Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/31140
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dc.contributor.authorWang, C-
dc.contributor.authorLiu, Y-
dc.contributor.authorZhang, Y-
dc.contributor.authorXi, L-
dc.contributor.authorYang, N-
dc.contributor.authorZhao, Z-
dc.contributor.authorLai, CS-
dc.contributor.authorLai, LL-
dc.date.accessioned2025-05-04T17:49:58Z-
dc.date.available2025-05-04T17:49:58Z-
dc.date.issued2025-03-21-
dc.identifierORCiD: Can Wang https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5892-253X-
dc.identifierORCiD: Yuzheng Liu https://orcid.org/0009-0003-2244-0808-
dc.identifierORCiD: Chun Sing Lai https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4169-4438-
dc.identifierArticle number 135731-
dc.identifier.citationWang, C. et al. (2025) 'Strategy for optimizing the bidirectional time-of-use electricity price in multi-microgrids coupled with multilevel games', Energy, 323, 135731, pp. 1 - 12. doi: 10.1016/j.energy.2025.135731.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0360-5442-
dc.identifier.urihttps://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/31140-
dc.descriptionData availability: The data that has been used is confidential.en_US
dc.description.abstractDemand response (DR) based on the time-of-use (TOU) electricity price is an effective method for addressing the source‒load mismatch in microgrids by improving the load curve on the user side, thereby improving source‒load matching. However, the degree to which users respond to DR strategies is not only influenced by economic factors but also closely related to psychological factors. Therefore, considering the TOU electricity prices on both the generation side and the load side, this paper presents an optimization strategy for the bidirectional TOU electricity price for multi-microgrids (MMGs) coupled with multilevel games. First, the DR model based on the endowment effect is constructed with close attention to the influence of psychological factors on user behavior in the context of electric energy trading in an MMG system. A bidirectional TOU electricity pricing incentive mechanism is designed that simultaneously targets both power producers and users, promoting the active participation of various stakeholders in scheduling within MMG systems. Second, a multilevel differential game model is established, which takes power producers, microgrid operators (MGOs), and microgrid users as the main actors, couples a noncooperative game and a leader–follower game, achieves game balance by optimizing the bidirectional TOU electricity price, and makes appropriate decisions. Finally, the case study results demonstrate that the proposed strategy can optimize energy management, reduce the system's operating cost and the user's power consumption cost, and improve the power producers' economic benefit and user satisfaction.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipThis work was supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant 62233006.en_US
dc.format.extent1 - 12-
dc.languageEnglish-
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherElsevieren_US
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International-
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/-
dc.subjectmulti-microgridsen_US
dc.subjecttime-of-use electricity priceen_US
dc.subjectmultilevel gamesen_US
dc.subjectenergy managementen_US
dc.titleStrategy for optimizing the bidirectional time-of-use electricity price in multi-microgrids coupled with multilevel gamesen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.date.dateAccepted2025-03-19-
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2025.135731-
dc.relation.isPartOfEnergy-
pubs.publication-statusPublished-
pubs.volume323-
dc.identifier.eissn1873-6785-
dc.rights.licensehttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcopde.en-
dcterms.dateAccepted2025-03-19-
dc.rights.holderElsevier Ltd.-
Appears in Collections:Dept of Electronic and Electrical Engineering Embargoed Research Papers

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