Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/4836
Title: | Auditing and property rights |
Authors: | Iossa, E Legros, P |
Issue Date: | 2004 |
Publisher: | Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The RAND Corporation |
Citation: | RAND Journal of Economics, 35(2): 356-372 (Summer 2004) |
Abstract: | Third-party audit provides incentives to an agent whose actions affect the value of an asset. When audit intensity and outcome are unverifiable, we show that with interim-participation constraints the optimal mechanism may use only the auditor's report, disregarding the agent's information. Furthermore, the auditor obtains the asset and the agent a monetary compensation, when a high asset value is reported. This suggests regulating renewable resources or utility networks by giving entrants the option to buy the right to use the asset at a predetermined price, and financially rewarding incumbents for good performance. |
Description: | This is the official published version. Copyright @ 2004 RAND |
URI: | http://www.jstor.org/stable/1593695 http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/4836 |
ISSN: | 0741-6261 |
Appears in Collections: | Economics and Finance Dept of Economics and Finance Research Papers |
Files in This Item:
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Fulltext.pdf | 491.13 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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