of the untouchables by the higher castes in India, or that of the African slaves or their descendants in America, signals a very uneven balance of power. Attaching the label of “lower human value” to another group is one of the weapons used in a power struggle by superior groups as a means of maintaining their social superiority. In that situation the social slur cast by a more powerful group on a less powerful group usually enters the self-image of the latter and, thus, weakens and disarms them. Accordingly, the power to stigmatisate diminishes or even goes into reverse gear when a group is no longer able to maintain its monopolisation of the principal resources of power available in a society and to exclude other interdependent groups – the former outsiders – from participation in these resources. As soon as the power disparities or, in other words, the unevenness in the balance of power, diminishes, the former outsider groups, on their part, tend to retaliate. They resort to counter stigmatisation, as negroes do in America, as peoples formerly subject to European domination do in Africa and as a former subject class, the industrial workers, do in Europe itself.’ (Elias, N, 1994: pxx-xxi).
a part in these figurations and that violence, when committed by Irish Catholics was, at times, referred to by the British establishment as terrorism. However, Irish Catholics were sometimes referred to as terrorists even if they had not committed any acts of violence. Moreover, being members of an outsider group meant that the label of terrorists became an effective form of stigmatisation.

Elias (1994: xxiii) went on to suggest that, if an individual wishes to remain a member of his or her established group, he or she has to submit to specific group norms and must control his or her emotions in ways that are acceptable to their wider established group. In return for submitting to established group norms, individual members are rewarded with the self-belief that they belong to a more powerful and superior group in relation to other, outsider groups. As mentioned, this thesis examines the antithesis between civilisation and terrorism. In this context, we will see how those that adhere to group norms in Britain tend to be rewarded with the label of ‘civilised’, but in certain special cases, those who do not are stigmatised as terrorists.

Additionally, Elias points out that all groups that are highly cohesive have a very significant effect on how their members act and feel, and, as such, this tends to be even greater among established groups than it does outsiders. He (1994: xi) suggests that the power ratio of an individual member is reduced if his or her behaviour or feeling is opposed to that of his or her group. If the power potential of an individual member of a group is reduced in some way or another it can make it difficult for him or her to hold their own in their group’s internal status competition and this can mean that they become subject to blame gossip and stigmatisation themselves. They are in this sense held in check by their group through the fear of becoming an outsider.

What Elias (1994: xli) was suggesting is that an individual's conscience, and therefore, his or her conduct is, to a large extent, determined by the groups to which he or she belongs. Such processes, accordingly, may be central to the cohesiveness of terrorist groups. If self-image and self-respect are linked to one’s group, then those people who belong to groups designated as terrorist will base their self-esteem and self-respect on how they conform to the beliefs and objectives of those groups. Such internal-group relationships may help to explain why some people undertake terrorism and remain members of terrorist groups. That is, the constraints of terrorists’ we-groups contribute to their undertaking acts that are designated as terrorism, as it is these kinds of activities that are central to the pride and charisma of their specific groups. This can be seen by the fact that suicide bombers are referred to as martyrs by their we-groups. Later in the thesis, these issues are examined in relation to the 7/7 bombers. Of course, a person may also belong to more than one group at a time and groups

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2 Elias said:

‘Group opinion has in some respects the function and character of a person's own conscience. In fact the latter, forming itself in a group process, remains attached to the former by an elastic, if invisible cord. If the power differential is great enough, a member of an established group may be quite indifferent to what outsiders think of him or her, but is hardly ever indifferent to the opinion of insiders – of those who have access to power resources in whose monopolistic control he or she participates or seeks to participate and with whom he or she shares a common pride in the group, a common group charisma. A member's self-image and self-respect are linked to what other members of the group think of him or her. Though variable and elastic, the connection between, on the one hand, the self-regulation of his or her conduct and sentiment – the functioning of the more conscious and even some of the less conscious layers of conscience – and, on the other hand, the norm setting internal opinion of one or other of his or her we-groups breaks down only with sanity. It breaks down, in other words, only if his or her sense of reality, ability to distinguish between what happens in fantasies and what happens independently of them, fades out.” (Elias, N, 1994: xli).
can merge into one another in various ways. This has implications for how individuals regulate their conduct and sentiment in that this must be determined by the varying strength of the bonds he or she has with his or her different we-groups. Elias argued:

The relative autonomy of an individual person, the extent to which their own conduct and sentiment, self-respect and conscience are functionally related to the internal opinion of groups to which he or she refers as "we", is certainly subject to great variation. The view, widespread today, that a sane individual may become totally independent of the opinion of all his or her we-groups and, in that sense, absolutely autonomous, is as misleading as the opposite view that his or her autonomy may entirely disappear within a collective of robots. That is what is meant when one speaks of the elasticity of the bonds linking a person's self-regulation to the regulating pressures of a we-group. This elasticity has its limits, but no zero point...Here, what stands out most graphically is the way in which the self-regulation of members of a closely knit established group is linked to the internal opinion of that group. Their susceptibility to the pressure of their we-group is in that case particularly great because belonging to such a group instils in its members a strong sense of their higher human value in relation to outsiders. (Elias, N, 1994: xli).

It is an important point to consider that terrorists can have more than one we-group and as such, their self-regulation can be based on the balances between these we-groups, and which of them has the highest value for individual terrorists. For example, British-socialised jihadist terrorists' we-groups include his or her terrorist network, often a wider Islamist or jihadist network, his or her family, the local community and even Britain. It is clear that in cases like the 7/7 bombers, the individuals responsible placed a higher value on their terrorist we-group than on their other we-groups.

In addition, the idea that individual self-regulation within tightly-knit groups and its relationship to members of such groups having a strong sense of their human value in relation to other, outsider groups is fundamental to this thesis. For example, throughout much of this work, it is contended that established groups in Britain have considered themselves as having greater human worth than many of those groups that they have been labelled as terrorists. At the same time, however, outsider groups that have acted according to designations of terrorism have also often regarded themselves as having greater human worth than those groups with a higher power ratio, and have often challenged them on the basis of this. For example, groups who have undertaken terrorism based on their Islamic beliefs have often regarded their targets as having less human worth than themselves.

Elias (1994: xli) suggests that one of the most recent manifestations of established group charisma is a central characteristic of nation-states. That is, he says, people in nation-states, which are dominated by party-government establishments tend to unite against outsiders through their ‘common social belief in their unique national virtue and grace.’ In the past, people tended to belong to groups that were dominated by priestly establishments, and united against outsiders by ‘common superhuman belief’. Of course, there are inter- and intra-state struggles between groups that on the one hand unite against outsiders though their common belief in their national virtue and grace, and those who united against outsiders through their common superhuman belief. There can also be a mixing of these belief systems. For example, the terrorism figurations involving Britain, Irish Catholics and Irish Protestants have had various blends of nationalism and religious belief.

If we examine the terrorism figurations between Britain and jihadist terrorists, we can see fairly clear cut conflict between, on the one hand, a group that has a belief in its national virtue and grace or in other words ‘civilisation’, and on the other, a group that unites against outsiders through a common
superhuman belief. Of course, there are also, terrorism figurations that involve two nation-states, each with a belief in its own national virtue and grace, such as was the case between Britain and Germany during the first and second world wars.

As such, this thesis focuses on these issues related to national we-groups but also in relation to religious and economic we-groups, which have also played a significant role in terrorism figurations. For example, in one instance, it can be argued that a weakening British establishment in the twentieth century held onto its colonies in the misguided belief that Britain was still as powerful and ‘virtuous’ as it was in the nineteenth century. The groups that fought for independence from the British were often stigmatised as ‘barbaric terrorists’ for trying to escape the control of the crumbling empire.

In another sense, on a more micro level, the thesis, as mentioned, examines some of the issues involved with so-called jihadist’ terrorists groups in Britain and how the pressure from belonging to such groups gives their members a sense of their greater human worth and, as such, opens up the possibilities for dehumanising groups they consider beneath them. This is, of course, linked to the larger-scale social processes discussed above. For example, as mentioned, it can be argued that there has been a clash between those who have religion-based charismatic beliefs in the case of terrorists who claim to be fighting in the name of Islam and the more or less secular governments that they oppose, which have nationalistic-charismatic beliefs.

Also central to terrorism figurations and related to established-outsider processes, are what Elias (1994: xliii) refers to as a person’s I-image and I-ideal, and their we-image and we-ideal, both of which form part of a person’s self-image. As such, when a person refers to him or herself as ‘I’, they are referring to what makes them unique. However, when, for example, someone refers to themselves as ‘I am an Englishman’ or ‘I am working-class’, they are also referring to their we-image and group identity. A person’s we-image distinguishes him or her from outsider groups, whereas a person’s ‘I-image’ distinguishes him or her from other members of their own group.

Elias (1994: xliii) suggests that a person’s we-images and we-ideals are always a combination of fantasy and reality. However, when fantasy and reality fall apart, he says, the fantasy content is brought to the fore and is experienced as personal versions of collective fantasies. In a number of very obvious cases related to terrorism this seems to have been the case with respect to so-called lone wolf terrorists such as Timothy McVeigh (1995 Oklahoma City bombing), David Copeland (1999 London nail bombings) and, most recently, Anders Behring Breivik (2011 Norway attacks), all three of whom had close links to or were members of racist far right groups. As such, their we-images and we-ideals were heavily laden with fantasies about Zionist or government conspiracies; that they were fighting for a master race and so on. Other examples could also include the individual fantasies of those who belong to terrorist groups like the 7/7 suicide bombers. Their fantasy we-images, for example, included the belief that they were holy warriors fighting on behalf of Muslims across the world.

Elias argues that nation-states and other groups often try to hold onto we-images of once or even imagined great pasts, even though their power in relation to other interdependent groups may have
diminished significantly. This, he says can be dangerous and even contribute to violent conflict in pursuit of their we-ideal. He suggests:

‘A striking example in our time is that of the we-image and we-ideal of once-powerful nations whose superiority in relation to others has declined. Their members may suffer for centuries because the group charismatic we-ideal, modelled on an idealised model of themselves in the days of their greatness, lingers on for many generations as a model they feel they ought to live up to, without being able to do so. The radiance of their collective life as a nation has gone; their power superiority in relation to other groups, emotionally understood as a sign of their own higher human value in relation to the inferior value of these others, is irretrievably lost. Yet, the dream of their special charisma is kept alive in a variety of ways – through the teaching of history, the old buildings, masterpieces of the nation in the times of its glory, or through new achievements which seemingly confirm the greatness of the past. For a time, the fantasy shield of their imagined charisma as a leading, established group may give a declining nation the strength to carry on. In that sense it can have a survival value. But the discrepancy between the actual and the imagined position of one's group among others can also entail a mistaken assessment of one's power resources and, as a consequence, suggest a group strategy in pursuit of a fantasy image of one's own greatness that may lead to self-destruction as well as to destruction of other interdependent groups. The dreams of nations (as of other groups) are dangerous. An overgrown we-ideal is a symptom of a collective illness.’ (Elias, N. 1994: xliii-xliv).

Elias most likely had Germany at the forefront of his mind when writing this. The actions of Hitler and the Nazis would correspond closely to what he was saying about an overblown we-ideal leading to self-destruction and the destruction of others. However, these insights also apply to a great many other groups. In terms of those focused on in this thesis, several stand out. One, for example, is Great Britain, which has declined in power from the first part of the twentieth century and particularly since the Second World War. There are numerous instances in which the British state has acted in ways that suggest that it is trying to live up to the fantasy image of the period of the British Empire. Its involvement in the global war on terror and the deployment of large numbers of troops to Afghanistan and Iraq are obvious examples. Likewise, as mentioned, those terrorists who claim to be fighting in the name of Islam also tend to have overgrown we-ideals. For example, much of what they believe is based on the once great Muslim Empire or Caliphate that was destroyed following the First World War. Their aims include the restoration of the Caliphate, martyrdom and eternal salvation based on their actions.

According to Elias (1994: xlv-xlvi) the patterns of self-restraint of members of declining established groups are liable to break down as their group’s power superiority breaks down and the belief in their superiority falters. However, such processes can take considerable time and often involves members of the group maintaining a fantasy image of themselves and their greatness in relation to other groups. When the reality of their faltering position becomes apparent to them, they tend to mourn their lost greatness. Outsider groups that do not share any of the faltering established group's norms are seen as 'irritants' and this is regarded as an attack on their we-image and we-ideal. They repel what they see as threats to their position of superiority by continuous attack and humiliation of the outsider group.

In this thesis, I examine how these processes work in relation to terrorism on a number of different levels. For example, with respect to contemporary British and Islam-related terrorist figurations, there is an examination of how processes of stigmatisation in British society play a part in marginalising certain Muslim groups. These processes, it can be argued, are related to faltering established group norms in Britain, whereby Britain’s power on the global stage is diminishing. For example, much of the
establishment press helps to stoke xenophobic and even racist attitudes. Many newspapers have actively demonised Islam and British Muslims. For example, on 4th November 2010, the Daily Express ran the front-page headline:


At the same time, many of those who are considered to be jihadist terrorists have fantasy beliefs about Islam and the once powerful Caliphate. It is argued here that these fantasies contribute to the enmity between jihadists and the British establishment. There is, as Elias (1994: xliv) puts it, a group strategy in pursuit of a fantasy image of their own greatness that leads to self-destruction as well as to the destruction of other, interdependent groups. The 7/7 bombers are a case in point — they destroyed themselves as part of the fantasy image of their own greatness. Later on in this thesis the 7/7 bombers and the figurations, which they are part of, are examined in greater detail.

Habitus

Peoples’ I-images and we-images form part of what Elias called ‘habitus’. He argued that all members of the same social group share with each other a specific make-up. What he called the social habitus of individuals includes aspects such as personality, dress, mannerisms, language and so on. It is from the social habitus that individual characteristics grow, or in other words people’s individual habituses develop. In order to emphasise the concept of habitus, Elias discusses what he has called a habitus problem ‘par excellence’ in relation to ‘national character’, which is based on the level of complexity of a particular society – usually, the most prominent layer of a person’s group habitus in modern nation states is at the national level of integration – people regard themselves as French, American, Canadian and so on. In societies that have fewer planes of integration, tribal or religious rather than national features may be prominent. Disintegrative processes in countries like Iraq and Syria at present are good examples of this where religious and tribal differences are tending to supersede national similarities and to lead to violent conflict. Elias suggests:

‘The idea that the individual bears in himself or herself the habitus that he or she individualizes to a greater or lesser extent can be somewhat more precisely defined. In less differentiated societies, such as the Stone Age hunter-gatherer groups, the social habitus may have had a single layer. In more complex societies it has many layers. Someone may, for example, have the peculiarities of a Liverpool-English or a Black Forest-German European. It depends on the number of interlocking planes in his [or her] society how many layers are interwoven in the social habitus of a person. Among them, a particular layer usually has special prominence. It is the layer characteristic of membership of a particular social survival group, for example, a tribe or state. In members of a society at the developmental stage of a modern state this is referred to by the expression “national character”. In members of societies on the way to becoming a modern state, tribal characteristics can often be distinguished – in Nigeria, for example, the social habitus of the Ibo or the Yoruba. At present, it is more pronounced than the common features of all Nigerians, whereas in the German Federal Republic or the Netherlands or France, despite strong countervailing movements, the regional differences between people are fading in relation to national ones as integration advances.’ (Elias, 1991: p182-183)

In this thesis, the relationship between habitus and established-outsider figurations and we-I balances is drawn out. For example, in Section 4, Chapter 12 there is an examination of some of the specific
aspects of social and individual habitus that form part of the established-outsider figurations relative to the 7/7 bombers. Processes of identification in relation to the bombers are crucial in this respect – their individual habituses grew out of their positions as British-born second generation Muslims and the associated identification problems of being members of an outsider group in Britain. Their social habituses encapsulated a wide variety of, often conflicting, layers. For example, on the one hand they identified with the global Jihadi movement, which is violently opposed to Britain and its institutions. On the other hand, most of them played sports that were developed in Britain, such as cricket and football. They were all brought up in Britain and so the layers of their habituses expressed this to varying degrees. As such, and in-line with Elias’s point about some layers of habitus being prominent in relation to others it can be argued that the layers of the bombers’ habituses that had special prominence were the layers associated with Islam and the global Jihadi movement, and not the layers associated with the British nation-state. As such, they regarded their survival groups as their small terrorist grouping and as the wider Jihadist terrorist movement.

In a nutshell, Elias was able to show that how people in certain groups come to perceive themselves as individuals who are distinct from what they perceive as society ‘out there’ is specific to the particular figurations in which they grow up. So, for example, people in the West tend to have a very strongly developed perception of their being unique individuals, separate from each other and the rest of society, and in fact that society is something that acts upon them. It is in this context that Elias introduced the concepts of the ‘we-less I’ and ‘thinking statues’. In fact, he pointed out that the battle between the communist world and the capitalist world during a large part of the twentieth century helps to show how we-I balances played out in a political sense. Put simply, on the one hand, there was a group, the capitalist West, which put greater emphasis on the rights of individuals and regarded society as a means to contributing to the well-being of individuals. On the other hand, the communist world regarded individuals as subservient to the greater good and the longer-term survival of the larger unit. Elias argued that both views are problematic, since regarding individuals and society as separate entities is a fiction. Rather, these opposing views in the capitalist West and communist East were simply different forms of self-consciousness relative to their particular social configurations.

In terms of established-outsider figurations, or we-they relations, therefore, the position of we-I balances becomes a little clearer – balances towards the ‘I’ are simply certain manifestations of the self-consciousness of particular we-groups, and balances towards ‘we’ are also particular manifestations of self-consciousness of people’s we-groups. These forms of self-consciousness are dependent on wider structural characteristics of societies, such as the development of civilising processes and the complexities of interdependence. Elias put it as follows:

‘In a word, each of the people who pass each other as apparently unconnected strangers in the street is tied by invisible chains to other people, whether they are chains of work and property or instincts and affects. Functions of the most disparate kinds have made him dependent on others and others on him. He lives, and has lived since a child, in a network of dependencies, that he cannot simply change or break simply by turning a magic ring, but only as their structure itself allows; he lives in a tissue of mobile relationships, which by now have been precipitated in him as his personal character. And this is where the real problem lies: in each association of human beings this functional context has a very specific structure.’ (Elias, 1991: 14)
Accordingly, people are tied to each other through invisible chains of interdependence, which are variable and dynamic. These chains, as Elias points out, manifest as all kinds of disparate functions, including established-outsider relations. Such figurations, as has been discussed previously, can manifest in numerous ways, such as name calling, the exclusion of one group from certain power chances and outright violent conflict. The individual character of a person, therefore, is moulded and takes its shape through the interdependence of relationships with others, including through established-outsider figurations. It is within these kinds of contexts that certain people come to be designated as terrorists and act according to those designations. That is, terrorism and terrorists are a result of specific tissues of mobile relationships. This is opposed to the idea that there are people with ‘terrorist personalities’ and whose ‘inner selves’ are, for varying reasons, more predisposed than others to becoming terrorists. That ‘inner self’ and the idea of a terrorist personality is, rather, related to the complex development of people who form part of certain established-outsider figurations, and within those figurations the concept of terrorism is used as a form of stigmatisation and delegitimisation. Likewise, it is also opposed to the idea that an event or particular circumstance will act on an individual to cause him or her to become a terrorist. The labelling of people as terrorists and their violence (or non-violence) labelled as terrorism are relational and form part of, as mentioned, particular established-outsider figurations.

The individual differences that each of us have, which are often referred to as one’s personality grow out of what Elias (1991) called the social habitus. What people refer to as personality is what Elias (1991) called individual habitus. Social habitus and individual habitus are, therefore, central in processes of identification. People identify themselves as part of we-groups and depending on the social structure of their societies, as individuals within those we-groups. As mentioned, how much emphasis is put on their individuality related to their we-group is dependent on those particular social structures.

**Civilising and decivilising processes**

Another concept at the heart of this thesis and in fact from which the other figurational concepts are generated, is Elias’s theory of civilising processes. This was, in fact, his central theory, his seminal work being *On the Process of Civilization* (2012), which is more widely recognised as *The Civilizing Process*. The former, however, is a more accurate translation of Elias’s original title. The book uncovers and examines the processes by which people in the West have come to regard themselves as civilised in relation to other peoples around the world and other Western peoples of the past. Accordingly, Elias investigated changes in Western peoples’ manners and behaviour over the long-term, from the Middle Ages through to the twentieth century, as well as nation-state formation, by analysing time-series data predominantly from manners books. At the level of individuals, Elias is able to show, that there has been a shift in the balance between external constraints towards internal self-restraint over the long-term. This has led to the development of people who tend not to fluctuate between extremes of emotion in the same way that people in the Middle Ages did or still do in less complex contemporary societies, or even at the bottom of the social scale in more unequal, complex societies. In addition, Elias (2000) shows how people in the West have, since the Middle Ages,
developed greater levels of foresight, mutual identification and rationalisation, and that there has been an advance in the frontiers of peoples’ thresholds of shame and repugnance.

Elias (2000) was able to show why these changes occurred and, in doing so, managed to bridge the divide between micro and macro sociological analysis. He did this by uncovering and examining, on a micro level, the connections between changes in social standards and manners, and the relationships that these processes have with macro level processes such as state-formation and the monopolisation of violence and taxation. On the level of state-formation, Elias suggested that a society can be dominated by either ‘centrifugal’ or ‘centripetal’, competitive pressures. By the term ‘centrifugal’, Elias was referring to competitive pressures that are and were decentralising and disintegrative. Such societies fail to develop strong, centralised monopolies of violence and taxation. ‘Centripetal’ forces, on the other hand, are centralising and integrative, and societies of this kind tend to form strong, centralised monopolies of violence and taxation. In the West since the Middle Ages, centripetal forces have been in the ascendency. This has led to a position whereby the control of violence and taxation has rested in fewer and fewer hands in Western societies until the present day where the governments of nation-states, which are the largest human survival units, are almost solely responsible for this function. Centrifugal and centripetal forces operate on both the inter- and intra-state levels and, as will become apparent, play a major role in the development of terrorism figurations.

In On the Process of Civilization (2012) Elias showed how, during the Middle Ages, in France, England and Germany, increasing pacification of territory by the most powerful survival units (which were usually headed by monarchs) led to warriors having to lay down their arms and became courtiers. In this more pacified arena of the royal court, status was achieved and lost not as much through conquering others by violence but by currying favour with the monarch and one’s fellow courtiers. This led to processes whereby those at court refined their manners and behaviour in ways that differentiated them from the lower classes (the bourgeoisie, merchant and peasant classes). In this way, bodily functions and violence were increasingly pushed behind the scenes of everyday life and regarded with abhorrence. It needs to be added that Elias discovered differences between France, England and Germany in the ways the courts differentiated themselves from the lower classes.

The competitive pressures between social groups and pacification across what are now nation-states meant that more refined and nuanced ways of behaving were not simply limited to those at court but were also adopted by the lower classes. This encouraged the aristocracy to further refine their affects in order to distinguish themselves from the bourgeoisie. Bourgeois groups eventually came to challenge the aristocracy and, over a long period, what came to be seen as more ‘civilised’ forms of behaviour spread throughout Western society. So, put simply, state-formation and, in particular, the monopolisation of violence and taxation contributed significantly to the moulding of peoples’ affects in civilising directions.

However, Elias was not claiming that civilising processes are an inevitable march of progress and head in just one direction. On the contrary, he (1997, 2000) also introduced the concept of
‘decivilising’ processes, arguing that if the level of social fears increases then the human capacity for rational action tends to be diminished and there are subsequent increases in the fantasy-content of peoples’ beliefs about each other and the world around them. Consequently, a society could suffer a corresponding increase in violence and the position of the central authority could be increasingly challenged. Related to this, and in the second part of On the Process of Civilization (2012), Elias discussed the processes of feudalisation that occurred in the early European Middle Ages, during which centrifugal forces were dominant. These processes can be regarded as examples of decivilising processes during which time there was fragmentation of society and far less central control over violence and taxation. In this period, the ability to be constantly ready to undertake violence would have been an asset whereas in the present day it is more likely to be a hindrance most of the time.

A key aspect of decivilising and civilising processes, however, is that they can work in tandem and what is crucial for the overall trend is which is dominant – there is, therefore, a balance. Jonathan Fletcher (1997: 83) sets out what he describes as a provisional model of decivilising processes, as Elias never devised an explicit one himself. Fletcher points out that decivilising processes consist of the following:

‘...[O]ne would be a shift in the balance between constraints by others and self-restraint in favour of constraints by others; another would be the development of a social standard of behaviour and feeling which generates the emergence of a less even, all-round, stable and differentiated pattern of self-restraint; and, third, we would expect a contraction in the scope of mutual identification between constituent groups and individuals. These three main features would be likely to occur in societies in which there was a decrease in the (state) control of the monopoly of violence, a fragmentation of social ties and a shortening of chains of commercial, emotional and cognitive interdependence. It is also likely that such societies would be characterized by: a rise in the levels of fear, insecurity, danger and incalculability; the re-emergence of violence into the public sphere, growing inequality or heightening of tensions in the balance of power between constituent groups; a decrease in the distance between the standards of adults and children; a freer expression of aggressiveness and an increase in cruelty; an increase in impulsiveness; an increase in involved forms of thinking with their concomitantly high fantasy content and a decrease in detached forms of thought with an accompanying decrease in the ‘reality-congruence’ of concepts (cf. Dunning and Sheard 1979: 288-9; Dunning et al. 1988: 242-5; Mennell 1990a: 206).’ (Fletcher, 1997: 83)

Clearly, civilising and decivilising processes have significant implications for terrorism figurations. On the surface, it would appear that terrorism is simply representative of decivilising processes, and in some respects it is. However, in many examples of terrorism a high degree of self-restraint is necessary on the one hand to be a member of a clandestine organisation and on the other to commit some of the acts that tend to get called terrorism. As such, questions around problems of the monopolisation of violence, a potential decrease in mutual identification and an increase in tensions between groups that often occur as part of terrorism figurations are crucial. These and related issues will be examined later on in this thesis.

Another point to make at this stage is that the terms ‘civilisation’ and ‘terrorism’ were forged at the same time in relation to the first French Revolution and the concurrent French reform movement. Following this, the two concepts have been regarded as in antithesis to each other – people who are called ‘terrorists’ are often said to be ‘uncivilised’ and ‘barbaric’.
It is also important to explain that there is a distinction between the idea of civilisation and civilising processes. The former refers to, as mentioned, the self-consciousness of people in the West and what they see as better in themselves compared to other societies and their own societies of the past. Civilising processes refer to the processes by which people come to see themselves in that way.

**Double-binds**

At times when groups are in competition with each other, they can become locked into processes whereby the structure of their relationships encourages a march towards conflict, in which fantasy ideas about the other increase, which encourages further irrationality towards each other. Elias (1987) referred to this process as a double-bind process. These are social processes whereby, for example, two or more interdependent social groups are locked in to a conflict that none of them can fully control. This inability to control and fear of the other side leads to highly emotive responses that tend to lack higher degrees of reality congruence and are laden with fantasy images of the other group. Such responses tend to perpetuate double-bind processes, as each side acts towards the other based on their fantasy ideas of each other. Elias (1987: 50) argued, that the level of affective thought governing inter-human relationships is in many ways equivalent to the relationships that human groups at a pre-scientific stage of development have with non-human nature. That is, a level of thought and action that is highly affect- or emotion-laden. Double-binds often appear as parts of established-outsider relations and do so whether the balance of power between two groups is relatively uneven or even. It is a contention here that, on certain levels, established-outsider figurations play a part in relationships between states even if those states, in terms of balances of power, are relatively even. This is because the same processes of stigmatisation are at play between states and, in a related way, processes of internal cohesion in one state relative to another rely, in part, on the development of established-outsider relations. For example, the British may close ranks against and stigmatise Germans. At the same time, they may hold themselves up to be better human beings than Germans. Such beliefs may not be particularly damaging to the feelings of self worth of most Germans but they may help to bond British people together in the belief that they are superior human beings.

The fact that, on the inter-state level, there is no effective monopoly of physical force that can prevent states from attacking each other means that nation-states are in a constant state of insecurity and fear of attack from ‘outsiders’. This fear can encourage a great degree of affect-laden or fantasy thought and action on behalf of nation-states and their representatives. According to Elias:

> '[In] a social field without effective violence-control, the structure and the dynamics of the inter-state level have special characteristics. Every power unit, every state within it, is drawn into a competitive struggle, often a survival struggle, with others, whether its representatives want it or not. If other states get stronger, if their power ratio increases, any state which does not get stronger, gets weaker. It automatically moves to a lower position within the status and power hierarchy of states. Hence, in a social field with immanent dynamics of this type, every unit is forced to compete, or else its representatives, lacking the resources or the will to compete, have to resign themselves to a lower position within the hierarchy and to the possibility of pressure or invasion from others. A state, as constituent of such a field, which cannot expand while others are expanding, loses power and status.'
‘However, for the people of a country to accept themselves as a country of lesser power and status than before, as what may appear to many of them to be a déclassé country, is a painful and difficult process. This is an example of the invisible cord that links the inter-state level to the individual level. The lowering of status and the loss of caste of a nation-state within the hierarchy of states is widely felt, among the individuals who form this state, as a personal loss of caste...

‘...A field of states without a central monopoly of physical violence is inherently unstable. There are a hundred and one reasons why tensions and conflicts between states may arise. But whatever the particular reason, the primary driving force is provided by the intrinsic competitive pressure of the figuration, by the elementary survival struggle between the constituent units and by their power-and-status-conflicts.

‘At present, explanations in terms of the built-in dynamics of a figuration may appear strange. Other types of explanation predominate. An obvious explanation is the explanation of inter-state conflicts in terms of the aggressiveness of one or another of the states concerned. This appears to imply that a whole nation as a collectivity is biologically endowed with a higher propensity for violence than most others. Differential biological characteristics are thus held responsible for the instability and the recurrent violent encounters which are a standing feature of all inter-state relationships.’ (Elias, 1987: 82-83).

As will become apparent later on in this thesis, there was an opinion among the British establishment, during the world wars that Germans were ‘naturally’ barbarous and ‘terroristic’.

**Sociogenesis and psychogenesis**

Crucial to civilising and decivilising processes are what Elias (2000) referred to as ‘sociogenesis’ and ‘psychogenesis’, which are processes that operate, respectively, on the macro and the micro levels of interdependence. Sociogenesis, quite simply, means social generation. Psychogenesis refers to the influence of processes at the level of the psyche on wider social processes, which suggests the interdependent interweaving of sociogenetic and psychogenetic processes.

In *On the Process of Civilization* (2012), Elias examined what he called the sociogenesis of the concept of civilisation in Western Europe – how it developed from earlier concepts like *courtoisie* and *civilité* to, at first, become an expression of the values of the French reform movement to later becoming, as already discussed, the standard by which Western nation-states judged themselves as better and more advanced than peoples of other parts of the world and people of earlier stages of development from their own countries.

Elias also examined the antithesis between the French and English concepts of civilisation and the German concept of *Kultur* (roughly translated as culture). He points out that the concept of civilisation refers to a variety of aspects of Western ways of life that people in the West are proud of, such as their science, manners, cleanliness, technology, art, sport, politics and so on. In fact, most aspects of life can either be referred to as ‘civilised’ or ‘uncivilised’. This makes the concept difficult to define. However, it is much easier to express its function, which is to express the self-consciousness of peoples in the West and how they see themselves as more civilised in relation to other peoples and their own societies of the past. According to Dunning and Hughes (2013: 82): ‘It is a concept which is fundamentally bound up with power differentials and inter-group feelings and perceptions.’ In this sense, the concept of ‘civilisation’ bears a great deal of similarity with the concept of ‘terrorism’, in that both are difficult to define but both have specific functions that are bound up with power differentials.
and inter-group feelings and perceptions, albeit that one has positive and the other negative connotations.

However, the concept of civilisation means different things to different Western nation states, specifically France and England on the one hand and Germany on the other. In the case of Germany, civilisation is only a praise concept of the second rank and can be used to denote superficiality. The corresponding praise concept in Germany is Kultur, which expresses pride specifically in German achievements. According to Elias:

"To a certain extent, the concept of civilization plays down the national differences between peoples; it emphasises what is common to all human beings or – in the view of its bearers – should be. It expresses the self-assurance of peoples whose national boundaries and national identity have for centuries been so fully established that they have ceased to be the subject of any particular discussion, peoples which have long expanded outside their borders and colonized beyond them.

"In contrast, the German concept of Kultur places special stress on national differences and the particular identity of groups; primarily by virtue of this, it has acquired in such fields as ethnological and anthropological research, a significance far beyond the German linguistic area and the situation in which the concept originated. But that situation is the situation of a people which, by Western standards, arrived at political unification and consolidation only very late, and from whose boundaries, for centuries and even down to the present, territories have again and again crumbled away or threatened to crumble away. Whereas the concept of civilization has the function of giving expression to the continuously expansionist tendency of colonizing groups, the concept of Kultur mirrors the self-consciousness of a nation which had constantly to seek out and constitute its boundaries anew, in a political as well as a spiritual sense, and again and again had to ask itself: "What really is our identity?" The orientation of the German concept of culture, with its tendency towards demarcation and the emphasis on and detailing of differences between groups, corresponds to this historical process. The questions "What is really French? What is really English? have long since ceased to be a matter of much discussion for the French and English. But for centuries the question "What is really German?" has not been laid to rest. One answer to this question – one among others – lies in a particular aspect of the concept of Kultur." (Elias 2000: 7)

There are a number of points here that are useful to the discussion in this thesis. One is the idea of how certain concepts can come to represent the self-consciousness of groups or how their functions are central to inter-group relations. Another is the role that certain concepts play in processes of identification. As such, it is put forward later that processes of identification contribute an important part to home-grown British jihadist terrorism figurations.

Returning to the discussion of sociogenesis, the relationship between sociogenetic and psychogenetic processes, therefore, is absolutely fundamental to civilising processes. Elias (2000) has shown how external constraints are transformed into self-restraints as society develops on a broader scale. These processes are mutually perpetuating; that is to say, psychogenetic development drives sociogenetic development, while at the same time sociogenetic development drives psychogenetic development – they are different sides of the same coin and Elias’ work shows that separating micro and macro processes can only ever lead to partial discoveries at best. That is, explanations of human social processes and relationships must focus on human beings in the round, as individuals who form part of smaller and larger interdependent groups, if explanations with a greater degree of reality-congruence are to be found. That is something this thesis seeks to do.

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3 This is no longer the case in England and France, following the collapse of their respective empires. Elias was writing before this happened.
Sociogenesis and psychogenesis are also central to this study in a number of other ways. The most obvious is through the examination of the sociogenesis of the concept of terrorism since it was first coined during the first French Revolution in 1789. The sociogenesis of concepts or, in other words, how their meaning changes over time, reveals wider structural changes. In this case, the changing meaning of the concept of terrorism reveals the changing function of the word for those who use it. For example, it was used at times in the nineteenth century by the British establishment to describe rebellious Irish Catholics. This had a function for the British establishment, not least as a means of stigmatising and delegitimising a group that represented a threat to their interests and dominance, especially at a time when other elite groups across Europe were being challenged.

Another important role played by these concepts is related to the psychogenetic processes at play with respect to the 7/7 bombers. Accordingly, there is a discussion later of how psychogenetic processes are relevant in this context. For example, it is asserted that processes of identification of a small number second and third generation Muslims, including the bombers, contributed to their joining terrorist groups and plotting, and undertaking terrorism. This is, of course, tied up with wider sociogenetic processes related to positions within established-outsider figurations.

**Functional democratisation**

Functional democratisation refers to processes by which the differences in power potential between different strata in a society diminishes. Even though there may still be large gaps in the power potential between groups, over the long-term, these have reduced considerably. Functional democratisation involves processes by which groups higher up the social scale become more functionally dependent on groups lower down the social scale, which correspondingly increases the power potential of the lower status group relative to the higher status group. Elias suggests how this process played out in Europe:

‘Except where the institutionalized balance of domination corresponded to the actual power potentials of the mass, the increase [in lower class power potential] showed itself in diffuse manifestations of discontent and apathy, and in looming rebellion and violence. Provided the society had developed institutional means of assessing the distribution of power and legal methods of making constant adjustments to keep pace with the changes in the power ratio, these feelings could find expression through electoral choice, through strikes, and in mass party demonstrations and mass movements, each with its own social belief system. However that may be, in the wake of the overall social transformation usually labelled by one of its aspects such as ‘industrialization’, there has been a lessening of power differentials between all groups and strata – as long as they remain within the constantly changing functional orbit of the society.’ (Elias, 1978: 67-68).

Functional democratisation has played a fundamental role in the development of British terrorism figurations in a number of ways. In fact, in order for groups to undertake terrorism, the power ratio between them and their targets, which tend to be higher status established groups, has to be such as to enable them to challenge one another. If power ratios between groups are too great, then lower status groups will be unable to engage in conflict with higher status groups. It is a contention here that functional democratisation among many other processes, contributes to terrorism.

**Figurational concepts related to terrorism research**
Sociogenetic and psychogenetic processes have, according to Elias, led to people in the West and to some extent elsewhere since the time of the Renaissance, to experience themselves in a very particular way. That is, as contained within the shell of their own bodies and closed-off from other human beings. He called this form of self-consciousness *Homo Clausus* or ‘closed man’ whereby people understand themselves as individuals separate from societies and what they perceive as their ‘true’ self is located within a shell, locked away from the rest of the world in a container that is their body. This is best summed-up by Descartes’ famous dictum, ‘I think therefore I am’ (*cogito ergo sum*) – this well-known dualism suggests that existence is only something related to mental activity and is not bodily. We can see evidence of this way of experiencing ourselves in philosophical approaches to the acquisition of knowledge, whereby it is assumed that adult individuals (who such approaches suggest have never been children) are able to acquire knowledge purely by means of their own unique abilities, or reason, without being part of a process of learning where knowledge is acquired (or lost) over the generations.

A central problem with this form of self-consciousness for social research, and as such, research into terrorism, is that social scientists tend to approach society and sociological problems as if they were on the outside looking in and, as a result, they fail to appreciate that they are also among the observed. That is, the fact that they are able to consider society and sociological problems in what we would call a social scientific manner is the result of long-term social processes through which human beings have developed ways of understanding the world in more detached ways than has previously been the case. A simple way of showing how this has happened is by pointing out that people of twelfth century England would not have been able to understand the world social scientifically. This is not because individuals at the time did not have the intellectual potential for such understanding but because the figurational conditions they experienced were not such so as to allow for social scientific understanding of the world.

Put very crudely, there are generally two distinct ways in which social scientists tend to approach the study of human beings. At one extreme, are those who contend that social structures are dominant in determining social change and social phenomena. At the other extreme, are those social scientists who study the ‘self’, which is seen as being distinct from society. In this sense there is a split created between ‘individual’ and ‘society’. The dichotomy between the terms ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ helps to show how deep such thinking in the social sciences and elsewhere is. But these approaches to social research fail to recognise the interconnectedness of people and that the perception of being a self locked in a body is simply a consequence of certain figurational conditions.

Related to the concept of *Homo Clausus* are a number of other concepts cited by Elias. These include: *Homo Economicus*, *Homo Psychiatrias*, *Homo Psycho-Analyticus* and *Homo Sociologicus*. *Homo Economicus* refers to how the conception of market forces is understood simply as the result of individuals’ innate ‘rational’ pursuit of profit rather than the complex, interdependent relationships that
people form with each other. Like the concept of *Homo Clausus*, it takes as its starting point the closed individual as producing social phenomena, in this case the market. Therefore, the concept of *Homo Economicus*, refers to the branch of social sciences usually referred to as economics and within this particular branch specific models are created to try to explain the social world, albeit within a relatively limited scope. In many cases, including in much of the research on terrorism, these approaches are used. For example, rational choice theory is often used to explain the actions of terrorists (See Horgan (2005), Bjorgo (2008), Gupta (2008) and Crenshaw (1981) for example).

Like *Homo Economicus*, *Homo Psychiatrias* and *Homo Psycho-Analyticus* make common assumptions about human beings and this plays a key role in how they approach their work. In their case, the individual is paramount and his or her interconnectedness with others is understood as an unstructured background. According to Elias, the terminology used by psychiatrists, psycho-analysts and psychologists often regards individuals as highly structured and their relations with others as unstructured. He suggested that their approaches often imply: ‘...the existence of a wall between the highly structured person in the foreground and the seemingly unstructured network of relations and communications in the background.’ (Elias, 2009: 164.)

In the case of *Homo Psychiatrias* and *Homo Psycho-Analyticus*, as with *Homo Economicus* and *Homo Clausus* 'the individual' is seen as paramount, with little or no reference to his or her social relationships. Such approaches are common in the literature on terrorism, with some even claiming that there are terrorist personalities.

The concept of *Homo Sociologicus* follows a similar vein, whereby assumptions about human beings are made that form the approach of many sociologists to their work. In this respect the social world is seen as highly structured, whereas the individual is understood as being relatively unstructured and in the background. However, in the same way as the concepts discussed above, the individual and society are understood as two separate, relatively unrelated entities. Likewise, there is research on terrorism that takes into account broad social structures and pays little or no attention to the individuals that form those structures.

Of course, in all of these cases there is a continuum on which some approaches are closer to *Homo Economicus* and *Homo Psychiatrias* on the one hand, and on the other are closer to *Homo Sociologicus*. Likewise, there are approaches that fall close to the middle of this continuum, such as some social-psychological investigations.

Elias, in order to overcome some of these problems, invites us to examine the significance of the personal pronouns I, you (singular), we, you (plural), he, she, and they. He argues that these show that all human beings are connected to other human beings and that all individuals are social. With these concepts in mind Elias shows that the conception of human beings, and therefore, the study of them, rather than being one that sees people as we-less / ‘I’s or *Homo Clausus* and its related offshoots, should be one of *Homines Aperti*, meaning open people. Elias stated that:
...[T]he significance of the series of personal pronouns leads immediately to an easy transition from the image of man as *Homo Clausus* to one of *Homines Aperti*. It also helps us to understand something else – that the concept “individual” refers to interdependent people in the singular, and the concept of “society” refers to interdependent people in the plural. It may be quite justified and absolutely necessary for scientific work in these two fields to be assigned to different groups of specialists. The first field should be the concern of psychologists and psychiatrists, the second of sociologists and social psychologists. Taking personal pronouns as a model makes it easier to understand that in the long-run it is indeed possible to distinguish between research into people in the singular and research into people in the plural, but impossible to separate them – any more than people in the singular can be separated from people in the plural.’ (Elias, N, 1978: 125).

*Homo Clausus* and its related concepts play an important role in how the study of terrorism is approached in this thesis. For example, as mentioned, there are a huge number of approaches to the subject that focus on terrorism as being a result of psychological abnormality. Others focus purely on macro-level structural ‘causes’. However, in this thesis there is, as already discussed, an examination of processes on both macro and micro levels, which are regarded as interdependent.

**Reality-congruence**

Another of Elias’s concepts that is closely associated with how we understand terrorism figurations is ‘reality congruence’. This, unlike approaches that either claim that notions of ‘truth’ are only relative to language and the power structures that produce dominant discourses, or those that regard reality as having a fixed, thing-like essence, takes into account dynamic processes and focuses on degrees of approximation rather than static either-ors. It should be understood in terms of degrees of knowledge derived from research and theories developed by scientific specialists investigating what is real, as part of an overarching dynamic process of interdependence. It is the case that degrees of reality congruence can move in either direction. That is, for example, people can develop knowledge of society that is more reality congruent or that is less reality congruent. This process must be understood in the context of wider social processes, for example, civilising processes.

Dunning and Hughes explain what Elias meant by reality congruence in greater detail:

‘...the term ‘reality congruence’ implies a ‘process’, not a state. It is a ‘flow’ term not an ‘essence’ term, one which refers to varying degrees of approximation, of agreement, between the dynamism of scientific knowledge and the dynamism of the social reality of which that knowledge forms part...Elias did not think of ‘reality’ as something fixed, monolithic and ultimately ‘fully knowable’. He did not see it as a ‘thing out there’, but rather as a dynamic totality which includes humans and their expanding (and sometimes contracting) knowledge as an integral part. It follows that, in Elias’s view, knowledge can never be ‘absolute’, never ‘finished’ or ‘final’ as is implied by a static concept like ‘truth’. It is worth observing that, as an alternative, a term such as ‘value-congruence’, and indeed, the sociological investigation into how scientific knowledge is, to varying degrees, consistent with extra-scientific values is, in the current sociological climate, considerably less controversial. It is perhaps useful, then, to qualify Elias’s usage of the term ‘reality congruence’. In using it, he was also inevitably implying a consideration of ‘value-congruence’: the key is which values (note, not simply ‘whose’ values – as in a ‘history of ideas’ model of science)? Put simply, Elias’s stance on knowledge suggests that a consideration of ‘value congruence’ without a consideration of ‘reality congruence’, as in a solely relativist position, is as problematic as a consideration of ‘reality congruence’ without ‘value congruence’ as in a naive empiricist stance.’ (Dunning and Hughes, 2013: 134)

Much of the research on terrorism tends to fall into a positivistic, naive empiricist category, without acknowledging the power structures through which terrorism comes about either as a concept or as figurations in which groups act according to designations of terrorism. On the other hand these stances have often been criticised by social constructivists and post-modernists for not dealing...
adequately with issues of value congruence and the associated language and power structures that ‘construct’ terrorism. These latter approaches, however, like the positivists, tend to fail to take into account how relationships between people, including those who are designated as terrorists, do not only exist as part of language and discourse but rather are real, tangible human relationships. These and related issues will be explored in much greater depth in the subsequent sections. Accordingly, it is appropriate that one of the most controversial problems in terrorism research is explored next, namely, definitions of terrorism. The next chapter will also show the reader how research on terrorism forms part of wider terrorism figurations. That is, it develops an understanding of how, predominantly mainstream terrorism theorists, fail to take into account their role in how terrorism figurations are developed and sustained by blindly accepting established group definitions of terrorism without any consideration of their own role in these processes and relationships.
Section 1: Research on terrorism as part of the terrorism problem

Chapter 1: Definitions of terrorism and the essentialist trap

Before expanding on the other issues raised in the Introduction, it will first be useful to scrutinise some of the research there is on terrorism. On the one hand this will expose some of the deficiencies of the field to date, and on the other, it will enable me to highlight why a figurational approach to terrorism is necessary to provide knowledge on the subject that has a greater degree of reality congruence. As part of this, I will show why it is necessary to consider terrorism research as part of wider terrorism figurations. As such, in this and the following two chapters, I examine some of the research that has already been undertaken on terrorism, focusing primarily on definitions and its so-called ‘causes’, and how these have come into being as part of wider terrorism figurations. The first two specific aspects of the literature on terrorism (definitions and causes) are closely related to each other. For example, psychologist John Horgan (2005) argues that the way terrorism is defined in a piece of research is central to determining the course of that research and therefore, how a researcher will decipher what the ‘causes’ of terrorism might be. Both of these areas are closely related to the concern of the research here. This is because the issue of how terrorism is defined over time is related to the sociogenesis of the concept – it has had different meanings over the course of history. What are claimed to be ‘causes’ of terrorism are closely related to the concern here of tracing the figurational conditions under which people act according to various designations of terrorism, which include, for example, processes of functional democratisation, established-outsider figurations, civilising and decivilising processes, combined with those of habitus, identification and we-I balances. Approaches to the study of terrorism tend, roughly, to equate it in one of two ways; either by defining it in essentialist terms and seeking its ‘causes’ or by developing relativistic accounts that focus on the ‘narrative’ of terrorism as part of its development through language and discourse. The vast majority of research tends to be from the former camp, which in some academic circles has been referred to as mainstream terrorism studies, and is how it is referred to here. The way in which these approaches to the study of terrorism have come about and that terrorism has come to be an area of study in its own right, is, as will become clear, a part of the development of wider terrorism figurations.

There are a number of problems that one encounters when reviewing academic literature on terrorism. Perhaps the biggest of these is the sheer scale of what has been produced over the past 30 to 40 years. To put this into perspective, Horgan (2005: xii), points out that in the 12 months following the attacks on America on 11th September 2001 over 800 academic texts on terrorism were produced in English alone. It is the case that the academic literature on terrorism has grown exponentially since the early 1970s and at the same time the subject has become one of the most regularly reported items in news media. This helps, in part, to explain why there is a myriad of definitions of terrorism produced across the academic, media and governmental spheres. The growth of research on terrorism following 9/11, for example, also shows that what are called terrorist events often dictates
the development of terrorism research. This helps to reinforce the point made here that research on terrorism needs to be understood as being part of wider terrorism figurations.

Before discussing some of the definitions devised by academics, it will first be useful and of relevance to give two examples of government definitions – one from the United States and one from the United Kingdom. One of the reasons for this is that some academics have been criticised for creating definitions that reinforce the strategic aims and prejudices of governments when they use the words terrorism and terrorist in a pejorative, highly politicised way. Another reason is the simple fact that government definitions tend to be those that are most widely recognised as reflecting reality, and are generally taken for granted as being ‘correct’, even though they tend to lack degrees of reality congruence that more detached definitions might have, partially as a result of their being used to a large extent, as a label to delegitimise enemies. It is this acceptance and in many respects unreflecting collusion (wittingly and unwittingly) with established group definitions of terrorism developed by governments that are at the centre of the many problems with mainstream terrorism theories, and shows why they need to be considered as part of wider terrorism figurations. The two government definitions below will allow for some comparison with academic definitions. The first of these is from the US State Department:

Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f (d):
The term terrorism means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.
The term “international terrorism” means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country.
The term “terrorist group” means any group practising, or that has significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism. United States Department of State (2004)

There are a number of interesting points about the US State Department definition. One glaringly obvious one is the idea that terrorism is violence against noncombatant targets. This, therefore, would seem to rule out soldiers on patrol or in other situations – the definition is based on the status of the victims. The idea that terrorism is practised by subnational groups or clandestine agents would appear to rule out overt and large-scale actions by governments. Nevertheless, governments have, since the term was coined, been referred to as terrorists by other governments, including the United States. Additionally, the concept of clandestine activities is open to question. Drone attacks by the US government could be regarded as clandestine, as could a variety of other secretive military practices. The US State Department definition of international terrorism is also open to a range of questions. How might citizens of more than one country be involved? It could involve sending donations of money abroad to groups regarded as terrorists, training for terrorism abroad and so on. As such, what international terrorism might cover becomes extremely broad. Finally, it is certainly the case that the US government regards terrorism as having thing-like properties, which makes it quantifiable. What it fails to do is to take into account the fact that its definition is only effective because of the dominance in its power relations relative to other groups.

The following is from the British government (from the Terrorism Act 2000):

Terrorism: interpretation
(1) In this Act terrorism means the use or threat of action where—

(a) the action falls within subsection (2),

(b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government or an international governmental organisation or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and

(c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause.

(2) Action falls within this subsection if it—

(a) involves serious violence against a person,

(b) involves serious damage to property,

(c) endangers a person’s life, other than that of the person committing the action,

(d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or

(e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system.

(3) The use or threat of action falling within subsection (2) which involves the use of firearms or explosives is terrorism whether or not subsection (1) (b) is satisfied.

(4) In this section—

(a) “action” includes action outside the United Kingdom,

(b) a reference to any person or to property is a reference to any person, or to property, wherever situated,

(c) a reference to the public includes a reference to the public of a country other than the United Kingdom, and

(d) “the government” means the government of the United Kingdom, or a Part of the United Kingdom or of a country other than the United Kingdom.

(5) In this Act a reference to action taken for the purposes of terrorism includes a reference to action taken for the benefit of a proscribed organisation.

The words in subsection (1) (b) “or an international governmental organisation” were inserted by the Terrorism Act 2006, s 34(a), and came into force on the 13th April 2006. (Terrorism Act 2000)

This definition, unsurprisingly, bears a number of similarities to the US definition. For example, it regards terrorism as having a number of ‘thing-like’ properties. But it could also refer to the actions of states during war. One of the major problems it has, therefore, is that it is far too broad a definition, and at the same time could include acts and groups that even in a normative sense are not regarded as terrorism. Perhaps having broad definitions of terrorism gives governments’ greater scope to pick and choose who they define as terrorists.

Those who research terrorism often recognise the issue of its definition to be a key problem and there has often been criticism of government definitions which are frequently said to be developed to serve narrow political purposes, or in other words, governments often call groups terrorists simply because they are opposed to them. Obvious examples include Russia’s description of Chechen rebels as terrorists. Or the former Libyan dictator, Colonel Gaddafi referring to rebels in his country as terrorists; or the Syrian government calling rebels in Syria, terrorists. These three examples also highlight the recent fashion of calling jihadists, terrorists, although, interestingly, there is a degree of reluctance on the part of Western countries to call the people in these examples terrorists simply because they are opposed to the West’s enemies. Nevertheless, like government definitions, most academic and non-
academic attempts tend to conceive terrorism in an essentialist way. That is, in trying to define terrorism, social scientists often give it an essence; particular properties that allow them to say this thing or that thing constitutes terrorism. In fact, some psychologists and psychiatrists have claimed that terrorists can be reduced to being psychologically abnormal or as having terrorist personalities. In many, if not most, cases academic definitions of terrorism still tend to resemble the kinds of government definitions highlighted above.

**Academic definitions**

The wide range of views and disagreements as to what exactly constitutes terrorism has led political scientists Schmid and Jongman (2006), to uncover 109 different definitions. There are, however, many more. They defined terrorism by combining a number of these definitions as follows:

‘Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby – in contrast to assassination – the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist) organization, (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.’ (Schmidt & Jongman, 2006: 28).

We can see from this definition that Schmidt and Jongman, along with many other mainstream terrorism theorists and governments, understand terrorism as consisting of a number of properties such as ‘violence’, ‘communication’ ‘intimidation’ and so on. It, like other definitions, is clearly essentialist and static, as such a definition could not be applied to everything that has been called terrorism since the inception of the concept. That is, what people have called terrorism in the past may not be called terrorism now. Likewise, what people call terrorism now may not be called terrorism in the future. Nevertheless, Schmidt and Jongman’s attempt is widely held as being the closest that anyone can get to a broadly accepted definition of terrorism and, as such, has been widely used by terrorism researchers, particularly if they regard terrorism as a method or tactic. This suggests that terrorism involves acts of violence. However, there are instances where groups have been said to have undertaken terrorism but which have not committed any violent acts. Catholic priests and members of political reform movements have been labelled in this way and may fall into this category. In addition, one group may call a group terrorists or an act terrorism, and another group may not. Annamarie Oliverio (1998) points out how the American government and media referred to the Palestinian Liberation Front hijacking of the Italian cruise ship, the Achille Lauro, as terrorism, whereas the Italian government and its media did not. Different groups interpret different acts and phenomena differently.

A major criticism of definitions like the one attempted by Schmidt and Jongman, is that they tend to be too close to governments’ definitions of terrorism, and therefore, blindly help to give legitimacy to governments’ attempts to label people and groups as terrorists. Accordingly, they tend not to critically evaluate the processes involved in how certain established groups are able to effectively label certain outsider groups as terrorists. Nor do many academics fully understand their positions as members of established groups in relation to the terrorism figurations of which they form a part. Their acceptance
of normative definitions of terrorism would suggest evidence of Gramsci’s idea of hegemony. That is, established groups or dominant groups have successfully projected their definitions of terrorism in ways that suggests that they represent the ‘true’ order of things. For the researchers who do not question this, this is a serious oversight. There are, of course, researchers who have criticised this body of thought. For example, Raphael, as part of criticism of ‘established’ mainstream terrorism research stated the following:

‘Overall, the core figures in terrorism studies have, wittingly or otherwise, produced a body of work plagued by substantive problems which together shatter the illusion of objectivity. Moreover, the research output can be seen to serve a very particular ideological function for US foreign policy. Across the past thirty years, it has largely served the interests of US state power, primarily through legitimising an extensive set of coercive interventions in the global South undertaken under the rubric of various ‘war(s) on terror’ (Raphael, 2009: 51)

There are also some mainstream terrorism theorists who appreciate the terrorism label is problematic. Political scientist Martha Crenshaw (2000: 406) adds an important point to the definition debate: she recognises that terrorism can be a pejorative label. This is often omitted from definitions, although it is widely considered to be the case among theorists that the terrorism label can be such. The fact that it is often left out of definitions is quite a serious oversight, nevertheless, and it can possibly even be a case of ignoring it because it does not fit with some theorists’ research agendas. It is, perhaps, in many ways, at the heart of the definitional issue in that, although it is widely assumed to be the case, much work on terrorism tends to discard the significance of it being a pejorative label in order to pursue what are attempts at precise, scientific definitions, which invariably turn out to be essentialist. Perhaps in a way not dissimilar to the argument in this thesis, Crenshaw (2000: 406) identifies that when terrorism occurs: ‘in practice, events cannot always be precisely categorized’. However, in defining terrorism, she also falls into the same essentialist trap as many others. For example, she (2000: 406) has claimed that ‘terrorism is meant to hurt not to destroy and that terrorism is pre-eminentely political and symbolic.’

The debate over what constitutes terrorism is so polarised that some have even said that it is now a pointless exercise to try to define it. Walter Laqueur (2000: 46), for example, says that disputes about the definition of terrorism do not contribute in any meaningful way to our understanding of the problem. That said, many researchers seem not to have heeded this advice. What, rather unwittingly, they seem to be doing, in a figurational sense, is describing recurrences of seemingly similar social relations that are parts of ongoing processes. It can be argued, therefore, that, at best, rather than simply uncovering the properties of terrorism, social scientists are simply describing what can be regarded as some of the regularities of social processes and relationships that have been designated as terrorism over time. These regularities feed into their definitions of terrorism and include terms like violence, political, fear, threat, strategy, symbolic, civilians, communication and so on. There is little research that tries to understand terrorism as a set of complex long-term, interdependent processes and this may be one of the reasons why terrorism researchers have found it so difficult to agree upon a definition. To highlight this further, one only needs to recognise the point already made that different examples of terrorism from around the world and from different times throughout history will not all be the same – they cannot be if we try to understand the conflicts described as terrorism in terms of complex configurations of social processes. However, the very notion of a definition of terrorism
suggests that each case there has ever been of terrorism is, for the most part, the same as all others, committed by the same sort or similar sorts of people – terrorists.

Despite the disagreements among social scientists about the definition of terrorism, in recent years there has been, as already mentioned, an increasing consensus that it is simply a tactic or method by whatever group it is applied to. This is highlighted by Tore Bjorgo (2005), who claims that terrorism is generally a tactic and method that involves the premeditated use of violence against civilians with the aim of inducing fear into a wider population (also see Wilkinson, 2006; Horgan, 2005). He says:

‘...there is actually a growing consensus among researchers as well as among governments about the core meaning of the concept of terrorism. Most agree that terrorism is a set of methods or strategies of combat rather than an identifiable ideology or movement, and that terrorism involves premeditated use of violence against (at least primarily) non-combatants in order to achieve a psychological effect of fear on others than the immediate targets. However, beyond this core meaning of terrorism, there is heated disagreement regarding the delimitation of the phenomenon of terrorism, and particularly when it comes down to which specific groups or violent campaigns should be included or excluded under the label 'terrorism'. Some definitions explicitly exclude state actors as possible terrorists, whereas others include states. Some definitions restrict the notion of terrorism to attacks on civilians only, whereas other definitions would include military and police targets under non-war conditions. Some limit terrorism to violent acts with a political purpose, whereas others also include terrorism for criminal purposes. Most definitions (implicitly or explicitly) consider terrorism as an illegitimate method, irrespective of its goals or purposes. However, a few (rather exceptional) definitions specifically claim that armed struggle for certain just purposes is legitimate, irrespective of means. The emerging consensus, however, is that terrorism is primarily an extremism of means, not one of ends.’ (Bjorgo, 2005: 1-2).

Bjorgo’s point still implies that terrorism is a static phenomenon, as it fails to take into account the fact that human figurations and therefore, terrorism are dynamic processes, which are constantly shifting. By defining terrorism in the way he does, Bjorgo fails to take into account how terrorism can be used as part of processes of stigmatising groups we disapprove of, which in turn form part of established-outsider figurations. In addition, the idea that terrorism is seen as an extremism of means suggests that it is a form of acting that most people would regard as extreme. However, it is quite fair to say that there are likely to be situations in which it is regarded as less extreme and even quite normal. For example, if terrorism is regarded as a tactic, war zones may experience a significant amount of terrorism as part of the norm. The recent war in Iraq and its aftermath would be a case in point. As such, the point made by Bjorgo, if made in a figurational sense, would perhaps suggest that the extremism of means that terrorism is said to involve is relative to what is considered to be civilised behaviour. Additionally, his point that there is a growing consensus among and between researchers and governments helps to highlight the point focused on here that many terrorism theorists blindly follow established groups approaches to terrorism, without realising they are playing a significant role in the development of terrorism figurations.

Another position in the definition debate and one that starts to recognise that the study of terrorism should involve the study of social processes comes from the psychologist John Horgan (2005). He states the following:

‘An uncomfortable reality is that we are currently nowhere near an agreed understanding of terrorism, let alone a proper formulation of questions that might emerge from any one perspective (in this case, a psychological one). As academics, we might sometimes be guilty of presupposing the existence of a certain level of thinking (at a political level) about terrorism, but part of the problem is that we cannot agree on its nature (that the perceived essence of terrorism may be
constantly changing is an important feature of this), and ironically our responses to it are often such that we only engage in and sustain the problems we are discussing.’ (Horgan, 2005: 46).

There are two glaring, related problems with what Horgan says here. The first is that he seems to suggest that terrorism has a nature, and related to this, he says, it has an essence. Obviously this would suggest that he believes that terrorism has observable properties but fails to take into account the development of terrorism as a process and as part of relations between groups.

However, despite his idea that terrorism has an essence, Horgan begins to move in the right direction when he claims that ‘the essence of terrorism may be constantly changing’. By this statement, he seems to recognise that terrorism is processual. However, Horgan (2005) is also drawn to the idea that terrorism should simply be understood as a tactic and argues elsewhere that the definition put forward by Schmid and Jongman is the best attempt at this to date.

Political scientists, Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur and Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler (2004), took up the reins from Schmid and Jongman by attempting to reach a consensus view of terrorism experts. They, like many others, claim that it can be used as a pejorative term. However, what their research uncovered was that views were for the most part similar to those expressed by Schmid and Jongman in their attempts to produce a consensual definition. There are two or three differences, with the main divergences being that Schmid and Jongman’s definition placed much more emphasis on the psychological aspects of terrorism than theirs. In addition, they point out that theirs and Schmid and Jongman’s research relied far too much on Western, and especially American academics. That said, they did come up with a new consensus definition, which is as follows: ‘Terrorism is a politically motivated tactic involving the threat or use of force or violence in which the pursuit of publicity plays a significant role.’ (Weinberg, Pedahzur and Hirsch-Hoefler, 2004: 782)

Weinberg, Pedahzur and Hirsch-Hoefler question whether their new consensus definition is adequate and point out that it is unlikely to satisfy a great many people, including other academics. They claim that such a definition and, therefore, the word terrorism itself is a semantic device through which governments divert attention away from their own crimes. They argue that academics who are against the word terrorism believe the following:

‘For those members of academia who wish to express their solidarity with the sufferings of the oppressed, ...it is clear that so-called terrorism is the logical and just resistance of the people against state terrorism, capitalism, racism, sexism and imperialism. ‘Terrorism’ in and of itself is simply a way of changing the subject by transforming victims into perpetrators.’ (Weinberg, Pedahzur and Hirsch-Hoefler, 2004: 786-787)

Weinberg, Pedahzur and Hirsch-Hoefler argue that those academics who hold such views have a point in that their new consensus definition, together with other definitions bears a remarkable resemblance to official government definitions. We can see here a partial admission that much mainstream terrorism research fails to be adequately detached from the interests of governments, and that such research is, in fact, part of wider terrorism figurations.

In part contrary to most mainstream terrorism theorists, the sociologist, Charles Tilly (2004: 5) argues that the terms terror, terrorism, and terrorist do not identify ‘causally coherent and distinct social
phenomena’ but are instead strategies that ‘recur across a wide variety of actors and political situations’. He argues that ‘social scientists who reify the terms confuse themselves and render a disservice to public discussion’. He goes on to say that ‘social scientists who attempt to explain sudden attacks on civilian targets should doubt the existence of a distinct, coherent class of actors (terrorists) who specialise in a single form of political action called terror’.

Oliverio (1998) has a not dissimilar position and argues that the concept of terrorism is a political construct and is used by governments, particularly the United States to scapegoat certain groups. She is highly critical of academics and the media, who she claims create definitions of terrorism that either wittingly or unwittingly serve the purposes of the state. Central to her argument is that a more adequate and fruitful way of approaching knowledge about terrorism would be to examine the broader questions of how it is ‘constructed’ rather than refining existing definitions when the need arises. She argues:

‘The task then becomes...to examine the political processes and practices that maintain, create, and change the definitions of certain actions as terrorist... Incidents defined as terrorism often provide the script of historical interpretations of national identity and political sovereignty. The intense public fear of and hostility to terrorism produced by infrequent but dramatic incidents involves a complex process including interest group politics, the state, and the practice of mass-mediated society: a process which has been explicated by Gramsci using the concept of hegemony... [H]istory as construed and produced by professional researchers or scholars has become only one of many possible discourses on the past, and it has a limited hold on popular memory. Despite scholars' best attempts and intentions, unarguably in contemporary societies, the media are at the heart of the production of history. Violence represented as terrorism provides the dramatic script.’ (Oliverio, 1998: 5-8).

For Oliverio then, what is crucial with respect to definitions of terrorism are power relations, in that by and large, governments and the media control what terrorism means and what constitutes terrorism. This is what Weinberg et al (2004) mean when they claim some academics tend to understand terrorism as a semantic device.

Oliverio’s point about terrorism and power relations is useful and is incorporated into this thesis. However, it is only partially useful and borders on epistemic relativism. For her, terrorism is only a pejorative label and a question of power relations and language. This thesis recognises that this forms a key part of terrorism figurations, but at the same time people who are designated as terrorists also act according to those designations, whatever they may be, and that terrorism does not simply exist solely within the enclaves of discourse. The effects on people of what is labelled terrorism are very real, and so, regarding it as existing purely in discourse, fails to fully take into account its consequences.

A view that follows a similar course to Oliverio’s is put forward by Jackson, Smyth and Gunning (2009). They point out that terrorism, like many other concepts in the social sciences, suffers from definitional issues but that this does not necessarily impede empirical analysis in and of itself. What they claim to be the ‘real’ problem is that the definitions of terrorism are applied in inconsistent ways and that the term is used as a ‘tool of delegitimisation by political actors.’ In practice what many terrorism researchers do, according to Jackson et al., is to identify the group they want to study first.
and then apply the term terrorism to them and their actions, rather than allowing the definition to
determine which groups are studied. They argue:

‘What are considered ‘terrorist groups’ is moreover typically influenced by the (dominant) political
climate of the day. This kind of pre-selection has meant that, at any given time, the field’s overall
output tends to be skewed towards examining particular groups. During the cold war, for example,
left-wing groups received the most attention, while after 2001; Islamist groups have become the
primary focus. Given that this pre-selection virtually always coincides with the official designation of
terrorist groups by leading Western states, this research practice taints the broader field with a
certain amount of political bias, associating it with Western counterterrorism policies, and
functioning ideologically to legitimise and promote Western state interests and priorities,
inadvertently or not.’ (Jackson, Smyth and Gunning, 2009: 217)

They go on to argue that a result of this bias is that many other processes and groups that fit the
definitional parameters go unstudied, especially state terrorism, and in particular state terrorism by
Western states.

This is an interesting position, as it helps to highlight that terrorism can be something that is relative to
how powerful groups define it. In addition, the idea that what are considered to be terrorist groups is
dependent on the political climate of the day is an important point and one that is highlighted
throughout this thesis. As such, this means that different designations of terrorism are dependent on
different political climates. It also, again shows why research on terrorism needs to be considered as
part of wider terrorism figurations, for the reason that research on terrorism can contribute to the
development of such figurations by producing fantasy-orientated knowledge of a low degree of reality
congruence, as part of double-binds which are often central to terrorism figurations.

Despite making the important points above, Jackson et al. (2009: 217) do still seem to be caught in
the static, essentialist trap, when they claim terrorism can fit the definitional parameters.
Nevertheless, theirs and Oliverio’s positions are useful in many ways and can be said to have
exposed certain fallacies with normative conceptions of what terrorism is. The problem with such
stances, though, is that they fail to address the processes that contribute to certain actual events,
relationships and group dynamics. For example, two planes really were flown into the World Trade
Centre in New York on September 11, 2001 and this has been called an act of terrorism. There were
certain processes that contributed to this event. There were also certain processes that have
contributed to the people who flew the planes into the World Trade Centre being called terrorists and
acting according to that particular designation of terrorism.

As already discussed, in order to overcome such problems this thesis tackles them processually and
relationally. Given this, an investigation of the sociogenesis of the concept of terrorism can reveal a
great deal. This shows how the normative use of the concept has developed over time and at the
same time uncovers some of the wider structural processes at play that contribute, at least in part, to
what is understood to be terrorism in a normative sense. Such an approach avoids essentialising
terrorism and at the same time steers a course clear of more relativistic understandings of the
phenomenon. It also helps to unveil the ways in which present-day definitions of terrorism came
about.
Before moving on to consider another major aspect of research on terrorism and one that is closely related to the definitional issue – types of terrorism – it will be useful to explore, briefly, how another sociologist who also incorporates the work of Elias has approached the definition issue.

Stephen Vertigans (2011: 1) in some respects echoes Horgan (2005) and Jackson et al. (2009) when he points out that definitions of terrorism are ‘hugely controversial’ and that they are:

‘...sensitive to location, periods of history, power, shifting perceptions of morality, international relations, military hardware and how these interact with the person, institution, government or international agency who is defining.’ (Vertigans, 2011: 1).

Like Oliverio, Vertigans argues that the terms terrorist and terrorism are social constructions that have been formed within long-term processes. However, in his book *The Sociology of Terrorism: People, Places and Processes* (2011), he points out that it is necessary to provide a definition in order to give readers parameters to his discussion. His definition is as follows:

‘The targeted and intentional use of violence for political purposes through actions that can range in intended impact from intimidation to loss of life...[T]hese definitions are flawed and are not designed to attain the unattainable within studies of terrorism, namely universal agreement and thereby eternal acclaim. My ambition is rather modest, merely to inform the reader that is what and who I think I am talking about. (Vertigans, 2011: 2)

The points that Vertigans makes highlight the difficulties and complexities involved in trying to define terrorism, and how to actually mark-out the parameters of research.

