Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/31952
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dc.contributor.authorBouaicha, MA-
dc.contributor.authorDestefanis, G-
dc.contributor.authorMontanaro, T-
dc.contributor.authorLasla, N-
dc.contributor.authorPatrono, L-
dc.date.accessioned2025-09-09T12:37:49Z-
dc.date.available2025-09-09T12:37:49Z-
dc.date.issued2025-06-03-
dc.identifierORCiD: M.A. Bouaicha https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3069-988X-
dc.identifierORCiD: Giuseppe Destefanis https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3982-6355-
dc.identifierORCiD: T. Montanaro https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1750-8268-
dc.identifierORCiD: N. Lasla https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6685-9043-
dc.identifierORCiD: L. Patrono https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8591-1190-
dc.identifierArticle number: 122374-
dc.identifier.citationBouaicha, M.A. et al. (2025) 'Shill bidding prevention in decentralized auctions using smart contracts', Information Sciences, 718, 122374, pp. 1 - 19. doi: 10.1016/j.ins.2025.122374.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0020-0255-
dc.identifier.urihttps://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/31952-
dc.descriptionData availability: The data that has been used is confidential.en_US
dc.description.abstractIn online auctions, fraudulent behaviours such as shill bidding pose significant risks. This paper presents a conceptual framework that applies dynamic, behaviour-based penalties to deter auction fraud using blockchain smart contracts. Unlike traditional post-auction detection methods, this approach prevents manipulation in real-time by introducing an economic disincentive system where penalty severity scales with suspicious bidding patterns. The framework employs the proposed Bid Shill Score (BSS) to evaluate nine distinct bidding behaviours, dynamically adjusting the penalty fees to make fraudulent activity financially unaffordable while providing fair competition. The system is implemented within a decentralized English auction on the Ethereum blockchain, demonstrating how smart contracts enforce transparent auction rules without trusted intermediaries. Simulations confirm the effectiveness of the proposed model: the dynamic penalty mechanism reduces the profitability of shill bidding while keeping penalties low for honest bidders. Performance evaluation shows that the system introduces only moderate gas and latency overhead, keeping transaction costs and response times within practical bounds for real-world use. The approach provides a practical method for behaviour-based fraud prevention in decentralised systems where trust cannot be assumed.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipMohamed Abdelhai Bouaicha is currently the beneficiary of a Ph.D. research grant partially funded by the Italian Ministerial Decree No. 352/2022 – PNRR, Mission 4, Component 2, “From Research to Enterprise” – Investment 3.3. “Introduction of innovative doctoral programs that respond to the needs of enterprises and promote the recruitment of researchers from enterprises” – an innovative doctoral scholarship with an industrial focus. This research was also partially funded by the Apulian Italian Region within the project “INVISIBLE BUSINESS - EXPONENTIAL TECHNOLOGIES FOR INVISIBLE BUSINESSES” under the Regional Operational Programme “P.O. PUGLIA FESR 2014–2020 – Asse I – Obiettivi specifici 1a Azione 1.1 Sub-Azione 1.1.b – Regolamento Regionale del 30 settembre 2014, n. 17 e s.m.i. – Titolo II – Capo 2 – Art. 26 – PROGRAMMI INTEGRATI DI AGEVOLAZIONE – PIA MEDIE IMPRESE”, funded through the “Atto Dirigenziale” n.686 – 20/09/2021.en_US
dc.format.extent1 - 19-
dc.format.mediumPrint-Electronic-
dc.languageEnglish-
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherElsevieren_US
dc.rightsCreative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International-
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/-
dc.subjectblockchainen_US
dc.subjectsmart contractsen_US
dc.subjectonline auctionsen_US
dc.subjectfraud preventionen_US
dc.subjectshill biddingen_US
dc.subjectmalicious biddersen_US
dc.titleShill bidding prevention in decentralized auctions using smart contractsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.date.dateAccepted2025-05-28-
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ins.2025.122374-
dc.relation.isPartOfInformation Sciences-
pubs.publication-statusPublished-
pubs.volume718-
dc.identifier.eissn1872-6291-
dc.rights.licensehttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode.en-
dcterms.dateAccepted2025-05-28-
dc.rights.holderThe Authors-
Appears in Collections:Dept of Computer Science Research Papers

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