Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/21177
Title: | Strategic private experimentation |
Authors: | Felgenhauer, M Schulte, E |
Keywords: | Experimentation;information provision;information acquisition |
Issue Date: | 2014 |
Publisher: | American Economic Association |
Citation: | Felgenhauer, Mike, and Elisabeth Schulte. 2014. "Strategic Private Experimentation." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 6 (4): 74-105. doi: 10.1257/mic.6.4.74. |
Abstract: | We consider a model of persuasion in which an agent who tries to persuade a decision maker can sequentially acquire imperfect signals. The agent's information acquisition is unobservable and he has the option to hide unfavorable signals. Nevertheless, if the signal precision is sufficiently high , he can persuade the decision maker by revealing a sufficiently large number of favorable signals. When the number of signals that can be transmitted to the decision maker is limited , persuasion is impossible if the agent's stakes are too high. |
URI: | http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/21177 |
DOI: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.6.4.74 |
ISSN: | 1945-7669 1945-7685 |
Appears in Collections: | Dept of Economics and Finance Research Papers |
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