In order to try and overcome some of the problems associated with essentialist concepts of terrorism, and overly relativistic social constructivists approaches this thesis, as has been suggested, seeks to address the social processes by which terrorism has come into being (the sociogenesis of the concept), and the processes that contribute to people acting according to the various designations of terrorism and terrorist in relation to Britain. However, such an approach still leaves a hugely wide field of enquiry. If someone or anyone has been designated as a terrorist then they should be fair game for enquiry under this approach.

By engaging with the idea that terrorism is a social construct, or more accurately that the concept is socially generated (the sociogenesis of the concept of terrorism), as well as researching those who are designated as terrorists, we can begin to deal more adequately with these issues. However, choices still need to be made in terms of which groups, designated as terrorists should be investigated. What I seek in this thesis to do, is to focus on the most frequent examples of terrorist designation by the British establishment, as part of established-outsider figurations. This begins to control the problem of such a wide field of study.

Before discussing what social scientists have described as ‘causes’ of terrorism, I will first explore the issues raised in relation to the idea that there can be ‘types’ of terrorism.

**Types of terrorism**

There is a practice among some social scientists of distinguishing between what they see as different types of terrorism. This is only partially useful, however, as it distinguishes between some of the
specific kinds of structural regularities that have been identified when the term terrorism is used to
describe one or more of the parties in what is usually a conflict. However, many of these regularities
appear in conflicts that have aspects that are not designated as terrorism, for example in some wars,
riots and so on. Resistance movements during the Second World War are an example of this.
Nevertheless, as with trying to define terrorism, there is often little agreement between researchers as
to what constitute the different types of terrorism. For the purposes of this study, it would be useful to
examine some of the types and typologies that terrorism theorists have put forward. One that is often
mentioned is ‘state terrorism’. This, it is claimed, can be seen as specific kinds of violence perpetrated
by nation-states against their own or other populations. And the basis for calling something state
terrorism varies greatly from simply an act of what some would call war, to more clandestine types of
violence, such as assassinations. According to Lizardo and Bergesen (2004):

‘State terrorism includes everything from the Reign of Terror during the French Revolution; through
the Stalinist purges, trials, and camps; to the Allied bombing of Dresden to terrorize the German
population during World War II.’ (Lizardo and Bergesen, 2004: 38)

Noam Chomsky (2007: 44) is a vocal theorist in the discussion of state terrorism. He argues that, if
using United States and United Kingdom definitions of terrorism, then the United States would be one
of the world’s leading ‘terror’ organisations. Chomsky claims that acts of violence and aggression are
treated differently depending on which side one is on. In this respect, for him, like Crenshaw, terrorism
is a pejorative term but that actual violence and aggression is perpetrated by both small, non-state
groups and nation-states and can be called terrorism.

In contrast to state terrorism is terrorism undertaken by non-state entities, which terrorism theorists
have divided into a multitude of different types. It must be noted that there is not a clear break
between non-state and state terrorism, as it has been identified that some non-state terrorist groups
are backed by nation states. This is often referred to as ‘state-sponsored terrorism’.

Forensic psychologist Andrew Silke (1998: 54), refers to non-state terrorism as ‘insurgent terrorism’.
He says that it is a ‘strategy of the weak’ in order to undertake political change and is usually formed
by ‘small’, ‘covert’ groups. ‘Non-state’, ‘substatal’ or ‘insurgent terrorism’ is again categorised into a
multitude of different types. These include, among many others: ‘domestic terrorism’, ‘international
revolutionary terrorism’, ‘nationalist terrorism’, ‘anarchist terrorism’, ‘Islamist or Jihadist terrorism’ and
so on. A variety of subdivisions of these different types of terrorism have also been proclaimed by
researchers.

Attempts to develop types or typologies are problematic, however. By creating these ‘ideal types’,
researchers immediately move away from being able to obtain knowledge that has a greater level of
reality congruence. As already mentioned, ‘reality-congruence’ is a processual term that focuses on
degrees of approximation. So, for example, a type of terrorism may be more or less reality-congruent,
depending on how it is situated within wider social processes. It seems, however, that for many
terrorism researchers, such processes are not taken into account. For example, researchers that
claim that there are specific personalities that lead to someone becoming a terrorist fail to take into
account wider social processes and so it could be said that their work is of a low level of reality-congruence.

In addition, many researchers tend not to question the reality- or value-congruence of their assumptions. As such, in terms of types of terrorism, for the most part, they invariably have to try to fit what they think they are observing into an ‘ideal’ category, thus skewing what the relationships and processes in which the concept of terrorism is applied are. They fall into this trap because they are trying to apply methods that are more suited to philosophical interpretations of what the social sciences should adhere to; i.e. methods that are more suited to the physical sciences. What they seem to be doing by creating these typologies and definitions is breaking down what they see as different characteristics of terrorism into particular constituent parts in attempts to develop models that fit proscribed positivism-influenced scientific formulae. Many theorists fall into this trap, when they conceive the social world as static and at the same time understand individuals and groups as existing as separate entities and not as part of dynamic, interconnected relationships and processes. So, on the one-hand, they are seeking a detached ‘scientific’ approach by ‘shoe-horning’ methods from the physical sciences into social scientific research, but on the other, they fail to understand their positions as members of established groups researching outsider ‘terrorists’. This failure means that, in fact, they are lacking the detachment they seek.

Examining the problem of ‘ideal-types’ of terrorism, the distinction made between domestic and international terrorism, fails to recognise that human interdependencies are processual. It can be argued that terrorism occurs as part of inter-state processes or processes of global integration and disintegration, which means that at least some aspects of terrorism can be international. For example, the conflict between Irish nationalist terrorists and the United Kingdom has been labelled as domestic terrorism. However, it can be argued that a contributing process in its emergence was the integrating expansion of England which included conquering Ireland. Other examples may involve terrorist groups having contact with other groups from different countries, whether that is states or other terrorists, such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army’s buying of arms from Libya and America; it may involve using technologies to communicate across international boundaries with one another and so on. In this sense, therefore, the ideal types of international and domestic terrorism fail to take into account the complex social processes that are at play and, as such, most examples of terrorism could conceivably be understood as being domestic, international or both. Horgan (2005:31) makes a similar point and argues that terrorism can be ‘highly heterogeneous’ and ‘ever changing’.

Furthermore, the use of types is derived in many respects from the ideal-types formulated by Max Weber in *Economy and Society*. This is problematic, however; as Elias (1978: 177) suggested: Weber represented everything about societies as abstractions, and saw sociology as a generalising science. Social structures, regularities and types, for Weber could only be typical and never real – they were precise, orderly and scientific rather than being in reality disordered and unstructured. Terrorism theorists fall into the same trap. When creating different types of terrorism, what they are in fact doing is what Weber did – creating artificial categories in order to fit in with what they see as precise scientific conceptions, despite what they categorise as types of terrorism being ‘disordered’.
The search for types of terrorism is related to the search for definitions of the phenomenon. In both cases, theorists are looking for the ‘essence’ of terrorism or the constituent parts of terrorism. However, in both instances they invariably assume that terrorism is a static phenomenon and is not part of highly complex, interdependent social processes. A figurational approach deals much more adequately when examining the problem of terrorism, which, rather than being regarded as a thing in itself, and therefore, not considered as part of wider social process, should be understood as forming parts of complex established-outsider figurations that shift over time, which at the same time form part of inter- and intra-state processes. A figurational approach, as such, is likely to be much more congruent with reality than approaches that do not take into account broad and long-term social processes, and rather focus on, either consciously or unconsciously, trying to fit their accounts into a prescribed ‘scientific’ formula that is better suited to the physical sciences.

This is related to the problem that much terrorism research fails to address its role in terrorism figurations. It appears to be the case that findings from positivistic-orientated research on terrorism can suit the purposes and goals of established groups, and this is partly the case because such research seeks to use inappropriate methods for social research in the name of precision. Additionally, when considering terrorism as part of established-outsider figurations, academics almost invariably are members of established groups conducting research on outsider ‘terrorists’. Rarely is this acknowledged. However, as is often the case, particularly when it comes to mainstream terrorism theories, research, and therefore definitions of terrorism wittingly or unwittingly can blindly legitimate governments’ and other elite groups’ actions in relation to outsider terrorists. The latest ‘War on Terror’ is a case in point as are the actions of dictators in relation to rebellious populations in countries such as Libya and Syria.

The idea of understanding terrorism figurations more broadly, and which incorporate research on terrorism as part of those figurations is explored further in the following two chapters. The next chapter also further explores the problem of many terrorism researchers seeking to import practices from the physical sciences into the social sciences. It also examines the problems inherent in approaches that take into account power relations when researching terrorism but then fail to recognise that terrorism and other social phenomena can exist outside of the realm of language.
Chapter 2: Research on the ‘causes’ of terrorism

As discussed in the previous chapter, central to this thesis is the development of an understanding of the processes that contribute to people acting according to designations of terrorism assigned to them by established groups in Britain over the past two hundred years. The majority of the literature on terrorism that seeks to explore similar issues tends to discuss what theorists refer to as ‘causes’ of terrorism. It would be useful, therefore, to deal with some of the main areas that have been covered. As will be detailed shortly, many terrorism theorists claim particular ‘causes’ for terrorism such as poverty, affluence, political oppression, weak government, globalisation, insufficient globalisation, democracy, religion, technology, the media, mental illness and so on. Some of them bundle several ‘causes’ together and claim that combinations of these ‘causes’ ‘cause’ terrorism. However, from a figurational standpoint, the concept of ‘causation’ is problematic and this is outlined subsequently.

Broadly speaking, there are two main approaches towards understanding the so-called ‘causes’ of terrorism in the mass of literature. The first of these comes from mainstream approaches to terrorism, which often have positivistic leanings and focus on normative conceptions of terrorism. As already mentioned, these approaches also tend to develop essentialist definitions of terrorism, although there is recognition among mainstream terrorism theorists that the definition issue can be problematic. As we have seen, they have, however, been criticised for being too closely aligned to government conceptions of, and objectives in relation to, terrorism. Mainstream terrorism theories make up the great bulk of work on terrorism and range from ‘psychologistic’ theories to wider social structural explanations. Some approaches examine a combination of more micro and macro processes, although they do not often use the concept of process in their work. Additionally, rational choice theories tend to form large parts of the analyses across much of the work on terrorism. It is generally these theorists who fail to recognise that their research forms part of wider terrorism figurations and that it plays a role in the development and perpetuation of these figurations.

Broadly speaking, the other approaches, as has been discussed in relation to the definition issue, tend to be from social constructivist positions and what can be described as postmodernist standpoints, and for present purposes will include post-structuralism and other forms of constructivism. This way of understanding terrorism has a much more recent history than more mainstream attempts, and focuses on the social construction of terrorism discourses. They tend to place much more value on historical narratives; there is a greater emphasis on ‘state terrorism’; and because they regard terrorism as a social construct, they eschew any kind of essentialist, and therefore, positivistic definitions of terrorism. There are other approaches but these tend to be far fewer, and include critical realist, historical materialist and figurational approaches. These will also be discussed here. These approaches are also part of wider terrorism figurations but tend to be much more reflexive about their roles, as power relations are regarded by them as having a much more prominent position in social relations. First, however, let us examine some of the mainstream
approaches to the subject and how they attempt to explain what they regard as the ‘causes’ of terrorism. The first area is individual-based psychologicist theories, which tended to dominate the field 30 to 50 years ago (1960s-1980s).

**Individual psychology as a cause of terrorism**

These explanations focus on individual psychology as the main driver for someone becoming a terrorist. Such views gained traction in the 1960s and dominated theories of terrorism until well into the 1980s. Popular views that terrorists are psychopaths are still prevalent in much of today’s media, which, in part can be understood as a legacy of some of these individual psychological approaches, and a failure by these researchers to recognise that they were part of wider terrorism figurations. There are a number of different psychological perspectives that examine why individuals might become terrorists and the idea that there is such a thing as a ‘terrorist personality’. Horgan (2005) has discussed these, and points out that they include the following: terrorists as psychopaths, psychodynamic theories, narcissistic-aggression hypothesis and frustration-aggression hypothesis. Below is a brief exposition of these theories.

There are few theorists who still claim the popular conception that terrorists are simply psychopaths, ‘crazy’ or ‘irrational’. However, rather surprisingly, there were some (Kellen, 1982; Pearce, 1977) in the past who supported this idea. Horgan (2005: 49) is highly critical of these views, however, and argues that the label of psychopath is often used with the same pejorative notions that the label terrorist is. He also argues that because psychopaths suffer from extreme forms of egocentrism, it is unlikely they would be candidates for recruitment into terrorist organisations where certain levels of bonding and trust are required. Nevertheless, it is still probable that psychopaths have been members of terrorist organisations but they would tend to be the exception rather than the rule, for the very reasons set out by Horgan.

There are also those (Crenshaw, 1986; Kellen, 1998) who have taken a psychodynamic approach to explanations of terrorism. They claim that terrorists tend to have had unhappy and repressed childhoods and act out unconscious feelings they have in relation to their parents against society. Terrorists are said to see themselves as on the defensive, as victims and oppressed by wider society, which they believe is ‘evil, intrusive and aggressive’. Kellen (1998), for example, studied West German terrorist Hans-Joachim Klein, who, he says, acted out the unconscious feelings he had against his repressive father by way of terrorist violence against the state.

Another individual psychological theory put forward to explain why some people become terrorists and one that bears some resemblance to psychodynamic approaches is the narcissistic-aggression hypothesis (NAH). The claim in this instance is that people who become terrorists tend to be suffering from some kind of ‘narcissistic injury’, usually from their childhood. One of the main proponents of the NAH is Richard Pearlstein (1991: 7), who claims that 90 per cent of what he calls ‘political terrorists’ have suffered from some kind of narcissistic injury or narcissistic disappointment. This means that, at some stage in their lives, they have suffered ‘massive, profound and permanent damage’ to their ‘self
worth’ or ‘self esteem’. Pearlstein claims that people who have suffered such an injury try to redress the balance through defensive aggressive behaviour. However, for someone to also undertake terrorism, they must be a member of a radical group, lack other options and ultimately be recruited into a terrorist organisation. The idea that terrorists lack other options is closely linked to an idea that many other theorists propose, which is that the decision to undertake terrorism is based on a rational choice. This will be discussed in detail shortly. Nevertheless, with these ‘preconditions’ in place, those people who are suffering a narcissistic injury are more likely than those who are not to become terrorists. So for proponents of the NAH, the ‘causes’ of terrorism involve a number of preconditions and a form of neurotic mental illness. These preconditions can be regarded as a relatively unstructured social background against which a much more structured, mentally ill individual stands. Horgan (2005: 57) points out that one of the most pervasive individual psychological explanations of terrorism is the frustration-aggression hypothesis (FAH). He explains that this approach is used by a multitude of researchers to explain terrorism, and comes in various forms. These include Friedland (1985), Tittmar (1992), Gurr (1970), Kampf (1990), Hess (2003), and Juergensmeyer (2006). The FAH asserts that, when a person’s ability to attain their goals is blocked for some reason, they resort to violence to try to achieve these goals. This, as with the claim in the NAH that terrorists lack other options, again shows the influence of rational choice theory on this kind of research. Terrorism, as such, becomes the most rational form of action given the circumstances. Elaborating on one of the most well-known forms of FAH is the work, as mentioned, of Gurr (1970, 2006). He argues that relative deprivation is the biggest influence on why many groups commit terrorism. However, for him, it is the middle classes from developing countries, rather than the poorest people in the world that are more likely than any others to become terrorists. For him, these groups tend to have the greatest expectations but limited opportunities to fulfil them and therefore, turn to terrorism as a rational choice to help them change the circumstances which are preventing them from achieving their wishes.

Criticisms of individual psychology approaches to terrorism.

The psychologistic accounts of terrorism highlighted above, as mentioned, tend to have gained the greatest currency in the media and the British population more generally. This further highlights why it is important to recognise that research on terrorism must be understood as part of wider terrorism figurations, and that they play a part in what groups governments label as terrorists and how governments and populations respond to terrorism – it is probably easier to react violently to dehumanised psychopaths or cold calculated killers than it is to people who are not labelled as such.

As well as lacking an understanding of their research in relation to wider terrorism figurations many psychologistic approaches fail to take into account how wider social-processes and relationships can contribute to people becoming terrorists. Theorists like Kellen and Pearlstein place too much emphasis on psychopathology, without seriously acknowledging the part played by long-term social changes. Theirs are static approaches to the understanding of people, as they assume that all individuals across both time and space have exactly the same kinds of psychical make-up, which leads them to taking out their repressed feelings on the state.
However, there are differences with respect to the incorporation of the social among psychologistic accounts. For example, those accounts that tend to regard terrorists as psychopaths tend to almost totally ignore wider social processes. The NAH and FAH approaches, do have a greater acceptance of the role played by social processes, and the ‘forces’ that are seen as ‘external’ to an individual. Nevertheless, these ‘forces’ are still regarded as secondary to the individual pathology of individual terrorists.

Horgan (2005), although a psychologist himself, is highly critical of individual psychological accounts of terrorism and terrorists. In particular he is disparaging of claims that there can be such thing as a terrorist personality or that particular individual traits are more likely to lead to some people becoming terrorists. He cites what he claims to be the poor quality research of those who have claimed that terrorists suffer from personality ‘abnormalities’ and argues that theories about individual traits should not be seen as ‘all encompassing’ and able to explain all behaviour. Added to this, he says, is that many other processes outside of the possible personality traits of terrorists can contribute to a person becoming a terrorist; for example, political and social contexts. As such, he is much keener to examine the role that social processes have in relation to terrorism.

A key point to acknowledge in terms of individual psychological approaches to terrorism is that the professional standards and practices of many psychologists and psychiatrists limit how they can approach the phenomenon and the conclusions that they draw. Their training does not encourage them to look for explanations beyond the individual psychology of terrorists but instead teaches them to regard the ‘social’ as unstructured relative to highly structured, unconnected individuals. By not paying enough attention to wider structural social processes and relationships, individual psychological approaches to terrorism are incomplete. The models of human beings presented by those who undertake individual psychological and psychiatric approaches to terrorism fall foul of the issues that Elias (2009) discussed in his points about Homo Psycho-Analyticus and Homo Psychiatricus respectively, as highlighted earlier. As such, the way psychiatrists and psychologists understand humans, is a direct result of the ingrained professional standards of their practices. Elias (2009:164-165) has suggested that these disciplines seek to provide diagnoses of individuals' internal psychical processes, such as ‘compulsion syndromes, object cathexis, perversion, and character disorders’. These internal processes, he says, run in complete autonomy from the network of relationships that individuals have with each other. According to Elias:

‘The Homo Psychiatricus, then, is a human being stripped of most attributes that one might call ‘social’, such as attributes connected with the standing of his or her family, with educational attainments, occupational training and work, or national characteristics and identifications. The individual person is seen essentially as a closed system whose own internal processes have a high degree of independence in relation to what appear as ‘external’ or social factors. In general, the latter are evaluated as peripheral when a person is considered psychiatrically. They can be ‘taken off’, as it were, like a patient’s clothes in a doctor’s surgery.

‘The presentation of the psychiatrist’s concept of the human being would be incomplete if one did not add that the Homo Psychiatricus is in many respects a more sophisticated and refined version of the dominant concept of the human being of contemporary industrial societies as a Homo Clausus. In these societies, terms such as ‘group’ or ‘society’ are very widely used as if they refer to something that lies outside the person, that surrounds or ‘environs’ the single individual.’ (Elias, 2009: 164-165)
Many of the standard psychological approaches to terrorism seek to determine the pathology of individual terrorists, as I mentioned above, and as if something has gone wrong with terrorists’ internal mental faculties. For example, they are psychopaths or are suffering from some kind of narcissistic injury. On top of this, certain ‘social factors’ are working on these ‘damaged’ individuals. The idea of ‘social factors’ can be regarded as the equivalent of what many terrorism theorists call preconditions of terrorism, in that these preconditions tend to act on individuals in ways that encourage or cause them to commit acts of terrorism.

Of course, there are approaches that almost totally ignore processes at the level of individuals, and these tend to suffer as a result of similar misconceptions about the structural organisation of human beings. Accordingly, it would be useful here to examine some of the mainstream theories of terrorism that consider some of these wider structural aspects.

**Mainstream terrorism theories that focus on wider structural ‘causes’ of terrorism**

Theories that tend to be more concerned with wider structural processes focus to a greater extent on the reasons why certain groups undertake terrorism, rather than why individuals become terrorists. For present purposes, these can be described as ‘structural cause approaches’, as they claim that wider structural ‘factors’ take precedence as the ‘causes’ of terrorism over individual psychological ‘causes’. These wider structural ‘causes’ of terrorism include processes such as globalisation (or lack of), modernisation, technological advances, democracy, lack of democracy, repression, poverty, religion, inequality and many others. Again, many of these theories have entered into media and popular accounts of terrorism, which have an influence on the development of terrorism figurations more generally.

**Terrorism and globalisation**

There are a number of theorists who claim that globalisation is a ‘cause’ of terrorism. A brief examination of these approaches is appropriate here, as there are some similarities with the ideas expressed in this thesis in relation to inter-state processes and terrorism. However, globalisation is often regarded as being the spread of free market economics or American culture, rather than much longer-term processes during which integrative centripetal forces are in the ascendancy, as opposed to disintegrative centrifugal forces. Nonetheless, it is important to examine what has been talked about in relation to terrorism and globalisation, even if the terms are often poorly defined and understood in overly simplistic terms.

Two proponents of this view are Omar Lizardo and Albert Bergeson (2003, 2004), who take a world systems theory approach to the problem. They claim that such an analysis is able to uncover large-scale structural changes that can account for the emergence of terrorism. They classify terrorism into three main types: Type 1, which is ‘domestic terrorism’ and is perpetrated by actors of core countries against core governments; Type 2, which is perpetrated by actors from peripheral or semi-peripheral countries against governments of those countries; and Type 3 which is perpetrated by actors in
peripheral or semi-peripheral countries against core countries. Both Type 1 and Type 2 terrorism, according to Lizardo and Bergesen, can also develop into Type 3 or ‘international terrorism’. They adapt the work of historian David Rapoport (2004) who claims that terrorism comes in waves and add to this that there are a number common international conditions associated with the emergence of terrorism waves: ‘hegemonic decline; globalisation; empire/colonial competition and; terrorist origination in autocratic semiperipheral world-system zones.’ (2004: 47).

Lizardo (2006) builds on his work with Bergesen and puts forward a theory of terrorism based on what he describes as the ‘globalisation of world culture’. He argues that the spread of ‘individualistic’ and ‘voluntaristic’ modes of action across the globe may have helped to increase the amount of violence aimed against the current global system. In discussing what he calls ‘modern terrorism’ (according to him terrorism that began with the Russian anarchist movement), Lizardo argues that the integration of world culture actually helps disaffected groups to launch violent attacks against their perceived enemy – the dominant global power. At the same time, these groups have what they deem to be a better ideological framework for humanity and they see this as being threatened by more dominant forms of culture. Therefore, according to Lizardo, a structural ‘cause’ of terrorism is the globalisation of Western culture. This is because this culture is seen by groups that go on to undertake terrorism as being opposed to their world-view, and this facilitates terrorism by giving these groups a belief that individualistic action can affect change. Like a number of other theorists, he claims that modernisation provides means, such as technology, for groups to perpetrate terrorism.

Benjamin Barber (1992) is another proponent of globalisation as a ‘cause’ of terrorism and claims that it is ‘caused’ by an aggressive form of globalisation, which he refers to as ‘McWorld’. Terrorism for Barber is the result of a struggle against globalisation, together with struggles against the nation-state and a desire by certain groups to secure an inward-looking, fragmented, tribal way of life for themselves. The violence undertaken by these groups is also central for the development of identity for certain groups that feel their traditional ways of life are being subsumed by the forces of globalisation or ‘McWorld’. A similar view is held by Christopher Coker (2002), who argues that terrorist groups are simply protecting their traditional cultures and ways of life against an aggressive form of globalisation, which is embodied by organisations like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the global hegemonic power – America. Barry Cooper (2005) shares Coker’s and Barber’s view that terrorism is a result of groups trying to protect their ways of life against globalisation. He differs from Barber and Coker by claiming that rather than this being the result of aggressive globalisation, it is due to there being parts of the world that globalisation has failed to reach.

**Religion, globalisation and terrorism**

 Henner Hess (2003) also subscribes to the view that current forms of terrorism are a reaction to the negative forces of globalisation. However, he adds to his analysis the role of religion. He says that terrorism is a weapon of the weak, for which conventional opposition offers little chance of success. For Hess, fundamentalist religion plays an important role in contributing to the brutal and suicidal
nature of current forms of jihadist terrorism. This, he says, is because secular dilution is absent in the interpretation of the scriptures and they are, therefore, taken literally. The norms and tolerance associated with the Enlightenment that have been taken up by more mainstream versions of religion are absent and, says Hess, this means that fundamentalists are allowed and encouraged to dehumanise others or non-believers. Hess goes on to argue that the imagery of war is a crucial element for terrorists who claim to be fighting in the name of Islam and that, rather than seeing themselves as martyrs, they see themselves as warriors and draw on the language of the Koran, as well as the experience and situation of being at war. The idea that such terrorists regard themselves as warriors is widely held and confirmed later on in this thesis. Hess goes on to argue that war becomes a way of life for so-called jihadist terrorists. He also discusses those people who are born in the West but become terrorists affiliated to groups like Al-Qaeda, and says that they often stray into radicalism and terrorism due to feelings of frustration, inferiority and not feeling accepted. As a result, radicalism and terrorism offer a world that they can have of their own that gives them a sense of greatness and belonging.

Mark Juergensmeyer (2006) has also investigated the connection between terrorism and religion but expands beyond the link between terrorism and Islam to include other religions. He claims that the roots of terrorist conflicts are to do with social identity, marginalisation, alienation and social frustration. Nonetheless, he says, grievances related to these roots are articulated in religious terms and, accordingly, violence is then articulated in religious terms. In this context, Juergensmeyer argues that religion can provide a number of otherwise absent factors to a conflict. For example, says Juergensmeyer, it can personalise a conflict and provide spiritual rewards for violence. Furthermore, he says, it can provide an important network of infrastructure such as churches, mosques and so on. Also, and crucially, it can be used to legitimise violence by providing a notion of ‘cosmic war’ that gives terrorists an identity as soldiers fighting the forces of evil. This, of course, chimes with Hess’s point, as well as similar points made later in this thesis and elsewhere. However, the notion of cosmic war or ideologically based war need not be based on religion but also on other belief systems such as communism or far right ideology.

The idea of religious terrorism has been criticised by Gunning and Jackson (2011:370), who say that behaviour labelled as religious terrorism is so diverse and often indistinguishable from secular terrorism, so as to render the concept meaningless. They argue the following:

‘...[B]y privileging the religious dimension, the term may downplay the wider context within which movements and actors operate, thereby essentialising religion and the role of beliefs more generally. By distinguishing it from politics, it functions to otherwise political actors who draw their inspiration from religion, thereby demonising them and pathologising their involvement in politics.’ (Gunning and Jackson, 2011: 381)

The role assigned to religion by governments and the media in many current terrorism figurations, particularly those in relation to Jihadist terrorists, has been instrumental in determining reactions to terrorism and how such terrorism figurations have developed.

Other mainstream theorists
There are many more mainstream terrorism theorists who claim a variety of wider structural ‘causes’ of terrorism. For example, Leonard Weinberg (2006: 47) claims that terrorism is predominantly perpetrated against democracies (also see Wilkinson, 2006). He argues that countries that have had and retain contentious democracies tend to suffer more terrorism and that ‘direct, instigating conditions’ play a significant part in the emergence and longevity of terrorism. With reference to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict he draws on three instigating conditions that he claims form the core. The first is radicalisation, the second is the emergence of ‘small entrepreneurial bands’ that employ terrorism, and the third condition is the behaviour of the authorities. He argues that repression by the authorities in democracies has often sparked terrorism, and that even compromise later on by the authorities may not prevent terrorism from continuing in these instances. Similarly, Bjorgo (2005: 2-3) argues that there are various preconditions for terrorism, including processes of modernisation and globalisation and that in the context of these preconditions there are what he describes as ‘trigger causes’, such as police brutality or politicians provoking certain groups. Bjorgo attempts to address the problem of causation and argues that there are a multitude of ‘causes’ and levels of causation of terrorism due to there being several different types of the phenomenon.

Laqueur (2002: 134), argues that it is futile to make generalisations about what ‘causes’ terrorism, as a variety of contexts need to be taken into account, such as ‘political and social conditions’, the ‘historical and cultural context’ and the ‘purpose of the terror and its targets’. He adds that terrorist movements tend to be dissimilar from each other. However, like Weinberg and Bjorgo, he claims that terrorist groups use terrorism in order to achieve specific ends, such as seizing power, changing a policy, encouraging the international community to act or to lure their enemies into retribution.

**Criticisms of mainstream, wider structural explanations of terrorism.**

A key problem with a focus on what here has been described as the wider structural causes of terrorism is that they tend to regard individuals as relatively unstructured and in the background in relation to ‘society’. As such, the problem that we encountered with respect to individual psychological approaches is reversed. Accordingly, rather than individuals being seen as highly structured and in the foreground, he or she is regarded as relatively peripheral. We can see, therefore, that a great deal of the research on terrorism is infected by an unhelpful micro-macro divide between ‘the individual’ on the one hand and ‘society’ on the other. As we saw earlier, Elias (2009: 163-165) points out that the model of human beings that many psychologists and psychiatrists have is what he has called *Homo Psycho-Analyticus* and *Homo Psychiatricus*; that is, one of a highly structured individual set within an unstructured ‘social’ background. Likewise, as already discussed, for Elias, there is the model of human beings put forward by some sociologists and other social scientists that regards the individual as peripheral to a highly structured ‘social’. The term he uses in this connection is, as mentioned, *Homo Sociologicus*.

Like the proponents of *Homo Psychiatricus or Homo Psycho-Analyticus* models of human beings, those who purport a *Homo Sociologicus* version are also driven by their professional practices and training to regard their concepts and procedures as the most central. What is important to note
regarding the problem of *Homo Sociologicus* is that in many ways this conception suffers from the same problems that the *Homo Psychiatricus* and *Homo Psycho-Analyticus* models of human beings suffer. The problem is that all three conceptions are very closely related to a *Homo Clausus* conception of people. This is because the idea of relatively unstructured individuals forming parts of highly structured social patterns fails to break down the artificial barrier that has been erected between the individual and society, which directs thinking towards the idea that these are two distinct processes – they are not. This barrier is best exemplified by the idea of *Homo Clausus* and is dispelled using Elias’s demonstration of personal pronouns – I, you (singular), we, you (plural) – showing us that humans are at once both individuals and social, meaning that social and individual processes, if taken in isolation from each other, are unable to explain adequately social and individual processes. If we use personal pronouns, then the *Homo Clausus* model of human beings is what Elias called a ‘we-less / I’. That is, lone individuals without any relationships to other individuals, which simply do not and cannot exist.

In order to develop models that overcome the micro-macro divide, Elias (1991, 2009) suggested that we abandon altogether the idea that human beings are closed systems with an inside self and an outside or environment (the social) that impacts upon that self. He used personal pronouns to show how individuals and society are basically different sides of the same coin.

A core point to understand here is that personal pronouns are relational concepts – there is no ‘I’ without a ‘you’, nor ‘we’ without a ‘they’. Nor, for that matter is there an ‘I’ without a ‘we’ nor a ‘they’. These words that we use every day in virtually every context show us that we are all interdependent, and, as such, these interdependencies have to be taken into account when examining social and individual processes. Accordingly, when researching terrorism, it is important on the one hand to recognise that terrorists form groups that are specific configurations when observed by outsiders. However, to fully understand these configurations from the outside, it is crucial to acknowledge and, if possible, examine them from the perspectives of the people who constitute them.

Elias points out that our use of personal pronouns: ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘we’ and ‘they’ highlights that people considered in the singular and people considered in the plural as groups are the same people. However, he adds that the structures and regularities of people in the singular compared to people considered in the plural are of a different type but are, nonetheless, interdependent.

As such, work that focuses only on the ‘individual’ or only on the ‘social’ can only ever offer a very limited insight into social and individual realities.

Accordingly, for Elias, therefore, sociologists (and other social scientists who focus on wider structural aspects of human beings) often fail to take into account the kinds of affective relationships between people but tend instead to focus on broader relationships. The same can be said of those that propose that wider structures ‘cause’ or contribute to terrorism – there is a failure on the part of these researchers to appreciate that, without small-scale, individual-to-individual relationships, there would be no communication between people at all, and therefore, no wider structural relationships. As such, any approach to the study of terrorism that fails to take into account the related broader processes
and relationships, and the more small-scale, individual-to-individual relationships risks presenting only a very partial account of the problem.

As can be seen, there are a number of fundamental problems with approaching terrorism from either a purely individual psychological perspective or perspectives that only consider wider structural features of terrorism. There are, however, approaches that attempt to combine these two different aspects. However, for the most part they still fail fully to take into account the interdependence of individuals and societies.

**Approaches that combine structural and micro-level explanations**

As I am seeking in this thesis to examine British terrorism figurations on scales that bridge the false micro-macro divide by exploring broader processes such as established-outsider relations, inter- and intra-state competitive pressures and functional democratisation together with the interdependent processes of identification, habitus and we-I balances of a small group of terrorists — the 7/7 bombers — it would be useful first to explore some of the other work on terrorism that has also attempted to bridge the gap.

Such approaches to terrorism and those that acknowledge that the divide is problematic can be found across the social sciences but unsurprisingly draw heavily from social psychology. For example, psychologist Franco Ferracuti (1982: 139) criticises approaches that simply focus on individual psychology. He claims that many psychological accounts of terrorism are problematic as they move too far from ‘social’ explanations towards what he calls the ‘idioverse’, of the individual. He argues that theories of terrorism should be interdisciplinary and focus on the ‘idioverse of terrorists and the “universe” of terrorists’ social systems’. However, what Ferracuti fails to mention in this context is that individuals and society are interdependent – they are simply different sides of the same coin.

Another psychologist, Jerold Post (2006: 23), and in ways similar to Ferracuti’s point, argues that it is more fruitful to think in terms of ‘terrorisms’ and ‘terrorist psychologies’ and that these should be the focus of interdisciplinary study. He claims that ‘group, organisational, and social psychology – and not individual psychology’ are better ways to investigate the phenomena.

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4 Ferracuti advocates what he calls a subcultural approach to the study of terrorism. This, he says, allows researchers to examine both group and individual ‘factors’:

‘A subcultural approach would fall within an established form of reference for the analysis of violent behaviour, of which political violence would be a specific subcategory. The learning process, implied in the subcultural theory, would explain indoctrination and terrorist careers. At the same time individual differences in life experience would find proper placement in the process of entering the subculture. Moreover, the psychological dynamics would permit psychiatric handling in terms of value changes. (Ferracuti, 1982: 139).

5 Post argues that becoming a terrorist is a process:

‘The process of becoming a terrorist involves a cumulative, incrementally sustained, and focused commitment to the group. For the majority of contemporary terrorists – whether religious or secular – there is an early entrance onto the pathway into terrorism with many stations along the way. Also...there is a continuing reinforcement by manipulative leaders by consolidating the collective identity and by externalizing, justifying, and requiring violence against the enemy. (Post, 2006: 23)
Likewise, Ariel Merari (1999: 59) says that there are two ways in which the motivations of terrorists can be analysed; these are the ideology of a group and psychological drives that encourage either violence or non-violence by a group. Furthermore, he claims that motivations to undertake terrorism are extremely diverse and include religious, nationalist and social goals, and that terrorism is simply a reflection of conflicts and the level of their intensity.

Horgan (2005), in a way similar to Ferracuti, Post and Merari, argues that a starting point to any psychological analysis of terrorism or behaviour in general must be framed by the political and social contexts in which it happens. Horgan’s point of view on terrorism is that ‘involvement’ and ‘engagement’ in terrorism should be viewed as a process that examines initial involvement in terrorism, staying involved, committing terrorist acts and leaving terrorism. Central to this process, for him, is to ask the question of how does someone become involved in terrorism rather than why does someone become involved in terrorism? He claims that the process of involvement in terrorist organisations often involves a gradual socialisation, which can include a process by which an individual, through taking on certain roles, is able to increase his or her status within a terrorist organisation. He adds to this that there are a great many complex ‘factors’ that influence whether or not an individual either intentionally or unintentionally joins a terrorist organisation. As a person becomes more ‘crystallized’ within a terrorist organisation, says Horgan, they gain a greater sense of control and agency within that organisation and the idea and feeling that social and group processes are central to sustaining their involvement. He argues:

‘The role of social and group processes is very powerful, with implicit and explicit conformity, compliance and obedience operating as powerful sustaining engagement process factors. The nature of terrorist groups is such that dissent is not tolerated easily within the group, with group conditions frequently becoming stifling as a result, but for the individual terrorist increasing psychological investment, or the process of becoming a more committed member, is shaped most remarkably through engagement in terrorist activities.’ (Horgan, 2005: 138)

Horgan (2003) makes a succinct attack on the limitations of most approaches to the study of terrorism. On the one hand he describes psychologists’ attempts at explanations as ‘fuzzy’ or ‘vague’. On the other hand, he claims that approaches that focus on broader social processes are imprecise and indeterminate.

As can be observed, attempts to bridge the micro-macro divide would seem to overcome some of the problems that focus exclusively on individual psychology or wider structural ‘causes’. However, if we examine the language used by Horgan, we can come to see that it highlights an issue raised by Elias (2009: 165). Horgan (2005: 51) speaks of ‘factors’ that come to bear on individuals’ socialisation. Such a statement suggests that Horgan’s conception of the individual and society fails to break free from accusations of *Homo Clausus* thinking. What he has said suggests that he understands the relationship of individual and society as one in which external social ‘factors’ act upon individuals – society is understood as existing externally to individuals and as acting on individuals, rather than individuals and society being different aspects of the same interacting human interdependencies.

**Rational choice as a ‘cause’ of terrorism.**
Homo Clausus thinking among terrorism theorists is also evident among those who have claimed that rational choice theory is capable of explaining it. Horgan (2005) and Crenshaw (1981), for example, regard both individual motivation and group and ‘environmental factors’ as important aspects of any explanation. However, in trying to develop this they both, to varying degrees, embrace aspects of rational choice theory. For example, Horgan’s analysis of the processes of involvement in terrorism uses as a starting point Clarke and Cornish’s (1985) rational choice theory of criminal behaviour, which he says, has been successful in determining the processes involved in juvenile criminality. He (2008:82) claims that such a starting point helps to uncover what he calls ‘the factors that maintain involvement and sustain behaviour, which at a later stage contribute to the commission of terrorism’. Crenshaw (1981) also examines the ‘causes’ of terrorism from what she calls the ‘deliberate choice of a basically rational actor, the terrorist organization.’ (1981: 380) Bjorgo also claims that terrorism is a rational choice. He says:

‘It may be...useful to see terrorists as rational and intentional actors who develop deliberate strategies in order to achieve political objectives. They make their choices between different options, on the basis of the limitations and possibilities the situation offers. When applying such an actor orientated approach we would be interested in understanding dynamic processes rather than focusing on more or less static causes.’ (Bjorgo, 2005: 3).

Bjorgo’s point about examining dynamic processes rather than static causes is a welcome one. However, his approach becomes highly problematic when he suggests that terrorists should be understood as rational actors who make rational choices – an approach drawn from crude economistic approaches to social reality. Unfortunately, rational choice theory is highly pervasive in much more of the ‘mainstream’ research on terrorism. Let me expand on this.

For example, Dipak Gupta (2005: 18) also uses rational choice theory as the basis for his analysis of why people become terrorists and undertake terrorism. He argues that individuals do so for two ‘rational’ reasons; the first is to improve their own personal welfare but they can only do this through a second means and that is by trying to maximise the welfare of the social group they belong to. As such, terrorism can become a rational choice in trying to achieve that. In addition, what he calls ‘political entrepreneurs’ emerge through having made these rational choices and include people like Carlos Marighela (Carlos the Jackal), and Osama bin Laden, who are able to frame the identity of the groups they belong to for their followers, who in turn respond with violent actions.

Criticisms of RCT

Despite its popularity, rational choice theory (RCT) is problematic for a variety of reasons and not least because it follows a similar course to individual psychologistic accounts of terrorism. That is, it tends to push wider social processes into the background, bringing us back to a model of the highly structured self with the social in the background that at times causes the self to act. As Goudsblom argues:

‘One limitation of the ‘rational choice’ model is not only that it is focused too narrowly on just one dimension of action, but also that social and cultural conditions are too easily put aside as ‘parameters’, i.e. as ‘external’ circumstances of no particular relevance to the analysis. These conditions should be at the very core of sociological analysis, however, and one of the primary goals of research should be to find out how, in each specific instance, ‘habitus’ is embedded in social and cultural structures.'
'In the ‘rational choice’ model, habitus and habitus formation are overlooked. The field of vision is narrowed down to a quasi-objective ‘he’ perspective – a view of how an adult individual (probably male), always intent upon his own advantage, is supposed to cope with the situations he finds himself in. It is an image of a man deprived of history and social ties. At what age did this phantom begin to ‘choose rationally’, and who was it that taught him to do so? Neither question is even raised.

'The ‘rational choice’ view proceeds from the individual person, the ‘actor’, as \textit{homo rationalis} – timeless and tieless. This yields a casino image of society separate players, each of whom is under the illusion that he can calculate exactly what to do.

'Social structure is thus pushed into the background, and reduced to one dimension: the well considered exchange of interests. Nor is the time dimension taken into account.' (Goudsblom, 1996: 20-21).

As we can see, therefore, rational choice theory is just another manifestation, and in many respects one of the more simplistic manifestations of crude \textit{Homo Clausus} thinking and models of people. The idea that individuals and groups always act rationally is an issue that was taken up by Elias (1994) in his theory of established-outsider figurations. For him, the reason why the belief that people, both individually and as groups, normally act rationally, has arisen is because people find it emotionally pleasing to regard themselves and their groups in this way\textsuperscript{6}.

In fact, he argues that the very idea of individuals and groups normally acting rationally is itself a group fantasy based on a belief that one’s group is more civilised and thus more rational than others.

\textbf{Terrorism and processes of identification}

Before discussing some of the problems centred around the idea of ‘causes’ of terrorism, it is important to examine some of the social-psychological work that has been undertaken on terrorism and terrorist identities as this also seeks to bridge the macro-micro divide and is, as mentioned, a focus of the final section of this thesis. Perhaps one of the most obvious starting points is a symbolic interactionist approach. Arena and Arrigo (2006) tackle the issue from this perspective, approaching the problem from what they call a structural symbolic interactionist perspective. They merge this with an identity theory approach, with a focus on inter-group and intra-group conduct. They emphasise three forms of identity – personal, social and group/collective. Citing Henri Tajfel (1978), Arena and Arrigo point out that personal identity corresponds to:

\begin{quote}
'Interpersonal behaviour in that all individuals see a differentiation between themselves and others...Social identity as ‘that part of the individual’s self-concept which derives from [one’s] knowledge of his [or her] membership in a social group (or groups), together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership.’...The group/collective identity can be defined
\end{quote}

\footnote{Elias elaborates on this point, saying:

'At present group fantasies still slip through our conceptual net. They appear as protean historical phantoms that seem to come and go arbitrarily. At the present stage of knowledge one has got so far as to see that affective experiences and fantasies of a person at an earlier stage of life can influence profoundly the patterning of affects and conduct at later stages. But one has yet to work out a testable theoretical framework for the ordering of observations about group fantasies in connection with the development of groups. That may seem surprising, for the building up of collective praise- and blame-fantasies plays so obvious and vital a part in the conduct of affairs at all levels of balance-of-power relationships; and no less obviously they all have a diachronic, developmental character. On the global level, there is, for instance, the American dream and the Russian dream. There used to be the civilizing mission of the European countries and the dream of the Third Reich, successor to the First and Second Reichs. There is the counter-stigmatization of the former outsiders, for example, of African countries in search of their negritude and their own dream.' (Elias, 1994: xxxvi)
as a shared sense of characteristics, values, purposes, statuses, histories, and futures. Within Social Identity Theory, all three dimensions play a significant role in shaping one’s self-concept, self-worth, self-esteem, and self-definition.’ (Arena and Arrigo, 2006: 27-28)

Although this approach is to all intents and purposes ahistorical, and therefore, tends to fall foul of a ‘we-less I’ understanding of people, there are some useful and pertinent points made by Arena and Arrigo. As such, they (2006: 227) claim to have produced what they describe as an ‘interpretive and explanatory model that accounts for the emergence and maintenance of identity among various terrorist organisations’. At the centre of their thesis Arena and Arrigo (2006: 228) state that ‘culture, self, and society profoundly interrelate’, and their ‘conceptual framework attempts to understand behaviour as an interaction between the internal psychological factors and the external sociological forces of the human experience.’ (2006:229) This final point highlights some of the biggest flaws in their work, and it is immediately apparent that they split individual from society by separating ‘internal psychological factors’ and ‘external psychological forces’, which is a classic example of ‘we-less I’ or Homo Clausus thinking.

Empirically, Arena and Arrigo apply their conceptual framework to what they describe as five extremist organisations: the IRA, Hamas, the Peruvian Shining Path, the Tamil Tigers and racist skinheads in the US. In terms of symbols and their meanings, they found that each group had powerful symbols that exerted significant influence on the members of these terrorist organisations. They are able to generalise and point out that, for each group, at least one symbol represents some kind of wrongdoing towards the terrorist group by another group. They (2006: 231) point out that particular symbols ‘served to cast the members of a particular ethnic, racial, religious, or political segment of society into what was perceived as a threatened, though cherished, position or status’. Arena and Arrigo (2006:233) add that how terrorist groups define their situations is highly significant for their identities and that they tend to regard these as under siege by their enemies:

‘On the basis of a rigid belief system that defines the situation dichotomously, members regard their struggle for movement identity as a fight between good and evil, oppressor and oppressed, aggressor and victim. This steadfast view informs the terrorist organization’s contention that it knows what is best for its citizenry, and that achieving the desired outcome (e.g., economic liberation, nationalism, self-determination, racial purity) is worth sacrificing the lives of innocents.’ (2006: 234)

They point out that this belief system includes the use of terrorism to rebalance their feelings of victimhood. This idea of terrorist victimhood or victim identity seems to be a common belief among others who have considered identity problems in relation to terrorism. As will be outlined later in this thesis, it seems to be the case that violence is often used by ‘outsider’ groups if they have the power chances to do so, and this may also be tied to a sense of victimhood and feelings of being under siege by a group’s enemy.

Arena and Arrigo (2006: 234) argue that of the roles adopted by those in the terrorist groups they studied, two stand out – victim and martial roles. Terrorist groups, they say, take on victim roles and they regard themselves as persecuted. They add that the martial role draws upon this sense of victimhood and encourages a violent response to their victimisation.
The mythology and romanticism of something lost or stolen corresponds closely to ideas of former greatness (whether real or imagined) and helps to generate fantasy ideas about a group’s status in the world as its power chances relative to other groups have declined. They argue that the martial role is central to the status of members of terrorist organisations. They conclude that statuses such as ‘Republicanism’, ‘volunteer’, ‘Islamist’, ‘Senderista’, ‘freedom fighter’, ‘male’ and ‘racial holy warrior’ are all statuses in which high value is placed on qualities such as ‘justice’, ‘equality’, ‘self-determination’, ‘freedom’, ‘autonomy’, and ‘self-sacrifice’. In the cases they examined, Arena and Arrigo discovered that the role the family played in ‘socialisation’ processes also played a part in developing a sense of victimhood, that they were part of a struggle. In addition, schools and religious centres played a key role in developing a sense that pupils are in a struggle and in some cases martial roles are taught. Moreover, significant others, such as teachers, play a huge role in the development of terrorist identities. Generalised others, through media such as murals, posters and so on, play an equally important role in the socialisation of people into terrorist groups.

Arena and Arrigo go on to explain how society shapes terrorist selves. They point out that the function of different societies can ‘wed’ people to role identities that are key to being members of terrorist organisations. They point out that participation in certain activities that terrorist organisations take part in or groups that adhere to the terrorist group ideology can help to encourage the prominence of martial roles, which otherwise might not be at the forefront of a terrorist’s identity when dealing with most other social situations. Terrorist or extremist organisations, therefore, function to develop martial roles for individuals.

The idea that socialisation processes play a significant role in the development of terrorist identities is shared by other social psychologists, too. Bracher (2009: 99), for example, claims that socialisation can incline terrorists to develop identities that see violence and aggression as positive. Similarly to Arena and Arrigo, he argues that masculine roles such as hero and martyr often form major parts of terrorists’ identities, especially those who undertake suicide missions. He also agrees with their view that the victim identity is often prominent with terrorists:

‘One of the most significant beliefs is a corollary of the victim identity: the conviction that one’s own group is innocent and good and that its problems derive from the aggressive or oppressive actions of another group, which is guilty of egregious transgressions against it. This identity bearing ideology and its violent entailments can be found in the rhetoric of most terrorist groups...’ (Bracher, 2009: 100)

Bracher’s point corresponds to the figurational idea that, as part of established-outsider figurations praise and blame gossip is used, and that one’s own group is said to be virtuous but outsider groups are said to lack these qualities and are often regarded as uncivilised. Nevertheless, for Bracher (2009: 93), what he refers to as the ‘root causes’ of all intergroup violence are related to identity, and specifically what he calls ‘large-group identity’. This, in figurational terms, is similar to the idea of we-group identity. As such, citing Volkan (1997: 17) Bracher (2009: 93) claims that ‘people kill for the sake of protecting and maintaining their large group identities.’ However, Bracher (2009: 94) goes a step further by saying that, if what he calls’ people’s personal identities are fragile, then they tend to invest more in group identities and attempt to enhance their stature. Looking at this in a figurational sense, we could argue that what Bracher refers to when discussing people with a ‘fragile personal
identity are rather people whose balance is more towards the ‘we’ end of a ‘we-I’ balance, as opposed to suffering from some kind of individual weakness, as Bracher suggests. This, like Arena’s and Arrigo’s analysis edges towards a ‘we-less I’ vision of people, that their social position is somehow determined by personal failings alone. The so-called fragile personal identity is, therefore, not an individual pathology but rather more a consequence of the figurations in which people live.

Bracher, citing Burton (1997), also contends that often people who become terrorists do so because they are unable to fulfil a proper ‘collective’ identity, and, as such, become attracted to terrorist groups that are not regarded as the ‘out-group’. If this is the case, it may be that those who join jihadist terrorist groups in Britain, for example, do so because they are unable to fulfil a proper collective identity within their immediate communities, simply because they do not fully identify with the communities developed by their parents and grandparents. On the other hand, they may also have difficulty fulfilling a more Westernised collective identity because the barriers to meaningful western identities for them are especially high due to their relative outsider status.

The issue of so-called ‘collective identity’ is also a theme for psychologists Donald Taylor and Winnifred Louis (2005), who claim that issues of identity can help to create the conditions that enable terrorist recruitment. And although, like many other terrorism theorists, including Arena and Arrigo and Bracher, Taylor and Louis essentialise terrorism, they still recognise that power differentials play an important part in the process. As such, they claim that terrorists tend to come from groups with little power. They add that a number of other features are relevant, including relative deprivation, and rapid social, economic and political change. Nonetheless, despite this essentialising of terrorism, their analysis has some useful points with regards to identity issues associated with those people who are designated as terrorists and act according to those designations.

Taylor and Louis (2005: 173) focus on a theory of the self, which they claim can be applied universally. This theory brings together four themes of the self – ‘collective identity (shared attributes)’, ‘personal identity (unique attributes – “who am I”)’, ‘collective esteem’, and ‘personal (self)-esteem (evaluation of one’s self)’. They argue that collective identity takes precedence over the other aspects of the self, and personal identity takes precedence over personal esteem. They argue this as follows:

‘Collective identity is a description of the group to which individuals belong, which serves as the normative backdrop against which they can articulate their unique attributes. In summary, without a clearly defined collective identity, an individual cannot engage in the normal comparative processes that would allow for the development of a personal identity. In this sense, collective identity is primary. The collective identity of a terrorist organization describes the group’s beliefs, values, attitudes, and goals. Moreover, it specifies the routes an individual might take to internalize the values and achieve the goal. The individual terrorist now has a template against which to formulate his or her personal identity.’ (Taylor and Louis, 2005: 172-173).

Some of the points raised here are not dissimilar to those Elias (1991: 182) discusses in relation to habitus, in which he points out that social habitus is the soil from which individual habitus grows. Social habitus, in this case, corresponds in some ways to the idea of collective identity and individual habitus corresponds to the idea of individual identity. There is a similar point to be made with respect to we-I balances, and the idea that I-identities develop as part of we-identities.
Returning to Taylor and Louis (2005: 174-175), they argue that everyone has many collective identities but what they call cultural identity is by far the most powerful, as it covers every aspect of a person’s life. They also include religious identity as part of this, as religion in certain circumstances can perform the same function. Cultural identity, they claim, is extremely powerful and very difficult to dislodge or assimilate. However, they argue that in some cases some individuals or groups fail to ‘internalise a clear schema’ of their collective cultural identity. It is a disruption of collective identity that, they claim, contributes to people becoming terrorists. They argue the following:

‘...the sudden implementation of a fundamentalist religious collective identity as a reaction to a more secular collective identity would produce a chaotic collective identity for most. All of a sudden, established norms, values, and goals are replaced with new ones that are often totally at odds with the previous collective identity. The values, specification of goals, and the specific normative routes to their achievement are in disarray.’ (Taylor and Louis, 2009:176).

Taylor and Louis argue that young people tend to be the most affected by dramatic changes in cultural identity and that educated young people tend to emerge as leaders in this context. They suggest that young people of this kind tend to be prime candidates for terrorism. Taylor and Louis contend that Osama bin Laden, for example, was an educated person who had no ‘collective blueprint’ for obtaining his ambitions and is said to have crafted a collective identity in order to develop an individual identity. In this process he came to regard the West and in particular the US as being the cause of Muslims’ deprivation. Therefore, in order for him to develop his personal identity, he felt that he had to encourage Muslims to confront the US, and to do this by the only means realistically possible – terrorism.

Taylor and Louis go on to say that, across the world, there are Muslims who have empty collective identities, for example, those in refugee camps or those who have been severely affected by local or international conflicts, and other transient social positions. In these situations, argue Taylor and Louis, people often find it difficult to engage with the collective identities they were ‘socialised’ into. Young people, however, who are not as committed to that identity, are more likely to seek a new and more fulfilling collective identity.

Although most British-born and British-socialised jihadist terrorists have not been refugees, it can be argued that many may find it difficult to engage with the collective identities they were ‘socialised’ into. It can also be argued that at least some young British Muslims regard their parents’ collective identities as outmoded, and therefore, they seek new collective identities. They may regard their parents’ collective identities as not functioning well enough for their status aspirations, particularly if they may have been the subject of racism, economic disadvantage, and living in a country that they see as attacking Muslim countries like Afghanistan and Iraq. More on this issue will be explored towards the end of this thesis.

Taylor and Louis (2005: 180) go on to argue that terrorists’ personal identities tend to be built more closely around their collective group identities than is the case for other people. They point out that this is because the collective identities of terrorist groups in relation to the ‘out-group’ or enemy is constantly ‘salient’. Having a group that is an enemy and is in fact used to develop the identity of opposing groups is an important point. Elias (1991; 229) points out that we-feelings have developed in
conjunction to threats to one’s own group by other groups. As such, terrorists and their conflicts help to perpetuate the established-outsider figurations that they form a part of.

Another psychologist, Moghaddam (2006: 27), puts forward similar propositions and agrees that many Muslims do not have the collective resources needed to achieve an authentic identity and that the search for authentic identity is something that is prescribed by societies. He adds that this is in the context of an identity crisis being experienced by Muslim societies. He adds that the West as the ‘out-group’ (established group) for Muslims, has greater power and is therefore able to determine the identity of Muslims through the export of cultural items such as films, books, clothing and so on. Moghaddam (2006: 28) adds that many Muslim groups especially those who have emigrated to a new country, in the West, tend to put the distinctiveness of their identity ahead of that identity being positively received, and, as such, tend not to integrate into their host society. This is in order to ward off the threat to their identity from what is a real and perceived overwhelming Western cultural identity.

Moghaddam (2006: 30) goes on to point out that processes of globalisation play a significant role in problems of identity. He argues that processes of integration, particularly economic processes, are creating larger social units from smaller ones. However, he points out that, in terms of identity, people across the world are still closely wedded to their local identities and reject the amalgamation and possible disappearance of these identities. So, for example, people still refer to themselves as German, English, French and so on, despite greater integration on the European level. He points out that few people, if any are bonded to a European identity. This problem is what Elias referred to as the ‘drag effect’. He argued:

‘The resistance to the merging of one’s own survival unit with a larger unit – or its disappearance into that unit – is undoubtedly due in large part to a particular feeling. It is the feeling that the fading or disappearance of a tribe or state as an autonomous entity would render meaningless everything which past generations had achieved and suffered in the framework and in the name of this survival unit.’ (Elias, 1991: 222-223).

Moghaddam argues that the Muslim identity cannot be regarded as a global identity, as it only refers to a narrow grouping of people and is not, therefore, truly global. This is born by the fact that many Muslim groups see other Muslim groups as outsiders. He goes as far as to say that humans may have an evolutionary trait to identify at the local level, as this would have facilitated greater cooperation when most of humanity lived in hunter-gatherer tribes. He argues:

‘...the push towards globalization, associated as it is with integration into larger and larger units, might make sense economically, but it runs against the human tendency to want to identify with local groups, places and events. The transition from smaller to larger identity units took centuries to evolve in Western societies, but is being pushed through quickly in the third world, creating enormous tensions and conflicts. Moreover, the larger identity units available in third world societies, such as those based in Islam, are themselves under pressure to change to fit modern, global standards. The result at the level of individual experience is further tensions and paradoxes. It is in this larger context of global tensions and paradoxes that we must view the evolution of terrorism.’ (Moghaddam, 2006: 30)

Moghaddam (2006: 37) claims that an Islamic identity crisis plays a significant role in the development of jihadist terrorism. This identity crisis has three core features. The first is that young Muslims are caught in a variety of changes that include revolution, war, migration and other huge upheavals. Secondly, young Muslims are seeking models for a better future; and thirdly, the importation of
Western and American culture and ideals into the Islamic world has attracted many young Muslims to these ideals, especially what Moghaddam calls "the good copy problem", whereby attainment of the ultimate ideal – 'Hollywood man or woman' is desirable. However, this means that Muslims and others can never be the 'real' and 'authentic' Western ideal but just copies. This, says Moghaddam, means that Western ideals are not seen as credible, thus leaving an identity void which is filled by Islamic fundamentalism. Islamic fundamentalists have also filled the void left by leaders in Muslim countries who, according to Moghaddam (2006: 42) have failed to provide authentic identities for their populations that are able to be defined as authentic against imported inauthentic Western identities.

Issues around terrorism and processes of identification will be explored in greater detail later on in this study and many of the points above will be incorporated into an examination of the 7/7 bombers. Although the issues surrounding terrorists' identities do not involve direct claims that processes of identification cause terrorism, there is, in some cases, an unquestioned adoption of some of the practices of mainstream terrorism theorists, such as, as pointed out earlier, the accepting of essentialist definitions of terrorism. This is related to more general problems associated with mainstream theories of terrorism, which will now be discussed.

**Terrorism and causation**

One of the reasons why mainstream terrorism theorists have found it so difficult to agree upon what they describe as 'causes' of terrorism is because of the ways in which they approach the subject, and more generally in their approaches to the generation of knowledge overall. Although approaches to the study of terrorism vary in terms of their 'epistemological' and 'ontological' roots, there is a strong positivist influence in the majority of this work, particularly in mainstream theories.

The influence that positivism has on research into terrorism is exemplified by the essentialist definitions of terrorism, and the idea that it is 'factors' and 'variables' that 'cause' it. This is a residual effect of the power relations involved with respect to what is considered to be scientific knowledge and what is not. The aim of social scientific research that has a positivistic bent is to replicate the rigour, reliability and validity of methods used in the physical sciences. Such an approach, however, when applied to terrorism does not work, as terrorism, in accordance with other social processes and relationships, does not have thing-like properties. One cannot say that terrorism only consists of certain elements such as violence and communication, and involves coercion and only targets civilians. Nor can we realistically say that either A, B or C 'causes' terrorism. This is because it is not a physical thing but part of a dynamic and relational process. Terrorism, like other relational concepts, operates on a different level of integration compared to those things studied in the physical and natural sciences. This means that social processes cannot be adequately explained by processes on a lower level of integration, such as at the physical-chemical plane. However, as mentioned, social scientists who are heavily influenced by positivism tend to regard the rigour, reliability and validity of the natural sciences as something that ought to be emulated. Moreover, the idea that the social sciences should try to ape the physical sciences is a result of the grip that philosophy has on what constitutes permissible knowledge in the sciences and social sciences. Elias (1987) examined this
problem in detail and explained that the philosophy of knowledge has tended to hold up the model of the physical sciences as the scientific ideal. He argued that this method and way of theorising is not suitable for the social sciences, which tend to have a higher degree of involvement and, accordingly, tend to generate knowledge that is less reality congruent. As such, for Elias, the social funds of knowledge at different stages of development have different structural characteristics. He suggested:

‘As a rule philosophers have done little more than to present the knowledge of the natural sciences, and especially of the physical sciences, as a model and an ideal. Their approach to a theory of knowledge has not helped to clarify the obvious differences between the provision and the advance of knowledge at different levels of integration. Neither have they devoted much attention to the problem, highly relevant to social scientists, of the influences which differences in the object of research – must have on the provision of more reality-congruent knowledge about them. A hardened philosophical tradition has obscured an obvious fact: that the scientific study of human beings, as individuals and as groups, may make different deans on those who undertake such studies from those made on scientists studying lifeless pieces of matter, such as atoms or molecules, or simpler organisms, such as amoebae or fieldmice. All that the representatives of the philosophy of knowledge have usually done is to present the scientific explanation of lifeless matter as the model for the provision of fact-orientated knowledge and to say categorically, ‘This is the model of a scientific enterprise, take it or leave it.’ If you have difficulty in adopting for the exploration of human societies the models provided by those whose task is the exploration of lifeless pieces of matter, so much the worse for you.’ (Elias, 1987: p xviii-xix).

If we recognise that a large swathe of research undertaken on terrorism falls into this trap of seeking to emulate the physical sciences in its approach, we can see how problematic the results might be, as well as beginning to develop an understanding of why much of the research fails to develop adequate explanations of terrorism. The core problem in this regard, therefore, is that a significant proportion of terrorism researchers are getting stuck in a quagmire of supposed scientific rigour suitable for the physical sciences when in fact what they should recognise is that what they are studying are processes and relationships on more complex levels of integration than such methods are designed to explore. However, the grip that philosophical notions have over what is permissible scientific knowledge is so strong that this, and the professional practices of those involved in its production are so ingrained, that they are unable to break free from their constraints. They end up like the idiom of a dog chasing its tail suggests, and are only able to contribute knowledge that has only a limited degree of reality-congruence.

The problem with claiming there are causes of terrorism.

A result of this is that most mainstream accounts of terrorism tend to follow, to varying degrees, cause-and-effect models. For example, there are those that claim psychological abnormality as a ‘cause’, those that claim wider structures, such as modernisation, globalisation, frustration, oppression and religion as ‘causes’, and those that claim the rational choices of terrorists’ as ‘causes’. However, as has been suggested earlier, the concept of causation is highly problematic, especially if applied to human relationships and processes. This focus on causes of terrorism has in many ways led researchers down blind alleys and in some cases have helped to perpetuate the established-outsider figurations of which terrorism forms a part. That is, by focusing on ‘external causes’ they fail to recognise the relational and processual aspects of terrorism figurations. They do not seem aware that their research is established group research about outsiders and often tends to blindly follow what appear to be the interests of those established groups. They become parts of these wider terrorism figurations, although they may not be aware of this and the role that they have
within these relations. If we examine the idea of causes of terrorism with this in mind we can see that such approaches fail to explore the totality of terrorism figurations and that the idea of causes of terrorism only highlight a small part of these figurations, at best. It is the case, therefore, that by adopting positivistic approaches to terrorism many researchers inadvertently fail to achieve the levels of detachment they are seeking. Their approaches become dogmatic, one-sided and involve labelling outsider groups, which, at the same time can be used by governments to further their own short-term aims, such as wars on terror, curtailment of civil liberties and repression.

To explore these problems further, it will be useful to examine what Elias (2009: 172) claimed were the difficulties with causal explanations. He described them as the ‘billiard ball’ concept of social causation. According to him, this way of explaining phenomena has grown out of two related explanations; the first being a ‘personal’ Creator as a cause and the second as being an ‘impersonal’ cause as in the physical sciences. He adds that even when complex chains of interdependency are the phenomena being studied, as is the case with sociological research on terrorism, explanations tend to be understood as ‘bundles’ of ‘factors’ or ‘variables’, that together, are seen to be ‘the cause’. With this in mind, Elias (1978: 71) developed what he called game models, which help, in simplified form, to show how interdependent structures develop from processes and relationships. In one such model, he asks us to imagine a game situation of two players of equal strength and to explain the twelfth move in that game. He points out that we may claim that the twelfth move is caused by the player’s intelligence or tiredness but that such explanations are ‘insufficient’. He argues that the twelfth move in a game, for example, cannot be explained in terms of ‘short unilinear causal sequences’ or by the character of the players. Rather, the move can only be interpreted with respect to all the other ‘intertwining’ preceding moves in the game and, therefore, of the figuration which this intertwining has produced. He suggests:

‘Only the progressive interweaving of moves during the game process, and its result -- can be of service in explaining the twelfth move. The player uses this figuration to orientate himself before making his move. Yet this process of interweaving and the current state or figuration of the game, by which the individual player orientates himself, exhibit an order of their own. That order is a phenomenon with structures, connections and regularities of distinctive kinds, none of which exists above and beyond individuals, but is rather the result of a continual combination and interweaving of individuals. All we say about ‘societies’ or ‘social facts’ refers to this order which, as we have said, includes specific types of ‘disorder’…as well as constantly recurring types of disintegrative or unravelling processes.’ (Elias, 1978: 97-98).

If this is applied to mainstream, positivistic-leaning research on terrorism, we can see that the similarities between claiming the ‘causes’ of terrorism to be things like psychological abnormality or rational choice is similar to claiming that the twelfth move in Elias’s game model should be attributed to the character of the player making it, or the previous move in the game, rather than taking into account all of the other related interdependencies that contribute to people who are designated as terrorists and involve acts designated as terrorism.

To further highlight the frailties of cause-effect approaches, Elias (1978: 161-162) invites us to look at how figurations flow into each other over time. He argues that, if one looks into the past from the present, it is possible to say that an earlier figuration is a precondition for the emergence of a later figuration and why this is the case. However, when looking into the future, it is only possible to say that a later figuration is only one possible ‘transformation’ of an earlier one. Therefore, it would be
wrong to use the concepts of cause and effect in this regard, as looking into the future there may be many possible ‘transformations’ from a present figuration. Elias suggested that:

‘…[I]t cannot be expected that the type of explanation needed for research in developmental sociology will be just like explanations which conform to the pattern of traditional models of causality. Instead, changes in figurations are to be explained by other prior changes, and movement by movement, not by a ‘first cause’ which, so to speak, set everything in motion, and which itself is unmoved.’ (Elias, 1978: 162)

Accordingly, if one tries to explain social events like terrorism in cause and effect terms, one would need to ask what caused the cause(s), and then what caused that/those cause(s) and so on. Such an analysis would have to go on indefinitely until we reached the ‘big bang’ as a starting point. This highlights the deficiencies of such an approach when trying to understand terrorism or any other aspect of human interdependence by using the concept of causation.

In order to get away from these problems, this thesis examines terrorism figurations in Britain developmentally. That is, a number of past figurations are focused on, which were preconditions for the emergence of earlier and present figurations. For example, it is shown how past terrorism figurations, such as those related to the French Revolution, are important to later terrorism figurations, such as those related to the break-up of the British empire, which in turn are related to present-day, home-grown jihadist terrorism figurations. Equally, as has been explored throughout these earlier chapters, is the role in terrorism figurations played by those who research the phenomenon. When this role is unquestioned, ignored or not understood, there is a tendency to follow normative explanations of terrorism, which, as already discussed, are often used by governments and established groups to justify labelling outsider groups as terrorists and actions against these groups, such as in Libya and Syria, and with respect to various wars on terror that have happened throughout history. These arguments will be developed further in the next chapter on the sociogenesis of terrorism as a social scientific concept. However, first I will explore some of the approaches to terrorism research that seek to avoid some of the issues confronted by positivistic research on terrorism.

‘Postmodern’ approaches to terrorism.

There are approaches to research on terrorism that attempt to side-step the cause-effect problem, and tackle definitional issues from a different angle from those that are more or less positivistic in their understanding of the subject. Generally speaking, these approaches tend to come under the umbrella of social constructivism and postmodernism/post-structuralism. They tend to focus on how discourse and language construct what are regarded as ‘truths’ and in this case ‘truths’ associated with terrorism, rather than regarding terrorism as something with thing-like properties.

According to Richard Jackson, these approaches include the following characteristics:

‘...[A]n understanding of language as constitutive or productive of meaning; an understanding of discourse as structures of signification which construct social and political realities, particularly in terms of defining subjects and establishing their relational positions within a system of signification; an understanding of discourse as being productive of subjects authorised to speak and act, legitimate forms of knowledge and political practices and, importantly, common sense within
particular social groups and historical settings; an understanding of discourse as necessarily exclusionary and silencing of other modes of representation; and an understanding of discourse as historically and culturally contingent, inter-textual, open-ended, requiring continuous articulation and re-articulation and, therefore, open to destabilisation and counter-hegemonic struggle.’ (Jackson, 2009: 68)

In other words, social constructivist and postmodernist approaches give primacy to language and discourse, and in fact claim that social reality is itself constructed through language and discourse. As part of this, they point out that the way that power is distributed means that there are legitimate and illegitimate discourses with the former seeking to silence the latter.

A great deal of this work has appeared in the journal, Critical Studies On Terrorism, the aim of which, according to its editors (Jackson et al.,2008), is ‘a more critical approach to the study of terrorism’, and one that welcomes the research and viewpoints of those who reject the ‘ontological, epistemological and ideological commitments of existing terrorism studies’ (2008: 3).

Research undertaken by Herring and Stokes (2011), breaks down the article contributions to Critical Terrorism Studies by methodological type and is as follows: post-structuralist – 3% (two articles); thick social constructivist – 36% (21 articles); thin social constructivist – 21% (12 articles) positivist – 31% (18 articles) and; historical materialism – 9% (five articles). The research clearly shows a leaning towards social constructivism and its close relative post-structuralism (both of which can be said to fall under the umbrella of postmodernism); one would also expect a significant contribution from positivism, due to its pre-eminence in terrorism research more generally.

