Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/29146
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dc.contributor.authorDavies, PHJ-
dc.date.accessioned2024-06-10T12:21:44Z-
dc.date.available2024-06-10T12:21:44Z-
dc.date.issued2024-04-25-
dc.identifierORCiD: Philip H J Davies https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3820-8862-
dc.identifier.citationDavies, P.H.J. (2024) 'Counterintelligence and escalation from hybrid to total war in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict 2014–2024', Intelligence and National Security, 2024, 39 (3), pp. 496 - 514. doi: 10.1080/02684527.2024.2329419.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0268-4527-
dc.identifier.urihttp://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/29146-
dc.descriptionThis article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.en_US
dc.description.abstractThis article examines certain counterintelligence (CI) aspects of the on-going conflict between Russia and Ukraine since 2014 in terms of key problems in current western CI concepts, doctrine and processes. It examines not only the CI threat to Ukraine during the Donbas ‘frozen war’ and 2022 invasion from the traditional CI triad of espionage, sabotage and subversion but also from Russian intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and activities supporting both irregular and regular combatants. The article concludes that a UK and allied approach to CI shaped by a two-decade security focus on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency may not be fit for purpose in a contemporary strategic environment characterized by a persistent and escalating threat from strategic peers engaged in state-supported hybrid conflict.en_US
dc.format.extent496 - 514-
dc.format.mediumPrint-Electronic-
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherRoutledge (Taylor & Francis Group)en_US
dc.rightsCopyright © 2024 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. The terms on which this article has been published allow the posting of the Accepted Manuscript in a repository by the author(s) or with their consent.-
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/-
dc.subjectRussiaen_US
dc.subjectUkraineen_US
dc.subjectcounterintelligenceen_US
dc.subjectSBUen_US
dc.subjectFSBen_US
dc.subjectFRUen_US
dc.subjectRusso-Ukraine waren_US
dc.titleCounterintelligence and escalation from hybrid to total war in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict 2014–2024en_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.date.dateAccepted2024-03-05-
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2024.2329419-
dc.relation.isPartOfIntelligence and National Security-
pubs.issue3-
pubs.publication-statusPublished-
pubs.volume39-
dc.identifier.eissn1743-9019-
dc.rights.licensehttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode.en-
dc.rights.holderThe Author(s)-
Appears in Collections:Dept of Social and Political Sciences Research Papers

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