http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/181 Thu, 26 Mar 2026 06:55:09 GMT 2026-03-26T06:55:09Z http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/32836 Title: Corporate governance, CEO characteristics and earnings management: Evidence from UK listed companies Authors: Jasem, Yousef A Y Abstract: This research a novel contribution by explicitly quantifying the impact of behavioural CEO traits, specifically greed and narcissism on earnings management, extending traditional agency theory to a behavioural governance framework within a UK institutional setting. The findings demonstrate that CEOs exhibiting higher levels of greed and narcissism are significantly more likely to engage in earnings management, even in firms that formally comply with established corporate governance codes. This evidence indicates that structural governance compliance alone is insufficient to constrain opportunistic financial reporting when behavioural risks at the executive level are present. From a policy perspective, the results suggest that UK regulators such as the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) should move beyond a narrow focus on formal board structures and strengthen the behavioural dimension of corporate governance oversight. Specifically, governance codes and stewardship guidelines could be enhanced by encouraging greater transparency around CEO incentive intensity, power concentration, and behavioural risk indicators, particularly in firms with high discretionary reporting environments. The findings also support closer regulatory scrutiny of remuneration schemes that amplify short-term performance incentives for CEOs displaying behavioural traits associated with opportunism. From a practical governance standpoint, the research provides clear recommendations for boards and nomination committees. CEO selection, evaluation, and succession planning should explicitly incorporate behavioural screening alongside traditional measures of experience and competence. Boards should apply heightened monitoring during early CEO tenure and when behavioural indicators of greed or narcissism are present, for example through stronger audit committee engagement, such as, more frequent performance reviews. Furthermore, separating the roles of CEO and chair and strengthening audit committee independence are shown to be particularly effective in mitigating the earnings management risks associated with such behavioural traits. For institutional investors, especially foreign institutions with active stewardship mandates, the findings highlight the value of integrating behavioural CEO risk assessments into engagement strategies, voting decisions, and portfolio monitoring. Recognising greed and narcissism as systematic risk factors can improve stewardship effectiveness and enhance long-term investment value. Overall, this research contributes to original UK-based empirical evidence demonstrating that CEO greed and narcissism are economically meaningful drivers of earnings management, and that effective governance requires a behaviourally informed policy and monitoring approach, rather than reliance on formal compliance alone. Description: This thesis was submitted for the award of Doctor of Philosophy and was awarded by Brunel University London Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/32836 2026-01-01T00:00:00Z http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/32272 Title: The Determination of Bank Interest Rate Margins - Is There A Role for Macroprudential Policy? Authors: Davis, EP; Karim, D; Noel, D Abstract: The advent of macroprudential policy alongside monetary policy raises the issue whether macroprudential policy has an additional effect on bank interest rate margins to that of monetary policy, and if so, whether it accentuates or offsets the interest rate effect. In light of this, we estimate combined effects of macroprudential policies and monetary policies on bank interest margins for up to 3,723 banks from 35 advanced countries over 1990-2018. In the short run, tightening of both types of policy tends to narrow the margin, while in the long run, monetary policy typically widens the margin while effects of macroprudential policies are mostly zero or positive, suggestive of countervailing action by banks. There are also significant interactions between macroprudential and monetary policy for several macroprudential policies; a tighter monetary stance is widely found to offset the negative effect of macroprudential policies on margins while a loose monetary policy leaves the negative effects intact, with potential consequences for financial stability. These results are of considerable relevance to policymakers, regulators and bank managers, not least when monetary policies are tight to reduce inflationary pressures. Description: JEL Classification: E44, E52, E58, G21, G28. Fri, 01 Nov 2024 00:00:00 GMT http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/32272 2024-11-01T00:00:00Z http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/32271 Title: Noninterest Income, Macroprudential Policy and Bank Performance Authors: Davis, EP; Karim, D; Noel, D Abstract: Macroprudential policies have become crucial tools for maintaining financial stability, but their effect on banks’ noninterest income has not yet been examined. This is a paradox in light of results in the literature linking noninterest income to bank performance indicators such as risk and profitability. Using a global sample of 7,368 banks over 1990-2022, we find macroprudential policies have a significant positive effect on noninterest income. Similar results are found for disaggregated samples by type of noninterest income, country development, bank size and pre and post the Global Financial Crisis, and in three robustness checks. However, the extent to which such positive effects feed through to overall profitability depends on the type of noninterest income. Furthermore, stimulus from macroprudential policies to noninterest income, and especially its nonfee component, is found to affect bank risk adversely. Our findings have important implications for central bankers, regulators and commercial bank management. Description: JEL Classification: E44, E58, G21, G28 Fri, 01 Nov 2024 00:00:00 GMT http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/32271 2024-11-01T00:00:00Z http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/32270 Title: Implementing macroprudential policy in NIGEM Authors: Carreras, O; Davis, EP; Hurst, I; Liadze, I; Piggott, R; Warren, J Abstract: In this paper we incorporate a macroprudential policy model within a semi-structural global macroeconomic model, NiGEM. The existing NiGEM model is expanded for the UK, Germany and Italy¹ to include two macroprudential tools: loan-to-value ratios on mortgage lending and variable bank capital adequacy targets. The former has an effect on the economy via its impact on the housing market while the latter acts on the lending spreads of corporate and households. A systemic risk index that tracks the likelihood of the occurrence of a banking crisis is modelled to establish thresholds at which macroprudential policies should be activated by the authorities. We then show counterfactual scenarios, including a historic dynamic simulation of the subprime crisis and the endogenous response of policy thereto, based on the macroprudential block as well as performing a cost-benefit analysis of macroprudential policies. Conclusions are drawn relating to use of this tool for prediction and policy analysis, as well as some of the limitations and potential further research. Description: JEL Classification: E58, G28. Mon, 26 Mar 2018 00:00:00 GMT http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/32270 2018-03-26T00:00:00Z