**Critical Terrorism Studies**

Jackson, Breen-Smyth and Gunning (Jackson et al) (2009) have sought to develop a new research agenda on terrorism and, as already mentioned, argue that ‘mainstream’ approaches to research on the subject tend to distort the issues and, therefore, the ‘causes’ of terrorism by focusing for the most part on non-state groups that have already been labelled as terrorists by elite groups, such as Western governments and their allies. As such, they regard much of the ‘mainstream’ work on terrorism to be a validation of the hegemonic control that elite groups seek to maintain and expand. Jackson et al (2009) argue that terrorism is a ‘social fact’ rather than a ‘brute fact’. By this they mean that it is socially constructed:

‘...[I]ts nature is not inherent to the violent fact itself, but is dependent upon context, circumstance, intention, and crucially, social, cultural, legal, and political processes of interpretation, categorisation, and labelling (Schmid and Jongman, 1988: 101). Similarly and importantly, the same ontological approach applies to the ‘terrorist’ label. Such a designation can never be an ontological statement about the nature or status of a particular individual: ‘terrorist’ is not an identity like ‘Amish’ or ‘Canadian’, nor is one ‘once a terrorist, always a terrorist’ (Schmid, 2004: 205; Toross, 2008b; Toros and Gunning this volume). We argue that there is little intellectual value to be gained by reducing or essentialising a person or group to what is usually a subset of their overall behaviour, and which, in some cases, does not even accurately describe their behaviour, even by its own definition.’ (Jackson et al, 2009: 222).

This view clearly exposes the frailties with mainstream terrorism theories by pointing out that essentialist definitions are not really statements of fact, as their exponents claim they are but are rather, dependent on social and cultural contexts, and, at the same time, involve categorising and
labelling certain individuals and groups within those contexts. Jackson et al claim a better approach for research on terrorism, suggesting:

‘...[T]here are observable ‘regularities’ in human activity (what positivists call laws), and that one can distinguish between different acts on the basis of their characteristics, even while recognising that these characteristics, and how we interpret them, are a product of their social context and thus, are not ‘objective facts’ (in the positivist sense).

‘The advantage of such an ontology is that it permits both the study of the discourses which produce ‘terrorism’ as a discursive subject, as well as the material interests which generate and sustain these discourses, and the actual political violence in the ‘real’ world which has ‘terroristic’ characteristics.’ (Jackson et al, 2009: 223).

This approach clearly regards terrorism as existing in discourse and that this discourse can be studied. At the same time, they see acts of what is called terrorism as having particular regularities that can be researched and understood. This is, of course, similar to the position taken up in this thesis. However, the idea of ‘terroristic characteristics’ is problematic as it borders on essentialising terrorism.

Another position similar to that of Jackson et al. is Annamarie Oliverio’s (1997) whose work on terrorism shares a great number of the same positions as Jackson et al, but draws primarily on Foucault and Gramsci (see also Lauderdale, 2005). She sees terrorism as being the product of ‘a historically produced political discourse rather than as an essential human expression’ (1997: 50) and argues that the dominant conceptual understanding of terrorism emerged in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, which was a time when the concepts of ‘man’, ‘nation-state’ and ‘political sovereignty’ were common currency in philosophical and political thought. With reference to Foucault, Oliverio states:

‘Terrorism...can be viewed as a historically produced phenomenon, the product of a particular political discourse rather than the expression of certain underlying and fixed human capacities. As a particular political discourse, terrorism emphasizes and privileges language and polemical interpretations over direct experience (Foucault, 1972, 1979)’ (Oliverio, 1997: 50).

Here again we can see a propensity among social constructivists and post-structuralists to regard terrorism as existing only as part of discourse and language. This, of course, has its uses, as it shows that terrorism is a label, the effectiveness of which is dependent on the power ratios between the labelled and the labeller.

Oliverio goes on to cite Edmund Burke’s opposition to the French Revolution and claims that he called its supporters (including Rousseau and Voltaire) ‘terrorists’, ‘assassins’ and ‘robbers’ but, in doing so, he failed to realise that the actions of the those that he called terrorists were what she says were a consequence of their injustice and suffering. She adds that Burke thought that the French revolutionaries and their supporters were attacking ‘reasoned’ aristocratic man. Another way of putting this, perhaps, is that for Burke and his allies, the French revolutionaries saw themselves as attacking

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7 For Jackson et al, what they call ‘Critical Terrorism Studies’ is what they claim to be an ‘over-arching framework’ for critiquing existing research on terrorism, especially mainstream terrorism research. Central to their agenda is to avoid and critique explanations for terrorism that rely on models of linear cause and effect. As such they seek to examine the following:

‘...[T]he discourses and representational practices of terrorism, and the ontological-discursive foundations – the ideological, conceptual, and institutional underpinnings – which make both terrorism studies, and the practices of terrorism and counterterrorism, possible in the first place.’ (Jackson et al., 2009: 228).
Accordingly, Oliverio claims that little has changed with respect to how people conceptualise terrorism, and that it is understood either as ‘warfare from below’, where groups spread fear, or in relation to failing states and their actions. At the same time, Oliverio claims that most research on terrorism ‘provides sweeping individual orientated conclusions, generalisations, and reductionist historical chronologies’. She argues:

‘The concept of terrorism is inextricably associated with the formation and expansion of modern nation-states, including control of territory, moral boundaries, human resources, and the construction of political identities (Oliverio, 1997). This symbiotic relationship between the state and terrorism provides two essential features: First, the state reinforces the use of violence as a viable, effective mitigating force for managing conflict; second, such a view is reinforced by culturally constructed and socially organized processes, expressed through symbolic forms, and related in complex ways to present social interests. Within increasing economic and environmental globalization, gender politics, and the resurgence of nationalities within territorial boundaries, the discourse of terrorism, as a practice of statecraft, is crucial to the construction of political boundaries. As such, terrorism is invoked in the art of statecraft when multiple, often conflicting versions of the past are produced and, at particular historical moments, become sites of intense struggle.’ (Oliverio, 1997: 52).

For Oliverio, therefore, terrorism is used as part of a discourse to mark out what the rulers of nation-states see as legitimate and what they see as illegitimate. In addition, the discourse of terrorism allows for nation-states to undertake their own ‘legitimate’ violence. Oliverio goes on to point out that terrorism is generally defined as some kind of political violence with the aims of undermining the legitimacy of the state. However, there are similar examples of political violence that are not referred to as terrorism. This, she says, is a result of a change in ‘cultural narratives’ which have been manipulated by states throughout history.

Oliverio’s approach throws up some useful insights as to how one might approach research on terrorism, in that she explains how normative conceptions of terrorism have developed and how nation-states use the concept of terrorism to define what is legitimate and illegitimate, and in addition shows that mainstream terrorism research tends to blindly become a part of wider terrorism figurations. More will be discussed on these points shortly. For present purposes, in order to get a fuller understanding of the work undertaken on terrorism, it will be of use to deal briefly with another postmodern perspective on the issue and what Jean Baudrillard has had to say about the problem.

Baudrillard (2001) applied his theory of ‘hyperreality’ to the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon in America on 11th September 2001. Writing in Le Monde in November 2001 and focusing directly on the attacks on the World Trade Centre he wrote:

‘The collapse of the towers of the World Trade Centre is unimaginable, but that is not enough to make it a real event. A surplus of violence is not enough to open up reality. For reality is a principle, and this principle is lost. Real and fiction are inextricable, and the fascination of the attack is foremost the fascination by the image (the consequences), whether catastrophic or leading to jubilation are themselves mostly imaginary.’ (Baudrillard, 2001)

What Baudrillard seemed to be trying to express here is that how most people around the world experienced the attacks on the World Trade Centre is not real because reality itself is a social construct, and because most people saw images of the attack on the television and that all images are fiction – they become more real than the actual event. His concept of hyperreality goes further and claims that, as we only have images, so everything is fiction – there is no ‘truth’ other than images. In this case, it would not be too far a leap of faith to claim that Baudrillard was suggesting
that, as we generally experience terrorism through our television screens, then terrorism is nothing other than images and therefore a fiction.

**Criticisms of social constructivist and post-structuralist (postmodern) approaches to social phenomena and therefore, terrorism.**

The three positions outlined above – Jackson et al, Oliverio and Baudrillard – can be seen as existing on a postmodernist continuum, which moves from less to more extreme versions of epistemic relativism – Jackson et al’s tends to be less extreme and Baudrillard’s tends to be more extreme. As such, social constructivist and post-structuralist approaches to terrorism can be criticised in a number of ways. Some of these come from theorists who come from historical materialist and critical realist standpoints.

Joseph (2011: 32), for example, argues that, if terrorism is to be regarded as a social construction, this means that terrorists cannot be regarded as the primary source of analysis, as they are only simply the consequence of discourse, rather than the other way around. If such a route is to be taken, he says, then the study of terrorism should focus on the ‘discourse in which the social construction of terrorism takes place’ and calls certain people terrorists. But, he claims, such an approach ultimately becomes little more than discursive reductionism. He expressed his view as follows:

‘This is reductionist because it suggests that the idea of terrorism is exhausted by discourse, rather than seeing discourse as one crucial component in the construction of terrorism. But for the ‘discourse’ to construct terrorism, there must be something that allows for this construction to be worthwhile and meaningful. It would be ridiculous, for example, to suggest that something like the war on terror or the Northern Ireland peace process is all about discursive construction and nothing to do with material interests or socio-economic relations.’ (Joseph, 2011: 33)

What Joseph is saying, put simply, is that social processes, relations and structures exist independently of their construction in language. For example, conflicts can, and often do, exist as part of competition for resources.

Social constructivist and post-structuralist approaches to terrorism eschew what they call grand narratives and focus on issues of ‘language’, ‘power’, ‘reality’ and ‘truth’. For social constructivists and post-structuralists, then, notions of truth become indistinguishable from the power relations in which they emerge, and therefore, the labelling of certain groups as terrorists is more an expression of power relations than it is one of ‘truth’. Such a position, as mentioned, is useful in many ways and can be said to have exposed certain fallacies with normative conceptions of what a phenomenon like terrorism is. The problem with such stances, though, is that they fail to address the processes that contribute to certain actual, material events processes and relations that happen independently of language. For example, two planes really were flown into the World Trade Centre in New York on September 11, 2001 and this has been called an act of terrorism. There were certain processes and

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8 Joseph (2011) criticises post-structuralist accounts by arguing the following:

‘...[T]he epistemological relativism that post-structuralists maintain should be accompanied by judgemental rationalism that notes that theories can still be judged, if not according to their truth, then according to their explanatory adequacy. This has to be part of the case if contradiction and misconception are to be meaningful and not just part of a language game. (Joseph, 2011: 32).
relations that contributed to this event. There were also certain processes and relations that contributed to the people who flew the planes into the World Trade Centre being called terrorists, and, crucially, acting according to that designation. But social constructivists and post-structuralists are not able to tackle these relations and processes together as they do not recognise any of them as existing independently of discourse. In figurational terms, although the social constructivist and post-structuralist approaches may address value-congruence in their assessments of terrorism, they do not fully address reality-congruence, which in the case of the September 11 attacks, involved, as mentioned, relations and processes that contributed to people acting according to a particular designation of terrorists, as well as relations and processes involved in labelling them as such.

**General criticisms of post-structuralism and social constructivism**

As mentioned, Baudrillard’s approach is perhaps the most extreme example of the crude nominalist and epistemic relativist positions that social constructivists and post-structuralists fall into. And, in some respects, his and others do help to offer a counterweight to the unsophisticated positivism espoused by a large proportion of the supporters of mainstream terrorism theories. However, like mainstream terrorism theories, the infiltration of post-structuralists and social constructivists in research on terrorism is not unproblematic either in terms of developing reality congruent knowledge about terrorism or for helping to provide a degree of legitimacy to some of the groups that have been designated as terrorists.

A first area in which the work of post-structuralists and social constructivists is problematic is that they tend to use highly obscure and imprecise language, which they claim is a kind of poetry that ought to be decoded by the reader in order to find the ‘real’ meaning. Baudrillard is one of the worst culprits of this. The extent of the poorly written work by post-structuralists and social constructivists is revealed by Sokal and Bricmont (1998: 5), who argue that the reason many postmodern texts appear incomprehensible is because they mean nothing. Attacking Baudrillard, they argue (1998: 143) that he tends to use scientific and unscientific language with total disregard for what the words mean. In addition, they point out that if such language was stripped away from Baudrillard’s work much of what he says would be banal. For example, his notion of the hyperreal existing at the expense of the real because we only experience images or replicas of real events and things, can simply be interpreted as saying that we experience much of what is happening in the world as recordings of real events and things. Of course, for most people this does not mean that the recordings are any more or less real than the events and things themselves.

Sokal and Bricmont (1998: 177) regard the use of deliberately obscure and misleading language as akin to the fable of the emperor’s new clothes. That is, when the dressed up propositions of social constructivists and post-structuralists are stripped down, it often becomes apparent that what they are really saying is rather obvious and banal. In other cases, Sokal and Bricmont (1998: 179) point out that what social constructivists and post-structuralists are saying is manifestly false.
The second area where social constructivist and post-structuralist accounts are highly dubious is that they fall into the trap of epistemic relativism and, as such regard terrorism and other ‘facts’ or processes as being nothing other than social constructions, and as existing only as part of discourse. For them, reality only exists as part of language or discourse, and can only be interpreted through discourse analysis. This is evident in what Baudrillard said about the 1991 Gulf War, which he claimed did not take place at all but was rather a simulation played out by the mass media on television screens. Norris (1992) confirms this stance with the following point:

‘...[R]eality’ is constructed entirely in and through language or the structures of this or that signifying practice; that there is no possible access to truth or matters of historical record except by way of those same discursive representations; and therefore – as Baudrillard triumphantly concludes – that we inhabit a realm of unanchored free-floating language games (or modes of persuasive utterance) where rhetoric quite simply goes all the way down, and where nothing could count as an argument against what the media or government information-machine would presently have us believe.’ (Norris, 1992: p19-20).

As such, the government and official media versions of events, being the dominant discourses, become reality and are the only reality because they are produced by the dominant groups. That reality exists outside of language and discourse in the dynamic structures of relations between people does not figure in the ideas of epistemic relativists like Baudrillard and other postmodernists and post-structuralists.

The ‘power effects’ of epistemic relativism, nominalism and discourse-dominated accounts of terrorism.

A further problem with epistemic relativism and nominalism are the ‘power effects’ these positions have in relation to what they are making propositions on. This can perhaps be seen as almost the opposite of the problem that positivistic accounts of terrorism create, whereby such research often fails to question normative assumptions about terrorism, and unwittingly helps to legitimate governments and elite group approaches to ‘terrorists’. For example, for postmodernists, by simply claiming that terrorism only exists within discourse and, as such, is nothing other than a pejorative label, fails to take into account that many of the people and groups who have been designated as terrorists murder others to further their own interests. By omitting this crucial aspect of terrorism figurations, there is a failure to take into account that violence is often a major aspect of these relationships. At the same time, these approaches help to provide some justification for the acts of those designated as terrorists. That is, if terrorism is simply seen as operating within a particular discourse and it is only regarded as existing as part of attempts by powerful groups to label their enemies, then those who blow up civilians or cut their heads off are given a degree of legitimacy, and are able to say that their being labelled as terrorists by nation-states shows that what they are killing people for, is in some ways justified – they really are the freedom fighters they believe themselves to be.

Critical realist approaches

More novel, albeit less established, approaches to the understanding of terrorism compared to those that have gone before include critical realist and historical materialist positions. Herring and Stokes
(2011) marry these two areas. They seek to integrate historical materialism as their ‘historically specific substantive theory’, with critical realism as their underlying theoretical and methodological ‘set of assumptions.’

As realists, they do not recognise the claims of positivists that A causes B but rather they see patterns or tendencies that are the result of the underlying structures of social reality. This highlights the fact that realism and critical realism are relational approaches to the social world. Unlike much of the work on terrorism, Herring and Stokes focus on terrorism deployed on behalf of ruling elites or the capitalist ruling class rather than terrorism aimed against them. They outline four situations in which this happens. The first of these is when terrorism is deployed by the capitalist ruling class to destroy social formations that are pre-capitalist or capitalist in ways that prevent the rapid movement of capital. The second is that the ruling classes of rentier states are often inclined to use terrorism on the domestic level. These states are usually reliant on income from foreign countries. One example of this would be Saddam Hussein’s rule in Iraq and his terrorising of the Iraqi people. The third is when ruling groups use terrorism on a domestic basis to force through neoliberal economic policies in the face of opposition. The fourth is domestic terrorism whereby the ruling group in a country is in an alliance with a strong external country that backs the use of terrorism in the former country. They cite the role of the US in Latin America and in particular Colombia as examples.

Unlike much of the positivistic work on terrorism, Herring and Stokes say they are focused on identifying changing rather than fixed relations. As such, they claim the following about terrorism:

‘We see that there is not a necessary relationship between capitalism and terrorism, but that capitalism does contain propensities for it. Certainly, terrorism has had its place in overcoming actual or potential opposition to capital accumulation or to particular capitalist elites, but legitimacy and consent are more likely to serve their interests as measured by their most secure and maximal accumulation of capital. A thoroughly internalised acceptance of capitalist modes of being would make disciplining through terrorism superfluous in many respects.’ (Herring and Stokes, 2011:16)

When it comes to terrorism that is opposed to the capitalist ruling class, Herring and Stokes reject essentialist conceptions of the term. Aligned to one of the main arguments in this thesis, they suggest that terrorism is not an abstract thing but a specific social relation. Also, like the arguments put forth here and elsewhere, citing Leon Trotsky (1911), they point out that there is a willingness among ruling elites to label any opposition to them as terrorism, while at the same time excluding state-sanctioned mass killing from that label.

Among the reasons for this brief discussion of Herring and Stokes’ approach is that critical realism is a standpoint that is in some ways closer to the figurational position than many others, and so it is useful to discuss why I have rejected it as a means for investigating terrorism. Realism, as a ‘methodological’ perspective has developed out of structuralism, and realists view reality as consisting of various layers that have to be ‘peeled back’ in order to reveal what is happening. They claim that there are deep structural or causal mechanisms that we cannot observe, and this idea of observable structures bears some relation to the figurational position that as chains of interdependency become more complex, then the social world becomes more opaque. Nevertheless, the idea that there are deep structures is highly present-centred and accordingly, conceives the social world as static. The starting point for realism is ontology and not epistemology. It assumes that scientific knowledge is a human
activity. It asks: what is the nature of reality in order for science to be at least partially successful in developing knowledge? Realism, also in a way similar to the figurational approach to ‘everyday’ knowledge and ‘scientific’ knowledge, aims to avoid making sharp demarcations between the two. In this respect there is some similarity with the figurational idea of different levels or degrees of reality congruence.

According to Potter (2000: 204), there are three aspects to realist ontology: the real, the actual and the empirical. He argues that there are two central features of realism:

‘The first tenet is that “things” exist independently of us; they are as they are, regardless of what we believe about them, whether we see them or don’t see them, whether we even exist or not... [T]he second tenet of realist philosophy is that we can achieve knowledge of reality, and that we have knowledge of reality.’ (Potter, 2000: 206).

As can be seen the first tenet expressed by Potter helps to dispel notions of epistemic relativism. That is, some things also exist outside and independently of human experience and interpretation. Nevertheless, with respect to the second tenet, he suggests that there is a degree of relativism in realist thought, which some realists call ‘a correspondence notion of truth’. This, he argues, refers to the idea that ‘knowledge is relatively true or false according to the degree in which beliefs or propositions “correspond” to an independently existing reality’. Accordingly, similarities can be seen between this and Elias’s concept of reality congruence. For Potter (2000), what sets science apart from ‘everyday’ knowledge are the institutions, practices and processes that science adheres to, which includes rational discussion, peer review, democratic consensus and so on. Furthermore, realists understand scientific laws as tendencies rather than fixed absolutes. As such, they claim the gap between positivistic social science and interpretivist social science is narrowed, as reasons are seen as causes for realists. Potter (2000: 215) also points out that realists understand reality as existing on a number of levels and at different depths. For example, an animal could be described in a number of ways; from an anthropomorphistic angle, from physics, from chemistry, from biology and so on. Such an explanatory model, however, construes reality as static; although this is disputed by realists.

Despite aspects of realism that construe reality as static, the realist position is similar to the figurational position in the way it highlights processes and levels of integration. For example, realists argue that social structures change over time and are not static. They also claim, as mentioned, that there are different levels of integration and that by combining two elements on one level can create something on the next level that does not resemble the two elements on the lower level of integration in any way. Both Elias and realists in this sense have some similarities to Gestalt theory – society is more than the sum of its parts (individuals). For example, as mentioned earlier, Elias talks of the ‘relative autonomy’ of social structure. However, a core difference between the realist and figurational positions is that realism still clings onto philosophical notions of knowledge and reality. Realism fails in the way that Elias has done to make a total break from the idea of individual isolated adult human beings gaining knowledge of the world. As Richard Kilminster (2007: 32) points out:

‘Another example in Elias of the sociological transmutation of the philosophies of being is the way in which he transforms philosophical speculations about the ‘objects’ of the different sciences and the so-called ‘modes of being’ postulated by fundamental ontologists and philosophical realists
such as Hartmann and Whitehead. These speculations provided the stimulus for Elias eventually to develop a systematic and testable theory of the levels of integration (physical, chemical, biological, psychological, social) of the social and natural worlds investigated by the different sciences (Elias 1987a; Bentham van den Bergh 1986; Wassall 1990). In all these ways, Elias subverted the ontologists’ transcendental-theological underpinning of the distinction between the ontic and the ontological, implicitly rejecting the whole transcendental-theological underpinning of the distinction (Goldmann 1977: 105; Steiner 1978: 86-7; Kilminster 1979: 226-9; 1998: ch. 1). The formulations of the fundamental ontologists thus represent trace elements in Elias, existing as distant presuppositions and preconditions for his research-based sociological framework which has transformed the questions those philosophers posed.’ (Kilminster 2007: 32).

It follows from this that the realist position fails to make a break from metaphysics in the way that the figurational position does. In fact, despite the realist criticism of positivism, realism still shares many of positivism’s flaws, in ways that figurational sociology does not. This is highlighted by Lane (1996: 363) who argues that realism has replaced positivism as the dominant approach to science. She argues that the idea of underlying causal mechanisms suffers from similar problems to the idea of causation. This fails to break fully from the positivistic tradition. What realists claim is that they are searching for ‘real causal mechanisms.’ Therefore, realists fall into the same trap as positivists with respect to causation. They transfer the concept of causation from the physical sciences and apply it to social processes, which would lead one to ask again what caused the cause and what caused that cause and so on. A realist approach to studying terrorism, therefore, carries much of the baggage that positivistic approaches to the phenomenon have. Whereas realists may ask what caused a cause of terrorism they would then have to continue asking what caused that cause indefinitely or they would bundle causes as factors, which, as discussed earlier, is highly problematic and fails to get a real grip on the processual and relational aspects of terrorism figurations.

Another point about deep causal mechanisms that are beyond observation, is that their visibility is dependent on existing funds of knowledge. The difference between this and figurational approaches is that realists understand social reality as existing in different realms, whereas figurational sociologists see existence on different levels of integration and different levels of structural complexity. As these become more opaque it becomes increasingly difficult to gain reality congruent knowledge about them. However, as Dunning and Hughes (2013: 199), argue they can be understood over time through ‘the systematic interweaving of theory and enquiry by interdependent generations of scholars.’ Realists, however, tend to regard the unobservability of unobservable levels of reality as being part of their intrinsic essence. Although these levels of reality may have relationships with each other. For realists, as already mentioned, their approach implicitly assumes that these structures are static and that the acquisition of knowledge about them is also static.

**Figurational approaches to terrorism**

As this research seeks to develop a figurational understanding of the processes and relationships that have contributed to what we understand as terrorism in relation to Britain it would be useful to examine the figurational work already undertaken in this area. This work, like that of some theorists like Herring and Stokes, seeks to overcome the problems associated with positivistic and postmodern approaches to terrorism. Nevertheless, it still forms part of terrorism figurations. However, figurational sociologists tend to have better understandings of their positions in established-outsider figurations
than positivists do, and do not regard reality as only existing as part of discourse and language as postmodernists do.

Stephen Vertigans (2008, 2011) comes from a figurational position and argues that terrorism, both as a concept and form of political action is not static. Echoing Horgan, he claims that it is problematic to categorise the people involved in terrorism because terrorist groups are often involved in other, non-violent activities, and individuals involved in terrorism have other facets to their lives other than terrorism. As a result, those people ought to be understood as existing within broader social processes. Vertigans also looks at what he calls socialising agents as part of the processes by which individuals become involved in terrorist organisations, particularly what he calls nationalist terror groups, such as ETA, the IRA and Hamas. He points out that these agents of socialisation can include family members, a person's community and increasingly the media. Central to his argument are long-term social processes, which he describes as follows:

‘...[T]he significance of longer-term trends, processes and the wider cycles of protest of which terrorism is a part (Della Porta and Tarrow, 1986) are overlooked: understanding and explanation of the phenomenon is only partially achieved. Only by examining longer term local and global processes, like the heritage of political violence, the inability to effect change through peaceful political mechanisms and the failure of other types of conventional violence such as warfare by Arab states against Israel, can the genesis of the groups be established and the reasons behind individual contemporary radicalisation understood. History is also important for the groups in two fundamental ways. One set of groups stress their continuity with traditions, symbols, victories and narratives from the past, for example, American far-right groups, Northern Irish Republican and loyalist paramilitaries, militant Muslims. By comparison, the second category seeks to break with the ‘dark side’ of the past, like the ‘red’ urban groups from Germany, Italy and Japan, and their fear of authoritarian structures and the return of fascism.’ (Vertigans, 2008: 12).

Vertigans only focuses on what Silke (1998) calls ‘insurgent terrorism’; that is, small non-state groups that undertake such activity. He seeks to uncover long-term processes in relation to why and how people join terrorist organisations, the dynamics within those groups and how terrorism and terrorist careers can come to an end. Vertigans’s exploration is one of just a small number of sociological investigations undertaken of terrorism, especially when compared to the mass of work on offer by psychologists and political scientists. He provides a synthesis of theories and standpoints from sociology (Elias, Mennell, Bourdieu, Simmel, Tilly, Della Porta, Wieviorka, symbolic interactionism) psychology (including Horgan and Silke) and political science (including Weinberg and Crenshaw) to develop what is ultimately a sociological explanation of, and framework for the study of, terrorism. He aims to provide detached analysis and seeks to integrate both rational and emotional reasons for terrorism. In order to achieve this, Vertigans has used a number of key sociological concepts that are also central to the present thesis, which to name a few, include concepts such as long-term social processes, habitus, established-outsider figurations and double-binds. In addition and almost uniquely, Vertigans also gives serious consideration to the role of women in relation to terrorism.

A range of terrorist groups form Vertigans’s subject matter, including among others, left-wing organisations from Italy, Germany and South America, the American far right, religious groups, such as al-Qaeda and Japan’s Aum Supreme truth, and nationalist groups, such as those from Sri Lanka and Northern Ireland. Vertigans seeks to explain how contemporary terrorists draw on ideologies, take inspiration and justify their actions from events and figures of the past. To this effect, terrorists tend to draw on histories of violent struggle which, in turn, imbues their habitus. Moreover, he argues that
terrorism can come about in relation to how regional state monopolies of violence have developed and that the possibility of terrorism emerging becomes greater when ‘weak restraints intersect with violent sediments from the past’ (2011: 43). He also examines the social processes involved in recruiting, retaining and leaving terrorist organisations, and for Vertigans habitus plays a key role here. For example, he points out that the legitimisation of violence by nation-states, such as public executions and torture can contribute to terrorism by reinforcing in people’s habitus the idea that violence is an acceptable solution to political problems. In addition, political manoeuvring by governments that involves aggression towards other countries can help to normalise aggression in the national habitus, and thus contribute to the emergence of terrorism. He adds that communal habitus can also contribute to the process of radicalisation and provide normative standards for feelings and behaviour. For example, shared historical memories and commonality of feeling tend to be behind wider community support for terrorism. As such, if there is support for terrorism in a community, such as has been the case in Palestine, Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka, then the emergence of terror groups and their sustainability is more likely. For Vertigans, terrorism is more likely to emerge in less stable nation states, especially unstable democracies. Therefore, he argues, the likelihood that a country can avoid terrorism is influenced by the duration over which self-restraints have been internalised as well as the length of time and levels of mutual interdependence, functional democratisation, stability and security have been in place.

Vertigans also draws out the relationship between habitus and established-outsider figurations and shows how the latter are integral to the development of terrorism. For example, he explains that certain examples of social protest have transformed into terrorism partly because perceived shifts in national consciousness have left militias feeling like ‘detached outsiders’. The transition to terrorism happens in the context of detachment from the rest of society. As outsiders, members of terrorist organisations can become dependent on each other and develop strong we-images through the ‘collective effervescence’ of their group. In this context, group cohesion is partially determined by the feelings of threat generated by outsider groups. The stigmatisation of radical or terror groups can further strengthen their internal cohesion, he adds. On the flip-side, Vertigans points out that terror groups develop a sense of collective charisma and stigmatise outsiders, which helps to further cement their bonds. Within this context, shifting forms of we-identification are crucial, he says, and enable terrorists to justify their actions both in terms of protecting their group and associated ideology, community and nation and attacking their enemies with whom they no longer identify. Vertigans argues that terrorists tend to consider themselves as soldiers at war, and, like conventional soldiers, an emphasis upon we-identification strengthens at the expense of I-images. As part of established-outsider figurations between terrorist organisations and nation-states, spirals of violence can escalate and acts of terrorism and counter-terrorism can become more violent, says Vertigans (2011: 130). He explains how terrorists and nation-states tend to form double-bind relationships with each other, whereby violence tends to escalate between opposing groups. Nevertheless, within these contexts and at times of heightened emotion, terrorists must practice restraint if they are to carry out their activities with any chance of success. For terrorists, says Vertigans (2011: 103), identification with and within groups provides regulatory frameworks to restrain individuals both when expressing their emotions during challenging and exciting activities and during more mundane work associated with their organisations. Given this, terrorist groups must practice internal pacification in order to undertake
effective campaigns of violence against outsiders – they must pacify themselves in order to be violent. He adds that the actions of states within these double-bind processes can help to justify to terrorists their actions and beliefs about the state and that violent counter-terrorism responses are often driven by the fact that nation-states traditionally react violently to violent attack. Consequently, it is in the habitus of politicians and populations to react violently to terrorism. Vertigans (2011) explains that it is also important to focus on the reasons why people leave terrorist organisations and the processes involved in decisions by terrorists to end violence if we are to find solutions to encourage people to disengage from terrorism. More particularly, violent counter-terrorism operations rarely work on their own and the reasons for the emergence of terrorism in the first place must be addressed or undermined, otherwise the threat will remain, as has been the case in Northern Ireland, for example.

How this thesis builds on and differs from Vertigans

There are a number of key differences and similarities between the work here and that of Vertigans. In places, it builds on some of the areas that Vertigans has examined, and in others seeks a different figurational approach. Perhaps the most obvious difference is that Vertigans examines a range of terrorist organisations from across the world in order to explore some of the figurational conditions at play in the generation, sustainment and ending of terrorism. This thesis, on the other hand investigates terrorism solely in relation to Britain. Such a key difference, in fact, gives rise to another fundamental distinction in the two approaches; whereas Vertigans seeks to develop a figurational understanding of terrorism broadly across the world, including some of the long-term processes involved in each case he cites, the work here examines in detail the sociogenetic processes at play in the specific context of Britain. Of course, the conclusions reached here can be expanded and tested in relation to the sociogenetic conditions found in other national or survival group contexts.

This thesis and Vertigans work also overlap in crucial ways. For example, the part played by established-outsider relations in terrorism figurations is seen by both as central. Nevertheless, the work here, as well as showing that outsider status can, in certain circumstances, contribute to terrorism, goes beyond Vertigans to show that the development of terrorism as a concept and as a form of stigmatisation is predicated upon such relations. Furthermore, this thesis explores how terrorism has developed in antithesis to the Western concept of civilisation, which, again, forms part of established-outsider figurations. Another area that both this work and that of Vertigans examine is where terrorism fits in relation to state monopolies of violence. For example, as discussed, Vertigans explores the possibility of terrorism emerging when monopolies of violence are weak. Here, however, but not dissimilarly, the emphasis is on how the expansion and retraction of monopolies of violence play a role, particularly in relation to Britain in contributing, on the one hand, to groups being labelled as terrorists and then those groups acting according to one of the designations of terrorism given to them by the British establishment over the past two centuries. For example, as Britain expanded into Ireland, rebellious Irish Catholics were often labelled as terrorists, and acted according to those designations. As Britain withdrew from Ireland (it is still undergoing this process in the North), groups undertook and still do undertake acts of terrorism, or acts that have been designated as such.
A further similarity is the interplay between established-outsider figurations and we-I balances. Vertigans, as mentioned, points out that, in terrorist groups, the balance among individuals often tends towards the we rather than the I. This thesis recognises in the section on the 7/7 bombers, that they tend to identify more with a collective we as Muslims, and more accurately, warriors fighting on behalf of Muslims, than they do on their more individualised and Westernised I-identities. However, this does not mean that their I-identities do not play a part in their undertaking acts designated as terrorism. Given that, the possibility that Western individualisation is something that may have contributed to their committing terrorism is examined.

Also key, and as has been mentioned throughout the first two chapters is an acknowledgement that research on terrorism contributes to terrorism figurations more generally, including this thesis. However, unlike much of the positivistic work, this thesis seeks a more reflexive approach to understanding terrorism figurations, rather than provide ammunition for established groups to hijack research in order to advance their own agendas and perpetuate terrorism figurations. Part of that, as is apparent from the previous two chapters, is an examination of the role that research on terrorism has in terrorism figurations. The following chapter builds on this by examining the sociogenesis of terrorism as a social scientific concern.
Chapter 3: The sociogenesis of terrorism as a social scientific concern

The sociogenesis of terrorism as a social scientific concern is important in the context of this thesis, as it helps to show how mainstream and other theories of terrorism have come into being, and why it is that terrorism is regarded as having thing-like properties. This is an absolutely crucial point in the development of the concept, and terrorism figurations more generally because academic theories of terrorism add considerable weight to perceptions of what is and what is not terrorism. As many theories of terrorism help to support government approaches to terrorism and terrorists, the sociogenesis of the concept as a social scientific concern is especially pertinent. As such, the way in which social scientists have conceived of the phenomenon forms part of the same established-outsider figurations in which terrorism emerges. Of course, as mentioned, in a small way, this thesis is part of those processes of sociogenesis of terrorism as a social scientific concern. And I am a member of established groups and could be a target, albeit an indiscriminate one, of terrorism. Nevertheless, a key difference is my acknowledgement of my position in wider terrorism figurations.

The sociogenesis of terrorism as a social scientific concern, of course, is also closely related to the sociogenesis of the concept of terrorism more generally. Therefore, it is necessary to note that the concept as a social scientific concern has pre-academic and semi-academic roots – there was not a definitive point at which the sociogenesis of the concept of terrorism suddenly moved from a general one to being a social scientific one. For example, throughout the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, there were various media, including the press, plays, novels and government debates that sought at least partial understandings of terrorism. These media forms, however, lacked the levels of detachment that are usually associated with work that is considered scientific or social scientific. Of course, much of the newspaper reporting examined later on in this thesis is representative of this, as are the Parliamentary debates. In addition, there are a number of examples of newspaper reports of plays and books about terrorism that add to this process. As the social sciences developed further during the first half of the twentieth century, however, terrorism, began to become a social scientific concern in varying ways.

The development of the social sciences and their relationship to civilisation and terrorism

Before examining in greater detail the development of terrorism as a social scientific concern, it is first necessary to establish how sociology and the social sciences developed, in order to provide some context to these terrorism specific processes. Elias (2009: 65-66) has suggested that the social sciences developed initially, at least in part, to prove correct, scientifically, the aims of ideals such as socialism, communism, conservatism, liberalism and so on. They also developed as part of social needs for new intellectual tools to cope with the problems of the age.
The early part of the nineteenth century marked a significant point during which there was an acceleration in the development of Western societies from pre-scientific to more scientific forms. Accompanying this was the early development of the social sciences, which, at that point, were not compartmentalised into varying professional specialisms, as they are today, but were, as mentioned, used, in part, to prove that certain ideals about society were correct. As such, the social sciences developed further during the nineteenth century and in conjunction with wider societal developments. That is, as the balance of power shifted in favour of the industrial bourgeoisie from the aristocracy and gentry, and as production and trade increased, new kinds of thinking were required to deal with the problems of the increasingly more complex societies that were developing in the West. In terms of the development of sociology, Elias points out the following:

‘...[S]ociology, like economics, came into its own as a science when groups of people conceived a particular order of events as relatively autonomous in its functioning and were able to substantiate their claim by a continuous cross-fertilisation by a process of reciprocal testing of the general ideas they formed of this order and of factual observations of details they made within this order. But sociologists were less concerned than the economists of their time with static regularities of the kind which economists observed in the recurrent movements of prices and other properties of markets. The problem shared by all the early sociologists was how society developed. They all saw society as a self-regulating process which had a force of its own more or less independent of the short-term intentions of individuals who formed it. They all were concerned with the direction of this process. Their common problem was the long-term development of humankind. They wanted to know the order of this development, its stages and its driving forces.’ (Elias, 2009: 60).

In this sense, therefore, social sciences like sociology and economics were developing in the eighteenth century and nineteenth century in order to make sense of social processes that were regarded as functioning autonomously from the plans and actions of individuals. Of course, there were other and further specialisations, such as the development of psychology and political science, and yet further specialisations, which have broken up the social sciences into many hundreds of complementary and competing disciplines.

Dunning and Hughes (2013: 4) point out that, during the early development of the social sciences, sociologists, and more generally social scientists existed outside of universities but later undertook their enquiries from within established settings of universities, which highlights that people were approaching the social sciences in a more formalised and ‘scientific’ manner. They (2013: 5) add that following the collapse of the functional positivist/empiricist sociology in the 1960s that had been dominant for 20 years, the subject ‘fractured’ into a variety of competing sub-disciplines. Dunning and Hughes point out the following in this connection:

‘Since the 1960s...there has been on offer in sociology an increasing array of paradigms, albeit that some have now fallen from vogue. These include – and this is by no means an exhaustive list – various forms of functionalism (for example, ‘neo’, ‘normative’ and ‘general’, ‘soft’ and ‘hard’); social systems theory; Marxism (for example, ‘humanist’ and ‘structuralist’); feminist sociology (for example, ‘liberal’, ‘socialist’, ‘Marxist’, ‘post-’ and ‘cultural’); critical sociology; conflict theory; Weberian theory; rational choice theory; ethnomethodology; symbolic interactionism; structuralism; post-structuralism (of which there are too many variants to list); postmodernist sociology; actor network theory; critical realism; reflexive sociology; structuration theory; and figuralational (also ‘developmental’ or ‘process’) sociology.’ (Dunning and Hughes, 2013: 7).

As one can see, in sociology alone there are a huge number of sub-disciplines. These sub-disciplines are, of course, not unique to sociology. For example, Marxism, structuralism, feminism, realism, postmodernism, poststructuralism and rational choice theory can all be found in the political science literature. Likewise, there are a variety of different types of
psychology, including psychodynamic theories, behaviourism, cognitive psychology, structuralism and social psychology. Similarly, there is Marxist economics, classical economics and Keynesian economics. The latter two social sciences – psychology and economics – and to a lesser extent political science, differ from sociology, however, in that they have a greater degree of intellectual consensus, and tend to a much larger extent be built on a standard paradigm of ‘logical positivism and empiricism’ (Dunning and Hughes, 2013: 9).

Along with the growing complexity of social scientific disciplines, there has been a corresponding growth in the fragmentation of areas studied, which include media studies, cultural studies, gender studies, international relations, terrorism studies and business studies to name just a few. Many of these, however, have almost become disciplines in their own right. This, in part, reflects cross-discipline collaboration (which is partially a result of the fragmentation of disciplines in the first place), as well as the increasing complexity of contemporary societies and their need for new conceptual tools, in addition to a rejection by some schools of thought of what they regard as disciplines associated with the Enlightenment project, such as sociology, psychology and science more generally.

Dunning and Hughes (2013: 3) point out that Alvin Gouldner (1970), in his book The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology (1970), argued that between the end of the Second World War and prior to the fragmentation of sociology in the late 1960s and 1970s, sociologists were being increasingly drawn into ‘the coalescing military-industrial-welfare complex’, and that they were becoming parts of the status quo ‘and used as instruments of management and social control.’ There are parallels here between the claim that mainstream terrorism theorists, in their adoption of western government definitions and their focus on groups that are proscribed as terrorists by governments, and the idea that sociologists in the 20 years after the Second World War had become instruments of management. In both cases, social scientists and sociologists respectively have/had failed to recognise that they are/were members of established groups, and form part of a complex nexus of power relations with those that they study – governments, financiers, academic institutions and so on.

The study of terrorism in its own right

It was during this process of the sociogenesis of the social sciences that terrorism began to become an area of study in its own right. As mentioned earlier in this text, discussion and media on terrorism throughout the nineteenth century and to a greater extent in the early part of the twentieth century was in the form of newspaper reports, plays, fictional literature and government debates. There was little, if any, systematic, detached social scientific enquiry on terrorism. There were, however, growing attempts at categorising the phenomenon, and this is best exemplified by the 1937 League of Nations Draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism which, although never coming into existence, was one of the earliest attempts at defining terrorism. Of course, this was not an example of a social scientific study of terrorism but is related to this. It was, however, an early attempt at categorising terrorism for the purpose of creating international law. As such, it represents a bridge between, for example, parliamentary debates on terrorism and institutionalised academic research on
the subject. The need to create international law on terrorism shows that it was regarded as a significant global problem, already in the 1930s.

Earlier attempts at understanding terrorism were evident in a booklet called *Terrorism and Communism* written by Leon Trotsky in 1920 at the height of the Bolshevik Revolution, which sought to defend and situate the role of terrorism in revolutions. Trotsky's booklet was in response Karl Kautsky's 1919 *Terrorism and Communism*, which includes, as mentioned by the author, ‘an examination of terrorism, its origin and its consequences’. These clearly represent early examples of the development of terrorism as a social scientific concern, albeit ones that were not undertaken, at this point, in the context of universities, or by professional social scientists.

One of the earliest examples of a professional social scientist examining terrorism was JBS Hardman in the 1937 Volume 14 edition of the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (cited in Schmid and Jongman, 2006: 247), in which he included a definition of terrorism. As such, we can see the development of terrorism as a social scientific concern, to the point at which it was, in the inter-war period becoming an area of interest for professional social scientists. The historian Beverly Gage, points out the following about what Hardman wrote on the subject:

‘...[T]he American editor and labor activist J.B.S Hardman described terrorism as "the method...whereby an organized group or party seeks to achieve its avowed aims chiefly through the systematic use of violence." Hardman emphasized the symbolic and communicative nature of terrorism, distinguishing it from "mob violence". He also set it apart from “governmental terror”, suggesting that law enforcement repression, however terrorizing, deserved an analytical category of its own. Terrorism, Hardman concluded, was a clandestine revolutionary tactic designed to destabilize the existing order through well-planned acts of spectacular violence. As exemplars, he cited the anarchist movement, the Fenians of Ireland, and the Russian revolutionaries of the 1870s and 1880s.’ (Gage, 2011: 76)

Gage points out that, following the interwar period interest in terrorism among historians in the United States diminished considerably, initially because there was a greater concern with fascism, communism and militarism and later because of attempts to play down alarm over revolutionary violence in the face of McCarthyism. The lack of interest in terrorism by American historians is reflected in the dearth of social scientific literature on the subject until the early 1970s. It is from this period that social scientific research on terrorism accelerated hugely and the topic became a major social scientific concern. Horgan (2005: 25) points out that one of the early terrorism researchers during the acceleration in terrorism research, David Rapoport, when seeking teaching materials on terrorism in 1969, found only a small number of texts. However, 17 years later, Rapoport saw a terrorism biography with over 5000 publications in just English. Miller has discussed the huge rise in research output on terrorism that developed from the early 1970s. He wrote:

‘In an apparent effort to compensate for this intellectual shortfall, the literature of terrorism has exploded. Journalists, social scientists, of every subfield, and historians, of every era, have brought their resources to the subject. Philosophers have seriously entertained the issue of the morality of terrorism, and psychologists have pondered the terrorist’s mindset. Policy specialists have reflected on their ‘hands on’ experiences dealing with terrorist events. Former hostages, as if anointed by their personal trauma, have become instant experts, undaunted by disciplinary boundaries, on every facet of the subject.’ (A. Miller, 1989: 391-396, cited in Horgan, 2005: 25-26)

The increase in social scientific research on terrorism is highly significant for a number of reasons. On one level, as mentioned, it highlights a process by which social scientists have failed to consider that
they may have become part of the status quo and, as such, are wittingly or unwittingly supporting the objectives of governments in relation to terrorism figurations. For example, by not challenging government definitions of who is and who is not a terrorist, many researchers fail to investigate the power relations that are core to terrorism figurations. Related to this, therefore, the explosion in research on terrorism helps to substantiate government claims that terrorism is perhaps a more serious threat than it really is, which in turn may help governments to achieve other, unrelated policy objectives, such as securing access to oil reserves or other strategically important objectives. Of course, it must also be noted that, despite the problem that much terrorism research only tends to have a relatively small degree of reality congruence, and that it can be used to legitimise government actions, it is also likely that it has contributed to the prevention and ending of terrorism in some cases.

Nevertheless, the sociogenesis of terrorism as a social scientific concern continued to develop in specific directions. Lisa Stampnitzky (2013: 23) points out that terrorism research began to take off in the early 1970s following a series of sensational incidents, including high-profile kidnappings, like those at the 1972 Munich Olympics, and aircraft hijackings, which led to policy needs for expert analysis, which in turn led to the development of terrorism as not just a label for terrible events but as a knowable object. She argues that in the mid-1970s, the study of terrorism changed from being one that understood terrorism in the light of theories of political violence to one that understood terrorism as an entity in its own right. At this point as well, peer reviewed articles on terrorism began to be produced. Additionally, the United States government began to fund research, including giving contracts to the RAND corporation from which a number of terrorism experts emerged.

Edna Reid and Hsinchun Chen (2007: 42-56) point out that there were 42 core terrorism researchers between 1965 and 2003. Citing Reid and Chen’s work, Ranstorp (2009: 20) says that this 42 centred around a top ten core of terrorism researchers, who were central to the development of the field. Again citing Reid, Ranstorp points out that there have been different phases in terrorism studies since they ‘took-off’ between 1972 and 1978. He points out that:

‘The period 1986-90 was marked by a decline in the number of publications, the level of collaboration, and the extent of research funding. During this period, Reid showed that a small and close-knit group of twenty-four scholars produced the majority of publications (from ten to thirty-four books and articles each). This influential ‘club’ of terrorism researchers was responsible for establishing the principal conceptual and methodological boundaries of successive waves of research. A major problem of research in the pre-9/11 period was methodological, as researchers tended to create closed and circular research systems where they relied on each others’ work which was synthesized and functioned in a constantly reinforcing feedback loop (ibid.). As argued by Reid, terrorism studies “indicates a static environment, the same hypothesis, definitions and theories continue to be analyzed, assimilated, published, cited, and eventually retrieved” (ibid.) (Ranstorp, 2009: 21).

During the take-off phase in the 1970s political science dominated the field of terrorism research, and psychological research, too, did so to a lesser extent. Psychological approaches, as we have seen, tended towards explanations based on individual psychopathology, such as terrorists as psychopaths. The most dominant terrorism theory to emerge from the 1970s, and one that even today, as mentioned, still has a great deal of emphasis placed upon it, was Ted Gurr’s (1970) rational choice imbued theory that relative deprivation can lead to frustration-aggression relationships, which in turn can lead to collective violence, including terrorism.
Since the 1970s and throughout the 1980s and 1990s, as I mentioned earlier, there have been a variety of social scientific approaches to terrorism, the majority of which have come from political science and, as mentioned, to a lesser extent psychology. These have included psychodynamic theories, frustration-aggression theories, terrorists as narcissists theories and so on. Dominating the field from the 1980s has been rational choice theory, which has been central to political science and is also used in psychological analyses by people like Horgan (2005). Such theories have been at the vanguard of terrorism research, especially since the exponential growth of literature on the subject since the 11th of September, (2001) attacks on the United States.

The lack of sociological work on terrorism, until recently, at least, is reflected in the relatively narrow and standard paradigm for knowledge in terrorism research, which also happens to be the standard paradigm of most political science and psychology. This has encouraged research on terrorism to develop in specific directions. That is, the sociogenesis of terrorism as a social scientific concern since the early 1970s in particular, has been driven, in part, by the standard paradigm of knowledge in the fields of political science and psychology – as Dunning and Hughes (2013: 9) put it, to oversimplify, logical positivism and empiricism. This has contributed to problems like the definitional issue and the treating of terrorism as if it has thing-like properties. In other words, the standard paradigm in psychology and political science plays a major part in the essentialist definitions of terrorism that have for so long plagued research on the subject. In addition, the standard paradigm in political science and psychology has focused research on seeking causes of terrorism rather than exploring the relations and processes through which terrorism comes about. The problems of causal approaches were discussed earlier but such approaches are clearly closely related to the narrow gaze that logical positivism and empiricism afford researchers. It is not surprising, accordingly, that the standard paradigm in political science and psychology has led researchers to claim that terrorism is caused by the rational choices of rational actors, as rational choice theory fits the confines of the logical positivism and empiricism paradigm well.

As has already been stated, the amount of literature on terrorism has increased exponentially since the 9/11 attacks on America. Those attacks have clearly had a profound effect on the development of terrorism research. On the one hand, there has been a huge shift in the focus of terrorism research to groups associated with Al Qaeda and so-called jihadist terrorism from other areas such as ‘red terrorism’, ‘domestic terrorism’ and similar phenomena. In addition, there has been an opening up of the subject to a much wider cross-section of the social sciences. This has brought a variety of new perspectives to bear on the research problems associated with terrorism. This is perhaps most clearly highlighted by the creation of the Critical Terrorism Studies journal, which provides a platform for a wider range of perspectives on terrorism. It also marks a significant development in the sociogenesis of terrorism as a social scientific concern. As such, following 9/11 the field has opened-up to include, as mentioned earlier, postmodernism, poststructuralism, historical materialism, critical realism, social constructivism and figurational sociology of which this thesis is an example.
Nevertheless, mainstream terrorism theories still tend to dominate the field. And, as has been addressed throughout this thesis so far, they fail to develop sufficient levels of detachment from wider terrorism figurations of which they form a part. As discussed, this has helped to legitimate a variety of government actions in relation to terrorism, including in the West and elsewhere, as they have failed to challenge government definitions and approaches adequately. This ‘closed-shop’ of terrorism researchers, moreover, needs to be considered as part of research on terrorism more generally, as their roles are not insignificant. This is what has been attempted in the preceding three chapters. The following chapters seek to examine other aspects of terrorism figurations, including the next one which charts the early stages of the sociogenesis of the concepts of terrorism and terrorists, which invariably follow the sociogenesis of terrorism as a whole.
Section 2: The sociogenesis of terrorism in nineteenth century Britain as part of inter- and intra-state processes

Introduction: The case for a sociogenetic approach to the study of terrorism

Having examined a sample of the multitude of theories on what terrorism is and what is said to cause it, and found that there are still large gaps left in our knowledge about the problem and that research on terrorism should be consider as part of wider terrorism figurations, the following section seeks to address some of these failings, and details how competitive inter- and intra-state struggles between the British establishment and its rivals during the nineteenth century have played a central part in the development of terrorism directed against Britain and its interests. As already discussed, inter- and intra-state struggles are understood as specific manifestations of more general established-outsider processes and relationships and these were fundamental to British terrorism figurations during the nineteenth century, as will be outlined below.

Following the introduction to this section, the chapter on terrorism and the 1789 French Revolution examines the sociogenesis of the concept of terrorism and its derivatives (terrorist and terrorists) from the time they were first coined during that first French Revolution. This is done through an examination of when the concept first emerged within the context of revolution in France and the subsequent wars between France, Britain and other European states. Against this background, the chapter sets out the relationship between the concepts of terrorism and civilisation, arguing that they were born of interrelated movements in the eighteenth century. The chapter then goes on to discuss how the concept of terrorism began to be understood and used in antithesis to civilisation in the context of Britain’s relationship with France and the latter’s revolutionaries.

Subsequent chapters in this section examine the part played by other inter- and intra-state processes in the sociogenesis of terrorism in relation to Britain, and focus on Britain’s relationship with Ireland, domestic trades unions and related reform movements, and revolutionary and reform movements across Europe. There are a number of core processes focused on in this section that form parts of Britain’s nineteenth century inter- and intra-state relations and include the antithesis between terrorism and civilisation, functional democratisation and other established-outsider figurations on a variety of levels. As part of this, the changing use of the concept of terrorism by the British establishment to stigmatis, dehumanise and delegitimise outsider groups that were regarded as enemies, and with which Britain was usually entangled in violent power struggles, is traced. A regularity throughout the nineteenth century with respect to British terrorism figurations is that terrorism is often associated with revolution and the threat or potential threat of revolution (Land, 2008:3). This, of course, is unsurprising, as the term was first coined during the 1789 French Revolution.
These chapters are not a history of nineteenth century terrorism since the first French Revolution. There are a number excellent texts that chart this development, which have been drawn upon to aid this thesis. It is, rather, a historical / sociological examination of the power relations and social structures involved in the sociogenesis of the concept of terrorism in the context of Britain or in other words how Britain’s inter- and intra-state relations have been central to the development of terrorism directed against the country.

Nevertheless, a major difference between a sociological approach that examines long-term processes and an historical approach is that many historians tend to focus on specific blocks of history with little attention placed on what might link these blocks of history to others. According to Elias (2007: 152), any linkage tends to lack adequate levels of detachment to the extent that historians have a tendency to project the standards and values of their own time onto people of the past. He says:

‘Nothing is more common than historians sitting in judgement over people of former times, whilst using as a yardstick values of their own time. They thus give the impression that no essential differences, no changes in the level of development, exist anywhere between pre-history and the present.’ (Elias, 2007: 152).

The fact that many historians focus on specific blocks of history means they only tend to examine short-term history with a relatively short time-span. This means, along with their tendency to project their own standards onto the past, that on the one hand, they are unable to account for long-term developmental changes, and on the other, that their work becomes untestable. Elias (2007: 152) points out that historians are able to uncover large quantities of factual evidence but that their narratives of the past are at a low-level of synthesis and as such are rarely testable.

He (2007: 154) goes on to argue that, conversely, a sociological approach requires a greater degree of detachment and higher level of synthesis. This means that research should be focused on longer-term developments, which tend to concentrate on timeframes beyond the scope of most work undertaken by historians. Dunning and Hughes (2013: 73) point out that each person born is unique, unrepeatable and rapidly changing but that they form relatively persistent figurations with each other. As such, they add that failing to recognise this and to tackle historical processes in a detached long-term way leads to a waste of effort:

‘This is rarely recognised by the institutionalised establishment of historians, argued Elias, and it perpetuates both the inherent individualism of their approach and their feelings of superiority relative to newcomers such as sociologists. This leads to a terrible waste of human effort in the sense that each generation feels an urge to rewrite history in the sense of historians continually revisiting the same topics and events, bringing with them new values, new axes to grind, new sensitivities and new biases but with little sense of the need for incremental knowledge.’ (Dunning and Hughes, 2013: 73).

The point, therefore, is that a historical or developmental sociological approach can produce knowledge that has a higher degree of reality congruence and is also testable. Accordingly, an investigation of the ‘sociogenesis’ of the concept of terrorism can reveal a great deal, including how normative uses of the concept have developed over time, and at the same time uncovers some of the wider structural processes (such as inter- and intra-state phenomena) at play that, at least in part, contribute to what is understood to be terrorism in normative senses. Such an approach avoids essentialising terrorism, as many mainstream terrorism theories tend to, and at the same time steers
a course clear of more highly relativistic understandings of terrorism that, as we saw, are often evident in social constructivist and post-structuralist approaches. The approach used here does not reduce terrorism to things like substances on the one hand, and on the other recognises that terrorism relates to real and observable processes and relationships, rather than as something that exists solely within or predominantly within discourse and language – in other words, people who are designated as terrorists often act according to those designations and this thesis seeks to understand some of the processes and relationships involved.

The section draws its analysis from time-series data from The Times newspaper every five years from 1790 (with a few exceptions), the nineteenth century radical press, Hansard and other literary and newspaper sources. The reason for this is that newspaper and government records provide good access to the development of long-term social processes. In addition, The Times newspaper can be said to represent, more or less, the views and beliefs of established groups in Britain, as, of course, does Hansard. The radical press represents the views and beliefs of the industrial working classes, which at the time were gaining greater power chances than had been the case previously. The chapter also attempts to develop an understanding of the sociogenesis of terrorism in Britain by drawing heavily on the work of Elias and his concepts of civilising processes and established-outsider figurations, as well as other related figurational concepts.

**Document research and the figurational approach**

Newspaper reports, Hansard and other official government reports are very specific kinds of documents in that they are, in many respects, created to consciously document human experiences. Of course, they have other functions too, such as to entertain, help in the careers of the authors, to influence audiences and so on, making them multi-functional. But documents are more than simply records of what they are pertaining to describe and report. They are much more, and are, in fact parts of wider social processes and therefore figurations. For example, a newspaper report describing a particular terrorist incident on the one hand may provide a factual account of what happened such as who the terrorists were, what they did, where and when they did it and how they did it but at the same time it shows that terrorism is something worth reporting – readers will find it interesting, it will sell newspapers, it is something that reporters and editors know they have to cover as part of their professional standards and career progression. At the same time, the report may show the wider political affiliations of the reporter, and the readers and newspaper. More specifically in relation to this thesis reports can unveil some of the language and relationships involved between established and outsider groups. To be specific, if The Times newspaper is writing for certain established groups, then this can show how those groups regard certain outsider groups, and in particular, those they label as terrorists.

From the above, one can see that, a figurational approach to documental analysis takes into account the myriad of relationships and interdependencies that each document may be a part of. Accordingly, a central question in this regard is to ask: how did this document come about? Or what are the social relationships involved in the creation of this or that document? (Hughes, in press) These are
specifically sociogenetic questions that allow for the development of long-term processes, in this case terrorism. Taken together, the documents that inform this thesis, are on the one-hand, related to one another in a number of ways – many are from the same publication (The Times or Hansard); they are written by and for established groups; and terrorism is at least a part of their focus, to name a few. As such, the time-series data that the documents provide allow for a developmental approach to the questions arising when exploring the sociogenesis of terrorism in relation to Britain. At the same time, they also help in perhaps revealing long-term patterns of terrorism in relation to Britain, and the position of each report therefore becomes important and can show changing patterns, especially through the way in which the reports can be seen as connected to each other. Accordingly, in a figurational sense, documents are far more than simply records of events but should be viewed as being intrinsic parts of the social world, dynamic interdependencies and the social conditions within/under which they came about.

The etymology of the concepts of terrorism and terrorist.

Before going into detail about the role of the French Revolution in relation to the development of Britain-related terrorism figurations, it will be useful to explore, briefly, the etymology of the words terrorism and terrorists. The word terrorism and its derivatives (terrorist and terrorists) first appeared in France and England around the time of the Jacobin ascendency and Maximilien Robespierre’s *regime de la terreur* (reign of terror) during the first French Revolution. It is derived from the much older word *terror*, which has its roots in Latin. *The Barnhart Concise Dictionary of Etymology (1995)* lists the words as follows:

Terror (v) About 1375 *terroure* great fear, borrowed from Old French *terreur*, learned borrowing from Latin *terror* great fear, dread, from *terrere* fill with fear, frighten, terrify; for suffix see – OR. Latin *terrere* is cognate with Old Irish *tarrach* timid, Greek *trein* to tremble, flee, Lithuanian *trisa* tremble, Latvian *triset* to tremble, and Sanscrit *trasati* (he) trembles from Indo-European *ters/-tres-* from original *teres* (Pok.1095).

Terrorism (n) 1795, government by intimidation in the Reign of Terror (1793-94) during the French Revolution; borrowing from the French *terrorisme* (Latin *terror* terror + French *isme* –ism). The general sense of systematic use of terror as a policy is first recorded in English in 1798.

Terrorist (n) 1795, person connected with the Reign of Terror during the French Revolution, in the Annual Register; borrowing of French *terroriste*. (Latin *terror* + French –*iste* –ist). The sense of one who furthers his cause by the use of terror is first recorded in English in 1866, in connection with the activities of extreme radical or revolutionary groups in Russia.9

One of the significant changes in language highlighted by *The Barnhart Concise Dictionary of Etymology (1995)* is the placing of the suffixes ‘ism’ and ‘ist’ on the end of the verb terror as this creates two new nouns. At the same time, it relates to a more general development in language to categorise and describe what people were experiencing as societies that were becoming increasingly more complex. According to *The Barnhart Concise Dictionary of Etymology (1995)* the use of the suffix ‘ism’ increased greatly in the 1500s in England. The dictionary lists ‘ism’ and ‘ist’ as follows:

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9 It must be noted briefly that the research on which this thesis is based suggest that the last point in *The Barnhart Concise Dictionary of Etymology (1995)* – that the sense of one who furthers his cause by the use of terror being first recorded in English in 1866 – is not fully correct. There are many instances in newspapers and other sources that record this kind of meaning as appearing much earlier.
-ism a suffix forming nouns and meaning: 1 act or practice of ..., as in baptism. 2 quality or condition of being ..., as in heroism, paganism. 3 illustration or instance of being ..., as in witticism. 4 an unhealthy condition caused by ..., as in alcoholism. 5 doctrine, theory, system, or practice of ..., as in Darwinism. Borrowed through French –isme or directly from -ismus -isma, from Greek -ismos -isma, a suffix forming nouns of action from verbs in -izein -ize. Compare IST. Forms of the suffix were active in both Greek and Latin, and many words containing this suffix and later French terms were later borrowed directly into English. The suffix in English became very active from the 1500s on.

-ist borrowed from French -iste or from Latin -ista, from Greek -istes, noun suffix for verbs in –izein. The suffix –ist is related to –ism in meaning and form, but its development in English concerns about meaning, where after the extension of its use by the early Christian writers for ecclesiastical and scriptural terms, its extension became so wide that its use, if not its meaning, approaches the suffix –er for agent nouns. Where –ist at one time indicated probable presence of a verb in –ize, the case can no longer be made.

The increased use of these suffixes in the 1500s represents, in a small way, part of a transformation that European societies were undergoing in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. That is, the greater use of suffixes, which are specifically used to create words that categorise, shows that there was, at the time of the increase in their use a greater social need for categorisation, as more emphasis was being placed upon detached forms of thinking in conjunction with increasingly longer and more complex chains of interdependency, and a broadening of the social division of functions in England, Europe and globally. In other words, the increased use of suffixes like ‘ism’ and ‘ist’ form part of a wider process of ‘scientificisation’. The words terrorism and terrorist are, therefore, parts of a process intended to generate better understanding of human affairs and therefore, to categorise particular forms of social behaviour. However, they were not developed within a vacuum of rational thought but within the cauldron of inter- and intra-state rivalries and conflict.

Elias suggested that the significance of the development of the suffixes ‘ism’ and ‘ist’, and their use as parts of words intended to convey new social ideals. He said:

‘To most of those living today, the fact that people have social ideals is so familiar that they no longer ask for the specific social conditions which make it possible and meaningful for people to have social ideals. Most people are so involved, directly or indirectly, leisurely or intensely, in open or hidden struggles for their own or against other people’s social ideals that they no longer ask what are the social functions of social creeds and ideals as such?

‘One can see the problem better if one looks back to the age of the early sociologists. In their time, social ideals such as liberalism, conservatism, radicalism, socialism, communism and others appeared as something new. It was the [19th century] first century of the great ‘isms’. The social beliefs which played so large a part in the approaches to society of the early sociologists were not necessarily identical with the nascent mass beliefs of their age, but although often more sophisticated, they were functionally related to them. One of the main levers for the study of society undertaken by the early sociologists was their desire to contribute, with the help of their studies, to the clarification of the aims, the programmes of action, the banners behind which social groups in society at large marched and rallied in their concerns with each other. One of the main motives in studying the past development of society was that of proving scientifically with the help of factual evidence that one’s aims for the future were right.’ (Elias, 2009:65-66)

As Elias mentioned, there were different social groups in the nineteenth century that had different ideals, which were often represented by words ending in ‘ism’. These social groups developed concepts and words to represent in some ways the antitheses of their social ideals, and among those terms would have been words such as ‘barbarism’ and ‘terrorism’. These two examples would have performed specific functions in helping to define the social positions of the groups deploying them, as well as the social positions of their enemies and rivals, as they saw them. The concept of terrorism developed as part of a social need to categorise specific kinds of enemies by established groups.
Those enemies often tended to be groups who were opposed to the establishment, such as working class organisations, groups from colonised countries, rival nation-states and so on.
Chapter 4: The development of the concept of terrorism in antithesis to the concept of civilisation

Through the above discussion of the etymology of the words terrorism and terrorist, it has been established that, as far as we currently understand the issue, the concepts first emerged in the period during and immediately after the 1789 French Revolution. It seems that the terms terrorism and terrorists were first used by and in relation to Maximilien Robespierre and his Jacobins as they implemented what they called the regime de la terreur (reign of terror) in 1793-94. Laqueur (2001: 6) points out that a French dictionary published in 1796 suggests that the Jacobins initially used the terms in a ‘positive’ sense to describe themselves during the reign of terror. However, after the ‘Thermidorian reaction’ and the fall of Robespierre in July 1794, the terms terrorism and terrorist began to be used in a negative way. According to Laqueur, the word terrorism was used in the Dictionnaire de l’Académie Française in 1798 and meant a ‘système’ or ‘régime de la terreur’, which of course referred to the actions of Robespierre and his followers. Laqueur wrote:

‘...[T]he meaning of terrorism was given in the 1798 supplement of the Dictionnaire de l’Académie Française as système, régime de la terreur. According to a French dictionary published in 1796, the Jacobins had on occasion used the term when speaking and writing about themselves in a positive sense; after the 9th of Thermidor, terrorist became a term of abuse with criminal implications.’ (Laqueur, 2001:6).

During his brief rule, Robespierre claimed that ‘Terror’ was a legitimate and virtuous aid to ruling. The aim of the régime de la terreur was to intimidate, and in many cases put to death those thought to oppose the Revolution, and to help consolidate the power of the revolutionaries. Robespierre in 1794 suggested: ‘...[V]irtue, without which terror is evil; terror, without which virtue is helpless... Terror is nothing but justice, prompt, severe and inflexible; it is therefore an emanation of virtue.’ (1794, cited in Hoffman, 2006: 3).

Political scientists, Gérard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin (2007:101), point out that the apparatus which helped enable the régime de la terreur was set up early on in the Revolution, in 1789. The Comité des recherché, they say, was created to uncover counter-revolutionary conspiracies. It was the precursor to the Comité de sûreté générale, which was instigated to administer the régime de la terreur. They point out the following:

‘The Terror was...part and parcel of the Revolution: ‘Launched to exterminate the aristocracy, the Terror had become a tool for crushing villains and fighting crime,’ Gueniffey observes. ‘It had become an integral component of the Revolution, inseparable from it, because only terror could ultimately bring about a republic of citizens...If the Republic of free citizens was not yet possible, it was men, warped by their history, remained evil; through Terror, the Revolution—history as yet unwritten and brand-new—would make a new kind of man.’ (Chaliand and Blin, 2007: 102)

11 Of course the word used here by Robespierre is “terror”. The terms terrorism and terrorist were, however, also used at the same time by the French and the English to describe the régime de la terreur and its protagonists.
What Chaliand and Blin are describing is what today is often designated as state terrorism. As such, it is unsurprising that many terrorism theorists refer to the reign of terror as an example of this kind of state violence.

**Revolution and civilisation**

In addition, the new kind of man referred to by Chaliand and Blin was a more ‘virtuous’, ‘reasoned’ and ‘civilised’ man. In fact, Robespierre’s claim that terror emanates from virtue helps to show that there is a direct connection between the concepts of ‘civilisation’ and ‘terrorism’ through their relationship to the idea of virtue and the French reform movement. Crucially, as Elias (2000) pointed out, shortly after the Revolution the concept of ‘civilisation’ moved to the foreground as a ‘rallying cry’ for French aspirations and colonisation. But the concept was not one of the slogans of the Revolution, unlike Robespierre’s famous line about the virtues of terror. However, the concept of ‘civilisation’ was still closely linked to the Revolution. The term was first coined in the second half of the eighteenth century prior to the Revolution by the French Physiocrat, Victor Mirabeau (otherwise known as the elder Mirabeau and whose son – Honoré Mirabeau – was a revolutionary) as part of the moderate opposition movement against the **ancien regime**. It was, as Elias (2000: 38) has explained, part of a more general social criticism of governments’ irrationalities in the face of social dynamics, at a time when the Physiocrats began to regard societies as having their own internal dynamics and that kings, governments and rulers were unable to regulate all human affairs, and as such, they argued, a more rational form of governing was required.

The development of the word ‘civilisation’, according to Elias (2000: 39), involved a ‘transformation of the earlier civilisé into a noun, helping to give a meaning that transcended individual usage.’ He suggested (2000:39) that Mirabeau contended that ‘genuine civilization’ stood between ‘barbarism’ and a ‘false, decadent civilization’ and that it was the role of a more ‘rational’ government to steer a course between the two. He went on to say that the concept of civilisation increased in usage as the reform movement in France gained pace. It was the case, however, that reformist middle-class thinkers in France who were using the term ‘civilisation’ understood it as something not complete and that needed to be taken further. They thought that the masses needed to be civilised. Elias argued:

‘...[I]n the hands of the rising middle class, in the mouth of the reform movement, the idea of what was needed to make a society civilized was extended. The civilizing of the state, the constitution and education, and therefore the liberation of broader sections of the population from all that was still barbaric or irrational in existing conditions, whether it were the legal penalties or the class restrictions on the bourgeoisie or the barriers impeding a freer development of trade, this civilizing must follow the refinement of manners and the internal pacification of the country by the kings.’ (Elias, 2000: 41-42).

