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http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/30007Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Felgenhauer, M | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2024-10-23T14:07:22Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2024-10 | - |
| dc.date.available | 2024-10-23T14:07:22Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2024-10-05 | - |
| dc.identifier | ORCiD: Mike Felgenhauer https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9882-403X | - |
| dc.identifier | 112017 | - |
| dc.identifier.citation | Felgenhauer, M. (2024) 'Competition for publication-based rewards', Economics Letters, 244, 112017, pp. 1 - 4. doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.112017. | en_US |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0165-1765 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/30007 | - |
| dc.description | JEL classification: D82; D83. | en_US |
| dc.description | Data availability: No data was used for the research described in the article. | - |
| dc.description.abstract | This paper studies how more competition among researchers for publication-based rewards affects the quality of the publication process. Publishable results can be generated via costly informative sequential private experimentation or costly uninformative manipulation. By reducing expected rewards, competition may discourage manipulation in favor of experimentation, but not vice versa. It also reduces excessive experimentation. Both effects improve the quality of the publication process. | en_US |
| dc.description.sponsorship | This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors. | en_US |
| dc.format.extent | 1 - 4 | - |
| dc.language | English | - |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Elsevier | en_US |
| dc.rights | Attribution 4.0 International | - |
| dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ | - |
| dc.subject | experimentation | en_US |
| dc.subject | persuasion | en_US |
| dc.subject | manipulation | en_US |
| dc.subject | information acquisition | en_US |
| dc.title | Competition for publication-based rewards | en_US |
| dc.type | Article | en_US |
| dc.identifier.doi | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2024.112017 | - |
| dc.relation.isPartOf | Economics Letters | - |
| pubs.publication-status | Published | - |
| pubs.volume | 244 | - |
| dc.identifier.eissn | 1873-7374 | - |
| dc.rights.license | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode.en | - |
| dc.rights.holder | The Author | - |
| Appears in Collections: | Dept of Economics and Finance Research Papers | |
Files in This Item:
| File | Description | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FullText.pdf | Copyright © 2024 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license ( https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ). | 565.52 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
This item is licensed under a Creative Commons License
