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    <link>http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/181</link>
    <description />
    <pubDate>Sun, 12 Jul 2026 12:27:23 GMT</pubDate>
    <dc:date>2026-07-12T12:27:23Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Government accounting, crisis, reforms, and accountability, an institutional theory perspective: Evidence from Kuwait</title>
      <link>http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/33431</link>
      <description>Title: Government accounting, crisis, reforms, and accountability, an institutional theory perspective: Evidence from Kuwait
Authors: Almutairi, Bader
Abstract: This study examines the rationale, management, and implications of accrual accounting reform in Kuwait’s public sector, focusing on how international standards, particularly International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS), are adopted and experienced in a resource-rich, non-crisis environment. While much of the public sector accounting literature centres on reforms driven by external pressure or fiscal crises, this research explores how reforms develop in politically stable contexts where coercive forces are weak, but legitimacy pressures are strong. &#xD;
Drawing on institutional theory, the study explores three interconnected research questions: 1. What is the rationale for the transition from cash to accrual accounting in Kuwait’s public sector? 2. How has the Ministry of Finance (MoF) managed and responded to the accounting reform process? 3. What have been the effects of this accounting reform? &#xD;
Using a qualitative method, the research combines analysis of archival documents (1978–2022) with 25 semi-structured interviews involving senior officials, accountants, and MoF staff. The findings reveal that the reform was largely driven by mimetic and normative isomorphism, aimed at aligning with international practices and signalling modernisation, rather than an internal fiscal crisis. Implementation was fragmented, procedural, and centralised, with limited legal reform, cross-entity coordination, and behavioural integration. While technical systems such as the Government Financial Management Information System (GFMIS) were implemented, accrual accounting remained symbolically adopted and decoupled from core accounting practices. &#xD;
The study contributes to institutional theory by demonstrating how symbolic compliance, institutional inertia, and logics of legitimacy shape reform in high-capacity, non-crisis states. It provides practical lessons for policymakers and those seeking to embed accounting reforms in similar contexts, emphasising the need for legal alignment, professional engagement, and local continuity, underscoring the complex institutional dynamics of public sector reform beyond crisis-driven models.
Description: This thesis was submitted for the award of Doctor of Philosophy and was awarded by Brunel University London</description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 01 Jan 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/33431</guid>
      <dc:date>2025-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Corporate governance, CEO characteristics and earnings management: Evidence from UK listed companies</title>
      <link>http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/32836</link>
      <description>Title: Corporate governance, CEO characteristics and earnings management: Evidence from UK listed companies
Authors: Jasem, Yousef A Y
Abstract: This research a novel contribution by explicitly quantifying the impact of behavioural CEO traits, specifically greed and narcissism on earnings management, extending traditional agency theory to a behavioural governance framework within a UK institutional setting. The findings demonstrate that CEOs exhibiting higher levels of greed and narcissism are significantly more likely to engage in earnings management, even in firms that formally comply with established corporate governance codes. This evidence indicates that structural governance compliance alone is insufficient to constrain opportunistic financial reporting when behavioural risks at the executive level are present.  &#xD;
From a policy perspective, the results suggest that UK regulators such as the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) should move beyond a narrow focus on formal board structures and strengthen the behavioural dimension of corporate governance oversight. Specifically, governance codes and stewardship guidelines could be enhanced by encouraging greater transparency around CEO incentive intensity, power concentration, and behavioural risk indicators, particularly in firms with high discretionary reporting environments. The findings also support closer regulatory scrutiny of remuneration schemes that amplify short-term performance incentives for CEOs displaying behavioural traits associated with opportunism.  &#xD;
From a practical governance standpoint, the research provides clear recommendations for boards and nomination committees. CEO selection, evaluation, and succession planning should explicitly incorporate behavioural screening alongside traditional measures of experience and competence. Boards should apply heightened monitoring during early CEO tenure and when behavioural indicators of greed or narcissism are present, for example through stronger audit committee engagement, such as, more frequent performance reviews. Furthermore, separating the roles of CEO and chair and strengthening audit committee independence are shown to be particularly effective in mitigating the earnings management risks associated with such behavioural traits.  &#xD;
For institutional investors, especially foreign institutions with active stewardship mandates, the findings highlight the value of integrating behavioural CEO risk assessments into engagement strategies, voting decisions, and portfolio monitoring. Recognising greed and narcissism as systematic risk factors can improve stewardship effectiveness and enhance long-term investment value. Overall, this research contributes to original UK-based empirical evidence demonstrating that CEO greed and narcissism are economically meaningful drivers of earnings management, and that effective governance requires a behaviourally informed policy and monitoring approach, rather than reliance on formal compliance alone.
Description: This thesis was submitted for the award of Doctor of Philosophy and was awarded by Brunel University London</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/32836</guid>
      <dc:date>2026-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Determination of Bank Interest Rate Margins - Is There A Role for Macroprudential Policy?</title>
      <link>http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/32272</link>
      <description>Title: The Determination of Bank Interest Rate Margins - Is There A Role for Macroprudential Policy?
Authors: Davis, EP; Karim, D; Noel, D
Abstract: The advent of macroprudential policy alongside monetary policy raises the issue whether macroprudential policy has an additional effect on bank interest rate margins to that of monetary policy, and if so, whether it accentuates or offsets the interest rate effect. In light of this, we estimate combined effects of macroprudential policies and monetary policies on bank interest margins for up to 3,723 banks from 35 advanced countries over 1990-2018. In the short run, tightening of both types of policy tends to narrow the margin, while in the long run, monetary policy typically widens the margin while effects of macroprudential policies are mostly zero or positive, suggestive of countervailing action by banks. There are also significant interactions between macroprudential and monetary policy for several macroprudential policies; a tighter monetary stance is widely found to offset the negative effect of macroprudential policies on margins while a loose monetary policy leaves the negative effects intact, with potential consequences for financial stability. These results are of considerable relevance to policymakers, regulators and bank managers, not least when monetary policies are tight to reduce inflationary pressures.
Description: JEL Classification: E44, E52, E58, G21, G28.</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 01 Nov 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/32272</guid>
      <dc:date>2024-11-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Noninterest Income, Macroprudential Policy and Bank Performance</title>
      <link>http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/32271</link>
      <description>Title: Noninterest Income, Macroprudential Policy and Bank Performance
Authors: Davis, EP; Karim, D; Noel, D
Abstract: Macroprudential policies have become crucial tools for maintaining financial stability, but their effect on banks’ noninterest income has not yet been examined. This is a paradox in light of results in the literature linking noninterest income to bank performance indicators such as risk and profitability. Using a global sample of 7,368 banks over 1990-2022, we find macroprudential policies have a significant positive effect on noninterest income. Similar results are found for disaggregated samples by type of noninterest income, country development, bank size and pre and post the Global Financial Crisis, and in three robustness checks. However, the extent to which such positive effects feed through to overall profitability depends on the type of noninterest income. Furthermore, stimulus from macroprudential policies to noninterest income, and especially its nonfee component, is found to affect bank risk adversely. Our findings have important implications for central bankers, regulators and commercial bank management.
Description: JEL Classification: E44, E58, G21, G28</description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 01 Nov 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/32271</guid>
      <dc:date>2024-11-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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