Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/30181
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorMellewigt, T-
dc.contributor.authorEhrmann, T-
dc.contributor.authorDecker, C-
dc.date.accessioned2024-11-19T11:45:03Z-
dc.date.available2024-11-19T11:45:03Z-
dc.date.issued2011-02-16-
dc.identifierORCiD: Carolin Decker-Lange https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6669-9673-
dc.identifier.citationMellewigt, T., Ehrmann, T. and Decker, C. (2011) 'How Does the Franchisor's Choice of Different Control Mechanisms Affect Franchisees’ and Employee-Managers’ Satisfaction?', Journal of Retailing, 87 (3), pp. 320 - 331. doi: 10.1016/j.jretai.2011.01.001.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0022-4359-
dc.identifier.urihttps://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/30181-
dc.descriptionJEL classification: C21; M10; M13; M31.en_US
dc.description.abstractSatisfaction of franchisees and employee-managers affects the overall performance of a franchise system. We argue that different actors in the same franchise system need to be treated in different ways. The franchisor's choice of control mechanisms affects the satisfaction of franchisees and employee-managers differently. To our knowledge this is the first study that gathers primary data from franchisees and employee-managers in the same franchise system at the store level with almost identical questionnaires. We show based on data from the largest German franchise system that outcome control leads to higher satisfaction among franchisees and employee-managers, while behavior control enhances employee-managers' satisfaction. Thereby, outcome control leads to higher satisfaction among more experienced franchisees, while behavior control enhances both highly and lowly experienced employee-managers' satisfaction. Our results suggest that franchisors face a dilemma: On the one hand, behavior control is associated with high costs and has no impact on franchisees' satisfaction at all. On the other hand, it might still be necessary to prevent franchisees from behaving opportunistically. © 2011 New York University.en_US
dc.format.extent320 - 331-
dc.format.mediumPrint-Electronic-
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherElsevier on behalf of New York Universityen_US
dc.rightsAttribution 4.0 International-
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/-
dc.subjectfranchisingen_US
dc.subjectplural formen_US
dc.subjectcontrol mechanismsen_US
dc.subjectsatisfactionen_US
dc.titleHow Does the Franchisor's Choice of Different Control Mechanisms Affect Franchisees' and Employee-Managers' Satisfaction?en_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jretai.2011.01.001-
dc.relation.isPartOfJournal of Retailing-
pubs.issue3-
pubs.publication-statusPublished-
pubs.volume87-
dc.identifier.eissn1873-3271-
dc.rights.licensehttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode.en-
dc.rights.holderNew York University-
Appears in Collections:Brunel Business School Research Papers

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
FullText.pdfCopyright © 2011 New York University. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ (see: https://www.elsevier.com/about/policies/sharing).305.19 kBAdobe PDFView/Open


This item is licensed under a Creative Commons License Creative Commons