Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/30193
Title: Information provision and financial incentives in Catalonia's public primary care (2010–2019): an interrupted time series analysis
Authors: Esteban-Fabró, R
Coma, E
Hermosilla, E
Méndez-Boo, L
Guiriguet, C
Facchini, G
Nicodemo, C
Vidal-Alaball, J
Keywords: health policy;primary care;health economics
Issue Date: 18-Oct-2024
Publisher: Elsevier
Citation: Esteban-Fabró, R. et al. (2024) ‘Information provision and financial incentives in Catalonia’s public primary care (2010–2019): an interrupted time series analysis’, The Lancet Regional Health - Europe, Vol. 47, pp. 1 - 13. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lanepe.2024.101102.
Abstract: Background: The relative efficacy of information provision versus financial incentives in improving primary care quality remains a critical, unresolved question. We investigated these two strategies in Catalonia's public primary care system from 2010 to 2019: an innovative online platform providing real-time quality indicator information and targeted economic incentives for achieving indicator goals. Methods: We conducted a comprehensive interrupted time series regression analysis on data from 272 primary care practices (5,628,080 patients). This analysis used linear regression models with Newey–West standard errors, and a sensitivity analysis including logit transformations to address ceiling effects. We evaluated 1) immediate post-intervention changes (step changes) in indicator results and inter-practice variability (coefficient of variation, CV), and 2) shifts in pre-intervention trends (slopes). We scrutinized 39 indicators after rigorous quality control: 23 novel (12 informed, 11 incentivized) and 16 derived from existing incentivized indicators. Robustness checks included 14 consistently incentivized and 10 non-intervened indicators. Overall, we assessed 63 indicators: 18 control, 13 follow-up, 9 quaternary prevention, 7 treatment, 7 diagnosis, 6 screening and 3 vaccination indicators. Findings: Informed indicators showed positive impacts in 75% (9/12) of cases, and incentivized indicators in 64% (7/11) of cases. Incentivized indicators displayed improvements in annual trends ranging from 6.66 to 1.25 percentage points, with step changes up to 8.87 percentage points. Information led to step changes ranging from 19.67 to 1.07 percentage points, along with trend improvements between 1.09 and 0.34 percentage points annually. Both interventions were associated with step reductions in variability (up to −0.18 CV reduction) and significant trend improvements. Derived indicators showed limited improvements in results or variability (31%, 5/16), with minor step increases up to 2.22 percentage points. Interpretation: Our findings reveal that information provision alone can match or even surpass the impact of financial incentives in improving care quality and reducing practice variability. This challenges conventional wisdom and offers a cost-effective, scalable approach to primary care quality enhancement, with far-reaching implications for global health policy.
Description: Supplementary Material: https://ars.els-cdn.com/content/image/1-s2.0-S2666776224002692-mmc1.pdf
URI: https://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/30193
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lanepe.2024.101102
Other Identifiers: Article No.: 101102
ORCiD: Catia Nicodemo https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5490-9576
ORCiD: Josep Vidal-Alaball https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3527-4242
ORCiD: Roger Esteban-Fabró https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8173-3323
ORCiD: Ermengol Coma https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8000-3321
ORCiD: Eduardo Hermosilla Pérez https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3031-0304
ORCiD: Leonardo Méndez-Boo https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9215-4378
ORCiD: Carolina Guiriguet https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1201-6248
ORCiD: Gabriel Facchini https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6382-5486
Appears in Collections:Brunel Business School Research Papers

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