Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/12961
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dc.contributor.authorSeligmann, M-
dc.date.accessioned2016-07-18T13:28:39Z-
dc.date.available2016-01-07-
dc.date.available2016-07-18T13:28:39Z-
dc.date.issued2016-
dc.identifier.citationWar in History, 23 (1): pp. 20 - 35, (2016)en_US
dc.identifier.issn1477-0385-
dc.identifier.urihttp://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/12961-
dc.description.abstractThis article contests Sean McMeekin’s claims concerning Russian culpability for the First World War. McMeekin maintains that Ottoman rearmament, particularly the purchase of several battleships released onto the global arms market by South American states, threatened to create a situation where the Russian Black Sea Fleet would be outclassed by its Ottoman opposite number. Rather than waiting for this to happen, the tsarist regime chose to go to war. Yet, contrary to McMeekin’s claims, the Ottoman naval expansion never assumed threatening dimensions because the Porte was unable to purchase battleships from Chile or Argentina. As a result, it provided no incentive for Russia to go to war in 1914.en_US
dc.format.extent20 - 35-
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherSAGE Publications (UK and US)en_US
dc.subjectOrigins of the first world waren_US
dc.subjectNavyen_US
dc.subjectOttoman empireen_US
dc.subjectGermanyen_US
dc.subjectBritainen_US
dc.titleKeeping the Germans out of the straits: The five ottoman dreadnought thesis reconsidereden_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0968344514550544-
dc.relation.isPartOfWar in History-
pubs.issue1-
pubs.publication-statusPublished-
pubs.volume23-
Appears in Collections:Brunel Law School Research Papers

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