Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/30165
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dc.contributor.authorRahman, S-
dc.date.accessioned2024-11-18T09:52:00Z-
dc.date.available2024-11-18T09:52:00Z-
dc.date.issued2024-06-26-
dc.identifierORCiD: Sheehan Rahman https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0805-7311-
dc.identifier100633-
dc.identifier.citationRahman, S. (2024) 'Has the Transparency Directive benefited the United Kingdom?', Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 56, 100633, pp. 1 - 16. doi: 10.1016/j.intaccaudtax.2024.100633.en_US
dc.identifier.issn1061-9518-
dc.identifier.urihttps://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/30165-
dc.descriptionData availability: All data used in this study are publicly available from the sources identified in the paper.en_US
dc.description.abstractPost Brexit, this study contributes to assessing the efficacy of the European Union (EU) Transparency Directive (TPD) in attaining its regulator-specified goals for the United Kingdom (UK) capital market. During its adoption in 2004, the Commission of European Communities and the UK Government argued that TPD adoption should increase firms’ financial reporting quality and investment efficiency while decreasing firms’ cost of capital and information asymmetry. Using several alternative test variables in a sample of FTSE All-Share Index firms, I find evidence consistent with these four goals following TPD adoption. Additionally, I find that firms have lower cash holdings and higher dividend payouts following TPD adoption. Most of these trends do not reverse after the 2014 TPD amendment that abolished mandatory quarterly trading updates. This is the first study to examine the association between TPD adoption and firms’ cost of capital, investment efficiency, cash holdings, and dividend payout. Collectively, my results suggest that the primary regulatory goals of the TPD are being attained in the UK. Therefore, a case can be made for the relevance of the TPD and the resulting Disclosure and Transparency Rules in UK post Brexit.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipThis research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.en_US
dc.format.extent1 - 16-
dc.format.mediumPrint-Electronic-
dc.languageEnglish-
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherElsevieren_US
dc.rightsAttribution 4.0 International-
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/-
dc.subjecttransparency directiveen_US
dc.subjectdisclosure and transparency rulesen_US
dc.subjectfinancial reporting qualityen_US
dc.subjectinformation asymmetryen_US
dc.subjectinterim management statementen_US
dc.subjectBrexiten_US
dc.titleHas the Transparency Directive benefited the United Kingdom?en_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.intaccaudtax.2024.100633-
dc.relation.isPartOfJournal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation-
pubs.publication-statusPublished-
pubs.volume56-
dc.identifier.eissn1879-1603-
dc.rights.licensehttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode.en-
Appears in Collections:Dept of Economics and Finance Embargoed Research Papers

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