Public opinion analysis in pandemic management: an evolutionary game theory perspective

Abstract

The way the government releases information to the general public through social media is an important method of communication. Currently, such communication plays a crucial role in pandemic control and management due to the popularity of social media, and in fact, it has become an integral part of daily life. This study examines the issues related to public opinion management during a pandemic. To achieve this, it applies evolutionary game theory to analyse the factors in the information that affect public opinion in a pandemic, in particular, using payoff matrices for modelling the likely outcomes from different situation management strategies. Social media has gradually become a key platform for opinion sharing and exchange during a pandemic, so it is necessary to understand the multi-players of government, social media, and the general public in this process as well as paying attention to the strategic choices of those multi-players and their impact on public opinion. This study has developed a tripartite behaviour evolutionary game model of three players, namely, the government, social media, and the general public, and has constructed the replicator dynamic equation. The equilibrium point has been examined, and its stability has been analysed. Simulation-based evaluations have been conducted.