A key part of the Physiocrats’ concept of civilisation was the ideal of virtue, which, as Elias (2000:433) points out, the emerging bourgeoisie counter-posed to the courtly frivolity of the courtly-aristocratic upper class. In addition, as we have seen, Robespierre claimed that virtue was helpless without

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13 Elias (2000:34) points out, in the Civilizing Process, that in its earliest manifestation, the concept of civilisation tended to refer to the sensibilities of the courtly ruling classes, such as the “softening of manners, politeness and suchlike.” This was what Mirabeau was referring to as a false decadent civilisation. Its meaning was to change when it was adopted as a watchword for the self-consciousness of the bourgeoisie, and in conjunction with their rising power potential.
'terror', and, in fact, that terror emanated from virtue. As such, for him, terrorism was a way of implementing and defending many of the values that had come under the umbrella of civilisation. Discussing the sociogenesis of this concept, Elias quotes Mirabeau on how he linked the concept of civilisation to virtue:

‘If they were asked what civilization is, most people would answer: softening of manners, urbanity, politeness, and a dissemination of knowledge such that propriety is established in place of laws of detail: all that only presents me with the mask of virtue and not its face, and civilization does nothing for society if it does not give it both the form and the substance of virtue.’ (Mirabeau, 1760s cited in Elias, 2000: 34).

It is clear, therefore, that the concepts of civilisation and terrorism were born of the same movements – the related French reform and revolutionary movements of the latter half of the eighteenth century. The two concepts, at birth, were inextricably linked. However, whereas civilisation referred to a gradual process, terrorism or the régime de la terreur was much more closely related to the most violent and radical aspects of the Revolution and in fact was used as a system to help force reform during some of the bloodiest years of the Revolution. In this sense, the two concepts are quite dissimilar: ‘civilisation’ meaning a gradual reform and ‘terrorism’ being a system with which to implement revolutionary reform, albeit in order to ‘civilise’ the population.

Elias (2000:42) points out that, as the Revolution became more moderate, in the years immediately after the régime de la terreur, ‘civilisation’ came to be used as a ‘rallying cry throughout the world’. He points out:

‘In 1789, as Napoleon set off for Egypt, he shouted to his troops: ‘Soldiers, you are undertaking a conquest with incalculable consequences for civilization.’ Unlike the situation when the concept was formed, from now on nations came to consider the process of civilization as completed within their own societies; they came to see themselves as bearers of an existing or finished civilization to others, as standard bearers of expanding civilization.’ (Elias, 2000: 43).

Napoleon’s Egypt mission can be regarded as one of the earliest examples, other than those already undertaken in France itself during the Revolution, of what have been referred to as ‘civilising offensives’, whereby established groups seek, often through violent means, to impose what they regard as civilisation on groups they see as inferior and barbaric. This concept will be expanded on further in subsequent chapters but it may be useful to consider here the idea that Robespierre’s régime de la terreur, his terrorism, might be counted as a ‘civilising offensive’. In this sense, Robespierre was seeking to civilise the French people through terrorism. In addition, the backlash against European civilising missions by rebellious peoples who had been colonised has often been referred to as terrorism. This helps to highlight how the concepts of civilisation and terrorism have remained bound together since their inception – taken from the perspective of established groups in Western Europe, rebellious, colonised peoples were committing terrorism against civilisation. More will be discussed about the sociogenesis of terrorism in relation to the British Empire later.

Britain, terrorism and France

The first French Revolution had and still has, even today, profound effects across Europe and the world, with its influence being most obvious throughout the nineteenth century. This included a
significant impact on Britain, which among its population, included supporters and detractors of the revolutionaries. As such, the relationships that groups in Britain had with the French Revolution played an important role in the sociogenesis of the concept of terrorism, which was developed unintentionally as part of established-outsider figurations between competing English and French groups at the time. The Marxist historian, Eric Hobsbawm, suggested the huge influence the Revolution had outside of France:

‘...European (or indeed world) politics between 1789 and 1917 were largely the struggle for and against the principles of 1789, or even the more incendiary ones of 1793. France provided the vocabulary and the issues of liberal and radical-democratic politics for most of the world. France provided the first great example, the concept and vocabulary of nationalism. France provided the codes of law, the model of scientific and technical organization, the metric system of measurement for most countries. The ideology of the modern world first penetrated the ancient civilizations which had hitherto resisted European ideas through French influence. This was the work of the French Revolution.’ (Hobsbawm, 2011: 73-74).

These are important points by Hobsbawm but they arguably tend to give too much credence to the Revolution instead of exploring other movements and processes, including the French reform and other similar movements across Europe, as well as civilising processes more generally. Nonetheless, the Revolution was perhaps one of the most explicit manifestations at the time in Europe of the evening up of power differentials between social groups. In fact, it was one of the clearest signs of the processes of functional democratisation at work. That is, the power differentials between, for the most part, the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie in France had come to a point where the latter was able to challenge and defeat the former.

Returning to Hobsbawm's points, much of what he describes falls under the umbrella of 'civilisation', such as codes of law and scientific and technological organisation. Equally, and as part of the influence the French Revolution has had over Europe is the influence that the idea of 'civilisation' has had for the world. As such, the belief that Europeans had of their 'civilisation', and therefore, their sense of greater human worth, helped to justify their colonial expansion into 'uncivilised' parts of the world.

As mentioned, Britain was heavily influenced by the 1789 French Revolution and related reform movements. However, at the end of the eighteenth century, in Britain, opinion about the Revolution was divided between those who supported its emancipatory aims (and in some cases wished for a similar revolution in Britain), and those who rejected it and were fearful of its influence across Europe. The latter tended to be more supportive of the old aristocratic order. Nonetheless, according to the historian Gregory Claeys (2007:5-6) there was no credible threat of a similar revolution happening in Britain throughout the period during and immediately after the first French Revolution and throughout the subsequent Napoleonic wars. This was despite a number of naval mutinies, the United Irishmen uprising in 1798 and various other conspiracies.

However, Claeys argues that, in the 1790s, a significant section of the British population sought reforms of what they considered to be a corrupt ruling class, which they saw as decadent and without virtue, and there was a belief that rights ought to be extended further down the social scale. But war with France made supporting revolution in Britain significantly more difficult due to nationalist and
patriotic sentiments. In addition, says Claeys, Britain was, by the standards of the rest of Europe, wealthier and afforded its citizens a greater degree of liberty, which again dampened any potential revolutionary fervour. Nevertheless, Claeys believes that the French Revolution had a lasting and ‘civilising’ effect on Britain. He states:

‘Official rejection of the Revolution’s principles was long lasting: the government would refuse to permit its ambassador to attend celebrations of the centenary of the Revolution in 1889. But Britain would eventually expand and amend its constitution to encompass virtually all that most [British] reformers in the 1790s had demanded, and for some later Victorian liberals – at any rate Francophile liberals – the Revolution could be seen indeed to herald ‘a new phase of civilisation...a movement of the human race towards a completer humanity.’ Far from having failed, then, the much castigated ‘Jacobins’ of the 1790s laid the foundations for that political and social democratisation of Britain, and the elimination of feudal institutions...’ (Claeys, 2007: 6-7).

Britain and the concept of civilisation.

The roots of the concept of terrorism are clearly in France, as are the roots of the concept of civilisation. However, in order to trace the sociogenesis of the concept of terrorism in Britain it is necessary briefly to set out the development of the concept of civilisation in Britain too, because, as mentioned, the two concepts stand in antithesis to each other but at the same time are closely related. Accordingly, the development of the concept of civilisation was not limited to France. It also developed among the establishments in other Western European countries from the end of the eighteenth century, including Britain. It did not, however, develop in other countries in isolation from each other. Ruling groups across Europe shared much in common and therefore, there was a great deal of cross-fertilisation of ideas, language (primarily French) manners, and customs among them. However, the forms of civilisation varied according to the structural peculiarities of each country.

Jonathan Fletcher (1997: 9), points out that the concept of civilisation developed in England in much the same way that it did in France and that civilisation in England refers to political, economic, technical and other social facts that originally expressed the social situation of the ruling elite of the aristocracy and parts of the bourgeoisie. Expanding on this, Elias pointed out how the process of civilisation developed in England. He said:

‘In the making of [the] English code features of aristocratic descent fused with those of middle-class descent – understandably, for in the development of English society one can observe a continuous assimilating process in the course of which upper-class models (especially a code of good manners) were adopted in a modified form by middle-class people, while middle-class features (as for instance elements of a code of morals) were adopted by upper-class people. Hence, when, in the course of the nineteenth century, most of the aristocratic privileges were abolished, and England with the rise of the industrial working classes became a nation-state, the English national code of conduct and affect-control showed very clearly the gradualness of the resolution of conflicts between upper and middle classes in the form, to put it briefly, of a peculiar blend between a code of good manners and a code of morals.’ (Elias, 2000: 428).

It is at least partially the case that the resolution of conflicts between the upper and middle classes in Britain over a gradual timeframe helped to immunise Britain from potential revolution in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. However, the context of the French Revolution and the debates in Britain over its merits need to be understood, for the purposes here, in relation to the great historic rivalry between France and Britain. The enmity between the two countries and the pre-nation-state territories that were to become Britain and France, stretches back many hundreds of years. These rivalries, which included the so-called ‘Hundred Years War’ and the ‘Second Hundred Years War’, played a major part in the development of the two distinct nation-states and, by the time the
boundaries of France and Britain had become more or less fixed in their current geographies, and by the time of the French Revolution, the two were great rivals not only on the European stage but on the world stage. Therefore, the way in which the British ruling elites viewed the Revolution must be understood in this context of long-term rivalries and conflict. In fact, in the years just prior to the Revolution, there was a growing sense in France of imminent war with Britain. Elias (2000: 40) points out that, among the middle-class reformist circles in France there was a great deal of support for America's Declaration of Independence from Britain in 1776. There was also support for American independence among certain sections of the middle-class elites in Britain, too.

War between Britain and France broke out while the French Revolution was at its height, shortly after the execution of Louis XVI and just before Robespierre’s régime de la terreur, in 1793 and lasted until 1802. The war was a direct result of the Revolution, which France had to defend at home and was attempting to export abroad.

Supporters of the French Revolution in Britain

As mentioned, in Britain there was a great deal of support for the French Revolution and its principles to begin with. Claeys points out that, at first, the sentiment in Britain was on the whole positive towards the Revolution, and he argues that many philosophers regarded it as a victory for reason and that virtue would replace the corruption of the old regime. He suggests:

‘Two groups in particular linked their own causes to this enthusiasm. Dissenters from the Established Church had long rattled the chains of civil and political disability clamped upon them after the restoration in 1660, when they were punished for supporting the overthrow of Charles I...Secondly, radical Whigs and political reformers, already inspired by the American Revolution, and alarmed by ministerial incompetence in the pursuit of a lengthy and unpopular war against the ex-colonists, welcomed French efforts to reduce arbitrary privileges and to extend the franchise.’ (Claeys, 2007: 9)

The prominent Whig, Charles James Fox, is perhaps one of the best known politicians who supported the Revolution. Hobsbawm (2011: 103) backs up the view that there was a great deal of support for the Revolution in Britain from educated elites, including poets such as ‘Wordsworth, Blake, Coleridge, Robert Burns and Southey’; scientists including the chemist ‘Joseph Priestly and several members of the distinguished Birmingham Lunar Society’; ‘technologists and industrialists like Wilkinson, the ironmaster, and Thomas Telford, the engineer’. Other notable supporters included Thomas Paine and Mary Wollstonecraft.

Opposition to the French Revolution in Britain

Despite this support, the most powerful established political and military groups in European countries saw the French Revolutionaries as enemies. The official government stance in Britain, including that of King George III, was opposed to what was happening across the channel. This is borne out by the wars during that period between France and Britain and other European powers. During the nine-year period of the war, Britain had been allied against the French at various times with Austria, Holland, most of Italy, Prussia, Russia and Spain. As such, the attitudes of the British establishment towards France and the Revolution have to be taken in the context of these wars. As has been shown, these
attitudes differed from outright support of the Revolution to total opposition. The official British government line was the latter and this is best exemplified by the famous Whig politician Edmund Burke. Burke can also be credited as one of the earliest examples by a member of the British establishment as using the word ‘terrorist(s)’.

**Edmund Burke, the French Revolution and terrorism**

Burke was no supporter of the old aristocratic order but at the same time regarded the French revolutionaries as tyrannical, and even went as far as describing revolutionary France as a barbarian power that could no longer be accepted among Europe’s civilised states. For Burke, the revolutionaries were totally uncivilised, whereas, for him civilisation did exist in the old order. Burke was critical of the Revolution from early on and makes this clear in 1790 in his *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (2009). In 1795, when discussing the revolutionaries in a letter to the Earl Fitzwilliam, Burke refers to events in 1793 and says:

‘The Constitution of 1790 was universally received. The Constitution, which followed it, under the name of the Convention, was universally submitted to. The Constitution of 1793 was universally accepted. Unluckily, this year’s Constitution, which was formed and its genethliacon sung by the noble Author while it was yet in embryo, or was but just come bloody from the womb, is the only one in its very formation has been generally resisted by a very great and powerful party in many parts of the kingdom, and particularly in the Capital. It never had a popular choice even in show. Those who arbitrarily erected the new building out of the old materials of their own Convention, were obliged to send for an Army to support their work. Like brave Gladiators, they fought it out in the streets of Paris, and even massacred each other in their House of Assembly in the most edifying manner, and for the entertainment and instruction of their Excellencies the Foreign Ambassadors, who had a box in this constitutional Amphitheatre of a free people.

‘At length, after a terrible struggle, the troops prevailed over the Citizens. The Citizen Soldiers, the ever famed National Guards, who had disposed and murdered their Sovereign, were disarmed by the inferior trumpeters of that Rebellion. Twenty thousand regular troops garrison Paris. Thus a complete Military Government is formed. It has the strength, and it may count on the stability of that kind of power. This power is to last as long as the Parisians think proper. Every other ground of stability, but from military force and terreur, is clean out of the question. To secure them further, they have a strong corps of irregulars, ready armed. Thousands of those Hell-hounds called Terrorists, whom they had shut up in Prison on their last Revolution, as the Satellites of Tyranny, are let loose on the people. The whole of their Government, in its origination, in its continuance, in all its actions, and in all its resources, is force; and nothing but force. A forced constitution, a forced election, a forced subsistence, a forced requisition of soldiers, a forced loan of money.

‘They differ nothing from all the preceding usurpations, but that to the same odium a good deal more contempt is added. In this situation, notwithstanding all their military force, strengthened with the undisciplined power of the Terrorists, and the general disarming of Paris, there would almost certainly have been before this an insurrection against them...’ (Burke, 1999: 358-359).

Burke was speaking in 1795 during which time war between Britain and France was at its height. His comments, however, were in the context of a potential peace-making with France, which he called ‘a Regicide peace’ after the fact that the revolutionaries had executed Louis XVI. When speaking of France in this context, Burke was clearly speaking of an enemy. His opposition to the Revolution more generally and especially the tactics used by the Jacobins during the *régime de la terreur* compounds this. It would seem to contemporary eyes that his use of the term terrorists adds to the other stigmatising words he uses to describe the revolutionaries, such as hell-hounds, robbers and murderers. However, closer inspection reveals that he is simply using the term that the Jacobins used to describe a certain section of their enforcers of the Revolution. In fact, as Laqueur (2001: 6) points
out, it seems at that time that the word terrorists did not have quite the pejorative notions that it was later to take on.

There were, however, a great many instances in which Burke used stigmatising, delegitimising and dehumanising language to describe the revolutionaries. For example, in the above quote, he calls them ‘Hell-hounds’. Elsewhere he calls them ‘regicides’, ‘robbers’, ‘murderers’, ‘ruffians’, ‘thieves’, ‘assassins’ and describes their actions as ‘crimes’ and ‘savage’. In addition, Burke stated the following opinion of the Revolutionary Committee in Paris:

‘The Costume of the Sansculotte Constitution of 1793 was absolutely insufferable. The Committee for Foreign Affairs were such slovens, and stunk so abominably, that no Muscadin Ambassador of the smallest degree of delicacy of nerves could come within ten yards of them...’ (Burke, 1999: 339).

Burke’s claims that his French revolutionary enemies smelled badly is an example of a commonly used attempt at stigmatising outsider groups by established groups. For example, in the eighteenth century during efforts to differentiate themselves from bourgeois groups, aristocrats would often refer to something they disapproved of as having the stench of the bourgeoisie. The claim that outsider groups are unclean is discussed by Elias. He (1994: xxvii) points out that when the power margins between established and outsider groups are great enough, established groups tend to experience outsiders as ‘unruly breakers of norms’ and as unclean. In addition, he adds that there is a widespread feeling among established groups in this context, that contact with outsiders will contaminate them with both dirt and anomie ‘rolled into one’.

This can be seen in the relationship between Burke, the social group he represented and the French revolutionaries, which was complex and multilayered, but nevertheless, represented a clear example of the deployment of stigmatising language in the context of an established-outsider figuration. Burke’s enemies, the Sansculottes (literally translated as without knee breeches), according to Hobsbawm (2011: 84) were an urban movement mostly from the labouring poor, and included small-scale entrepreneurs, craftsmen, artisans and shopkeepers. They organised themselves through the ‘sections’ of Paris and political clubs. They were, says Hobsbawm (2011: 84), ‘the main striking force of the Revolution – the actual demonstrators, rioters, constructors of barricades’.

Hobsbawm (2011: 84) points out that the Sansculottes, in terms of social stratification, existed between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat but were generally poor. As such, they represented an outsider group in relation to Burke who was a member of the established political elite in Britain. In this sense, there would have been a significantly large power differential between groups that Burke belonged to and the Sansculottes. But established-outsider figurations, in this case, extend even further, in that Burke was a member of the English Parliament, and the Sansculottes were French, meaning that, for Burke the Sansculottes were outsiders in two ways – because they were of a lower social standing and because they were foreigners, ie French.

However, this only partially helps to explain the established-outsider figurations that existed between members of the British political elite like Burke and the Sansculottes. As has already been made clear, France and Britain were great rivals and, as such, there were complex established-outsider
figurations involved in the relationships between the two countries, and on the part of which stigmatising language was often employed. In this case, however, the power differentials were relatively small. Given this, the increased power potential of the Sansculottes during the Revolution, although not huge, was enough to even up the balance a little between them and the British political elites of which Burke was a member.

Therefore, Burke’s claim that the Sansculottes ‘stank’ can be seen as an attempt to stigmatise an outsider group that was gaining relatively greater power-potential in relation to Burke’s established British political elite, which shared a great deal more in common with members of the French nobility and higher echelons of the French bourgeoisie, such as the Noblesse de Robe and the Noblesse d’épée. In this sense functional democratisation was occurring across nation-states, as well as within them. In On the Process of Civilization (2012), Elias discusses how the upper class used similar stigmatising tactics when they were under pressure from below by the bourgeoisie. With respect to the upper classes Elias points out that: ‘Anything that touches their embarrassment-threshold smells bourgeois, is socially inferior; and inversely, anything bourgeois touches their embarrassment-threshold.’ (Elias, 2000: 422)

The idea that a social group has a particularly bad smell, and one that clearly signifies inferiority, highlights how significant the label of uncleanness is in stigmatisation processes. As has already been made clear, Burke’s attempts at stigmatising the revolutionaries did not stop at claiming that they smelt. He also regarded them as criminals. In 1793, he wrote that the revolutionaries were the ‘most dreadful gang of robbers and murderers that were ever embodied’ (1999: 55).

It is clear that Burke found the revolutionaries to be uncivilised and the language he uses against them is a clear attempt to devalue their human worth and legitimacy. This is significant for a number of reasons, not least because, although civilisation was not one of the watchwords of the Revolution, its close relationship to the concept of virtue, which was, shows that, on the one hand, the French revolutionaries saw their revolution as an extension of virtue (and therefore ‘civilisation’) but on the other hand, powerful members of the British establishment regarded their actions as the opposite of civilised behaviour. In other words, who is civilised depends on which side one is on – the revolutionaries regarded themselves as civilised, yet a large proportion of the British establishment, including Burke saw them as barbaric. For example, in discussing the difference between the state of affairs in Paris during the Revolution and the court society of France’s past, Burke shows that he sees the current revolutionary situation as uncivilised in comparison with the past. He suggested:

‘Here it is impossible that a sentiment of tenderness should not strike the sternness of politicks, and make us recall to painful memory the difference between this insolent and bloody theatre, and the temperate, natural majesty of a civilized court, where the afflicted family of Asgill did not in vain solicit the mercy of the highest in rank, and the most compassionate of the compassionate sex.’ (Burke, 1999: 80)

In discussing the dangers of being conquered by France, Burke again claims that it is civilised countries that would be conquered. He states:

‘This is the only power in Europe by which it is possible we should be conquered. To live under the continual dread of such immeasurable evils is itself a grievous calamity. To live without the dread of
them is to turn the danger into disaster. The influence of such a France is equal to a war; its example, more wasting than an hostile irruption. The hostility with any other power is separable and accidental; this power, by the very condition of its existence, by its very essential constitution, is in a state of hostility with us, and with all civilized people.’ (Burke, 1999: 122).

Burke’s claim that revolutionary France was at war with civilized people shows how the concept of civilisation is relative to established-outsider figurations – on the one hand revolutionary France is seeking to spread ‘virtue’ and civilisation among its people and later export that abroad; on the other hand this is seen as an attack on civilisation by France’s enemies. In many respects, these inter-state figurations can be regarded as a clash of civilisations between the British establishment version of civilisation and the revolutionary French version. Of course, the British version, or to be more specific Burke’s version in this context, may relate more closely to the original meaning of ‘civilisation’, that simply referred to softness of manners and politeness. Although there is likely to be an element of reality congruence to this idea, it is also probable that Burke’s version of civilisation also corresponded closely to that of revolutionary France.

Burke’s claims are echoed more than 200 years later, albeit in a slightly different context. In a speech about ‘jihadist terrorism’ shortly after the attacks on London’s transport system in July 2005, when the then British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, said the following:

‘What we are confronting here is an evil ideology. It is not a clash of civilisations – all civilised people, Muslim or other, feel revulsion at it. But it is a global struggle and it is a battle of ideas, hearts and minds... This is the battle that must be won, a battle not just about the terrorist methods but their views. Not just their barbaric acts, but their barbaric ideas.’ (BBC News online, 2005).

The similarities in the rhetoric are almost uncanny, and in both cases show an attempt to delegitimise an outsider group, which exemplifies that the concept of terrorism should be understood as a relational one, as part of established-outsider processes and as a means to stigmatise and delegitimise outsider groups. It has developed, in this context, and is still used today, in antithesis to the concept of civilisation.

**How terrorism was reported in the establishment press during the revolutionary years**

The term terrorists was not just limited in its usage to the French and Burke in the latter part of the eighteenth century. It also appeared in newspaper reports. This suggests that its meaning was, in certain established British circles, relatively well known. As already discussed, Britain and France were at war in this period, so the reporting needs to be understood in that context – a British newspaper, *The Times*, reporting on the enemy France’s National Convention reads as follows:

‘...Legendre – “On the day of the festival of the 14th of July, it becomes a friend to liberty to speak to patriots. I invite the Committee of General Surety to separate among the prisoners, those who are patriots in their heart, and whose hands are pure, from the drinkers of blood. Undoubtedly the Sections have acted well in denouncing the terrorists, but it is possible that some trivial injury, some private animosity, may have led to the arrest of particular citizens; and it is not fitting that the tyranny of the oppressors should be succeeded by the tyranny of the oppressed. We ought not to let loose those who may be dangerous to liberty and the public surety; but we ought not to leave in
prison those who have served their country, and who may still be serviceable” – Applauded.’ (The Times, 21 July 1795)

The extract quotes directly from the National Convention and the word terrorists refers to Robespierre’s terrorists of 1793-94. It suggests that the word terrorists was not yet a concept that was used as a significant term of abuse but it was used to name a group, albeit a group that was ill thought of. There is a relationship, therefore, between the first groups that were called terrorists, with the term perhaps initially being used as a noun, and the fact that very quickly those groups became outsider groups both within French society and for the English establishment. That is, the word terrorists developed out of a name for a group that was regarded as an enemy of the British establishment.

In another article from The Times (21 March 1796), it is suggested that the ‘Terrorists’ were still active in France. In this case, however, it would appear that terrorists refers to the Jacobins but nevertheless, those terrorists were said to be ready to open the French frontiers to France’s enemies – which ones are not mentioned. The concept of terrorism in France at this time seems very much to do with power struggles between the revolutionaries, which is unsurprising since sections of Robespierre’s ‘enforcers’ were called ‘terrorists’. In addition, these terrorists tended to be somewhat illegitimate in the eyes of the ruling groups in France, as well as being closely associated with France’s foreign enemies. It also seems to be the case that there were parts of France where the Jacobins were still active and were involved in assassinations. For example, an article from The Times (19 August 1796) suggests that terrorists had assassinated ‘citizens’ in Marseille and Aix. It reads as follows:

'It is not alone at Marseilles and Aix that the blood of Citizens has been spilt by the daggers of the Terrorists. These assassins, sheltering themselves under the protection of the Administrators, formerly accomplices in their crimes, and at this moment accomplices in their projects, have on the 27th and 28th insulted, abused, and assassinated many peaceful citizens, who celebrated the day on which the tyranny of the Democrats was destroyed. The departments of the Lot and Allier groan under the horrid despotism of the same men.’ (The Times 19 August 1796)

It is interesting to note that the British establishment Times refers to the terrorists as democrats. It seems clear that such notions of representation were at the time, regarded as tyrannical and highly radical by established groups in Britain.

In 1796 we also see the first use of the term terrorism in The Times (27 August 1796). In this case, it refers to France being the dominion of terrorism:

‘The dominion of terrorism is very far from being at a period in France, Perlet, in his journal of the 21st...observes that the city of Toulouse is at this moment oppressed by the most horrid tyranny. The Revolutionists, and the friends of the Constitution of 1793, exercise the most arbitrary despotism; while the good citizens who are enemies to every kind of oppression are insulted, proscribed and assassinated. The constituted authorities are chiefly composed of the disciples of Marat and Hebert, who, instead of punishing, protect the delinquents.’ (The Times 27 August 1796)

14 In the same article, at an earlier point, it refers to foreigners as terrorists. This could well mean that the term in France was starting to be used more widely than just to describe Robespierre’s terrorists, and that blame was being apportioned to other outsider groups – foreigners.
Again this shows that references to terrorists and terrorism are related to the previous revolutionary constitution of 1793-94. And the use of the terms terrorists and terrorism in these instances clearly referred to those who supported Robespierre, rather than referring to any group that acts in a particularly brutal and violent way. It is also clear that the Jacobin’s and their allies still held sway in certain parts of France.

The next time we encounter the concepts of terrorism, terrorist or terrorists in The Times is in 1810. This is 14 years after these concepts were first mentioned in the newspaper. This is obviously quite telling and clearly demonstrates that, as concepts, they were not widely used and, in fact, probably still only referred to groups associated with Robespierre and the régime de la terreur. In fact, even when the word terrorists is mentioned in 1810 by The Times, it involves a reference to Robespierre and the régime de la terreur.

The Napoleonic wars

The Times was not the only newspaper in the early nineteenth century to use the words terrorism and terrorist. Both terms are used in the context of the Napoleonic wars to describe the actions of Napoleon and the French, and very often refer to the implementation by Napoleon of ‘systems of terrorism’, which obviously relate closely to the régime de la terreur during Robespierre’s rule. For example, the Scottish Caledonian Mercury on 7th January, 1809, reported a letter from Spain stating that a ‘system of terrorism’ is likely to be put in place in Madrid by Napoleon and the occupying French. This again highlights the idea of a clash of civilisations as part of the British and French inter-state relations at the time. On the one hand Napoleon was fighting for France and for civilisation but for established groups in Britain his implementation of civilisation amounted to terrorism.

The birth of the concept of terrorism, therefore, was inextricably linked to the sociogenesis of the concept of civilisation, and was in fact regarded as the antithesis of civilisation. During the régime de la terreur, terrorism was the term used by Robespierre and his followers to protect virtue, which in turn was a major part of the newly ‘civilised’ France. However, with the removal of Robespierre and the Jacobins, the words terrorism and terrorists quickly took on negative connotations. Both words were used in a negative sense by the British establishment to, initially, describe Robespierre and the Jacobins and later to describe French revolutionaries more generally, including Napoleon. As such, the sociogenesis of the concepts of terrorism and terrorist, when the terms were first coined, in simple terms, was heavily influenced by established-outsider figurations and functional democratisation within France and established-outsider figurations between France and Britain. These relationships were however, highly complex. For example, the relationship between established groups in Britain with newly established groups in France but who were still relative outsiders to the British elites were relative to the relationships between established groups in Britain and outsider groups in Britain. Functional democratisation also played a role here. That is, increased functional democratisation in Britain and the fear of a home-grown revolution helped to determine the British establishment’s position relative to the French revolutionaries, which was as enemies. So there was a situation where
the terms ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’ in Britain, very early on, came to be associated with Britain’s enemies and those enemies were also regarded as barbaric and uncivilised.

These inter- and intra-state processes involving Britain and France during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, were therefore, absolutely fundamental to the development of the concepts of terrorism and terrorist. This also shows that the phenomenon must be understood in relational terms rather than as a thing, as positivistic approaches to terrorism suggest it should be. Additionally, these established-outsider relations that were crucial to the early development of terrorism figurations show that when examining terrorism it is necessary to examine structural relationships that exists outside of language discourse, such as the relationships that existed between various established and outsider groups in Britain and in France at the turn of the eighteenth century.

The inter- and intra-state processes mentioned above were fundamental to the sociogenesis of terrorism and continued to be throughout the nineteenth century, as will be seen in the next section where British-Irish relations are examined.
Chapter 5: The sociogenesis of terrorism in nineteenth century Britain in relation to Ireland

This section details the sociogenesis of the concept of terrorism as part of British-Irish relations during the nineteenth century. As is well understood, terrorism, particularly in the twentieth century has played a major role in the inter- and intra-state processes between these two countries and the United States of America. It also played a significant role between them in the nineteenth century. In a more general sense, the sociogenesis of terrorism as part of British-Irish relations helped to solidify the concept as something that established groups used to try to delegitimise their outsider enemies. As such, the sociogenesis of the concept of terrorism, as one that is in antithesis to the concept of civilisation, gained greater traction in the relations between the British establishment on the one hand, and rebellious Irish Catholics on the other. In this context, British civilising offensives in Ireland were undertaken to increase British control and counter the real and perceived threats posed by rebellious Catholic ‘terrorists’.

Additionally, the figurations in which the British establishment labelled rebellious Irish Catholics as terrorists, their acting according to those designations, and related civilising offensives are highly significant in relation to a wider nexus of inter- and intra-state relations. Relations between the British establishment and the Irish were on both the inter-state and intra-state levels because, at the time, Ireland was part of the United Kingdom albeit a part that was far from being pacified. Additionally, Britain’s and Ireland’s inter-state relations with France were integral to the development of relations between the British establishment and the Irish. That is, competition with France drove the British establishment to expand its influence overseas, as well as ensure that its borders were secure from French invasion.

Therefore, the sociogenesis of the concept of terrorism, in the context of British-Irish relations, involved a shift in its meaning from being solely related to the French Jacobins, other French revolutionaries, Napoleon and in one case the Belgian state, to a more general concept, which was applied to groups that rebelled against the British establishment. The concepts of terrorism and terrorist first appear in the context of Britain’s relationship to Ireland around 40 years after the 1789 French Revolution. In the intervening years, as well as those circumstances just mentioned, the concepts were also used in the Tory-supporting Morning Post, which referred to the actions of members of the Radical (Whig) Party as terrorism. Together, these examples show a process that involved the transformation of the concept from being solely associated with the French Jacobins to a more general term, used, in these cases, by the British establishment to delegitimise and stigmatise its enemies. The use of the term to describe Irish Catholics is a continuation of the process of its becoming a more general term and at the same time is a departure from calling outsider political enemies with relatively greater power chances, terrorists, to calling outsider groups with fewer power chances, terrorists. In other words, evidence from The Times and other British newspapers suggests that there were sociogenetic changes that constituted changes in the meaning of terrorism and
changes in the concept's functional use. As mentioned, a number of the sociogenetic changes were closely linked to structural features of the British establishment's relationships to France, other European powers, and to Irish Catholics. There are, of course, other structural aspects, including Britain's relationships with its colonies and relations between different social groups within Britain but there is not space here to discuss all of them.

The historical context of Britain's relationship to Ireland

Before going into details about the structural relationships involved in the sociogenesis of terrorism in the British-Irish context, it would be of use to explain, briefly, the historical relationship between England (Britain) and Ireland. Accordingly, during the processes of nation-state formation and monopolisation between the various competing monarchs in Medieval Europe, Ireland came, a number of times, under the rule of English monarchs and ruling groups. They attempted to impose 'civility' on the Irish as part of a process known in the seventeenth century as plantation, which involved the colonisation of Catholic Ireland with English and Scottish Protestants. Discussing plantation, the historian, Richard English says:

'It involved the colonization of Irish land by settlers planted here from England and Scotland. For the settlers, new opportunities were available in the new land; for the authorities, the colonies would offer many supposed benefits: security against foreign attack, control of the local population, defence of royal interests, the stimulation of economic development, and – perhaps above all – an exemplary model of civility and true (Protestant) religion would have a transforming effect on the barbarous Irish.' (English, 2006: p58)

Despite introducing significant numbers of newcomer English and Scottish Protestants to Ireland, the process of plantation was still unable to fully pacify the country, and there were many rebellions by...

15 In the 250 years following the Norman conquest of England in 1066, the Normans set about conquering much of Ireland and by 1297 held the first parliament there. However, the Norman monopoly of physical force and taxation in Ireland was relatively weak and by the fourteenth century had to a large degree broken down. As such, the ruling groups in Ireland tended to consist of Normans (Anglo-Irish) and native Irish (Gaelic Irish).

In the period until the mid-sixteenth century, power struggles between various English nobles and kings were played out across Britain, and in Ireland, which included many threats and attempted seizures of the English crown by forces from Ireland. For example, during the English War of the Roses (1455-85), Gaelic Irish groups tended to back the Yorkist side, whereas the Anglo-Irish supported the Lancastrians.

When Henry VIII came to the throne in England he conquered the whole of Ireland making both the Anglo-Irish and Gaelic Irish directly answerable to the English crown. This was partially done to protect England from attack by competing European powers and also as part of a related expansionist policy. It was during the period of the Tudor kings and queens, including the Catholic Mary I and the Protestant Elizabeth I that the practice of plantation began.

This became more entrenched and systematic throughout the seventeenth century, during the rule of the Stuarts. Previously, under the rule of Elizabeth I, England, through the reformation, had become, for the most part, a Protestant country. Ireland, however, was still predominantly Catholic. The Stuart period of plantation in Ireland involved the usurpation of Catholic Anglo-Irish and Gaelic Irish lands by the English crown for Protestants from both England and Scotland and by the middle of the seventeenth century, Catholics were only able to own land to the west of the river Shannon.

16 Jennifer Todd (2009) points out that following this process:

'...power relations were tied around religious distinction, legally in the Penal Laws, informally in Protestant resistance to reform. The result was a multiconstituted conflict, where power relations (expressed in military force, economic resources, class position, law and political representation) were partially organised by formal and informal religious institutions and networks, and where symbolic boundaries were multiplex, with religious beliefs, moral-political norms and civilizational values, historical narratives of plantation, and ethno-national identities overlapping if never quite coinciding.' (Todd, 2009: 2).

As such, there were a variety of established-outsider figurations at play in this context. These included, in simple terms, established-outsider relations within Ireland that consisted of established Protestant groups, which tended to be allied to the British establishment and outsider Catholic groups. There were, of course similar relations with respect to the British establishment and outsider Catholic groups in Ireland too.
Catholics against Protestant landowners throughout the seventeenth century. The largest of these rebellions occurred in 1641 in which Gaelic Irish and Old English (Anglo-Irish) Catholics rose up and killed 4,000 Protestant settlers. This uprising came at the beginning of civil war in Ireland in which Gaelic Irish and Old English (Anglo-Irish) Catholics joined forces in attempts to improve their political position, swearing allegiance to the Catholic English king, Charles I. However, following the victory of the Protestant Parliamentarian, Oliver Cromwell, in the English civil war and the beheading of Charles I, Cromwell set about taking revenge on Irish Catholics who had supported the king. This revenge included massacres and the usurping of land from Catholics, reducing their holdings from 60% to 20% of the land.

There were further violent insurrections throughout the eighteenth century against English and Protestant rule. However, by the end of that period, the Protestant ruling elite themselves were joining Catholic calls for reforms and a weakening of Ireland’s ties with England. Catholics, by this point, had been granted greater rights but were still debarred from the Irish parliament and the judiciary. A group of Irish Protestants and Catholics formed the United Irishmen in this period, and despite serious violence between other groups of Protestants and Catholics, especially in Ulster, they sought greater independence for Ireland from England, as well as political emancipation.

Following the French Revolution and subsequent war with England, a French fleet in 1796, in cahoots with the United Irishmen, attempted to invade Ireland but were unsuccessful. In 1798, the United Irishmen rebelled more extensively. However, they were put down by British forces. Following this, there were further attempts by French forces and rebellious Irish to defeat the British but in each case they were unsuccessful.

In 1801, under the leadership of Prime Minister William Pitt, the Irish Parliament was dissolved and the country was incorporated into the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. Throughout the first three decades of the nineteenth century, one of the main concerns for Catholics in Ireland was emancipation, which would allow them to sit in the United Kingdom parliament. This movement was led by Daniel O'Connell, a Catholic lawyer and in 1829 the Catholic Emancipation Bill was passed. Following this, O’Connell set about seeking further reforms for Ireland including repeal of the Act of Union. However, the British Parliament was far less forthcoming in this regard.

The structural context of nineteenth century British-Irish terrorism figurations.

Inter- and intra-state processes on a variety of levels have been fundamental to the conflicts involving the British establishment and Irish Catholics and, as such, to the sociogenesis of terrorism in relation to it. Throughout the eighteenth century Irish Catholics had more land confiscated and had a series of rights taken away including restrictions on Catholic worship, and were blocked by and large from the political process and many of the higher professions. That meant that by 1778, according to Joseph Coohill (2000: 26) Irish Catholics only owned 5% of the land.

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17 The unequal distribution of land in Ireland continued despite the restoration of the English crown. However, many Irish Catholics were hopeful that the position would improve following the elevation to the crown of Catholic James II. Their hopes were dashed when English Protestant Parliamentarians invited the Dutch Protestant William of Orange to invade and take over the English crown. James attempted to regain it after successfully invading Ireland and raising an army of Catholics. However, he lost to William at the battle of the Boyne in 1690.
to these two groups. As such, inter-state competition between England/Britain and its rivals and consequently the monopolisation of physical force and taxation over increasingly larger areas by the rulers of England/ Britain have been crucial to these processes. Again, the relations between the British establishment and its French counterparts are prominent with respect to Britain's relations with Ireland.

The fact that centripetal monopolisation forces were in the ascendency in Europe from the eleventh century has to be considered for the purposes here in relation to the competition between the rulers of what was to become France and what was to become England and later Britain. At times, for example, single rulers ruled areas that encompassed parts of what is now France and what is now Britain simultaneously. Both of these countries had developed the characteristics of nation-states by the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, meaning that the populations in the geographical areas called ‘France’ and ‘Britain’ came under the control of centralised, monopolistic governing structures in the guise of monarchs and parliaments, and that the apparatuses of physical force and taxation were under the control of these centralised authorities. However, this did not mean that competition was over; there were still inter-state pressures, particularly between these two powerful nation-states. That pressure, as we have seen, already, culminated in wars between the two countries following the French Revolution and a rejection of the principles of the Revolution in England by a significant proportion of the establishment, including the Prime Minister, the King and the military. Furthermore, the competition between the two countries also encouraged them both, at various times, to increase their monopolies of violence and taxation to other jurisdictions – a process which is often referred to as colonisation. England/Britain, for example, expanded its monopoly of violence and taxation to Catholic Ireland in part, at least, to help protect itself from invasion from Catholic France. We can see here, therefore, that the competitive interdependent relationships between England/Britain and France played a significant role in the relationship between England/Britain and Ireland. As such all three countries formed part of the same inter-state figuration, in which people acted according to the designation of terrorism along one of the fault-lines of those relationships. That fault-line came about as England/Britain attempted to increase its monopolisation of physical force and taxation to include Ireland. However, it was never able to subdue fully the rebellious (predominantly Catholic) Irish in the same way that other groups have been brought under monopolistic control in the rest of

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Elias (2000:268) points out that if one side of this monopoly process collapses then the other will follow. He also argued that societies tend to be balanced between centrifugal forces and centripetal forces. The former are decentralising and dis-unifying, whereas the latter are monopolising and centralising. Until the 11th century in Europe centrifugal forces were in the ascendency. However, from that period centripetal forces became dominant. According to Elias, monopoly processes of violence and taxation can be summarised as follows:

"If, in a major social unit, a large number of the smaller social units which, through their interdependence, constitute the larger one, are of roughly equal social power and are thus able to compete freely – unhindered by free existing monopolies – for the means to social power, i.e. primarily the means of subsistence and production, the probability is high that some will be victorious and others vanquished, and that gradually, as a result, fewer and fewer will control more and more opportunities, and more and more units will be eliminated from the competition, becoming directly or indirectly dependent on an ever-decreasing number. The human figuration caught up in this movement, will therefore, unless countervailing measures are taken, approach a state in which all opportunities are controlled by a single authority: a system with open opportunities will become a system of closed opportunities." (Elias, N, 2000: 269)

So for Elias, central to these processes are competitive pressures between different social groups, although, he points out that in reality there are a number of additional complexities that can add to the processes, such as a number of smaller groups overcoming a single larger one, and so on.
Britain. The resultant designation as terrorists of those who did rebel forms part of attempts to stigmatise and delegitimise those who rebelled, in some cases violently and in others non-violently. We can see here the connection between, on the one hand, inter-state processes between Britain and France and the development of terrorism in antithesis to civilisation. The British establishment, driven by inter-state pressures, tried to pacify Irish Catholics in the name of civilisation.

**Civilising Offensives in Ireland**

The attempted pacification of Ireland by England / Britain was not purely and simply for instrumental reasons related to competition with France. There was also a genuine attempt at trying to ‘civilise’ what were considered to be barbaric people. In a way not dissimilar to Napoleon’s clarion call to his troops, that their Egypt campaign had ‘incalculable consequences for civilisation’, which in turn bore an uncanny relationship to Robespierre’s cry that ‘virtue, without which terror is evil; terror, without which virtue is helpless...’ The English/British also undertook similar ‘civilising offensives’ in relation to Ireland and other societies. Civilising offensives, according to Van Krieken (1999: 297) are, ‘self-conscious attempts to bring about ‘civilization’, and have revolved around essentially violent policies and practices.’ Civilising offensives can be understood as attempts by established groups to, on one level, subjugate outsider groups, and on others to incorporate them into their own standards of conduct. Attempts by established groups to civilise outsiders are sometimes imbued with violence but other times are not. Nonetheless, these processes work on both the inter- and intra-state levels. That is established groups seek to civilise outsider groups both within their nation states and outside of them. It is the latter that tend to be most likely imbued with violence due to the lack of violence controls on the inter-state plane.

A relevant point in relation to civilising offensives, and therefore, civilising processes more generally, is that violence is not regarded by Elias as being in antithesis to them. However, this is opposed to a normative conception of civilisation, whereby certain people consider themselves to be part of groups or societies that are at the apex of civilisation, and in this sense civilisation is often regarded as being in antithesis to certain forms of violence. Jonathan Fletcher (1997:177-78), writing on Elias, points out that both violence and civilisation are ‘interwoven aspects of overall processes of social development’. Individual self restraint in terms of violence is tied to wider social relations in which there are specific controls on violence. This, however, is processual and the sociogenetic changes of civilisation tend to involve gradual, long-term pacification within societies and, to a lesser extent, between societies.

Civilizing offensives on the part of the English/British in relation to Ireland have a long history. In fact, even before the concept of civilisation was first coined there were precursors to civilising offensives. English (2006: 57) points out what could be described as ‘civility offensives’. He argues that the sixteenth century English poet and Irish landowner, Edmund Spenser, epitomised the sentiments of the ruling elites in England towards Ireland at the end of the 1500s, which, he claims, involved the imposition of English authority and enforcing the dominance of Protestantism through force, if necessary. Richard English states:
Religious reform and political subjugation were as one here, as reflected in Spenser’s allegorical epic The Faerie Queene (1590-96). This stressed the benefits of violence when deployed for truly worthy causes, and indeed emphasized that the righteous must be prepared so to use violence against evil. Force had proved historically necessary in order that civility should defeat barbarism, and Spenser presented a single British world as having been created – through conquest – out of the varied materials of England, Scotland and Wales. Within this portrait, England had an historic mission to defend civility and genuine Christianity, and to do so through the production of a unitary state within the islands of Britain and Ireland. (English, 2006: 57)

English’s analysis clearly shows that established groups in England saw it as their duty to ‘defeat barbarism’ in Ireland and the rest of Britain through force in the name of civility, and to do this through expansion to control larger territorial areas including Scotland, Wales and Ireland. Accordingly, monopolisation processes within the British Isles at the time were imbued with ideas of civility. However, this was during a period (the late sixteenth century) in which the aristocracy and the monarch formed a greater proportion of established groups than in later times, and certainly by comparison with revolutionary France. If we are to call this an example of a civility offensive, it was one that was conducted in the interests of the aristocracy. Civilising offensives on the other hand have a far more bourgeois character. However, there are also similarities with these ‘civility offensives’ and Robespierre’s imposition of terrorism in order to protect and expand virtue in France. ‘Civility’ and civilising missions were a crucial part of early terrorism figurations and the figurations that precluded the development of the concept of terrorism.

Van Krieken discusses the English civilising offensives in Ireland and explains how the English conception of barbarism developed in antithesis to civilisation in the Irish context and was then deployed during the colonial conquests of the British Empire. He argues the following:

‘Any cursory look at Irish history makes it clear that it is closely bound up with English state and cultural formation, and that a central element of the English perception of Ireland was a persistent distinction between civility/ civilization and barbarism being equivalent to the distinction between the English and the Irish. Indeed English civility was in many respects defined precisely in opposition to Irishness – it was everything that the Irish were not. And the Irish later returned the favour, seeing themselves from around the eighteenth century onwards likewise as the morally superior representatives of an ancient Celtic/Catholic civilization that had resisted the temptations of modernization and their associated descent into moral turpitude, decadence and degradation (Augusteijn, 2006: 274–77).’ (Van Krieken, 2011, 31)

There are clear parallels that can be drawn here between the idea that Irish Catholics in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw themselves as defenders of an ancient civilisation and the views put forward by contemporary Islamists and jihadist terrorists, who, likewise, often regard themselves as defenders of an ancient civilisation that is less corrupt and more moral than present day Western civilisations. A similar view can be found in the work mentioned earlier of Barber (1992) and Coker (2002) who claim that terrorism is an attempt to defend traditional, tribal ways of life against aggressive forms of globalisation. Contemporary Islamists, for example, blame an aggressive West for the collapse of the Caliphate, and see themselves as crucial in trying to resist Western domination and restoring Islam’s former glory. We can see in this connection that resistance to British civilising offensives by eighteenth and nineteenth century Irish Catholics has direct parallels with violence by jihadist terrorists to perceived civilising offensives by the West today. Of course, whether or not contemporary civilising offensives are real or perceived is open to question. However, American and British attempts to democratise Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, could quite easily be regarded as civilising offensives. That said, the processes involved in these figurations tend to be much more
complex than powerful nations trying to impose their will on the rest of the world. For example, there were voices within Iraq calling for democracy, and so on. Nevertheless, these two examples of terrorism and civilising offensives appear to intersect the boundaries between inter- and intra-state relations, especially in terms of how terrorists identify themselves. For example, as mentioned, rebellious Irish Catholics in the nineteenth century regarded themselves as defenders of an ancient Celtic culture and, likewise, British jihadist terrorists regard themselves as defenders of Islam. At the same time, they are or were at different times citizens of the United Kingdom, whether they like(d) it or not. In the case of Ireland during the nineteenth century, Irish Catholics were a colonised group that clearly identified much more closely with Ireland than Britain. In terms of national boundaries in the nineteenth century, relations between the British establishment and rebellious Irish Catholics were on the intra-state plane. However, in terms of how rebellious Irish Catholics identified themselves, as distinctly Irish, then relations were much closer to the inter-state plane. With respect to British-born jihadist terrorists, the relations in terms of national boundaries are again on the intra-state level. However, in terms of identification, jihadist terrorists tend to reject Britain and instead identify much more closely with a transnational Muslim community – the *Ummah*. In this sense, relations between the British establishment and British born jihadist terrorists are on the inter-state plane.

Returning to civilising offensives in relation to Ireland, Van Krieken (2011: 42) adds that the antithesis between civilisation and barbarism was placed into stark contrast as part of the processes by which the English in the twelfth century tried to incorporate the ‘Celtic fringe’ into English society and its political system. He points out that the idea that the Irish were barbarous savages helped to legitimate extreme violence by the English against the Irish as a means of civilizing and pacifying them. He argues that this level of violence was practised until at least the end of the seventeenth century, and was then followed-up by subsequent economic exploitation during the next two centuries. Crucially, says Van Krieken, Ireland became a kind of test-bed for later English and British colonial practices. He says:

‘The psychology and practicalities of colonization and the resort to violence as the mechanism by which civilization, in its first face, is to be achieved were a lesson that English administrators thought they had learned in Ireland (and Wales and Scotland) from 1169 onwards, and which they then applied in the New World in the sixteenth century (Gillingham, 1992; Muldoon, 2003: 152; Harding, 2005). As Michael Hechter observed, ‘The case of Ireland is an almost idealypical example of a colonial situation, and it provided England with practical experience by which to evaluate later colonial policies’ (1975: 73). In the end, though, the overt attempts at civilizing offensives on England’s frontiers proved only partially effective in bringing about the kinds of transformations that were already in motion, and to the extent that they drew on decivilizing techniques of escalating rather than reducing violence, they actually slowed those changes down (see, for example, Tait, Edwards and Lenihan, 2007).’ (Van Krieken, 2011: 42)

The idea that the English / British used violence or decivilising techniques to try to civilise Irish Catholics is important. The point here is that such techniques would be fundamental to the reciprocal, double-bind violence or non-violent rebelliousness committed by Irish Catholics against the English / British, which was then designated as terrorism. As such, in this respect civilising offensives can be regarded as contributing to terrorism.

Similar conclusions can be drawn with respect to terrorism figurations in relation to Britain’s later colonial relationships, as they can in relation to present-day British-born jihadist terrorists, who often claim that they commit violence against Britain in the form of retaliation against British actions in
countries like Iraq and Afghanistan. Such conclusions, however, may be over-simplistic and arguably provide an excuse for the actions of those designated as terrorists. It is unlikely that the sole reason for terrorism committed against Britain is Britain undertaking civilising offensives or other forms of violence around the world. More plausible explanations involve a far more complex array of relationships involving Britain and other groups involved in these terrorism figurations, some of which this thesis is seeking to uncover.

The concept of terrorism in nineteenth and early twentieth century Ireland

Returning to nineteenth century Ireland, we can see how some of these relationships manifested themselves in the British press. One of the first uses of the word terrorism in relation to Britain’s relationship to Ireland was in 1821 in a Tory supporting newspaper – The Morning Post. This was before the Catholic Emancipation Bill was passed and during the period in which Daniel O’Connell was actively campaigning to improve the rights of Catholics. The article, which is reprinted in The Morning Post from the Dublin Patriot, refers to murders, presumably by people belonging to a relatively large rebellious group. It reads as follows:

‘The Limerick Papers received since our last, contain accounts of new atrocities, but none of them, we have some consolation in stating, attended with deprivation of life to the victim. The absence of one species of intelligence is, however, a matter of deep regret. The perpetrators of the late murders have not, even in a single instance, been discovered; we cannot record apprehension of one of the conspirators, though their number must exceed one hundred. This fact shews how general the guilt, and how well contrived the system is upon which the guilty act; the evident object of which system is to put down the law, and to substitute the reign of terror in its stead. But the Magistrates and Gentlemen of the County of Limerick have not been deterred, by the many late effective manifestations of this principle of terrorism, from manfully standing forth, in defiance of the dagger of the assassin. They have entered into Committees, and Safety Associations, in many parts of the county; several Gentlemen, and among these, Clerical Gentlemen of influence and popularity, are engaged in promoting subscriptions, while some of the Magistrates have, individually, offered large rewards, in order to obtain information. This is the kind of co-operation by which the authority of the Government should, in such a case, be seconded; and these are the exertions which must ultimately affect the objects in view, at the same time that they serve to purge the character of the county of the disgrace which now affixes it – a disgrace which cannot be wholly removed, until the monsters, at present shielded from the laws, are consigned.’ (The Morning Post, 27th October, 1821)

It is noteworthy that the concept of terrorism is used in this extract in relation to the idea of a reign of terror, which, of course, are both terms taken from the French Revolution. This shows how entrenched the effects of the Revolution were in that some of the concepts that arose from it were transferred to rebellion in Ireland and, therefore, gave them a more general meaning. It also shows that the British and Irish establishments, as part of attempts to distinguish themselves from outsider groups in Ireland, who nonetheless were seen as a threat, were keen to use such language as a means of delegitimising and stigmatising groups in Ireland that may or may not have been violent but were opposed to established groups in Ireland and the rest of what was in those days Britain.

Following this early instance of the use of the word terrorism to refer to Irish Catholic rebels, there are others in the Morning Post that talk about ‘Catholic terrorism’ in direct relation to Daniel O’Connell, and Catholic priests, who in one article are referred to as ‘popish cut-throats’.
It is six years following the enactment of the Catholic Emancipation bill, in 1835, that we first encounter the use of the terms terrorism and terrorist in *The Times* newspaper being applied in relation to Irish Catholics. This was at the height of O’Connell’s attempts to repeal the Act of Union. Of course, this period was nearly 50 years after the first French Revolution during which the concepts of terrorism and terrorist were first coined. It is also noteworthy to point out that, prior to this time, the only uses of the words terrorism and terrorist in *The Times* were in relation to the French state or, on one occasion, the Belgian state. The use of the terms in relation to Irish Catholics is a departure from only calling states terrorist, and can be understood as an early example of an established group linked to the British state (*The Times*) calling an outsider, non-state group, terrorists. It also constitutes the early use of the concept of terrorism to describe an intra-state outsider group.

This first *Times*’ use of the concepts is in the context of an election in which Morgan O’Connell (Daniel O’Connell’s son) was standing against the Knight of Kerry. *The Times* stated:

‘The means adopted to prevent the Knight of Kerry’s election chiefly demand observation – they are so monstrous and unparalleled, so far beyond the range of election warfare, as to have attracted the attention, we may say, of the empire. What effect these means may have in determining the election remains to be seen; but, hitherto, we boldly assert, that in every breast animated, by the feelings of a man or the independence of a free citizen, they have excited no sentiments but those of indignation and wonder. We acknowledge, with pride and thankfulness, that the Knight of Kerry ranks among his supporters individuals who have nobly and generously forgotten minor differences, and buried all personal questions under a common determination to resist a system of terror, alike subversive of the freedom of election and the just influence of property.

‘To preserve the threatened peace of this country, and indeed the lives of the voters, the following formidable array of troops is concentrated in and about Tralee, viz – 2 troops of the 4th Dragoon Guards; 2 troops of the 7th Dragoon Guards; 4 companies of the 37th Regiment, and two companies of the 31st Light Infantry, from the Cork district, under Captains Flamank and Hanley. The necessity of this protection in the frightful state to which Mr. O’Connell’s reckless measures of terrorism have reduced the country, may be judged from an unfeeling paragraph in the Tralee Mercury, a decidedly O’Connellite paper, that exults in the mischief he has caused:- “A party of Dragoons left here this morning for Dingle, whence they are to escort the three Iveragh freeholders, who are going to vote for the Knight. It appears that these poor people are to be conveyed across from Valentia to Dingle; one of them – Paul Jones, an old man 96 years of age, though he went through some stormy seas in his youth with the daring navigator whose name he bears, is but ill able to endure the rough passage across Dingle Bay this wintry weather. However, it appears poor Paul, and the two other freeholders, are to have an escort of His Majesty’s 4th Dragoon Guards, whose sole duty in these ‘piping times of peace’ consists in escorting the supporters of Tory candidates to the hustings.

‘In the midst of all the notorious ruffianism which these troops are obliged to be employed in repressing, Morgan John O’Connell has the hardihood and hypocrisy to put forth an address, declaring – "I am a Reformer of all abuses".’ (*The Times*, 22 January, 1835).

It seems quite clear from this extract that *The Times* was backing the Tory candidate – the Knight of Kerry – in this election, and uses the word terrorism and other stigmatising language, such as ‘ruffianism’, to try to delegitimise his opponent, Morgan O’Connell. It also accuses O’Connell’s supporters of implementing a system of terror. This, of course, is not to say that some of the acts that O’Connell’s supporters were alleged to have undertaken did not happen, but rather, shows that terrorism as a concept had moved on from simply describing a group of French revolutionaries and related groups to a more general usage to describe what people today might call political intimidation. It is also clearly being used as a form of stigmatisation, delegitimisation and even dehumanisation in order to undermine a political opponent within the context of established-outsider figurations, in which
the view of *The Times* is representative of the establishment British and pro-Britain Irish against outsider Irish Catholic reformers.

In an article dated just a few days later, on 29th January, 1835, following its accusation that terrorism had been committed by O’Connell’s supporters, a little more context is given as to *The Times*’ motives for claiming that O’Connell and his supporters were employing terrorism during the election. One extract claims the following:

‘The freeholders, after having been shut up in their parish chapel until pledges to vote at O’Connell command are obtained from them, are marched under mob escorts headed by priests to this town, and locked up until conveyed by those priests who act as agents to the respective booths for polling. In the interval they are subjected to all the terrors of the Romish church. The arch-demagogue’s “deaths head and cross bows,” and the infliction of exclusive dealing are denounced against them if they should dare vote for the Knight of Kerry.” (*The Times*, 29 January, 1835)

This article adds further clarification that *The Times* was firmly against O’Connell, and used highly stigmatising and delegitimising language against Catholic priests, which, it claimed, were using ‘terror’ to force people to vote for O’Connell. The same article refers to O’Connell’s actions as ‘tyranny’ and that the Catholic priests were ‘despotic’ and ‘wicked’. Again, whether or not the accusations were true was in some ways beside the point. What was crucial is that the establishment *Times* was using the concept of terrorism and other terms to try to delegitimise O’Connell and the Catholic priests.

Nevertheless, evidence from *Hansard* (House of Commons, 21 August 1835), suggests that at least part of *The Times* article came from a document called *‘The Patriots Curse’*, which was published during the time of the election and threatened those who voted for the Knight of Kerry. However, according to *Hansard*, MPs found that the document was a hoax and that *The Times* had been misled. In addition, *Hansard* reported that the Government had an observer at the election who claimed there was not sufficient evidence against O’Connell and his supporters to support the claims reported in *The Times*. O’Connell also denied any intimidation.

It is interesting, therefore, that *The Times* took it upon itself to publish articles that were vehemently opposed to O’Connell and used such stigmatising language to try to delegitimise him and his supporters. This seems quite clearly to be evidence of the mouthpiece of an established group in Britain trying to delegitimise an outsider group, albeit one that was clearly gaining in power relative to the established groups. Evidence for this rebalancing of the power ratio is the fact that O’Connell was not only able to stand in an election but was able to win election to the House of Commons. Of course, the issue of *The Times*’ failure to ‘fact-check’ correctly may also be indicative of other processes, such as an over-eagerness to report shocking news. That said, it is still an example of an establishment mouthpiece seeking to delegitimise an outsider group, albeit, even though other members of the establishment – Parliament – found the report to be inaccurate.

This was not the only example of *The Times* describing the actions of those in Ireland who were trying to repeal the Act of Union or the actions of Catholic priests as terrorism. In fact, in another article from *The Times* (12 November, 1835) in the same year, priests are described as terrorists. The report claimed that Ireland’s Roman Catholic provinces exhibit a diseased constitution of society, and that priests and other Catholics are evil. It added that there are two
possible outcomes: that ‘either Popery puts down the State, or the State, in self-defence, must crush it’. These two possibilities clearly show how established-outsider figurations in Ireland at the time were being manifested – as a sometimes violent struggle between the British establishment and rebellious Irish Catholics. The article went on to claim that Catholic priests are pious terrorists and commit acts of ‘savage cruelty.’

The article referred to what was claimed to be intimidation and violence by and on behalf of Catholic priests in Ireland, who it said were intimidating Catholics not to vote for a Tory candidate called Bagwell. The article claimed that this was done through attacks by mobs and religious threats, including one threat to turn anyone who voted for Bagwell into a serpent. The language used was in many ways quite extraordinary. For example, the claim that Catholic Ireland was suffering from a diseased constitution, and that Catholic priests are evil, savage, cruel and are terrorists shows the level of polarization that existed between the British establishment and Catholic Ireland. It is clear that The Times, on behalf of establishment Britain was trying to delegitimise in some of the strongest possible terms any form of Catholic emancipation or rebellion against the United Kingdom. Another related article (The Times, 6 November, 1835), albeit one that did not use the term terrorist, stated that there was no other comparable behaviour of Catholic priests, except during the ‘barbarous’ ages. These attitudes to the priesthood in Ireland and Catholics in Ireland more generally, were reflected in the language used in some debates on Ireland in the Houses of Parliament. For example, during one (04 May 1838) in the Lords, Catholic priests were described as ‘overbearing, tyrannical, bigoted and implacable’, and three provinces in Ireland were described as ‘barbarous’.

It is clear that 50 years after the concept was first coined the use of the word terrorist had changed significantly from its original reference to the Jacobins and was clearly being employed on a more general basis. This obviously incorporated Irish Catholics and was a major step towards its application by established groups in Britain against those they regarded as a threat to their position, and to what they regarded as ‘civilisation’.

A decade later, in 1845, The Times was still using the concepts of terrorism and terrorist to describe alleged acts of violence by Irish Catholics against the land-owning British-backed Irish gentry. In one article The Times juxtaposed Ireland with England and said that the English were ordered and submissive to the rule of law but on the other hand in many Irish districts there was said to be no such state of affairs and that these districts were lawless and suffering from terrorism. The Times, in other words, was claiming that the English were civilised and that at least parts of Ireland were ‘uncivilised’ or ‘barbaric’. Therefore, we can see further development of the concept of terrorism in antithesis to the concept of civilisation. The fact that this antithesis was being explicitly reported in The Times shows how entrenched the relationship between these concepts was becoming among established groups in Britain.

In an 1865 Times article, references to ‘Fenians’ was prominent. They were groups of Irish revolutionaries who took over the mantle of trying to oust the British from Ireland from those, including Daniel O’Connell, who had failed by political means to repeal the Act of Union. The leading group of Fenians, according to Coohill (2000: 83), were called ‘the Irish Republican Brotherhood’ (IRB). He
points out that the Fenian groups believed that the only way to rid themselves of the British was through physical force. In order to achieve this, the various Fenian groups sought to cultivate relationships with both France and America and had a good degree of success with the latter. This shows that the established-outsider figurations between the British establishment and rebellious Irish Catholics were more complex than at first appears. These relations, as such, have to be understood in the context of multi-polar inter-state figurations, which also involved France and America. This means that many of the decisions and moves by the British establishment and Irish Catholic rebels have to be understood in the context of the decisions and moves by France and America, among others. A crude example may be that the British establishment might have been seeking control in Ireland in order to keep in check the threat it considered France to be. Likewise, rebellious Irish Catholic outsiders sought support in France and America to help repel the British.

There were a number of violent uprisings associated with Fenian groups, many of which engaged in what people at the time and today describe as terrorism. This included a high-profile bombing campaign on the British mainland, especially in London, in the 1880s. But support for the groups was mixed in Ireland, according to Coohill (2000: 85). The priesthood are said to have initially been against Fenian groups, banning its members from joining them, although it is also said to have eased its opposition later on. The following extract in *The Times* is the first mention of Fenianism in relation to terrorism:

‘On Wednesday the affray at Dangan between the constabulary and the Fenians again engaged the attention of the coroner, who resumed his enquiry into the circumstances attending the death of Samuel Kelly, who was shot on the occasion. The Courthouse at Midleton was densely crowded and the greatest interest manifested in the proceedings. It is stated, however, that evidence in favour of the police is difficult to be obtained in consequence of the terrorism exercised over the minds of the people of Fenianism.’ (*The Times*, 19th August, 1865)

*The Times’ use of the word terrorism in this context seems to follow on from earlier uses to describe Catholic priests. By claiming that terrorism is ‘exercised over the minds of the people of Fenianism’, seems to suggest that terrorism in this context is equivalent to intimidation and threats not to give evidence to the police about someone who was shot. Terrorism in this context, therefore, is intimidation by non-state outsider groups.

In another article published in 1870, the concept of terrorism is again used in relation to Fenianism and is equated with intimidation. There are further examples in *The Times* during that period in which Fenian terrorism is equated with intimidation. Terrorism as intimidation, of course, does have some similarities with some aspects of contemporary definitions but obviously differs in a number of other ways. For example, there is no reference to bomb attacks targeting civilians in order to communicate the terrorists’ aims in these two cases, among other clear differences. This suggests that the concept of terrorism, during this period, was less technical than it is today, and more of one that was being used specifically in antithesis to civilisation. In other words, it was more clearly relational.

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19 Fenianism” is also associated with terrorism in the Houses of Parliament, on a number of occasions, during the second half of the nineteenth century. It is also linked with the reign of terror in France during the Revolution. Evidence for this can be found in Hansard (HC Deb 21 March 1870 vol 200 cc328-411; HC Deb 17 August 1871 vol 208 cc1773-837)
The following extract from The Times in 1870 refers to an act of terrorism and is also typical of the reporting of the issue at the time:

‘The congregation had been dismissed from mass, and were thronging the street in great numbers. Among them walked a wealthy farmer, who lived at the upper end of the town. When he drew near his own house, seven men, well armed with revolvers, came before him, and, putting him on his knees, swore him to give up a certain farm that he held; told him, ‘This is the second time we have warned you; if we are obliged to come a third time, it will be your death; and now you may get up and go and tell the police if you like it.’ The terrified man did not do so – he rushed into his house, drew bolts and bars, and shut himself in. Now, this occurred at 2 o’clock in the day, in a street crowded with people, none of whom made any attempt to arrest the terrorists. Several jaunting-cars conveying members of the congregation drove hastily by. The terrorists drew on one side and let them pass, and then they walked quietly off unharmed, unmolested, unpursued, and unarrested.’ (The Times, 23rd February, 1870)

What is interesting about this extract is that the perpetrators of the aggressive act are called terrorists rather than criminals by The Times. This either signifies that it was obvious that the perpetrators were part of a group known for terrorism or that The Times was simply equating violent, intimidating (possibly politically motivated) crime in Ireland with terrorism, and as such, it was simply because this act took place in Ireland, committed against a land-owner that made it terrorism.

During the same period, Fenian and member of the Irish Republican Brotherhood, Michael Davitt, set up the National Land League, the aims of which were to reduce land rents and then to nationalise the land of Ireland. According to English (2007: 203), its members protested about rents in both legal and illegal ways, including withholding rent. The Land League’s objectives and tactics were clearly frowned upon by members of Britain’s ruling elite, the evidence for which is visible in a Times article of 18th October, 1880, which suggested that the Land League undertook ‘terrorism’, created ‘anarchy’, was ‘uncivilised’ and undertook ‘monstrous oppression’. The use of the word ‘anarchy’, along with terrorism and making statements that show these concepts are in antithesis to civilised behaviour is interesting in this context because, at the same time in Europe, there was a great deal of concern about anarchist groups, who were also said to be terrorists by Britain’s ruling elite. This article, correspondingly suggested a conflation of ‘Irish terrorism’ with the ‘anarchist terrorism’ that was occurring across Europe. This conflation provided an over-simplistic picture of what were, in fact, continent-wide structural changes, painted by an establishment mouthpiece like The Times, and was clearly useful propaganda for the status quo at the time.

In another Times article on the 19th October, 1880, it was reported that a Conservative MP claimed that Ireland is governed by a ‘system of terrorism’ and that it is important that the Empire should ‘stem the tide of democracy’. This helps to reinforce the view that Britain’s ruling elite had of Ireland, and, at the same time, exposed a link to the French Revolution. The idea of ‘a system of terrorism’ in Ireland suggests this, as does the idea that the tide of democracy needs stemming. It is also clear that this shows a degree of fear among the ruling elites that a push towards greater democracy by outsider groups would be a threat to their position, and, as such, they attempt to stigmatise and delegitimise outsiders by claiming that they are terrorists who operate a ‘system of terrorism’.

As I mentioned earlier, Fenians in their attempts to gain Irish independence undertook a bombing campaign on the British mainland, with a focus on London. The labelling of this as terrorism, of
course, bears much closer resemblance to contemporary definitions. For example, on 1st November, 1883, The Times reported the bombing of the Metropolitan and the Metropolitan District Railways in London and said that this was a declaration of war against civilisation and social order. The rhetoric used in this and similar articles bore a great deal of similarity to the language used by contemporary established groups in relation to terrorist attacks, which regularly counterpose terrorism with civilisation, claiming that such attacks are an affront to the civilised world. This is further borne out in the various clash of civilisations theses (see Huntington, 1996) that have been put forward. In the 1883 article, The Times claimed that this and other bombings had one markedly different aspect to them and that was that they targeted the masses, including the working classes. However, it also points out that it had not been proven that it was 'Irish terrorists' that were behind the bombings but that they were the likely suspects, together with the possibility that it may be anarchists from elsewhere in Europe. The fact that The Times pointed the finger at Irish terrorists being the most likely culprits without proof is important. On the one hand this shows an eagerness to blame what was clearly regarded as the major terrorist enemy at the time, and on the other, it was following the then terrorist ‘Zeitgeist’, which is likely to have considered terrorists only to be Irish or anarchists. Similar terrorism Zeitgeists have existed in more recent times. For example, most contemporary terrorist violence tends to almost immediately be associated with Muslims or Middle Eastern groups. The most conspicuous example of this followed the 1995 Oklahoma City bomb attacks, after which the finger was pointed at Middle Eastern and Muslim groups. The bombers turned out to be white, far-right Americans.

