Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/24652
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dc.contributor.authorLodh, S-
dc.contributor.authorNandy, M-
dc.contributor.authorKaur, J-
dc.date.accessioned2022-05-31T17:22:33Z-
dc.date.available2022-05-31T17:22:33Z-
dc.date.issued2022-05-30-
dc.identifierORCID iD: Suman Lodh: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4513-1480-
dc.identifierORCID iD: Monomita Nandy: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8191-2412.-
dc.identifier.citationLodh, S., Nandy. M. and Kaur, J. (2022) 'Influence of governance bundles and directors’ social capital on cash holding in foreign cross-listed firms', International Journal of Finance and Economics, 28 (4), pp. 4271 - 4298. doi:10.1002/ijfe.2650 .en_US
dc.identifier.issn1076-9307-
dc.identifier.urihttps://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/24652-
dc.descriptionData Availability Statement: The data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.en_US
dc.description.abstractCopyright © 2022 The Authors. This paper provides new evidence on how both governance bundles and directors' social capital together can help to determine cash holdings for foreign cross-listed firms. Using a large cross-country sample of 1677 publicly listed firms from 32 countries during the period of 2004–2015, we find a positive relationship between governance bundles and cash holdings for foreign cross-listed firms with higher directors' social capital. We address potential issue of endogeneity. Therefore, our findings are robust to alternative model specifications and instrumentations and alternative measure of social capital. The findings of our study contribute to the inconclusive decision in the academic literature related to cash holdings, governance bundles, and directors' social capital, especially related to the foreign cross-listed firms. In addition, the findings can assist the stakeholders of foreign cross-listed firms to understand the intention of the firms' cash holdings and allow policy makers to identify the need of modification for governance structure by controlling the opportunistic behaviour of the firm manager.-
dc.format.extent4271 - 4298-
dc.format.mediumPrint-Electronic-
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherWileyen_US
dc.rightsCopyright © 2022 The Authors. International Journal of Finance & Economics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.-
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/-
dc.subjectgovernance bundlesen_US
dc.subjectcash holdingen_US
dc.subjectforeign cross listingen_US
dc.subjectsocial capitalen_US
dc.subjectdirectors’ networken_US
dc.subjectexcess centralityen_US
dc.titleInfluence of governance bundles and directors’ social capital on cash holding in foreign cross-listed firmsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1002/ijfe.2650-
dc.relation.isPartOfInternational Journal of Finance and Economics-
pubs.issue4-
pubs.publication-statusPublished online-
pubs.volume28-
dc.identifier.eissn1099-1158-
dc.rights.holderThe Authors-
Appears in Collections:Brunel Business School Research Papers

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