Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/31238
Title: Momentum Returns and Corporate Governance
Authors: Alquraishi, A
Kartsaklas, A
Keywords: corporate governance;shareholder rights;momentum;portfolio returns
Issue Date: Sep-2024
Publisher: Brunel University of London
Citation: Alquraishi, A. and Kartsaklas, A. (2024) Momentum Returns and Corporate Governance. Uxbridge: Brunel University of London, pp. 1 - 30.
Abstract: We hypothesize that corporate governance affects, first, how a firm is perceived by investors in terms of risk, transparency, and valuation and, second, investors’ decisions to buy/sell past winning/losing stocks during good and bad times. Implementing momentum strategies on portfolios of US stocks with different corporate governance scores demonstrate that past winners and losers with weak shareholder rights exhibit significant positive excess returns during expansionary and recessionary periods, respectively. This is consistent with the return behavior of winners and losers when momentum is applied across all stocks. Overall, investors are less (more) reluctant to sell (buy) losing (winning) stocks of weak compared to strong shareholder rights companies. Results show that stocks with weak shareholder rights may be less informationally efficient and subject to biased valuations.
Description: JEL classification: G11, G12, G30, G40, G41, O16.
This is a working paper. It is not certified by peer review.
URI: https://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/31238
Other Identifiers: ORCiD: Aris Kartsaklas https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9302-8736
Appears in Collections:Dept of Economics and Finance Research Papers

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
FullText.pdfCopyright © 2024 The Author(s). This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).321.92 kBAdobe PDFView/Open
Tables.pdfCopyright © 2024 The Author(s). This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).714.31 kBAdobe PDFView/Open


This item is licensed under a Creative Commons License Creative Commons