Nevertheless, The Times equated the 1883 Metropolitan bombings with what it called ‘revolutionary terrorism’, as follows:

‘The masses, however easily their passions may be excited and their judgment confused, are governed, in the main, by strong feelings of sympathy and generosity; they are readily moved to a wholesome and warm-hearted indignation, and they do not quickly forget or forgive the cold-blooded calculations of revolutionary terrorism. If the vile deeds of Tuesday night can be brought home by moral or legal proof to the Irish revolutionists, who were undoubtedly implicated in the attempt to blow up the Local Government Board and in other similar schemes, a wide chasm will be opened between the working men of England and the party or the principles contaminated by such a connexion.’ (The Times, 1st November, 1883)

It is interesting to note that The Times author seems to have believed that there was a link between Irish ‘revolutionaries’ and the masses in England, which suggests that there may well have been concern among the ruling establishment, even in the late nineteenth century, of the potential for revolution in Britain. Nonetheless, the same article claimed that the English working classes would not have had sympathy for ‘revolutionary’ groups that used violence to achieve their ends. It stated the following:

‘It can hardly fail to occur, even to the least thoughtful of minds, that the warfare against property and the classes possessed of property upon which the fanatics of modern communism are prepared to enter could not be conducted without bitter suffering and incalculable dangers to the wage earning classes. MR. DAVITT’s lecture on “Land Nationalization,” of which we published a full report yesterday, proclaims doctrines that cannot be applied in practice without the disruption of society and the losing of all moral bonds. MR. DAVITT’s most intelligible proposition amounts simply to this, that owners of land are robbers, and the “dynamite party” are only attempting to give practical effect to this teaching by compelling those robbers to disgorge their spoil. The working men of England are not likely to be tempted to champion a cause which must involve its adherents in desperate and ruinous struggles. The remote effects of revolutionary adventures upon capital and industry are not obscure; but those who are unable to see even so far ahead cannot
close their eyes to the meaning and consequences of acts intended to terrorize society into submission. If the battle of communism is to be waged with the weapons of the dynamite party, it will not enlist the sympathies of any section of the English people, and the same observation applies to the demands of the Irish Nationalists. The most democratic communities in this country have shown little sympathy with the efforts of the Irish malcontents to break away from the British connexion. The reason is, no doubt, that Irish revolutionary movements have rarely been free from the stain of crime. But the guilt of agrarian or political murder, deep as it is, pales beside the cruelty and baseness of attempts to strike terror into a nation by spreading indiscriminate ruin among masses of innocent and irresponsible people. The moral repugnance which has been produced among civilized men by the acts of the Nihilists of Russia has paralyzed the political power of that party and thrown back for an indefinite time the movements towards liberty which come of them at least were honestly zealous to promote. It is not to be regretted that the Irish Communists should have unmasked themselves. They have failed to produce the panic on which they probably counted to obtain some objects of their own, but they have stirred up strong and lasting indignation in the popular mind against a cruel and cowardly attempt to inspire terror and break down resistance. ('The Times', 1st November, 1883)

We can clearly see here a link being made by *The Times* between Communism in Europe, Irish nationalist groups and the working classes in mainland Britain. Furthermore, even 100 years following the first French Revolution, terrorism is still closely associated with revolution. These groups are all outsider groups in various ways, with differing power ratios to the British ruling elite but who were all either competing with them or had the potential to compete with them. Hence, in order to try to bolster their position the British ruling elite stigmatised these competitors as terrorists. Those competitors acted according to that designation, whatever that may have meant doing but often, though not always, involved violence or intimidation of one kind or another. We can also see again the interconnections between inter- and intra-state processes. The fear of the rising power potential of Irish Catholics and the working classes in Britain, as well as Communist groups across Europe is central to the terrorism figurations at the time. In all senses, this increase in the power potential of lower class groups provides examples of functional democratisation both within Britain and between ruling and ruled groups across Europe. It is within these relations that acts by lower status groups, including violent acts, were designated as terrorism, and those groups and individuals were labelled as terrorists. This labelling of them as terrorists further compounds the antithesis between terrorism and civilisation. As such, the anti-establishment violence of lower status groups was/is considered as barbaric.

Terrorism figurations in Britain by the late nineteenth century had become far more multi-dimensional than in the past. Links are made in *The Times* (26th January, 1885) between anarchist or communist terrorism with Irish nationalist terrorism, as well as the relationships between Irish Catholics, Irish-Americans and Britain. This clearly shows that the structural characteristics of terrorism figurations in Britain had moved on from less complex relationships between the British establishment and the French revolutionaries to far more global figurations that encompassed Britain’s transatlantic relations with America, as well as relationships across Europe, including Ireland, Russia and other countries where communism was regarded as a threat. Additionally, in a passage from the 26th January, 1885 report it was claimed that Irish terrorists are more barbaric than their continental anarchist or communist counterparts. This has close parallels with what is said about the more recent terrorism of so-called jihadis, which are said to be more barbaric than many other terrorist groups as they deliberately target civilians. Accordingly, a clear distinction was drawn in the late nineteenth century between more and less barbarous acts of terrorism, just as tends to be the case...
today. The targeting of civilians was regarded as less civilised than the actions of tyrants in the Medieval period. Today, al-Qaeda and associated groups are often likened to Medieval ‘barbarians’.

The fact that groups which were, in terms of power chances relatively weak, were by the mid- to late nineteenth century able to bomb mainland Britain or assassinate European leaders shows that the power differentials between the ruling groups and the lower orders were shifting somewhat in favour of the latter. In addition, the fact that established groups were so compelled to try to delegitimise and stigmatise the so-called terrorist groups is evidence that they were fearful of an equalisation of power chances in their relations with lower status groups.

There are two other important points to note in the quoted *Times* articles. In its role as a mouthpiece for the British establishment, the newspaper used derogatory language when describing the Irish, but praised the English. This reinforces the idea that *The Times* was representative of established groups as part of established-outsider figurations in the Britain-Ireland terrorism context. To highlight this, it attempted to link Charles Stewart Parnell with terrorism. Again, we see that, as processes of functional democratisation were in train, the power differentials between the British ruling elites and Irish Catholics were diminishing, the latter were regarded as being in antithesis to civilisation, and, as such, were often designated as terrorists. At the same time, those designated as terrorists did act according to those designations whether they undertook violence, intimidation or anything else in opposition to the ruling elites in Britain.

During the last 15 years of the nineteenth century, terrorism in the context of British / Irish relations became less of an issue and this is highlighted by its near absence in British newspapers reports. The issues that had dogged the two countries were never far away, however, and in 1905, *The Times* again claimed that terrorism was a serious problem in Ireland, more particularly that it was ‘rampant in many districts’, and again that this was related to those people in Ireland who wanted to reform the land laws.

Following this brief re-emergence, terrorism in Ireland again took a back seat for the next 15 years, particularly due to the focus that the media had in that context on the First World War. Following that, however, the 1919-1921 conflict in Ireland (often referred to as the Irish War of Independence) that resulted in an independent Irish state and a British-controlled Northern Ireland also shows how the concept of terrorism was employed to delegitimise the Irish nationalist forces. In it, loyalists to Britain claimed that Ireland was operated under a ‘system of organised terrorism’. Again this had very clear echoes of the kind of language employed by the ruling elites in Britain in relation to the French revolutionaries. The author of the following *Times* article suggested:

‘Terrorism In Ireland’

‘The Irish Unionist Alliance, in a statement issued on behalf of Southern Irish loyalists, point out that the criminal statistics published in the White Paper recently issued do not adequately represent the real condition of Ireland. The crimes described in it are part, and only part, of a gigantic system of organized terrorism. The most serious aspects of the orgy of crime are perfect organization, definite and persistent purpose, immunity from the law, and success. In the war now proceeding in Ireland the Government has been everywhere beaten.’ (The Times, 16th April, 1920)
The language used here is again interesting in the context of British-Irish established-outsider figurations. The word ‘orgy’, for example, is clearly used to suggest that the Irish are debauched as opposed to civilised England, which again highlights the issue of the antithesis between civilisation and terrorism. The fact that Southern Ireland had seceded from the United Kingdom also further highlights processes of increased functional democratisation and the weak monopoly of violence that Britain held over large parts of Ireland.

In such a context, terrorism has played a major part in the relations between Britain and Ireland since the early part of the nineteenth century. As a concept, it was developed in this context along with major structural changes in Britain, Ireland, Europe and the rest of the world. The concept, however, has continually been used by established groups to try to delegitimise outsider Irish groups who were seeking to even up the power ratios in British-Irish Catholic relations. The complexity of these relations includes the inter-state relations between Britain, Ireland, France and the United States, as well as relations between these groups and other countries such as Russia and anarchist groups across Europe.

The focus on Ireland will be picked up again in a subsequent section of this thesis, discussing British colonialism and Ireland in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The next section discusses how terrorism forms a part of the relationships between the British establishment and reform movements in mainland Britain. These groups, as is apparent in some of the news articles on Irish terrorism, had relationships to Irish emancipatory movements, the French Revolution, and wider European revolutionary movements.
Chapter 6: Trades unions, reformers and terrorism

At around the same time that the concepts of terrorism and terrorist were becoming established as part of the figurations involving the British establishment and rebellious Irish Catholics, so they also began to be used in connection with rebellious groups in England, most notably trades unionists and those seeking democratic reforms. Given that, this section will examine, in greater detail, the sociogenesis of the concept of terrorism in the context of functional democratisation in England / Britain, which formed part of the complex intra-state processes that were then occurring in Britain itself. Similar intra-state processes are evident in contemporary Britain in relation to established groups and British-born jihadist terrorists. Although, of course, British-born jihadist terrorists, unlike nineteenth century trades unions and emancipatory movements, are not seeking democratic reforms. There are nevertheless similarities in that, in both cases, outsider groups are seeking to change the balances of power in their favour relative to the established groups in Britain. As such, parallels can be drawn and comparisons made.

The development in the use of the concepts of terrorism and terrorist in the context of relations between established groups in Britain and trades unions and emancipatory movements, along with their use relative to Ireland, further highlights a shift in its meaning from being solely related to the French ‘Jacobins’ and Napoleon to their becoming more general concepts, which, as will be seen in this section, were applied to lower class British groups who rebelled against the national establishment. Again, as with the French revolutionaries and Irish Catholic rebels, those lower-class groups who opposed the British establishment were regarded as being in antithesis to civilised established groups and were often labelled as terrorists. Those lower-class groups included political reformers, such as the Chartists, and trades unions. This expansion in the use of the concept from its original meaning is important: the terms were coming to be used more generally to describe political reformers (whether through violent or non-violent means) or what the establishment in the late eighteenth and nineteenth century saw as threats to their positions – French revolutionaries, reform minded Irish Catholics, and the members of British working class emancipatory movements.

Structural contexts in which trades unionists and political reformers acted according to the designations of terrorism

British nineteenth century reform movements developed as the power chances of the lower classes increased relative to the ruling elites as a consequence of the wider structural shifts that were occurring across the Western world, especially in Europe. These structural changes were linked most directly to the processes of rapid industrialisation and urbanisation that had begun to even up the power differentials between social classes, which were becoming increasingly more functionally dependent on each other. Elias, (1978: 67) used the term ‘functional democratisation’ to describe this trend.
Functional democratisation and advanced monopoly processes in Britain

As already discussed, the processes of the monopolisation of violence and taxation and thus pacification in Britain had, by the nineteenth century reached an advanced stage, whereby the country was more or less pacified, with the exception of Ireland. In his book on Elias, Fletcher (1997:89) points out that, relative to France and Germany, England’s (and subsequently Britain’s) national boundaries became more or less fixed at a relatively early stage and this helped in the process of internal pacification. In addition, he points out that the defeat of King John at the Battle of Bouvines in Normandy in 1214 weakened him relative to the English nobility and clergy, which in turn instigated the development of the Magna Carta which limited royal power in England. Following this, a parliamentary system was developed giving the English nobility and gentry a relatively significant say in the governing of England and subsequently Britain.

The relationships between the landed nobility and the bourgeoisie in England / Britain developed at a relatively early stage, which, as already mentioned, meant that there was considerable cross-fertilisation of codes of behaviour and moral codes (see Elias, 2000; Fletcher, 1997: 90-92). In addition, an alliance of these two groups helped to restrict royal power. Moreover, the royal court played a much less significant role in England compared to France meaning that the centre of social power existed elsewhere other than the court. In its place, was the English Parliament. Accordingly, a process of ‘Parliamentarization’ occurred in England, which involved a shift in the relations between the competing political groups – the Whigs and the Tories – towards non-violent forms of conflict, and thus, an acceleration in a civilising direction or what was referred to by Elias (2000: 381-382) as a ‘civilising spurt’. This involved the pacification of the upper classes, as well as wider sections of English society. As part of this, there was growing commercialisation, increased pacification as a result of the growing effectiveness of the state monopoly of violence, and the curtailment of violence in inter-group struggles for the institutions of rule, or in other words parliamentarisation. A crucial point in the parliamentarisation and pacification processes in Britain was that upper class factional interests were open and relatively non-violent. Their restraint, however, involved a form of self-restraint rather than restraint placed upon them from above by the monarchy, which, in Britain, was relatively less powerful in relation to the landed upper classes than its French counterparts.

During the course of the nineteenth century, the middle classes rose to prominence, replacing, to a large extent, the landed gentry as the ruling elite. As such, Britain’s state representatives became more concerned with moral issues both at home and abroad. Fletcher (1997: 94) points out that these

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20 The overall process of parliamentarization involved a ‘civilizing spurt’ – a period in which the pace of the civilizing process increases – which in this case incorporated the pacification of the upper classes as well as large segments of English society. This civilizing spurt occurred in conjunction with growing commercialization; pacification connected with the expansion or increasing effectiveness of the monopoly of the means of violence by representatives of a country’s central ruling authority, the exclusion of the use of violence from inter-group struggles for control of the main institutions of the central ruling authority (parliamentarization) (Fletcher, 1997: p92).

21 Fletcher argues that: ‘The landed upper classes had at least increased their power potential in relation to the king and court and their superiority over the urban middle classes. The king and his ministers increasingly had to take into account the actions of the nobility and gentry: compromise therefore became essential. Within the parliamentary regime it was necessary for factional interests to come out into the open, but they did so in a controlled, relatively non-violent fashion. Thus, the nature of this pacification process in the upper classes...entailed a type of restraint being imposed by a self-ruling oligarchy upon itself and not by a prince and courtly entourage.’ (Fletcher, 1997:p93).
moral concerns were part of a much larger transformation in Britain during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which also included ‘democratization, moralization and the spread of national feelings, consciousness and ideals’. As a result, much larger proportions of the population came to regard themselves as being part of a broader sovereign collective, including members of the working classes, which was subsequently expressed in specific national we-images.

Accordingly, the English national habitus came to correspond to the resolution of conflicts between the landed upper classes and the middle classes, which resulted in the specific blend of manners (from the upper classes) and morals (from the middle classes) (Fletcher, 1997: 94; Elias 1994a: 506). Accordingly, this involved the development of more rounded and stable self-restraints and an increase in levels of mutual identification, which consequently contributed to an acceleration of civilising processes in England. In addition, says Fletcher, England’s position as a colonial power enhanced feelings among the upper and middle classes of shared foresight and self-restraint, due to their shared governing of these colonies. Fletcher citing Elias points out that:

‘The first spurt towards the moralization of state images and a ‘nationalization’ of morality came with the establishment of Cromwell’s Commonwealth. Colonial expansion marked the growing importance of England as a sea power and her ability to acquire or rule over other territories. The middle-class intelligentsia could justify their colonial conquests as ‘civilizing missions’ which they regarded as more or less successful depending upon the degree to which the standards of the conquered society could conform to their own ideal of ‘civilization’. Thus, ‘what appeared in the eyes of the people brought up in the tradition of middle-class morality to be hypocrisy, deceit and violence was, in fact, a normal distinguishing characteristic of a dynastic and aristocratic warrior tradition’ (1996: 458n). Nobles and princes together employed these means as an unavoidable and self-evident necessity in their relations with other states. But the rising industrial middle classes of England, through the process of relative equalization vis-à-vis the aristocratic establishment, fought against aristocratic codes with the weapons of morality as they gained an increasing stake in the ruling of their own country. Elias suggests that England provides more examples of conflicts between moral and honour codes than other European countries because, in the latter, there was greater pressure to conform to the nationalistic credo. At the same time, however, a more homogenous national belief system spread and came to be seen as an indispensable tool of state power.

‘By the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the ‘nationalization’ of feelings, consciousness, we-image and we-ideal were firmly established in England, due largely to its relative continuity of state-formation in comparison with other European states.’ (Fletcher, 1997: 93-95)

Part of what Fletcher is describing – the growing interdependence between upper, middle and lower classes – was central to processes of functional democratisation in England. In particular, in nineteenth century and twentieth century England there was a degree of equalisation between the middle classes and the industrial working classes. These processes of functional democratisation were, in part, influenced by the relations that states had with one another. As such, functional democratisation was desirable as the ruling classes of industrialising countries were competing against each other and so they had to rely on workforces (the working classes) and the generation of capital to help maintain and improve their power positions in relation to ruling groups in other countries. In Britain this was connected, for the most part, in relation to its competition with France.

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22 This influence of moral imperatives formed part of a broader overall transformation of society through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries which included processes of democratization, moralization and the spread of national feelings, consciousness and ideals. With these processes, increasing numbers of the English population, including the working classes, became more aware that they were part of a broader sovereign collective and this became expressed in the formation of their own we-image. (Fletcher, 1997:p 94)
For example, the industrial bourgeoisie and the working classes were needed to expand economies, drive industrialisation, make money, provide soldiers and perform various other tasks that were central to the development and competition between nation-states.

In the more pacified society of nineteenth century Britain in which the balance of power increasingly favoured the industrial bourgeoisie relative to other social groups, the industrial working classes also gained greater power chances relative to other social groups, as part of the process of functional democratisation.

An absolutely fundamental part of the processes of functional democratisation during the nineteenth century in Europe was that, at times, it manifested itself in the prospect of and actual rebellion and violence. This rebellion and violence was, at times, more specifically, designated as terrorism, and rebellious groups were designated as terrorists. In addition, the extent to which British society had/has developed the institutional means of dealing with functional democratisation, and those seeking to increase their power chances relative to established groups is important. If avoiding violence has been one of the objectives of established groups, then clearly they have not been altogether successful. This societal failure to develop institutional pressure valves has clearly manifested in the development of terrorism figurations in which outsider groups through either violent or perceived illegitimate non-violent means, have sought to even up the power differentials between themselves and established groups, and as such have been labelled as being ‘uncivilised’ and ‘terrorists’. We can see here, therefore, that processes of functional democratisation in Britain have played a central role in the development of terrorism figurations.

Processes of functional democratisation were not limited to the figurations formed between the ruling classes and the working classes in the nineteenth century. Similar processes are evident in the relationships between established groups in Britain and people from former British colonies and their children. As such, there has been an evening up of the balance of power between established British groups, their former colonies and migrants to Britain from its former colonies. This had implications for the development of ‘home-grown’ contemporary jihadist terrorism, which will be explored in greater detail later.

In the nineteenth century, however, as Britain industrialised and urbanised, processes of functional democratisation became increasingly apparent. There was certainly an increase in the power potential among the lower classes in Britain during the nineteenth century and this did manifest itself in, among other ways, discontent, rebellion and violence. At times, established groups in Britain during the nineteenth century, referred to rebellious and potentially rebellious lower class groups as terrorists and as conducting terrorism. These ruling elites, which tended to include a high proportion of the bourgeoisie, together with the aristocracy and gentry, who were slowly losing their functions and therefore, their power potentials, and became more functionally dependent on the lower classes, most specifically the industrial working classes. This worked in a number of ways and is, as I mentioned earlier, related to both inter- and intra-societal and intra-state processes. As competition between European nation-states continued and intensified, increased technicisation and industrialisation played significant roles in providing different European powers with a competitive
edge. For example, innovations in weaponry have consistently played a role in determining the balance of power between states, and innovative, efficient and mass industrial production plays a part in the development of such weapons. There are, of course, other examples, such as the ability to move labour and or goods around more quickly through the development of more efficient transport systems. Nevertheless, ruling groups in European countries became more reliant on the lower classes for labour and as soldiers as part of these increasingly more complex societies in which the efficient mass production of goods gives a competitive edge over international rivals. As such, the social usefulness of the lower classes increased and correspondingly so did their power chances. This meant that they were able to bargain with the ruling groups, and as Elias (1978: 67-68) points out, could use tactics including strikes and even violence to seek to further improve or consolidate their positions.

The development of reform movements and trades unions

These processes of functional democratisation are evident in various forms and degrees of structural complexity and, as such, manifest themselves in both highly complex and less complex social formations. These processes can be understood in the context of the sociogenesis of terrorism. So, for example, as already mentioned, during the French Revolution there was support for its aims and hope for a similar revolution in Britain from significant sections of the British public, including more radical sections of the Whig party, educated elites and from some sections of the lower classes. Related to this support but in the context of wider structural shifts, including functional democratisation, various reform movements and other emancipatory processes were set in motion.

The historian A K Webb (1955: 36-37), argued that a number of ‘radical’ groups were formed in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, often by the working classes. However, a conservative backlash, from 1794 onwards against them and led by the then prime minister, William Pitt, resulted in their decline. This government backlash (1955: 40)23, as described by Webb, was to all intents and purposes driven by the established group and the upper class fear of the idea of extending the franchise to groups that were previously relatively politically passive. Much of this, so-called, lower class agitation came in the guise of political pamphlets and through the radical press.

The backlash24 by established groups, led by the government, against this rise in the power potential of the lower classes involved harsh criminal sentences including transportation. In addition Habeas Corpus was suspended in 1794, the scope of high treason was extended and public meetings were

23 According to Webb: ‘...the threatening element from the government point of view was the extension of political agitation to segments of society hitherto relatively untouched. Windham referred in the House to “alarming discontents actively propagated by seditious publications,” and Pitt called for “a great deal of activity on the part of the friends of our constitution, to take pains properly to address the public mind, and to keep it in that state which was necessary to our present tranquillity.”’ (Webb, 1955: 40).

24 Repressive measures taken as a result of the panic among the upper classes were sweeping, harsh, and effective. Prosecution of individuals reached its climax in the heavy sentences of transportation laid on the leaders of the Edinburgh Convention. Habeas corpus was suspended in 1794, and acts of the following year limited the holding of public meetings and extended the scope of high treason. The radical societies began to disappear, with a final blow dealt by the Corresponding Societies Act of 1799, which also imposed strict control by justices of the peace on the printing trade.’ (Webb, 1955: 40-41).
severely restricted. In 1799 the Corresponding Societies Act was passed, which imposed strict controls on the printing press.

The reactions against working class radical groups show the fear that ruling elites had of them. These established groups were also fearful in the context of what had happened across the channel, where ruling groups were deposed during the first French Revolution. It also shows that the power chances of the lower classes in Britain had increased relative to the ruling groups and as a result this gave the latter more opportunities to challenge the status quo. This they did in many ways. The most well known groups to do this, in the first half the nineteenth century included the Owenites and the Chartists, as I shall now seek to show.

Urban discontent in the first half of the nineteenth century was evident across the West but was most pronounced in Britain and France. Chief among these movements in Britain was, as mentioned, the Chartist movement or People's Charter, which regarded Tories, Whigs and liberals as enemies of its aims. Other, socialist movements tended to be restricted by an inability to develop effective strategies and leadership. This weakness is symptomatic of the general weaknesses suffered by relative outsider groups, and is evident across a wide spectrum of such groups, and not just those based on class distinctions, but also those based on race, gender and so on.

The very fact that these working class movements were able to challenge the establishment, however, shows that the power differentials between these groups had lessened relative to earlier periods when similar such action would have been crushed, or simply would not have been possible due to the lack of complexity in the relations between people in the lower orders and their related interdependence with the ruling elites. Nevertheless, despite some gains which further helped to even up the power differentials between the ruling elites and the lower classes, such as the Reform Act of 1832, the power ratio between these groups was still relatively large, particularly by today’s standards. This gap in power ratios meant that, by and large, the demands of the working class reformers were, for their immediate future, not met.

**Terrorism as a way to delegitimise**

As part of these class struggles that developed as part of processes of functional democratisation in the nineteenth century, stigmatising and delegitimising language was deployed by all sides. That is, the ruling elites used such language towards lower class groups and there were also attempts at counter-stigmatisation directed at the ruling elites by the lower classes. The words terrorism and terrorist were words that were used in this context, and, of course, people, at least some of the time acted according to those designations, which often, in the case of terrorism, referred to intimidation, violence and the threat of violence. We can see in the following extracts from *The Times* examples of how the ruling elites in Britain used the words terrorism and terrorist to try to delegitimise working class reformers and trades unions. Of course, they were not at this stage categorising them as terrorists based on various properties of terrorism. For example, a report in *The Times* newspaper of a Parliamentary debate in the House of Commons from 1831 highlights an example of the use of the
concept of terrorism in relation to the radical press, which, as mentioned, was, in many ways, at the forefront of the reform movements and attempts to emancipate the working classes. An extract from the article (included below) links the radical press in England with censorship of the press in France before the latter’s second revolution in 1830. The claim was that the radical press in England undertook terrorism as part of attempts at reform, and that it was tyrannical:

‘He (Sir C. Wetherell) depreciated as much as any man, any attempt to censorship on the press, but let us take care that we have no Polignac press. No man could conceal from himself this fact—that the press, the Polignac press, of this country, had contributed largely to the excitement of the public feelings; it was one of these causes, which acting in unison with the ministry, had ably and largely contributed to that state of the public mind which we all in common join in deprecating. He contended that an attempt had been made by the terrorism of the press to carry the measure of reform against the wishes of those who had always been attached to the constitution. (Hear, hear.) That attempt was manifest to all who had witnessed the manner in which the press had endeavored to excite the radical reformers against every member of the conservative party. To what limits ministers intended to let the press go before they arrested it in its progress, gentlemen on his side of the house could not know, but this he would maintain that at no period in the history of either England or France, or the Roman Empire, or, indeed, in the history of any state either ancient or modern, which had ever laboured under a censorship, had there been exercised such a tyranny over men’s minds, as was now exercised under the radical, and Polignac, and tyrannical press of England.’ (The Times, 19 December, 1831)

It is perhaps useful to note that the language used here to describe the English radical press is not dissimilar to that used to describe Robespierre and his terrorists. In particular, the words tyranny and terrorism, used in both instances, show that The Times was seeking to paint a picture of the radical press that corresponds to the worst deeds of the French revolutionaries or, as can be seen, even the Roman Empire. Either way it is clear that it was attempting to delegitimise the radical press, which stood for the interests of the lower classes, whose power chances, as mentioned, were increasing relative to established groups.

In another article, in 1839, following Chartist riots in Newport, The Times reported the following from a Parliamentary debate, which claimed that trades unions undertook terrorism:

‘Mr. T. PROTHEO, of Malpas, rose to second the resolution amid loud cheers. He said Mr. Mayor and genuine before I proceed to the immediate object of the resolution, I will, with your permission, make a few remarks upon the nature and causes of this insurrection as perceived in many of the London papers expression of surprise at the secrecy with which it was conducted a surprise into which gentlemen living at a distance, as the editors of the London papers do, and unacquainted necessarily with the habits of our population, might very readily fall into, but which a matter of no surprise to those acquainted with the inhabitants of our mountain, and the cause of which I will endeavour to explain. Immediately after the repeal of the late combination laws, the mountaineers established the baneful clubs among them called Trades Unions, which at first were conducted openly and without much offence, as men were allowed either to join them or not, being left unmolested in the event of their refusing to do so. They shortly, however, converted them into secret associations and a system of coercion of the worst character, and terrorism the most complete was carried on throughout the country, the leaders and chief conspirators bearing the name of Scotch cattle. Outrages were perpetrated in the night-time, the better disposed were coerced, and the terrorism became so complete that the wicked became possessed of influence and power; while the moderate and well-disposed were utterly powerless. (Hear.) Nay, so complete was the state of terror into which the inhabitants were thrown, that although the sufferers by the system knew well who were their persecutors in scarcely one instance had they the courage to come forward and give evidence against them. (Hear.)’ (The Times, 23rd November, 1839)

Here we see terrorism was associated with ‘coercion’, ‘secrecy’, ‘conspiracy’ and ‘wickedness’, which were all attributed to trades unions. However, violence is not said to be central to this particular designation of terrorism. It is clear, nonetheless, that the establishment Times was opposed to trades unions, whether or not it was close to reality that they were wicked, coercive and conspiratorial.
There are further references in *The Times* in 1839 that use of the concept of terrorism in relation to Chartism and another example where the two were linked in 1842. In 1850 the term was used in relation to trades unions again. However, by the time we reach 1860, trades unions and their leaders were regularly referred to as undertaking terrorism. For example, there were four articles in *The Times* in 1860 that referred to trades union terrorism. As with earlier examples, often *The Times* referred to terrorism in the trades union context as if it were used as a form of coercion in order to force people to join unions or to strike. It, on occasion, claimed that this coercion was backed up with threats and violence. The following is an example of this from 1860:

‘Not only are the Unions maintaining their old system of persecution, but the recollections of the late struggle are still allowed to create discord and conflict. A Trades' Union may make its own laws for the governance of its own members, but beyond that circle it is powerless, and its action, when exerted against those who do not belong to it, becomes absolute tyranny. All the allegations, in fact, went the same way, and tended to show that, notwithstanding the nominal termination of the recent struggle, the Unionists were still bent upon coercing or intimidating all who stood aloof from their body. Now, that is the very system against which public feeling rebels. The laws against combination were relaxed because it was thought that working men ought not to be deprived of that strength which union confers. It was intended to put them on a fairer footing as regarded their employers; but if they turn the privilege to the injury of their fellow workmen and to the destruction of private rights, the matter will be looked at in a very different spirit. The country will not tolerate a system of terrorism in any trade or calling. Every workman is free to dispose of his labour as he thinks best. He may make his terms on his own private account, or adjut them after conference with others exactly as he pleases, without being subject, either in the one case or the other, to obloquy or persecution.’ (*The Times*, 23rd May, 1860)

In this article we can see the processes of functional democratisation at work and how they are related to the sociogenesis of terrorism. The relaxation of the laws against combination were clearly needed to release pressure from the growing relative power potential of the working classes. However, this relaxation meant that the working classes were able to further increase their power potential thorough the formation of trades unions, and through these sought to even up the power balances between themselves and industrial bourgeoisie even further. Articles such as this in *The Times* clearly represent a backlash against the new power potential that trades unions were providing for the working classes, and, as part of this backlash stigmatising language, including words like terrorism and terrorist were deployed. The trades unionists were designated as terrorists and acted according to those particular designations.

Additionally, it is useful to note that similar articles and language are used by the contemporary British press towards trades unions today. However, they tend not to call them terrorists, which shows how the concept of terrorism has developed since it was used with respect to trades unions. Rather, the term terrorist tends, in the contemporary British press, to be reserved for so-called jihadist terrorists (and to a lesser extent, some republican and loyalist Irish groups) but is also used rather indiscriminately to stigmatising a broader section of Muslims, who do not necessarily fall within normative definitions of terrorists.

Moreover, it is perhaps useful to make the point that, although there are some similarities with contemporary definitions of terrorism here, it is clearly not the same. Today, the actions of the unions described in *The Times* would most likely not be called terrorism but rather might be referred to as political coercion. For example, there is no mention of targeting civilians with
violence to communicate a political message, nor are the trades unionists regarded as
belonging to dedicated terrorist groups who plant bombs, blow themselves up and so on.
Nevertheless, their actions were still called terrorism at the time. This helps to highlight the
sociogenesis of the concept – its meaning has changed over time, and this reflects the
changing social conditions and the need for the term to change its function, albeit in sometimes
subtle ways, and, in other respects, more radical ways, as highlighted here.

Returning to nineteenth century trades unions, a *Times* article from 11th April 1865 discussed
the possibility of a Europe-wide merger of trades unions. It claimed that while a combination of
industrial owners is more powerful, it is more difficult to maintain than trades unions and, unlike
the latter, would not use so-called terrorist tactics.

The idea that trades unions and workers were more capable of organising themselves than
employers is highly significant. On the one hand, if true, it shows that the power potential of
workers, on one level, was capable of surpassing that of employers. On another level it shows
the extent of fears among established groups. However, the power potential of both of these
groups should not be understood as operating independently of other parts of society. For
example, the power potential of employers is greatly enhanced by the fact that, to a large
extent, the British government and other established groups were/are on their side, meaning
that although the balance of power between owners and workers has diminished, it is still
relatively uneven. It also means that they tend/tended to have a greater influence in the
monopoly of violence, and as such, were/are able to use the police and the army to bolster their
position; something which is much more difficult for the workers to do.

The following article from 1870 also referred to the terrorism of trades unions:

‘Our correspondent, Mr. MAULT, was certainly justified in inquiring whether such a description as
was given applied to a proclaimed district of Ireland or to the busiest part of the second city in
England. A Manchester manufacturer is unable to sleep with safety in his own house, or even to let
it be known where he intends to pass the night. His coachman dares not drive him home, and even
his friends cannot visit him, except at their possible peril. All this terrorism is created, we are led to
understand, by the action of a certain Trade or Trade Union, and it is in this respect that the case
acquires peculiar importance at the present conjuncture.’ (*The Times*, 11th May, 1870)

As we can see here, trades unions in Manchester were compared to the situation in Ireland. No
doubt, this referred to what *The Times* was calling terrorism in Ireland on the part of Irish Catholics
who were seeking land reforms and a repeal of the Act of Union. *The Times* attempted to conflate
trades union terrorism with rebellious Irish terrorism, both of which involved outsider groups seeking
to even-up the power differentials with established groups in Britain.

There are other examples of trades unions being accused of terrorism in *The Times* in the latter half
of the nineteenth century. A final example (below) shows how terrorism is associated with socialist
trades unionism, which is seen as the antithesis to more civilised forms of labour:

‘The National Free Labour Congress. The report which is to be presented at the third annual
congress of the National Free Labour Association, commencing on October 7 at Newcastle-on-
Tyne, opens by setting out the “grave causes” which brought the association into existence. It says
“The advent of the new Socialistic trade unionism was marked by deeds of violence, both in London and the great industrial centres, which disgraced the name of civilized labour. Men went in fear of their lives when searching for work, and, as in the case of the Albert Dock strike in 1891, the Cardiff strike in 1891 the Leeds Gas strike in 1892, and the Hull strike in 1893 scenes of terrorism, burnings, and even attempted murder were the favourite instruments which this new Socialistic movement employed.’ (The Times, 19th September, 1895)

Socialism and the trades unions associated with it were clearly labelled as terroristic and uncivilised. It is interesting to note that The Times in this article was seeking to draw a distinction between civilised labour and socialist trades unions, which it claimed undertook terrorism and murder. This was clearly an attempt to delegitimise an outsider social group by the newspaper, and is an example of the deployment of such tactics in order to try to maintain the status quo. It is also useful to note that attempted murder was seen as worse than terrorism. This again highlights that terrorism in this period had a different meaning than the one it has presently.

**Terrorism as used as part of counter stigmatisation processes by members of the reform movements in Britain.**

The greater power chances that many of the lower classes were acquiring, as well as giving them the chance to organise through trades unions and other movements, also gave some of them the opportunity to attempt counter-stigmatisation. Accordingly, the concept of terrorism was also used, with somewhat less effect, in this context, against the British state, by those who were seeking democratic reform. For example, in an article in the radical newsletter, The Poor Man’s Guardian, in 1832, the author suggested that Robespierre was not a terrorist and that the British had been conducting a ‘reign of terror’ in Ireland for centuries. He also described British soldiers as terrorists. The very fact that members of the lower classes were able to print stigmatising language about the establishment is further evidence of functional democratisation in progress.

However, when something English was directly attacked, as in the case of a bomb attack in 1880 at Mansion House, allegedly by an Irish group, the radical press referred to this as terrorism. This perhaps suggests that, while the people who wrote and bought radical newspapers, identified with the emancipatory movements of the lower classes across Europe; at the same time, when directly attacked they identified at least as strongly with their nation and, accordingly, with its ruling groups. Such a process also occurred during the First and Second World Wars, as will be explored shortly.

Despite attempts at counter-stigmatisation, the association that trades unions and working-class or ‘left-wing’ reform movements had with terrorism in the nineteenth century stuck then and to an extent still does, much more than claims that the ruling elites in the nineteenth century were terrorists. What is crucial here, therefore, is that processes of functional democratisation played a significant part in the nineteenth century in the sociogenesis of the concept of terrorism and the sociogenesis of the processes by which people (in this case reform-orientated lower-classes) acted according to those designations at the time. These designations were not entirely the same as those applied to Irish terrorists, although there were similarities between the reformers in mainland Britain and reformers in Ireland. Nor were the meanings of the concepts of terrorism and terrorist the same as they are today.
The counter-stigmatisation that political reformers and trades unions engaged in during the nineteenth century has parallels to the counter-stigmatisation engaged in today by jihadist terrorists, who often refer to established groups and nation-states like Britain and the United States as terrorists or Satan of Kuffur and so on. However, these processes of counter-stigmatisation have proved relatively fruitless due to the power differentials between jihadist terrorists and Britain and the United States. Nevertheless, this point shows the similarity between nineteenth century terrorism figurations in Britain relating to trades unions and present-day terrorism figurations in relation to Britain and jihadist terrorists.
Chapter 7: Terrorism and revolutionary Europe

Functional democratisation and revolutions in Europe 1815-1848

The process of functional democratisation was not only confined to Britain in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. It was, in fact, a process that enveloped most of Europe and, in part, manifested itself in rebellions against absolute monarchs and rule based on hereditary privilege across the continent. In this section I shall examine how processes of functional democratisation across Europe in the nineteenth century contributed to the sociogenesis of terrorism in Britain. Central to these processes are the relationships Britain had with its European neighbours which were, on one level, that of being foreign and relative outsiders to each other, and also the influence that the French Revolution was still having on Britain’s ruling elites and elite groups throughout the continent. Of course, as with the main theme throughout this thesis, established-outsider figurations played a critical role in these processes.

The functional democratisation during the nineteenth century in Europe and the resulting shift in the balances of power in the continent between the social classes was emulated, in some ways, on a global basis in the twentieth century. For example, the power differentials between former colonial powers and their former colonies reduced to some extent in that period. In both instances, these related inter- and intra-state processes contributed to the development of terrorism figurations, including those related to so-called home-grown jihadist terrorism. More will be discussed on twentieth century functional democratisation and terrorism later.

However, between 1815 which marked the end of the early nineteenth century wars in Europe, related to the first French Revolution and 1848, there was a series of further revolutions and rebellions all related to structural shifts in social stratification across the continent, or in other words, there was increasing functional democratisation. As such, there were three distinct periods in this time-span during which revolutionary fervour across Europe peaked: the first was between 1820 and 1824 and included rebellions in Spain (1820), Naples (1820) and Greece (1821). The second was from 1829 until 1837 and involved great swathes of Europe, including Belgium winning independence from Holland in 1830, and agitations in Poland, Italy, Germany, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, and Britain. Perhaps the biggest spike in activity and certainly the most well-known was in 1848 and included rebellions and rebellious activity in France, Italy, the German states, most of the Habsburg Empire, Switzerland, and to a lesser extent Spain, Denmark, Romania, Ireland, Greece and Britain. Hobsbawm (2011:141)25 argued that the first French Revolution was pivotal in these rebellions and revolutions, as it provided a specific focus for them.

25 According to Hobsbawm:

‘The political models created by the Revolution of 1789 served to give discontent a specific object, to turn unrest into revolution, and above all to link all Europe in a single movement – or perhaps it would be better to say current – of subversion.’ (Hobsbawm, 2011: 142).
However, despite the central role of the French Revolution as espoused by Hobsbawm, it did not ‘cause’ revolts in other countries. It was simply a symptom of functional democratisation in France. Accordingly, the process of functional democratisation across Europe meant that people, instead of fighting in the name of monarchs, began to fight for social movements, for example, as Elias (1978: 62) points out, ‘conservatism’, ‘liberalism’, ‘communism’, ‘socialism’, and ‘capitalism’. What these ‘isms’ stood for was peoples’ awareness of a change in their structural positions, in their power potential relative to established groups. This new awareness of a greater power potential manifested itself in revolutionary violence and agitation for reforms. Discussing this greater self-awareness Elias (1978) suggested:

‘Everyone knows about these changes, yet they are not always perceived clearly and unequivocally as changes in social structure. They are usually labelled “historical events”. In other words, people perceive a wealth of detail about events in various industrialized countries of Europe during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In France there was a revolution. Kings and emperors came and went. Eventually bourgeois and workers’ parties fought for and created a republic. In England Reform Acts extended the franchise to the bourgeoisie and the workers, and admitted their representatives to government posts. The power of the House of Lords declined, while that of the House of Commons increased. Eventually England became a country ruled by the industrial bourgeoisie and the industrial workers... What were the reasons for the transformation of the whole human situation in these and other countries? All were moving in one and the same direction; they had in common increasing scientificization of control over nature, increasing occupational differentiation and many other trends. This is precisely the sociological problem. Until this point has been taken, it is difficult to appreciate what sociologists understand by ‘society’. When it has, though, it can be seen that beneath the many differences of historical detail between the various countries, there was a structural parallelism in their overall development as societies....

‘...These parallels in the development escape notice very easily if attention is paid only to one sphere of development, whether it is the economic, the political or social. That is one of the difficulties. Industrialization, scientificization, bureaucratization, urbanization, democratization or the growth of nationhood – whichever concept is seized upon to demonstrate parallelism in social change, it emphasizes only one particular aspect over another.’ (Elias, 1978: p62-64).

A key feature of that parallelism across Europe was the process of increasing functional democratisation. It was the greater power potential of social groups lower down the social scale relative to ruling elites that was central to their ability to challenge the established order, whether that was through violent insurrection, or the threat of violence. It was within this context that the concept of terrorism was used and developed further.

Revolutions in Europe and terrorism

As mentioned, the relationship that the ruling elites in Britain had with ruling elites across Europe, as well as those groups challenging them from below was complex. Generally speaking, there was hostility in Britain towards absolutist monarchs on the continent but at the same time there was fear of post-revolutionary France (Hobsbawm 2011: 138). As such, the core objective among European

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26 According to Hobsbawm:

‘Rarely has the incapacity of governments to hold up the course of history been more conclusively demonstrated than in the generation after 1815. To prevent a second French Revolution, or the even worse catastrophe of a general European revolution on the French model, was the supreme object of all the powers which had just spent more than twenty years in defeating the first; even of the British, who were not in sympathy with the reactionary absolutisms which re-established themselves all over Europe and knew quite well that reforms neither could nor ought to be avoided, but who feared a new Franco-Jacobin expansion more than any other international contingency. And yet, never in European history and rarely anywhere else, has revolutionism been so endemic, so general, so likely to spread by spontaneous contagion as well as by deliberate propaganda.’ (Hobsbawm, 2011:138)
elites was to prevent large-scale revolution across the continent. Despite Britain’s dislike of the absolutist monarchies in the rest of Europe, there was even greater fear of a ‘Franco-Jacobin expansion’.

Accordingly, the concepts of terrorism and terrorist in relation to many of these revolutions and insurrections were used at times by established groups in Britain and Europe to describe and stigmatise revolutionaries. Parallels can again be drawn with the not dissimilar structural changes and revolutions that have been happening in the Middle East and North Africa in more recent years. In many of these cases, such as in Libya and Syria, established groups in those countries have claimed that those rebelling are terrorists.

Returning to the structural changes and terrorism during the nineteenth century, again *The Times* is a good source of evidence. It is perhaps not surprising that the concepts of terrorism and terrorist were used because, as has already been shown, they were first coined during the first French Revolution, and the relationship of subsequent European revolutions should not be seen in isolation to that event. In fact the first example of *The Times* using the concept of terrorist in relation to revolutions outside of the first French Revolution was in the context of France’s 1830 July revolution, during which King Charles X was overthrown and replaced by King Louis Philippe of Orleans. Reference was made to the nephew of the first French Revolution’s Danton being under police surveillance. Danton’s nephew, the article said, was the ‘terrorist of old’. This is a rather isolated case of the use of the concept of terrorist at the time and is clearly related to the first French Revolution. This, as already suggested, shows that the concepts by that period had not altered much from their original meanings, which were, for the most part used to describe Robespierre’s Jacobins and groups closely related to them.

However, 1830, as already mentioned, also witnessed the first use of the concepts of terrorism or terrorist in *The Times* that fell outside of the immediate context of the first French Revolution. Accordingly, the word terrorists was used to warn that violent suppression of the ‘Belgic insurrection’ by the King of the Netherlands would make him and his army, terrorists, and be an affront to civilisation. The article reads as follows:

‘The king may satisfy the just demands of Belgium by declaring it separated from Holland as far as all matters of finance are concerned, and by modifying certain institutions which have hitherto done nothing but exasperate the Belgians. This administrative separation of two countries under the rule of one sovereign would not present an extraordinary sight. Europe offers several instances of it; for instance, Sweden and Norway, Austria and Hungary, England and Hanover.

‘This appears to us to be the most expedient measure that can be adopted in the present important crisis. The King of the Netherlands may perhaps be able, by means of his Dutch army, and of the rancour which prevails between the population of Holland and that of the Netherlands, to combat the Belgic insurrection, and to suppress it altogether; but so cruel an effusion of blood would render him odious to his subjects and to Europe. At the high degree of civilization which we have now reached, and at a period when a revolution has been effected in France by the people, without vengeance and without bloodshed on the scaffold, kings, who should make themselves terrorists would meet with nothing but universal hate, and would prepare for themselves a frightful fall, sooner or later.’ (*The Times*, 1 September, 1830)

The use of the concept terrorists in this regard is not in any way insignificant. It exemplifies a shift away from the specific use of the concept related directly to the first French Revolution to a more general usage. This more general usage is seen as state violence used against a population and at
the same time is regarded as the direct antithesis to civilisation. It is also interesting to note, in this context, the British establishment's disdain for violent suppression of revolution, at least in other countries, and is perhaps an example of how the British establishment considered itself as more civilised than its European counterparts.

Nevertheless, as I mentioned earlier, the change of the concept of terrorists from specific to more general usage in this instance is reflective of the particular social configurations in Europe, whereby previously established groups were being challenged by former outsider groups. These were generally bourgeois groups challenging the old absolutist systems such as the ancien régime in France. The general feeling among established groups in Britain, as has already been discussed, was that, although they did not often actively support the continent's absolutist regimes, they were fearful of insurrection spreading from the rest of Europe to Britain. These fears were stoked by movements like radicalism, Chartism, pro-repeal Irish groups and trades unions.

This slightly contradictory approach to what was going on in continental Europe among the British establishment can be seen in The Times' coverage of the 'Belgic insurrection', which was not critical of the rebellious Belgians. However, it was highly critical of the first French Revolution. It also indicates that one meaning of terrorism for established groups in Britain represented by The Times, was of violent and uncivilised repression, either by ruling groups (except, of course, those in Britain) or more or less outsider groups challenging ruling groups. Such coverage by The Times helps to further drive home a point that has already been made, which is that the use of the concepts of terrorism and terrorists was used only to describe groups that The Times (and therefore large parts of the British establishment) considered to be their enemies or competitors.

Later on, during the period in and around 1848 which was perhaps the most revolutionary in Europe in the whole of the nineteenth century, there was an increase in the use of the concepts of terrorism and terrorist in the British establishment press to describe revolutionary events and those involved in them. The following is an extract from an article that appeared in The Times in 1848: In this case the article is about revolutionary activity in the Duchy of Baden in the German provinces.

'Struve and his accomplices, whose presence and agitations along the German frontier had called forth the complaints of the German Diet, a few days back made an invasion into the Grand Duchy of Baden. Rapine and forced contributions marked their passage, and their proclamations only too well proved that the object of their criminal enterprise was the violent overthrow of existing order, for the purpose of substituting for it, under the mask of liberty, the most awful terrorism and the most frightful despotism. Although the valour of the troops of the empire and the attachment of the citizens to their constitution and to legal order, baffled the infamous designs of these free corps, that event still imposes on the Government of the Vicar of the Empire the duty of adopting such measures as the honour and safety of Germany demand.' (The Times, 12th October, 1848)

It is clear that The Times considered the German revolutionary cause to be highly undesirable and this is rubber stamped by its claim that Struve and his compatriots wished to impose ‘the most awful terrorism and the most frightful despotism’ on the people of Baden.

The Times had a similar approach to revolutionary activity in Austria. Another article stated the following:
'In the whole course of events since the 6th of October no name of eminence on the Liberal side in Austrian politics has ever been put forward by the insurgent. No specific demands of a practical kind were ever preferred; no definite rallying cry was raised. Yet by some means or other the extreme party, aided by the Republicans from other parts of Germany, by French and Sardinian emissaries, by Polish and Hungarian malcontents, succeeded in inducing or compiling a very large number of the populace of Vienna to make a defence against the Imperial troops, which would have been heroic if it had been directed against a foreign enemy. The probability is that the revolutionary party, who had reckoned on more effectual support from Hungary, and had sent out their agents to kindle a general insurrection in the provinces, succeeded in no part of their plan but that of establishing a sort of terrorism in Vienna. The unfortunate inhabitants were divided between their dread of the terrible chastisement hanging over them for the murder of LATOUR and the expulsion of the Imperial family, and the no less formidable evils of a revolutionary dictatorship within their walls.' (The Times, 8th November, 1848)

The treatment in The Times of Austrian revolutionaries was a little less harsh than its treatment of the German revolutionaries. Nevertheless, it did state that the exercise of military power against them was acceptable because in the eyes of The Times, they were criminals.

The following extract was published in The Times in 1850 and referred to the Hungarian revolt against the Hapsburgs.

'The systematic railing at the cruelty of Governments on which have devolved the painful task of re-establishing the fundamental principles on which society is based, and of which military discipline is one of the most powerful – the passing over in silence, or the excusing from generous impulses all of the excesses of revolutionary terrorism – the searching after political liberty under the government of Radical terrorists...' (The Times, 2nd January, 1850)

The use by The Times of the term ‘revolutionary terrorism’, suggests that this was a concept that could be applied on a general basis to almost any insurrection across Europe. It is interesting to note that the term ‘revolutionary terrorism’ was used and not simply the term ‘revolution’. By adding the word ‘terrorism’ to ‘revolutionary’ it is clear that there was an attempt to delegitimise that rebellious activity. Again, parallels can be drawn between recent revolutions in North Africa and the Middle East, and Europe’s nineteenth century revolutions. In both cases, the terms ‘revolution’ and ‘terrorism’ become almost synonymous in the way established groups describe their challengers.

Russia and terrorism

Apart from in France, for the most part at least in the immediate term, the rebellions in Europe proved unsuccessful. Following these short-term successes for established regimes against the revolutionaries, the talk of terrorism in the context of revolution in The Times ended until around 1880 when Russia came under the spotlight with the emergence of the revolutionary group ‘Narodnaya Volya’ (The People’s Will), which assassinated Tsar Alexander II. This group is often regarded by terrorism experts as one of the first ever terrorist groups, as they fitted relatively closely with more recent normative conceptions of what terrorism is said to be. (Rapoport, 2004; Hoffman, 2006)

The position The Times took in relation to the Narodnaya Volya and the Russian establishment, is informative on the inter-state figurations at the time, especially those between Britain and Russia. On the one hand, its claims that the Narodnaya Volya has created a climate of terrorism in Russia but on the other says that the Russian establishment is repressive and savage, and blames it, in part, for the terrorism of Narodnaya Volya. In fact in an article from the period, The Times claimed that both the
Narodnaya Volya and the Russian secret police engaged in terrorism. The British establishment position, in the context, was indicative of the complexities of the relationships between the British establishment and both established and outsider groups in other countries. It also echoed the idea that the British establishment was fearful of revolutionaries across Europe and at home but at the same time was disdainful of the reactionary absolutist regimes across the continent, which also happened to be direct rivals to Britain. The following Times article highlighted some of these issues:

‘Russians who loathed Nihilism have not for the last half-year been obliged to feel a half-sympathy with its conspiracies by the consciousness that they were being treated as accomplices. The load of the absolutism confided to the Supreme Executive Commission has been infinitely lightened by the abeyance of the constant terrorism of the secret police. Military law has been less hard to bear than a perpetual police inquisition. The Russian people, if it analyzed its own feelings, would confess that it has enjoyed calmer days during the last six months than at any other recent period.’ (The Times, 23rd August, 1880)

The fact that The Times referred to the actions of Tsarist Russia’s secret police as terrorism, as well as the actions of the Narodnaya Volya further demonstrates the complexity of the relations between the British establishment and Russia at the time. On the one hand, the Tsar and the Russian establishment were regarded with suspicion if not outright hostility, but on the other hand revolutionary groups in Russia and elsewhere were regarded as a danger to the established order in Europe, including in Britain. The article also appears to confirm Hobsbawm’s (2011: 138) point that the British establishment was more afraid of revolutionaries than it was of what it considered to be despotic governments and rulers. More generally, The Times articles on the various revolutions in different European countries helps to confirm Elias’s (1978: 62-64) point that there was a parallelism of social development across Europe, in that functional democratisation was contributing in many countries to challenges against existing established groups. Of course, that challenge was often referred to as terrorism by the established groups, whether or not violence played a major part in such rebellious activity. Very often, however, it did.

Anarchism

The use of the concepts of terrorism and terrorist in the British establishment press also began, in the late nineteenth century, to include the labelling of anarchist and communist groups as the two extracts below show. Both are taken from articles about the situation in France at the time:

‘Great excitement prevails and numerous contradictory rumours are circulating throughout the town concerning a serious affray which took place this afternoon at the Pere Lachaise Cemetery. Several revolutionary groups, belonging for the most part to the Anarchist party, proceeded to deposit crowns and immortels at the foot of the wall where the last defenders of the Paris Commune were shot during the final struggle in May, 1871. The demonstration was legal, but the carrying of banners is illegal. Nevertheless several societies brought with them red flags and some black flags. Among others there was a group that glories in the suggestive terrorist title of the “Anarchists of the Axe,” and also the juvenile Revolutionary Communists of the 11th Arondissement and the Atheist Socialists of the Ninth Arondissement.’ (The Times, 25th May, 1885)

And

‘The French Government was, of course, warned at the time. Just 12 months ago I had an interview with Demski, and talked with him for half an hour at the hospital upon the work of this terrorist party. He is a powerful fellow of 32, is very intelligent, and speaks French and German well. Although severely wounded and unable to move in his bed, he expressed himself steadfast to
the terrorist cause. The bursting of a bomb at his feet, he said, was a trifling matter, and as soon as he could walk he should take up the work again.’ (The Times, 2nd June, 1890)

Further articles in The Times continue the theme of referring to revolutionary movements in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as terrorists and as undertaking terrorism. For example, it often claimed that the revolutionaries and the government during the 1905 Russian Revolution were terrorists. Likewise, by the time of the 1917 Russian Revolution, it began referring to the Bolsheviks as terrorists. This had echoes of its use of stigmatising language towards the French revolutionaries in the late eighteenth century. Below are two examples of articles from the period of the 1917 Russian Revolution:

‘Trotsky assumed quite an exceptional position in the Communistic Party as soon as its other leaders split into two opposing factions: the Extremists-believers only in terrorism and world-revolution-and Moderates, eventually prepared to compromise in order to secure for Russia a permanent regime as near orthodox Marxism as possible. He astutely isolated himself and attracted a number of followers, who may all be termed Opportunists.’ (The Times, 29th June, 1920)

And

‘The leaders of the strongly Socialist National Centre Party in Moscow and the leaders of the great Cooperative movement have been for the most part shot. Terrorism holds down the civilian masses, and a terrorism, yet more shameless and cruel, has immensely improved the Red armies. The wives and children of thousands of officers of the old Imperial Army have been seized as hostages for the fidelity of these unhappy men ‘to a cause which they abhor. They are forced to fight for LENIN, because the tyrant is ready to punish suspected disloyalty to the Red cause by the murder of their families.’ (The Times, 14th January, 1920)

The evidence so far from The Times, other establishment press, Hansard and other documentary sources shows a pattern of attempts by established groups in Britain, from the period of the first French Revolution right through to the Bolshevik Revolution, of trying and achieving the stigmatisation and delegitimisation of certain outsider groups by calling them terrorists. These include French Jacobins, Napoleon, Irish Catholics, Chartists, trades unions, anarchists, communists and other revolutionaries and reformist groups in Europe in the nineteenth century. Those groups, for their part, also acted according to how they were designated at the time. Those designations, however, tended to vary, depending on the power relationships between the established and outsider groups involved in the particular terrorism figurations. In addition, in most cases they did not conform to present-day definitions of terrorism, which shows that terrorism is relational and does not have thing-like properties as the definitions of most mainstream terrorism experts suggest. In addition, it also shows that, in contrast to the often held belief that so called ‘modern terrorism’ began in the late nineteenth century with anarchist groups, especially in Russia; terrorism was a feature of British and European society from at least the late eighteenth century. It is also clear that processes of functional democratisation were playing a core role in almost all regards in which established groups labelled outsider groups as terrorists. Across all the examples discussed so far, there have been processes in which the balances of power between established and outsider groups have been equalising to varying degrees and enough for outsider groups to challenge the positions of established groups. As part of their attempts to maintain their positions and fight off the challenges from outsider groups, established groups labelled them as terrorists. At the same time, many of the outsider groups, labelled as terrorists, challenged established groups with violence. However, this was not the case in every instance.
The labelling of outsider groups with stigmatising language, including the term terrorists, by established groups is something that still happens today in Britain. For example, when protestors occupied the space outside St Paul’s Cathedral in London in 2012 as part of protests about global capitalism, the London Mayor, Boris Johnson, referred to them as a ‘fornicating hippies’. Such a label clearly has connotations closely associated with what are often considered to be less civilised forms of conduct. Likewise, in 2013, during a by-election in Eastleigh in the south of Britain, a Labour Party Parliamentary candidate was depicted by the Prime Minister and establishment press as a ‘terrorist sympathiser’.

However, Britain, today, is a society with a greater degree of functional democratisation, than was the case in the nineteenth century. This means it can be more difficult for established groups to label outsider groups as terrorists and to make that label stick. For example, it would be difficult for the government and establishment to make the label of terrorist stick in the above examples or in relation to trades unions today. Therefore, there are normative conceptions of terrorism and people can act according to those designations. Those normative conceptions, however, are related to structural changes over time, such as functional democratisation, inter- and intra-state processes and civilising processes. What was terrorism in the nineteenth century is not terrorism today.
Section 3: The sociogenesis of terrorism in the twentieth century

Chapter 8: The world wars – terrorism and inter-state violence

The sociogenesis of the concept of terrorism and those who act according to that designation in relation to war.

The reason for calling this section three is simply logistical, in order to break the thesis up. The turn from the nineteenth into the twentieth century did not represent any specific kind of split from the end of the nineteenth century in terms of terrorism figurations. However, its first half did represent an increase in the inter-state tensions in Europe, culminating in the First and Second World Wars, which had significant implications for British terrorism figurations. Both of these wars also had enormous implications with respect to terrorism figurations later on in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. For example, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the creation of the British Mandate in Palestine following the First World War and the creation of Israel after the Second World War have been central to terrorism figurations in relation to the Middle East and so-called jihadist terrorism. In addition, they were also central in contributing to the collapse of the European colonial empires, which again involved a variety of terrorism figurations together with increases in functional democratisation on a global basis. The world wars also contributed to greater functional democratisation in Britain, as established groups became even more dependent on groups lower down the social scale in a context of acute competition and war with Nazi Germany. That dependence included the need for soldiers who would fight for their country, as well as productive and healthy skilled, semi-skilled and low-skilled workers to produce goods, machinery and weapons to help in the war effort and contribute to an efficiently functioning economy. Such functional democratisation contributed to outsider groups lower down the social scale challenging established groups in various ways. These dynamic social structures are still evident today and enable outsider groups lower down the social scale to challenge established groups further up the social chain, in various ways, including through terrorism, such as is the case with so-called home-grown jihadist groups. There were also, of course, specific terrorism figurations related directly to Britain’s relationships with Germany during the world wars too, and it is to these that I turn next.

The concepts of terrorism and terrorist in the first half of the twentieth century were used in a variety of contexts by established groups in Britain. Two of those were in the First and Second World Wars to describe the Germans. Again, in that context, when the Germans were called terrorists, they were regarded as being the antithesis of civilisation – they were often also called barbaric and savage. As mentioned earlier, the competitive pressures among European powers were still evident but had shifted since the French Revolution. France was weaker than it had been and the balance of power, in an international sense, had shifted towards Germany, which, having been relatively weak throughout
most of the nineteenth century, had unified and even engaged France in war in 1870-71 and won. The rise in power of a militaristic Germany eventually contributed to the First and the Second World Wars, and it is in these contexts of shifting inter-state relations that British terrorism figurations developed further.

**Inter-state violence and terrorism**

Despite countries in the West having undergone significant internal pacification by the early part of the twentieth century, relationships between countries were still highly volatile and prone to violence. In fact, violence between states tended and tends to be regarded as more acceptable than violence within states. Often in this context, outsider states and their people who were in conflict with Britain were referred by the British establishment as terrorists. The first part of this chapter details such relationships on the inter-state level and shows how civilising processes and pacification processes were far less advanced on that plane compared to those on the intra-state level.

The use of the concepts of terrorism and terrorists by established groups in Britain to describe their opponents on the inter-state level was, as we have already seen, apparent in relation to Britain’s relationship with revolutionary and Napoleonic France, as well as with pre- and post-revolutionary Russia. It was also a feature of the relationship between Britain and Germany during the First and Second World Wars. Such figurations in which nation-states are called terrorist and act according to those designations are what is commonly referred to as ‘state terrorism’. But, as was discussed earlier, this should not be regarded as a fixed and unchanging category but rather as part of a processual relationship between two or more states. Inter-state relationships can help to generate the conditions by which one state refers to another as terrorist and for the labelled state to act according to that designation. Elias (1987: 74) suggested that nation-states are arranged on the basis of differences in power ratios and argued the following:

‘...[A] state’s power ratio – is a combination of a number of basic determinants. Among them are manpower, social capital, raw material resources, strategic position relative to military techniques, level of productivity, of education, of integration, and some others. As a calibrated combination, they account for the power ratio of a state in relation to other states, and thus for its position in the status and power hierarchy of states which, under competitive pressure, is continually changing and moving.

‘Within this combination, one determinant plays a key role in the ranking of states – their violence potential, the capacity of a state for using physical violence in its relationship with other states as a means of maintaining or improving its position in the hierarchy. Nothing is more characteristic of the structure of inter-state relations than this fact. It indicates that human beings, at the level of inter-state relations, are still bound to each other at the primeval level. Like animals in the wilderness of the jungle, like tribal groups in humanity’s early days, like states throughout history, so the states of today are bound to each other in such a way that sheer physical force and cunning are, in the last resort, the decisive factors in their relationship. No one can prevent a physically stronger state from lording it over weaker states, except another state which is its match in terms of physical force. If another such state exists, the two experience one another, with great regularity, as rivals, each trying to prevent the other from attaining hegemonial power within the whole field. Thus, unless a state is checked by another state that is militarily its equal, there is nothing to prevent its leaders and the people who form it from threatening, exploiting, invading and enslaving, driving out or killing the inhabitants of another state, if they are so minded.

‘Within states, conditions are different. There, physically stronger persons or groups are normally no longer in a position to exploit, to rob, to injure or to kill weaker persons. That this is normally not possible is a condition of what one usually calls today a “civilized” way of life. That it can be
maintained for any length of time is not due simply to the insight, the good will, the morality or the rationality of individual people – not all people can be relied upon to be of good will and act reasonably. That, within states, the physical superiority of individuals or groups is no longer a decisive determinant of people’s relationships with each other – in contrast to the situation in inter-state relationships – is entirely due to the way in which people organize themselves in the form of states or, in other words, to their figuration as states. It is one of the principal characteristics of the type of human grouping which today is called a ‘state’ that, within its web of relationships, people are more or less effectively protected from each other’s physical violence.’ (Elias, 1987: 74-75)

This discontinuity between intra- and inter-state relationships simply exposes the fault-line between the relatively pacified space within states compared to the relatively unpacified space between states. In other words, monopolisation processes of physical force and taxation do not extend to the inter-state level in any way near to the same degree that they do at the intra-state level. In addition, as mentioned, it is the figurations between nation-states, the competitive pressures between countries that contribute to greater intra-state pacification and civilised forms of behaviour, due to the mutual interdependence and interests between nation-states’ social groups in protecting themselves from attack by other nation-states.

Despite the discontinuity between inter- and intra-state relationships, Andrew Linklater (2010), talks about global civilising processes, whereby inter-state violence is held in check as a result of processes of mutual identification between people across states, as part of what he refers to as universal history. Specifically, he examines the extent to which the ‘scope of emotional identification’ keeps pace with any further lengthening of the webs of material interconnectedness (Linklater, 2010: 156). He points out that international societies have a major role in moderating the inter-state problems that arise as part of established-outsider figurations. He argues the following:

‘...[G]lobal civilizing processes that replicate the patterns of self-restraint within pacified domestic realms have rarely influenced the conduct of international relations, but they have not been entirely without influence. The expansion of ‘frameworks of communication’ through which social systems coordinate longer chains of interdependence, and become attuned to one another over greater distances, is evidence of a global civilizing process that has its source in the human ability to develop shared meanings that span diverse cultural horizons (McNeill, 1995a; van Vree, 1999). At least in that limited sense, it is legitimate to claim that ‘despite numerous back-eddies and local breakdowns of civilized complexity, [there] has been an ineluctable expansion of the portions of the globe subjected to or incorporated within civilized social structures’ (McNeill, 1983: 10).’ (Linklater, 2010: 157)

What Linklater is suggesting here is that innovations and a growth in communications, as part of more complex global chains of interdependence, have contributed to the development of shared meanings between groups that cross national boundaries. As such, there has been a concerted shift in a civilising direction on the global scale. He adds:

‘...[T]he rise of the universal human rights culture was evidence of a tangible, if precarious, global civilizing process (Elias, 2001a: 232). It might be added that developments in international criminal law and support for humanitarian intervention in some quarters are an attempt to increase the influence of ‘civilized’ sensibilities on how power monopolies treat their citizens and behave towards one another. One dimension of current levels of global interconnectedness, namely the greater awareness of distant suffering and the increased capacity to assist in some fashion, is evident in those developments. But Elias was always quick to point out that such restraints on killing can be expected to crumble rapidly should violence erupt once again (Elias, 2001b: 51).’ (Linklater, 2010: 160)

The point here is that there tends to be a greater degree of mutual identification across national boundaries, and these are manifested in areas such as international human rights laws and empathy and action to support those who are suffering in far away countries. Elias added, though, that such
institutions and feelings are not permanent and that civilising trajectories can quite easily reverse into decivilising processes.

At the heart of the inter-state problems that arise out of global established-outsider figurations and central to the processes by which nation-states become embroiled in violent conflict with each other are double-binds. These processes were at play in the European context prior to and during the First and Second World Wars. In particular, Germany in this period, although a rising power, was a country that was and had been dealing with its status as a second rate power in relation to France and Britain. For most of the nineteenth century, except for the Franco-Prussian war and the period of the Second Reich, Germany was far weaker than its rivals. This status led to the development of a German habitus that was imbued with feelings of inferiority but at the same time sought to redress these feelings and restore what was thought to be German greatness in the guise of the Holy Roman Empire. Its subsequent defeat in the First World War compounded these painful feelings of lost status. German attempts to rectify this real and perceived status imbalance, therefore, contributed directly to the First and Second World Wars. Competition and violence between it and its two main rivals in Europe – France and Britain – was almost inevitable. Taking just Britain and Germany together in this context, the double-bind between the two countries involved an escalation to the point where near total destruction of one or the other, and the potential for a huge drop in status, became a very real possibility. As such, the language and explanations that the two rivals had for each other were highly emotive. For example, newspaper articles from the first half of the twentieth century implied that Germans were biologically endowed with a higher propensity for violence, reporting the Germans as being naturally barbaric and violent. In addition, Germany was described as being a terrorist country. We can see, therefore, how the concept of terrorism developed further in the context of inter-state relationships, competitive pressures and the double-binds between Britain and Germany during the two world wars.

What is central in this context is the difference between relations at the inter-state level versus those on the intra-state level. Double-binds between human groups still exist on both levels but are usually more pronounced on the inter-state plane. Although there are many cases on the intra-state level in which human groups threaten the survival of other groups, there is a greater tendency that it is a group’s social rather than physical existence that is endangered, as monopolies of violence and taxation exert influence. Nevertheless, according to Elias (1987), these controls can easily break-down to the point at which groups at the intra-state level begin to threaten each other’s physical existence, especially in those states that have relatively weak monopolies of violence. Recent examples of this kind of intra-state breakdown have happened in North African and Middle Eastern countries, including Egypt, Syria and Libya.

Nevertheless, despite the possibilities of breakdowns in violence control at the intra-state level, there tend to be fewer such controls on the inter-state plane. The strongest military power is able to impose its will on weaker states. As mentioned, people’s beliefs tend to have a high fantasy content, which often leads to ways of acting that are akin to those of simpler societies.
The double-binds involved in respect of recent examples of Jihadist terrorism show high levels of fantasy content on all sides. For example, members of the British press have often been keen to associate much larger numbers of Muslims with terrorism than is in reality the case. Governments have also sought to link a number of countries with groups like Al Qaeda. Likewise, jihadist terrorists and Islamists tend to have fantasy beliefs about the position of Islam in relation to the West, such as blaming the West solely for the destruction of the Caliphate, and claiming that there are various conspiracies against Muslims and so on.

More generally, the structural affinities that inter-state relations have with simpler societies are borne out by the way in which established-outsider figurations develop on the inter-state level. As mentioned, as part of the double-binds that two or more countries find themselves involved in emotive and stigmatising language is deployed to describe outsiders which encourages, on the one hand, internal cohesion and on the other hand seeks to weaken opponents. The concept of terrorism, as already discussed forms part of this armoury. In addition, these processes also operate on the intra-state level.

**Terrorism in the context of inter-state violence; focusing on the world wars.**

In terms of Britain’s relationship with Germany, the words terrorism and terrorist were deployed by the British as a way to stigmatise and delegitimise the Germans during the First and Second World Wars. Additionally, the structural processes by which both of these wars came about were through competitive inter-state pressures in Europe and globally, and in this context the increase in power of the newly unified Germany relative to the other great powers – Britain, France and America.

