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http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/21176
Title: | Bayesian Persuasion with Private Experimentation |
Authors: | Felgenhauer, M Loerke, P |
Keywords: | Experimentation;persuasion;information acquisition |
Issue Date: | 25-Aug-2017 |
Publisher: | Wiley |
Citation: | Felgenhauer, M. and Loerke, P. (2017). BAYESIAN PERSUASION WITH PRIVATE EXPERIMENTATION. International Economic Review, 58(3), pp.829–856. doi: 10.1111/iere.12237 |
Abstract: | This paper studies a situation in which a sender tries to persuade a receiver by providing hard evidence that is generated by sequential private experimentation where the sender can design the properties of each experiment contingent on the experimentation history. The sender can selectively reveal as many outcomes as desired. We determine the set of equilibria that are not Pareto dominated. In each of these equilibria under private experimentation the persuasion probability is lower and the receiver obtains access to higher quality information than under public experimentation. The decision quality improves in the senderís stakes. |
Description: | This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Bayesian Persuasion with Private Experimentation, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12237. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving. |
URI: | http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/21176 |
DOI: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/iere.12237 |
ISSN: | 0020-6598 |
Appears in Collections: | Dept of Economics and Finance Research Papers |
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