Vulnerability analysis of satellite-based synchronized smart grids monitoring systems

Abstract

The large-scale deployment of wide-area monitoring systems could play a strategic role in supporting the evolution of traditional power systems toward smarter and self-healing grids. The correct operation of these synchronized monitoring systems requires a common and accurate timing reference usually provided by a satellite-based global positioning system. Although these satellites signals provide timing accuracy that easily exceeds the needs of the power industry, they are extremely vulnerable to radio frequency interference. Consequently, a comprehensive analysis aimed at identifying their potential vulnerabilities is of paramount importance for correct and safe wide-area monitoring system operation. Armed with such a vision, this article presents and discusses the results of an experimental analysis aimed at characterizing the vulnerability of global positioning system based wide-area monitoring systems to external interferences. The article outlines the potential strategies that could be adopted to protect global positioning system receivers from external cyber-attacks and proposes decentralized defense strategies based on self-organizing sensor networks aimed at assuring correct time synchronization in the presence of external attacks.