Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/7803
Title: | Mixed oligopoly, public firm behavior, and free private entry |
Authors: | Bennett, J La Manna, M |
Keywords: | Mixed oligopoly;Entry;Privatization |
Issue Date: | 2012 |
Publisher: | Elsevier |
Citation: | Economics Letters, 117(3), 767 - 769, 2012 |
Abstract: | We analyze a mixed oligopoly with free entry by private firms, assuming that a public firm maximizes an increasing function of output, subject to a break-even constraint. We establish an irrelevance result: whenever a mixed oligopoly is viable, then aggregate output, aggregate costs and welfare are the same with and without the public firm. However, replacing a viable mixed oligopoly with a public monopoly yields higher net welfare. Implications for privatization policy are suggested. |
Description: | © 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved |
URI: | http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/7803 |
DOI: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.08.025 |
ISSN: | 0165-1765 1545-2921 |
Appears in Collections: | Publications Dept of Economics and Finance Research Papers |
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