There is not the room here to discuss all the details of the German state-formation processes, apart from to reiterate that the Germany of the early twentieth century was a country seeking what its people considered to be the restoration of a lost glorious past of the medieval German empire. During the mid-nineteenth century, Prussia won out as the leading hegemonic power in the lands that made up the former German empire, with the Austrian Hapsburgs retreating to become the emperors of Austria and its territories to the south only. This, however, followed many years of structural weakness and humiliation for the German people, as they were severely impoverished by the Thirty Years War and later lost in battles to France including against Louis XIV and Napoleon. Elias (1997) points out that, by the time a Prussian-led Germany had unified and beaten France in the 1870-1 war, it could have meant the end of its drive to catch up with other European countries. However, he points out that:

‘...Germany was still at its core an absolute monarchy. The stage of state development meant that dynastic rivalries continued to be decisive factors in relations among the great powers. In this way, the politicians, chosen by the Kaiser steered unexpectedly towards a new war, without apparently asking themselves if Germany had any chance of winning if America were also to enter it on the side of the Western allies.

For many Germans, the defeat of 1918 was an unexpected, highly traumatic experience. It hit a raw nerve in the national habitus, and was felt to be a return to the time of German weakness, of foreign armies in the country, of life in the shadow of a great past. The entire catching-up process in Germany was at stake. Many members of the German middle and upper classes – perhaps the large majority – felt that they could not live with such humiliation. They felt they ought to prepare
themselves for the next war, with a better chance of a German victory, even if at first it was not clear how this could be done.’ (Elias, 1997: 7-8).

It was in this context of a militaristic Germany attempting to assert hegemonial control over Europe, that the First and Second World Wars were fought, and in which the British establishment references to Germany as a terrorist country began.

We can again see some parallels between the feelings of humiliation and their pining for a perceived glorious past felt by the German people following defeats by other European powers, and the beliefs and feelings by many contemporary Islamists who often claim they have been humiliated by the West and are seeking to restore their glorious past – the Caliphate.

**Examples of the use of the concept of terrorism to describe the Germans in the First and Second World Wars.**

**WII**

During the period of the First World War (1914-18) the concept of terrorism was regularly used to describe the actions of German soldiers. They were often said to break international law and the rules of war and to commit terrorist acts. The use of the concept of terrorism in this context obviously differs in a number of ways from previous uses, such as those with respect to Irish terrorism, trades unions and other rebellious groups. However, it does show that highly emotive language was used by the British to describe the Germans as part of the double-bind in which the two counties were embroiled. Of course, double-binds, albeit different in each case, tend always to play a part in terrorism figurations. The following example from *The Times* was from a prayer said at Westminster Abbey about the First World War and shows how ‘German terrorism’ was seen as in antithesis to the rest of European civilisation by leading members of the British establishment:

‘We pray earnestly for the victory of the Allies, not merely because their defeat would mean a catastrophe to civilization and the world, but because we are convinced that they are fighting for the cause of righteousness. Let us pray for the victory of a cause that stands righteously for the sanctity of treaties, the preservation of little nationalities, and the defence of humanity against the reign of force, cruelty, and terrorism.’ (*The Times*, 4th January, 1915)

Established groups in Britain also referred to Germany as a ‘terrorist country’ that was seen as uncivilised and a danger to civilisation. The German army was said to have practices that contradicted civilisation, and followed a ‘code of savagery’ that ignored humanity and common morals. They were also said to conduct a system of terrorism, to be barbaric and that they had a ‘lust for war’. Reports in *The Times* focus in particular on German actions in Belgium and, it is in this context more than any other, that they were referred to as terrorists and of undertaking terrorism. In one article, they were said to be operating a reign of terror in Belgium.
The acts that German troops were reportedly undertaking in Belgium are truly horrific, such as the rape, torture and murder of women and children. Such reports have proved controversial and there has been significant debate as to whether or not such acts actually happened. The German occupation of Belgium, however, is often referred to as 'the rape of Belgium'. Even though it seems highly probable that the German army did commit some of the acts reported. It is also the case that the British government and press undertook a propaganda campaign highlighting real and alleged German atrocities in Belgium. Whether or not what was reported actually happened is in many ways beside the point for the purposes here. What is interesting is that the Germans were said to be undertaking a system of terrorism in Belgium and these appalling acts of violence are what constitute it. We can see here, therefore, that there was a huge effort being made to delegitimise and stigmatise Germany in order to encourage people to join the war effort and fight against Germans. At the same time, this encouraged the British to regard themselves as better and more civilised humans than the Germans – they were seen as fighting in the name of civilisation against barbarism and terrorism. This is a clear example of what may well have been the highly emotive fantasy content of language used when two countries became locked together in a violence imbued double-bind. Such accusations are themselves also able to drive double-binds even further. Claiming that the Germans were raping and murdering women and children, and that they were terrorists would have made it easier for the British to be violent towards what, in effect, was a nation-state that had been reduced to a sub-human level. Killing Germans could therefore, be much more easily justified. The drive to kill ‘barbaric’ Germans would help to fuel the double-bind from the German point of view – the more the British killed Germans, the more the latter would try to kill the British. Of course, the Germans would have used their own highly emotive and fantasy-laden language to describe the British, which would have also helped to drive the double-bind in which both countries were entangled.

27 The following article from the *Times* is an example of this:

’When an army is directed or permitted to commit such deeds, the ferocity of the worse natures springs into fuller life, and both lust and the thirst of blood become more widespread and more formidable. This system of terrorism, with all its attendant horrors and abominations, is the logical outcome of the new morality with which German thinkers and German militarists have permeated the nation. In the minds of Prussian officers the Committee declare war seems to have become a sort of sacred mission, one of the highest functions of the omnipotent State. In this theory held by a ruling caste, and plainly laid down by the German military authorities, the spirit of war is defiled, and military-obedience over-rides all moral right. That is the doctrine – the doctrine which fills the most cultured of Christian peoples with loud-voiced exultation at sinking of the Lusitania, and which leads them to silent acquiescence in such deeds as are narrated in this Report. They began the moment the Germans entered Belgium, a sign that they are the fruits of the doctrine, and not of provocation by the victims. They were perpetrated in particular districts and within fixed dates, another evidence of cold-blooded deliberation. The corps of incendiaries are regularly equipped for their work and have a motto on their belts. It is God with us. It was to the discipline rather than the want of discipline that systematic outrage was due. It was a calculated policy, carried out under the direction of the higher military authorities. The particular acts to which the execution of the policy led are almost too inhuman and too bestial to name. We read of fifteen or twenty women violated in a public place and in open day at Liege, with some seventy Germans standing round. German officers were the first to assault the victims. We read of another brute bayonetting a woman who repulsed him, amidst the laughter of his comrades. We read of women tied to trees and flogged, of obscene mutilations, of rapes innumerable. We read of young girls stabbed, of a child of five or six with his wrists nearly severed, of women with their breasts cut off, of a whole family with feet and hands cut off, of an infant of two carried away by a German on his bayonet, he and his comrades still singing. Another infant was found nailed to the door of a farm by its hands and feet, and the Committee expressly accept the evidence on this fact. Children were roped together and used to screen the German soldiers from fire. A woman who refused to advance at such a screen was stabbed, and a little child who ran up to her as she fell had half its head blown away by a shot from a rifle. Other incidents of the same kind were reported from Nazareth. It is not easy in the face of these enormities, which would have disgraced the armies of CHENGIZ or of TAMERLANE, to assent without qualification to the view that the Germans are a kindly people. At all events, the professors and the militarists have preached to many of them with complete success. They have instilled into them the sanctity of God with us. It was to the discipline rather than the want of discipline that systematic outrage was due. It was a calculated policy, carried out under the direction of the higher military authorities. The particular acts to which the execution of the policy led are almost too inhuman and too bestial to name. We read of fifteen or twenty women violated in a public place and in open day at Liege, with some seventy Germans standing round. German officers were the first to assault the victims. We read of another brute bayonetting a woman who repulsed him, amidst the laughter of his comrades. We read of women tied to trees and flogged, of obscene mutilations, of rapes innumerable. 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At all events, the professors and the militarists have preached to many of them with complete success. They have instilled into them the sanctity of war, and have thoroughly brutalized them in the process. We are fighting to exterminate that doctrine. We are fighting also to prevent its advocates from applying it, with the aggravations which special hatred and malice can add, to our English homes, our wives, our daughters, and our little children. That is avowedly their darling purpose. What man will refuse his all to defeat it?’ (*The Times*, 13th May, 1915)
Inter-war years

In the inter-war period, especially in relation to the Nazis, The Times (1935) continued its reporting of German-related and Germanic terrorism. Articles\(^{28}\) included reports of Nazis sending letter bombs in places like Austria and Jews being subjected to terrorism by Nazis. Importantly, the Nazis were referred to as terrorists and as undertaking terrorism.

WWII

Terrorism continued to be a theme in relation to Germany during the Second World War. During the Blitz frequent references were made to Germany’s ‘air terrorism’\(^{29}\) against Britain. Terrorism was also used to describe the actions of Hitler and the Nazis in relation to Poland\(^{30}\). The following article again refers to Nazi terrorism and at the same time calls German actions ‘brutal and barbarous slaughter’. It describes a German attack on a ship evacuating children from Britain to Canada:

‘Not even the daily and nightly occurrences in HITLER's programme of merciless, undiscriminating war, the descent of his aerial torpedoes in residential areas to blast people from their homes, nor any of the other examples of Nazi terrorism, can deaden the sensitiveness of feeling to this atrocity of the torpedo launched through dark and tempestuous seas.

‘Brutal and barbarous slaughter, drawing no distinction between combatant and non-combatant, and not sparing the innocence and inoffensiveness of children, is the mark of German determination in war by sea, air, and land. In the advance through Northern France the same

\(^{28}\) The following articles from The Times highlights this:

Headline: Bombs by Post in Austria. Nazi Terrorism Revived.

‘Official statements about the recent Nazi bomb plot say that on Wednesday last the postal authorities at Linz called the attention of the police to 10 postal sample packets of suspicious appearance addressed to the Prince Archbishop of Salzburg, the editor of a monarchist newspaper, several police officials, and former Socialist functionaries. One packet, on being opened, exploded, seriously injuring a detective inspector. The nine others were found also to contain explosives. The police inquiries, according to the official announcement, showed that a group of Nazis in Salzburg had been formed to renew the campaign of terrorism which was waged last year. Several arrests have been made and the prisoners state that the two ringleaders, a master carpenter and a shoemaker, whose names are given, have fled to Germany.’ (The Times, 23rd September, 1935)

‘Mr. James G. McDonald has sent to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations a letter resigning his office as League High Commissioner for Refugees Coming from Germany. Mr. McDonald's letter (into which we have inserted cross-heads) reads as follows:- The campaign against any dealings with Jews is now systematically prosecuted in the larger towns. Despite the restrictions upon migration from the provinces into the few largest cities where Jewish economic activity is not yet completely excluded, the Jews are fleeing to those cities-because there only can they hope to escape, at least for a time, from the more brutal forms of persecution. This influx has exhausted already the resources of the Jewish philanthropic and educational institutions in Germany. The victims of the terrorism are being driven to the point where, in utter anguish and despair, they may burst the frontiers in fresh waves of refugees.’ (The Times, 30th December, 1935)

\(^{29}\) The following article from The Times highlights this:

Headline: Formula for Air Terrorism. German Devices.

‘German official publicists are striving to find a formula which will justify any action their air force takes against this country. The Luftwaffe is clearly in need of phrases which will cover indiscriminate bombing of civilians but at the same time convince the people at home that they are taking action which will eventually bring Great Britain to her knees.’ (The Times, 3rd December, 1940)

\(^{30}\)The following extract from The Times highlights this:

‘At the end of the first year German brutality and Polish courage are alike undiminished. Treachery in beginning the war, terrorism in following it up, has been the Hitler technique.’ (The Times, 31st August, 1940)
pitiless denial of humanity and the same callousness of the robot regarded refugees as no more than obstructions on the road, to be mown down or knocked aside. The German way of warfare knows no restraint of conscience.' (The Times, 23rd September, 1940)

The following article is about the Nuremberg trials of high-ranking Nazis, including Rudolph Hess and Hermann Goring and describes Nazi actions against Jews as terrorism:

'The crimes they sought to condemn and punish, they said, had been so calculated, so malignant, and so devastating that civilization could not tolerate their being ignored because it could not survive their being repeated.

'They were living symbols of racial hatreds, terrorism and violence, and of the arrogance and cruelty of power; they were symbols of fierce nationalism and militarism, of intrigues and war-making which had emboiled Europe in generation after generation, crushing its manhood, destroying its homes, and impoverishing its life. Civilization could afford no compromise with social forces which would regain renewed strength if they dealt ambiguously or indecisively with the men in whom those forces precariously strived.

'Their seizure of the German State and subjugation of the German people, their terrorism and extermination of dissident elements, their waging of war and their calculated ruthlessness in its conduct, their deliberate and planned criminality towards conquered peoples – all these were ends for which they acted in concert. Justice Jackson retraced the steps along the lawless road to power back to the proclamation of the Nazi programme at Munich in 1920, suggesting that from its inception the party contemplated war and a campaign of terrorism.' (The Times, 22nd November, 1945).

Again and again, we see that so-called German terrorism in both World Wars is regarded by the British establishment as uncivilised and that the actions of the Germans were barbaric. Of course, in many instances, the Germans acted according to those designations. The murder of at least six million Jews is the most obvious example of this. However, Britain and her allies, albeit not on the same scale, acted in ways not dissimilar to the Germans. For example, the bombing of Dresden by the allies was at least comparable to many of the acts undertaken by Germany that the British establishment called terrorism and The Times referred to as 'air terrorism'. But, of course, the British establishment was highly unlikely to call its own action by the terrorism label. This, therefore, highlights the place that the concept of terrorism has in established-outsider figurations and inter-state relations as a term that has the express function of trying to stigmatise and delegitimise enemies and outsider groups, and when used in antithesis to the concept of civilisation, to help reinforce feelings of superiority among established groups. The examples from The Times also show how the sociogenesis of the concepts of terrorism and terrorist developed as part of the double-bind processes that enveloped Britain and Germany during the First and Second World Wars. The association of German aggression, violence and war crimes with the concept of terrorism and terrorist, not only would help reinforce feelings of superiority among the British but would also further entrench the concepts within the British habitus as something that is illegitimate, barbaric and sub-human.

The theme across the centuries of the development of the concept of terrorism in antithesis to civilisation is as clear here as it is with earlier examples. This antithesis is related to the development of the configuration of social structures over time. So, for example, during the nineteenth century these inter- and intra-state social structures involved established-outsider figurations between the British establishment and a variety of outsider groups, including the French revolutionaries and other revolutionary groups across Europe, rebellious Irish Catholics, British trades unions and reform.
movements, Russia and so on. The same is the case in the twentieth century, including between Britain and Germany during the world wars, and is also central to the relations between established groups in Britain and home-grown jihadist terrorists. More detail on this will be investigated shortly.

It is also clear from this chapter and those on the French revolutionaries and other revolutionary groups across Europe, rebellious Irish Catholics, British trades unions and reform movements, Russia, that terrorism, as mainstream terrorism theorists would have us believe, is not a thing or simply a tactic. It is, rather, relational. That is, as has been shown earlier, it is a concept that performs specific functions, as part of certain established-outsider relations. Those functions tend to be the stigmatising, delegitimising and dehumanising of enemies. However, when the terrorism/terrorist label is applied, those on the receiving end have acted or do act according to the way the terms are designated at the time. For example, the Germans acted according to the designations of terrorism during the First and Second World Wars. Those designations, however, were different to present-day designations. Additionally, we can see that the designations of terrorism/terrorist during the world wars are in a large part generated by those wars, as they are in other cases.

In order to get a better understanding of how these and related processes, including established-outsider figurations developed, I shall turn to terrorism figurations in the context of the Cold War.
Chapter 9: Terrorism, communism, the Soviet Union and the left

The sociogenesis of terrorism and communism

The sociogenesis of terrorism in relation to Britain as part of the inter- and intra-state processes is evident with respect to Britain’s relationship with the Soviet Union, and more generally, with respect to communism. In these cases, the concept of terrorism was deployed by the British establishment to describe its communist foes. Equally, Britain’s communist foes either acted or allegedly acted according to how their designations as terrorist were expressed at the time. The British establishment’s approach to the Soviet Union and communism during the twentieth century was in many ways a continuation of its approach to ‘left-wing’ rebellious groups throughout the nineteenth century, including the French revolutionaries, reformists and trades unions in Britain and rebellious groups across Europe. Processes of functional democratisation were still relevant with working class groups putting significant pressure on established groups and, in some cases, as in Russia and the Soviet Union replacing old establishments. Inter-state pressures remained, including between Britain and the Soviet Union.

There are a number of important processes at play with respect to the sociogenesis of terrorism in this context. In particular, throughout the twentieth century terrorism was associated for the most part with left-wing groups, and it is as part of this that concepts such as international terrorism developed, as left-wing groups were linked to the Soviet Union and the global spread of communism. Additionally, many of the inter-state relations related to the Cold War during the twentieth century contributed, along with other parallel processes, to the development of the conditions in which today’s jihadist terrorism has emerged. More on this will be discussed later.

Inter-state processes and the Soviet Union

By way of background, the Soviet Union came into existence in 1922 after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. However, Britain’s relationship with the communist state has its roots in the relationship between Britain and Russia and the two corresponding empires. Relations for the most part of the nineteenth century between Britain and Russia were hostile and in 1854 war broke out between the two rivals in the guise of the Crimean War, which also included the French and Ottoman empires on the British side. Part of the reasons behind the Crimean war were that the British were fearful that the Russians would attempt to expand their empire to include parts of the weakened Ottoman Empire and India. Despite beating the Russians in the Crimean war, the British still feared the Russian empire, which continued its expansion through central Asia towards the Himalayas. Nevertheless, following victory there was no longer as a great a concern for the safety of India from Russian attack.
It is no surprise, therefore, that Britain’s establishment feared the Soviet Union when it was created by the Bolsheviks. Not only was this the old foe from the previous century that Britain had already gone to war with but it was formed to a considerable extent by members of an outsider social class – the proletariat – which for the British establishment, still represented a threat, as it had done throughout the nineteenth century.

**Before the Cold War**

The competitive pressures between Britain, the Bolsheviks and the early Soviets was multifaceted. On the one hand, there was competition in a nationalistic sense whereby both states were locked into conflict as part of attempts to expand their empires and influence across the globe, and by way of protecting themselves from one another. On the other hand, there was inter-class competition whereby the middle- and upper-class British establishment regarded the Soviet proletariat and other lower class movements across both Britain and Europe as potential threats. These particular figurations were, as discussed earlier, brought about through processes of functional democratisation.

Prior to the formation of the Soviet Union in 1920, *The Times* referred to the Bolsheviks’ ‘methods’ as terrorism. One headline from 9th August, 1920, is about the treatment of the Polish population in the Kieff district reads: ‘Reds' Methods Of Terrorism’, and refers to the execution of Poles who were fighting against the Soviets.

Another article in *The Times*, from 29th June, 1920, claims that the Communist Party split into three – extremist believers in terrorism and world-revolution, and moderates, who were prepared to compromise in order to secure for Russia a permanent regime as near orthodox Marxism as possible, and Trotsky and his followers, who *The Times* referred to as ‘opportunists’. Another *Times* article this time from 14th January, 1920, claims that the Soviets used terrorism to suppress the masses.

There are many more examples in *The Times* in which the Soviets are said to have engaged in terrorism. For example, in 1925 it was said that they revived their methods of terrorism to suppress counter-revolutionary groups. The Soviet Communists are also said to have been linked to Indian communists and to have encouraged British trades unionists to visit the country. *The Times* also reported between 1925 and 1935 that Stalin’s Soviets also claimed that British imperialism amounted to terrorism and that there were counter-revolutionary terrorist groups in the Soviet Union, including those linked to Lenin’s former circle, and Trotsky. At the time of Trotsky’s death, *The Times* claimed that he was a terrorist.

In the early years of the Second World War, in 1940, *The Times* referred to attacks on Finland by the Soviet Union as terrorism. For example, a headline from 2nd February, 1940 reads: ‘Russia renews her air terrorism’. Terrorism was also said to have been undertaken against Finnish civilians by the Soviets. Reference to the Soviets as terrorists in *The Times* after the formation of the Grand Alliance of Britain, the United States and Soviet Union diminished significantly, however.
During the Cold War

As already discussed, the Second World War contributed to a major shift in the global balance of power that witnessed the emergence of the United States and the Soviet Union as global super-powers as part of what became a bi-polar world order. Major European states, including Britain, France and Germany were seriously weakened and the war and its aftermath helped to accelerate processes by which the empires of the former two countries disintegrated at an accelerated pace. The move from the pre-war, multi-polar order to the bi-polar order, manifested itself in the Cold War conflict between the two superpowers, which lasted until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. In simplistic terms, the United States, driven by competition with the Soviet Union, aimed to extend its sphere of influence across the globe and stood for an economic system based on capitalism. The Soviet Union likewise aimed to extend its sphere of influence across the globe but instead in the name of ‘communism’. However, the conflict between the two countries was not simply a conflict of communism against capitalism. The Cold War was driven by the dynamics of inter-state relations, which in the case of the United States and the Soviet Union involved the two nation-states and their spheres of influence being locked into a complex of double-binds, as part of the kinds of inter-state struggle that have been a feature of human societies for a very long time.

The processes at play in the context of United States and Soviet Union relations were not dissimilar to the processes at play between Britain and France in an earlier period. Nevertheless, the British establishment’s position within this later inter-state figuration was on the side of the United States, and claimed more or less that giving a free reign to management would create an ideal society, as its establishment had claimed for over a century previously. Accordingly, the British establishment during the Cold War used stigmatising language to describe its Soviet enemy, including the words terrorism and terrorist. The Soviet Union often obliged and acted according to how it was designated at the time.

31 As Elias (1987: 92) argues the Soviet Union and the United States:

’. . .[W]ere driven towards a steady expansion of their spheres of influence, towards a direct or indirect control of other countries – in short towards empire-building. They were driven in that direction simply by the pull of the figuration they formed with each other, by the dynamics of the process that involved them. As in comparable cases in the past, the two super-powers are driven towards continuous tests of strength. Every increase in the military potential of one side has to be countered by a corresponding increase on the other side. Every alliance which one side forms with another country anywhere in the world has to be countered by a compensating alliance by the other side. Previous imperial powers also started on their road, not because their representatives planned to build an empire, not by design, but because of the pressure of specific rivalries. Only at a later stage of the process do the leaders of such countries take up more consciously the role into which they have been driven, the role as centre of an empire.

Inherently, the drift towards empire-building of the two greatest hegemonial powers of the late twentieth century has little to do with the social ideals of either communism or capitalism... [I]nter-state relations have a dynamics of their own. Sociological means of orientation derived from the intra-state level, from the conflict of interests between workers and management, can be of little help in the attempt to achieve a better orientation towards problems at the inter-state level, among which the most pressing is the drift towards war. Explanations in the usual terms, according to which this drift is either the fault of the capitalists or the fault of the communists, is not only a misorientation. It obscures the double-bind character of the figuration and also makes the struggle more intractable. On each side, it gives the hegemonial struggle between the two super-powers the character of a crusade. The simple fact that here are two great powers bound to each other in such a way that each constitutes a deadly danger for the other is obscured, and both constituents identify themselves, as Christian and Moslems did at the same time of the great crusades, as Protestants and Catholics did in the great wars of religion, through two different and antagonistic belief systems.

In former days, the belief systems were centred on super-natural powers. The present belief systems revolve around two different ways of ordering human affairs. One of them claims that, through favouring the interests of industrial workers, it will produce an ideal society for the whole of humanity. The other claims that it will produce an ideal society by giving free reign to management. In both cases, the social practice which they have created is so far removed from an ideal state that it is impossible, by any stretch of the imagination, to see how, from that social reality, an ideal social condition can emerge. Yet that is what each of the two antagonistic states claims for its own side; that is what fires the emotions.’ (Elias, 1987: 92-93)
time. Therefore, on one level, there was little change in the relations between Britain and pre-war
Soviet Union, or for that matter pre-Bolshevik Revolution Russia. Hostilities were only suspended
during the Second World War while they fought their common enemy – Germany. On another level,
the dynamic was changed considerably. Britain was still an enemy of the Soviet Union but only one of
the second order. The Soviet Union’s central conflict was with the United States.

There are a number of articles in The Times after the Second World War that claim the Soviet Union
undertook terrorism. For example, in an article from 1960, it was claimed that the Soviet Union
imposed communism on East Germany through terrorism. Later, it was claimed that the Soviet Union
sponsored individual terrorists and terrorist groups; in other words it became a state-sponsor of
terrorism. Perhaps one of the most famous terrorists that the Soviets were accused of sponsoring was
Carlos the Jackal, who was discussed in a Times article on 29th July, 1975.

There was also a belief in Britain and elsewhere that the Soviet Union was a state-sponsor of
terrorism. Additionally, there was a general belief that there was a problem with international terrorism,
which, for the most part, tended to be associated with left-wing groups. This wave of international
terrorism corresponded to Rapoport’s (2004) ideas of waves of terrorism and of the general,
conventional belief that the early part of the second half of the twentieth century was blighted by left-
wing revolutionary terrorism. Far too little was made of the violence committed by other groups that
tended not to be left-leaning. Part of the reason for this, at least, could have simply been that most of
the violence during that period was by left-wing groups. However, it may also be the case that groups
associated with communism and therefore, invariably the Soviet Union, would, as an enemy of Britain
and the West by association, have been far more likely to be subject to attempts at stigmatisation and
delegitimisation. Calling them terrorists would have done just that.

The spread of communism in places other than the Soviet Union was also a concern for the British
establishment. For example, as early as the 1920s there were fears of communism in China. As in
other cases, the communists in China were often referred to as terrorists.

**Intra-state processes and left-wing terrorism.**

The claims of Soviet state-sponsored terrorism and the idea that non-state terrorist groups, especially
those on the left, are linked and form a ‘wave’ of international terrorism brings into stark contrast the
relationships between inter- and intra-state processes. Such interdependent processes often tend to
be a hallmark of terrorist figurations. For example, and as already alluded to, there are currently a
number of inter-state processes related to the intra-state figurations at play with respect to
contemporary home-grown jihadist terrorists in Britain, more of which will be discussed later.

In terms of these interdependent processes related to left-wing terrorism, as well as a number of
communist terrorist groups that fought against colonialism, there were a number of left-wing,
communist and anarchist terrorist groups in countries that were not trying to rid themselves of colonial
masters. In fact there were many left-wing terrorist groups in more developed countries. These
included in Germany (the Red Army Faction, Revolutionary Cells, Movement 2 June), Italy (The Red Brigades), France (Action directe), Japan (Japanese Red Army), United Kingdom (The Angry Brigade), United States (Weather Underground), Portugal (Revolutionary Brigades), Spain, Greece (17 November) among other countries.

Perhaps the best known of all of these groups is the Germany-based Red Army Faction or Baader Meinhof Gang. This group was particularly active in the 1970s and 1980s, and may have had links with the Soviet Union.

Elias (1997: 230) in his book *The Germans* discussed some of the processes that contributed to the emergence of left-wing terrorist groups in Germany. He argued that as part of attempts to try to exonerate themselves of the stigma of their parents and grandparents from the world wars and also in the context of defeat in both of those wars, young middle-class Germans in the second half of the twentieth century often turned to Marxism. He pointed out that Marxism helped to give meaning to the lives of young middle-class Germans, who were in political conflict with the older generations of Germans.

Elias went on to say that those young middle-class Germans who joined terrorist groups claimed that they were struggling against a highly unequal and oppressive society. However, he pointed out that they were, in fact, living in the least unjust, unequal and oppressive society that had ever existed in Germany. In an attempt to solve this paradox, Elias suggests the following:

> ‘The most general answer can be quickly put: human groups usually revolt against what they experience as oppression not when the oppression is at its strongest, but precisely when it begins to weaken. All over the world, younger groups – with which we are concerned here – are dependent for some time while growing up on more powerful groups of older people. The constraints that they are thereby exposed to – however essential they may be for those growing up – can in fact be more or less oppressive in character, and at any event can be experienced as frustrating oppression by those who are themselves growing up. And they become even more so if the power gradient between the younger and older generation is *de facto* decreased. That, however, was the case in all the more highly developed industrial societies in the course of the twentieth century not only in the Federal Republic.’ (Elias, 1997: 235)

Elias’s first point is absolutely fundamental to many terrorism figurations, including those examined here. Groups revolt against perceived oppression but only when that oppression begins to weaken, as is the case through processes like functional democratisation. Such processes are evident in the terrorism figurations related to home-grown jihadist terrorists in Britain. They perceive Muslims across the world as being oppressed by the West, especially the United States and Britain. However, their ability to undertake terrorism against those countries is partially the result of functional democratisation on a global basis, as well as functional democratisation within Britain, especially if we compare the abilities of groups low down the social scale to act violently towards established groups prior to shifts towards greater equality.

Elias adds that, from the end of the Second World War, there were globally, a number of instances in which the power differentials between different groups decreased, including between men and women in the West, and workers and entrepreneurs and colonial peoples in relation to their colonisers. Young middle-class people, he says, were able to gain independence sooner than earlier generations had
but this then exposed them at an earlier age to the constraints of state bureaucracy and the labour markets. Marxism, in this context, says Elias, served as a seemingly fitting means of orientation in these young people’s own societies and allowed them to identify with oppressed groups across the world, who were more often than not seen as battling against the imperialist ambitions of the United States. As Elias (1997: 236) contended, ‘the young middle class movements of protest and rebellion in post-war European societies used the heritage of Marxist ideas as a means of orientation and struggle.’

Again, these are crucial points made by Elias, and again these processes can be seen in relation to present-day British home-grown jihadist terrorists. Like young people in the West during the twentieth century being drawn to Marxism and identifying with oppressed groups and battling against the imperial ambitions of the United States, many young Western Muslims do the same, albeit that they identify with political forms of Islam.

Elias adds that the German terrorists’ claims that economic constraints were the central reason for their conflict with the older generations is not an adequate explanation for their resort to Marxism and violence. He argues that the search for meaning and a personally fulfilling purpose was another important constraint that drove young middle-class Germans to become terrorists. This search for meaning was tied-up with conflicts between the generations which in advanced industrial societies, are institutionalised. As such, Elias (1997: 243) suggested:

‘...[P]hases of violence, whether in the intra-state or inter-state relations of people – that is, periods of war and civil war or revolution with subsequent restoration of the state monopoly of force – are usually at the same time phases with relatively wide and open channels of upward mobility. By contrast, long periods of peace, in the domestic just as in the inter-state space, are periods in which the flow through the channels of upward mobility slows down. The circulation of the generations becomes more sluggish. In most cases, the average age of the established groups at the pinnacle of the career hierarchy is correspondingly raised. For the younger generations, life chances become more limited, especially those chances with which individual feelings of meaningfulness are connected.’ (Elias, 1997: 243).

The fact that Elias put access to meaning in life at the core of inter-generational conflicts and therefore, as something that, when denied, can contribute to terrorism in the case of the middle-class left-wing terrorists of the mid-twentieth century is an important point and will be expanded upon later in this thesis. The search for meaning is apparent in other terrorism figurations, including those involving contemporary British home-grown jihadists. As will be discussed shortly, such identification processes play a significant role in their development as terrorists.

Returning more specifically to the issue of left-wing terrorism in the twentieth century, by the mid-1980s this was considered to be a very serious global problem, much like jihadist terrorism is today. The then idea, that there was a global terrorist network of like-minded groups is almost entirely the same as claims about a network of global jihadist terrorists. Of course, there is likely to be a degree of reality congruence to these claims but, at the same time, it is also likely that the interests of established groups in the West and elsewhere are enhanced by promulgating the idea of major terrorist threats which, in turn, can help to bind together populations through the use of fantasy-based knowledge, as part of established-outsider figurations. Of course, these processes are likely to be a combination of conscious and unconscious actions on the part of established groups, which
compound the problems associated with terrorism in double-binds which, in turn, can contribute to an escalation of violence and fear on all sides. It is also the case that non-violent figurations can be escalated into violent figurations by established groups, as part of attempts to bind themselves together more closely and consolidate the power differentials between them and competing groups.

As already mentioned, left-wing and Soviet Union-linked terrorism was not just confined to Germany and France but was also evident on all continents. Terrorism was closely linked to communism globally, and, as mentioned and as evidence from The Times suggested it was regarded as a major international problem. As also discussed, it is also clear that there was a belief that terrorist groups across the world were closely linked to each other. The atmosphere among the British establishment in the 1970s is highlighted by a Times article from 25th January 1975, that reported the arrest of an Italian Marxist, who, it was claimed was a threat to national security. No other reasons were given.

Another article from The Times (20th September, 1975) reports that a Conservative MP had claimed that major institutions in Britain had been infiltrated by communists, Marxists, Maoists and nihilists, and that the Labour Party was under siege and had been subverted by ‘extremist left-wingers’. He said that anyone convicted of terrorism should be put to death. Another Conservative MP claimed that trades unions had become communist organisations and that Britain was moving towards becoming a communist country under the influence of the unions.

Such articles and beliefs clearly show that established groups in Britain, in this case Conservative MPs, equated their enemies, including trades unions, and the Labour Party with terrorists. The rhetoric is an attempt to stigmatise and delegitimise their enemies. Of course communism is again equated with terrorism. Claiming that their domestic political enemies are close to becoming part of a greater Soviet Union and the enemy of the West is clearly an example of political manoeuvring designed to make voters fearful and repulsed by the political enemies of the Conservative party. Likewise, such manoeuvring would also help to unify members of the Conservative party against their

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32 The following article from The Times highlights this:

Infiltration, by communists and nihilists had become a "growth industry" in Britain. Mr Eldon Griffiths, MP for Bury St Edmunds and the Opposition frontbench spokesman on foreign and commonwealth affairs, said last night. "A number of our most strategic industries, the commanding heights of the economy, have been penetrated by Marxists and Maoists who would not hesitate to bring them to a halt to further their political ambitions ", he told a meeting of Conservative women at Lancaster University."The Labour Party is under siege from extremist left-wingers who, in constituency after constituency have seized the levers of, power. Our civil police are attacked and denigrated; so are the British armed services." The country's political institutions were also under pressure from organized political terror. There was civil war in Ulster, and nearer home political fanatics sought deliberately to force our free society into restricting our liberties and adopting harsher measures in an effort to ensure its survival. At first these measures would be popular, but as time went on and the restrictions became more onerous, the revolutionary and the terrorist groups were looking to gain new allies from the alienation of sections of the community from the police and the Armed Forces. What was to be done? "Like most of my constituents, I am, and always have been, in favour of capital punishment for those who deliberately commit wanton acts of terror against innocent people", Mr Griffiths said. Law and order was all of a piece. If a hole was torn in the law in one place, whether at Clay Cross or in the capitulation of a government to terrorists or industrial bullies, the whole fabric could start to come apart. Mrs Jill Knight, Conservative MP for Edgbaston, told a meeting of women Conservatives at Taunton, Somerset, that the British trade union movement was rapidly becoming a communist organization. But some "moderates" were, belatedly, becoming aware of it. "The Soviet organization responsible for subversion is the KGB," she said. "Mr Len Murray mistimed his invitation to the notorious Alexander Shelepin earlier this year, and the public response forced him to leave prematurely."But Boris Avervanlov, one of Shelepin's assistants and official head of the Russian trade union organization, has just been having a splendid time drinking with trade union Communists in the better bars of Blackpool at the TUC. "This man's major job is to effect communist domination of the European trade unions, and the TUC and Len Murray are perfectly aware of this." She said Britain was moving farther and farther from being a democratic country as the unions got more powerful and more communist. "The unions have the lifeblood of Britain in their hands. If they choose to destroy us, they can." (The Times, 20th September 1975)
enemies. This kind of political activity is still common today. For example, as already highlighted, during a recent by-election the Labour Party candidate was referred to as a terrorist sympathiser by members of the Conservative Party.

A further *Times* article, this time from 1980, reported the Duke of Edinburgh conflated Marxism with terrorism. It was headlined as follows: Duke Criticises Marxist Terrorist Core. This is further evidence that certain established groups in Britain, in this case the monarchy, believed or sought to encourage others to believe that Marxists tend to be terrorists and that any terrorism across the globe is supported by communist countries. Such a belief is not dissimilar to the ideas put forward by certain sections of the establishment today that seek to closely associate all or a majority of Muslims with terrorism, or at least as being terrorist sympathisers. For example, there have been various statistics published in British newspapers that have claimed most Muslims are sympathetic to the aims of terrorists and that they believe that the actions of terrorists are understandable in light of British foreign policy.

If we are to look back at the examples of terrorism highlighted in this thesis, the majority tend to be related to groups that could be described as left-wing, from the French revolutionaries, through to Irish emancipatory movements, British working class emancipatory movements, and various communist and anarchist groups. However, if we compare this belief about terrorism to beliefs about terrorism today, we can see that there is much less of a conflation of terrorism and Marxism. This, for the most part has been replaced with a conflation of terrorism with Islam. It is perhaps no coincidence that the association of terrorism with Marxism and left-wing movements has greatly diminished following the end of the Cold War and the weakening of left-wing movements around the world more generally. This, of course, appears to have been replaced, in the West, by movements related to Islam. This does not mean that rebellious groups not linked to the left or Marxism did not exist during the Cold War but rather that communism and related movements were regarded as the biggest threats to the West and so any terrorism related to them held the highest precedence. Likewise, Islam-related terrorism is regarded, or said to be regarded as one of the biggest violence threats to the West today and so it now receives the greatest attention from established groups in the West.

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33 The Labour Party candidate in the 2013 Eastleigh by-election was called a terrorist sympathiser by the Conservative prime minister, David Cameron, for having written in a book that his first thought following a bomb attack at the Brighton hotel in 1984 that targeted senior members of the Conservative Party, was that he wished it had killed the then prime minister, Margaret Thatcher.

34 The following article from *The Times* highlights this:

"The Duke of Edinburgh last night attacked what he called “a hard core of Marxists” involved in terrorism. He told an invited audience in St George’s Chapel, Windsor, Berkshire, that there appeared to be a remarkable sameness about violence, terrorism, and the political style of successful revolutionaries. "At the heart of the terrorist campaign is a hard core of Marxists. Terrorists, liberators or revolutionaries are almost invariably supported by money, arms, men and women from countries under Marxist regimes”, he said. He said: "There is one thing we must all learn from Marx. It is now more important than ever that we know and understand the guiding principles of our system if we are to make it fulfil our ambitions to live in freedom, harmony, prosperity and justice.' (*The Times*, 12th April 1980)

35 For example, a 15th of March, 2004 article in *The Scotsman* claimed that a poll suggest that one in eight Muslims support terrorist attacks on the United States. A *Daily Mail* article from 2nd August 2007 claims that polls suggest that one in 11 Muslims support suicide bombing.
Chapter 10: The sociogenesis of terrorism, the end of the British Empire, the Middle East and international terrorism

The consequences of the First and Second World Wars for Britain were not as catastrophic as they were for countries such as Germany and Japan but they were significant in contributing to the break-up of the British Empire and undermining Britain’s position as one of the major powers in what had been a multi-polar world of first level competing states. Britain, over the following decades, was set on a road towards a significant reduction in status and power potential relative to the emerging superpowers – the Soviet Union and the United States. Accordingly, in the first half of the twentieth century the British Empire began to weaken and, following the Second World War, crumbled to the point at which it disappeared almost totally. Terrorism played a significant role in this context, and in particular in the conflicts engaged in by colonialists seeking independence, or the overthrow of post-colonial regimes.

The reasons for the collapse of the British Empire are multifaceted but, in many respects, boil down to the fact that Britain, as with all previous empires, was unable effectively to pacify and control the areas that made up its overseas territories anymore, partially as a result of competitive pressures from other states and empires, including competition from the two new super-powers – the Soviet Union and the United States – and their growing empires and spheres of control. Of course, Britain and its ability to hold onto its empire had been seriously weakened in other competitive struggles with Germany during the two world wars, which further compounded the collapse of its imperial rule.

Another core, but related process that was central to the dissolution of the British Empire was that the power balances between Britain and its colonies had evened up somewhat. This was partially a result of Britain’s weakened position and also because, in some cases, Britain’s colonies were receiving support from Britain’s competitors – the Soviet Union and China, which sponsored a number of communist insurgencies in the empires of the European powers. These, of course, were also related to a more general spread and support of communism globally, including, as has been examined already, Western countries. In addition, functional democratisation in Britain itself contributed to previously outsider groups demanding that the state spend more resources on the British people as opposed to administering the Empire. As such, pressure was placed on Britain’s ruling elites from within Britain to end their imperial ambitions. On a broader structural level, what happened, in fact, was a breakdown in Britain’s monopoly of violence and taxation in its colonies due to competitive pressures. It is in this context of a retreating ruling British elite that rebellious colonialists were referred to as terrorists and acted according to those designations at the time. The break-up of the British Empire and related global and internal functional democratisation, as mentioned, have implications for today’s terrorism figurations in Britain. That is, the creation and collapse of the British Empire, as part of complex inter- and intra-state processes has made a significant contribution to the development of jihadist terrorism and attacks on Britain. More on this will be explored shortly but first it is necessary to show more clearly some of the terrorism figurations involved during the time of the break-up of the British Empire.
The British Empire

In order to understand the processes involved in the break-up of the British Empire better, it is necessary to point out that its size – stretching around the world – played a significant role. At various points in its history the British Empire incorporated most of North America, large parts of Africa, India, parts of South East Asia and Australasia, and was the result of over three hundred years of overseas expansion. According to the historian Lawrence James (1998), the champions of the empire claimed that it existed to civilise and uplift its subjects:

‘There was, on the whole, general agreement that the empire was a powerful force for the spread of civilisation through trade and the imposition of superior codes of behaviour on its ‘savage’ inhabitants. Few would have disagreed with an editorial in the Sun, which welcomed the announcement of the form of government chosen for Britain’s newest colony, New Zealand, in January 1847. So speedy an attainment of the choicest fruits of civilisation, in a country where, a few years since, a hardy race of savages alone ranged free, ignorant of their better nature, is without parallel in history.’ (James, 1998: 184-185).

Just like the French ruling elite and Napoleon in the nineteenth century, many of the British establishment during the nineteenth century, regarded their empire as at the forefront of civilising the uncivilised parts of the world. James (1998: 188) quotes the missionary, James Stewart, in 1874 as saying: ‘We were going as civilisers as well as preachers’. Violence was a key part of the spread of empire and of civilising ‘savages’. In fact James (1998: 190) points out that the spread of empire and civilisation required almost constant imperial warfare.

Civilising offensives

As we can see, the use of violence to ‘civilise savages across the British empire fits the notion that established groups in Britain undertook civilising offensives, as discussed earlier, and developed by Van Krieken (2011) in his discussion of English civilising offensives in Ireland. In particular it is his idea that Ireland, in many ways, provided a test-bed for future colonial civilising offensives across the world. Van Krieken points out the following:

‘The concepts used to legitimize the colonial enterprise in royal charters to colonizers first took shape in the papal bull encouraging Henry II to take possession of Ireland. Before 1641, observes Jane Ohlmeyer, 100,000 people had migrated to Ireland from Britain (30,000 Scots, the rest Welsh or English); the corresponding numbers of migrants crossing the Atlantic were: c.6,000 settlers in Massachusetts by 1636 and c.8,000 in Virginia by 1640 (Ohlmeyer, 1998: 139). Colonial adventurers like Walter Raleigh (1554–1618) and Humphrey Gilbert (c.1539–83) cut their teeth in Ireland, experimenting there with subduing an indigenous population with an alien culture and the mechanics of displacing the natives by establishing plantations of imported, already civilized and disciplined, settlers before they set sail for the more lucrative New World (Muldoon, 2003: 91–2).’ (Van Krieken, 2011: 41)

The fact that the expansion of the British Empire involved attempts to civilise natives is important in the context of terrorism figurations. This is because, when those natives rebelled, they were often referred to again as savages, barbaric and also as terrorists and were seen as the antithesis of the civilised British. Of course, in all the cases stated in this thesis those rebellious colonialists acted according to the way they were designated as terrorists at the time, which was often violently, and certainly in opposition to Britain. However, their actions ought to be understood in the context of the
violent expansion of the British Empire and the violent rearguard action undertaken by the British during its break-up. In both cases, there is no reference to British terrorism by established groups in Britain. In the context of both the expansion and the retraction of the British Empire there was, as mentioned, a great deal of violent conflict. Accordingly, double-binds, along with related highly emotive language also played an important role. Much of the violence became protracted and was exceedingly bloody, and, in many cases, dehumanisation processes were clearly evident. This was perhaps most clear in Kenya and the conflict with the Mau Mau. Related terrorism-imbuwed double-binds, such as the Israel-Palestine conflict, are still ongoing, which helps to highlight some of the entanglements related to the collapse of the British Empire. More will be discussed on that issue later.

The Break-up of the British Empire and specific examples relating to terrorism

The break-up of the British Empire was in many instances, as mentioned, just as violent as its creation. However, the violence this time around involved rebellion by the former colonies and a rearguard action in the name of civilisation. In many instances, the rebels’ violence was referred to as terrorism. Here again, like Van Krieken’s (2011) point that civilisation is often regarded as the antithesis of barbarism, civilisation can be seen as the antithesis of terrorism, and only those who are violent towards civilisation are terrorists, as opposed to those who are violent for the sake of civilisation. In fact, in many cases, violence in the name of civilisation was seen as justified.

Historians generally consider the collapse of the British Empire to have been the result of a combination of independence movements, ‘imperial overstretch’ and pressure from other nation states, including the United States, and that its final days ended in disarray. However, there are others who argue that the relinquishing of its colonies was done in a far more strategic manner. For example, Benjamin Grob-Fitzgibbon (2011:2-3) argues that it was the policy of the British government to encourage its colonies to accept independence on Britain’s terms and those that did not were dealt with violently. He argues that this strategy aimed to move much of the former empire into the British Commonwealth and, therefore, into British and American influence rather than that of the Soviet Union. The aim was to secure Western dominance during the Cold War.

The point that Grob-Fitzgibbon makes about using the former Empire and Commonwealth to strengthen Western influence in the context of the Cold War was exactly the same issue of inter-state competition and the pressure that Britain and other Western nations were facing in relation to the growing power of the Soviet Union and communism more generally. This competition was a part of Britain’s and the West’s defence and expansion of civilisation. The British establishment regarded themselves as bastions of British civilisation and that they had a duty to spread and protect it across the world.

Although, in terms of civilising processes, Britain was and is at a relatively advanced stage, especially if taking into account processes like technisation, functional democratisation and the banishing of human impulses to behind the scenes, the belief by its people of their superiority and, therefore, of being better humans than other peoples betrays a large degree of fantasy and wishful thinking based
on their self-love. Their comparison with less civilised and, in their eyes, more barbaric people, further highlights this delusion. What they were really expressing was part of the established-outsider figurations in which they found themselves. Those figurations, in the context of Empire, were highly unequal and it was those differences in power potentials that came to be expressed in beliefs that the British were, in many ways, special humans compared to those they conquered. In other words, it was the ratio of power between Britain and its colonies, as part of established-outsider figurations that determined the belief that the British were attempting to civilise barbarians. As part of this context, those barbarians were also often referred to as terrorists, and, of course, many of them acted according to those designations. However, at the same time, British violence was somehow regarded as civilised or at least justified as it was in the name of civilisation.

Grob-Fitzgibbon argued that, if populations accepted the hand-over to independence on British terms, then a variety of prizes awaited them. Those who did not accept these terms were dealt with violently. The concept of terrorism was used by the British establishment in the context of the break-up of its Empire in several countries, each of which was seeking independence from Britain. These terrorism figurations included: India, Malaya (now Malaysia), the British Mandate in Palestine, Cyprus, Kenya and the South Arabian Federation (now part of Yemen). There is only space here to examine three of these examples, however – India, Kenya and the Palestinian Mandate/Israel.

India

Claims in The Times newspaper of terrorism against British colonial rule in India began in 1910 and ended in 1955, eight years after Indian independence. The majority of cases involved rebels in Bengal, which until partition from Pakistan and Bangladeshi independence, was a large area of north-eastern India. Many of the reports of terrorism and terrorists refer to Bengali youth movements shooting officials or exploding small bombs. In one case from 12th February, 1935, a headline in The Times referred to a war on Bengali terrorists. The headline read: ‘War on Bengal Terrorists. Decline in Crimes. Governor and Future Appeasement’. This, of course, has some parallels with the United States’ ‘War on Terrorism’ following the September 11 attacks on New York and Washington. The article itself refers to how the war on Bengali terrorists was being won and says that terrorist attacks were reducing: ‘the number of terrorist crimes in 1932 was 99, in 1933 42, and in 1934 14.’ The reduction was said to have been a result of government action. Again there are examples of the

36 Another context in which terrorism played a significant part was the rebellion in the country previously known as Malaya, and which later became known as Malaysia, following full independence from Britain. Terrorism was an issue in this jurisdiction from at least 1950 until 1965, and like much of the terrorism previously reported in Bengal, was closely associated with Communism. The terrorist threat in Malaya resembled what many today would refer to as guerrilla warfare on the part of the insurgents. Much of the terrorism in Malaya was blamed on the Soviet Union and China and, as such, can be regarded as state-sponsored terrorism.

37 Terrorism also played a central part in Cyprus’s struggle to gain independence from the British Empire. Evidence, again from The Times suggests that this was a major issue in the years 1955 to 1960. Terrorism, in this case, seems to come under the guise of bomb attacks and shootings. In an article dated 21st November, 1955, Cypriot terrorism and the independence movement is linked to Communism. The article also says that the Communist threat is a reason why Britain should not leave Cyprus.

38 It is interesting to note that terrorism also played a part in the other parts of the world where Britain is accused of torture during the end of its empire. For example, terrorism also played a major role in the independence struggle of the South Arabian Federation, which now makes up part of the Yemen.
antithesis between civilisation and terrorism. In a *Times* article from 23rd February, 1940 it is claimed that the British and French were defending civilisation, and that gangs of terrorists were hampering this effort.

Even as late as 1940 established groups in Britain regarded themselves as civilising ‘savages’ and ‘barbaric’ peoples across the globe. And as early as 1925, terrorism in India, in the Bengal region, was associated with communism, as one headline from *The Times* on 6th February, 1925 shows: ‘Red" Agitation in India. Assembly and Bengal Ordinance’. Communism and terrorism in India were also closely linked following independence and during the early years of the Cold War.

The description of rebellious communist groups in India and elsewhere as terrorists by the British establishment during the first half of the twentieth century reveals a pattern that stretches right from the French Revolution and which involves labelling of almost any lower-class rebellious group as terrorists, including the French Jacobins and Sansculottes, Chartists and trades unionists, rebels across Europe, and anarchists, and Irish Catholics. These terrorists were clearly in need of ‘civilising’ in the eyes of the British establishment.

The region, and Pakistan in particular, is also notable as being a key focus of the present-day US and British ‘War on Terror’. For example, parts of Pakistan and Afghanistan are said to be strongholds of the Taliban and to harbour Al Qaeda terrorists. In fact, the government of Pakistan has been undertaking its own ‘civilising offensives’ in what is often described as lawless areas that border Afghanistan. There is also a further link between the region and present-day terrorist figurations. As mentioned, the area is a focus of the US and British War on Terror, and this is for a number of reasons. One of those is that both Afghanistan and Pakistan have been key staging grounds for attacks on the West. In addition, a large proportion of so-called British home-grown jihadist terrorists come from families who emigrated from Pakistan. Many of those who have undertaken recent terrorism in Britain or who have been imprisoned for terrorism offensives visited and trained in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. So in one sense Britain’s colonial past in the region has been fundamental to a number of terrorism figurations, including those related to independence movements in Bengal, communism, and present-day jihadist terrorism. In other words, we can see how long-term inter-state processes, such as the creation and break-up of the British Empire, have contributed to recent intra-state terrorism figurations in Britain.

**Kenya**

Between 1955 and 1965, *The Times* also reported terrorism as being a major problem during the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya. The following article is interesting in that it shows the draconian nature of laws and regulations imposed by the British in Kenya during the uprising:

> ‘Illegal possession of ammunition or explosives unrelated to the emergency will no longer be a capital offence in Kenya. This is one of the effects of a “rationalization” of the emergency regulations dealing with major crimes announced today by the Government. The unlawful possession of ammunition or explosives will now be a capital offence only if circumstances raise the reasonable presumption of an intent to use them in a way prejudicial to the public safety or to the maintenance of law and order. Otherwise the penalty will be life imprisonment. A Government
spokesman said that this would apply to a member of an armed gang arrested with ammunition. Unlawful possession of firearms remains a capital offence in any circumstances. Two regulations are revoked because, it is stated, they have proved of little practical value and overlap other regulations. These deal with furthering terrorism and delivering firearms. The latter necessarily involves possession, and is displaced by a new regulation designed to deal with middlemen in arms transactions who at no stage handle fire-arms, ammunition, or explosives. This new regulation carries life imprisonment. Consorting with members of an armed gang remains a capital offence even if the offender is unarmed. The ruling remains that no prosecutions can be undertaken without the authority of the Attorney-General. DEATH FOR SABOTAGE. Other types of consorting not subject to the death penalty have been covered by a new composite regulation, "for the sake of simplicity." This covers a person who consorts with an armed terrorist who is not necessarily a member of an armed gang. The existing presumption continues that an offender consorting with an armed person knows that that person is illegally armed unless the contrary is proved; it is extended so that a person consorting will also be presumed to have reasonable cause to believe that the armed person intended to commit acts of terrorism. The old capital offence of demanding and receiving supplies, which has been little used, is amended to reduce the penalty to life imprisonment. This brings it into line with offences such as harbouring and consorting, with which it is usually associated. The regulation dealing with sabotage, which is considered wider than is necessary, is also amended. ’(The Times, 21st July, 1955)

To contemporary eyes such laws appear exceptionally harsh and unnecessary. What this highlights is the way in which inter-state affairs are conducted relative to intra-state affairs. The British government would not have been able to get away with such laws in Britain itself but because the structure of relations between the British establishment and the Kenyan population was considerably different to that of the British establishment and the rest of the British population. Accordingly, the differences in established-outsider figurations in each case are crucial, as are processes of functional democratisation. The power ratios between the British establishment and the Kenyan people were much greater than they were between the British establishment and the British population. This is partly due to a more advanced level of functional democratisation in the case of the latter compared to the former. In other words, the British establishment was more dependent on the British population than it was in the Kenyan population and so could impose more draconian laws on the latter.

Another important point to be made about the example of Kenya and the Mau Mau is related to civilising offensives. Recent British state documents have been declassified and released into the public domain, which admits to British torture of suspected terrorists in Kenya related to the Mau Mau uprising. In her book, Britain's Gulag: The Brutal End of Empire in Kenya, Caroline Elkins (2005) highlights the brutality of British treatment of imprisoned Mau Mau terrorists. Torture included beatings and sexual violence, such as sodomy with foreign objects, animals and insects. Castration was also said to have been used by the British, at times using an instrument called castration pliers, which would crush men’s testicles before ripping them off. Detention camps were created to hold Mau Mau, and whole villages were turned into prisons by encircling them with barbed wire. It is believed that around one hundred thousand may have died as a result of disease, starvation and brutality. Of course, the Mau Mau also undertook violence as part of their anti-colonial uprising but it was not as systematic or bureaucratic as the British violence.

Britain’s acknowledgement of torture in Kenya, according to Elkins in a Guardian article (07.07.13), has opened up the possibility of claims against it from other former colonies. She claims that there is ‘unequivocal evidence of colonial brutalities in end-of-empire Malaya, Cyprus and elsewhere’. She adds that British colonial repression was honed ‘first in Palestine, and then Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, Aden, Northern Ireland and elsewhere’.
What this shows is that, despite claims by the British establishment that they were fighting terrorists in the name of civilisation, to a large extent what is civilised or uncivilised or terrorist is relative to the power ratios inherent in established-outsider figurations. By many definitional standards, especially recent ones, Britain’s actions in Kenya could be defined as ‘state terrorism’. Likewise, the actions of the Mau Mau could be and were described as terrorism. However, due to the structure of power relations, the terrorism label has only tended to stick to the Mau Mau.

Of course, as mentioned at the beginning of this thesis, a distinction needs to be drawn between the concept of civilisation on the one hand and civilising processes in a technical sense on the other. For example, the violence of the British towards the Mau Mau may have been as bad or worse than the violence committed by the Mau Mau, and yet it was the Mau Mau that were labelled as ‘uncivilised’ and ‘terrorist’. However, the structural configuration of British interdependencies were more complex and far-reaching than those of the Mau Mau, in addition to a variety of other more ‘civilised’ attributes, such as technicisation, a greater degree of reality congruence in knowledge systems, a removal of bodily functions to behind the scenes and more even temperaments. This can be seen in the different ways each group deployed violence. The systematic and bureaucratised violence of the British towards the Mau Mau required a greater deal of foresight and planning than the violence of the Mau Mau towards the British and other Africans, which tended to be undertaken with much less sophistication.

The distinction between more and less civilised forms of violence is important, especially with respect to contemporary forms of terrorism, which often require a great deal of foresight, planning and self-restraint. Examples, such 9/11 and 7/7, which took years for their participants to plan, are cases in point. More will be discussed on these issues shortly.

**The British Mandate in Palestine**

Terrorism was also an issue for the British ruling elites in relation to their mandate in Palestine, which was bestowed upon them by the League of Nations following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War. In effect, however, it was a British colony. In the mandate both Arab and Jewish groups who wanted to see the back of the British were referred to as terrorists. Terrorism by these groups was seen as a problem from around 1935 until 1945. Reports from *The Times* (1940) suggest that terrorism by Arabs was regarded as more of a problem in the early part of this period and then Jewish terrorism became a greater issue later on. Jewish terrorism was undertaken by groups like the Stern Gang (also known as Lehi).

These terrorism figurations in, firstly, British Mandate Palestine and then Israel are linked to the sociogenesis of what has often been referred to as global terrorism, and other kinds of terrorism that emanated from the Middle East. This, of course, was closely related to the collapse of the British Empire and, at the same time, was closely related to the power relations at play between the United States and the Soviet Union and the Israelis and Arabs. As I mentioned earlier, the delegation of Palestine to Britain followed its seizure during the First World War from the Ottomans to prevent the
Germans taking control of it. In 1917, the Balfour Declaration was made, which had as its aim the creation of a homeland in Palestine for the Jewish people. However, according to Grob-Fitzgibbon (2011: 9), the British had promised the land in 1915 to Husain ibn Ali, the Grand Sharif of Mecca, and in 1916 the British and the French agreed as part of their partitioning up of the Middle East that Palestine would go to the British. Palestine became a British colony in all but name and from the 1920s onwards the British committed themselves to developing Palestine as a homeland for Jews. This created an imbalance in the relationships between the British, the Jews and the Arabs in the area, which was skewed towards the British and the Jews, marginalising the Arabs. In such a context, tensions between the Jews and Arabs grew with each side provoking the other. These tensions reached breaking-point in 1929, and a number of riots ensued, killing 133 Jews and 116 Arabs and injuring 339 Jews and 232 Arabs (Grob-Fitzgibbon, 2011:9). Throughout this period and in the time shortly afterwards, Jewish migration to the area grew. As a result of this, Arabs revolted between 1936 and 1939 and forced the British government to curb Jewish immigration and move towards an independent Palestine.

Grob-Fitzgibbon (2011: 10) suggests that Jewish groups saw that force could determine British policy and so some of them took up arms to demand Jewish sovereignty. Although at the beginning of the Second World War most Jewish groups, in light of Nazi treatment of Jews, suspended any violent action against the British in Palestine, apart from one faction – The Lohamel Herut Israel (LEHI – Fighters for the Freedom of Israel), which formed in 1939 as a breakaway group from the Irgun Zvai Leumi (the IZL – National Military Organization).  

After it was confirmed that Jews were being systematically murdered by the Nazis and the British failed to relax immigration controls of Jews to Palestine, the IZL decided to join LEHI and resorted to violence against the British. Accordingly, the state of affairs involved violence between Arabs and Jews and by both groups against the British. Much of this violence at the time was referred to as terrorism and still is today. Of course in both the past and present cases, terrorism would have been used in a normative sense, although the characteristics of what was described as terrorism in the 1940s were different from those of the present, as we have seen throughout this thesis.

Terrorism in the British Mandate in Palestine and the formation of Israel

According to Grob-Fitzgibbon (2011:12), the IZL published a declaration of revolt against the British in 1944 and together with LEHI, began a campaign of ‘terror’ which included bombing official offices and members of the security forces. Despite a supposed ceasefire by militant Jewish groups in 1945, violence against the British continued until Britain gave up its mandate in Palestine in 1947 with the

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39 According to Grob-Fitzgibbon:

The Lohamel Herut Israel (LEHI – Fighters for the Freedom of Israel) formed in 1939 as a breakaway group from the Irgun Zvai Leumi (the IZL – National Military Organization), the militant wing of Zionism, which had largely allied itself with the British on the outbreak of war. LEHI’s founder, Avraham Stern, was heavily read in the literature of Europe’s revolutionary past; he formulated LEHI as a seditious organization that would employ terror against the British Empire, in his view the chief enemy of Zionism. Once the British were defeated and expelled from Palestine, he believed the Zionists would be free to set up the state of Israel, a true national home for the Jews. (Grob-Fitzgibbon, 2011:11)
promise that it would fully evacuate by the following year. James (2011) points out that, during the last
days of the British mandate, violence intensified between the Arabs and the Jews:

‘The last days of the mandate witnessed the massacre of 240 Arabs, including women and
children, by a Jewish unit at Deir Yassim. This incident helped trigger a mass exodus of
Palestinians and, by 1949, 720,000 refugees had fled either to Gaza or Jordan. Their legal
statelessness and bleak camps were a reproach to Britain, and a reminder to the Arab world of her
impotence and perfidy. After 1948, Britain and the infant state of Israel became symbols of alien
domination and Arab powerlessness. It was left to the United States to offer the refugees financial
assistance and, where possible, attempt their resettlement.’ (James, 2011: 563).

The exit of Britain from its mandate in Palestine, as well as from its influence in other Arab and
Middle Eastern lands was clearly part of the disintegrative processes at the heart of the
collapse of its empire. At the same time, events in the British mandate in Palestine in the first
half of the twentieth century were clearly crucial to what has become one of the world’s most
controversial and protracted terrorism-marked conflicts during the second half of the twentieth
century until the present – the so-called Middle East conflict.

**Examples from *The Times***

Evidence from *The Times* suggests that, in 1940, the concepts of terrorism and terrorist were being
applied to both Arab and Jewish groups. One article from the 1st January, 1940, for example, claimed
that Jewish groups said that the British had caved in to Arab terrorism during talks to try to develop
agreement on the future of Palestine. Another article from 23rd February, 1940, claimed that, 18
months previously, rebel Arabs had demanded money from villages by threats of terrorism. A further
article from that year, 8th May, 1940, claimed that a small Jewish terrorist group had been discovered.

An article from 1945, discusses earlier Arab terrorism in the context of Hitler’s attempts to cultivate
positive relations with Arabs in Germany’s war against the Allies. It reads as follows and is typical of
the kind of article printed in *The Times* that year when referring to Arab terrorism:

‘A concession to Arab terrorism which raged in Palestine from 1936 onwards with the support of
Hitler and Mussolini, the White Paper was designed to gain Arab support in the event of a war with
the Axis. But it failed to achieve even that practical objective, as witness the open alliance with
Hitler of Raschid Ali of Baghdad and of the then Mufti of Jerusalem.’ (*The Times*, 14th August,
1945).

The majority of articles from 1945, however, refer to terrorism by Jewish groups. The following two
articles from *The Times* are typical of this:

‘Now, with armoured cars, wireless patrol cars and other highly mobile units, all suitably armed, the
police feel they can keep down terrorism to a minimum and could, should the necessity arise,
break up the Stern Gang and other terrorist organizations. To accomplish this would, however,
mean such disorganization of ordinary life that it will not be undertaken while things remain as they
are now, with nothing more than the distribution of revolutionary leaflets and proclamations, some
of which are scattered by means of small home-made bombs. The real danger would come should
some event bring in to the arena the bulk of the Jewish population, which contains large numbers

And:

‘In Palestine the activities of Jewish subversive organizations led to a number of outrages and
arrests. On August 8, the retiring High Commissioner, Sir Harold MacMichael, narrowly escaped
assassination, and, on November 5, Jewish terrorists murdered Lord Moyne in Cairo.’ (The Times, 2nd January, 1945).

The role that Britain’s establishment played in the area of the Middle East now referred to as Israel and in other Arab countries is not insignificant in terms of how certain social processes developed into a conflict in which terrorism has been a major aspect. However, it was subsequent processes in the region that helped to escalate the conflict between predominantly Jewish Israelis and Palestinian Arabs and other Arab countries. Following British withdrawal from its mandate in Palestine and the declaration of the state of Israel, violence broke out between Israel and its neighbours, with this conflict lasting from 1948 to 1949. During this war, Israel captured significant land from its neighbours but with Egypt and Jordan holding onto the Gaza Strip and the West Bank respectively.

The period in between 1949 and the 1967 Six Day War, fought by Israel against Egypt, Syria and Jordan was reported in The Times (1950) as, at times, suffering from terrorism. The newspaper, in 1950 still referred to some Israeli Jews as terrorists and did this in an article from 23rd May, 1950 when referring to, ‘the Israeli terrorist leader Menahem Beigin’. The only other incidents of terrorism in the Israeli-Palestinian figuration, reported between the creation of Israel and the 1967 war, related to attempted assassinations and the actual assassination of Hazza Majali, the Jordanian Prime Minister.

In the years soon after the 1967 Six Day War, the majority of the focus on Israeli-Palestinian-related terrorism was on what was often described as “‘air terrorism’. This, in effect, involved either the hijacking or blowing up of civilian aircraft by anti-Israel groups, usually Palestinians. The change to calling Palestinians terrorists rather than Jews is in line with structural changes more generally, for instance the cementing of the state of Israel and the legitimacy that this gave it in light of the international community. In addition, Israel as a close ally of the West and especially the United States in the context of the Cold War, gave it far more legitimacy than the Palestinians had.

The following two articles are typical of what The Times was reporting in this period:

‘In a severe condemnation of Palestinian terrorism and sabotage of civil aircraft, the 17-nation Council of Europe Assembly in Strasbourg today unanimously called for an international treaty on hijacking and for sanctions against “accomplice states”. A resolution stated that “these acts of hijacking, sabotage, the taking of hostages and blackmailing of governments are occurring and increasing only because the terrorists and their organizations are able to use the territory of certain Arab states as a refuge, a training ground, and a base for action “. Commenting on the resolution, Mr. Duncan Sandys, a British Conservative M.P., said urgent action was required to restore the “freedom of the air”.’ (The Times, 19th September 1970)

And

‘President Nixon today ordered Government guards to be placed on American commercial aircraft and called for the suspension of flights to all countries which refuse to punish or extradite hijackers. Mr Nixon said he had instructed Mr. William Rogers, the Secretary of State, to ask the Civil Aviation Organization to call an emergency meeting to suspend airline services to countries which fail to act against the terrorists. The presidential assistant who released details of the American action, MT. Peter Flanigan, said that the United States would ask for nations that do not penalize hijackers to be ostracized. He said that the United States airlines and the Airline Pilots Association unanimously concurred in the steps taken. The President also ordered the Transportation Department to direct airlines to install additional electronic surveillance equipment and to place this, wherever possible in other countries. The guards will begin their duties on airliners immediately. They will be drawn from the Secret Service and will be supplemented by specially trained members of the armed forces who will serve until an adequate number of civilian guards have been trained. The cost of the guards will be paid out of a “very slight increase” in the head tax on international passengers of $3, (about 25s.) and in the excise tax on domestic tickets. The airlines will pay for the extra
surveillance equipment. Special anti-sabotage training will be given to airlines staff. Mr. Nixon said: "It is the policy of the United States Government to hold the countries in which the hijacked airliners are landed to assume the responsibility for the safety of United States citizens and so Mr Flanigan indicated that the United States sympathized with Jordan's powerlessness to deal with the actions of the guerrillas on its territory. It has been estimated that about 4,000 personnel will be needed to guard all American overseas flights. The White House confirmed that the American Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean had moved closer to the Middle East as a "routine precaution." for the possible evacuation of hostages and other civilians. Another spokesman, Mr. Ron Ziegler, said that the deployment of the fleet was in the same class as the earlier dispatch of six C-130 transport aircraft to Turkey. Both moves had been taken for evacuation purposes. There was no intention of any armed intervention.' (The Times, 12th September 1970)

Another article from The Times for 29th August, 1975, refers to a Japanese government presentation to the United Nations of a draft agreement for the prevention of 'international terrorism'. This highlights parallels between the relationships involved with respect to the issue of terrorism in the Middle East in the 1970s and the so-called anarchist terrorism in Europe from the early part of the twentieth century, in which international agreements were also being made for the policing of terrorism and terrorist groups.

In another Times (1975) article, a group of Israelis who set fire to a bus occupied by Arabs in revenge for a similar incident involving Arabs setting fire to a bus full of Israelis are referred to as 'counter-terrorists'. This suggests that terrorists were only considered by The Times and in all likelihood many other members of the British establishment as being Arabs and not Jews in the context of Israel-Palestine terrorism figurations in this period 40.

By the early 1980s, terrorism was still high on the news agenda, although, following the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the subsequent hostage taking of Westerners, particularly Americans, that country came further under the spotlight as a so-called terrorist nation. Here we can see parallels with the labelling of the French revolutionaries as terrorists as also was the case with the Germans during the world wars.

