Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/21174
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dc.contributor.authorSchulte, E-
dc.contributor.authorFelgenhauer, M-
dc.date.accessioned2020-07-08T13:43:41Z-
dc.date.available2017-08-01-
dc.date.available2020-07-08T13:43:41Z-
dc.date.issued2016-10-06-
dc.identifier.citationSchulte, E., Felgenhauer, M. Preselection and expert advice. Int J Game Theory 46, 693–714 (2017). doi: 10.1007/s00182-016-0551-9en_US
dc.identifier.issn0020-7276-
dc.identifier.urihttp://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/21174-
dc.description"The final authenticated version is available online at https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-016-0551-9-
dc.description.abstractWe study the effects of preselection on an expert’s advice about the execution of a project if its execution yields more precise estimates about the expert’s expertise. The in troduction of a preselection stage, in which the decision maker evaluates the project before asking for advice, alters the expert’s perception of the problem. We identify conditions under which preselection occurs in equilibrium. We show that if the expert adjusts his behavior, the option to preselect may reduce the expected utility of the decision maker.-
dc.description.sponsorshipCollaborative Research Center 884en_US
dc.format.extent693 - 714-
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherSpringer Verlagen_US
dc.subjectReputationen_US
dc.subjectcheap talk.en_US
dc.subjectsafe havenen_US
dc.titlePreselection and expert adviceen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-016-0551-9-
dc.relation.isPartOfInternational Journal of Game Theory-
pubs.issue3-
pubs.publication-statusPublished-
pubs.volume46-
Appears in Collections:Dept of Economics and Finance Research Papers

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