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|Title:||Executive Compensation in Corporate Lobbying Firms|
|Keywords:||Corporate Lobbying;Executive Compensation;Executive Network;Company Performance|
|Abstract:||Executives’ networks and corporate lobbying affect financial performance of firms and financial performance affects executives’ compensation. However, there is a lack of evidence in the academic literature where the researchers examine the effects of executives’ network and corporate lobbying on executive compensation in existing lobbying companies. In this paper, we investigate the effects of executive networks and corporate lobbying on executive compensation in the US lobbying companies. In particular, we examine the executives’ professional and educational networks and the lobbying expenses as our dependent variables and executive compensation terms as our independent variable. We use a sample of 952 US companies with 76,981 executive-year observations from 2005 to 2015. We find a negative relationship between executives’ compensation and executive networks (professional and educational networks) in the US lobbying companies, whereas we find a positive relationship between executive compensation and corporate lobbying. Our study expends the determination of executive compensation in the US lobbying companies, where lobbying expenses is more significant than executive networks in determining executive compensation. Our study also helps the company policy makers to understand the importance of corporate lobbying in determining the executive compensation.|
|Appears in Collections:||Brunel Business School Embargoed Research Papers|
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