Other countries, including Iraq, were designated by the United States in the 1980s as supporting terrorism. Libya, Syria and Saudi Arabia were all reported as either suffering from terrorism or as having regimes that support terrorism. One article, however, reported that the Syrian government killed a number of members of the Muslim Brotherhood who, it claimed, were terrorists. It read as follows but clearly has striking similarities to events in 2012-2014 in which the Syrian government has been fighting rebels that it referred to as terrorists:

40 A significant theme from the mid-1970s was the media obsession with Carlos the Jackal (the Jackal). A significant amount of reporting is devoted to the Jackal who was regarded as a major "international terrorist". There are clearly parallels here with the way in which the media and the British and other Western established groups turn individuals into cult figures. For example, there are similarities between the reporting of the Jackal and Osama bin Laden, both of whom became almost theatrical hate figures in the Western media. The development of them into classic 'bad guy' figures clearly helps to unite established groups against them and their cause, and at the same time distracts from the more complex issues of the figurational dynamics involved in terrorism, such as inter- and intra-state processes, double binds, and civilizing processes. At the same time charismatic leaders play important roles in the development of terrorist organisations. For example, people like Osama bin Laden and Carlos the Jackal, as well as bogeymen, can play the role of figureheads for various terrorist movements. bin Laden, for example, acted as a director and inspiration for many jihadist terrorists across the world. In fact, it could be argued that he was the symbolic leader of a collection of outsider groups that, for a time, were growing in power relative to established groups (nation states) on the international stage.
Syrian security forces today attacked a house in the northern city of Aleppo and "killed eight members of the banned Muslim Brotherhood organization, an official said. The security forces were reported to have found a large cache of weapons, including automatic rifles, grenades, hand guns and explosives in the house. The Brotherhood members were described as "terrorists" who had been involved in "a number of murders and assassinations" in Aleppo. The organization has been blamed for the massacre of army cadets in Aleppo last summer and the assassination of Shaikh Muhammad Shami, a close friend of President Hafez al-Assad, in the city this year. In an interview published yesterday in Beirut, Mr Issam al-Attar, the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, denied the organization was responsible for terrorism in Syria but added: 'We should overthrow the existing regimes in the Islamic world.' (The Times, 19th February 1980)

Syria’s use of the concept of terrorism in this and other cases was simply riding on the rhetoric of more powerful nations, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, which claim a global terrorist threat. This, of course, follows a long history of claiming that weaker outsider enemies were terrorists. It is likely that the claim made by the Syrian government in the above article and claims made today would stick among certain members of that country and elsewhere, simply because it is a powerful group attempting to stigmatise a weaker group, and because it is in the interests of other nation-states to either agree or disagree with Syria based upon the relations and competitive pressures with other nation-states. However, observed from a much more powerful group – Britain – the claim of terrorism made by the Syrian government tends to ring hollow, as can be seen in The Times article above, which has the word terrorists in speech marks. Current attempts by the Syrian government to call groups in Syria that are fighting against them terrorists are also reported in a similar manner. The fact that, therefore, countries with a greater power ratio than others use the concepts terrorism and terrorist to stigmatise groups they consider to be enemies and a threat encourages other groups to do the same. Countries sometimes try to justify their violence by claiming that the recipients of that violence are terrorists, and that those terrorists represent an existential threat to their existence. Of course, those labelled as terrorists may not regard themselves as such and nor may other nation-states regard them as such.

Established-outsider figurations in the Israeli-Palestinian-British context.

There are a multitude of complex established-outsider figurations in the context of the Israel-Palestine conflict. These, of course, date back to before the British mandate in Palestine. However, for the purposes here and due to space considerations there will only be an examination of those relationships during and since the British mandate. As already discussed, the British took control of Palestine from the Ottomans during the First World War and were delegated the territory as a mandate by the League of Nations which, in effect, meant that Britain was the colonial power in the territory. Put simplistically, established-outsider figurations in the Palestinian mandate involved mainly Britain, Palestinian Jews and Palestinian Arabs. The majority of the latter were Muslims, although included a minority of Christians. As has already been discussed, the period of Britain’s Palestinian mandate was also at the time when the British Empire was at its height. In the Middle East, along with France, Britain was one of the hegemonic powers. Globally at the time, as well as from the French, there were challenges to British power by Germany, America and Russia/the Soviet Union. This is not to say that Britain was a superior power in the early part of the twentieth century in the same way that America is today. But that Britain, along with a number of other countries, constituted the most powerful states across the globe, the balances of power between them being relatively even.
In the Palestinian Mandate, Britain, in terms of power ratios, was clearly the established group, and had the capability to more or less impose its will on the Jews and Arabs in the territory. As such, the situation was not entirely dissimilar from that in twentieth century Northern Ireland, in which the British hold the highest power ratio in an established-outsider figuration consisting more or less of three different groups. If isolating the Jewish-Arab relations during the Mandate figuration, it would appear that the power ratios between those two groups were relatively even. However, Britain was able to tip the balance from one side to the other in terms of which best served its interests. This is perhaps why contradictory promises were made to both Arabs and Jews that the British would withdraw and the land would be theirs eventually.

In some respects, British, Jewish and Arab positions in the Palestinian mandate were not dissimilar from the power relations at play in what Elias (2000) called the royal mechanism. He (2000:319-320) points out that, when two groups hold relatively equal power chances within a figuration but at the same time feel threatened by one another, this, in fact, ties both groups’ hands. In such a situation, the central authority (in the case of the British mandate in Palestine, the British ruling class) ‘has the optimal scope for decision’. Elias suggested:

'It is a figuration of this kind to which here the term “royal mechanism” is applied. In fact the central authority maintains the optimal social power of an “absolute” monarchy in conjunction with such a constellation of social forces. But this balancing mechanism is certainly not only the sociogenetic motive force of a powerful monarchy; we find it in more complex societies as the foundation of every strong one-man rule, whatever its name might be. The man or men at the centre are always balanced on a tension between greater or lesser groups who keep each other in check as interdependent antagonists, as opponents and partners at once. This kind of figuration may appear at first sight extremely fragile. Historical reality shows, however, how compellingly and inescapably it can hold in bondage the individuals who constitute it – until finally the continuous shift of its centre of gravity that accompanies its reproduction through generations makes possible more or less violent changes in the mutual bonds of people, so giving rise to new forms of integration.' (Elias, 2000: 320)

As the figurational dynamics changed across the globe and in the Middle East, the balance of power shifted away from Britain, which ultimately contributed to a weakening of its position relative to Jewish and Arab groups in the Palestinian mandate. And of course, British rule in the Palestinian mandate was not by a single strong man ruler. However, it can be argued that colonial rule in many instances bears striking similarities to the ways in which absolute monarchs or strong-man rulers governed. That is, rule and pacification of competing groups often tends to be through overt physical force. In the case of the Palestinian Mandate and other British colonies, as we saw with the examples in Kenya, the forms of government tended to be harsher and more overtly militaristic than the way the British establishment governed in Britain itself.

Accordingly, overt shows of force were required by the British in the Mandate figuration. It was not a pacified place in the sense that overt military shows of strength were required to keep people’s violence in check. Accordingly, in terms of a balance between external restraints and internal restraints, there was a greater reliance on the former to keep the peace.

Another similarity with what Elias describes as the royal mechanism and the situation in the British mandate in Palestine was that as absolute rulers the British had to balance the interests of the Arabs and the Jews in the mandate, so as to help maintain British power. Tipping power too far to one side
could risk violent upheaval from the aggrieved side, and thus threaten Britain’s pre-eminent position in the Mandate, or at least require it to channel scarce resources to bolster its position.

Britain’s position as absolute ruler in its Palestinian mandate and as the group with the highest power ratio in this three-pronged established-outsider figuration, was further complicated by the figurational dynamics of the wider international stage and, most notably, with respect to Britain’s relationship to the United States. The growing power of the Americans, globally, meant that they, along with the Soviet Union, were in the process of supplanting the European powers as the dominant global force. Their interest in international affairs, including the British mandate in Palestine was significant and carried a great deal of weight. It so happened that the US was pushing Britain to form a Jewish state in the Mandate. External international pressure, particularly from the United States, together with internal pressure from Jews in the Middle East, as well as the collapse of the British Empire following the Second World War unstoppably led to Britain’s withdrawal from the Mandate and the subsequent creation of the state of Israel.

It was within that established-outsider figuration in the British Mandate in Palestine that terrorism or what was called terrorism against the British and between the Jews and Arabs developed.

**Established-outsider figurations in Israel.**

Following the withdrawal of Britain, the creation of the state of Israel, the 1948 Arab-Israeli war and the 1967 six day war, the balances of power between Israeli Jews, their Arab neighbours and in particular Palestinian Arabs shifted significantly in favour of Israeli Jews.

In such a situation, the British role in Middle Eastern terrorism figurations was reduced to a degree, as the country’s position became less central to the figuration. At the same time, along with its growing global power the role of the United States in Middle East terrorism figurations increased. Despite Britain’s reduced role and the United States’ growing prominence in the figurations, Middle East terrorism was still firmly on the British agenda. However, as with other nations globally, terrorism was considered to be almost solely the acts undertaken by Palestinian Arabs and other Arab groups in the context of Middle East terrorism figurations. This can be attributed to two core processes. The first is the rise of research on terrorism in the 1970s, which sought to understand what terrorism is and why it happens. Particularly acts, usually by outsider groups, were defined as constituting terrorism. It so happened that some Palestinian and other outsider Arab groups who were opposed to Israel undertook violent attacks against Israeli and other targets, during this period, and those attacks fitted the terrorism definitions that were becoming increasingly popular at the time, as I discussed in terms of the scientifcisation of terrorism earlier.

The other core and related process was, as mentioned, the huge relative shift in the balance of power in the region from Palestinian and other Arabs towards Israeli Jews, partially as a result of the British withdrawal and also due to the support of the United States and the United Nations for the state of Israel as a homeland for the Jewish people. As such, the violence of the outsider Palestinians and their allies was described as terrorism by established groups (Britain, the United States and the
United Nations), whereas the violence of the Israeli Jews tended not to be described in that manner, or at least to the extent that it stuck and had delegitimising consequences.

The creation of Israel followed a UN vote in 1947 to pass UN Resolution 181 for the partition of Palestine into two states – one Arab and one Jewish with Jerusalem remaining under international control. Interestingly, Britain abstained in the vote, which suggests it was maintaining a relatively neutral position between the Arab and Jewish populations. The vote gave 56 percent of the territory to Jews and the rest to Arabs. The latter rejected this and war broke out between Jews and Palestinian Arabs at first and then surrounding Arab states including Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon also became involved. As already mentioned, the war was won by Israel, which seized large tracts of land that had originally been proposed as Palestinian Arab land. This left just 22 percent of the area as Palestine, rather than 44 percent. In 1949 that remaining land was divided between Transjordan and Egypt. The 1967 war in which Israel fought Egypt, Jordan and Syria, ended in Israel’s victory and the annexation by it of the West Bank, Gaza, Jerusalem, Sinai and the Golan Heights. In this struggle, Israel had increased its size by three times and destroyed the military power of the vanquished states. Following the war, Israel, Egypt and Jordan signed UN Resolution 242, which involved Israel’s withdrawal from occupied territories in exchange for recognition of its sovereignty. However, the Resolution has been interpreted differently, with Israel claiming it can withdraw from some of the territories and not all of them in order to protect its integrity. The Arab states interpreted it as meaning a total Israeli withdrawal.

The 1948 war created a significant number of Palestinian refugees in Jordan and Egypt. Other Palestinians were left in the West Bank and Gaza but, following the 1967 war, came under Israeli rule. Throughout this period the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) headed by Egyptian president Nasser was created, as a well as the more radical and militant al-Fatah, which both aimed at the destruction of Israel and the return to Palestine’s boundaries of the mandate era. Following the 1967 war, the PLO became more militant. Harma and Ferry (2008: 118) explain this process as follows:

‘Its puppet leadership, hand-picked by Egypt’s Gamal Abdul Nasser, resigned under pressure (December 1967) and was supplanted by a guerrilla organization that wished to garner international attention and engage the situation in commando-style fashion. The PLO and the resistance movement in general quickly built up both a reputation and a following.’ (Harma and Ferry, 2008: 118)

They add that in 1969 Yasser Arafat, the leader of Fatah was elected leader of the PLO and remained so until his death in 2004. They continued:

‘Fatah at this point was the preeminent PLO guerrilla organization, in size and status. But, along with Fatah, there were a number of other groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP). These groups, unlike Fatah, preferred to address revolution in the Arab world as a whole, not just in Palestine. The PFLP and PDFLP, among others, hijacked airplanes and committed acts of terrorism in an effort to further their cause and bring the Palestinian question to international attention.’ (Harma and Ferry, 2008: 119-120).

It was this context of terrorism and the hijacking of airplanes to attract international attention that brought Britain back into the equation of Israel-Palestine established-outsider figurations. On one level, Britain as a member of the UN Security Council and a former colonial power in the region, had remained involved in the figuration but its influence was much less than the influence of the two global
superpowers – the Soviet Union and the United States. On another level the internationalisation of the Palestinians’ plight through terrorism increased Britain’s presence and other nations’ involvement in the process. At the same time, it also witnessed what many researchers describe as a form of terrorism called ‘international terrorism’.

The complexity of the established-outsider figurations involved in the Israel-Palestine terrorism figurations are laid out above but, to recap and make them clear, in the period following the dissolution of the British mandate they were as follows: in terms of power relations in the Middle East, following 1948 Israel can be described as the more established group. Neighbouring Arab states had relatively less power chances but were nowhere near a position of total subjugation in relation to Israel. The stateless Palestinian Arabs, on the other hand, had relatively few power chances compared to the Israeli Jews and other Arab groups in the region. This relatively localised figuration was also part of much wider global figurations, which shows the interdependence of the conflict. In one respect the disintegration of colonial empires, especially the British Empire, played a significant part in the sociogenesis of the conflict. In another respect, so did the bi-polar power relations of the Cold War. Following the creation of Israel and the development of the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States attempted to increase their influence in various regions of the world in order to reduce the threat that each saw the other as posing. Accordingly, the United States more or less backed Israel with the Soviets tended to side more or less with some of their (Israel’s) Arab enemies. The situation is somewhat more complex than this, as at various times the United States has provided support for Arab nations and the Soviets support for Israel. Nevertheless, the Israel-Palestine figuration must also be understood as existing within the wider Cold War figuration.

As for Britain’s role in this figuration, as that country’s relative power chances diminished over the course of the twentieth century, so did its position in the Israel-Palestine figuration. Its role in that figuration, however, was maintained by its position as a member of the United Nations Security Council, the fact that it is the former colonial power there, and growing global interdependence, which is exemplified by the attempts at internationalising the plight of the Palestinians through terrorism among other actions.

These Middle East terrorism figurations are also closely linked to jihadist terrorist figurations. For example, many jihadists claim that one of their biggest grievances is the position of Israel and the Palestinians in the Middle East. They cite US and Western support for Israel as justifications for their terrorism. This issue played an important role in the development of British home-grown jihadist terrorists, many of who identify closely with the plight of the Palestinians.

**The idea of international terrorism**

During the 1970s and following the PLO’s attempts to bring the plight of the Palestinian people to the attention of the world through acts that have been referred to as terrorism, rhetoric from established groups about the problem of what was called ‘international terrorism’ grew. As was mentioned earlier in this thesis, political scientist David Rapoport (2004: 47) refers to four
different waves of terrorism that were international in nature. He suggests that anarchists initiated the first wave of modern terrorism in Russia in the 1880s and this subsequently spread across Europe. Evidence from *The Times* newspaper would seem to lend credence to this proposition as it suggests that the concept of international terrorism' was used as early as the 1880s. One particular article from 7\(^{th}\) February 1885 talks about ‘international terrorism’ in relation to an extradition treaty signed by Russia and Prussia and hopes that other European countries would sign, too.

In terms of the four waves, Rapoport claims the following:

‘The “Anarchist wave” was the first global or truly international terrorist experience in history; three similar, consecutive, and overlapping expressions followed. The “anticolonial wave” began in the 1920s and lasted about 40 years. Then came the “New Left wave,” which diminished greatly as the twentieth century closed, leaving only a few groups still active today in Nepal, Spain, the United Kingdom, Peru, and Colombia. In 1979, a “religious wave” emerged.’ (Rapoport, 2004: 47)

As mentioned, according to Rapoport, each of these waves had or have international ‘ingredients’ to them. However, this theory is limited in a number of ways. For example, as discussed previously, almost any form of terrorism can be said to have ‘international ingredients’. It just depends which relationships or interdependences are focused on. Additionally, Rapoport argues that the IRA, after being formed in 1916, is one of only a few organisations to transcend successive waves. However, this fails to take into account the organisations that were the precursors to the IRA and that carried out acts of what was described as terrorism in the nineteenth century, including bombings. The idea of waves of ‘international terrorism’ is nevertheless in some ways useful and interesting but undermines the complexity of terrorism and the variety of interdependencies that form it in its various guises, whether these are called ‘international’ or not.

**International terrorism from the 1970s**

Despite the weaknesses in Rapoport’s analysis, in the 1970s governments and the established media began to concern themselves with what they often referred to as ‘international terrorism’ or the ‘global terrorism’ threat. This idea often lumped together a variety of groups with a variety of different objectives and causes, and simply referred to them as ‘the terrorism problem’. Such groups included many that have already been discussed in this thesis, such as those associated with the Palestinian and Arab causes against Israel, left-wing or ‘red’ terrorist groups, and nationalistic terrorist groups such as the IRA and ETA. In some of these cases there was cross-over; for example, the IRA at times considered itself to be a Marxist group.

Newspaper reports from this period exemplify how the ‘global terrorist threat’ was articulated to populations by established groups, including those in Britain. An article from *The Times* on the
16th of June, 1975, 41 highlighted this and showed how the idea of terrorism was considered more of a general threat.

It, and others like it, suggests that the British establishment by this period regarded terrorism as an obvious threat that could emanate from anywhere. Terrorism was regarded as a global threat, and as such, surveillance industries were being created to fight terrorism. Or at least, terrorism was used to justify the creation of new surveillance techniques. Furthermore, there were moves to curb civil liberties in the face of real and perceived terrorist threats.

Like today, and in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in 1975 some established groups sought to describe a general terrorism threat and, in some cases, have done this in order to help promote their policy agendas, including those that might restrict civil liberties, or sell goods by certain manufacturers.

In another article from 1980, the British government sets out how it thinks terrorism should be tackled across Europe, which is again suggestive of the idea of a general terrorist problem rather than specific conflicts in which terrorism is said to play a part:

‘Mr Whitelaw outlines four part strategy to combat terrorism’

‘A four-part strategy for quelling terrorism, was put forward yesterday by Mr William Whitelaw, the Home Secretary, to a conference of European police officers in Brighton. Mr Whitelaw outlined the Government's philosophy of combating terrorism in a speech to the eighth congress of the Union Internationale des Syndicats de Police. The UISP represents 500,000 officers in European police unions. Mr Whitelaw said there was growing liaison among European governments on terrorism. In recent years machinery had been created for a rapid exchange between countries of information on terrorist groups. He said that the aim of the British Government's counter-terrorism strategy must be "to maintain and, if necessary, restore public confidence in democratic institutions. It is this confidence which is the ultimate safeguard against the terrorist threat." To achieve that it was necessary first to defuse grievances which the terrorists were making use of, but that had to be done without surrendering to the terrorists. Second, terrorism had to be treated as a crime pure and simple. If special measures were needed to bring terrorists to book everything should be done to see they did not affect the general public. Mr Whitelaw said the fourth part of the strategy was to strengthen the operational capabilities of the police in such areas as intelligence gathering and forensic-science techniques. The international cooperation needed to handle terrorism was also needed to deal with other crimes committed across borders.’ (The Times, 1st October 1980)

41 The following article from The Times highlights this:

Firm policy urged to defeat terrorism

‘In a pamphlet on the terrorist threat to Britain and her allies, published this morning, Mr Philip Goodhart, joint secretary of the Conservative 1922 Committee, contends that "if terrorists find that their attacks are met by a hesitant government and a querulous public then they will be encouraged to think that a few more savage blows will produce that climate of collapse which is the objective of all terrorists ". On the other hand; he writes, if the terrorists are made to realize that they face a firm government and a resolute public who will neither give in nor rush into over-reactive measures of repression then "it is the terrorists who will face defeat". In the last analysis, the best defence that the British people can mount against terrorist bombs and bullets is a determined reaffirmation of the national tradition of courage, resolution and defiance. Mr Goodhart sees western democratic societies as peculiarly vulnerable, physically and psychologically, to terrorist attacks, because they are open societies where there are objections to the loss of liberty involved in the use of the latest surveillance equipment. As an example, he mentions that one leading British electronics company, Muirheads, has produced a movement monitoring system through which an immigration control officer could transmit a traveller's photograph and fingerprints and in five minutes receive confirmation of whether they belonged to the right person. The West German authorities have bought and installed the British product on a massive scale. So far the British Government has dithered on the brink of placing an order, although the utility of this system as an aid to checking the movement of suspects across the Irish Sea is plain. Mr Goodhart notes both the way terrorists are allowed in Britain to exploit television and the fact that very few convicted terrorists now believe they will serve their full prison sentences.’ (The Times, 16th June 1975)
The arguments put forward by William Whitelaw in the above article have strong echoes of the ideas that were being put forward in 1885 with respect to a European-wide extradition treaty for "international terrorists. This shows a distinct link between the rhetoric being used by established groups in the late nineteenth century and that used in the late twentieth century where terrorism was concerned, with there being, in both periods, a belief of a general, international terrorist threat. The idea of a general terrorism threat in Britain and across the world was further highlighted by fears that terrorists would try to attack using nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Such fears started to grow from the late 1970s and early 1980s, and formed part of the narrative of some established groups around the threat of terrorism.

The 1980s American 'war on terror'.

Perhaps the most telling evidence concerning the perceived generalised international terrorist threat was a speech in 1985 by the then US president, Ronald Reagan, about a 'confederation of terrorist states' seeking to attack Americans. The focus here on the United States was in the context of increasingly longer and more complex chains of interdependency in which Britain played a significant part. That is, the 1980s American war of terror had major implications for Britain and its approach to terrorism. President Reagan’s speech was reported by The Times as follows:

"President Reagan, delivering one of the toughest speeches of his presidency, yesterday warned the world that a confederation of terrorist states was arming, training and supporting attacks on US citizens and installations. Banding together Iran, Libya, North Korea, Cuba and Nicaragua, Mr Reagan said they were united by a fanatical hatred of the United States and dedicated to expelling America from the world. They were run by the "strangest collection of misfits, looney tunes and squalid criminals since the advent of the Third Reich". Without going into details, he warned the terrorists that the American people would strike back. "These terrorist states are now engaged in acts of war against the Government and people of the United States. And under international law, any state which is the victim of acts of war has the right to defend itself," the President told the convention of the American Bar Association. Last year he said, the number of terrorist attacks rose to more than 600, with 305 bombings – almost one a day. At the present rate there would be as many as 1,000 acts of terrorism in 1985 "unless civilized nations act together to end this assault on humanity". He identified the chief perpetrators as Iran and Libya, but said North Korea, Cuba and Nicaragua also were linked to an international terrorist network - "a new international version of Murder Inc". Terrorists who were kidnapping and murdering US citizens were being trained, financed and controlled by this group of radicals that the wave of assaults on the United States and its Western allies had a clear 'strategic purpose" the President said their aim was: "To disorientate the United States, to disrupt or alter-our foreign policy, to sow discord between ourselves and our allies, to frighten friendly Third World nations working with us for peaceful settlements of regional conflicts, and finally, to remove American influence from those areas of the world where we are working to bring stable and democratic government. "In short, to cause us to retreat, retrench, to become 'Fortress America'. Yes, their real goal is to expel America from the world." President Reagan gave notice to the terrorists that the American people, united in their wrath, would strike back to defend themselves. "When the emotions of the American people are aroused, when their patriotism and their anger are triggered, there are no limits to their national valour, nor their consuming passion to protect this nation’s cherished tradition of freedom." With steely fury he recalled a warning given, by Admiral Yamamoto to the Japanese after Pearl Harbour that he feared "we have only awakened a sleeping giant, and his reaction will be terrible." For obvious security reasons, he did not spell out to the lawyers his military options for combating terrorism or any retaliation he might now be planning for the recent TWA hijacking. In the light of the November Geneva summit meeting with Mr Mikhail Gorbachev, Mr Reagan did not highlight the role of the Soviet Union as his Administration has often done in the past. He said Moscow had close ties with terrorist states and the implications of these on bilateral relations with the West and other democracies had to be recognized. But in a sharp response to Soviet accusations that, during the Beirut hostage crisis, the United States was gripped by hysteria and was looking for a pretext for a military invasion, he suggested a single coarse word "with deep roots in our rich agricultural and farming tradition". The President also noticeably made no mention of Syria, a country still on the list of states supporting terrorism, though one that played a vital role in freeing the American hostages. But he listed in detail the crimes committed by the five states he named.
Iran: In 1983 alone the CIA had evidence of Iranian involvement in 57 terrorist attacks. Since September 1984 Iranian-backed groups had been responsible for almost 30 attacks. Libya: Libyan agents or surrogates were linked to at least 25 incidents last year, including a plot to bomb the US embassy in Cairo. Mr Reagan quoted Colonel Gaddafi as recently boasting: “We are capable of exporting terrorism to the heart of America. We are also capable of physical liquidation, and destruction and arson inside America.” North Korea: An unending series of attacks against South Korea. Support for terrorism and separatism in Sri Lanka, and a secret arms agreement with the former communist government in Grenada. Cuba: Sponsoring and arming terrorism in at least three continents – Latin America, Africa and the Middle East. Nicaragua: Sponsoring terrorism in El Salvador, Costa Rica and Honduras and harbouring some of the worst terrorists of Italy, West Germany and Spain, as well as giving a safe haven to the PLO and IRA. President Reagan said the greatest hope the terrorists and their supporters harboured was to disorientate the American people, cause disunity and disrupt or alter US foreign policy. But in looking at the open debates in the US on policy no foreign power should mistake disagreement for disunity. He called on civilized nations to act with full weight of the law - both domestic and international - against terrorism. “We will act to indict, apprehend and prosecute those who commit the kind of atrocities the world has witnessed in recent weeks,” he declared. “There can be no place on Earth left where it is safe for these monsters to rest or train or practise their cruel and deadly skills. We must act together or unilaterally if necessary to ensure that the terrorists have no sanctuary - anywhere.’ (The Times, 9th July 1985)

The speech given by Reagan is in many ways incredible. On one level it borders on the absurd by coming close to suggesting an orchestrated global terrorist conspiracy against the US between a variety of disparate countries and non-state groups. Of course there may be elements of organisation against the US by some of the groups and countries Reagan referred to as terrorists but not the global conspiracy that Reagan implied. The context of this speech, however, has to be understood in terms of the Cold War, domestic US politics and, to a lesser but related extent, threats posed to US interests by some of the countries listed. It is clear that the rhetoric of a confederation of terrorist states lined up against the civilised world was being used to indirectly implicate the Soviet Union as a sponsor of terrorism, and therefore, delegitimise it and some of its allies or potential allies. Additionally, Reagan was addressing the American people through the use of ‘blame gossip’ to refer to America’s weak enemies as barbaric and in some respects insane. At the same time, he used ‘praise gossip’ to help solidify the bonds between his supporters, the American people in general and the US’s allies more broadly.

The speech is also remarkable (or perhaps unremarkable) in that, less than two decades later, the then sitting US President, George W Bush, made a very similar speech in 2002 during his State of the Union address. In it, he listed an ‘axis of evil’ consisting of Iran, Iraq and North Korea. Later that year Libya, Syria and Cuba were added. Of course, four of the countries were the same as those mentioned by Reagan. They were also said to sponsor terrorism, and, with the use of the word ‘axis’, it was implied that these countries somehow co-ordinated their hostility and terrorism towards the United States. Again, the George W Bush speech must be understood in terms of strategic positioning and established-outsider blame and praise gossip. That is, in part, such speeches are aimed at domestic audiences and seek to bind the citizens of the US together by uniting them against a common enemy or enemies, and doing this by suggesting that Americans are human beings with greater worth than their enemies mentioned above. Stigmatising language was also aimed at a global audience, partially as attempts to build support among other nation-states for America’s position and also to warn other countries not to cross America.

In another striking similarity to the rhetoric used by George W Bush in the early 2000s, the concept of a ‘war on terror’ was used in relation to President Reagan’s policies as early as the 1980s.
'Israelis salute US action in war on terror'

'Israel was jubilant yesterday about the capture of the four hijackers of the Achille Lauro, and for several different reasons. There was admiration for the subtlety of the operation. "We congratulate you and the US hugely on the flawless implementation," Mr Shimon Peres, the Prime Minister, said in a telegram to President Reagan. Another was satisfaction that the hijackers were to be brought to justice. "A major contribution to the international struggle against the double plague of cold-blooded murders and outright lies by both the perpetrators and their superiors," the message went on. Most important of all was the belief that America had now firmly and irrevocably joined Israel in branding the Palestine Liberation Organization as nothing but a terrorist organization. "Your action is a landmark in the fight to eradicate terrorism, a shining example of your resolve," Mr Peres said. The telegram sent to Mr George Schultz, the Secretary of State, underlined this. "We stand reassured that we are together in the war against terrorism." Mr Yitzhak Shamir, the Foreign Minister, also made this point forcefully in a news conference yesterday afternoon when he returned from Washington. He had noticed, he said, that the hijack of the ship had brought American public opinion and, more importantly, Congress, round to the view that the PLO was responsible for the spate of terrorist activities. 'The success of the Americans in capturing the hijackers, he said, meant that the US should now be encouraged to take the lead in the struggle against terrorism. But he was despairing of making Britain understand. There was enough evidence to show that the PLO was responsible for the recent terrorist attacks, he said, but he did not think it would be good enough to convince Britain. He was therefore resigned to a visit to Britain next week by two PLO executive members, Mr Mohammed Milhem and Bishop Elias Khoury. 'It seems to me that the British will not change their decision.' (The Times, 12th October 1985)

The use of the concept of a 'war on terror' by established Israeli groups in relation to American rhetoric was clearly part of an attempt to undermine and delegitimise the PLO and Palestinians more generally. Additionally, there was clearly an attempt to leverage greater US support against its perceived enemies, namely the PLO and Egypt. At the same time, it seems that Britain, rather than siding more with one side or the other was maintaining a relatively neutral role, which is not dissimilar to the role it took during the time of the Palestine Mandate. Nevertheless, Britain's role in this context was far less relevant than it had been, reflecting the shifts in global balances of power. However, it is apparent that Britain's earlier relations with Israel and its Palestinian mandate contributed to the development of later terrorism figurations such as those expressed in the above article. That is, there is a relationship between the development and collapse of the British Empire and the figurational conditions under which Israeli-Palestinian terrorism figurations have developed.

Returning to the 1980s American 'war on terror', Chomsky (2003: 49) has examined the US establishment rhetoric, especially that of the Reagan administration, in relation to these issues. He points out that one of the main focuses of American foreign policy when the Reagan administration came to power was a war on terror, which focused on the barbaric enemies of civilisation. He adds that, rather than using legalistic means, terrorism would be dealt with through violence. He points out that the focus of this war on terror was the Middle East and Central America, which, of course, incorporated all of the countries named by Reagan (except North Korea) in the above but one article. Chomsky argues that in Central America alone, around two hundred thousand people were killed in the US war on terror and over a million refugees were created. He adds that the US attack on Nicaragua was condemned by the World Court and would have been also by the UN Security Council, if it had not been for the fact that the US vetoed the resolution. As a result, and for backing 'paramilitary' groups in other Central American countries, Chomsky claims that the US was undertaking terrorism itself. He adds that part of this process was a propaganda war, whereby the
media tend not to report acts of aggression and violence by the US as such, but on the other hand were eager to report such acts by enemies of the US.

In terms of the Middle East, Chomsky claims that US support of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, which killed around twenty thousand people, was the worst case of international terrorism during that period. This was, he points out, a part of the first US war on terror. He wrote:

‘If you take the official U.S. government definition of terrorism – the threat or use of violence to achieve political, religious, or other ends through intimidation, inducing fear, and so on, directed against civilian populations – Israel’s invasion of Lebanon is a textbook example. You couldn’t have a clearer example. International terrorism, because of the decisive U.S. role.’ (Chomsky, 2003: 52)

He adds (2003: 52) that another example of international terrorism in the Middle East was of a car bombing in Beirut that killed 80 people and injured 250 others, and was, he claims, traced back to the CIA and British intelligence.

So, for Chomsky, the 1980s American war on terror was, in fact, a cover for violent campaigns by the US and its allies (including Britain) to further its (their) interests.

The latest ‘war on terror’.

There are clear parallels between the 1980s war on terror and the one that started in 2001. One, for example, in relation to the Middle East conflict is that Israel and other countries have used the rhetoric coming from the US in both periods to further their own political aims. By also using such terrorism rhetoric, there is an attempt to lump together with the Americans’ stated terrorist enemies, Israel’s terrorist enemies. Such a tactic has been used more recently. For example, and as I have already demonstrated, using the rhetoric of the most recent war on terror launched, at least at face value, against militant and radical Muslim groups such as al-Qaeda and those groups related to it, Arab dictators such as Libya’s Colonel Gaddafi and Syria’s Bashar al-Assad in the face of rebellions have claimed that the revolutionaries in their countries were and are terrorists linked to radical Muslim groups. Clearly this was an attempt at stigmatising their enemies but, at the same time, bought into the war on terrorism rhetoric used by the world’s most powerful country and countries. Additionally Russia has used the US war on terror as cover to further its own ‘war on terror’ against Chechen rebels.42

Chomsky (2003: 60) addressed this issue in a discussion of the 2001 war on terror in the context of state terrorism more generally. It is worth quoting from at length because Chomsky dealt with a number of points raised in this thesis:

‘...That principle [it is terror when our enemies carry out atrocities but war or counter-terror when we do] is, as far as I know, close to universal...And it’s not just the United States. As far as I know it’s universal...During the whole history of European imperialism, this is the standard line: We do it to them, it’s counter terror or a just war, bringing civilization to the barbarians, or something like that. If we do that in their own countries –

42 See Time magazine article: How the War on Terrorism Did Russia a Favour (19 Sept 2011)
because remember, until September 11, the West was largely immune – at a vastly worse level, it's not terror. It's a civilizing mission or something like that.

'It was true even of the worst killers in history. They used the same techniques. Take, say, the Nazis. If you read the Nazi literature, in occupied Europe, they claimed to be defending the population and the legitimate governments against the terror of the partisans, who were directed from abroad. And like all propaganda, even the most vulgar, there's a thread of truth to that.

'The partisans did carry out terror and there's no question that they were directed from London, so they were carrying out terror directed from abroad. And the Vichy government is about as legitimate as most of the governments that the United States installs throughout the world or that other imperial powers have, so there's some marginal justification for this grotesque Nazi propaganda, which has a close resemblance to ours.

'The same is true of the Japanese in Manchuria and North China. They were bringing the people an earthly paradise, defending the nationalist government of Manchuria against the Chinese bandits, and so on. Very much like us.' (Chomsky, 2003: 60-61).

As can be seen, Chomsky's points bear some similarity to the points made in this thesis about claims that terrorism is undertaken by outsider groups against established groups. The concept of terrorism is relational and used as a form of stigmatisation in particular relationships between established and outsider groups that usually involve violence by the outsider group against the established group. As has already been discussed, those labelled as terrorists do act according to how the label of terrorism is defined at the time. Bearing this and Chomsky's points in mind, the United States, Britain and other nation-states also clearly act according to the designation of terrorism, that is, at least Chomsky's designation of terrorism, which, as he pointed out, adheres to the United States government's definition of terrorism. The fact that labels of terrorism tend not to stick to nation-states like Britain and the United States is that such labels tend not to matter to them due to the massive power differentials between these countries and relative outsider critics like Chomsky. Of course, in other respects, Chomsky is a member of established groups – the United States and the intelligentsia – and so is labelling one of his we-groups as terrorist.

It is generally accepted that wars on terror, such as those highlighted above, began in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. However, Land (2008: 2) argues that there were wars on terrorism during the nineteenth century, especially during the emergence of systematic anarchist terrorism or what Rapoport refers to as the first wave of international terrorism. We can see, therefore, that war on terrorism rhetoric or at least similar such rhetoric centred around terrorism figurations, by established groups, has a much longer precedence than often seems to be the case. Accordingly, this would appear to add greater weight to the idea that terrorism should be regarded as a relational concept that operates as part of established-outsider figurations.

Having explored some of the figurations involved in the development of so-called ‘international terrorism’ in relation to Britain during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, it now makes sense to explore how the figurations involved in relation to what has sometimes been called ‘domestic terrorism’. As already discussed, however, this label is problematic, as it fails to
address the complexities for so-called ‘domestic terrorism’, which has both international and domestic aspects to it. The main focus on the next section is terrorism in the Northern-Irish context and follows on from many of the issues discussed earlier in relation to Britain and Ireland.
Chapter 11: The fault-lines in the British monopoly of violence and domestic terrorism

Terrorism in post-partition Ireland.

As the earlier section of this thesis on terrorism in relation to Britain’s relationship with Ireland shows, terrorism has played a significant part in these figurations for a long time. As such, evidence from time-series data, suggests that the concept of terrorism was first employed by the British establishment in the first half of the nineteenth century to describe rebellious Irish Catholics. And, of course, rebellious Irish Catholics often acted according to the ways they were designated in that period.

The terrorism figurations involved in the twentieth century relations between the British establishment, those seeking a united Ireland, those seeking to keep Northern Ireland part of the United Kingdom and other groups were highly significant in the development of terrorism figurations in Britain more generally. For example, these predominantly intra-state relations show how uneven the British monopoly of violence was. That is, there was, at the time, a significant movement seeking, often through violent means, to end that monopoly in Northern Ireland.

Additionally, the Northern Ireland situation, as well as some other lower profile conflicts, bears some similarity to present-day jihadist-Britain figurations, in that it involved groups attacking the country and people in which they were born and socialised. Those terrorists who were seeking a united Ireland identified more closely with Ireland than they did with the United Kingdom. As will be examined in detail, shortly, British-born jihadist terrorists identify more closely with specific forms of Islam than they do with Britain. Such processes play a significant role in the development in this country of terrorism figurations.

If we examine twentieth century Britain-Ireland terrorism figurations more closely, we can see that following the Irish War of Independence (1919-1921) and the subsequent partition of the country, the figurational dynamics in this context changed. In this period, as we have seen, the British Empire was declining and the Second World War was fought. Additionally, the dynamics of global power relations were shifting significantly too, and, after the Second World War, the bi-polar world of the Cold War emerged. This was also a time, during which a number of Irish terrorist organisations came to prominence, including the Irish Republican Army (IRA), which later split into the Provisional IRA and the Official IRA, and again into the Real IRA and Continuity IRA, and the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) all of which are/were republican groups. On the loyalist side, among others there were the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF), and the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF). Nationalist / republican groups sought a united Ireland and took it upon themselves to protect Catholic communities in Northern Ireland from real and perceived threats from Protestants, loyalist groups and the British. Likewise, loyalist groups took it upon themselves to resist the
unification of Ireland and to protect the Protestant community from real and perceived threats from republicans.

Evidence from The Times suggests that there was considerable Irish nationalist / republican terrorist activity during the Second World War. For example, one article from 23rd February 1940, claims that, as part of the Prevention of Violence (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1939, 119 people were deported from Britain who were believed to be involved in IRA terrorism. Likewise, there were reports in 1940 of terrorist bomb attacks by the IRA in Birmingham, Coventry and London. Five people were said to have been killed in the Coventry attack.

Following this relatively active period of 'Irish republican terrorism' during the Second World War, there is no mention in The Times until 1950, which suggests a quieter period in the intervening years. Reports of Irish terrorism in the 1950s and 1960s were also relatively few and far between. However, by 1970, media coverage of Irish terrorism had increased significantly. Headlines from The Times during the period include: 'Ulster Conspiracy by Terrorists, Healy Says' (6th April, 1970), and 'Major Chichester-Clark Fears Terror Campaign Against Ulster on 1956 Scale' (13th October, 1970).

One Times article from 1975 claimed that the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974 saved lives and the headline reads as follows: 'Lives Saved and Terrorists Jailed as a Result of the Anti-Terrorism Act – Mr Jenkins'.

There were also growing calls in the 1970s that convicted terrorists should be put to death by the state. This view was put forward, in particular by members the Conservative Party, including by future prime minister, Margaret Thatcher.

Additionally, Irish nationalist / republican terrorism was also equated with communism. There was, in fact, significant support among members of the IRA for Marxist ideology at various times during the organisation's different incarnations. The Times, during the 1970s, treated this real or perceived connection seriously as it printed an article with the headline 'Ulster Terrorism 'Communism Inspired'.

43 The following article from The Times highlights this::

‘A "highly intelligent, sophisticated and sinister organization", which, if not communist in inspiration, was akin to communism, was behind the present subversive activities in Northern Ireland, Mr Harry West, leader of the official Ulster Unionists and of the Unionist coalition in the Northern Ireland Convention, told a Monday Club meeting at Blackpool yesterday. "We have about 2 per cent of the population in Ulster engaged in violence and terrorism ", Mr West said "This figure includes not only the thugs who pull the trigger or plant the bombs but also the members of a highly sophisticated background organization which is arranging the campaign." When a questioner wanted to know how Mr West could associate that organization with communism, he replied: "We cannot be certain, because it is very difficult to get information about these people. But we know they are far more intelligent than the very often innocent people who do the work for them. It is inspired from communist sources." Mr West said the United Kingdom Government had special responsibility to see that the terrorists, in Ulster and Britain, did not force a break-up of the United Kingdom. If the potential consequences of such an event were fully realized it would cause great concern to not only the British Government and people but also to Nato, having regard to the important strategic position of Northern Ireland on the vital lifeline between Britain and North America. Mr West said there was no greater menace to the quality of life in his community than the scourge of terrorism. Conservatives must now be well aware that even London could be paralysed and its life brought to a halt, as had happened in Ulster: cities, through the bombs and the hoax bombs. "We owe it to present and future generations of our people to obliterate this menace from society ", he said. "The full force of law available to deal with the growing cancer of terrorism has not proved a sufficient deterrent. Therefore fresh initiatives and stronger legislation are urgently required." (The Times, 11th October 1975)
The level of media attention in relation to terrorism by 1975 was so significant that the Queen, in her annual televised Christmas speech, praised people who stood-up to terrorism. A *Times* article dated 27th December 1975 carried the headline: ‘The Queen Praises Resisters of Terrorism’. The increase in media coverage and related state actions over terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s was such that it resulted in the wrongful conviction of a number of Irish citizens, including the Birmingham six and the Guildford four. The then prime minister, Harold Wilson also claimed that terrorism was endemic to the times.

A *Times* headline from 7th October, 1975, reads: ‘The Wrong Way to Fight the Terrorist War’. This, of course, had parallels with the so-called, more recent US-led ‘War on Terror’.

By the 1980s, there were still calls for the death penalty to be given to convicted terrorists and a variety of civil liberties were challenged through internment, mass arrests, curfews and deportations to try to tackle terrorism by the British establishment. At the same time, there were also claims that there had been abuse of the Prevention of Terrorism Act and a *Times* article from 2nd January 1985 reports that two drunken Irishmen were arrested under the Act despite having no connection to terrorism.

Again parallels can be drawn with contemporary British home-grown jihadist terrorism figurations, in which many people have been wrongfully arrested, arrested and released without charge or even killed by the police as was the case when a Brazilian man was shot dead on the London Underground because police thought he was a suicide bomber. More recent examples involve alleged abuses of terrorism legislation when the partner of a Guardian journalist was held under terrorism laws apparently for no other reason than that he had been helping his journalist partner in the research and administration of news reports that exposed mass electronic surveillance by the United States and British security services.

To further highlight how far entrenched the problem of terrorism had become in the 1970s and 1980s in the British media and therefore, more widely in society, *The Times* began in 1985, running reports under the headline that simply read: ‘Terrorism’. This also highlights how impactful the word terrorism had become, as, alone, it was clearly deemed to be enough to attract readers’ attention. To add to this, the concept of terrorism had become so deep-rooted in British public life that *The Times* on 2nd March, 1985 ran an article discussing what it claimed to be the ‘essence of terrorism’.

The conflation of terrorism in Northern Ireland with the Soviet Union and other rebellious groups around the world, as mentioned earlier, follows the pattern that is being traced in this thesis. That is, as part of inter- and intra-state established-outsider figurations, the British establishment uses stigmatising language to try to delegitimise its enemies. That stigmatisation is, for the most, part framed as being an antithesis to civilisation. Of course, Britain’s enemies, including the Soviet Union and the IRA committed violent acts, often on a mass scale. As such, they are labelled as terroristic and barbaric.
Established-outsider figurations, double-binds and decivilising processes in the context of post-partition Ireland.

Examining the relationships between Britain, Ireland and Northern-Ireland we can see that the established-outsider figurations in this context, put simply, involved four main groups: the British establishment, Northern Irish loyalists, the Irish establishment and Northern Irish republicans. Of course, there were also relationships with other groups; for example those with the United States and the US government. But these tended, for the most part, to play a relatively less important role. Vertigans (2011: 130) talks about triple binds in this context, and argues that these were formed between the British state and loyalist and republican terrorist groups.

The situation in Northern Ireland, following partition, is related to the collapse of the British Empire. The relinquishing of control over the whole of Ireland can be understood as part of the process by which Britain was retreating from its former global dominance, and as such reflects a reduction in the power differentials between the British establishment and Irish Catholic republicans. However, the situation in Northern Ireland is more complex than that between the British establishment and Irish Catholic republicans due to the fact that a majority of Northern Ireland’s population were and are Protestant and loyalists. As such, established-outsider figurations in the context of the Northern Ireland conflict take on added complexity. For example, the power differentials between loyalist Protestants and nationalist/republican Catholics tended and tend to favour the former. Likewise the British establishment had greater power chances than both of these groups but tended to be more closely aligned to the loyalist Protestants for obvious reasons. Other parts of this figurational nexus include the Irish and United States governments, and Irish-Americans, among others. These groups had and have relationships with and sympathies for Northern Irish nationalist republicans, but also, at the same time some of them, at least, had relationships and sympathies with the British government.

However, the most prominent established-outsider figurations in the Northern Irish terrorism context were and are between nationalist republican Catholics, loyalist Protestants and the British and Irish governments. Although not totally uneven, the power ratios between the Northern Irish Protestants and Catholics were and are significant, with access to better political and economic positions tending to be in the hands of loyalist Protestants. Catholics were, accordingly, discriminated against and stigmatised more effectively than any counter-stigmatisation measure directed by them against Protestants.

Immediately following partition in 1921, it was the intention of the British government to create a united Ireland. However, opposition to this from Protestant loyalists and the subsequent ‘troubles’ put paid to that. Accordingly, until the late 1960s, Britain maintained a relatively hands-off approach to Northern Ireland, which, as mentioned, was governed, for the most part, by Protestant politicians. By 1969, violence between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland had escalated to such an extent that the British army was sent in to keep the peace. They were initially accepted by most people but soon, Catholics came to resent them as a result of indiscriminate arrests, shootings of Catholics and the introduction of internment. As mentioned, the British government, in terms of the
Northern Irish figuration, held the greatest power chances of the different groups involved. Its position tended to align them more closely with the regions loyalist Protestants and vice versa, simply because the latter saw themselves as British. The greater power chances of the province’s Protestants were, in part, a result of their relationship to the British establishment. In fact, some could be said to be part of the British establishment due to the fact that their political leaders sat and sit in the House of Commons. These greater power chances, among other things, meant that theirs and the British attempts to stigmatise and delegitimise Irish Catholic republicans were far more effective than any counter-stigmatisation attempts by the latter. In terms of terrorism, this can be shown by the fact that the IRA are the most recognisable terrorist group that were part of the Northern Irish figuration, despite the prominent role of loyalist groups in many violent attacks.

The power chances of Northern Irish loyalist Protestants in relation to the region’s republican Catholics is further enhanced by the history of relations in Ireland. Catholics, for centuries, were regarded as second-class citizens, had limited land rights compared to the island’s Protestants, and generally were denied access to higher status occupations and political office. This centuries-long established-outsider dynamic in Ireland as a whole, therefore, was crucial in determining the established-outsider dynamics in Northern Ireland following partition. Spanning back at least to the period of plantation in Ireland in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the figurational dynamics of established-outsider relations had often developed to such an extent that violent confrontation became a regular part of these relationships.

As in most violent confrontations between two or more groups, there tends to be a spiralling of the tensions between them. For example, in the case of Northern Ireland the separation of Protestant and Catholic communities, together with the unequal power chances in favour of Protestants, and as mentioned, attempts to stigmatise and delegitimise by both sides. Such processes can, and in this case, did spiral into greater and greater levels of violence, in which the fantasy content of the language used against the other increased. So, for example, all Catholic republicans were tarred with the terrorist brush by the British and loyalist Protestants. The same process was evident the other way around, and the British were regarded as occupiers and the real terrorists by the Catholic community. Such spiralling of fantasy-laden suspicions and violence was and is central to double-binds forming in this context.

The double-binds that the people in Northern Ireland, Britain and Ireland were entwined in the second half of the twentieth century, as mentioned, involved the deployment of stigmatising language against each other. Double-binds in this and other contexts, according to Elias (1987: 67) are reinforced because the deployment of stigmatising language against another group is emotionally satisfying in that it helps to elevate one group above the other. This stigmatising language tends to tar the whole stigmatised group with the characteristics of their most ‘anomic’ members (Elias: 1994: xix), and so in the case of the Northern Ireland context this would generally be their most violent members, or terrorists. At the same time, each group tends to ascribe to itself the qualities of its ‘best’ and most virtuous people. This helps to reaffirm the self-love that groups have for themselves.
Differences between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland were and remain entrenched in a number of ways including in the education system. Coohill (2000: 160), for example, points out that Protestant children were taught that Britain was “the good nation” rather than Ireland or Northern Ireland, so that children thought that goodness came from Britain. The Republic was seen by Protestants to be under the thumb of Rome and there was a fear that a united Ireland would succumb to such a fate. Differences were further compounded by the use of stigmatising language used by one group against the other. As well as often referring to the other as terrorists (as well as the British referring to predominantly republican groups as terrorists and, vice versa, republican Catholics trying to counter-stigmatise by calling Britain terrorist), both Protestants and Catholics had a number of derogatory words for each other. For example, Protestants called Catholics ‘Fenians’ and ‘Taig’, and Catholics called Protestants ‘Hun’ and ‘Prod’.

Such language and the spirals of violence in Northern Ireland help to show that there were significant decivilising trends in the province throughout the twentieth century. These spirals of violence were often referred to as terrorism by the British establishment. Additionally, as already discussed, the violence in Northern Ireland highlights the relatively weaker monopoly of violence that Britain had in Ireland at the time.

**UK non-Ireland-related ‘domestic terrorism’**

The problem of so-called ‘domestic terrorism’ in the United Kingdom other than that closely related to Ireland and Northern Ireland has, as has already been discussed, been a problem throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and was previously mainly attributed to trades unions and political reform groups. However, from around the 1970s onwards there were a not insignificant number of reports about other so-called terrorist groups including Scottish and Welsh nationalist terrorist groups, football hooligans and animal rights groups. Rebellious groups within Britain are no new thing and there have been many examples, in the past, of groups, especially from places such as Wales and Scotland that have sought independence from the rest of the United Kingdom. Correspondingly, there has been a variety of intra-state pressures throughout the United Kingdom for a considerable period. However, it is only within the past 200 years that rebellious groups have been labelled as terrorists as part of established-outsider figurations.

As I mentioned earlier, the label has broadened to encompass a wide range of groups. For example, a report in a 23rd June, 1970 article in *The Times*, referred to student protests at Keele University as terrorism. Some of the students were also called anarchists and super-anarchists. More common, albeit still relatively rare, have been reports related to nationalist terrorism within Britain. A *Times* article from 11th April 1970 reported that two members of the British Territorial Army were on trial for being members of a Welsh nationalist terrorist organisation called M.A.C. (*Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru*, or Movement for the Defence of Wales) and seeking to undertake acts of terrorism. According to the article a spokesman for the M.A.C said the following: ‘We believe in every form of violence. . . . We are prepared to kill. . . . We are dealing with a government which apparently sets aside logic and reason. We aim to make them sit up and take action.’ (*The Times*, 11th April 1970)
The M.A.C statement here highlights processes of counter-stigmatisation adopted by outsider groups as tends to be the case in terrorism figurations. The claim that the government sets aside logic and reason, seeks to delegitimise it to an extent. This kind of counter-stigmatisation is apparent among the four men who blew themselves up on London’s transport system on 7th July 2005 (the 7/7 bombers), whose leader, Mohammed Sidique Khan, said the following in a martyrdom video before blowing himself and several civilians up on the London Underground: ‘Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people all over the world’. This statement is a little stronger than the M.A.C. statement, however. But both are seeking to stigmatise the British state.

A *Times* article from the 15th October 1980, with the headline: ‘Six Guilty in Scottish Terrorism Plot’ highlights that there was what was called Scottish nationalist terrorism in Britain at the time.

The existence of domestic terrorist groups in Britain, whether those are left-wing, right-wing, nationalist or jihadist shows that the British state’s monopoly of violence is incomplete and fluid – that is, its strength tends, even in recent times, to ebb and flow. The existence of Welsh and Scottish nationalist terrorists as recently as the 1970s and 1980s seems strange, almost unbelievable to people today. However, their seeming disappearance suggests a strengthening of violence controls relative to nationalist Welsh and Scottish nationalist movements. This strengthening, however, is likely to be a combination of internal and external constraints. That is, effective surveillance and policing is likely to be working in conjunction with a rejection of violent means by Welsh and Scottish nationalist groups. There are likely to be similar issues at play in relation to Irish nationalist groups, as violence has reduced significantly in relation to the aims of Irish reunification. Of course, the British state monopoly of violence in relation to Northern Ireland has consistently been much weaker compared to the relationships with Wales and Scotland.

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The following article from *The Times* highlights this:

Six men were found guilty at Glasgow High Court last night of conspiracy to further, by criminal means, the purposes of the Scottish Socialist Republican League. The jury took more than nine hours to reach a verdict after a trial which lasted a month. Before the court were Peter Wardlaw, aged 32, and Alexander Ramsey, aged 29, both of no fixed address; Dominic McGrady, aged 30, and Thomas Bryan, aged 23, both of Easterhouse, Glasgow; Ewan Bickerton, aged 20, of Govan, Glasgow, David Hunter, aged 24, of Edinburgh and Leonard Reynolds, aged 36, of East Prestonpans. Mr Wardlaw and Mr Ramsey were found guilty of the full conspiracy charge which included firearms, ammunition, and explosives and theft and robbery. Mr Ramsey, Mr Hunter and Mr Wardlaw were found guilty of a raid on the Scottish Assembly Building in Edinburgh. The men will be sentenced today. During the past nine years there have been three important trials in Scotland involving militant nationalist groups who turned to terrorism. In March, 1972, heavy sentences were imposed on three members of the Workers’ Party of Scotland, a Maoist group who mingled political theory with armed robbery. Since then, five men have appeared in the “army of the Provisional Government” trial in 1975 when prison sentences totalling 34 years were imposed. The next year five men were accused at the “Tartan Army” trial after a series of explosives attacks on electricity pylons and an oil pipeline. Two were jailed for a total of seven years, two were freed and one was placed on probation. The story heard in the Glasgow High Court over the past month had an element of lethal farce running through it. The gang, who hoped to be heroes of an independent socialist republic in Scotland, almost blundered into the dock. Their list of calamities included an attempt to blow up the Scottish Assembly Building in Edinburgh on the anniversary of the repeal of the Devolution Bill. That attempt was abandoned after a “wild-looking man” began walking round their car parked on Carlton Hill and a bus carrying tourists drove by. They took their 40lb bomb back to Glasgow where part of it exploded, setting fire to the building. The investigation by firemen and police after the blaze uncovered the league’s activities. Other schemes also went awry. A bugging device planted at the offices of a firm dealing with explosives was fitted upside down. Instead of monitoring the calls it put the telephones out of order. During a £100,000 robbery of a post office van two of the gang got stuck inside the vehicle. In another raid on a post office two men escaped with £1,000, leaving behind £4,000. A police official described the group’s activities as largely a comedy of errors, although he said it was fortunate that the league had been caught in its infancy. (*The Times*, 15th October 1980)
The British state monopoly of violence, however, has more recently been challenged by the emergence of domestic jihadist terrorist groups, which have been able on more than one occasion to undertake violent terrorist attacks. This again shows the fluidity of the British state monopoly of violence. In this case it is clear that internal constraints among some Islamists, and external constraints have not been able to counter terrorist violence. Of course, the British state security services have claimed to have prevented many large-scale terrorist attacks by jihadist terrorists. At the same time, however, certain violence-controls on one level in Britain, and on other levels among Islamists are undermining the state monopoly of violence.

Likewise, on another level, attacks by far-right groups on Muslims are another example of how the state monopoly of violence is undermined. However, such attacks are rarely described as terrorism by established groups in Britain precisely because they do not target established groups but are rather attacks by one outsider group on another. It is sometimes regarded as the ‘uncivilised’ attacking the ‘uncivilised’.
Section 4: Micro-level processes and jihadist terrorism in Britain.

Chapter 12: The case of the 7/7 bombers

This chapter deals with how the issues discussed previously in this thesis are directly related to the problem of what is sometimes referred to as home-grown jihadist terrorism in Britain today. As mentioned in the previous chapter, there are a number of fluctuating fault-lines in Britain's domestic monopoly of violence that have been exposed as varying times by Irish, Scottish and Welsh nationalists, although most regularly and effectively by the former. This chapter examines the role played by Britain's inter- and intra-state rivalries, double-binds and functional democratisation in the emergence of British socialised jihadist terrorists, and how related issues of habitus and processes of identification are linked to these wider structural figurations and British jihadist terrorism.

In order to do this the case of the four 7th July, 2005 London (7/7) bombers is examined, especially with respect to how they, all of whom were British, might have come to attack the country of their origin. The focus on the 7/7 bombers complements the examination of wider social processes with more micro level processes. Accordingly, it develops the explanation of British terrorism figurations to focus on individuals who form part of smaller and larger interdependent groups, and therefore seeks to focus on human beings in the round.

Functional democratisation and British domestic jihadist terrorism

However, prior to what I have suggested above, it is necessary to provide more context to British-jihadist terrorist figurations. As discussed earlier, Britain's colonial expansion in the nineteenth century and early twentieth century, as part of inter-state rivalries with countries such as France and Russia, often involved violent conflict with the people Britain was seeking to colonise, and these outsider groups were sometimes referred to as terrorists. Many of these conflicts and colonising processes involved what were described earlier as civilising offensives. As such, the British establishment, as well as increasing its power potential abroad in order to counter the increasing power potential of its rivals, sought to colonise other peoples as part of attempts to civilise ‘savages’ and ‘barbarians’.

British colonialism included Muslim groups in places like the Palestinian Mandate, Yemen and pre-partition India (especially in Bengal) among others. In terms of the latter, Britain has a long-term relationship with Pakistan as its former colonial power. Tensions, at various levels and varying intensities, have always existed between Britain and Pakistan, which included rebellions during the colonial period. Therefore, the fact that three of the 7/7 bombers were of Pakistani origin needs to be partially understood in this context. Additionally, the reason why the families of the bombers moved to Britain was because of these former colonial links – they were clearly seeking a better economic future and Britain needed labour. This helps to explain why the bombers’ families were in Britain in the first place.
Processes of functional democratisation play a key role here. There have, for example, been processes of functional democratisation on the global level. For example, as discussed earlier, when the British Empire weakened, those territories which were colonised increased their relative power chances and rebelled, often violently. Such rebellions against ‘imperial’ powers or established groups still happen. For example, groups fight against the United States (Al Qaeda and the Taliban are obvious examples). Outsider groups fought against the Soviets (Afghanistan) and against Russia (Chechnya). They also fight against established groups in other countries. However, due to its much weaker influence and now lack of empire, fighting against the British is much less frequent than it was during the collapse of its empire. Accordingly, relative to the days of the British Empire, there has been a significant equalising of power chances between Britain and its former colonies.

As part of these processes, and in order to remain competitive with other comparable nation-states and maintain its position as what is now a second rank, rather than first rank country, Britain imported labour from its former colonies, including the Indian subcontinent. Processes of functional democratisation are at play here, too. The fact that immigrant labour is needed by the establishment in Britain to maintain their position relative to other nation-states is evidence of this. This, of course, is similar to the functional democratisation of the nineteenth century, whereby the British establishment became reliant on the industrial working classes for labour to help them compete with countries like France and Germany. In both cases, the increased reliance by established groups on outsider groups has reduced the power differentials between them to an extent.

The immigrants’ power chances, having moved to Britain, have also improved compared to their former fellow countrymen, who have remained in places like Pakistan, both in relation to the British and in terms of their standing in their comparable countries. That is, Britain tends to be a more equal society than countries like Pakistan, meaning that relative to other groups in their respective societies, the new immigrants have greater power chances in Britain than they had in Pakistan and elsewhere. The scope for functional democratisation and moving up the social scale is much greater in a country like Britain than it is in a country like Pakistan.

However, the immigrants when they first arrived were still outsiders in Britain and were close to the bottom of the social scale in terms of power chances. This, of course, was partly due to the short period they had lived in Britain. Everyone was a stranger, including their fellow countrymen, and they had not had the chance to develop the relationships that would allow them to increase their power chances relative to the rest of Britain.

Second and third generation immigrants, including those whose parents and grandparents were from the Indian subcontinent have, in many respects, greater power chances than their parents. The fact that their communities have been in Britain longer means they have had the chance to form more complex and stable relationships than was the case when their parents first arrived in Britain. In addition, and related to this, they are likely to be able to speak better English than their parents and grandparents, meaning they can develop more complex relationships outside of their immediate communities. This means there is the potential for a shift towards increased functional
democratisation as the power chances of second and third generation immigrants are potentially greater than those of their parents and grandparents. At the same time, second and third generation immigrants are still members of outsider groups and still have relatively few power chances, compared to many other groups in Britain.

However, there is a fault-line here, between second and third generation immigrants, their parents and grandparents, and their relationships with wider British society. The latest generation is standing in a gap between their parents’ and grandparents’ communities and the more hyper-individualised society that has developed to a large extent in countries like Britain. These two societies are in many ways at odds with each other. On the one hand, traditional communities (including those in Britain) have a greater emphasis on we-identity, and on the other, more hyper-individualised societies that have started to come to greater prominence over the past 35 years place far greater emphasis on I-identities.

Inter-state processes, functional democratisation and the development of jihadist terrorism in Britain

Some second and third generation immigrants also have opportunities to increase their power chances and status through global jihadist groups, such as Al Qaeda. If we return to the related issue of inter-state processes it becomes apparent that such groups have developed, in part, and even been encouraged, as part of processes related to inter-state conflicts and competition. For example, according to Curtis (2010: 222) as Britain has sought to maintain its power potential across the world, or at least slow its decline somewhat, it has created strategic relationships with countries that have encouraged and or stimulated terrorism. Its relationship with Saudi Arabia is a case in point. It has maintained that relationship due to Saudi Arabia’s position as the world’s largest oil producer. However, Saudi Arabia has been widely reported as providing funding for jihadist terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda. A 2010 WikiLeaks cable by Hilary Clinton (The Guardian, 2010), the then US Secretary of State, said that ‘donors in Saudi Arabia constitute the most significant source of funding to Sunni terrorist groups worldwide.’ Britain also has a strategic relationship with Pakistan, and that country is widely believed to provide significant support to a number of terrorist groups, including affiliates of Al Qaeda. Additionally, there is the support that the US, Britain and others provided to jihadist fighters during the Afghan war with the Soviet Union. Similar relationships are apparent in Libya and Syria in 2012 and 2013.

There are also important issues with respect to relationships that the British state has with British-based jihadists as part of what is called ‘the covenant of security’ by some radical Muslims, whereby there is agreement that the British establishment would not interfere too heavily with jihadist terrorists in Britain, as long as they do not attack the country. As a result, many jihadists set up in Britain to fight battles abroad, and domestic jihadists have for many years travelled abroad to fight jihad. As I mentioned, the security services allowed this to happen for a long time, as long as Britain itself was not attacked. This is partly because these groups could help in Britain’s strategic aims, such as defeat of the Serbs in Bosnia during the Bosnian war in the 1990s, and the undermining of certain
governments, such as those in Libya, Syria and Iraq, which Britain regards or used to regard as enemies. Due to this, London has sometimes been referred to as Londonistan (Curtis, 2010; Phillips, 2006). Curtis (2010: 222) discusses this and Britain’s relationships to Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. He writes:

‘...Britain continued to tolerate the phenomenon of Londonistan, including the presence of Bin Laden associates who publicised the al-Qaida declarations around the world. Indeed, London had by now become, along with Taliban controlled Afghanistan which housed Bin Laden, the principal administrative centre for the global jihad, where the authorities were, at the very least, turning a blind eye to terrorist activities launched from their soil... Whitehall also continued its strong backing for the two most significant sponsors of radical Islam: Pakistan, while it promoted the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the terrorist cause in Kashmir and its surge in central Asia; and Saudi Arabia, which remained the largest financier of the Islamist cause worldwide.

Moreover, Britain continued to collude directly with radical Islamists, principally in Libya and Kosovo, and to a limited degree in Iraq... As it had done historically, militant Islam proved useful to British planners in countering nationalist regimes – Qaddafi in Libya, Milosevic in Yugoslavia and Saddam in Iraq. This phase in Britain’s collaboration with Islamist forces occurred while the terrorist threat rose to challenge overall Western interests, showing how pragmatic elites continued to be. At stake, were key issues for British foreign policy – the installation of favoured regimes to rule over major oil resources in Libya and Iraq, and the desire to see pro-Western government in the heart of Eastern Europe to aid the expansion of the European Union and NATO.’ (Curtis, 2010: 223-224)

We can see from the points made by Curtis that home-grown jihadist terrorism has developed as part of wider inter-state concerns of the British establishment. That is, Britain’s strategic relationships with countries like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have helped to legitimise the support that those countries have had of jihadist terrorism. Additionally, the relationship that the British establishment has had with British-based and British-born jihadist terrorists in order to further its strategic interests abroad, has helped to further encourage the development of jihadist terrorism both in Britain and abroad. We can see here the close connection between inter- and intra-state processes. That is, Britain’s inter-state relations have been instrumental in contributing to the development and rise of jihadist terrorism in Britain and intra-state conflict that has included attacking Britain and many other planned attacks against that country.

According to Curtis (2010: 257-258), following the 11th September, 2001 attacks on the United States, the then Blair Labour government introduced stricter terrorism legislation, in the process, outlawing a number of organisations and threatening the covenant of security. In fact, Curtis (2010: 258) argues that the covenant was not ended and nor did the British government end its green light policy regarding terrorist attacks abroad. He (2010: 258) even argues that this approach contributed to the bomb attacks on the London transport system on 7th July 2005:

‘In 2004, for example, MI5, monitoring of some of the later London bombers, discovered them talking about jihadi activity in Pakistan and support for the Taliban’, but since they were not discussing terrorist attacks in Britain, MI5 left them alone; the standard policy that was a crucial part of the covenant. Had MI5 decided to act against these overseas activities, it is possible that 7/7 could have been prevented.’ (Curtis, 2010: 258).

The historical background of domestic jihadist terrorist groups in Britain is complex and, as has been shown, is closely related to global figurational dynamics such as those that formed part of the British Empire, as well as Britain’s attempts to stave off its loss of power potential relative to other nation-states, such as the United States, the Soviet Union and Asian countries such as China and India, among others. In order to do this, as Curtis points out, the British government has supported, and is
still supporting jihadist terrorists groups, and this has contributed to attacks against Britain on British soil.

Britain’s tolerance of jihadist terrorists, or support for countries that fund such groups is part of its attempts to hold onto its mythical golden-aged we-image, as one of the world’s supreme powers. Accordingly, we can see here that established group fantasies in Britain about this ‘golden age’ have contributed to the development of jihadist groups in Britain, and inadvertently, to attacks on Britain and its interests. As such, the fantasy among many established groups that Britain is still a first rank country has played a part in the development of recent terrorism figurations. These, of course, are related to earlier figurations during which Britain was a first rank country, as outlined here in the section on the break-up of the British Empire. That is, the processes by which the 7/7 bombers came to be in Britain in the first place were closely related to the development and subsequent break-up of the British Empire.

In addition, attempts by the British establishment to maintain Britain’s global prominence as part of the desire to hold on to the belief that Britain is still a first rank country, can be seen in its participation as the main partner of the United States in recent civilising offensives. For example, attempts to democratise Iraq and Afghanistan continue the process of civilising offensives across the globe. This has also contributed to the development of home-grown jihadist terrorism in Britain. For example, the 7/7 bombers and others have cited Britain’s roles in these conflicts as motivation for their planned attacks on Britain.

Functional democratisation and we-I balances

As well as the contribution that Britain’s inter-state rivalries have made towards the development of jihadist terrorism in Britain, processes of functional democratisation, as mentioned, have also played a crucial role in this process, and are related specifically to we-I balances. Accordingly, those who become jihadist terrorists and who were socialised in Britain face a choice. This choice is relative to their being in contemporary Britain, and is symptomatic of societies in which identities are pushed towards the ‘I’ on the ‘I-we’ continuum. The choice they face, in simplistic terms, could be greater involvement in their local communities’ we-group, and therefore, also to their parents’/families’ we-group. But this is probably unfulfilling for them, particularly in the light of pressures to break away from such groups and forms of identity in Britain more generally. This choice clashes with the parts of their identity that are ‘Westernised’ through living in Western figurations.

Third generation British Muslims could reject further their parents’ and local communities’ we-identities in favour of becoming more ‘Westernised’/individualised. However, access to status in this context would be difficult given their already low status and various associated blockages to status, such as various forms of racism and the vagaries of the British class system, which at times might allow for greater social mobility and at others may mean reduced social mobility, such as is the case now. This route would also clash with their family we-identities, which may contribute further to a rejection of more ‘Westernised’ identities.
A third choice is Islamism. It offers meaning directly related to their outsider status and a potential way out of their low status. The same is true of violent jihadism. Both can offer greater status, meaning and excitement. Such a move involves a shift towards a we-identity, which can be experienced as more fulfilling and meaningful than shifts towards i-identities. In addition, this identity crosses over with a number of aspects of their families we-identity, such as Islam, Pakistan and so on. It also crosses over with individualised i-identities. The fact that they have more scope to determine their identities in the first place, nevertheless, is something that is common to more highly individualised societies such as Britain than it is to less highly individualised societies such as Pakistan.

This scope to determine, or choose, however, is not to be confused with a ‘rational choice’ or rational choice theory. Of course people make choices in life but they are not made as a person independent of all other people, taking measurements of what he or she can gain from a particular choice. Choices are only partially made by way of self-determination, and that self-determination is influenced by the particular figurational conditions in which a person exists. In fact, the idea of self-determination is simply a reflection of the figurations in which identities that, on balance, place a greater emphasis on i-identities than we-identities. The choices made by those people who are socialised in Britain and become jihadist terrorists are determined by the structure of the figurations of which they form a part. Under different figurational conditions, the same kinds of choices do not exist. For example, a peasant living in Pakistan’s tribal region, which borders Afghanistan, does not have the opportunity to chose a highly individualised Western-style of identity. He or she is bound by the figurational structures of his or her own society.

We can see, therefore, that through processes of functional democratisation, third generation Muslims in Britain are able to make choices about whether or not they identify more closely with groups that place a greater emphasis on either ‘i’ or ‘we’ identity. In terms of the latter, that choice often boils down to the same groups as their parents or grandparents, or Islamist groups.

