Thinking as mental model-building: a Piagetian-cum-mechanistic explanation of the 'engram'

Abstract

Piaget (like Skinner) appears to deny the relevance or possibility of describing thought in mechanistic terms. Nevertheless, this paper attempts to outline one way in which this might be done for Piaget's concepts. Three domains or "worlds" are considered (following both Piaget and Popper); Reality and the senses, thought proper, and a symbolic domain (divided into [a] internal, and [b] external). Within the second domain are linear codings (pre-set but changeable) which can comprise "schemes" when activated synchonously in sufficient numbers. Non-linear schemes and schemata are explicable in tems of "sub-programming" and "cross-referencing". Elementary units for schemata may be scheme-elements (or ensembles of them) which have become more or less permanently stabilized due to their self-sustaining cross-references. These inhabit the symbolic domain ("world 3a").