Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/21176
Title: Bayesian Persuasion with Private Experimentation
Authors: Felgenhauer, M
Loerke, P
Keywords: Experimentation;persuasion;information acquisition
Issue Date: 25-Aug-2017
Publisher: Wiley
Citation: Felgenhauer, M. and Loerke, P. (2017). BAYESIAN PERSUASION WITH PRIVATE EXPERIMENTATION. International Economic Review, 58(3), pp.829–856. doi: 10.1111/iere.12237
Abstract: This paper studies a situation in which a sender tries to persuade a receiver by providing hard evidence that is generated by sequential private experimentation where the sender can design the properties of each experiment contingent on the experimentation history. The sender can selectively reveal as many outcomes as desired. We determine the set of equilibria that are not Pareto dominated. In each of these equilibria under private experimentation the persuasion probability is lower and the receiver obtains access to higher quality information than under public experimentation. The decision quality improves in the senderís stakes.
Description: This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Bayesian Persuasion with Private Experimentation, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12237. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.
URI: http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/21176
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/iere.12237
ISSN: 0020-6598
Appears in Collections:Dept of Economics and Finance Research Papers

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