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http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/11057
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DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Vaccaro, A | - |
dc.contributor.author | Zobaa, AF | - |
dc.contributor.author | Formato, G | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2015-06-24T11:18:35Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2014-03-12 | - |
dc.date.available | 2015-06-24T11:18:35Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2014 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Electric Power Components and Systems, 42 (3-4): 408 - 417, (2014) | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 1532-5008 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1532-5016 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/15325008.2013.862328?tab=permissions#.VYqQXjZwZ9A | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/11057 | - |
dc.description.abstract | The large-scale deployment of wide-area monitoring systems could play a strategic role in supporting the evolution of traditional power systems toward smarter and self-healing grids. The correct operation of these synchronized monitoring systems requires a common and accurate timing reference usually provided by a satellite-based global positioning system. Although these satellites signals provide timing accuracy that easily exceeds the needs of the power industry, they are extremely vulnerable to radio frequency interference. Consequently, a comprehensive analysis aimed at identifying their potential vulnerabilities is of paramount importance for correct and safe wide-area monitoring system operation. Armed with such a vision, this article presents and discusses the results of an experimental analysis aimed at characterizing the vulnerability of global positioning system based wide-area monitoring systems to external interferences. The article outlines the potential strategies that could be adopted to protect global positioning system receivers from external cyber-attacks and proposes decentralized defense strategies based on self-organizing sensor networks aimed at assuring correct time synchronization in the presence of external attacks. | en_US |
dc.format.extent | 408 - 417 | - |
dc.language | eng | - |
dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
dc.publisher | Taylor and Francis | en_US |
dc.subject | Global positioning system | en_US |
dc.subject | Phasor measurement unit | en_US |
dc.subject | Radio frequency interference | en_US |
dc.subject | Wide-area monitoring systems | en_US |
dc.subject | Smart grid | en_US |
dc.title | Vulnerability analysis of satellite-based synchronized smart grids monitoring systems | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
dc.identifier.doi | http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15325008.2013.862328 | - |
dc.relation.isPartOf | Electric Power Components and Systems | - |
pubs.issue | 3-4 | - |
pubs.issue | 3-4 | - |
pubs.volume | 42 | - |
pubs.volume | 42 | - |
Appears in Collections: | Dept of Electronic and Electrical Engineering Research Papers |
Files in This Item:
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Fulltext.pdf | 178.49 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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