Continuing Contestation of the Concept of Democracy: A Norm or a Right?

Abstract

Democracy was one of the concepts given by Gallie as contested, and the practice and articulation of the concept since Gallie wrote in the 1950s suggest the understanding of democracy as a jural concept remains disputed. Gallie’s theory of an essentially contested concept supposed there exists recognised or shared ideas of political or philosophical importance subject nonetheless to ongoing contestation as to their meaning that is not marginal. More recent scholarship has tended to affirm Gallie’s analysis of democracy, with refinements about how to articulate the extent or character of contestedness, and notwithstanding the widespread adoption of democratic systems of government after the Cold War. Held identifies over ten different conceptions as to how a democracy can be structured, while scholars also disagree about the measurement of a democratic standard whatever the structural form self-described democratic institutions may take, especially regarding the concept of participation and regarding procedural and substantive accounts of democracy (or of the quality of democracy). Scholars have also recently disputed the status of democracy as a ‘right’, in the sense of it having a normative status beyond what recognition may be given to it in particular national systems. While the notion of democracy as a right may be considered the strongest expression of its normative value, international practice, including, for example, in the EU and Council of Europe, has strengthened claims for the global normative standing of democracy beyond individual States. Taking Gallie’s concept of essentially contested concepts as a starting point, this paper considers to what extent a core normative content of the concept of democracy can be identified, including to what extent the concept overlaps or interacts with other politically and legally endorsed norms such as rights and the rule of law.