Fawzi al-Qawuqji’s moment in Palestine: insurgent military effectiveness and the politics of the Arab revolt, 1936–39

Abstract

When Arab military veteran Fawzi al-Qawuqji deployed to Palestine in August 1936 to command insurgents fighting British rule in the country during the Arab revolt, his military organisation and command style impressed British soldiers. He galvanised local Palestinians and supercharged the insurgency. Initially, this article argues that a charismatic, experienced commander can have a significant impact on an insurgency even though al-Qawuqji fought in Palestine for only six weeks. This examination then develops two arguments. First, al-Qawuqji stood out because other field commanders were ineffective and parochial. Second, Britain thoughtfully married military operations and policy making, facilitating al-Qawuqji’s escape from Palestine in October 1936 to effect a ceasefire. Palestinian and Arab political leaders encouraged both the ceasefire and al-Qawuqji’s departure as they were uncommitted to violent insurgency. This article emphasises the importance of unified central and local insurgent organisation. It tilts to weaknesses in Palestinian resistance, makes positive comment on Palestinian Islamist insurgent Shaykh ‘Izz al-Din al-Qassam, and concludes with how the British permitted Palestinian supreme leader Hajj Amin al-Husayni’s escape from Palestine in October 1937.