<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">
  <channel rdf:about="http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/8598">
    <title>BURA Collection:</title>
    <link>http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/8598</link>
    <description />
    <items>
      <rdf:Seq>
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/33281" />
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/33241" />
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/33239" />
        <rdf:li rdf:resource="http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/33238" />
      </rdf:Seq>
    </items>
    <dc:date>2026-05-21T12:36:40Z</dc:date>
  </channel>
  <item rdf:about="http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/33281">
    <title>Inflation targeting, Monetary policy, and Inequality</title>
    <link>http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/33281</link>
    <description>Title: Inflation targeting, Monetary policy, and Inequality
Authors: Chortareas, G; Evgenidis, A; Fasianos, A
Abstract: This paper explores whether the transmission from monetary policy to income inequality may depend on the adoption of Inflation Targeting (IT) regimes. Using an interacted panel VAR, we find that expansionary monetary policy shocks reduce income inequality in countries that have switched to IT regimes. In contrast, in non-IT regimes the same shock is associated with a short-lived increase in income inequality. A decomposition of transmission channels indicates that the employment channel is the primary equalizing mechanism under IT, as expansionary shocks generate stronger improvements in labor market conditions. The financial channel operates in the opposite direction but is quantitatively smaller. We further show that the inequality-reducing effects of monetary policy are not replicated by other institutional features often associated with credibility, such as central bank transparency or central bank independence. Our findings are robust to alternative identification schemes, broader classifications of IT regimes, controls for self-selection into IT adoption, and to conditioning on different inflation environments.
Description: JEL classification: &#xD;
D31; E4; E5.; Data availability: &#xD;
Data will be made available on request.; Supplementary data are available online at: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014292126001030?via%3Dihub#appSB .</description>
    <dc:date>2026-05-05T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/33241">
    <title>A shot in the arm: stimulus packages and firm performance during COVID-19</title>
    <link>http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/33241</link>
    <description>Title: A shot in the arm: stimulus packages and firm performance during COVID-19
Authors: Igan, D; Mirzaei, A; Moore, T
Abstract: We provide some early evidence on the effectiveness of COVID-19 economic policy packages. Our empirical strategy uses firm-level data and relies on the varying degree of vulnerability to the pandemic across industries. We find a robust association of fiscal stimulus with changes in firm performance indicators (as measured by sales-to-assets ratio, profit margin, interest coverage ratio as well as probability of default) in pandemic-prone sectors. We also observe marginal effects of monetary policy on the sales-to-assets ratio and of foreign exchange intervention on the interest coverage ratio in the hardest-hit firms. Overall, the preliminary evidence suggests that policy interventions have bought time for the hardest-hit industries, by supporting turnover and improving liquidity.
Description: JEL Codes: &#xD;
G01 , G14 , G28 , E65.</description>
    <dc:date>2022-07-14T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/33239">
    <title>GDP revisions are not cool: the impact of statistical agencies’ trade-off</title>
    <link>http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/33239</link>
    <description>Title: GDP revisions are not cool: the impact of statistical agencies’ trade-off
Authors: Asimakopoulos, S; Lalik, M; Paredes, J; Salvado García, J
Abstract: Official estimates of economic growth are regularly revised and therefore forecasts for GDP growth are done on the basis of ever-changing data. The economic literature has intensively studied the properties of those revisions and their implications for forecasting models. However, much less is known about the reasons for Statistical Agencies (SAs) to revise their estimates beyond the timeliness of their data collection. We show that SAs behave as risk managers who have an implicit interest (loss function) in not revising their initial GDP estimates too much, while they are much more open to revise GDP expenditure components over time. More than a curiosity, we exploit this resulting cross-correlation of revisions among GDP components to build a model to better forecast GDP.
Description: JEL Codes: &#xD;
C01 , C82 , E01.</description>
    <dc:date>2024-02-29T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </item>
  <item rdf:about="http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/33238">
    <title>Effectiveness of EU CRA regulations in curbing rating shopping and catering in the securitisation market</title>
    <link>http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/33238</link>
    <description>Title: Effectiveness of EU CRA regulations in curbing rating shopping and catering in the securitisation market
Authors: Karimov, N; Kara, A; Downing, G; Marqués, D
Abstract: Have EU regulations implemented after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) on credit rating agencies (CRAs) been effective in curbing rating inflation? We answer this question by analysing a large dataset of asset-backed securities (ABS) issued between 1998-2018. We find that new regulations reduced rating catering. However, rating shopping remains a concern, especially for investors of premium ABS. Overall, our findings show that the effectiveness of the regulatory changes has been limited.
Description: JEL Codes: &#xD;
G21 , G28.</description>
    <dc:date>2024-08-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </item>
</rdf:RDF>

