Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/21089
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dc.contributor.authorNandy, M-
dc.contributor.authorLodh, S-
dc.contributor.authorWang, J-
dc.contributor.authorKaur, J-
dc.date.accessioned2020-06-26T01:32:21Z-
dc.date.available2020-06-26T01:32:21Z-
dc.date.issued2020-08-10-
dc.identifier.citationNandy, M., Lodh, S., Wang, J. and Kaur, J. (2021) 'Does lobbying of firms complement executive networks in determining executive compensation?', International Journal of Finance and Economics, 26 (3), pp. 4137 - 4162. doi: 10.1002/ijfe.2008.-
dc.identifier.issn1076-9307-
dc.identifier.urihttps://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/21089-
dc.format.extent4137 - 4162 (26)-
dc.format.mediumPrint-Electronic-
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherWileyen_US
dc.rightsThis is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Does lobbying of firms complement executive networks in determining executive compensation?, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1002/ijfe.2008. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.-
dc.subjectcorporate lobbyingen_US
dc.subjectexecutive compensationen_US
dc.subjectexecutive networksen_US
dc.subjectbehavioral agency theoryen_US
dc.titleDoes lobbying of firms complement executive networks in determining executive compensation?en_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1002/ijfe.2008-
dc.relation.isPartOfInternational Journal of Finance and Economics-
pubs.issue3-
pubs.publication-statusPublished-
pubs.volume26-
dc.identifier.eissn1099-1158-
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