Development and learning at the operational level in the British and Indian armies during the second world war

Abstract

Contextualised with an examination of pre-war doctrine and military thought within both the British and Indian Armies this thesis examines doctrine, training, and selection of personnel to understand how the British and Indian Armies developed more effective ways of conducting warfare at the operational level between 1939-1945. It argues that the War Office failed to settle key doctrinal and organisational questions before the war, and subsequently failed to centralise authority over doctrine and training during the war. This meant that there was limited uniformity in doctrine and that this negatively affected the ability of the British and Indian Armies to learn and adapt together. Ultimately the War Office preferred to influence military conduct through the Military Secretary’s branch which instituted increasingly centralised control throughout the war. This thesis therefore emphasises the agency of national armies, local theatre headquarters and individual commanders in controlling their own individual courses of development over the central control of the War Office. This thesis offers a new perspective on the extent to which the armies of the British Empire worked and learned as an integrated ‘Imperial Army’ during the Second World War. Recent research has emphasised the integrated, and Imperial nature of the British, Indian and Commonwealth Armies. This especially emphasises their ability to work together, it is claimed, because of shared doctrine and staff procedures. To date, research has focused upon pre-war War Office doctrine and examination of military activity at the tactical level. This thesis has a different scope and conducts a comparative examination of the development and conduct of the operational level within the British and Indian Armies. This, therefore, studies the development of the British and Indian Armies and their doctrine at the operational level from across the world, not just that which was produced by the War Office.