**Established-outsider figurations, we-I balances, habitus and jihadist terrorism in Britain.**

One of the central themes of this thesis has been to show how established-outsider figurations are at the heart of the structural relations between groups that give rise to terrorism and groups and individuals who are labelled as terrorists. Most of the focus, so far, has been on large-scale group level processes. However, as is evident from the first part of this chapter, these processes and relationships work and are interdependent with smaller-scale and individual processes and relationships. In order to uncover some of these smaller-scale terrorism figurations the next part of this chapter goes into greater detail on the processes and relationships involved when four young men (the 7/7 bombers) blew themselves up on London’s transport system on 7th July 2005, killing 52 people and injuring more than 700 in the process.

*Interview request denied*
The case study on the 7/7 bombers replaces a previous proposal to interview around 20 people convicted and imprisoned for terrorism offences, related closely to their ‘jihadist’ beliefs. However, access to imprisoned terrorists was denied by the National Offender Management Service (NOMS).

The fact that NOMS denied my request to interview imprisoned terrorists is not sociologically uninteresting and is relevant to this thesis. It appears that access to groups that the state has labelled and imprisoned as terrorists is extremely limited. This suggests that only research sanctioned by the state is allowed on these groups, which is likely to adhere closely to narrowly determined and defined notions of what terrorism is and what ‘causes’ terrorism. That is, the vetting process for access to imprisoned terrorists is based solely on what the state sees as research that is relevant to its interests. Of course, this short-sighted approach may not be in the state’s interests at all, since providing greater access to imprisoned terrorists may help to develop knowledge that has a greater degree of reality congruence than the limited access currently allowed by the British government.

Despite this setback, I decided that a case study of a group of terrorists – the 7/7 bombers – who are in many ways similar to those who were sought for the interviews, would be a suitable alternative. There are a number of reasons for choosing this group, as opposed to others. For example, there has already been a significant amount written about them and, so, source material is relatively easy to find. In addition, this group, taking normative conceptions of terrorism into account, are one of the few to have been successful with their terrorist activity. Many of those who have been imprisoned were prevented from committing their terrorist plans by the British state and so the tag of terrorist, in a normative sense, is a little more dubious.

The empirical evidence for this section is drawn from a variety of sources, including newspaper and magazine reports and articles, a report entitled *Islamist Terrorism: The British Connections* by the right-wing think tank, the Centre for Social Cohesion, the British government’s *Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005* (2006), and so-called ‘martyrdom’ videos of the bombers’ reasons for the attacks. The aims of using these sources were to generate data that as closely as possible resembled data that could have been generated from interviewing imprisoned jihadist terrorists. Of course, such sources would never be able to recreate data exactly the same as if the interviews had been allowed and were undertaken. However, they do allow for a number of questions to be answered, albeit in ways that would differ from their being answered as part of interviews. As such, a number of core questions were asked while sifting through the data. These questions involved seeking information on the 7/7 bombers’ backgrounds, identities, approaches to Islam, the West and terrorism.

**The 7/7 bombings and the bombers’ backgrounds.**

Related problems of identity, ‘we-I’ balances and habitus played a significant part in the development of the four men who blew themselves up on the London transport system on 7th July 2005, killing themselves and 52 other people. These processes contributed to their terrorism, and, as already
documented were, at the same time, related to established-outsider and inter- and intra-state
figurations that have played a part in the development of terrorism in Britain more generally.

It is widely believed that the leader of the 7/7 bombers was Mohammed Sidique Khan who was aged
30 when he blew himself up on the Circle line near the Edgware road on London’s underground
network. Khan, like two of the other bombers – 22-year old Shezad Tanweer (who blew himself up on
the Circle line near Aldgate (London), and 18-year old Hasib Mir Hussain (who blew himself up on the
top deck of a double-decker bus in Tavistock Square, London) – was born in the Leeds area of
England. All three had parents who had emigrated to the Leeds area from Pakistan. Both Khan and
Tanweer grew up in an area on the outskirts of Leeds, called Beeston, and Hussain in a neighbouring
area, called Holbeck.

Khan’s background

Khan was the youngest of six children and came from what seems on the outside to be a relatively
typical Pakistani immigrant family. Through interviews with his brother, by the journalist Shiv Malik
(2007) for Prospect magazine it turns out that the family originally came from Rawalpindi, which is in
the Punjab. This, says Malik, means that the family would have stood out to some degree in Beeston,
as the majority of Pakistani immigrants there were Mirpuri. In this sense Khan’s family were outsiders
among an already outsider group. This may have had implications for the development of Khan’s we-
identity, in that such an identity may have been subject to even greater outsider status than many of
the other members of his community.

Nonetheless, growing up in Beeston, Khan had what is considered to be a fairly typical existence,
which included occasionally getting into fights, and some drug, tobacco and alcohol use. According to
Malik (2007), he mixed with both Asian and white friends. As a child, he attended Friday prayers and
adhered to Islamic practices such as Ramadan. However, in the mid-1990s, he is said to have started
to become involved in Islamic fundamentalism and became a Wahhabi, which is a highly conservative
form of fundamentalist Islam, which seeks a return to Medieval fundamentals of the religion. Khan
was also part of a gang called the Mullah Boys who were known for trying to clean up their area,
which had a severe drug problem, sometimes by kidnapping addicts and forcing them to go ‘cold
turkey’.

In terms of his occupation, Khan was unemployed between 2004 and the bombings. However, prior to
that he had worked at Hillside Primary School as a learning mentor for children with special needs. He
had also volunteered as a community youth mentor in Beeston. This involved acting as a ‘detached
mentor’ whereby he would spend three hours a night talking to kids in the area about their problems.
He came to be highly thought of as a local youth worker. In another previous role, he had worked as
an administrative assistant for the Benefits Agency.

His academic background was relatively unremarkable. He had a 2:2 degree in business studies from
Leeds Metropolitan University. At school, he was said to have been quiet and studious and sometimes
bullied. Khan was keen on keeping fit and undertook various physical exercises, including weight
training and outdoor pursuits. Some of this, at least, was with the other bombers. For example, Khan,
Tanweer and Hussain each worked-out at a local gym nicknamed the al-Qaeda gym. In general, he is
said to have been a hard working, professional, kind, patient and popular individual. He was also
considered to be a father figure to some of the more disadvantaged people he had worked with in the
Beeston area.

Tanweer's background

Tanweer was the second oldest of four children and the oldest boy among his siblings. Like Khan, at
the time of the bombings he was unemployed. Prior to that, he had worked in his father's fish and chip
shop. Tanweer was said to have been academically quite gifted and studied sports science at Leeds
Metropolitan University for which he received an HND. He left after two years, however, which meant
he failed to achieve a degree. He was also said to have been a keen sportsman and it is claimed he
was in particular, a gifted cricketer and athlete. As a teenager, according to the government's Report
of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005, published in 2006, Tanweer is said
to have had a balanced life. He was reported as being calm, modest and mature, and popular. He
owned a red Mercedes and was keen on his appearance, wearing designer clothes. It is claimed that
he began to be more religiously observant aged 16/17. Nevertheless, he was also a member of the
Mullah Crew, and is also said to have fought gang battles with groups of white youths.

Hussain's background

Hussain was the youngest of four children, and his family was said to be close knit. He lived with his
24-year old brother, Imran, and his sister-in-law, and had several other family members living close
by. He did not have a job, however. This was partially due to his age (18). On leaving school, he
studied at college for a business diploma until just before the bombings. He is said to have not been
particularly gifted academically and achieved relatively low grades at GCSE. He is also said to have
been keen on sport but again not very gifted. There were reports in The Guardian on the 14th of July
2005 that Hussain 'went a bit wild' and started drinking after leaving school. He frequented many of
the same places as Khan and Tanweer, including the al-Qaeda gym and a local Islamic bookshop.

Lindsay's background

Of the four bombers, Germaine Lindsay was the most distinct, being the only convert to Islam of the
four bombers. He was also the only one who did not come from the Beeston area. Instead, he was
born in Jamaica but moved to Huddersfield with his then 20-year old mother. His father remained in
Jamaica. According to the Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th
July 2005, (2006) his first stepfather treated him harshly but he had a better relationship with his
second stepfather. His mother moved to the US to live with another man in 2002 when that
relationship ended. He had two younger stepsisters.
Lindsay was unemployed at the time of the bombings but had worked as a carpet fitter until early 2005 – a job he obtained through his brother-in-law. He married a white convert to Islam in 2002 and moved from Huddersfield to Aylesbury in 2003 to be closer to his wife’s family. Their first child was born in April 2004. Lindsay’s mother converted to Islam in 2000 and Lindsay quickly followed suit. At school, Lindsay is said to have been bright, successful academically and good at sport. However, on leaving he lived on benefits, did occasional odd jobs, selling mobile phones and Islamic books. He is also said to have been artistic and musical, and, as a teenager, became interested in martial arts and kickboxing. It is believed that he may have met Khan through the latter’s Islamic activities in the Huddersfield area. The two are said to have become close associates by the second half of 2004.

Just by examining some of the very basic background information on the 7/7 bombers, a few observations can be made. For example, there was nothing out of the ordinary about the bombers, apart from their embracing of Islamism in their mid- to late-teens, and even this is not remarkable. In addition, it is clear that at least some of them sought higher status and more meaning in their lives, as three of them, apart from Lindsay attended university. Nevertheless, none were particularly successful at moving significantly from their relatively low social status positions. Accordingly, Islamism would have probably been appealing to them as a way of improving their individual and group status.

The 7/7 bombers and processes of identification: we-I, we-they balances

Each of the 7/7 bombers had, in the final instance, identities that were peculiar to Britain. That is, they had British identities, even if they rejected what they regarded as British values. Without perhaps being fully aware of it, it would have been totally impossible to get away from such identities, for the simple reason that they had all spent most of their lives in Britain and were therefore moulded and constrained by particular figurations that are and were unique to Britain. Their identities, formed within and as part of these figurations, which in following the thread of this thesis included a myriad of established-outsider relations. The bombers developed particular we-groups, we-identities and I-identities, which were all relevant to their terrorist actions. These identities are central to the processes of radicalisation that they became involved in.

Family identity

As already mentioned, Mohammed Sidique Khan was widely regarded as having been the leader of the bombers. He has also been the one most widely researched. This obviously means that there are more data available on him, and accordingly, the discussion here tends to focus more on him than on the other bombers.

As mentioned, the fact that the Khan family is Punjabi and not Mirpuri is significant for the fact that, in terms of established-outsider figurations, it is probable that they were, to some extent, an outsider group within an outsider group. This obviously adds an additional layer of complexity to Khan’s we-identity. Of course, there is no direct relation to this and his becoming a terrorist but it may account for the way some of his and his family’s relations developed in the immediate Beeston community. That
development may have, in one or two ways, been distinct from Mirpuri immigrants. Nevertheless, there is not the space here to delve deeper into this aspect of Khan’s identity, so it must be enough to note that it is likely to have played a part, even if that was only a relatively small part, in the formation of his we- and I-identities, and that perhaps Khan felt that in some ways that he stood outside both mainstream British society and the immigrant Mirpuri community.

Other than this difference, Khan’s family was a fairly traditional Pakistani family. His two older brothers had arranged marriages and jobs in the Leeds area that were typical of first and second generation Pakistani immigrants. The family practised a traditional form of Islam common to the Indian subcontinent and one that is heavily influenced by Sufism, called Barelvi. As such, Khan’s identity would have been affected by this background, and not least by the fact that he considered himself a Muslim. However, he rejected much of these traditional beliefs and roles that are typical to his family and other Pakistani immigrants in the Leeds and other areas. According to Malik (2007), in an attempt to try to reconnect Khan to his family’s more traditional Barelvi beliefs and a more traditional role in the British Pakistani community, his family sought help from their preacher but to no avail. As a last resort, his father moved to Nottingham and tried to get his son to follow. He refused and contact between them ended. A few years earlier, Khan’s mother had died, which would certainly have affected his family’s dynamics, and may have changed how he identified with them in terms of his we-group.

Tanweer and Hussain also firmly rejected these same traditional roles that their families ascribed to. Both of them were still living with their parents at the time of the bombings. This, of course, would have had a significant effect on their identities. At home, it is likely that they both had strong family we-identities in terms of the roles they had in their respective families. It is clear, however, that these roles – these we and related I-identities – would not have been dominant enough to have encouraged them to seek meaning in more socially acceptable identities such as through work or indeed through their families.

The case of Lindsay is in some respects similar and in others a little different. He was not from a family that emigrated from Pakistan, was not originally a Muslim, and lived in a different area – Huddersfield – as a child. He was, of course an immigrant. As was mentioned earlier, he emigrated from Jamaica with his mother when he was a year old. Despite having been brought up in Britain, he would still have been a relative outsider, partially because of his immigrant status and partially because of the colour of his skin and various forms of prejudice based on skin colour in Britain. The same, of course, would have been true of the other, Pakistani bombers.

Lindsay’s family we-identity was clearly complex and had been severely disrupted. The facts that his father remained in Jamaica when he emigrated to Britain, that his first stepfather treated him harshly, and that he had a second stepfather, and that his mother moved to the United States with another man, are all likely to have had a profound effect on his family-based we-identity. It may well have been the case that such a complex set of relationships may have weakened or confused his family-based we-identity. The fact that he converted to Islam shortly after his mother did is telling, however. It suggests that there was at least a degree of closeness to his mother and therefore, this relationship
formed a significant part of his family we-identity. A further significant point about Lindsay is that his widow, Samantha Lewthwaite, was, more recently, accused and suspected of carrying out terrorism in Kenya. She has been given the nickname ‘White Widow’ by the media. This suggests that Lindsay’s family we-identity, albeit the part of his family that is the same generation as him, was closely linked to jihadist terrorism.

The further development of the bombers’ British identities

According to Malik (2007), Khan had a relatively typical upbringing for a young Pakistani whose family had emigrated to Britain. Most of the children in his first school were white and he is said to have integrated well. His nickname there was Sid. His second school had a larger proportion of Pakistani children but Khan is said to have still had a number of white, as well as Asian friends. In addition, he is said to have been a little rebellious. For example, it is claimed (Mailk, 2007) that he would often smoke cigarettes behind the school gym. The government’s Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005 (2006) claims that Khan had told people that, as a youth, he had got into fights and that associates of his claim that he undertook some drug and alcohol use. These experiences are fairly typical of teenagers growing up in Britain, and are often claimed to form part of the processes whereby adolescents experiment with seeking more concrete I- and we-identities. It must be assumed, for example, that Khan undertook his drinking and drug taking with others, which would have formed part of one of his we-groups at the time, albeit possibly a somewhat transient we-group. It was in the mid-1990s, though, that Khan became involved with the Mullah Boys gang, and started to express an interest in Wahhabism. Of course, these would have formed we-groups for Khan as well.

Tanweer also became a member of the Mullah Boys, after having been a fairly typical youth. The government’s Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005 (2006) claims that he had a ‘balanced life’ as a teenager and was ‘calm, friendly, mature and modest’, as well as being popular. In addition, he owned a red Mercedes bought for him by his father, and is said to have spent time and money on his appearance, being keen on designer clothes. Like Khan, he was also involved in low level violence as a youth. According to The Independent (2005), following an incident in which the windows of his father’s chip shop were smashed he became involved in racial violence between whites and Asians, during which a white boy died. Tanweer was said to have not been involved in the incident but was cautioned for public order offences. It was when he was around 16/17 that he started to become involved with radical Islam, which, like Khan, became a significant we-group for him.

Hussain also had a rather typical British teenage identity. He was said to be quiet and unremarkable at school. On leaving, it has been suggested that he started drinking alcohol and behaving wildly.

Khan, Tanweer and Hussain were all keen on sports first developed in Britain, including football and especially cricket. Of course, cricket is the national sport of Pakistan and is therefore, closely related to the colonial past between Britain and countries like Pakistan. However, this did not detract from
their participation in it as a leisure activity even when they had rejected what they regarded as other parts of their British identities.

As already discussed, Lindsay was also good at sports. His background was not unusual either. However, he is said to have begun hanging around with troublemakers at school and it was also during this period that he started to become involved in radical Islam. Like the others, it is clear that this formed a crucial part of his we-identity.

The development of radical Islamic identities

As also mentioned, Lindsay converted to Islam at the same time as his mother did. At school, he got into trouble for handing out leaflets that supported Al Qaeda. He was also quick to learn Arabic and *The Quran* at his local mosque. Nevertheless, he is also said to have been heavily influenced by the radical preacher, Abdallah al Faisal, who is now serving a prison sentence for soliciting murder and is also of Jamaican origin. Unlike the others, Lindsay only really rejected what he saw as his British identity when he turned to radical Islam. The others did this but also rejected the Islam of their parents and most of their local communities. As a convert, Lindsay did not have to reject ‘traditional’ Islamic beliefs in the way the others did, which included the associated rejection of their own families and to some extent their identities based on their family relationships, and therefore, traditional Islam.

One of the most significant ways in which Khan expressed his rejection of the traditional Islamic and Pakistani values of his family was when he refused an arranged marriage and instead chose his own wife – a British Deobandi Muslim of Indian origin, whom he met at Leeds Metropolitan University. Khan married his wife, Hasina Patel, during the period in which he had converted to Wahhabism. His move to this more fundamentalist form of Islam was, according to his brother (Malik 2007), in part related to the fact that he did not think the area’s traditional mosque had anything to offer him, and that the people who ran the mosque had no idea of how to connect to the younger generation of British-born Muslims. In fact, all of their sermons and publications were either in Arabic or Urdu. Wahhabi publications, on the other hand, were printed in English and so were able to immediately connect with second generation British Muslims. According to Malik (2007), Khan’s family had known he was potentially a violent radical for at least six years. This suggests that he had joined like-minded Muslims in at least the late 1990s. We can see here that access to a meaningful we-identity was difficult in his parents’ community. Khan, being ‘Westernised’, clearly found it difficult to relate to the area’s traditional mosque, which held sermons in Urdu or Arabic. Clearly, Wahhabi publications in English provided a much easier route to helping Khan develop a meaningful we-identity, as would have been the case with the other bombers.

Khan, along with Tanweer and Hussain, spent a large part of their social life around mosques, youth clubs, gyms and a local Islamic bookshop. There was a gym – the Al Qaeda gym – and youth club under one mosque in which Khan lectured and worked-out. The local bookshop, which sold books, tapes and DVDs, was also used to give lectures on Islam. Of course, these places allowed the development of identities and statuses among Khan, Tanweer, Hussain and whoever else frequented
them. There is conflicting evidence as to whether or not extremist lectures took place in them or extremist material such as DVDs and books were viewed or sold in them. But the fact that people developed their identities in them is of far greater relevance.

Malik (2007) goes on to say that the fact that the majority of Pakistani immigrants to the Beeston area in Leeds were from a rural part of Kashmir called Mirpur is significant. Accordingly, they relied on tribal connections and structures rather than the apparatus of the state in Pakistan to perform many social functions, including arranged marriages, which helped with the cohesiveness of their tribes. This culture was transferred over to Britain and again helped with the cohesiveness of the immigrants. The rejection of these traditional practices by people like Khan, in fact, demonstrates an identity that, in this respect, is British and Western rather than more traditionally Pakistani. Additionally, because Khan and others chose whom they married out of love also suggests that they had a more individualistic identity – he married for himself rather than his family. This shows a clear shift towards the ‘I’ in the we-I balance. Choosing his own brand of Islam – Wahhabism – is another example of this shift towards an I-identity and, therefore, what is generally regarded as more of a Western identity. Nevertheless, Khan and the other members of the Mullah Boys who chose whom they married still married Muslims, who were often converts. As such, they were choosing a different we-identity from that of their parents as well. The fact that they could choose a we-identity again demonstrates a shift towards an I-identity relative to their parents’ generation, however. That is, the figurational structures in Britain and other complex societies, as opposed to simpler societies, give individuals freer rein to choose their we-groups and develop stronger I-identities. Additionally, that there is a global Islamic identity to choose as well is telling and is clearly a demonstration of the increasing complexity of global interdependence between Muslims on the one hand and Britain, the West and the rest of the world on the other. Khan’s we-identity and I-identity, therefore, would have consisted of a combination of his Pakistani, Muslim background and his Westernised British background. Nonetheless, ultimately such identities are distinctly British.

In terms of Tanweer’s Muslim identity, he, like Khan, clearly rejected the Islam of his parents’ generation for a more extreme, global form of the religion. There is conflicting evidence as to when he began to take religion seriously. However, according to the government’s Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005 (2006), he is said to have done this from an early age but not shown signs of extremism. The report points out that, in 2002, Tanweer began to show an even greater dedication to religion, dropped out of university and spent more time observing his religion, including attending a local religious school. This appears to show that, in developing his we-identity, Tanweer rejected the possibility of creating a meaningful identity through mainstream education and university, in favour of developing a meaningful identity through religion.

The report states that Hussain undertook a Hajj visit to Saudi Arabia with his parents in 2002. After this it is claimed that he started observing his religion more fervently, including the wearing of traditional clothing. In addition, he is said to have been open about his support for Al Qaeda, writing ‘Al Qaeda No Limits’ on his school RE book and claiming the 9/11 bombers were martyrs. Again, it is clear that Hussain, at a relatively early age, began to find meaning in the development of a radical Islamist identity.
Radical Islamic soldier identities and close-knit group identities.

The fact that all four of the bombers developed radical Islamic identities that was in part a conscious effort to reject mainstream British or Western identities and at the same time rejected more traditional Islamic identities, especially those associated with their parents in the case of Khan, Tanweer and Hussain is significant. However, their identities went further than that. They, in fact, developed identities as Islamic soldiers fighting for their we-groups against what they saw as outsider enemies – the West, including their own country, Britain, and those associated with other forms of Islam. At the same time, they developed the bonds and relationships of their relatively tight-knit, immediate we-group, which include the four bombers and other violence-inspired ‘jihadists’.

The period in which Khan and Tanweer were members of the Mullah Boys and began to practice more fundamentalist forms of Islam can be seen as distinct points in which their processes of identification moved away from Western identities and traditional Muslim and Pakistani identities and towards identifying with the global Islamist movement. In all four cases, they not only identified with a global Islamist movement but with one that regarded the rest of the world, especially the West and certain other Muslim countries as the enemy. Accordingly, the four bombers started to identify themselves as liberators and soldiers of their people. In this context, however, they also identified more closely with each other. As mentioned, most research, official reports and newspaper coverage suggests that Khan was the leader of the four bombers, with Tanweer as his right-hand man. In fact the two, according to Prospect (2007), had known each other since childhood. Khan would have identified himself as a leader of his small we-group. He was also said to have mentored both Tanweer and Hussain, and, in fact, both he and Hussain visited Pakistan together in 2004 and 2005.

Khan, Tanweer and Hussain, according to the government’s Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005 (2006) spent a lot of time together at each others’ houses and were, from time to time, seen with Lindsay. There are claims that Khan and Tanweer attended terrorist training camps in Pakistan and the group also undertook outdoor pursuits in Britain together, such as white water rafting and other ‘bonding’ exercises that involved physical exertion.

This we-group bonding is highly significant in terms of what the four terrorists were prepared to do for each other. The anthropologist, Scott Atran (2010: 297), argues that individuals will make sacrifices for and fight for their we-group, especially if the stakes include ‘territory, vital resources and membership’. He argues:

‘Parochial altruism is a basic aspect of the evolutionary imperative of human populations to “cooperate to compete.” In all cultures, parochially altruistic acts are considered noble and good. Though what is noble and good in one culture and time can be evil and ignoble for another. Individuals within a society may also differ widely in their appreciation of the value of an altruistic act, such as suicide bombing or the struggle for civil human rights.’ (Atran, 2010: 298).

Atran (2010: 303) goes on to argue that altruistic behaviour for kin groups can be extended to ‘imagined kin’ groups, which helps to facilitate large-scale sacrifice and cooperation, as is the case with jihadist terrorists sacrificing themselves for the global Islamic cause. Critical to jihadist terrorist
groups, for Atran, are the fact that they are small-scale and therefore, the close-knit friendships that develop among members which, he says, maximise trust and cooperation among them. This helps to develop a ‘deep love’ of their group, which, says Atran, encourages them to fight and die for their friends, even against all odds. Citing a study by political scientist Lindsay O’Rourke, Atran explains the following about almost all cases of male suicide bombings:

‘...[M]ales form part of a small group of friends that becomes a “band of brothers” whose members die for one another as much or more than for any cause. [A] Saudi study finds that 64 percent join through friends and 24 percent through family, a result that accords with Marc Sageman’s research on how volunteers across the world join the Al Qaeda-inspired movement.’ (Atran, 2010: 327-328).

It is highly plausible that the 7/7 bombers formed a ‘band of brothers’ who would die for each other. The fact that they blew themselves up supports this. Additionally, some were already friends before they became heavily involved in terrorism. Following on from this trend, as well as being members of a global Islamist movement and a small tight-knit group of four, the we-groups of the four bombers extended to a wider network in Britain of violent Islamists. Khan is said to have known Omar Sharif and Asif Hanif – two British Muslim suicide bombers. Sharif blew himself up in a Tel Aviv bar in 2004, killing three people and injuring many others. Hanif’s bombs failed to detonate but he was found dead on an Israeli beach, soon after Sharif’s attack. According to the right-wing think tank, The Centre for Social Cohesion (CSC), Khan and Tanweer knew a number of other British jihadist terrorists and members of Al Qaeda, this included Muktar Said Ibrahim, who along with three others were convicted of attempted suicide attacks on the London transport system soon after the 7/7 bombers. They are also said to have been in contact with Omar Khyam, who was the mastermind of another bomb plot in Britain. Khan and Tanweer’s terrorist training in Pakistan also shows the connections the two had with the wider Al Qaeda network. Khan is also said to have been active in trying to recruit people to the jihadist cause, and, of course, he was active in recruiting the other 7/7 bombers.

Within the context of these British jihadist terrorist figurations, and related to the points made by Atran, it is likely that the individual members, such as the 7/7 bombers, of these jihadist networks would base their self-images and self-esteem on how they conform to the beliefs and the objectives of their groups and networks. As such, the constraints of these jihadist terrorist networks and groups can encourage individuals to undertake terrorism, as it is those acts designated as terrorism by established groups that are central to the pride and charisma of jihadist terrorist organisations.

Khan’s so-called ‘martyrdom video’ provides some of the best evidence as to who he regarded as his most important we-group and his I-identity. The following is an extract from that:

‘Our driving motivation doesn’t come from tangible commodities that this world has to offer.

‘Our religion is Islam – obedience to the one true God, Allah, and following the footsteps of the final prophet and messenger Mohammed...This is how our ethical stances are dictated.

‘Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people all over the world. And your support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters.

‘Until we feel security, you will be our targets. And until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people we will not stop this fight. We are at war and I am a soldier. Now you too will taste the reality of this situation....
I myself, I make du’a to Allah...to raise me amongst those whom I love like the prophets, the messengers, the martyrs and today’s heroes like our beloved Sheikh Osama Bin Laden, Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and all the other brothers and sisters that are fighting in the...of this cause.' (BBC News Online (2005)

Global Islamic we-groups and terrorism

Here we can see that Khan regarded Muslims across the world as his we-group – he called them his brothers and sisters. In addition, he clearly considered members of Al Qaeda to be part of his we-group. In terms of I-identity, he regarded himself as a soldier, fighting for Islam. He clearly demarcated what he saw as the decadent West from what he regarded as the spiritual, godly and moral Islam. Accordingly, he rejected what he saw as this decadent, secular and materialistic identity of the West for what he claimed was a more ethical Islamist identity. To summarise, his we-identity is, at the highest level, global Islam. His I-identity, related to this, is of protector and soldier for his people. It is interesting to note that the role of protector is something that Khan can be said to have undertaken in other situations, including his job as a youth worker and as a member of the Mullah Boys seeking to ‘cure’ drug addicts. Khan, in rejecting traditional Islam was rejecting what he regarded as a form of Islam that has been tainted by the West. His Islam, in his eyes, is a far purer form. In addition, in a video made by Al Qaeda after the 7/7 bombings, Ayman al-Zawahiri, at that point Osama bin Laden’s second in command, talks about the bombings and as such, provides evidence that Khan and his fellow bombers were regarded by the highest ranking members of Al Qaeda to be part of their we-group.

It is also clear from the Khan transcript that Arena and Arrigo’s (2006: 234) point, discussed earlier in this thesis, that terrorists tend to have victim we-identities, and as having wrong done to them has some resonance. So if we apply this to the 7/7 bombers and jihadist terrorists generally, symbols of their victimisation could include the perceived destruction of the Caliphate and undermining of Islam by the West, Western attacks on Muslim countries, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, Western support for despotic regimes in Muslim countries, and so on. We can see, therefore, that some Muslim we-identities, especially Islamist we-identities may be developed in opposition to the West through their own particular interpretations of history and related power relations which, in Khan’s case, appear to be what he sees as persistent atrocities committed by Britain and the West against Muslims.

In addition, Arena and Arrigo’s (2006: 234) point about the victim role or we-group encouraging a violent response would also appear to be pertinent to Khan and the 7/7 bombers. As such, jihadist terrorists like the 7/7 bombers may see themselves as trying to avenge or rectify the position of Islam on behalf of all Muslims. Khan appears to be stating this in his address and it is certainly the case that well-known Islamist groups/organisations, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir lay blame for the demise of the Caliphate at the door of the West. In fact, they tend to buy into the clash of civilisations thesis argued by some people in the West such as Samuel Huntingdon (1996) and some Muslims. An extract from an article on the Hizb ut-Tahrir website confirms the view that the group considers what they regard as a once great Muslim empire (their we-group) to be the victim of aggressive outsiders – the West:

'The Khilafah [Caliphate] was officially abolished on the 28th of Rajab 1342AH, which corresponds in the Gregorian calendar to the 3rd of March 1924. However this was not a one-off attack. Rather
it was the culmination of three centuries of work by the Western powers. Furthermore, it is important to appreciate that the measures taken by the Western powers were not of any one type. There was a mixture of attacks. It was not only a cultural invasion through missionary work. It was not only a political invasion through incited rebellion. It was not only a military attack through war and invasion. It was not only a legal invasion through imposition of Western laws. It was not only the co-opting of agents. It was not any one of these things. It was all of these together. Only all of these together, over a period of almost three hundred years, and at a time of historical weakness of the Ummah, were the kuffar able to bring down the might and glory of the Islamic State.’ (Hizb ut-Tahrir, 2010)

It is clear from these claims on the Hizb ut-Tahrir website that blame for the destruction of Islam’s perceived glorious past lies at the door of the West. More complex processes are ignored or simply not considered, as these do not fit in with, on the one hand, a sense of we-group victimisation, and on the other the fantasy context that has built up as part of the pining for a lost golden past, whereby a once powerful we-group has lost significant status, and is, at best, a single outsider we-group relative to a collection of nation-states, and at worst a collection of disparate outsider we-groups among a collection of other, stronger nation-states. This context and the feelings of victimisation, which are apparent from the Hizb ut-Tahrir website may, according to Arena’s and Arrigo’s (2006: 234) perspective, therefore, encourage some members of those we groups to develop martial/soldier we- and I-identities.

There is little evidence to suggest that martial/soldier and victim we- and I-identities of the 7/7 bombers were significantly developed by their families or in the context of their formal education. There may, however, have been processes whereby the 7/7 bombers and other young Muslims have been socialised into victim we-identities simply by the fact that Muslims tend and have tended to be outsider groups in Britain and so the opportunities for perceiving their we-group as one that is victimised are likely to be greater, especially when one considers the relationships that many Muslim groups have had with more established groups in Britain, which include various forms of racism and discrimination. However, there are various groups that at least some, if not most British-born jihadist terrorists, including the 7/7 bombers, attended that could help to develop a sense of victimhood and martial/soldier we- I-identities. These include at mosques, at groups connected to or loosely connected to mosques, informal study groups, gangs, foreign Madrassas, terrorist training camps and so on. Other areas include the internet and propaganda videos, and through the sharing of so-called Jihadi DVDs and videos. In addition, their attendance of terrorist training camps and other meetings and pursuits are likely to have helped wed the 7/7 bombers to their martial/soldier roles.

As mentioned earlier the idea of terrorists’ we-identity as victims also forms part of Bracher’s (2009) analysis, which shows that jihadist terrorists blame Muslim victimhood on the West. Bracher argues that:

1In the case of many Islamic terrorists, [a] polarized belief combines with an identity of “cosmic specialness” (Kfir, 2002, p. 144) in an apocalyptic world view that sees the relation between Islamic civilization and Western civilization as a cosmic struggle between good and evil...’ (Bracher, 2009: 100-101)

Such a position is clear in the rhetoric of Hizb ut Tahrir, and such an identity of cosmic specialness in the context of a clash of civilisations between Islam and the West among jihadist terrorists is mirrored in the West by, as mentioned, theorists like Huntington (1997) and politicians like former US President
George W. Bush, who at the time of his presidency claimed that the US was in a battle of good against evil, that there was an axis of evil that had to be confronted and that if you were not with America you were against it.

Again citing Bracher, (2009: 94) the idea that the 7/7 bombers and British-born jihadist terrorists, more generally, might acquire more individualised senses of identity would appear to be more problematic for them than for many other sections of British society, although, of course not all. It can be argued, for example, that, as a general rule, groups with the fewest power chances are more likely to develop more overtly obvious we-identities relative to their I-identities, and this is manifested in, for example, exhibitions of their strong feelings towards their local communities that in some cases become violently territorial; in others involve overt displays of patriotism or nationalism and so on.

If we consider that more highly individualised I-identities tend to develop in Western societies, it can be argued that a quest for a highly prized, highly individualised I-identity could help to drive some Western Muslims like the 7/7 bombers to identify themselves as Islamic warriors or jihadi fighters, and therefore jihadist terrorists. This could be a consequence of their Western egos seeking to distinguish themselves from both their more traditional Islam practising parents and their ‘decadent’ Westernised peers. It could be the case, therefore, that the search for highly individualised identities could contribute to people joining terrorist organisations.

For Bracher and others, such as Jerold Post (1998) the central ‘cause’ of terrorism is damaged identity but it tends to be the group identity that is damaged rather than the individual identity. Bracher argues:

‘Of particular significance is the lack of status and recognition accorded by the Western secular world to identity-bearing Islamic beliefs, values, ways of life, and political power. As Bernard Lewis points out, during the past three or four centuries, the political power of Islam has been in continuous decline, beginning with “loss of domination in the world”, extending to “the undermining of [the Muslim man’s] authority in his own country through an invasion of foreign ideas and laws and ways of life and sometimes even foreign rulers or settlers” (Lewis 2003, p. 196), and culminating in “the challenge to his mastery in his own house, from emancipated women and rebellious children” resulting from Western “forces that have devalued their traditional values and loyalties and, in the final analysis, robbed them of their beliefs, their aspirations, their dignity, and to an increasing extent even their livelihood”.

‘Volkan explains that such collective traumatizing conditions can result in what he calls the “transgenerational transmission of chosen traumas”, through which individuals are traumatized by the still unresolved traumatic experiences of past generations. A “chosen trauma” is the enduring impact of a calamity suffered by the group’s ancestors, which the group now uses unconsciously as a central identity content, thus transferring from one generation to the next a wounded identity embodying the memory of the trauma. A chosen trauma is not just a recollection; “it is a shared mental representation of the event, which includes realistic information, fantasized expectations, intense feelings, and defences against unacceptable thoughts” (Volkan, 1997 p. 48) Bracher, 2009: 97-98).

There are parallels here with Vertigans’s (2011: 51, 56) idea of how the transmission of shared habitus – historical memories and commonality of feeling – can be behind wider community support for terrorism.

Also, in Bracher’s analysis, we can see that there is an opposite process to Elias’s (1991: 222-223) idea of a drag effect. This is, put simply, a process by which certain inter- and intra-state processes of
integration outstrip people’s identifications and habitus. For example, there may be processes of European integration but members of nation-states identify more with their nation-states than with the newly developing survival unit – Europe. In terms of the drag effect in reverse, a once great Islamic empire is regarded as having fallen on hard times, and there are fantasy beliefs in terms of how wonderful that empire was and how wonderful it would be if it returned. These groups fantasise about the existence of a highly integrated, international Islamic community, called the Ummah, whereas in reality Muslims tend to consist of a large number of disparate groups. In addition, the idea that traumas are passed down generations is an interesting proposition. If this is the case, then there is the possibility of multiple traumas being passed down to British Muslims whose parents emigrated from Pakistan, including the loss of Islamic power, British rule in India, the consequences of partition, the dispute over Kashmir, and the trauma of being immigrants (outsiders), including the racism that they would have suffered at the hands of more established groups in Britain.

7/7 bombers and habitus

Therefore, the relationships between established-outsider figurations and we-I balances played a significant part in contributing to the terrorism of the 7/7 bombers, as outlined above. The terrorism figurations of which the 7/7 bombers formed a part are related to both inter- and intra-state processes. In this context, therefore, issues of habitus are central to the development of jihadist terrorism in Britain and to the 7/7 bombers specifically.

As discussed earlier, the idea of habitus plays a central role for Vertigans (2011) in the development of terrorism. For example, he (2011: 51) argues that the legitimisation of violence by nation-states, such as public execution and torture can contribute to terrorism by reinforcing in people’s habitus that violence is an acceptable solution to political problems. In addition, political manoeuvring by governments that involves aggression towards other countries can help to normalise aggression in the national habitus, and thus contribute to the emergence of terrorism. Vertigans (2011: 56) adds that communal habitus can also contribute to the process of radicalisation and provides normative standards for feelings and behaviour. For example, shared historical memories and commonality of feeling tend to be behind wider community support for terrorism. This last point is related to the idea of the passing down of traumas and we-group victimhood between generations. The previous points might suggest that, on the one hand, Britain’s violence as a nation-state, may have reinforced in the 7/7 bombers’ habitus that violence is an acceptable solution to practical problems, especially its violence on the inter-state level, and in particular its violence towards Muslim countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Even the idea of just or moral wars, which have been undertaken by Britain and its allies may have contributed to the normalisation of aggression among the 7/7 bombers. Some of these wars have even been undertaken to protect Muslims, such as in Kosovo. However, there are problems with this idea, in that one would expect non-Muslims to be encouraged into violence as well. Nevertheless, it may well contribute to the processes of radicalisation that some British Muslims go through.
It is less likely that British intra-state violence and aggression could have had a similar effect, for the simple reason that it is far less prevalent and is regarded as unacceptable across British society. On the other hand, the bombers habituses would also have been affected by the backgrounds of their parents and grandparents. Three of them had origins in Pakistan where intra-state violence is much more prevalent and extreme. For example, capital punishment exists there, as do extra-judicial killings by the security forces, as well as torture by the state. There is also a much greater prevalence of sectarian violence and what the Pakistani state and others refer to as terrorism. The idea, however, that violence in Pakistan is responsible for British home-grown jihadist terrorism is problematic, as if this were the case, one would expect the older generations, those who perhaps grew up in Pakistan and moved to Britain, to be more involved in jihadist terrorism. Nevertheless, the picture is complex and it cannot be dismissed that violence in places like Pakistan plays a part in British home-grown jihadist terrorism, and the habituses of the terrorists.

Vertigans (2011: 60) draws out the relationship between habitus and established-outsider figurations and shows how the latter are integral to the development of terrorism. For example, he explains that certain examples of social protest have transformed into terrorism partly because perceived shifts in national consciousness have left militias feeling like detached outsiders. Accordingly, the transition to terrorism happens in the context of detachment from the rest of society. Taking this into account, it seems that the 7/7 bombers could have perceived themselves as detached outsiders with victim and martial/soldier we-group identities, and, as such, transitioned into terrorism in this context. Vertigans adds that, as outsiders, members of terrorist organisations can become dependent on each other and develop strong we-images through the ‘collective effervescence’ of their group. In this context, group cohesion is partially determined by the feelings of threat generated by outsider groups and the stigmatisation of radical or terror groups can further strengthen their internal cohesion. Alternatively, Vertigans points out that terror groups develop a sense of collective charisma and stigmatise outsiders, which helps to further cement their bonds. Within this context, shifting forms of we-identification are crucial, he says, and enable terrorists to justify their actions both in terms of protecting their group and associated ideology, community and nation and attacking their enemies with whom they no longer identify. Vertigans argues that terrorists tend to consider themselves as soldiers at war, and like conventional soldiers an emphasis upon we-identification strengthens at the expense of I-images.

It is clear from the data on the 7/7 bombers that they considered themselves as soldiers at war. Additionally, they also sought to counter-stigmatise established groups in Britain. Hizb ut-Tahrir, for example, refers to Westerners as Kuffur. In addition, the 7/7 bombers’ we-group identities and cohesiveness would have been reinforced by their outsider status, and feelings that they were being threatened by more dominant established groups in Britain. These feelings of being under threat, together with the fantasy ideas about the West being solely responsible for the low status of Muslims across the world, and the idea that they are at war with the West shows that they are locked into double-bind spirals with established groups in the West. Added to this, is the violence that people like the 7/7 bombers have undertaken against the West or have tried to undertake against the West help to perpetuate these violence spirals. Those established groups, for their part, have contributed to spirals of violence – the war on terror and the war in Iraq being obvious examples. These, as is widely
recognised, have helped to fuel further terrorist attacks against the West. The 7/7 bombers were locked tightly into these double-binds between established groups in the West and jihadist terrorists and Islamists.

In summary, the four young men who attacked the London transport system were part of a relatively weak outsider group in Britain. However, on another level, they were also part of another, perhaps less weak, outsider group – the so-called jihadist or violent Islamist global movement. This group, sometimes referred to as Al Qaeda, in some situations would have been a relatively strong, cohesive group, say for example, in certain parts of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq. By belonging to this group, Khan and the other bombers would immediately acquire greater power chances than many other second and third generation British Muslims. Nevertheless, in Britain they remained an outsider group. Their we-identity was focused around their violent Islamism to the point at which their I-identities were as soldiers fighting for their we-group. Perhaps somewhat paradoxically, the high values placed on individualism and uniqueness in Britain and the West, may have contributed to Khan and others rejecting the Islam of their parents and community in search of identities that were more unique and exciting. They found these as jihadist soldiers.

In addition, Khan and the others, being members of an outsider group in Britain would have found it more difficult than many people to develop more mainstream British I-identities, such as, for example through work. It is no secret that people from so-called ethnic minorities in Britain tend to find it more difficult than white people to become members of the establishment and professional classes. Additionally, the same is the case with respect to people from lower income groups. Khan and the bombers, while not poor, were from a highly deprived area of Leeds. As such, the paths to developing meaningful identities for them would be blocked relative to many other groups in Britain. This blockage may have contributed to two important aspects of the identification processes of the bombers. On the one hand, they may have sought a stronger we-group – the global Islamist movement; and on the other they may have, through access to this we-group, been able to develop much more satisfying and meaningful I-identities. These global jihadist and Islamist movements are locked into double-binds with established groups in the West, which help to perpetuate violence between them – violence by the terrorists encourages violence by Western countries, and that violent response encourages more violence on the part of the terrorists.
CONCLUSION

The sociogenesis of terrorism figurations in Britain since the concept was first coined during the first French Revolution has been significant, and as has been confirmed in this thesis, are closely related to the development of competitive pressures between established groups in Britain and their rivals on both the inter- and intra-state planes. These rivalries, or established-outsider figurations, include many in which the power potential between established groups in Britain and their adversaries are relatively slight, as was the case with terrorism figurations involving established groups in France and Germany, and relatively large as was the case between established groups in Britain and trades unions, rebellious Irish Catholics, its rebellious former colonies and, more recently, home-grown jihadist terrorists.

Furthermore, central to the development of terrorism as a concept and the relations between established groups and outsider terrorist groups, is that, in all the cases cited, the latter have been regarded as being in antithesis to civilisation and civilised forms of conduct. This is in keeping with the birth of the concepts of terrorism and civilisation, which, as has been established, were born of the French Revolution and the closely related French reform movement.

Terrorism is used as a label to stigmatise and delegitimise. But there are also inter- and intra-state processes involved whereby groups act according to various designations of terrorism. These are important because people die, are injured and traumatised as a result. In fact, people who act according to many of the designations of terrorism made by established groups in Britain have contributed to wars and other violent conflicts.

There are a number of important issues related to the use of terrorism as a label and those who act according to the various terrorism designations. One is that a distinction has tended to have been made by established groups in Britain between violence in the name of civilisation or violent civilising offences, which in some cases have been deliberately hidden from the British public and other countries (including in Kenya, Malaya, Yemen and elsewhere during the break-up of the British Empire), and violence or even simply threats to established group status by outsider groups, which has often been called terrorism. This chimes with the idea that one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter, in that the very idea of terrorism is relative to the power relations at play when the term is deployed. In other words, it tends to be the case that the terrorism label is only really defined and successfully deployed by established groups against their foes, especially those, in recent years who have fewer power chances. The charge of state terrorism by established groups has tended to have been used less often, especially recently. Accordingly, the function of the words terrorism and terrorist have developed as ways in which established groups try to differentiate themselves from their competitors, especially their competitors’ violence compared to their own, and even more so, if there is a large gap between themselves and their competitors when it comes to
power potential. As such, the terms terrorism and terrorist occupy a place similar to that of a number of other terms that are regarded as the antithesis of civilisation. Similar terms include barbarism, criminal, sociopath, tyrant and so on.

Despite the concept of terrorism being one the meaning and function of which are relative to power relations should not mean that the figurations in which it is deployed should not be studied and that the only aspect of sociological importance to terrorism figurations is their use as a political tool by established groups. The deployment of the concept of terrorism comes about as part of the same figurations in which groups and individuals are designated as terrorists. Those figurations almost always involve some form of conflict and often that conflict involves violence. As a result, many people are killed, either directly or indirectly, as part of terrorism figurations. This makes such figurations an important area for sociologists to investigate. However, the dearth of sociological enquiry into terrorism figurations highlights the problematic area of terrorism and the ‘involved’ positions of many sociologists. That is, research on terrorism often tends to be associated with academics who are close to government positions on terrorism. Many sociologists tend to have more critical positions when it comes to governments and, in some cases, share similar ideological views to some terrorist groups, albeit that they may disagree with the use of violence.

The little sociological work on terrorism that has tended to emerge often suffers significantly from epistemic relativism and a crude nominalism. At the same time, it can also help to legitimate the actions of terrorists. Nevertheless, its exposure of the problems associated with normative explanations of terrorism and the highlighting of the importance of power relations in the development of terrorism as a concept are useful, albeit incomplete and overly simplistic. They do, however, provide an important, although inadequate counter to the mass of mainstream terrorism research, which often fails spectacularly in developing knowledge with a greater degree of reality-congruence than that which is often disseminated in the media or through government propaganda. As has been shown earlier in this thesis, mainstream terrorism research tends to take for granted government definitions of terrorism and ideas about which groups should be called terrorists. A result of this is that mainstream terrorism researchers, in failing to challenge government ideas about terrorism, help to legitimate the actions of governments in relation to terrorism, such as the various wars on terror that have been launched by the United States, Britain and their allies. A consequence of this has often been to exacerbate terrorism figurations by deepening established-outsider relations through the development, maintenance and extension of double-binds. For example, the war on terror, including the attack on Iraq by the United States and Britain in 2003, was partially responsible for a huge increase in the number of ‘terrorist attacks’, especially in Iraq itself but also in the West, including the 2004 Madrid train bombings and the 7/7 London bombings. Additionally, the ‘involved’ positions of what tend to be mainstream terrorism theorists, as has been discussed earlier, mean they usually fail to reflect on their positions in terrorism figurations, and the fact that their research can be used in the development of fantasy images and beliefs of outsider ‘terrorists’ as part of double-binds. The most obvious is the idea that terrorists are psychopaths, which has moved from academic work to the rest of society.
An additional problem that mainstream terrorism theorists have helped to develop when it comes to terrorism figurations is the definition problem. By treating terrorism as ‘thing-like’, a huge amount of time and resources have been wasted and again this has helped to legitimate government actions that in many cases have exacerbated terrorism by accepting government definitional criteria for terrorism, rather than regarding terrorism as relational and processual, which this thesis does.

As mentioned, the idea that terrorism figurations should be understood as relational and processual allows us to develop an understanding of how competitive inter- and intra-state pressures, most specifically those involving established groups and their competitors, are central to the development of those terrorism figurations, both in terms of the processes of labelling groups as terrorists and in terms of the structural conditions in which conflicts, often violent, come about. In terms of Britain, specifically, inter-state pressures during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have contributed to a variety of terrorism figurations, related intra-state pressures and more subsequent terrorism figurations. For example, during the nineteenth century, the relationship between the British establishment and France contributed to a number of terrorism figurations. For example, the fear of French invasion contributed to Britain’s violent expansion elsewhere, including Ireland. Many Irish Catholics rebelled and, in addition, it was believed that they might support the French, which contributed to their being labelling as terrorists, uncivilised and barbaric by the British establishment. Accordingly, we can see how competitive inter-state pressures between Britain and France during the nineteenth century played a fundamental part in British-Irish terrorism figurations.

In addition, inter-state pressures during the nineteenth century were central to functional democratisation in Britain. As has been shown, the need for a more productive and efficient workforce – the industrial working class – during the nineteenth century in order to compete on the inter-state plane, helped to reduce the power differentials between ruling groups in Britain and those lower down the social scale. This, in turn, gave the working classes the opportunity to seek further reductions in the power differentials between them and ruling groups in Britain. In response, ruling groups often labelled trades unions and reform movements, such as the Chartists as terrorists. The actions of these groups, however, were fundamentally different from the actions of many Irish groups. The latter, often planting bombs, and the former, intimidating other workers to join trades unions, for example. Both, however, were designated as terrorists. The regularity in both these contexts is that, in both cases, there was, to some degree, an equalisation of power chances between established and outsider groups, with the latter able to challenge the former. They were not similar in the so-called “terrorism” they committed.

Processes of functional democratisation, as such, have been fundamental to the development of terrorism figurations. Across Europe during the nineteenth century, for example, the power differentials between established and outsider groups were diminishing to the extent that outsider groups were able to challenge the ruling classes. The earliest manifestation of this, of course was the 1789 French Revolution, during which the concept of terrorism was first coined. These processes, contributed to a variety of revolutions and rebellions, many of which, at the time, were designated as terrorism and their proponents as terrorists.
These terrorism figurations did not disappear at the turn of the twentieth century, and the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, which itself came about following processes of functional democratisation, marked a significant milestone for Britain’s inter-state relations and terrorism figurations in general. As, of course, did the rise of Germany as a competitor to Britain and France in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. As threats to the status of established groups changed, as a result of the dynamism of inter-state relations across Europe and the world, so did terrorism figurations that Britain was a part of change. For example, as has been highlighted here, the Soviets were regarded as terroristic, as were the Germans and Nazis during the First and Second World Wars. Again, in each case highlighted in this thesis, these terrorism figurations involved an antithesis between civilisation and terrorism. In fact, the two world wars were fought in the name of civilisation against barbarism, and, as it happens, terrorism.

The inter-state processes that culminated in the First and Second World Wars, as well as the rise in power of the Soviet Union and the United states, were fundamental for British terrorism figurations. The weakening of Britain and the other colonial powers relative to the newly emerging superpowers – the United States and the Soviet Union – as well as in relation to their colonies and former colonies played a significant role in the development of new terrorism figurations. The relative evening-up of power chances between Britain and its colonies and former colonies gave the latter the opportunity to rebel against their British masters. Again in this context, the rebellious groups, such as those in Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, Palestine/Israel and Yemen were labelled as terrorists. Out of these inter-state processes emerged one of the most protracted and significant terrorism figurations that the world is currently having to deal with – the Israel-Palestine conflict.

The move from a multi-polar world to the bi-polar world of the Cold War during the twentieth century was also highly significant for British terrorism figurations. For example, a number of left-wing terrorist groups emerged or developed in this period, many of which were closely linked to the Soviet Union. In fact, left-wing groups, whether violent or not, were at times linked to terrorism by certain established groups in Britain. Many of these groups, however, should be viewed as examples of the continuing, albeit uneven processes of functional democratisation. For example, in some cases young people in the West were able to challenge older generations in ways they were previously unable to do. In some cases, this was done violently by groups such as the Red Army Faction in Germany, the Red Brigades in Italy, the IRA in Ireland and the United Kingdom and Weather Underground in the United States.

Although the idea of international terrorism first emerged during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, particularly in light of the so-called wave of anarchist terrorism, the concept gained much greater weight in the second half of the twentieth century with the emergence of left-wing groups that were said to be linked to each other and to Arab groups, usually consisting of Palestinians seeking the destruction of Israel and the formation of a Palestinian state.

Victory for Britain and the West in the Cold War helped to contribute to the demise of Western-based left-wing terrorist groups. However, the competitive pressures during the Cold War, together with the continuing residual effects of the break-up of the old colonial empires, and functional democratisation
on a global basis contributed to a number of new terrorism figurations emerging, many of which have been described as global or international terrorism. For example, the competitive inter-state pressures that contributed to the creation of, initially the British Mandate in Palestine and then Israel and subsequent support for the latter by the West against its Arab neighbours has helped to exacerbate terrorism figurations in the Middle East and elsewhere and on a global basis.

Furthermore, the strategic alliances during the Cold War and afterwards, entered into by Britain, the United States and others, again as a result of competitive inter-state pressures have been fundamental in contributing to the growth of global jihadist terrorism. For example, as was highlighted earlier in this thesis, Britain's relationships with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have contributed to the development of global jihadist terrorism. At the same time, support by Britain, the United States and others of jihadists who fought the Soviets in Afghanistan has also played a key role in the development of recent jihadist terrorism figurations. As has the role played by established groups in Britain of providing a safe haven for foreign and domestic jihadists to attack Britain's enemies abroad, in order to contribute to Britain's strategic objectives such as the undermining of regimes in places like Iraq, Libya and Bosnia. More recently, Britain and the United States have provided support to jihadist groups and or those linked to them abroad in countries that include Libya again and Syria.

Competitive inter-state and intra-state pressures have been fundamental to the development of terrorism figurations in Britain. Chapters 4 to 11 of this thesis have shown the developmental processes involved in the sociogenesis of terrorism related to Britain over the long-term. These sections of this thesis provide a broad-brush overview of how specific inter- and intra-state processes involving Britain over the past 200 years have been crucial to the development of terrorism figurations related to Britain, and included the processes just mentioned, such as functional democratisation, civilising processes, civilising offensives, established-outsider figurations and double-binds.

Chapter 12 examined these processes in greater detail through the case study of the 7/7 bombers and highlighted how competitive inter- and intra-state pressures, processes of functional democratisation and double-binds have contributed to and are part of the established-outsider figurations of which the bombers were a part, as well as their habituses and we-I balances, which, in turn, were crucial to their undertaking acts of terrorism against their fellow Britons.

Competitive inter- and intra-state pressures and established-outsider figurations are central to the development of specific terrorist habituses. In terms of British home-grown jihadist terrorism, we-I balances tend to favour we-identities rather than I identities. However, paradoxically, the more individualised British habitus means that British people, including and especially those who become jihadist terrorists are able to choose between identities that emphasise either the ‘I’ or the ‘we’.

As has been established, processes such as the development of the British empire, its break-up and related functional democratisation on a global basis contributed to the habituses of the 7/7 bombers and others like them in Britain. For example, it was competitive inter-state pressures that contributed to Britain seeking immigrant labour from places like Pakistan in the mid-twentieth century. This, together with established-outsider figurations in Britain, and the existence of a growing global jihadist
terrorist movement related to competitive inter-state processes discussed earlier, has contributed to a situation in which some British born Muslims have identified with Islamist movements and in some cases global jihadist terrorist movements. Additionally, Britain’s inter-state violence and the idea that this is a civilised and acceptable form of inter-state conduct may have contributed to the habituses of jihadist terrorists, in that they may perceive violence as an acceptable solution to political problems. In addition, the parents and grandparents of many jihadists originate from societies that have greater degrees of intra-state violence. This may also have an effect on the habituses of those who become jihadist terrorists.

There are thought to have been thousands of British-born Muslims who have travelled to fight jihads abroad, to date, and this is something that is still going on. According to Channel 4 News Online (2013), as of June 2013, it is believed that around 80 British Muslims had travelled to Syria to fight against the Assad government there. As has been already mentioned, these groups have been tolerated and even encouraged by established groups in Britain in order to further their own strategic interests. The development of jihadist habituses by some British based Muslims comes as part of a rejection of more Westernised identities and the more traditional Muslim identities of their parents and grandparents. Part of the reason for this is that jihadist identities may appear to offer more meaning and status than being a member of an outsider group in Britain whether or not that identity follows a more traditional Muslim path or a more Westernised path. Fighting wars as a holy warrior on behalf of Muslims across the world is clearly more appealing to some than the mundane, routinised lives that they might have in Britain.

Being a member of the global jihadist movement involves a shift towards we-identities from more westernised I-identities which, again, may make life more meaningful and exciting. The we-identities of global jihadists, however, tend to include feelings of victimisation. If it is perceived by jihadists that Britain has been a perpetrator against them then this is likely to contribute to terrorist attacks against Britain. Interestingly, the idea of just wars, such as those fought by Britain, the United States and their allies in Kosovo, Bosnia and so on, and which are similar to the world wars, which were wars in the name of civilisation, is taken on by jihadists who claim to be fighting against injustice to Muslims. From the jihadists’ points of view their wars are the equivalent to wars in the name of civilisation. However, a final point in this thesis examines, briefly, the idea that decivilising processes play a part in the emergence of the global jihadist and other forms of terrorism.

Decivilising processes and terrorism

As set out in the exposition early on in this thesis, decivilising processes are marked by increases in social fears about other groups, and beliefs about those groups tend to be more fantasy-orientated, often leading to a decrease in rational action in relation to those groups. Also, as mentioned in the Elias exposition, civilising processes often work in tandem with de-civilising processes, and it is a question of which processes are dominant that determines the overall direction of a particular society’s development – ‘civilising’ or ‘decivilising’. For example, in terms of terrorism figurations, civilising processes may be dominant in a society and yet the processes through which terrorism
figurations develop could be decivilising. Additionally, processes of state formation, including violent conflict may well be decivilising on certain levels but overall, over the longer-term, the monopolisation of physical force over wider areas tends to move social groups in civilising directions. The same could perhaps be the case during empire building and other forms of globalisation. For example, civilising offensives may well have a variety of decivilising aspects to them, not least brutality and violence but, depending on a variety of other processes, may ultimately be part of overall civilising trends. Of course, civilising offensives may also be part of wider decivilising trends but as already said, this depends on whether civilising processes or decivilising processes are dominant.

Also, as pointed out earlier in the exposition, according to Fletcher (1997: 83), there are three central characteristics of decivilising processes. These include shifts towards constraints by others rather than self restraints, the emergence of less even, rounded and differentiated patterns of self-restraint, and a drop in the level of mutual identification between groups. There is certainly evidence of these processes happening as part of terrorism figurations. For example, if we take the example used earlier of the 7/7 bombers and jihadist terrorists more generally we can see these processes at play. Joining terrorist organisations, or becoming a holy warrior involves, to a degree, a conscious decision to join a group in which self-determination and therefore, the scope for self-restraint is limited relative to many Western standards. That is, on joining a jihadist terrorist organisation or any terrorist organisation, the rules, formal and informal of such organisations are likely to involve a greater degree of external constraints than is the case for most people in Western societies. For example, threats to members’ physical existence are likely if they undermine the objectives of their group, and so on.

The possibility that more uneven patterns of self-restraint might emerge in terrorist organisations as part of terrorism figurations is difficult to determine without further research. But it is enough to say that this is a distinct possibility, although it is dependent on the structure of particular terrorism figurations. For example, such a process is probably more likely among those who have spent years in war zones fighting jihads than perhaps those who have ‘self-radicalised’ over the internet in Britain. The reduction in levels of mutual identification is perhaps the most obvious decivilising process that is apparent among terrorists. Their willingness to kill others, especially civilians shows that the level of mutual identification they have with their perceived enemies is near to non-existent. Accordingly, if we are to relate these three characteristics of decivilising processes to terrorism figurations, it is apparent that terrorism, including jihadist terrorism, is decivilising, although often (though not always) situated within a wider context of civilising processes.

It is not just the process of being a terrorist that is subject to decivilising processes. Wider terrorism figurations are also subject to decivilising processes. For example, double-binds which are central to most terrorism figurations are decivilising and include the three decivilising characteristics outlined by Fletcher, as well as social relations in which fantasy-orientated beliefs increase as well as a reduction in rational action based on those beliefs. For example, the double-binds in which established groups have become entwined with groups they have designated as terrorists include all of those discussed in this thesis, and, as such, decivilising processes on a variety of levels have developed, for example, in the prison camps in Kenya during the Mau Mau uprising, or as part of the various wars on terror, including the 2003 attack on Iraq, which in each case have involved descents into barbarism.
Radicalisation: a comparison between the development of terrorism in early twentieth century Germany and jihadist terrorism in the twenty-first century

As has been established above, it appears that decivilising tendencies are a significant part of the process of being a terrorist. As a final point to this thesis, it would be useful to, briefly compare how this happened in early twentieth century Germany with the present day jihadist movement in Britain and across the world. The reason for comparing jihadist terrorism with German terrorism is that Elias (1997) wrote of the radicalisation process of German terrorists, and, as this is a figurational examination of such issues, it makes sense to use work that has already been undertaken in this area.

The radicalisation of the Freikorps following WWI

A first striking similarity is the effects that the fates of the respective German and Islamic empires had on subsequent generations. Elias (1997: 179) points out that the German empire of the nineteenth century was weak relative to its inter-state competitors and that this had a profound effect on the self-esteem of the German people. In addition, Germany unified relatively late compared to its competitors. Elias points out that the unification of Germany was achieved through war by the nobility, and that the middle-class, despite wishing for a unified Germany, were and remained in the second rank politically and thus as an outsider group to the nobility, with whom they had struggled for supremacy. However, with the unification of Germany many gave up this fight, content with the new found status of the German people.

Elias points out that this had a profound effect on the middle-classes, in particular on the upper-middle classes. He argues that many of them gave up their ‘anti-court, anti-aristocracy’ attitudes and began to be assimilated into the upper-classes. The values of the upper classes were war-like and had a strong warrior ethos, adds Elias. At the same time the aristocratic code was transformed. More particularly it was ‘bourgeoisified’:

‘In aristocratic circles, military values embodied in conceptual symbols such as courage, obedience, honour and discipline, responsibility and loyalty were usually part of a long family tradition. In accordance with their different social situation, middle-class circles adopted the aristocratic code only in a certain version. In this way, it underwent a class-specific change in function: it lost the character of a tradition-bound and correspondingly little reflected upon pattern of behaviour, and became expressed in an explicitly formulated doctrine hardened by reflection. What was for the aristocracy a more or less unquestioned tradition – a largely naive high estimation of warlike values, a socially inherited understanding of the meaning of power potentials in the inter-state play of strength – was now cultivated very much more consciously by the upper sections of the middle-classes as something newly obtained, seldom before had so much been said and written in praise of power, even of the violent sort.’ (Elias, 1997: 180)

As a result of Germany’s unification coming through a war conducted by the aristocracy, says Elias (1997: 180-181), it was seen that war and violence were good political ‘instruments’. War and violence, he added, were romanticised by a large section of the middle-classes. At the same time, says Elias (1997: 181), many from the middle-classes yearned to be part of the aristocracy. Elias
(1997: 181) illustrates the change in the psyche of the middle-class Germans with examples of how the literature changed from idealist literature to more nationalist literature, in which it was accepted as normal for enemies to be dehumanised. The German people’s feelings of great power and superiority following unification contributed to the march into war for control of Europe and therefore the First World War ensued.

There are clearly a number of similarities with the position of the German people, in terms of self-esteem, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century and that of present-day jihadist terrorists. As has been established, it appears that jihadist terrorists tend to identify themselves as victims. Related to this is that the great Islamic empire’s collapse led to a corresponding drop in the self-esteem of many Muslims. This chimes with the low-self esteem of the German middle class relative to their French and English competitors in the nineteenth century.

In addition, the rise in the self-esteem of the German middle classes following unification and their acceptance of and high estimation of war bears some similarity in the warrior ethos of jihadist terrorists. For example, the fact that the early spread of Islam corresponded to conquests of the Arab empires can work as an antidote to feelings of low esteem which have been generated by the weak position of Muslims relative to other groups, including nation-states like Britain and the United States. Accordingly, it is perhaps not surprising that jihadists accept war and warrior identities as these correspond to a period in which Islam was in the ascendency.

**Similarities between the Freikorps and jihadist terrorists**

Elias (1997: 184) points out that, at the same time that Germany was defeated in the First World War, its leading social groups – the upper and middle classes – were challenged by the emergence of organised working class groups. The ruling elites saw themselves as the true representatives of Germany and they organised extra-state violence and propaganda against workers’ organisations and Jews through what was known as the Freikorps (military groups of former army officers). Elias (1997: 186) says of one particular Freikorps – the Ehrhardt Marine Brigade – was a precursor to ‘the undercover terrorist organisation ‘Consul’. One of the goals of this group, he says, was the ‘systematic murder of prominent politicians whom they regarded as ‘undesirable’.’ He adds that the Freikorps and related student associations probably murdered hundreds or thousands of people in the early years of the Weimar Republic. The majority of students and the Freikorps wanted to overthrow the government of the Weimar Republic and took it for granted that violence was an appropriate way to do this.

Elias (1997: 189) goes on to explain how the reduction of the size of the German army by the Allies led thousands of officers who were forced out of the army to form Freikorps, These groups were mainly made up of young middle-class former officers, who wanted to stay in the military because, as Elias (1997: 189) says, it gave them pleasure. Elias (1997: 189) goes on to point out that the officers that joined the Freikorps were unable to find civilian roles after having spent years fighting at the front. They could not find roles that matched their status aims. As a result many travelled to the Baltic region
to fight the Russian Bolsheviks at the request of Latvian nationalists, who in turn promised them land. They saw such an endeavour as more fitting to their status. Elias argues that the Baltic campaign is useful in helping to explain the emergence of terrorist groups in pre-World War II Germany.

Elias argues that there was a radicalisation process that individuals went through on their way to joining terrorist groups. They were:

• An officer of the Wilhelmine army;
• A member of the Freikorps;
• Member of a conspiratorial secret association of a terrorist character; A member of the National Socialist (Nazi) Party.

In describing how people become terrorists, Elias claimed that:

‘They feel like detached outsiders in relation to a society which seems to be rotten to the core. They are convinced that the society is going under, and wish for this to happen, although it is not perhaps particularly clear what will happen when it has done so.’ (Elias, 1997:192).

This detached outsider status is comparable to the detached outsider status of British born jihadist terrorists, who, as discussed earlier regard themselves and other Muslims as victims but who also, if we are to take the 7/7 bombers as examples, chose to detach themselves from mainstream British society and the communities that their parents belonged to. In addition, the idea among British born jihadist terrorists, as well as many Islamist groups more generally, that British society is rotten to core is widespread and they certainly wish for British society to go under and, in their case, to be replaced by an Islamic state.

For the members of the Freikorps, says Elias (1997: 193), there was a dream to return to the ‘old world’ where the German Empire is restored and military values were highly regarded again. Again jihadist terrorists and Islamists more generally dream of restoring the Islamic Empire or Caliphate.

Another major similarity between the lives of members of the Freikorps and jihadist terrorists is the kinds of lives they lead and sought to lead, which tended/tend to be freer of the constraints that most members of society are restricted by. Elias (1997: 193) points out that life in the Baltic for the Freikorps was unfettered and free and in direct contrast to the routinised middle-class lives in Germany. There is a clear similarity with the less routinised and exciting lives that jihadists seek when they travel abroad to fight jihad and the kinds of lives that members of the Freikorps led.

Elias (1997: 196) points out that defeat after defeat, including that of the First World War, and the poor living conditions of the Freikorps in the Baltic had a number of effects on them, not least that they were undergoing a slow process of ‘brutalisation’ and this was borne out in the ‘orgy of violence’ they undertook against their enemies. Elias states:

‘If one enquires into the conditions in a society under which civilized forms of behaviour and conscience begin to dissolve, one sees once again some of the stations on this path. It is a process of brutalization and dehumanization which, in relatively civilized societies, always requires
considerable time. In such societies, terror and horror hardly ever manifest themselves without a fairly long social process in which conscience decomposes.’ (Elias, 1997: 196).

It can also be argued, therefore, that those British Muslims who become jihadist terrorists may have also undergone a process of ‘brutalisation’. A very crude and preliminary sketch of how this might happen follows:

A person or persons might be a relative outsider in Britain, due to being part of a Muslim minority. As a result, certain pathways to a meaningful social and political existence may be blocked. Knowledge and interest in Islam may have been garnered through family, friends and attending a mosque. Perceived injustices towards Muslims around the world may be developed, together with a sense of injustice in Britain due to having routes of meaningful political expression blocked. Here we can see how the identity of being a victim might begin to develop. Interest grows with respect to perceived injustices towards Muslims across the world and knowledge of Islam’s more powerful past is acquired, together with a sense that Islam is superior to other forms of human expression, and therefore, non-Muslims are inferior.

The interest in injustices towards Muslims is fuelled by the watching of horrific acts of violence towards Muslims by either the Western military or regimes, including Muslims who are supported and/or armed by the West, on the internet and DVDs. This may have a partial brutalising affect. In his or her search for meaning the person travels abroad for Islamic training, perhaps training in ‘terrorism’, or even to fight jihad against groups they regard as enemies of Islam which further brutalises them. At this point, the person or persons have undergone a process of brutalisation and experienced acts of violence that may have seemed beyond them previously are now relatively easy for them to undertake, including acts of ‘terrorism’ in Britain against British citizens.

It is likely that the 7/7 bombers and other British home-grown jihadist terrorists had undergone brutalisation processes that contributed to their attacks or attempted attacks on Britain. However, these are not the only processes that have played a part. As mentioned, they form part of a nexus of established-outsider figurations in which they are locked into double-binds with established groups in Britain and elsewhere. They have also developed habituses and identities that correspond to these established-outsider figurations. Additionally, processes of functional democratisation have evened up the power ratios between them and established groups, which have made it possible for them to challenge established groups.

Many of these processes are apparent in other British terrorism figurations but not all of them. Nevertheless, established-outsider figurations, processes of functional democratisation, and double-binds appear to be universal in all the British terrorism figurations examined in this thesis. Processes of brutalisation are likely to have only been apparent in some, such as in the jihadist terrorist context, Ireland, to varying degrees during the break-up of the British Empire and in the Middle East. They are not likely to have played such a direct part, or much of a part in nineteenth century trades unions and reform movement ‘terrorism’. Nor do they seem to have played a direct part in the Cold War terrorism figurations, although they may have played a greater role in the First and Second World War terrorism figurations.
A final point, therefore, is that if governments and terrorism researchers are seeking to lessen the incidence of terrorism, on the one hand they need to develop a better understanding of the power relations involved when using the terrorism label, and on the other, they need to try to prevent themselves from being sucked into spirals of violence which inevitably lead to more violence.
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